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Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Middle East Peace Talks at the End of the Road? WP S One-State Reality Consolidating Muriel Asseburg

The nine months of negotiations agreed last summer by the US mediators and the two parties ended on 29 April 2014. US Secretary of State John Kerry has since announced a pause in US facilitation activities. Yet, a definitive breakdown or failure of the Middle East peace talks bears far-reaching risks. Even if the mediators were to succeed in effect- ing a restart of talks, there is scant hope of bridging the rifts within the year envisaged – at least if the previous approach were to be maintained. That will lead to a further consolidation of the one-state reality that has long since emerged between the Mediter- ranean and River . Germany and its partners in the must face up to the alternatives: either a much more robust approach to propel the talks to a two- state solution, or insistence on equal political, economic and cultural rights for all in the territories controlled by .

The timeframe scheduled for conclusion these to the respective other side. But that of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement did not lead to rapprochement. Worse still, expired at the end of April. Despite US Sec- the parameters defined by President Bill retary of State John Kerry’s intense efforts, Clinton at the end of 2000 (and largely ac- the talks made so little progress that by the cepted as a point of reference since) were end of 2013 he was concentrating primarily watered down. In addition, the lack of clear on achieving a prolongation. He first hoped parameters and demands allowed Israeli to negotiate a framework agreement Prime Minister to binding both parties to core principles for place his demand for recognition of Israel a peace settlement. But that could not be as a Jewish state at the centre of the talks achieved by the approach he chose, as Kerry and the public debate, rather than nego- neither formulated such principles nor tiating over the final status issues of the made concrete proposals for bridging the Accords (borders and legal status of gaps between the positions. Instead he con- , , settlements, refugees centrated on sounding out the needs and and security arrangements). priorities of the parties and presenting

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division and director of the project “Elite change and SWP Comments 21 new social mobilization in the Arab world” realised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). May 2014

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Talks in Crisis settler wing and Greater Israel ideologues The conflicts finally burst into the open and by some of its coalition partners (no- at the end of March 2014. In the scope of tably Naftali Bennett’s HaBayit HaYehudi). confidence-building measures agreed at the President Abbas also lacks the support he beginning of the talks in July 2013, Israel would require to relinquish the “Palestin- was to release 104 Palestinian prisoners ian constants”: a state in the 1967 borders imprisoned since before the (or at least an equivalent), the right of (in four stages), while the return for refugees and a Palestinian capital promised to undertake no further action in Jerusalem. Abbas’s mandate has long towards joining international conventions since expired (at the latest in 2010), and his and organisations. Israel should have re- engagement in the talks is eyed with great leased the fourth and last group of Palestin- suspicion in the Palestinian population and ian prisoners on 29 March, but Netanyahu in his own Party. Almost eighty years made this conditional on the Palestinians old, Abbas has been further weakened by agreeing to a prolongation of the talks. A political infighting within Fatah over the series of confrontational actions by both selection of a deputy and potential suc- sides ensued: President cessor. signed fifteen international conventions On the other hand, both leaderships and treaties, including the “State of Pales- fear that breaking off the talks could in- tine” joining the four Geneva conventions crease international pressure on them, for that regulate rights and obligations in mili- example by lending weight to the inter- tary conflict and under occupation regimes national boycott movement against Israel and are therefore of particular relevance or by endangering the financial basis of the to the . Israel an- extremely donor-dependent PA. However, nounced the issuing of tenders for about for both leaderships continuing the process seven hundred housing units in Gilo (East is the least worst option only as long as Jerusalem), suspended cooperation with they can persuade their respective base that Palestinian ministries (with the exception it does not harm them. For the Palestinian of the negotiations and security cooper- leadership this is extremely difficult in the ation), and declared its intention to once face of unabated settlement construction. again withhold the transfer payments It remains uncertain therefore whether the due to the Palestinian Authority (PA) under US mediators can offer enough to persuade the Oslo Accords. responded with both parties to return to the negotiation reconciliation with . At the same table. time both sides remained concerned to signal to the that they were still keen to continue the talks, to improve Issues and Principles their own negotiating position and blame Even if the talks were to be extended by the other side for the crisis. another year, it is extremely unlikely that The negotiating process is indeed a tight- the opposing sides would reach a final rope walk for both leaderships. It is easier status agreement within that period. Their for them to continue it (at least in form if positions are miles apart on all final status not in substance) than to make the “painful issues and other questions – much further compromises” evoked so often or to break than in earlier talks, for example under it off altogether. On the one hand, it is Prime Minister in 2008. In questionable whether Netanyahu wants this situation, the American side has done substantial progress at all, as that would even less than previous administrations to break apart his governing coalition and balance the power asymmetry between the possibly even the Likud Party itself, as it parties by laying down firm principles. This would be rejected out of hand by Likud’s has led to a blurring of the contours for a

