The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur War in Israeli Society

CHARLES S. LIEBMAN

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 arouses an uncomfortable feeling among Israeli Jews. Many think of it as a disaster or a calamity. This is evident in references to the War in Israeli literature, or the way in which the War is recalled in the media, on the anniversary of its outbreak. 1 Whereas evidence ofthe gloom is easy to document, the reasons are more difficult to fathom. The Yom Kippur War can be described as failure or defeat by amassing one set of arguments but it can also be assessed as a great achievement by marshalling other sets of arguments. This article will first show why the arguments that have been offered in arriving at a negative assessment of the War are not conclusive and will demonstrate how the memory of the Yom Kippur War might have been transformed into an event to be recalled with satisfaction and pride. 2 This leads to the critical question: why has this not happened? The background to the Yom Kippur War, the battles and the outcome of the war, lend themselves to a variety of interpretations. 3 Since these are part of the problem which this article addresses, the author offers only the barest outline of events, avoiding insofar as it is possible, the adoption of one interpretive scheme or another. In 1973, Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, fell on Saturday, 6 October. On that day the Egyptians in the south and the Syrians in the north attacked Israel. The attack came as a surprise. The question of why Israel was surprised, should it have been surprised, and who was to blame for the surprise is a matter of debate, but it is beyond dispute that war found the Israeli public as well as the army unprepared. In the first few days the Israeli army suffered 'heavy' losses and was forced to retreat along both fronts. On the third day, Israel launched a counter attack on the southern front which failed. However, the tide of the war turned in the early days of the second week. Within two weeks the Israeli army had advanced into enemy territory inflicting heavy casualties on the Egyptians, encircling one of its armies, although it never dislodged the Egyptian army from the Sinai desert, and advancing in the north to within artillery range of Damascus. A cease fire was declared on 22

Middle Eastern Studies, Vo1.29, No.3, July 1993, pp. 399-418 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 400 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES w~en ~)llnt~ October 22 at the insistence of both the United States and the Soviet War of Independence at a time the fifth its size during the Yom KIppur ar. Union and a separation of forces agreement was eventually signed with · ry Furthermore, U the active intervention of then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. celebrated in Israe1 1 memo. 1" thl dence there were no civilian casua tIes m p~n 'dthat the loss of life is measured ag mIght respon . ted to the War of Independell The outcome Impu . D ' THE YOM KIPPUR WAR A FAILURE: THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT the outcome of the SIX ay the State an d . h . ny h . . f the West Bank WIt Its rna The mention of the war in the press and in popular books and articles (hberatlOn) 0 1 hich contains the suggest the following reasons, not necessarily in order of importance, for eastern part of Jerusa edm w Yom Kippur . t is impute t 0 the . recalling it as a calamity.4 ~~~~~~;:eli society co~ld ~ve, ;e~~:p;~l~:~ 1. The great number of casualties. having brought p~ace. WIth gyp. uestion al 2. The loss of territory which followed the conclusion of the war. make this connectIon IS part of the q 3. The surprise nature of the attack, contrary to the expectations of the ne ative associations, not the answer.. military and political elite. This, it might be argued has two conse­ ~ith re ard to the surrender of terntory ar; quences. First, it destroyed public confidence in the leadership and War it is t~ue, resulted in the surrendfeSr.of~h;~ undermined the public's sense of security. Secondly, it minimized a .' W r But the surrender 0 mal <: sense of victory that might have followed the conclusion of the war. ~~~~ E:y~t and Isra:l, a tr:a%:~~~~~:: The fear and trepidation that preceded the Six Day War (the June, Israelis acclaimefd. ~rt~:r~~~ed States, ced 1967 war), enhanced the sense of victory. In the case of the Yom under pressure ro . . h < Kippur War, the country felt secure before its outbreak so there was Yet that war is not overlaId WIt a" capture d . . ent the less cause to be grateful at its successful completion. With respect to the surpnse argum. ' 4. The inability of Israel to achieve a crushing military victory stemmed factor in weakening public confid~nce 10 the ~ from the intervention of the superpowers. This demonstrated Israeli data on Israeli public opinion pnor to ~d I~ dependence (impotence) and points to the conclusion that Israel can Public confidence in the gov~rnmen~i:;:g never defeat its enemies decisively; hence it will always be subject to steadily deteriorating f~ll~wmr ~e blic di security threats. Yom Kippur War a maJo.n~~ 0 "t e pu sh b~e; Analyzed, one by one, the arguments are not overwhelming. However, of Israel's military invincIbIhty ?ad Yom Kippur War did lower publIc con ene each of them has at least a surface credibility. When added together, it any~ay. might be argued, they explain why the war is recalled as less than a confidence had been declining On . t on the public's confidence 10 the n victory. But they don't account for the feeling of despair, or disaster that Israeli society associates with the Yom Kippur War. :t~~ the Six Day War, the pUb.l~c ~~n~~~~ war and therefore, had no trepl a 1 . . With regard to the casualties argument - whether there were or were Sl:a~ not a great number ofcasualties depends on a number offactors including Octobe:, the same was true of the although Israelis only learned later ho b expectations with regard to casualties, the period of time in which the . h try there was a pu casualties took place, and other, even more subjective judgements. In a overrunmng t e coun, . II gOl~g newspaper column written less than a month following the war, an astute few days that the War was not we . eral sense of relief as Israel s ,army Israeli observer noted that the number of casualties is not sufficient to gen h I the mood of the Israehs can. account for the prevailing 'atmosphere of dejection'.5 Less than 3,000 Nevert e ess, . d' 7 f the first week and reached Its na lr on _ soldiers died in the Yom Kippur War. Slightly over 600 soldiers died in o . for those who died in the war, t the Six Day War which Israelis considered the most glorious victory in mourmng their history. Over 6,000 Israelis are presumed to have died in the 1948 been declared." MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 401 lce of both the United States and the Soviet rforces agreement was eventually signed with War of Independence at a time when the country's population was one­ ~hen US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. fifth its size during the Yom Kippur War. But that war is widely celebrated in Israeli memory. Furthermore, unlike the War of Inde­ pendence, there were no civilian casualties in the Yom Kippur War. One might respond that the loss of life is measured against the fruits of victory. FAILURE: THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT The outcome imputed to the War of Independence is the establishment of the State and the outcome of the Six Day War was the occupation . the press and in popular books and articles (liberation) of the West Bank with its many holy places, especially the os, not necessarily in order of importance, for eastern part of Jerusalem which contains the Western Wall. No great achievement is imputed to the Yom Kippur War. But, we will argue iualties. below, Israeli society could have, retrospectively, credited the War with <:h followed the conclusion of the war. having brought peace with Egypt. The reluctance of Israeli society to e attack, contrary to the expectations of the make this connection is part of the question about why the War arouses :e.. This, it might be argued has two conse­ negative associations, not the answer. oed public confidence in the leadership and With regard to the surrender of territory argument - the Yom Kippur :sense of security. Secondly, it minimized a War, it is true, resulted in the surrender of the Sinai desert captured in the 1t have followed the conclusion of the war. Six Day War. But the surrender of Sinai was part of the peace treaty that preceded the Six Day War (the June, between Egypt and Israel, a treaty which the overwhelming majority of =sense of victory. In the case of the Yom Israelis acclaimed. Furthermore, the 1956 war in Sinai ended with Israel, felt secure before its outbreak so there was under pressure from the United States, ceding all the territory it had .t its successful completion. captured. Yet that war is not overlaid with a sense of tragedy or despair. chieve a crushing military victory stemmed With respect to the surprise argument, the importance of the surprise ~e superpowers. This demonstrated Israeli factor in weakening public confidence in the state's elite is undermined by .nd points to the conclusion that Israel can data on Israeli public opinion prior to and in the aftermath of the War. ~cisively; hence it will always be subject to Public confidence in the government, though not the military, had been steadily deteriorating following the Six Day War" whereas even after the ~uments are not overwhelming. However, Yom Kippur War a majority of the public did 'not believe that the "myth rface credibility. When added together, it of Israel's military invincibility" had been shattered'. 7 In other words, the Yom Kippur War did lower public confidence in the political elite but that It why the war is recalled as less than a I for the feeling of despair, or disaster that confidence had been declining anyway. On the other hand, it had little Ihe Yom Kippur War. impact on the public's confidence in the military. While it is true that unlike the Six Day War, the public did not anticipate the outbreak ofthe !i argument - whether there were or were depends on a number offactors including war and, therefore, had no trepidations about its consequences before 6 §ualties, the period of time in which the October, the same was true of the Sinai War in 1956. Furthermore, =-, even more subjective jUdgements. In a although Israelis only learned later how close the enemy had come to overrunning the country, there wa~ a public perception during the first :han a month following the war, an astute -number of casualties is not sufficient to few days that the War was not going well. This should have resulted in a osphere of dejection'.5 Less than 3,000 general sense of relief as Israel's army reversed the tide of battle. Nevertheless, the mood of the Israelis continued to decline from the end .. War. Slightly over 600 soldiers died in considered the most glorious victory in of the first week and reached its nadir on 7 November, the national day of mourning for those who died in the war, two weeks after a cease fire had !i are presumed to have died in the 1948 been declared.x

