Eastern Focus ISSUE 04 | Autumn 2020 A project by GlobalFocus Center, Bucharest

The West vs. the Rest: like a Rolling Stone

China: decoupling from the dragon

A (geopolitical) Europe missing in action

Democracy in intensive care

The World After Tomorrow Table of Oana Popescu Zamfir: Editor's Foreword______p.002 DISRUPTION / 006 DEMOCRACY AND RESILIENCE / 090 Contents Interview John C. Hulsman, global political-risk Adéla Klečková (Prague): Murder, blackmail consultant (Milan): The West should avoid and corruption - why CEE needs the Beatles’ predicament and become the Magnitsky Act______/ p.092 more like the Rolling Stones______/ p.008 Andrei Tiut (Bucharest): It's a tough choice Zsolt Darvas (Budapest): to hold elections during the pandemic______/ p.102 Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!______/ p.016 CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT / 108 Interview David Kilcullen, professor of practice, Marius Ghincea (Florence): This is Sparta! Insights from international relations theory into Arizona State University (Tempe): Warfare in the age of dragons______/ p.110 what the post-Covid world might look like / p.024 Liviu Horovitz (Zurich): ‘We didn’t think it was Alec Bălășescu (Frankfurt): Will computers decide who lives and who dies? Ethics, going to be a peaceful world’ - Brent Scowcroft and the world he helped fashion______/ p.122 Health, and AI in a COVID-19 world______/ p.034 Interview Ulrike Franke, policy fellow, Maria Pilar Lorenzo (Brussels): Human security carving itself out European Council on Foreign Relations (Brussels): ‘We are still in a world where military in a (post)COVID-19 world______/ p.048 power translates into geopolitical power. Interview Mathew J. Burrows, director of the If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, military capabilities’______/ p.128 and Risks Initiative (Washington D.C.): ‘Governments can band together in a fight Interview Samir Saran, President, Observer Research against China and authoritarianism, but Foundation (New Delhi): ‘If the EU fails, we can say goodbye to the liberal order’______/ p.136 the real threat is more from inside’______/ p.054 Interview Kuni Miyake, research director, About Eastern Focus Interview Parag Khanna, global strategy Canon Institute for Global Studies (Tokyo): advisor (Singapore): ‘Europe has no interest in A focus on Central-Eastern Europe, It is more than a trade war between decoupling from Asia’______/ p.060 the Black Sea and the Balkans, US and China, it is a hegemonic rivalry_____ / p.148 in a transatlantic key #EUROPEONWARD / 066 Bucharest-based English-language Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Istanbul): quarterly bringing regional voices, ideas Turkey and the quest for limited and topics to the great debates of today. autonomy from the West______/ p 068 Shedding light on regional developments. Srecko Latal (Sarajevo): EU can’t afford SPECIAL BRIEF: Anchored in democratic values. Delivered to lose the battle for the Balkans______/ p 074 Iran’s endgame - between straight to the movers' and shakers' Elsa Lilja (Brussels): Pandemic of discord. American sanctions inboxes across Europe, America and Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace and the Covid-19 pandemic globally. Connecting people across to slip through its fingers?______/ p 082 Ioana Constantin Bercean / p.154 geographies and thought bubbles.  Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020

Editor's Foreword

happens to a majority or to a wide minority, Trump is one half of The global pandemic then that is the sign of structural problems which need to be heeded, not brushed aside a deeply divided America dismissively as an accident of history. … of which Covid-19 that is here to stay. Indeed this is exactly what many of us, at least in Europe, hoped the four Trump is only a symptom years would prove to be, after the US 2020 elections result: an accident of history, lasting a painful four years, but now over and locked away in a Pandora box never to be opened again, discussed and tackled discreetly, with gradual and sometimes cosmetic measures, as per the political habit of the past many many years. Thank God it’s over, good man Joe will With the US elections still undecided as this now bring back some of the grace of the Obama years, even if article is being written, either way this goes, little else, and the angry pro-Trump crowds will be silenced. Donald Trump wins. And that is because the redhead reality TV star-cum-businessman The record turnout though lends implacable legitimacy not turned politician, whom all the quality media just to the result, but also to these crowds. From QAnon, to and ‘quality people’ mocked as a clown (albeit the white supremacists, the gun lobby, the radical pro‑life a dangerous one), is in fact truly an institution. movement, anti-vaxers, anti-maskers, they have spoken at the He is the embodiment of all the suppurating ills polls, they have exercised their sacred democratic right to elect that have been sapping at the root of America’s freely and very much within the rules of the democratic game, democracy, politics, society and standing in the they have made their choice following four years of intense world for decades, if not centuries. They have not debate and amid an equally powerful tide of anti-Trumpism, been unknown all this while; just unaddressed. which has also taken to the polls in high numbers. Whoever wins, there is no democratic argument that can be made that But this is not to say that Donald Trump the these huge numbers of people should not be properly heard, institution is inherently evil; the man may be, but that their claims should not be taken seriously and addressed this collection of realities that he gave a voice to is promptly by their newly elected representatives – even if in their not. In a democracy, people are sometimes wrong, manifestations during these four years and before they have but the grievances that underscore the options of often abdicated democracy, decency, reason and common Trump voters are real. This mood of dissatisfaction sense. Donald Trump did not create these realities; he has can be politically manipulated, a minority can be harnessed them and climbed on the wave – not as a leader, but radicalised, Russia can meddle, but if the same rather as a follower of public mood and thus he may be a toxic, pathogen agent, but to consider all those whom he represents © Photo by Steluța Popescu as such would be a terrible and antidemocratic mistake. Oana Popescu Zamfir @OanaPope

Editor-in-chief, Director GlobalFocus Center Trump is one half of a deeply divided America that is here to stay.

002 003  Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020

Much like the coronavirus. Just as toxic and itself. The fragility of our liberal system and the to how the West can kick back and stay relevant, following the ravaging, but equally not guilty of the realities underlying rule of law is the reason why Europe, Rolling Stones model to avoid the Beatles’ predicament. it has revealed, rather than created. From and specifically Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), the neglected global climate change and needs a Magnitsky Act, writes Adela Kleckova None of this is likely to happen though, unless the EU learns to flex the numerous warnings we’ve had about the (Czechia). Along the same lines, anthropologist some muscle and use its position as the (now increasingly sole) imminence of associated pandemics, to changes Alec Bălășescu (Germany/Romania) outlines flagbearer ofliberal values as its most powerful geopolitical weapon, in work routines and labour markets, from the ethical choices and dilemmas in a world says Samir Saran (India). The EU is in the difficult, but uniquely powerful gentrification, overcrowded cities and their perils, where the decision-making role of computers position to determine the course of East‑West competition, he says. to global supply chains, dependencies and value and artificial intelligence over our health and Geopolitical Europe is another prominent topic in this double issue of creation, from work-life balance to the lagging lives has turned overnight from a more or less Eastern Focus and ECFR’s Ulrike Franke (Belgium/Germany) explains behind of education and healthcare systems, we remote scenario to immediate reality. Hence, the to what extent this objective, declared at the onset of the von der are being confronted with everything we have very concept of security itself needs to evolve Leyen European Commission, stands a chance to become reality. known about but chose to look the other way. from outdated ideas of hard power, to a more Much like the ridiculous clown that Donald Trump encompassing notion of human security – so that Beside internal challenges and differences, the EU also finds itself often is (one of the reasons he’s been constantly our delivery instruments can evolve accordingly, without its prime ally, the United States, now caught between underestimated by ‘serious’ analysts), this virus writes Maria Pilar Lorenzo (Philippines/Belgium). democratic backsliding, economic problems, efforts to stem is not by far as deadly or contagious as Ebola or the spread of the pandemic at home, and external challengers HIV. Transmission can be stemmed dramatically China made a prominent comeback to the (aside from China, Iran will soon prove influential and the nuclear with just the observance of a few easy rules, like international scene when it started the pandemic. question will require a response from both Washington and wearing a face-mask and washing hands. Yet We look at this from every perspective: from Brussels, Ioana Bercean (Romania) argues in a special brief). to this day more than 1.20m people have died. the prospects of the EU reducing its trade Even worse, the EU finds itselfcaught in a quasi-competition and economic dependence on Beijing, via with the US in its immediate vicinity, the Western Balkans, The post-Covid-19 world will likely not be the possible - but improbable – relocation where Elsa Lilja (Belgium/Norway) and Srecko Latal (Bosnia suddenly different from the pre-Covid-19 one, of production to CEE, as shown by Bruegel’s and Herzegovina) show how when two argue, third powers just as life post-2020 US elections will not be Zsolt Darvas (Hungary), to how renewed focus (China, Turkey, the Gulf monarchies, etc.) may be the winners. radically different from what it was the day before on threats coming from the Far East, including The European vicinity is increasingly difficult strategically, as November 3. However, just as the record turnout authoritarianism outside Western borders Turkey’s bellicose behaviour takes on increasingly alarming among pro-Trump voters has (hopefully) made may blind us to the ‘real threat’ coming from aspects, projecting risks straight onto EU territory via the Eastern us aware that we need to stop treating them and inside – according to Mathew Burrows (US). Mediterranean, as described by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Greece/ the phenomenon they represent as marginal, the Turkey). Samir Saran, but also Parag Khanna (India/US) and current pandemic has revealed the deep global A wide-ranging examination of the nature Kuni Miyake (Japan) help us look at how Europe may diversify transformations that have long been piling up and consequences of the ‘West versus its partners in dealing with Asia - and China in particular. and have now reached boiling point, demanding Rest’ competition that stands to determine a a correspondingly courageous leap forward in completely new paradigm in global security We don’t offer too many answers. The world is still in crisis political, economic and geopolitical leadership. has taken us to review the beginnings of management mode and it is still early for comprehensive systemic recent-time interventionist America, with Liviu reform – though time is running out fast. This issue of Eastern We have chosen to examine in this issue of Horovitz (Belgium/Romania) looking back at Focus does claim though to offer a few solid paths to analysis that Eastern Focus those global issues – and their late Brent Scowcroft’s memories of the first should guide us in looking for solutions. Marius Ghincea (Italy/ regional relevance – that the Covid-19 pandemic Iraq War, moving on then to the present-day Romania) draws one possible IR theory framework for analysis has put in front of us with unprecedented Game of Thrones world shaped by ‘return from where the Peloponnesian War could not have been missing; clarity. Andrei Tiut (Romania) looks at how the of the dragons’ (Russia, China and others) but from geopolitical Europe, to China and the global powershift, essential pillar of our democracy, elections, can after an era of fighting different versions of to protecting liberal democracy in times of crisis, all other authors withstand the test of a pandemic and whether, ‘poisonous snakes’ (terrorists and insurgents), from around the world provide glimpses into the very near future. like so many other pieces of the democratic as David Kilcullen (US/Australia) puts it. puzzle, they can be turned against democracy John C. Hulsman (Italy/US) offers a roadmap 004 005 Disruption

Salvador Dali Geopoliticus Child Watching the Birth of the New Man

Interview John C. Hulsman, global political-risk consultant (Milan): The West should avoid the Beatles’ predicament and become more like the Rolling Stones / p.008

Zsolt Darvas (Budapest): Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast! / p.016

Marius Ghincea (Florence): This is Sparta! Insights from international relations theory into what the post-Covid world might look like / p.024

Alec Bălășescu (Frankfurt): Will computers decide who lives and who dies? Ethics, Health, and AI in a COVID-19 world / p.034

Maria Pilar Lorenzo (Brussels): Human security carving itself out in a (post)COVID-19 world / p.048

Interview Mathew J. Burrows, director of the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative (Washington D.C.): ‘Governments can band together in a fight against China and authoritarianism, but the real threat is more from inside’ / p.054

Interview Parag Khanna, global strategy advisor (Singapore): ‘Europe has no interest in decoupling from Asia’ / p.060

006 007 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview John C. Hulsman: The West should avoid the Beatles’ predicament and become more like the Rolling Stones

INTERVIEW John C. Hulsman, Milan on the march. They crack down on Hong Kong, they bully the Indian army along its shared Himalayan border, they cause trouble in Vietnam and the South China Sea. All these The West should avoid the Beatles’ moves suggest that they know that in the short run they have an advantage. Everyone is going to be preoccupied so they are going to be aggressive. The problem with being predicament and become more aggressive is that doesn’t change the longer-term problem that they have. The Chinese economy is 14 trillion dollars, like the Rolling Stones while the American one is 22 trillion dollars. The US is still by far the dominant economy in the world, while China is clearly second. By bullying all the neighbours, the Chinese are giving the United States a tremendous opportunity to gather allies both in Europe and in Asia, NATO plus the Quad basically, and a League of Democracies in the long run. If the

For the past fourteen years, In your latest book - To Dare More Boldly; The Audacious United States can husband together the resources of NATO John C. Hulsman has been the Story of Political Risk - you talk about the ‘butterfly effect’ and the Quad-plus (Australia, India above all, Japan plus the President and Managing Partner (where random events have outsized consequences), ASEAN countries) in a global League of Democracies, the of John C. Hulsman Enterprises (www.john-hulsman.com), and quote the British prime minister Macmillan – US will be in a perfectly good position. The Chinese have an a prominent global political “Events, dear boy, events.” Do you see COVID-19 in such immediate, fantastical advantage, but they are overplaying risk‑consulting firm. Presently, John is also the widely-read a disruptive manner for the international order? What that, because they don’t see the strategy behind things. John C. Hulsman senior columnist for City AM, the trends, new or old, would you expect to accelerate? newspaper for the city of London. Is Donald Trump the right steward and the ideal Dr. Hulsman is also a life member of the US Council on Foreign Going into COVID-19, there was a 20-year pattern, a builder of a League of Democracy? The concept is an Relations, the pre‑eminent US generational pattern of a poker game between the old one – it was used by John McCain in his 2008 foreign policy institution. The Europeans, the Chinese and the Americans. The Americans campaign, now it’s being embraced by Joe Biden author of all or part of 14 books, Hulsman has given over 1540 were the richest people at the poker table, the Europeans as a core concept of his foreign policy. interviews, written over 790 articles, were the oldest player, while the Chinese were the up-and- prepared over 1330 briefings, and comer. And every year in the game the Chinese tended The easy answer is that he is not the right guy. I delivered more than 540 speeches on global political risk and foreign to win, the Americans broke even and the Europeans am unique among the people you are going to policy for blue-chip corporations lost for a variety of reasons. Now with COVID-19 you see interview. I neither love or hate Trump. Most analysts and governments around the all the cards thrown up in the air. The question is who love or hate Trump. It gets in the way of their world, making a name for himself as an uncannily accurate predictor plays them fastest and best. COVID-19 was a disruptive analysis. I don’t love or hate the people I analyse. of global geopolitical risk (and event to a very routinised and predictable pattern. I analyse. As a disruptive force, Trump has done reward) in our new multipolar era. In recognition of this, Hulsman some good things. It has forced the Europeans to presently sits on the Editorial Crises don’t tend to make things new; they tend to clarify pay more money for NATO. I was polite to Europeans Board of the prestigious Italian things that are already going on. China has already been for 20 years. How much progress did I make? Thank Foreign Affairs Journal, Aspenia. His most recent work, the best- rising, but now that it’s getting through COVID-19 quicker, you for laughing. Zero. Trump made good inroads in selling To Dare More Boldly; it has a first-mover advantage. It got hammered in the first Central and Eastern Europe. That’s a good thing. Trump The Audacious Story of Political quarter but it’s coming out now, whereas the Americans and got most of the Americans to see China as the next Cold Risk, was published by Princeton University Press in April 2018, and the Europeans are going to be hammered in the second War enemy. That’s an incredibly important historical thing. is available for order on Amazon. quarter. So in the short run, the Chinese have the freedom When I left Washington everybody was pro-Chinese. to act while all their enemies are preoccupied. So what do When I go back everyone is a hawk. Trump is the the Chinese do? They are going to settle their unfinished catalyst in that change. All that is to the good. business, because no one is going to stop them. China is

008 009 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview John C. Hulsman: The West should avoid the Beatles’ predicament and become more like the Rolling Stones

Saying that, given that world I just competition? Should we start planning better to have friends with described, smart realists have always in terms of the resilience of the West? disagreements than be To unite the West we need to said that institutions can be a force What initiatives should be contemplated surrounded by people who multiplier for power. Hard realists don’t for strengthening the West? don’t see the world as we do, find ways to get the Europeans think that. Of course, institutions should and normatively are against it. be used as power maximisers. NATO and That is the question. We have to remember interested in a common the Quad are two great examples. This what unites us, and not necessarily the Second point, the US needs nuanced argument is what separates obvious things that divide us. We need to go to be agnostic about Europe. position that says, yes, you can realist internationalism from isolationism back to first principles. We are democratic. Through COVID, Europe has and unilateralism. So no. It disturbs me When we see what the Chinese are doing yet another navel-gazing commercially do things with China that he spends all his time insulting our in Xijiang province with a million people in exercise about what it is: is it friends. It disturbs me that he doesn’t concentration camps; when we see the door a Hamiltonian state? (which given certain limitations, but see that it is in America’s interest – if you closing on freedom in Hong Kong, where I think it will never be, given really are ‘America first’ – to work with they totally neutralised the agreements its history) is it a Jeffersonian let’s be very careful not to sell the as many natural democratic allies as made in 1997 to the British and where the confederation? (that might be humanly possible. He is very useful on ‘two systems, one country’ mantra falls possible) or a free formation strategic silver and pay the butcher. pointing the finger at China, but to best apart; when we see the way they threaten of nation states? That isn’t China you need a different kind of leader. the Taiwanese for nearly having democratic our concern. That’s up for For this reason we need common elections; when we see them throwing their Europeans to decide. The On the other hand let’s not assume that weight around in the South China Sea; when more the US meddles in that, standards against Huawei. We that is a Wilsonian democrat who doesn’t they ignore international ruling and treaties the worse we will do. Obama understand the power realities of the that don’t suit them, or trying to bully the overdid it with Brexit by didn’t let the bloody KGB run the world at all. Talking shops are no good if democratic Indian state – this is all part of a saying we will never support they are talking shops. If they maximise larger pattern. Yes, I am a realist; there are Brexit; that didn’t help the telephone network in the 1980s, power and reach common decisions times when you have to engage authoritarian cause. And Donald Trump that suit people’s interests, then they are countries, when you have common interests overdoes it by saying ‘I hate why should we let Huawei in the good. Joe Biden has his own problems you have to do things with them. However, everything the EU does’. to deal with. More importantly for him, he values do matter. In the West we share That doesn’t help either. We British network now? has a real record of weakness on China. a certain way of looking at the world: need to say that because He has been part of the old pro-Chinese individuals matter, the state doesn’t dominate we share democratic norms, that’s up to you. What is consensus, and this is going to come everything, we have free internal elections up to us is that – whether Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, or to bite him, and I imagine Trump will where people make the decision, when I free nation states – we will work with you. We want to spend a lot of energy on that. Frankly mention Thomas Jefferson is a common work with you: we share interests, we share values. neither of them is ideal for the world point of reference, when we say democratic, we are living in. But it is up to those of we broadly mean the same thing. This is a In Asia it is much easier because the Chinese are throwing us across the party lines that see that tremendous amount in common, and it puts their weight around. I would argue that we are in a better the League of Democracy is the future us on the side of the Hong Kong protesters, strategic position in Asia than Europe because, with the to band together for this argument, on the side of the Uighurs, on the side of Chinese doing all these things, the outcome is that our and take someone who is not a natural the Indians, on the side of the Hague Court new best friends are the old best friends. We are closer ally and convert him to this idea. ruling on the law of the sea. It puts us all to Japan, Australia and India (that is the key to the region) on the same side on all these policy issues. than we have ever been. This happens not because we How can the West be re-invented as Let’s take a deep breath and remember: are nice guys, but because the Chinese are behaving a geopolitical & geo-economical unit for as annoying as a NATO meeting can like a neighbourhood bully and an offshore balancing for a world shaped by great-power be – and God, they can be annoying – it is friend is always better than the bully next door. Even the

010 011 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview John C. Hulsman: The West should avoid the Beatles’ predicament and become more like the Rolling Stones

ASEAN countries that are not democratic, like Vietnam, very stable, very happy band, and everything we keep calling meetings with the Quad in “Events, dear are doing things with us because they are aware they’re was great from about 1965 to 1967, when they Asia and demanding people work together. next door to a very angry and a very brutal neighbour. did their best work – they do Rubber Soul, But we are angrier as we do it, hence the boy, events.” Revolver and Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Trump phenomenon. We keep grinding Harold Macmillan and John To unite the West we need to find ways to get the Europeans Club Band. The reason everything worked so everyone up, we are resentful, they are Kennedy had totally different histories, and that explains their interested in a common position that says, yes, you can well was that the system was stable. George resentful. Eventually this is what happens different points of view. I have a commercially do things with China given certain limitations, Harrison got two to three songs, Ringo got with Paul McCartney. Increasingly, Paul historical approach to political but let’s be very careful not to sell the strategic silver and one, with everything else being Lennon/ finally says in 1970 – I’ve had enough, I am risk, as opposed to most of my competitors that have a more pay the butcher. For this reason we need common standards McCartney originals. Everybody was happy going my own way – Make Paul Great Again. political science approach. against Huawei. We didn’t let the bloody KGB run the telephone with that system. That system began to History is the experience of network in the 1980s, why should we let Huawei in the British break down because George Harrison got George Harrison is China in this scenario. lived life, the way we’ve lived in society since time began, network now? Given the Chinese situation, we need Europeans better and better, John Lennon lost interest He can’t understand why, despite his meaning it’s empirically based to play a role there. Europe is great with trade. This Cold War and Paul McCartney was resentful for increasingly dominant position, he still on how humans actually behave. will be much more about trade, about standards, things that are being the force holding the band together was not being given real opportunities So here is a man whose entire cast of life was shaped by Balliol European strengths. At the same time, Europe has a tradition when it frankly would do other things. to rise in the Beatles’ system. He soon College, Oxford and WWI (of of being involved in Asia. We need Europeans to do more in becomes resentful and distrustful, and the 28 students who were in his year at Balliol, only one other a global way. If we do all these things, and at the same time In a very short period of time, between after a while he says I don’t like the system classmate survived the Great work on a free trade deal (here Biden would be much better 1967 to 1970, the whole thing breaks up. anymore, it doesn’t give me room to War), and he has this gloomy than Trump) – a version of TTIP with Europe uniting Europe and What makes it a great metaphor is to put grow so I want out. So by the time we hit view of human affairs; Kennedy, on the other hand, has this WWII the US at last – this will put the West in a much better position. geostrategic realities in that. What does the the ’70s, they all want out for different rationalist can-do kind of mind- The worst thing Trump has done was getting rid of TPP. We world look like today? If the global ordering reasons, and the system breaks down. set. They got along really well: had a brilliant trade deal with all of Asia who was united in an system is the Beatles, then they were both intellectuals, both had a sense of humour, anti-Chinese, pro-free trade, pro-American position, and we John Lennon is Europe We are at this key moment had fairly decent lives, but when threw it away. Easily the worst thing we’ve done. We need to go utterly preoccupied with Europe at about 1968 in this Macmillan says to Kennedy, what back to first principles, and resurrect those alliances and link himself, with Yoko Ono, with analogy, the system hasn’t do you worry about, Kennedy the rationalist said he worried about that world together. We need to remember that we have each his past, wanting to get out is doing broken down yet, but the deficit and nuclear weapons other. If we do all those things, that is an agenda for a Harry from the tours around the nothing new has taken – things with numbers, political a pretty good science stuff. Kennedy was Truman-style presidency and that is what we need back – a world – neo-isolationist, its place. One of the scared of the known. Macmillan, transformative presidency policy that will resurrect the West. self-involved, and not very outcomes is that things on the other side, is a historian helpful. When I go to Germany impersonation break down, and we have and says, “I worry about the events, I worry about the things You are always the best in crafting gifted metaphors I talk to them about China; naked jungle-living great- I don’t know are coming, I worry to explain visually key geopolitical predicaments. So they are polite, but they are of John power competition. But about the unknown.” COVID-19 is let’s discuss a bit the implications of the Beatles vs. more interested in the future there is another model, the the greatest example of that. Rolling Stones as alternative futures for the West. of the EU, how do we get Lennon. Rolling Stones – a system off our knees economically, that evolves over time to The problem with foreign policy is that you have to know in what what we are going to do change to the power reality. system you are – is the system stable, and how is the power with the French – that’s what drives them. Originally, under Brian Jones, the founder working in the system? Rather than talking about what in IR we They are not driven by China, it’s a longer and original leader of the Rolling Stones, the are calling Waltzian systemic analysis (I am bored even saying term issue. Europe is doing a pretty system was unipolar. He was the manager of that), instead it seemed to me more interesting to talk about the good impersonation of John Lennon. the band, he picked the other band members breakup of the Beatles, as a cautionary tale for today’s Western and the profit places. But that didn’t work world as a whole, and the rise of the Rolling Stones. We all On the other hand, the US is a harassed because he didn’t write the music, and understand the story and you can visualise it. The basic point is Paul McCartney. We keep calling NATO was increasingly incapable of sustaining that the Beatles in a very short period of time went from being a meetings demanding more from people, performances because of alcohol and drug

012 013 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview John C. Hulsman: The West should avoid the Beatles’ predicament and become more like the Rolling Stones

problems. Over time the band evolves into Asian world, to the greatest single power The good news is that Europe is kind of the key power, along a multipolar power triumvirate of Jones- still in the world – the US. That is a strategic with a rising Asia. If the US and China are by far the two dominant Jagger-Richards, not much liking each other, threesome that has the dominant power to powers, certainly who scrambles for allies matters immensely. but working together. That doesn’t work sustain itself in terms of global governance Does the Quad emerge as a Chinese or a pro-American group, or either, so Jagger and Richards ruthlessly – if it wants to. It is a duty thing. But if it does is it neutralist? More importantly, does Europe maintain its pro- get rid of Jones. A month later, he dies that instead of the Beatles’ outcome, we are Western, pro-American and trans-Atlantic outlook, meaning that mysteriously in his swimming pool, but now going to end up like the Rolling Stones. it is broadly anti-China and broadly pro-America? If it does that, the system has lasted for 50 years as the that’s enough power in the group to dominate. But if it is neutral, band was able to adopt a power relationship You’ve lived in Europe for the past 15 which Europe could well be given what’s going on, then we are that mirrors its basic creative forces. Richards years. You’ve seen the weaknesses living in a very different world. Given the structural position, and Jagger are the creative powers of the and the strengths, the debates without Europe has a real say in what kind of world we are living in. band, and they have been since 1969. The end, the cleavages between North power and the reality of who does what and South, East and West. Can Europe An agenda is the same, and when that is the case, become structurally ready for a for reviving The interview was conducted by the system works. So I would argue that a more great power-centric world, and Octavian Manea the West

League of Democracies linking Europe (while become ready to go beyond a Steven “First, it must re-engage the in relative decline, still important and viable) Pinker belief in the ‘Better Angels of emerging market powers – on new terms that actually reflect to up-and-coming powers like India and the Our Nature’ strategic mindset? today’s changed multipolar global geopolitical and macroeconomic realities. It must forge a new global democratic alliance with rising regional powers, connecting itself more substantially to South Africa, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, and India. The single greatest strategic challenge for the next generation is determining whether the emerging regional democratic powers can be successfully integrated into today’s global order.

Second, the West itself must be bound together anew; Lennon- McCartney must recommit to the band, in this case the project of serving as the ordering powers in an increasingly factious world. The common grand strategic project of enticing the emerging democratic powers into becoming stakeholders of the present international order can serve as a large portion of the glue that relinks Britain, Europe and America.”

Excerpt from To Dare More Boldly; The Audacious Story of Political Risk published by Princeton University Press, 2018.

014 015 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Zsolt Darvas: Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast! Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!

By Zsolt Darvas | Budapest

estern European imports from central Europe have fallen W dramatically, while imports from China fell much less, and had already recovered to pre-COVID level by April 2020. Central European governments should instigate new measures to foster the transition towards knowledge-intensive economic activities.

The COVID crisis caused a major setback to second quarter of 2020 compared to the global value chains (GVCs), can call the Foreign trade facts global trade and disrupted the functioning same quarter of the previous year, the benefits of globalisation into question, disappoint relocation hopes of global production networks. From the steepest decline on record according to and might prompt companies to bring perspective of Central, Eastern and South the World Trade Organisation. Almost their suppliers closer. For Western However, recent trade data paint a sobering Eastern European (CESEE) countries, half of global trade is composed of European producers, the CESEE region picture of such hopes: the imports of the first this has raised the hope that Western intermediate goods for production, would be a natural place to relocate fifteen European Union member countries European manufacturers will bring their and there were companies in Europe their suppliers due to its geographical (EU15) declined the most from the CESEE suppliers from East Asia closer, potentially and elsewhere which did not receive closeness. Relocation would boost region, while imports from China had reverted boosting investment in CESEE. essential intermediate inputs for investment in CESEE, which in turn back to their 2019 level by April 2020, the latest production during the height of the could speed up the recovery from available data at the time of writing (Figure 1). The volume of merchandise trade is COVID crisis. Such disruptions to global the corona-recession and support Imports from CESEE declined by a shocking expected to drop by almost 20% in the trade and global production networks, or medium-term growth and jobs. 35%, while within the EU15 imports (such as

016 017 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Zsolt Darvas: Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!

Figure 1: EU15 imports from different regions, euro billions at current prices, seasonally adjusted, 2019 average = 100 What can we make of these developments?

First, the limited fall and the quick rebound of EU15 imports from China is really remarkable, given that the economic activity and total imports of the EU15 was much lower in April 2020 than on average in 2019. Perhaps imports from China in April 2020 partially replaced imports from other countries suffering from COVID‑related lockdowns. The rebound of imports from China suggests that East Asian supplier problems were short-lived; and from the perspective of disrupted supply chains, there is not much justification to relocate suppliers from East Asia to Europe. The adverse public health situation due to COVID-19 was addressed quickly in China, allowing suspended production and shipments to restart – and faster than in Europe. Such rapid Source: author’s calculation, using bilateral trade data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics dataset (accessed on 6 August 2020), which includes US dollar values. Average euro/US dollar exchange rates from Eurostat were control of the epidemic in China might even used to convert USD figures to euros. The euro values were seasonally adjusted using the X12 method. reinforce the reliability of Chinese suppliers. Relocation would Note: EU15: first 15 members of the European Union. CESEE13: the 13 countries that joined the EU in 2004-2013.

Second, while the CESEE countries are boost investment in geographically close to consumer markets in the EU, they are still very far away for the CESEE, which in turn value chains of some goods that are produced German import from France and French import major increases, while others declined; in China. For instance in ICT goods, the value could speed up the from Germany) declined by 30% on average by however, several intermediate goods chain is predominantly East Asian, so moving April. EU15 imports from the United States and categories gained or did not suffer much certain intermediate inputs from China to recovery from the Japan declined by about a quarter. The decline from April 2019 to April 2020. The highest Europe would mean getting closer to the of EU15 imports from China had already started increases in April 2020 compared with the consumer but farther away from other suppliers. corona-recession and in February 2020, earlier than from the rest of same month last year were recorded for Replicating whole value chains in Europe the world, given that COVID-19 hit China first. automatic data processing machines (+€884 seems to be a difficult and costly task. support medium-term Yet even at the lowest point in March 2020, the million, +33%), articles of apparel of textile EU15’s imports from China was ‘just’ 16% lower fabrics (+€129 million, +36%) and electronic Third, the lower decline of EU15 imports from growth and jobs. than on average in 2019, while in April 2020 tubes, valves and related articles (+€92 million, the United States and Japan than from CESEE it had returned to the same level as in 2019. +12%). (Textile articles include COVID-19 related suggests that distance to Western Europe is not the primary products, such as textile face masks, surgical determinant of trade flows, even in times of lockdowns and trade Among the 13 CESEE countries, Slovakia masks, disposable face masks and single use disruptions. The product composition of trade seems to be a was hit the hardest by its exports to the EU15 drapes). The largest decreases in absolute more important factor. This again highlights that the geographic almost halving. Romania was the second terms were observed for imports of footwear proximity of CESEE to Western Europe should not be overrated. hardest hit, followed by Hungary and the (-€254 million, -52%), telecommunications Czech Republic with about 40% export losses. equipment (-€232 million, -6%) and baby Fourth, the extent of trade losses depends on the sectoral and At the other end, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania carriages, toys, games and sporting goods product composition of exports to EU15, including the mix of suffered from ‘just’ about 15% trade losses. (-€225 million, -28%). Other intermediate intermediate and final products. It seems that CESEE countries production inputs such as pumps, which are more integrated into Western European production The composition of EU imports from China compressors, fans, electric power machinery networks, such as Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, suffered from shows that some product categories saw and parts, motor vehicle parts fell less. larger declines in exports. Since the bulk of exports includes

018 019 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Zsolt Darvas: Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!

manufacturing products, export decline should instead of building such supply chains as replaced by higher value-added and higher The rebound of coincide with industrial production decline. Korea and Taiwan had to do over a long period technological-level production. The IMF study Indeed, industrial production fell the most (by of time, since these countries developed mentioned above finds unfavourable results for imports from China about one third) from May 2019 to May 2020 themselves before the GVC era. Joining most CESEE countries, by analysing Germany’s in Slovakia, Hungary and Romania among GVCs since the mid-1980s has allowed less auto supply chain: for the Czech Republic, suggests that East Asian EU member states, according to Eurostat. developed countries to embark on a faster-track Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the contributions This suggests that greater participation in development, specialising in certain tasks. of high and low technological-level sectors supplier problems were European value chains exposes an economy to remained broadly the same between 2000 and greater variation in production, with associated A recent IMF study concludes that it is GVC- 2013, suggesting there had been no moving short‑lived; and from the consequences for employment and GDP growth. related trade, rather than conventional trade, up on the value chain. For Romania, in contrast, which has a positive impact on income per there has been a shift away from low-tech to perspective of disrupted Fifth, as industrial production recovers, so capita and productivity, more high-tech manufacturing. does trade. Eurostat data shows that industrial even though such gains As regards non-EU countries, supply chains, there is production started to recover from April to appear more significant The region’s the study finds that China’s May 2020 since lockdowns were eased, and for upper-middle and contribution to the German not much justification to is expected to recover further in subsequent high-income countries. advantage as auto supply chain is showing months. At the time of writing, the latest bilateral a shift towards more high- relocate suppliers from foreign trade data available is for April 2020. Such longer-term benefits a low-wage tech services, while Russia’s Hence the large drop in intra-EU trade by April have likely induced CESEE contribution became East Asia to Europe. is expected to correct itself, at least to some governments to attract supplier more intensive in low-tech extent, over the coming months. It will be as much foreign direct manufacturing due to the interesting to analyse whether intra-EU trade will recover as fast as investment (FDI) as they can by of western mining and quarrying sector. EU15 imports from China, or whether it does so at a slower pace. offering the maximum amount of state aid which is possible in European Related indicators suggest And sixth, GVC-related trade also suffered much more in the the EU, such as tax exemption similarly unsatisfactory aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis than traditional trade, for a decade, or financial manufacturing progress for most CESEE but it also recovered faster after 2009 (see Figure 1 here). support to train employees countries. The European and reduce labour costs. FDI networks is Union’s innovation Thus, greater participation in GVCs exposes trade and production can foster participation in scoreboard, which is to greater variation, which can have adverse consequences for GVCs by local suppliers. The gradually measured using 27 output, employment, government budget balances and many other recent races between CESEE performance indicators indicators in times of economic shocks. Such adverse variation countries to attract prominent diminishing. distinguishing between should certainly make CESEE policymakers think about their foreign manufacturers ten innovation dimensions industrial policy strategies, although shorter-run (or cyclical risks) seem to suggests that this in four main categories, and longer-run structural impacts should also be jointly analysed. development strategy is set to continue. concludes that with the sole exception of Estonia, CESEE countries rank well below the EU average in 2019. Moreover, the Global value chain participation Most CEESEs have not moved improvement in innovation performance from has longer-term benefits up in the value chain 2012 to 2019 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia was below the average Participation in GVCs has a number of longer-term benefits. As An important aspect of development is whether improvement in the EU, and there was even Richard Baldwin argues, emerging and developing countries companies participating in GVCs gradually move a setback in innovation performance in with less developed industrial structures and smaller domestic up in the value chain: that is, whether the initial Romania and Slovenia. CESEE countries do markets can join the supply chains of firms from high-tech nations, contributions to low-wage sectors are gradually not rank highly in the World Economic Forum’s

020 021 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Zsolt Darvas: Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!

