Vojaška Zgodovina Military History

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA MILITARY HISTORY

Številka/Number 1 (14), Letnik/Volume 9/2008

2 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Izdajatelj: Vojaški muzej Slovenske vojske Issued by: the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces Uredniški odbor: dr. Valerija Bernik Burja Board of Editors: major mag. Matjaž Bizjak Dr. Valerija Bernik Burja dr. Damijan Guštin Major Matjaž Bizjak, M.A. dr. Ronald Haycock (Kanada) Dr. Damijan Guštin podpolkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik (glavni in odgo- Dr. Ronald Haycock (Canada) vorni urednik) Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Tomaž Kladnik, (Chief stotnik mag. Zvezdan Markovič (namestnik glavne- Editor) ga in odgovornega urednika) Captain Zvezdan Markovič, M.A. (Deputy Chief Ladislav Mesarič (tehnični urednik) Editor) dr. Vladimir Prebilič Ladislav Mesarič (Technical Editor) dr.Robert S. Rush (Združene države Amerike) Dr. Vladimir Prebilič dr. Erwin Schmidl (Avstrija) Dr. Robert S. Rush (USA) dr. Rok Stergar Dr. Erwin Schmidl (Austria) dr. Tomaž Teropšič Dr. Rok Stergar mag. Marjan Vešnar Dr. Tomaž Teropšič Marjan Vešnar, M.A. Lektoriranje: Meta Brulec Prevodi: mag. Jeta Leskovar, Iris Žnidarič Proofreader: Meta Brulec Oblikovanje in priprava: Peter Florjančič Translators: Jeta Leskovar, MA, Iris Žnidarič Design: Peter Florjančič Založnik: Defensor d.o.o. Direktor: Boris Knific Publisher: Defensor d.o.o. Tisk: Mond Grafika d.o.o. Director: Boris Knific Naklada: 800 izvodov Printed by: Mond Grafika d.o.o. Number of Copies Printed: 800 Številka 1 (14), letnik 9/2008 ISSN 1580-4828 Number 1 (14), Volume 9/2008 ISSN 1580-4828 © Defensor d.o.o. Ljubljana 2008 © Defensor d.o.o. Ljubljana 2008 Za vsebino prispevkov so odgovorni avtorji. Ponatis člankov in slik je mogoč samo z dovoljenjem Voja- Responsibility for content lies with authors. No part škega muzeja Slovenske vojske in navedbo vira. of this publication may be reproduced without the prior written permission of the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces and without acknowledge- www.vojaskimuzej.si ment of source. [email protected]

www.vojaskimuzej.si [email protected]

2 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Kazalo

Contents •

Zvezdan Marković 6 Vojni načrti vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja The Kingdom of Yugoslavia's Military War Plans in late 1930's

Blaž Torkar 24 Podoba agenta medvojne tajne službe Special Operations Executive (SOE) Image of a Second World War Secret Organizations Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent

Andrej Gaspari 36 Votanov hram namesto otoške cerkve Marijinega Vnebovzetja Temple to Wotan as a Replacement for the Church of the Assumption on the Bled Island

Mag. Dmitar Tasić 58 Preoboroževanje enot zagrebško-ljubljanske armadne oblasti s tehniko iz programa zahodne vojaške pomoči v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja Rearmament of the Zagreb-Ljubljana Army Authority with Technical Assets from the Western Military Assistance Programme in the 1950s

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 3 Nagovor urednika

Introduction •

Spoštovani prijatelji vojaške zgodovine, Dear Military History Enthusiasts,

pred vami je prva številka novega letnika this is the first issue of the new volume of the vojaškozgodovinskega časopisa Vojaškega mu- Vojaška zgodovina (Military History) maga- zeja Slovenske vojske Vojaška zgodovina. zine published by the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Že ko so v Centru za vojaškozgodovinsko dejavnost leta 2000 izdali njegovo prvo števil- The very first issue of the Military History was ko, ki je prinašala vsebino referatov s posveta brought out by the Center for Military History in o novejši vojaški zgodovini na Slovenskem, je 2000. It contained the research papers present- bilo to mogoče poimenovati za enega od pre- ed at the session on Newer Slovenian Military lomnih trenutkov v naši sodobni vojaški zgo- History. The publication of this first issue was a dovini, saj je pomenil zagon znanstveno raz- turning point for modern Slovenian military his- iskovalne in publicistične dejavnosti in nov tory as it provided impetus to scientific research prispevek k obravnavi slovenske, pa tudi obče and publishing activities, in addition to contrib- vojaške zgodovine v slovenskem prostoru. V uting to discussion on both the Slovenian and prvih številkah je bila večja pozornost name- general military history in Slovenia. The first is- njena obravnavi naše polpretekle zgodovine sues dealt mainly with our modern history, i.e. oziroma obdobju osamosvajanja in Obrambni Slovenia’sgaining independence and the defensive vojni leta 1991. Objavljeni so bili spomini ak- war of 1991. These issues included memoirs of the tivnih udeležencev te vojne, ob njeni 10. oble- participants in the war. On the tenth anniversa- tnici pa je izšla tudi tematska številka. V šesti ry of the war, a special issue was published. After številki pa smo začeli objavljati tudi članke, ki the sixth issue, the publication included articles obravnavajo slovensko vojaško zgodovino tudi on older Slovenian military history. v starejših obdobjih. The idea of bringing up to date the content and Kar nekaj časa je v Vojaškem muzeju Sloven- design of the Military History has been contem- ske vojske zorela ideja po vsebinski in oblikovni plated by the Military Museum of the Slovenian prenovi Vojaške zgodovine. Tako s to številko Armed Forces for some time. This issue is the be- pričenjamo njegovo postopno preoblikovanje ginning of the Military History’s gradual trans- iz vojaško zgodovinskega zbornika v vojaško- formation from a collection of papers on military zgodovinski strokovni in znanstveni časopis, history to a military history magazine that in- kar zagotavljajo ugledni domači in tuji člani cludes expert and scientific articles contributed uredniškega odbora in recenzenti znanstvenih by renowned Slovenian and foreign Editorial člankov, ki jih objavljamo. V drugem delu ča- Board Members and authors of appraisals. The sopisa pa bo prostor tudi za predstavitev usta- second part of the magazine concentrates on nov, ki delujejo na področju vojaške zgodovine presentations of the military history institutions po svetu, kongresov, konferenc in simpozijev, throughout the world, congresses, conferences kritik in ocen oziroma recenzij, arhivskega gra- and symposiums, critiques and appraisals, archi- diva ter zgodovine posameznih vojaških enot, val materials, and history of individual military v katerih so se kot vojaki bojevali Slovenci. units whose members included Slovenians.

4 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA V tej številki objavljamo znanstvene članke This issue brings forth scientific articles by the raziskovalcev vojaške zgodovine iz Vojaškega military history researchers from the Military muzeja Slovenske vojske. Tako stotnik mag. Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Captain Zvezdan Marković v svojem članku obravna- (M.A.) Zvezdan Marković delves into the war va Vojne načrte vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije plans of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in late v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja kot enega 1930’s that can be seen as one of the causes of od »krivcev« za poraz kraljeve vojske v april- defeat of the king’s army in the April War. In ski vojni. Za marsikoga povsem neznano in the article Temple to Wotan as a Replacement provokativno temo iz naše zgodovine prinaša for the Church of the Assumption on the Bled članek doc. dr. Andreja Gasparija, ki pod na- Island, Dr. Andrej Gaspari deals with a rather slovom Wotanov hram namesto otoške cerkve unknown and provocative theme from Slovenian Marijinega vnebovzetja obravnava nacistične history, exploring the Nazi intentions of building namere o nepoganskem kultnem središču na a neopagan cult center on the Bled Island. Blaž Blejskem otoku. Višji vojaški uslužbenec Blaž Torkar presents information on Second World Torkar nam v svojem članku skozi mrežo šol War Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents za specialno urjenje prikaže podobo agenta by describing the network of Special Training medvojne tajne službe Special Operations Exe- Schools. In the last article, Dmitar Tasić, M.A., cutive (SOE). Kot zadnji pa v članku Preobo- from Serbia describes the technical re-armament roževanje Jugoslovanske ljudske armade mag. of the Yugoslav People’s Army through Western Dmitar Tasić iz Srbije opisuje oboroževanje military aid program after Yugoslavia’s relation- armade s tehniko iz programa zahodne voja- ship with the Soviet Union deteriorated. ške pomoči po zaostritvi odnosov Jugoslavije s The second part of the magazine draws atten- Sovjetsko zvezo. tion to the publishing activity of the Military V drugem delu časopisa pa predstavljamo Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces, i.e. to the publicistično dejavnost Vojaškega muzeja Slo- publications from a collection of books we have is- venske vojske oziroma dela, ki so izšla v naši sued on the subject of Slovenian military history. knjižni zbirki Slovenska vojaška zgodovina. Ta These open new venues of research of the national odpira nova poglavja nacionalne vojaške pre- military past. Thus, they assist in understanding teklosti ter s tem pomaga razumeti našo seda- the present and contribute to the development of njost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju sloven- Slovenian military thought. ske vojaške misli. In conclusion, I’d like to express a warm wel- Ob koncu pa bi rad še posebej pozdravil vse come to all participants to the 8th Conference of udeležence 8. konference Mednarodnega zdru- the Military History Working Group (MHWG) ženja za vojaško zgodovino (Military History which will be held from 20 April to 23 April 2008 Working Group - MHWG), ki jo v sodelova- in Ljubljana and Kobarid and is co-hosted by the nju z Landesverteidigungsakademie Österre- Military Museum of Slovenian Armed Forces and ichisches Bundesheer med 20. in 23. aprilom Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreichisches 2008 gostimo v Ljubljani in Kobaridu. Bundesheer.

Podpolkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Tomaž Kladnik glavni in odgovorni urednik Chief Editor

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 5 6 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Vojni načrti vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia's Military War Plans in late 1930's • mag. Zvezdan Marković

Izvleček Abstract

Prispevek obravnava vojne načrte Vojske This article deals with the Kingdom of Kraljevine Jugoslavije, ki jih je v drugi polovici Yugoslavia’s military war plans that were revised 30. let 20. stoletja kar nekajkrat spreminjala. several times in late 1930’s to reflect the new in- Načrti so se morali velikokrat popravljati v ternational situation, especially in the neighbor- duhu novonastalih razmer v mednarodnem ing countries. One of the important influencing okolju, zlasti v soseščini. Zagotovo je med naj- factors was certainly the entry of German troops bolj pretresljivimi dogodki treba omeniti nem- into Austria and the annexation of Austria to the ško zasedbo Avstrije (anšlus) in njeno priklju- Third Reich (Anschluss). The Yugoslav war plans čitev k tretjemu rajhu. Vojni načrti nam tudi reveal the basic doctrine and the strategic policy razkrivajo temeljne doktrinarne in strateške directions of the top Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s usmeritve v vojaškem vrhu Vojske Kraljevine Army officials. However, after the events of 27 Jugoslavije. Dogodki, ki so sledili po 27. marcu March 1941, there was not enough time to for- 1941. leta, pa so prehiteli snovalce vojnih na- mulate a new plan. črtov, preden so lahko pripravili novega. Keywords: Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Ključne besede: Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Vojska Army, General Staff, War Plans, Anschluss, Kraljevine Jugoslavije, generalštab, vojni načrti, Little Entente, Offensive, Defensive. anšlus, mala antanta, ofenziva, defenziva. Yugoslav War Plans 1938 – 1941 Jugoslovanski vojni načrti 1938–1941 The Chief of General Staff provided the basic Načelnik Glavnega generalštaba je dal te- idea for a war and operative plan and was respon- meljno idejo vojnega in operacijskega načrta sible for its elaboration but it fell to the govern- in bil odgovoren za njegovo pripravo, potrje- ment to confirm and approve it. The Minister for vala in odobrila pa ga je vlada. Vloga mini- the Army and Navy informed the Chief of General stra vojske in mornarice je bila, da obvešča Staff on the general external policy orientation of načelnika Glavnega generalštaba o splošni the government, however, he did not take part in zunanjepolitični usmeritvi vlade, zunanjepo- discussing the operations. litičnem položaju, pri tem pa se ni spuščal v The Operative Department of the General Staff operativne razprave. prepared the war plans for all conceivable war Operativni oddelek Glavnega generalštaba scenarios while taking into account the military je pripravljal vse vojne načrte in pri tem moral and political situation as well as the strength of upoštevati vojaško-politične razmere in moč the armies of the countries that could be involved armad tistih držav, ki bi bile vpletene v vojno. in a potential war.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 7 Do leta 1938, tj. do anšlusa, je Jugoslavija Until 1938 (i. e. until the Anschluss) Yugo- imela le eno nevarno in močno sosedo, in sicer slavia only had one dangerous and powerful Italijo. Sosede Avstrija, Madžarska, Bolgarija neighbor, i. e. Italy. Its other neighbors Austria, in Albanija so po določilih mirovnih sporazu- Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania had to comply mov po prvi svetovni vojni morale spoštovati with the provisions of the peace agreements con- omejitve za oborožitev in vojsko, drugi sosedi cluded after the First World War limiting their ar- pa sta bili naravni zaveznici (Romunija, Grči- mament and the size of their armies. The remain- ja). Zato so bili v tem obdobju vsi vojni načrti ing two neighbors were natural allies (Romania, proti Italiji obrambni, proti drugim sosedam Greece). Therefore, all plans for war against Italy pa so predvidevali ofenzivno delovanje. De- were of a defensive character in this period, even fenzivni značaj so načrtovalci obdržali tudi though offensive actions against other neighbors v vojnih načrtih, ki so bili izdelani po anšlu- were provided for. Even the post-Anschluss war su, razen v primerih, ko so predvidevali na- plans kept their defensive character except in the pad na Madžarsko (natančneje na vzhodno case of planning an attack on Hungary (more Madžarsko).1 precisely, Eastern Hungary).1 Vojni načrt I10 N1 M9 Ar3 B10 (D - II) War Plan I10 N1 M9 Ar3 B10 (D - II)

Oblikovanje tega načrta je bilo končano This plan had been formulated by the Operative 24. 8. 1938 v Operativnem oddelku Glavne- department of the General Staff before 24 August ga generalštaba. V njem so predvidevali soča- 1938. It envisaged a simultaneous attack against sni potek vojne Jugoslavije proti združenim Yugoslavia by the joint forces of Italy, Albania, silam Italije, Albanije, Nemčije, Madžarske Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In case of in Bolgarije. Ob takšnem poteku dogodkov bi such a development, Yugoslavia would establish Jugoslavija bila v zavezništvu s Češkoslovaško, an alliance with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Romunijo in Turčijo. Predvidevali so, da bi se Turkey. It was predicted that Greece would either jugoslovanski strani pridružila tudi Grčija, v join the war on the side of Yugoslavia or declare

1 Arhiv vojnoistorijskog instituta, Beograd – v nadaljevanju AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1. 1 Archives of the Vojnoistorijski institut (the Institute of War History), Belgrade – hereinafter AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.