J~ 402 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR . r War was not mythologized, Finally, with respect to the argument that the War demonstrated Israeli why the Yom dKelfPePa~s and thereby transformed in. impotence, this was not the first war whose outcome suggested that Israel in the case 0 f , could never inflict a blow of such magnitude on its enemies that they Israelis. could no longer threaten its security. It was no secret that even in the Six Day War the army's northern command was alloted a minimal amount of Contemporary Political Myth th once used exclusively to refer t() time to capture the Golan Heights before the Security Council imposed a The term my , . d' d increa~ cease-fire on Israel. Furthermore, the Six Day War remained the excep­ originated in the cl~ssical peno '~s ~~:'s discu. tion to all Israeli wars. That victory alone generated a belief that Israel ry socIety. Henry u . conte~pora 13 th is a dramatic narratiVe a had achieved some permanent security. The Sinai War was surely a prime especIally usefh~\. ~y 1 which functions to assist example of how the results of a brilliant military victory could be erased calor pseudo- Istonca , . M th im (; through superpower pressure. in .0rderingdtheirthPr::::~~x::~~~:~iy i~comp~~ Other reasons might be offered to explain the sense of gloom as­ HIstory an my ., h' t r'­ · the very process of wntmg IS 0 J' sociated with the Yom Kippur War. It has been suggested that the create myt h m b pseudc problem is not the outcome ofthe War, but the great failure ofthe protest h' h the myth recounts may e ~vents.w ICe case of contemporary myth, the nal movement following the war. Yaacov Hasdai has written that the hkely, m th h'ch did occur - selects, • humiliating failure of the protest movement, its inability to formulate a to a series of events WI. . d' t' ctIVe manner. positive program or to produce a leadership was more troubling than these events m a IS m 'd . '131 sl~m other aspects of the war. 9 Eva Etzioni-Halevy has described this protest A reservation with respect to thIS an . movement which arose as soon as large numbers of soldiers had been the term 'dramatic narrati.ve'. Tdhe eXt~:st~~nc; th But thIS nee no released from active service following the conclusion of the Yom Kippur form to t h e my· f ents A dramatic I War. lO The protest movement, she observes, was related to general overarching structur.e 0 evor ~ore forms, b1. grievances, but it was precipitated: from this stru~ture m one th Lincoln did nc canonical verSIOn of the my . H inaugural.a~dress. by the alleged failures of the government in handling the war ... Civil War in his second te; What was especially resented was that no cabinet members or investing it with mea~ing, by exPlam:~;~~~rda; senior officials were willing to assume responsibility for the failures which American socIety had. to pa~, h Am thl~ thmne~~i~h and to resign their posts. 11 sin of slavery. Following oU w() t d in dramatIc for now be recoun e with the Emancip But there is no evidence that the general Israeli public, outside certain ~egro e~:~~:e;oe~~~~~:;:may be no narrati'­ marginal political and academic circles, shared Hasdai's concern about y Vlctt.or but rather different stories connecte the failure of the protest movements. If so, the outcome of the Yom en uety , f h myth as Ion Kippur War or at least the failure of the protest movements should have ture. These stor~es are part o. t ~ses. The H. left a long-term impact on Israeli morale, but Etzioni-Halevy, relying on the meaning WhICh the myth l~~rom the mal public opinion data reports that this is not the case. 12 Israeli version, can be dedu~e Holocaust. 14 ": It might be argued that the reason why the War is recalled with such about and commemorate t ~ f s wi" unhappiness is a combination of some or all of the factors already within Israeli society i~ a va:I~ty ~~li~:;ews suggested. That may be true but the combination, by itself, does not the myth - the destructIOn 0 SIX ~l ve th while the world did nothmg to sa render the arguments any more convincing. The claim of this essay is not Europe 'ptas a S' that the public does not accept one or more or even all these arguments, tion that Jews have n,o secunty exce or even that, as indicated above, they do not have at least surface land. One could recIte the myth as a d~a~ d' this form in school texts. The pom , credibility. The claim here is that there is no convincing case for any of foun m .' . b t whether there them. But even if the arguments were persuasive we must still explain narrative eXIsts m reahty, u MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 403 • the argument that the War demonstrated Israeli .he first war whose outcome suggested that Israel why the Yom Kippur War was not mythologized, as frequently happens w of such magnitude on its enemies that they in the case of defeats, and thereby transformed into a source of pride for its security. It was no secret that even in the Six Israelis. ~ern command was alloted a minimal amount of Contemporary Political Myth I Heights before the SecUrity Council imposed a lermore, the Six Day War remained the excep­ The term myth, once used exclusively to refer to a class of stories which hat victory alone generated a belief that Israel originated in the classical period, is used increasingly with reference to Ilent security. The Sinai War was surely a prime contemporary society. Henry Tudor's discussion of myth seems :s of a brilliant military victory could be erased especially useful. 13 Myth is a dramatic narrative of critical events, histori­ iure. calor pseudo-historical, which functions to assist the individual or society e offered to explain the sense of gloom as­ in ordering their present experience. Myth imposes meaning on events. ~ppur War. It has been suggested that the History and myth are not necessarily incompatible. The historian may ~ of the War, but the great failure of the protest create myth in the very process of writing history. On the other hand, the ~,War. Yaacov Hasdai has written that the events which the myth recounts may be pseudo-history. But more than trotest movement, its inability to formulate a likely, in the case of contemporary myth, the narrative - though referring 'duce a leadership was more troubling than to a series of events which did occur - selects, organizes, and interprets ~a Etzioni-Halevy has described this protest these events in a distinctive manner. ~n as large numbers of soldiers had been A reservation with respect to this and similar definitions is the use of tfollowing the conclusion of the Yom Kippur the term 'dramatic narrative'. The expression suggests a fixed narrative form to the myth. But this need not be the case. Myth refers to some .1 !.lent, shed observes, was related to general IpItate : overarching structure of events. A dramatic narrative can be inferred ::' from this structure in one or more forms, but there need not be any Ifof the government in handling the war ... canonical version of the myth. Lincoln did not recite the events of the h:sented was that no cabinet members or Civil War in his second inaugural address. He mythologized the war by lting to assume responsibility for the failures investing it with meaning, by explaining the terrible loss of life as the price ••11 which American society had to pay, in accordance with God's will, for the ~T" sin of slavery. Following this outline, the American Civil War myth can .at the general Israeli public, outside certain now be recounted in dramatic form which would begin with the story of rRic circles, shared Hasdai's concern about Negro enslavement and end with the Emancipation Proclamation and the nrements. If so, the outcome of the Yom victory of the North. There may be no narrative version of the myth, in its Jure of the protest movements should have entirety, but rather different stories connected to the overarching struc­ ilOIi morale, but Etzioni-Halevy, relying on ture. These stories are part of the myth as long as they serve to reinforce !tat this is not the case.12 the meaning which the myth imposes. The Holocaust myth, at least in its reason why the War is recalled with such Israeli version, can be deduced from the manner in which Israelis speak 14 o of some or all of the factors already about and commemorate the Holocaust. The Holocaust is projected but the combination, by itself, does not within Israeli society in a variety of forms which point to the meaning of : convincing. The claim of this essay is not the myth - the destruction of six million Jews and ofJewish life in Eastern one or more or even all these arguments, Europe while the world did nothing to save them is conclusive demonstra­ nve, they do not have at least surface tion that Jews have no security except as a sovereign nation in their own lat there is no convincing case for any of land. One could recite the myth as a dramatic narrative and it can be Its were persuasive we must stilI explain found in this form in school texts. The point, however, is not whether the narrative exists in reality, but whether there is a narrative structure to the THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 404 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES . the victim'S tJ Holocaust in the minds of those who speak about the events or act on the victim's.fat~; it. also i~~~:~~;y the power 0: basis of their understanding of these events. tion, bnng10g 1Otl~' 1 and social reality t 't wn po It!ca In studying myth, therefore, the scholar may have to provide the flesh onto I.S 0 If_understanding as a Cl and bones of the very narrative which he seeks to explore. Such an which It comes to se enterprise is not without its problems but this merits a separate essay. . h as already noted, is 1 A political myth is a myth whose referent (subject matter) is political Thp- central Israeh myt, 'ng in the death 0 and/or whose consequences are political (it reorders contemporary politi­ ff t to find meam reflects the e or . h l'f1 in Eastern and Cel cal experiences). Myth is of special importance in the case of defeat or destruction of J~WIS 0 :ccasion mythological ~ some other national catastrophe. Victory or success requires little defeats or tragedIes:IS f r the Zionist settlers explanation. It affirms a society's belief in itself, it generates self confi­ most impor~a~\of~o~~eth~se cases, ostensible dence, confidence in the society's leaders and in its norms and values. and Tel~Ha1. n s a source of inspiration, c Those who might have suffered in the achievement of the success are been re10terpreted a. ortant of all, as purpc comforted by the fact that their suffering and sacrifice contributed to the legitimacy, and mo~t ~mp n true of the Holoe ·' in ThIS IS eve 1 achievement. But defeat, tragedy and national catastrophe challenge a not dIe 10 va . d ofthat event. Ont society's self-confidence, its belief in itself, its leaders and its values. It deny the en~rmoustrageat~eastin part, by asS threatens everyone with loss of ultimate meaning, especially those who the victims IS honoredd' nl'tude But there allele mag . 'sacrificed' the most. It seems to pose one of two alternatives. Either tragedy 0 f unpar . denied ultimate s destiny and fortune, if not justice itself, is on the side of the 'other', the involved. The enemy 11S their dignity or pr have never 0 st . 