Security Studies in Israel: Scholarship and Practice a Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Oh

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Security Studies in Israel: Scholarship and Practice

A thesis presented to

the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Adam Gil Ben-Porath

April 2021

This thesis titled

Security Studies in Israel: Scholarship and Practice

ADAM GIL BEN-PORATH

has been approved for

the Department of Political Science

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Nukhet A. Sandal

Associate Professor of Political Science

Florenz Plassmann

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

Abstract

BEN-PORATH, ADAM GIL, M.A., April 2021, Political Science

Security Studies in Israel: Scholarship and Practice

Director of Thesis: Nukhet A. Sandal

Epistemic communities supply advice for policy makers. Like in other areas, these communities have the capacity to research, organize, and influence policy in the security realm. Israel does not have a long history of utilizing epistemic communities as is the case in the United States and much of the Western world. Israel’s security paradigm and its perception as existing in a perpetual state of conflict has created a highly insular network of policy makers, wary of new and outside perspectives. The growing number of security challenges facing the state have, however, created a situation whereby policymakers are beginning to seek outside expert opinion. The proliferation of academic programs of study and security-oriented think tanks have provided a new cadre of experts and institutions eager to breach the closed circle of decision makers. As the security landscape continues to evolve, so too will the role of epistemic communities in responding to these changes.

Dedication

For Johnathan and Rose.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Nukhet Sandal, my advisor and long-time mentor, for her unwavering personal and professional support throughout my academic career. Without her guidance I would not be the scholar or the person that I am today. Additionally, I would like to thank Professors Jonathan Agensky and Brandon Kendhammer for serving as committee members. I would also like to express my gratitude to the individuals who generously gave their time to be interviewed as part of this thesis. Their expertise and candor allowed me to holistically depict the state of security studies in Israel. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, family, and friends, all of whom supported me throughout this challenging and exciting process.

Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 4 Acknowledgments...... 5 List of Tables ...... 8 List of Figures ...... 9 Introduction ...... 10 Chapter 1: Epistemic Communities and Security Studies as a Field ...... 15 The Role of Epistemic Communities in Policy-making ...... 16 Filling Gaps Within the Bureaucracy ...... 19 Epistemic Communities versus Special Interest Groups ...... 20 Security Studies: Scope of the Field ...... 21 Origins of Security Studies ...... 23 Security Studies and Think Tank Culture ...... 25 Chapter 2: Israeli Security Policy ...... 28 The Six Day War ...... 30 Yom Kippur War ...... 31 First Lebanon War and the PLO ...... 33 Lessons Learned...... 34 Shaping Security Policy ...... 36 Origins of Israel’s Security Grand Strategy ...... 37 Updating Israel’s Grand Strategy ...... 38 Chapter 3: Security Studies and Academia in Israel ...... 43 The Israeli Approach to Security Studies ...... 46 Courses in Security Studies Programs ...... 49 Textbooks and Course Materials ...... 52 Profile of Security Studies Students ...... 54 Profile of Security Studies Faculty ...... 56 Chapter 4: Security Studies and Israeli Think Tanks...... 59 Profile of Think Tank Scholars ...... 61 Overview of Select Active Think Tanks ...... 66 The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) ...... 66 7

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) ...... 68 The Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) ...... 70 The Reut Group (Reut) ...... 74 The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) ...... 76 The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim) ...... 78 Institutional Structure...... 79 Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts ...... 84 References ...... 88 Appendix A: List of Interviews Conducted ...... 107 Appendix B: Selection of Syllabi Reviewed ...... 108 List of Tables

Page

Table 1 Enrolment at Israeli Universities 2021-2021 ...... 44 Table 2 Selection of Security Studies Curricula ...... 51 Table 3 Background of Security Studies Affiliated Faculty ...... 58 Table 4 Think Tanks Heads of Center Tenure ...... 82

List of Figures

Page

Figure 1. Territories occupied by Israel in 1967 ...... 30

Introduction

This thesis evaluates the role of epistemic communities in shaping and influencing security policy in Israel. There is ample scholarship on American epistemic communities and plenty of examples of their direct impact on shaping the American policy and discourse. As an American-Israeli with an understanding of the Israeli political structure, I sought to uncover whether the American epistemic community model was replicated in Israel, as are many elements that are borrowed from the United

States. To my surprise, there existed very little research on this subject. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in literature, serving as a first of its kind in the analysis and review of security oriented epistemic communities in Israel.

Epistemic communities have been an integral part of the policy making process since World War II in the United States and have become increasingly common in other

Western states. I hypothesize, however, that due to the insular and secretive nature of

Israeli security policy, there would be less openness amongst its statecraft elite to allow outsiders to contribute to the policy formation process. Understanding how a state forms policy is crucial to understanding the value it places on individual perspectives. Looking specifically at the role of epistemic communities informs an outside observer the worth that the state assigns to policy field experts. In Israel, there is no shortage of experts in most any field. In 2018, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) ranked Israel as the third most educated country, surpassed only by Canada and

Japan (Hess, 2018). Whether or not, and if so, how, Israel utilizes its well-educated civilian population, is of particular interest to this thesis. 11

Though there are frequent references to American epistemic communities, this thesis is not a comparative analysis between the United States and Israel. References to the United States are provided, however, to explain the origins of epistemic communities and how they have been successfully integrated into the policy formation process. The first chapter is dedicated to explaining the role of epistemic communities, their origins, and how they differ from other communities. Additionally, this chapter will introduce the reader to the field of security studies, connecting the dots between the scientific approach employed by epistemic communities and the field in which they operate. Weaving these two topics together, the chapter explains in the context of increased transnational governance the need for policy experts to supplement the existing structure of the administrative state’s bureaucracy, culminating in what is referred to today as “think tank culture.”

In order to provide readers with an understanding of the context in which the epistemic communities evaluated by this thesis operate, the second chapter introduces

Israel’s strategic self-vision, addressing its constructed view as a state and a people in a perpetual state of existential conflict. The chapter will review Israel’s conflict history, elaborating on specific conflicts that shaped and reshaped its strategic understanding.

This thesis is not meant as an in-depth overview of Israeli military history. To that end, the second chapter will individually cover only the most important in the context of grand strategy to include, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1978 First

Lebanon War. The chapter will identify how these conflicts reshaped the Israeli conceptualization of security and the important lessons learned from these conflicts individually and collectively. 12

So as to set the stage for the place and role of epistemic communities in shaping

Israel’s security policy, the second chapter concludes with an overview of Israel’s grand strategy, tracing its origins to the Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s (1923) Iron Wall. The second chapter will outline the efforts undertaken in Israel to update its security grand strategy, its failures and successes in doing so, in addition to highlighting when and by whom these efforts were undertaken. Chapter 2 will identify the statecraft elite who are among the select few involved in security policy. It is through this elite that epistemic communities are able to break the historically limited role of actors outside the statecraft elite in contributing to the policy making process.

The third chapter will introduce readers to Israeli academia, an epistemic community in its own right. First providing an overview of the history and structure of

Israeli academia, the chapter will introduce the field of security studies as it is practiced and studied in Israel. Understanding that academic institutions lay the foundational blocks for epistemic actors, informing how these future actors will perceive and interact with the environment, the chapter will examine specifically Israeli security studies curricula. To do so, this thesis will draw on interviews with various renowned faculty at

Israeli institutions in security studies and adjacent fields, as well as original research on courses of study included in security studies programs. The chapter highlights the similar courses to what an American institution may offer while paying special attention to the unique Israeli and region-specific course offerings.

To better understand Israeli academia’s epistemic actors, chapter 3 outlines a snapshot profile of both students, both at the graduate and undergraduate level, and faculty in security studies. Students are the future of the field and faculty are the actors 13 presently driving the field and educating the next generation. Understanding what motivates both students and faculty, their ideological positions, and the factors that drive them are crucial elements to understanding where and how they can fit into the security policy formation process. The chapter notes the unique experience that most Israeli students and faculty have a first-hand understanding of security given that Israel has mandatory conscription for both men and women. This is taken into account along with the political environment that these actors and future ones are operating in order to fully illustrate students, faculty, and the broader Israeli mindset on security.

The fourth and final chapter of this thesis returns to the notion of “think tank culture” introduced in the first chapter. First alluding to Israel’s and the Jewish people’s long history of scholarly inquiry, and the academics that framed and brought into existence the Jewish state, the fourth chapter specifically examines Israeli think tanks, briefly mentioning broader think tank culture in Israel before narrowing in on Israel’s security-oriented think tanks. Given that think tanks are among the most prominent and influential epistemic communities, the chapter profiles select think tank scholars, observing their education, motivation, and outside experiences.

Chapter 4 distinguishes between two types of think tanks: “academic” and

“policy” oriented. In profiling the scholars who conduct research at these institutions, the chapter notes the significant number of retired high ranking Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officers and senior diplomats that find a new home at these institutions following their retirement. Based on interviews with some think tanks heads and academics alike, the chapter explains these individuals’ motivation for joining an epistemic community such as a think tank, in the context of a low mandatory retirement age in Israel and the desire 14 amongst these individuals to remain active and relevant in security following their retirement. In turn, chapter 4 explains think tanks’ interest in recruiting these retired officials, not only to benefit from their first-hand experience, but also to exploit their connections to senior policy makers in the statecraft elite, in order to gain their ear and in order to influence policy through these personal connections.

To test the initial hypothesis that epistemic communities are not influential on security policy, this thesis undertook a review of a section of active think tanks operating in the security policy domain, noting their active and past projects. This was accomplished by conducting interviews with think tank directors and scholars, reviewing previously conducted interviews with the Israeli and foreign media, as well as reviewing active publications and press releases from these institutions. The chapter continues with an overview of the institutional structure, hierarchy, and research agendas of Israeli think tanks, pointing out unique features to the Israeli model such as the role of MA and PhD students in supplementing an institution’s research. The chapter also notes the influential role of an institution’s leader, observing the lengthy tenure and power wielded particularly by founding directors.

Combined, this thesis offers a first of its kind review of Israeli security studies, the role of epistemic communities in shaping security policy, and the context in which both of these developed. It is the intention of this thesis to draw greater attention to the work that epistemic communities in Israel are already doing to advance Israel’s security policies and to highlight the potential that epistemic communities have in contributing to a more informed and empirically tested grand strategy as Israel continues to rely on an arguably outdated and ad-hoc approach to security. 15

Chapter 1: Epistemic Communities and Security Studies as a Field

An epistemic community is a conglomerate of experts in a given field who possess an authoritative claim to matters of public policy under their field of expertise which may comprise experts from one or multiple disciplines (Haas, 1992;

Kutchesfahani, 2010). Epistemic communities are established and function around a core set of values or beliefs that serve as the basis of a common policy agenda (Haas, 1992).

Epistemic communities trace their origins to the physical sciences, and most studies still focus on scientific communities and their impact on policy (Gough & Shackley, 2001, p.

338).

Following the Second World War, industrialized states underwent a professionalization and expansion of their respective bureaucracies (Bromley & Meyer,

2015, p. 16). This expansion resulted in the decentralization of power and the dissemination of decision making to unelected civil servants whose roles in policy making have steadily increased since (Haas, 1992, pp. 9-10). Staffing these bureaucracies are members of what Dorothy Nelkin (1979, p. 107) terms, “knowledge elite” whose authority is vested in their accreditations from an epistemic community such as a scientific or academic institution (Barnes & Edge, 1983, p. 2). As bureaucracies, such as the US State Department or the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have increased in size, so too have the networks of private epistemic communities filled with policy experts eager to provide input (Haas, 1992, p. 8).

Initially, industrialized bureaucracies were hesitant to delegate portions of their decision making to epistemic communities; however, in the realm of state security, epistemic communities have proven their value by taking on aspects of foreign policy 16 that have become more technical, less certain, and that intersect with various other policy objectives, foreign and domestic, of the state (Cross, 2011). Toke (1999, p. 7) cites global environmentalism as one such area that has necessitated the use of external experts.

Without the consultation of these experts, policy makers risk unintended consequences not only on the environment, but on global trade, human security, and various other functions of the state that may not be anticipated by the policy makers.

The Role of Epistemic Communities in Policy-making

Consulting experts from a variety of fields helps policy makers in crafting effective legislation. Beyond the ever-growing technical nature and interlinkage of policy making, there are several additional reasons why policy makers may choose to engage with epistemic communities. As has been noted, epistemic communities carry a degree of authority based in their scientific legitimacy. Policy makers may call on epistemic communities in order to provide research and data to bolster a policy position or to gain a better understanding on how a prospective policy may impact varying interest groups.

An additional, and more recently acquired role beyond serving as consultants, that epistemic communities have acquired is that of policy writers. The political volatility of a policy issue often dictates the degree to which policy makers seek the counsel of epistemic communities (Cross, 2013, p.145). Haas (1992, pp. 15-16) argues that it may at times be advantageous for policy makers to include epistemic communities in the policy making process so as to provide a scapegoat based on the epistemic community’s faulty data; however, legislative responsibility still ultimately lies with the policy makers, regardless of how much of a role an epistemic community had in advocating or event crafting the specific policy. In the age of growing transnational governance, the role of 17 epistemic communities will continue to grow. Epistemic communities are at the forefront of translating expert knowledge into power (Cross, 2013, p. 141). Not every epistemic community wields the same support and respect from policy makers and the public at large. An epistemic community’s power and influence on policy is highly dependent on its reputation (Cross, 2011).

Transnational governance is not a new phenomenon. The automobile, aircraft, and maritime industries, to name a few, have been heavily regulated by international and transnational agreements that create uniform safety standards across borders since the

1980s (Vogel, 1997, p. 557). Today, however, it is not only the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) creating regulations at the transnational level. Organizations such as the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), and numerous other international agencies are regulating more divisive issues such as the international political economy and matters of public health. Seeking to attract the best expertise, these organizations consult epistemic communities in crafting their policy

(Cross, 2013, pp. 52-53). Through these organizations, the knowledge elite have expanded their influence beyond that of a single state.

Returning to a domestic viewpoint, beyond the immediate impact on specific policies, epistemic communities represent an important element of civil society. Ideas that originate in epistemic communities that are then incorporated into policy contribute to the diffusion of communal ideas directly on the state’s behavior (Dunlop, 2009, p. 22).

