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Palestine Water Fact Sheet #1

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Palestine Water Fact Sheet #1 hrough e t hu ic m t a FACT SHEET s n ju r l i a g i h c t o s THE RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE: A BACKGROUND s 11 C E S R he Israeli confiscation and control of LEGEND ability to manage water resources and just Palestinian water resources is a defining Groundwater flow allocates the limited supply made available by T feature of the Israeli occupation and a LEBANON Groundwater divide Israel, the PWA, rather than the Occupation, is GOLAN major impediment to a just resolution of the Israeli National Water HEIGHTS blamed for water scarcity. Moreover, the Oslo Israel-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, Israel’s Carrier Sea of II agreement does not call for redistribution of control of Palestinian water resources Armistice Demarcation Galilee Line, 1949 existing water sources nor require any undermines any possibility for sustainable Haifa Tiberias Syria-Israel Cease Fire reduction in water extraction or consumption development and violates Palestinians’ human Line, 1967 Nazareth by Israelis or settlers. right to safe, accessible, and adequate drinking Palestinian Territory Occupied by Israel (June n Jenin a water. Israel’s discriminatory water policy 1967) d r • Since 2000, after the onset of the Second o Northern J maintains an unequal allocation of water between Aquifer r e v Intifada in September, the Israeli army has Tu l k a re m i Israel, illegal Israeli settler communities and R intensified the destruction of water infrastruc- Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian Nablus Western ture and confiscation ofwater sources in the 7 territory (oPt), while appropriating an ever greater Te l Av i v Aquifer WEST r BANK West Bank and Gaza. e f i u portion of Palestinian water resources for its own r q e f A i u use. In a water-scarce region, Israeli water policy q 8 A Ramallah l JORDAN COMPARING WATER USE a t Jericho hinges on finding more water to maintain present s a Mediterranean Sea o Jerusalem consumption levels – regardless of the C Both absolutely and proportionately, Israelis use in ta n u Eastern a a far greater amount of the region’s total water sustainability of current patterns of water use by e Mo Aquifer S Gaza d resources. Settlers use nearly 600 litres of water Israelis and settlers. In 1993, the Israeli State Hebron GAZA Dea each day. Palestinian water use does not even Controller said that the West Bank is the STRIP “principal reservoir of drinking water for the Dan meet the minimum daily standard of 100 litres as ISRAEL recommended by the World Health Organisation. region, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beersheba” and the Rafah Beersheba “most important long-term source in the 600 1 Courtesy Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). Adapted from: 'Water and War in [national] water system” the Middle East' Info Paper no.5, July 1996, Centre for Policy Analysis on Palestine/The Jerusalem Fund, Washington D.C. 500 water disputes, set pumping quotas and forbade • Israel controls a disproportionate amount of Palestinians construction of new wells by Palestinians the two water systems it shares with Palestine. 400 It effectively controls 100 percent of the without permission from the area Israeli military Israelis Jordan River basin and more than 80 percent commander. Since 1967, permits have been Litres 300 of underground water resources from the granted for only 23 new wells.5 Settlers (Gaza) Western (Mountain) aquifer. 2 • In 1982, the Israeli national water authority, 200 • Israel uses 85% of groundwater resources Mekorot, took control of Palestinian water. WHO standard 100 available in the West Bank – accounting for 25 While many existing Palestinian wells were (100 l/person/day) percent of Israel’s water consumption.3 being destroyed, digging and pumping for deeper wells for Israeli use continued – 0 HISTORY effectively drying up older Palestinian wells. Daily per Capita H20 Consumption • In 1964, Israel completed the construction of • In 1986, Israel reduced the quotas for the 100% 4.3% 3.3% the National Water Carrier, begun in 1953. amount of water Palestinians could pump from This enormous water project, a network of their wells by 10%, resulting in widespread Palestinians 80% pipelines, pumping stations, reservoirs and water scarcity.6 canals extending from the Sea of Galilee to the Israelis Negev, diverts 75 percent of the waters of the 60% • In 1995, under the Oslo II Accord, division of 63.8% 85.9% Jordan River to Israel. While Syria and Jordan water sources was designated as an issue for are allowed to use 160 mcm per year and 320 Settlers “final status negotiations” – a device used by 40% mcm per year respectively, Palestinians are Israel to continue illegal appropriation of prohibited from using any water from the Palestinian water resources from 1995 until the Jordan River.4 20% 31.9% present (the “final status negotiations” of Oslo • After 1967, Israel took control over all water have never been reached). A Palestinian Water 10.8% resources in the newly occupied Palestinian Authority (PWA) was set up, but Israel Population Water Consumption Total: approx. 