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two-state settlement as formulated by Presi- already made their historical compromise. dent Barack Obama in his first address Nonetheless, the Palestinian negotiators to the UN General Assembly in September have accepted that there could be limited 2009 and presented to the UN Security land swaps of equivalent size and quality Council in greater detail by the E3 (Ger- so that some of the settlements on the Pales- many, , ) in February tinian side of the Green Line would go to 2011: a territorial solution on the basis of Israel, while Palestine would receive land the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, on the other side in return. But they make security arrangements that satisfy the such swaps conditional on them not leading needs of both sides, a just solution to the to further fragmentation of the Palestinian refugee question agreed by both sides as territory and on affected citizens agreeing well as the main host states, and Jerusalem to resettlement. as the capital of both states. The principal Security arrangements: In earlier talks points of disagreement are as follows: the Palestinians had already accepted that Jerusalem: While the Palestinians claim their state would not possess heavy weapon- East Jerusalem as their capital, the present ry. It would also not have freedom to enter Israeli government insists on a united Jeru- into military alliances and would tolerate salem under Israeli sovereignty. Under the Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley for a Clinton parameters both capitals should be transitional period (three years under the accommodated in Jerusalem, with the Arab Clinton parameters). But now Netanyahu quarters under Palestinian sovereignty, has been insisting on a long-term Israeli the Jewish under Israeli. According to press military presence in the Jordan Valley, and reports, Kerry favours a Palestinian capital has rejected Abbas’s suggestion to replace in just one quarter of East Jerusalem. them with NATO forces. Israel also insists Territory/settlements: While Netanyahu on the right of hot pursuit into Palestine accepted a two-state solution in principle in in specific cases. Both of these conditions a widely noted speech at Bar-Ilan University would mean the continuation of the Israeli in 2009, he also promised during the last military presence and operations and leave election campaign that no settlements Palestine unable to protect its citizens would be dissolved under his government. against assaults. That, however, is unaccep- He has accelerated settlement construction table to the Palestinian side. and refuses to accept the 1967 borders as : During the first the basis for negotiations. Netanyahu also Arab-Israeli war about three quarters of a sprung a surprise demand that even settle- million Palestinians fled or were displaced. ments far from the settlement blocks, such Today the number of Palestinian refugees as Pesagot and Beit El on the outskirts of registered with the has Ramallah, should remain part of Israel. grown to about five million. United Nations According to press reports Kerry’s nego- General Assembly Resolution 194 of Decem- tiating team has not insisted on the 1967 ber 1948 grants them the right to return borders as the starting point for the talks. to their homes. In earlier negotiations the The Palestinians, on the other side, sides had already agreed that this would be assume that their state will comprise all the accomplished largely through return to Palestinian territories occupied in 1967: the State of Palestine and permanent settle- the , East Jerusalem and the Gaza ment in current host countries or in third Strip. Even these represent only about 22 countries (with the respective state’s agree- percent of the former British Mandate’s ment), and only in exceptional cases through territory, whereas the 1947 UN Partition return to Israel. Additionally, Israel was to Plan proposed an Arab state accounting for recognise its share of responsibility for the about 43 percent of the territory. In that refugee problem and a fund was to be set respect, the Palestinians assert, they have up to pay compensation to refugees. While

