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Palestinian Perspectives Issue 5 December 2013 PERSPECTIVES Political Analyses and Commentary from the Middle East & North Africa 1994 1995 1996 1993 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO END OCCUPATION ATTEMPTS TO RESTART NEGOTIATION PROCESS 1993 1995 2000 2001 2007 2010 2013 CAMP NEW OSLO OSLO II DAVID TABA ANNAPOLIS WASHINGTON TALKS 20 Years Since Oslo: Palestinian Perspectives Published by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2013 This work is licensed under the conditions of a Creative Commons license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/. You can download an electronic version online. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work under the following conditions: Attribution - you must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work); Noncommercial - you may not use this work for commercial purposes; No Derivative Works - you may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Editors: Bente Scheller, René Wildangel, Joachim Paul Sub-Editing: Claudia Lewis Layout: Heythem Smaali Photographs: See attributions Printed by: Crea Concept Opinions expressed in the articles are those of their authors and not Heinrich Böll Stiftung. The cover illustration is derived from the Visualizing Palestine graph on page 33. Heinrich Böll Foundation – Middle East & North Africa Our foremost task is civic education in Germany and abroad with the aim of promoting informed democratic opinion, socio-political commitment and mutual understanding. In addition, the Heinrich Böll Foundation supports artistic, cultural and scholarly projects, as well as cooperation in the development field. The political values of ecology, democracy, gender democracy, solidarity and non-violence are our chief points of reference. Heinrich Böll’s belief in and promotion of citizen participation in politics is the model for the foundation’s work. This edition is published jointly by the offices of Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Tunis, Beirut and Ramallah. 2 Heinrich Böll Stiftung Contents Editorial 4 A Lot of Process, No Peace: A Timeline of 20 Years of Post-Oslo Meetings, Agreements, Negotiations and Memorandums 5 Introduction to Oslo: Key Issues, Past Mistakes and Future Prospects NEWPal 9 The Morning After Edward Said 16 Interview I: Nabil Shaath “Nabil, today the peace process has died” 23 Twenty Years of Oslo and the Future of the Two-State Paradigm Mouin Rabbani 29 Palestinian Civil Society and the Oslo Process: Some Personal Reflections George Giacaman 34 Are the Oslo Accords Still Legally Binding? Ten Points to Consider Victor Kattan 38 Palestinian Membership at the UN and a Rights-Based Approach Shawan Jabarin 43 Interview II: Nabeel Kassis “We had too much trust in our ability to turn the situation to our favor” 49 Fixing the Paris Protocols Twenty Years Later: Some Lessons for Diehard Reformers Hiba I. Husseini and Raja Khalidi 56 The Economics of the Oslo Accord Saeb Bamya 61 Palestine’s Private Sector: Two Decades of Disappointment Sam Bahour 68 Humanitarian Aid and the Oslo Process Nora Lester Murad 74 Hamas and Oslo: Rejection, Confusion and De Facto Adoption Khaled Hroub 80 Interview III: Ahmad Youssef “[Hamas] is now acting in this very framework” 86 Oslo and the Systematic Exclusion of Refugee Rights Saree Makdisi 90 Reaching the Next Generation of Nonviolence Leaders: Budrus, the Graphic Novel Just Vision 95 Popular Resistance: A Personal Account from Bab al-Shams Abir Kopty 98 Oslo and the Re-Emergence of the One-State Solution Diana Buttu 104 Heinrich Böll Stiftung 3 Editorial 20 Years Since Oslo: Palestinian Perspectives More than twenty years have passed since Their main message is clear: The 1993 the historic handshake between Palestinian Oslo Accords need to be urgently revised by President Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Prime Palestinians, Israelis and the international Minister Yitzchak Rabin in Washington community alike in order to be replaced by a new D.C. Originally this was supposed to be the framework. As such, we have also included some beginning of a five-year-process leading to the articles that highlight current internal Palestinian establishment of an independent Palestinian discussions about their future strategies, state. including civil resistance and disobedience against the occupation (Just Vision, p. 95. A. However, 20 years later, there is no such Kopty, p. 98), a legal struggle in the international Palestinian state. The reasons for this are arena (S. Jabareen, p. 43) or the debate about a manifold, and no doubt Palestinians themselves one state solution (D. Butto, p. 104). have made mistakes and lost opportunities to advance their goals. The failure to achieve a This is not an attempt to provide a complete final peaceful settlement to the conflict is an or “objective” review of the Oslo-process, but endless source of frustration for both Israeli to provide space for on-the-ground analysis by and Palestinian society; but for Palestinians, Palestinian