Innovation capability component of the Global Competitiveness and disadvantaged families in CESEE. Secondary education, Index either. Slovenia (28th), the Czech Republic (29th) and vocational training and lifelong learning are similarly crucial. Estonia (34th) have the highest rankings in the CESEE out of 155 countries, while the lowest rankings in the CESEE region Given the relatively low public debts of CESEE countries belong to Latvia (54th), Romania (55th) and Croatia (73rd). and their prospectively faster economic growth than in Western Europe (which will help their fiscal Overall, it seems that while participation in global value chains sustainability), it is surprising that these countries do not has brought major benefits to CESEE countries in terms of devote more resources to education and research. growth and jobs, it has not been associated with improved technological and innovation capabilities. This is a key problem, The COVID-19 economic shock and the associated collapse because with continuing fast wage growth and a deteriorating in trade should serve as a wake-up call for policymakers demographic outlook, the region’s advantage as a low-wage in CESEE countries. The existing economic model, which supplier of western European manufacturing networks is has fostered as much foreign direct investment as possible gradually diminishing. Most CESEE countries rank disappointingly as well as greater participation in global value chains, has in the World Economic Forum’s Skills ranking, served its purpose, but it will soon run its course. Even a which considers various indicators related to short-term boost cannot be expected from a hypothesised Greater participation in the current and future workforce, suggesting strategic reorganisation of suppliers from East Asia to that the workforce is not up to the challenge CESEE. Instead, policies fostering upward movements on European value chains of moving away from low-wage activities. the values chain should be significantly stimulated. exposes an economy to greater variation Sustained convergence requires transition towards in production, knowledge‑intensive economic activities

with associated Sustained convergence toward western European productivity and living standards will be possible consequences for by moving up the value chain towards more knowledge-intensive activities. This, first and employment and foremost, requires better education and research, GDP growth. which in turn necessitates higher public spending. For example, public expenditure on tertiary

education is below 1% of gross national income in most CESEE ZSOLT DARVAS is a senior fellow at

countries, but around 1.5% or more in most northern and Brussels-based think-tank Bruegel

western European countries. In a forthcoming study we find a and a senior research fellow at the

statistically significant correlation between public spending Corvinus University of Budapest.

on universities and a number of educational result indicators. His research interests include

Primary and secondary education are equally important. As macroeconomics, international

James Heckman argues, in disadvantaged families the highest economics, finance, EU governance

rate of return in early childhood development comes from and social policy. investing as early as possible, because skills beget skills in a complementary and dynamic way. There are many poor

022 023 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Marius Ghincea: IR theory and the world after COVID-19

IR scholars are often criticised for their in a comprehensible way that makes the most This is Sparta! Insights from engagement in what seems a purely of what we know from IR theory. IR scholars academic exercise centred on an obsession produce knowledge, not ‘solutions’ to policy with theory and abstract debates. And, true problems; nevertheless, this knowledge can international relations theory enough, IR theory is ill-suited to providing become a tool for devising fruitful solutions. pre-packaged solutions to current problems, but many scholars will argue that that is not This essay is divided into three parts. First, into what the post-Covid their business. IR theory can provide insights it discusses the current pandemic through into international behaviour, and may provide the lenses of the ‘agency-vs-structure’ informed predictions about how international debate in International Relations. Second, world might look like affairs may evolve and how states may react it uses the three mainstream approaches to shocks, but it cannot prescribe a course in IR to interpret and predict the effects of of action. Moreover, IR theory is not in fact a the pandemic on the development of the homogenous, coherent‘theory’, but a divergent international system. Finally, it discusses By Marius Ghincea | Florence set of theories and approaches which look what insights we can gain from other, at different problems and phenomena in more critical approaches in IR and their world affairs from different ontological and importance for understanding world events. epistemological positions. No one theory can provide a comprehensive interpretation or predictions of world politics. However, taken Changing the structure years ago, in his account of the Peloponnesian together, these theories can help decision of world politics War between Athens and Sparta, the Athenian makers and the public fill the gaps in the 2500 historian and general Thucydides made the puzzle we call ‘International Relations’. The aim International Relations is a discipline ravages of the plague affecting Greece a central feature of the tragic decline of this essay is exactly that: to suggest a way defined by structural theorising. Each and fall of the Athenian Empire. The plague ravaging the many territories we can integrate various pieces of the puzzle of the three major schools of thought in that Athens had dominion over, at the time of a desperate struggle against its arch-enemy Sparta, undermined its power and hastened its demise.

Today’s great pandemic consuming the world has produced similar reactions among some commentators. The trade and security struggles between the United States, as the receding hegemon, and a resurgent China have been interpreted by scholars and commentators as a reiteration of the ancient theory of power transition that defines Thucydides’ history. However, IR theory has more to say about the world of tomorrow than the dramatic effects that, according to Thucydides’ followers, the pandemic could have on security and trade relations between the U.S. and China. This piece seeks to offer a brief but comprehensive overview of the major approaches in IR theory, what they may say about the world after the end of this pandemic, and how it will affect global politics.

024 025 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Marius Ghincea: IR theory and the world after COVID-19

the discipline, neorealism, neoliberalism, material capabilities (i.e. wealth) changes. models currently operating around the world will define the level and constructivism, are theoretically Therefore, according to a materialist of growth, depending on how successful their growth models dominated by a structural understanding ontology, the global pandemic will produce will prove to be. At the same time, constructivists stress that the of world politics. What makes them change in the international system if it alters international structure is ideational in nature and a product of different is their assumptions about the distribution of material capabilities. social interaction. How political leaders decide to act during the these structures and state behaviour. On the other hand, if the structure of the pandemic and afterwards will affect how the structure evolves. Neorealism and neoliberalism share a international system is ideational, defined If decision-makers choose a confrontational approach, then materialist understanding of structures, by shared ideas and norms, then change the world of tomorrow will arguing that all that matters is the can happen whenever the overreaching be confrontational. If they distribution of capabilities under anarchy. ideas held by states change. It is thus decide to cooperate, then the IR theory can provide insights How wealthy you are (in weapons, apparent that the global pandemic can future will be cooperative. natural resources, GDP, technology) effect change in world politics if it produces In the end, the world is into international behaviour, and defines your status and behaviour in the changes in the way states (i.e. politicians) what states make of it. international system, which is taken as understand the world and their role in it. may provide informed predictions inherently anarchical and competitive. The distinction between Where they differ is in their assumption How does this work in practice? From a material and ideational about how international affairs about what drives state behaviour: materialist perspective, actual changes in structure is important not relative gains, as neorealists argue, or the distribution of resources must happen only because it emphasises may evolve and how states may absolute gains, as neoliberals suggest. in order for change in world politics to different factors that affect take place. This could happen due to the change, but especially react to shocks, but it cannot Constructivists criticise this materialist economic consequences of the pandemic, because it delineates understanding of structure and argue which may destroy economic capacity in the importance of actors prescribe a course of action. that we should conceive structures as some countries, decreasing their relative as producers of change. inherently social, as the product of social material capabilities and therefore shifting For neorealists, for example, history is deterministic, and interaction. Structures are, therefore, the the relative distribution of capabilities. If, for agency has almost no role in it. In the great scheme of things, product of what we do and how we do it. example, the United States and Europe are neorealists believe that what matters is how material power This means that anarchy is neither pre- substantially more affected economically shifts, not what people do or believe. For constructivists, given, as the other two schools assume, nor than China because of the crisis in the human agency is at the centre of structure, defining and exclusively based on material capabilities, medium and long term, and will experience re-defining it constantly. Human action determines the but very much on ideas which give meaning lower rates of growth with higher rates of future of the international structure, not simply how material to those capabilities. When the ideas public debt, then China becomes relatively resources are allocated. However, this structural perspective actors have change, then their behaviour more powerful (i.e. it gains more assets of change in world affairs is not all that IR theory has to offer. changes, and that produces a change in than Europe and the US). Conversely, if the structure of the international system. the pandemic forces a reconfiguration of value chains in world trade, then the United Power, institution, and ideas Why does this matter in respect to the States and Europe may benefit because in times of global pandemic effects of the global pandemic in world of what economists call on-shoring, near- politics? It matters because change in shoring, and shortening of value chains. Neorealism as a structural theory of international relations is much of IR theory translates into changes informed by the political theory of classical realism. Therefore, in the structure of the international system. However, from an ideational perspective, neorealists conceive the world as a dangerous, anarchic On the one hand, if the structure of the constructivists would argue that in order world inhabited by egoistic states that seek either their international system is material – defined for shifts in material capabilities to happen, own survival (defensive realists) or to maximise their power by how wealthy you are – then change changes in ideas need to happen first. The (offensive realists) and use any tool at their disposal to achieve can happen only when the distribution of economic ideas dominating the economic these goals. In a world where survival is the main goal and

026 027 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Marius Ghincea: IR theory and the world after COVID-19

the survival of the fittest is the main mechanism of ‘natural’ will produce increased international party, and the FED is playing its role as the selection, states can only rely on their own strength and tensions, a struggle for power and lender of last resort for the world economy. cannot trust other states. According to this view, international diminishing opportunities for cooperation. In healthcare we can observe some signs organisations such as the World Health Organisation or of regional cooperation in Europe, among historical phenomena such as globalisation are devised and Reversely, neoliberalism suggests that Latin American countries and, to a lesser used by great powers to further their power and enhance their the outcome of the pandemic will be degree, in North America and Asia. control over less powerful states. This is one of the reasons the opposite of what neorealists foresee. why neorealists dismiss the role of international organisations Neoliberals assume that states seek absolute Neoliberals would predict the emergence as venues of cooperation, together with the assumption that gains, not relative gains as neorealists of cooperation frameworks for pooling all states seek relative gains, making cooperation difficult. do, and states have a tendency towards expertise, sharing knowledge about the virus cooperation in order to reduce transaction and how to fight it better. This is visible in the During the current pandemic, a neorealist will ask: how costs and the negative effects of unwanted quest to develop a vaccine, even if the Trump does the pandemic affects the distribution of power in the events, and to enhance the benefits from administration has been acting in a less international system? As deeper and denser ties. This means that cooperative way than the rest of the world. mentioned previously, when faced with a pandemic of global At the same time, the crisis is forcing states power is understood here proportions, states have a powerful incentive to reassess the limits of their cooperation, The global pandemic can effect in terms of the material to cooperate. For neoliberals, international and to consider why certain cooperative capabilities that states institutions reflect the desire of selfish frameworks such as the WHO have not lived change in world politics if it have at their disposal. states to cooperate in order to reduce costs up to their expectations by pushing forward Here, the economic and maximise benefits. Institutions such reforms. But all these are defined by what produces changes in the way component becomes as the World Health Organisation exist to ideas are circulating in the national capitals. particularly interesting allow coordination between national health states (i.e. politicians) understand for neorealists. If the authorities, as a channel for knowledge Neorealism and neoliberalism presuppose pandemic affects the US exchange, and as a forum for deliberation. that the way the world works and what the world and their role in it. economy much more than interests states have as pre-givens are that of China, for example, Therefore, the question that neoliberals ask objective facts which can be taken for then this increases the is: how does the pandemic affect incentives granted. Constructivists dismiss this as relative power of China, for states to cooperate internationally? If a lack of sophistication, and even an which over the medium to long term may build an economy the pandemic reduces the incentives for outright misunderstanding of how world which is substantially stronger than the American economy. cooperation, then a more neorealist logic politics works. Instead, constructivists In the short to medium term, a weak American economy may will dominate world politics. But if the human such as Alexander Wendt argue that create opportunities for China to acquire US assets or push and economic costs of the pandemic as world politics is “what states make of to ‘reform’ US-sponsored international institutions, increasing foreseen prove to be substantial and able it”. The beliefs and identities of political its global influence. The Chinese takeover of Western assets to be managed more effectively through leaders define how the world is and how is perceived as a real danger in several Western nations, global coordination, than the pandemic may it will evolve. National identity, culture, with Germany taking active measures to prevent Chinese increase cooperation and may enhance the political interactions play a substantial takeovers of strategic companies. The United States may importance of international organisations role in making sense of the world and seek to do the same. At the same time, a neorealist would such as the WHO. Signs of increased constructing it as it is. The choice between predict that the US will react by counterbalancing China, coordination and cooperation, particularly on competition or cooperation results, not seeking to preempt or block Chinese takeovers of US- economic matters, are already visible. The from changes in the distribution of power sponsored international organisations, and perhaps impose leading central banks (the FED, the BCE, the or the incentives states have, but from new economic protectionist measures and create incentives to CBJ, the BoE) have already signed swap and their identities and beliefs. A state may near-shore or reshore the American manufacturing capabilities repo agreements that will provide almost exhibit bellicose or friendly behaviour in currently abroad. In the neorealist playbook, the pandemic unlimited liquidity in the currency of each international politics depending on the

028 029 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Marius Ghincea: IR theory and the world after COVID-19

ideas and identity defining its society At the same time, constructivists would and the critical approaches and political elite. But these ideas and caution about the impact of misinformation to IR and security studies Malign actors may seek to identities change over time, especially and information warfare on which ideas and are frequently mentioned because of crises which force people to identities become dominant. Malign actors in disciplinary debates. produce bellicose beliefs reassess their beliefs and who they are. may seek to produce bellicose beliefs and identities by promoting polarising ideas, or New liberalism is a and identities by promoting Therefore, a constructivist would ask: how fake news which provokes anger and fear, or contemporary reformulation does the pandemic change shared beliefs reframes truthful news in ways that promote of interwar liberalism, and was polarising ideas, or fake news and identities, and what effect would conflict and social tensions. The world is proposed primarily by Andrew these changes have on world affairs? what we make of it, as constructivists say. Moravcsik. New liberal theory which provokes anger and fear, If the pandemic produces new ideas looks at domestic dynamics and identities that promote competition Who is right? None of them and all of them. to explain foreign policy. In its or reframes truthful news in ways and conflict, then international relations While these three major approaches to most common formulation, will be defined by conflict. Conversely, international relations are often framed in new liberalism argues that that promote conflict and social if the pandemic produces solidaristic opposition to each other, they illuminate the most important actors and cooperative ideas and various parts of international in world politics are not the tensions. The world is what we identities, then world affairs politics. Practitioners and states, but the domestic will be characterised by In the policy elites should use groups and actors which make of it, as constructivists say. increased cooperation and them together to make define state policy and thus harmony. The world is what neorealist sense of the world and influence world politics. Adopting a bottom-up approach to we make of it; it is constructed to build better calibrated foreign policy analysis, liberals assume that domestic actors by us according to our beliefs playbook, and critically informed have different interests and are in a constant struggle to about what is appropriate. policy responses to global shape state policy. Therefore, foreign policy is defined by this the pandemic challenges such as the confrontation between various groups seeking to influence A neorealist or neoliberal current pandemic. foreign policy. As a result, the question asked by new liberals is: would find it hard to answer will produce how does the pandemic reshuffle or reinforce the configuration why states would build air of power and influence between domestic groups? bridges to transport COVID-19 increased Society, patients from Italy to Germany, discourse, In Europe, the economic consequences of the lockdown for example. Constructivists, international and security and the pandemic have the potential to increase the power instead, would say that this in the world of those social and political groups which seek a more sign of solidarity is the result tensions, a of tomorrow solidaristic European Union, pressing for more social transfers of the beliefs dominating the at the European level and more integration, especially with public debate in the societies struggle for IR theory may be regards to monetary and fiscal issues. This may overcome of Italy and Germany and dominated by neorealism, the long dominance of austerity- driven fiscal hawks that among the political elites of power and neoliberalism, and have ruled the higher echelons of power in Berlin, Frankfurt, those two countries. Another constructivism as the three Paris and Brussels. If that happens, the configuration of power example is the reappearance diminishing major approaches to the between these groups will change, and consequently it will of policy debates about study of world politics, but shift the policies adopted at national and European level. resilience, ideas about the need opportunities they are not alone, and for strategic autonomy in the several other theories and In other parts of the world, such as in the United States, production of vital products for approaches can fill other the effects of the pandemic are harder to discern, but such as medicine, or the need gaps in the puzzle. Among they seem to be producing a new wave of social unrest for European solidarity. cooperation. them, new liberalism which may or may not unravel the current political

030 031 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Marius Ghincea: IR theory and the world after COVID-19

configuration, and with it the American foreign policy. In will be imperiled. This, in turn, could escalate into political and an increasingly dangerous world, ‘America First’ could diplomatic tensions and conflict between countries who ban become an even more persuasive idea, and the US may travel to certain countries and those who are thus affected. seek to shore up its current unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. In totalitarian or authoritarian regimes faced with increased death tolls, such as Russia or Belarus, the Conclusions regimes may seek to enhance their power over society by increasing the levels of oppression and intrusion, IR theory cannot provide prepackaged forecasts or solutions as well as the elimination of political opponents. about and for the world after the pandemic, but it can suggest further possible trends in world politics, depending on the Finally, another perspective comes from the Copenhagen theoretical assumptions each approach supports. Neorealism School’s ‘theory of securitisation’, which argues that security is assumes conflict as the natural state of the world, and therefore intersubjective and socially constructed. This means that there predicts more conflict. Neoliberalism presupposes cooperation are no inherent security and foresees as much. Constructivism tells us that it is what we threats, and that all threats make of it, that nothing is predetermined, and what matters is In Europe, the economic are defined socially through the ideas and identities that come out of this pandemic. New processes of persuasion liberals look inside the state and tell us that what matters is consequences of the lockdown by powerful actors, which how domestic groups will be affected by the pandemic, while seek to securitise – to take the Copenhagen School argues that the socially constructed and the pandemic have the outside the sphere of normal understanding of threats will define much of the world after the politics and life – certain pandemic. Who is right? Again, none and all at the same time. potential to increase the power issues. The pandemic itself Every one of these theories provides a piece in the larger puzzle has been securitised in we know as world politics. Understanding what each of them has of those social and political much of the world, as an to offer and what its limits are can help practitioners to better existential threat to life and understand what is happening and prepare better for tomorrow. groups which seek a more our societies, with leaders such as Emmanuel Macron solidaristic European Union, and Angela Merkel using a martial language, talking pressing for more social about a ‘state of war’ in

relation to the pandemic and MARIUS GHINCEA is a Ph.D.

transfers at the European the imposition of exceptional Researcher at the European

measures (i.e. lockdown). University Institute (EUI) in Florence,

level and more integration, pursuing a Ph.D. in Political and

If issues related to the Social Sciences. Simultaneously, he

especially with regards to pandemic or its aftermath is a Senior Teaching Assistant at the

are subjected to further Johns Hopkins University, Bologna.

monetary and fiscal issues. processes of securitisation, His research agenda focuses on

this may further impact identity and foreign policy, FPA,

world politics. If the virus continues to be an existential threat, transatlantic relations, the Common

social, economic, and political links may be distorted by the Foreign and Security Policy of the

perception of danger. If travel between countries becomes EU, and global political orders. impossible, as the risk of infection during transit appears too great, then trade routes will be cut and investment and tourism

032 033 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Alec Bălășescu: Will computers decide who lives and who dies? Ethics, Health, and AI in a COVID-19 world

Will computers decide who lives and who dies? Ethics, Health, and AI in a COVID-19 world

By Alec Bălășescu | Frankfurt

“Brother! You doubting Thomases get in the way of more scientific advances with your stupid ethical questions! This is a brilliant idea! Hit the button, will ya?” Calvin addressing Hobbes regarding the ‘Duplicator‘ (Waterson, 1990)

Abstract Exploring the possible answers to this question will lead us to analyse the impact of the dynamic socio-cultural environment on While talk about a post-COVID-19 world is ripe, reflecting more the predictive capacities of algorithm-based AI models. The article the desire for an economic relaunch than the medical reality of will emphasise the importance of integrating culturally specific the moment, we are still struggling to understand the effects that dimensions in developing and deploying AIs, and discuss how to the pandemic is having on our societies. Those ripple effects are approach ethics as applied to AI in a culturally aware manner. likely both to outlive the pandemic, and even to make themselves visible after the pandemic has hopefully been eradicated. COVID-19 One of the conversations that has emerged most clearly is linked to the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare, and concerns The pandemic we are living through has generated a series both its effectiveness and its ethics. This article will follow two of unforeseen effects on local, regional and global scales. major ethical questions that have dominated the public sphere From raising instances of racism and subsequent domestic up to now: the use of violence in conjunction with the lockdown measures, to data tracking systems for major disruptions in human activities that may generate AI models interact with forecasting viral spread, the biggest economic contraction since World War II, and the possible use of we are experiencing a combination of phenomena that institutional, social and AI as decision support for reminds us of the interconnectedness of our world. the allocation of medical cultural contexts, and may resources in emergency The SARS-COV2 virus appeared in a context of decreased situations. The main question trust in public institutions and in scientific expertise at a global fail if they are not designed underpinning this article is: level, against a background of the increased dominance of how will our approach to these social media in spreading fake news and pseudo-scientific for the appropriate context. challenges impact our future? theories. This was a perfect storm, which has allowed not only

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the weakening of democratic institutions that we need to be aware of how these relying on AI as decision-making mechanisms need to have the and the rise of authoritarian leadership, but aspirational universal codes are expressed in practices that embody moral norms as their starting points, and not also the rapid spread of the virus itself. daily practices, and how the transformation universal ethical codes and their presumed possible codification of these practices can (and does) generate in AI algorithms. The immateriality of AI models has received a At the global level all efforts are geared towards new moral norms that in their turn shed reality check, and the same is about to happen to AI ethics. controlling the spread of the virus, creating a light on those very cultural blind-spots. vaccine, and treating those affected. Naturally, eyes turned to Artificial Intelligence and to the Let’s take an example: Valuing human life A material world possibility of using it as a tool to help in these is a universal ethical code. But what type of At a higher level of analysis, the pandemic is a reminder that our efforts. This process has revealed, and continues human life is more ‘valued‘ than others in world is material, despite a discourse that everything has now been to reveal, complex and rather problematic different societies? And how do these societies virtualised, from markets interactions between AI models and the reality make decisions on that basis? Is a young to life itself. All of a sudden in which they are deployed, as well as the life more valuable than an old one? How is COVID-19 has forced us to Ethical codes may compete conflict between competing AI ethical principles. this valuing expressed in daily practices? experience at least three major Is life at any cost more valuable than an types of materialisations: among themselves and trying individual choice to ‘not resuscitate‘, or to Ethics: principles retain dignity in dying? Is it possible to have Materialisation of borders. to codify them in universally versus practices an ‘equally valuable‘ approach to human life While borders have not even in moments of scarcity? Is collective In a lecture at Tübingen University, the former always been easy to cross, applicable AI algorithms would survival more important than individual well- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: “One and some frontiers have being – and can these even be separated? thing that should be clear is that the validity been more material than probably lead to the emergence of universal values does not depend on others, in the past three These types of questions have emerged their being universally obeyed or applied. months the transboundary of new types of biases instead of forcefully during the current COVID-19 Ethical codes are always the expression of an movement has come to pandemic crisis, and scientists, ethicists, ideal and an aspiration, a standard by which almost a complete halt. eliminating the existing ones. and politicians are tackling the answers – moral failings can be judged, rather than a Most countries in the world or acting as if they knew them already. prescription for ensuring that they never occur.” have become inaccessible to those who are not their citizens or residents, and repatriation has more often than not been To continue, let’s follow two major conversations This is a powerful statement, touching at the the only type of existing international travel. As I write this text that have dominated the public sphere lately: the core of the ethical challenges of leadership. the lockdown is easing in the European Union, but many other use of data tracking systems for forecasting viral However, it may also contain a major flaw: while countries around the world remain closed to foreigners. spread, and the possible use of AI as decision ethical codes can be framed as an expression support for the allocation of medical resources of universal aspirations, the standards by which In parallel, extraordinary forms of collaboration at regional and in emergency situations. By analysing the we may judge moral failings cannot equally be global levels have shown that only the continuation of an open conversations and practices around this topic, universal. Whether we like it or not, morality type of approach may offer long-term solutions, for example the this text will advocate a bottom-up approach is culturally dependent – and moral failings German hospitals taking in French patients at frontier regions towards the use of AI. The main arguments are may certainly fall into a cultural blind-spot in order to relieve the over-stretched French hospitals. At the that sometimes ethical codes may compete for many of us. Yet this does not mean that same time, displays of solidarity have also been received with among themselves, and that trying to codify we can advocate abdicating universal ethical suspicion, raising questions about the use of solidarity as a them in universally applicable AI algorithms codes in the name of ‘cultural particularities’ mechanism of soft power, particularly in the case of China. would probably lead to the emergence of (although this is a current practice among new types of biases instead of eliminating authoritarian figures, particularly regarding (De-)Materialisation of movement. Movement has become the existing ones. Thus, both deciding on respect for human rights). It merely means at once materialised and virtual. Movement has entered a the instances of using AI, and designing &

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controlled phase at all levels during lockdown, with much of the workforce entering a mass experiment of working from home. Many who perceived the ability to move as ‘natural‘ are now experiencing it for the first time as a privilege. And movement has been displaced onto online platforms, dematerialising itself into bits and pieces of data (more on this later).

Materialisation of our bodies. Most importantly, we have been called upon to acknowledge the full extent of the importance of our bodies. We, individually and collectively, have dramatically come to realise that our lives are very real and unequivocally linked to our material bodies. The variations of the abstract indicators of the economy show that the entire global complex system is not separated from, but is in fact heavily dependent on our The US took a fragmented human bodies, their health and their movement (see approach, leaving the above). This will contribute to the gradual dismantling of the development and deployment of illusion that we may have had that we live in a virtual world for the purpose of marketing and targeted world of algorithms, while juxtaposing them tracing apps, and the subsequent in which the body is only an publicity. In some instances police forces can with pre-designed models, assigning the instrument among others, a use the same data to track movements and individual user to typologies within the ethical decisions, to the tool to be refined in gyms and ‘prevent crime’ – a contested practice that is models. It does not matter if the models are yoga sessions, or a resource not yet fully understood, let alone regulated. of consumer habits, potential delinquency, or latitude of private companies. to overstretch during long, the likelihood of paying off one’s mortgage. caffeine-fuelled working hours. The European Union (EU) enacted a data The trouble with models in AI has largely European countries have a Somehow our bodies have protection act (the General Data Protection been discussed in the literature (O’Neil, become ourselves again. Regulation 2016/679, implemented as of 2019; Broussard, 2018; Galison, 2019), and more centralised approach. May 2018) that obliges developers to allow it emerges from a few major sources: for security protection, pseudonymisation 2. The models are based on previous behaviour Tracking and/or anonymisation of users in designing and aggregated data, and have a probability their products, and to fully inform and obtain rate of correct identification. This means that The data tracking systems (DTS) are not a novelty, and their use consent from the consumers regarding their they are not 100% accurate. While this may by the police is quite widespread in the US. So is their use by use of data. This regulation impacts the use not be a major problem in cases in which marketing companies that rely on ’data from individual users to of data tracking systems (DTSs), and makes it we have models of success for an athlete’s push products through targeted advertising. As early as 2012 more difficult to apply it indiscriminately or sell performance, it is highly problematic if they the question of data tracking while surfing the internet was it to third parties (as US-based corporations are used to decide upon the finances of or brought to the public’s attention’. The generalisation of the use tend to do). More recently the EU has adopted the delivery of justice to individuals. It also of smartphones has made possible the extension of tracking a series of white papers regarding the more means that they function as long as the from virtual movement to material movement in space and time. general use of AI, to which I will return. reality matches the conditions within which Apps, which use the phones’ GPS system and a scantily disguised the data has been collected, and they are but default option for the user (‘allow the app to access your 1. DTSs combine borders, movements and highly dependent on the data quality and location’), track, store, and sell movement data to third parties bodies, and recreate them in the immaterial accuracy. Under normal circumstances (read

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long periods of status quo), the models more or less function as on this data who can and do not necessarily correspond designed (my emphasis). But as the COVID-19 crisis has shown, who cannot return to work, The Western to human behaviour. any sudden disruption causes ‘model drift’: that is, the models travel, or even visit friends? no longer correspond to reality, and they need to be redesigned. What about getting the perception To the external observer, This was first signalled in Amazon’s use of AI, and then spotted treatment one may need? the situation seems to be in all the major industries that use Artificial Intelligence. is that AI completely different in those 3. The use of proxy measurements in order to decide the This dilemma has generated countries that appear to have value attributed to a typology. For example, in order to different responses, and the deployment a centralised, all-powerful decide if one is a good educator, a model may use the solutions proposed gravitate system of data tracking measurement of children’s performance in a specific around a twofold approach: in China is and AI use, such as China. exam. However, that in itself depends on a series of other use the device’s Bluetooth While a European observer factors that have nothing to do with the educator’s qualities systems instead of the GPS top-down and may readily conclude that and qualifications. At the same time, performance scores to signal proximity only (and the balance between the may be tackled if an educator feels threatened in her not location), and store all the monolithic, common good versus livelihood, giving birth to further distortions (see O’Neil). relevant data on the device individual anonymity has (and not on third parties’ hypercentralised already tilted towards the Models are designed by humans, and more often than servers). Downloading and former in China’s case, and not they embed the biases held by their designers and using the app is voluntary. and controlled, that China can already use its developers. This is also a frequently discussed topic in AI A diversity of apps featuring Social Credit System in order ethics. The solutions offered range from increasing the these solutions are being with no room to track and prevent COVID-19 diversity in designer and product development teams deployed as I write. spread, this is not precisely to renouncing the use of the tool itself altogether. for ethics. But the reality of the situation. The US took a fragmented The approach in China With the COVID-19 pandemic, eyes have turned towards the approach, leaving the this is far from actually seems to be more possibility of using DTSs in order to predict and prevent the rapid development and deployment fragmented than in some spread of the virus by creating early warning mechanisms. The of tracing apps, and the the truth. European countries. Some idea is relatively simple: once downloaded, the DTS apps track the subsequent ethical decisions, provinces have developed user’s movements using their phones, and identify whether the to the latitude of private companies. European their own DTSs; some of the apps use GPS, user has been in the vicinity of someone who is already registered countries have a more centralised approach, while others are based on the user voluntarily as being COVID-19 positive. The app would then alert the user, in that the governments are more involved in inputting their location. Regional governments and also create an anonymous map of possible viral spread. financing and developing the apps, with features and cities may use different apps that may result that must meet European privacy standards. in different ‘health scores’ assigned to the same AI ethicists raised the first concerns, particularly having to do Germany has only just started rolling out its person. As Ding (2018) observes in his analysis with the tension between two major ethical principles in AI: the 20-million euro app, and is reassuring its users of China’s AI strategy, the Western perception autonomy of the user (including rights to privacy) and usage for that the data will not be made accessible to the is that AI deployment in China is top-down and the common good. First, the DTS cannot offer 100% autonomy, platform provider they use (Android or Apple), monolithic, hypercentralised and controlled, particularly when the GPS system is being used for tracking. When but only to public healthcare specialists in the with no room for ethics. But this is far from the movement data becomes health data (as in this case), anonymity country. At the same time, Norway has decided truth, as Ding shows in his work. This perception is all the more important. Individual health data is highly sensitive; to withdraw its own app because its reliability is a common trope of the depiction of the ‘East’ it is stored in highly secure environments, anonymised and used was questionable at the very least. Being based in Western popular thinking. While the doctrine exclusively by specialists in healthcare. What if movement is health? on voluntary download and reporting, and built of social peace and its attainment does guide What if one’s own movement is used in the aggregated data set in on the assumption that people always carry the actions taken in China, ethical debates are order to evaluate, through approximate models, one’s health – and their smartphones with them, the Norwegian still present and are being conducted by private eventually sold to interested third parties? Can we decide based government concluded that the app’s models enterprises, such as Tencent’s Research Institute.