Through inter-state contact, these ideas begin to transcend the state and the policies, values, and perspectives offered by national epistemic communities diffuse and become 18 transnational trends (Seabrooke, 2014, p. 59). Beyond interstate contact, policy trends advanced by epistemic communities may diffuse into the transnational space through international research collaborations, conferences, journal publications, and through the leveraging of epistemic communities in track two diplomacy (Simon, 2002, p. 168).

In 1972, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) signed an Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty geared at stabilizing the balance of power between the world’s two nuclear superpowers and to encourage nuclear deterrence through cooperation (Nixon, 1972). The continued nuclear arms race was a zero-sum game with the potential of instigating a nuclear war and total nuclear disarmament was not feasible given the climate of international politics at the time (Adler, 1992, p.113). Prior to the signing of this treaty, only a few scholars or practitioners in the federal government would have thought such a feat to be possible (Adler, 1992, p.135). Recognizing the need for alternative solutions, the United States government commissioned a panel of experts, an early epistemic community, to consider alternatives and their ramifications (Adler,

1992, p. 125). From this community, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was born, representing one of the earliest occasions that an epistemic community was directly involved in the policy formation process.

The epistemic community responsible for this breakthrough in international relations did not resemble the staff of formalized institutions that one may be familiar with today, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the RAND

Corporation, or the Brookings Institute, to name a few. Rather, this early epistemic community was comprised of experts in arms control and international relations who were hand-picked by the United States government to negotiate on its behalf with the 19

USSR (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 34). These scholars came from think tanks such as the

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (PCSW), an epistemic community in its own right, established in 1957 as an evidence-based policy advocacy group guided by its desire for a nuclear-weapons free world (Pugwash, n.d.), public and private universities, as well as various departments and bureaus within the federal government

(Adler, 1992, p. 114). Despite ideological and interdisciplinary differences, the scholars were able to find common ground and a mutual understanding that led to a cohesive strategy that addressed each of their concerns (Adler, 1992, p. 123).

Filling Gaps Within the Bureaucracy

Epistemic communities partially supplement the state’s bureaucracy. As the state’s attention has become increasingly divided due to growing concerns at home and abroad, the bureaucracy has become a jack of all trades, but an expert at none. Epistemic communities exist in the form of consultants within nearly every department of the US federal government and that of other Western democracies (Cross, 2013, p. 152). Though their work is intended for the betterment of the state machinery, epistemic communities and the bureaucracy do not always come to the same policy conclusions. In such instances, it is important to evaluate the motives of each actor. Unlike epistemic communities, bureaucracies act out of self-interest to preserve themselves and their budgets (Haas, 1992, pp. 15-16). Such self-preserving behavior has shaped the field of international relations’ understanding of state behavior as exhibited in Rational Actors

Theory (Allison, 1971; Levy, 1997; Allison & Halperin, 2015).

Though epistemic communities may find themselves at odds with the state’s preconceived assumptions, notions, and beliefs, it is that very outside perspective that 20 elected leaders and bureaucrats alike turn to when faced with a particularly taxing crisis that challenges the existing order (Haas, 1992, p. 2). Cross (2013) builds on Haas’s

(1992) inventory of epistemic communities and developed criteria for assessing the likeliness of an epistemic community to affect policy. Cross (2013, p. 137) suggests that the scope, political opportunity structure, the phase in the policy process, status of coalitions, and the policy field coherence will all impact an epistemic community’s ability to carry influence. The epistemic community’s access to top level decision makers and their understanding of the decision makers’ objectives and hardlines is essential for an epistemic community to carry influence (Raustiala, 1997, p. 487).

Epistemic Communities versus Special Interest Groups

Though epistemic communities share many similarities with special interest groups, distinguishing between the two is essential to understanding the unique potential of epistemic communities. Like special interest groups, epistemic communities are organized around a shared interest or policy objective; however, unlike special interest groups, epistemic communities operate on the basis of a shared understanding of knowledge and of cause-and-effect relationships (Haas, 1992, p. 18). Special interest groups are concerned with shaping broader political beliefs whereas epistemic communities take a narrower focus on the technical matters of decision making

(Peterson, 1995, p. 74). Scholars within epistemic communities emphasize the scientific method and scientific reason and understand that it is their commitment to these principles that lends authority to their work. In contrast, special interest groups are concerned with the implementation of policy objectives regardless of the scientific validity behind their efficacy (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p.23). An epistemic community 21 advocates for policy outcome based on reason and rationality whereas an interest group advocates pre-determined policy without necessarily having debated and considered alternatives that may better achieve the end goal.

To further illustrate the difference between epistemic communities and special interest groups, one can compare the Jewish Institute for National Security of America

(JINSA), a Washington D.C. based epistemic community and the American Israel Public

Affairs Committee (AIPAC) a special interest group also headquartered in Washington,

D.C. Both organizations’ mission statements address promoting the US-Israel alliance, and both charter their organizations to educate policy makers and the general public as a whole; however, JINSA employs research driven analysis to create policy proposals whereas AIPAC comes up with tactics in presenting its case within its own sphere of influence (JINSA, n.d. & AIPAC, n.d.). As an epistemic community comprised of scholars, JINSA would be precluded from advancing policies that go against its shared causal beliefs. This would not be the case for AIPAC, however, as it is comprised of individuals from multiple disciplines and backgrounds, many of whom do not share the same causal beliefs that is required amongst members of an epistemic community.

Security Studies: Scope of the Field

Before analyzing the nature of security oriented epistemic communities, it is first prudent to review the scope of the field of Security Studies. Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988, p. 6) define security studies not as a discipline unto itself, rather as an interdisciplinary understanding of the complex issues of international violence that expand beyond the realm of a single discipline. The focus of the field has traditionally been heavily state- centric and deeply rooted in Neorealism (Krause & Williams, 1996, p.230). This 22 conceptualization of security studies has placed an emphasis on the use of military force, the study of threats to state security, and the policies enacted by states to prevent or prepare for conflict (Walt, 1991, pp. 212-213). The Neorealist approach takes for granted the role of the state, assuming its supremacy in the realm of security, largely due to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Krahmann, 2013, p.54; Krause &

Williams, 1996, p. 232). Despite its interdisciplinary nature, the focus on interstate violence places security studies most closely to the field of international relations (Nye &

Lynn-Jones, 1988, pp. 19-20). The scholarly approach, as opposed to the political approach, to security studies often relies on a manipulable variable (Walt, 1991, p, 212).

This variable can be a specific policy decision or a strategic decision in war for example that researchers are able to examine and identify causal variables.

The notion of security presented above arguably represents the standard Western definition. Other cultures may view security through a broader lens, still focusing on human security, though with an expanded definition of human security that may include, the environment, hunger, reproductive rights, poverty, and other issues outside that of state or national security (Paris, 2001, p. 89; Crosston, 2015. p.30) Perhaps attributable to globalization and the diffusion of liberalism, scholars in the West, particularly in the

United States, are beginning to acquiesce to this broadened definition with new schools of thought entering the mainstream of security studies literature (Levyk, 2020, pp. 178-

179). Such schools include Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen School, and

Feminist Security Studies.

Origins of Security Studies

The field referred to today as Security Studies has debated origins. Though academic works on the great power struggle in the interwar period were present, the impetus and focus on what would first be “deterrence studies” did not gain widespread attention in American academic circles until after World War II and the advent of the atomic bomb (Zagare, 2019, p. 127). Huth (1988, p. 15) defines deterrence as “policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force will outweigh the benefits.” During the Cold War period, new theories emerged from both the Realist and Liberal schools of thought, to include

Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Deterrence Theory (Huth et. al, 1993, pp. 611-

612). As new theories emerged, so do did academic debate as scholars, primarily in political science’s subfield of International Relations, began to analyze and test these new theories.

Game Theory, though originally posed in economics theory, has long been a part of international relations and emerged as a key theoretical component to deterrence and later Security Studies (Zagare, 2019, p. 147). The theory’s ability to model actors’ preferences and outcomes led to its rise to prominence, overshadowing many other theories of the time, a reality that continues in present the day (Zagare, 2019, p. 16). Walt

(1999, p. 7) expressed his concern over Game Theory’s dominance in theoretical discourse, arguing that it left little room for competing or adjacent theories. Though this would later prove not to be the case, Game Theory remains highly influential in security studies. Its implications and relationship to Israel’s security grand strategy will be briefly discussed in Chapter 2. 24

From the mid twentieth century into the twenty-first century, Security Studies as a field and its cadre of theories continued to expand. In the early days of Realist deterrence concept, scholars such as Henry Kissinger (see Kissinger, 1957) and Thomas Schelling

(see Schelling, 1981) dominated the field with their seminal works on nuclear deterrence in the Cold War. As the field has progressed, so to have the schools, approaches, and investigations of Security Studies. The collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated a rethinking of the field or risk waning away from scholarly interest (Baldwin, 1995, p.

133). This fear was partially exemplified in the Security Studies community’s lack of interest in addressing a hot war in Vietnam, focusing rather on strategy and deterrence in the ongoing Cold War (Baldwin, 1995, p. 124).

Walt (1987) described several weaknesses that hamper the field of Security

Studies and explained how they account for many failures in actual security policy.

According to Walt, the combined effect of secrecy and the political nature of security constitute obstacles to the successful implementation of security strategy. Policy makers and the bureaucracy classify much of their own research, leaving it inaccessible to outside reviewers in a manner similar to policies in other realms such as health or education policy. Because it is the same entities that classify information that have the most to gain or lose, the role of politics is central as well (Walt, 1987, p. 147). Political rivalry can lead to the intentional distortion of information which in turn leads to sub- optimal results, and the classified nature of most security operations insulates policy makers and the bureaucracy from public accountability when this leads to unfavorable results. Political rivalries can occur between political parties or specific actors, but also internally between different agencies within the bureaucracy who all compete for their 25 share of the world’s largest defense budget (Walt, 1987, p. 148). In many cases, the result is non-empirical policy proposals produced for political motives, rather than empirically sound research designed to objectively contribute to the field’s understanding of issues at hand.

Security Studies and Think Tank Culture

In the United States and much of the Western world, think tanks are key players in the policy formation process and represent among the most influential epistemic communities. Chapter 4 will specifically review Israeli think tanks. Before this, a brief summary of the Western concept of the “think tank” is in order. Think tank culture in the

United States is enabled by the “revolving door” of government whereby as a new administration enters office, it turns to think tanks to fill thousands of executive department positions with pre-vetted qualified academics who are eager to gain practical experience in government (Abelson, 2014, pp. 131-132). As one party loses control of the presidency, its appointed members may return to think tanks newly emboldened by their government experience, meanwhile, the party assuming office turns to its ideologically aligned think tanks to fill the new vacancies, thus constituting “the revolving door”.

Think tanks specialize in a particular policy field, such as security, and respond quickly to emerging policy issues with thorough research. Additionally, think tanks often have an ideological if not political affiliation. Political or policy advocacy and media representation has increasingly become a cornerstone of think tanks’ work. In turn, policy makers in the US often use think tanks’ research to justify and propagate their desired policy objectives. The result of this is a highly intertwined network between policy makers and think tanks, which on occasion blurs the line of research independence. 26

In the United States context, the Heritage Foundation, for example, the third most influential think tank in the United States according to the Global Go to Think Tank

Index (McGann, 2020), identifies itself as “an organization whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (Heritage, 2021). To achieve this mission, the Heritage Foundation’s scholars publish reports advancing a conservative position on a wide variety of matters including homeland security and defense (Venable, 2018), immigration (Ries, 2020), public health (Badger & Michel, 2020), and education (Butcher & Burke, 2021). Heritage

Foundation scholars who are experts in these fields are frequently called to testify before

Congress to explain their policy perspectives. One such example, in January 2019, Hans von Spakovsky, Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The

Heritage Foundation and a former commissioner on the Federal Elections Commission, provided expert testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, outlining constitutional and policy objections regarding H.R. 1, otherwise known as the “We the People Act”

(von Spakovsky, 2019).

Beyond testifying before Congress, it is additionally commonplace for think tanks to host public events geared at influencing academic and public opinion. The Brooking

Institute, another highly influential and more liberal think tank based in the United States, for example, has hosted policy forums with its experts to advocate policy. In October

2017, the Brookings Institute hosted an event “Middle East Crises and Conflicts – The

Way Ahead.” The event consisted of a discussion between John R. Allen, President of the

Brookings Institute and three experts in Middle Eastern politics who advanced ideas for 27 reconciling the power vacuum left by the defeat of the Islamic State, the Iranian threat, and peace prospects in the region (Brookings, 2017). A second type of event that think tanks may host, intended to boost the profile of an institution, are international conferences that bring world leaders and policy makers together to discuss policy. In

February 2021, the Brookings Institute hosted an international policy conference on the status of the Middle East in light of changing alliances and new peace deals in the region.

The conference consisted of speeches, testimony, and panel discussions from participants than included King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Barham Salih of Iraq, Leader of the

Opposition Yair Lapid of Israel, and former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad of the

Palestinian National Authority (Brookings, 2021).

Chapter 2: Israeli Security Policy

As the focus of this thesis is on Israeli security studies and Israeli epistemic communities, this chapter will outline security policy in Israel, the key players in the policy formation process, as well as Israel’s tumultuous history and unique circumstances that define its security paradigm. Responding to the realities of the region where Israel finds itself and its history, Israel has developed a security doctrine primarily based on deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory (Eisenkot & Siboni, 2019, pp. 34-37). To that end, Israel uses its military and intelligence establishments to project strength as well as to deter and identify planned attacks by its enemies. Should deterrence fail, in the view of Israel’s statecraft elite, the state’s very survival is dependent on clear and decisive victories over its adversaries (Dror, 2011). As an additional form of deterrence, Israel has adopted the policy of disproportionate response in order to dissuade enemies from future attacks (Ben-Israel & Paikowsky, 2017, p. 154; Freilich, 2006, p. 659). This strategy is a gamble as it risks being perceived by the international community as excessive force. A relatively recent example of Israel’s military response drawing ire from the international community is illustrated by the community’s response to the 2009 Israel-Gaza War

(Operation Cast Lead). Numerous Israeli leaders, including the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Tzipi Livni, were threatened with arrest warrants by judges in the European

Union purporting that Israeli leaders had failed to apply the principles of proportionality in its response to rockets fired by Hamas against Israeli civilians (Zinman & Azoulay,

2011; Bob, 2015).

