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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Fertő, Imre; Kóczy, László Á.; Kovács, Attila; Sziklai, Balázs R. Working Paper Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament CERS-IE Working Papers, No. CERS-IE WP - 2021/14 Provided in Cooperation with: Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Suggested Citation: Fertő, Imre; Kóczy, László Á.; Kovács, Attila; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2021) : Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament, CERS-IE Working Papers, No. CERS-IE WP - 2021/14, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237558 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS | KRTK-KTI MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament IMRE FERTŐ – LÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY – ATTILA KOVÁCS – BALÁZS R. SZIKLAI CERS-IE WP – 2021/14 March 2021 https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CERSIEWP202114.pdf This paper was published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, Volume 47, Issue 5, December 2020, Pages 1897–1919 at https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbaa011. Please cite the journal version. INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES, BUDAPEST, 2021 ABSTRACT We aim to identify the most influential members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (COMAGRI). Unlike previous studies that were based on case studies or interviews with stakeholders, we analyse the voting power of MEPs using a spatial Banzhaf power index. We identify critical members: members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that rapporteurs, EP group coordinators and MEPs from countries with high relative Committee representations, such as Ireland, Poland or Romania are powerful actors. Italy emerges as the most influential member state, while France seems surprisingly weak. JEL codes: D71, D72, Q18 Keywords: European Parliament, Common Agricultural Policy, voting games, Banzhaf index, voting game over a convex geometry Imre Fertő Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary and Kaposvár University, Kaposvár, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] László Á. Kóczy Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary and Department of Finance, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] Kovács Attila Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] Balázs R. Sziklai Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary and Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] Az Európai Parlament Agrárbizottsága tagjainak a befolyásossági rangsora IMRE FERTŐ – LÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY – ATTILA KOVÁCS – BALÁZS R. SZIKLAI ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ A célunk, hogy azonosítsuk az Európai Parlament Agrárbizottságának (COMAGRI) a legbefolyásosabb tagjait. Eltérően korábbi tanulmányoktól, amelyek mélyinterjúkon, vagy esettanulmányokon alapulnak, mi egy térbeli hatalmi indexet, az ún. Banzhaf indexet használunk a szavazási erő meghatározására. Azonosítjuk a kritikus szavazókat, akik egy nyerő (döntőképes) koalíció létrehozásához szükségesek. Rapportőrök, csoport koordinátorok és a bizottságban felülreprezentált országok, mint pl. Írország, Lengyelország, vagy Románia képviselői befolyásos szereplőknek bizonyultak. Olaszországnak vannak a legbefolyásosabb képviselői, ezzel szemben a francia delegáltak meglepően gyengék. JEL: D71, D72, Q18 Kulcsszavak: Európai Parlament, közös mezőgazdasági politika, konvex szavazási játékok, Banzhaf index Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament Dr. Imre Fertő Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, [email protected] László Á. Kóczy, PhD Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Finance, [email protected] Attila Kovács, PhD (corresponding author) Tecnológico de Monterrey, [email protected] and attila.m.ko- [email protected] (preferred) Cell: +36304710281 (HU); +525574878765 (MEX) Fax: +525591778000 Balázs R. Sziklai, PhD Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, [email protected] 1 The power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament Abstract We aim to identify the most influential members of the Agricultural Committee of the Euro- pean Parliament (COMAGRI). Unlike previous studies that were based on case studies or interviews with stakeholders, we analyse the voting power of MEPs using a spatial Banzhaf power index. We identify critical members: members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that rapporteurs, EP group coordinators and MEPs from coun- tries with high relative Committee representations, such as Ireland, Poland or Romania are powerful actors. Italy emerges as the most influential member state, while France seems sur- prisingly weak. Keywords: European Parliament, Common Agricultural Policy, voting games, Ban- zhaf index, voting game over a convex geometry 2 Discussion about the content as well as the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) has been high on the political agenda in the last decades and generated much academic interest as well. CAP reforms have been subject to comprehensive analysis both from political and policy aspects. In his landmark book, “The Perfect Storm” on the 2003 Fischler reform, Swinnen (2008) shares the view that this has been the most radical reform of the CAP since its creation. Ten years later, another, more moderate CAP reform, the “Imperfect Storm” (Swinnen, 2015a) took place. Swinnen (2015a) identifies four key domains of this reform: first, the drivers and the assessment of the reform (Swinnen, 2015b); second, the factors influencing policy outcomes, including internal, like the Multi- annual Financial Framework (Matthews, 2015), as well as external factors, like the WTO negotiations (Swinbank, 2015); third, the content, including direct payments (Sahrbacher, Balmann, & Sahrbacher, 2015) or the so-called greening (Erjavec, Lovec, & Erjavec, 2015); finally, the institutional aspects, with focus on the role of the European Parliament after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Fertő & Kovács, 2015; Olper & Pacca, 2015). The 2013 CAP reform was the first one in which the EP was a co-legislator with the Council, which partly explains why the decision-making of the CAP in the European Parliament is mostly unexplored. Throughout the last CAP reforms and the EU’s legislation on agricultural policy, scholars focused on the external and internal stakeholders, their motivations and influence on the pol- icy and legislative outcomes. Similarly, the driving forces, constraints and achievements of reforms have been part of the political and academic discourse. On the other hand, the deci- sion-making of the CAP, the role and influence of various stakeholders on the legislative 3 outcome is still unexplored. This is especially true for the European Parliament and its mem- bers. This article aims at filling this gap by analysing the role of the Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) in the CAP legislation through quantifiable power scores. Contrary to previous studies on intra-EP struc- tures, like committees or EP Groups (Whitaker, 2005), we concentrate on the decision-mak- ing at the level of individual EP members. In particular, we provide the voting power ranking of the MEPs – both Members and Sub- stitute Members – of COMAGRI based on their policy positions along two dimensions: ide- ological spectrum of national parties and the local significance of agriculture. Our choice is supported by results that show MEPs voting behaviour influenced by ideology (the MEP’s party group affiliation) and also nationality (Cencig & Sabani, 2017). We position members in the ideology space given