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Yasir Arafat and the Plo, One Month Since Hebron

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YASIR ARAFAT AND THE PLO, ONE MONTH SINCE HEBRON An Assessment of PLO Compliance with the Hebron Accord, January 15 - February 15, 1997 ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA 4 East 34th Street, New York, NY 10016 Tel: 212-481-1500 I Fax: 212-481-1515 E-mail: [email protected] I Web Site: Http:llwww.zoa.org About the Zionist Organization of America The Zionist Organization of America is the oldest, and one of the largest, pro­ Israel organizations in the United States. Founded in 1897 to support the re-establish­ ment of a Jewish State in the ancient Land of Israel, its presidents have included such illustrious Jewish leaders as Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. The ZOA was instrumental in mobilizing the support of the U.S. gov­ ernment, Congress, and the American public for the creation of Israel in 1948. The Jerusalem Post recently called the ZOA "one of the most important and influential Jewish groups in the U.S. today." With a national membership of more than 50,000 and active chapters throughout the United States, the ZOA today works to strengthen American-Israeli relations, through educational activities, public affairs programs, support for pro-Israel legislation on Capitol Hill, and by combating anti­ Israel bias in the media. The ZOA also sponsors important educational and cultural programs-in Israel. ZOA House is the premier cultural center in Tel Aviv. The ZOA's Kfar Silver school, on a 500-acre campus near Ashkelon, provides education and vocational training for new Jewish immigrants and others. The ZOA's youth division, Masada, sponsors one of the largest programs for sending young Jews to visit Israel. 1 The Israel-PLO Accords "First, criminal jurisdiction over terror On September 13, 1993, the leaders of Israel attacks carried out against Israelis belongs to and the Palestine Liberation Organization Israel, and not to the P A. Hence, it is Israel signed the Oslo I accord (also known as the which is the sole authority that may try and Declaration of Principles), in a ceremony on the convict such suspects. White House lawn. On May 4, 1994, Israel and "Second, the clause in question permits the the PLO signed the Gaza-Jericho self-rule P A to delay the transfer of a suspect only when agreement, in Cairo. On September 28, 1995, he is detained in connection with another Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo II accord, crime, and not when he is detained or again at the White House. On January 15, 1997, imprisoned in connection with the crime for Israel and the PLO signed the Hebron accord. which Israel is seeking his transfer. Thus, even in instances where the P A detains or imprisons terror suspects in Palestinian jails, the PA is obligated under the Oslo accords to transfer the I. Extraditions suspects to Israel without delay." (c) The PLO's Record, (a) The PLO's Obligation January 15- February 15,1997 The Gaza-Jericho accords require the PLO Amin Al-Hindi, head of Palestinian to honor all Israeli requests for the extradition General Intelligence --the intelligence branch of suspected terrorists.l of the PLO's Palestinian Authority-- said in January: "Neither Adnan Al-Ghoul, a member (b) Background of the [Hamas] Izzeddin Al-Qassam units and a On December 18, 1996, the Israeli detainee inside a P A prison, nor any other Government released an official report listing Palestinian will be handed over to Israel."4 the 27 terrorists whom it has asked the PLO to During the first month since the signing of extradite, in accordance with the Oslo accords the Hebron accord (January 15-February 15, (Annex III, Article II [7] of the Gaza-Jericho 1997), no terrorists were extradited by the PLO Agreement). So far, the PLO has not honored to Israel. any of the requests. In fact, according to the Israeli Government report, 10 of the 27 "are either serving in the Palestinian police or are in the process of joining its ranks."2 II. Changing the PLO Covenant The PLO's Palestinian Authority (PA) has held 5-minute show trials of some of the 27 (a) The PLO's Obligation wanted terrorists, claiming it can delay Oslo I requires Arafat to "submit the [PLO extraditions for as long as the suspects are in P A Covenant] to the Palestinian National Council custody. PLO cabinet minister Nabil Sha'ath [PNC] for ... the necessary changes" so that the recently said: "Israel has the right to seek articles of the Covenant no longer "deny Israel's custody of any Palestinian responsible for right to exist" or conflict with the accords by, killing an Israeli only if the Palestinian for example, urging violence against Israel. 