UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date:______5/17/2007______

I, Tiest Sondaal ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: Master of Arts in: Political Science

It is entitled: Muslim immigration in Holland: Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: Prof. Richard Harknett______Prof. Laura Jenkins______

Muslim immigration in Holland: Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism

A thesis submitted to the

Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

in the Department of Political Science of the McMicken College Of Arts & Sciences

2007

by

Tiest Sondaal

B.A., International Affairs, Xavier University, 2003

Committee Chair: Prof. Richard Harknett Thesis Abstract

As the Muslim population in Western Europe (mainly France, Germany, and Holland)

increases exponentially, understanding processes of integration is critically important.

However, despite this importance, there seem to be many misconceptions surrounding

this topic as people tend to conflate integration and assimilation, even though they are not

the same. After reviewing the literature on the concepts of assimilation and cultural

pluralism, this thesis concludes that both concepts have evolved historically from their

traditional conceptualizations and have converged to a point where one does not exclude

the other.

This finding carries significant policy implications, as convergence of the two

frameworks could serve as the basis for future policies. A case study of Muslim

immigrants in Holland is used to promote policies which will help immigrants integrate

more smoothly while simultaneously reassuring the population at large that their dominant culture will not be eroded at the expense of the newcomers.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction p. 1-6

Literature review:

Historical evolution of the concept of assimilation p. 6-16

Contemporary Muslim Perspectives on Assimilation p. 16-18

Rethinking Assimilation p. 16-26

Cultural Pluralism p. 26-39

Conceptual Convergence and the Case of Holland p. 41-69

Assessment of Indicators p. 69-71

Conclusion p. 71-75

References p. 76-79

Muslim immigration in Holland: Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism

As the Muslim population in Western Europe (mainly France, Germany, and Holland)

increases exponentially, understanding processes of integration is critically important. A high level of immigration is both necessary for economic vitality, but also a source of resentment and potential social conflict. Although there is much resentment against Muslim immigrants in particular, which relates to their perceived reluctance to assimilate, Western European states with negative native birthrates will require this infusion of population. Increasing the level of immigration is the only option many of these states have to sustain their social welfare systems, but of course, such increases also burden the very social systems they infuse. Current estimates predict that the Muslim population in Europe will reach 20 per cent in 20501, which makes the

need for proper integration policies even more urgent. In sum, these numbers are impressive and

require Western European governments to adopt a comprehensive approach to manage the

process of integrating these large numbers of Muslims into their countries.

Despite this importance, there seem to be many misconceptions surrounding this topic as people tend to conflate integration and assimilation, even though they are not the same. In addition, the often-heard emphasis on assimilation leaves out the option of cultural pluralism, which would allow immigrants to retain their old culture while being able to operate fully in the new society. The notion of cultural pluralism is therefore worth re-examining in today’s global environment in which around 200 million people live in a different country from which they were born.2

1 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2004), p. 29. 2 Crawford Young, The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 26.

1 In order to provide some clarity, the first part of this thesis will analyze the meaning and

historical evolution of the concepts of assimilation and cultural pluralism. The second part will

deal with the situation of Muslim immigration in Holland and it will include a proposal to

measure integration by looking at a number of indicators that could be helpful for further

research on this topic.

After reviewing the mostly U.S. literature on the concepts of assimilation and cultural

pluralism I view them as more compatible than traditionally thought. Both concepts are often

framed in opposition of each other. Richard Perle’s argument that “the lax multiculturalism that urges Americans to accept the unacceptable from their fellow citizens is one of this nation’s greatest vulnerabilities in the war on terror” seems to imply that multiculturalism separates different ethnic cultures, which can then lead to dangerous situations that would not occur in a

society in which every immigrant was assimilated. Similarly, Daphne Spain, in her article The

Debate in the United States over Immigration poses a number of questions that also seem to

imply the dichotomy between the two concepts, which include: “Do we celebrate cultural

differences or do we try to minimize them? Should ethnic and racial boundaries be erased

through assimilation of immigrants by blurring differences to achieve a melting pot, or should

racial and ethnic differences be maintained to create a stronger society?” Instead of portraying

assimilation and cultural pluralism as polar opposites, I would argue that these concepts, while

far from being uniform, do not differ that much when properly understood in today’s globalized

environment in which immigration is a part of life as hundreds of millions of people live in a

different country from which they were born. Thus, this thesis concludes that we should

abandon the traditional view of assimilation that carried with it the expectation or at least

connotation of forced abandonment of an inferior ethnicity in an attempt to achieve parity with

2 the superior Anglo-Saxon mode. That ethnocentric model of assimilation of the early 20th century does not comport with the reality of the 21st century. The dynamics of contemporary

immigration, particularly that of Muslims in Europe, call for us to view assimilation as a much

more complex two-way process in which immigrants gradually lose part of their distinctive

ethnicity and ethnic features through adaptation to the host society and, concurrently, the host

society changes as it incorporates new aspects of the immigrants into its evolving broader

culture. In one author’s words, “assimilation is about finding a balance between what makes us

different and what we have in common.”3 This thesis suggests that such balance must be sought.

The contending concept of cultural pluralism must also be re-examined in immigration

debates. It must be re-translated beyond its original conceptualization of implying the

construction of mini-societies of separate ethnic identities (an extreme pluralist society). This

traditional interpretation of the term served as a counter to the strict Americanization movement which flourished during and right after WWI. However, under current conditions a more appropriate and contemporary interpretation of the term understands it as a framework through which there is acceptance by immigrants of a single public domain (including language, national culture, etc.) with allowance for pluralism in the private domain (including traditions, morals, ethnic language, etc.). This understanding of cultural pluralism would require immigrants to be able to function and accept the national language, culture and symbols in the host society while they could retain their culture, values, and morals in the private domain. This understanding of cultural pluralism is not summarily distinct from the view of assimilation offered above. In sum, both concepts have evolved historically from their traditional conceptualizations and have converged practically to a point where one does not exclude the other.

3 Tamar Jacoby, Reinventing The Melting Pot: The New Immigrants And What It Means To Be American. (New York, New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 15.

3 What is most important in both concepts is that they require acceptance and willingness on the part of both the members of the host society and the immigrants. This carries significant policy implications. A convergence of the two frameworks could serve as the basis for future policies that can shape behavior in ways that will help immigrants integrate more smoothly while simultaneously reassuring the population at large that their dominant culture will not be eroded at the expense of the newcomers. In order to make integration policies successful, members of the host society will have to accept that the immigrants bring with them a different language and culture and cannot require them to instantly lose their heritage. In addition, they will have to show a willingness to make these immigrants feel at home in order to help their integration process. Similarly, the immigrants will have to accept they are coming to a country with an established language and culture and, in order to succeed in that country, they will need to adapt and be able to function properly. This will require the willingness to learn its language and culture so as to blend in smoothly.

Before continuing on the historical evolution of both concepts, it is important to explain why use is made of mostly U.S. models of assimilation and cultural pluralism (or multiculturalism). The reason for this is that the United States has had a long and relatively successful history of incorporating immigrants as it is seen as the ‘classical’ immigration country.4 Whereas the United States has been an immigration country from its founding, and as such has had a rich literature on this phenomenon, the Netherlands on the other hand had little to no immigration until the end of the Second World War and therefore lacked an extensive literature on this topic. Its initial generous immigration provisions reflected both a need for cheap labor in the booming economy of the 1960s and a desire that favoring immigrants could

4 Han Entzinger and Renske Bieseveld, Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration. Report written for the European Commission, (Rotterdam, Netherlands, August 2003), p. 7.

4 serve as a form of atonement for the fact that the vast majority of Dutch Jews were killed during

the Second World War. This sense of shame was one of the main reasons for the ‘multi-

culturalist’ approach to immigrants, who were under no pressure to assimilate. The other critical

factor was the expectation that these workers would only stay for a few years before returning to

their home countries. However, the waves of immigrants that followed coupled with the current

and future economic need for immigration to remain steady and manageable means that a

national comprehensive examination of immigration is required. This being the case, it is

important that Holland starts devising models that incorporate the specific nature of Dutch immigration, in light of both the explosion of immigrants from the 1960s on, combined with the effects of 9/11/2001, and finally in light of the fact that a stop to immigration is impossible as more and more immigrants will be needed in order to off-set the effects of a declining population in the coming decades. Adopting policies such as the passing of the new mandatory citizenship exam (‘Inburgeringstest’), which is comparable to the American naturalization test, will eventually have to be replaced by policies devised based on domestic considerations or European considerations.5

A consequence of using American models of assimilation and cultural pluralism is that

the issue of religion often takes a backseat to issues such as ethnicity, class and race. This has to

do with the fact that most models dealing with assimilation focused on the stream of immigrants

coming over from Europe which were either Protestant with regard to most Northern Europeans

or Catholic with regard to most Southern Europeans. And while Catholics were often seen as

second-class citizens and faced obstacles that Protestants did not face, both Catholics and

Protestants shared a Judeo-Christian heritage. On the contrary, most of the Post-World War II

5 Roger Cohen, Dutch virtue of tolerance under strain. International Herald Tribune, Monday, November 7, 2005. http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/16/news/islam1.php. (Visited on 3/10/2007).

5 immigrants that have entered Western Europe have come from Muslim countries which can pose

a problem as their religion is very different from that of the host societies. Whereas most

Western societies have a (strict) system that separates church and state, most Muslim societies do

not have this separation. However, an (over-)emphasis on religion can be problematic as well as

Muslims cannot be categorized easily into a homogenous group. As will be highlighted later in

this work, the Muslim population in Western Europe is very diverse which makes it difficult to

put forward simple assumptions about their relationship to religion. Given this complexity, the

American experience with and literature on immigration is a solid foundation upon which to

draw in order to consider comparatively the characteristics and challenges of the Dutch

immigration.

Assimilation

Much has been written on the topic of assimilation, the most important of which is Milton

Gordon in his book Assimilation in American Life (1964). Even though the book is written about

American immigration, its findings were thought to have universal applicability as other countries were dealing with “similar processes of urbanization and industrialization, and which

have a population base of diverse racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds.”6 Assimilation is

described by Milton Gordon as a series of stages through which an individual must pass, which

include behavioral assimilation (or acculturation), structural assimilation or social assimilation,

and marital assimilation of the individuals of the minority and majority society. This formula

presupposes that there is a continuum beginning with acculturation and ending with complete

assimilation. Thus, assimilation, it is assumed, takes time and is not achieved immediately. The

actual process of assimilation consists of seven variables, namely change of cultural patterns to

6 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 3-4.

6 those of host society, large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host society,

large-scale intermarriage, development of a sense of ‘peoplehood’ based exclusively on the host

society, the absence of prejudice, the absence of discrimination, and the absence of value and

power conflict. Again, according to Gordon, “not only is the assimilation process a matter of

degree, but, obviously, each of the stages…may take place in varying degrees.”7 According to

Gordon, complete assimilation is not necessarily the final result of acculturation. Sometimes

value systems of the minority culture are a part of the entire configuration of culture, which is

not compatible with the way of life of the majority culture. This often corresponds with a period

of transition during which the minority society, while losing faith in its own traditional values, is

unable to adopt the values of the majority culture. This period of transition is often accompanied

by feelings of insecurity and unhappiness. This said, however, Gordon believed that assimilation was to be a “natural evolutionary process that would yield an inevitable outcome as time passed.”8 This line of reasoning was in line with other members of the Chicago school,

including Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, who had written on the topic of assimilation in the

1920s.

The crucial distinction in Gordon’s analysis is that between cultural and structural

assimilation, which he relates to the distinction between cultural behavior and social structure.

In Gordon’s view, cultural assimilation involved a process of acculturation on the part of the

immigrants, of becoming “like” in cultural patterns, such as language, behavior, and values.

Structural assimilation on the other hand resulted only when the immigrant had been accepted

into the major institutions of the society (educational, occupational, and political) and into the

social cliques and clubs that led to intimate primary relationships, including intermarriage. In

7 Ibid, p. 71. 8 Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, “Immigration Research: A Conceptual Map,” Social Science History, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Spring 1990), p. 45.

7 other words, while acculturation was a one-way process of adopting the cultural patterns of the

host society, structural assimilation could be described as a two-way process between the

immigrant community and the host society, albeit on the host society’s terms.

One of the earliest criticisms leveled at Gordon and others from the Chicago school has

come from the proponents of the internal colonialism model, which tried to explain the ways in

which the experiences of the racial minorities has been different significantly from the

experiences and eventual assimilation of the white European immigrants. While acculturated in

every sense, one can argue that African-Americans as a group have not structurally assimilated

based on the indicators provided by Gordon, even though they have resided in the United States

for centuries. According to the internal colonialism model, racial minorities suffered a process

of internal colonization based on the role and place in the system of production that they came to

occupy because of their color and race, and therefore Gordon’s notion of assimilation is not valid

as it has not been applicable to African-Americans.9

One other often-heard criticism of assimilation theory is that is has a tendency to be

ethnocentric. This tendency to be depicted as ethnocentric has been reinforced by statements

made by early social scientists that portrayed immigrants as having to play catch up to become full members in their new host society. It relates to how assimilation was portrayed by advocates of the Americanization movement of the early 20th century who wanted immigrants to lose their

old heritage completely if they wanted to be accepted as Americans. An example are the

remarks made by William Lloyd Warner and Leo Strole who described ethnic groups as needing

to “unlearn” their “inferior” cultural traits in order to succeed in the host society.10

9 Among other works see, Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U.S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads, (Nov. 1993), p. 124. 10 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, (Winter 1997), p. 827.