'enemy', the forces that were victorious, or there is no pattern or meaning reported t0 d _ 'I believe wIth coml to events and reality is built on sands of accident and chaos. Both ness would be restore . 'the victim h h he tarnes , explanations are destructive of social and personal order. Hence, it is no will come even t oug hambers _ and mo surprise that some of our most important myths and mythological for­ on their way to the ga~ ~ om their death - tt mulations refer to events that appear to be defeats or might be inter­ great good has e~e~~:tio~ of Zionism, that preted as defeat but are affirmed, through the myth, as actually being a Israel and the v1O~1I el Furthermore, soc victory of some sort. Martin Jaffee, in an article that discusses the outside the l~nd ~ r~r\o' the values shared mythologization of the Holocaust, describes this pattern in more general heroism and 10 fi elY terms. those who li~e. t of each myth and th Victimization ... is easily thematized in memory and story as a The narratIve conten t deal about the sc myths relate tells us a grea . hardly S\l moment of victory. That is, when transformed by the religious dd d But one IS imagination into myth, the experience of victimization can confer a become embe ~. s Henry Rosenberg kind of holiness and power upon the victim. In stories constructed mythic constructIOn. ~h death of Saul al around the murder of the innocent victim, for example, each the biblical story of f ~ nidas and the b: retelling reconstructs the original moment of the victim's destruc­ Herodotus' account 0 I eo Rosenberg pc< tion and transformation. In such stories the victim is always both Persians at Th~rm?py ~~lsh modern Gr victim and victor, always destroyed but always reborn in a form that English, Scand1O.avlan, to help illumio: and American ,hteratu:: against the Si, overcomes the victimizer ... Not incidentally, the chief beneficiary nd George Custer ~ last s I then about 1 of that empowerment is the community, which views itself as the ua historical witness to the victim's degradation and transcendence, There is noth1Og unus t' Wh~t is surp the Holocaus . the historical body that, in its own life, preserves the memory of and or Masad a or h' ch lend themselve relives the moment of degradation and transfiguration. By telling or a series of ~vents Wn~ calamity. This se and retelling the story of the victim, the community of victimization in terms of dIsa~te~ a embered in Ism not only memorializes the victim and stands in solidarity with the Kippur War as It IS rem MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 405 of those who speak about the events or act on the lding of these events. victim's fate; it also shares in the victim's triumph and transforma­ :refore, the scholar may have to provide the flesh tion, bringing into its history the power of its myth and mapping narrative which he seeks to explore. Such an onto its own political and social reality the mythic plot through It its problems but this merits a separate essay. which it comes to self-understanding as a community of suffering. IS llyth Whose referent (subject matter) is political ,ces are political (it reorders contemporary politi­ ThP- central Israeli myth, as already noted, is the Holocaust. The myth is of special importance in the case of defeat or reflects the effort to find meaning in the death of six million Jews and the :ttastrophe. Victory or success requires little destruction of Jewish life in Eastern and Central Europe. But lesser society's belief in itself, it generates self confi­ defeats or tragedies also occasion mythological formulations - among the :. society's leaders and in its norms and values. most important of these for the Zionist settlers in Palestine were Masada ;uffered in the achievement of the success are and Tel-Hai. 16 In both these cases, ostensible defeats and failures have 1 their SUffering and sacrifice contributed to the been reinterpreted as a source of inspiration, as a bestowal of territorial • tragedy and national catastrophe challenge a legitimacy, and most important of all, as purposeful. Those who died did j~ belief in itself, its leaders and its values. It not die in vain. This is even true of the Holocaust. No effort is made to -oss of ultimate meaning, especially those Who deny the enormous tragedy of that event. On the contrary, the memory of eems to pose one of two alternatives. Either the victims is honored, at least in part, by associating their death with a l,justice itself, is on the side of the 'other', the tragedy of unparalleled magnitude. But there is more than tragedy that is :i:e victorious, Or there is no pattern or meaning involved. The enemy is denied ultimate satisfaction, the fallen are !>oilt on sands of accident and chaos. Both reported to have never lost their dignity or pride or belief that righteous­ ~c; of social and personal order. Hence, it is no ness would be restored - 'I believe with complete faith that the Messiah fJPost important myths and mythological for­ will come even though he tarries', the victims are reported to have sung ijIat appear to be defeats or might be inter­ on their way to the gas chambers - and most significantly of all, some fP;med, through the myth, as actuaUy being a great good has emerged from their death - the emergence of the State of ffin Jaffee, in an article that discusses the Israel and the vindication of Zionism, that is, the futility of Jewish life (.;~ust, describes this pattern in more general outside the land of Israel. Furthermore, society has learned a lesson in heroism and in fidelity to the values shared by those who fell as well as asily thematized in memory and story as a those who live. bat is, When transformed by the religious The narrative content of each myth and the particular lessons which the ~ the experience of Victimization can confer a myths relate tells us a great deal about the society in which the myths have »vee upon the Victim. In stories constructed become embedded. But one is hardly surprised at the enterprise of f the innocent victim, for example, each mythic construction. As Henry Rosenberg notes,11 it is at least as old as ls le original moment of the victim's destruc­ the biblical story of the death of Saul and Jonathan. It is found in 1. In such stories the victim is always both Herodotus' account of Leonidas and the battle of the Greeks against the sdestroyed but always reborn in a form that Persians at Thermopylae. Rosenberg provides similar examples from :r ... Not incidentaUy, the chief beneficiary English, Scandinavian, Welsh, modern Greek, Serbian, French, Scottish ; the community, which views itself as the and American literature to help illuminate his case study of General victim's degradation and transcendence, George Custer's last stand against the Sioux Indians. n its own life, preserves the memory of and There is nothing unusual, then, about the mythologization of Tel-Hai egradation and transfiguration. By telling or Masada or the Holocaust. What is surprising is when a seeming victory the victim, the community of victimization or a series of events which lend themselves to mythologization is recalled e victim and stands in solidarity with the in terms of disaster and calamity. This seems to be the case of the Yom Kippur War as it is remembered in Israeli society.

.. THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 406 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES . . . e of war, becomes a central . THE MYTHOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR especially m t~~ which the intellectuals who leaders, a tas m h 'bes of society's high Cl There are at least three related paradigms that are available in mytholo­ roducers as well as t e scn . h b ~ole Ifthe loss of life has no mealllng~ then t e gizing the Yom Kippur War: the Purim paradigm, the bravery paradigm, th 'f t nd all members of the Soclety ar~ and the consequences paradigm. com or a . b the attnbut chaos. This is overcome, m pallrt t~e 'myth of t1': h t George Mosse has ca e d The Purim Paradigm ~~~h ~~ o~~~ aof the fallen soldiers leads some The holiday of Purim celebrates the salvation of Persian Jews recorded in . been achieved. In addltlOn, we . the biblical book of Esther. The story is of an imminent threat to Jewish ~~~~~~; particular soldiers by retelling t~~he;~: life and the nullification of that threat through what might appear to be . and bravery. The bravery 0 natural but the believer knows to be miraculous means. The ultimate of herOlsm. . ts it honors the society wh­ then achlevemen , . for which tb victory of the Jews, therefore, signals both Jewish power of sorts as well sanctifies the values of the s~clety. as the help of God who is the source of that power. The paradigm's emphasis on the immediate threat to Jewish existence and miraculous de~~ea~r~~~;y:~i~~r~~~\::~i~~:~nu::::o~~ttl~ salvation from the threat, sometimes but not always accompanied by the d celebrated before the war humiliation of the Jews' enemies, recurs throughout the Middle Ages. :~~;o~st~~~a: re::~~~t:~~~::~;,e~~~~~' Collective memory manipulates sacred history, as Lucette Valensi notes, are innovatlon, but .the w bered in that ligl by appropriating 'the great tradition and ground[ing] it in local context' .19 Independence, lS not remem Local Jewish communities, relived the Purim paradigm in their own experiences and commemorated the anniversary of the event with local The Consequences Paradigm . variations of the Purim celebration. The Encyclopaedia Judaica lists 100 b 1977 Egyptian presldent PI such 'special Purims' the earliest of which dates from 1191 in Champagne, On 19 Novem er David talks a few me The visit led to the Cam~ d 26 March 1 France and the latest in 1878 from Vidin, Bulgaria. 20 treaty with Egypt was Slgn~e ~;eaty as ope The Yom Kippur War contains all of the elements of the Purim we~co~ed ~e~bors. paradigm. It might be argued that secular Israeli society's historical Israelis the Short of tha relations wlth lts.A~ab ~elgthe most formidabl memory is so dim and its distance from the tradition so great that it has a . t d as chmmatmg limited capacity to formulate contemporary events in classical Jewish m~erpre e 1 ce for Middle East observers molds. 