8 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA nasprotnem primeru pa bi razglasila nevtralen neutrality. Besides, Yugoslavia could hope for the status. Poleg tega bi Jugoslavija lahko upala na support of France. The help from the allies would francosko pomoč. Zavezniška pomoč bi bila depend on their engagements on other fronts since odvisna od njihove angažiranosti na drugih a general war in Europe was regarded as a pos- frontah, ker so predvidevali, da lahko pride do sibility. Absence of territorial links between po- splošne vojne na evropskih tleh. Kot ugodno tential enemies (particularly Albania, Bulgaria, okoliščino za Jugoslavijo so poudarjali terito- and Hungary) was emphasized as a favorable cir- rialno nepovezanost njenih morebitnih sovra- cumstance for Yugoslavia with, however, a nega- žnikov, zlasti Albanije, Bolgarije in Madžarske, tive aspect of prospective attack being conducted neugodno pa bi bilo, če bi napad potekal z več from several directions at once. Consequently, the strani in bi zato morali razmestiti sile na raz- Yugoslav army would have to be deployed in sev- lične konce države. eral areas of the country. V načrtu so izpostavili problem številčne The plan highlighted the problem of the dif- neenakosti pripadnikov oboroženih sil. Po ference in the number of troops. According to ocenah Glavnega generalštaba je bilo za Jugo- the General Staff's estimate, this ratio was very slavijo to razmerje zelo slabo (1 : 7). Pri tem unfavorable for Yugoslavia (1 : 7), before even niso upoštevali še nezakonitih albanskih in taking into account the irregular Albanian and bolgarskih enot, njihovih rezervnih enot itn. Bulgarian units, reserve units, etc. V primerjavi z letalskimi silami sta bili As far as respective air forces were concerned, Nemčija in Italija močnejši od Jugoslavije, Germany and Italy had an advantage over ta pa močnejša od vseh drugih. Vendar, če bi Yugoslavia while the latter was stronger than Madžarska, Bolgarija in Albanija združile svoje other countries concerned. However, should these sile, bi bilo skupno letalstvo močnejše od jugo- states (Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania) combine slovanskega. Vse to je sililo h krepitvi protile- their armies, their joint air force would have an talske obrambe. Načrt poudarja izrazito pred- advantage over Yugoslavia. Therefore, air defense nost italijanske in nemške vojske v oborožitvi, had to be developed. The plan stresses the pro- preostale vojske pa bi bile še nekaj časa slabše nounced advantage of the Italian and German od jugoslovanske.2 armies in armament, even though other armies V poglavju Cilji in značaj vojne lahko za- were expected to remain weaker than the Yugoslav sledimo: »V takšnem primeru, za takšen vojni army for some time to come.2 primer, mora biti v svojih temeljih naš vojni The chapter »Objectives and Character of načrt defenziven, vendar če bi nastali pogoji War« states: »In case of such a war, our war plan za našo uspešno obrambo, se omogoča prehod is necessarily fundamentally defensive in nature, na ofenzivno delovanje.« (tekst je v origina- however, in the event of this defense being suc- lu podčrtan). Pri tem bi bil glavni cilj zavrni- cessful, the plan allows for transition to offensive tev napada in istočasen napad na Madžarsko operations » (the original text is underlined). »kot najbolj nevarnega nasprotnika v prvem The main goal of this course of action would be udaru.«3 to repel the attack and to attack Hungary at the V načrtu so najprej poudarili nevarnost, da same time as it would “pose the greatest threat in bi prišlo do hkratnega napada iz bolgarske in the first strike«.3 albanske strani proti »Južni Srbiji«, torej Ma- The plan first highlighted the danger of a si- kedoniji, in sicer v smeri Skopja, kar bi resno multaneous Bulgarian and Albanian attack on ogrozilo jugoslovansko obrambo. Prav tako se “Southern Serbia”, i. e. the Former Yugoslav jim je zdel nevaren napad Italije in Nemčije Republic of Mace-donia, namely in the direc- proti Zagrebu, kot tudi delovanje nemške voj- tion of Skopje, seriously threatening the Yugoslav ske z madžarskega ozemlja. defense. An Italian and German attack towards V nadaljevanju lahko preberemo, da so oce- Zagreb was equally feared, as well as possible njevali Nemčijo kot najmočnejšega in najne- German army operations from the territory of varnejšega nasprotnika, zlasti zaradi njihove Hungary. sposobnosti za izvajanje hitrih akcij, kot tudi The following text mentions that Germany

2 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2. 2 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2. 3 Prav tam. 3 Ibid.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 9 zaradi teritorialne povezanosti z Madžarsko. was perceived as the strongest and most danger- V sklepu tega poglavja lahko preberemo: ous enemy, mostly due to German capacity for »1.Proti Madžarski je treba nastopiti z najbolj swift attacks but also because of the territorial energično ofenzivo, ki bo povezana z delo- vicinity to Hungary. vanjem naših zaveznikov in njen cilj bi bil, The conclusion to the chapter states: da se dotolče njena glavna sila, ki bi bila na- »1.In cooperation with our allies, the most ener- potena proti nam z obeh strani Donave. getic offensive measures have to be taken 2. Ko se pusti najpotrebnejšemu delu naših sil, against Hungary, their aim being to destroy da skupaj z zavezniki izkoristijo uspeh pro- Hungary's main force that would be sent here ti Madžarski, se vse proste enote uporabijo from both sides of the Danube. proti Nemčiji, Italiji ali Bolgariji, da bi tudi 2. After the requisite troops are dispatched toge- njih premagale, in sicer najprej tisto, ki bi ther with the allies to take advantage of the su- bila v konkretnem času najbolj nevarna. ccess against Hungary, all available units are 3. V prvem obdobju defenzivna operacija proti used against Germany, Italy, or Bulgaria in Zadru, v ugodnem trenutku preiti v napad, order to defeat them as well, starting with the katerega cilj je njegovo zavzetje in odstrani- country that poses the greatest threat at that tev nevarnosti s te strani.«4 particular moment. 3. In the first phase to conduct a defensive ope- V poglavju VII obravnavajo še druge mo- ration in the direction of Zadar, in an appro- žnosti za delovanje jugoslovanskih nasprotni- priate moment to switch to an attack with the kov in na podlagi vsega, kar so analizirali in objective of conquering Zadar and eliminating predvideli v tem vojnem načrtu, sklenejo, »da the threat from this flank.«4 je osnovni pogoj za uspešno izvedbo obrambnih dejavnosti povečati operativno vojsko in Chapter VII deals with alternative possibili- učinkovitost njene oborožitve in opreme; nje- ties of action by the Yugoslav enemies. Based on no urjenje za hitre transporte in manevrira- analyses and predictions contained in the war nje; povečanje in izboljšanje prometnih sred- plan, it concludes that »the basic condition for stev in pravočasno fortifikacijsko urjenje na successful implementation of defense activities vseh mejnih območjih, ki naj bi bila bodoča is to increase the number of the operative army vojskovališča, zlasti proti Nemčiji, Madžarski units and improve the quality of their weapons in Italiji«.5 and equipment; train it for swift transport and maneuvering; increase the number of vehicles and Vojni načrt N M8 I9 Ar2 B2 improve them; and to conduct timely fortification (Varianta »D – 8« osnovnega načrta »D«) training in all border areas that could become future battlefields, especially against Germany, Vojni načrt je bil podpisan 17. 9. 1938, do- Hungary, and Italy ».5 končan pa 27. 9. 19386. V načrtu je predvideno, da se bo Kraljevina War Plan N M8 I9 Ar2 B2 Jugoslavija istočasno vojskovala proti Nem- (variation ‘D - 8’ of the basic plan ‘D’) čiji in Madžarski ter da se Italija, Albanija in Bolgarija ne bodo vmešavale. Morda bi lahko This war plan was signed on 17 September prišlo do združitve vseh sil teh petih držav. Ob 1938 and the process of its elaboration was con- takšnem razvoju dogodkov bi bila Jugoslavija v cluded on 27 September 19386. zvezi s Češkoslovaško, Romunijo in Turčijo. V The plan originated in the hypothesis that tem taboru bi bila tudi Grčija, ki bi v najslab- the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would be simulta- šem primeru imela status nevtralne države. neously engaged in warfare against Germany Besedilo vojnega načrta je podobno, skoraj and Hungary. Meanwhile, Italy, Albania, and enako prejšnjemu vojnemu načrtu, saj so vne- Bulgaria would remain neutral. In the event sene le nepomembne spremembe: where all five states concerned would join forces,

4 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2. 4 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2. 5 Prav tam. 5 Ibid. 6 AVII, P-17, k. 11, f. 1, br. 46, Str. Pov. Dj. O. Br. 707. 6 AVII, P-17, k. 11, f. 1, br. 46, Str. Pov. Dj. O. Br. 707.

10 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • govori se o prenehanju vojaških določb Ne- Yugoslavia would find allies in Czechoslovakia, uillyj-skega sporazuma, ki je omejeval »svo- Romania, and Turkey. This camp would comprise bodo oboroževanja« Bolgarije; podobne Greece, as well. In the worst case scenario, Greece določbe Trianonskega sporazuma, ki je bil would stay uninvolved. dosežen z Madžarsko, so izgubile »skoraj ves The wording of the plan is similar, almost praktičen pomen«; identical, to the war plan above. Only some mi- • najpomembnejša sprememba se nanaša na nor changes are added: ofenzivne operacije proti Madžarski. Ker • the plan mentions the cessation of validity of so menili, da so močne nemške sile na za- the military provisions of the Neuilly Treaty hodnem Madžarskem, se je ofenziva proti limiting “the freedom to arm” to Bulgaria; jugoslovanski severni sosedi zožila na po- the similar provisions of the Trianon Treaty dročje vzhodno od Donave (na območju with Hungary had lost “almost all meaning in Bačke), in sicer tako, da je prišlo do nepo- practice“; sredne povezave s Čehi in Romuni. Tako bi • the most important change concerns offensive dobili oporišče in strateški naslon za napad operations against Hungary. Since it was tho- zahodno od Donave, v najslabšem primeru ught there were strong German forces in the bi uporabili Donavo kot naravno oviro med west of Hungary, the offensive against the Yu- Nemci z ene in oboroženimi silami Češko- goslav northern neighbor was narrowed to the slovaške, Romunije in Jugoslavije z druge area to the east of the Danube (the Bačka regi- strani. Opazimo lahko, da niso izključili on) so as to achieve a direct link with Czecho- možnosti, da bi ob takšnem razvoju dogod- slovakia and Romania. Thus, both a foothold kov Italija ostala nevtralna ali celo pristopi- and a strategic base for an attack to the west of la k jugoslovansko-češkoslovaško-romunski the Danube would be gained. In the worst case zvezi. scenario, the Danube would be a terrain obsta- V poglavju o zbiranju jugoslovanskih sil so cle between the Germans on one side and the naredili določene spremembe7. armed forces of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and

7 AVII,P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 11 Ta dva vojna načrta sta izhajala iz predvi- Yugoslavia on the other side. It is worth no- devanja, da bi se lahko Kraljevina Jugoslavija ting that the plan did not exclude the possibi- uspešno obranila in celo izvajala ofenzivne lity of Italy remaining neutral or even joining akcije pred združenimi silami petih sovražnih the alliance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and držav. Koliko je to bilo nerealno zaradi ne- Romania. pripravljenosti Jugoslavije na vojno, se vidi iz dveh dokumentov, in sicer iz poročila Glavne- The chapter on the grouping of Yugoslav troops ga generalštaba z dne 31. 8. 1938 in poročila contains certain changes7. Glavnega generalštaba z dne 20. 11. 19388. Both war plans originated in the assumption that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could success- Vojni načrt I N M Ar B (»O«) fully defend itself and even carry out an offensive against joint forces of five enemy states. The fact 9 V tem vojnem načrtu je predvideno, da that such expectations were unfounded (since bo Jugoslavija vodila vojno »proti združenim Yugoslavia was unprepared for war) is evident

8 Aprilski rat 1941, Zbornik dokumenata, I, Vojnoistorijski institut Beograd, 1969, dok. 7 AVII,P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1. 25, str. 68−95; AVII, P-17, k. 84, f. 5, br. 34. 9 Nisem mogel najti točnega datuma in podpisa besedila tega vojnega načrta. Vendar sodeč po tem, da se Češkoslovaška ne omenja več kot jugoslovanski zaveznik, še zmeraj pa se govori o Albaniji, sem prepričan, da je bil vojni načrt podpisan med 15. 3. in 7. 4. 1939.

12 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA silam Nemčije in Madžarske. Italija, Albani- from two documents: the report of the General ja in Bolgarija naj bi bile neopredeljene in ne Staff of 31 August 1938 and the report of the bodo takoj objavile mobilizacije ali, da vsaj ne General Staff of 20 November 19388. bodo takoj na začetku usmerjene proti nam.« Na jugoslovanski strani bi bili Romunija in War Plan I N M Ar B (‘O’) Turčija, ravnanje Grčije bi bilo odvisno od 9 stališča Italije, Velike Britanije in Francije, This war plan foresees Yugoslavia at war with vendar bi Grčija v najslabšem primeru ostala “the joint forces of Germany and Hungary. Italy, nevtralna. Albania, and Bulgaria would remain unallied and Glavni cilj tega načrta je bil »varovanje would not immediately declare mobilization or at celovitosti našega sedanjega državnega oze- least would not side against us straight away.” mlja«. Za najmočnejšega in najnevarnejšega Romania and Turkey would be on Yugoslav side sovražnika so ocenili Nemčijo, takoj za njo je while the position of Greece would depend on the bila Italija. Zaradi svoje bližine »glavni pove- views of Italy, Great Britain, and France with, zavi med Srbijo, Hrvaško in Slovenijo« je bila however, the worst possibility being Greece’s nevarna Madžarska. Druga mogoča sovra- neutrality. žnika, tj. Albanija in Bolgarija, sta ocenjena The main objective of this plan was to “se- kot manj nevarna, saj je bilo stališče Albanije cure the integrity of our present state territory”. odvisno od Italije, Bolgarija pa je bila nevarna Germany was estimated to be the most dangerous zaradi bližine »Solunski bazi«. enemy, closely followed by Italy. Hungary was Tako je bila predvidena obramba na vseh dangerous because of its proximity to “the main treh frontah. Proti Madžarski bi bile zbrane 3 link between Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia”. armade z 10 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo; The other two prospective enemies, i. e. Albania proti Nemčiji in Italiji 2 armadi s 5 pehotnimi and Bulgaria, are assessed as less dangerous as in konjeniško divizijo ter 3 odredi, Primorska Albania’s stand depended on Italy while Bulgaria armadna oblast in vojna flota bi bili na pri- was dangerous due to its proximity to the morski fronti; III. armadna oblast s 3 peho- “Thessaloniki base”. tnimi divizijami ter odredom in V. armadna In such a way, the defense of all three fronts oblast z 2 odredoma bi bili postavljeni proti was provided for. 3 armies with 10 infantry Albaniji in Bolgariji. Menili so, da bodo za iz- and 1 cavalry divisions would be used against peljavo koncentracije sil potrebovali od 12 do Hungary while 2 armies consisting of 5 infan- 14 dni, kar bo odvisno od enot. Vloga strateške try and 1 cavalry divisions and 3 detachments rezerve (6 pehotnih divizij, deli Kraljeve gar- would be employed against Germany and Italy. de) bi bila manevrska, »s težiščem grupiranja The Primorska (Littoral) Army Zone and the nasproti verjetno najmočnejše sovražnikove War Fleet would fight on the Primorska Front. skupine na Dravskem bojevališču«. Poleg teh In the meantime, the III. Army Zone with three pehotnih enot so predvideli tudi zbiranje arti- infantry divisions and one detachment and the V. lerijskih, letalskih in inženirskih enot ter utr- Army Zone with two detachments would stand jevanje, rušenje, oviranje in zapiranje meja. up to Albania and Bulgaria. It was estimated 12 Glavni cilj dejavnosti je bil, da onemogočijo to 14 days would be needed to concentrate forces, prodor oklepnih enot.10 depending on troops. The strategic reserve (6 infantry divisions, part of the King’s Guard) would Vojni načrt I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 – »O1« be used as movable forces “with concentration of forces against what would probably be the en- Vojni načrt I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 – »O1«11 emy’s strongest point at the Drava battlefield”. je bil podoben vojnemu načrtu »O«. Edi- Besides the infantry troops, the artillery, air ne spremembe so bile v zvezi z zbiranjem force, and engineering units would be assembled.

10 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1. 8 Aprilski rat 1941, Zbornik dokumenata, I, Vojnoistorijski institut Beograd, 1969, 11 To je različica načrta »O«, ki je obravnavana v obdobju marec/april do junija 1939. dok. 25, pp. 68−95; AVII, P-17, k. 84, f. 5, br. 34. 9 I was unable to discover information relative to the date of this war plan and its signing. However, since Czechoslovakia is not counted among the allies of Yugoslavia any more while Albania is still mentioned as an ally, I am convinced this war plan was signed between 15 March and 7 April 1939.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 13 jugoslovanskih sil na fronti proti Albaniji in Fortification, demolition, impeding the enemy, Bolgariji, v zvezi s sestavo in številom enot and closing down the borders were planned. The strateške rezerve (namesto 6 pehotnih divizij main objective of these activities was to prevent je bilo predvidenih 5, ob delih Kraljeve garde) armored units from advancing.10 in v zvezi z delovanjem posameznih enot. Te- meljna določila tega vojnega načrta so ostala War Plan I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 - ‘O1’ enaka kot v prej obravnavanem.12 The War Plan I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 - ‘O1’11 Vojni načrt I2 N2 M2 B2 – »P« resembled the War Plan ‘O’. The only changes involved the grouping of the Yugoslav forces at To je bil načrt,13 ki bi bil uporaben ob more- the front against Albania and Bulgaria, compo- bitnem istočasnem vodenju vojne Kraljevine sition and number of the strategic reserve units Jugoslavije proti Italiji, Nemčiji, Madžarski in (the King's Guard units and 6 infantry divisions Bolgariji. Predvideno je bilo, da bi se uporabile instead of 5), and activities of individual units. naslednje enote: 3 skupine armad, v katerih The basic provisions of this war plan did not dif- sestavo bi šlo 6 armad ( I., II., III., IV., V. in fer from the war plan above.12 VII. armada). Za operacije proti Madžarski bi namenili 3 armade z 10 pehotnimi in konje- War Plan I2 N2 M2 B2 - ‘P’ niško divizijo; za operacije proti Nemčiji in 13 Italiji bi uporabili VII. armado (v svoji sestavi This plan would be used in case of the je imela 3 pehotne in konjeniško divizijo ter Kingdom of Yugoslavia being involved in warfare 2 planinska odreda) ter na primorski fronti against Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. enote Primorske armadne oblasti (pehotna The use of the following troops was foreseen: 3 divizija, poveljstvi Boke Kotorske in Šibenika army groups composed of 6 armies (I, II, III, IV, ter Pomorsko obalno poveljstvo), mornariško V, and VII Army). 3 armies consisting of 10 in- letalstvo in vojno floto. Na fronti proti Alba- fantry and 1 cavalry divisions would be utilized niji III. armada (s 5 pehotnimi divizijami in to implement the operations against Hungary, konjeniško brigado) ter Mornariški odred na VII Army (consisting of 3 infantry and 1 cavalry Skadarskem in Ohridskem jezeru bi bila na- divisions as well as 2 mountain detachments) meščena na fronti proti Albaniji in južni Bol- would be employed to fight Germany and Italy. At gariji. Za operacije proti severni Bolgariji so the Primorska Front, the Primorska Army Zone bile predvidene: V. armada (2 pehotni in ko- units (1 infantry division, the Boka Kotorska njeniška divizija ter 2 odreda) in del Dravske and Šibenik Commands and the Coastal Army rečne flotilje. V strateški rezervi (v pristojnosti Command), the Navy Aviation Force and the vrhovnega poveljstva bi bilo 7 pehotnih divizij War Fleet would be used. III Army (with 5 in- in deli Kraljeve garde, ki so bili razporejeni v fantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade) and 3 skupine (jugovzhodna, severna in severoza- the Navy Detachment at the Skadar and Ohrid hodna). lakes would be used on the front against Albania Za Jugoslavijo je bilo pomembno, da je bila and Southern Bulgaria. Conducting operations predvidena zaščita meje proti Italiji, Nemčiji, against Northern Bulgaria would involve V Army Madžarski, Bolgariji in Albaniji ter zapiranje (2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and 2 detach- meja proti Romuniji in Grčiji. Vse to bi morale ments) and part of the Drava River Flotilla. The početi enote rezervne vojske. strategic reserve (under the Supreme Command) Besedilo načrta je podpisal 1. 6. 1939 načel- would number 7 infantry divisions and part nik Glavnega generalštaba, armadni general of the King's Guard, deployed in three groups Dušan T. Simović.14 (southeastern, northern and northwestern). Z aktom, ki je izšel 9. 9. 1939, je ukazal:15 A very important factor for Yugoslavia was the • da se izvede sprememba v vojnem načrtu anticipated defense of the borders against Italy,

12 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1. 10 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1. 13 Za ta vojni načrt nisem našel splošnega dela. 11 This is a variation to the War Plan “O”, elaborated between March/April and June 14 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 1939. 15 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 12 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1. 13 I was unable to find the General Part of the plan.