8 A procedural criticism directed at Gordon is that his theory lacks a causal mechanism that gives rise to assimilation. Additionally, two criticism directed at Gordon apply to his hypothesis and his framework of analysis. On the first criticism, it is unclear whether Gordon’s hypothesis is meant to apply to groups or individuals.11 Even though Gordon’s focus was on group life and the hypothesis has been interpreted as applying literally to groups, the measurement of assimilation was placed at the individual level. An example of this is that while individuals may be structurally assimilated, there can still remain widespread prejudice and discrimination. In addition, another criticism leveled at Gordon is that his two-group framework of analysis does not hold in multiethnic societies.12 Gordon’s use of language implies that structural assimilation is to be equated with minority-group relation versus members of the majority group. However, most societies, especially American society, have become more and more heterogeneous which has made the majority group smaller relative to the number of minority groups. Critics, therefore, have called for a multi-group instead of a two-group conception of assimilation in order to reflect the level of ethnic intermixing in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

An attempt to devise Gordon’s theory so as to incorporate group change has been put forward by Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan who built upon Park’s race-relations cycle. Their basic argument is that the way a person is treated in society depends less on “what he is,” and more on the “manner in which he is defined.”13 According to Shibutani and Kwan, the tendency to place people in categories, each associated with expected behavior and treatment, occurs in order to deal in a predictable manner with people outside one’s primary group. This “us” versus

“them” mentality is also an important topic in the writings of European Muslim intellectuals in their discussion of the challenges of integration (this will be discussed at a later point in this

11 Ibid, p. 830. 12 Ibid, p. 830. 13 Ibid, p. 838.

9 section). These differences give rise to social distances (the subjective state of nearness felt to certain individuals) which are sustained by classifying and ranking. Their theory differs from

Gordon in that a change in subjective states, or reduction of social distance, precedes structural assimilation, whereas in Gordon’s hypothesis this change occurs after structural assimilation has taken place. Furthermore, they argue that ethnic stratification orders tend to be long-lasting once established and institutionalized which helps explain the situation of many non-whites, who struggle to achieve upward social mobility. This theory, therefore, allows for individual assimilation while the system of domination remains intact. Despite arguing for the stability of ethnic stratification orders, they agree with Park and Gordon that assimilation will occur at the final stage of the natural history of the race-relations cycle, through their use of ecological theory, examples of which are technological innovations that will alter modes of production, and demographic changes that will alter ethnic relations. A final vehicle for improvement is a change in values, examples of which are the discrediting of white supremacist ideologies and social movements addressing institutionalized inequalities.

Others who have modified Gordon’s notions are Warner and Stole, who were students of

Park and Burgess. Their notion of “straight-line assimilation” sees assimilation as a process which comes about in a sequence of generational steps; “each new generation represents on average a new stage of adjustment to the host society, i.e., a further step away from ethnic

“ground zero,” the community and culture established by the immigrants, and a step closer to more complete assimilation.”14 In this theory, generations represent the vehicle for ethnic change, with each generation facing distinctive issues with regard to both the ethnic group and the larger society, and its resolution brings about a distinctive pattern of accommodation. The main criticism of this argument is that it assumes that all ethnic content is imported by

14 Ibid, p. 832.

10 immigrants. Critics of this theory argue that much depends on the conditions and cultural

materials in the host society, and that ethnicity has gone through periods of recreation and even

renaissance, such as the “bumpy-line theory of ethnicity” put forward by Herbert Gans, which

still holds on to the core concept that there is a generational dynamic behind ethnic change that

tends to move in the direction of assimilation, but allows for variance.15

Another attempt to modify the notion of assimilation has been put forward by Ruben

Rumbaut. She questions the proposition that is implied in assimilation that assumes gradual

improvement of the immigrant’s status versus the native population. Rumbaut’s main argument

is that the concept of assimilation “conflates elements that are descriptive and prescriptive,

empirical and ideological, ethnographic and ethnocentric.”16 In her view the notion of

assimilation contains a number of paradoxes, such as that the acculturation process was a one-

way process of becoming like the host society that would lift the immigrant to the level of the

host society. According to Rumbaut, data on breast cancer rates and other health indicators show

that cancer risks have been less for first-generation than for second-generation Americans, while

other data in the areas of immigrant health, mental health, ethnic self-identity and education

similarly show that becoming American as predicted by the straight-line assimilation hypothesis

does not correspond with increased health and increased educational success. These findings

show that the one-way process of ‘becoming like’ does not necessarily equate progress. Again,

many of the foreign-born immigrants scored better results than the U.S.-born immigrants on the

issues mentioned before. This being said however, Rumbaut makes the point that one has to

beware of the fact that research on immigrants needs to take into consideration its enormous

class and cultural diversity and selectivity, as well as different social contexts of reception and

15 Ibid, p. 833. 16 Ruben G. Rumbaut, “Paradoxes (And Orthodoxies) of Assimilation,” Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 40, No. 3, (1997), p. 484.

11 incorporation. Consideration of this diversity is needed as the United States currently attracts

many immigrants with college degrees who will have an easier time adapting to their new environment than those coming in with no education at all. Despite taking a variety of immigrant class and diversity, the data used showed a clear link between increasing acculturation and health risk behavior, which means that rapid acculturation does not automatically lead to the outcomes one would expect based on the conventional notion of assimilation. Research on ethnic self-identities reveals a similar pattern that is in contrast to Gordon’s predicted direction of

gradual movement to “identificational assimilation” by which he meant a primary self-identity as

an unhyphenated American. The outcomes of the study showed that “change over time, therefore, has not been toward assimilative American identities (with or without a hyphen), but a return to the ancestral or immigrant identity.” Some of these tendencies are also visible with regard to young Muslims in Holland whose ties to religion and their native roots in some cases

seem to be stronger than those of their parents, which might be part of this period of transition

that is often accompanied by feelings of insecurity and unhappiness as discussed by Gordon. In

addition, similar research shows that “assimilation itself can be a traumatic process rather than a

simple solution to the traumas of immigration.”17 It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that not

every change in the direction of becoming like the native is for the better, which is what the

traditional assimilation model suggests. This finding in the literature highlights the conflation of

prescriptive and descriptive elements of assimilation theory. While these studies show that the

straight-line assimilation hypothesis does not accurately reflect immigration experience,

Rumbaut does not argue that assimilation does not take place. Instead, she argues that

assimilation is not “a zero-sum game” and that it should reflect the very different class character

of current immigration by providing divergent modes of incorporation.

17 Ibid, p. 494.

12 Again, most authors will agree that Gordon’s biggest contribution has been in defining a

multidimensional framework with useful concepts, and especially the distinction between

acculturation and structural assimilation. As mentioned before, the crucial distinction in

Gordon’s analysis is that between cultural and structural assimilation, in which cultural

assimilation involved a process of acculturation on the part of the immigrants, of becoming

“like” in cultural patterns, such as language, behavior, and values and structural assimilation on

the other hand resulted only when the immigrant had been accepted into the major institutions of

the society (educational, occupational, and political) and into the social cliques and clubs that led

to intimate primary relationships, including intermarriage. So while acculturation was a one-way

process of adopting the cultural patterns of the host society, assimilation could be seen as a two-

way process between the immigrant community and the host society. However, despite

Gordon’s contribution, assimilation is still not an unambiguous concept as it means different

things to different people. Instead of viewing it as a state-imposed normative program aimed at

eradicating minority culture, social scientists such as Richard Alba and Victor Nee see

assimilation as “a social process that occurs spontaneously and often unintendedly in the course

of interaction between majority and minority groups.”18 Their definition of assimilation comes

close to the one by Park and Burgess in 1921 which described assimilation as “a process of

interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and

attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are

incorporated with them in a common cultural life.”19 Although that definition did not require the

eradication of all signs of ethnic origins, Park seemed to view assimilation as the inevitable

outcome of his race-relations cycle of “contact, competition, accommodation, and eventual

18 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, (Winter 1997), p. 827. 19 Ibid, p. 828.

13 assimilation.”20 Park described assimilation through the race relations cycle, which was made up of stages of interaction through which immigrants and racial groups progressed irreversibly: contact, competition, and accommodation, culminating in eventual assimilation. According to

Park, competition was the inevitable result of contact between groups struggling to gain advantage over one another. Eventually competition would result in accommodation when a social structure of usually unequal relations of groups and a settled understanding of group relations came into being. Finally, despite accommodation, personal relationships that cross group boundaries would develop which would render accommodation useless and would lead to assimilation. The race relations cycle implied that the notion of assimilation could be extended to both immigrants and racial minorities alike, the difficulty of which has been highlighted by advocates of the internal colonialism model. In sum, Alba and Nee argue that assimilation remains an important concept that is useful in analyzing the immigrant experience. While acknowledging some of the criticisms leveled at assimilation, they favor amending the concept because of its great power for a thorough understanding of the contemporary ethnic scene in the

United States. Broadly defined as the decline and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the culture and social differences that express it, their definition leaves open the possibility that the changes brought about by assimilation are more mutual than one-sided.

Some of the more serious criticism of the term assimilation has come from Nathan

Glazer. In his article “Is Assimilation Dead?” he traces the history of assimilation and concludes

that the entire assimilation ideal and program has been discredited due to the failure of

assimilation to accommodate blacks, which Glazer discounts as resulting from the particular

strength of American discriminatory and prejudiced attitudes and behaviors toward blacks. In

20 Ibid, p. 828.

14 tracing back the history of the concept of assimilation, Glazer concludes that the “concept of

assimilation looked toward Europe.”21 While Americanness was made dependent on adherence

to ideals and universal principles written into the Declaration of Independence and the

Constitution rather than ethnicity, blacks were never included. While immigration was largely

unregulated and promoted in the 19th century, things changed at the turn of the century. In the

early 20th century the Americanization movement lost its welcoming aspect due to fears brought

about by World War I and postwar fears of Bolshevism and radicalism, and as a result

assimilation became an oppressive tool, insisting that immigrants learned and spoke only

English. But even in this hostile environment, attention was merely given to European

immigrants and not to the African-American population. Even those attacking the demands on

full and complete assimilation, grouped together under the banner of cultural pluralists, had

nothing to say about the situation of the black population, which was the largest minority group

in the country. However, despite its poor track record with regard to the black population,

Glazer argues that as a process assimilation does have its merit and is useful in describing the

transition made by many immigrants in adapting to American life. Recognizing that the key to

material success is a swift transformation to American ways, they learn the English language in

order to blend in and prosper. In addition, intermarriage rates of immigrants are high for all

immigrant groups, including Jews, Hispanics and Asian groups. Again, blacks stand apart in

intermarriage rates and rates of residential segregation, which warrants the conclusion that

assimilation has not been universally applicable. Glazer, in summarizing his article, argues that

“the word may be dead, the concept may be disreputable, but the reality continues to flourish,”22

21 Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, (Nov. 1993), p. 124. 22 Ibid, p. 134.

15 which means that assimilation as a process is still very much alive, brought about both by public ideology but also by the immigrants themselves in their drive for material success.

In sum then, one can see how the concept has not been unambiguous as many different authors have offered alternative versions of how they view assimilation. While no agreement will be reached on one exact definition, there has been an identifiable trend within the literature towards re-thinking assimilation in multi-impact context – that the process entails effects on the immigrants and on the host society. Whereas assimilation was initially viewed as a state- imposed program aimed at eradicating immigrants’ old memories in order to become instant

Americans, it seems that the current understanding of assimilation more accurately reflects the process of immigrants trying to adapt to a new country, and how this process changes both them as well as the country’s culture they are adapting to.

Contemporary Muslim Perspectives on Assimilation

This point of seeing integration as a two-way process is an important point that is brought up by many Muslim European intellectuals as well, including Tariq Ramadan, who is one of many Muslims born in the West to Muslim parents and seen as one of the most influential

European Muslims. While feeling a strong connection to the principles of Islam in which he grew up, he feels himself European culturally. His challenge is to try and find ways to be able to combine being a Muslim and being a European, which is not always easy in the current

European political climate. His efforts to improve life for Muslims in Western Europe involve both a need for reform within the Western countries as well as “an auto-critique of the Muslim

‘way of life’ in its broadest sense.”23 According to Ramadan, the need for reform within the

23 Rosemary Bechler, A bridge across fear: an interview with Tariq Ramadan. (July 14th, 2004). http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-5-57-2006.jsp.

16 Western countries requires on the one hand a change in the perception of Muslims, who are

currently often stereotyped and discriminated against, while on the other hand the Muslim

community needs to shed its binary approach, which has given way to seeing the world in terms

of “us” versus “them”. Instead of focusing on the differences, the emphasis should be on what

both cultures have in common. In this way, Muslim identity and European identity can be made

compatible where all people are seen as citizens rather than belonging to minority or majority

groups.

A similar argument is made by Ajmal Masroor, another European Muslim who tries to

reconcile being a Muslim and being European. His emphasis is on what he calls “mutual

integration” as the key to successfully integrating the Muslim communities in Western Europe, a

concept which he sees as a necessity. He takes issue with those arguing simply that Muslims

have to adapt to the Western way of life (the old argument of the Americanization movement of

the early 1900s), as integration affects all communities. “Integration is a two-way process.

When we talk about integration, we are often told that minority communities must try everything

they can do to integrate into their host communities. Such an assumption is simply wrong.

Because integration is an essential part of building stronger and more cohesive communities,

there should be mutual integration. Simply demanding the minority communities to integrate

would be seen as unfair and as a one way process; it is, therefore, not the solution. Hence, both majority community and minority communities must seek mutual integration.”24

Bashy Quraishy argues both that there is no common European definition of integration

and that most definitions require a one-way adoption of the majority culture, Quraishy comes to

the conclusion that under the present conditions Muslim cannot integrate as it would equate

24 Ajmal Masroor, Integration A Two Way Process. (Posted on Wed., Jun. 7, 2006). http://www.islamonline.net/English/EuropeanMuslims/CommunityCivilSociety/2006/06/01b.shtml.

17 giving up their heritage. In his words, “it is hard to support the European model of integration

because it is based on segregation and exclusion and not inclusion… If European societies really

wished for a two-way integration, they must stop demanding and start listening in order to lay

the foundations for a fruitful dialogue.”25 The problem is that there is little to no acceptance of

the fact that there is much institutionalized racism within the various societies which is one of the

issues that need to be addressed before true integration can take place. In sum, his argument is

that the right conditions need to be in play before a constructive dialogue can occur between the

Muslim communities and the majority communities.

Rethinking Assimilation

As with most things in life, moderation is important, and the same goes for the concepts

of assimilation and cultural pluralism. The extreme versions of assimilation and cultural

pluralism, those that leave no room for particularity and those that stress diversity without regard

for a shared identity do not accurately reflect the average immigrant experience, which is more

complex. According to Tamar Jacoby, “The truth is that difference is as American as the Stars

and Stripes. Assimilation has always left room for a hyphen.”26 In order to provide clarity on

the debate on assimilation, Jacoby divides the immigrant experience in two dimensions; an objective and a subjective one. The objective dimension deals with the tangible challenges

immigrants face, which include learning the language and finding a job. The subjective

dimension is more difficult to gauge as it deals with the process of feeling a sense of belonging

in a new place. Using data on U.S. immigration over the last forty years, Jacoby makes the claim

that assimilation as a process is taking place. Over the last forty years, there have been 31

25 Bashy Quraishy, Segregation Rather Than Integration. (Posted on Wed., Jun. 7, 2006). http://www.islamonline.net/English/EuropeanMuslims/CommunityCivilSociety/2006/06/01a.shtml. 26 Tamar Jacoby, Reinventing The Melting Pot: The New Immigrants And What It Means To Be American. (New York, New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 16.