21 But why did the religious public fail to mythologize the War in It lS commonp a t in the events t1 as an import~~~o~p~~;~ar, in other wor terms of the Purim paradigm? Interestingly, even the haredim (sing: acc~rds. haredi) , the ultra-Orthodox and ostensibly anti-Zionist community which T::ar whic:resulted in a peace tr' zatlOn as f'dable threat to ISfi constitute roughly one-third of the religious public, did do so with respect provided the most orml .d' h to the Six Day War,22 Furthermore, they acknowledged that miracles had whatever cost Israel might have pal m 23 taken place in the Yom Kippur War. Yet they refused to portray the deemed worthwhile. , K Yom Kippur War in accordance with the Purim paradigm - a step which The potential for interpretmg th~ Yom would have turned the event into one with very positive rather than in order to obtam peace pre~ negative associations. Israel had to pay I l's current conclusion of the war. srae ce treaty books written before the pea I d The Bravery Paradigm 'b d the war as the possible pre u e descn e 'nly beca This is the most self-evident of the paradigms. Loss of human life, Moshe Dayanargued that It was 0 'U' g 1 Yom Kippur War that he was WI;; . particularly of young people, is deemed unnatural and it begs for inter­ ' to the terms of the Camp aVI pretation. The imposition of meaning upon the loss of many lives, accor dmg MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 407 POTENTIAL OF THE YOM KlPPUR WAR especially in time of war, becomes a central task of every society's ;related paradigms that are available in mytholo­ leaders, a task in which the intellectuals who are among the major :Var: the Purim paradigm, the bravery paradigm, producers as well as the scribes of society's high culture, playa prominent aradigm. role. Ifthe loss of life has no meaning, then the bereaved remain without comfort and all members of the society are threatened by conceptual chaos. This is overcome, in part, by the attribution of purpose to death, ~brates by what George Mosse has called the 'myth of the war experience'. 24 The the salvation of Persian Jews recorded in death of the fallen soldiers leads to some outcome that would not have er. The story is of an imminent threat to jewish otherwise been achieved. In addition, we console ourselves about the )f that threat through what might appear to be deaths of particular soldiers by retelling the event of their death as a saga :knows to be miraculous means. The ultimate of heroism and bravery. The bravery of the fallen not only celebrates fore, signals both Jewish power of sorts as well their achievements, it honors the society which produced them and is the Source of that pOwer. The paradigm's sanctifies the values of the society for which they were prepared to face lte threat to jewish existence and miraculous death and for which they did their utmost. sometimes but not always accompanied by the The bravery of Israeli soldiers on the battlefields of the Yom Kippur :nemies, recurs throughout the Middle Ages. War was already celebrated before the war had ended. Particular epi­ dates sacred history, as Lucette Valensi notes, sodes of the war are recalled as instances of great courage, fortitude and tradition and ground[ing] it in local context'. 19 innovation, but the war in its entirety, unlike, for example, the War of -, relived the Purim paradigm in their own Independence, is not remembered in that light. Irated the anniversary of the event with local ~bration. The Encyclopaedia Judaica lists 100 The Consequences Paradigm -/iestofwhich dates from 1191 in Champagne, On 19 November 1977 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Israel. 78 from Vidin, BUlgaria. 20 The visit led to the Camp David talks a few months later. A formal peace contains all of the elements of the Purim treaty with Egypt was signed on 26 March 1979. The vast majority of lIed that secular Israeli society's historical Israelis welcomed the peace treaty as opening a new era in Israeli tance from the tradition so great that it has a relations with its Arab neighbors. Short of that, the peace with Egypt was te contemporary events in classical Jewish interpreted as eliminating the most formidable threat to Israel's security. igious public fail to mythologize the War in It is commonplace for Middle East observers to see the Yom Kippur War :m? Interestingly, even the haredim (sing: as an important component in the events that led to the Camp David ,nd ostensibly anti-Zionist community which accords. The Yom Kippur War, in other words, lends itself to mythologi­ )fthe religious public, did do so with respect zation as a war which resulted in a peace treaty with the country which more, they acknowledged that miracles had 23 provided the most formidable threat to Israel's existence. In that case, )ur War. Yet they refused to portray the whatever cost Israel might have paid in human life could have been Ice with the Purim paradigm _ a step which deemed worthwhile. t into one with very positive rather than The potential for interpreting the Yom Kippur War as the price which Israel had to pay in order to obtain peace has been available since the conclusion of the war. Israel's current president Chaim Herzog, in two books written before the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, 25 of the paradigms. Loss of human life. described the war as the possible prelude to peace. In a 1980 article, s deemed unnatural and it begs for inter­ Moshe Dayanargued that it was only because of Sadat's setback in the meaning upon the loss of many Jives, Yom Kippur War that he was willing to discuss peace with Israel according to the terms of the Camp David agreement. 26 In November, 408 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

f life.29 As Eliezer Schweid put it, .'the great 1990, five Israelis were killed and 25 wounded by an Egyptian military d policeman near the Egypt-Israel border. Describing the incident on ~onger hoped became reali~i~s' and, 10 the wor Israeli television, Israel's foreign minister David Levy commented on the like unto them that dream . fact that Israel had fought a bloody war in order to secure a peace treaty Within a few years the dream had shatt~red. with Egypt. This presumably made the absence of proper security and the new self-image generated b~ the SIX D~ 27 . t . Israel was left with a reahtytotally dl. arrangements by the Egyptians all the more reprehensible. But state­ SOCle y 10 I . p' ments of this sort are unusual. The question is why are they so unusual? Israeli society. Israelis felt themse ves mc~ c Why does Israeli society not remember the war as a case of 'miraculous' romise which the Six Day War had engen e p . t d wl'th the Yom Kippur War, therefore salvation, by human if not by divine hand, in which the courageous assoCIa e d ft' Israelis achieved, against great odds and by dint of self-sacrifice, a narrate the Yom Kippur War as a e ea IS military victory which resulted, a few years later, in a peace treaty with distortion of reality because the successfu~.conc Egypt? subsequent outcome were significant aC leveI romise of the Six Day War ge~erated t h e nel ~lose the circle which begins With .the June. V defeat excuses Israeli societ~ its fallure to l~:: THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AS FAILURE: THREE EXPLANATIONS June war by suggesting that It. was ~he prom false. Only further study can lllu~lllnate t~~:f My argument is that the Yom Kippur War has been mythologized but not a~Ong.whlch in a manner that students of myth would have anticipated. It has been when this came about, segm .. how deep into Israeli society It reached, an:. mythologized into a myth of defeat. I suggest three explanations for this. affec~e They are not mutually exclusive and are offered as hypotheses which whom it never affected or may have II merit study rather than conclusions based upon extensive research. All this is very much related to the next pomt. are based on the assumption that if Israeli society insists on viewing the Completing the Reintegration into Jewis~ H~i Yom Kippur War in negative terms then we ought to ask about the The Six Day War strengthened ~he JeWIsh lC function which that view serves. secular Zionist vision which dommated Isr~el through the first two decades of statehoo l~ . J w The Israe 1 The Shattered Promise of the Six Day War different than the dlaspora e . Three weeks of growing tension and acute concern for Israel's security referred to the term Jew, a further m~asu ~onal conceptions), understood thebJel.wlshd~ preceded the June 1967 war. The lightning victory of the Israeli forces, . . d e leve the total destruction of the Egyptian air force and the rout of its land than a religious collectiVIty, an . f forces, the capture of Ramat HaGolan from the Syrians, but especially Jewish state had transformed themsel~es _ the acquisition of territory with deep historical associations, the old city normal nation. This image b~gan t~ dechne I of Jerusalem in particular, generated a sense of euphoria ar,nong Israeli War marks a dramatic turmng P?mt. IS~~~ Jews and a new set of perceptions and expectations about Israel. Socio­ 'nk of themselves as linked to dIas~ora . th1 ..'h J sh reh· logist Zvi Sobel has suggested that these perceptions and expectations reaffirm their aSSOCiatiOnS Wit eWI. i involved three major realms of life - Israeli security (Israel no longer had But there is a paradox about the. SIX ~ay to fear military threats from its neighbors), aliya (the expectation that reintegration of Israeli Je~ish SOCl~ty mto masses of diaspora Jews would flock to Israel), and economic prosperity There is no historical JeWish paradigm, cer resulting from large scale economic investment from abroad. But beyond tion of the second Temple 2,~OO year~ the specific realms in which Israelis anticipated change, a new self-image o timism generated by the SIX Day 2 p. the Purim paradigm iIIustrat emerged - that of a self-sufficient Israel, capable of any achievement. ' If enemies, as . be d ate of the Jew IS to e not an entirely new Israel, it was an Israel which had reached a new stage temporary. The f MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 409 killed and 25 wounded by an Egyptian military ypt-Israel border. Describing the incident on of life. 29 As Eliezer Schweid put it, 'the great things for which we no ; foreign minister David Levy commented on the longer hoped became realities' and, in the words of the Bible, 'we were It a bloody war in order to secure a peace treaty like unto them that dream'.JQ Imably made the absence of proper security Within a few years the dream had shattered. The hopes, expectations yptians all the more reprehensible. 