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In conclusion, the use of DTSs poses ethical dilemmas in what order of emergency. This is different However, two important because they reveal the opposition between individual from the pandemic situation in overstretched factors need to be taken autonomy and the common good, and they raise practical ICUs, where treatment may not be available for into consideration here: issues regarding accuracy and efficiency because of the everyone who needs it, and access to it has to be way in which data is collected, stored, and used. selective. This is an important distinction, and this 1. The AI models embedded that pass a is what happens today in many ICUs around the judgment on the state of health of the world. ER triage procedures do not apply to this patients may themselves be flawed: the Triage situation. So what are the healthcare providers use of proxy measures in order to establish around the world doing? They are trying to follow the state of a patient’s health (such as The spread of COVID-19 has put serious strain on healthcare the recommendations and to devise their own the money they have spent in the past systems in many countries, and each of them has had to find a procedures, in order not only to best serve their x years on health-related issues) can be different way of coping with the crisis. From avoiding testing and patients and the common good, but also to very misleading: for example, one such sending home those patients who were not in a critical state, as reduce their own enormous emotional stress. AI-powered tool kept showing that black happened in the UK in the first phase of the pandemic, to carefully There are a few criteria they may use, and as patients’ health is much better that of white planning the lockdown and the bed allocations in places like Philip Rosoff, ethicist and MD at Duke University ones, and as a result they may receive less Germany, the entire range of systemic behaviour has been displayed explained, we know how not to take a decision medical attention. This was in fact due to a during this crisis. Among these, uplifting shows of solidarity of this kind: not in a rush, not at the bedside, reversed causation: blacks in the US receive between countries have been displayed, for example when border and not using judgment based on privilege. less medical attention due to financial hospitals from Germany accepted patients from neighbouring In his words, in healthcare, at least in the US, hardships and systemic racism, resulting in France in order to help ease congestion in the French system. there are ordinary situations in which there is their spending less money on health. The a distinction made between VIPs and VUPs AI system considered this a sign of good The strain on hospital beds and respiratory units, and the need to (Very Unfortunate Persons). In the case of the health. If a subsequent decision is taken allocate scarce resources to an increasing number of patients in COVID-19 pandemic this distinction is eliminated, based on this, it will in fact continue the critical states have placed a lot of pressure on medical personnel. and so is the question of age. Age is not a spiral of inequality (Obermeyer et al., 2019). Ideally every national health system should have guidelines decisive factor in providing treatment in case of 2. The risk of errors induced by the way for extreme situations such as pandemics. More often than not, scarcity (contrary to what some may believe). in which the humans interact with the though, these guidelines contain a set of recommendations machines. One important element in AI about triaging the patients and allocating scarce resources, but The only criterion that should play a role, as a decision support tool, particularly they do not necessarily describe practical ways in which these Rosoff explained, is the clinical chances the in healthcare, is that the system should recommendations can be patient has of surviving. This can be assessed remain a tool for support, and should not implemented. Thus, nurses and by healthcare professionals based on the be transformed into a decision-maker. Blacks in the US receive doctors are left scrambling to healthcare records of the respective patient However, the high emotional stress devise their own procedures and on the current clinical state displayed. combined with the workload experienced less medical attention due in this type of emergency. Here, one can see that AI-powered tools may by health workers may generate the so- come into play to a very significant degree. called “suspension of clinical thinking”, that to financial hardships and The particularity of this Electronic Health Records (EHR) facilitate the is, taking the AI’s recommendation as the pandemic is putting strain on the preservation of patients’ medical history and, ultimate authoritative decision. In other systemic racism, resulting in Intensive Care Units (ICUs) rather combined with the data of the current chart words, under a variety of circumstances, than on Emergency Rooms of a patient, they could theoretically match particularly high stress, humans may their spending less money on (ER). ERs around the world the patient’s history and current state with a be tempted to offload the weight of the are currently using a diversity recommendation regarding a triage decision. decision onto the machine. While this health. The AI system considered of triage systems, where one This may provide certain relief in high-stress may be possible in a driverless car, it usually decides what type of situations, and the decision may be supported may prove disastrous in medical settings. this a sign of good health. treatment a patient needs, and by this type of evidence-based approach. Ironically, it seems easier (although it

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is not) to create an algorithm advising doctors (because everything happens between the screen and the health worker) than an integrated AI system that drives a car.

In conclusion, AI may provide assistance in patient triage for resource allocation in a pandemic situation, but it should not be transformed into an automated decision-making instrument, precisely because previous biases and model dysfunctionalities may create irremediable medical errors. And of course, the question of accountability may have to be considered.

AI ethics and models

Both the instances analysed above (DTSs and the possible use of AIs in triage for medical resource allocation in the ICU) have in common concerns regarding ethics.

The EU has put forth seven We should distinguish between making an ethical decision and principles for trustworthy AI: the method with which we arrive at that decision. The methods Currently a series of bodies are devising principles for creating Human agency and oversight, used to arrive at an ethical ethical AIs, that is, the things one needs to take into consideration decision are the equivalent of when designing and using AIs. The EU has put forth seven Technical robustness and safety, ethical codes, or principles. The principles for trustworthy AI: Human agency and oversight, decisions we take (or which we Technical robustness and safety, Privacy and data governance, Privacy and data governance, let the AI take in an automated Transparency, Diversity, Non-discrimination and fairness, Societal manner) are the result of and environmental well-being, and Accountability. Under each of Transparency, Diversity, Non- choosing the precedence of one these principles we can find a list of recommendations meant to principle or code over another. explain what they mean. Under privacy and data governance we discrimination and fairness, When subsequently analysing may find anonymity, respect for individual rights; under Societal the decision under the lenses and environmental well-being we may find concerns for the Societal and environmental of a different code, the decision common good, and so on. As argued above, these principles may taken may appear unethical. compete in different cases. They are also highly abstract, and they well-being, and Accountability. may mean different things in different socio-cultural contexts. In ethical decision-making theories, there are five major methods of coming to an ethical AI models interact with institutional, social and cultural contexts, and decision: the utilitarian approach (make the most good and the may fail if they are not designed for the appropriate context. In fact, least harm), the rights-based approach (what best protects the this happens in most cases where AIs work directly with humans: a moral rights of those affected), the fairness and justice approach very recent example comes from health again, when a retina scan AI (whether the decision is fair), the ‘common good’ approach, diagnosis system by Google performed perfectly in lab conditions and the virtue approach (is the decision in accordance with but failed consistently in Thailand. This happened simply because the decision-maker’s values?).These methods are present and the workflows differed from the lab, the light conditions were expressed as AI ethical codes in most of the approaches. variable, and the health technicians understood the deployment of

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machines as an authoritative cultural context (regional, institutional, professional) and to work COVID-19 is here to stay. There measure to which they had to one’s way back from there into the design of the AI systems. respond perfectly; sometimes 3. The design process should start in the field, and not in labs. is no post-COVID world. Even they photoshopped the images We need to design for the cultural context: build models so that the AI algorithm would starting with reality, and do not try to model reality on if a vaccine becomes readily accept the quality of the shot. abstract models (including ethics) – sooner or later they will drift, and one of the domains in which they fail is ethics. available, the virus will only be Ethical models do the same, 4. And last but not least, we need to create constant evaluation and in order to avoid drift, we feedback loops. Remember, AI is material: it has a material subdued by its generalised use. should develop them by starting support and it interacts with the material world. That means with observing practices. The it is not going to flow smoothly. Be prepared to reassess and Just as with measles or polio, ethical codes themselves adjust based on how the adoption process develops. do not exist in theory, stopping vaccination would COVID-19 is here to stay. There is no post-COVID world. Even if a despite the fact that some vaccine becomes readily available, the virus will only be subdued mean the return of the virus. ethicists generate them by its generalised use. Just as with measles or polio, stopping theoretically first. In fact they vaccination would mean the return of the virus. The ripple effects References: are initially expressed in different practices. Their very meaning of the current pandemic will be felt in economy, culture, and Broussard, Meredith (2018). Artificial Unintelligence. How is translated through practices; but practices vary in time and politics. For AI it means both a great opportunity to show where Computers Misunderstand the World. space. Different practices show the cracks in the models, as in it is really helpful, and a wake-up call to demystify some of the Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press. the AI deployment cases. We should look at practices and their hype around it. One major lesson is that AI not only interacts with a

Ding, Jeffrey (2018). Deciphering variations first in order to make our way back to judgements on material world in continuous transformation, but that its functioning China’s AI Dream The context, values and ethics. Returning to the question of rights and valuing depends on this very materiality (and material culture). The crisis components, capabilities, and consequences of China’s life: how is this expressed in various practices? How can we design has also re-emphasised the importance of understanding socio- strategy to lead the world in AI. decision-making mechanisms (automated or not) that correspond cultural variations (geographical or institutional) when approaching Centre for the Governance of AI, Future of Humanity Institute, to the variability of practices and their dynamic transformations? ethics, and to be more aware of the ethical implications of AI University of Oxford. design, deployment and adoption. One major question that was Galison, Peter, ‘Algorists Dream overlooked till recently would be: what domains and instances of Objectivity’, in Brockman, John (ed.) (2019) Possible Minds. 25 Matter matters need the deployment of AI? Is AI as a decision-making support a Ways of Looking at AI. New York: really good idea in a particular domain or not? Should we automate Penguin Press. pp. 231-240 The major lesson for AI and for ethics which COVID-19 has decision-making support in all domains? Should we optimise O’Neil, Cathy (2019). Weapons taught us is that adoption means adaptation in a world in of Math Destruction. How Big everything just because we can? As Rosoff observed in his dialogue Data Increases Inequality and which matter matters. Therefore we must conclude: with David Remnick, healthcare is a multibillion-dollar business Threatens Democracy, New York: Broadway Books. in the US. In this particular context, optimising processes with AI ALEC BĂLĂȘESCU 1. AI is a tool: it does not need to be ethical (it’s absurd). Obermeyer, Ziad, Brian Powers, may not always be in the best interest of the patient. So let’s be Anthropologist by training, his Christine Vogeli, Sendhil It should be designed in accordance with ethical patient, and instead consider where AI can be useful, and where research, writing, and practice Mullainathan (2019), ‘Dissecting principles understood contextually, leading to it acting racial bias in an algorithm it has the potential of becoming a ‘weapon of math destruction’. is centred on understanding of used to manage the health of ethically within the context. Therefore, we first need to human actions in context (the populations’, Science, Vol. 366, understand the context – ask an anthropologist. Issue 6464, pp. 447-453, DOI: result of dynamic interactions 10.1126/science.aax2342 2. Assume that models are always wrong. Models do not drift between culture, technology, Waterson, Bill (1990). ‘Calvin and because people behave weirdly – they drift to begin with because economy, religion, gender and Hobbes’, January 9, 10, 11, in The they are models; their accuracy is limited over time, and the faster Complete Calvin and Hobbes, sexuality, and institutional practices). Book Three 1990-1992, Kansas we change, the faster they drift. Carrying them across contexts

City, Sydney, London: Andrew will implicitly lead to drift. So first, one needs to study the model’s McMeel Publishing, p. 9

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development pertains to the Human Security Carving Itself Out broadening of people’s choices, while human security involves protecting people’s freedoms in a (Post)COVID-19 World to exercise those choices.

In 1982, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues articulated By Maria Pilar Lorenzo | Brussels the first stretch of the idea of security beyond a state- centric conceptualisation and military-heavy approach when it proposed to incorporate tates have traditionally dominated the orthodox concept of security. This the well-being of people. The is not without reason, as history attests to an international community concept of human security, ravaged by deadly wars, with the two World Wars as probably the most S however, was only formally infamous examples. Given the ever-present possibility of threats from external defined and enshrined in aggressors, the notion of (in)security has been heavily associated with states. 1994 in the United Nations Development Programme’s publication, the Human Development Report, which puts forward a holistic vision But amidst the ongoing health crisis, this pandemic has of security that incorporates clearly demonstrated that security is indeed a far more not only state-security and complex notion than nuclear threats and military build-ups. military solutions but also lays A non-state threat, such as a microscopic virus, can very emphasis on the forgotten much threaten and erode a nation’s sense of security. needs of human beings.

COVID-19 has taught the world how closely societies are Hinged on three pillars – the interwoven with one another, and it has highlighted that the freedom from fear, freedom international community is only as strong as its weakest link. from want, and freedom from It is within this context that the world’s great powers will indignity – human security advocates an expanded notion have to play a critical role for the necessary international of security that involves different facets (security, economic, cooperation that would aid the entire globe and enable other food, environmental, personal, community, political, and countries to be assisted in a more effective manner. health) and fields (security studies, international relations, development studies, human rights, among others), and Reshaping the security framework locates it at all levels (global, regional, national, local).

With the push for a greater understanding of human needs and Expanding the notion of security resonates greatly at the the emergence of other, equally pressing phenomena such as individual level because, after all, a sense of insecurity climate change, migration, health issues and the rise of Information may easily arise in the face of hunger, disease, or Technology, the concept of security has been expanded and repression, and not necessarily from a war – although intertwined with the concept of human development. Human these could be tightly interwoven in some occasions.

048 049 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Maria Pilar Lorenzo: Human Security Carving Itself Out in a (Post)COVID-19 World

Security beyond arrangements, many have experienced conflicts and weapons temporary unemployment, the reduction or total loss of their livelihood. Upon the By the end of July, the John Hopkins Corona onset of the spread of COVID-19 at the Virus Resource Center has reported that the beginning of this year, around 190 million outbreak of the coronavirus, known officially people across the world were already as the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) unemployed, and the lockdowns, whether has already yielded 16,747,268 confirmed partial or full, have only intensified these. infections and claimed 660,593 deaths at the global scale. What started as a pneumonia of At present, the disruption in work has affected unknown cause detected in Wuhan, China, 2.7 billion workers, which is equivalent to four out as the World Health Organisation’s Office in of every five members of the world’s workforce. China reported on 31 December 2019, rapidly Those in the informal sector are among the most spread across borders in a very short time. vulnerable in the labour market, with 1.6 billion being drastically impacted by the lockdowns. Further still, the consequences of this pandemic extend beyond the boundaries of Unemployment is linked to the concept of health. Lockdowns causing relative poverty, which a halt to business operations the International Labour and goods transfers have The security Organisation defines as triggered a global recession. “the proportion of workers A recent study published in Lancet Psychiatry criminals might take advantage of the CleverMaps, a spatial data threat imposed with monthly earnings that about the psychiatric consequences of pandemic to further their cause. analytics company displaying fall below 50 per cent of coronavirus infections (including SARS, MERS, the number of COVID-19 by COVID-19 the median earnings in the and COVID-19) reveals that patients have Another area that the impact of COVID-19 cases alongside the expected population”, a figure that experienced confusion, depressive moods and is infiltrating is the political arena. The economic impact on GDP, departs from is estimated to increase insomnia during acute illnesses, and insomnia, pandemic has started to incur democracy shows that the change over by almost 34 percentage anxiety, irritability, traumatic disorders and sleep deficits as government officials politicise time in terms of economic the orthodox points globally for informal disorders in the post-illness stage. Other forms the pandemic and government agencies effect from 22 January to 2 workers, 21 percentage of violence have also increased rapidly, including scale down their operations. June 2020 is a loss in filtered notion of points for upper-middle- the intensification of domestic abuse. Although time of US$152,952,074,798, income countries, and 56 there are still no comprehensive reports on In the US, President Donald Trump’s allies with the United States of security that percentage points for lower- intimate partner violence due to the pandemic, have exhibited favouritism by extending America, the United Kingdom, middle-income countries. there are already reports from the United States, coronavirus contracts based partly on France, Italy, and Spain heavily locates China, Canada and Turkey, among others, personal relationships. In India, Muslim as the top five countries Juxtaposed to the economic pointing to increased rates of domestic violence. minorities have been scapegoated during incurring economic losses. it at the level of woes are mental health issues the pandemic, as Muslims have been that have been triggered or As some groups of people may feel neglected specifically accused of spreading the virus. In terms of the impact on the the state and magnified by the crisis. As or excluded, this situation could potentially lead labour market, millions of pointed out by the World to or aggravate ongoing conflicts, whereby the In the Philippines, press freedom workers have been directly associates it Health Organisation, past possibilities of such are broader in the poorer has been further curtailed with more affected by the lockdown. pandemics escalated the and more vulnerable countries in the world. restrictive measures imposed during Although some have been with inter-state number of people dealing with the pandemic such as intimidation, able to continue their work mental health issues, resulting It is within this context that armed surveillance, red tagging, and restriction through remote working conflict. in suicide or substance abuse. groups, terrorists and organised of movement for journalists.

050 051 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Maria Pilar Lorenzo: Human Security Carving Itself Out in a (Post)COVID-19 World

Human security first close cooperation among states. It has demonstrated that the international community is unprepared to wage this kind of war.

That being said, this ongoing pandemic has driven home Preparing for other kinds of security threats demands building the point of the pressing need to strive for integral human friendly relations among countries with variegated social systems, security. The traditional realist concept of security tends to as well as investment in the longer term in development support. put a premium on military security, which tries to anticipate Short-term and ad hoc humanitarian assistance can never substitute imminent external threats posed by other states. for the development of robust institutions across countries.

It stresses the conflictual and competitive Efforts to fortify human security require states to context of the international system, due to an Crises such as this synergise their resources in order to fight off these new anarchic nature that pushes states to act out of threats. Collective problems need a united struggle in their own self-interest and struggle for power. demonstrate that order to confront these cross-boundary issues.

This pandemic has pushed states to fight a security threats are no Given the devastating impact of this disease that the whole world different kind of foe – a plague – whereby large- is grappling with, this current pandemic has drawn attention to scale investments in arms and ammunitions are of longer isolated events the other security frontiers that need attention as well. The crisis no use. As weapons lie idle, this lethal pandemic has offered ample opportunities to revisit the notion of security MARIA PILAR LORENZO is a has ‘attacked’ the health sector, which has cooped up solely within in general by focusing on it through the lens of human security. development professional and proven itself to be unprepared as it suffers from shortages of hospital beds, masks and doctors. researcher based in Belgium. Her the borders of one This is not to suggest that national security be brushed research areas focus on governance

aside, but the concept of human security offers us the (regional governance, administration, This situation has, in turn, rapidly and violently country. The impact opportunity to consider all major aspects of security and public sector innovations) and affected economic, political, social and personal thereby expand the understanding of security. COVID-19 can development issues (social (in) aspects of life. Over the past few months, of this kind of security help us situate human security in a meaningful context by equity, human development, shattering events such as deaths, hunger expanding the discourse on human development, which can higher education). She is currently and economic meltdown have truly tested threat travels around only be done through authentic international cooperation. a fellow of the Regional Academy the state-centric notion of state security. on the United Nations, a Research

the world and threatens The integral concept of human security provides both the Associate of the Philippine Society What started as a health risk has leaked language and the arena to re-evaluate mankind’s most urgent for Public Administration, and a into all other spheres of society, posing the whole community. vulnerabilities and threats to its survival. COVID-19 has shown that Research Affiliate of the Asian threats and disrupting the lives of numerous health security is a vital area that permeates other facets in society Society for Public Administration. individuals and communities. whereby prioritising and putting the needs of people at the heart She is currently completing a Master

of discourses and policies serves as a game-changing paradigm. of Arts in International Politics This crisis has shown that human security is relevant across countries, whether from the so-called North or from the Katholieke Universiteit South, East or West, developed or developing state. (KU) Leuven in Belgium, and she holds an Advanced Master of

In spite of the coronavirus being an equal threat for Science in Cultural Anthropology everyone, there have been unequal responses from states, and Development Studies from KU highlighting the asymmetrical consequences of the virus. Leuven as a VLIR-UOS scholar, and Master of Public Administration from

With rising intra- and inter-national polarisation and power rivalry University of the Philippines (UP). in the twenty-first century, this has impeded the much-needed

052 053 Interview Mathew J. Burrows: “Governments can band together in a fight against China and authoritarianism, Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 but the real threat is more from inside”

Interview Mathew J. Burrows, director of the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, for pharmaceutical supplies). If anything, I would say that we and Risks Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Washington D.C. are seeing less globalisation (at least in terms of trade and investment flows), more political antagonism between the US and China and very little global cooperation. There will be ‘Governments can band together less economic growth, a downturn in trade and investment across borders, and the movement of people will diminish, but none of all this will disappear unless the US and China get in a fight against China and into a conflict which would end this period of globalisation.

authoritarianism, but the real Can the COVID crisis become also an opportunity – a change in mindset for a more united West, especially a Europe ready to embrace the great power competition against threat is more from inside’ China? Even the debate inside NATO has lately taken a China angle. Is COVID an opportunity for the Atlantic system, for reinventing the Atlantic strategic unity & solidarity?

MB: I see Europe being ambivalent about going along with the US on all the measures that the Trump administration is taking against China: on tariffs plus a prohibition against Huawei What would you expect to be the possible geopolitical fallout/ in Western networks. I don’t think many in Europe want to aftershocks that will shape the post-coronavirus world? be too closely aligned with the US in such strident attacks against China. They understand the US point of view and share Mathew J. Burrows: The obvious path that we are on at the many of the concerns, but they are also fearful of bipolarity, moment is a world shaped by bipolarity, in particular by the of getting into a world that sends everybody back to a 1950s competition between the U.S. and China. Within the West there and 1960s-style Cold War. There is another issue within Europe, are some common concerns about China. The Chinese side seems a division over China, as some are increasingly economically Mathew J. Burrows to feel more and more embattled, becoming more defensive dependent, reliant on China as an investor: for some countries in in their diplomacy and the south and east that are already bending towards announcements. There is China, the crisis could accelerate this path There will be less economic very little multilateralism. even more. Moreover, the EU took The US pullout of the WHO, a blow in this pandemic, where growth, a downturn in trade while a terrible idea, is also every member state had to fend a leading indicator of the for itself. Certainly Italy felt that and investment across borders, mood inside the Trump it didn’t get the support from administration. There are other the other member states that and the movement of people will measures too: the Trump it was entitled to or from administration not allowing the EU as a whole. There is diminish, but none of all this will the US government pension an ongoing debate about system to invest in Chinese the economic recovery: disappear unless the US and China stocks; there is growing who pays? Many feel that support for the repatriation Germany and Nordic get into a conflict which would of the supply chains in order countries should be to have far less dependence much more generous end this period of globalisation. on China (especially in terms of the

054 055 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020

economic recovery support. about. Unless Europe finds There is a lot of division, and Unless Europe a way of overcoming these Europe remains far from divisions, the EU will gradually speaking with one voice. finds a way of disappear or become irrelevant, particularly for younger For sure, NATO is also split. A overcoming generations. In general, the key factor on the European EU has a tendency of coming side is the distress created internal together at the eleventh hour, by the Trump administration. but in finding a solution at Germans worry that the Trump divisions, the last minute it allows hard administration could impose feelings and resentments to tariffs on the automobile the EU will accumulate. Trying to speed industry, an export which up some of the solutions will the entire German economy gradually help the process of binding depends on. Of course, if there together the community again, would be a sudden Russian disappear necessary for remaining a move against the Baltic states, force on the world stage. I would still see NATO coming or become together. The problem to me It is said that history rhymes. was the ordinary guys that paid the price. So if These days we see the revival of an old is when there is no major live irrelevant, To some observers the you have another iteration of the same pattern, idea meant to fix to some extent the crisis external threat like that, and current pandemic brings you will create a class that feels that they of multilateralism, but also to respond to given that you have different particularly parallels with the type of have few stakes in society or in a democratic the new revisionism – a global concert/ interests by all the players world in which Spanish government that doesn’t work for them. This alliance of democracies (supported and a US administration that for younger Influenza was spreading after would be a very dangerous turn of events, and in the past by John McCain, embraced is disengaged, disintegration WWI – intense geopolitical we know that part of what happened in the today by Joe Biden, promoted in a certain has the upper hand. generations. competition, inward focus and 1920s and 1930s was a middle class which felt version also by Heiko Maas). Is such an protectionism, nationalism dispossessed (by the combined conditions idea feasible and operationalised? How would you see the EU faring in on steroids and nation-first type of responses, generated by WWI and the economic collapse a world in which power politics, not democratic recession, a crisis of international that followed). Consequently, it didn’t have MB: I am not sure that it solves what I multilateralism is again the new normal? architecture, all wrapped up in a profound any particular faith in democracy and saw its think is the real issue. People lost faith in economic recession. What can be done salvation in strong leaders. That could happen democracies because they don’t seem to be MB: This is not the world that Europe expected. to avoid/ tame such an interwar cycle? again, although we are much more sensitive working particularly well for the less skilled A decade ago the EU was looking forward to What lessons should we be reminded of? to the signs of that happening. The tendency or the lower strata of the middle class. There a postmodern world in which there were far with many economic crises has been that are very few people in the US that think fewer conflicts, where European integration MB: We should be very worried about the they do prop up the strong, and those that are this democracy works. So governments would become the model for others. Obviously economic recovery. High unemployment and weaker pay the biggest price. This has to be can band together in a fight against China that world is not happening. What is essential income stagnation could bolster populism our number one concern. Another concern and authoritarianism, but the real threat is is Europe’s ability to reach or retain a political and widespread discontent in those countries should be not to fall in the trap (which we see more from inside than from the outside. consensus. In the recent crises (whether the where the middle class are already under the US falling into) of seeking shelter under euro-crisis or the migration crisis) the end result pressure. If you look at the economic recovery protectionism, even if the feeling against China Are you worried about the domestic has instead been a deepening of the divisions after 2008, it led to more inequality and to a is running very high. This is another lesson resilience of the West? Are we already too between east and west, north and south. The part of society, the lower middle class, feeling of the 1920s and 1930s, that protectionism far in this process of polarising ourselves pandemic looks like that, too, deepening the its interests were not being looked after, that may feel good in the short term, but it will and becoming more like Sunni vs. Shia/ same cleavages. That is what I worry the most they were losers. The bankers got bailed out, it make it harder to recover in the long run. Hutu vs. Tutsi? Can we come back?

056 057 Interview Mathew J. Burrows: “Governments can band together in a fight against China and authoritarianism, Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 but the real threat is more from inside”

MB: During the pandemic there was an initial period where MB: I don’t really see anybody prepared to do what the US and people were coming together. Congress passed in record time NATO did in the Balkans in the 1990s. In Europe the main effort the 3 trillion dollar stimulus and rescue plans. In the recent will be to protect itself against huge flows of refugees. The weeks it has returned to the old pattern of partisanship. The effort will be focused on not allowing the crisis to get to the pandemic seems to be reinforcing the division between Blue worst-case scenario. It will be an effort to drive down some of and Red states. Blue states like New York and California have the worst outcomes of conflict, but not to really settle them. suffered far more so far than Red ones. At the same time Donald Trump openly tries to deepen these divisions as part In the 1990s, the West — both the US and Europe — was at the of his strategy is to keep his base mobilised. It is very hard for height of its power, which also made it confident of solving others’ both sides to work across the aisle, because they are stuck in a problems. Hence the wish to solve the world’s ills, from the Iraqi system in which they derive more advantages from this polarised invasion of Kuwait, to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There are atmosphere. Partisanship groups today within Western societies — NGOs and civil society is deeply entrenched. In — that remain activists. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation High unemployment and income the long run, you may have has done enormous good in combatting disease in Africa and more populism on the left, other developing regions. But because of the internal problems, stagnation could bolster populism the kind of Bernie Sanders Western governments don’t have the means or bandwidth to type of socialism focused solve the world’s big problems. Instead of offense, it’s defence. and widespread discontent in especially on providing They get involved if there is the threat of the conflict having free university tuition and the potential to spill over in the form of terrorism, threatening those countries where the middle better healthcare to those the West. And then the effort is to seal off the problem, not struggling in the middle solve it. Syria is a prime example. The US effort was geared to class are already under pressure. class. What certainly will be combating ISIS, not supporting the rebels against Assad. different for the US is that If you look at the economic the state is going to be a lot more powerful as a result recovery after 2008, it led to more of it having to save the economy in this pandemic. inequality and to a part of society, In this context, it is very likely that we are going to the lower middle class, feeling its see a revival too of the Tea Party on the right, opposed interests were not being looked to the big government and to moving the US closer Mathew J. Burrows serves as the after, that they were losers. to the European model. director of the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Is the West, and especially Europe in danger of Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He over‑learning the lessons of the post-9/11 campaigns, was appointed counselor to the in the sense of ‘never again’? Everyone is running away National Intelligence Council (NIC) from the liberal interventionism, stabilisation operations in 2007 and director of the Analysis and Production Staff (APS) in 2010. or R2P today. But sometimes they might be needed. He was the principal drafter for Can Europe recapture the patience of winning the the NIC publication Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. peace? Especially in a world in which Europe continues to be affected by MENA instabilities that could be The interview was conducted even more significant in a post-pandemic world? by Octavian Manea

058 059 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview Parag Khanna: “Europe has no interest in decoupling from Asia”

Interview Parag Khanna, a leading global strategy advisor, There is no West… world traveller, and best-selling author, Singapore You are a researcher of globalisation and connectivity. What will change in the pattern of globalisation? How ‘Europe has no interest in will globalisation be restructured and recalibrated? Especially in a context shaped by pressures for decoupling from Asia’ decoupling and fears of deglobalisation.

It is very important to emphasise that decoupling and deglobalisation are different things. Deglobalisation is if all globalisation stops. But Europe and China are both trading more with Asia, therefore you do not have deglobalisation. Decoupling simply means that the US might invest less in China, it might buy less Sometimes crises put history on fast forward. What would from China and the reverse. Some connections are you expect to be the geopolitical fallout/aftershocks weaker and some connections are getting stronger. that will shape the post-coronavirus world? To what But when it comes to trade, the United States is not extent is Covid-19 accelerating some of the trends that nearly as important as Asia. We should be looking at were discernible even before the pandemic? the globalisation of trade from the Asian standpoint,

not the American standpoint. Trade between Parag Khanna For me the biggest geopolitical and geoeconomic trend under Europe and Asia is much larger than trade with way for quite a few years is regionalisation. It is an organic process America. There is not necessarily deglobalisation, given the growth of the but we can identify sectorial decoupling. Asian regional environment, In the post-COVID world given the renegotiation of We can talk about increasing globalisation the North American trade or decreasing globalisation by sector. regionalism will accelerate relationships, but also In the energy sector, you have because of the US-China deglobalisation because oil is because it is very difficult to trade war. In the post- abundant, but consumption is COVID world regionalism down, so you have less trade travel outside of one’s region will accelerate because in oil. You have some slight it is very difficult to travel deglobalisation of finance, as for an indefinite period of outside of one’s region for an some portfolio capital has indefinite period of time, as been removed from some time, as the supply chains are the supply chains are going emerging markets. In to be more entrenched digital services there is an going to be more entrenched within the regions; it will increase of globalisation – accelerate because of everyone is using Skype, within the regions. the growing suspicion Zoom and Netflix. We of outsourcing to China have an increase in trade across long distances. In in digital services, which short, there are many reasons why we will see this emphasis is a very high value-added on the region, instead of the global. This is a very significant component of globalisation. geopolitical trend that began before the pandemic. It is more important and more

060 061 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview Parag Khanna: “Europe has no interest in decoupling from Asia”

It still needs to import some energy, it is still international system where we see so much importing food from different parts of the world, internal fragmentation, between North but it is trying to be more self-sufficient. If and South, Old Europe and New Europe, Google were to stop Internet access for Google but at the same time a world in which the in Europe, that would be a problem for Europe. “return of history” and Machtpolitik, not But there is no particular technology where multilateralism define the new normal? you would say that if Europe switches off that access to America, then America is in trouble. I don’t believe in the language of Robert Kagan. It is reflective of a trend focused on measuring capabilities in a way that is very different Time for Europe to from the way sophisticated people measure take itself seriously capabilities today. In the XXI century, there is no particular reason to privilege the size of a I also want to discuss a bit the dynamic nuclear arsenal over market access. Europe’s that you see inside the Atlantic system. The strength derives from areas where a) it acts COVID crisis that started in China hit the coherently, and b) where it demands reciprocity West dramatically, right at its core. Is COVID and where it insists on high standards. This is a an opportunity for the Atlantic system, for very important source of European influence. reinventing the strategic unity & solidarity Europe has to actually act on these capabilities of the Atlantic system? We see a lot of calls in trade, in regulations, in human rights. What

The experience of Singapore valuable than oil. We usually see the oil tankers as from the other side of the Atlantic trying to we are seeing over the last couple of years is Singapore is a country that the embodiment of globalisation, but they are not. persuade Europe to align with the U.S. in Europe trying to be tougher on China in terms embodies a lot of hesitation and Internet is a better embodiment of globalisation. the broader great-power competition. of reciprocity, demanding to have a greater concern about China, even if it is a majority Chinese country. You share in the BRI projects, demanding reciprocal have Chinese people in a country To what extent is this phenomenon of decoupling reinforcing Europe has no interest in decoupling from Asia. market access, it has declared China as a that is not China, but they are very worried about China. In a way, the trend of regionalisation? In both United States and Europe Europe is much more export-dependent than strategic competitor, it is working to develop a the more Chinese Singapore has we can hear calls for reshoring some strategic industries and America is. Europe still needs to trade and big fund to support strategic industries. All of become demographically, the less comfortable it has become creating some sort of Western resilience from this perspective. export to Asia. That is why you can see that while these are indications that Europe does want with China geopolitically. I believe Should we expect massive shifts in this direction? the US is trying to block the Asian Infrastructure to be a more coherent strategic player, but there have been times when, even though Singapore was suspicious Investment Bank (AIIB), the Europeans were this will require of course that Europe evolves about China, it was also naïve, as When we talk about infrastructure, supply chains and resilience we joining the AIIB. There are different perspectives towards a common fiscal policy as well. they hoped that China would have a peaceful rise. That has not been the should not be talking about the West. The West is a cultural concept on this issue. In terms of a case. Now, Singapore has been very and it has nothing to do with supply chains and resilience, which strategic community, you clever to make sure to emphasise to China that it will maintain its are essentially geographical concepts. We must focus on North can still argue that there is The West is a cultural concept and strategic relationship with the America and Europe completely separately. For example, Europe a cultural West, but in terms United States, that it will not back down from allowing American is moving towards some degree of decreasing the dependence on of geo-economics, you it has nothing to do with supply naval forces to have a presence fossil fuels, therefore it is not competing for global oil supply. When cannot argue that there is on its territory. It is a strong sign of Singapore’s independence and you look to North America – United States, Canada and Mexico, all a common West. America’s chains and resilience, which are neutrality. When it comes to the are major energy powers. North America has energy self-sufficiency, geopolitical allies are also its US and China it is much more of a binary. But countries like South a large labour force, it has industrial potential, it has technology, geo-economic rivals. They are essentially geographical concepts. Korea, Thailand and Singapore labour, land. All of these potential inputs for self-sufficiency and competing with each other to have been very good at maintaining good relations with both. This is resiliency are present in North America. Europe does not have its big gain market share in Asia We must focus on North America tricky because there is very strong software companies, but it has more people than North America, How would you see the US pressure on one side and very strong pressure on the other side. it has enough land, it has renewable energy, it has financial capital. EU faring in a post-COVID and Europe completely separately.