14 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Vojni načrt I N M Ar B (»O«) War Plan I N M Ar B (‘O’)

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 15 »P« in da se pripravi različica »P – 1«,16 v Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, as kateri bi ostal enak razpored sil kot v prime- well as the closing of borders with Romania and ru »P«, razlikovalo bi se samo razporejanje Greece. All of this would be done by the reserve I. armade; army units. • da se pripravi tudi različica vojnega načr- This plan was signed on 1 June 1939 by the ta »P – 1«, ki bi imela oznako »I4 N4 M4 Chief of General Staff, Army General Dušan T. B4« in šifro »P – 2«. Tu bi bila edina spre- Simović.14 memba pri zbiranju Šumadijske in Timoške In the Act of 9 September 1939 he ordered:15 divizije.17 • to amend the War Plan ‘P’ and to prepare a variation ‘P - 1’,16 keeping the deployment of Vojni načrt »S« (Severna fronta) troops from the case ‘P’ and changing only the grouping of the I Army; Vojno proti Madžarski in Nemčiji so pred- • to draw up a variation to the ‘P - 1’ War Plan 18 videli v načrtu »NM«. Skupaj s svojimi po- designated ‘I4 N4 M4 B4’ and coded ‘P - 2’. močniki ga je pripravil načelnik Glavnega The only change would involve grouping of the generalštaba armadni general Simović, ki je Šumadijska and Timoška divisions.17 bil na tem položaju od septembra 1938 do 15. januarja 1940, vendar moram opozoriti, da War Plan ‘S’ (Northern Front) ga je podpisal, ko je bil končan, in sicer maja 1940.19 This plan, titled ‘NM’, incorporated the plans Vojni načrt »S« je imel defenzivni značaj. V for the war against Hungary and Germany.18 It njem sta bila predvidena nemški in madžar- was drawn up by the Chief of General Staff, Army ski napad, ob predvidevanju, da bodo Nemci General Simović and his assistants. Simović was uporabili tudi madžarsko ozemlje in da bi Ju- in office from September 1938 until 15 January goslavija lahko računala na morebitno pomoč 1940, although it needs to be stressed he signed in podporo Francije ter Velike Britanije.20 P o - the aforementioned plan after its final comple- sebna pozornost je bila namenjena dejstvu, da tion in May 1940.19 ne bi prišlo do prekinitve povezave s Solunom, The War Plan ‘S’ was of a defensive character ker so v tej smeri načrtovali umik. anticipating a German and Hungarian attack. It V izjavi, ki jo je dal general Simović 28. 6. foresaw that the Germans would conduct opera- 1946 Generalštabu, je posredoval podatke v tions from Hungarian territory as well, and that zvezi z vojnim načrtom »S«: Yugoslavia would be able to count on the support • v prvi črti, za zavarovanje mejne fronte, so of France and Great Britain.20 Special attention obdržali samo najnujnejši in nepogrešlji- was paid to maintaing the link with Thessaloniki vi del sil, »v glavnem obmejne divizije in since a retreat was planned in this direction. posebej formirane odrede«, skupaj je bilo In his statement to the General Staff of 28 11 pehotnih in 3 konjeniške divizije ter 10 June 1946 General Simović provided the follow- odredov; ing data on the War Plan ‘S’: • »Zadrževanje zelo močnih rezerv v drugi li- • on the first line of battle, the border front was niji (okoli 12 pehotnih, in to prvorazrednih protected only by essential and indispensable divizij); tem je bilo določeno: da se tajno troops, »mostly border divisions and newly mobilizirajo v potrebnem trenutku in ko bo formed detachments« – in all, 11 infantry and odkrit sovražnikov načrt ali napad ter ko bo 3 cavalry divisions and 10 detachments; dokončno razkrit razpored njegovega zbira- • »keeping very strong reserves on the second nja in smeri njegove akcije, da se jih še pred line of battle (app. 12 first-rate infantry divi- začetkom splošne mobilizacije premesti v sions); their orders were: a secret mobilization

16 Verjetno bi bila oznaka v tem primeru I3 N3 M3 B3. 14 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 17 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 15 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 18 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 3, Str. Pov. D. O. Br. 222. 16 It would probably be designated I3 N3 M3 B3. 19 Izjava generala Simovića, ki je bila dana 28. 6. 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18. 17 AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2. 20 V. Terzić: Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije, II, Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, Pobjeda, 18 AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 3, Str. Pov. D. O. Br. 222. Ljubljana, Beograd, Titograd, 1984, str. 159. 19 General Simović’s statement of 28 June 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18. 20 V. Terzić: Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije, II, Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, Pobjeda, Ljubljana, Beograd, Titograd, 1984, p. 159.

16 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Vojni načrt I2 N2 M2 B2 – »P« War Plan I2 N2 M2 B2 - ‘P’

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 17 zaledje ogrožene fronte z možnostjo upo- when they were needed and when the enemy rabe, ali za okrepitev divizij prve linije za plan or attack would be discovered and the obrambo ogroženih smeri, ali za ofenzivno pattern of enemy grouping and direction of protidelovanje - glede na situacijo na dolo- activities would be revealed. Even before the čeni fronti.«; general mobilization, these troops were to be • v zaledju sovražnikovih armad je bilo treba transferred to the rear of the endangered front organizirati gverilske odrede; line in order to be used either to reinforce the • izpeljani so bili ukrepi za skrajšanje časa, divisions on the first line of battle and defend ki bi bil potreben za mobilizacijo in kon- newly threatened areas or for offensive coun- centracijo, na 12 dni, kot tudi izogibanje ter-attack, depending on the situation at the možnosti, da »bi bila ovirana in morebiti front concerned; celo preprečena z napadom sovražnikovega • organizing guerrilla detachments on the letalstva«.21 enemy's rear; • measures were carried out to reduce the time of Ocenjujemo, da je vojni načrt »S« večinoma mobilization and concentration to 12 days and realno prikazoval razmere, ki so prevladovale to avoid the possibility that mobilization and v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji in njeni vojski. S priča- concentration would »be impeded or possibly kovanjem nemškega in italijanskega napada even prevented by the enemy attack from the kot napada najresnejših glavnih sovražnikov, air ».21 je bil v načrtu »S« predviden umik proti jugu, saj je bilo samo s te strani pričakovati morebi- It can be assessed that the War Plan ‘S’ pre- tno pomoč Francije in Velike Britanije. Poleg sented a mostly accurate reflection of the situation tega je »predvideno vodenje gverilske vojne v in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its army. Since sovražnikovem zaledju, na ozemlju, od koder the plan ‘S’ provided for an attack by Germany b i s e u m i k a l e l a s t n e e n o t e , k a r b i u s t r e z a l o t r a - and Italy as the two most dangerous enemies, it dicijam jugoslovanskih narodov in ozemlju, ki planned for a retreat to the south because this je zelo ugodno za to obliko vojskovanja«.22 was the only direction from which possible help of France and Great Britain would arrive. In ad- Vojni načrt »R - 40« dition, it »provides for guerrilla warfare on the enemy's rear taking place in the territory emp- Ta vojni načrt je bil pripravljen za primer, tied by our own retreating units which would be če bi bila Jugoslavija v vojni z Nemčijo, Italijo, consistent with the traditions of the Yugoslav na- Madžarsko in Bolgarijo, torej je pomenil modi- tions and with the terrain which is very favorable fikacijo vojnega načrta »S«. Oblikovan je bil v for this type of combat«.22 času, ko je bil načelnik Glavnega generalštaba

21 AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18. 21 AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, p. 18. 22 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 161. 22 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 161.

18 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA armadni general Petar Kosić, ki je 15. 1. 1940 War Plan ‘R - 40’ zamenjal generala Simovića. Besedilo tega vojnega načrta je bilo sprejeto na konferenci maja This war plan was prepared for the eventuality 1940, na kateri so bili prisotni minister vojske of Yugoslavia being at war with Germany, Italy, in mornarice Milan Nedić, general Petar Pe- Hungary, and Bulgaria. It is a modified version of the War Plan ‘S’ and was drawn up when the šić (ob morebitni vojni v vlogi pomočnika vr- Chief of the General Staff was Army General hovnega poveljnika kneza Pavla) in vsi vojni Petar Kosić who replaced General Simović on 15 poveljniki armadnih skupin. Sprejeli so tudi January 1940. This war plan was adopted on a nekaj manjših sprememb, ki so bile le taktič - conference of May 1940. Present at the confer- ne narave (na podlagi povojne izjave generala ence were the Minister for Army and Navy Milan Kosića). Nedić, General Petar Pešić (who would act as as- Čeprav bi lahko že razčlenjen vojni načrt sistant to the Commander-in-Chief Prince Pavle »S« prilagodili novim razmeram (okupaci- in case of war) and all the army commanders of ja Češkoslovaške in Albanije, začetek druge the army groups. They also approved some mi- svetovne vojne, bolgarsko približevanje silam nor changes of purely tactical nature (as General osi), ga armadni general Petar Kosić ni hotel Kosić claimed in his statement after the war). sprejeti. Res je, da je načrt »R - 40« ohranil Although the War Plan ‘S’ was already elabo- tudi nekatere ideje Simovićevega načrta, in rated and could be revised to reflect the new situa- sicer obrambo po globini na severni in seve- tion (occupation of Czechoslovakia and Albania, rozahodni fronti, s prizadevanjem, da ne pride start of the Second World War, Bulgaria begin- do presekanja povezave s Solunom in tako do ning to side with the Axis Powers), the Army trganja in ločevanja vojske. Poleg tega je bila General Petar Kosić refused to approve it. It is predvidena zasedba Zadra, da se proti Bolgariji true that the plan ‘R - 40’ kept some of the ide- začne z akcijo, ki bi bila v »duhu Balkanskega as of Simović's plan – the in-depth defense on pakta, ki je predvideval koncentričen napad the Northern and Northwestern Fronts with vseh članic Pakta, če bi Bolgarija napadla eno 23 every effort made to prevent being cut off from izmed držav članic Pakta«. Thessaloniki so as not to have the army dispersed Temeljna razlika je bila v velikosti in številu and scattered. In addition, Zadar would be cap- divizij, ki so bile predvidene za obrambo meja. tured in order to start activities against Bulgaria Zdaj je bilo njihovo število povečano na račun »in keeping with the spirit of the Balkan Pact strateške rezerve, ki bi ji ostalo skupaj samo 9 that stipulated a concentric attack of all the Pact divizij (30 odstotkov skupnega števila). members should Bulgaria attack one of them ».23 Predviden je bil naslednji strateški razvoj The fundamental difference between the two jugoslovanske vojske: plans derived from the number and size of divi- • 2 armadi s 7 pehotnimi in konjeniško divisions that would be sent to defend the borders. zijo na fronti proti Albaniji in Bolgariji; With the new plan, their number was increased • 2 armadi s 6 pehotnimi in konjeniško di- and the strategic reserve reduced to 9 divisions vizijo ter odredom (do Donjega Miholjca) (30 % of the total number). proti Madžarski; The following strategic development of the • 2 armadi s 5 pehotnimi in konjeniško divi- Yugoslav Army was planned: zijo ter 2 planinskima odredoma proti Ma- • 2 armies with 7 infantry and 1 cavalry di- džarski (od Donjega Miholjca), Nemčiji in visions on the front against Albania and Italiji; Bulgaria; • za obrambo obale Jadranskega morja in • 2 armies with 6 infantry and 1 cavalry divi- napad na Zadar enote Primorske armadne sions and 1 detachment (to the town of Donji oblasti; Miholjec) against Hungary; • 9 divizij v Slavoniji, okoli Zagreba, Niša in • 2 armies with 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divi- Skopja v strateški rezervi; sions and 2 mountain detachments against • vojna flota in mornariško letalstvo za Hungary (to the town of Donji Miholjec), obrambo obale; Germany, and Italy;

23 V. Terzić: Slom .., II, str. 162. 23 V. Terzić: Slom...,II, p. 162.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 19 • na Ohridskem jezeru rečna flotilja z Mor- • Primorska Army Zone units for the defense of nariškim odredom. the Adriatic coast and the atack on Zadar; Vendar se dogajanja leta 1940 niso tako kon- • 9 divisions in Slavonija, near Zagreb, Niš, and čala, da bi vojni načrt »R - 40« lahko bil sploh Skopje as a strategic reserve; ustrezen. Aprila 1940 je Nemčija popolnoma • the War Fleet and the Navy Aviation Force for »pometla« z Dansko in Norveško, maja in ju- the defense of the coast; nija pa so bile poražene Nizozemska, Belgija in • a River Flotilla and a Navy Detachment on the Francija, v Dunkerqueu je britanski ekspedi- Ohrid Lake. cijski korpus doživel zelo hud poraz (k sreči ni bil uničen), tako da je Nemčija lahko od junija However, the developments in 1940 prevented 1940 naprej brez kakršnih koli obveznosti in the War Plan ‘R -40’ from being in any way rel- dejavnosti na zahodni fronti pristopila k izva- evant. In April 1940, Germany literally »swept janju pritiska na majhne države v jugovzhodni away« the armies of Denmark and Norway. In Evropi. Namen tega pritiska je bil, da se drža- May and June, Netherlands, Belgium, and France vice priključijo trojnemu paktu. Temu pritisku were overpowered. In the meantime, the British sta novembra 1940 najprej podlegli Romunija expedition corps suffered a serious defeat at in Madžarska, ki sta pristopili k trojnemu pak- Dunkuerque (but was luckily able to evacuate). tu. Italija je že oktobra 1940 napadla Grčijo. Po Therefore, Germany did not have any engage- omenjenih dogodkih je Jugoslavija ostala tako ments or activities on the Western front since rekoč osamljena, zlasti ker je bil pristop Bolga- June 1940. Accordingly, it was able to pressure rije k trojnemu paktu pričakovan in je bilo le small countries in Southeastern Europe. The ob- še vprašanje časa, kdaj se bo to zgodilo. S tem je jective of the pressure was to compel these states razpadel balkanski pakt in na njegovo oživitev to join the Tripartite Pact. The first to succumb niso mogli računati. were Romania and Hungary. Both signed the Kljub temu Glavni generalštab ni nič ukre- Tripartite pact in November 1940. Even before nil do 22. 2. 1941. Takrat so se odločili, da bi that, in October 1940, Italy attacked Greece. načrt »R – 40« dopolnili ali celo pripravili nov Against this backdrop, Yugoslavia was virtually vojni načrt. Zaradi takšne neodločnosti vla- isolated, particularly because it was expected it dajočih krogov so bile izvajane vse priprave was only a question of time when Bulgaria would jugoslovanske vojske na morebitno vojno na accede to the Tripartite Pact, as well. Thus, the podlagi vojnega načrta »R - 40«, ki je bil velja- Balkan Pact (or the Balkan Entente) collapsed ven do marca 1941. and there was no hope of its being revived. Vojni načrt »R - 40« je imel te pomanjklji- Inspite of this, the General Staff did not take vosti: any action until 22 February 1941 when it was a) Glavni generalštab je izhajal iz prepričanja, decided to amend the ‘R - 40’ plan or even cre- da je treba braniti vse državne meje, kar so ate a new war plan. Due to this indecisiveness in zahtevali zlasti hrvaški in slovenski politi- the government circles, all the preparations of the ki. To je vodilo k razpršitvi, raztegnitvi in Yugoslav Army for a possible war were carried slabšanju sil, predvsem rezervnih, ki so se - out on the basis of the War Plan ‘R - 40’ that stavljale samo 30 odstotkov skupne moči remained in force until March 1941. jugoslovanske vojske. b) Razporeditev glavne vojske je bila takšna, da The War Plan ‘R - 40’ had some other weak- so imeli dve veliki reki, Savo in Donavo za nesses: hrbtom, kar bi ob morebitnem umiku po- a) The General Staff proceeded from the convicti- menilo veliko oviro. on that the state borders need to be defended in their entirety which was demanded particular- Vseh omenjenih pomanjkljivosti, zlasti po- ly by the Croatian and Slovenian politicians. manjkanje rezervnih enot na področju proti Such a course of action would lead to dispersal Bolgariji, ob napačni domnevi, da se bo glavni and deterioration of the troops and to their be- napad zgodil s severne in severozahodne strani, ing spread too thin. This was especially true of ni mogel popraviti niti novi vojni načrt »R - 41«. the reserve troops that constituted only 30 % of the total of the Yugoslav Army.