27 But state­ and the new self-image generated by the Six Day War dissipated. Jewish Jsual. The question is why are they so unusual? society in Israel was left with a realitytotally dissonant with the myth of not remember the war as a case of 'miraculous' Israeli society. Israelis felt themselves incapable of living up to the lot by divine hand, in which the courageous promise which the Six Day War had engendered. The sense of defeat t great odds and by dint of self-sacrifice, a associated with the Yom Kippur War, therefore, resolved the tension. To ulted, a few years later, in a peace treaty with narrate the Yom Kippur War as a defeat is not only a myth but a distortion of reality because the successful conclusion of the War and the subsequent outcome were significant achievements. But the frustrated promise of the Six Day War generated the need for a myth of defeat to close the circle which begins with the June War of 1967. The myth of .S FAILURE: THREE EXPLANATIONS defeat excuses Israeli society its failure to live up to the promise of the 1m Kippur War has been mythologized but not June war by suggesting that it was the promise of that victory which was of myth would have anticipated. It has been false. Only further study can illuminate the details of whether, how and If defeat. I suggest three explanations for this. when this came about, among which segments of the population it began, ;lusive and are offered as hypotheses which how deep into Israeli society it reached, and whether there were groups lclusions based upon extensive research. All whom it never affected or may have affected in a different manner. All of In that if Israeli society insists on vieWing the this is very much related to the next point. tive terms then we ought to ask about the :rves. Completing the Reintegration into Jewish History The Six Day War strengthened the Jewish identity of Israeli Jews. The secular Zionist vision which dominated Israeli Jewish society prior to and eSix Day War through the first two decades of statehood was of an Israeli Jew totally lsion and acute concern for Israel's security different than the diaspora Jew. The Israeli Jew (the term Hebrew was . The lightning victory of the Israeli forces, preferred to the term Jew, a further measure of alienation from tradi­ Egyptian air force and the rout of its land tional conceptions), understood the Jewish people to be a national rather l HaGolan from the Syrians, but especially than a religious collectivity, and believed that those who lived in the ith deep historical associations, the old city Jewish state had transformed themselves from a pariah people into a ~nerated a sense of euphoria aJ.llong Israeli normal nation. This image began to decline in the late 1950s, but the 1967 tions and expectations about Israel. Socio­ War marks a dramatic turning point. Israeli Jews once more began to :d that these perceptions and expectations think of themselves as linked to diaspora Jews and Jewish history, and to 3 If life - Israeli security (Israel no longer had reaffirm their associations with Jewish religious symbols. \ its neighbors), aliya (the expectation that But there is a paradox about the Six Day War as a turning point in the :l flock to Israel), and economic prosperity reintegration of Israeli Jewish society into Judaism and Jewish history. omic investment from abroad. But beyond There is no historical Jewish paradigm, certainly none since the destruc­ 'aelis anticipated change, a new self-image tion of the second Temple 2,000 years ago, to describe the kind of ~nt Israel, capable of any achievement. 2" If optimism generated by the Six Day War. Jews might defeat their :is an Israel which had reached a new stage enemies, as the Purim paradigm illustrates, but the victory is always temporary. The fate of the Jew is to be despised by the non-Jew and to

.. THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 410 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES lk of their followers with the gen( f the bu suffer thereby, because the non-Jew is more powerful than the Jew. The cerns o· . f rO~e th1~77 se 0' metaphor most frequently invoked within the tradition to describe the are increasingly indistingUishable I development was accelerated by t h. condition of the Jewish people in the world is 'the lamb among seventy nationalist government especially s~mp~ et~ wolves'. Jews have no recourse other than the help of God. The only ower But the tendencies are to be oun ~u appropriate strategy for Jews to adopt, besides fulfilling God's will and ~ecog~ition by haredi writers of the gr~at VlctO~ beseeching Him for mercy, is to behave with great caution in worldly the Six Day War.}4 Amongst haredlm, ~ew, matters. There is no room for pride and least of all for confidence. There . 'ty the object of Genttle ersecuted mmon , .. . is no way in which the victory of the Six Day War, the display of Israeli P . d I b the miracles of Dlvme mter might, the conquest of territory, the subjugation of the Palestinians, and sustame on Y y .. Yom Kippur War facilitated the mtegratlo~ 0 the supreme confidence in the future could be squared with historical tion of Jewish history a~d reinforced hare~l C( Jewish paradigms. The single most influential leader.of haredl Jev Two segments of the Israeli-Jewish public were untroubled by this . d that the suffering which resulted f emphaSlze f h . paradox - the unregenerate Jewish secularists who continued to feel total . . J that they must repent 0 t elf S IS a sign to ews h· . tb alienation from the Jewish tradition and had no need to fit contemporary e who argue that t IS IS developments into some historical Jewish paradigm, and the ultra­ observan.t Thos h Redemption, according to Rav Schacb' w;rt~: nationalist religious messianists who believed that the victory in the Six of the War and misleading Jews a .o~ Day War signaled the imminence of Divine redemption, as a conse­ Another haredi writer was mor~ exphclt ab~ quence of which traditional historical paradigms were no longer ap­ the Six Day War and the Yom Klppur.War. plicable. 32 But one might have expected that the largest segment of the he claims, Jews deceived themselve~ mt~ be~ public would be troubled, if only at the unconscious level, by the theirs rather than the result of God s he.p. contradiction between the reintegration of Israel into the stream of . bl' ded by dangerous pretensIons Jewish history and the seeming transformation of history wrought by the pubhcwere 10 Six Day War. The Yom Kippur War, viewed as a defeat, represents the forced Jews to ask: final step in the reintegration of Israel into traditional Jewish historical Why all this suffering? Why ?oes the!~ paradigms. This explanation is especially applicable to the religious e suffering? Little by htt purpose 0 f th (1 sector. the search for the right pat~, an~ ~rae The Yom Kippur War as the integration of Israel into Jewish history is to return to Judaism until ~ntlre mSI illuminated by comparisons between the Yom Kippur War and the number of Israeli penitents mcreased Holocaust. The Holocaust, within many segments of Israeli society, is understood as the inevitable outcome of life in 'exile', a fulfillment of the In other words, it is the suffering wh.ich r( Zionist conception of Jewish life in the absence of a Jewish state. Hence, War, rather than the exultation followmg t1: any analogy between the Holocaust and events within Israel challenges a which reminds Jews about the.true nature ~ basic Zionist tenet but does affirm the Jewish normalcy of Israel. Com­ fortunes of the state of Israel mto the regnc parisons between the Holocaust and the Yom Kippur War were common Jewish history. in the period immediately following the war. They are almost unheard of today for reasons which will become clear in the following section. The continuing appropriation of the Yom Kippur War as a mode for integrat­ THE MEHDAL AS A MYTH OF REASSUR. ing Israeli society into the stream of 'normal' Jewish history is most evident among haredi elements. There is no question that the Israeli.army • Although the ultra-Orthodox segment ofthe Israeli Jewish population, War victorious. But equally clear ~ th:t the haredim, are charged with antagonism to the state, their political some leaders, Minister of Defense os e leaders have adopted an increasingly pragmatic attitude" and the con- MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 411 the non-Jew is more powerful than the Jew. The cerns of the bulk of their followers with the general welfare of the society Itly invoked within the tradition to describe the are increasingly indistinguishable from those of other Israeli Jews. This people in the world is 'the lamb among seventy development was accelerated by the 1977 election that brought a recourse other than the help of God. The only nationalist government especially sympathetic to religious concerns to Jews to adopt, besides fUlfilling God's will and power. But the tendencies are to be found much earlier as was evident in rey, is to behave with great caution in worldly recognition by haredi writers of the great victory which Israel enjoyed in n for pride and least of all for confidence. There the Six Day War. 34 Amongst haredim, Jews are perceived to be a ctory of the Six Day War, the display of Israeli persecuted minority, the object of Gentile hatred, physically weak, rritory, the subjugation of the Palestinians, and sustained only by the miracles of Divine intervention. The myth of the in the future could be squared with historical Yom Kippur War facilitated the integration of Israel into their concep­ tion of Jewish history and reinforced haredi conceptions of that history. Israeli-Jewish public were untroubled by this The single most influential leader of haredi Jewry, Rabbi Eliezer Schach, te Jewish secularists who continued to feel total emphasized that the suffering which resulted from the Yom Kippur War 1 tradition and had no need to fit contemporary is a sign to Jews that they must repent of their sins and become religiously historical Jewish paradigm, and the ultra­ observant. Those who argue that this is the suffering that precedes anists who believed that the victory in the Six Redemption, according to Rav Schach, were distorting the true message lminence of Divine redemption, as a conse­ of the War and misleading Jews about their obligation to repent.35 Ilal historical paradigms were no longer ap­ Another haredi writer was more explicit about the connection between lave expected that the largest segment of the the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Following the Six Day War, I, if only at the unconscious level, by the he claims, Jews deceived themselves into believing that the victory was ~ reintegration of Israel into the stream of theirs rather than the result of God's help. 'The leaders and the broad Iling transformation of history wrought by the public were blinded by dangerous pretensions ...'36 The Yom Kippur War ppur War, viewed as a defeat, represents the forced Jews to ask: on of Israel into traditional jewish historical on is especially applicable to the religious Why all this suffering? Why does the Jew always suffer? What is the purpose of the suffering? Little by little these thoughts awakened the integration of Israel into Jewish history is the search for the right path, and [Israeli Jews] began, little by little s between the Yom Kippur War and the to return to Judaism until entire institutions were built and the within many segments of Israeli society, is number of Israeli penitents increased. 37 outcome of life in 'exile', a fulfillment of the I life in the absence of a jewish state. Hence, In other words, it is the suffering which resulted from the Yom Kippur locaust and events within Israel challenges a War, rather than the exultation following the victory of the Six Day War, affirm the Jewish normalcy of Israel. Com­ which reminds Jews about the true nature of reality and which merges the ust and the Yom Kippur War were common fortunes of the state of Israel into the regnant paradigms of the nature of lowing the war. They are almost unheard of Jewish history. become clear in the following section. The ~e Yom Kippur War as a mode for integrat­ ,tream of 'normal' jewish history is most ItS. THE MEHDAL AS A MYTH OF REASSURANCE