062 063 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview Parag Khanna: “Europe has no interest in decoupling from Asia”

the Chinese interests, but in the medium term it could be the Short-term vs. long-term trends Balancing China country where there is a substantial backlash against China. “The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global In the recent past, the way China has been rising has created Competition in the Twenty-first a lot of resentment in Japan, in Australia (as we’ve seen in the In a shifting global landscape where we will see a change in Century” is about the competing efforts of the United States, of last few weeks) in the whole East Asia, because of Beijing’s supply chain patterns, will the Belt and Road Initiative remain a Europe and of China to develop aggressive push in the South China Sea. Does the US have comparative advantage for China or could it become a liability? spheres of influence in emerging regions and ‘swing-state’ sort of the ability to create a balancing coalition to check China’s areas like Eastern Europe, Arab strategic ambitions there? Or is that a role to be played The Belt and Road Initiative is an integral part of China’s grand world, Latin America, Central Asia or Southeast Asia. In each of those first and foremost by local countries (like the TPP-11)? strategy. A lot of people are discussing whether China is going to regions you see a very different speak less about BRI or de-emphasise it. We should focus less landscape of influence. In the short term you hear people saying that The answer is definitely both. The most important thing to on what they say in speeches and more on following the money. Russia calls the shots in Syria, that it remember is that Japanese, Indian, Korean and Australian This is the bigger issue. What we will see is that China will talk is very influential in the Middle East. In the long term that is nonsense, interests have been aligned for a very long time. As neighbours less about BRI as it has become controversial, but I think it is still Parag’s newest book is The Future is because Russia cannot be of China, they’ve been concerned about China’s rise for much a strategic priority to achieve the supply chain diversification, to influential in those regions. Through Asian: Commerce, Conflict & Culture the 2000s we thought about longer than anyone else. It is important not to argue that the build these infrastructure corridors, to access West Asia and access in the 21st Century (2019). Central Asia as part of the American United States are leading the effort to balance China. That is Europe through infrastructure. There will still be BRI, but China will dominion because U.S. invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and had a not true. Japan and India really are leading the effort. America talk less, it will try to multilateralise more and it will have to make very large military presence there. has the most powerful capabilities and it is wisely supporting concessions on issues of debt relief in the wake of the pandemic. In 2020, American presence has declined to almost a symbolic one efforts like the Quad arrangement (Australia, India, Japan and American influence is almost and United States). The four navies are working together to zero. Geopolitically we have to make a distinction between a very maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The aim is to Lessons from Asia artificial and short-term situation prevent China from dominating the South China Sea, from like the occupation of Afghanistan, in managing COVID-19 versus the long-term reality that dominating the Indian Ocean. This is going to shape Chinese countries like China and Iran will be behaviour. It is not a formal alliance, as in Asia alliances are South Korea and Taiwan were at the forefront in much more influential in countries like Afghanistan. very rare. It is a coalition of countries based on a very strong managing the pandemic. What lessons in terms of structural agreement on the desire to contain China. resilience and effective governance should be learned from their example, including by the West? In the book (“The Future is Asian: Commerce, Conflict & Culture in the 21st Century”) published last year you What is crucial to remember is that these are democratic point out that “Russia and China are today closer than states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan) that performed at any point since the heyday of their 1950s Communist very well during the pandemic. The key aspect is that they alliance”. Do they learn from each other in challenging the are democracies, but they are also technocracies. They have status quo? Are they coordinating their movements? democratic elections, independent branches of government and separation of powers, but they have a very strong civil It is more an axis of convenience than a real alliance. service, really competent and professional bureaucracies that Russia remains very suspicious of China, but Russia is also know how to get things done to meet the basic needs of the accepting a lot of investment from China. What will happen people to deliver high quality medical care. It is very important over time is a China that is being very careful not to alienate to appreciate that countries can be democratic and technocratic is Russia, as it could potentially cut down on the amount of the at the same time. Very often that is something that we ignore. Parag Khanna Founder & Managing Partner of Chinese investments in the country, even though it needs it FutureMap, a data and scenario- based strategic advisory firm. desperately. In the long term, China has significant interests He holds a PhD from the London in using Russia for access to Europe and the Arctic, but it School of Economics. has to be careful not to appear too dominant. I can see that The interview was conducted right now Russia is the country that is most compliant with by Octavian Manea

064 065 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 #EuropeOnward

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Istanbul): Turkey and the quest for limited autonomy from the West / p 068

Srecko Latal (Sarajevo): EU can’t afford to jose the battle for the Balkans / p 074

Elsa Lilja (Brussels): Pandemic of discord. Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers? / p 082

066 067 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou: Turkey and the quest for limited autonomy from the West

Yet apart from this surreal state of play between Islam as the dominant ideology of the Empire. Turkey and the quest Greece and Turkey, which most of their western Nevertheless, a level of political expediency allies do not understand or do not want to is very much in evidence, especially since understand or pretend does not exist, this the 2010s when the synthesis between the for limited autonomy summer has been different because a number instrumentalisation of religion, nationalism, of other paradoxes are coming to the fore. Most and anti-western Kemalism or Eurasianism from the West stem from ideological imperatives and domestic has been shaping the direction of Erdoğan’s cleavages within Turkey proper that have Turkey today. According to political scientist rapidly acquired an external or foreign policy Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, the decision represents an dimension. Here the broader implications of the example of the assumption of moral superiority reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque over Kemalism without necessarily impacting By Dimitrios Triantaphyllou | Istanbul come into play, although barely six weeks after upon the nature of the relationship between the 10 July decision to do so, the issue no longer the state and religion since Turkish secularism seems to dominate the headlines anymore. or “laicism, as the continuation of a Byzantine- era practice, is inherently dependent upon y over-projecting its power potential, Ankara finds itself the state’s control and guidance of religion in on a conflictual trajectory, on a case-by-case basis, ‘It’s the domestic line with the state’s interests and objectives.” B with the interests of other major or regional powers such politics, stupid’ As to the effect on Turkish multiculturalism, as the US, Russia, France, Italy, Israel, Egypt, and Germany. its practice is already problematic, as the The decision to reconvert the Hagia Sophia inherent and privileged correlation between into a mosque was primarily motivated by Turkishness and Sunni Islam has been a way domestic considerations and the deep dividing of life throughout the 97 years of the existence The summer of 2020 has been unlike any summer in recent lines within Turkish society, history. Usually, during the long summer months, a sort of informal which undoubtedly have moratorium appears between Greece and Turkey so that there political characteristics. The The synthesis between the would be no particular spike in tensions between them, as the current Turkish government inflow of ever-growing number of tourists with their greenbacks and its leader, Recep Tayyip instrumentalisation of religion, on both sides of the Aegean was deemed too important for the Erdoğan, seem to favour economies of both countries. This summer, when the coronavirus the implementation of a nationalism, and anti-western has been wreaking havoc and tourist revenues have been negligible, civilisational discourse into the action has shifted to gunboat diplomacy and the search for a civilisational state reality, Kemalism or Eurasianism has leverage in an increasingly complex and unsteady European primarily for reasons of security architecture. Yet there is no novelty here, as this has been political expediency. This is been shaping the direction of the state of relations between the two countries – both NATO particularly relevant in the members since 1952 while Turkey is still formally negotiating its perennial battle between Erdoğan’s Turkey since the 2010s. accession to the European Union since 2003 – for a long time. It Kemalists and Islamists that of the Turkish Republic. The troubled history reflects the surreal pragmatism in both Turkey’s relationship with the has shaped Turkish politics for decades. This of the country’s Greek orthodox minority, as West, to which it still belongs but doubts whether it does, as well does not imply that the emergence of a ‘clash well as that of its Armenian, Kurdish, and Alevi as the transactional reflexes of both Greece and Turkey regarding of civilisation’ discourse does not have deep populations, among others, are a testament to their relations with each other, given the ambiguous positions of seated roots within both the governing party this sad state of affairs. Though successive polls their partners and allies. Should there have been no NATO or EU, and its electorate, in particular as a revindication since the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia do a good argument could be made that relations between the two of the Kemalist turn toward modernisation, no show that it has had a significant impact in countries would mirror Turkey’s relations with some of its other Westernisation and secularism upon the ashes the government’s sagging poll numbers, the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul neighbours, such as Iraq or Syria, or even Iran and Armenia. of the Ottoman Empire, away from the virtues of

068 069 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou: Turkey and the quest for limited autonomy from the West

mitigated reaction by the and minds of Sunnis around sidetracked. While for the European Union and its member states, Kemalist opposition reflects The decision to the world. Erdoğan’s some form of multilateralism and its normative framework are a sine an acceptance that its ability reference on 10 July that the qua non for addressing regional and global challenges, for Turkey to influence the country’s reconvert the “resurrection of the Hagia the militarisation of foreign policy instruments as evidenced in the ideological direction has Sophia heralds the liberation tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the challenge to been further limited. What Hagia Sophia of the Al-Aqsa Mosque” in international forums and institutions and their norms and rules to emerges is a very real Jerusalem is a case in point. which Turkey is a party to, will be an acceptable means of conduct existential dilemma for the into a mosque if these limit its ability to extend its Lebensraum and its ability to country’s secular population manifest itself as an indispensable regional actor. For example, the as to what this gradual, overt was primarily An increasingly Hagia Sophia reconversion is a case in point, as Turkey went through promotion of political Islam coercive posture the process without prior consultation, for example with UNESCO, as means for their way of life. motivated it was bound to do given the monument’s World Heritage Site status. The third facet linked to the For the Greek Orthodox by domestic conversion of Hagia Sophia The instrumentalisation of religion as a foreign policy tool, in this minority and Bartholomew is the wider geopolitical case, promotes the simplistic perception of a ‘Neo-Ottomanist’ I, the embattled Ecumenical considerations and geo-economic context turn in Turkish foreign policy where Ankara leads the fight Patriarchate and spiritual which capitals around the against the West. In other words, as Nicholas Danforth notes, “[w] leader of 300 million Orthodox and the deep world have been grappling hen it serves their purposes, Turkey’s leaders will undoubtedly Christian worldwide, the with, given the consensus continue to dress their foreign policies in neo-Ottoman garb.” reaction of the Patriarch dividing lines that the regional and global encapsulates the reality: security architecture, and as a “What can I say as a Christian within Turkish consequence the international More of a disruptor rather clergyman and the Greek liberal multilateral order in than a pole of stability patriarch in Istanbul? Instead society. place since the end of the of uniting, a 1500-year-old Second World War, has been Despite the aforementioned instrumentalisation of religion and heritage is dividing us. I am saddened and faltering. With the United States – the crucial the militarisation of foreign policy, Ankara has not made a move shaken.” As his close associates have told me, link holding the order in place – doubting to either withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance or to break totally the Ecumenical Patriarchate has survived 567 both its role in the world as well as what its with the European Union. Yet the tell-tale signs are many, starting years without the Hagia Sophia, which was priorities should be, regional states have been in particular with the overt attempt to couple greater strategic converted into a mosque in 1453 and then into scrambling to reconsider their priorities. While autonomy from the West with its growing relationship with the a museum in 1935, and can continue to do so. for the European Union and its member states, Russian Federation since 2016. Alarm bells were raised by the this implies a painful conceptual and material 2019 purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile system and transition into a more geopolitical union, Turkey’s its implications for Ankara’s relations with Washington as well Promoting an Islamic agenda methodology has involved the promotion as NATO as a whole. Its recent and ongoing strong-arm tactics and implementation of a more transactional against Greece and France, among others, have led many A second dimension has to do with the approach where assertive and coercive to suggest willy-nilly that Turkey has become the Alliance’s perception within the Muslim world as to diplomacy predominates. Here the attempt ‘elephant in the room’ with a proliferation of strategic divides on which leader is defending or promoting an is both to rationalise the vacuum that a less a variety of fronts, with implications regarding NATO’s already Islamic agenda. Although many predominantly strategic United States leaves both within the problematic reach in the Black Sea region and the Middle East. Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt wider European space and in the Mediterranean, and the United Arab Emirates, are at odds and to ensure that consensual national An argument could be made that Turkish actions imply the with Turkey’s perceived infringement upon the strategies – such as the country’s place as a implementation of a security doctrine based on the concepts of global Islamic discourse (and their geopolitical regional energy transit hub, and, by extension, as forward defence and self help, given its assessment of the regional interests), the battle is actually for the hearts a regional power with global reach – do not get security concept as well as the synthesis domestically of political

070 071 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Dimitrios Triantaphyllou: Turkey and the quest for limited autonomy from the West

Islam, nationalism, and anti-Westernism. transition away from Kemalist tenets is slow and provided the methodology Ankara uses to promote either choice Yet the contradictions of Turkish foreign contained, the wider European regional context does not become excessively heavy-handed, putting at risk the policy, and its possible self-entrapment due implies one of balancing and rebalancing, action interests, sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU and NATO member to an overestimation of its influence or an and reaction between the region’s powers. states, and by extension, the organisations they belong to. Although acceptance of the manner in which it tries to The US’s ambivalence and ambiguities have there is not much room for optimism at this point in time, a more enforce it, make it more of a disruptor rather led regional states to seek different ways to permanent, long-lasting, value-laden binding agreement with than a pole of stability in the wider European, augment their security, many (especially the Turkey is necessary. There is a need to move beyond the stopgap Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Eurasian European countries) within the confines of triptych of ‘solidarity, de-escalation, and dialogue’ as Josep Borrell, spaces. In other words, by over-projecting its international law and multilateral institutions, the EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign power potential, Ankara finds itself heading while others test the system’s limits. The pace Affairs and Security Policy, suggested after the video conference for a conflictual trajectory, on a case-by- of change is rapid, with the verdict still out as meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member case basis, with the interests of other major to whether the frayed relationship between States on 14 August. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. or regional powers such as the US, Russia, Turkey and its partners and allies does remain France, Italy, Israel, Egypt, and Germany. a Gordian knot. The options on the table now are between limited strategic autonomy for As long as Turkey’s break with the West Ankara or strategic independence. Both of these does not become more permanent and the choices or developments can be managed,

DIMITRIOS TRIANTAPHYLLOU is

Professor of International Relations

and Director of the Center for

International and European Studies

(CIES) at Kadir Has University,

Istanbul.

072 073 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Srecko Latal: EU Can’t Afford to Lose the Battle for the Balkans

Feeling shunned by the EU, In recent years, months EU can’t afford to lose in one of the most precarious moments of recent history, and weeks, the region has may prove to have been the battle for the Balkans the last drop in the Balkans’ been slipping away from the overflowing bucket of frustrations and dismay, and path towards the EU and its the final proof to local leaders By Srecko Latal | Sarajevo that their interests will be democratic practices, and better served in alliance with some other foreign actors. turned towards autocracy, hina, Russia and the USA are using the corona pandemic to strengthen At the end of April, the EU their positions in the Balkans, although their divergent interests threaten nationalism, corruption and eventually corrected its course C both the region’s EU perspectives and its long-term stability. Over the and provided a whopping last two months, the corona pandemic has thoroughly changed the world in other foreign influences. €3.3 billion package for many different ways, on the global, regional, local and individual levels. health, economic and social challenges in the Balkans. Yet and the entire world – when divergent foreign this intervention may be coming too late for at influences rekindle the region’s unresolved least a part, if not all of the Balkans, where the national, religious and ideological differences. One of those changes has been the accelerated return of EU has lost much – if not all – of its influence. geopolitics, as manifested in the Balkans by China, the Gulf The most flagrant such example happened states, Russia, Turkey, and the US, who have been using In recent years, months and weeks, the more than a century ago, when the Austro- medical assistance, political and PR moves to pursue their region has been slipping away from the path Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was interests and strengthen their positions, with the mediation towards the EU and its democratic practices, assassinated in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, of some of their new (or old) allies in this volatile region. and turned towards autocracy, nationalism, which triggered the start of World War I. corruption and other foreign influences. These geopolitical moves are undermining the Balkans’ EU While EU leaders and officials are still The Balkan powder perspectives, and with it the region’s pondering what further steps they should kegs smoulder again long-term stability, since for the take in the region, most of them still do past two decades hopes of EU not seem to grasp the urgency or the As this anniversary draws near, the geopolitical membership have been the main, if seriousness of the situation. Even those who situation in the Balkans seems to be ever not the only protection against the are aware of the risks seem to be at a loss more complicated and dangerous. potential chaos underlying the region’s as to what to do in the difficult and troubled unresolved ethno-political issues. region where – as some of them believe In addition to the new health, security, – they have already tried everything. economic and social challenges caused by The EU response to this challenge was the pandemic, the region is witnessing a initially marred by a major blunder, Whether because of the EU’s ignorance, its rekindling of many of its old problems, such as EU countries blocked exports of own mounting internal problems, or because of as rampant corruption and internal ethnic their medical equipment to other the Balkans’ traditional complexity, the region & political divisions. Furthermore, most of member and non-member countries, is still far from the top of the EU agenda. The the Balkan countries are already gearing up triggering furious criticism, from Italy EU seems to have forgotten how dangerous for elections this year, adding yet another and Spain, to Albania and Serbia. the Balkans can be – for itself, the continent flammable ingredient to the volatile concoction.

074 075 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Srecko Latal: EU Can’t Afford to Lose the Battle for the Balkans

Many experts and reports have been pointing to the adoption of the 2020 state budget. The latter the region’s long-term stability and enable serious democratic downturn in the region. will delay Bosnia’s upcoming local elections, the gradual transformation of its nationalist which have currently been postponed ideals. All other options, meaning the absence “The breakdown of the democratic consensus has been most until November, but will be delayed even of the EU and the presence of divergent visible in Central Europe and the Balkans, which experienced the further until the state budget is adopted. foreign influences, would inevitably add fuel greatest gains after the end of the Cold War,” warned the Freedom to the local ethno-political House’s global ‘Nations in Transit’ report, published on May 6. In both Kosovo and North China and quarrels, thus destabilising Macedonia, the governments’ the region in the long run. The report noted a considerable decline in democratic practices efforts to control the Russia proved in Montenegro and Serbia, as well as in the EU member coronavirus pandemic have Nevertheless, in recent years Hungary. These three countries were “no longer democracies,” from the very beginning been once again to the enlargement process has the watchdog organisation concluded, and added them to the overshadowed by political gradually screeched to a halt. group of ‘hybrid regimes’ with the rest of the Balkan countries. and personal battles. North be better at Macedonia is also distracted by The region never fully the preparations for its general the game of recuperated from the The latest developments across the region elections, while in Kosovo the impact of the 2008-9 have added more reasons for concern. Constitutional Court is set to winning over global recession, and its rule on the recent controversial readiness and capacity for In recent days alone, Albania has seen clashes between the toppling of the government Balkan hearts. economic and social reforms police and opposition supporters and activists over the disputed and indicate how a new weakened as politicians demolition of the National Theatre in Tirana. The demolition government should be elected. and politics became was carried out overnight, against the advice of EU officials and more and more conservative. The global their efforts to find a compromise solution. The subsequent recession has strengthened conservatism violent protests reflected growing tensions The EU is squandering and undermined internal cohesion within between the ruling and opposition parties. its influence in the region the EU too, which has weakened the Union’s The region never fully readiness to accept new members. Similar tensions are simmering in Montenegro, The local and regional power struggles in recuperated from the where the ruling regime of Milo Djukanović the Balkans have been augmented in recent As a result, the accession process – which has been facing off against the opposition years by various global actors, which have was both the EU’s technical toolbox and its impact of the 2008-9 parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church, exploited the steady decline of EU interest only strategy in the Balkans – has become an ahead of the parliamentary elections and influence in the region to strengthen their exercise in bureaucratic procrastination, a game global recession, and its scheduled for the end of the year. positions and pursue their individual interests. in which the Balkan countries pretended to still be willing to reform while the EU pretended to readiness and capacity The situation is no better in Serbia, where Since the early 2000s the Balkans have be ready to accept the new member states. supporters of the ruling and opposition been yearning to join the EU, which was for economic and social parties have been holding reality show-style supposed to provide the region with more job The Balkan summits in Sofia and London in protests against each other, while gearing opportunities and better living standards. Yet May and July 2018 were the turning point, reforms weakened as up for parliamentary elections in June. equally important was the fact that only EU as they revealed that enlargement into the membership could fulfil another Balkan dream; Balkans had effectively, albeit not officially, politicians and politics In Bosnia & Herzegovina, a complete political to enable all the region’s ethnic groups to live been taken off the table. At those meetings, deadlock has been blocking the formation with their ethnic kin within the same borders. the EU leaders – increasingly troubled by became more and more of a new government in the BiH Federation their problems back home – would not even entity for some 18 months now, since the 2018 It has been this second motive that made allow use of the word ‘enlargement’, using conservative. general elections, and is also preventing the the EU the only option able to guarantee terms like ‘connectivity agenda’ instead.

076 077 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Srecko Latal: EU Can’t Afford to Lose the Battle for the Balkans

The Balkan leaders got the message loud and clear, and military personnel, and why these military teams Grenell pushed for Kurti’s removal as he was started turning more and more towards their historic allies: were allowed to move across the country, and standing in the way of a US-sponsored agreement the Serbs towards Russia, and the Bosniaks towards Turkey even into Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity of intended to at least nominally resolve the dispute and the Gulf countries – as well as towards the new, wealthy Republika Srpska, without any oversight or control. between Serbia and Kosovo. The no-confidence kid on the block – China. The Albanians, on the other hand, vote in Kurti’s government opened up a new and had always been linked much more closely to the US over In neighbouring Kosovo, meanwhile, America complicated legal and political crisis in Kosovo, the past two decades, but America’s new, chaotic foreign was also using the pandemic to pursue different which is threatening to undermine Kosovo’s ability policy under Donald Trump threatens to change that too. but equally self-serving and potentially even to deal with the health, economic, social and more detrimental tactics. Thanks to the direct all the other consequences of the pandemic. intervention of Richard Grenell, the acting Global actors use the pandemic Director of the US National Intelligence, the Over the last two months Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia to strengthen their Balkan grip US Ambassador to Germany, and the Special and all the other Balkan countries eagerly awaited Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo and carefully counted the planeloads coming The new European Commission appointed at the end of 2019 Peace Negotiations, the government of Albin from China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states, as seemed to be aware of the growing trouble in the Balkans, Kurti was toppled in Kosovo on March 25. they meant not only a difference in fighting the and appeared determined to restore at least some of the influence the EU has lost during the time of the previous Commission. Yet its efforts have been interrupted by the coronavirus pandemic, and the EU’s initial abysmal reaction to this difficult challenge made things only worse.

On the other hand, China and Russia proved once again to be better at the game of winning over Balkan hearts, and used the situation to gain additional leverage in the region by sending masks and other medical equipment early on.

Their assistance – in line with their strategic orientation in the Balkans – focused on Serbia, the biggest country and biggest market in the region. Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić did not spare the theatrics in thanking China and Russia for their aid, as it helped the country to fight the coronavirus while at the same time boosting his own popularity ahead of the elections.

With every new planeload, Vučić and other Serbian government officials made major public displays of gratitude, while Russian and Chinese flags, as well as billboards boasting ‘a friendship of steel’ with China and ‘historic relations’ with Russia lined the streets of Belgrade.

On the other hand, this assistance raised many eyebrows. Some experts warned that a significant portion of the Chinese aid deliveries seemed to be of poor quality, or that it was superfluous. Others questioned why the Russian health assistance was being coordinated by the Russian Ministry of Defence, why it includes

078 079 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Srecko Latal: EU Can’t Afford to Lose the Battle for the Balkans

pandemic, but also indicated the status of each People in the Balkans see these and by holding a virtual Balkan summit on May 9, an event country in relation to a different global actor. many similar cases as examples of that was originally supposed to take place in Zagreb the EU’s own inconsistency, duplicity as a part of Croatia’s presidency of the EU. and constantly changing criteria. The EU comes back strong, The joint declaration which the EU and Balkan leaders but is it too late? On April 29, the EU came back strong, adopted during the conference reiterated “unequivocal announcing a massive package of financial support for the European perspective of the Western The EU eventually realised that China’s ‘mask assistance for the region. This included Balkans”, and stressed that the EU’s support to the region diplomacy’ and Russia’s military-driven health €38 million of immediate support to the went “far beyond what any other partner has provided.” assistance was threatening to undo years of health sector, as well as exclusive access the EU’s strong presence in the Balkans. to EU instruments and medical equipment; Yet by the end the Balkan leaders and their citizens almost €1.2 billion euro in aid funding remained clearly unimpressed by the event, whose biggest On March 26 EU leaders finally agreed to set for the region’s social and economic achievement seemed to be the fact that it was held in such dates for the start of negotiations with Albania recovery; and almost €2.2 billion to support a difficult situation, and which, once again, deliberately and North Macedonia, yet this move was too businesses and public sector investments. avoided even mentioning the word ‘enlargement’. little and too late to make a major difference. EU officials in Brussels, as well as around As EU leaders and officials now ponder how to move on with This step, which for the EU was just a small the EU and in the Balkan capitals, also the pledged assistance, including the conditionality that will be technical move, but which it nevertheless stepped up their communication efforts applied, experts say that the Union is still far from securing its delayed, had been eagerly awaited by these to make sure that the Balkan peoples position in the Balkans, warning that they cannot afford to lose it. two countries and the rest of the region and their leaders understood that the for years – but it was almost completely Union still cared for the region. “The European Commission promises €3.3 billion to help the buried under the avalanche of reports Western Balkan countries mitigate the impact of the pandemic related to the fast-spreading pandemic. The news was welcomed across the Balkans, and bring them closer to the EU. Without a fundamental change of although in Serbia it was still overshadowed direction, however, this initiative comes too late,” a leading Balkan At the same time, EU leaders are still by the Serbian government’s ever more expert Dušan Reljić said in his analysis published on May 5. withholding the visa-free regime for emotional reactions to the much smaller Kosovo, despite the fact that the European gifts coming from China and Russia.

Commission has proposed this already back SRECKO LATAL is Bosnia Country

in 2016, having concluded that Kosovo’s The fact was not lost on Western officials and Editor, Balkan Insight. As Associated

authorities had met all the agreed criteria. local experts. Many of them have expressed Press correspondent and editor,

concerns that Vučić may SreckoLatal covered Bosnia and

have ‘passed the point Herzegovina during and after the The EU eventually realised that of no return’ – that he 1992-1995 war, but also reported may have concluded from other places such as Kosovo, China’s ‘mask diplomacy’ and that, at least during his Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also reign, Serbia’s future wrote for numerous regional or Russia’s military-driven health looks brighter in alliance international media and analytical with China and Russia, organizations, and worked as assistance was threatening to rather than with the EU. communications expert and political advisor for the World Bank and other undo years of the EU’s strong The EU tried to international organizations. further restore its presence in the Balkans. position in the Balkans

080 081 ?Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Elsa Lilja: Pandemic of discord: Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers Pandemic of discord: Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers?

By Elsa Lilja | Brussels

he COVID-19 pandemic has engendered an opportunity to reinitiate discussions regarding the controversial redrawing of borders along T ethnic lines between Kosovo and Serbia. Right when the COVID-19 crisis reached Kosovo, its government fell. The Parliament ousted Prime Minister Albin Kurti in a vote of no confidence. The pretext was that he Although governments aim to present their Europe must also look at its own complex refused to enact a state of emergency that would legally justify the restrictive borders as stable, the ideological nation- history in relation to ethnic minorities and measures he had put in place in order to curb the Coronavirus outbreak. state is in flux, and nationalism is swiftly nationalism. Moreover, it also needs to evolving across Europe. Amidst rising populist learn from recent history in order to keep sentiment and ensuing xenophobia, ethnic a very volatile situation under control. difference is increasingly presented as a Kurti claims he was concerned about transferring the problem for the nation-state. If the fall of the government powers to the Security Council chaired by nation-state has been predicted already, the Pandemic of discord: President Hashim Thaci. Yet Kurti added that his concern pandemic crisis has only served to highlight could it bring about ethnic was less about the coronavirus threat, and more about and amplify its centrality in debates over the borders in Europe? his fear that Thaci would use the powers given by the future of Europe by now rendering it a crucial new act to conclude a controversial deal with Serbia to component of public discourse. While the Prime Minister Kurti and President Thaci redraw Kosovo’s borders along ethnic lines. In the weeks grave health and economic consequences of had long disagreed on a proposal for that followed, the deal seemed set to become reality. the Pandemic persist, the rapid political shifts territorial exchange as part of a potential that resulted from it can bring about structural Kosovo-Serbia final peace settlement. There is reason for Europe to take this seriously, as it may well changes that will be felt for decades to come, Kurti was worried Thaci would seize the become a defining moment for nation-states in Europe. The and have implications for Europe as a whole. opportunities offered by the COVID-19 question of redrawing borders underlines a larger crisis of Pandemic to move forward with this deal. the nation-state in which ethnic minorities play a key role. In The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has remained some cases, the presence of large ethnic minorities has been in a stalemate for quite some time, with While the specifics of such a land swap perceived as a legitimate factor in the demarcation of borders. Brussels hesitating to take any decisive are largely unknown, Thaci’s statement in Yet it has also been used as a claim to legitimise ethno-territorial action. However, to address lingering 2018 announcing the proposal suggested fantasies that brought the Western Balkans to war in the 1990s. tensions in the Kosovo-Serbia relationship, it would unify Albanian majority areas

082 083 ?Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Elsa Lilja: Pandemic of discord: Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers

in southern Serbia with Kosovo. In return, Serb majority The timing was not an accident. The the country, its reputation and the path to areas in northern Kosovo would be united with Serbia. Court stated that Thaci was suspected democracy and freedom.” It specifically to have made efforts to obstruct the called on political leaders to “waive the rapid The thought of redrawing borders along ethnic lines led work of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, signing of an agreement between Serbia thousands to protest in Kosovo’s capital Prishtina. Given the and feared Thaci would attempt to and Kosovo if it threatens to risk the stability EU’s acquiescence on the matter, several civil society groups negotiate amnesty for himself as part of of the region (...) especially the case if the in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as former high representatives a settlement with Serbia, as well as to agreement provides for ethnic-geographical to Bosnia sent open letters to then-EU High Commissioner overturn the law establishing the Court. exchange of land between countries.” It Federica Mogherini, urging her to oppose the deal. For the concluded that any agreement must have past two years, the The EU now looks set to once again take public support and strengthen rule of law issue has galvanised charge of the dialogue, and has announced and democracy “beyond ethnic borders.” The pandemic crisis has only intense public debate, it will host a series of talks beginning with particularly after it was its Paris Summit in July 2020. To ensure that Now is the time for the EU to take served to highlight and amplify revealed that the Kosovo the Pandemic is not used as a pretext to decisive action. Changes brought on by government had in 2019 rapidly conclude a final settlement between emergency measures enacted during the the centrality of the nation-state in commissioned a Paris- Kosovo and Serbia, it is imperative to Pandemic may well affect the political based company to lobby critically address the EUs approach to peace landscape of Europe for years to come. debates over the future of Europe in favour of a land swap. and state building in line with its perspective on multiethnic states and minority rights. History has shown there are reasons to take by now rendering it a crucial Given the controversy, This is particularly urgent this moment seriously. President Thaci given its acquiescence to A state of emergency component of public discourse. later reframed his border change, and in light The EU, given in the Western Balkans proposal with the more of what appears to be a race has through its history palatable framing towards a final settlement its prominence been used for political of “border correction” (supposedly modeled on similar for Kosovo and Serbia. purposes. At times this has agreements between Belgium and the Netherlands) in the process, had dire consequences. and promised that there would be no demarcation along The Pandemic has facilitated Former Serbian president ethnic lines. In promoting the proposal, he adopted a conditions in which a needs to be Slobodan Milosevic, who language grounded in liberal democratic values, speaking democratically elected prime initiated a campaign of of normalization, reconciliation and the “preservation of minister could be ousted, particularly ethnic cleansing in the a multiethnic spirit,” in line with EU aspirations. However, without proper opportunity Western Balkans in the the ambiguity and complete lack of transparency of the for the governing party to wary of the 1990s seized on the proposal’s contents, as well as lack of concerted efforts to elect a new prime minister. opportunity of a state of consult public opinion, has done little to diminish concerns. Social distancing measures risks of emergency, and under complicated the opportunity the authority of the latter, The prospect of a final settlement between Kosovo and to hold a snap general election setting an captured power legally. Serbia looks to be dictated by circumstance. The Trump- and limited protests. This When protests had administration, eager for a foreign policy win, offered has not gone unnoticed in ethnopolitical erupted over proposed to host talks between Thaci and President of Serbia Europe. 15 European MPs amendments to strip Aleksandar Vucic in the White House on June 27th. signed an open letter urgently precedent in Kosovo of its autonomy, warning against “using the Milosevic declared a That is, until June 24th when Thaci was indicted for extraordinary situation caused the Western state of emergency. This war crimes by the Special Prosecutor’s Office in the by the Pandemic for political allowed him exceptional Hague, prompting the cancellation of the talks. maneuvers that can damage Balkans. authority to amend the

084 085 ?Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Elsa Lilja: Pandemic of discord: Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers

Yugoslav constitution and return governing power over Kosovo to Belgrade. Amidst the Pandemic, governments in Russia, Poland and Hungary have all taken advantage of the current state of emergency to acquire greater powers internally.

Despite efforts to promote civic identities that embrace ethnic diversity, the EU has tended to accept that ethnicity has clear borders and boundaries.

The EU, given its prominence in the process, needs to be particularly wary of the risks of setting an ethnopolitical precedent in the Western Balkans. This extends beyond the Balkans - given Russia’s assertion of its right and obligation to protect Russian ethnic minorities everywhere, the EU may find itself inadvertently ethnically different groups cannot coexist in Establishing concrete benchmarks and demonstrating endorsing ethno-territorial claims such peace. Despite efforts to foster diverse and tangible progress on minority rights is a precondition for as that of Russia to parts of Ukraine, multi-ethnic identities across the European EU membership. However, proposals for Kosovo’s Serbian Moldova, The Baltics and Central Asia. Union, large ethnic minorities continue to minority have fallen little short of segregation. Addressing be perceived as threats to the nation-state. the internal biases that may be leading all parties into a stalemate on this issue is indispensable, as lack of progress A future for the Even the more moderate of views tend in this field has been the major cause of dialogue impasse. (multiethnic) state? to consider mono-ethnic groups as politically and culturally homogeneous, The EU’s approach in the Western Balkans tends to see EU officials and academics have warned as if in a natural and inherent manner. ethnic identities as inherently problematic. This is consistent that redrawing borders along ethnic lines Ethnic homogeneity, thus, is believed with theories of ethnic nationalism that characterise ethnic may open old wounds and cause ripple- to ensure higher levels of social and identities as intolerant, irrational and xenophobic. effects across the Western Balkans and the political trust and thereby easier to govern EU itself. Ethnic tensions are not solely a within the framework of a nation-state. The EU’s Enlargement process attempts to make ethnic Balkan issue. Underlying the rise of far-right identities less salient, for instance by encouraging ethnically nationalism in Europe today is fear, anger Preached in this belief, tangible solutions inclusive national symbols: a multi-ethnic flag asserting its EU- and hatred of a particularly ethnic character: to disentangle Kosovo’s ethnic apartheid future and a national anthem called “Europa” without any lyrics grounded in xenophobia and a belief that system have been sparse and uncreative. - so as to respect Kosovo’s multiethnic nature. Across Europe

086 087 ?Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Elsa Lilja: Pandemic of discord: Will the EU allow Kosovo - Serbia peace to slip through its fingers

and its neighbourhood, the EU has sought to Malcolm (who explores myths and facts Commissioning an expert group of local and international promote civic national identities, considered of both Kosovo Albanian and Serbian academics, researchers, EU officials, politicians and policy- liberal and inclusive, based on solidarity, histories), demonstrates that culture has makers, students and civil society groups to develop a democracy and political legitimacy. been in constant flux since records began. comprehensive, sustainable, and resilient framework for minority rights that holds governments accountable to the Concurrently, ethnic identities are protected Instead of building resilient structures to protection of rights and interests, and ensures minority and empowered under universal values protect against government neglect and representation in political institutions - could pave the that lay the foundations for minority rights, mismanagement; instead of empowering way for sustainable peace and resilient, democratic as set forth in the EU’s accession criteria. civil society to come up with sustainable institutions. The EU can do this by also opening up its solutions permissive own preconceptions of ethnic difference for debate. of multiple and If the EU remains uninterested transcendent identities When it looked as if the US would take over the dialogue and the evolution of and negotiate a final settlement, it was a wake-up call for the and inactive, it may end up with these over time- such EU. Now that the EU is back in the driver seat, it can use the as desegregating opportunity of the talks to transform the dialogue’s format an unprecedented problem on the school system, and put agency back in the hands of citizens, as well as to facilitating multiethnic begin the process of putting options on the table that are its borders and, if a land swap history exchanges, centred on citizens’ interests. This is even more important or to question how given the risk of rapid political shifts spurred on by emergency is agreed to, risk endorsing a minority communities measures enacted under the guise of the Pandemic. The may have come to EU needs to ensure that the dialogue is accountable to precedent with dire consequences. shape their own distinct citizen interest by complimenting the high-level talks with culture- institutionalizing formal and informal dialogues with mid-level leaders and

a framework civil society. The EU needs to establish guidelines and ELSA LILJA is working as a

While civic identities, in theory, should be for minority rights has failed to evaluate emergency measures on a case-by-case basis, Communications Officer in the field

permissive of ethnic identities, the result surpass ethnic segregation. and keep in mind its history in the Western Balkans. If the of EEA (European Economic Area)

is an, at times, confused and contradictory EU remains uninterested and inactive, it may end up with an Law in Brussels. She has a degree in

approach: striving simultaneously for unprecedented problem on its borders and, if a land swap is International Comparative Studies multiethnic coexistence that promotes Transforming the process agreed to, risk endorsing a precedent with dire consequences. from the ICS Honours Program at and preserves ethnic identities, and for a Duke University, United States and

unified civic national identity that attempts The EU holds a key responsibility in an M.A. in International Relations

to make ethnic identities less salient. supporting Kosovo to develop an approach and EU External Relations from the

to minority rights that avoids entrenching University of Kent, United Kingdom.