18 million newcomers that have come to the United States, which means one in nine Americans is

an immigrant. In addition, half the laborers entering the American workforce in the 1990s were

foreign-born. In contrast to the last great wave of immigration at the beginning of the 20th

century, today’s immigrants are more diverse, both ethnically as they come from all over the

globe, although the majority is Hispanic, and educationally, as many of the Hispanic immigrants

are poorly-educated compared to many of the Asian immigrants, who often speak English and

have college degrees. This diversity in immigrants’ backgrounds makes it difficult to generalize on their experience but data on issues such as educational performance, language skills, home ownership, ethnic intermarriage rates, and opinion research polls show that by the third- generation very little difference exists between natives and immigrants. For example, by the third generation 80 percent of Latinos are English dominant, more than 50 percent marry someone of a different ethnicity, English is overwhelmingly favored over Spanish, and on traditional issues such as homosexuality, divorce, and the importance of friends and family they show little to no difference from their native-born counterparts.27 Again, while these indicators

do not provide conclusive answers to the overall immigrant experience, the data that has been

available has shown consistently that the second and third generation immigrants are often no

longer distinguishable from native-born Americans in both performance and attitudes, which is a

hopeful sign for the future of American immigration.

What seems to be a common feature in the writings of today’s authors on assimilation is a

need for revision of the definition of assimilation based on the difference in the current wave of

immigration compared to the one of the early 20th century. The old theories on assimilation were

based on the overwhelmingly-dominant European immigration wave and are no longer useful

today, as the current immigration wave is much more diverse. The old theories are also

27 Ibid, p. 27-28.

19 somewhat unreliable as the researchers conducting the studies on immigrants focused mostly on

second-generation immigrants, who spoke English and had a tendency to assimilate quicker than

their parents who hardly spoke English and maintained their old culture. Their notion that

cultural, social and other forms of assimilation would occur uninterrupted over several

generations led to the development of the ‘straight line theory’, which has proven too simplistic

as immigrant experience has differed based on many factors, of which class and race have been

the most important ones. For example, working-class communities have been slower to give up

their ethnic institutions than middle-class groups, and immigrants with a darker skin color such

as from the Caribbean as from elsewhere, have had more difficulty assimilating since they are

treated as part of the African-American population with all the associated disadvantages.

However, despite the fact that assimilation takes place at various speeds and in different forms, the underlying thesis remains true which is that “the institutions and cultures that immigrants bring from the old country erode further with each generation.”28

Another common thread that represents a change in the literature based on the post-1965

wave of immigration is the changed approach to ethnicity. In addition to the recognition of the

fact that the immigrant experience is much more diverse now than it was in the past, there is also

recognition that ethnicity does not necessarily need to disappear in order for assimilation to take place. The reasons for this change are multiple. First of all, the fact that there have been no

World Wars since 1945 is a reason why ethnicity has become more accepted. The strict

Americanization movement was to a large degree a reaction to the threat of war and a potentially divided country based on traditional ethnic loyalties. Therefore an attempt was made to eradicate the old loyalties by transforming immigrants into unhyphenated Americans. The lack of major wars set in a nationalist context (rather than the ideological context of the cold war) has

28 Ibid, p. 39.

20 implied a similar lack of wartime pressure to quickly assimilate. This line of argument raises the question whether the current debate on immigration is reform is really related to economic concerns, or if it is related to security concerns following this historical trend?

In addition, historical evidence shows that retaining self reference to an ethnic group does not equate with a lack of loyalty to the new host country in which one lives. Feeling part of an ethnic group nowadays often means little more than visiting an ethnic festival or eating an ethnic dish. This is an important point in today’s polarized debate in the United States about the impact and the future of the large Hispanic community, estimated to be about 35 million people. There are many fears that this Hispanic community will demand special treatment based on their large numbers. But the same 2000 census revealed that 43 million Americans reported German origin when responding to the question what one’s ancestry or ethnic origin was. Despite this vast number, one hears little to nothing about German issues or a German vote or anything that would resemble close ties to Germany. Despite the fact that many people still view themselves as having German origin, this does not show in their everyday behavior and more than likely the same will hold true for the Hispanic community. These references to ethnicity are what Stephan

Thernstrom calls “symbolic ethnicity” which is characterized by its voluntary character and are, therefore, not threatening to the unity of the country. According to the same author, the example of the German ancestry origin “clearly illustrates the peril of putting individuals into categories based on their ancestry and assuming that those categories will have great social significance far into the future.”29 Data seems to confirm this view as data taken on issues including educational achievement, intermarriage rates and cultural attitudes all show that Hispanics are making up ground on natives, which is a sign they are assimilating into mainstream American life.

29 Ibid, p. 59.

21 Another attempt to explain the acceptance of ethnicity within the framework of

assimilation theory is put forward by Nathan Glazer. He argues that since the 1960s the idea of holding multiple identities has become more acceptable due to the “surprising change in our conception of the claims of citizenship and national identity on the new American.”30 Today,

dual citizenship has become more easily attainable for immigrants and cheaper means of travel and communication has enabled them to maintain ties with their homeland long after they left.

But there has also been a change on the part of the native population with regard to ethnicity.

Glazer traces this change back to the Second World War when America’s leaders used ethnicity

to stir up emotions needed to gain political capital to fight overseas. While during the First

World War multiple identities were prohibited, during the Second World War loyalty to the

United States was reconcilable with loyalty to an immigrant’s original culture, with the exception

of the Japanese, of course. This acceptance was only enhanced by the changes in the

immigration laws (from preferential quotas to a formally equal treatment of all nations and races)

and U.S. Supreme Court decisions during the 1960s that extended rights to non-citizens and

immigrants. These changes were driven by many factors, including both the civil rights

movement in the United States and international human rights movements, which “encouraged

and justified ethnic identities and diminished the exclusive claim of national identity.”31 In the last couple of decades this trend has only grown stronger, as in today’s globalized world, millions of people live outside the borders of their country or birth. The fact that today’s immigrants continue to identify with their old country does not need to be cause for regret and despair, as they simultaneously forge an identity as Americans. This fact leads Glazer to argue that the concept of assimilation needs revision due to how national identity has lost its exclusive

30 Ibid, p. 64. 31 Ibid, p. 66.

22 edge. In sum, assimilation is still applicable as a concept but it needs to take into consideration that in today’s environment it accommodates the holding of more than one identity and more than one loyalty.

Roger Waldinger comes to the same conclusion as Glazer, although his explanation for

the acceptance of ethnicity is somewhat different. He agrees that today’s immigrants are allowed

to retain their old ethnicity due to the achievements of the civil rights movement that had

democratized the United States and had made racial and ethnic origin irrelevant to both

membership and citizenship. While the first wave of immigrants entered what he calls a “white

republic” and “white” conceptions of American identity, this is no longer the case for the more

recent immigrants. His other reason why today’s immigration is different from the earlier wave

deals with the different ethnic affiliation of earlier and current immigrants, which relates to

background and experience. The old immigrants came either from mostly peasant societies with

no clearly defined nationality or multiethnic empires in which nationality and ethnicity rarely

converged and they, therefore, had no real connection to a homeland and no clear sense of

belonging, which made it easier to start a new life in a new country. The story of the immigrants

who came in the post-1965 mostly came from established nation-states and identities that help

see them as members of an ethnic group. While some see this development as dangerous as it

may hinder the transformation of these immigrants into ‘Americans,’ Waldinger argues

differently and sees it as potentially positive. Today’s immigrants come to a country that has an

expanded understanding of what it means to be American and which allows for multiple

identities. Also they have the opportunity to make themselves heard by using their ethnicity as a

political tool of group mobilization. This increases the prospects for continued assimilation.

23 Alba and Nee also argue that the civil rights movement has made it easier for the post-

1965 immigrant generation, of whom eighty percent are not from Europe, to assimilate into

mainstream American life. In addition to these institutional mechanisms, they argue the pace of

assimilation depends on individual action and on what they call “network mechanisms.”32 These

three factors together will determine the success of an immigrant being able to assimilate rapidly.

The emphasis on these three factors forces Alba and Nee to alter their definition of

assimilation. First of all, the term needs to reflect the fact that society itself changes as a result

of the immigrants. Second, it needs to recognize that assimilation does not imply the eradication

of ethnicity as many used to argue. Third, our conceptualization of assimilation needs to be

aware of the fact that assimilation can take place in what Alba and Nee identify as a “segmented

fashion”33 – meaning that different groups will experience different outcomes. According to

them, “ethnicity is a social boundary: a distinction that individuals make in their everyday lives

and that shapes their actions and attitudes towards others. This boundary is given concrete significance by the social and cultural differences between groups-differences that allow

members of one group to think “they are not like us.” Assimilation is best understood as the

fading of such boundaries, i.e., individuals on both sides of the line come to see themselves as more and more alike.”34

In sum, one can see how the definition of assimilation has changed in the last century. It was originally viewed as a one-way process in which the immigrants shed their old ethnicity in the process of becoming American. This view was related to the Anglo-Saxon model that seemed relevant since the great wave of immigration was made up primarily of Europeans, who were seen as able to assimilate quite rapidly. Although the situation was somewhat different for

32 Ibid, p. 94. 33 Ibid, p. 89. 34 Ibid, p. 88-89.

24 southern Europeans, who were darker skinned than for northern Europeans, who were lighter

skinned, all Europeans were able to assimilate quite successfully, albeit at different rates. The

same could not be said for people of color. Park, part of the Chicago school and one of the

earliest scholars writing on the issue of assimilation, already conceded this much when he argued

in the 1920s that assimilation as a concept had failed to work for people of color. This

acceptance implied the failure of the old ‘straight line assimilation’ model which saw

assimilation as a gradual process that proceeded in a straight line.

The other reason why assimilation was seen as a one-way process in which the

immigrants had to shed their old ways was related to the geopolitical situation of the early 20th century. The build-up and eventual outbreak of World War I led to a strict Americanization movement which advocated English-only policies and no tolerance for different cultures. Until that time, German was taught in many public schools in states that housed a large German-

American population, which made a deliberate effort to keep their old culture alive. After World

War I, they were no longer able to maintain these ties to their old country. This situation changed during and after World War II when the United States government stimulated ties to the immigrants’ old countries when it evoked sentiments in order to mobilize people to fight overseas. In addition, whereas many of the earlier immigrants came from peasant societies or empires, after World War II most immigrants came from established nation-states with an established identity and ethnicity. This sense of identity and ethnicity allowed them in many cases to assimilate more quickly as they moved into neighborhoods with (former) compatriots who could help them get used to a new life.

Race and class are still important issues that have an impact on the pace of assimilation

(immigrants that have a college degree, and those with a lighter skin have better chances of

25 assimilating more quickly than those with no education and a dark skin), which explains the

acceptance by most of what has been termed “segmented assimilation”, but overall the

environment that today’s immigrants enter provides them with more opportunities to assimilate

than at the beginning of the century.35 Ethnic intermarriage rates, seen by most social scientists as the ultimate indicator of successful assimilation seem to confirm this view as by the third generation most immigrants marry outside their ethnic group and these numbers are not merely

limited to the European descendants but these numbers also apply to the Hispanic community.

It seems that most authors thus agree that assimilation is still a valuable concept although

it has not worked for the African-American community. Today’s view of assimilation is different

from the old definition of assimilation and it seems to have three main characteristics. It is seen

as a two-way process instead of a one-way process of immigrants becoming ‘like’ the native population, it allows for the immigrants to maintain their old ethnicity to a certain degree, and it accounts for different rates of assimilation for different groups. Overall however, it seems that most authors believe that assimilation is still a very powerful concept in describing the process of immigrants trying to make a new life for themselves in a new country. These findings are valuable in assessing the trajectory of immigration in Western Europe. While the origin of the concept was found in the United States and focused mainly on indicators such as race, class, and ethnicity in explaining assimilation, thereby overlooking the important indicator of religion, its

findings can still be useful in assessing the process of integration of Muslim immigrants in

Europe.

Cultural Pluralism

In the literature on immigration, the notion of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism has

received less attention than assimilation, even though in the last few decades it has become a

35 Ibid, p. 93.

26 quite prominent concept. The concepts of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism, which are often

used interchangeably, were first brought up around the same time as the notion of assimilation

came to the forefront and many scholars credit Horace Kallen with being the first one to use this

term. Both concepts developed as a response to the strict Americanization movement that was at its high point during the years of World War I and which reflected the drive toward political and cultural conformity. Since the terms cultural pluralism and multiculturalism are often thrown around without clarification of what is meant, some definitional clarification is needed before the merits and criticisms of this concept are addressed.

Despite the fact that Kallen first brought up the notion of multiculturalism in the early

twentieth century, theories and models advocating multiculturalism and cultural pluralism did

not become prominent until the late 1960s and 1970s. The development of these theories was

related to the inability of assimilation theory to explain the persistence of ethnicity as a powerful

force and the racial inequality and conflict of the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the explanations

that have been offered for the resurgence of ethnic politics include “lack of assimilation, lack of

socioeconomic mobility for second and later generations, rise of ethnic group consciousness,

ethnic character of public policy leading to group mobilization for federal funds, continued

vitality of ethnic political cultures, and the view that ethnic politics is really class politics in

disguise.”36 The fact that multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are used interchangeably

shows that these terms are often used meaning the same thing. Multiculturalism has been a

fashionable term that has been employed differently over the years. It is used to refer to a

general demographic description of society; exotic otherness as seen in festivals, dances,

cuisines; a vision of how society should function with its minorities; public policy aimed at

36 Dale C. Nelson, “Assimilation, Acculturation & Political Participation,” Polity, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Autumn 1982), p. 26.

27 minorities, etc. Multiculturalism is also often used in the areas of law and citizenship, which

makes it even more important to make clear in what sense one uses the term.

Pluralism generally can be described as the acceptance of immigrant populations in

ethnic communities that remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard to

language, culture, social behavior, and associations over several generations. It implies that

immigrants should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society without being expected to

give up their diversity, although usually with an exception of conformity to key values.

Pluralism is seen as having two main variants. There is the ‘laissez-faire’ approach that is

typical of the United States, in which difference is tolerated, even though the role of the state is

not seen as having to support the maintenance of ethnic cultures. The second variant contains

explicit multicultural policies that imply the willingness of the majority population to accept

cultural difference and to change social behavior and institutional structures accordingly.

Canada, Australia, and Sweden are countries that employ general policies of multiculturalism.