)x segment of the Israeli Jewish population, There is no question that the Israeli army emerged from the Yom Kippur :h antagonism to the state, their political War victorious. But equally clear is that, in the early days of the War ~asingly pragmatic attitude33 and the con- some leaders, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan foremost alpong them, 412 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR dents skirted the issue and refused to admit tb believed that the destruction of the state was a real possibility. 38 It would also appear that, were it not for the American arms that were rushed to they made it clear that war and insecurity wen Israel, the Arab armies might have prevailed.39 Although these arms, in decision to emigrate. He observes that: effect, offset the Soviet arms with which the Egyptians and Syrians had The 1973 war led to the rise of feeling of been liberally supplied both before and during the war, the fact remains ent~rpris that the Yom Kippur War demonstrated that the state of Israel is not a long-term survivability of the secure haven for Jews. Its security is precarious, its survival dependent certain morbidity, a kind of socIetal I u~on.the support of a g~eat power. This contradicts the central message of mortality.45 Zlomsm, a message reInforced by the Holocaust myth, that there is no This suggests that the contradiction betweel secure place for J~ws except in their own land where, unlike everywhere suppre~sl else, they are an Independent self-sufficient people. In other words, the experience of the Yom Kippur War is denying concern over the threat of destructlo Yo~ Kippur War threatened this central message and myth of Israeli socIety. unconscious level and is resolved by mytholog The work of Claude Levi-Strauss has sensitized students of society to as a mehdal. Mehdal is the term most often associated wi1 the. role of myth in 'mediat[ing] contradictions or opposition as ex­ penenced by men'40 by posing significant contradictions and then resolv­ association that dates to November 1973, if I 4 translatable. Some Israeli authors, writing in 1 ing them. ! The question is, why are these contradictions posed and Hebr~w resolved through myth, that is, in analogical terms, rather than in logical original Hebrew. The Alkalai Englis. or causal terms. The answer may be that the contradictions or dilemmas 'omission' or 'oversight'. A mehdalls somett are too frightening or challenging for society to confront directly. The bad but not, in and of itself, a major catastl conscious confrontation would require the surrender of some other might be 'shortcoming'. The sentence 'the societal norm or value. Therefore, like dreams, the contradictions are rendered as 'something went wrong'. But, as cloaked in symbol. Myths present reality in symbolic form. The act of Dictionary suggests, what went wrong was. m o~ o~mss representation is a form of catharsis and representation in symbolic form not having done something, an error commls~lon. conceals from our consciousness the full horror of the contradiction. something wrong, an error of Hence, the resolution ofthe contradiction is also symbolic. Myth does not The association of the term mehdal WIth th great deal about how the War is rememben ~rovide a rational resolution to the contradiction but this is no problem recalled as something which went wrong, yel s~nce. the contradiction is only projected symbolically. Indeed, the resolu­ tIOn IS of only secondary importance to the more important function of alludes to the possibility that under diff' the myth - the unconscious relief offered by the symbolic representation different circumstances, things might have c of the dilemma. the heart of the Yom Kippur War myth. Israelis refuse to accept the obvious implications of the Yom Kippur mehdal can reconcile the threat which the­ basic premises of Zionism with continuing a· War at the conscious level. A 1975 survey reported that only 17 per cent of Israeli Jews harbored a fear that the state would be destroyed. 42 Only This is especially evident if we recall tt weeks after the war ended, a random sample of adult Israeli Jews found associated with the Yom Kippur War in the the vast majority denying that 'the myth of Israel's military invincibility of 'earthquake' .47 Unlike a mehdal, an earth had been shattered'. They affirmed that the Israeli army could, if event of frightening dimensions, one that one that man can do nothing to prevent a ne~essary, .repel .an ~ggressor. singlehandedly.43 Most interesting of all, ZVI Sobel, IntervIewIng IsraelIs on the verge of emigrating from Israel in knows about in advance, he ought to flee The term mehdal suggests that somethir 1980.reported th~t 'notwithstanding the shock and upset of the 1973 war, rare IS the IsraelI who would suggest the possibility of serious defeat in wrong is rectifiable. It might have been tt! future wars, at least aloud'.44 But,-whereas Sobel reports that his respon- time or over-confidence or some other '!' MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 413 !on ofthe state was a real possibility.38 It would dents skirted the issue and refused to admit their deep feelings of fear, lot for the American arms that were rushed to 39 they made it clear that war and insecurity were potent elements in their :ight have prevailed. Although these arms, in decision to emigrate. He observes that: oms with which the Egyptians and Syrians had lh before and dUring the war, the fact remains The 1973 war led to the rise of feeling of doubt with respect to the -demonstrated that the state of Israel is not a long-term survivability of the enterprise, the development of a security is precarious, its survival dependent certain morbidity, a kind of societal growth of intimations of power. This contradicts the central message of mortality. 45 Iced by the Holocaust myth, that there is no ,t in their own land where, unlike everywhere ~nt This suggests that the contradiction between Zionist ideology and the self-sufficient people. In other words, the experience of the Yom Kippur War is suppressed at the conscious level by led this central message and myth of Israeli denying concern over the threat of destruction. But it resurfaces at the unconscious level and is resolved by mythologizing the Yom Kippur War i-Strauss has sensitized students of society to as a mehdal. at[ing] contradictions or opposition as ex­ Mehdal is the term most often associated with the Yom Kippur War, an ng significant contradictions and then resolv­ association that dates to November 1973, if not earlier.46 It is not easily S, why are these contradictions posed and translatable. Some Israeli authors, writing in English, use the word in the is, in analogical terms, rather than in logical original Hebrew. The Alkalai Hebrew English Dictionary translates it as . may be that the contradictions or dilemmas ~nging 'omission' or 'oversight'. A mehdal is something that happened which is for society to confront directly. The bad but not, in and of itself, a major catastrophe. The best translation luld require the surrender of some other might be 'shortcoming'. The sentence 'there was a mehdal' is best :refore, like dreams, the contradictions are rendered as 'something went wrong'. But, as the Alkalai Hebrew English resent reality in symbolic form. The act of Dictionary suggests, what went wrong was more likely the result of one's Itharsis and representation in symbolic form not having done something, an error of omission, rather than having done ~mess the full horror of the contradiction. something wrong, an error of commission. :ontradiction is also symbolic. Myth does not The association of the term mehdal with the Yom Kippur War tells us a to the contradiction but this is no problem great deal about how the War is remembered. It tells us that the War is -projected symbolically. Indeed, the resolu­ recalled as something which went wrong, yet did not have to go wrong. It I(>rtance to the more important function of ~lief alludes to the possibility that under different perhaps even slightly offered by the symbolic representation different circumstances, things might have come out much better. This is ~ the heart of the Yom Kippur War myth. Because only the myth of a obvious implications of the Yom Kippur mehdal can reconcile the threat which the Yom Kippur War raised to 1975 survey reported that only 17 per cent basic premises of Zionism with continuing adherence to Zionist ideology. r that the state would be destroyed. 42 Only This is especially evident if we recall that a second metaphor was random sample of adult Israeli Jews found associated with the Yom Kippur War in the first few years, the metaphor l 'the myth of Israel's military invincibility of 'earthquake'.47 Unlike a mehdal, an earthquake is by definition a major 3ffirmed that the Israeli army could, if event of frightening dimensions, one that is embedded in nature itself, singlehandedly.43 Most interesting of all, one that man can do nothing to prevent and in the face of which, if he :s on the verge of emigrating from Israel in knows about in advance, he ought to flee. nding the shock and upset of the 1973 war, The term mehdal suggests that something went wrong, but what went mggest the possibility of serious defeat in wrong is rectifiable. It might have been the wrong leaders at the wrong ut,.whereas Sobel reports that his respon- time or over-confidence or some other 'shortcoming', or o.mission, or

... 414 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR oversight but it is not inherent in Zionist ideology or the nature of the Security Council call for a cease fire because, '\1 Jewish state. The term mehdallocates the key to the interpretation of the was of primary importance'.52 . War in the surprise attack and the story of how the Israeli army eventually Herzog's narrative cloaks the threat Whlcl overcame the surprise. In fact, the use of the term mehdal reinforces premises of Zionism. But the residue offears Zionist ideology which emphasizes activity rather than passivity, doing fear for the viability of the Jewish state, the rea rather than responding. The error of the Yom Kippur War, therefore, places in the world for the Jew than in I~rae becomes the fact that Israel did not do enough, in this case properly Israeli sovereignty depends on the goodWill 0 evaluating and assessing intelligence information about the enemy and remains present in the minds of Israeli Jews. T then acting on the basis of that information. War cannot be recalled as an achievement () The term mehdal suggests the narrative structure of the Yom Kippur What the myth of the mehdal does is to pern War myth. This structure, at least in quasi-narrative form, is implicit in object of these fears and of the real cause for Chaim Herzog's radio broadcasts during the first month of the war, and the War. subsequently published as a book.48 Herzog notes in his introduction that the Yom Kippur War was: NOTES A glorious war of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the Israeli soldier who, despite the mistakes, the faulty assessments and the I am grateful to Robert Paine, Bernard Susser and Stuar shortcomings [mehdalim] had the spiritual strength, the courage, earlier version of this paper. the capacity for innovation and the spirit of sacrifice to overcome a 1. Note, for example, the recollection of the Yom Kip~­ beginning which is the worst Israel has ever known. The moment of newspaper in 1990. The country's most popular lyn surprise and despair, the bravery, the resourcefulness, the suffering column of verse in the paper. On the seventeen~~ a~n he devoted his column to 'the shock, the humiliatia and the pain and the death joined together in a mighty effort that death' wrought by the war. 'The house was saved,' ~f turned a dangerous situation into a glorious military victory that, if the fire.' Two other articles deal with the war and Its not for the intervention of the great powers, would have been war widow since her husband's death in 1973 and I large number of soldiers who suffered from battle.