Prospects for progress are not helped ethnic divides into its political system. In 2017, she lived and worked for

by the EU’s chronic lack of enthusiasm Abandoning the all-stakes, high level, six months in Kosovo as an intern

for the Western Balkans. Despite efforts trickle-down approach of the Kosovo- at the Norwegian Embassy to

to promote civic identities that embrace Serbia dialogue in place of a transformative Kosovo and Albania. She received

ethnic diversity, the EU has tended to multi-level and bottom-up approach that a distinction for her Master’s

accept that ethnicity has clear borders and makes governing officials accountable to dissertation on the EU Enlargement

boundaries. From this view, the conclusion their citizens- would make Kosovo more process in Kosovo and its role in the

is that ethnic relations need to be managed resilient against circumstantial political management of ethnic relations

in a way that assumes the permanence disruption and vigilant against officials and minority rights in Kosovo. of ethnic identities. A reading of Kosovo’s using their positions to ensure their own history, as presented by historian Noel impunity over people’s interests.

088 089 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Democracy and Resilience

Adéla Klečková (Prague): murder, blackmail and corruption - why CEE needs the Magnitsky Act / p.092

Andrei Tiut (Bucharest): Andrei Tiut: It's a tough choice to hold elections during the pandemic / p.102

090 091 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Adéla Klečková: Murder, blackmail and corruption: why CEE needs the Magnitsky Act

unfortunate deadly disease. He was tortured, denied medical Murder, blackmail and care, eventually dying of a gall bladder infection. Until the very last moment, he did not stop believing in justice and the positive power of rule of law. Each week, he submitted corruption: why CEE lengthy official complaints about the state of his health and the way he was treated, requesting contact with his family and proper medical care. During 358 days in detention, he needs the Magnitsky Act wrote over 400 complaints and petitions seeking justice.

His name is often mentioned together with Anna Politkovskaya and Boris Nemtsov, as a straightforward example of yet another Russian By Adéla Klečková | Prague who paid with his own life for fierce criticism of the Russian political regime. Yet Sergey Magnitsky was never a member of the Russian opposition. He was a lawyer and accountant, working for British billionaire businessman Bill Browder and his hedge fund Hermitage Capital Management, which was until 2004 the biggest foreign investor in Russia. Before his arrest, Magnitsky was investigating a 230 million dollar web of financial fraud, allegedly involving Russian hat action can the CEE countries take against the government figures misappropriating funds related to companies “bad guys?” How to send out a clear message that which were confiscated W political corruption, blackmail, organ trafficking, from Browder by a criminal rape and other crimes have no place in our countries? And how group with close ties to can we protect ourselves from the worst criminals of the world? One of the strongest arguments Kremlin representatives. His investigations were against it concerns a fear of completely apolitical, purely business-motivated. unnecessary antagonisation of

Yet in November 2008 three Russia, while other critics call The answer has three words: the Magnitsky Law. An unprecedented representatives from the global initiative to pass legislation that would allow national Russian Interior Ministry the legislation superfluous, governments to impose personal sanctions on human rights arrested Magnitsky. Ironically, violators resembles a thriller movie more than anything. the Interior Ministry officials given that there are already who arrested him worked for Who was Sergey Magnitsky, the man whose name probably the same officer he testified a number of recognised and makes Vladimir Putin grind his teeth in anger? Why is there an against. A year later, Magnitsky undeclared hybrid war raging around this piece of legislation? died in prison. His death has effective international sanction And how can passing the legislation help the CEE region? become a symbol of the fight against corruption and regimes under the auspices of the oppression of human The story of Sergey Magnitsky – rights all over the world. international organisations an auditor who changed the world Magnitsky was a tax lawyer and auditor who changed such as the European Union Eleven years ago, in November 2009, Sergey Magnitsky died the world, and one who may in a Russian prison. The reason was neither old age, nor an yet change it even more. and the United Nations.

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Putin’s biggest enemy and violating human rights anywhere in the world. The the international crusade for measures which can be implemented include the passing the Magnitsky Act power to freeze bank accounts and other assets, and ban individuals from entering a given country. As a result, the Magnitsky Act can be perceived Magnitsky’s death set in motion a spiral as a tool to strengthen the foreign policy toolkit of of events no one could have anticipated. individual countries. So far, seven countries have However, if there was ever a man who implemented the legislation: the US, Canada, the could make the impossible possible, UK, and the three Baltic countries; the newest Magnitsky’s boss – Bill Browder – was a likely addition to this group is Kosovo, which passed candidate. This billionaire with influential the Magnitsky Act at the beginning of 2020. connections at the highest levels of global politics turned almost overnight from one However, it is not always sunny in the of the biggest advocates of appeasement realm of human rights protection, and with the Russian regime and the biggest the piece of legislation does have a foreign investor in Russia into, as some number of forceful critics too. call him, Putin’s number one enemy.

A final common argument against it is the His motivation was quite straightforward: altogether defeatist retort that “sanctions will individuals and 102 entities from 24 countries, including South In her State of the Union Address there were no legislative tools to bring not change anything.” Taking each of these Sudan, Uganda, Iraq and Cambodia. Among the individuals (16 September 2020), Ursula criminals responsible for Magnitsky’s death von der Leyen announced that in turn however, reveals these concerns listed, we find Myanmar officials responsible for the genocide the European Commission will to justice. So he decided to persuade the as largely misplaced and unfounded. of Rohingya; doctors and Chinese officials involved in illegal come forward with a proposal British and the American government to on an European Magnitsky Act. organ trafficking of Uyghurs; and warlords from Africa. change the legal gamefield. Simply, this a) Universal Human Rights Protection Tool law imposes visa bans and asset freezes The most prominent individuals listed on the US Magnitsky on individual human rights abusers — Russian President Vladimir Putin has called sanctions list include: Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov; the particularly those who played a role the law „a purely political and unfriendly act“. daughter of late Uzbek President Islam Karimov, Gulnara in Magnitsky’s false arrest, torture and And just days after the US act was passed, Karimova, who is involved in political corruption; 17 individuals death. However, eventually he decided Russia retaliated through deploying a number involved in the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi; to turn this into a global initiative, with the of countermeasures, including barring and, billionaire Israeli mining magnate Dan Gertler. ultimate goal of persuading governments Americans from adopting Russian orphans. all over the world to implement their own b) Targeted Sanctions Mechanism version of a piece of legislation called the More importantly however, even though Magnitsky Act. Browder has spent the the initiative was originally envisaged as To address the second counterargument, unlike many last nine years fiercely campaigning for a tool against a criminal group with close international sanctions regimes, the Magnitsky Act, by the law, and his efforts are bearing fruit. connections to Russian police and the ministry targeting individuals rather than entire countries or sectors, of finance, responsible for Magnitsky’s death, avoids ‘broad-brush’ sanctions that can disproportionately Explaining the Magnitsky Act it has since developed much beyond that. affect more vulnerable citizens in target states. Currently, sanctions apply to 148 individuals Proponents call it the first solely human rights and entities suspected of human rights This targeted approach also enables the direct sanctioning of violations-focused sanction mechanism in the abuses and corruption worldwide. malicious individuals and networks, even from countries that are world. The Magnitsky Act, specifically, is a piece considered to be allies or crucial for broader foreign policy priorities. of legislation allowing individual countries to The US government, for instance, has For instance, the 2017 and 2018 US Global Magnitsky sanctions impose personalised sanctions on individuals unilaterally imposed sanctions on 94 listed above involved Saudi and Israeli nationals, individuals from

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countries which are strategic allies of the US and, thus, unlikely is not without its flaws – the proposal only Additionally, the inconvenience of being to be the subject of broader international financial sanctions. applies to human rights abuses and doesn’t denied entry to the US, Canada, UK or the cover corruption like the US version does. EU is also a significant penalty, as is the It is true that the EU already has the power to impose sanctions considerable stigma that comes with being to promote international peace and security, prevent conflict, The original version of the Magnitsky Act sanctioned. Australia, for instance, is currently fight terrorism and defend democratic principles and human in the UK does not cover corruption either. considering setting a new precedent in its rights. Sanctions can be imposed upon governments of third The most likely explanation is that they version of the Magnitsky Act, by also including countries (as is the case of prefer not to rely solely on the EU’s often family members of targeted individuals Iran, Burma, Venezuela and slow and cumbersome foreign policy into travel bans, such as children wanting It is very likely though that others), or non-state entities processes. Indeed, the Magnitsky Act to study at private schools and universities and individuals. However, can actually strengthen the foreign policy or parents seeking to go to hospitals. the EU will decide to omit this current mechanism even of the member countries of the EU seems to be insufficient in and make it less dependent on it. The Act In the words of Elaine Pearson, director of Magnitsky’s name, to avoid ever changing geopolitical enables national countries to pass sanctions UN Human right watch: “By joining other environments, and the more quickly and flexibly or pass them countries with similar laws, Australia will creating an impression that the context of challenges that against those individuals whom a majority be sending a strong message to abusive democracies must face. of EU members might not agree about. leaders everywhere that there are far- law is primarily anti-Russian. reaching consequences for their actions.” The EEAS has already c) Projecting Strong Global Message This would go directly against undertaken steps to prepare a new sanction It is important to maintain that the Act is Implementation the main idea behind the new mechanism based upon not simply a symbolic ‘virtue signal’ of in the CEE space the same principle as international law. Personalised sanctions EU sanctions regime proposal, the Magnitsky Act. are of course only one part of the anti- For Magnitsky-type laws to be effective and corruption puzzle, but they are an important to have a meaningful impact, it is crucial which is to enable the EU to Among the proposed tool in the arsenal. Such sanctions make that more states join in and introduce an crimes that would trigger it more difficult for criminals to launder equivalent of the Magnitsky Act. Besides the impose visa bans or to freeze such sanctions are: illicit gains or continue to do such EU, Australia and Sweden, three countries extrajudicial, arbitrary business in dollars, pounds or euros, in the CEE region are currently taking the assets of individuals from or summary executions, the most common global currencies. steps to pass the law: the Czech Republic, enforced disappearances, Slovakia and Romania. What then must any country in the world who torture and other cruel, They will enable countries to freeze the these countries do, in order to successfully inhumane and degrading bank accounts and assets of individuals implement the Magnitsky Act, and ensure commit serious human rights treatment. If the law passes, within their own territories or local banks. that its detractors are proven wrong? this would send a strong They are a successful example of concrete violations and abuses. message to those who may action being taken against the corrupt and commit or be complicit in the worst human rights abusers, hitting them Czech Republic: abuses that the financial where it hurts the most – in their pocket. a one‑man crusade centres and currencies of the world’s two largest Indeed, as Browder himself states: “These economies (the EU and the US) are off limits. types of individuals keep their money in In the Czech Republic, the crusade to get the West, where property rights and rule the legislation passed has largely taken the Nevertheless, some EU member states still choose (or have of law exists. This led to the idea of the form of a one-man show. The legislation chosen to) pass their own versions of the Magnitsky Act. One Magnitsky Act, which freezes assets and is currently being advocated for by one of the reasons for this might be that this piece of EU legislation bans visas of human rights violators.” Member of the Czech Parliament – member

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of the Czech Pirate Party, vice chairman of Nevertheless, Slovak political representatives proposal did not list corruption as a crime. the committee on defence and the foreign have indicated their interest in the Magnitsky However, this might come as a surprise for CEE countries stand to affairs committee, Jan Lipavský. The Minister Act before the decision made by Washington. many observers, given that the proposal came of Foreign Affairs, social-democrat Tomáš Like in the Czech Republic, the main driving from the so-called “anti-corruption” party. gain from a rules‑based Petříček, a supporter of the EU version force behind the legislation was a group of MPs of the Magnitsky Act, seems reluctant to led by a member of the Slovak Parliament and When the three MPs submitted their proposal to order that has powerful embrace a Czech version of the legislation. leader of the Political Party “Together”, Miroslav the Committee on Foreign Affairs of Romanian This could be, at least in part, a result of Beblavý. One of the promises he made during Senate in April 2019, they may have expected enforcement mechanisms, political pressure from his own political the political campaign was the promise of a positive reaction from fellow MPs. This was party and from the Czech president, both passing this legislation if re-elected. During the partly because, in 2018, 43 Romanian MPs as opposed to a more of which are known for their closeness to late February 2020 parliamentary elections, signed a petition urging the government to autocratic regimes such as Russia and China. the coalition of liberal parties Together and adopt a ‘Magnitsky Act’, imposing sanctions transactional system, Progressive Slovakia did not pass the threshold on human rights abusers. It was also because The Pirate Party is in opposition and therefore for entering the parliament. With no other the draft had been signed as a sign of support where their negotiating has very limited options to get any piece political party having the implementation of the by 33 MPs out of 136, most of them from their of legislation passed. This means that the Magnitsky Law on its agenda, it is very unlikely own faction, but also by three deputies from power is likely to be chances for passing and implementing the that there will be any significant progress the ruling Social Democratic Party and two Magnitsky Act by the end of the current on this matter in the foreseeable future. from the National Liberal Party, the second limited. A piece of political mandate in October 2021 are very largest party. Thus, there was an indication slim, to say the least. Similarly to the EU of broader support. However, the draft was legislation strengthening approach, Mr. Lipavský has also decided Romania: a victim of finally declined by the Committee and only to omit the name “Magnitsky” in the title political power play members of the USR ended up supporting it. their foreign policy in the and simply name it “The Law on Human Right Protection.” Primarily, because it is Out of the three CEE countries in question, In the Romanian case, some claim that the name of human rights against the Czech common practice to name the Magnitsky Law proposal got the furthest Magnitsky Law became a victim of political laws after people. Secondly, for reasons in Romania, being presented on the floor power play. Indeed, it may well have been is an epitome of such akin to the EU’s; to avoid allegations of of the Romanian Senate. The main initiators viewed by other Romanian political forces as a intentionally targeting only Russian officials. of this legislation were three members potential internal political weapon in political an order and a logical of the Save Romania Union (USR); Adrian battles with the Social Democrat Party and Prisnel, Iulian Bulai, and Cristian Ghinea. in the ongoing attempt by the USR to take addition to a national Slovakia: an outsider agenda over support from the National Liberal Party, Fighting corruption is the most important topic while also reinforcing its position in its tenuous diplomatic toolkit of For Slovakia, the Magnitsky Act bears a for the third biggest Romanian party and so it alliance with the PLUS party, another reformist unique meaning. Until this day, Slovakia is made sense for the USR to make this human entity led by former European Commissioner post-Soviet countries. the only country from the CEE region which rights initiative their own. New sanctions were and technocrat Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș. has a citizen who has been directly targeted to be made more “flexible” than the older, by the Magnitsky Act. The US administration country-based ones, and were therefore Another possible explanation is that maneuvering against has decided to add to its sanction list Marián predicted to have a “strong psychological effect” the proposal may also have simply been an attempt to Kočner, a Slovak oligarch who is directly on the abusers. The main punishment was prevent further antagonising Russia, with relations between responsible for the murder of Slovakian supposed to be the visa ban and asset freeze. the two countries at their lowest point in decades and investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his dialogue practically non‑existent. However, the USR was fiancee Maria Kušnírová in early 2018. Similarly However the proposal was primarily focused not completely discouraged by their loss. In January to the Czech Republic, Slovakia also supported on severe human rights abuses. Similarly to 2020, the leadership of the USR announced that they the European version of the Magnitsky Act. the UK and EU Magnitsky Acts, the Romanian would seek to reintroduce a new version of the law.

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A protestor in Hong Kong holds a sign asking for the implementation CEE: a hybrid target of the Magnitsky Act Recent years have seen frequent © Photo by Sandra Sanders hybrid operations intent on meddling in the internal affairs of CEE countries on the part of both Russia and China, clearly indicating that neither of them respects the sovereignty of the CEE region countries. Such influence operations include, but are not limited to, strategic corruption, espionage, blackmail, performed through hacking, as well as other forms of cyber attacks, including the spread of hostile propaganda and disinformation in both the public and virtual space – with a recent spike since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We can recall attempts of espionage in Poland from Chinese-owned Huawei in 2019, the attempted state coup in Montenegro in 2017, and the attempted assassination of Emilian Gebrev in Bulgaria, to name but a few. Or the very recent “Koněv affair” where the decision of the local government of Prague 6 to remove an old statue of Soviet Marshall Koněv from a square in Prague led to a chain of disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and the activation of Czech far-left and far-right civil actors.

There has been no progress on this matter ever since. an international order based on universal values, which is

Partially also because according to some, there is a sense equipped with mechanisms for preventing their extortion. ADÉLA KLEČKOVÁ is a specialist

that institutions like the DNA (Anti-Corruption Directorate) are in strategic communications and

strong enough to handle corruption, including transborder. At a more profound level, the Magnitsky package, with its both hybrid warfare. Currently, she is

human rights and anti-corruption dimensions, should become part researching new forms of civic

Also, the state had shown the will in the past to sanction of an expanded arsenal of tools to compete in the 21st century activism in the virtual space as a

individuals, such as denying Dmitri Rogozin the right to geopolitical arena. Creatively used, it can simultaneously be non-resident fellow of the German

transit Romanian air space. In conclusion, there is very leveraged for deterrence purposes, but also for lawfare especially Marshall Fund. She works as head

little urgency or impulse to the Magnitsky act and it is very against those foreign adversaries that instrumentalise corruption analyst for the Spolecne pro Česko

unlikely it will resurface in a foreseeable period of time. to manoeuvre, exploit and weaponise certain vulnerabilities within think tank and as an adviser to the

the CEE space. The region is particularly prone to malign foreign deputy chairman of the Committee

interference via corruption, clientelism and lack of transparency. on Defense and the Committee Why it matters The comprehensive Magnitsky legislation could be seen as an on Foreign Relations in the Czech important step in enhancing regional resilience to hybrid operations. parliament. There are also key reasons, specific to the CEE region, for passing this piece of legislation. Primarily, it is about enhancing

100 101 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Andrei Tiut: It's a tough choice to hold elections during the pandemic It's a tough choice to hold elections during the pandemic

By Andrei Tiut | Bucharest

There is little doubt, by now, that the novel coronavirus

pandemic is a threat not only to health and the economy, Concept of correspondence voting in Presidential election Poland in pandemic time © Photo by Wiola Wiaderek but also to some of our democracies. In order to fight the spread of the virus effectively, governments have to restrict quite robust: polls have taken place during civil rights. Some are becoming excessively good at it. Delay the elections wars, famines and civil unrest. But this kind of crisis is peculiar. Elections bring people Emergency powers sometimes fit into the plans and desires of An obvious strategy would be to delay the together in various ways and bringing people would-be autocrats in search of an opportunity to grow stronger. elections until a better moment arrives. together will surely bring about disease. This is done at a rapid pace and is creating growing concern. To Mostly, such plans suppose that the virus give just one example, calling Mr. Viktor Orban a dictator, once would be less… viral during the summer Let us walk through the options. an expression relegated months. But this is just untested theory yet. to informal conversation, is now becoming Also, playing with the elections date can be mainstream (see The Business as usual politically and constitutionally complicated. Elections bring people Economist coverage on Some constitutions require elections to This one is the most clear-cut case. Running April, 2nd vs. April, 23rd). happen before a well-defined moment. together in various ways and elections during a pandemic increases the health risks for participants and society at But there is another Even where it is constitutionally possible, large. Since people will realise that, they bringing people together will problem that plagues delaying elections at will may still give are likely to come to the polls in smaller even countries that remain governments the power to pursue numbers, undermining to an extent the surely bring about disease. committed to liberal improper political gains. Even when they very legitimacy of the process. France democracy: how to hold do not give in to temptation, opposition played brave and saw it happen. elections. Elections can be parties may feel that they do.

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Multi-day elections booth on election day. It is considered safe in Voting by Internet the United States (though president Trump recently disagreed). But in the UK a judge ruled One easy way to lower the risk posed by Large scale Internet voting is logistically easier (possibly, in 2005 that “the system is wide open to fraud elections seems to be to keep the polls maybe, we do not really know). But all the other problems of and any would-be political fraudster knows open during more than one day. Thus, there postal voting come back to us with a vengeance. People would that”, adding that he could find “evidence will be greater social distancing, especially still need to identify themselves when they get some form of of electoral fraud that would disgrace a if people are advised to come to the polls “electronic right to vote”. The process would be ripe for spreading banana republic”, according to the BBC. in different days, according to their name the virus. It also could be unconstitutional in many countries. or any other random characteristic. Scaling up such a system would create On top of this, there are a whole host of ways to defraud internet major logistical and security problems. But other problems remain. People will voting. And, very importantly, voting fraud is much easier to Can postal companies and services cope still need to be in close proximity to those scale than in pretty much any reasonable elections scenario. with such pressure? After all, they are who are part of the elections committee, continuously losing market share to more will still use pens and stamps. E-voting may be the agile competitors. Supposing the deed can future, but, realistically, the be done, the mail worker may choose not to The case of Singapore suggests, Those who handle the pens, stamps and technology is not here yet. deliver the postal sacks from areas where ballot boxes will be particularly vulnerable. people tend to vote “the wrong way”. nevertheless, that, if the pandemic Keeping the polls open during more than one day might actually have a discouraging Are there any Americans have voted by mail in record persists, we might eventually effect on these people, even though, ways out? number in the recent US elections. The same statistically, they are at no greater risk. was also planned to take place in Poland, Earlier this year Singapore learn to competently live with it already arousing suspicions of a familiar revised electoral districts and Multi-day elections would also be relatively combination of authoritarian slide, ill-prepared promoted measures to ensure to the point where relatively safe novel since, typically, countries are more than policies and malevolent intentions. that voting was possible happy to close the polls the same day they during a pandemic. This was elections become possible. open them. Romania has tried this approach However, even if postal voting were possible read by some as a sign that a few times, particularly when referenda and secure, it may be unconstitutional in the government is considering snap elections to capitalise required a quorum to be considered valid and many countries. After all, nobody wrote a on the success of containing the virus. As the number of people were reluctant to meet that quorum. constitution with a pandemic in mind. infections increased, plans seem to have been abandoned. However, speculation about snap elections were not a Vote by (physical) mail Even if constitutional, postal voting is not cause for public outcry, suggesting that the population is necessarily safe from the coronavirus. generally willing to trust that the government will be able to In such a scenario, postal workers would Citizens would have to be identified by organise elections safely (voting is mandatory in Singapore). deliver the ballot papers to the citizens, the postal workers and few institutions in making sure that everybody who has Eastern Europe would accept identification Can we, in Eastern Europe, or Europe generally, copy that the right to vote gets one authenticated without some form of handwritten signature. model? Not really. Singapore is a strong state, some say piece/ set. Then, so to speak, the mailbox That makes postal workers potential authoritarian, inhabited by a compliant population that would become the ballot box. (Multiple super-spreaders. It also makes them is well familiarised with social distancing from previous similar arrangements are possible) potential victims. It is worth remembering epidemics. Europe, and especially Southern and Eastern that in some East-European countries Europe, are nothing like that. The case of Singapore Mail voting is regularly done in the case of postal workers are essential for delivering suggests, nevertheless, that, if the pandemic persists, we citizens who live abroad, or who are unable pensions, utility bills, and generally keeping might eventually learn to competently live with it to the or sometimes unwilling to come to the voting remote places connected to the world. point where relatively safe elections become possible.

104 105 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Andrei Tiut: It's a tough choice to hold elections during the pandemic

Another theoretical option is sortition, which constitutional pressure to hold elections. Not to mince words, we are at a point where democracy kills, is randomly selecting people for office. But the science about the coronavirus because elections kill. When calling an election, governments Such means of selecting magistrates was a is in flux and new ideas are untested. will know that they are sending people to death just as surely as staple of ancient Athenian democracy and So, decision-making will include a they know it when they send troops into the fight. But, at least, was used later in some Italian Republics. certain degree of randomness. modern troops are volunteer-based rather than conscripted. Army Nowadays it is used sparingly in “citizen juries” members choose to risk their lives. But, in an epidemic, citizens who selected to advise politicians on issues. And there is ample room for bad decisions. go to vote will implicitly risk the lives of those who do not vote. In Poland voting by mail was deemed Given a large enough elected impossible at such short This will undoubtedly impact the legitimacy of elections and, body or simple enough notice. So, elections were by extension, of democracy itself. But resilient democracies responsibilities, it can be postponed de facto – but can move on. Failed elections are not a proof of failed argued that sortition ensures not necessarily de jure, democracies, but rather of failed public health planning. representation of relevant because it was too late in the Once the crisis is gone, democracies can fully recover. opinions at least as accurately process (it’s complicated). as elections, if not better. Except where democracy is already plagued Next comes the mix-and- by “pre-existing conditions”. However, such a solution match wave. Various means of precludes the citizens from We are at a voting described in this article giving a mandate to elected could be used simultaneously. leaders. It also results, point where And each country might sociologically speaking, in have its own combination. diminished legitimacy and democracy Inclusive electoral democracy trust. In Romania, for example, will pay off: countries that after each major election kills, because already have more inclusive the number of people who voting options will have it PS When I wrote this article, I said that we were living a believe that the country is elections kill. easier, both from a legal and period of confusion on what safe alternatives to traditional heading in the right direction a logistical perspective. elections looked like. In a certain sense, we are still there. increases. Such moments of According to the Council on Foreign Relations, more than optimism would be lost. At least in summer, good mixes 60 countries have postponed elections from the start of the stand a chance to deliver pandemic. But those who did hold them largely abstained Last, but definitely not good elections. But it will from innovation. Behind the plethora of public health measures least, only very few – if take a while to get everything the same-old same-old kind of action took place: in-person, any – constitutions in in good order. After all, for single-day, come-when-you-like (exceptions exist). Europe would allow it. Singapore, which was first to Did it work? For some countries it did but for some others consider holding elections it did not. As the virus will continue to roam among us for

despite the virus, this is not its first epidemic. months (at least), the discussion is still valid: are governments ANDREI TIUT is a political What next? doing everything to protect the voters? Or are they trying consultant and advocacy worker And then we hope for an to make choices that are safe for themselves, adhering (on Romanian electoral laws) with a

It may well be that the actual response to effective vaccine to come. to the conventional wisdom more than necessary. background in domestic politics and

the electoral challenges of the virus will An inflexion point may be brought about by the US elections, online research. He has extensive

come, like the virus itself, in waves. The considerations above are far from where extended mail-in voting seems to be the solution of experience on political campaigns,

exhaustive. They aim not to be a study in choice. A successful, reasonably uncontroversial process may both at home and abroad. We experience now a wave of confusion. electoral alternatives, but to illustrate the give the world a signal that alternatives are possible. Anything Governments are under political or challenges that any such alternative would face. less may scare government away from electoral innovation.

106 107 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Changing Character of Conflict

Drawing by Dan Perjovschi, part of the Horizontal Newspaper, Sibiu

Interview David Kilcullen, professor of practice, Arizona State University (Tempe): Warfare in the age of dragons / p.110

Liviu Horovitz (Zurich): ‘We didn’t think it was going to be a peaceful world’ - Brent Scowcroft and the world he helped fashion / p.122

Interview Ulrike Franke, policy fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (Brussels): ‘We are still in a world where military power translates into geopolitical power. If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs military capabilities’ / p.128

Interview Samir Saran, President, Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi): ‘If the EU fails, we can say goodbye to the liberal order’ / p.136

Interview Kuni Miyake, research director, Canon Institute for Global Studies (Tokyo): It is more than a trade war between US and China, it is a hegemonic rivalry / p.148

108 109 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

Interview David Kilcullen, professor of practice Arizona State University, Tempe to get out of dealing with the snakes, because that threat is real. We can’t just go for great power competition, because we are dealing with hyper-empowered non-state actors that now have Warfare in the age of dragons access to all kinds of technology and capability that didn’t exist a decade ago. We can’t just ignore that. By the same token we can’t continue to primarily focus on non-state actors, because states have adapted and evolved specifically to exploit our tunnel vision on terrorism since 2003. I emphasise 2003 rather than 2001, because it was the invasion of Iraq that got us bogged down, not so much Afghanistan. The 2003 moment highlighted the limits of the Western way of war - a very high-tech precision-centric David Kilcullen approach that emphasizes battlefield dominance and is characterised by a narrow focus on combat.

David Kilcullen is the author Robert Kagan was talking about the (geopolitical) What we’ve got to do is cover a much of the newly published The jungle that grows back. Your latest book has more of a broader range of threats with a much Dragons and the Snakes - How the Rest learned to fight the Game of Thrones (GOT) vibe: the return of the dragons. more agile approach, which suggests West, Oxford University Press. In short, from GWOT [Global War on Terrorism] to GOT. to me a lighter footprint, with greater The genesis of the book goes back to February 1993 with the The emerging changes to the character of war, the ways emphasis on agile responses to a confirmation hearing of James in which the dragons are practising warfare are at the wider variety of threats in a wider Woolsey as director of the CIA. At the time he captured well core of your new book. Based on your observations, how variety of places. We have to the strategic Zeitgeist of the did the character of contemporary war change? become more capable of dealing emerging unipolar era – “we have slain a large dragon, but we with both state and non‑state threats live now in a jungle filled with a The book is about military adaptation. It’s about how both state at the same time and in many of the bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways the and non-state adversaries responded to us in the period since same places. In Syria, for example, we dragon was easier to keep track the Cold War. We created the fitness landscape within which have significant non-state threats but of.” Today, the dragons (Russia and China) are back again. all of our adversaries are adapting, and the event that created also state adversaries that are playing a that was the 1991 Gulf War. It showed everybody how not to multi-level game. That is actually pretty fight the US. The next big event was the 2003 invasion of Iraq typical and is happening in many of today’s that showed everybody that you can fight the US and you can operating environments. The traditionally succeed, but you need a completely different model – small neat distinction between conventional and modular low-profile groups that operate autonomously among unconventional warfare is breaking down and people in a protracted conflict. What we’ve seen in the 17 years we are going to need forces that are cheaper, since we invaded Iraq is that adversaries have learned from more agile, more modular and are able to respond each other and also reacted to the environment that we created in a seamless fashion to a wider variety of threats. by avoiding and going around our conventional strength. We need to be swing-role: a multi-role aircraft can do multiple missions but can do only one mission Today we live in a security environment where the dragons at a time, while swing-role aircraft can seamlessly operate and fight like snakes (embracing non-state types of shift in mid-mission to a different type of task. activities like cyber-militias, subversion, political warfare) and That is the kind of mindset that we need where the snakes have acquired the capabilities of traditional to be emphasising – forces that can dragons and sometimes fight like a state. That poses for us a do not only multiple things, but can dilemma going forward. If we are thinking about the future of transition seamlessly among tasks war, we can’t just decide to stop worrying about terrorism and in the middle of a mission.