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Prime Minister Olmert agreed to limited international community in peacekeeping returns to Israel for humanitarian reasons concretised and the consequences of failure and family reunification, Netanyahu strict- spelled out. The latter could, for example, ly rejects any return of refugees. mean freeing the way for an International Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state: Court of Justice legal opinion outlining a In the course of the 1993 Oslo I Accord the solution compatible with international law PLO recognised the State of Israel and Israel and its implementation by the UN Security recognised the PLO as the legitimate repre- Council. Admittedly, such a move (or a com- sentative of the Palestinians. The demand parable one) cannot currently be expected that the PA should recognize Israel as a from the United States. Not only does Con- Jewish state has been raised prominently gress reject presenting binding principles only by Netanyahu. He has also used the and exerting greater pressure, with great debate over this to sow doubts about wheth- unity across party lines in this question. er Palestinian negotiators were really nego- Obama’s Administration is also under grow- tiating in good faith over a two-state settle- ing domestic pressure to turn its attention ment in the sense of one state for the Pales- to other crises and problems rather than tinians and one for the Jews. Leaving aside wasting yet more time on what are per- that the question of Jewish identity is ceived as futile talks. Accordingly, the US also highly contested within Israel, the PA administration announced a pause in its rejects the demand for several reasons. efforts in early May. First, it is established practice under inter- After more than twenty years of Oslo national law to recognise states as such, not negotiations, large majorities in both popu- their identity. Second, such a move could lations would interpret failure of this round be interpreted as the PA approving the un- of talks as the failure of a negotiated solu- equal treatment of the Palestinian tion per se. That would especially under- (who make up about 20 percent of Israel’s mine and indeed fundamentally call into population). And third it could be taken as question the legitimacy of the PA, which a sign that the PA had renounced the right was originally established to administer of return. If at all, therefore, Palestinian the Palestinian Territories for a transitional negotiators signal that recognition of Israel period (1994–1999), in which negotiations as the nation-state of the Jews could come were to lead to liberation from occupation. only after, rather than before, the conclu- That would also make it harder for the PA sion of talks settling these issues. to cooperate with Israel to the extent is does today, for example in the sphere of security. Consequences of Failure The hardening of positions and the widen- ing of the gaps between the two sides means A Third Intifada? that failure of the talks, if they are to restart An end of the talks would not, however, at all, is foreseeable sooner or later, at least automatically lead to a third Intifada, in if no new approach is adopted. The latter the sense of a renewed outburst of violence. would have to involve concerted interna- In 2000 the Palestinian population still tional pressure to bind the parties to the held high expectations of independent basic principles of a solution, followed statehood and successful negotiations at by intense mediation to clarify the details Camp David, and the failure of those talks between the parties. An oversight mecha- did therefore contribute to spark the second nism would have to be established to moni- Intifada. But the most recent negotiations tor steps leading to a solution (as provided are followed largely with resignation. for but not implemented in the Middle East Surveys show that Palestinians (like their Quartet’s Roadmap of 2003), the role of the Israeli counterparts) have abandoned any