-s decisive. were minimized and casualties who were treated In Sept. 1990, 'Yom Kippur S~cti(.m'~. A year late~ He concludes the introduction with an observation that does not seem to (eighteen is a number of speCial slgmficance to Jew_ make any sense. He notes that the maturity, the intelligence and the stories of the War and its aftermath along the sam fortitude which the nation as a whole as well as the army displayed under 2. Such efforts have been made including, most recentl on the fifteenth anniversary of the death of David El: conditions which would have perplexed other nations 'are the legiti­ the Yom Kippur War. Elazar resigned in the wake c mation of Zionism and of all the efforts invested in the state of Israel ... '49 which held him responsible for Israel's lack of 1= The only way I can understand this remark is Herzog's unconscious program was devoted to Elazar's success in the YOI war as a great victory. The battery of for.~er gener!: response to his own sense that the War has undermined the basic Zionist public who appeared on the program pralsmg Elazal thesis. Herzog's narrative also responds to the problem of Israeli depen­ at least among the former militar~ elite there a~e m; dence on the United States. Massive American aid to Israel is interpreted as a success. Their failure to convmce the Israeli put a worthy topic of study. as an effort to foil the Soviet Union. The initial Egyptian success is not 3. In the preface to one of his t~.o bo~ks on the war, ( only attributable to a mehdal but to the active role of the Soviets, partners former commander of Israeli mteiligence (now Pre' in Egypt's 'machiavellian plan whose purpose was not only to deceive us the most impressive military victory in Israeli his Atonement (Jerusalem: Edanim, Yediot Aharonot but the entire western world'. 50 American intervention, therefore, be­ army colonel Yaacov Hasdai, who se:~ed in the wa­ came necessary for the sake of the West, not for the sake of Israel. It is, admits is shared by political and military leaders according to Herzog, a turning point in halting Soviet imperialism. 51 argues that Egypt won the war and the Israelis who defend the establishment against the mass protest Finally, although Herzog acknowledges that the superpowers would not changes in Israeli society. Yaacov Hasdai, The Ir have allowed Israel to win a decisive victory anyway, Israel accepted the 1983), pp.25-35, 40. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 415 erent in Zionist ideology or the nature of the Security Council call for a cease fire because, 'weighing the price, in sons, "dallocates the key to the interpretation of the was of primary importance'.52 'lOd the story of how the Israeli army eventually Herzog's narrative cloaks the threat which the War raises to basic I fact, the use of the term mehdal reinforces premises of Zionism. But the residue of fears which the War raised, the ,phasizes activity rather than passivity, doing fear for the viability of the Jewish state, the realization that there are safer "he error of the Yom Kippur War, therefore, places in the world for the Jew than in Israel, and the knowledge that :leI did not do enough, in this case properly Israeli sovereignty depends on the goodwill of at least one superpower, ,telligence information about the enemy and f that information. remains present in the minds of Israeli Jews. That is why the Yom Kippur War cannot be recalled as an achievement or remembered with pride. .ts the narrative structure of the Yom Kippur What the myth of the mehdal does is to permit the masking of the real at least in quasi-narrative form, is implicit in object of these fears and of the real cause for the gloom associated with Idcasts during the first month of the war, and the War. I book. 48 Herzog notes in his introduction that

~ IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the Israeli NOTES :he mistakes, the faulty assessments and the I am grateful to Robert Paine, Bernard Susser and Stuart Cohen for their comments on an lim] had the spiritual strength, the courage, earlier version of this paper. ation and the spirit of sacrifice to overcome a worst Israel has ever known. The moment of 1. Note, for example, the recollection of the Yom Kippur War in Israel's most widely read newspaper in 1990. The country's most popular lyricist, Haim Hefer, writes a regular he bravery, the resourcefulness, the suffering column of verse in the paper. On the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the war jeath joined together in a mighty effort that he devoted his column to 'the shock, the humiliation, the disappointment as fierce as uation into a glorious military victory that, if death' wrought by the war. 'The house was saved,' he writes, 'but we still see the signs of the fire.' Two other articles deal with the war and its outcome. One relates the life of a on of the great powers, would have been war widow since her husband's death in 1973 and the second reminds readers of the large number of soldiers who suffered from battle-shock, numbers whose dimensions were minimized and casualties who were treated inadequately. (Yediot Aharonot, 28 )n with an observation that does not seem to Sept. 1990, 'Yom Kippur Section'). A year later, on the eighteenth anniversary that the maturity, the intelligence and the (eighteen is a number of special significance to Jews), the daily papers were filled with stories of the War and its aftermath along the same lines. .a whole as well as the army displayed under 2. Such efforts have been made including, most recently, a television documentary shown tie perplexed other nations 'are the legiti­ on the fifteenth anniversary ofthe death ofDavid Elazar, the Israeli chiefofstaff during the Yom Kippur War. Elazar resigned in the wake of a government commission report the efforts invested in the state of Israel ... '49 which held him responsible for Israel's lack of preparedness. A good part of the :tand this remark is Herzog's unconscious program was devoted to Elazar's success in the Yom Kippur War and it portrayed the it the War has undermined the basic Zionist war as a great victory. The battery of former generals, names well known to the Israeli :0 responds to the problem of Israeli depen­ public who appeared on the program praising Elazar and his achievements, suggest that at least among the former military elite there are many with a stake in recalling the war .1assive American aid to Israel is interpreted as a success. Their failure to convince the Israeli public of their case remains, therefore, : Union. The initial Egyptian success is not a worthy topic of study. but to the active role ofthe Soviets, partners 3. In the preface to one of his two books on the war, Chaim Herzog, military analyst and former commander of Israeli intelligenci: (now President of Israel), labeled the war as n whose pUrpose was not only to deceive us the most impressive military victory in Israeli history (Chaim Herzog, The War of i'.50 American intervention, therefore, be­ Atonement (Jerusalem: Edanim, Yediot Aharonot edition, in Hebrew, 1975). Retired )f the West, not for the sake of Israel. It is, army colonel Yaacov Hasdai, who served in the war, dismisses this argument which he admits is shared by political and military leaders across t~e political spectrum. He ling point in halting Soviet imperialism. 1/ argues that Egypt won the war and the Israelis who claimed otherwise only sought to nowledges that the superpowers would not defend the establishment against the mass protest movements which demanded basic lecisive victory anyway, Israel accepted the changes in Israeli society. Yaacov Hasdai, The Iron Pen (Jerusalem: Kvutzat Laor, 1983), pp.25-35, 40. 416 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

4. I am presently engaged in a study to determine how widely each of these arguments or 26. Moshe Dayan, 'Footnotes in the Wake of the Yom KiJ= others have indeed been evoked, by which segments of the population and in which Sept. 1980, 'Erev Succot Supplement', in Hebrew). period since 1973. 27. This televised appearance by Levy is cited from memor: was the original trigger for this research project. 5. TJ.1e ~olumn was .~ritten by Shlomo Avineri and is reprinted in his book Essays on ZIOnism and Politics (Jerusalem: Keter, in Hebrew, 1977), p.83. 28. Zvi Sobel, Migrants From the Promised Land (New I 1986), pp.24-38. 6. Louis Guttman and Shulamit Levy, 'The Home Front', Encyclopaedia Judaica Year F~llC Book 1974, pp.88-91. 29. Jay Gonen, 'The Israeli Illusion of Omnipotence of Psychohistory, Vol.6 (Fall, 1978), pp.241-71, CIte! 7. Ibid., p.91. b~ 8. Ibid., p.88. Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine (16June, 1967) 9. Hasdai, op. cit., p.50. the title 'A New State Has Emerged'. According to 10. Eva Etzioni-Halevy with Rina Shapiro, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and St~te und~rwent it~ Integration Among Israeli Jews (New York: Praeger, 1977). It may be said that the Jewish 11. Ibid., p.1l7. and its bar-mitzva [rituals associated With reach. 12. Etzioni-Halevy, op. cit., p.188. Today it has achieved its majority. Israel is no " 13. Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Macmillan, 1972). powers of the UN which acted as mediators be around. From now on, any talking about Midelll 14. TJ.1e. poin~ i.s di~ussed in som~ ~etail in C~arles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, done with Israel. Her power is unquestioned in CIvil ReligIOn In Israel: TraditIOnal JudaISm and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Ber~el~y: University of California Press, 1983). The most recent and complete descnptlon of the memory of the Holocaust in Israeli society is Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 30. Eliezer Schweid, Israel At The Crossroads (Philadelr: 1973), p.159. Schweid cites the biblical phrase. 'Memory ~nd. Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust', Peter Medding 31. The evidence for this change is presented, in some del (ed. ), Studies In Contemporary Jewry: An Annual, VIII (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). op. cit. 32. For a survey of the political implicati~ms of the ~~ 15. Marti'.l S. Jaffee, '~he Victim-Community in Myth and History: Holocaust Ritual, the QuestIOn of Palestme, and the Rhetoric of Christian Witness', Journal of Ecumenical 'Totalitarian Democratic Hermeneutics and Pohcl­ Studies, Vol.28 (Spring, 1991), pp.23D-I. Nationalism', The Israel Academy of Sciences and 16. The mythical nature of these two events are treated in Yael Zerubavel, The Last Stand: cracy and After (Jerusalem: The Magnus Press, 19B; On the Transformation of Symbols in Israeli Culture (Philadelphia: Dissertation 33. Yosef Fund, Agudat Israel Confronting Zionism anti submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1980). Policy (Ramat Gan: Doctoral dissertation submitted I 17. Henry Rosenberg, Custer and the Epic ofDefeat (University Park PA: The Pennsyl­ also Efraim Inbar, Gad BarziJai and Giora Goldbc vania State University Press, 1974). ' Orthodox Parties in Israel on National Security', fo 18. Rosenberg might have observed that the events of Saul and Jonathan's death are 34. See note 21. (Friedman, whose study is cited it! conclusions than I about the integration of the state related somewhat lac~)fii~ally at the end of First Samuel and retold, in mythic form, a page later at the begmnmg of Second Samuel, especially in David's eulogy. history). HaModia, the daily newspaper of Agudat Y 19. Lucette Valensi, 'From Sacred History to Historical Memory and Back', History and the haredim in this period, is filled with stories of th Anthropology, -Vo1.2 (1986), p.287. immediately following the Six Day War. 20. The list is not complete. Jews of Baghdad declared a second Purim to celebrate the 35. Rav Schach's message, delivered shortly after th miracles associated with the British capture ofthe city in 1916. Nissim Kazzaz The Jews Ne'eman the Hebrew language newspaper which ac in Iralj in the Twentieth Century (Jerusalem: The Ben-Zvi Institute, in Hebr;w, 1991). See the }rated supplement, 'The Weekly Yated' (3 21. That IS probably true of the Purim paradigm though it is not true of the exodus from 36. Schwartz, op. cit., p.9O. Egypt paradigm. 