110 111 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

Is this more along the lines of what repertoire. To me the dragons of the day Assad), combining conventional and irregular They manipulate their signature so as to only general Charles Krulak was arguing behave like insurgents, they are really methodologies. Another example is the pop up into the ambiguous zone of operations in the 1990s with his three-block war insurgent powers trying to overhaul a way we operate now in Afghanistan with CT long enough to achieve very specific short concept (humanitarian, peacekeeping, certain type of international order. [counterterrorism] pursuit teams that work term goals and then to drop back down into high intensity), shifting from one to on the ground in ways that are very similar to the sub-liminal environment before we can another, but with a new dimension The clearest example here are the Russians how the Taliban operate. It is one example of respond. It is about manipulating their own – great power competition? that in the Western Military District have us evolving to look like the adversary. The flip signature, it’s about creative ambiguity and actively copied ISIS models of warfare to side of this is that the modern Taliban, and in it’s about time – operating in the blur of the It is beyond the three-block war. It is more create super-light brigades that operate in a fact ISIS during the fighting in Iraq and Syria “gray zone” and surging rapidly to achieve key like 16-block war with multiple domains – distributed fashion with small combat teams look a lot like us – the way they operate with objectives and quickly getting back below the cyber, space, political and economic warfare, and a weapons mix similar to what we’ve seen artillery, tanks and vehicles in a light cavalry threshold of response before we can react. alongside the physical and electromagnetic from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. They swarm. They are adapting to look like us. In domains. One of the points I make about have directly copied the ISIS manoeuvre model a co-evolution environment we are in a tit- There a few techniques that they apply. For China is that we are dealing in the way they are operating. for-tat adaptive process with adversaries. example, reflexive control, a theory with a long with an adversary that has Another example is also history in the Russian political warfare. Another dramatically broadened its China has Russian: Moscow fielded a By contrast, in a peacetime environment - and is decisive shaping, where the decisive phase of definition of warfare beyond wide array of autonomous and this applies to all the countries that haven’t been operation is not the manoeuvre phase, but the what we consider to be war. In dramatically new armoured systems into so heavily involved in the War on Terrorism: pre-manoeuvre shaping phase. Some Russian fact, what they do in practice is the Syrian campaign, learned Russia, China, North Korea and Iran - they were strategists want to win the operation before to mobilise multiple dimensions broadened important lessons and triggered free to sit back, watch us struggle, identify the first tank rolls or before the first airstrike of national power that are a series of adaptations based strengths and weaknesses in our approach, goes in. If they don’t believe they already won, way beyond our traditional its definition on that operational experience. come up with concepts to enable them to the tanks will never roll. That means that a lot military domains. Even if we improve and build capabilities that would of liminal warfare is political warfare, economic could conceive of a lot of of warfare In the book, following counteract Western dominance. In the case warfare, weaponisation of oil and gas, the use what the Chinese are doing Stephen Rosen, I draw a of Russia it’s a bit of a combination – they of special forces in very small numbers to work as warlike, it is not clear that beyond what distinction between wartime watched us struggle in 2003 and learned a lot with local groups, and then rapid strike ops. the Ministry of Defence of and peacetime adaptation. from that, but they also had their own adaptive any Western country would we consider When you are in wartime learning curve from the internal conflicts In the lead-up to the Georgian campaign be in charge of the response. adaptation mode, it’s a process in Georgia, North Caucasus or Ukraine. in 2008, the Russians engaged in a We need to think carefully to be war. of unconscious evolution “passportisation” program where they about reconceptualising (and actually co-evolution) Is fighting at the edges - a new type of offered any Russian-speaking Georgian what we mean by war. between you and the adversary. out-manoeuvring and out-competing citizen a Russian passport. They did that for Wartime adaptation is a direct response to the West? What does a liminal warfare months before the operation. By the time enemy action and one result is that over time playbook like the one practised by Russia the operation began they had a very large Russian way of warfare you come to resemble your adversaries. The entail in a frontline ecosystem? number of newly-created Russian citizens process works both ways: states are borrowing inside Georgia and were able to invoke the I think one important question that non-state techniques and applying them in Liminal means threshold. Liminal warfare is responsibility to protect their own citizens. should be raised is what did the dragons their own ways as an enabler to conventional about threshold manipulation. It is a style of This whole shaping phase happened before learn from the snakes of the post 9/11? military operations, while non-state groups warfare that the Russians in particular have the operation began. When we think about I mean the attacks on cohesiveness and are borrowing from states. One example is the perfected, which is about riding the edge the manipulation of oil and gas in the Crimea legitimacy, subverting the rules of the road, way that Hezbollah evolved from a classical of observability, surfing the threshold of operation in February 2014, mid-winter, shaping hearts and minds, the grievances resistance movement to a regional actor that detectability so a lot of their activity is literally Russian political warfare was heavily focused they are cultivating and exploiting - all operates more like a state (both in the 2006 sub-liminal (“below the threshold” of perception), on targeting Germany to prevent NATO from are features reminding of an insurgent war against Israel, and later in Syria supporting and we don’t even notice what is happening. reacting. A big part of that campaign was to

112 113 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

say to the Germans, do you really want to pick The Chinese way of war is about “conceptual a fight with Russia in the middle of winter, envelopment”, expanding the concept of war to when you depend on Russian oil and gas the point where they are able to manoeuvre in a to provide heating to a majority of German space that is outside of our definition of conflict. population? At the core of liminal warfare is In contrast with the Russians, who favour a more the integration of political, economic, legal, vertical type of escalation, the Chinese embrace military, intelligence, cyber into a single horizontal escalation by expanding the spectrum seamless mix of activity emphasising the of competition and confrontation to the point shaping before the operation. All built on that battlefield is everywhere and warfare is the idea of escalating to de-escalate: they everything. In this sense, controlling the means move quickly to seize a key objective early of technology – 5G systems, strategic real on, presenting an enemy with a fait accompli estate purchases, ports and harbours all over and later de-escalate their rhetoric in order to the world, controlling certain kinds of supply- negotiate from a position of strength. Crimea chain and critical infrastructure investments, is the perfect example of this. While “escalate these are all described in the 1999 Unrestricted to de-escalate” is an idea that originally came Warfare (written by Qiao Liang and Wang from Russian nuclear strategy (although Russia Xiangsui) as non-military war operations. The watchers disagree whether a formal doctrine two colonels dramatically broaden the definition in this sense ever existed), they’ve applied it of war going beyond battlefield dominance, in many other fields of activity since then. emphasising “trans-military” and “non-military a maritime and land power. This is a gigantic transformation. When war operations” by leveraging society and the Xi Jinping came to power, one of his first military announcements international system to achieve a military goal talked about the imperative to move away from the idea that the Chinese way of warfare with non-military means. The authors of that land is more important than the sea and become a real maritime document talk about combination strategies power. It’s incredibly important to understand the geopolitical So South China Sea, maritime and land that mix lethal and non-lethal, military and non- implications for the global security environment of China going Silk Roads, key strategic acquisitions in military means (including criminal networks or from being a land power to now challenging the US at sea in the the West, A2/AD posture, 5G - what is the civil organisations) bringing into play a whole Western Pacific, building a militarised archipelago of islands in the essence of the Chinese way of warfare? variety of competitions and combining them in a South China Sea and bases elsewhere, toward being able to project seamless architecture, similarly power globally. The third is the conventional modernisation of to what we’ve been talking Chinese land forces, which goes along cyber, space, and long-range about with the Russians. precision fires, as well as advanced manoeuvre forces and special At the core of liminal warfare forces, and “informationalisation” of battle networks. If you contrast There are three broad strands Russian with Chinese developments, Russia has a small, but very is the integration of political, in the Chinese way of war. capable set of niche assets at the high end of the technology One is Unrestricted Warfare, spectrum. The Chinese, in contrast, are doing high-tech at scale. economic, legal, military, which later became the Three Warfares doctrine in There is a sense of overlapping, in both theory and practice, intelligence, cyber into a 2006 - cyber warfare, public between the Chinese URW [Unrestricted Warfare] and how opinion/information warfare Gerasimov is framing warfare. Do the dragons learn from single seamless mix of activity and lawfare. The second is the each other? In the end, both are building A2/AD [Anti Access/ change of China from being Area Denial] zones in their immediate proximity or creating emphasising the shaping a land-based power (which it new facts on the ground (the bridge linking Russia with has been since the middle of Crimea, the artificial islands) that give them the opportunity before the operation. the 16th century) to being both to claim entire regions (Azov Sea or the South China Sea).

114 115 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

We know that the Russians and the Chinese have exercised Beyond COIN privilege and optimise the effect of your together, jointly, over the past few years, that they share existing organisation, concepts and information and compare notes. I don’t think it is clear that Professor Hew Strachan talked extensively technologies and that is what we’ve been they are consciously collaborating, but I do think that like in his writings about the danger of doing really since the Cold War. We have every other adversary that we have, they are all responding the strategic influence of operational to step back a little bit from that dynamic to a similar set of circumstances that we created, and level solutions. Is the failure to convert interaction between operations, tactics, even if they are coming from different starting points, battlefield victory into strategic strategy and technology, to think about they are co-evolving in a way that makes them to begin success and into a better peace the adaptation as a separate thing, consider looking increasingly similar to each other. Yes, there is main lesson of the post 9/11 era? how our adversaries are adapting, some collaboration, but in some ways it is more interesting consider if it is possible to shape their than that conceptually, because they are independently I make the point in the book that we are adaptation in ways that favour us. co-evolving towards similar solutions, with a similar set extraordinarily good at achieving particular of challenges. There is also a very significant element of battlefield results, but extraordinarily bad A key component of the security territorial/spatial expansion in the way that both Russia at translating those battlefield results into environment that you are describing are and China think about what they are trying to do. We tend long-term political outcomes. We’ve seen the dragons that learned to fight like the to think in a very manoeuvre-centric way, they tend to this in Afghanistan and Iraq, of course. The insurgents and embraced an insurgent think in terms of shaping and in a spatial control way. repeated failure to convert battlefield victory toolkit to fight the West – competing and into a better peace remains a key reason subverting the Western minds for example. In contrast with the Russians, Obviously, China and for these inconclusive wars that ultimately In this sense, shouldn’t we act more like Russia have a very contribute to internal unrest across the world. a counterinsurgent in our response? who favour a more vertical different set of strategic As a former COIN [counterinsurgency] circumstances. China The rise of populism in the West and practitioner, what do you think we type of escalation, the is a rising power that the collapse of confidence in elites and should preserve from the COIN portfolio? is trying to cement its establishments of all kinds are in some A civil-military fusion maybe? Chinese embrace horizontal role as a major global ways connected to the failure of our military player, whereas Russia models to deliver what they claimed. I think there is a lot of value in our Iraq/ escalation by expanding the is a power that is in a We told people for 25 years that they’ve Afghanistan experience that translates long-term decline. What got the best military in the world and yet directly to dealing with today’s environment: spectrum of competition and the Russians are trying they can see with their own eyes that that the need for integrated civil-military effects, to do is create a sort military isn’t delivering on the ground. the requirement for robust and properly- confrontation to the point of trade space, where So, this leads to a cognitive dissonance resourced civilian agencies to partner they can expand their that results in a collapse of confidence. with the military, the need for political that battlefield is everywhere capabilities now while leaders to fully engage in the problem- they still can, so that There is a dynamic interaction between set, and the importance of narrative. That and warfare is everything. they have something to strategy, technology and tactics. You have said, one of my key points at the end of trade later, when China a particular strategy, which leads you to the book is that we need to get out of the in particular becomes develop particular kinds of tactics and business of occupying and attempting to a major threat to them. One of the paradoxes here is that particular kinds of technologies. Once you govern remote places over the long term China and Russia are currently cooperating with each have those technologies and capabilities in a large-scale way: we can go long, or other against the West, but in the long term they are in place, they actually limit your choices of we can go big, but we shouldn’t try to do actually potential adversaries and geopolitical rivals. strategy. You are not able to just choose both. So, in that sense our approach should This is where any Western retreat is not going to result in any strategy, but you are channelled by perhaps draw more from Unconventional peace and harmony, but in a new Cold War between China the kinds of capabilities that you have. Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense, and Russia, rather than China, Russia and the West. Then you start adopting strategies that rather than large-scale neoclassical COIN.

116 117 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

Going Byzantine how they operated. They were very capable of allow the world to change, so that there is a selectively copying from adversaries in terms viable successor and the adaptive approach How should the Western way of warfare change in of technologies, techniques, ways of operating, of our adversaries becomes less threatening. order to respond effectively to the adaptations and they learned from their wide range of enemies variations in the operational environment? and incorporated those lessons into their own Lastly, we need to move away from a solely very adaptive, flexible way of operating. battlefield-centric conception of war and There are broadly three potential courses of action. embrace a more holistic approach that Secondly, they got out of the business of broadens the notion of successful strategy The first is doubling-down: keep doing what we are doing occupying and governing entire provinces as beyond battlefield dominance, and adopt now, just do it harder, spend more money on the same kind the Romans had done, and focused instead a more flexible model of statecraft. In of capabilities we are building now. That is not going to work on agile mobile forces that could react at long short, as JFC Fuller would say, the object because our adversaries have already adapted, so to continue distances to a wide variety of threats, stabilise of war is not victory, but a better peace. what we’ve been doing is not going to change the environment. the environment and step back. They were also able to build constellations of capable local Please describe the contours of a Secondly is to embrace the suck – accept that our primacy will allies that could do a lot of the work in-between reconceptualised and expanded notion decline and just try to manage that in a way that achieves a interventions. They maintained a selective edge of war that should become the new soft landing. That is not going to work either, because for a soft and mastered some key technologies that other normal for any Western strategist. landing to work you need people couldn’t master, such as Greek Fire, a a successor that is capable high-tech defensive tool. Most importantly, they War in the modern world is fought War in the modern world is enough or willing to do focused very heavily on resilience at home, simultaneously across all domains — air, space, the job of stabilisation and on building an effective civil and military and sea, land, cyber and the electromagnetic fought simultaneously across all friendly enough to the US economic system that was resilient to shock, spectrum. It includes elements of economic and the West that it wouldn’t that was not optimised for efficiency in the warfare, political warfare and narrative domains — air, space, sea, land, be a total disaster for us to absence of shock, but optimised for resilience to manoeuvre and involves cyber-kinetic allow a handover. We don’t shock. We just need to look at what is happening operations (cyber-ops with lethal effects and cyber and the electromagnetic have any such successor. to COVID-19 to realise that the modern world kinetic ops with cyber effects) that favour forces we’ve created with Western military systems which manoeuvre simultaneously in cyberspace spectrum. It includes elements Third is some sort of a since the Cold War is hyper-efficient but at and physical space. Modern war is fought in a Byzantine strategy – a holding the same time is also very fragile because it crowded, cluttered, electronically connected, of economic warfare, political strategy to enable a potentially relies on efficiency in the absence of shock. mostly urban and coastal environment, against acceptable successor to A Byzantine model would ask how would we a complex mix of adaptive state and non-state warfare and narrative manoeuvre emerge. The Western Roman make all our systems more resilient to shock? adversaries who copy each other’s techniques, Empire collapsed in the This would possibly mean decentralisation, and are often seeking to overwhelm us and involves cyber-kinetic 4th century AD, while the lower tech, more play space in our systems through a large number of small simultaneous Byzantine Empire survived so they don’t rely on very precise integration challenges, rather than a single big threat. operations (cyber-ops with lethal for another 1100 years until of multiple moving parts. An urbanised world They tend to prefer decisive shaping (winning the fall of Constantinople. depends on very complex interlocking systems the conflict before the first shot is fired) and effects and kinetic ops with cyber So how did they manage and when one part collapses, it all collapses. creative ambiguity (rather than fully covert or to achieve another 1100 We are living and watching that happen. clandestine operations) as a way to avoid our effects) that favour forces which years of primacy in the conventional strength. The most important Eastern Mediterranean after In a world in which the West is no longer thing we can do to adapt to this kind of war manoeuvre simultaneously in the collapse of the Roman militarily dominant, a Byzantine approach is to get out of our defensive crouch, and Empire? In the book I describe would suggest ways to hold the line – in their begin operating aggressively to shape them cyberspace and physical space. a number of things about case for more than a millennium – in order to rather than wait to be shaped ourselves.

118 119 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview David Kilcullen: Warfare in the age of dragons

When discussing a future posture of the West, I am wondering if Firstly, the US will not be able to carry the burden forever and The interview was first published in Small Wars Journal, in May 2020. you take into consideration the idea of a concert of democracies secondly, the American people have signalled now in multiple able and willing to defend the legacy and the Western order? elections that they don’t want to do it anymore. In many ways The interview was conducted by Octavian Manea the coronavirus shows the equally dangerous risk of being so The transition from US primacy might be to another leading dependent on China economically, and you could argue that in the power, but it might also be to a concert of powers and ideally a military sphere there is a similar risk - which is allies’ dependence concert of democracies, involving India, Europe, Latin America on the US. Our countries are so dependent on China economically and Asian democracies. I don’t think this path is particularly and so dependent on America militarily: the coronavirus teaches likely, primarily because Europe and other countries (Australia is us that we need to break out of our dependence on China in the a good example) are so dependent on US security guarantees economic sphere, while in the military sphere the last 20 years that these actually undermine their ability to fulfil that role. In teach us that we need to break out of our dependence on the US. some ways president Trump’s approach in forcing European This will be good for everyone – it will allow the US to be more agile allies to do more and withdrawing blanket American security and responsive. Small allies are never going to compete with the guarantees, while unpleasant and done in a very vulgar US-led way of war but they can specialise in other forms of war that way, actually is pointing to something important, which is the US doesn’t have a good understanding of. The classic example that we have to have countries stepping forward and taking would be Estonia, which is not a major player in the system-of- responsibility for their own resilience and their own defence. systems Gulf War-type warfare, but is leading the way in creating “defensive cyber home guards” within local David Kilcullen is a professor defense associations or preparing a defensive of practice in the School of guerrilla warfare/resistance warfare model. If Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University and we want to broaden the alliance response, we a professor in the School of have to focus on our comparative advantages, Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of New South with different nations doing different things. Wales. He served 24 years as an army officer, diplomat and policy advisor for the Australian Are you worried about the domestic resilience and United States governments. of the West? Are we already too far in this In the United States he served on the writing team for the process of polarising ourselves and becoming 2006 Quadrennial Defence more like Sunni vs. Shia/Hutu vs. Tutsi? Can we Review, then as Chief Strategist in the State Department’s come back? Our internal cohesion seems to be Counterterrorism Bureau, where an easy prey for the insurgent outside powers. he designed the Regional Security Initiative and served General Mattis warned in the last chapter of his in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, memoirs: ”What concerns me most as a military Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. He served in Iraq as a man is...our internal divisiveness...we are dividing member of the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, and as into hostile tribes cheering against each other, Senior Counterinsurgency fuelled by emotion and a mutual disdain”. Advisor to Multinational Force— Iraq through 2007, before becoming Special Advisor The short answer is I don’t know if it is for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State in 2008-2009. possible to recreate that sense of unity and He was lead author for the U.S. move past the polarising divisions that have Government Counterinsurgency Handbook, and founded really crippled our ability to respond to the the ISAF Counterinsurgency current crisis. But it is imperative to do that. Advisory Assistance Team in 2009. Dr Kilcullen was named Otherwise we are going to be destroyed. one of the Foreign Policy Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009.

120 121 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Liviu Horovitz: “We didn’t think it was going to be a peaceful world:” Brent Scowcroft & the world he helped fashion ‘We didn’t think it was Retired U. S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, addresses the audience during the Business Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award Dinner going to be a peaceful honoring Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in Washington, D.C., May 15, 2008 world:’ Brent Scowcroft and the world he helped fashion

by Liviu Horovitz | Zurich

M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank during the Desert Storm, January 1991.

“this will not stand, this aggression against places. For as long as America’s capitalist lmost exactly thirty years ago, on August 2, 1990, Brent Scowcroft sat Kuwait.” And another few months later, an democracy had been engaged in a deadly on a small airplane. Crammed in the seat in front of him, their knees international coalition led by US military battle with Soviet totalitarian communism, A touching, sat George H.W. Bush, the President of the United States. Bush forces defeated Iraq’s army, with broad leaders in both Washington and Moscow had spent the flight on the phone, calling up leaders around the world. Scowcroft, who reverberations throughout the international had little choice but to intervene. But now the was the American President’s principal foreign policy advisor, was madly revising system2. Brent Scowcroft died a few Soviets were down and the Americans were the speech Bush was going to give at their destination in Colorado – he had to weeks ago, on 6 August 2020. He was 95. surprised by their sudden success, the Iraqis make it compatible with the things that had happened the day before. Saddam Today, the question on many an analyst’s reasoned. The world seemed remarkably Hussein, Iraq’s dictator, had sent his troops to invade neighboring Kuwait. mind is whether America was very much unrestrained. These circumstances “will not a different country three decades ago, or happen again for fifty years,” an adviser told whether Washington’s key policymakers the Iraqi dictator. It was the “opportunity The entire world was now watching the United States. The back then were a different type of people. of a lifetime.” Moscow had its own fish to Cold War was almost over. The Berlin wall had fallen. Two fry and Washington would swallow his Germanies would soon become one. Faced with naked Despite Bush’s clear words and Scowcroft land grabbing, Saddam concluded3. aggression in a somewhat less-than-crucial context, would apparent lack of doubt, the decision to American leaders look the other way? Or would they intervene had not come easy. “Yours is a The Iraqi despot was not alone with his conclude that it was in their country’s interest to intervene? society which cannot accept [ten thousand] assumption. Before boarding for Colorado, dead in one battle,” Iraq’s dictator had told Bush and Scowcroft had attended a meeting He had had “absolutely no doubt” about Bush’s determination, the US envoy in Baghdad before his daring that seemed to reach that very conclusion. Scowcroft subsequently recalled1. A few days later, after move. He was implying that Americans The US government’s key policymakers had landing back at the White House, Bush told journalists that had no stomach for long wars in far-away congregated for an hour at the White House.

122 123 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Liviu Horovitz: “We didn’t think it was going to be a peaceful world:” Brent Scowcroft & the world he helped fashion

“There was sort of a fait acompli atmosphere,” Scowcroft later the message. Scowcroft, together with his principal White REFERENCES:

recalled4. All gathered had agreed that they had to protect Saudi House staffers, worked in the background. Luckily, upon further 1. Philip Zelikow and James H. Arabia – it was inimical to US interests to permit any power to consideration, various other decisionmakers throughout the McCall, “Interview #2 with Brent Scowcroft,” August 10, 2000, 61, “gain dominance over Gulf oil supplies,” Pentagon planners had US government came to the same conclusion. By the time of University of Virginia, Miller Center, argued before. But the world needed oil, and Saddam would the next meeting on the crisis, the tenor had changed. “This George H.W. Bush Oral History Project, released August 2020. provide it, the officials at the meeting had concluded. Liberating is the first test of the postwar system,” Larry Eagleburger, the 2. The best overview is Richard N. Kuwait was “not viable,” budget officials concerned with the Deputy Secretary of State, underlined. If Saddam succeeded, Haass, War of Necessity, War of costs of a potential deployment had opined. Military leaders “others may try the same thing.” This would be a “bad lesson.” Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). doubted whether their political masters possessed the resolve The world would become a more dangerous place – with For a more recent narrative, John to go to war over Kuwait. Some had even argued that the long-term negative consequences for America’s goals of Gans, White House Warriors (New York: Norton & Co, 2019), 89-114. crisis offered an “interesting opportunity” to boost production constructing a liberal and democratic global order. Both US 3. Cited in Jeffrey A. Engel, When and drive down the global price of oil – to the benefit of US security and prosperity would suffer8. The bottom line was that the World Seemed New: George H. consumers. Dick Cheney, Bush’s Secretary of Defense at the the US leadership had to accept the costs of intervention now W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, time, later remembered that the general feeling had been that in order to prevent larger future threats to the national interest. 2017), 381 and 388.

most citizens of Kuwait lived “in the south of France anyway.”5 4. Zelikow and McCall, “Interview #2 And yet, Bush’s choice – as preordained as it appears in the with Brent Scowcroft,” August 10, 2000, 59. Mere hours later, rearview mirror – was anything but easy9. For instance, US 5. Sandra Charles, “Memo for Haass: “We were trying to set up jam‑packed on their military leaders were aware that high losses would once Minutes from NSC/DCM, August 2, small plane, Scowcroft again damage their reputation and, hence, their position 1990, on Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” January 22, 1991, Bush Library, told Bush that he was within the American society. Scarred by the war in Vietnam a Richard N. Haass Presidential a method of behavior for Meeting File CF0118-019, NSC very disturbed at the few decades prior, military commanders wanted the armed Meeting – August 2, 1990 Re: Iraqi tone of the morning forces to have the support of the population. Their “number Invasion of Kuwait; Philip Zelikow, the post‑Cold War world,” “Interview with Dick Cheney,” March meeting. It had skipped one priority was to rearrange the relation with the American 16, 2000, 55, University of Virginia, over “the enormous people,” a former official told me a few years ago. Thus, military Miller Center, George H.W. Bush Scowcroft later remembered, Oral History Project; and Norman stake the United States leaders pushed the President to authorize an overpowering Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: had in the situation, but very expensive deployment – they believed that decisive The Autobiography of General H. and this was the key moment Norman Schwarzkopf (New York: or the ramification of force would end the war quickly and save (American) lives.10 Bantam, 1993), 297. the aggression on the where Washington needed to 6. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, emerging post-Cold This type of military expedition ultimately delivered a crushing A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 317–18; and War world.”6 First, victory, but significantly increased Bush’s political costs in set the tone for the future. Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: there was a regional case of defeat. Towards the end of August 1990, Bush met American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York, dimension. Washington Secretary of State James Baker – who was also his best New York: Penguin Press, 2017). wanted to stabilize the Gulf, and Saddam’s actions were friend – at the White House. Baker cautioned that the Iraq Also, Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the reinforcing old antagonisms. Also, neither Iraq nor Iran crisis had “all the ingredients that brought down three of Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: could be allowed to dominate the region, and Saddam’s the last five Presidents: A hostage crisis, body bags, and Public Affairs, 2009), 9. incursion was threatening to start tilting the balance in a full-fledged economic recession caused by [expensive] 7. Zelikow and McCall, “Interview #2 with Brent Scowcroft,” August 10, his direction. However, the second – the global order – oil.” Bush replied: “I know that, Jimmy, I know that. But we’re 2000, 61 and 72–73. dimension was dominating. “We were trying to set up a doing what’s right; we’re doing what is clearly in the national 8. John Meacham, Destiny and method of behavior for the post-Cold War world,” Scowcroft interest of the United States. Whatever else happens, so be Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (New later remembered, and this was the key moment where it.”11 Thus, when the military leadership asked for very large York: Random House, 2015), 426; Washington needed to set the tone for the future.7 forces to be dispatched to the Gulf, Bush – at Scowcroft’s and Andrea Mitchell, “Interview with Brent Scowcroft,” November 7, 2007, advice – listened carefully and then stood up and said, “You’ve Princeton University Library, James In other words, had the remaining superpower allowed a rogue got it. Let me know if you need more.” He then promptly A. Baker Oral History Project. dictator to do what he wanted, others would have registered walked out of the room, leaving everyone stunned.12

124 125 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Liviu Horovitz: “We didn’t think it was going to be a peaceful world:” Brent Scowcroft & the world he helped fashion

9. For the same conclusion, see forces would be “unleashed.” Without the US Stephen Knott, “Interview with Bush, Scowcroft, and many global engagement, Washington’s international Richard Haass,” May 27, 2004, University of Virginia, Miller Center, politico‑economic designs would be imperiled.14 George H.W. Bush Oral History of their advisers believed Project. Today, we face a chicken and the egg problem. We see 10. Interview with Joint Chiefs of Staff official, March 2018, that the international arena how Donald Trump, the current US President, is abandoning Washington D.C. See also long‑held American responsibilities. Was America so different Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero. remained a highly competitive three decades ago that it brough people like Scowcroft and 11. James A. Baker and Thomas DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy Bush to power to served its interests at that point in time? If (New York: Putnam, 1995), 277. environment. Thus, they this is the case, we should brace ourselves – any American 12. Robert M. Gates, “The Scowcroft President will be transactional, less interested in global order Model,” Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2020. thought it was “romantic” and stability, and more likely to question the utility of the

13. Philip Zelikow, “Interview #1 transatlantic alliance. Conversely, maybe the United States did with Brent Scowcroft,” November and “wrong” to imagine that not change that much, but the people who governed it three 12, 1999, 52, University of Virginia, Miller Center, George H.W. Bush Oral decades ago were different individuals, with different priorities History Project. history could have ended. and different ideas. Should this be the case, there is hope. 14. Brent Scowcroft, “Memo for Maybe the next President will be able to go back on some of Bush: US Diplomacy for the New Europe,” December 22, 1989, Bush the steps this Administration has taken, especially towards Library, Scowcroft Collection, 91116 mending Washington’s relationship to Western Europe. In German Unification (December 1989). Also, “Memo for Bush: Your Ultimately, Bush and Scowcroft’s choices were grounded in any case, the future remains interesting and uncertain. What Meetings in Brussels with NATO a particular reading of international affairs and, implicitly, of is certain is that Scowcroft wisdom will be sorely missed. Leaders,” November 29, 1989, and “US Policy in Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era. “We didn’t think it was going to be a 1990,” January 1990, Bush Library, peaceful world,” Scowcroft later remembered his and the Scowcroft Collection, 91116 German Unification (November 1989) President’s thinking. “We thought it was going to be a messy and NSC Collection, Robert D. world.”13 Francis Fukuyama, who was at that point the deputy Blackwill Chronological Files 30547- 010, January 1990. For Francis director of the State Department’s policy planning staff, had just Fukuyama’s essay, “The End of advanced his famous and popular end-of-history thesis: With History?,” The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18. communism dead, nations would converge, and conflict would be avoided. But Bush, Scowcroft, and many of their advisers believed

that the international LIVIU HOROVITZ is a Swiss

arena remained a highly National Science Foundation

competitive environment. Post-Doctoral Researcher at the

Thus, they thought it was Institute for European Studies of

“romantic” and “wrong” the Vrije Universiteit in Brussels.

to imagine that history He is currently finishing up a

could have ended. book on the United States’ desire

Regional disputes, for military preponderance, and

long suppressed spent many years researching

by the US‑Soviet the international politics of the

competition, would be late 1980s and early 1990s. reawakened, and new George H.W. Bush riding in a Humvee with General Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990 “political and economic”

126 127 Ulrike Franke: ‘We are still in a world where military power translates into geopolitical power. Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs military capabilities’

Interview Ulrike Franke, policy fellow at the European Council For now, the EU still struggles to be a geopolitical actor. And on Foreign Relations, Brussels Germany in particular appears not ready for the EU to be a geopolitical actor. The current situation in the Mediterranean is a good illustration of this. There are still important voices in ‘We are still in a world where Germany who believe that the EU - even in this specific instance - should be an honest broker and an arbitrator rather than an actor. But this is a dispute between an EU member state and a military power translates into Ulrike Franke non-EU member state! The idea that here the EU could be an honest broker is rather surprising, but that is what you hear from geopolitical power. If Europe Germany. France is taking on a completely different vision; they argue that this is an EU member state, so of course we are taking sides and we are sending support to the Greek. This is a perfect wants to sit at the table, it example where you see the difference in approach between France and Germany when it comes to a geopolitical EU. needs military capabilities’ With regard to COVID, I don’t think that it will have a major impact on European foreign policy, or that will contribute to a geopolitical awakening of Europe. Rather, at least at the moment, the consequence is that geopolitical issues have been pushed into the background - and we’ve seen this in the von der Leyen speech – because there are other things that seem to be more important at the moment.

To what extent are Europe and Germany ready for a world where Ulrike Franke's areas of focus include What potential do you see for truly projecting a geopolitical the return of great-power competition is becoming German and European security and Commission, especially in a post-pandemic Europe? What are the the new normal? Thomas Bagger in Washington defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such critical ingredients for a successful geopolitical Commission? Over Quarterly was emphasising the lessons as drones and artificial intelligence. the past years, France was very active in advancing bold visions that his generation took on board from for the future of Europe that were received with little enthusiasm 1989 that influenced their worldview – in Berlin. Is a Franco-German alignment on a geopolitical convergence, multilateralism, the belief Europe agenda more or less likely in a post-pandemic context? that Germany was no longer threatened and that the future was more about This is the big question for the EU at the moment. In my view, development aid and mediation. It the first step in shaping a geopolitical EU would be for the Union is very much a mind set that slows to define in a clear way the interests it has in the world, and to Europe down in communicate them. But this interest-focused thinking is something the geopolitical that the EU is not very comfortable with, and Germany in particular arena as opposed is neither comfortable, nor used to doing it. The second challenge is to all the other finding agreement among the 27 member states on various issues, major players. Put whether it is on Russia, China or anything else. It is often difficult more broadly, is a to get to a unanimous decision among the 27, which is why Ursula generation shaped von der Leyen has proposed qualified majority voting on some by the ‘end of history’ foreign policy issues, especially in the areas pertaining to human mindset ready for a world in rights, as she pointed out in her latest State of the Union speech. which the “jungle grows back”?

128 129 Ulrike Franke: ‘We are still in a world where military power translates into geopolitical power. Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs military capabilities’

I very much liked Thomas Bagger’s article, and I am in the By now, more people are talking about France, on the other hand, is more interested midst of writing a follow-up article which looks at the question “European sovereignty”, or European strategic in the defence part of common defence, and from a Millennial point of view. I thought what he said about his sovereignty rather than autonomy. Many found therefore points out that the establishment of generation, the legacy of 1989 and how it influenced the thinking that autonomy sounded too much as if it was common projects does not mean anything yet. of his generation was very interesting. But what he may not have directed against the US. So today the term is thought about so much is what this means for my generation, strategic sovereignty, rather than autonomy, How realistic is a potential strategic who didn’t experience 1989, but grew up in the world that was although the idea broadly remains the same. convergence between Europe and the US shaped by it. The three decades following 1989 have been But in any case, there is a certain level of in counterbalancing Chinese influence in extraordinarily stable and, well, weird, geopolitically speaking. ambiguity, which allows everyone in the EU to the post-COVID world? Or will mercantilist But for my generation define the concept in a way that suits them. pressures (very high in Germany for this was normal. We are example) trump geopolitics? The three decades following absolutely not prepared for The general idea behind European sovereignty a world where geopolitical is that the EU, that Europe, should become more Over the last few years, the EU, and Europeans 1989 have been extraordinarily power play is again the of a geopolitical actor. In my view, this is a good broadly speaking, have woken up to the fact primary language. This is ambition for the EU to have. But one can already that China is not just an economic competitor stable and, well, weird, true for Bagger’s generation, see that different countries emphasise different and rising power, but an ideological and but it is even more true for elements. Germany for example, seems to strategic competitor. For quite a long time, geopolitically speaking. But my generation, as we never support the idea because it is something that China has been seen primarily through learnt this language. This, could help bring the 27 EU members closer economic lenses, this has only changed for my generation this was in my view, explains why together, which is a German priority. France, on recently. For Germany, a big wake-up call was Germans have so many the other hand, tends to be much more focused the acquisition of the German robot maker normal. We are absolutely not problems with geopolitical, on concrete outcomes, even, sometimes, at KUKA by a Chinese investor. More recently, strategic thinking. the detriment of European unity. Plus, there is the aggressive disinformation campaign on prepared for a world where the defence question; European sovereignty COVID by China reminded Europeans that But this is not solely a German includes a defence element, but the extent to China’s geopolitical power is an issue. geopolitical power play is problem. The EU, as an which the EU should be or become a defence organisation, also struggles actor is controversial. In the European East, There is now more cooperation between again the primary language. with this new situation, many worry that a too ambitious EU may Europe and the US on the issue, although the because it wasn’t built with a undermine NATO. So there is still a lot of work to US’s stance is much more clear-cut than the geopolitical mind set either. be done before the EU can claim sovereignty. European one. Also, on this topic, the Trump I like the rhetoric about the geopolitical EU but if you look at the administration has caused a big problem, in State of the Union speech that Ursula von der Leyen gave recently, To sum up, Germany seems more focused on particular regarding public opinion. In some she didn’t mention defence with one word. And on geopolitics, process as a team-building effort, while France countries, there is such a rejection of the she ran through the list of the foreign policy challenges but didn’t is more interested in the concrete ends. US under Trump that people have begun to advocate a particularly strong position on any of them. Changing wonder whether a more dominant China would this will be difficult and it will be particularly difficult as the It depends on the context, but this is something really be so bad. European policy-makers biggest country in the EU is particularly unprepared for this. we are indeed seeing when it comes to the issue are still broadly transatlantic in their thought of defence and military cooperation. Germany process, but the last four years of the Trump Let’s unpack a bit the issue of strategic autonomy. How far has always focused more on the common part administration have destroyed a lot of goodwill from each other are Paris and Berlin on this issue? Which of common defence than on the defence part. among the European population and this will are the main disagreements? To me a very divisive issue, Germany likes building up European defence come back and haunt the US when it comes especially in the CEE space, is the French instrumentalisation because it helps strengthen EU unity. Therefore, to teaming up with Europe on China. If Trump of the Trump factor in order to push for strategic decoupling the creation of common security structures, from is re-elected, I think that it is going to be much and become more independent from the US. PESCO to the EDF was seen in itself as a victory. harder for Europe to work with the US on China.