5 authorities have been negligent in their Oslo II obligates the PLO to make the changes handling of the matter. Therefore it is within two months of the inauguration of the important that we bring offenders to trial as new Palestinian Council, meaning that it had soon as possible, in order to prevent their to be changed by May 7, 1996. extradition to Israel."3 The Israeli Government report, however, (b) Background contends that P A's interpretation "is invalid The Covenant was adopted at the time of for two reasons: the establishment of the PLO, in 1964. (At that time, the Arabs ruled the territories of Judea, 2 Samaria [the West Bank], Gaza, Sinai, Golan decision fails to meet the obligations laid out in Heights and eastern Jerusalem.) It defines the the Oslo accords in two respects. First, the ideology and strategy of the PLO, and, actual amendment of the Covenant has been according to the PLO Constitution, is binding left for a future date. As of now, the old upon the PLO' s member-organizations. It can be Covenant, in its original form, remains the changed (according to Article 33 of the governing document of the PLO, and will Covenant) only by a vote of a two-thirds continue in this status until the amendments are majority of the total membership of the PLO's actually approved .. .There is a sharp difference Palestine National Council (PNC), at a special between calling for something to change and session of the PNC. actually implementing the changes. Second, Articles 15, 19, 20, 22, and 23 of the the decision does not specify which clauses will Covenant directly deny Israel's right to exist, be amended." by declaring that the purpose of "the liberation Also significant was an internal PLO of Palestine" is to attain "the elimination of position paper on the Covenant, prepared and Zionism in Palestine" (15) and that "the circulated by the "Research and Thought partition of Palestine in 1947 and the Department" of Fatah, Yasir Arafat's faction establishment of the State of Israel are of the PLO. The document was released on May entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of 21, 1996 by Peace Watch. Explaining the PNC time.': (19) These articles also redefine Judaism decision, the document said that changing the as "a religion, not an independent nationality" Covenant would have been "suicide for the which is therefore unqualified for statehood. PLO." It continued: "The text of the Palestinian (20) National Covenant remains as it was and no Articles 1-6, 8, 11-14, 16-18, 21, 24-26, 28 changes whatsoever were made to it. This has and 29 indirectly deny Israel's right to exist, by caused it to be frozen, not annulled. The granting the Palestinian Arabs the sole legal drafting of the new National Covenant will and historical right to the Holy Land and by take into account the extent of Israeli denying the right of any Jews to live there fulfillment of its previous and coming except those who were already residing there obligations ... evil and corrupt acts are expected prior to "the beginning of the Zionist invasion," from the Israeli side .. .The fact that the PNC in 1917. (Thus, those Jews who arrived, or were did not hold a special session to make changes born, in the Holy Land in 1918 or later-­ and amendments in the text of the National meaning nearly all of today's Israelis--are Covenant at this stage ... was done to defend the considered by the PLO to be illegal aliens.) new Covenant from being influenced by the Articles 7, 9 and 10 directly call for the use current Israeli dictatorship."6 of "armed struggle" (violence) against Israel. Articles 27 and 30 indirectly call for the use (c) The PLO's Record, of violence. January 15- February 15, 1997 Thus, a total of 30 of the 33 articles in the The official American "Note for the Covenant either directly or indirectly deny Record" that is part of the Hebron agreement, Israel's right to exist, or directly or indirectly states: "The Palestinian side reaffirms its call for the use of violence against Israel. All commitment" to "complete the process of of these articles would have to be deleted or at revising the Palestinian National Charter." least substantially altered in order to conform The "Note for the Record" also specifies that with the terms of the Oslo accords. (Three the PLO must act "immediately" to change the articles do not need to be changed.) Covenant and fulfill its other commitments. On April 24, 1996, the PNC met in Gaza and During the first month since the signing of passed a vaguely-worded resolution concerning the Hebron accord (January IS-February 15, the Covenant. A legal opinion issued on April 1997), the PLO took no steps to fulfill its 25 by Peace Watch concluded: "The [PLO's] commitment to change the Covenant.
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