9.4 million Total = 2280 MCM/Year territories by a series of military orders that maintained control of the total flow and volume negated all previous and existing settlements of of water to the oPt. While the PWA has no Percentage population vs. water consumption 1 LAW, “An Overview of the consequences of Israeli 4 PASSIA Special Bulletin, “Water: The Blue Gold of the Middle 7 Palestinian Environmental NGO Network “Apartheid Wall Occupation on the environment in the West Bank and Gaza,” East,” July 2002. Campaign, Report #1” November 2002. 2000. 5 LAW, “An Overview of the consequences of Israeli Occupation 8 Figures calculated from PASSIA Special Bulletin, “Water: The 2 B’Tselem, “Thirsty for a Solution,” 2001. on the environment in the West Bank and Gaza,”2000. Blue Gold of the Middle East,” July 2002; B’tselem, “Thirsty 3 Jad Isaac and Mohammad Ghanyem, “Environmental 6 PASSIA, “Fact Sheet – Water and Environment,” 2001. for a Solution,” 2000; and UNEP “Desk Study on the Degradation and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” ARIJ 2001. Environment in the West Bank and Gaza,” 2002. Center for Economic and Social Rights | 162 Montague Street | Brooklyn, NY 11201 | 718-237-9145 | [email protected] | www.cesr.org • Limited access to trucked water. Israel’s VIOLATIONS OF PALESTINIANS’ policy of ‘closure’ severely limits access to POLLUTION OF PALESTINIAN 21 RIGHT TO WATER water carriers in a context where more than a WATER SOURCES BY ISRAEL third of all Palestinians rely on buying water While Israelis and settlers get continuous water from private or municipal tankers for their • Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 14 supply from Mekorot all year-round at subsidized water needs. Gaza are mostly located on hilltops and dump prices, Palestinians face these situations: manure, untreated sewage and wastewater into • Increased price of water. Water tankers the valleys – polluting Palestinian water sources • Irregular water supply across the West delayed at checkpoints raise their prices by and agricultural land. According to 1997 f igures Bank, particularly in the water-scarce summer almost 80% because of the increased transpor- from the West Bank, settlers were 6 times more months. tation time due to closure.15 With 70-90% of polluting that Palestinians (300,000 settlers the workforce unemployed, Palestinians spend produced 30 mcm of wastewater a year, while • Depleted/contaminated/salinated water in as much as 39% of their household expenditure 16 in the same period, 1,870,000 Palestinians Gaza because of over-extraction of the Coastal on purchasing water. produced 31 mcm of wastewater). Aquifer – due in part to the fact that Palestinians are not allowed to develop or • Highly polluting Israeli industries are being repair water infrastructure.9 relocated to the West Bank (again, on hilltops) to avoid Israeli environmental regulations. At • Water distribution network losses of 30 – least 200 industries in 7 industrial zones in the 50% because of deteriorating networks and West Bank send untreated industrial effluents leaky pipes in dire need of repair.10 and wastewater into Palestinian streams and agricultural land. • No piped water at all for 215,000 Palestin- ians in 150 West Bank villages (26% of West • In February 2001, Israel discharged 3.5 Bank households).11 million cubic meters of untreated wastewater mixed with rainwater into northern Gaza strip • Many Palestinians must buy water – either towns. from Mekorot, or from private suppliers selling A section of the ‘Separation’ Wall that will come between expensive and unregulated trucked water. Even many Palestinians and their water and land. WHAT YOU CAN DO within the oPt, Mekorot’s prices are different (Photo courtesy John Reese © 2002) for Palestinians and Israeli settlers.12 • Ban on drilling wells. In October 2002, The Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) has Israeli infrastructure minister Effi Eitam banned launched the Palestine Water for Life Campaign to Palestinians from drilling for water and placed a promote worldwide awareness of the water and freeze on the issue of future permits for sanitation situation in Palestine, as well as to wells.17 develop coordinated, comprehensive responses to the water crisis among donor, development, • Separation from water sources. In June of relief, human rights, and other NGOs. Please visit 2002, the Israeli government authorized a plan the campaign website at www.phg.org/campaign to build a ‘security wall’ - more accurately for more information about how you can support referred to as a ‘Separation Wall’ or ‘Apartheid their efforts. Wall’ - with electric fences, trenches and security patrols along the entire 220 mile The Palestinian Environmental NGO length of the West Bank. However, the Wall is Network (PENGON) has initiated the Apartheid not being built along the ‘Green Line’ (the de Wall Campaign to raise awareness of and Water tanker trucks such as these are often prevented at organize opposition to the “Separation Wall” Israeli checkpoints from collecting and delivering vital facto pre-1967 border between Israel and the West Bank) - but rather inside the West Bank.
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