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Mediating the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Current Prospects and Alternative Frameworks Asaf Siniver

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Mediating the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Current Prospects and Alternative Frameworks Asaf Siniver ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST POLICY BRIEF FOR THE MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE ON A WMD/DVS FREE ZONE NO. 31 • MARCH 2014 Mediating the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Current Prospects and Alternative Frameworks Asaf Siniver As one of the most intractable confl icts the confl ict itself. Accordingly in recent Abstract of our time, the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict years the growing disenchantment with the has invited more third party mediation notion of an America-mediated two state This POLICY BRIEF examines the reasons than any other confl ict since the end of the solution has led some, mostly in academic for the continued stalemate of the Israeli- Cold War. The historic 1991 Madrid Peace and activist circles, to campaign for a one Palestinian peace process, which started Conference was followed by a wide range of state solution (a binational state) as a more more than two decades ago. In particular, mediation initiatives, summits, frameworks, desirable and feasible solution. it assesses the ubiquity of American and back channels by various third parties. mediation as an integral part of the peace Some of the most notable mediation efforts The record of two decades of Israeli- process and its role in the evolution of the in this period include the 1993 Oslo Accord Palestinian negotiations suggests two strik- Israeli-Palestinian confl ict since the early between Israel and the Palestine Liberation ing lessons: the fi rst is the dismal record 1990s. By looking at the characters of Organization (PLO); the Oslo II Agreement of mediation success despite the enormous third-party mediation in the confl ict and the between Israel and Palestinian Authority; time and energy, as well as political and unique traits of past and present American the 1997 Hebron Agreement; the 1998 Wye fi nancial capital, which have been invested diplomatic efforts, this POLICY BRIEF suggests River Memorandum; the EU’s 1999 Berlin in the process by a multitude of third parties. that the current paradigm of American Declaration; the Camp David Summit and The second feature is the ubiquitous role of engagement, which has rarely been scruti- the Clinton Parameters of 2000; the 2001 the United States as the principal manager nised in the past two decades, may not be Taba Summit; the 2002 Arab Peace Initia- of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. conducive to the achievement of Israeli- tive; the 2003 Quartet Roadmap; and the Notwithstanding the different tactics em- Palestinian peace. The current efforts of 2007 Annapolis Conference. Most recently, ployed by the administrations of presidents Secretary of State, John Kerry, indicate the indefatigable U.S. Secretary of State, Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama, the that American mediation is no more likely to John Kerry, has tried to revive the moth- resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict be successful in 2014 than it was ten or 20 balled peace process by proposing a new has remained throughout a strategic priority years earlier. framework of negotiations for an Israeli- for American foreign policy. Accordingly the POLICY BRIEF proposes alter- Palestinian settlement. native frameworks which may complement Outline of this POLICY BRIEF or supplant the current American approach Mediation and the Intricacies of to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. It thus the Israeli-Palestinian Confl ict Given the evidently inauspicious environ- provides essential conceptual and policy ment for a successfully mediated Israeli- tools to facilitate a deeper understanding None of these efforts have succeeded in Palestinian settlement, this POLICY BRIEF of the vagaries of the Israeli-Palestinian resolving the core issues of the confl ict: the highlights the conditions which, at least confl ict and the ways in which mediation status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, theoretically, are deemed both necessary and can be harnessed to mitigate some of Jewish settlements, borders, and water rights. essential to promote a peaceful resolution to its key intricacies. As a policy analysis Nor has there been a cumulative record of the confl ict. It then evaluates the key factors of confl ict resolution, the insights in this mediation success over the years to bring which determine the ongoing failure to arrive POLICY BRIEF also serve as important about a positive change in reciprocal trust and at the two state solution by emphasising the building blocks in the Helsinki process on empathy between Israelis and Palestinians. role of the disputants themselves as well establishing a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the More than two decades after the initiation of as American mediation in propagating the Middle East. n the Oslo peace process, Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. It concludes by suggesting alter- peace remains as elusive as it has ever been. native or complimentary methods to extract This POLICY BRIEF is based on the discus- One of the most disturbing consequences of the parties out of this destructive deadlock. sions of the ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA work- this stalemate has been the growing disillu- shop held in Frankfurt from November 9-11, sionment on both sides with the prospect of Observing these alternative frameworks of 2013, with participants from Israel, Iran, a peaceful settlement to the confl ict, which confl ict resolution is pertinent beyond the Germany, Palestine, United Kingdom, ipso facto perpetuates the intractability of immediate confi nes of the Israeli-Palestinian United States, and Yemen. ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 31 • MARCH 2014 confl ict; a successful settlement to this the disputants and the mediator, the as a face-saving tool to buy time or confl ict has the potential to stimulate a historical trajectory of mediation in the defl ect external pressures. parallel process towards a zone free of confl ict, the timing of mediation in the 2. A grassroots/civil society-led change in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and life cycle of the confl ict. how the parties perceive each other. Like their delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle 2. The mediator: the type of mediation in many other intractable confl icts, the East. This is especially true since some offered (Track I/II, multiparty, etc.), greatest obstacle is psychological, and conclude that any effort to make progress the status, knowledge, expertise and until visible signs of trust and empathy towards such a zone must fi rst address interpersonal skills of the mediator, as are developed on both sides, suspicion Israel’s long standing security concerns well as the mediator’s ability to exercise and belligerence will remain the key about its neighbors and the ongoing effective leverage on the parties (i.e., to drivers of the parties’ motivations to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. affect their bargaining position), and the negotiate. Only then, and after the advancement of mediator’s perceived impartiality. 3. Until both parties realise that they are comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, could 3. The process of mediation: the objectives better off with a peaceful settlement the issues of Israel’s nuclear disarmament at the initiation of the process, the nego- than without one, they are unlikely to and the broader reduction in the regional tiation strategies which the parties bring make headway at the negotiation table. arms balance be advanced. However, these to the table and the tactics which they This is a particular area where an able two processes (peace and disarmament) do employ at the table, the visibility and mediator can change the bargaining not exclude each other and progress in duration of the process, the handling of process between the parties and affect one area may result in achievements in the the media and peace spoilers. their calculations of alternative negoti- other fi eld. Therefore, getting it right in the ation positions. context of mediating the Israeli-Palestinian In academic circles there is a propensity peace process may prove to be an important to portray an ‘ideal’ type of mediation or In light of these conditions, and based on step on the road envisaged in the Helsinki mediator to explain, always in retrospect, the historic record of (successful and failed) Conference. the success of an anecdotal mediation third party mediation in the Arab-Israeli effort. For instance, Jacob Bercovitch, one confl ict, it is possible to identify certain The Prerequisites of of the leading scholars on mediation, states scenarios where mediation is more likely to Successful Mediation the obvious when he points that “[o]nly an be successful. appropriate mediator is likely to be effective. Mediation is a distinct method of confl ict An appropriate mediator should possess Timing resolution, performed for the purpose of intelligence, tact, skills in drafting formal infl uencing or facilitating the settlement proposals, and a sense of humor, in addi- The timing of the mediation effort is in- of a dispute. It is essentially non-violent, tion to specific knowledge of the conflict trinsically linked to its chances of success, non-binding, and voluntary, which makes it at hand.”2 In reality, however, such formu- but determining the most propitious time far more attractive to the disputing parties lations are redundant as policy tools. The for mediation to take place is hard to do as a confl ict resolution tool than other history of Arab-Israeli diplomacy is littered without the benefi t of hindsight. To assess methods such as arbitration, adjudication with examples of appropriate mediators the ‘ripeness’ of the confl ict for resolution, or military intervention. Perhaps the most who ultimately failed in their mission the notions of a confl ict cycle and a mutually distinctive quality of mediation is that the (Bill Clinton is perhaps the most famous hurting stalemate are often used. A confl ict ultimate power lies with the disputants and example). This point only reinforces the cycle suggests that most confl icts are charac- not the third parties.
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