The notion of cultural pluralism was developed first by Jewish intellectuals in the early

twentieth century who were concerned with the movement toward cultural unification in states

such as Russia and Austria that had led to the suppression of many minority and ethnic groups.

When similar demands began to be made in the United States, these Jewish intellectuals, of

whom Horace Kallen would be known best, developed a counter-ideology that stressed the need

for a “federation of nationalities,” which fitted the dilemma many Jews felt they were in.37

“Jews, like other minorities, needed the protection of impartial state administrators, yet at times

37 Fred R. Wacker, “Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism in American Social Thought,” Phylon, Vol. 40, No. 4, (4th Qtr. 1979), p. 328.

28 they were seriously threatened by unification movements aimed at creating greater uniformity among the state’s inhabitants”38

Kallen wrote the book, Cultural pluralism and the American idea: an essay in social

philosophy (1956) in which he expanded on his concept. Written as an attempt to combat the

notion of the Anglo-Saxon conformity, which, according to him, violated the democratic practice

in multi-culture America, it stressed the need for recognition of different cultures and the right to

be different, and the obligation of the government to respect and protect multiple ways of living.

Cultural pluralism was necessary in guaranteeing the individual rights that were the foundation

of the United States. He proposed the idea of a “federation of nationalities” that would allow

individual cultural and religious groups to retain their distinctive existence, which was threatened

by both the Americanization movement and socialism. This view separated Kallen from those

advocating assimilation. Although these authors also advocated their concept as a reaction to the

strict Americanization movement and were sympathetic to the immigrants and their cultural

heritage, they argued that the powerful social forces of urbanization, industrialism, and mass

communication would cause their cultures to merge into the American mainstream society. In

sum, they argued that the migrants coming to America went through a process of adapting to

American ways which left the American culture mostly intact. Instead, Kallen saw assimilation

as a more complex process, in which there are no straight assimilators or assimilatees. “Each

occupational group, each religious denomination, each political party, each sex, each race, set

over against all the others, counts as a minority; associated with the others, as of the majority.

Majorities are minorities in combination; minorities are majorities in division.”39

38 Ibid, p. 328. 39 Horace Kallen, Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea: An Essay in Social Philosophy. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956), p. 109.

29 While there was praise of Kallen’s emphasis on the need for diversity, there was mostly criticism. One of the criticisms leveled at Kallen was that the emphasis on accepting diversity could have dangerous implications, which was the idea put forward by R.J. Henle. According to

Henle, one of the main problems for a society is the interplay between respecting diversity while simultaneously trying to achieve unity. He argues that the United States has been able to achieve this goal by having employed a number of policies, which include the state acting non- ideologically, allowing its citizens to be American citizens while at the same time being members of a church or adhering to a certain ideology, and finally by respecting and according full rights to individual persons, while allowing differences. These policies have laid the groundwork for having a society in which members of all different religions and ethnic backgrounds can live peacefully in one state. The danger in stressing diversity and acceptance of diversity according to Henle is that certain dangers to society will not be recognized or, when recognized, will not be acted against. “By a seeming paradox, a government like ours, which has renounced ideological competence, cannot defend itself at the level of ideologies; it must leave this defense to the free institutions and individuals within society.”40 According to Henle, freedom for diversity therefore does not only entail the right to be different but also the right to hold one’s views as better as another’s as well as the desire to change the other’s views as long as this is done in a respectful and lawful manner.

One of the main criticisms of the notion of cultural pluralism at the time was that it assumed that ethnic groups had stereotypical characteristics, which was an unpopular statement at the time when “advanced” and “liberal” social science and social thought were at its high point. Kallen developed his concept on the assumption that each national or ethnic group had “a

40 Henle’s critique on Kallen’s work is included in Ibid, p. 149.

30 destiny to fulfill.”41 A critique of this assumption was that it did not allow for diversity within a group as it saw all Jews as having an original nature that separated them from other groups.

Kallen’s belief that individuals were inevitably shaped or specialized by their racial or ethnic heritage was rejected by most scholars who argued that American democracy allowed for possibilities for individual growth. They argued that Kallen was not that much different than those in the Americanization movement as both stressed some form of uniformity, either to

‘American’ society or the immigrant’s ethnic culture.

Even though the notion of multiculturalism has changed over time, there is still the

criticism which takes aim at the perceived static nature of the ethnic group. Despite the multiple

definitions of multiculturalism, according to Steven Vertovec, there seems to be a consensus on

the part of ‘culture’, which is seen as containing a “kind of package of collective behavioral- moral-aesthetic traits and ‘customs’, rather mysteriously transmitted between generations, best suited to particular geographical origins yet largely unaffected by history or a change of context, which instills a discrete quality into the feelings, values, practices, social relationships, predilections and intrinsic nature of all who ‘belong to (a particular) it’. Populations and population segments, it follows, are categorized culturally according to cultural essences, which are presumed to be imparted at birth.”42 The danger with such an implicit notion of culture is

that it presumes that all members belonging to this group share the same traits and therefore policies will be enacted that will not leave room for individual differentiation. Policies enacted that make use of this ‘cultured’ understanding of multiculturalism will do nothing to lessen the difference between the majority and minority groups. It will merely reinforce old stereotypes

41 Fred R. Wacker, “Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism in American Social Thought,” Phylon, Vol. 40, No. 4, (4th Qtr. 1979), p. 330. 42 Steven Vertovec, Migration and Social Cohesion. (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 1999), p. 224.

31 and the gap between the majority and the minority groups. In addition, it will also leave no room

for attempts for cooperation between various ethnic groups trying to combine strength to address

inequalities or other problems. In sum, Vertovec argues that this static notion of culture will be detrimental to both the minority groups and society as whole groups will be lumped together into individually homogenous and fixed minority “uni-cultures.” The result will be that policies to

deal with these minority groups will lead to what he calls the “benevolent isolation of

minorities,” which is not a promising prospect in today’s globalized world in which tens of

millions of people live in a different country from where they were born.43 A similar problem is

visible with regard to the Muslim immigrants in Europe. There is a tendency within Western

societies to see all Muslims in a similar way, as sharing the same traits and having the same level

of religiosity, the danger of which is that policies based on this static understanding will do little

to differentiate between the great diversity within Islamic culture. Instead of achieving the aim

of integration by devising specific policies aimed at specific groups of Muslims (Sunni or Shi’a,

secular or religious, urban or rural, etc.) policies which make use of a ‘cultured’ understanding of

multiculturalism, when based on the idea of lumping all Muslims together can have the opposite effect and contribute to affirming the binary approach discussed by Ramadan where the Muslim community will see society in an “us” versus “them” approach.

As a model for how multiculturalism can be made to work, he points to the Leicester

model, named after the English city of Leicester, which has sizeable ethnic populations. It has

been able to successfully deal with minorities by helping develop a large variety of ethnic

organizations and activities, which in turn has stimulated participation by creating a public place

in which the minorities saw an opportunity to address important issues. The Leicester-model is a

three-dimensional model that promotes more democratic functions surrounding community

43 Ibid, p. 225.

32 leaders, stimulates more active civil participation among minority group members, publicizes

more positive images of minorities, and helps foster, among both members of the majority group

as well as among the ethnic groups, a more malleable understanding of culture. By incorporating

the ethnic groups into the public arena, the city of Leicester was able to show that the ethnic

minorities are no threat to the majority group, while at the same time it helped convince

members of the ethnic groups that they could achieve political success in a new society in a

democratic and civil manner.

The problem of confining ethnic groups to their own group due to a static nature of

culture can be resolved by designing a policy that will allow for the immigrants to retain some

parts of their old ethnicity while stimulating them to become active in mainstream society.

According the John Rex, this will help them shed some of their traditions. As multiculturalism

became the goal for British race relations in the late 1960s, Rex has analyzed the term in an

attempt to make clear its implications and goals. His work on multiculturalism has been based

on the notion of integration provided by the former English Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, who

said that what he envisaged as a policy aim was “not a flattening process of uniformity, but

cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”44 The

Jenkins formula of integration thus involves the three elements of cultural diversity, equality, and mutual tolerance. Drawing upon Durkheim among others, Rex sees integration as both “a moral and social psychological question.”45

Before analyzing the Jenkins’ formula and its implications, Rex distinguishes a multicultural society from a plural society. A plural society according to Rex is a society in

44 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration. (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), p. 32. 45 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnicity. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 245.

33 which each ethnic community handles its own affairs, exists separately and has its own

communal morality. These pluralist structures can be characterized by the inequalities of

economic and political power between the society’s constituent groups, an example of which was

the Apartheid regime in South Africa. However, others argue that the concept of pluralism does

not imply apartheid. According to Robert J. Bentley, pluralism “reflects the social reality

determined by language, ethnic membership and cultural traditions and implies control of

institutions by members of the constituent groups.”46 Finally, according to Milton Gordon, pluralism refers to a “national society in which various groups, each with a psychological sense of its own historical peoplehood, maintain some structural separation from each other in intimate primary group relationships and in certain aspects of institutional life and thus create the possibility of maintaining, also, some cultural patterns which are different from those of the

“host society” and of other racial and ethnic groups in the nation.”47

The defining feature about a multicultural society according to Rex is the distinction

between the public and the private domain. In his own words, “multiculturalism in the modern

world involves on the one hand the acceptance of a single culture and a single set of individual

rights governing the public domain, and on the other hand a variety of folk cultures in the private

domestic and communal domains.”48 He differentiates between the public domain, which covers

the areas of law, politics, and the economy, and the private domain, which covers matters

relating to family, morality and religion. Recognizing that this distinction is not always very clear as in today’s welfare states the public domain is extended through bureaucratic state

46 Robert J. Bentley, “The Challenge of Pluralism,” The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 40, No. 4, (Autumn 1971), p. 337. 47 Milton M. Gordon, “Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, (Mar. 1981), p. 181. 48 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration. (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), p. 18.

34 activity in matters of family and morality (the private domain), Rex argues that this extension

does not necessarily have to cause problems as welfare provisions are in place to assist families.

There are other areas, however, that impact both the public and private domain and cause

occasional conflict, such as education. According to Rex, modern educational systems have three functions: it selects individuals on the basis of their achievement for various occupational

roles, it transmits important skills needed for survival and work, and, finally, it transmits moral

values. It is in this last category that conflict can erupt as these moral values are not

unambiguous. Issues such as sex, marriage, the family and religion can cause tension when

immigrant groups feel their communal values are under attack. Notwithstanding the potential for

conflict, Rex is hopeful that dialogue will lead to compromise or as he puts it: “Just as, earlier

times, class conflict which started in circumstances of riot and disorder gave way to processes of

negotiation and compromise, so the relationship of ethnic minorities to British society will be

renegotiated.”49

The acceptance of a single culture in the public domain requires acceptance by the

migrant groups of the national language, the national culture and religion, but this does not mean

that their minority language should be extinguished or that they cannot celebrate their own

culture. All it means is that the various groups need to be able to function in the areas of the

public domain according to the conventions of the host society while retaining their rights in the

areas covering the private domain. Rex argues for the recognition of separate cultures in the

private domain for various reasons; in addition to having a value in themselves as enriching the

culture as a whole, they serve as an intervening form of belonging between what is provided by

the state and the family, and they can serve as a vehicle for achieving ethnic solidarity. In sum,

49 Ibid, p. 47.

35 Rex argues for acceptance of a single culture in the public domain and acceptance of various

sub-cultures in the private domain, while dialogue is needed in case conflict arises.

An oft-heard criticism of multiculturalism is that is naïve to assume that very different

groups with very different conceptions on how to live can co-exist peacefully. Adherence to a

single public domain while allowing for variation in the private domain sounds great in theory,

but in reality there will be many instances where this distinction is blurred with the potential for

conflict. One main criticism with regard to integrating Muslim immigrants in Western Europe in

relation to Rex’s model is his relegating religion to the private sphere. Although there is

differentiation between various Muslim communities with regard to race and class, which can have an impact on how they are perceived, the main problem with Rex’s model is on the issue of religion. As is well known many Muslim societies do not have a separation between church and state as most Western societies do. In Islam the basic belief is that the Qu’ran is the word of

Allah, and as such, Islam cannot be separated from the state as it serves as the guide on running both the state and people’s individual lives. As such, many would argue that Rex’s model is not feasible as it is based on false assumptions. The problem with this line of critique, however, is that it carries the danger of assuming all Muslims are in favor of having religion dictate all aspects of life. Just as there are many differences between Germans and French people, as well as many differences between Protestant Germans in Schleswig-Holstein and Catholic Germans in Bavaria, there are also many differences between Muslims from Turkey, which has been a strict secular country, and Muslims from Saudi Arabia, which has been a strictly Islamic country.

One of the findings of the Network of Comparative Research on Islam and Muslims in Europe

(NOCRIME), a group doing research on Muslims in Europe, is what it calls the essentialist approach to Islam and Muslims. This approach “involves a totalization effect: it mistakenly

36 takes for granted that all immigrants of Muslim origin are devoutly religious and observe all the principles of Islamic law in a fundamental way. It thereby overlooks the existing variations in

Muslim belief and practice resulting from the impact of migration, the fact that Islam is a highly decentralized religion, as well as the influence of the pluralistic environment in Western

Europe.”50 What is important then is to assess in each individual case how the issue of religion

of the minority community can be made compatible with the requirements of the majority

community, which can happen in a constructive manner, although this does not exclude the

potential for some conflict.

However, as Rex argues, conflicts about the exact demarcation of this division are not

necessarily detrimental; instead they are crucial in bringing groups together in a civil manner and

also in working out the boundaries of the private and public domain, especially with regard to

minority practices that are seen by the majority group as offensive. Discussion will need to take

place between the majority group on the one hand and the minority groups on the other hand to

come to a consensus on what practices should be tolerated and which ones should be banned,

examples of which are female circumcision, polygamy, arranged marriages, and the right of

Muslim girls to wear traditional head dress to school. Instead of these principles being laid down in advance, Parekh argues that “inter-communal dialogue is needed in order to reach a reasonable consensus.”51 Assessing the five principles of moral universalism, core values, no-

50 Among others see, Jocelyne Cesari, Islam, Citizenship and the Dynamics of European Integration. Final Report, (August, 31, 2003). http://www.euro-islam.info/PDFs/ICDEI_final_report2.pdf; Carolyn M. Wamer and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics, (September 2006); F. J. Buijs and J. Rath, Muslims in Europe: The State of Research. (New York City, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); F. Dassetto and G. Nonneman, Islam in Belgium and the Netherlands. Towards a Typology of ‘Transplanted’ Islam, in G. Nonneman, T. Niblock and B. Szajkowski (eds.), Muslim Communities in the New Europe, 187-218. (Reading: Ethica Press, 1996). http://users.fmg.uva.nl/jrath/downloads/@RSF%20European%20Research%20on%20Islam%20and%20Muslims.pd f. (Visited on 2/26/2007). 51Steven Vertovec, Migration and Social Cohesion. (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 1999), p. 19.