20 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Vojni načrt »R - 41« b) The main force was deployed in a way that put two large rivers (the Sava and the Danube) Priprava tega vojnega načrta se je začela v 24 behind its back constituting a great obstacle to Glavnem generalštabu 22. 2. 1941. T e m e l j - retreat. no zamisel je dal takratni načelnik Glavnega All these deficiencies, in particular the shortage generalštaba armadni general Petar Kosić. of reserve units in the area next to Bulgarian bor- Načrt sta odobrila knez Pavle, kot vrhovni po- der that was caused by the mistaken assumption veljnik, in armadni general Petar Pešić, ki je that the main attack would come from the north bil predviden za njegovega namestnika, če bi 25 and the northwest, could not be rectified even by a se začela vojna. new war plan, the War Plan ‘R - 41’. Temeljna zamisel novega vojnega načrta je bila: »... z maksimumom sil izpeljati preboj k War Plan ‘R - 41’ Solunu in Grčiji zaradi združitve s tamkajšnji- mi zavezniškimi silami, cilj pa, da se vojna po- The General Staff began drawing up this war daljša do zmage. Vse druge naše sile bi morale plan on 22 February 1941.24 The basic idea was z bojem po globini in umikanjem proti jugu provided by the then Chief of General Staff, Army oziroma jugovzhodu pridobiti na vzhodni, General Petar Kosić. The plan was approved by severni in severozahodni fronti potreben čas Prince Pavle in his capacity as the Commander- za preboj glavnih sil proti Solunu in Grčiji za in-Chief and by the Army General Petar Pešić who 26 eva-kuacijo.« Predvidena je bila tudi ofenzi- would act as his deputy in case of war.25 27 va v smeri Albanije in zasedba Zadra. The fundamental idea of the new war plan was Osnovna razporeditev sil v omenjenem voj- to: »... use the maximum number of troops to at- nem načrtu: tempt a breakthrough to Thessaloniki and Greece • 4 divizije in odred proti Albaniji; in order to join the allies' forces with the objective • 4 divizije in odred proti makedonsko-bol- of prolonging the war until victory is achieved. By garski fronti; in-depth fighting and the retreat to the south or • 4 divizije in 2 odreda proti srbsko-bolgarski southeast, all our other troops would have to in- fronti; crease the time available for the breakthrough and • 3 divizije in 5 odredov proti Romuniji; evacuation of the main force from the Eastern, • 7 divizij in 2 odreda proti Madžarski; Northern, and Northwestern fronts to Thessaloniki • 4 divizije in 2 odreda proti Nemčiji in and Greece.«26 It was also foreseen that an offen- Italiji; sive would be carried out towards Albania and that Zadar would be conquered.27

24 Izjava generala M. Nikolića, ki je bila dana junija 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, br. 1. 24 General M. Nikolić’s statement of June 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, br. 1. 25 Prav tam. 25 Ibid. 26 Prav tam. 26 Ibid. 27 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 164. 27 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 164.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 21 • divizija, 2 trdnjavski poveljstvi in 2 odreda The basic deployment of troops according to na primorsko-obalni fronti; this war plan was the following: • v strateški rezervi 4 divizije (Mladenovac, • 4 divisions and 1 detachment against Albania; Stara Pazova, Modrića, Nikšić).28 • 4 divisions and 1 detachment on the Macedoni- an – Bulgarian front; Iz zgornje razporeditve lahko vidimo, da je • 4 divisions and 2 detachments on the Serbian - ostala samo osmina sil (4 od skupno 32 divi- Bulgarian front; zij) v strateški rezervi in še od teh 4 divizije • 3 divisions and 5 detachments against niso bile sposobne izvajati kakršnih koli ma- Romania; nevrov, ker niso bile motorizirane. • 7 divisions and 2 detachments against Naloga vojaškega letalstva je bila, da pre- Hungary; preči delovanje sovražnikovega letalstva na • 4 divisions and 2 detachments against Ger- jugoslovanskem teritoriju oziroma nebu, da many and Italy; napada letališča, železniške in druge objekte • 1 division, 2 fortress commands and 2 deta- v nasprotnikovih obmejnih področjih ter da chments on the Primorska - Coastal Front; podpira operacije kopenske vojske in morna- • 4 divisions in strategic reserve (Mladenovac, rice. Stara Pazova, Modrića, Nikšić).28 Vojna mornarica je morala braniti obalo, preprečevati delovanje nasprotnikove morna- The deployment above shows that only 1/8 of rice in sodelovati v napadih na Zadar. the troops (4 out of the total of 32 divisions) was Enote rečne flotilje so dobile nalogo, da so- kept in strategic reserve. Furthermore, these 4 divi- delujejo z enotami kopenske vojske ter da na- sions were not capable to do any maneuvring since sprotnika ovirajo na rekah itn. they were not motorized. Značilnosti vojnega načrta »R - 41« so: The Air Force was entrusted with preventing 1) Predviden je bil umik jugoslovanskih sil na the activities of the enemy military aviation in the jug, v Grčijo zaradi oblikovanja in vzposta- Yugoslav territory (or sky) and with attacking vitve nove fronte, ki bi nastala v zavezništvu airfields, railway facilities, and other targets in the z Grčijo in Veliko Britanijo. frontier-zone of the enemy, as well as with provid- 2) Predvideno je bilo ofenzivno delovanje proti ing support to the land-based Army and the Navy. Albaniji in napad na Zadar. The War Navy was charged with defending the Ti ideji bi bili lahko uresničljivi, vendar sta po- coast, preventing the opponent navy's actions, stali marca 1941, ko so nemške enote vkora- and helping in the attacks on Zadar. kale v Bolgarijo, neuresničljivi in nerealni. The river flotilla units were ordered to cooper- Za uresničitev dela načrta, ki je predvideval ate with the land-based troops and to impede the nastanek nove solunske fronte, je bilo tre- enemy on rivers, etc. ba nujno zapustiti celotno državno ozemlje, The characteristics of the War Plan ‘R - 41’ are kar je bilo v takratnih notranjepolitičnih the following: razmerah neuresničljivo, »... ker so sloven- 1) It envisaged the retreat of the Yugoslav forces ski in hrvaški ministri že napovedali, da se to the south (to Greece) with the aim of for- Slovenci in Hrvati ne bodo borili izven svo- ming and establishing a new front in alliance jih nacionalnih teritorijev.«29 with Greece and Great Britain. 3) Predvidena je bila kordonska obramba celo- 2) It expressed the intention of carrying out of- tnega ozemlja (opozoriti je treba, da je bila fensive operations against Albania and an at- dolžina celotne meje večja od bodoče vzho- tack on Zadar. dne fronte), kar bi pripeljalo do obkolitve in Up to a point, both of these plans were feasible. zajetja celotne vojske. However, as soon as the German troops invaded 3) Nevarnost, ki je grozila Jugoslaviji z bolgar- Bulgaria in March 1941, they became unattain- ske strani, saj so tam bile nemške enote že able and unrealistic. razporejene, ni bila pravočasno opažena, kar To realize the part of the plan foreseeing the new

28 Prav tam. Memoarji Dušana Simovića; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, str. 125−236, II. del. 28 Ibid. Memoarji Dušana Simovića; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, p. 125 - 236, Part II. 29 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 187.

22 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA je bilo v aprilski vojni usodno, ker so prav z Thessaloniki Front, the entire territory of the operacijami iz Bolgarije preprečili uresniči- country would have to be abandoned. Howe- tev najpomembnejše jugoslovanske ideje – ver, the internal political situation forbade this umik proti Grčiji. course of action »...because the Slovenian and Croatian ministers stated Slovenians and Cro- Po 27. marcu 1941 ni bilo časa, da bi teme- ats would not fight outside their national ter- ljiteje spreminjali vojni načrt. Bilo pa je dovolj ritories ».29 časa, da bi lahko odstopili od kordonske razpo- 3) A cordon defense of the entire territory was de- reditve enot. Tako bi se izognili frontalni vojni cided upon (it is necessary to draw attention in sile omejili na obrambo državnih težišč, ki to the fact that the border was longer than the bi zajela Srbijo, Črno goro in Makedonijo,30 future Eastern front) which could lead to the kar so pričakovali tudi Nemci. Zelo pomemb- entire army being surrounded and captured. ne bi bile akcije gverilskih odredov, ki so bile 4) The threat to Yugoslavia from the direction of predvidene že v vojnem načrtu »S«, vendar od Bulgaria (where the German troops were alre- takrat niso bile vključene v kombinacije, ki jih ady amassed) was not noticed in time. In the je Glavni generalštab predvidel v načrtih »R - April War, this was of fatal importance becau- 40« in »R - 41«. se the operations conducted from the Bulgarian territory prevented the realization of the main Ko je armadni general Dušan Simović kriti- Yugoslav idea – a retreat to Greece. ziral vojni načrt »R - 41«, je v svojih Memoarih zapisal tudi naslednje: »‘Vojni načrt R - 41’ ni After 27 March 1941, there was no time for pomenil novega originalnega načrta s točno any radical changes of the war plan. Nevertheless, opredeljeno idejo, ampak slabo popravljeno it would still have been possible to abandon the i z d a j o n a č r t a ’ R - 4 0 ‘ , k a t e r e g a s t r a t e š k e r e z e r - idea of the cordon deployment of troops. Thus, ve so uporabili za zapolnitev lukenj in nadalj- a frontal war could be avoided and all the forces no razširitev front, vendar vse to na podlagi še would be used for the defense of the central part of nezadostno zbranih podatkov o sovražnikovih the state encompassing Serbia, Montenegro and namenih in o grupiranju njegovih sil.«31 Macedonia,30 which was what was expected by the Germans themselves. A very important role could be played by the guerrilla detachments' activities foreseen in the War Plan ‘S’, however, they were not part of combinations prepared by the General Staff in the plans ‘R - 40’ and ‘R - 41’.

When the Army General Dušan Simović criti- cized the War Plan ‘R - 41’ in his memoirs, he added the following: »The War Plan ‘R - 41’ was not a new and original plan with a well-defined idea but a badly revised version of the War Plan ‘R - 40’, employing the strategic reserves to fill in holes in the defense and to further extend the front lines, however, with incomplete information gathered on the enemy intentions and grouping of troops.«31

Fotografije: Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije na manevrih na All Photos: The Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia območju Dravske banovine leta 1939. maneuvres in Dravska banovina (Drava province) in 1939. Vir: Fototeka Muzeja novejše zgodovine Slovenije, Ljubljana. Source: the National Museum of Contemporary History's collection of photography (Ljubljana).

30 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 189. 29 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 187. 31 Dušan Simović: Memoari; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, str. 125 - 236. 30 V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 189. 31 Dušan Simović: Memoari; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, pp. 125 - 236.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 23 24 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Podoba agenta medvojne tajne službe Special Operations Executive (SOE)

Image of a Second World War Secret Organizations Special Operations Executive (SOE) Agent •

Blaž Torkar

Izvleček Abstract

Prispevek obravnava sistem rekrutiranja in The contribution deals with the recruit- urjenja britanske Uprave za posebne operacije ment and training system of the British Spe- (Special Operations Executive – SOE). SOE je cial Operations Executive (SOE). SOE’s Spe- svoje kandidate urila v šolah za specialno urje- cial Training Schools trained candidates in nje (Special Training Schools), v katerih so se sabotage, wireless telegraphy and parachuting. urili v diverzantskih znanjih, radiotelegrafiji in SOE agents had at their disposal an extensive padalstvu. Agenti SOE so imeli na voljo precej- choice of internal collection of weapons, equi- šen izbor internega orožja, opreme in poseb- pment and gadgets used in clandestine war- nih naprav, namenjenih tajnemu vojskovanju. fare. Although SOE used an efficient training Kljub učinkovitemu sistemu urjenja, dobremu system, weapons and equipment, its objective orožju in opremi, se cilj SOE, da zaneti upor v of sparking resistance in the occupied Europe zasedeni Evropi, ni popolnoma uresničil. was not entirely attained.

Ključne besede: SOE, STS, rekrutacija, urje- Keywords: SOE, STS, Recruitment, Training, nje, agent. Agent. Uvod Introduction

Britanska uprava za posebne operacije ali The Special Operations Executive (SOE) Special Operations Executive (SOE) je bila bri- was a British secret service organization respon- tanska tajna služba, katere naloga je bila zane- sible for stimulating and coordinating resistance titi in usklajevati upor proti silam osi v okupi- against the Axis powers in countries occupied by ranih državah med drugo svetovno vojno. SOE Germany during the Second World War. SOE did ni bila dovolj močna, da bi lahko nadzirala in not have the capacity to oversee or direct the re- dajala direktive odporniškim skupinam, lahko sistance groups, although it was in the position pa jih je preko svojih misij na terenu opremlja- to influence them as well as to provide equipment la, jim svetovala in nanje na različne načine and advice through its representatives in the field. vplivala. Take načrte je imela tudi v Jugosla- It had formed similar plans for its operations in viji oziroma Sloveniji, kjer ji ni uspelo združiti Yugoslavia, including Slovenia. There, SOE failed obeh odporniških gibanj Tita in Mihajlovića, to convince the two resistance movements (one vendar je precej prispevala k odločitvi, da so led by Tito and one by Mihajlović) to join forces. zavezniki podprli partizansko gibanje in odte- However, it was largely instrumental in the Allied gnili pomoč Mihajloviću. decision to withdraw support from Mihajlović and give it to the Partisans instead.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 25 SOE je imela tudi učinkovit sistem rekru- SOE had an efficient system of recruitment and tiranja in usposabljanja, ki je potekalo v šolah training, the latter being carried out at Special za specialno urjenje (Special Training Schools Training Schools (STS). These were serving as a – STS) od koder so svoje agente v obliki misij base from which agents were sent to the field in pošiljali na zasedena območja. Izurila je tudi order to operate in the occupied territories. SOE nekaj Slovencev, ki so se med urjenjem izkazali trained agents included some Slovenians who kot uporaben in zanesljiv kader. Večina Slo- proved themselves as adept and dependable stu- vencev se je po prihodu v Slovenijo z velikim dents during the training. Most of them eagerly veseljem pridružilo narodnoosvobodilnemu joined the national liberation movement on their gibanju (NOG), vendar proti koncu vojne do- arrival in Slovenia, however, they suffered a trag- živelo tragično usodo, saj jih je Organizacija za ic fate towards the end of the war when they were zaščito naroda (OZNA) označila za britanske accused of being British spies by the intelligence vohune. V članku so obravnavani temeljni po- agency OZNA (Department for Protection of the stopki rekrutacije, urjenja agenta ter oprema, People). This article deals with the basic recruit- ki jo je uporabljal pri svojih nalogah. ment and training procedures and describes the equipment used by the agents on their missions. Rekrutacija agenta SOE Recruitment of an SOE Agent Uspeh vsake tajne službe temelji tudi na kakovosti njenih agentov, zato je pomembno, da The success of every secret service organization is je njihova rekrutacija vnaprej natančno dolo- partly dependant on the quality of its agents. Therefore, čena in premišljena. Vodstvo SOE se je zaveda- it is important that recruitment is well designed and lo, da je nepopolni sistem rekrutiranja za or- planned. The SOE leaders were aware of a negative ganizacijo lahko usoden, zato je samo prevzelo impact a faulty recruitment system could have on the rekrutacijo svojih podrejenih.1 Rekrutacija je organization. Accordingly they reserved the right to per- kot najbolj tvegan del celotnega subverzivne- sonally recruit their subordinates.1 As the recruitment ga delovanja sledila trem osnovnim načelom. was the most uncertain part of the subversive activi- Prvo načelo je bilo, da je kakovost kandidatov ties, it was guided by three fundamental principles. The pomembnejša od kvantitete, čeprav so neka- first principle was that the quality of the candidates is tere subverzivne dejavnosti zahtevale veliko more important than the quantity, inspite of the fact število agentov. Drugo načelo je bilo, da se that certain types of subversive operations demanded rekrutira zanesljive in resne kandidate, saj jih a large number of agents. The second principle was the je pozneje veliko odpadlo že na prvih ravneh recruitment of reliable and serious candidates since later usposabljanja. Organizatorji rekrutiranja so many dropped out even in initial stages of training. The bili še posebej sumničavi do kandidatov, ki recruitment organizers were particularly suspicious of so se SOE želeli priključiti prostovoljno, saj je candidates who wished to join SOE as volunteers because bilo veliko možnosti, da so dvojni agenti. Tret- there was a high likelihood they were double agents. The je načelo je bilo rekrutacija kandidata za na- third principle was to choose a candidate according to logo in ne obratno. Poleg treh temeljnih načel the requirements of a task rather than vice versa. Next je bilo pomembno, da je odgovorni častnik za in importance to three fundamental principles were the rekrutiranje znal delati z ljudmi in da je bila following factors: that the officer in charge of recruit- ustreznost kadra odvisna tudi od območja in ment had good people skills and that the choice of opera- vrste agentov, ki jih je SOE iskala. 2 tives depended on the area involved and on the type of SOE je največ kandidatov pridobila iz vrst agents SOE considered appropriate. 2 nekdanjih vojakov, sindikatov, poklicnih SOE selected most of the candidates from the ranks of združenj, različnih društev in verskih skupno- former soldiers and from trade unions, professional as- sti. O morebitnem kandidatu je skušala zbrati sociations, various societies and religious communities. vse informacije, spoznati njegove šibke točke All candidates were subjected to an extensive background

1 The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), Records of SOE (hereinafter HS), 7/52, 1 The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), Records of SOE (hereinafter HS), 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 1. Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 1. 2 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, 2 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A November 1943, p. 1. 13, November 1943, p. 1.