The central component to Israel’s deterrence is its strong and well-funded defense establishment (Lissak, 1983). As of 2019, Israel spends 5.3% of its $395.1 billion GDP 29 on defense, a percentage greater than that of the United States (3.4%), Russia (3.9%),

China (1.9%), and Iran (2.3%) (SIPRI, 2020). Though the Zionist dream of establishing a

Jewish state in the ancient homeland of the Jewish people was realized just seventy-three years ago, Israel has faced an array of security challenges. One chapter cannot adequately address and analyze every event that has affected security policy; nor is that within the purview of this thesis. However, a brief overview of several of the key events that shaped

Israel’s security paradigm from its establishment until its disengagement from Lebanon in 1985 is in order.

After declaring independence on 14 May 1948, Israel was immediately attacked by its neighbors, Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi-Arabia, and Yemen

(Morris, 2009). The newly established Jewish state survived the attack, having successfully repelled the belligerent armies beyond its borders. Though the war was won, it was only the first of many. Israel emerged from the war understanding that losing any war would put its very existence at stake (Dror, 2011). This realization emphasized the need to develop what would become Israel’s security grand strategy.

Drawing on a constructivist understanding of security, Israel and its policy makers perceive the Jewish state as existing in a constant state of existential conflict (Paikowsky

Interview, 2020). This constructivist narrative originates from the Jewish people’s millennia long history of persecution that includes the 1492 Spanish Inquisition (P�rez,

2005, p. 1), the Pale of Settlement under the Russian Empire from 1791-1915 (Geraci,

2019, pp. 778, 791), and more recently, the Holocaust which resulted in the genocide of more than six-million Jews in Europe (Schalli�, et. al, 2020, p. 83). The lack of a lasting peace between Israel and most of the Arab states coupled with the ongoing Israeli- 30

Palestinian conflict has perpetuated the narrative of insecurity (Sucharov, 2005). From its establishment in 1948 until its territorial expansion in 1967, Israel lacked the strategic

depth to absorb an enemy first strike which Figure 1 led Israeli strategists and Israel’s first prime Territories Occupied by Israel in 1967 minister, David Ben-Gurion, to conclude that (Source:mideastweb.org/israelafter1967. in any future conflict, Israel must bring the html) battle to the enemy, away from its own

borders (Horowitz, 1983, p. 20). Prior to

1967, much of Israel’s civilian population

was within miles of the armistice line.

Jerusalem, Israel’s capital, was divided and

directly bordered Jordan, a state still legally

at war with Israel, while urban centers such

as Tel-Aviv were situated on a coastal plain

along the Mediterranean Sea no more than

fifteen miles from the armistice line (Allon,

1976). Israel would not obtain strategic depth (Source:mideastweb.org/israelafter1967.html) until its victory in the 1967 Six Day War

(Horowitz, 1983, p.20).

The Six Day War

In June 1967, fearing imminent attack from the surrounding Arab states, the defense establishment convinced Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to authorize a surprise 31 attack on Egyptian airfields where their fighter jets and bombers had been deployed. The attack resulted in the near total destruction of the Egyptian Air Force and guaranteed

Israeli air superiority for the duration of the conflict (Parker, 1996). Israel won the war and seized territorial control over the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the

Golan Heights from Syria, as well as Judea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem from Jordan, thereby insulating Israel and its civilian population from the enemy states (Parker, 1996).

Deterrence has been Israel’s strongest defense mechanism, however, it failed to prevent the onslaught of war in 1967. Israel cited multiple casus belli to justify its preemptive strike that signaled the start of the Six Day War. Among them were the Egyptian blockade of Straits of Tiran, the formation of a joint Egyptian-Jordanian military command in Amman, the buildup of Egyptian forces along Israel’s border in the Sinai

Peninsula, and the increased cross-border terror attacks and infiltrations (Horowitz, 1983, pp. 21-22). During the war, the necessity of strategic depth was reinforced when Syrian troops in the Golan Heights initiated assaults against Israeli civilians living in communities along the Sea of Galilee (Allon, 1976). Capturing the Golan Heights from

Syria provided Israeli civilians in the north with a buffer, just as the Sinai Peninsula provided the same for civilians in the south of the country. These newly acquired buffers would again prove their worth and the importance of strategic depth in Israel’s next war, six years later.

Yom Kippur War

On Yom Kippur 1973, the holiest day in Judaism and a day in which most of the

Israeli soldiers were praying in synagogues or on leave with their families, a coalition of

Arab states led by Egypt and Syria crossed the cease fire lines in the Sinai Peninsula and 32

Golan Heights, reigniting direct conflict between Israel and the Arabs (Siniver, 2013).

The attack came as a complete surprise not only to Israel, but also to its primary backer the United States (Penney, 2012). Declassified memoranda and intelligence reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated that both Israel and the United States erroneously concluded that the Egyptian and Syrian mobilization of forces was posturing and that there was no risk of an eminent attack (Colby, 1973). Despite the catastrophic intelligence failure, Israel’s expanded borders afforded it sufficient strategic depth to ward off the invading armies well before they were able to reach civilian population centers in Israel proper (Siniver, 2013). Within three days, Israel pushed the fronts back to the 1967 armistice lines, successfully recapturing the Suez Canal and entering deeper into Egyptian and Syrian territory (Siniver, 2013). Demonstrating its resolve, Israel advanced on the Syrian capital of Damascus before withdrawing its forces from Syrian territory under a UN brokered cease fire (Nyren, 2012).

The 1973 intelligence failure continues to weigh heavily on the conscience of

Israeli policy makers and is a frequent subject of study among Israeli security studies scholars as will be discussed in chapter 4 (Zellman Interview, 2020). Beyond its implications on the study of intelligence, the Yom Kippur War solidified Israel’s position as the dominant military force in the region, a prestige previously bestowed upon the

Egyptians who now stood defeated in five separate wars against Israel (Horowitz, 1983, p. 31). Prior to the cease fire, Israel was on track to take Damascus and to advance further into Egypt beyond the city of Suez (Nyren, 2012).

This massive demonstration of force on the part of Israel contributed in part to

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s decision to capitulate to the reality of a Jewish state 33 that could not be eliminated and his decision to travel to Israel to seek a lasting peace

(Kober, 2002). Sadat’s peace initiative initially took policy makers in Israel and the

United States by shock (Steinberg & Rubinovitz, 2019). Departing from the previous three decades of an Egypt-led anti-Israel pact eliminated the prospects of a two-front war and led to a radical revaluation of the Israeli security paradigm (Kober, 2002; Horowitz,

1983, p. 32). The 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty resulted in a multiphasic Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the creation of a multinational peace keeping force to observe and enforce the demilitarization of the territory returned to Egypt

(Steinberg & Rubinovitz, 2019). Peace with Egypt exemplifies the effectiveness of

Israel’s maximum deterrence policy. Mezhrahid (2014) explains Egypt’s calculation to make peace with Israel through the lens of game theory vis-à-vis the complex rivalry that existed between Israel and Egypt that ultimately lead Sadat to the realization that peace would be more beneficial than war.

First Lebanon War and the PLO

Though peace with Egypt ushered a period of calm on the southern frontier, tension along Israel’s northern border intensified as Israel’s clashes with the Palestinian

Liberation Organization (PLO) intensified (Rubin, 1994). Since its inception in 1964, the

PLO was dedicated to the armed resistance against the presence of a Jewish state in Eretz

Israel (Lybarger, 2012). Following Israel’s victory in the Six Day War, Yasser Arafat’s

Fatah faction took over the PLO and increased its attacks against Israeli civilian targets

(Lybarger, 2012). A consequential ramification of Israel’s territorial gains following the

Six Day War was its assumption of responsibility for the over one million Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip (Ennab, 1994). Managing the territory 34 and its inhabitants in what would become the longest military occupation in modern history has been and will continue to be a subject of frequent debate amongst Israel’s policy elite (Hajjar, 2005).

Following the PLO’s failed 1970 coup against Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, the

PLO found refuge in Lebanon where an estimated 400,000 Palestinian refugees from the

1948 war and their descendants were already living (James, 1983). From their base in southern Lebanon, the PLO orchestrated and executed cross border terror attacks against

Israeli civilians (Rubin, 1994). In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon as the country’s growing Muslim population rejected the disproportionate power held by the Maronite

Christian population (James, 1983). The civil war significantly weakened the Lebanese state which was growing further incapable of containing the PLO. On 14 March 1978, the deteriorating situation led Israel to invade southern Lebanon with the objective of expelling the PLO (Dror, 2011). A UN brokered ceasefire along with a Security Council resolution led to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon seven days later; however,

Israel would again invade Lebanon in 1982 in what would become the First Lebanon War

(Sucharov, 2005). The campaign lasted until 1985 at which time Israel determined that its primary objective of expelling the PLO from Lebanon had been achieved (Kay, 2002).

Israel would again invade Lebanon in 2006, this time to fight the Shia Islamist terror organization, Hezbollah (Inbar, 2007).

Lessons Learned

Israel has emerged from each war with a renewed understanding of the existential reality it faces. Due to wavering international support, as demonstrated by Israel’s isolation following the Six Day War and the reluctance of allies to come to Israel’s aide 35 during the Yom Kippur War, Israel has gained a deep appreciation of the need for self- sufficiency which it has achieved in many fields (Inbar, 2014; Cohen & Freilich, 2018).

Intelligence is perhaps the field in which it has succeeded in this endeavor the most.

Israel has the infrastructure and the technical know-how to develop its own technology used in signal intelligence (Cordey, 2019). Additionally, Israel has been crafting and perfecting its human intelligence program since before the state’s establishment

(Pedahzur, 2010). Outside of intelligence, however, the reality is that Israel remains heavily dependent on the United States for security support, be it in the form of security aid packages, now totaling $38 Billion (S. 2497, 2018), or in the form of political support in the international forum (Arian et. al, 2018; Dvor, 2011). Israel’s intelligence capacity serves the dual purpose of deterring threats due to its long reach in addition to providing the state with early warnings that conflict is near. By maintaining intelligence autonomy, the state is not beholden to share its motives or intentions with any other actors, enemies and allies alike (Dror, 2011).

Though this chapter focuses primarily on Israeli security policy and events that have shaped it, it is important to recognize that no state, no matter how unique its circumstances, exists in a vacuum. Despite this fact, Israeli security studies scholars and practitioners seem to pay little attention to events outside their own borders. This is evident in the lack of comparative analysis in academic programs as well as the strict regional focus employed in Israeli security think tanks. These factors will be further explained and analyzed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The lack of outward attention is owed in part to Israel’s longstanding belief that its existence is exceptional and constantly at threat (Zellman Interview, 2021). Nevertheless, the failure to adequately review the 36 experiences of other states has contributed to Israel’s lack of a grand strategy or long- term security plan.

Shaping Security Policy

Security policy in Israel is predominantly shaped by the statecraft elite that exist within the bureaucracy consisting of the Mossad, Shabak, the military, and to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Eiran Interview, 2020). The bureaucracy is a far tighter knit circle than its American counterpart. Generally, bureaucrats do not enter and exit government positions in the same revolving door manner as they do in the United

States (Paikowsky Interview, 2020). One explanation offered for this phenomenon by

Ehud Eiran (Interview, 2020), an expert in maritime security and the founding director of the Haifa Research Center for Maritime Strategy (HMS), is that because Israel sees itself as existing in a perpetual state of war, it seeks to consolidate the decision-making process and avoid overburdening it with too many voices that too frequently change. Similarly, one observes a distinct lack of political appointees within the Israeli bureaucracy; most of its members are career civil servants. Those political appointees who serve at the top of their agencies are almost always selected from within the agency and there is an expectation that the prime minister will appoint the previously identified heir apparent

(Eiran Interview, 2020).

A ramification of the bureaucracy’s tight grasp on security policy has been that the public is largely excluded from the policy making process. The public has accepted this reality because, ostensibly, the existing process is perceived to be working (Eiran

Interview, 2020). A detractor of this system, however, is that it has left Israel with an outdated grand strategy (Goren, forthcoming). Security and foreign policy in Israel are 37 not long-term oriented. Israeli policy makers accept this ad-hoc approach due to the belief that Israel’s situation is unique and too dynamic for a static strategy (Goren Interview,

2020). This thinking is not without credence as the threats change almost daily. Israel faces a diverse array of threats ranging from those from non-state actors such as Hamas in the south (Levitt, 2007) and Hezbollah in the north (Levitt, 2013) to those emanating from states like Iran (O'Balance, 1997). What little does exist in Israel by way of grand strategy, comes from a dated security doctrine (Goren, forthcoming).

Origins of Israel’s Security Grand Strategy

Dmitry Shumsky (2018) traces Israel’s “strategic thinking” to the early works of

Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founder of the Israeli right-wing. Jabotinsky, writing two decades prior to the establishment of the state, analyzed the security challenges facing the Jewish community in Eretz Israel, namely the threat that amounted from the growing tensions between the Arab and Jewish communities. Jabotinsky hoped for a peaceful resolution to the Jewish-Arab conflict in Eretz Israel; however, he predicted that it was, for the time being, impossible (Jabotinsky, 1923). Jabotinsky dismissed those within his own community who thought that they could deceive the Arabs in Eretz Israel by masking the

Zionist objectives of achieving a Jewish majority within the territory (Jabotinsky, 1923).

To Jabotinsky, the only way to ensure victory over the Arabs who sought to stifle Jewish

Aliyah, a core component of Zionism, was to build a metaphoric iron wall crafted not as a physical barrier, but rather from the strength and resolve of the Jewish people to build and protect their homeland. Jabotinsky (1923) contended that the strength of the iron wall would eventually dissuade the Arab states and Arab inhabitants of Eretz Israel from seeking to undermine Jewish sovereignty in the land, eventually leading to a peaceful 38 mutual recognition. Ben-Israel and Paikowsky (2017, p. 153), however, illustrate

Jabotinsky’s failure to articulate specific policies geared towards achieving this this ideal.