37 harm principle, human rights, and dialogical consensus, Parekh comes to the conclusion that

some of the principles that many in the West view as belonging to the category of moral

universalism are not as straightforward as one might think. He points out that there is a tendency

in the West to “universalize local values” and of using the language of universality to coerce

others into accepting these values.52 Issues such as autonomy and coercion can be defined in

different ways and can be reconciled with other important values in other ways. Prohibiting a

sane adult woman her demand for a clitoridectomy procedure in a free society touches deep

moral issues about how members of a society should live and are therefore not easily categorized

under universal values. On many of these hot-button issues, Parekh argues that, inter-communal dialogue will be the best way to reach dialogical consensus. In order to succeed, the dialogue needs to be bifocal, which means that the majority society will need to state its reasons why it finds a certain practice unacceptable in light of its operative public values (the constitutional, legal and civic values that represent a society’s shared or common values or public culture and define its conception of the good life), while the minority society will have to state its reasons why it finds the practice valid and why it should be respected by the wider society. Debating these issues will have, in addition to hopefully resolving the matter, an additional effect of stimulating debate both within the minority culture as well as the majority culture about its values and the boundaries of these values. Debate about these minority practices can thus have a transformative effect for all involved which will help all involved.

Rex’s model is one among many which deals with how a receiving country can react to

immigration. In addition to the multicultural- or pluralism approach, there are three other

important ideas for dealing with the issue of immigrants and refugees. These three approaches

52 Ibid, p. 23.

38 have been that of total exclusion, differential exclusion, and assimilation.53 Total exclusion

means the complete prevention of immigrants entering, which no highly-developed country has

succeeded in doing after World War II. In addition, there is the approach of differential

exclusion, or also called the ‘guest worker’ approach. This reflects the situation in which

immigrants are incorporated in certain areas, mainly the labor market, and denied access in other

areas, most notably the welfare system, citizenship and political participation. This situation

corresponds with the view that the foreign workers are not residents but temporary workers who

will return to their homelands. Although they receive minimal social rights, they are not granted

citizenship and cultural diversity is allowed, even encouraged, which will facilitate their eventual

return. Most Western European countries initially employed this approach. The final approach

is that of strict assimilation as represented by French thinking. Immigrants are granted citizenship regardless of ethnic or national origin, but cultural diversity of ethnic groups is not

encouraged.

Historical Context

Most authors will agree with the statement that these different approaches to immigration

are related to a country’s historical experience of state formation, of which a central issue is the

rules on citizenship. Although the issue of citizenship is extremely important and has many links

to issues of immigration, it would be beyond the scope of this literature review to deal with this

topic. However, a few words can be said about how a country’s history is an important indicator

of its stance on issues relating to immigrant incorporation. In general, in some nation-states the

dominant criteria for belonging are based on membership of an ethnic group or a cultural

53 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration. (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), p. 51.

39 community in order to preserve ‘ethnic purity’, of which Germany is an example.54 These

countries will usually employ policies of differential exclusion that will prevent the occurrence

of linguistic and cultural diversity that is seen as a threat to the cultural homogeneity it possesses.

In addition, there are nation-states that base their sense of belonging on a combination of

membership in the political community and sharing in a common culture, of which France,

Britain, and Holland are examples. These countries’ responses to immigration have varied from

the assimilationist model to the pluralist model. Finally, there is what is termed the pluralist

model of membership of the nation on the basis of residence. In these nations, membership of

civil society, initiated through permission to immigrate, leads to participation in the nation-state,

the examples of which are classical immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, and

Australia.

In sum, the most important thing one needs to keep in mind when studying these models

is that they do not exist in exclusion of one another. All highly-developed immigration countries

have at one time or another adopted aspects of the assimilationist model. Policies of assimilation

in specific areas, such as education or social policy, can co-exist with policies either of

differential exclusion or of pluralism in other areas, such as citizenship or cultural policy.

Australia is one such example, which has seen an evolution starting with differential exclusion,

progressing to calls for complete and rapid assimilation, moving on to ideas of gradual

integration, which has finally led to the adoption of pluralist models. In this light, it is important

that these concepts are not viewed as static, polar opposites that operate in exclusion of another,

but that they are seen as flexible models that are trying to deal with the issue of immigration.

Based on the literature review one can see how both concepts – assimilation and cultural

54Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter 1992-1993), p. 110.

40 pluralism -- developed as a response to a certain condition and as such were products of their time. Over time and as the external circumstances changed, these models changed accordingly in order to more comprehensively reflect contemporary trends. As mentioned before, the strict concept of assimilation initially developed as a response to the threats of the First World War and therefore must be seen in its proper context. Over time, and especially after the end of the

Second World War and the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the concept of assimilation has been transformed and is more reflective of the current globalization trends. It no longer requires immigrants to lose their old ethnicity as a pre-requisite for success in the new society. Similarly, the concept of cultural pluralism initially developed as a response to the strict assimilation demands that were prevalent during the First World War. Horace Kallen’s idea of a “federation of nationalities” must be seen in this light. In today’s globalized world, however, this thought of

a society carved up in separate and different entities is no longer feasible. Rex’s idea of a

separation between the public and the private domain is a good attempt to bridge the differences

between members of the immigrant community and the ‘native’ society by providing two spheres, one in which adaptation is required and one in which difference is accepted.

Conceptual Convergence and the Case of Holland

The notion that the concepts of assimilation and cultural pluralism do not need to be seen

as opposites can have important implications in developing policies on how to help integrate

newcomers into mainstream society. In the following section I will describe the history of

Muslim immigration in Holland. After describing the various waves of immigration, I will describe a way to measure integration by looking at various indicators, which will result in arguing against looking either exclusively at assimilation or cultural pluralism, but instead take aspects of each concept in order to deal with the challenges presented by large scale immigration.

41 Ever since the 1990s, which witnessed the rise of extreme right-wing parties, the issue of

integration has been a hot one in Holland. The terrorist attacks 9/11/2001 and the assassinations

of the popular politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 have only

increased the intensity of the debate. The issue of integration and assimilation was on the front

pages again in the fall of 2005 when it was assumed as one of the reasons why the Dutch

population voted against adopting the European Constitution.55 Despite the fact that Holland

historically has been one of the countries where there has been substantial support for the

European Union, dissatisfaction about immigrants’ perceived reluctance to assimilate and fear

that Turkey might be allowed to join the Union were some of the reasons why the referendum

did not pass, in addition to fears of loss of identity and the huge expenses associated with the

European project.56 Although the Constitution would not alter the structures of the Union

dramatically, many were afraid that by voting in favor of the Constitution, borders would break

down even more, which would result in large numbers of Muslims workers coming to Holland

and other Western European countries. The ‘no’ vote, therefore, was a significant blow to those

in favor of greater cooperation on the issue of foreign policy and immigration rules and signaled a clear message to the politicians in charge that more attention needs to be paid to those issue before the European integration process can move forward.57 And finally, the issues of

immigration and integration resurfaced again in November 2006 when in the national

parliamentary elections, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid), led by a populist

politician, Geert Wilders, who ran on an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim platform advocating

55 Information from the Times website at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-1637421_2,00.html. (Visited on 2/11/2007). 56Information from The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in The Netherlands. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl172_en.pdf. (Visited on 1/12/2007).

57 Information from The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in The Netherlands. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl172_en.pdf. (Visited on 1/12/2007).

42 the notion of prohibiting new Muslims from entering the country and prohibiting the building of new mosques in Holland, won nine seats.58 This election result occurred only a week after the

Dutch minister for migrants issues (minister voor vreemdelingenzaken), Rita Verdonk, also

called Iron Rita for her harsh stances on immigrant issues, proposed legislation to prohibit

Muslim women from wearing the burqa in public, which would make Holland the first country

with such legislation.59

At this point it is important to highlight the history of migration to Holland and its policy

responses in order to cope with the immigrants entering. Since the Second World War there

have been three main waves of migratory movements that have contributed to the creation of the

Muslim presence in Western Europe, and, specifically, the Netherlands. The first one started at

the end of the Second World War and ended in the beginning of the 1970s, and corresponded

with the mass arrival of workers from mainly the Third World in response to the reconstruction

of the European economy and the need for cheap manual labor in the postwar period. With

regard to Holland, it signed recruitment agreements with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal

(1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969), and Yugoslavia and Tunisia (1970).60

The first arrival of Muslims was thus the result of a deliberate policy of immigration drawn up between industry and the most powerful European states.61 These immigrants were supposed to

stay only as long as their work was needed; in other words, they were supposed to be temporary

workers, also called Gastarbeiter (the issue of temporary workers is being debated at the

moment in the United States, where many illegal immigrants are living and working. Some,

58 Information from the BBC website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6175956.stm. (Visited on 1/10/2007). 59 Information from the CNN website at http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/17/dutch.burkas.ap/index.html. (Visited on 1/10/2007). 60 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 105. 61 Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States. (New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 13.

43 including President George W. Bush, have argued for temporary permits to allow guest-workers

to come over and work for a certain designated period in areas where workers are needed, after

which they would return to their respective homelands). These mostly Muslim workers lived in

groups of their own in separate social spaces and their primary goal was to make as much money

as possible before returning to their homelands. They, therefore, made little attempt to bring over their wives and children. This first phase of Dutch immigration policy highlighted education, self-organization, and social work and this policy, which was in place throughout the

1960s and 1970s, could be characterized as both categorical, as it was spread out over several ministries, and ambiguous as it was simultaneously aimed at integrating immigrants and preparing them for return migration. The policy’s slogan of “integration without loss of cultural identity” highlights this as it was based on the assumption that the workers would return to their home countries.62

It is generally agreed that the oil crisis of 1973 signaled the end of the first migratory

movement.63 The economic downfall caused by the oil crisis forced a change of policy and led

to restrictions on the rules of migration. As a result, the legal status of these immigrants that

entered as temporary guest-workers became uncertain, as they could not leave the host countries

anymore knowing they would be allowed back in. Not wanting the risk of losing their jobs while

visiting their families in their home countries, many of them decided to stay and bring their

families over, which was still allowed under the notion of family reunification. In addition to

family reunification, this period witnessed an influx from former Dutch colonies in the

62 Lotty Eldering, “Multiculturalism and Multicultural Education in an International Perspective,” Anthropology & Education Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, (Sep. 1996), p. 323.

63 Among others see, Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States. (New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 13; Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons,” The Political Quarterly, Volume 74, Issue no. 1, (August 2003), p. 15; Andrew Geddes, “Migration and the Welfare State in Europe,” The Political Quarterly, Volume 74, Issue no. 1, (August 2003), p. 156.

44 Caribbean and South American, mainly the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam.64 Key points in

the new policy, dealing with the changed circumstances, were equal opportunities to Dutch

citizens and immigrants alike, no compulsory assimilation, no segregation and comparable social

and economic positions for all. This change occurred after the country’s initial policy had been

criticized for isolating minority populations. The policy shifted from ‘integration-while-

preserving-cultural/ethnic identity’ to an emphasis on reducing social disadvantages. The 1970s

and 1980s, therefore, constituted the second immigration wave, during which formerly split

families were reunited and immigrants from former colonies entered.

The third and final phase of immigration to Europe, and Holland, consisted of the waves

of refugees and asylum-seekers in the 1980s and 1990s. Many refugees from countries such as

Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, and later Somalia and Bosnia, came to the Western European

countries in order to escape the wars in their respective countries. This third phase witnessed

another shift in policy as well, which occurred in the 1990s. Policy emphasis was put on

citizenship and on integration of minorities into society, a process in which education and

employment were crucial. A focus on ‘integration’ policy replaced the previous focus on

‘minority policy’ which corresponded with the desire to stimulate the immigrants to become

active citizens. This emphasis on immigrants becoming active citizens was a result of the

criticism that had befallen the multicultural policies of the 1980s for “maintaining social distance

between immigrants and the Dutch, for contributing to social exclusion, and for not pushing

Dutch institutions to become more accommodating of newcomers.”65 For the first time this

included duties on the part of the immigrants, especially with regard to the social obligations of

64 Patrick Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), p. 119. 65 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 113.

45 citizenship. An example of this changed approach was the government’s decision to make

courses in Dutch language and culture mandatory for large numbers of minorities, especially for

those on welfare or those that received other benefits.

The patterns of immigration in Holland are similar to those of the other European

countries in some aspects, but also different in others. Like in many other Western European countries, most of the immigrants came in the 1960s when many workers were needed in the booming Dutch economy. There were many jobs that the indigenous Dutch did not want to do and for which immigrant workers were brought over. As mentioned before, in the early 1960s most workers came from Southern Europe (Spain, Greece and Portugal), but from 1964 on the vast majority came from Turkey and Morocco, although also some from Tunisia. In the same period many people left Holland and moved to mainly Australia and Canada in hopes of building a better life, transforming Holland into an immigration country, meaning more people entered the country than left the country.

However, the situation of Holland is also somewhat different from other Western

European countries, which is related to its distinct colonial history and the countries it controlled.

Whereas France witnessed large influxes from its former North African colonies, especially

Algeria, and Great Britain from its former Asian colonies, such as India and Pakistan,

immigrants that came to Holland came from a variety of places. While many came from

Northern Africa (mainly Morocco) and Turkey, Holland also witnessed a large influx of

immigrants from its former colonies such as Indonesia, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles.

Many people who had worked with the Dutch in Indonesia followed their employers when it

gained its independence in 1949, fearing they would be persecuted by the new government.

With regard to Suriname, which gained its independence in 1975, a rule was put in place that

46 allowed people from Suriname to automatically acquire Dutch citizenship. Many took this

opportunity and moved to Holland to make a new living.

The Dutch situation is also different because it is a very small country. It is the most

densely populated country in Europe. Its surface area is only 41,528 square kilometers; the

greatest distance from north to south is 300 kilometers and from east to west 200 kilometers. Its

population currently consists of 16.1 million people, which has tripled in the last century, from 5

million in 1900 to 10 million in 1950, up to the current number. These numbers are important

contextually because the effects of immigration are much more visible and tangible in a small

densely populated country such as Holland than in a large country such as the United States.