26 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA in ugotoviti njegove osebne zveze. Pomembno investigation that included determining their weak- načelo vsake tajne organizacije je bilo, da se nesses and examining their personal contacts. An im- agent izogiba tistim, ki delajo za druge tajne portant principle of every secret organization was that službe. Vsaka tajna služba in prav tako SOE agents should avoid members of other such organiza- sta, pred vstopom novega člana priredila “pos- tions. Every secret service organization, including the vetitveni obred”, ki je kandidatu poudaril po- SOE, held an “initiation ceremony” for new members, membnost njegovega položaja v organizaciji.3 the better to underline to the candidate his importance to the organization.3 Plačevanje, motivi in proces rekrutacije kandidatov Payment, Motives and the Candidate Recruitment Process SOE je velikokrat opravljala preizkuse zanes- ljivosti, s katerimi je dobila informacije, koliko SOE often performed reliability tests to find je agent zavezan svoji organizaciji. Vsak organi- out the extent of agent’s true commitment. A re- zator rekrutiranja je lahko kandidatu ponudil cruitment organizer was only authorized to offer delo šele takrat, ko je zanj dobil primerno na- employment to a candidate when the latter was logo. needed for a mission. Največ kandidatov se je SOE pridružilo zara- The most frequent reason for joining SOE di patriotizma, ki je bil najbolj pogost motiv za was the patriotic motive. Money was often an vstop v njene vrste. Denar je bil za kandidate ve- unimportant consideration as most agents were likokrat nepomemben, saj je bila želja po sode- predominantly influenced by the wish to liber- lovanju pri osvoboditvi svoje domovine zelo ve- ate their countries. Despite this, SOE established lika. Kljub temu je SOE razvila določena pravila some specific rules for payment. Agents were paid glede plačevanja. Agente so plačevali po rednih salariesaccording to grade. The beginners received plačilnih stopnjah, na začetku z manjšim znes- less and later received a pay rise depending on kom, ki se je pozneje skladno z uspešnostjo tudi their performance. SOE committed itself to pay- povečeval. SOE se je zavezala, da bo plačevala ing on time and in advance, preferably in cash.4 točno in vnaprej, najbolje v gotovini.4 Pripravili A list of the commonest motives to be taken into so tudi seznam najpogostejših motivov, ki jih je account when recruiting into the SOE ranks was bilo treba upoštevati pri rekrutaciji v svoje vrste: drafted. These included patriotism, political, re- patriotizem, politične, verske in socialne ideje, ligious and social convictions, enmity for the en- sovraštvo do sovražnika, zamera posamezni- emy, resentment for individuals, profits foreseen kom, dobiček po osvoboditvi ali vojni, pohlep for the period after the liberation or after the end in maščevanje. Najpomembnejši med vsemi pa of war, greed, and revenge. Patriotism and the sta bila patriotizem in želja po osvoboditvi do- wish to liberate the home country were perceived movine.5 as the most important motives.5

Pomembno pravilo rekrutacije je bilo, da je An important rule to follow during the recruit- treba iskati človeka za nalogo in ne naloge za ment procedure was to find the right person for človeka. Kakovosten kandidat ni bil nikoli iz- the job instead of finding a job for an individual. bran v naglici, kajti moral je vzbujati zaupan- A candidate of quality was never chosen in a hur- je med ljudmi. Vsak kandidat je moral razviti ry as he had to inspire trust. Each candidate had občutek, da ga podpira cela država in da ceni to feel he had the entire nation behind him as well ljudi na višjih položajih.6 as to have respect for his superiors.6

3 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, 3 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A November 1943, p. 2. 13, November 1943, p. 2. 4 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 14, 4 TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A November 1943, p. 1. 14, November 1943, p. 1. 5 TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 2. 5 TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 2. 6 TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, pp. 3, 4. 6 TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, pp. 3, 4.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 27 Radiotelegrafski aparat B Mark II ali B2 A wireless set B Mark II or B2

Selekcijski postopki SOE SOE Selection Procedures

Selekcijo kandidatov je SOE uresničevala SOE selected its candidates either through prek državnih sekcij SOE ali prek osrednjih SOE country sections or through central estab- komitejev kot je bil The Students Assessment lishments such as Students Assessment Board Board (SAB),7 ki je nadomestil pripravljalno ur- (SAB)7. The latter took over the work related to jenje, na katerem so kandidati dobili temeljno introductory training, consisting of imparting the vojaško znanje. Državne sekcije so velikokrat basic military skills to the candidates. Country urile neprimerne kandidate, ki jih je bilo treba sections often trained inappropriate candidates na višjih ravneh urjenja odstraniti. Hkrati pa so who had to be rejected in the later stages. On the nevtralni komiteji s togimi metodami zavračali other hand, the neutral establishments employed veliko morda primernih rekrutov. Zaradi takih rigid methods and turned down many potentially pomanjkljivosti selekcije so ustanovili sekcijo appropriate candidates. Due to these deficien- za urjenje, ki je začela nadzorovati SAB. Ta je cies in selection, the training section of SOE was začela oskrbovati državne sekcije s tehničnimi founded to supervise SAB and to supply technical sredstvi.8 resources to the country sections.8 Pred vsako selekcijo so izvedli tudi segrega- Before starting the selection process the candi- cijo kandidatov, ki je bila izvedena po nacio- dates were segregated either according to their na- nalnem načelu ali kot segregacija posamezni- tionality or as individuals and operative groups. kov oziroma operacijskih skupin. Največkrat As a rule the agents were sent to the country of so v isto državo pošiljali agente iste narod- their own nationality, which constituted a great nosti, kar je ob izdaji lahko povzročalo veli- danger in the event of treason. However, deploy- ko nevarnost. Vendar so bili agentje drugih ing agents of a different nationality caused poor nacionalnosti v določeni državi neučinkoviti, performance since such agents were unfamiliar

7 SAB was a quick and rather efficient system of candidate selection determining a 7 SAB was a quick and rather efficient system of candidate selection determining a candidate’s suitability for a certain type of work in a few days through extensive candidate’s suitability for a certain type of work in a few days through extensive tests and interviews. tests and interviews. 8 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter IV, September 1945, 8 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter IV, September 1945, also in HS 8/435. also in HS 8/435.

28 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA in sicer predvsem zaradi nepoznavanja jezika, with the language, area and culture of a foreign območja in kulture.9 country.9 Prvotni načrt je vseboval segregacijo po Originally it was planned the agents would narodnosti, ki je potekala na vseh ravneh ur- be segregated according to nationality, applying jenja. V tečajih signalizacije, na katerih so urili to all stages of training. In principle, segregation radiotelegrafiste, segregacije po narodnostih according to nationality did not take place dur- načeloma ni bilo. ing signals training, where wireless operators received their instruction. Sekcija za urjenje SOE Training Section of SOE Sekcijo za urjenje SOE s sedežem v Londonu je upravljal direktor urjenja, ki je nadzoroval The training section of SOE was headquar- šole za specialno urjenje (STS) v Angliji in na tered in London and managed by a director Škotskem, kjer so urili kandidate za delovanje whose responsibilities included overseeing v vseh evropskih državah. Izjema so bile šole Special Training Schools (STS) in England and na Daljnem in Bližnjem vzhodu, saj so ohra- Scotland, where the candidates were trained nile večjo avtonomnost, vodil pa jih je lokal- for operations in all European states. The ni upravnik SOE. Njihove temeljne naloge so schools in the Far East and the Middle East bile urjenje kandidatov in tudi inštruktorjev constituted an exception since they preserved urjenja. a higher degree of autononomy and were ad- Ker je bila SOE tajna služba se nihče ni mo- ministered by a local manager. The basic task gel rekrutirati na podlagi oglaševanja, zato je of these schools was to train both the candi- bil najučinkovitejši sistem rekrutiranje preko dates and the training instructors. osebnih zvez in poznanstev. SOE je velikokrat Due to the secret service nature of SOE, primanjkovalo profesionalnosti, zlasti Milita- recruitment through advertising was impos- ry Intelligence 6 (MI6)10 ji je večkrat očitala sible. The system of recruitment through per- amaterstvo, saj so bili njeni agentje velikokrat sonal contacts and acquaintances proved to be izurjeni v naglici in slabo pripravljeni poslani the most efficient solution. SOE often came na misije.11 up short when it came up to professionalism Že predhodnice SOE so upravljale s šolami and was frequently accused of amateurism, za urjenje svojih agentov, ki jih je SOE po especially by Military Intelligence 6 (MI6)10. združitvi še naprej upravljala. Šole so urile In fact, SOE agents were often trained in a kandidate različnih narodnosti z namenom, hurry and sent to conduct operations badly da jih po končanem urjenju pošljejo v njiho- prepared.11 ve matične države. Dolgoročni cilji SOE so Even SOE forerunners administered operative temeljili na oblikovanju mostišč v državah, training schools that were taken over by SOE af- ki so bile v središču zanimanja SOE, zato je ter the latter was amalgamated from the existing ta v njih oblikovala mrežo agentov in sistem departments. These schools trained candidates zvez. Kratkoročni cilji so bili v strogo tajnem of various nationalities in order to send them to območju delovanja SOE, saj so temeljili na their countries of origin after they completed the izvajanju samomorilskih napadov in atenta- training. The SOE long-term goals were based on tov.12 forming networks of operatives and contacts in SOE je razvila mrežo šol za urjenje v diver- the countries of particular interest to SOE. The zantskih znanjih, radiotelegrafiji in padalstvu. short-term goals were included in the strictly Sekcija za urjenje je postavila štiristopenjsko confidential part of SOE operations as their urjenje, ki so ga najprej opravili inštruktorji attainment depended on suicide attacks and in organizatorji urjenja. Ti so bili poslani v assasinations.12

9 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter XVII, September 1945. 9 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter XVII, September 10 MI6 or SIS was a British secret intelligence service that played an important role 1945. in the British intelligence and security system. Due to rivalry between the two 10 MI6 or SIS was a British secret intelligence service that played an important role organizations, it regarded SOE as superfluous. in the British intelligence and security system. Due to rivalry between the two 11 M.R.D Foot: SOE, Special Operations Executive 1940−1946, London 1999, pp. organizations, it regarded SOE as superfluous. 446−488. 11 M.R.D Foot: SOE, Special Operations Executive 1940−1946, London 1999, pp. 12 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter I, September 1945. 446−488. 12 TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter I, September 1945.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 29 pripravljalne šole, nato paravojaške in nazad- SOE developed a network of schools for train- nje zaključne šole. Pripravljalne šole so pome- ing in sabotage, wireless telegraphy and para- nilo preskusno dobo, v kateri so neprimerne chuting. A four stage training programme was kandidate odstranili. Na paravojaškem urjen- instituted by the training section that was first ju so kandidate učili o metodah rušenja, ravn- undergone by the instructors and training organ- anja z orožjem, taktiki, topografiji, šifriranju, izers. Both were sent to preliminary schools and varnosti na terenu ter metodah poizvedovanja then to paramilitary training and afterwards to in ogleda terena. Paravojaški tečaj je vseboval a final training programme. Preliminary training tudi padalsko urjenje. Vsaka državna sekcija je was a test period where inappropriate candidates imela svojo zaključno šolo, v kateri so se učili were rejected. Paramilitary training provided tudi o metodah delovanja tajnih služb in ak- the candidates with sabotage, weapons, tactical, tualnih dogodkih v okupiranih državah. Do topography, and encoding knowledge, as well as vpoklica na misijo so kandidate zadrževali v t e a c h i n g t h e m a b o u t s a f e t y d u r i n g fi e l d a s s i gn - zaključnih šolah. ments, investigative methods, and the scoping of the terrain. The paramilitary course included Sekcija za urjenje je leta 1943 dosegla parachute training. Every country section had svoj največji obseg, saj je zaposlovala kar 12 its own final programme school where the secret častnikov, potem pa se je začelo obdobje nje- services’ operative methods and current events in nega krčenja. Tako so junija 1945 zaprli vse the occupied countries were imparted. Candidates šole za urjenje, razen ene od šol na Bližnjem were kept at these schools until they were sent to vzhodu, ki je ostala prehodni tabor za more- a mission. bitne potrebe po urjenju. The training section achieved its greatest ex- Agentovo orožje, oprema in posebne t e n t i n 1 9 4 3 w h e n i t e m p l o y e d a s m a n y a s 1 2 o f - naprave ficers, however, their number was subsequently reduced. All training schools were closed in June Agentova oborožitev in oprema 1945 with the exception of a school in the Middle SOE je odporniška gibanja oskrbovala s kon- East that remained open as a transitional camp vencionalnim orožjem, ki so ga takrat upora- for eventual training needs. bljale vse zavezniške sile. Poleg konvencional- nega so imeli agenti SOE na voljo precejšen Agent’s Weapons, Equipment, and izbor interne zbirke orožja, opreme in posebnih Gadgets naprav namenjene tajnemu vojskovanju. SOE oziroma njeni znanstveniki so svoje orožje raz- Agent’s Weapons and Equipment vijali le za interno distribucijo. Večino pošiljk SOE was supplying the resistance movements orožja so sestavljale puške in lahki mitraljezi, with the conventional weapons used by all the poleg tega pa so svoje agente opremljali z raz- Allied powers. Apart from these, SOE agents had ličnimi vrstami pištol za samoobrambo. Kljub at their disposal an extensive choice of internal temu da je SOE večino orožja dobila od vojske, collection of weapons, equipment and gadgets je majhne količine orožja izdelala tudi sama s used in clandestine warfare. SOE, i.e. its scien- pomočjo svojih znanstvenikov in tehnikov.13 tists developed its own range of weapons intended for internal distribution only. Most shipments Raziskovalni sekciji SOE je načeloval vodja were composed of rifles and light machine guns. znanstvenih raziskovanj, ki je nadzoroval delo In addition, SOE agents were armed with vari- na štirih ravneh: na fizikalno-kemijski , inže- ous pistols intended for self-defense. Even though nirski, operativni ravni in kamuflaži. Na prvih SOE received most of its weapons from the army, dveh ravneh so obravnavali probleme poveza- small quantities were produced in its own facili- ne z vžigalniki in napravami, ki bi jih ti detoni- ties by SOE scientists and technicians.13 rali. Pri kemijskem raziskovanju so se usmerili

13 Denis Rigden: SOE Syllabus, Lessons in ungentlemanly warfare, (hereinafter: 13 Denis Rigden: SOE Syllabus, Lessons in ungentlemanly warfare, (hereinafter: Rigden: SOE Syllabus), pp. 18, 19; Mark Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook of Rigden: SOE Syllabus), pp. 18, 19; Mark Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook of Special Devices, (hereinafter: Seaman, Secret Agents Handbook), p. 20. Special Devices, (hereinafter: Seaman, Secret Agents Handbook), p. 20.