In the years immediately preceding the establishment of the state, Jabotinsky’s strategic conceptualization gained renewed traction. The political right, then lead by

Menachem Begin, Jabotinsky’s protegee who would later serve as Israel’s sixth prime minister some thirty years later, was still a marginal minority. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky’s iron wall strategy was adopted by David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the political left who served as Chairman of the Provisional State Council and as Israel’s first prime minister

(Shumsky, 2018, p. 172). Ben-Gurion refined the iron wall strategy and created what to this day is Israel’s security grand strategy (Ben-Israel & Paikowsky, 2017, p. 153). Ben-

Gurion’s strategy recognized the severe proportionate disadvantage that existed between

Israel and its Arab adversaries in the realms of geographic size, population and GDP.

Israel responded to this reality by creating a highly centralized and powerful security establishment based on a triad of deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory (Meridor

& Eldadi, 2019, pp. 11-12). Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine served the state well for many decades; however, it was never formally transcribed or updated until well into the twenty-first century.

Updating Israel’s Grand Strategy

Beginning in the late 1990s, largely in response to changes in threats, targets, and technology, an effort was made to formalize and update Israel’s security grand strategy.

In 1998, Major General David Ivri was tasked by the Minister of Defense, Yitzhak

Mordechai, to establish a committee for this very purpose (Meridor & Eldadi, 2019, p.

13). The committee ultimately failed and was unable to produce a coherent document due 39 to internal disputes amongst the committee members (Nagel & Schanzer, 2019, p. 4). In

2004, a renewed attempt at updating Israel’s security strategy was initiated under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (Meridor &

Eldadi, 2019, p. 13). This effort resulted in the creation of a new committee headed by

Dan Meridor comprised primarily of members of the security establishment (IDF,

Mossad, Shabak, Ministry of Defense) as well as a number of representatives from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the private defense industry, and for the first time, academia

(Meridor & Eldadi, 2019, pp. 65-66). The Meridor committee generated a 250-page classified report that was presented to the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and heads of the security agencies. The Meridor report brought attention to modern day challenges that did not exist when Ben-Gurion first drafted the state’s security strategy.

Chief among the new threats discussed in the Meridor report was the rise of terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons. Terrorism was not a new concept to

Israeli policy makers, who, at the time of the Meridor report, had witnessed two

Palestinian uprisings, commonly referenced by the Arabic term “intifada” as well as the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza (Shalev, 2019; Levitt, 2013; Levitt,

2007). What had changed were the tactics and the level of coordination and sophistication employed by these terror groups (Meridor & Eldadi, 2019, pp. 31-33). To address these concerns, the Meridor committee suggested a multidimensional approach focusing on tearing down the organizations’ infrastructure, bolstering civilian defense, and addressing the sociopolitical factors that motivate terrorism (Meridor & Eldadi, 2019, p. 32).

Regarding the threat posed by non-conventional weapons, meant to include their use by state and non-state actors alike, little is known about the state’s strategy to address these 40 threats vis-à-vis the grand security strategy due to the highly classified nature of this section of the Meridor report (Nagel & Schanzer, 2019, p. 5).

What little information that is officially available on the state’s approach to non- conventional weapons is that it is based on the existing strategies of maximum deterrence, employing sound intelligence to foil attacks before they can occur, and on shielding the civilian population to the extent possible in instances where deterrence and early warnings fail (Bar, 2020). The discussion and significant emphasis placed on the prospect of a nuclearized Middle East was an especially relevant update given indications that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program (Dvor, 2011).

Regarding Israel’s own nuclear capabilities, even less is publicly known. Cohen

(1998, p. 1) asserts that Israel maintained a functional nuclear arsenal as early as 1967, before the Six-Day War. The state’s official position has been to remain intentionally ambiguous on the nature of its nuclear program (Bar, 2020). Israeli Prime Ministers from

Levi Eshkol to Binyamin Netanyahu have publicly stated their intention not to be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East (Netanyahu, 2011; Kissinger,

1969). The term “introduce” is also intentionally ambiguous as it does not state that Israel will not be the first state in the region to possess nuclear weapons. “Introduce” in this case is better understood to mean “deploy”. Israel is well aware that its allies and enemies alike suspect it of possessing nuclear weapons (Kissinger, 1969).

The policy of nuclear ambiguity raised tensions, even with Israel’s closest ally, the United States. A series of letters exchanged between President Johnson and Prime

Minister Eshkol in March and April of 1964 regarding Israel’s secret nuclear facilities in

Dimona exemplify this point. In one such letter, dated 19 March 1964, Johnson asks 41

Israel to give its assurances to Egypt that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program in

Dimona (Johnson, 1964). Israel, however, was not interested in reassuring Egypt or any of its other adversaries. The Iron Wall strategy called for maximum deterrence and nuclear deterrence was by far the most superior form. Eshkol clarifies Israel’s position in a letter to Johnson, writing

In view of our excessive vulnerability- the paucity of airfields and the density of

population within a very small geographical area- the danger of sudden attack is

ever present. The US commitment to halt aggression cannot in itself remove this

danger. It is our conviction that the only way to prevent war is for President

Nasser to know that Israel possesses adequate deterrent capacity (Eshkol, 1964).

Israel’s nuclear strategy employs a form of game theory, utilizing the handicap principle developed by Amotz Zahavi (1999). Ben-Israel and Paikowsky (2017) describe how Israel’s nuclear program represents a costly signal to its adversaries of the sincerity of its resolve. By developing a nuclear program, only the sixth country to do so, Israel endured a heavy cost and security burden while joining an elite group of the world’s super powers, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,

France, and China who already possessed a nuclear arsenal (Cohen, 1999, p. 1). Though

Israel has fought many wars since the beginning of its nuclear program, it has relied only on conventional weapons to achieve victory (Levite, 2020). Israel’s nuclear program has helped further the security strategy and has likely dissuaded Israel’s enemies from attacking and may even have caused some to pursue peace. The peace agreements with

Egypt (1979), Jordan (1994), the United Arab Emirates (2020), and Bahrain (2020) promise to contribute to Israel’s perceptions of security in the region. 42

With the proliferation of peace agreements in the Middle East region, Israel has been able to turn aspects of its security and foreign policy agenda across the sea, forming new alliances in the eastern Mediterranean (Rubin Interview, 2021). The discovery of over one trillion cubic meters of natural gas between 1999 and 2012 off the Israeli coast has created new avenues for cooperation with Greece and Cyprus (Teff-Seker et. al,

2018, p. 617). According to Aviad Rubin (Interview, 2021), an expert on maritime policy at the University of Haifa, Israel’s agreement to link its gas fields with Greece and

Cyprus via undersea pipeline allows Israel to form closer economic and security ties with these two democratic like-minded member states of the European Union. Beyond the economic implications, such alliances allow Israel to distance itself in the eyes of the international community from the war-torn Middle East, painting itself instead as a member of the eastern Mediterranean (Rubin Interview, 2021). This policy is contingent, however, on avoiding a conflict with Lebanon over the boundaries of each states’ economic exclusive zone and their respective claims to the natural resources (Teff-Seker et. al, 2018, p. 621). Provided Israel can avoid being drawn into a new Middle Eastern conflict over the newly discovered gas, the state is positioned to enhance its security through economic integration with its new allies in the eastern Mediterranean. 43

Chapter 3: Security Studies and Academia in Israel

This chapter will serve two purposes. First, it seeks to explain Israeli academia and its institutional structure to foreign audiences. Second, this chapter describes the

Israeli approach to security studies, its origins, and its composition. These features are essential to understanding epistemic communities as the academic community itself constitutes an epistemic community. The importance of studying Israeli academia and its institutional structure is additionally relevant due to the fact that security studies scholars and practitioners alike are trained under the auspices of these institutions. The academe is responsible for training the field’s future generations.

Israeli Academia is highly institutionalized and time tested. At the end of the 20th century, Israel ranked seventh in the world for number of students entering post- secondary education, and second, only behind the United States, in proportion of GDP spent on higher education (Limor, 1999). The Higher Education Law (1958) established the Council for Higher Education (CHE) as the independent body responsible for accrediting and governing institutions of higher education in Israel. The CHE recognizes eight universities in Israel, which are distinct from other Israeli institutions of higher education in that they are accredited to offer PhDs. Other institutions exist and are accredited by the CHE to confer master’s and bachelor’s degrees; however, the CHE categorizes these institutions as colleges rather than Universities (Soffer Interview, 2021).

Table 1 represents the number of students enrolled in each of Israel’s eight recognized universities by degree. Tel-Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem have the highest number of total enrolled students whereas the Weizmann Institute of Science has the least, largely due to an absence of any undergraduate degree programs.

Table 1

Enrolment at Israeli Universities 2021-20211

Institution Doctorate Master's Bachelor's Total Degree Degree Degree Enrolment Hebrew University 2,338 6,323 12,081 20,742 Technion 1,158 3,243 9,381 13,782

Tel-Aviv University 2,143 8,955 15,285 26,383 Bar-Ilan University 2,018 6,573 8,917 17,508 Haifa University 1,576 7,826 7,858 17,260 Ben-Gurion Univ. of the Negev 1,683 4,028 12,005 17,716 Weizmann Institute of Science 725 474 0 1,199 Ariel University 317 1,181 10,751 12,249

A unique characteristic of these eight universities recognized by the CHE is that they are all public institutions (Rubinovitz Interview, 2021). The Interdisciplinary Center

Herzliya is set to become Israel’s first accredited private university and has already begun offering PhDs in select fields; however, its final status with the CHE is still under negotiation as the state debates how to handle the introduction of a private university into its existing structure (Magen, 2020). Ariel University’s status has also been contested based on its physical location in Samaria, outside of Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Ariel

University’s status was upgraded from a college to university in 2012 under the auspices of the Council for Higher Education in Judea and Samaria (CHEJS) over the objections of the CHE (Bob et. al, 2012). The debate over Ariel University’s status was largely put to rest in 2018 when the Knesset voted to transfer oversight authority from the CHEJS to the CHE, solidifying Ariel University’s status as Israel’s eighth nationally accredited university (Lazaroff, 2018).

1 (Council for Higher Education, 2020) 45

Faculty at Israeli universities are unionized, and their rank and promotion structure closely adhere to the European model. Salary negotiations at Israel’s eight public universities are handled through a uniform collective bargaining process (Rubin

Interview, 2021). The fact that, with few exceptions, faculty earn the same wage regardless of the institution eliminates the phenomenon of faculty constantly job searching and the subsequent transfer of faculty between institutions to earn higher pay that is frequently exhibited amongst American faculty (Sandler Interview, 2021). Though

Israeli society overall is less formal than American or European societies, academia remains one realm with a strict hierarchy where position and title carry great weight

(Ben-Porath Interview, 2021). The title “professor” is not afforded as a courtesy title to all instructors at a university as in the case in the United States. An entry level instructor begins his or her career as a “lecturer”, the equivalent of an assistant professor in the

United States. Upon promotion and receiving tenure, lecturers are promoted to “senior lecturer”, the equivalent to an American associate professor. Junior faculty are generally considered for promotion and tenure after four to seven years (Rubinovitz Interview,

2021). Promotion is based largely on faculty members’ publications, particularly in

English and their overall contributions to the field (Inbar Interview, 2021).

Lecturers and senior lecturers are never addressed as professor and are instead addressed as “doctor” for those with doctorate degrees and “mister” or “misses” in the rare cases of faculty without a doctorate degree (Soffer Interview, 2021). Israeli universities utilize an “up or out” system among its lecturers. Those who fail to achieve tenure and promotion are required to leave their positions to create space for more qualified scholars in the competitive Israeli academic job market (Ben-Porath Interview, 46

2021). Unlike the American system which utilizes three tiers, the Israeli system, based on the European model, has a fourth tier (BGU, n.d.). Senior lectures seek promotion to the rank of “associate professor” before they are eligible for promotion to “full professor”

(Rubinovitz Interview, 2021). At times, the four-tier system creates professional difficulties for Israeli faculty when they are engaging with their American colleagues at conferences and other forums.

The Israeli Approach to Security Studies

Security studies, as an academic field of inquiry, is approached differently in

Israel than it is in the United States. Traditionally, rather than being driven by empirical questions, Israeli security studies is more often descriptive of reality and history, and therefore more closely resembles the British model which is influenced heavily by military history (Zellman Interview, 2020). The Israeli model of research may appear effective in describing the military command structure; however, according to my review of Israeli academia and interviews, the result of this research is heavy on normative judgments and lighter on empirical research (Zellman Interview, 2020). The Israeli approach to security studies has been lauded for its detailed description of battles and events; however, conversely, it has been criticized for failing to explain how and why

Israeli military leaders think and act in the ways that they do (Paikowsky Interview,

2020).

This description of Israeli security studies is not meant to discredit the field or

Israeli academe at-large as a-theoretical; rather, it serves to describe the more qualitative analytical approach employed by Israeli scholars (Rosenhek et. al, 2003, p. 473). A negative outcome to this approach, however, is that it is difficult for Israeli scholars to 47 publish in American academic journals which place value and emphasis on empirical research. This has created hardship for many academics who are evaluated and promoted largely based on the number of pieces published in main-stream English language journals (Rosenhek et. al, 2003, p. 470; Zellman Interview, 2020; Sandler Interview,

2020). Publishing on Israeli military and security related events is further hampered by the fact that it is uncommon for military leaders to write auto-biographies or to explain their motivation and reasoning, thus depriving scholars of crucial insight into the mindset of the leaders who make the decisions that they seek to study (Paikowsky Interview,

2020).