According to data collected in the U.S. Department of State’s Annual Report on

International Religious Freedom 2003, there are currently around 23 million Muslims residing in

Europe, which is significantly higher than the estimated 13-18 million typically cited and this

number accounts for about 5 per cent of Europe’s total population.66 If Turkey is admitted into

the European Union, the share of Muslims in Europe will increase to 90 million and 15 per cent

respectively. In addition, Islam has become at least the second-largest religion in 16 of 37

European countries and current trends indicate that the number of Muslims is going to keep

growing at a high pace. Importantly, the unique variable of religion and its relationship to the

state will increasingly become a source of discussion in ‘secularized’ Europe due to this

demographic effect. As a demographic group, most Muslims view religion as an important part

of their life. As discussed earlier, in Islam there is no separation of church and state as is normal

in the West. Most Muslims see some role for religion in providing principles of public order,

whereas the strict secularization trends in Western Europe have undermined commitment to

66Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2004), p. 26.

47 principles of faith and reduced matters of faith to the private realm, which could potentially

impact the assimilation process for these Muslim migrants.

The need for continued immigration related to one of the mentioned trends is the ageing

population in Europe. Until the end of the 1980s the main population growth in Holland and

many other European Union countries was natural increase but this has changed. According to

several European population forecasts, the native population increase will be negative within a

few years and in some countries, including Holland, this process has already started.67 In the

1990s, already Europe’s population would have shrunk had it not been for the many asylum-

seekers and immigrants who came to Europe. With regard to Holland, population growth has

been falling since 2001 and therefore immigration is needed to prevent the population from

declining. As the baby-boom generation is set to retire towards the end of the decade and since

fewer people have children, shortly the number of deaths will exceed the number of births. The

Muslim birth rate on the other hand is more than three times that of non-Muslims, which has

resulted in the average age of Muslims being significantly younger than that of the non-Muslim

population. Furthermore, estimates show that by 2015 Europe’s Muslim population is set to

double, whereas Europe’s non-Muslim population is projected to fall by 3-4 per cent. By mid-

century, Muslims are set to comprise 20 per cent of Europe’s population, which is projected to

decline by more than 100 million from 728 million in 2000 to around 600 million in 2050.68

These numbers are impressive and highlight the importance of the need for comprehensive policies in order to help facilitate the integration process of these Muslim immigrants.

Assimilation by the Numbers

67Destination Europe: Immigration and Integration in the European Union. European Outlook 2. Annex to the State of the European Union 2005. Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, (September 2004), p. 31. 68 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2004), p. 29.

48 To better grasp what assimilation constitutes, one can look at a number of indicators in order to determine to what degree a minority group is assimilated. These indicators include physical assimilation (do minorities live in separate neighborhoods), media coverage, language

(what percentage speaks the dominant culture’s language), intermarriage (what percentage of the minority marries someone from the dominant culture), how many ethnics are in government, the number of biased crimes committed against minorities, a community variable (what percentage of the minority population centers around a radical mosque), the duration of stay (what percentage of the minority is 1st generation, 2nd, 3rd, etc.), and the level of education. For the sake of clarity these indicators can be categorized into three headings, respectively: the behavior of immigrants (i.e. mosque visits, how many speak the dominant culture’s language), the behavior of the host society (i.e. media coverage of immigrants, the number of biased crimes committed against minorities), and indicators that reflect the interaction of immigrants and the host society (i.e. employment, political participation/office holders).

Behavior of the Immigrant

The first variable associated with the behavior of the individual immigrant is housing; specifically, are there ethnic residential concentrations. This is an important topic as there is a widespread fear in Europe for large spatial concentration of non-western immigrants as this is seen as an obstacle to their full integration and participation in society. This exact line of argument was put forward by Daniel Benjamin when testifying in front of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee on the growing radicalism of Muslims in Europe. During this testimony he argued that “[Europe’s] Muslim residents, many now citizens, live for the most part in ghetto- like segregation, receive second-rate schooling, suffer much higher unemployment than the general population and those who do work are more likely than their Christian counterparts to

49 have low-wage, dead-end jobs. Indeed, it is this marginality that helps explain the appeal of radicalization.”69 Many of the immigrants came to Europe during a period of global and

economic restructuring that was accompanied by declining employment in industry and

employment growth in the service sector. There is a lot of literature written on the issue of

spatial segregation. According to Saskia Sassen, immigration is directly linked to economic

restructuring and this would aggravate social polarization, especially in cities that figure in the

globalization process linked with economic restructuring.70 This ‘social polarization theory’ is

partly underwritten by Joseph Wilson who also argues that economic restructuring is linked with

progressive social polarization. According to Wilson, economic restructuring has created a

mismatch between the demand for and the supply of employment. This ‘mismatch theory’

implies that social polarization carries over into social segregation as well, which means that social polarization will lead to spatial separation.71 This development would lead to a further

separation of the poor population into ghetto-type neighborhoods and the more well-off residents

into the suburbs or in isolated gated communities. Others argue that the dominant social process

in urban areas such as London and the ‘Randstad’ in the Netherlands is professionalisation rather

than social polarization. According to scholars like Hamnett and Burgers, the mismatch between

desired levels of education and those offered at the supply side has resulted in an upward

mobility in all social strata, as the need for highly educated people will result in the entire

population becoming more educated. This view is supported by rapports by the Dutch Social

and Cultural Planning Agency, which has noted the rise in educational levels among second

69 Quote from testimony by Daniel Benjamin in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs “Islamic Extremism in Europe”. Information found at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/BenjaminTestimony060405.pdf. (Visited on 2/11/2007). 70 Rinus Deurloo and Sako Musterd, “Unstable Immigrant Concentrations in Amsterdam: Spatial Segregation and Integration of Newcomers,” Housing Studies, Vol. 17, No.3, (2002), p. 489. 71 Ibid, p. 489.

50 generation residents of foreign descent.72 However, the mismatch theory is not automatically applicable to countries with extensive welfare systems such as Holland. Welfare states like

Holland attempt to redistribute extensively to mitigate the social differences that might result from processes like globalization. A comparative study by Rinus Deurloo and Sako Musterd on immigrant concentrations in Amsterdam and other European and American cities showed that countries like Holland had less income inequality, more income redistribution and less poverty compared to liberal welfare states such as the United States, which reduces the risks of social polarization.73 Taking the United States as example in explaining the aggravating effects of segregation, Massey and Denton argue that large concentrations of underprivileged people heighten social and ethnic differences.74 The belief is that segregation gives rise to structural conditions which lead to the emergence of a counterculture in which having a good job, a good education, and a steady relationship are no longer dominant values. The resulting enduring negative influences of segregation are captured by two theories: stigmatization, which holds that stigmatizing the concerned neighborhoods affects the participation of the local residents by reducing their employment prospects and socialization, which holds that not enough good role models are available which will perpetuate the current problems.

With regard to Holland, researchers have shown that the fear of ‘ghettoisation’ in Holland is excessive. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the immigrants live in the four large cities

-- Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht (whereas only 12.5 per cent of the indigenous

Dutch population lives in one of these four cities while more than 40 per cent of the non-western immigrants live there, noting that in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, almost one third of the population is non-western) -- the level of segregation has remained relatively stable for the

72 Ibid, p. 490. 73 Ibid, p. 491. 74 Ibid, p. 491.

51 last three decades.75 The situation in Holland is no different from other Western European

countries where immigrants tend to cluster geographically in industrialized, urban areas. Fore example, two-fifths of Muslims in the United Kingdom live in the greater London area, a third of the Muslim population live in or around Paris (in the banlieues), and a third of the Muslims living in Germany are found in the Ruhr industrial area. A study conducted to compare the level of segregation between different cities in Europe and the United States showed that the level of segregation in Amsterdam is on average with respect to other European cities and low compared to American cities.76 With regard to Holland, immigrant concentration areas were mainly found

in the inner city and adjacent neighborhoods in the early years of immigration but today’s

patterns show their new position in the post-war sections of the city.

The study that provided these findings was based on information available through the

six-figure postcodes which divided Amsterdam into 17000 small postcode areas. Using

statistical formulas, an area was designated as a cluster if 21.2 per cent of the population in the

area was Moroccan or of Moroccan descent (6.4 per cent of Amsterdam’s population is

Moroccan; cluster amounted to four standard deviations above the mean (6.4+ 4*3.7)). The

study, which was conducted in 1994 and repeated in 1999, found that although the number of

clusters rose from 14 in 1994 to 18 in 1999, only about one-third of the Moroccans in

Amsterdam lived in one of the 18 clusters found.77 Therefore, two-thirds lived in more mixed

surroundings. The same method was applied to measure the living situation of Turks and

Surinamese and the findings were similar to those of the Moroccans. In the case of the

Surinamese only 12 per cent lived in one of the only seven clusters, which means that the vast

majority of Surinamese live in more mixed surroundings. Comparing the situation of Dutch

75 Ibid, p. 491. 76 Ibid, p. 492. 77 Ibid, p. 492.

52 cities to cities abroad, on a scale from high levels of segregation to low, the United States scores

the highest, followed by Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and

Germany. It would be interesting to further explore this difference in levels of segregation

between American and European cities but the focus on this work is on Muslim immigrants and

the levels of segregation in the United States mainly concerns African-Americans, and therefore

fall outside the scope of this work. These results seem to confirm the view that active

government intervention in areas like social security, housing, and health care is associated with

moderate social and spatial contrasts. In addition to the Municipality playing an important role

in the construction and management of housing, the Dutch central government has also been

important in providing immigrant families with rent subsidies.78 Despite this good track record, recent changes in the Dutch governments’ policies have caused alarm, especially efforts to reduce government intervention due to the high costs involved. Concern exists that this

development may lead to an increase of social polarization. Holland, just like other Western

European states, is experiencing difficulties financing the extensive benefits that are provided in

its welfare state. A reduction of redistribution could potentially result in increasing spatial and

ethnic segregation, which could hamper integration efforts. But based on the information

available about the current situation, the housing situation of immigrants in Holland is fairly

stable and does not show signs of increasing ‘ghettoisation’. Although the immigrants are

largely concentrated in the four large cities, they are dispersed within those cities. As the study

conducted in 1994 and 1999 showed, most immigrants live in mixed surroundings and do not

really cluster together in large numbers. In light of the larger integration process it is important

that budget considerations not result in large immigrant concentrations as this can have a

78 Alisdair Rogers and Jean Tillie, Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities. (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), p. 19.

53 negative effect on their integration prospects. Having immigrants be exposed to a mixed

environment can help them in getting acquainted with the culture of the host society, which can

help reduce misunderstandings and increase successful integration.

Another indicator which can provide information about the level of integration is how

many Muslims visit radical mosques. This is an important issue as some of the Muslims residing

in Europe are more radical than those in their home countries. Radical political parties like the

Turkish Grey Wolves, at times, have had significant support in Holland and Germany.79

Similarly, some Imams active in Holland are more radical than those in their respective home countries. The El Moumni affair and the massive support he received from young Moroccan boys after he was portrayed negatively by Dutch media for his remarks about gay people, shows the value of this indicator. In addition, the importance of these radical mosques lies in the fact that they have been an important location of recruitment of Islamists. A report written by the

Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), the Dutch Intelligence and Secret Service in 2002 warned that recruitment for the Jihad had become a serious problem that warranted a comprehensive approach.80 The report mentioned that recruitment often took place at radical

mosques such as the al Nasr mosque, the Anahmane mosque, and the one most often mentioned as an extremely radical mosque, the El Tahweed in Amsterdam. The report did note that mosques

were not the exclusive place where recruitment took place. However, mosques were significant

because many young Muslims visited them. Those sought in recruitment efforts tended to have

been mostly young, second-generation Muslims who are often searching for identity. Feeling

excluded by mainstream society, they are vulnerable to indoctrination by the recruiters.

79 Information based on Tenzin Wangmo and Demet Yazilita, Turkish and Kurdish Identity and Nationalism in The Netherlands. http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=grey+wolves+support+in+holland+and+turkey 80 Information based on the Dutch government website at http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/5012/AnnualReport2002AIVD.pdf. (Visited on 2/12/2007).

54 Furthermore, since they are often not very knowledgeable about the Quran, it is relatively easy

for the recruiters to provide them with their version of the true Islam. There are, however, some

difficulties with this variable. First of all, as said before, there is little data on the exact numbers

who visit these radical mosques, although it is fair to say that thousands of Muslims visit them.

The An Nasr mosque reports it receives between three and four thousand worshippers a day during Ramadan. This variable highlights the potential need for the central government to become active in regulating or engaging in a process of discussion over which imams are allowed to lead services at mosques. As is shown by the reports by the Dutch security services, in some cases these imams wield significant power over their constituents and it is therefore important that potential legislation concerning this issue receive attention and debate. While it will be impossible to appoint ‘acceptable’ imams, efforts can be placed in training imams to display more moderate viewpoints on issues dealing with integration, as discussed by Ramadan,

Masroor, and others who see integration as a mutual process which entails duties both for the majority society as well as the minority society. Of course, this is only one aspect of managing radical recruitment as the Dutch report notes there are many other places where recruitment often takes place. Alternative areas most often mentioned in the report were Islamic centers, coffee houses, and prisons. Therefore, in order to get a clear view on the issue of radicalization among

Muslims, information is needed not just on radical mosques, but also a much broader set of gathering spaces, which of course makes such reliable data more difficult to obtain and makes counter-recruitment efforts more difficult to employ effectively.

Behavior of the Host Country

55 A variable that indicates the behavior of the host country to the immigrant community

that is worth looking at is coverage by the national media. As is obvious in the era of ‘around the clock news’, the media are very powerful and they have the ability to shape peoples’ ideas.

With regard to the immigrants in Holland, the media have often portrayed Muslim immigrants in a negative way, which has contributed to the negative stereotyping. During the 1990s Holland witnessed the rise of various extreme right-wing parties that had anti-immigrant platforms.

However, negative rhetoric directed towards immigrants was not exclusively confined to the leaders of these extreme parties; many moderate public leaders, and especially the media, engaged in criticizing immigrants for not doing enough to succeed. This tendency to blame the immigrants for the many wrongs facing society caused the NVJ Bureau Media & Migranten to look at the portrayal of Muslims by the media. It looked at a number of foreign events such as the Rushdie-affair, the first Gulf War, the first World Trade Center Attack in 1993, and some domestic events, such as the El-Moumni affair, and the Ede affair and how these events were

covered by the domestic media and what its implications were for how Muslims were viewed.