37. Ibid. 22. Menachem Friedman cites two prominent haredi writers who describe that War as a 38. The war aims of the Egyptians and the Syrians are a,.. miraculous experience which 'serves as their point of departure for a new look at that the Arabs harbored 'limited objectives vis-a-vi. reality'. Menachem Friedman, 'Israel as a Theological Dilemma', Baruch Kimmerling the state of Israel' (Frank Aker, October 1973: Th. (ed.), The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albaby: SUNY Press, Archon Books, 1985. p.19) finds support in the Eg: other hand even Aker suspects that Syria might ha" 1~89), pp.2?:4-5. See also Eliyahu Kitov, Kivsei d'Rakhmana: Al Hayamim Hey B'iyar However, the Israeli public, with whom this paper is V kat-he~ B Iyar [~he Se~rets ofGod: On the Days ofFifth of1yar and Twenty-eighth of Iyar] (pnvately pnnted, m Hebrew, 1987). The importance of this pamphlet should not Arabs sought the total destruction of Israel. ThL be underestimated since Kitov's commentary upon and interpretation of the Jewish November, 1973, political scientist Shlomo Avmt holidays and of sacred texts is widely accepted in haredi circles and among many within general of the Foreign Office within a couple of yea the religious Zionist camp as well. threat to its [Israel's] existence since 1948', Ma'ariv,. 23. See, for example, Yoel Schwartz, Yemot Olam [The Days ofthe World] (Jerusalem: cit. D'var YerushaJyim, \n Hebrew, 1980), pp.123--6. 39. According to Aker, 'when convinced that Israel's su.• 24. George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars (New York: responded so massively that the results turned the tl­ Oxford University Press, 1990). 40. Percy Cohen, 'Theories of Myth', Man, VolA .(Seo 41. See also Hide Ishiguro, 'Myths and False Dlchc 25. He~zog, op.cit. an~ Days ofAwe: Commentaries on the Yom-Kippur War (Jerusalem: Weldenfeld and Nicolson, The Ma'ariv Book Guild, in Hebrew, 1973). (Summer, 1985), p.368. MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 417

ludy to determine how widely each of these arguments or 26. Moshe Dayan, 'Footnotes in the Wake of the Yom Kippur War', Yediot Aharonot (24 .ked, by which segments of the population and in which Sept. 1980, 'Erev Succot Supplement', in Hebrew). 27. This televised appearance by Levy is cited from memory. Itwas Levy's statement which Shlomo Avineri and is reprinted in his book Essays on was the original trigger for this research project. lem: Keter, in Hebrew, 1977), p.83. 28. Zvi SobeL, Migrants From the Promised Land (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, I Levy, 'The Horne Front', Encyclopaedia Judaica Year 1986), pp.24-38. 29. Jay Gonen, 'The Israeli Illusion of Omnipotence Following the Six Day War', Journal of Psychohistory, Vol.6 (Fall, 1978), pp.241-71, cites, for example, an article in the Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine (16 June, 1%7) by columnist David Krivine under the title 'A New State Has Emerged'. According to Krivine: na Shapiro, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and liS (New York: Praeger, 1977). It may be said that the Jewish State underwent its Brit Mila [circumcision) in 1948 bar-mitzva :8. and its [rituals associated with reaching the age of thirteen1in 1956. Today it has achieved its majority. Israel is no longer a ward of the benevolent (London: Macmillan, 1972). powers of the UN which acted as mediators between herself and the countries : detail in Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, around. From now on, any talking about Mideast problems concerning Israel is .tional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State done with Israel. Her power is unquestioned in the zone. (p.249 in Gonen). lifomia Press, 1983). The most recent and complete the Holocaust in Israeli society is Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 30. Eliezer Schweid, Israel At The Crossroads (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, ~e: Israeli Society and the Holocaust', Peter Medding 1973), p.159. Schweid cites the biblical phrase. •Jewry: An Annual, VIII (New York: Oxford University 31. The evidence for this change is presented, in some detail, in Liebman and Don-Yehiya, op. cit. Community in Myth and History: Holocaust Ritual, the 32. For a survey of the political implications of the messianist theology, see Uriel Tal, ,Rhetoric of Christian Witness', Journal ofEcumenical 'Totalitarian Democratic Hermeneutics and Policies in Modern Jewish Religious " pp.230-1. Nationalism', The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Totalitarian Demo­ ~o events are treated in Yael Zerubavel, The Last Stand: cracy and After (Jerusalem: The Magnus Press, 1984), pp.137-57. vmbols in Israeli Culture (Philadelphia: Dissertation 33. Yosef Fund, Agudat Israel Confronting Zionism and the State ofIsrael- Ideology and : Pennsylvania, 1980). Policy (Ramat Gan: Doctoral dissertation submitted to Bar-Ilan University, 1989). See the Epic ofDefeat (University Park, PA: The Pennsyl­ also Efraim Inbar, Gad Barzilai and Giora Goldberg, 'The Positions of the Ultra­ L974). Orthodox Parties in Israel on National Security', forthcoming. 'ed that the events of Saul and Jonathan's death are 34. See note 21. (Friedman, whose study is cited in note 21, draws very different t the end of First Samuel and retold, in mythic form, a conclusions than I about the integration of the state into haredi conceptions of Jewish Second Samuel, especially in David's eulogy. history). HaModia, the daily newspaper of Agudat Yisrael, the major political party of History to Historical Memory and Back', History and ,.287. the haredim in this period, is filled with stories of the great IsraeLi victory during and immediately following the Six Day War. . of Baghdad declared a second Purim to celebrate the 35. Rav Schach's message, deLivered shortly after the War, was reprinted in Yated tish capture ofthe city in 1916. Nissim Kazzaz, The Jews Ne'eman, the Hebrew language newspaper which accepts his unquestioned authority. (Jerusalem: The Ben-Zvi Institute, in Hebrew, 1991). See the Yated supplement, 'The Weekly Yated' (3 Oct. 1990), p.16. .rim paradigm though it is not true of the exodus from 36. Schwartz, op. cit., p.90. 37. Ibid. prominent haredi writers who describe that War as a 38. The war aims of the Egyptians and the Syrians are a matter ofsome dispute. The notion serves as their point of departure for a new look at that the Arabs harbored 'limited objectives vis-a-vis the idea of totally exterminating Israel as a Theological Dilemma', Baruch Kimmerling the state of Israel' (Frank Aker, October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War, Harnden, CT: iely: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albaby: SUNY Press, Archon Books, 1985, p.19) finds support in the Egyptian conduct of the war. On the IU Kitov, Kivsei d'Rakhmana: Al Hayamim Hey B'iyar other hand, even Aker suspects that Syria might have wanted to achieve total victory. God: On the Days ofFifth ofIyar and Twenty-eighth of However, the Israeli public, with whom this paper is concerned, never doubted that the ew, 1987). The importance ofthis pamphlet should not Arabs sought the total destruction of Israel. Thus, in a newspaper column of 16 s commentary upon and interpretation of the Jewish November, 1973, political scientist Shlomo Avineri, destined to serve as director dely accepted in haredi circles and among many within general of the Foreign Office within a couple of years, called the war 'the most serious ell. threat to its [Israel's) existence since 1948', Ma'ariv, (16 Nov. 1973) cited in Avineri, op. tz, Yemot Olam [The Days ofthe World] (Jerusalem: cit. , 1980), pp.123-6. 39. According to Aker, 'when convinced that Israel's survival hu~g in the balance, America Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars (New York: responded so massively that the results turned the tide of the war'. Aker, op.. cit., p.57. 40. Percy Cohen, Theories of Myth', Man, VolA (Sept. 1969), p.346. ~: Commentaries on the Yom-Kippur War (Jerusalem: 41. See also Hide Ishiguro, 'Myths and False Dichotomies', Social Research, Vol.52 Ma'ariv Book Guild, in Hebrew, 1973). (Summer, 1985), p.368. 418 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

42. Rachel Katz, 'Concerns of the Israeli: Change and Stability from 1962 to 1975', Human Relations, Vol.35 (1982), pp.83-99. In all fairness, the figure was none in a comparable 1%2 survey. 43. Guttman and Levy, op. cit., p.91. 44. Sobel, op. cit., p.109. 45. Ibid., p.1l3. 46. I found the term used in the press as early as November, 1973, with indications that it was already in public use. It may have been used earlier. The extended research, to which this paper is only a prelude, will determine when it was first invoked. 47. A bibliography of serious works concerned with the Yom Kippur War lists 25 books in Hebrew, Shmuel Zabag, Israel's Foreign Policy: A Selected Bibliography (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 1990). Two of the books include the term mehdal in the title, one uses the term earthquake. My own survey of colleagues, scholars whom one might suppose have better memories of national events found that whereas everyone as­ sociated mehdal with the Yom Kippur War, only one associated the term earthquake with that war. 48. Herzog, Days ofAwe, op. cit. 49. Ibid., p.2. 50. Ibid., p.39. 51. Ibid., pAO. 52. Ibid., p.57. Herzog's broadcasts were not simply narratives or quasi-narratives in which the story he tells lends itself to mythic interpretation. Herzog, on occasion, especially toward the end of the book, addresses at least one of the value contradictions which the War raises. He feels called upon to explain why Israelis ought not to feel depressed because the War demonstrated their dependence on the United States. He suggests that dependence is a two-way street and if a superpower supports a small country in the manner in which the United States has supported Israel it is a sign that this is important for its own national interest. Under such circumstances the superpower will not dictate policies to the smaller country (p.91). But this argument is quite secondary to the narrative of the war which unfolds in the volume.