Programs and courses oriented specifically on security studies are new to Israeli universities. Traditionally, security has been and remains a major component of courses in adjacent fields (Eiran Interview, 2020). A course on Israeli Foreign Policy in the department of Political Science, or a course on Middle East History in the department of

History, for example, would incorporate security-related topics. A standard course would address these issues chronologically, going from one war to the next (Eiran Interview,

2020). From the onset of security studies in Israel, the intelligence failure leading up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War has been the most widely studied subject in the field amongst

Israeli scholars (Zellman Interview, 2020). Eiran (Interview, 2020) however, asserts that deterrence will eclipse the Yom Kippur War as scholars seek to address present issues, namely the growing tensions in the region and the threat of a nuclear armed Iran.

These new threats -coupled with the slowly growing role for civilian consultation- are catalyzing a growth within the field that has led to a proliferation of new programs of study specifically in security studies, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels (Inbar 48

Interview, 2020; Sandler Interview, 2020). Noteworthy about these new programs are that they are primarily offered in English (Sandler Interview, 2020). Universities compete for international recognition and prestige. Part of this evaluation is calculated by the number of courses offered in English (Sandler Interview, 2020). Therefore, universities are incentivized to offer courses in English which also serve to attract a greater pool of students from abroad who otherwise would be unable to complete programs in Israel offered in Hebrew. Though at times the anglicization of Israeli academia has been met with resistance, it is widely understood that competence in the English language is a necessary skill for native Israelis to succeed in their future careers (Shohamy, 2014, p. 9;

Kheimets & Epstein, 2001, p. 208).

Recognizing that most graduate as well as a number of undergraduate students work full-time in addition to their studies, courses in a particular field are all typically offered one day of the week (Zellman Interview, 2020). Often students will select a university of study based on the day of the week that they are able to request off from their full-time jobs (Zellman Interview, 2020). Bar-Ilan University, for example, offers the majority of their political science courses on Wednesday versus the University of

Haifa which offers their courses on Monday. The typical structure for these courses consists of the instructor lecturing for the first three-quarters of each class session, reserving the final quarter to provide his or her personal commentary and opinion on the subject and to open a broader discourse with the students in what might resemble a more seminar style discussion to American readers (Zellman Interview, 2020). Beyond the unique structure of courses, Ziv Rubinovitz (Interview 2021) indicated that another major difference between a security studies course taught in the Israel versus the United States 49 is the composition of the final grade. In the United States, it is typical to have the final grade comprised of several assignments, perhaps of varying weights. Rubinovitz

(Interview 2021) and my review of Israeli syllabi indicate that the same does not hold true in Israeli courses which most often have final grades determined by a single final paper or final exam at the end of the term.

Courses in Security Studies Programs

Security studies programs, though often designed to attract foreign students, are highly centered around Israeli and Middle East security topics. At the master’s level, required courses in research methods, strategic thought, and approaches to political science make up the foundation that later courses build on. The core curriculum often includes global-scale courses on national security, law and ethics, and globalization. Most programs’ core curricula require additional regional context specific courses emphasizing topics such as International Law and the Middle East Conflict, Israeli security doctrine, and the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition to a prescribed core, students are generally afforded the opportunity to pursue electives tailored to their particular interests.

These electives are often a mix of broadly applicable courses in security studies on topics such as great power competition, cyber warfare, and the future of war, as well as courses more narrowly focused on Israel and the Middle East, covering topics such as the security conceptualization of the Arab states and Iran, Jewish international politics, and courses on Middle Eastern terror groups. Table 2 showcases the curriculum from three MA programs, two of which, the University of Haifa and Tel-Aviv University, are public institutions, and the final, from the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, is private institution. 50

As the first chapter indicated, the scope of security studies as a field is not defined in absolutes. Identifying security studies courses for this section was determined based on the course of study for security studies programs at the referenced institutions.

Identifying courses through this approach gives voice to the Israeli conceptualization of security studies which may include more elements of foreign relations than may be expected and may exclude other notions of security that are more accepted in the

American context. As discussed in chapter 2, the Israeli notions of security and foreign policy are tightly intertwined. It is worth mentioning that many institutions that offer programs of study in security studies also offer programs in conflict and peace management, a field that encompasses more elements of human security than the more narrowly focused national security approach of Israeli security studies. 51

Table 2

Selection of Security Studies Curricula

University of Haifa Tel-Aviv University Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya MA National Security Studies* MA Security and Diplomacy Studies† MA Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security‡ Approaches to Political Science History of Modern Strategic Thought Research Methods The National Security of Israel Issues in International Relations Workshop in Decision Making National Security: The Practitioners' Modern Diplomacy MA Seminar Perspective Political Economy in the Global Age Data Science and Information Technologies Law and Ethics in the Decision Making International Law and the Middle East Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Process in National Security Conflict Management of geopolitical risks and Israel's Strategic Doctrine opportunities in a global world The History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Core/Required The Evolution of War: The information and Core/Required Research Methods Core/Required Cyber Age Intelligence and National Security

War and Peace: Great Powers, States and The Future of War Formal and Informal Terrorist Actors Nations in the World and the Middle East The National Security Concepts of the Arab Insurgencies and Civil Wars The Management of Economic Statecraft States and Iran Psychological Aspects of Terrorism Managing the Democratic State: Dilemmas Terror, Counter-Terrorism and Moral Hezbollah - A Hybrid Terrorist Organization of Policy and Security Dilemmas Online Terrorism China's Foreign Policy and National Terrorism and Profiling Security Terrorism Fundraising Jewish International Politics Post Modern Terrorism Global Migration Challenges and Dilemmas Electives Electives Electives Introduction to Homeland Security Counter-Terrorism Issues and Challenges Strategy and the Terrorism Threat National Security Strategy and Deterrence Intelligence in the New Era Dilemmas in Counter-Terrorism Legal Dilemmas in Counter-Terrorism

*University of Haifa International School (2012) †Tel-Aviv University (n.d.) ‡IDC Herzliya (2020) 52

Textbooks and Course Materials

As part of this thesis, a brief review of syllabi from security studies courses across multiple institutions was conducted. These syllabi, which are included in Appendix B, demonstrated the breadth of material covered in Security Studies programs. Many of the foundational texts that American scholars are familiar with are included in introductory level courses. Stephen Walt, whose work has been referenced in this thesis, introduces

Israeli students, like American students, to the broader field of international relations, of which Security Studies is ostensibly a part. Henry Kissinger’s contributions to the Realist school of thought and strategies for international crisis management also would be familiar to American audiences. Emanuel Adler’s work on deterrence, also cited in this thesis, is also counted among the standard texts borrowed from American security studies. As courses move into more advanced topics, however, the focus narrows to a more Israel-centric approach.

Among the more influential Israeli scholars and scholars writing on Israel assigned to security studies in Israel are the works of Efraim Inbar, who was interviewed for this thesis, Michael Oren, former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, and

Kenneth Walt, whose suggestion that Iran be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons in order to provide a nuclear counterbalance in the Middle East is so disconcerting, that American audiences may be familiar with it. The inclusion of Walt in a required reading list demonstrates the breadth of scholarship that Israeli students are exposed to, including work that is antithetical towards the state’s position on its own security.

The overall composition of the course material is dependent on the nature of the course. Introductory courses tend to start with the pinnacle studies and scholarship in the

53 field that transverse state-specific issues, such as the works referenced above, before moving into issues directly relevant to Israel. For example, the Interdisciplinary Center at

Herzliya (IDC)’s course “Deterrence” is divided into themes. The introductory themes

“Strategic Studies: Theoretical Discipline and Practical Tool”, “Deterrence: Basic

Terminology and Classical Vocabulary”, “Evolution of Deterrence Theory and Practice”, and “Cognitive, Emotional, Cultural and Structural Limits of Deterrence” are broad in their focus, drawing heavily on the experience of the great powers during the Cold War.

The subsequent themes, “Deterrence: The Case of Israel”, “Terror and Asymmetrical

Warfare”, “Revolution in Conventional Warfare: Deterrence, Prevention and

Preemption”, “Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, “Alternative Strategic Futures:

Deterring a Nuclear Armed Iran”, cover topics that are widely applicable, but with examples and case studies of issues that directly impact Israel and the Middle East.

Beyond introductory courses to the general theme of security studies and its subfields, included in the programs of study are courses entirely geared towards the

Israeli security paradigm. Such courses include “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, “Israel’s

Strategic Doctrine”, and “Hezbollah- A Hybrid Terrorist Organization”. These courses do include material from American and other non-Israeli scholars; however, their focus is entirely geared toward the region or state-specific objectives of the course. These Israeli and region-specific courses are more apt to be offered in Hebrew in addition to English.

Material covered in the Hebrew version of the course closely mirrors that of English language courses, except that English language literature is replaced or supplemented with scholarship published in Hebrew when possible.

Profile of Security Studies Students

Israel’s complex security paradigm interests many students who enter security studies programs at Israeli universities. These students may go on to work in the civil service, joining the inner circle of policy makers, or they may begin careers in academia, joining the ever-growing epistemic security network in Israel. These students are the future of Israel’s security apparatus, regardless of if their work is done inside or outside of government. Understanding their motives and objectives will help gauge the future trajectory of the field.

Due to mandatory conscription in Israel, many domestic students enter the classroom already equipped with multiple years of first-hand experience in applied security. Undergraduate students, typically at least twenty-one years old, have become increasingly political (Zellman Interview, 2020). This development is in line with the general public in Israel which too has become highly political and has moved to the right of the political spectrum (Del Sarto, 2017; Leslie, 2017, p. 80). These students are motivated by the political climate; however, they often fail to apply principles learned in the classroom beyond the Israeli context (Zellman Interview, 2020). One such example could be in explaining just-war doctrine and casus belli.

Though Israeli undergraduate students studying security studies would be eager to discuss and apply these topics within the Israeli context, for example in the case of the

2014 Operation Protective Edge or the Six-Day war of 1967, their interest quickly diminishes when trying to apply these concepts to events outside the Israeli context, for example in studying World War I or the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War (Zellman Interview,

2020). An additional complicating factor for these students is the predominance of

English language publications on Security Studies. At the undergraduate level, not all readings can be completed in Hebrew; however, the foundational texts and theories in international relations and scholarly work on regions other than Israel still appear exclusively in English which poses a challenge for students who are not accustomed to studying or reading high level English (Rubinovitz Interview, 2021).

At the graduate level, students tend to arrive at their programs of study with a deeper appreciation for the global nature of the field. Many students pursuing an MA with a focus in security studies are those already employed in the government who join these programs to expand their knowledge, advance in their positions, and in order to increase their salaries (Sandler Interview, 2020). The majority of students in the field fall on the conservative end of the political spectrum and subscribe to the Realist school of thought (Inbar Interview, 2020). This is attributable to the significant presence of active practitioners in government. Efraim Inbar (Interview 2021), a professor emeritus at Bar-

Ilan University, retired director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and the founding director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security remarked that despite Israeli academia and its faculty being dominated by the Liberal school of thought, the practitioners that come from government understand that they “cannot daydream about how the world ought to be,” and are therefore more Realist and practical in their world views. Additionally, almost every Israeli student has served in the Israel Defense

Forces, many in combat roles, another factor that contributes the more conservative and

Realist orientation of security studies students (Inbar Interview, 2020).

Doctoral students, unlike MA students, are generally interested in pursuing careers in academia (Rubinovitz Interview, 2021). However, it is not uncommon for

56 current civil servants in government to pursue a PhD purely out of professional interest or in hopes of further advancing their careers (Sandler Interview, 2021). The PhD structure in Israel is different from that in the United States, based closer on the German and boarder European models instead. Under this system it is assumed that students complete their necessary coursework in their MA programs and that they have already completed a research thesis to demonstrate their capacity for individual research (Ben-Porath

Interview, 2021). Therefore, Israeli PhD programs do not typically include any courses, though students may elect to take graduate courses to acquaint themselves with the faculty (Rubinovitz Interview, 2021). During their time in the PhD program, student focus almost exclusively on research. This structure recognizes that students in Israel are generally older given their mandatory service in the Israel Defense Forces and that they likely work full-time and may have families in addition to their academic obligations

(Zellman Interview 2021). This structure allows for students to tend to their outside obligations and to complete their doctoral work at their own pace.

Profile of Security Studies Faculty

Faculty in Security Studies programs in Israel bring to the classroom a diverse range of experiences to the classroom, both academic and professional. Due to the competitive nature of Israeli academic positions and the greater supply of PhD graduates than available academic positions at universities in Israel, great emphasis is paid to candidates’ experience abroad (Rubinovitz Interview, 2021). It is common for doctoral students desiring an academic position to pursue their doctorate degrees abroad in order to showcase their ability to conduct research in English and their ability to forge meaningful connections and partnerships with scholars outside of Israel (Ben-Porath

Interview, 2021). For doctoral students who earn their PhDs from Israeli institutions, it is expected that they complete a post-doctoral appointment for one to three years at a university abroad before returning to Israel to seek an academic position (Rubinovitz

Interview, 2021). In my review of faculty affiliated with security studies, I found this to be the case in all but a few exceptions, namely retired senior officers in the Israel Defense

Forces (IDF) and retired senior civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the intelligence community who pursued their PhDs after a lengthy tenure in government.

Table 3 highlights security studies affiliated faculty based on where they earned their

PhD’s from and number of retired senior IDF officers from two public universities, the

University of Haifa and Tel-Aviv University, as well as from the Interdisciplinary Center at Herzliya, Israel’s only private university.

As indicated in Table 3, it is very possible for graduates from Israeli PhD programs to obtain academic positions at Israeli universities. At the IDC, a majority

(52%) of faculty earned their PhDs in Israel; however, that percentage is significantly less at the University of Haifa (36%), and at Tel-Aviv University (27%). The IDC is an outlier in this trend that is replicated across Israel’s seven public universities and across most disciplines. The IDC is likely an outlier due to its recent recognition as a university and the opening of its first PhD programs in the 2019-2020 academic year (Rubinovitz

Interview, 2021; Zerachovitz, 2018). Prior to its change in status, the IDC was considered a college, which carries with it a different legal and practical implications.