When analyzing the media reports during the Rushdie-affair, the study showed that many newspapers covered news about Muslims in Holland in a biased way. A number of examples were given to prove this point. After a group of Pakistanis held a pro-Khomeini rally in The

Hague in 1989, Gerrit Komrij wrote in a column in one of Holland’s most respected newspapers that Holland had created wolves by spoiling the Muslims and not forcing them to work.81

Another journalist wrote that people ought to resist the Muslims who were developing into a fifth column and who were not loyal to the values of Western democracies. The First Gulf War was another big international event that highlighted tensions between native Dutch and Holland’s

81 Bart Top, “Moslims en Media Effecten; Internationale Conflictsituaties en de binnenlandse gevolgen,” NVJ Bureau Media & Migranten, p. 3.

56 Muslim community. Because many Moroccans in Holland sided with the Palestinians, who were

against the intervention, they were portrayed by the media as supporters of Saddam Hussein.

Many Muslims who were interviewed were asked suggestive questions about their ‘obvious’

support for Saddam Hussein and their potential willingness to conduct terrorist actions to support

his cause. Furthermore, these street ‘interviews’ were conducted with lowly-educated immigrants who had difficulties understanding the question and its implications, and who were not able to identify the manner in which the interview was set up. In addition, a popular weekly magazine, Aktueel, printed a story called ‘Arabs and their manners’ which showed pictures of people being beheaded in Saudi Arabia and other ‘Islamic’ atrocities.82 Around the same time,

the leader of the VVD, Holland’s liberal party Frits Bolkestein, gave a speech in which he stated

that integration was incompatible with maintaining one’s ethnic identity, which eerily echoed the

early 20th century’s Americanization movement’s strict assimilation demands. In this speech he

referred to the integration policy of the 1970s which mentioned that integration did not imply

giving up one’s ethnic identity. The speech highlighted a belief that had grown among many moderate politicians at the time that the integration policy needed to change, and should reflect

this ‘new view’ that integration could not be achieved while retaining cultural identity. This

belief had not grown independently but was related to popular dissatisfaction with Muslim

immigrants. Rather than face being thrown out of office by anti-Muslim voters, many

mainstream politicians adopted moderate versions of the anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim

platforms advocated by the extreme right.

The El-Moumni affair highlighted another way how Muslims were being portrayed in a negative way. It dealt with El-Moumni, a radical Iman who worked at a Mosque in Rotterdam.

He was interviewed during a segment on a news show that dealt with the issue of violence

82 Ibid, p. 5.

57 against gay people by young Moroccans. In the interview, El-Moumni called homosexuality a disease and used expletive language in describing gay people.83 This particular sentence was

repeated many times to demonstrate how out of touch the foreign imams were with the values of

Western democracies, but the part of the interview in which he explicitly renounced the use of

violence against gay people was never aired. Finally, after 9-11 there was a report in all major

Dutch newspapers that a group of nine young Moroccans in the town of Ede had been

celebrating the attacks out on the streets.84 After a week, the report had to be rectified because it was based on false information. The reported story had never occurred but the damage was already done, as the ‘Ede Group’ had become a household name already and became another symbol of Muslims’ incompatibility with democracy and its values. The report noted that there has been a pattern of portraying Muslims in a negative fashion. In addition, it noted that despite

the difficulty of measuring the exact effects of this constant negative reporting, insecurity among

Muslims about acceptance and respect could result in negative psychological and social

consequences. Some young Muslims who are already struggling trying to find their identity could embrace the negative publicity and join radical Islamic groups who oppose the West and its values. The situation in Europe seems to be especially threatening since most of the 9/11

perpetrators had lived and were radically transformed while in Europe. More than 20 of the

original people held at Guantanamo Bay were citizens of six different Western European

countries compared to only two U.S. citizens. Furthermore, since 9/11 European countries have

arrested 20 times more terrorist suspects than the United States.85 With this additional information in mind, it is imperative that the media portray events in an unbiased way and

83 Ibid, p. 7. 84 Ibid, p. 8. 85 Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2004), p. 33.

58 provide both sides of the story instead of highlighting a small segment and placing it out of

context. They need to be aware of their power to shape people’s perceptions and act responsibly

in their reporting since the dangers of not doing so can be great. As highlighted before, the issue

of perception as mentioned by Ramadan is very important in trying to create a positive

environment in which Muslim immigrants can adapt to their new society. Ramadan urged the

Western societies to change its perception of Muslims and shed some of the negative stereotypes associated with Muslims and Islam. The media are a very important factor in this regard because

of their ability to reach millions of people and help shape their ideas, and as such, a responsible

and unbiased media is crucial in helping to shape the outlines of the integration process.

Violence directed at the immigrant community is another important indicator of how the

host country manages the immigration process. The number of biased crimes committed against

minorities is a measure worth considering in this context. The data on this indicator is collected

by adding the separate reports filed by the 25 police regions according to a uniform procedure

pre-approved by the Dutch Intelligence and Secret Service in compliance with other European

Union member states. The importance of this indicator is that it is assumed that less racist

violence occurs in a country where the minorities are more integrated. Unfortunately, there are

some difficulties with this indicator, one of which is the definition of violence. It is not entirely clear what constitutes racist violence. How serious does a threat need to be before it is considered violent? Furthermore, often it is not clear who perpetrated the attack and how serious it was. When a racist slogan is spray painted on a wall, it is not clear if the attack was carried out by a member of an extreme right-wing party or some kid looking for attention. And related to this, an attack carried out by a group of Turks against a group of Surinamese can also constitute racist violence. A final problem is that of under representation. It is generally agreed that most

59 racist violence never makes into the reports because it is does not get reported. Despite these

limitations, the Anne Frank Stichting (Anne Frank Foundation) has compiled an annual Racism

monitor that documents and categorizes the amount and type of racist violence.86 The report noted that in the period between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s very few incidents occurred. Aside from an occasional fight, no violence was reported. This situation changed in the 1970s, which corresponded with the rise of the number of immigrants that came

to Holland. The 1970s saw a steady increase in the level of violence and witnessed the first

killing when a Turkish man (who could not swim) was thrown into a canal in Amsterdam.

During the 1980s, the level of violence increased and changed nature as there were more fights,

assaults, shootings, and arson attacks (mostly against asylum camps). This trend continued

throughout the 1990s, which also witnessed a rise in anti-Semitic attacks. It might come as a

surprise that in the last number of years as tensions have continued to rise, the amount of attacks

have decreased. Despite the fact that 60 per cent of the instances of violence in 2001 took place

after 9/11 the total number of attacks was lower in 2001 (317) than in 2000 (406). In 2002 and

2003, this decline continued with 264 and 260 reported instances of violence. Another

remarkable finding is that only a small percentage of the attacks are committed by extreme right-

wing groups or individuals, which implied that the vast majority of the attacks were carried out

by average citizens. This evidence is supported by the fact that for the first time in 25 years no

extreme right-wing party participated in the 2002 national elections. However, the absence of

extreme right-wing parties could have been related to the extreme popularity of Pim Fortuyn and

his Lijst Fortuyn, which captured the vote of many people who might have otherwise voted for

an extreme right-wing party. Data on 2004 has not been made available yet, although the report

86 Information based on the Anne Frank monitor website at http://www.annefrank.org/upload/downloads/monitor6.pdf. (Visited on 2/13/2007).

60 does make some comments about it, especially the aftermath of the Van Gogh murder by a

Dutch Moroccan. After the murder there was a huge surge in attacks, most of them directed against Muslims and Muslim properties (a total of 106), such as Mosques and coffee houses.87

There were also retaliatory attacks against native ‘Dutch’ targets such as religious schools and churches.

When comparing these data to other countries such as Germany, the number of attacks in

Holland appears to be relatively low. Despite the large difference in population (roughly 80 million vs. 16 million), Germany recorded 12,933 acts of politically motivated criminality in

2002 and 11,576 in 2003, many of which are directed against foreign nationals and carried out by young men belonging to extreme right-wing groups called ‘skinheads’. Data on the situation in

France is somewhat ambiguous because there is a lack of data collection in France about actual racist and anti-Semitic incidents. This lack of data collection corresponds with a lack of concern about these issues, which was highlighted by an opinion poll taken in 2003 in which the French public placed ‘racism’ midway and anti-Semitism last on a list of possible social concerns. The numbers that have been made public for 2002 show a total number of 1305 racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic acts and threats, 924 of which were directed at the Jewish community. The number dropped to 817 racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic attacks in 2003, of which 588 were against the Jewish community. The large number of anti-Semitic attacks goes hand in hand with the situation in Israel. The high number of anti-Semitic attacks in 2002 corresponded with

87 Information based on the Anna Frank monitor website at http://www.annefrank.org/upload/downloads/monitor6.pdf. (Visited on 2/13/2007).

61 heightened Israeli-Palestine tensions; similarly, increases were also recorded in 2000 as the

second Intifada started.88

It will be no surprise that reducing the number of biased crimes against minorities is

important for any government trying to help integrate immigrants. And while the number of

biased crimes in Holland compared to some neighboring countries appears relatively low,

continued efforts are needed in order to prevent these acts from occurring. Again, the issue of

perception of immigrants by the native population is important in this regard as well as the

reaction these crimes cause by the group affected, as a reduction of crimes could positively affect

the integration process of Muslim immigrants when they feel they are being accepted as equals.

Measuring Interactions

Another indicator that can be useful in trying to determine whether or not Dutch Muslim

immigrants are assimilated is to look at their social situation. By looking at unemployment

numbers, educational achievements, intermarriage numbers, language skills, and representation

in government, it is possible to get an idea of the level of integration and acceptance. Before doing that, it is important to determine the total number of non-Western immigrants. Information from the National Statistical Institute, Centraal Bureau Satistiek (CBS), shows that of there are roughly 1.6 million non-Western immigrants out of a population of 16.1 million; thus, about ten percent. The three largest non-Western groups are Moroccans, Turks, and Surinamese. The three groups mentioned together make up around two-thirds of the total number of non-Western immigrants. The exact numbers are from the CBS website: there are currently 314,699

Moroccans in Holland, 167,375 of which are first generation, and 147,324 are second generation.

There are 357,911 Turks, 194,865 of which are first generation, and 163,046 are second

88 Information from the European Union website at http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/eurobaromter/EB2005/EB2005-summary.pdf. (Visited on 2/14/2007).

62 generation. There are 328,312 Surinamese, 187,496 of which are first generation, and 140,816

are second generation.89 Since this paper deals with the integration of Muslims, most attention will be paid to the achievements of the non-Western Muslim immigrants.

The indicator of the level of intermarriage in Holland is fairly substantial. There are 3.5

million married couples in Holland and in around 20 per cent of them (750,000) one of the two is

non-Dutch. Two-thirds of the cases involve a Western immigrant and one third (250,000) a non-

Western immigrant.90 A closer look at these numbers reveals some interesting findings; one of

these is that there are very few marriages between a second-generation immigrant and another

immigrant. Part of the explanation is that the second-generation Turks and Moroccans are still

really young; 85 per cent of this group is younger than 20 years old. However, the ones that

have gotten married already overwhelmingly choose a partner from abroad (75% of the Turkish men, 50% of the Moroccan men, and 80% of Turkish and Moroccan women).91 One would

assume that the second-generation immigrants who were born in Holland and speak the language

fluently would opt for a partner in Holland, but the data show differently as a sizeable majority

chooses to bring over a partner from their home country.

Most first-generation Muslims have significant problems with the Dutch language. There

is not much exact data available, but many of these first-generation immigrants do not speak any

Dutch, or if so, very little. This is no surprise however, since these first-generation Muslims

came over in the seventies when the Dutch government did not have a cohesive integration

policy. As mentioned before, Holland as a country had experienced very little immigration

89 Information from the Dutch Statistical Institute at http://www.cbs.nl/nlcijfers/thempagina/allochtonen/1- cijfers.htm. (Visited on 2/13/2007). 90 Information from a report by the Dutch Statistical Institute called Allochtonen in Nederland 2002. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voorburg/Heerlen, (2002), p. 33.

91 Ibid, p. 35.

63 before the Second World War and therefore made ad-hoc policy decisions regarding immigrants.

In other words, its decisions regarding immigration were initially based on short-term

considerations. In addition to wanting to be seen as tolerant and therefore allowing generous

immigration policies in order to attract cheap labor, it did not acknowledge the need for a

cohesive integration policy as the immigrants were thought to stay only for a few years. The fact

that they were called guest-workers (Gastarbeiders) highlights this fact, and in this situation little

emphasis was placed on providing language classes.

While some progress has been made as a result of a more pro-active approach by the

government, Muslim minorities still perform worse in school than the indigenous population and

European immigrants. Studying the percentages of school children who graduate academic high

school and go on to higher education (college or university), the latest numbers released by the

National Statistical Institute show the following: the graduation rate is highest for Dutch children

(95%) followed by Western immigrants (92%). The percentage for non-Western immigrants is

83 per cent with Moroccans performing better (83%) than Turks (74%).92 Another education-

indicator is the number of drop-outs in school. Data show that the percentage of drop-outs is

significantly higher among non-Western immigrants compared to Dutch children (20% to 10%);

studies also show that the number of drop-outs is directly related to the parents’ education.

Children of parents who are higher educated tend to drop-out less than those of parents who have

a minimal education.

There are some hopeful signs as well, one of which is that immigrant girls perform well, especially Moroccan girls. They tend to drop out of school much less frequently than their male counterparts. Another hopeful indicator of the emancipation of second-generation children

92 Information from the Dutch Statistical Institute at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/cijfers/themapagina/allochtonen/1- cijfers.htm. (Visited on 2/13/2007).

64 is that a higher percentage of non-Western immigrants who graduate academic high school enter university than Dutch children.93 The immigrant children who graduate academic high school

and are eligible to enter university make more use of this opportunity than non-immigrant

children. A reason for this could be that these children are more aware of the career

opportunities a university degree will provide. Often they will be the first in their families to go

to university which could be a big stimulus. This trend is similar in other countries such as the

United States where Asian-Americans perform better in school than white-Caucasian Americans.

The increased graduation rate and success in the classroom has translated in increased

representation in the government. In Holland, the citizenship laws make it relatively easy for non-Western immigrants to get Dutch citizenship, which allows them to vote in national elections. Already in the 1980s, the Dutch government extended to immigrants residing in the

Netherlands the right to vote and to stand for elections in municipal elections in order to strengthen their legal position.94 In addition to strengthening their legal position, it made them aware of the Dutch democratic process of voting and provided them with an avenue to address their grievances. These policies have contributed to an increased representation of Muslims in

the Dutch parliament. There are currently 12 Muslims active in the Second Chamber (House of

Representatives) out of the 150 seats total.95 This number corresponds quite well with the total number of non-Western immigrants in Holland, especially compared to Germany where the

number is significantly lower. This is partly due to Germany’s ‘essentialized’ understanding of

national identity. Its exclusive definition of German citizenship has made it extremely difficult

93 Information from the Dutch Statistical Institute at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/cijfers/themapagina/allochtonen/1- cijfers.htm. (Visited on 2/13/2007). 94 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 115. 95 Information from the Dutch government website at www.2ekamer.nl. (Visited on 2/13/2007).