130 131 Ulrike Franke: ‘We are still in a world where military power translates into geopolitical power. Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs military capabilities’

Finally, Europe has a unity problem when it comes to China. do have quite a few people thinking of the future of warfare Among the 27 EU member states, there are different views and conflict, especially in the UK and France, which makes when it comes to China. Of course economic interests are big sense, as they are the big military powers of Europe. One big here. As long as there are countries in Europe that struggle challenge is how to continue working with the EU, what will economically and feel that they are being helped more by new technologies mean for joint operations, such as within China than by the EU, the European bloc will have problems. NATO. Interoperability will be a big challenge, and it is essential to figure out how to work together and make sure we don’t Having in mind the broader trends impacting the character of end up with an interoperability gap at the NATO level. contemporary war, what should Europe prepare for? There is the pressure of geopolitical rivalries and that of the high-end war. At You are specialised in drones. What role will drones and swarms the same time with everything that is happening in the broader of drones play in enhancing deterrence? Such solutions could MENA space, it may be a dangerous illusion to think that we are be contemplated in better securing the Eastern flank. beyond the post-9/11 campaigns and the stabilisation operations. I don’t think that the current The biggest problem is that Europe needs to prepare for all generation of drones have a big eventualities. I study new technologies and it is true that this is an role to play in the inter-state wars, Germany has always focused area where Europe needs to do much more - but at the same time it or for deterrence. The current can’t neglect more conventional threats. European countries need to generation of drones are particularly more on the common part retain a conventional military capability. They will remain important good in asymmetric conflicts, for operations, be it stability operations or for defence. Even if we where you enjoy air superiority, but of common defence than on don’t use it - we are still in a world where military power translates they are vulnerable to contested into geopolitical power. If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs environments. That being said, the defence part. Germany military capabilities. This is the reality with which a lot of people are smaller countries benefit quite not necessarily comfortable or don’t like but I very much believe that a lot from having more airborne likes building up European that is still the case. So the big challenge is that Europe needs all capabilities, and this is something the above: conventional military capabilities and new technologies. which we are seeing right now defence because it helps in the conflict between Armenia Over the past few years, the US has invested constantly in and Azerbaijan, where both sides strengthen EU unity. France, searching for a new offset strategy, going beyond a precision- have used drones extensively. guided munitions regime and focusing on what is often called on the other hand, is more algorithmic warfare (combat operations dominated by intelligent A lot of work is being done on the weapons and platforms using artificial intelligence as the core, next generation of unmanned interested in the defence but also enablers like big data, cloud computing, the Internet of systems that have more autonomous Things, and intelligent control). Does Europe have a similar effort? capability, are harder to find, faster part of common defence. etc. This changes the situation, as I don’t think Europe has a similar effort as the third offset it means that they will be more of a strategy. But I don’t think that this is surprising, or concerning challenge for air defence. Swarming especially is an area where a - even in the Cold War, even for the first and second lot of work is being done. Swarms are particularly thought to be a offset strategies, the big ideas of reinventing, rethinking great way of overwhelming the enemy’s air defences, which are not warfare and conflict always came from the US. built and optimised against swarms of 100 or 1000 attacking drones.

That being said, of course there is a lot of thinking being But what we should never forget is that it will not be only our side done all over Europe about the future of conflict. It doesn’t trying to get this technology. I do see a danger of an arms race when necessarily happen at the EU level. But at the national level you it comes to ever more capable AI-enabled autonomous systems.

132 133 Ulrike Franke: ‘We are still in a world where military power translates into geopolitical power. ’Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 If Europe wants to sit at the table, it needs military capabilities

Macron has It seems that there is a different mood and tone in Berlin vis-à-vis In my view, Macron’s has simply looked at the map of the world, Russia, driven by what happened in Belarus and particularly by the he has assessed Europe’s interests and Russia’s interests and simply looked poisoning of Navalny. Will such a stance last? Should we expect he has concluded that we need to find some kind of modus a change also in Macron’s plans of rapprochement with Russia? vivendi with Russia and that the current situation is just bad for at the map of everyone - which strikes me as a valid point. But France has not This isn’t my primary area of expertise. If I had to speculate, done well in explaining its approach, particularly to the Eastern the world, he I wouldn’t think that Navalny’s poisoning is going to change Europeans. I think it was some misunderstanding among the the approach substantially. After all, it is not as if Macron had Eastern Europeans that France wants a new partnership with has assessed been saying “let’s work with Russia, they are going to be our Russia, but I don’t think this is what they are trying to do. . friends.” I believe that the French government is entering Europe’s into talks with Russia with open eyes. They are aware of the spoiler role that Russia has been playing with regard to European stability for the last 5 to 10 years. The poisoning interests The interview was conducted of Alexey Navalny hasn’t changed this assessment. by Octavian Manea and Russia’s interests and he has concluded that we need to find some kind of modus vivendi with Russia and that the current situation is just bad for everyone.

134 135 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Samir Saran: ‘If the EU fails, we can say goodbye to the liberal order’

Interview Samir Saran, president of the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi The Indo-Pacific is the frontline for European safety

‘If the EU fails, we can say goodbye We’ve been used to only existing as part of the transatlantic relationship. In the past few decades, Europe has never really to the liberal order’ seen itself as an individual actor, but rather in coordination with the US. That is something that is starting to shake now. Do you see Europe acting on its own terms, as a global actor, in the positive case in which the member states do get their act together? Are we rather going to continue to act together with the US? Or find some other partners?

I suspect that with Brexit, you might see a far more cohesive EU, organised around the French military doctrine and French military Samir Saran curates the Raisina To what extent is Europe important for the future posture. With an absent UK, I have the feeling that the political Dialogue, India’s annual flagship of the world order? Europeans feel like they platform on geopolitics and cohesion of the EU will increase and that the EU will be far more geo-economics, and chairs count less and less on the world scene. coordinated in its approach to the geostrategic and geopolitical CyFy, India’s annual conference on cyber security and internet questions. France realises that by itself, without the size of the governance. He is also the Europe is, paradoxically, the single most important geography EU, it might not be a significant actor. A French military presence Director of the Centre for Peace that will define the future trajectory of the global order. If and Security at the Sardar Patel will be compelling only if it acts on behalf of the EU. Samir Saran Police University, Jodhpur, India. Europe remains rooted in its fundamental principles - of being He writes frequently on issues democratic, open, liberal, plural, supporting a transparent and In terms of other partners, Europe has made one error. of global governance, climate change, energy policy, global open market economy, defending rule of law, the rights of Europe believed that it could change China by development architecture, individuals, freedom of speech - the world will have a chance engaging with them, however I suspect China will artificial intelligence, cyber security, internet governance, of being liberal. If the European Union is split between the change the EU before the EU changes China. The and India’s foreign policy north and south, east and west and we see a large part of mistake that the EU makes is that it imagines and authored four books, the latest of which is called it deciding to give up on the Atlantic project and align with that an economic and trading partnership ‘The New World Disorder’. more authoritarian regimes – which is quite tempting, due to will create a degree of political consensus in the material side attached to the choice – that will be the end Beijing. Nevertheless, Beijing is not interested of the Atlantic project. An EU that is not united in its ethics in politics, but in controlling European markets. is an EU that will eventually write its own demise. How will Europe swing? Will it be an actor, or will it be acted upon? What Europe should do is to consider the importance of India. If the European continent needs I have the belief that post-pandemic EU, as a political actor, to retain its plural characteristics, South Asia is the will see a new lease of life. A new political EU may be born as frontline. What is happening today between India and the pandemic ends. Unless that happens, I believe this is the China is actually a frontline debate on the future of end of the European Union itself. It is a do it or lose it moment. the world order. The Himalayan standoff is just the first Unless Europe becomes strategically far more aggressive, far of the many that are likely to happen unless this more expansive, aware of its role, obligations and destiny you one is responded to. If China is able to will see an EU that fades. For me, the most important known change the shape of Asia and unknown is the future of Europe. Will the EU hold? Will the 17+1 recreate the hierarchical become more powerful than the EU 27? Which way will the Confucian order, don’t wind blow on the continent? Will it really be the bastion of the be surprised if the liberal order or will the liberal order be buried in Europe? fate of Europe

136 137 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Samir Saran: ‘If the EU fails, we can say goodbye to the liberal order’

will follow the same path. If Europe needs to that are going to decide whether Europe feel secure in its own existence it needs to remains loyal to the ideals of its past or create new strong local partnerships – with decides to have a new path. CEE countries India, Australia, Indonesia, Japan. The EU are in many ways the decisive countries. needs to see itself as an Indo-Pacific power. The Indo-Pacific is the frontline for European CEE has two important options and two safety. If the Indo-Pacific was to go the other important pressures. The options: will they way, the mainland is not going to be safe. be able to create a consensus (between the Chinese, the Russians, the Old Europe and What do you think about the CEE’s role the new countries like India) or will they be an in the new emerging order? We see an arena for conflict? Can we create a ‘Bucharest increased competition for hearts and consensus’, where the East and the West, North minds here. How could India help, in an and the South build a new world order and the environment of increased competition and new rules for the next 7 decades? If you play it active engagement of China in this space? wrong you might become the place where the powers contest, compete and create a mess. The Central Europeans are going to be the centre of attention for many actors. There are also two pressures. Firstly, there is an China will buy their love, America will economic divide in Europe. You are at a lower

give military assurances and so on. In the per capita income, you need to find investment © Photo by Tomasz Makowski near future, many actors will realise the funds for the infrastructure, employment, on Shutterstock importance of the CEE, simply because it livelihoods and growth, which results in an Secondly, the nature of the economic growth that you are is these countries that will decide which economic pressure that needs to be tackled. investing in becomes another pressure. This is the second way Europe finally turns. In some ways they Therefore, Europe will have to decide if the choice that the CEE will have to make. In that sense, I believe are the swing countries, the swing nations provenence of the money matters. Does it that India becomes an actor. As we have experienced this in matter if it is red or green? the past 20 years, we are one of the swing nations that could Does it matter if they come decide the nature of the world order, thus we may share this What is happening today from the West or the East? experience with you. We have also decided that we don’t That is one pressure that want to be a low-cost manufacturing economy like China, but between India and China is needs consideration. How do rather a value-creating economy, building platforms. Even if we you meet your own aspirations, have a small economic size, we have a billion-people digital actually a frontline debate on while being political about it? platforms, digital cash system, AI laboratories and solutions.

the future of the world order. The other pressure is the As we move into the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the road you want to take. tyranny of distance between Europe and India disappears. If China is able to change the How do you envisage the We don’t have to worry about trade links, land routes and future? Is it going to be shipping lines. Bits and bites can flow quite rapidly. As shape of Asia and recreate the a future built on cheap we move to the age of 3D printing, to the age of quantum manufacturing? Being an computing, of big data and autonomous systems, the hierarchical Confucian order, advanced technological arena where we can cooperate becomes huge. society, are you going don’t be surprised if the fate of to be the rule-maker India gives Europe room to manoeuvre, room to choose. When it of the Fourth Industrial comes to choosing, besides the traditional American and Chinese Europe will follow the same path. Revolution or its rule-taker? propositions, there is also a third one – India, a billion-people market.

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Do you expect that there is going to be a industrial growth, far more intimate in character framework in the Indo-Pacific Europe believed that it could shift in the EU toward reshoring and ensuring - it is going to be about the organs inside your that should not create debt that manufacturing is not captive to Chinese body, it is going to be about the personal trap diplomacy, should create change China by engaging interests or to Chinese belligerence? experiences, about how we live, transact, date livelihoods, respect the or elect. They are all intimate value chains. The environment and recognise the with them, however I suspect I think that we are going to see a degree of intimate value-chains will require far greater rights and sovereignty of the reshoring everywhere. It is not going to be degree of thought than the mass production people. India came up with this China will change the EU only a European phenomenon. Political trust is factories that created value in the XXth century. when it saw that the Chinese going to become important. Political trust and were breaking all rules before the EU changes China. value-chains are going to affect one another. and all morality to capture Countries are going to be more comfortable with The EU may be setting the industrial infrastructure partners who are like-minded. They don’t have format for managing our spaces. The Americans under Donald Trump also came up with to agree on everything, but they should be on contested globalisation the Blue Dot American project for the Indo-Pacific – a framework the same ideological and political spectrum. that was based on values. Whenever you have to deal with a You mention the rising value of trust, as a powerful political opponent you throw the rule book in there. If There are two reasons for this. One is the currency even. In Europe, we often point out you don’t want to go to war with them, you will have to manage pandemic that we are currently facing and in that we are an alliance based on values. them through a framework of laws, rules and regulations. The a way it exposed the fragility of globalisation But even our closest partner, the US seems value systems are a very political choice. They are practices and as we know it. The hippie and gypsy styles of to be moving in a much more transactional choices enshrined in our constitutions and foundational documents. globalisation are over. I think that people are direction, let alone China and others. You Therefore, dismissing values and norms as being less political going to make far more political decisions. are describing a worldview that is relying or less muscular is wrong. The EU, “the empire of gnomes” that The second is that as we start becoming increasingly on shared values, at least was much criticised for the first two decades as weak and not more digitalised societies, individual data and some capacity to negotiate some common geopolitical enough, may well become an example for other individual space are going to be essential, thus ground, on predictability, whereas in many countries. If it remains solvent, a vibrant union, and if it is not you don’t want those data sets to be shared with ways it seems that things are moving in the salami-sliced by the Chinese in the next decade, the EU may well countries whose systems you don’t trust. Value opposite direction, a much more Realpolitik be setting the format for managing our contested globalisation. is going to increasingly emerge through intimate one. Is this something that is going to last?

The pandemic has brought this This pandemic is the first global crisis The next 5 years will be the age trend to the fore. People are where Captain America is missing going to appreciate trust and of the Quad. The Quad in many value systems more than ever. How does India see the future of the Quad? Usually the But I think this was inevitable. Quad is associated with a certain vision of the Indo - Pacific, ways is also the ‘make China If you would recall, India used free from coercion and open to unhindered navigation to be quite dismissive of the and overflight. Are we going to see the emergence responsible’ arrangement, EU, calling it “an Empire of of a more formal geopolitical alignment or even an gnomes”, with no strategic alliance to support a certain vision about Asia? an accountability framework clout. But if you look at the last two years, India has started The Quad is going to acquire greater importance in the coming which will keep the Chinese to absorb, and in a sense to years. It is going to expand beyond its original 4 members. We’ve propose solutions that the already seen South Korea and the Philippines joining the discussion honest and responsible actors EU itself has implemented in recently. We are going to see greater emphasis by all members the past. India came up with doing a number of manoeuvres, projects and initiatives together. in the global system. an investment infrastructure The next 5 years will be the age of the Quad. The pandemic

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started this process. I see three areas where Chinese. None of us wants a ‘No China’ the Chinese don’t like the EU and apply a ‘divide and conquer’ the Quad can be absolutely essential. world, because all of us benefit from China’s methodology to get more favourable deals. The Quad is in many growth and economic activities. Many of us ways an expression of that reality, as well of that the middle powers One is in delivering global public goods, have concluded that the only way to keep in Asia and Pacific (Indonesia, Australia and Japan) will have to keeping the sea lines open and uncontested the Chinese honest in their engagements, work together, sometimes without the Americans, to negotiate new so that trade, energy and people can economical or political, is to be able to put terms of trade and new energy, or technological arrangements. move with a degree of safety and stability. together a collective front in front of them, The Quad in many ways is also the ‘make China responsible’ In a sense, I see the Quad replacing the not negotiate individually. The EU has done arrangement, an accountability framework which will keep the Pax Americana that was underwriting that longer than anyone else and that’s why Chinese honest and responsible actors in the global system. stability in certain parts of the world. Wax figure of the famous Captain America © Photo by Pumidol on Shutterstock The second area is going to be around infrastructure and investments in certain parts of the world. I see the Quad grouping many initiatives that will allow for big investments in countries which currently have only one option – China. The Quad will be able to spawn a whole new area of financial, infrastructure and technology instruments closer to the needs of Asians, South Asian, East African, West Asians including the Pacific Islands. The Quad will be the basis of this kind of relationships in the upcoming years.

Thirdly and most importantly, the role of the Quad will be to ensure that we won’t reach a stage where we have to reject the

This pandemic is the first global crisis where Captain America is missing. What makes it even more complicated is that the successor to Captain America has caused the crisis.

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Do you also see this trend extending into the political sphere the potential for creating this league of interest to create and invest in institutions in a kind of collective endeavour both in Asia (through the democracies as some sort of manager and and informal institutions that could preserve Quad) and in the West (starting with Europe perhaps) to build defender of the liberal international order? a degree of values and allow for stability. a new kind of world order? Do you feel that this ‘middle powers concert’ is one possible way to go? Or do you believe that we I think it is inevitable. Technology is so intimate Such a coalition reuniting countries from Central are going to be disappointed, as we were by the BRICs, when that we are not going to trust our data with Europe, Western Europe and from Asia (such some of the members drowned in their own domestic problems? folks we have a suspicion as India, Australia, Japan) will about. Thus, it is this reality normalise the behaviour of We are part of a world that doesn’t have any superpowers. The that makes this coalition of The Russians both America and China. I do last superpower was America, and that ended with the financial democracies and like-minded not think that they behaved crisis ten years ago. Ever since, we have been literally in a world countries inevitable. Even if have to be given responsibly in the last few which had quasi-superpowers like the US, to some extent Russia, we may never call it that, it years - one because of its the Chinese, but there was no real hegemon that could punish is going to become that. We more room democratic insanity, and people for bad behaviour and reward people for good behaviour. are going to notice countries the second because of its engaging in these intimate in European absolutist medieval mindset. Some of the most interested actors in the Indo-Pacific in the industries with others who are Along these lines, you have last two to three years happened to be the UK and France. similar, who are like-minded, thinking so that democratic failure at one end A few years ago, they sensed that if they want to be relevant who have similar worldviews. and a despotic emergence in the future world order, as it is built and as it emerges, they Still, this process may take they don’t feel at the other end. We need need to be present in the debates that are unfolding in this longer than we have. We do to ensure that democracy part of the world. Both partnered with India – to do military not have the luxury of time, boxed into the will survive and that the manoeuvres, to create maritime domain awareness stations, because we are going to be middle powers will be able to invest in infrastructure and to create clearly the beginnings destroyed, divided, decimated Chinese corner. to normalise this moment. of a new order that might emerge from here. We will have and sliced in the meantime. to create these coalitions to be able to get things done. What is Russia’s role in all this? Is Russia A few countries will have to take leadership going to be on our side? Or is it going to be on The pandemic tells us something which is also quite tragic. Ever – either the French, the UK, the EU itself, or China’s – considering that sometimes they since I was born I have never witnessed a global crisis that did India, or all of them. Until there is an agreement seem to, although their agendas perhaps align not have America as a response leader. This pandemic is the first on a big vision for the new world order we only when it is opportune for both of them? global crisis where Captain America is missing. What makes it must agree to an interim arrangement and even more complicated is that the successor to Captain America have to create a bridging mechanism that Russia has an odd reality. It is a country has caused the crisis. Hence, you have the old power, which is takes us from the turmoil of the first two that has a very modest GDP (the second absent and engrossed in its own domestic realities, and the new decades of this century to a more stable smallest within the BRICs) but it is also a power that has been irresponsible and has put us in this position. second half of the century. We don’t want to country that is possibly the second most Both the previous incumbent and the new contender don’t have go through two world wars in order to achieve powerful military force in the world. A big the capacity to take action in this world by themselves. This this unity, as we did in the past century. We military actor with a very small economic tells us that building a coalition of middle powers is absolutely need to have some other mechanisms that size. This is creates a policy asymmetry in essential. It is not a luxury, it is not a choice. This is something will prevent conflict, but preserve ethics. Moscow. It has very little stakes in global concerning our own existential reasons that we must invest in. economic stability or global economic In this context the EU-India and the CEE-India progress, but it has huge clout in the political Do you see this coalition of middle powers as some sort of a projects are essential. It is us who have the consequences of developments around ’league of democracies’? It is a concept that was previously most at stake, because our future is on the the world. The Russians have somehow to advanced by John McCain and now Joe Biden is embracing line. The more the world is in turmoil, the less be mainstreamed into our economic future. as his overarching framework for foreign policy. Do you see we will be able to grow sustainably. It is our Unless Russia is going to have an active role

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China is a Middle in the Fourth Industrial Revolution or have Secondly, this Middle Kingdom will make use of modern tools. They real benefits, their economy will stay in the see Modernity as a tool, not as an experience. In that sense they Kingdom with Modern 20th century and therefore their politics is use it to strengthen the Middle Kingdom, not to reform and evolve. going to reflect a 20th century mindset. If Such tools include digital platforms, the control of media and a tools and a Medieval they are included in the economic policies modern army with modern weapons to control and dominate. of the future, their politics will evolve too. mindset that believes in It is not an easy transition. Nevertheless I Thirdly, the final M deals with a Medieval mindset. They are a would argue that the Russians have to be Middle Kingdom with Modern tools and a Medieval mindset a hierarchical world. given more room in European thinking so that believes in a hierarchical world. We are a world which that they don’t feel boxed into the Chinese has moved away from the hierarchies of the past. The world is corner. The last thing that we should be more flat, people have equal relationships. The Chinese don’t thinking of is giving Russia no option but to partner with the see it like that. They see a hierarchical world, where countries Chinese. Perhaps the immediate neighbours (the CEE) will not must pay tribute to them. They sometimes use the Belt and be open to a partnership, taking into account their political Road Initiative to create the tribute system or the debt trap history. But countries like India would be able to offer space for diplomacy to buy sovereignty. Likewise, they use other tools manoeuvre. In that sense, India could be a market, a consumer, to ensure the subordination of the countries they deal with. an investor in the Russian economic future and the CEE-India partnership could become important. Can we together play a These three Ms are defining the China of today. role in normalising that relationship? Can we give the Russians an option other than China? If Russia’s economic future is linked to ours, it doesn’t have to be in the Chinese corner. The Russians are not the Chinese. The Chinese take hegemony to a whole new level; the Russians have this odd asymmetry that defines their place in the world. This asymmetry should be addressed with new economic possibilities and incentives.

The rise of the Middle Kingdom

We’ve been discussing how to react to a world that is increasingly defined by China. But what are China’s plans? What does China want?

I do not know their plans, but I can tell you how I see China’s emergence, from New Delhi. I define it through what I call the 3M framework.

Firstly, I see them increasingly becoming the Middle Kingdom. Chinese exceptionalism is defined in those terms. They believe

they have a special place in the world – between heaven and The interview was conducted earth. They will continue to defy the global rules and they will by Oana Popescu Zamfir and Octavian Manea, as part of the not allow the global pressures to alter their national behaviour Central Europe-India Forum Initiative or domestic choices. So we will see the first M, the Middle created by the Observer Research Foundation (India), Keynote (Czechia) Kingdom, emerge more strongly in the years ahead. and GlobalFocus Center (Romania).

146 147 Eastern Focus Issue 04, Autumn 2020 Interview Kuni Miyake: It is more than a trade war between US and China, it is a hegemonic rivalry

Interview Kuni Miyake, research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies, Tokyo imperative to maximise the national interests in the middle of Kuni Miyake is president of the such difficult circumstances. Fortunately, he stayed in power Foreign Policy Institute and research director at Canon for almost eight years. If you have this time you can create Institute for Global Studies in a sort of a legacy which could last longer. Mr. Suga has no Tokyo. A former career diplomat, It is more than a trade war Miyake also serves as special choice because he was part of the Abe foreign policy. I always adviser to Prime Minister say that foreign policy is also politics, and all politics is local. Yoshihide Suga’s Cabinet. The views expressed here do not between US and China, If you want to make a commitment in your foreign policy, necessarily reflect the views of the biggest opponent are not the foreigners but your fellow the Japanese government. it is a hegemonic rivalry citizens inside your country who are opposed to new ideas. Therefore, in order to achieve a diplomatic goal, you need to convince the opponents inside your country. That is something Abe did and Mr. Suga did himself. That’s why I call Mr. Suga a part of the Abe foreign policy. He will just continue doing it. How would you characterise the post-COVID Indo-Pacific But Shinzo Abe was a Ferrari, a super car, and even if you security ecosystem from a Japanese perspective? drive a super car, if the streets are congested you cannot Kuni Miyake go anywhere. Mr. Suga is no Ferrari or Lamborghini, One thing is for sure: pandemics accelerate and in many cases but if you find the right route and streets, you can go deteriorate already-existing tendencies. For this reason, I focus anywhere. Abe created a great environment for Japan on the big trends. In the case of East Asia there are several such to maximise its national interests. Abe’s legacy will stay. tendencies. One, China is on the rise. Two, the United States is becoming more and more inward-looking, if not isolationist. The most worrying issue is the outcome of the US What’s happening now is quite similar to what we witnessed in the elections. This is a wild card. If Trump is re-elected we 1930s: you have a new rising regional power that considers the know how to deal with it. If Biden becomes status quo as something to president, probably his policy wouldn’t be be adjusted, and therefore dramatically different from the current Nationalism is an opium. Once it can be changed even administration. The main reason is that by force. With that in the geopolitical transformation in you start using it, you cannot stop mind, the rising power East Asia has been so drastic that challenges American it has really started a strategic it until you destroy yourself. hegemony in the Western rivalry between US and China. Pacific by force. That This is more than a trade is exactly what Japan did in the 1930s, but China is doing it war, it is a hegemonic on a scale 10 times bigger. In the case of Japan we attacked rivalry. The Americans Pearl Harbor and we started a war. China is not that stupid. But fear that one day China nationalism is an opium. Once you start using it, you cannot might challenge the stop it until you destroy yourself. That happened to Japan, U.S. hegemony in the and I am afraid that something similar could happen to China. Western Pacific and These trends have been exacerbated and accelerated. even replace the US in East Asia. This is not What would you expect to be the key pillars of post-Abe foreign something episodic, policy? What will change? What will be the continuities? but a strategic and structural trend Shinzo Abe is one of the few politicians in my country who which the pandemic really understands the global strategic environment and the has accelerated.

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A key component of Abe’s foreign policy past 60-plus years. It is time to rethink it legacy is the Quad. How does Japan see because our potential adversaries have the future of the Quad? What is the next more military capability than before, and stage in the development of the Quad? that requires more deterrent capability on the part of the Japanese side. Therefore it Too frequently we refer to China and the is not a debate between whether or not we CCP. The Quad is not an alliance, the Quad is should be able to attack enemy bases. It not NATO. It is a much looser sort of a forum is not that simple. What is more important because we don’t want to define it clearly. is a discussion about the qualification If you define it clearly then only a limited of the exclusively defensive posture of number of countries can participate. So we our defence policy. My argument is very should make it open. India has finally joined. simple, because defence policy consists It took us 14 years. We started talking about of two elements: deterrence and attack the Quad in 2006. Foreign Minister Taro capabilities. So try to deter your potential Aso told US Secretary of State Condoleeza adversary first (so enhance the deterrence Rice in Hanoi in November 2006 that it was power to discourage enemy attacks), and if important for Japan, Australia, India, and the the deterrence fails you should be able to US to get together to discuss security issues attack. As far as Japan is concerned, under in the Asia-Pacific, but at that time Ms. Rice the current constitution, we should put more did not respond positively. We may not see emphasis on the deterrence side rather than an expanded Quad in the foreseeable future. the attack element. It is time for us to adopt But what is more important is to keep the a ‘deterrence-oriented’ defence posture. Quad united, to make it as loose as possible, so that more countries can join later in the Is Washington’s plan to withdraw troops future. The Quad is a good idea, but it is not from Germany particularly worrying for NATO and shouldn’t be another NATO. Japan? Do you see any ripple effects for the broader US posture in the Indo-Pacific, In June the implementation of the Aegis or questions about US credibility? Ashore anti-missile system was canceled by Japan. At the same time there is currently The question is what are the stakes of the US a major debate in Japan about whether presence in Europe and East Asia? There is The former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe © Photo by TPYXA_ILLUSTRATION on Shutterstock the SDF should develop counterattack of course the cultural angle – we are allies capabilities, specifically acquiring and share the same values. But the US is attack missiles. What do these trends also a naval maritime power in the Indo- suggest about the national security Pacific, where the economies are growing policy, specifically about deterrence? fastest. Therefore, the US might withdraw some troops from Europe to reinforce the Xi Jinping thinks that it is time for China to Here the real issue is how we define our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific area. defence policy. There is a very long debate But of course, this shouldn’t be a zero-sum strike back. China cannot stop assuming an about what we mean by ‘exclusively game. You have more US Army troops defence-oriented’ defence policy. Exclusively in Europe while we have more US naval assertive posture in the foreseeable future. defensive defence policy means nothing. capabilities. In Asia what we need are the It is a tautology. It is a strange kind of amphibious Marine units who can fight on debate which we have continued for the the waters. It is a delicate balance, but the

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Europeans may have to keep in mind that the American priority it means that China is dominant inside the first island chain. has already shifted from Europe and the Middle East to Asia. We are located on the first island chain. As the US Marines say, they are already in the area and they are not going to move What does China’s most recent international behaviour (the away. They are there to stay and defend their positions. What border clash, the knock-out of Hong Kong freedoms, the we can do now is to prevent the Chinese Navy especially from bullying of Taiwan) expose about Beijing, its plans, ambitions going out of the first island chain. In order to do that they will and grand strategy? For sure this is no need more powerful platforms, which will be basically very longer Deng Xiaoping’s China – “Keep a cool vulnerable as the American forces transform in the future. As far as the water head and maintain a low profile” mind- set. Is this a sort of a wake-up moment? Biden or Trump? Who is better for the US system of alliances? areas inside the First The reasons behind the recent self- Japan is an exception. Japan is the only nation among the Island Chain are assertiveness are the following. allies of the United States which benefited most from the Trump Administration. Europeans suffered more than they concerned, Chinese Firstly: China is now a major power. It is not gained. Of course, we suffered too because of the inherent weak anymore. It has enough military power unpredictability of the administration. A Biden presidency dominance is already to realise its military and political ambitions. will be much more predictable. If Donald Trump is elected Secondly: the element of nationalism as part again maybe Shinzo Abe can play a role again. If I were established. of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Mr. Suga, I would nominate Abe as his special envoy. Party. The legitimacy of the CCP consists of three pillars: China is one and united; their victory over Are you worried about intra-Democratic party Japan in the Patriotic War; and they finally found the third, ‘civil war’ between the Biden moderates and which is the economic development in the late 1970s. This the radicalised progressive wing? last element really divided the nation, because it widened the gap between the rich and poor. This is something that Yes, once Biden wins, another battle among the over time will destroy the legitimacy of the CCP. That’s why Democrats will resume. I hope this will not damage the these days they have become excessively dependent on foreign and defence policy of the Democratic party. the nationalistic propaganda. The danger is that it is like opium, because once you start using it, you cannot stop it.

Thirdly: the imperial personality of Xi Jinping. He thinks that it is time for China to strike back. With these three elements combined, China cannot stop assuming an assertive posture in the foreseeable future.

When you visited Bucharest a few years back you warned about a power vacuum in the South China Sea that Beijing will take advantage of. What are/should be the lessons to be learned by the international community from the South China Sea?

It is too late. We missed the opportunity a few years ago before they started landfilling and creating artificial islands. Once they were there and deployed all the weapons systems it became The interview was conducted too late. In wartime these are highly vulnerable, but in peacetime by Octavian Manea

152 153 SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic

IOANA CONSTANTIN BERCEAN Impact Abstract of the COVID-19

COVID-19’s impact on Iran’s already pressured economy is no secret. The pandemic is reducing the Since announcing its first COVID-19 fatalities, on 19 February 2020, in the holy city of Qom, the government’s income and increasing its expenses. Iran’s fragile economy will endure even more Islamic Republic of Iran has been the Middle Eastern country most badly affected by the pandemic, pressure in the coming months, yet the aggressive dialogue between Tehran and Washington is reporting infection and fatality rates among the highest in the world. As this essay is being written, business as usual. Some argue the Iranian regime may not survive the coronavirus crisis. Others in October 2020, there have been 588,648 coronavirus cases, and the death toll currently stands are warning that the regime is taking the people of Iran hostage by means of the pandemic. The at 33,714. At the end of the month the numbers reached new heights, with an average of 300 daily embargo, put in place by the United States, is only exacerbating the Iranian people’s precarious deaths. The measures taken have been halting and ineffective, and the response to the pandemic living conditions. Which are the possible scenarios for US-Iran relations? Escalation, de-escalation has been a mixture of responsible warnings from public health officials, inconsistent government’ or the status quo? This essay aims to present three possible scenarios that could describe the policies and conspiracy theories spread by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Two days future of the US-Iran relationship and its implication for the European Union. A return to the past – after Iran’s February parliamentary elections – which despite the virus did take place, albeit amid a hypothesis in which the aggressive dialogue would continue without a constructive finality; historically low turnout – Imam Khamenei referred to what he called the large-scale propaganda Iran’s emergence as a regional hegemon; or a Western burst of action – where the European from foreign media calling on the ’people not to participate in the elections, pointing out, “This signatories of the JCPOA could decide whether to continue to support the nuclear deal or change negative propaganda began a few months ago and increased as the elections approached. In the the discourse, supporting Washington in its bid to negotiate a new deal. last two days, the pretext of an illness and virus was used, and their media did not miss the slightest opportunity to discourage people from voting”.