30 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Pištola Welrod 9mm z dušilcem A Welrod 9mm pistol predvsem na biokemijo, pri čemer so razisko- SOE research section was led by the head of vali uporabo strupov, uspaval in samomoril- scientific research who supervised four levels of nih tablet. Sestavljali so tudi posebne hranilne work: physics and chemistry level, engineering, obroke primerne za vojskovanje v različnih po- operations, and camouflage. The first two levels gojih obremenitve.Področje inženirstva je raz- dealt with the problems with igniting fuses and vijalorazlične naprave, med katerimi so pre- detonating devices. Research in the chemistry field vladovale magnetne bombe, ki so jih pritrdili was centered primarily on bio-chemistry or, more na tarčo, največkrat ladjo. To so bile podvodne specifically, the use of poisons, hypnotics and sui- bombe, s katerimi so se urili tudi kandidati v cide pills. In addition, special nutritious meals, šolah za specialno urjenje. Razvijali so tudi vse appropriate for warfare in different conditions of vrste posebnega orožja, ki se ga je dalo skriti strain were developed.The engineering field con- na preprost način. Prednost vsakega agenta centrated on inventing various devices, predomi- je bila v veščini, potrpežljivosti in poznavanju nantly magnetic bombs that could be stuck to a lokalnega okolja in ne v orožju, čeprav je bilo target, usually a ship. The use of such underwater dovršeno izdelano.14 bombs was another part of the Special Training SOE je izdala tudi ilustriran katalog poseb- Schools syllabus. Various kinds of special devices nih naprav in opreme, ki je bil namenjen agen- that could be easily concealed were invented as tom. To je bila interna publikacija, s pomočjo well. However, the agent’s biggest advantages katere so naročali željeno opremo. Vsebovala were his skill, patience, and the knowledge of the je opise, metode uporabe in vse glavne infor- local area rather than the weapons, even though macije o zažigalnih in osvetljevalnih bombah, brilliantly designed.14

14 Rigden, SOE Syllabus, p. 19. 14 Rigden, SOE Syllabus, p. 19.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 31 Welmanova podmornica A Welman submarine vžigalnikih, podvodnem eksplozivu in drugih For its agents, SOE issued an illustrated cata- napravah, ki so bile namenjene povzročitvi logue of special devices and equipment. It was an eksplozije.15 internal publication that aided the agents in or- Sekcija za kamuflažo SOE je svojim agen- dering the needed equipment. The catalogue con- tom zagotavljala primerna oblačila, ponava- tained descriptions, methods of use, and main di rabljena, ki so jih dobili iz starih zalog ali information on explosive incendiary bombs and od beguncev, ki so prihajali iz okupiranih night bombing flares, igniting fuses, underwater območij. Krojači so šivali predvsem civilne ob- explosives, and other explosive devices.15 leke glede na področje, kamor naj bi bil agent SOE camouflage section provided the agents poslan, na zalogi pa so imeli številne vojaške with appropriate clothing, usually used clothes uniforme, predvsem uniforme tretjega rajha. obtained from the warehouses or from the refu- Med urjenjem so se agentje naučili, kako spre- gees arriving from the occupied territories. Tailors meniti videz in kako se obnašati v določeni made predominantly civilian clothes in the style obleki, da bi ostali čim bolj prikriti. Med agen- of the area agent would operate in. Many mili- ti je bila zelo priljubljena padalska uniforma tary uniforms were kept in stock, mostly the striptease jump, ki jo je začela uporabljati tudi Third Reich uniforms. During training agents konkurenčna tajna služba MI6-SIS. Kakovost were taught how to change their appearance and padalske obleke je bila v hitrosti slačenja, po- how to behave in a certain kind of clothing so as leg tega je agenta dobro zavarovala pred mo- to to remain inconspicuous. A parachuting jump rebitnimi poškodbami in umazanijo. Zelo suit »striptease jump« achieved great popular- razširjena je bila tudi uporaba kovčkov in ak- ity among agents and was soon used even by the tovk, ki so jih uporabljali kot nastavljive mine rival secret service organization MI6-SIS. The proti nasprotniku.16 popularity of this parachuting uniform was due to the fact it could be speedily removed. Besides,

15 Rigden, SOE Syllabus, p. 22. 15 Rigden, SOE Syllabus, p. 22. 16 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 15.

32 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Eksplozivna in zažigalna sredstva it offered good protection from potential injuries SOE je razvila različne vrste eksploziva, še and dirt. There was a widespread use of explosive posebej plastičnega, ki se ga je dalo hitro spre- devices that were concealed in suitcases and brief- meniti v željeno obliko, zapakiran pa je bil v cases and could as used against the enemy.16 raznovrstne predmete, kot so kipci in orientas- ke rezbarije. Eksploziv je potreboval detonator Explosive and incendiary devices in vžigalnik z daljšim upočasnjenim delovan- SOE conceived different kinds of explosives, jem. Največ so uporabljali vžigalnik Lagleys, ki particularly plastic explosives that could eas- je postal splošni del opreme saboterja. Znanst- ily be molded and hidden in various items such veniki SOE so izpopolnili tudi podvodni as statuettes and oriental carvings. For the use eksploziv, ki je prav tako postal standardna na- of explosives, detonators and igniting fuses with prava za pomorsko sabotažo. Podvodni eksplo- a long time-delay were needed. The commonest ziv je bil zelo učinkovito sredstvo, saj je potopil type of igniting fuse was “Lagleys”, a standard okrog 3000 ton sovražnikovega ladjevja. part of an agent’s sabotage equipment. The SOE Poleg podvodnega eksploziva je SOE raz- scientists perfected underwater explosives that vila tudi tako imenovanega ježa (tyrebuster) became a standard device for maritime sabotage. - majhno mino, ki se je aktivirala na pritisk. The underwater explosives proved to be very effi- Uporabljali so jo za razstrelitev koles in pod- cient, sinking approximately 3000 tons of enemy vozja prevoznih sredstev. Te skrivnostne mine ships. so agentje uporabljali v različnih prikritih Besides the underwater devices, SOE developed oblikah kot opeke, kamenje, blato, ki jih je the so-called “tyrebuster” - a small pressure-acti- sovražnik težko opazil. Razvili so tudi razstre- vated mine. It was used to explode wheels and un- livo v obliki tlačilke za kolo, granate v obliki dercarriages of vehicles. These mysterious mines svetilk in številne druge oblike razstreliva.17 were used concealed as bricks, stones or mud that Zadnje popularno eksplozivno in were difficult to notice by the enemy. Other in- zažigalno sredstvo je bila tako imenovana ventions included an explosive device in the form eksplozivna podgana (the explosive rat), ki of a bicycle pump, lamp-shaped grenades and je bila izdelana za sabotaže na lokomotivah. many other forms of explosives.17 Agenti so eksplozivne podgane nastavljali v bližino kotlov, ki so ob stikuz ognjem eksplo- The last of the popular explosive and incendi- dirale in onemogočile nadaljnjo vožnjo vla- ary devices was the so-called “explosive rat” man- ka.18 ufactured for sabotage of train engines. An agent would place the explosive rat next to the boilers Radiotelegrafski aparati where it exploded on the contact with fire and Na začetku svojega delovanja je bila SOE prevented the train from continuing.18 popolnoma odvisna od MI6-SIS, saj je vsa radiotelegrafska komunikacija, torej šifre in Wireless Sets kode, temeljila na konkurenčni tajni službi. At the start of its activities SOE was entirely Šele pozneje je organizacija dosegla avtonomi- dependant on the MI6-SIS as it had to rely on the jo in sama začela proizvajati radiotelegrafsko the rival secret service organization for wireless opremo, ki jo je začela uporabljati tudi MI6- commnunications, ciphers and codes. It wasn’t SIS. Radiotelegrafisti so se v STS učili odda- until later that the organization achieved au- jati in sprejemati na različnih vrstah radiote- tonomy and started manufacturing its own ra- legrafskih aparatov (W/T)19. Ko dvostranska diotelegraphic equipment that came to be used by komunikacija med agentom in centralo ni bila the MI6-SIS as well. The Special Training Schools več potrebna, so začeli uporabljati miniaturni trained wireless operators to send and receive komunikacijski sprejemnik. communications while using different kinds of

17 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 17. 17 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 17. 18 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 18. 18 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 18. 19 W/T (wireless telegraphy) or radio set was a wireless receiver and transmitter 19 W/T (wireless telegraphy) or radio set was a wireless receiver and transmitter device used for sending and receiving coded communications by the missions. device used for sending and receiving coded communications by the missions.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 33 Najpogosteje uporabljena aparata sta bila radios (W/T)19. When two-way communication tip A Mark III in B Mark II (ali B2), ki so b e t w e e n t h e a g e n t a n d t h e c e n t r a l b e c a m e u n n e c - jih agentje kamuflirane nosili v običajnih essary, a miniature communications receiver was kovčkih. Prenosni aparati W/T so imeli dva used. vira napajanja, in sicer električno napeljavo The most frequently used radios were the sets ali pa baterije. Največ aparatov je kot vir na- of the type “A Mark III” and “B Mark II” (or pajanja uporabljalo baterije, ki jih je bilo treba “B2”) that an agent could camouflage as a nor- po določenem času tudi napolniti. Napajanje mal suitcase. Transportable W/T sets could be baterij je potekalo s pomočjo ročnih ali parnih powered either by electricity or batteries. Most generatorjev.20 sets were charged by battery power. The batteries were recharged by manual or steam generators. 20 Vodna plovila SOE je za veliko svojih sabotažnih akcij Sea vessels in misij potrebovala različne vrste plovil od For the sabotage purposes and missions, SOE čolnov, manjših ladij do podmornic. Med poz- often needed various types of vessels ranging from nanimi plovili, ki jih je organizacija razvila, so boats and small ships to submarines. Among the bili motorizirani delno potopljeni kanuji pri- best known vessels developed by the organiza- merni za transport agentov do sovražnikovih tion were motorized semi-submersible canoes for tarč ter manjša tovorna ladja Sleepin′ Beauty. transporting agents to enemy targets and a small Med podmornicami je slovela Welmanova cargo ship nicknamed the “Sleeping Beauty”. The podmornica za prevoz enega agenta, ki pa se v most famous submarine was a Welman one- praksi ni izkazala.21 man submarine, however, it did not work well in Po navadi so usposabljanja iz pomorstva ob- practice.21 segala predavanja predmetov iz pomorstva in Maritime training normally included courses opravljanje praktičnih vaj iz pomorskih sabo- on seafaring and practical exercises related to tažnih akcij.22 Urili so se v prikritem dostopu maritime sabotage operations.22 Exercises in- do posameznih točk, kjer so morali izvajati sa- cluded clandestine approach to the target where a botažne akcije. sabotage operation was carried out.

Sklep Conclusion

SOE je veliko naredila za razvoj urjenja svo- SOE placed high importance on the training jih agentov, saj je postavila učinkovito mrežo of agents, therefore, it built an efficient net- šol za specialno urjenje (STS) skoraj po celem work of Special Training Schools (STS) located svetu. Vsi agentje so se v SOE vključili prosto- throughout most of the world. All agents joined voljno, z željo po osvoboditvi lastne domovine SOE voluntarily either in order to free their home ali iz golega avanturizma. Kandidati so se urili countries or because they regarded it as an adven- v štiristopenjskem procesu urjenja in se v ne- ture. Candidates underwent a four phase train- kaj mesecih izurili v agente z različnimi vrsta- ing process that took several months and during mi specialističnega znanja. Orožje in oprema which they acquired different kinds of specialist agentov sta prihajala iz vojske ali raziskovalnih skills. The agents’ weapons and equipment were sekcij SOE. Kljub učinkovitemu sistemu ur- supplied by the armed forces or by SOE research jenja, orožja in opreme se cilj SOE, da zaneti sections. Although SOE used an efficient train- upor v zasedeni Evropi ni popolnoma uresni- ing system, weapons and equipment, its objective čil. SOE je dosegla tudi nekatere uspehe, kot of sparking resistance in the occupied Europe was so sabotaže mostov, tovarn, železnic in uspešni not entirely attained. SOE did achieve some suc- atentati na pomembne naciste. cess in carrying out sabotage operations on bridges, factories, and railways, as well as assasinations of some important Nazi party leaders.

20 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 24. 20 Seaman: Secret Agents Handbook, p. 24. 21 Rigden: SOE Syllabus, p. 19. 21 Rigden: SOE Syllabus, p. 19. 22 TNA HS 5/917, Wireless operaters record sheeets, 1941−1942. 22 TNA HS 5/917, Wireless operaters record sheeets, 1941−1942.

34 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Viri in literatura Sources and literature

Viri Sources The National Archives (TNA), London, gradi- The National Archives (TNA), London, Records vo SOE z oznako HS: of SOE, catalogue reference HS: • HS 5/917 • HS 5/917 • HS 7/51 • HS 7/51 • HS 7/52 • HS 7/52 • HS 7/55 • HS 7/55

Literatura Literature Boyce, Fredric: SOE: The Scientific Secrets, Boyce, Fredric: SOE: The Scientific Secrets, Sut- Sutton Publishing, London 2004. ton Publishing, London 2004. Foot, M. R. D: Special Operations Executive Foot, M. R. D: Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, Pimlico, London 1999. 1940-1946, Pimlico, London 1999. Piekalkiewicz, Janusz: Vohuni, agenti, vojaki: Piekalkiewicz, Janusz: Vohuni, agenti, vojaki: za kulisami druge svetovne vojne, Cankar- za kulisami druge svetovne vojne, Cankarjeva jeva Založba, Ljubljana 1973. Založba, Ljubljana 1973. Rigden, Denis: SOE Syllabus: Lessons in un- Rigden, Denis: SOE Syllabus: Lessons in ungen- gentlemanly warfare, Wold War II, Public tlemanly warfare, World War II, Public Re- Record Office, London 2001. cord Office, London 2001. Seaman, Mark: Secret Agents Handbook of Seaman, Mark: Secret Agents Handbook of Speci- Special Devices, World War II, Public Re- al Devices, World War II, Public Record Offi- cord Office, London 2000. ce, London 2000.

Ustni viri Oral Sources Simčič, Stanislav: ustno poročilo, 18. 11. Interview with Stanislav Simčič, 18 Novem- 2004. ber 2004.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 35 36 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Votanov hram namesto otoške cerkve Marijinega Vnebovzetja

K pričevanjem o nacističnih namerah o neopoganskem kultnem središču na Bledu

Temple to Wotan as a Replacement for the Church of the Assumption on the Bled Island

Testimonies on Nazi Intentions to Build a Neopagan Cult Center in Bled •

dr. Andrej Gaspari

Izvleček Abstract

Prispevek obravnava manj znane načrte The contribution deals with the little-known nacistov o ureditvi neopoganskega kultnega plans of the Nazis to establish a neo-pagan cult središča na Bledu. Glavni vir so pričevanja ob- center in Bled. The main source used is the tes- veščevalca Jožeta Jana, ki je ob koncu vojne za- timony of the intelligence agent Jože Jan who plenil gradivo posebne službe Glavnega urada confiscated the documents of the NSDAP Party NSDAP s sedežem v eni od blejskih vil. Službo, Chanceller’s special service (with headquarters ki se je od konca leta 1943 ukvarjala s projek- in one of the Bled villas) at the end of the Second tom gradnje Votanovega templja na Blejskem World War. The service was involved in the otoku in internata za izbrance SS na mestu project of building a temple to Wotan on the Bled nekdanjega dvorca Suvobor, je vodil dr. Mat- Island and an SS boarding school for selected in- thes Ziegler, nekdanji protestantski duhovnik dividuals at the site of the former Suvobor Palace. in tesni sodelavec Alfreda Rosenberga ter Mar- It was headed by dr. Matthes Ziegler, an ex-prot- tina Bormanna. Blejske namere spominjajo estant clergyman and a close associate of Alfred na delno uresničene načrte Heinricha Him- Rosenberg and Martin Bormann. The plans mlerja o ustanovitvi akademije in religioznega for Bled bear a close resemblance to Heinrich središča na gradu Wewelsburg v Westfaliji ter Himmler's partially realized plans for an acad- SS-kolonij v Nemčiji in vzhodni Evropi, ki so emy and a religious center at the Wewelsburg cas- nastajali ob psevdoznanstveni podpori zlogla- tle in Westphalia and for SS colonies in Germany sne organizacije Ahnenerbe in njenih inštitu- and Eastern Europe. Both of these plans were tov. Dokumentacije blejskega urada v Sloveniji formed with the pseudoscientific support of the ni bilo mogoče izslediti, zato bo treba iskanje infamous Ahnenerbe organization and its insti- razširiti na berlinske arhive. tutes. The documents of the Bled office could not be traced in Slovenia, therefore, research will have Ključne besede: Slovenija, Bled, druga sve- to be extended to the Berlin archives. tovna vojna, nacizem, cerkev, poganstvo, Vo- tan, SS, Ahnenerbe, Matthes Ziegler. Keywords: Slovenia, Bled, Second World War, Nazism, Church, paganism, Wotan, SS, Ahnenerbe, Matthes Ziegler