65 for the minorities to become German, although recent changes have been made that have made it

easier for the immigrants in Germany to become German. Germany’s citizenship law, however,

is still based on jus sanguinis, which means a person wherever born is a citizen of the state of his

parents.96 Thus, German citizenship is based on lineage, which has meant that some immigrants

who have been in Germany for decades still do not have German citizenship. This rule has

effectively banned them from participating in the political process and has deprived them from a

potential integration mechanism. Yossi Shain, who writes about the success of the Diasporas in

the United States where the citizenship law is jus soli which means a child receives its nationality

from its place of birth, explains the powerful incentives in allowing the various migrants the

chance to vote. According to Shain, allowing ethnic groups to organize is an important step in

helping them gain a place in their new society. In addition, he argues that “diasporic

mobilization has the potential to direct ethnodiasporan energies in ways that are conducive both

to the assimilation or reinforcement of basic American values, such as freedom and pluralism,

and to overall diasporic integration into American society.”97 In other words, allowing them a

voice in politics is an incentive for these groups to organize and to embrace the democratic tools

that are available to gain importance. In return, empowerment that would lead to gaining new

responsibilities will accelerate diasporic integration because it serves as a reminder of the

success of mobilization. Finally, these ethnic Diasporas can be used to export the democratic

values that they will have come to embrace and spread these values to their societies of origin.

With regard to Holland then, the representation of Muslims in government is fairly substantial

96Myron, Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” International Security, Vol.17, No.3, (Winter 1992-1993), p. 110.

97 Yossi Shain, Marketing The American Creed Abroad: Diasporas In The U.S. And Their Homelands. (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1999), p. 199.

66 although there are no Muslims active in the First Chamber (Senate), which seats one hundred

representatives. The importance of representation of minorities in the national legislature should not be underestimated. The notion that minorities have representation can serve as an indicator that they are accepted and that their voices are heard at the national stage. Holland’s electoral system, which is a parliamentary proportional representation (PR) system, allows for representation of many religious and minority groups and according to some political scientists,

countries that employ this system perform better in protecting minority interests and providing economic equality than presidential plurality systems.98

Unemployment numbers are another indicator of how far the Muslim immigrants have

come in the process of integration. The latest numbers available show a big discrepancy between

the native population, Western immigrants, and non-Western immigrants. The most recent

unemployment numbers for 2004 show that the unemployment percentage for the native

population was at 5.2 per cent. From 2000 on this number has ranged from 3 per cent in 2000 to

5.2 in 2004, the highest in 5 years. For Western immigrants, the 2004 unemployment number

was 8.3 per cent compared to only 5 per cent in 2000. The numbers are much higher for non-

Western immigrants: in 2004, the average unemployment number for non-Western immigrants

was a staggering 16 per cent and was higher among Moroccans (22.3 %) than among Turks

(13.7%). The numbers were higher compared to 9.3 per cent and 12.9 per cent respectively in

2000.99 These numbers are similar in other Western European countries where the

unemployment rate among Muslims is generally double that of non-Muslims. Partly, this

98 See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1984). 99Information from the Dutch Statistical Institute at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/cijfers/themapagina/allochtonen/1- cijfers.htm. (Visited on 2/13/2007).

67 difference can be contributed to a lack of education among non-Western immigrants. Holland is known to be a country where much emphasis is placed on a good education and a diploma can be seen as a prerequisite in order to get a good job. Another potential explanation can be that many of the first-generation immigrants receive welfare and do not work due to injuries sustained by working dangerous jobs with no adequate protection. Many of the first-generation immigrants were brought over to do the jobs that no one else wanted to do. Many of these jobs involved dangerous and exhausting labor for which the immigrants were not well equipped. There are many cases known where immigrant mine-workers were not given mouth caps and suffered bronchitis and other illnesses due to not being provided the proper equipment. Finally, research has shown that there are also cases of discrimination in the hiring process. At times, employers have tended to hire indigenous people instead of Muslim immigrants with the same qualifications. The implications of discrimination are dire as it can have a negative effect on the overall relations between the indigenous populations and the immigrants in a number of ways.

On the one hand, discrimination can reduce the efforts of Muslim immigrants to strive for a higher education because of the belief that they will not be able to get a good job anyway. In this context, the current unemployment numbers give no reason for optimism. It is, therefore, imperative that the government initiates policies to reduce the instances of discrimination in the hiring process because its implications can have huge consequences. Immigrants need to be convinced that they can get a good job with the right education. On the other hand though, it is equally important that the immigrants do their best to get a job in order to be seen as full participants in the Dutch economy. As said before, the unemployment numbers show that the non-Western immigrants are more often without a job than the indigenous population. In addition, one out of four non-Western immigrants receives some form of welfare, which is twice

68 as much as the indigenous population. Non-Western immigrants also apply for government

assistance much more. It should not come as a surprise that many in Holland are upset about this

situation. These factors combined partly explain the dissatisfaction felt by many about the work

ethic of many immigrants. They are viewed as lazy, not willing to work, and eager to collect their monthly welfare check. The main point of this indicator is that unemployment numbers and perception of immigrants are possibly related, which implies that a decline in unemployment might result in a change in the perception of immigrants. A pro-active government approach to help train immigrants in gaining the required skills needed for the labor market can thus have important consequences for the integration process.

Assessment of Indicators

Looking at all these indicators, one could argue that there is a mixed record when it

comes to the situation of Muslims in Holland. One the one hand there are definitely signs of problems with integration as highlighted by the growing popularity of anti-immigration rhetoric, the high unemployment number among Muslims, and the number of attacks against Muslims.

These tensions have only been accentuated with the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van

Gogh, which has further polarized the debate on integration. The attacks on Muslim targets after the assassination of Van Gogh and the retaliatory attacks by Muslims against ‘native’ targets were especially discouraging. Furthermore, the high unemployment number among Muslims has been interpreted by many as an indication that they are not willing to work, thereby forgetting that discrimination often plays a role in Muslims not being picked for a certain job. On the other hand, the numbers on physical assimilation, language skills, ethnics in government, and education are promising. The decision by the government in the 1970s to allow minorities to

69 vote in municipal elections has resulted in acquainting them with the process of voting in

Holland, which has resulted in the current representation of twelve Muslims in the Second

Chamber. Furthermore, despite the fact that Muslim minorities still under perform in the

classroom compared to the ‘native’ children, progress has been made. The differences in

graduation rates between Muslim minorities and the indigenous Dutch children have decreased

and trends indicate the differences to even further decrease. Hopeful is also the success Muslim women are experiencing in school, which is a sign of the liberalizing effect of education on

Muslim women. The results of the study on the housing situation of minorities showed that despite large concentrations of Muslims living in the four big cities, within these cities there is much spread. It showed that there are few real clusters and that most minorities live in relatively mixed surroundings.

There are those who will interpret these data differently and come to a negative

conclusion about the level of integration. One can point that the seeds of failure were planted

when the Dutch government made integration more or less voluntary in the 1970s. Based on the

understanding that these guest workers would return to their home countries within a few years,

no real comprehensive plan was set up to deal with them. When the government found out in the

late 1970s that most immigrants had no desire to return and wanted to bring their families over, it

quickly had to change its program to reflect this new reality. By then, it was too late already as

many of the immigrants lived in separate quarters where they had been able to retain their

customs and culture. The fact that many of the first-generation never learned how to speak

Dutch, due to both the fact that they came over at an older age and the fact that few language

programs were available, can explain the difficulties many second-generation immigrants are

feeling. While they speak Dutch fluently and have never lived anywhere else, they speak either

70 Moroccan or Turkish at home, which presents them with two different worlds. At home some of

them live in a traditional culture with strict rules and little freedom whereas outside the home they live in a liberal country with much freedom. To many this is a confusing situation that has resulted in identity struggles, especially in the light of perceived hostility by the native population. The high numbers of support for Pim Fortuyn and his anti-immigration rhetoric was

interpreted by many young Muslims that they are not welcome and this sense of alienation has

made them vulnerable to potential recruiters for political Islam, which in turn increases hostility

on the part of the native Dutch people. In this context, the report by Dutch intelligence and

secret service about the growing numbers of youngsters joining political Islamist groups is very

troubling. At the moment then, the situation can be assessed as being in a vicious circle of

action-reaction with no end in sight. Furthermore, the positive intermarriage numbers

notwithstanding, the fact that mixed couples end up divorcing in higher numbers than non-mixed

couples mitigates the positive numbers of intermarriage. Similarly, despite the fact that Muslim

children increasingly perform better in the classroom, they are still not up to par with native

children and the percentage of drop outs is twice that of native Dutch kids. In addition, the

number of attacks aimed at Muslim targets after 9/11 and the murder on Van Gogh showed a

level of hostility that was unheard of before in Holland. Having been portrayed as a tolerant

country, the vicious attacks that followed the murder of a filmmaker who routinely insulted

Islam and Muslims in graphic language displayed an underlying sense of hatred against Muslim

and taken together with the other indicators could be reason to alter this view of Holland as being

tolerant and replace it with that of a country which has shown no willingness to accommodate

and accept Muslims.

Conclusion

71 In the end though, I would argue that although the level of integration could be better,

there is room for optimism. When taking in mind that no real integration program was set up

until the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is no surprise that there are still difficulties. Many of the

Muslim immigrants are from Turkey and Morocco, countries that differ enormously from

Holland. Coming to a country like Holland from a traditional North African country is a huge

culture shock and it will take a few generations before this transition is made. Furthermore, since many families did not come to Holland until the 1980s, many of the second-generation

Muslims are in their teens or early twenties. Facing two different worlds compared to being at home in a conservative environment or outside the home in a liberal environment can obviously be confusing. This situation explains the popularity of radical mosques that cater to those who feel lost and are looking for identity. There is hope, however, that the third-generation immigrants, whose parents were born in Holland and who only know their home country from vacations will be more integrated because they will not be faced with this dual situation. This argument is similar to that of Gordon who also argued that it takes three generations before integration takes place successfully. The unemployment numbers and difficulties experienced in schools need to be seen in the same light. Many Muslim youngsters speak Arabic or Turkish when they are at home because their parents do not speak Dutch. As a result, they are not able to help them with their homework, which makes it no surprise that many Muslim children under perform when compared to native children. Again, expectations are that the third-generation will perform better in school although significant progress has already been made in the last decade.

Furthermore, this thesis suggests that it is imperative that the discussion on integration

change its tone. The insistence on complete assimilation is a big part of the problem. By forcing

Muslim minorities to assimilate, Dutch society may achieve the complete opposite. This is

72 exactly what Gordon talks about when he argues that there is a period of transition that is

accompanied by feelings of insecurity and unhappiness. Again, the value systems of countries

like Holland and Morocco or Holland and Turkey are very different and it takes time before

these different cultures can intertwine, if at all possible. It is true that integration in the 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States proceeded with seemingly less explosive potential but

this is partly related to the fact that many immigrants came from relatively like-minded

countries. The millions of immigrants who came from Europe did not experience the same

culture shock that Muslim immigrants experienced when moving from North Africa to Western

Europe. Another argument made both by Gordon and Thompson is that assimilation is not

always the end result of acculturation. Maybe the cultures of Holland and Morocco are too

different for complete assimilation to take place. One can pose the question whether assimilation

is a prerequisite to be successful in a different culture. Building on Rex’s model, there obviously

needs to be some integration, which relates to his insistence on acceptance of a single public

domain: speaking the language, knowing about Dutch culture and values are key requirements in

that regard. But by no means should Muslims be forced to give up their religion, values and

customs. As long as they are able to function in Dutch society, which includes the requirements

just mentioned, and respect the rules that apply in Holland, they should be allowed to retain their

own culture, which refers to Rex’s insistence on acceptance of variation in the private domain.

Related to this, the fear that Muslims will not be able to accept Holland’s public domain based

on its separation of church and state seems exaggerated. As shown earlier, the Muslim

population is very diverse, which thus undercuts assumptions that categorize different

nationalities based exclusively on their religion. This is especially the case since the Muslim

presence is only going to increase. Based on the many studies on the ageing European

73 population and lack of reproduction, immigration will be a necessity if the various European

countries do not want to experience shrinking overall populations. Based on some of the

estimates, which project the percentage of Muslims in Europe to increase to 20 per cent in 2050,

acceptance of Muslims becomes even more imperative.

Although much has been made of the attacks against Muslim targets by Dutch citizens, this should also not be exaggerated. Just as it was a culture shock for the Muslim immigrants coming to Holland, the same applied to the native Dutch people who were introduced to these immigrants who had customs with which the Dutch were unfamiliar. Within three decades, the

Dutch population has seen the number of Muslims increase from a few thousand to 1.6 million with no sign of this number slowing down. One also needs to keep in mind that the visibility of

Muslims and Muslim practices is much different in a highly densely populated country like

Holland compared to the United States, where there is still much land available. Holland is the most densely populated country in Europe and therefore immigration is going to be much more visible and problems will be highlighted much more than in less densely populated countries.

In sum then, I would like to assess the situation as being a glass half-full instead of seeing

it as half-empty. Although much work needs to be done by both Muslim immigrants and the

native population there is a common interest in the need for cooperation and there are hopeful

signs. Marjoor’s model of mutual integration will be very important in this regard, as both sides

will have to continue to learn how to live together since the current situation is not going to

change. The Muslim presence in Europe is a structural component of Europe’s future so it is important that both sides realize this and act accordingly. Instead of focusing on exclusively assimilation or cultural pluralism, the Dutch government should focus on those policies that can help the new immigrants function in Dutch society while being able to retain their ethnicity and

74 culture in the private domain. Most important is that both Muslim immigrants as well as the

Dutch government and the Dutch ‘natives’ do their share in making a multicultural society work.

Whereas the Muslim immigrants need to show a willingness to be able to function in Dutch

society, which includes learning the national language and its culture, Dutch citizens need to

show a willingness to accept the immigrants’ different ethnic and cultural background. Maybe the first government slogan will turn out to be the right one after all: ‘integration while retaining identity’ might prove to be the best solution to this extremely important issue.

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