Table 3

Background of Security Studies Affiliated Faculty

Total US UK European Israeli Non- Retired Faculty PhDs PhDs PhDs PhDs PhD Senior IDF Officers University of 14 8 1 0 5 0 1 Haifa* Tel-Aviv 15 3 3 1 4 4 1 University† IDC 25 7 2 1 13 2 2 Herzliya‡

Chapter 4: Security Studies and Israeli Think Tanks

The visionaries of the Israeli state were academics, thinkers, and experts from many different disciplines. Among them were Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, a lexicographer credited with the revival of the Hebrew language (Fellman, 1973), Chaim Weizmann,

Israel’s first president and former professor of organic chemistry (Reinharz, 1985), and

Theodor Herzl, a lawyer by training and the founder of the modern Zionist movement

(Penslar, 2020). The realization of the Zionist dream was only made possible by the combined intellectual efforts of these visionaries. The intellectual heritage of the state continues to present day. Israel has think tanks dedicated to the study of international development, health policy, environmental policy, security policy, economic policy, social policy, scientific advancement, and government transparency (El Din, 2016, p.

191). Think tanks operating in these various fields interact and impact policy to varying degrees. Think tanks overall, expanding beyond security-oriented ones, fall into one of four categories: academic think tanks (belonging to one of Israel’s research universities), partisan affiliated think tanks, independent private think tanks, or public sector state managed think tanks (El Din, 2016, pp. 188-189). The most prominent security think tanks those affiliated with universities. Security think tanks can be better categorized as either academic or policy oriented. The difference between these two will be further elaborated in this section.

Despite Israel’s sixty-nine think tanks, ranked nineteenth in the world and first in the Middle East, the institutions are not as numerous or influential as their American counterparts (McGann, 2020; Goren, forthcoming). Historically, security think tanks have influenced policy the least. The clearest explanation for this is the different strategic

60 culture in Israel. Israel views itself as existing in a constant state of conflict, be it with the

Palestinians or with any one or more of the hostile states in the region (Bar, 2020). This constant state of conflict is a different reality from that of the United States which is bordered by two friendly states to the North and South and two oceans to the East and

West (Paikowsky Interview, 2020). Israel’s security think tanks can be classified as either academic or policy oriented (Eiran Interview, 2020). Academic think tanks primarily serve to contribute to and expand the wealth of knowledge whereas policy-oriented think tanks seek to produce solutions to real-world problems facing policy makers. The advent of security-oriented policy think tanks is a relatively new development in Israel. Until recent, it was unusual for a scholar to try to bridge the divide between academia and policy (Goren, forthcoming).

Because policy-oriented think tanks are a recent advent in the Israeli security realm, they have sought innovative ways to break into the highly guarded policy domain.

A review of think tank heads and researchers as well as information collected during interviews indicated a tendency for think tanks to recruit retired IDF generals in order to utilize their connections with and to gain the ear of the statecraft elite. This feature will be further explored in this chapter in the section profiling think tank scholars as well as in sub-sections that review the work of individual think tanks. An additional method being pursued by policy-oriented think tanks has been to influence public opinion as a means of influencing state behavior. When think tanks are unable to directly influence the policymakers, they may influence public opinion to which the state’s actions are dependent. This is accomplished by participating in interviews on public television channels and with the Israeli media and by publishing policy briefs geared specifically

61 for public consumption which takes a different form than briefs prepared for academic circles or for policymakers (Goren Interview, 2020). This feature too will be explored further in this chapter in sub-sections outlining the work of individual think tanks.

Profile of Think Tank Scholars

The profile of a researcher at an Israeli think tank often depends on whether they are working at a policy oriented or academically oriented think tank. Those pursuing careers in policy-oriented think tanks are typically retired generals, diplomats, and other senior civil servants. These experts rely on their first-hand experience to advise policy makers and share their opinions with the broader public (Eiran Interview, 2020). Several factors drive these retirees to think tanks. Notably, the minimum retirement age in the

Israel Defense Forces is only forty-two years old (Sikuler, 2010). For many of these retired military and other civil servants, there is a psychological drive to continue to feel as if they are making an impact (Eiran Interview, 2020). This is partially exacerbated by the Israeli mindset which places a high degree of emphasis on one’s professional life

(Eiran Interview, 2020).

In addition to retired civil servants, policy-oriented think tanks often host politicians or aspiring politicians who seek to bolster their credibility in the political arena (Eiran Interview, 2020). One such example is Gideon Sa’ar who served as Minister of Education from 2009-2013 and Minister of the Interior from 2013-2014. Sa’ar who has also spent over a decade in the Knesset aspired to run for the Likud party’s chairmanship.

In 2019, Sa’ar challenged incumbent Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in the party’s primary (Eglash, 2019). Preparing to challenge Netanyahu, in 2015 Sa’ar joined the

Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a policy-oriented think tank based at Tel-

Aviv University, to bolster his credentials in the security field. While at INSS, Sa’ar published on military strategy against Hezbollah, the African migrant crisis, the civil war in Syria, as well as the Iranian threat (INSS, 2020). Ultimately, Sa’ar was unsuccessful in challenging Netanyahu who won his party’s primary and went on to secure a mandate to form a new government the next year (Eglash, 2019).

The profile of a scholar working at an academic-oriented think tank differs from that of their policy-oriented counterparts. Traditionally, these think tanks have been comprised of tenured faculty at universities, many of whom join to feel as though they are making a greater impact and to have an elevated platform for their research

(Paikowsky Interview, 2020). In recent years it has become more common to find young scholars from PhD programs at these think tanks as well (Fox Interview, 2020). Careers in Israeli academia are hard to come by and do not pay to the same as academic jobs in the United States (Levy, 2007). Nevertheless, it is a highly competitive process to receive a teaching or research position at an Israeli university. This results in there being far more

PhD graduates then there are professorships to fill. As a result, many who are unable to secure positions at a university, or who simply choose not to pursue such a career find themselves working at an academic think tank (Eiran Interview, 2020).

An additional new source for junior researchers at academic-oriented think tanks in Israel are graduates from MA programs. Historically, MA graduates in Security

Studies would pursue careers in civil service, more often than not with the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs (Goren Interview, 2020). Within the past decade, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lost much of its clout (Goren Interview, 2020). Modern technology has made real time communication between world leaders possible and practical, thereby

63 eliminating much of the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Goren Interview, 2020).

It is worth noting that this is a phenomenon afflicting foreign ministries around the world and not specifically an Israeli issue (Goren, forthcoming). Even so, Israel’s coalition model of government often results in the leader of a collation party assuming the role of

Minister of Foreign Affairs (Goren, forthcoming). At times, this creates an impasse between the Prime Minister and his party’s objectives and that of the Minister of Foreign

Affairs and his party. This was such an issue that from 2015 until 2019, Prime Minister

Netanyahu held the Minister of Foreign Affairs portfolio himself while simultaneously serving as Prime Minister, Minister of the Economy, Minister of Health, and Minister of

Regional Cooperation (MFA, n.d.). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been further weakened by the creation of new ministerial portfolios that take away from some of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ responsibilities, such as one of Netanyahu’s previous portfolios, as Minister in the Ministry of Regional Cooperation (Goren, forthcoming).

In light of the degradation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MA graduates who once may have sought positions in the ministry through their elite cadet program are now joining the junior ranks of academic-oriented think tanks (Goren, forthcoming). These scholars may work as research assistants or as fellows (Goren Interview, 2020; Eiran

Interview, 2020). The advent of fellowships for junior scholars is indicative of a general change in Israeli society which has seen a slow but steady increase in the role of civil society in Israel (Eiran Interview, 2020). Think tanks such the Institute for National

Security Studies (INSS), the Israel Policy Institute, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle

Eastern and African Studies, and others are seeking to attract younger MA and PhD level scholars with fellowships while they are still in or right after they complete their graduate

64 degrees (Goren Interview, 2020). As many think tanks are based out of research universities and comprise members of the university’s faculty, recruitment has been steady (Goren Interview, 2020).

As would be expected, think tank scholars’ work is aligned with the overall objectives of the institutions in which they are employed. These researchers are, however, afforded significant autonomy over the topics in which they study. Professor Efraim

Inbar (Interview, 2021), director of the Jerusalem Institute for Security and Strategy

(JISS) explained that he hand selects his scholars and trusts them to set their own research agendas. Inbar further explained that it is customary for his research to keep him apprised of their research and that they may seek his council and advice, though scholars are afforded a high degree of autonomy. Inbar explained this practice to be a near necessity due to the general disdain towards structure and authority shared by most academics who would not work well in a highly structured or hierarchical environment

(Inbar Interview, 2021). At JISS, this is represented in the breadth of topics its scholars pursue. Though JISS’s mission is oriented around the status of Jerusalem and Israeli security, its scholars pursue research on unrelated topics such as Venezuela and the role of great power dynamics in that state (Aharonson, 2019), and peripherally related topics such as energy politics in Israel and abroad (Navon, 2019). Though Israel and the Middle

East make up the vast majority of research topics covered by Israeli think tank scholars, ample attention is paid to issues regarding United States foreign policy, obsessively due to the significance of US support on Israeli security, and the great power struggle that is ensuing between the United States, Russia, and China (Eiran Interview, 2021).

As previously noted, security-based think tanks in Israel have traditionally had minimal impact on government policy. There has been, however, a renewed interest in changing this reality in the think tank community (Inbar Interview, 2021). In January

2014, INSS hosted a panel discussion with the leaders of think tanks to discuss and address these concerns. The panel focused in on two confounding variables. Firstly, they acknowledged the difficulty in measuring influence (Guzansky, 2014). Think tanks can influence policy by directly influencing policy makers, or as is more often the case in the

Israeli context, by influencing the public discourse which indirectly influences the policy makers. The panel discussed the importance of media exposure whilst also recognizing that exposure does not directly correlate to influence. The second variable focused on the burden of think tanks managing multiple target audiences (Guzansky, 2014). The two primary constituencies of think tanks are fellow Security Studies scholars and policy makers. The panel concluded that research and writing for these two groups ought to be different. For example, the academic community values lengthier, more in-depth analyses whereas policy makers are unlikely to read such lengthy documents. Without question,

Israeli think tanks have made great strides towards earning the respect and ear of policy makers. This trend has led to the further proliferation of think tanks, security or otherwise, and their increased visibility in the public sphere. Since the first Global Go To

Think Tanks Index Report was released in 2008 to the most recent report in 2019, Israel has increased from forty-eight to sixty nine recognized think tanks, a forty-for percent increase over the course of eleven years (McGann, 2008; McGann 2019).

Overview of Select Active Think Tanks

Not all of Israel’s sixty-nine think tanks are security oriented. In fact, some of its most successful think tanks work in fields related to cross-cultural dialogue, democracy studies, and social and welfare policy. For example, Yedid, a social and economic justice-oriented think tank based in Jerusalem, was the architect behind the (2015)

Amendment to the Economic Improvement Law that mandated the state open a savings account for every child born in Israel and deposit NIS 50 (approximately USD 13) monthly until the child reaches the age of majority (Heruti-Sover. 2015a). The law proposed by Yedid succeeded in breaking a parliamentary deadlock over the state’s child allowance and thwarted a possible coalition crisis. (Heruti-Sover, 2015b). In the security field, however, there are far fewer think tanks, and they face far greater barriers to influence policy. The following section will provide a brief overview of ten Israeli security think tanks. The overview of these think tanks serves as a typology and is based in part on interviews conducted with their leadership, publicly available information, and an analysis of their present and former projects.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

INSS was founded in 1978 as the Center for Strategic Studies, five years after the massive intelligence failure that allowed the Arab states to attack Israel without warning in the beginning of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The organization was established by Tel-

Aviv University with the objective of creating an independent center for security studies to aid and supplement the seriously shaken security establishment (INSS, n.d.). Major

General Ahron Yariv (ret.) was solicited by the university to serve as the Center’s first director, a position that he accepted in 1977 following his departure from a brief career in

67 politics. The Center underwent two name changes, once in 1983 to become the Jaffee

Center for Strategic Studies and again in 2006 when it became the Institute for National

Security Studies. According to its mission statement, INSS seeks to produce high quality analyses of security issues that impact Israel to provide policy recommendations to decision makers while influencing the public discourse on security related topics. INSS emphasizes outside of the box approaches “to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis” (INSS, n.d.).

Though not initially respected by the security establishment, INSS has garnered a reputation as a groundbreaking institution for research and analysis of Israeli security issues and has developed a closer working relationship with the security establishment.

Evidence of the warming relationship was seen at INSS’s Thirteenth Annual

International Conference in January 2020. Among its keynote speakers were Minister of

Defense Naftali Bennet, former IDF Chief of Staff and Head of the Blue and White Party

Benny Gantz, and former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman (INSS, 2019). Previous years’ conferences have seen keynote addresses and conversations with Israeli President

Reuven Rivlin, the serving IDF Chief of Staff, and the IDF Spokesperson (INSS, 2018).

The quality of INSS’s work has not gone unnoticed. In its most recent edition, the Global

Go To Think Tank Index ranked INSS as the top think tank in the Middle East and North

Africa Region (McGann, 2020).

At present, INSS’s team is actively pursuing research on topics vital to Israeli security and regional stability. INSS has been heavily involved in publishing on Israeli relations with the Gulf states in light of the Abraham Accords initiated under the auspices of the Trump Administration. INSS has investigated not only the impetus to the warming

68 relations, but also the role of domestic politics and preserves within the Gulf states, including their need to diversify their economies beyond a declining oil industry, pressure to respond to Iran’s attempts at nuclear proliferation by developing programs of their own, conventional arms races, and the broader intra-Arab tensions being exacerbated in the region (INSS, n.d). Additionally, and related to its research on the Gulf states, INSS is actively researching and strategizing on the Iranian threat and has developed and Iran

Program. Beyond monitoring the nuclear and conventional capabilities of Iran, a unique feature of INSS’s Iran program is its careful study of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the direction the Iranian state will take following his death and the subsequent succession of another Ayatollah to the office (INSS, n.d.). The program additionally supports the

Israeli government’s position by briefing and keeping apprised foreign diplomats and journalists on the status of Iranian aggression in the region (INSS, n.d.).

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA)

BESA was founded in 1993 as a non-partisan research institute dedicated to the study of issues in defense, intelligence, and foreign policy. The Center’s name comes from the two leaders who signed the historic Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979, Israeli

Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (BESA, n.d.).