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hopes they may have placed in the talks. population depends directly or indirectly Failure is therefore likely to provoke on income from the public sector. Further- no more than a shrugging of shoulder more, while the PA has adapted its tactics in most quarters. increasingly to the given situation by pur- Also, Palestinian readiness to support an- suing other paths to independence along- other uprising is likely to be much smaller side (and in future possibly instead of) talks, than it was fourteen years ago. Not only is there is no sign of it fundamentally aban- the viewed much less as a doning the objective of independent state- success than the first one, but the Palestin- hood. Handing responsibility back to the ians are still suffering its consequences. occupying power would, however, Most painful is the loss of jobs in Israel and contradict its efforts to achieve recognition the settlements, where about one fifth of of Palestine on the international stage. the Palestinian workforce was employed Yet, the collapse of the PA or at least a before the second uprising. What is more, serious erosion of its ability to govern can the separation barrier de facto annexes by no means be ruled out. Israel is likely about 8 percent of the West Bank and cuts to respond with reprisals as soon as the East Jerusalem off from its Palestinian Palestinian side takes any action it regards hinterland. Many Palestinians also worry as confrontative. That would include offi- about losing all they possess in any new cial support of the Boycott, Divestment and protracted conflict with Israel, especially Sanctions (BDS) movement or any attempt as private indebtedness has risen notice- to sign the statute of the International ably in recent years. Criminal Court. Israel could then withhold Finally, the Palestinian leadership under transfer payments or completely seal off President Abbas will also seek to prevent particular areas. Certain donors, first and any renewed popular uprising. Abbas cat- foremost the United States, would probably egorically rejects the use of violence and also suspend their support, at least par- is hardly likely to call for mass protests. tially. Although largely peaceful “popular resist- The rapprochement of the leaderships in ance” has gained traction in the popula- Ramallah and Gaza and their 23 April 2014 tion, especially among the youth, the major power-sharing agreement could entail simi- movements of Hamas and Fatah have en- lar consequences. While it is questionable couraged it only half-heartedly. In view of whether important elements of the recon- their falling popularity, both leaderships ciliation agreement, such as the holding of in Ramallah and Gaza City must fear that largely free elections including Hamas or mass protests could quickly turn against the integration of the two security services, them too. can actually be realised, the announcement itself was enough to cause Israel to threaten to quit the talks. If a technocratic consensus The End of the Palestinian Authority? government is actually established, Israel is Even the threat to disband the PA, voiced likely to stop its transfer payments. It is by with increasing frequency by figures in- no means clear either how the European cluding the President, appears more a help- Union and its member states would relate less warning than a seriously intended to and cooperate with such a government step. The Palestinian political and economic that included members of Hamas (which elites are hardly going to renounce the privi- has been on the EU terrorist list since 2003) leges associated with a VIP status rooted or refused to explicitly affirm the so-called in the Oslo Accords. The PA is also the re- Quartet criteria (recognition of Israel, cipient of international donations and the recognition of earlier agreements signed biggest employer in the Palestinian terri- between Israel and the PLO, renunciation tories. A considerable proportion of the of violence). This risks exacerbating the

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PA’s financial difficulties, stemming domination over Jerusalem and over the from growing donor fatigue, and thus Palestinian economy. further restricting its functioning and Since Oslo, there has been a further legitimacy. entanglement of the populations – that A recent study edited by Khalil Shikaki must not be confused with a harmonious (Director of the Palestinian Centre for coexistence. Israel’s continued settlement Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah) construction in the West Bank and East convincingly details the grave consequence Jerusalem, in violation of the Oslo Accords, of a collapse of the PA: The security situa- and its withdrawal of the settlers from the tion in the West Bank would escalate dra- in 2005, have produced a com- matically and local militias would be re- plex demographic pattern between the invigorated. There would also be a massive Mediterranean and the River Jordan, where socio-economic slump and public services inhabitants enjoy different rights (or are would deteriorate noticeably. denied them) depending on citizenship, place of residence and ethnicity/religion. Already today there is no longer a Jewish Consolidation of a One-State Reality majority in the region controlled by Israel, After the dissolution or collapse of the which is home to about 8 million Israelis Palestinian Authority it would no longer be (of whom some 6 million are Jewish, in- possible to ignore the fact that a one-state cluding roughly 550,000 Jewish settlers in reality has long since emerged in the areas the West Bank and East Jerusalem), about of the former British Mandate of Palestine. 4.4 million Palestinians and roughly 1.6 Although Israel actually annexed only part million Palestinian Israelis. Indeed, the of the occupied Palestinian Territories, Jewish share of the population is set to namely East Jerusalem, it exercises de facto decline, due to higher fertility among the far-reaching control over the entire territory Palestinians and because the waves of and its population. immigration seen in the 1990s are unlikely The basis for this state of affairs was to be repeated. created by the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, At the same time, since Oslo there has with the consent of the Palestinian leader- been no progress towards sustainable devel- ship, who at the time assumed that this was opment in the Palestinian Territories, an merely for a five-year transition period. The end to the occupation and the establish- Accords basically restrict the competencies ment of two states. The considerable inter- of the PA to self-administration and main- national investments in Palestinian govern- taining internal order in the largely discon- ment institutions and the private sector tiguous parts of Area A and Area B (enclaves have thus remained as ineffective as the representing today about 38 percent of the recognition of Palestine as a “non-member West Bank). For Area C (about 62 percent) observer state” by the UN General Assembly the Accords provide far-reaching Israeli in November 2012. control, including public order, security, Instead the territory envisaged for a planning and approval for all construction. Palestinian state has become ever more frag- In this manner Israel divested itself of mented through the construction of settle- some of the responsibilities of an occupying ments, settlement infrastructure and the power, while the international community separation barrier, the blockade of the Gaza took over funding. At the same time, the Strip, a complex system of checkpoints, Oslo Accords also gave Israel interim con- separate roads and travel permits, and the trol of land and sea borders and airspace internal Palestinian split. The everyday lives (with the exception, since mid-2007, of the of the Palestinians remain dominated by border between the Gaza Strip and ). the occupation. Not least, the Accords cemented Israeli