writers, thinkers and politicians of who have failed to gain their independence, in very different backgrounds. All authors express particular. In contrast, Oslo has only succeeded solely their personal views; the contributions do in maintaining the occupation and tripling the not represent the opinion of the Heinrich-Böll- population of Israeli settlements in the West Foundation. However we hope that this volume Bank, leading to a total number of 550.000 can contribute to rethinking the Oslo-framework settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and those elements, which have proven to at present. Therefore it is hardly surprising, that prolong the conflict instead of delivering a the Palestinian judgment of the failed process is historic compromise so urgently needed to allow today extremely negative. security, peace and dignity for all citizens in the region. Some Palestinians predicted this outcome on the eve of the historic agreement. Among René Wildangel, Bente Scheller, Joachim Paul them American-Palestinian intellectual Edward Said, whose 1993 text, “the morning after”, was a chilling warning of failure, and one that is worth reading in retrospect. Other authors in this volume look at the Oslo years from different angles, including political, legal and economic aspects. 4 Heinrich Böll Stiftung A Lot of Process, No Peace: A Timeline of 20 Years of Post-Oslo Meetings, Agreements, Negotiations and Memorandums The historic handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin and the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, overseen by US President Bill Clinton on the White House lawn September 13, 1993. Courtesy of Wikicommons. 1991: Madrid Conference a transfer of authority from Israel to the newly established Palestinian interim self-government As a consequence of the Gulf War, the US authority (PA) within five years, during which and the Soviet Union initiated the Madrid Peace time permanent status negotiations between the Conference to improve regional stability. The two parties were to be held. Israel recognized conference brought together Israel and various the PLO as legitimate representative of the Arab states. For the first time, negotiators from Palestinians; in turn the PLO recognized the the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) State of Israel’s right to exist. participated. The PLO was recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. 1994: Killing Peace September 1993: Oslo I Accord On February 24th, Baruch Goldstein killed 29 worshippers and injured another 125 at the Cave The Declaration of Principles on Interim of the Patriarchs in Hebron during the Muslim Self-Government Arrangements was signed in holiday of Ramadan. On April 6th, a suicide Washington DC on September 13. It was the bombing by a Palestinian against civilians in outcome of secret negotiations between Israel Israel took place, killing eight people in a bus in and the PLO in the Norwegian capital. It included the town of Afula. However, on May 4th, Israel Heinrich Böll Stiftung 5 and the PLO agreed on an Israeli Defense Force and the PA agreed on resuming permanent (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the status negotiations, until May 4th, 1999. The Jericho Area set for 1995, allowing for Yasser government of Benyamin Netanyahu collapsed. Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, to return to Jericho. 1999: Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1995: Oslo II Accords New Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to proceed with peace negotiations. The Oslo II Accords signed in Taba (the Taba The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Agreement) on September 28th split the West Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Bank and the Gaza Strip into Areas A, B and Commitments of Agreements Signed and the C. In Area A, about 3 percent of the occupied Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinian self- had the goal to implement Oslo II and other, government gained civil and security control. smaller agreements between the two conflicting In Area B, about 25 percent of the Palestinian parties and reach a final settlement in 2000. In Territories, civil control was by the Palestinian the following half year, Israel transferred more Authority (PA) while there was a joint security occupied land from Area C to A and B as well control. Area C remained under full Israeli from Area B to A. Still, Israel controlled 60 control. It was also stated that, “neither side percent of the land exclusively (Area C). Israel shall initiate or take any step that will change furthermore released 199 Palestinian prisoners the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in September, but missed a deadline in October pending the outcome of the Permanent Status to release another 150 prisoners. negotiations.” On November 4th, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by 2000: Camp David Summit, Outbreak of the Israeli extremist Yigal Amir.
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