BESA’s founding director Efraim Inbar served from the center’s inception until his departure in 2016. BESA’s research is geared primarily towards domestic policy makers; however, they conduct research applicable to foreign policy makers, the international

Jewish community, as well as the general public. BESA is affiliated with Bar-Ilan

University. Many of BESA’s research fellows hold a dual appointment as tenure-track faculty in Bar Ilan’s Department of Political Science. Though the Center was established

69 as a non-partisan institution, BESA, as well as its host university Bar-Ilan, is considered a right-wing or right-leaning research center (Fox Interview, 2020). At present, much of

BESA’s research focuses on Israeli-Palestinian relations. BESA’s researchers regularly publish in leading US an international journal and contribute to the discourse and scholarship on the Palestinian question. BESA has historically taken a critical stance on the two-state solution and Palestinian sovereignty (BESA, n.d.). Looking beyond the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, BESA is also highly engaged in research on the subject of

Israel’s relations with other states in the Middle East publishing on the Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli-Turkish relations, the ramifications of the 2020 Abraham Accords, and the threats on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Though there is still resistance to think tanks and outside review within the security establishment, BESA’s profile has expanded immensely due to what is perceived as warm relations with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. BESA is the only center to have hosted the prime minister (Fox Interview, 2020). In 2009, Netanyahu chose BESA as the location that he would issue a historic policy address in which he accepted and outlined his vison for a two-state solution (Netanyahu, 2009). BESA again hosted

Netanyahu in 2013 when he returned to give a keynote address at BESA’s Israel Towards

2020: Perils and Prospects conference. Again, Netanyahu used the opportunity to discuss major policy directives from his government relating to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Netanyahu, 2013). Jonathan Fox (Interview 2020), Chair of BESA’s executive council, asserts that the Prime Minister’s affinity for BESA over other centers is attributable to the sense of comfort that he feels among ideological allies at BESA. BESA

70 is just one of two mainstream security think tanks in Israel that skews to the right of the political spectrum (Fox Interview, 2020).

The Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)

ECF was founded in 1991 with the intention of creating a lasting peace between

Israel and the Palestinians through people to people (P2P) contact (Hirschfeld, 2009).

At the time, Israel was embroiled in the second Palestinian Intifada and there were no direct lines of communication between Israel, its primary security ally, the United

States, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Hirschfeld, 2009). ECF was responsible for initiating the Oslo Peace Process at a time when peace seemed all but impossible in Israel. One of the institute’s principal founders, Professor Yair Hirschfeld, recognized the unique role that academia can play in bringing adversarial parties together. Hirschfeld, along with ECF’s cofounders former Minister of Justice Dr. Yossi

Beilin, former Special Ambassador and Advisor to the President Nimrod Novik, and long-time policy expert Boaz Karni achieved this reality twofold. Firstly, as a non- governmental organization, ECF was divorced from the bureaucratic obstacles within the

Israeli government that hindered a cohesive stance on peace. The primary barrier to such a stance was the ideological difference between the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak

Rabin and the late Minister of Defense Shimon Peres. Secondly, due to the ongoing conflict between the PLO and Israel and the PLO’s status as an international terror organization, the government was limited in how it was able to engage with the PLO

(Hirschfeld, 2009). In 1990, Hirschfeld received the Israeli government’s blessing to independently examine the PLO’s openness to peace negotiations and to inventory the

PLO’s stance on key matters within the context of peace so long as the government could

71 distance itself from the ECF’s actions (Hirschfield & Charney, 1994). The government did not want to appear weak in the eyes of the general public for negotiating with terrorists, particularly if the outcome proved unfruitful.

ECF succeeded in establishing an unofficial line of communication with the PLO and found its leadership to be amenable to discreet discussions with Israel on peace

(Hirschfield & Charney, 1994). ECF secretly coordinated meetings between Israeli and

Palestinian leaders that ultimately resulted in the signing of the 1993 Oslo I Accord in

Washington D.C. (Eiran Interview, 2020). This landmark agreement led to the first mutual recognition between the two parties and transformed the PLO from a terror organization into a recognized political entity which would later become the Palestinian

National Authority (Hirschfeld, 2009). ECF views Oslo as a multi-faceted process that yielded a series of successes and a series of failures (Charney Report, 2014). Oslo, both the merits of the process and its outcomes, remains a highly debated issue in the field of conflict studies.

According to Hirschfeld, Oslo’s greatest success was that it created security cooperation not just between Israel and the Palestinians, but also with Jordan and Egypt.

Security cooperation has benefited Israel immensely. The Palestinian National Security

Forces (PNSF), created under the premise of the Oslo Accords, has proven capable of thwarting terror attacks within its jurisdiction. In 1992, before the security coordination agreement there were 2,400 terror attacks in Judea and Samaria alone. In 1999, this number was reduced to 140 (Zilber & Al-Omri, 2018). The IDF views the security cooperation as highly beneficial because it operates on the basis of trust (Croitoru, 2012).

This trust, however, has been tested throughout the years. The Second Intifada (200-

2005) as well as the series of armed conflicts between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip have strained relations and created a culture of mistrust and mutual suspicion between

Israeli and Palestinian security forces. Following the 2006 Palestinian Civil War and the

PNA losing control of the Gaza Strip, PNA President Mahmoud Abbas worked to rebuild the relationship out of a mutual interest in keeping Hamas at bay (Croitoru, 2012).

Despite the PNA’s mutual interest in countering Hamas activities in Judea and Samaria, in 2015, it was recorded that since being elected President of the PNA in 2005, Abbas had unilaterally threatened to end the security cooperation fifty-eight times (Purkiss &

Nafi, 2015).

According to Hirschfeld, Oslo’s greatest failure was its inability to successfully leverage public relations to gain domestic support for the accords and the overall peace process (Charney Report, 2014). Many scholars argue that for this reason that Oslo was doomed to fail from the beginning. No matter how many supporters in government that

ECF, and later Rabin and Peres, could garner for the peace process, there were still numerous spoilers on both sides. On the Israeli side, the 120,000 settlers living in Gaza,

Judea, and Samaria were vehemently opposed to any agreement that ceded land to the

Palestinians (Shlaim, 2016). Right wing political parties, partially bolstered by the settler movement, and their leaders, such as Binyamin Netanyahu, focused their campaigns on preserving the Jewish character of the state and ensuring a continual Jewish presence in all of Eretz Israel. On the Palestinian side, there were also a number of public relations failures that contributed to the delegitimization of the process. Shlaim (2016) notes that

Arafat did not have the full support of the Arab League, nor the support of competing

Palestinian factions (e.g. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine among others). Despite Oslo recognizing the PLO as the legitimate governing representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO was unable to resolve ideological disputes with both religious and secular competing factions, which hampered its legitimacy amongst the Palestinian public. Just over a decade later, these ideological differences would lead to the 2006 Palestinian Civil War which resulted in the PNA losing control of Gaza and the rise of Hamas in that territory.

Many in Israel view Oslo as a failure (Shamir & Shiqaqi, 2010). Public support for Oslo was at its peak in 1999 with 56% of Israelis indicating that they believed Oslo would bring peace; however, by 2002, in response to an ongoing second intifada, additional violence, and no lasting peace, only 19.4% of Israelis indicated that they believed Oslo would bring peace (Heler, 2012). The failure of Oslo has made policy makers wary to work with think tanks on future peace and security initiatives (Eiran

Interview, 2020). Conversely, there are those who continue to view Oslo as a success and an example of how think tanks can help facilitate track two diplomacy (Goren Interview,

2020). Those subscribing to this line of thinking assert that even though lasting peace was not achieved, think tanks still demonstrated their capacity to supplement and complement formal conflict resolution efforts organized directly by the state. ECF boasts that it continues to support the Israeli government with Track II diplomacy and that its experts are regularly consulted by Israeli and foreign government officials (ECF, 2015). ECF was involved in facilitating backchannel communications between Israel and Hamas during

Prime Minister Sharon’s 2006 disengagement from Gaza and was again called upon to advise Israeli negotiators during the 2007 Annapolis Conference (ECF, 2015).

The Reut Group (Reut)

Reut was founded in 1994 by Gidi Grinstein, a former negotiator for the Israeli government in its negotiations with the PLO (Charney Report, 2015). After graduating from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Grinstein returned to Israel, eager to combine his experience in public service and his new education to advance reforms in a government that he perceived to be too weak to adequately address the big issues facing the Israeli state. Reut is a research, strategy, and leadership group dedicated to dealing with the issues that are crucial for the sustainable future and prosperity of the State of

Israel and the Jewish people (Charney, Report, 2015). Grinstein (2015) describes Reut as

“a small-scale Israeli hybrid between Bell Labs and the RAND corporation”. Reut seeks to make a significant and uniquely Jewish contribution to humanity (Charney Report,

2015). To that end, Reut embodies the Jewish value of “tikkun olam” or “repairing the world” as a guiding principle of its work (Reut, 2012). Beyond addressing peace and security initiatives, Reut also sponsors domestic social programs geared at fulfilling its mission to tikkun olam. Tikkun Olam Maker (TOM) is a subsidy of Reut dedicated to harnessing Israel’s technical advantage to find solutions to social issues facing the elderly, individuals with disabilities, and the poor (TOM, n.d.). The Leapfrog Center is another subsidy of the Reut Group. The Leapfrog Center gives back to disadvantaged communities in Israel and utilizes Reut’s research expertise to promote socio-economic and urban development (Leapfrog, 2017).

On the national security front, Reut collaborates with Israeli leaders and brings attention to overlooked national security concerns (Reut, n.d.). Reut’s research and advocacy in the national security realm revolves around four key components: Palestinian

75 affairs, regional security, resilience, and the delegitimization of Israel. Regarding Reut’s vision for a peaceful resolution with the Palestinians, Reut advocates for Israeli unilateralism (Charney Report, 2015). Reut maintains the position that it is essential for

Israel to cease control over the Palestinian civilian population in the West Bank and that without an effective partner for peace in the PLO, Israel’s interests would best be met by acting alone. To that end, Reut calls for Israel to recognize a Palestinian state in the West

Bank without a final agreement in place with the understanding that a Palestinian state would be a more rational negotiator than the PLO which is susceptible to a greater degree of influence from external actors and internal factionalism (Charney Report, 2015).

Perhaps one of Reut’s most innovative paradigms is the one through which it views the issue of delegitimization. In 2006, Reut was among the first Jewish organizations to identify delegitimization as a serious threat to the long-term sustainable security of Israel and to successfully lobby the Israeli government to dedicate resources to fighting it (Grinstein & Greenblatt, 2016). The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

(BDS) movement has been the global voice of delegitimization since the 2001 World

Conference Against Racism that took place in Durban South Africa. The BDS movement has thrived in the present era of hyper polarization and has managed to attach itself and the plight of the Palestinians to the concept of intersectionality, cementing its legitimacy in left-wing politics (Reut, 2019). To address this reality, Reut has partnered with the

Anti-Defamation League in the United States to broaden its pro-Israel outreach and to connect with other minority groups (Grinstein & Greenblatt, 2016). Together, Reut and the ADL published a strategic framework for pro-Israel advocacy groups to use in combatting delegitimization. This strategic framework calls for structural changes, such

76 as increasing funding for research and efforts that counter BDS as well as for increased emphasis on countering BDS online (Grinstein & Greenblatt, 2016). Additionally, the strategic framework addresses policy issues and recommends a shift in how delegitimizes are characterized (Grinstein & Greenblatt, 2016). By forging partnerships with other minority groups, generating cutting edge research and analyses of BDS, and by rethinking how to approach the delegitimizes from different backgrounds, Reut has created a plan to marginalize BDS and delegitimize the delegitimizers.

The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)

JISS is among the newest high-profile security think tanks established in Israel.

Efraim Inbar founded JISS after retiring as director of the Begin-Sadat Center for

Strategic Studies in 2016, a position that he held for twenty-three years. Inbar founded

JISS in recognition of the fact that the largely liberal think tank community is out of touch from the more conservative leaning Israeli public (Inbar, 2017). JISS’s mission is twofold. First, it aims to affect policy and to assist the Israeli government in the planning of its long-term strategy. Secondly, JISS seeks to contribute to and influence public discourse in Israel on matters related to regional security and cooperation (Inbar, 2017).

JISS is comprised of policy experts that have been called upon to counsel Israeli leaders on matters of defense and diplomacy (JISS, 2019). JISS has also been called upon to brief foreign leaders on Israel’s security and foreign policy positions. JISS’s has earned it favorable commentary from leaders in government, including Prime Minister Binyamin

Netanyahu who remarked that, “JISS is an important component in strengthening the

State of Israel” (JISS, 2019).

JISS has earned a reputation for conducting in-depth research and preparing strategic alternatives to dilemmas facing Israel. To advance its mission, JISS collaborates with think tanks, universities, and other institutes of research from around the world, contributing the transnational diffusion of knowledge. A young organization itself, JISS maintains that it is training the next generation of Israeli national security analysts (JISS,

2019). JISS identifies itself as a non-ideologically driven institution seeking solutions rooted in realism and recognizing the situation on the ground for what it is (Inbar

Interview, 2021). JISS’s worldview is based on recognizing the Jewish people’s historic connection to Eretz Israel and is the only think tank dedicated to ensuring Jerusalem remain the unified capital of Israel (JISS, 2019). Inbar (2017) is critical of other prominent think tanks for selling out on the status of Jerusalem. In 2017, JISS published results from a landmark public opinion poll that found that 72% of Israelis oppose surrendering sovereignty over the Temple Mound (JISS, 2017).

Beyond the status of Jerusalem, JISS is heavily involved in shaping public policy and opinion on matters related to regional security and cooperation (Inbar, 2017). JISS has taken a vocal position against the Iran nuclear deal and has advocated in support of unilateral Israeli military action against Iran, declaring that the price Israel would pay by waiting for an Iranian first strike would far outweigh the price of an Israeli preemptive strike against the Islamic Republic (Inbar, 2017). To affect public policy and discourse,

JISS places a heavy emphasis on its Hebrew language publications (Inbar, 2017). This approach differs from that of most other think tanks that more often encourage publishing in English to attract a larger audience. JISS has been directly involved in courting new

78 relationships with Turkey and India (Inbar, 2017). JISS has formed a particularly warm relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Inbar, 2017).