Restrictions and measures aimed at limiting the virus’ spread were implemented in phases: on 23 February, the government ordered universities to close in some provinces and cancelled all cultural events; on 28 February, it called off Friday prayers and gatherings, followed by the closure of all academic institutions; on 5 March, it shuttered all sports venues, followed by religious shrines on 13 March, and a few days later travel between cities was banned. Moreover, by 17 March , Iran released 85,000 prisoners to prevent outbreaks of the virus in detention centres. Meanwhile, the Iranian government’s judgment continued to be marked by a combination of cynicism and religious ideology. Moreover, beyond the momentum of COVID-19, the theocratic government in Tehran is facing a set of challenges whose simultaneous pressure could, in the foreseeable future, cause a new wave of social movements, which would put Iran in the unprecedented situation of managing

II SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic III Eastern Focus Eastern Focus

the fourth consecutive year marked by revolts of society. Under the weight of severe economic extreme religious manifestation – has added its voice to the choir of Macron’s critics (UK, Kuwait, sanctions, unemployment and inflation have been rising while GDP is shrinking by 6% per annum. Qatar, Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). Such a gesture has the potential to However, the Iranian regime has proved remarkably stable, at least for the time being, as it continues distance France from the group of states that advocate the preservation of the nuclear agreement, to strengthen its regional influence and even to expand its nuclear programme. and may create the preconditions for Paris to align itself with the US stance in future.

At first, the spread of COVID-19 seemed to provide an opportunity for Washington and Tehran The pandemic is having its geopolitical impact against the backdrop of the wider US-Iran animosity to move away, at least temporarily, from aggressive dialogue and politics. The United States has that has grown steadily since president Donald Trump decided to unilaterally withdraw the US from provided nearly $274 million in aid to Iran, a sum which the Trump administration set aside for the JCPOA on 8 May 2018. The American ‘maximum pressure’ approach encountered maximum emergency international humanitarian funding. Also, Iran has released the US Army veteran and resistance from Tehran, which has led to an escalation of repressive or aggressive actions on both cancer patient Michael White from prison, who was handed over to Swiss diplomats (over time sides. General Soleimani’s killing was followed by a rocket attack in Iraq, claimed by an Iran-backed Switzerland has provided a channel of communication between these longtime foes). Furthermore, paramilitary group, against Camp Taji on March 2020, when three members of the US-led counter- some US diplomats have demanded the release of at least four other Americans allegedly detained ISIS coalition were killed and twelve were injured; another barrage upon the same facility three by Tehran, but Iranian decision-makers rejected Washington’s medical aid and did not respond days later injured three US troops. While escalatory dynamics have so far been kept in check, the to its request regarding the alleged American prisoners. The Trump administration responded equilibrium is fragile and often broken by continuous escalations and counter-escalations from by increasing sanctions on Iran; Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused the Iranian leadership both Washington and Tehran – and their proxies. Normally, whenever adversaries are confronted “trying to avoid responsibility for their grossly incompetent and deadly governance”, alleging that with common transnational threats, their propensity to adopt flexible and cooperative behaviours “the Wuhan virus is a killer and the Iranian regime is an accomplice”. However, not only did the to protect themselves increases. Even staunch adversaries like the US and Iran have had a history economic sanctions fail to bring about the desired outcome – which comes as no surprise – in fact, of cooperation against common threats in the post-1979 period. Historical cases include the early they have led to the strengthening of the ultra-conservative political faction. It is difficult to draw a years of the war in Afghanistan (1), the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the recent fight clear line between Iranian political leaders, but what is certain is that the current president Hassan against ISIS. On these occasions, both sides have temporarily de-escalated tensions, or have at Rouhani, along with politicians associated with the foreign minister Javad Zarif, overcame nationalist least refrained from embarking on major confrontations. In addition, the emergence of common pride and led Iran to the negotiating table with the West. Even though the mass demonstrations threats sets new limits to the continuation of regular policies. For example, during the Iraqi war, the which began during the winter of 2017 and peaked in December 2019 showed that Iranian society US military’s operational need to safely escape Iraqi air defence by traversing into western Iranian is deeply dissatisfied with its government, public opinion of the American administration is even airspace forced politicians in Washington to tone down their anti-Iranian rhetoric. more hostile. In January 2020, hundreds of thousands of Iranians mourned the death of General Qassem Soleimani – killed by an American drone strike – in one of the largest mass demonstrations Nevertheless, not much has changed in the US-Iran conflict since the pandemic’s outbreak. the country has ever seen. Not everyone venerated Soleimani, who supported a campaign to Despite expert advices and international calls, the US administration has refused to temporarily expand Iranian influence through proxy wars in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen; but his assassination ease the sanctions regime and facilitate Iran’s purchase of much-needed medical equipment on was a blow to national pride. the international market. At the same time, Iran has not shown any intention to revisit its offensive strategy against the US forces in Iraq. Both the US and Iran appear to be continuing their collision Iranian hardliners, the main beneficiaries of the current US administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ course. If anything, both parties seem to view Covid-19 as an opportunity to force the other party strategy, may see this as an unprecedented opportunity to do what the Iranian elite has rejected to change policy or surrender. They seem to have a worrying determination to use the pandemic to in the past – leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear reinforce old strategies and narratives. (NPT), and then resume the nuclear programme. For the European Union this scenario means that its worst prediction –several European leaders have warned the Trump administration that One might ask why so much is written about Iran-US relations, when in fact the central, and to a withdrawing from the JCPOA would trigger a chain of escalation with Iran – are becoming reality. lesser extent the eastern European countries, are the ones struggling to save the nuclear deal? The nuclear deal remains at the heart of EU policy toward Iran; however, if Tehran takes further And how, exactly, can such heated rhetoric between Washington and Tehran affect Europe or its drastic steps in violation of the agreement terms, this scenario could mark the total collapse of transatlantic relationship? The current trajectory not only endangers Europe’s non-proliferation the agreement. The EU and its former member, the United Kingdom, have so far resisted joining goals, but it also heightens the risk of a nuclear arms race and a further military escalation in Washington’s calls for ‘maximum pressure’, and will need to prepare for a worse security dynamic Europe’s backyard. Direct or indirect confrontation between American- and Iranian-backed forces across the Middle East if Tehran decides to escalate. However, given the latest events in France and across the Middle East will further fuel the regional conflicts (2), particularly in Iraq and Syria, that the series of statement on the terrorist attacks made by the French President, Emmanuel Macron, have already taken a heavy toll on Europe. While European leaders do share many of the US’s Tehran – even though President Macron has not named the Islamic Republic as a perpetrator of concerns regarding Iran, some European officials privately say that isolating Iran and excluding it

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from the international community may lead to a new ascent for the Iranian hardliners, politicians who would not back down from taking action “that [will] further fuel regional instability”(3). A regional escalation could appeal to the Iranian leadership for several reasons: it could divert attention from The first scenario: the mounting economic troubles and popular dissatisfaction at home, and achieve the long-sought goal of pushing the US out of Iraq with perceived lower risks of backlash, given President Trump’s desire to contain China and the need to address internal problems caused by the pandemic. Some return to the past officials in the Trump administration apparently hope that the compounded effects of COVID-19 and US sanctions will bring Tehran to the negotiation table: “There may be a window in the spring and summer for a negotiated ceasefire that puts us into a holding pattern until the November [US presidential] elections. A combination of pressures on the Iranian leadership … would leave the regime needing relief for limited stability”. However, signals from Tehran indicate that Iran is not interested in negotiations from a position of weakness.

Against this background the only safe assumption is that Tehran will not re-engage in any constructive dialogue with Washington before the US elections in November. Moreover, even this scenario will be influenced by the presidential elections in Iran in May 2021. Given the fact that the Iranian moderates are in freefall (as seen from the elections to the Majlis earlier this year) and Ayatollah Khamenei is preparing his successor, or his legacy, the next American administration will encounter a leadership in Tehran that is very much aggrieved, prideful, risk-averse and hyper- In May 2021, Hassan Rouhani’s term will come to an end, and it is widely believed that a hardliner sensitive about appearing weak, domestically, in the Mid-East region, and on the global stage. will come into office, just as the parliamentary elections showed this past February. In short, 2020 But even so, given their economic situation, the sharp global decline in demand for oil and crude has so far been a litany of disasters for the Iranian people. To compound their misery, crisis after prices, and the severe pandemic, the Iranians might be convinced to come back to the negotiation crisis has given conservatives and Iran’s unelected institutions the perfect opportunity to sideline table, to back down from violating the provisions of the JCPOA and return to its full compliance. voices of dissent, paving a path forward for conservatives to take power in the 2021 presidential This might be a very good window of opportunity for Europe, which, if it hits the right notes both election, and control the succession of Iran’s next Supreme Leader. Therefore, the best approach privately and publicly, will have the chance to de-escalate tensions, to revitalise its diplomacy and would likely be a return to the JCPOA, on a ‘compliance for compliance’ basis, and build up from to re-establish economic ties. The most important question that arises here – and possibly the only there. Rouhani will hand over power in August next year, so there is still a time window of one one – is whether Europe is indeed prepared for an open diplomatic confrontation with its natural year to open talks with those moderate politicians who brought Iran to the negotiations table in ally regarding the Iranian issue. Escalation, de-escalation or status quo? this might be a motto for the first place. Ali Larijani, a former military officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who the near future, on this particular international dossier. This essay aims to present three possible served as the Speaker of the Parliament of Iran from 2008 to 2020, Saeed Jalili, a former secretary scenarios that could describe the future of the US-Iran relationship and its implication for Europe. of the Supreme National Security Council from 2007 to 2013 and Iran’s nuclear negotiator, and A return to the past – a hypothesis in which the aggressive dialogue would continue without a Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former military officer who held office as the Mayor of Tehran from constructive finality; Iran’s emergence as regional hegemon; and a Western burst of action – 2005 to 2017, are probably three of the potential conservative candidates who could become where the European signatories of the JCPOA could decide whether to continue to support the president of the Islamic Republic. Such a scenario could take us back in time to June 2005, when nuclear deal or change the discourse, supporting Washington in its bid to negotiate a new deal. the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, newly elected as president of the Islamic Republic, driven by a new form of Iranian nationalism fundamentally tied to the nuclear programme, caused the Iranian government to resume the enrichment process at the plant in Isfahan. At the time, the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom, then still an EU member) reaffirmed its unilateral The American ‘maximum pressure’ approach security guarantees and offered long-time cooperation, but Iranian policymakers rejected the proposal. Throughout 2006 and 2007, the EU negotiators were largely caught between Iran – encountered maximum resistance from Tehran, which was not interested in a compromise, but rather felt emboldened regarding its rising clout in which has led to an escalation of repressive the Middle East – and the US, which saw the referral to the United Nations Security Council as the or aggressive actions on both sides. means to legitimise the containment of Iran (4).

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Engagement with Iran has had three distinct periods: the Critical Dialogue (1992-1997) and Biggest European deals announced in 2017 (Source: The New York Times) Comprehensive Dialogue (1998-2003, under presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami); the period from 2003 until 2005, when engagement was championed by the EU-3 and represented the effort to avoid another US-led war in the Middle East; and the period of coercive diplomacy (2005-2012). It was only during the period of coercive diplomacy that the US government participated – both passively and actively – in the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russian Federation, China and Germany) framework. The Critical Dialogue pursued by the EU between 1992 and 1997 represented the Common Foreign and Security Policy in its infancy, and failed (5) to make any linkages between areas of concern and relations with the EU.

In July 2012, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told an audience in Iran that the government would not “retreat even one iota from their rights, principles and values against the declining materialistic powers. The enemy strikes at the Iranian nation step by step; but, in return, it receives a stronger, heavier blow”. Apart from the economic aspect, a regional incident can always escalate into a more general conflict, just in Europe’s backyard. And in the present circumstances, when Europeans are fighting History looks set to repeat itself. In 2004, when many reformist voters stayed at home amidst the next wave of the pandemic and the associated economic crisis, a spillover effect would be more the internal repression of the reformist movement, a weakened reformist president, and also in than difficult to manage. The best option would be for EU officials and other European leaders to disappointment at the aggressive speech coming from Washington – the famous collocation “axis try to identify convergent interests with the US in the Middle East and do their best to focus on of evil” coined by George W. Bush –conservatives were handed a sizable majority in parliament, substance, rather than wasting time commenting on Trump’s tweets. They could also try to bring easing the way into office for Mahmoud Ahamadinejad. The newly-elected conservative parliament Iranian and American diplomats to the negotiation table before another crisis arises – and before will most likely bolster hardliners in the 2021 presidential contest and sway public policy debates the Russians or the Chinese do so first. away from engagement with the US. If the country’s economic issues and political stagnation continue, Iranians will feel justified in their abstention from the elections, solidifying the notion that the system no longer works for them.

The key problem for Europe in this perspective is perhaps not so much related to the re-emergence of a conservative political elite, but how it will use its power diplomatically, tactically and strategically. While the Iranian market has been reopened for European companies and investments after 2015, and EU trade with Iran reached a total of €21 billion in 2017, the most important companies that had started investing in Iran withdrew after the re-imposition of American sanctions. History looks set to repeat itself. The newly-elected conservative parliament will most likely bolster hardliners in the 2021 presidential contest and sway public policy debates away from engagement with the US.

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The second scenario: Iran’s emergence as regional hegemon

Ever since 1973 and the first oil shock, the centre of gravity of Middle Eastern politics has been (as mentioned in Article 9 of the Iranian Constitution), the influence factor – seeking to maintain gradually shifting from the eastern Mediterranean and the Arab-Israeli conflict toward the Persian strong influence in post-occupation or newly-formed governments in neighbouring countries (such Gulf, where Iran has long harboured ambitions to become a regional power, despite recent as Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan) – and the ‘balance of power’ factor – concentrating on both escalations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The process was accelerated in 1979 by the signing of international and regional powers (Iran has put a great deal of effort into defying the US’s influence the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which dramatically reduced the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli (6) in the region, and has shown a strong degree of aspiration to maintain its leading position as the war, and the peak of the Islamic Revolution, which replaced the government of Shah Mohammad region’s largest Shia majority country in order to cross-regionally offset the Saudi influence). (7) Reza Pahlavi with a radical theocratic regime under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In recent years, despite severe regime sanctions, Iran has managed a complex set of regional The dynamics of the Iran-Syria alliance have become more evident since the crisis in Syria began; relations and a considerable measure of success. Just mentioning the connections and proxies both countries have a higher chance of surviving, as well as achieving their long-term goals, Iran has in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen or even Afghanistan, it can be seen that Tehran can wield through their strategic, military, and economic ties. The relations between the two countries have influence, according to its own needs, over about half of the Middle East region. Therefore, it is attracted more headlines since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, but they actually date back to no surprise that the nuclear file has two components: a formal one – limiting, even stopping the the early stages of the inception of the revolutionary government in Tehran, when Syria was the proliferation process – and an informal one, for which the nuclear issue is the means of pursuing the first Arab country to recognise the provisional government after the Shah’s ouster. The mutually goal of containing Iran’s regional emergence. Saudi Arabia and Israel – two of Washington’s most beneficial relations between the two countries have provided Iran with opportunities to use Syria important allies in the region – are the main opponents of both Iran and the nuclear deal. as a guaranteed lifeline supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, and as a safe channel (8) for shipping undisclosed commercial and military goods, something which became particularly important after Iran’s regional policy has undergone changes due to a number of internal and external factors. the sanctions on Iran were tightened in 2011. The external factors have mainly followed regional trends and have often been triggered by external powers’ military interventions in the neighbouring countries and/or occupation of those Iran has pursued a multifaceted strategic alliance (9) with Syria, in line with the three main pillars countries. Through a combination of regional trends, often triggered by external powers’ strategies, of its foreign policy. In line with the sovereignty factor and with keeping Damascus close to Tehran, and Tehran’s definition of national expediency, Iran has become one of the most significant and Iran has retained strategic grounds for retaliating to potential Israeli military aggression. Moreover, influential states in the region, and has tailored its foreign policy based on the sovereignty factor in keeping close to the Assad regime, Iran, unlike other regional and international players who

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have largely alienated Assad since the crisis, has maintained a great deal of influence in the Syrian Lebanon’s Shia community. This core constituency provides the base for Hezbollah and Iran to fight government. Such influence does not necessarily mean that Iran’s green light would guarantee for dominance throughout the Middle East. With Iranian support, Hezbollah has emerged as the Assad’s exit, but broadly speaking, Iran is perhaps the only regional player that the Assad most powerful military and political force in Lebanon. government trusts so far. Finally, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis Iran has been the only regional player willing to and capable of putting boots on the ground (10). This kind of strategy has Iran’s ambitions in Afghanistan are not necessarily hegemonic. Tehran knows that it cannot maintained the ‘balance of power factor’, which is a key concern in Iran’s foreign policy. dominate its neighbour completely, yet it has certain interests to protect, such as securing its eastern border, preserving the flow of water from Afghanistan, countering drugs trafficking and Iran is not expected to cede its consolidation in Syria, despite its economic difficulties and the danger dealing with the large Afghan refugee population on its soil. Also, Iran is particularly anxious to of extensive popular protests related to the coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, Iran has been assisting prevent a total Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the expansion of Pakistani power. The Iranian Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad in retaking Idlib province and encircling the Kurdish areas. government has attempted to achieve its objectives through a variety of means, such as cultural and religious bounds, economic tools and even supporting various militias and armed groups (15). Iraq, the former foe and current ally, is an important pillar of the Iranian foreign policy; since as Iran’s activities in Afghanistan have not drawn the same attention as its operations in the rest of the far back as 2003, the influence factor has been translated into control of the post-Saddam Iraqi region, but it still remains an important and often difficult arena of Iranian foreign policy – meaning, governments. From that time, Iran has supported, either directly or through proxies, the creation of above all, to see stability in Afghanistan. a Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Another major goal of Iranian foreign policy in Iraq is to win the competition with other players involved in the region. The military campaign against ISIS in Furthermore, Iran recently sent five oil tankers to Venezuela, violating that country’s embargo, and Iraq has triggered a more pragmatic Iranian approach towards the West, somewhat similar to their thus crossing the regional border of its desire for influence. In doing so, Iran escalated its activities tactical cooperation in defeating al-Qaeda and the Taliban after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. in the western hemisphere, even if it is not the first time Tehran has meddled in South American Some European states, such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK, have joined the US-led anti-ISIS affairs: relations between Tehran and Caracas go back as far as the 1960s, when both countries air coalition, while others have provided training and arms to Iraq’s central army and to Kurdish were founding members of OPEC; Iran’s proxy Hezbollah has also been sending mercenaries to the Peshmerga forces. In private, Western officials say that Iran has been the most willing and effective tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. force (11) in coordinating ground troops with the coalition’s air campaign against ISIS. Europeans would have preferred a strong Iraqi security force that could act independently of Iran, but they Amid the backdrop of pandemic, sanctions and economic recession, the power of Iran’s conservative recognise that no Iraqi or foreign actor has the appetite or ability to replace Iran (12). Moreover, establishment has dramatically increased, setting the course for a new era of hardline politics. maintaining influence in Iraqi politics has become more crucial to the Islamic Republic as Iraq’s Conservatives politicians and critics – the very people whom campaigned against Rouhani’s large market provides an accommodating environment for Iran’s licit and illicit trade (13). Europe administration and his platform of external engagement and internal moderation – are more likely can tolerate, and to a degree even welcome Iran’s operations against ISIS, as long as they do not to continue, or in some cases to resume, the policy of regional influence from where they left off. weaken Iraq’s central government or reignite sectarian divisions. In addition, Europe will want to see In this scenario, Europe needs to institute a paradigm shift in its relations with Iran.The European Iran taking a more active part in tackling the actual and perceived sectarian tensions associated Union needs to move from a country-specific policy focused on non-proliferation toward a Gulf with its role in Iraq. One way that might be acceptable to Iran would be for its high-ranking strategy that accounts for the Islamic Republic’s ties with its littoral neighbours. As it happens, political, military, and religious figures to follow the example set by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al- the promotion of intraregional cooperation is part of the EU’s history and continuing success – Sistani in condemning sectarian acts (14) and working with Baghdad to shape inclusive political despite current shortcomings in handling migration, stabilising national debts and fighting the representation for Sunnis and other minorities. coronavirus pandemic.

Even amidst the pandemic crisis, the ‘maximum pressure’ strategy imposed by Washington and the In institutional terms, the timing on the EU side is good now. The European Commission that took large number of victims caused by COVID-19, Tehran is continuing its strategic approach to Iraq. In April office in December 2019 aims to be “more strategic, more assertive and more united” in its foreign 2020, 11 Iranian naval vessels aggressively veered close to five American military vessels transiting policy, in the words of its president, Ursula von der Leyen. After the US-Iranian escalation in Iraq the Persian Gulf. This clearly shows that the regime in Tehran has no intention of surrendering, and is in January 2020, the EU’s Council of Ministers mandated the union’s foreign policy chief to talk to carefully planning and executing a strategy based on calculated and calibrated actions. all parties to help de-escalate tensions in the region, support political dialogue, and promote a political regional solution. Europe can now move beyond its exclusive nuclear focus with Iran, and The Hezbollah model was the most effective way to spread the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, shift to a relationship based on engagement, not containment. This would allow the EU to pursue and Lebanon was the right environment to implement this strategy. Iran’s financing of Hezbollah’s its interests with Iran across a range of issues, in particular on de-escalating those conflicts in the military and social services enables the group to solidify its role as the protector and provider of Middle East in which Iran is involved. Despite the regional disorder, Iran is one of the few countries in

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the region that has a fully functioning state, security, and intelligence apparatus. Relations with Iran matter to Europe, in particular because of Iran’s deep footprint in almost every crisis that is currently unfolding in this region of strategic importance. Europeans have to deal with the repercussions of The third scenario: the Iraqi state’s disintegration after the US-led invasion in 2003, their incorrect calculations on how quickly Bashar al-Assad would fall in Syria, and the rising extremism across the region. The surge of ISIS has further underscored the volatile nature of the threats to Europe from internal radicalisation a Western burst of action and the backlash in the form of Islamophobia, the potential return to Europe of citizens now fighting in Syria, terrorism, and the human cost of the regional crises.

Although focusing on either Iran as a country or the nuclear deal as an issue is too narrow an approach in and of itself, the JCPOA should still be the EU’s point of departure. Even if Iran’s successive steps to reduce its commitments endanger what is left of nuclear cooperation under the deal, the coronavirus pandemic provides an additional reason to open a humanitarian channel that allows for regular trade in medical products and food staples with Iran, and from there to build a way to the negotiations table.

It is almost certain that in a year from now, Iran’s foreign policy will take on a new dimension, and the issue of the nuclear agreement will be more likely one of the main points on the next Iranian government agenda. Yet this scenario involves two ramifications, conditional upon the US presidential elections in November 2020, and those in Iran in May 2021. Whether Donald Trump or Joe Biden wins, the next American president will have about seven months to deal with the ongoing administration regarding the future of the nuclear deal and, in consequence, with Iran’s ambition in the region. Hassan Rouhani will end his second term, and he will hand over office to Amid the backdrop of pandemic, the next administration in August 2021, so there is a window of opportunity to negotiate with the sanctions and economic recession, moderates who brought Iran to the negotiations table in the first place.

the power of Iran’s conservative If Trump is re-elected it is more likely that the ‘maximum pressure’ strategy will continue. establishment has dramatically However, there is a chance to open up to an overture from Tehran, given the fact that the country’s increased, setting the course for economic and health conditions are such a precarious state. So, in order to avoid further mass uprisings, whose effects could be more profound than the previous ones, the current moderate a new era of hardline politics. regime in Tehran could take at least a minimal reconciliation with Washington into account. In spite of his aggressive rhetoric, some analysts have argued that President Trump’s reluctance to launch a military strike against Iran is proof of his prudence and restraint. Starting a war with Iran might lead to bloody retaliations against US’s regional allies; moreover, it would require a new military involvement in the Middle East, in addition to those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the Trump campaign’s slogan of ‘America First’. The fact that President Rouhani has just listed a set of conditions under which Iran would resume dialogue with the United States – even if Mike Pompeo has dismissed them – could send a message to the US administration that Iran is not completely closed to negotiations. However, it is equally clear that Washington will have to make certain concessions, otherwise any such zero-sum game will be completely rejected by Tehran.

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Biden’s election to the White House presents fewer and more accessible variables than the previous scenario regarding Iran. Even though the remarks made by Antony Blinken, a former Deputy Secretary of State with the Obama administration – “Iran would have to come back into full Conclusions compliance and unless and until it did, obviously, all sanctions would remain in place” – sparked a backlash in Iran, and Fars News, a conservative outlet affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, seized on Blinken’s remarks to say that Biden’s approach to Iran will not differ drastically from that of the Trump administration, it is more likely that the Democratic Party’s candidate will try to save some parts of Barack Obama’s legacy, including the JCPOA.

Regardless of who the new US president is as of January 2021, one thing is certain: Europeans will have to make a decision on Iran, either trying to save the nuclear deal or rallying behind Washington if the new administration decides otherwise. “Europeans view the nuclear deal as a significant foreign policy achievement”, analyst Kelsey Davenport has said; yet at the same time, the EU could come to rethink their stance if Iran continues to test the limits imposed by the JCPOA. However, at least for now, the EU (together with the United Kingdom, China and the Russian Federation) seems willing to do its best to save the deal, to continue to use INSTEX – the EU-Iran trading mechanism The COVID-19 crisis comes at a particularly difficult political moment for the Iranian government. designed to allow Europeans to bypass US sanctions and continue trade with Tehran – which just In November 2019, its decision to abruptly raise fuel prices triggered widespread protests, the has concluded its first transaction (facilitating the export of medical goods), and to cooperate with latest and most significant bout of unrest due to economic discontent and political stagnation. Tehran on several issues affecting the Middle East. France and Germany, signatories of the JCPOA, Security forces brutally suppressed the uprising, killing hundreds and imprisoning thousands. In could force the pace of the EU’s involvement in the Iranian issue, especially as the Europeans begin January, Iran downed a Ukrainian civilian airliner, having purportedly confused it for an incoming to lose visibility on an international stage which is now occupied, and will probably remain so in US missile at a time of heightened bilateral tensions following the US killing of General Qassem the near future, by the new type of cold confrontation between US and China. The rest of the Soleimani. All these events have eroded public confidence in the current government in Tehran, Central and Eastern European member states will most likely follow the approach of Paris and and with the 2021 presidential elections looming, hardliners are seizing the opportunity to promise Berlin; the only visible exception could be Poland, whose opinion in the aftermath after the US a more effective leadership. But given the history of ultra-conservative governments, the likelihood unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018 was that the “EU needs more empathy toward the of negotiations with Iran will be much lower, even for Europe, which has managed, at least for now, US over the Iran deal”. But this stance did not come as a surprise, as Warsaw is keen for security to keep the door open to diplomacy with Tehran. assurances from the US as a deterrence policy against Russia. Nevertheless, the Polish minister of foreign affairs, Jacek Krzysztof Czaputowicz, implied that Poland had not yet made a final decision: While the ‘maximum pressure’ strategy has not tempered Iran’s policies in the region, the Europeans “We need to think, there is still time. This doesn’t mean we don’t feel part of the EU community should attempt to de-escalate the situation. Even if the ‘New Europe’ – namely Central and Eastern in these discussions ... We will see what other EU members think”. On the other hand, some US European countries – tends to support US foreign policy on most Middle East issues, the Iranian observers believe that, when faced with a choice of doing business with Iran or facing economic question seems to be its Achilles heel, as all European states, including the CEE, could feel the secondary sanctions, European governments will opt to preserve their ties with the US. They also effect of a possible escalation of events in the Middle East region. tend to believe that, by threatening to adopt a confrontational position toward Iran – dismantling the nuclear deal, pushing for regime change, or even conducting limited military strikes against The first two scenarios described above would set back the confidence and rapprochement Iran – the US will coerce (16) Europeans to jump onboard with less extreme policies, such as the already built between EU and Iran by at least a decade. European countries should now prepare to renegotiation of the JCPOA or demanding that Iran change its behaviour on regional issues. In minimise the damage and preserve their strategic interests on non-proliferation, pursue stability opposing the current administration in Washington policy toward Iran, European governments – in the Middle East, and keep an eye on the on economic and energy strategy. The question arises: especially Paris and Berlin – find themselves in the unusual position of being closer to Russia and Does the EU want to be a global power or not? However, the reality on the ground is that Europe China than to their traditional transatlantic partner (17). Even if the EU’s leaders do share many of does not have the tools – or possibly even the will – to project its power. Europe’s financial resources the concerns of the US with regard to Iran, they have consistently voiced unanimous support for the cannot match those of the US, and more fundamentally, deep divisions remain within Europe over JCPOA, and have broadly favoured similar multilateral engagements to address outstanding issues whether it should even seek power, with or without the UK. Yet, the Iranian issue is far greater than regarding the Islamic Republic. Iran – in reality it epitomises a structural turning point in the transatlantic relationship.

XVI SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic XVII Eastern Focus Eastern Focus

Nevertheless, as cynical it might sound, the ongoing pandemic crisis could be an opportunity for NOTES Europe. While the US has to manage a set of internal crises – pandemic, rising unemployment,

and possibly further riots across the country – the EU can step up, and as a starter, protect its (1). Mir. H. Sadat, James P. Hughes (2006), ‘US-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan’, Middle East Policy, 17(1). important humanitarian connection with Iran. Given that the country continues to be the epicentre (2). Ellie Geranmayeh (2017), ‘The Coming Clash: Why Iran will Divide Europe from the United States’, ECFR, October 2017. (3). Ibid. of the pandemic in a fragile Middle East, the coronavirus is likely to lead to increased refugee (4). Bernd Kaussler (2014) Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy. Power politics and conflict resolution, New York: Routledge, pp. 36-37. flows to Europe. Building from here, the EU should form a coalition on non-nuclear issues, focused (5). Bernd Kaussler (2014), op. cit., p. 94. (6). Sara Bazoobandi (2014), ‘Iran’s Regional Policy: Interests, Challenges and Ambitions’, ISPI, Analysis no. 275, November 2014. on freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and the conflicts in Yemen and Iraq (18). Also, the (7). Ibid. European governments will need to push back against the US-led sanction regime so that their (8). Ibid. (9). Sara Bazoobandi (2014), op. cit., pp. 4-5. companies will not be penalised by the US for undertaking legal business with Iran. Should Europe (10). Ibid. (and the US fail) to provide relief to Iran in such grave circumstances, this would turn the Iranian (11). Ellie Geranmayeh (2017), op. cit., p. 4. (12). Ibid. public against them for generations. Moreover, it would give ammunition to those in Iran who favour (13). Sara Bazoobandi (2014), op. cit., p. 6. confrontation with the West. To devise smart contingency plans, it will be imperative for European (14). Ellie Geranmayeh (2017), op. cit., pp. 5-6. (15). Alireza Nader et. al. (2014), ‘Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan. Implications for the U. S. Drawdown’, RAND, pp. 1-74. governments to increase their coordination with China, Russia, and the other Asian economic (16). Ellie Geranmayeh (2017), op. cit., p. 4. giants such as India, South Korea and Japan (19). Not only do their interests align with respect to the (17). Ibid. (18). Ellie Geranmayeh (2017), op. cit., p. 1. JCPOA, they also share a more general concern about the use of secondary US sanctions. (19). Ibid.

Europeans see the nuclear deal as a key pillar of regional and world security, and have struggled to keep the agreement alive, despite US pressure. It might be the time now for a more assertive BIBLIOGRAPHY approach, one that will add to Europe’s credibility and strengthen its position. It will increase the

likelihood that Iran will take steps to return to full compliance with its nuclear commitments, *** (2020), Worldometer, October 29, 2020. Available at https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/iran/. because Tehran’s endgame is to restart oil exports, to enter the international finance system, and [Accessed 29 October 2020]. *** (2020), ‘Imam Khamenei’s thanks to the Iranian nation’, Khamenei.Ir, February 23, 2020. Available at https://english. to overcome the pandemic crisis. khamenei.ir/news/7383/Imam-Khamenei-s-thanks-to-the-Iranian-nation. [Accessed 25 July 2020]. *** (2020), Pandamag.Ir, 17 March 2020. Available at https://pandamag.ir/iran-temporarily-frees-85000-prisoners- including-political-ones-amid-coronavirus/. [Accessed 25 July 2020]. At the same time, a principled stance by Europe would pay off regardless of the outcome of the *** (2020), Irdiplomacy.ir, April 2020. Available at http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/. [Accessed 25 July 2020]. US presidential elections. If Joe Biden wins the election, Europeans will have kept the door open *** (2020), ‘Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Remarks to the Press’, U. S. Department of State, March 17, 2020. Available at https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-6/. [Accessed 27 July 2020]. for a US return to the nuclear deal. If, however, Trump is re-elected, Europe will have taken a long Bazoobandi, S. (2014), ‘Iran’s Regional Policy: Interests, Challenges and Ambitions’, ISPI, Analysis no. 275, November 2014. overdue step towards protecting itself from further coercive action. Glaser, J., Preble, C. and Trevor, A. (2019), ‘Trump’s Iran strategy: Maximum pressure, minimum impact’, The Hill, September 23, 2019. Available at https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/462507-trumps-iran-strategy-maximum-pressure- minimum-impact. [Accessed 27July 2020]. Geranmayeh, E. (2017), ‘The Coming Clash: Why Iran will Divide Europe from the United States’, ECFR, October 2017. Geranmayeh, E., Batmanghelidj, E. (2020), ‘How Europe can help Iran fight covid-19’, ECFR, 6 April 2020. Available at https:// ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_europe_can_help_iran_fight_covid_19/. [Accessed 20May 2020]. Kaussler, B. (2014) Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy. Power politics and conflict resolution, New York: Routledge. Nader, A. et. al. (2014), ‘Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan. Implications for the U. S. Drawdown’, RAND, pp. 1-74. Available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151.pdf. [Accessed 25 July 2020]. Neumann, P. R. (2015), ‘Foreign fighter total in Syria / Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR, 26 January 2015. Available at https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000- surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. [Accessed 26 July 2020]. Sadat, M. S., Hughes, J. P. (2006), ‘US-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan’, Middle East Policy, 17(1). Zamirirad, A., Meier, O., Lohmann, S. (2020), ‘Why Europe needs to push back to save the Iran nuclear deal’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 30 June 2020. Available at https://thebulletin.org/2020/06/why-europe-needs-to-push-back-to-save- the-iran-nuclear-deal/. [Accessed 10 July 2020].

Ioana Constantin Bercean is PhD candidate in International Relations at Babes-Bolyai University - Cluj-Napoca and PhD candidate in Sociology, at University of Bucharest. Also she was intern for Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. Fluent in English, French, Spanish, and speaks Italian, Farsi and Arabic conversationally, Ioana is Middle East expert at “Informational Warfare and Strategic Communication Laboratory” at “Ion I. C. Brătianu Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy”.

XVIII SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic SPECIAL BRIEF: Iran’s endgame - between American sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic XIX Editorial Board

Oana Popescu Zamfir, Octavian Manea, Ana Maria Luca, Rufin Zamfir

Editor-in-chief

Oana Popescu Zamfir

Managing editor

Octavian Manea

Proofreading

Jim Todd, Ioana Chilom

Layout concept

Alexandra Andronache

Art director

Florin Vedeanu

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Based on Mystery and melancholy of a street (girl running with a hoop), by Giorgio de Chirico About GlobalFocus Center Issue 04 / Autumn 2020

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