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 37 Uvod Introduction

Bled z okolico je bil zaradi termalnih izvirov In the second half of the 19. century, the ther- in izjemne jezerske vedute z otokom in gradom mal springs and the wonderful sight of the lake v drugi polovici 19. stoletja eden najbolj zna- with its island and castle made Bled and its sur- nih turističnih krajev v Avstro-Ogrski monar- roundings one of the most renowned tourist spots hiji, zaradi bivanja kraljeve družine v rezidenci in Austria-Hungary. The fact that the royal fam- Suvobor pa se je med obema vojnama razvil v ily was often in residence at the Suvobor palace in živahno diplomatsko središče. Po zlomu jugo- the period between the two World Wars turned slovanske vojske v aprilski vojni in kratkotrajni Bled into a lively center of diplomacy. After the prisotnosti italijanskih enot je Bled postal sre- defeat of the Yugoslav army in the April War Bled dišče nemške okupacijske oblasti na Gorenj- was briefly occupied by the Italian troops. The skem. Ta je za svoje sedeže izkoristila večino town later became the main base of the German zmogljivejših hotelov, v vilah in drugih hotelih occupying forces in Gorenjska. Most of the larger na Bledu, Mlinem in Rečici ter na Blejskem hotels were used as German headquarters while gradu pa so se razporedile različne vojaške in various military and police units and the gen- policijske enote ter orožniki.1 darmerie established themselves in the villas and Zaradi razmeroma ugodnih varnostnih smaller hotels in Bled, Mlino, and Rečica.1 okoliščin je Bled ves čas vojne ostal priljublje- Due to mostly favorable security conditions, na destinacija nemških dopustnikov in družin Bled remained a popular destination for German z bombardiranih območij, obiskali pa so ga holiday-makers as well as for the refugees from tudi mnogi nacistični funkcionarji. Med sle- the bombed areas throughout the war. It was vis- dnjimi navaja Božo Benedik, eden najboljših ited by many Nazi Party officials. According to poznavalcev krajevne zgodovine, tudi povelj- Božo Benedik, one of the foremost experts on lo- nika SS in vodjo urada za utrjevanje nemštva cal history of Bled, these visitors included the SS Heinricha Himmlerja, vplivnega strankarske- commander and the Reich Commissioner for the ga ideologa in nosilca različnih vladnih funk- Strengthening of Germanism Heinrich Himmler, cij Alfreda Rosenberga, šefa centralnega urada a top party ideologue and holder of various gov- stranke Martina Bormanna, vodjo Hitlerjeve ernment posts Alfred Rosenberg, the head of the mladine Baldurja v. Schiracha in vodjo Deut- Party Chancellery Martin Bormann, the head sche Arbeitsfront Roberta Leya.2 of the Hitler Youth Baldur von Schirach and the Med razloge za tako visoke obiske sodi tudi head of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront Robert Ley.2 poseben blejski urad vodstva NSDAP za religio- One of the reasons for such prominent visitors zne in svetovnonazorske zadeve, ki naj bi se po was the NSDAP leadership's Office for Religious dovolj verodostojnih pričevanjih ukvarjal tudi and Ideological Matters in Bled. Satisfactorily s pripravo projektov za postavitev nacističnega trustworthy testimonies claim the Office's tasks kultnega središča. Čeprav danes skoraj never- included designing projects to build a Nazi cult jeten načrt nadomestitve cerkve na Blejskem center. Although the plan of replacing the church otoku z Votanovim templjem v ničemer ne on Bled Island with a temple to Wotan hardly odstopa od delno institucionaliziranega oži- seems credible today, it is in line with partly insti- vljanja poganskih obredov Germanov, proti- tutionalized revival of Germanic pagan practices, klerikalizma in protikatolištva ter odkritega anti-clericalism, anti-Catholicism, and open spogledovanja nekaterih vodilnih nacistov z flirtation of some Nazi leaders with the occult. okultnim. Apart from the ambiental features and histori- Na izbiro Bleda kot primernega kraja so po- cal significance, the choice of Bled was undeniably leg ambientalnih odlik in zgodovinskega po- partly influenced by the Nazi image of »Southern mena nedvomno vplivali tudi nacistično pri- Carinthia« (Südkärnten) as »an ancient Germa- kazovanje »Južne Koroške« (Südkärnten) kot nic province«. Another influencing factor were

1 Benedik 1984. 1 Benedik 1984. 2 Ib., 2003, 75. V knjigi gostov blejskih hotelov 1887−1945 (Zgodovinski arhiv 2 Ib., 2003, 75. The names of the officials concerned cannot be found in the Ljubljana, Zdraviliška komisija Bled, RAD 65, knjiga 41) navedeni funkcionarji niso guestbook of the Bled hotels 1887-1945 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, vpisani, domnevno zaradi varnostnih ukrepov. Zdraviliška komisija Bled – Bled Health Resort Committee, RAD 65, volume 41), probably due to security measures.

38 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA »prastare germanske pokrajine« in rezultati the results of the racial tests of Gorenjska resi- rasnega pregleda gorenjskega prebivalstva, ki dents, showing a strong presence of the favorized je pokazal povečano prisotnost favoriziranega Nordic type.3 The Gorenjska region was envisaged nordijskega tipa.3 Nemški značaj Gorenjske, v to become home to 20.000 members of German katero so nameravali po izselitvi nezaželjene- minorities from the East following deportation of ga prebivalstva preseliti 20.000 pripadnikov undesirable inhabitants. The German character nemških manjšin z vzhoda, naj bi znanstveno of the region was to be proven mainly on the basis utemeljil Inštitut za preučevanje koroške de- of archeological, historical geographic, linguistic, žele (Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung), and folklore research by the Research Institute ustanovljen septembra 1942 pri univerzi v for the Land of Carinthia (Institut für Kärntner Gradcu,4 in sicer predvsem na podlagi arhe- Landesforschung),established in September 1942 oloških, historično-geografskih, lingvističnih as part of the University of Graz.4 in folklornih raziskav. A certain role in the promotion of Bled was Pri promociji Bleda je imel pomembno vlogo doubtlessly played by Franc Paar.5 Paar had been tudi medvojni župan Franc Paar,5 ugleden član the mayor of Bled in the period between the World NSDAP in Schwäbisch Deutsches Kulturbund. Wars and was a distinguished member of NSDAP Paar, ki je bil leta 1940 zaprt zaradi suma vo- and the Schwäbisch Deutsches Kulturbund. In hunstva in po nekaterih podatkih celo nosilec 1940, he was imprisoned on suspicion of spying. redko podeljevanega strankinega odlikovanja Some claims state he was a recipient of a rarely Blutorden, naj bi na Bled že pred vojno pova- awarded Nazi Party decoration Blutorden. He al- bil Baldur von Schiracha in mu kraj predstavil legedly invited Baldur von Schirach to Bled before kot mali raj v Evropi. V Paarovi korespondenci the war describing the town as a small paradise naj bi bil ohranjen dopis razvpitega Standar- in Europe. Supposedly Paar's preserved corre- tenführerja Otta Skorzenya, ki se je pri županu spondence includes a letter from the infamous zanimal za katero od razpoložljivih blejskih vil, Standartenführer Otto Skorzeny inquiring on v kateri bi se lahko naselil s svojo družino.6 available villas in Bled where he could stay with his family.6 Blejski načrti v povezavi z nacističnimi načrti o novi svetovni ureditvi Role of Bled in the context of nazi plans on the new world order Radikalen načrt za rušenje Marijine cerkve na otoku in gradnjo poganskega svetišča od- The radical plan of demolishing the St. Mary's raža dvojen in oportunističen odnos nacistov church on the island and constructing a pagan do Cerkve ter potrjuje, da je bilo oživljanje ger- temple reflects dual and opportunist relations of manskih kultov in njihovo prilagajanje ideo- Nazis with the church. Besides, it confirms that loško-propagandnim potrebam stvar osebnih restoration of Germanic cults and their adapta- nagibov vodilnih nacistov, med katerimi se tion to the ideological and propaganda needs was zanimanje za okultno pripisuje predvsem Ri- caused by personal inclinations of Nazi leaders. chardu Waltherju Darréju, Rudolfu Hessu, Among these, interest for the occult was attribut- Alfredu Rosenbergu in Heinrichu Himmlerju. ed principally to Richard Walther Darré, Rudolf Hitler se je iz poganistov norčeval in »kič, ki ga Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, and Heinrich Himmler. vlačijo iz nemške prazgodovine« imel za žalitev Hitler made the pagan worshippers the butt of his pravega germanstva, iz ikonografije masovnih jokes and considered »the kitsch they're bringing zborovanj stranke in začetega monumental- out of German ancient history« an insult to real nega arhitekturnega preurejanja nemških Germanism. Instead, he was fascinated by the mest pa je očitna njegova očaranost nad grško Greek and Roman antique as the iconography in rimsko antiko. Med vzponom na oblast je of the mass rallies of the Nazi Party and the be- katoliški in protestantski Cerkvi zagotavljal, ginnings of large-scale architectural renewal of

3 Ferenc 1968, 221, 222. 3 Ferenc 1968, 221, 222. 4 Wedekind 2005, 117−120. 4 Wedekind 2005, 117–120. 5 Benedik 2003, 76−79. 5 Benedik 2003, 76–79. 6 Za podatek se zahvaljujem Bogdanu Šanci. 6 I thank Bogdan Šanca for the data.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 39 Razglednica Blejskega otoka s cerkvijo Marije Pomagaj okoli A postcard of the Bled Island with the Church of the leta 1938 Assumption (app. 1938) da njegova stranka ne namerava vzpostaviti German cities bear witness to. When he seized germanskega poganstva. Postavljal se je celo v the power, Hitler assured the Catholic and the vlogo branitelja krščanstva pred komunistič- Protestant Church that his Party did not intend nim ateizmom, čeprav je v nekaterih govorih to establish German paganism. He even assumed pred volitvami leta 1932 tradicionalno kr- the role of a defender of Christianity against the ščanstvo zavračal kot vero, temelječo na judo- communist atheism, although he renounced tra- vski kulturi. Uradno je stranka podpirala »po- ditional Christianity as a faith based on Jewish zitivno krščanstvo«, vendar Goebbels in Hitler culture in several speeches prior to the 1932 elec- nista skrivala namenov, da bi cerkev po končni tions. Officially, the Party advocated »Positive zmagi pripravili k razvoju v nemško socialno- Christianity«, however, neither Goebbels nor evolucionistično organizacijo, ki bi namesto Hitler tried to conceal their intention of inducing odrešitve in Mojzesovih desetih zapovedi, ki the church to evolve into a German social evolu- so jih imeli za preživete in judovske, razglašala tionist organization after their final victory. Such kult rase, krvi in boja. Proti koncu vojne je re- a church would stop preaching Redemption and žim postajal vedno bolj protiklerikalen, vendar the Moses' Ten Commandments that were con- je bila ideja o tako imenovani rajhovski Cerkvi sidered obsolete and Jewish. It would proclaim the zaradi rivalstva med institucijami in manipu- cult of race, blood and fighting instead. Towards lacije z vprašanji religije že vnaprej obsojena na the end of the war, the regime's anti-clerical ten- neuspeh.7 dencies became more pronounced. Even so, the Med omenjenimi visokimi obiskovalci Ble- idea of a Reich's Church was doomed in advance da so trije izrazito protikrščansko nastrojeni owing to the rivalry between the institutions and nacisti, ki so bili v takšni ali drugačni povezavi the manipulation of religious issues.7 z Zieglerjem, in sicer Rosenberg, Bormman in Three of the above-mentioned high-profile Himmler. Svoje poglede so udejanjali v različ- visitors to Bled were decidedly anti-Christian nih uradih ali službah. Nazi Party members Rosenberg, Bormman, and

7 Steigmann-Gall 2003, 160. 7 Steigmann-Gall 2003, 160.

40 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), ki ga je Hi- Himmler, all connected to Ziegler. Their ideas tler leta 1934 označil kot »unser Parteidogma- were being put into practice through various of- tiker«, je v knjigi Mit dvajsetega stoletja (Der fices or departments. Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, 1930) Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946) to whom vpeljal koncept »religije krvi« (Religion des Blu- Hitler referred as »unser Parteidogmatiker« in tes), utemeljene na prirojeni obrambi nordij- 1934, introduced the concept of »religion of the skih ljudi pred kulturno in rasno degeneracijo. blood« (Religion des Blutes) in his book The Religija krvi naj bi nadomestila krščanstvo, ki Myth of the Twentieth Century (Der Mythus des ga je označil kot pojuden ponaredek rimsko- zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, 1930). The concept katoliške cerkve in jezuitov. Cerkveni naspro- was based on inborn defense of the Nordic peoples tniki pa so mu oponašali nevzdržnost njego- against cultural and racial degradation. Religion vih zgodovinskih konstruktov in očitali težnje of the blood was to replace Christianity Rosenberg po uvajanju Votanovega kulta. Rosenbergovo saw as a Judaized version of the Roman-Catholic sklicevanje na nordijske bogove nima tipično Church and the Jesuits. His opponents from the poganskega obeležja, kar izhaja tudi iz njego- church ranks reproached him for his untenable vega zapisa v Mitu: »Votan je bil in je mrtev«.8 historical constructs and his wish to revive the Čeprav se od zdi, da je Rosenbergova ideologija cult of Wotan. However, Rosenberg's references utemeljevala zavračanje krščanstva, jo je avtor to the Nordic gods do not bear tipically pagan videl kot njegovo radikalno revizijo.9 characteristics as can be gathered from his words Januarja 1934 je bil Rosenberg razglašen za in The Myth: »Wotan was and remains dead«.8 Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung From a distance it may seem Rosenberg's ideology der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen was grounded in a rejection of Christianity but Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP, ki se je v the author himself regarded it as a radical revi- skrajšani obliki imenoval Amt Rosenberg. Ta je sion of Christianity.9 imel urade za šolstvo, vzgojo, svetovnonazor- In January 1934, Rosenberg was named sko informiranje, tisk, literaturo, prazgodovi- Beauftragten des Führers für die Überwachung no in znanost, vendar je na teh področjih ostal der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen njegov vpliv omejen. Od oktobra 1940 je vodil Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP, also called Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), ki je Amt Rosenberg. Amt Rosenberg consisted of vari- po Hitlerjevem ukazu izvršil obsežno zaplem- ous offices in the fields of education, upbringing, bo umetniških in drugih kulturno-zgodovin- ideological propaganda, press, literature, prehis- sko pomembnih predmetov ter knjižnic v za- tory and science, although its influence in these sedenih ozemljih.10 areas remained limited. Since October 1940 Med zagovorniki različnih oblik poganske Rosenberg headed the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter religije je bilo precej protestantov ali nekda- Rosenberg (ERR) that looted, acting on Hitler's njih protestantskih duhovnikov in teologov, ki orders, numerous works of art, culturally and so izhod iz krize v delu protestantske cerkve ob historically significant objects, and library books koncu 19. stoletja iskali v ničejanski filozofiji in the occupied territories.10 vsestranske odrešitve in iz nje izhajajoče pro- Supporters of various pagan religions in- tikrščanske germanske vere.11 Med nekdanji- cluded a number of protestants or ex-protestant mi protestantskimi teologi v Rosenbergovem clergymen and theologians seeking to resolve uradu najdemo tudi Matthesa Zieglerja, enega the crisis in the Protestant Church at the end of glavnih protagonistov blejske zgodbe. Po po- 19. century through Nietzsche's philosophy of datkih iz biografije12 je že med študijem izsto- redemption and the anti-Christian Germanic pal z zbirko spisov Kirche und Reich im Ringen faith derived from it.11 One of the ex-protestant der jungen Generation, v katerih je nastopal s theologians in Rosenberg's office was Matthes tezami o »gosposki, plemiški krvi«, »nor- Ziegler who was one of the main protagonists of dijskem bistvu« in o kljukastem križu »kot the Bled story. According to his biography,12 he

8 Rosenberg 1930, 219. 8 Rosenberg 1930, 219. 9 Ib., 99. 9 Ib., 99. 10 Nicholas 1994. 10 Nicholas 1994. 11 Steigmann-Gall 2003, 111. 11 Steigmann-Gall 2003, 111. 12 Brückner 1986. 12 Brückner 1986.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 41 simbolu življenja, ki premaga smrt«.V NSDAP was noticed as early as his student years due to se je včlanil leta 1931 in še istega leta postal his collection of essays entitled Kirche und Reich pripadnik SA, leta 1935 pa član SS. Svojo pri- im Ringen der jungen Generation, presenting padnost nacistični stvari je izkazal tudi s spre- theses on »noble aristocratic blood«, »Nordic es- membo rojstnega imena Matthäus v Matthes, sence« and on the swastika as »the symbol of life ki naj bi zvenel bolj nordijsko. that defeats death«. He joined NSDAP and SA in Leta 1934 mu je Rosenberg predal ure- 1931 and became a member of the SS in 1935. He dništvo časopisa Nationalsozialistischen Mo- demonstrated his allegiance to the Nazi cause by natshefte, leta 1937 pa je bil imenovan za changing his name Matthäus to the more Nordic predsednika Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Deutsche sounding Matthes. Volkskunde. Istega leta je postal vodja oddel- In 1934, Rosenberg made Ziegler the editor of ka v Rosenbergovem uradu, ki je bil najprej the Nationalsozialistischen Monatshefte newspa- pristojen za cerkveno politiko, leta 1939 pa per and in 1937, he was appointed the President preimenovan v oddelek za svetovnonazorsko of Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Deutsche Volkskunde. informiranje (Weltanschauliche Information). In the same year, he became the head of one of Na novem položaju je ustanovil časopis De- the Rosenberg's office departments that was utsche Volkskunde, ki je izhajal do leta 1943 originally charged with overseeing church policy in je bil namenjen »Bearbeitung und Lösung but was renamed Ideological Information Office parteiwichtigen Forschungaufträge«. Najpo- (Weltanschauliche Information) in 1939. While membnejši Zieglerjevi deli sta Leitfaden für die in this post he founded a newspaper Deutsche Schulungs- und Erziehungsarbeit der NSDAP iz Volkskunde that was published until 1943 and leta 1939 in frontni brevir Soldatenglaube - Sol- intended for »Bearbeitung und Lösung partei- datenehre iz leta 1940, ki je izšel v več sto tisoč wichtigen Forschungaufträge«. Ziegler's most izvodih. Junija 1941 je na lastno željo izstopil iz important works are Leitfaden für die Schulungs- Amt Rosenberg, pri čemer razlogi za to odloči- und Erziehungsarbeit der NSDAP (1939) and tev niso jasni. V rivalstvu med Amt Rosenberg a breviary intended for soldiers Soldatenglaube in Ahnenerbe naj bi Ziegler kljub pripadnosti - Soldatenehre (1940), published in hundreds of SS veljal za Rosenbergijanca. thousands of copies. In June 1941, he voluntarily V orisu Zieglerjevega medvojnega delovanja, left Amt Rosenberg, however, his reasons for this ki ga je podal M. Brückner v Bayerische Blätter are not clear. Even though Ziegler was an SS mem- fur Volkskunde leta 1986, sovpada njegov pri- ber, he was supposedly on Rosenberg's side in the hod na Bled s koncem službovanja v SS-Toten- rivalry between Amt Rosenberg and Ahnenerbe. kopfdivison, kjer je bil s činom Obersturmban- According to the outline of Ziegler's activities nführerja odgovoren za propagando, na nov during the war presented in Bayerische Blätter fur položaj pa naj bi prišel s posebnimi nalogami Volkskunde by M. Brückner in 1986, Ziegler's po ukazu šefa glavnega urada NSDAP Martina arrival to Bled was simultaneous with the con- Bormanna. Njegov prestop je najverjetneje po- clusion of his service in SS-Totenkopfdivison with vezan z medinstitucionalnim bojem za primat the rank of Obersturmbannführer, responsible nad verskimi vprašanji, predvsem pristojnost- for propaganda. Apparently, his new posting in- mi kristjanov in krščanskim prepričanjem v volved special tasks he was entrusted with by the strankarskemu gibanju.13 head of the NSDAP Party Chancellery Martin Martin Bormann, ki je postal po Hessovem Bormann. It is very likely his transfer to another begu v Anglijo leta 1941 Hitlerjev tajnik in vod- service was caused by interinstitutional struggle ja glavnega urada stranke, je že pred tem veljal for supremacy over religious matters, especially za najbolj protiklerikalno in protikrščansko over the role the Christians and the Christian be- nastrojenega nacista.14 Tesno je sodeloval pri liefs should have in the Party movement.13 prepovedi opravljanja funkcij strankinih vodij Martin Bormann was considered the most v religioznih organizacijah, izključitvi pastorjev anti-clerical and anti-Christian Nazi even before iz stranke, vodil je kampanjo za zaseg premože- he assumed responsibilities of Hitler's secretary nja katoliške cerkve, iz ozadja pa je deloval tudi and the head of the Party Chancellery following