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Conflicts over Gaza and Jerusalem fada. But the situation in East Jerusalem as Other festering conflicts threaten an already a whole is explosive as Israel has massively fragile stability. The cease-fire between the expanded its settlement activities there Hamas government and Israel, mediated since the resumption of negotiations in July by Egypt after the last round of fighting 2013. Additionally, there is discrimination in 2012, has been increasingly eroded in in provision of public services and construc- recent months. There is an acute danger tion permits, and Palestinian homes built that a miscalculation by one or other side without permits have increasingly been could set in motion a renewed military demolished. escalation. In fact since Oslo the periods between armed conflicts involving the Gaza Strip have been short (2002, 2006, 2008/09, Conclusions 2012) and reprisal strikes have become Even if there were a return to negotiations, routine. they cannot be expected to produce a two- Also, the situation in the Gaza Strip, state settlement – with the result of a fur- which has been under Israeli blockade since ther entrenchment of the one-state reality. 2006 (even if it has been slightly eased in Germany and its European partners should the interim), has worsened further since face up to the alternatives: Either there the military coup in Egypt in July 2013. must be robust negotiations based on clear After the coup Hamas was declared a terror international principles to still achieve a organisation in Egypt, the Rafah border two-state solution after all. Or ways must crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt be found to deal with the one-state reality has been almost permanently closed, and without tolerating violations of inter- most of the tunnels under the border have national law or accepting that “might is been destroyed. As a result, the humani- right”. There is no sense in speculating tarian situation in Gaza has drastically about the point of no return from when a worsened, the economy has collapsed and two-state settlement would no longer be the population has lost its last physical possible. After all, housing and infrastruc- connection to the outside world. The Hamas ture can be dismantled or used by other government has also lost its main source population groups. But the political and of revenue, which was the licensing and material costs for a change of course rise taxation of trade through the tunnels. As with every new settlement unit constructed a consequence, it can no longer pay wages in the occupied territories. and salaries in full, making most of the It would be sensible for the EU member- Strip’s population once more dependent states to follow two guiding principles. First on international humanitarian aid. The they should work to prevent crises such as suffering is heightened by funding prob- the complete or partial collapse of the PA lems at the UN relief agency UNRWA, (for example as a consequence of Israeli re- which has already had to scale down its actions to the formation of a national con- services to refugees and poor families. sensus government) and renewed outbreaks In an unpublished March 2014 report, of violence, for example in Gaza or Jeru- EU member states’ representatives paint salem. Second they should seriously consider a dramatic picture of the situation in East whether they are willing and able to per- Jerusalem, warning urgently of an esca- suade the United States to adopt a consider- lation of the dispute over the holy sites. ably more robust approach to the negotia- Radical Jewish groups are attempting to tions. The alternative is unpalatable to all alter the status quo at the al-Aqsa Com- sides. With a vast majority of both popu- pound or Temple Mount, where a demon- lations, and Jewish Israelis in particular, strative visit by opposition leader Ariel rejecting a one-state settlement, that Sharon in 2000 triggered the second Inti- approach is unlikely to lead to a consensual

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solution. Still, in the absence of progress towards two states, the division of respon- sibilities between Israel and the PA agreed in Oslo and the associated assumption of most of the costs by the international com- munity will have to be questioned. And instead of continuing to pursue the support of Palestinian statehood, Europe will then have to demand equal political, economic and cultural rights for all inhabitants of the territory controlled by Israel.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014 All rights reserved

These Comments reflect solely the author’s views.

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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ISSN 1861-1761

Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 28/2014)

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