The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim)

Mitvim established in 2011 by Nimrod Goren, approaches think tank work from a new perspective by seeking to combine both the academic and policy functions of think tanks under one umbrella. After spending time in the United States studying the

American think tank model, Goren returned to Israel determined to replicate it (Goren

Interview, 2020). Mitvim was established with two objectives, to achieve peace with the

Palestinians, an issue it views as key to promoting regional stability, and secondly, to improve Israeli foreign policy by working with the Knesset to develop a grand strategy

(Goren Interview, 2020). Goren (2020) attributes much of his success to Mitvim’s diverse research staff comprised of a combination of academic experts who hold PhDs in security studies, diplomacy, or related fields as well as policy experts such as retired civil servants and ambassadors.

Mitvim satisfies its broad constituencies by scaling its publications to do different audiences. For example, Mitvim may publish a twenty-page research report for the scholarly community, an abridged 3,000-word version on the same subject for the

Knesset and other policy makers, as well as a short article in an Israeli news source for public consumption (Goren Interview, 2020). This scaled approach has been effective for

Mitvim in securing cooperation with the Knesset, a body largely ignored by the think tank community (Goren Interview, 2020). It was previously atypical for think tanks do not approach the Knesset because the Knesset is widely viewed as a weak (Goren

Interview, 2020). The Israeli government is comprised of the Prime Minister and his/her

79 ministers who directly manage the day-to-day operations of governance (Galnoor et. al,

2018, p. 161). Mitvim, however, recognized the value and protentional in working with the Knesset in its oversight capacity and has successfully leveraged its relationship with the Knesset to initiate parliamentary inquires (Goren Interview, 2020).

In addition to working to improve the work of domestic institutions, Mitvim extends its influence beyond Israel’s borders by engaging in track-two diplomacy. Goren views the Oslo process as a model to be emulated for track-two diplomacy and has based his organizations work with the Jordanians, Turks, Palestinians, and other regional actors off of the Oslo model developed by ECF (Goren Interview, 2020). It is important for a think tank engaging in covert diplomacy to have a complete understanding of where the state stands on specific issues. Such an intimate understanding of the state’s position cannot be obtainable without first culminating relationships with key policy makers. In this capacity, Mitvim’s retired civil servants and defense officials turned think tank fellows are invaluable to the organization. Retired officials are able to leverage their connections and make introductions with current policy makers on behalf of the organization (Goren Interview, 2020).

Institutional Structure

Think tanks, like most institutions, are hierarchical in structure. At its head is someone, usually with the title of Director, who manages and guides the research of the institution as a whole. It is common for think tanks to employ a deputy director to assist in the research oversight and day to day operations. Beneath the senior leadership level, larger think tanks will typically have area managers that specialize in specific research programs. Next is the core group of researchers who work under an area manager.

Additionally, beneath this core group, it has become more common to see research fellows who are typically MA or PhD students augmenting the institution’s work. The number of staff and layers of hierarchy is highly dependent on the overall size of the think tank. INSS, one of Israel’s largest security think tanks, is comprised of seventy-six research staff. INSS is headed by a director who is aided by two deputy directors, thirty- four senior researchers/program heads, twenty-seven researchers, and twelve research assistants (INSS, n.d.). Smaller institutions such as the Haifa Research Center for

Maritime Policy and Strategy (HMS) that is comprised of twenty-two research staff members have less layers to their hierarchies. HMS is headed by a director, however, the institution does not employee any deputy directors. HMS employees fifteen senior fellows and six research fellows (HMS, 2019).

At present, hierarchical structure of think tanks in more closely resembles that of their American counterparts. This is not coincidental as think tanks are seeking to institutionalize themselves in order to raise their legitimacy with domestic policy makers by emulating the successful think tank model employed in the United States (Goren

Interview, 2020). Different however, from think tanks in the United States is the degree of influence that its founding leaders carry and the length of tenure that they serve. Based on this study’s review of active think tanks and their leadership, it common for an inaugural holder of the think tank’s directorship to serve in that capacity for more than a decade.

Table 4 highlights the tenure of select think tank directors. The unusually lengthy tenure of these institutions has led some governing bodies such as Bar Ilan University, of which the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) is a sub-unit of, to implement

81 term limits on leadership positions at university affiliated centers. This is to prevent what

Jonathan Fox (Interview 2020) describes as centers becoming its leader’s “personal fiefdom.” It is worth noting that Bar Ilan implemented this policy after BESA’s founding director Efraim Inbar left Bar Ilan and BESA to form a new think tank, which cost BESA many of its donors who followed Inbar (Fox Interview, 2021). Inbar served as director of

BESA for twenty-three years, the second longest tenure of the selected think tanks after

Yair Hirschfeld who served as the director of the Economic Cooperation Foundation

(ECF) from its founding until 2019, a total of twenty-nine years. Historically, this practice has been uniform, perhaps attributable to comparative youngness of Israeli versus American think tanks.

Table 4

Think Tank Heads of Center Tenure

Institution Name Start End Tenure (years) Founder?

* BESA Efraim Inbar 1993 2016 23 Y BESA* Efraim Karsh 2016 Present 5

ECF† Yair Hirschfeld 1990 2019 29 Y

ECF† Celine Touboul 2019 Present 2

INSS‡ Ahron Yariv 1977 1994 17 Y

INSS‡ Ze'ev Maoz 1995 1997 2

INSS‡ Shai Feldman 1997 2005 8

INSS‡ Zvi Shutauber 2005 2008 3

‡ INSS Oded Eran 2008 2011 3 INSS‡ Amos Yadlin 2011 Present 10

JISS** Efraim Inbar 2017 Present 4 Y

Mitvim†† Nimrod Goren 2011 Present 10 Y

Reut‡‡ Gideon Grinstein 2004 Present 17 Y

As the founders of Israel oldest think tanks begin to retire, it will be interesting to observe if their replacements remain in their positions as long as their predecessors, of if a higher degree of turnover becomes more commonplace. The Institute for National

Security Studies (INSS) is the only selected think tank to have been led by more than two individuals. If INSS is indicative of the future of other think tanks, it would appear that turnover will occur more frequently. Though INSS’s founding director Aharon Yariv served in his position for seventeen years, subsequent directors served in the position

83 between two and eight years with the exception of its most recent director, retired Major

General Amos Yadlin who has been in his position since 2011. It is uncertain if this trend will replicate across other think tanks as each is unique and affected by different confounding variables.

The institutional structure of Israeli think tanks is also subject to vary based on its affiliation with outside institutions. The most significant of such institutions are the universities that host many of Israel’s security think tanks. Tel-Aviv University, the

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion University, Bar-Ilan University, and the

University of Haifa all host security think tanks. In exchange for providing the basic infrastructure such as office and meeting spaces, salaries for researchers, access to the

University’s libraries, and general funding, the university exercises a degree of control over the think tank’s research agenda (Eiran Interview, 2020). The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) hosted at Bar-Ilan University, for example, has an executive council comprised of ten members. Five of these ten members are faculty or administrators of Bar-Ilan university, including its chair Jonathan Fox, Professor of

Political Science, as well as Ari Zaban, president of Bar Ilan University, Miriam Faust,

Rector of Bar Ilan University, and Rami Ginat, Chair of the Department of Political

Science. With half of the executive committee’s membership comprised of university faculty and staff, this voting block has the potential to overshadow the discretion of its external committee members and may lead to internal conflict within the think tank’s leadership. According to Fox (Interview, 2020), however, there has not been confrontation between the executive committee and the BESA Center’s leadership as the executive committee acts primarily as an annual reviewer of the center.

Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts

In this first of its kind study of Israeli epistemic communities and the institutions and structures that they exist in, I sought to understand how and when epistemic communities contribute to the formation of security policy in Israel. By analyzing Israel’s security policy, its origins, and main actors, the findings of this thesis did not support the original hypothesis that that epistemic communities are completely uninvolved in security policy formation. Interviews with various epistemic actors, both in the university and think tank setting, indicated varying degrees of involvement and influence on the part of epistemic communities in impacting security policy. Combined, these interviews, along with a review of the groundbreaking work being undertaken by Israel’s think tank community, indicated that although it was once the case that epistemic actors were excluded from policy circles, there has been growing openness amongst Israel’s statecraft elite to consult epistemic communities, recognizing the value of their expert knowledge.

In part, this growing openness is attributable to the intermixing of retired senior military and civil servants in the academic realm as was discussed in chapters 3 and 4. By utilizing their connections with the statecraft elite, these retirees helped form the connection between epistemic communities in academia and think tanks to the small inner circle of decision makers. Additionally, this thesis demonstrated a second avenue by which epistemic communities have entered the security policy realm- grit and initiative. As was described in chapter 3 with the case of the Economic Cooperation

Foundation (ECF), initiative by a group of epistemic actors dedicated to the betterment of the state can and has been able to yield positive outcomes by independently creating dialogues for track two diplomacy. ECF’s instrumental role in bringing both the Israelis

85 and the Palestinians to the negotiating table which ultimately led to the Oslo Peace

Process.

The combined efforts of both tracks have helped modernize Israeli security policy and have contributed to the betterment of its grand strategy. This study’s findings have important ramifications for the study of security in Israel. Existing studies of Israeli security policy focus almost exclusively on the role of state and bureaucratic actors. The findings of this study suggest that greater attention should be paid to non-state actors, particularly those in epistemic communities. This study has demonstrated the need to reevaluate existing perception of actors and the importance of the epistemic method. In the Israeli context, further research on individual policies and the role that epistemic communities play in their implementation is in order. This study briefly reviewed the case of the Oslo Peace Process which may serve as an excellent starting point to build on this line of academic inquiry.

The ramifications of this study go beyond just the case of Israel. The existing literature on epistemic communities is heavily Americentric. Similar reviews of other states’ epistemic communities, particularly non-Western states, are warranted as the proliferation of epistemic communities continues around the globe. This is especially prudent given, as this study suggests, the interconnected nature of epistemic communities and how these communities use their relationships to create dialogue, even fostering track two diplomacy.

This thesis undertook a review of Security Studies as an academic field in order to better understand Israel’s conception of security. By reviewing programs of study, courses, and syllabi, this study was able to construct an understanding of how Israel sees

86 itself through the lens of security and the issues it deems most important. For non-Israeli readers, this is particularly important as one cannot understand Israel’s policy positions without first understanding where and how it perceives its vulnerabilities. Similar reviews conducted on other states will provide the same insight which can be beneficial in advancing diplomacy or in achieving victory in conflict. Hence Sun Tzu’s saying in Art of War, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat” (Chapter 3, 18).

Given the breadth of topics covered in this this thesis, it was not possible to cover every angle. Future studies into Israeli security policy may benefit from analyzing which actors can be categorized as belonging to security studies. For the purpose of this thesis, individual actors, institutions, and academic programs that self-identified as security oriented were considered. As is the case in the United States, there is not a consensus in

Israel as to who is a member of the field, owed in part to its interdisciplinary nature.

Future studies should seek to quantify security-oriented actors based on a uniform criterion. Such studies should also evaluate which actors influence and shape one another.

This thesis took for granted that the academic institutions, where scholars and practitioners study, shape these actors on an individual level as well as the institutions in which they are a part of. A future qualitative study should seek to verify this presumption while also investigating whether or not later also influences the former.

One further aspect of security studies in Israel that was discussed in this thesis and should continue to be explored is the heavy influence of the military over the field.

Chapter 2 detailed the degree of influence that the military has in shaping and influencing

87 security policy. Chapter 3 discussed the unique trend of Israeli generals pursuing academic degrees as well as the noteworthy number of retired generals occupying academic positions. Finally, chapter 4 noted the intentional trend of these retired generals joining and leading think tanks. This leaves one to question the ramifications of such a militarized field and further research should seek to answer this from a sociological perspective while also analyzing whether or not the military elite constitute an epistemic community unto themselves. Utilizing Haas’s (1992) definition of an epistemic community, many of the criteria are met. General officers have an authoritative claim to knowledge on security policy given their experience which is recognized amongst the

Israeli public. These generals operate under a shared normative and causal belief system and work in a common policy enterprise. Upon entering academia, these generals begin to operate under the same shared notions of validity. Future studies should explore whether this constitutes an epistemic community that transcends the fractured nature of

Israeli episteme.

The future of security oriented epistemic communities and the field of Security

Studies as a whole in Israel appears to be more vibrant than their past. Interviews conducted with members of these epistemic communities as well as the trends observed indicate that the field and its epistemic communities are becoming more closely aligned with their American counterparts. The Israeli and American teachings on security share much of the same foundational literature. The leaders of Israeli think tanks are eager to learn from and employee the American approach to further their own positions in the policy formation process and also to contribute to an expanded dialogue for the betterment of the state, its security, and most of all, its citizens.

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Appendix A: List of Interviews Conducted

- Ben-Porath, Sigal R., Professor of Education, Philosophy, and Political Science,

University of Pennsylvania.

- Ehud, Eiran, Senior Lecturer of International Relations, University of Haifa, and

Founding Co-Director of the Haifa Research Center for Maritime Policy and Strategy.

- Fox, Jonathan, Professor of Religion and Politics, Bar-Ilan University, and Chair of

the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) Oversight Board.

- Goren, Nimrod, Founding Director of the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign

Policies (Mitvim).

- Inbar, Efraim, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University,

Founding Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Founding Director

of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

- Paikowsky, Deganit, Lecturer of International Relations, Hebrew University of

Jerusalem and Vice-President of the International Astronautical Federation.

- Rubin, Aviad, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, University of Haifa and

Founding Co-Director of the Haifa Research Center for Maritime Policy and Strategy.

- Rubinovitz, Ziv, Israel Institute Teaching Fellow, Sonoma State University.

- Sandler, Shmuel, Professor of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University, and Senior

Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

- Soffer, Avi, Senior Lecturer, ORT-Braude College.

- Zellman, Ariel, Lecturer of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University.

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Appendix B: Selection of Syllabi Reviewed

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