13 Steigmann–Gall 2003, 236. 13 Steigmann–Gall 2003, 236. 14 Ib., 260.

42 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA pri poskusu odstranitve religiozne ikonografije Hess' escape to England in 1941.14 He was closely iz šol leta 1941.15 Bormann je kritiziral Baldur involved in adopting the interdiction against Party von Schiracha zaradi bogoslužju namenjenih leaders holding important positions in religious nedelj v Hitlerjugendu in domnevno preveč organisations and in expeling pastors from the prijateljskih odnosov z duhovščino, ki naj bi Party. Bormann managed the campaign to con- jih imel na novem položaju dunajskega gaule- fiscate the Catholic Church property and was in iterja. Napadal je tudi Speerjevo vključevanje the background of the attempt to remove religious protestanskih in katoliških organov v načrto- symbols from schools in 1941.15 Bormann criti- vanje lokacij cerkev v grandioznem projektu cized Baldur von Schirach because Hitlerjugend pozidave novih berlinskih četrti. Predlagal je devoted Sundays to religion and for allegedly being tudi dokončno rušenje v zračnih napadih po- on too friendly terms with the clergy in his new škodovanih sakralnih objektov in nasprotoval post as the Gauleiter of Vienna. He also attacked njihovi obnovi. Z izgovorom, da vojna prizade- Speer for involving the Protestant and Catholic vanja zahtevajo sproščenost na razvedrilnem bodies in deciding on church locations as a part področju, je ukazal začasno prekinitev predva- of the grandiose project of the rebuilding of Berlin. janja cerkvene glasbe, ki naj bi se nadomestila Besides,he suggested complete demolition of sac - z »lepo nemško glasbo«.16 ral buildings that had been damaged in air raids Heinrich Himmler je bil med vsemi visoki- and opposed their renovation. Claiming that the mi predstavniki tretjega Rajha najbolj prevzet war effort called for the lightness in entertain- nad panarijanskim rasizmom in določenimi ment he ordered a temporary ban on performing oblikami germanskega neopoganstva, sam pa church music that was to be replaced by »beautiful naj bi se imel za duhovnega naslednika saške- German music«.16 ga kralja Henrika I Ptičarja (Heinrich der Vogler, Among the important personages of the Third 919–936). Kralju, ki je porazil Madžare v bitki Reich, Heinrich Himmler was the one who was pri Augsburgu in utrdil konfederacijo kne- most fascinated by Panaryan racism and certain zov, poznejše Sveto rimsko cesarstvo, je Him- forms of Germanic neopaganism. He allegedly saw mler posvetil svoje osebne prostore na gradu himself as the spiritual successor to the Saxon king Wewelsburg. Po Himmlerju je »v času dokonč- Henry I, or Henry the Fowler (Heinrich der Vogler, nega zatona krščanstva« med naloge SS sodila 919-936). Himmler's private apartments at the tudi priprava svetovnonazorskih podlag, po Wewelsburg castle were dedicated to this king who katerih naj Nemci vodijo in oblikujejo svoja ži- defeated the Magyars at Augsburg and strength- vljenja. Njegov nepopustljivi protiklerikalizem enedthe confederation of duchies that subsequently se je nanašal na katoliško cerkev, hkrati pa je became the Holy Roman Empire. Himmler claimed bil naklonjen protestantizmu. that part of the SS mission in the »time of the final Takoj po imenovanju za vodjo Shutzstaffel je decline of Christianity« was to form the ideologi- Himmler začel preoblikovati SS v rasno elito iz cal bases according to which the German people mladih nordijskih moških, za kar naj bi od ja- should lead and shape their lives. His relentless nuarja 1932 skrbel nov urad Rasse und Siedlun- anticlericalism was aimed against the Catholic gshauptamt (RuSHA). Za vodjo je bil imeno- church while he was favorably disposed towards van kmetijski ekspert in rasni teoretik Walther Protestantism. Darré, ki je presojal rasno in dedno ustreznost Immediately after becoming the leader of kandidatov za SS in pripravil odlok o pogojih Shutzstaffel, Himmler began transforming SS za poroke njegovih pripadnikov. Izdaja soglasja into a racial elite of young Nordic males. From je predvidevala tudi enak postopek preverjanja January 1932, this task fell under the responsibil- in selekcije za neveste za zagotovitev čistosti ity of the new office Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt nordijskega rodu, ki naj bi poživil ves nemški (RuSHA) led by an agrarian expert and race theo- narod.17 rist Walther Darré. Darré was in charge of judg- Skladno s Himmlerjevimi pogledi naj bi po- ing the racial and genetic appropriateness of the SS roke esesovcev potekale v družinskem krogu in candidates and prepared a decree on conditions for

15 Ib., 243–246. 14 Ib., 260. 16 Ib., 250. 15 Ib., 243–246. 17 Padfield 1990, 102−104. 16 Ib., 250.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 43 ne v okviru javne ceremonije, ki bi predvideva- SS members' marriages. For the consent to be giv- la na primer špalir regimenta SS. Poročeni pari en, the brides had to undergo the same procedure so kot darilo prejemali srebrne kupe, družinam of checks and selection in order to ensure the racial SS pa so pošiljali masivne svečnike (Julleuch- purity of the Nordic race that was to revitalize the ter), izdelane po predlogi »iz zgodnje preteklo- entire German nation.17 sti našega ljudstva«. V javnem življenju naj bi Himmler's views demanded that the weddings krščanske praznike nadomestili z dvema glav- of the SS officers be in the family circle and not in a nima ceremonijama ob poletnem in zimskem public ceremony with, for example, an honor guard enakonočju, kot je bila tista leta 1936, ko je po of an SS regiment. Newlyweds were presented with Rosenbergovi zamisli zbor Hitlerjeve mladine silver goblets and the SS families received massive pel poganske litanije in častil arijskega boga. candlesticks (Julleuchter), with the design in- Del Himmlerjevega širšega načrta za siste- spired by »the early history of our nation«. In pub- matično stvaritev nove »germanske« kulture lic life, the Christian holidays were to be replaced in religije kot temelja povojne svetovne uredi- by two principal ceremonies held at the summer tve je bila tudi organizacija Deutsches Ahnener- and winter solstices. A ceremony of this type took be- Studiengesellschaft für Geistesurgeschichte .18 place in 1936, based on Rosenberg's idea, with a Društvo, katerega skrajšano ime pomeni do- Hitlerjugend chorus singing pagan litanies and besedno »dediščina«, je bilo ustanovljeno leta worshiping the Aryan god. 1935. Po spremembi statuta in preimenovanju Himmler's wider plan for a systematic crea- v Forschungs - und Lehrgemeinschaft das Ahne- tion of a new »Germanic« culture and religion on nerbe e. V. leta 1937 so njeni cilji obsegali pred- which the world was to be founded after the war vsem interdisciplinarno dokazovanje teorij o consisted of another component: the organization rasni superiornosti ter preučevanje in oživlja- Deutsches Ahnenerbe - Studiengesellschaft für nje germanskih tradicij. Na višku delovanja je Geistesurgeschichte.18 The Society (its shortened organizacija zaposlovala 137 znanstvenikov s name Ahnenerbe means simply »heritage«) was področja družboslovja, naravoslovja in medi- founded in 1935. After it changed its statute and cine v več deset raziskovalnih oddelkih, ki so wasrenamed Forschungs- und Lehrgemeinschaft imeli na voljo fotografski in filmski laborato- das Ahnenerbe e.V. in 1937, its main aims in- rij, kiparsko delavnico, muzej ter različne knji- cluded proving the racial superiority theories žnice in arhive. through interdisciplinary research and restora- Eno od glavnih raziskovalnih področij so tion of Germanic traditions. At its height, the bile študije pozabljene zgodovine umišljene organization employed 137 scientists in the fields arijske rase. Čeprav je večina raziskav pripa- of humanities, science, and medicine who were dnikov Ahnenerbe temeljila na rasistični psev- organized in dozens of research departments with doznanosti, so zavračali okultno razmišljanje a photography and film laboratories available, as ariozofskih skupin kot na primer društva Thu- well as a sculpture workshop, a museum and a va- le, in dajali prednost pragmatični metodologiji riety of libraries and archives. na temelju Mendlove genetike, darvinizma in One of the main research areas was the study biologije. Na drugi strani so se njeni astrono- of a forgotten history of a fictionalized Aryan race. mi ukvarjali z bizarno teorijo o izvoru solarne- Although most of the Ahnenerbe research was ga sistema, ki naj bi pojasnila domnevni zaton basedon racist pseudoscience its members rejected prve arijske civilizacije. the occult thinking of ariosophic groups like the Ahnenerbe je bila leta 1940 vključena v Thulesociety. They preferred a pragmatic method - službo osebnega urada vodje SS kot Amt A, če- ology founded on Mendelian genetics, Darwinism, prav so bili že pred tem vsi člani akademskega and biology. On the other hand, the association's in medicinskega osebja vsaj častni (zaslužni) astronomers tried to prove a bizarre theory on člani SS. Med vojno je na zasedenih ozemljih the origin of the solar system that was supposed srednje in vzhodne Evrope plenila znan- to explain the alleged decline of the first Aryan stvene zbirke in knjižnice, arhivsko gradivo, civilization.

18 Kater 1986; Pringle 2006. 17 Padfield 1990, 102−104. 18 Kater 1986; Pringle 2006.

44 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA arheološke najdbe in umetniška dela, v »ger- In 1940, the Ahnenerbe was incorporated into manskih robnih območjih« (Nizozemska, the personal office of the SS leader under the name Belgija, Danska, Norveška) pa se je ukvarjala of Amt A, even though all of academic and medical s propagando in novačenjem prostovoljcev za staff were at least honorary (meritorious) mem- Waffen-SS. Pod okriljem Ahnenerbe so potekali bers of the SS before that. During the war, the tudi zloglasni medicinski poskusi v koncentra- Ahnenerbelooted scientific collections and libraries, cijskih taboriščih Dachau in Natzweiler. archives, archeological artifacts, and works of art Praktični pomen spoznanj Ahnenerbe o in the occupied territories of Central and Eastern preteklosti arijske rase in znanju prednikov je Europe. In »Germanic border areas« (Netherlands, bil v zavračanju življenja v »moralno propa- Belgium, Denmark, Norway), it devoted most of dlem« okolju nemških mest in promoviranju its attention to propaganda and recruitment of vol- vrnitve k preprostemu družinskemu življenju v unteers for the Waffen-SS. In addition, Ahnenerbe kolonijah SS. S poljedelskim rajem, ki bi nado- sponsored and carried out the infamous medical mestil industrijsko Nemčijo, naj bi bila ustvar- experiments at Dachau and Natzweiler concentra- jena plodna podlaga za razmnoževanje arij- tion camps. ske rase in prehod v novo zlato dobo. Zaradi The practical implication of Ahnenerbe's find- pomanjkanja zemljišč je v letih 1937 in 1938 ings on the past of the Aryan race and the forebears' poveljstvu SS uspelo ustanoviti le vzorčno ko- knowledge was in renunciation of life in »morally lonijo Mehrow vzhodno od Berlina, v kateri so corrupt« German cities and promotion of the re- naselili 12 SS-družin ter manjše število kolonij turn to simple family life in the SS colonies. The ag- drugod po Nemčiji, na večji uspeh pa je Him- ricultural paradise that was to replace the industrial mler računal po aneksiji Avstrije in Sudetov, Germany would supposedly create a fruitful basis še posebej pa z nemškim prodorom na vzhod. for proliferation of the Aryan race and bring about Po imenovanju za vodjo komisije za utrjevanje the transition to the new Golden Era. However, due nemštva (Reichskommissar für die Festigung to land shortage, the SS command only succeeded des Deutschen Volkstums) oktobra 1939 je za- in founding a limited number of colonies in 1937 čel skupaj s Konradom Meyerjem pripravljati and 1938: a model colony in Mehrow east of Berlin Generalplan Ost, načrt za tri velike nemške ko- that became home to 12 SS families and a few others lonije na vzhodnih okupiranih ozemljih. Prvo in other parts of Germany. Himmler hoped for bet- je obsegalo Leningrad in južno ležeči prostor, ter results after the annexation of Austria and the drugo ozemlje severne Poljske, Litve in jugo- Sudetenland and particularly following the German vzhodne Latvije, tretje pa Krim in rodovitna drive to the east. After his appointment to the post območja jugovzhodne Ukrajine. Kolonija na of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening Krimu naj bi se imenovala Gotengau, in sicer v of Germanism (Reichskommissar für die Festigung počastitev germanskega plemena Gotov, v ka- des Deutschen Volkstums) in October 1939, he be- terih so nacisti videli arijske prednike Nemcev. gan, in cooperation with Konrad Meyer, laying the Rasno ustrezni prebivalci bi lahko ostali, Slo- foundations for Generalplan Ost proposing three vane in druge nezaželene skupine pa bi bodisi large German colonies in the eastern occupied ter- izgnali oziroma usmrtili bodisi zasužnjili po ritories. The first was to include Leningrad and the vzoru grških Helotov. Tako sproščen prostor area to its south, the second a region consisting naj bi zapolnili z etničnimi skupinami Nem- of northern Poland, Lithuania and southeastern cev in SS-naseljencev, ki bi poselili obrambne Latvia, and the third was to encompass the Crimea vasi vzdolž meja Gotengau. and the fertile fields of southeastern Ukraine. The Načrti za naselbine svetlolasih in modroo- Crimea colony would be named Gotengau in honor kih vojakov-kmetovalcev (Wehrbauern) z že- of the Goths, a Germanic tribe seen by the Nazis as nami in otroki so predvidevali hišo župana, v the Aryan ancestors of the German people. Racially kateri bi bival vodja SS ali NSDAP, stavbe za lo- valuable inhabitants were to be permitted to stay kalne odbore stranke, SS, Hitlerjeve mladine in while the Slavs and other undesirable groups were ženskih organizacij, Thingplatz ali zbirališče za to be exiled, put to death, or enslaved like the Greek slavja ob poletnem enakonočju in drugih na- helots. Once the area was emptied the defense vil- cističnih praznikih, pokopališče, kjer bi lahko lages along the Gotengau borders would be repop- družine častile svoje prednike, in športno va- ulated with the ethnic groups of German and SS dišče. Poleg radikalne spremembe regionalne settlers.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 45 demografske slike je Himmler nameraval z The plans for the settlements of blond and blue- nasadi hrasta in breze ustvariti posnetek tra- eyed soldier-farmers (Wehrbauern) with their dicionalnih gozdov severne Nemčije ter spod- wives and children envisaged a mayor's house that buditi kmetovanje z uvedbo novih kulturnih was to be occupied by the SS or the NSDAP leader, rastlin, ki jih je odprava leta 1939 prinesla iz buildings that would house the local committees of Tibeta. Zato je bila pri Gradcu ustanovljena the Party, SS, Hitler's Youth, and women's organ- nova raziskovalna enota Ahnenerbe, ki je pod izations, a Thingplatz (a form of amphitheatre) načelovanjem vodje odprave dr. Ernsta Schä- where the celebrations of the summer solstice and ferja razvijala nove kulturne rastline.19 other Nazi holidays would take place, a graveyard where families would honor their ancestors, and a Grad Wewelsburg in Himmlerjev načrt sportsfield. Besides radically changing the regional o viteškem redu SS demographiclandscape, Himmler intended to rep - licate the traditional forests of northern Germany Arhitekturni koncept sakralnega komple- by planting oak and birch groves and to stimulate ksa s središčem v Votanovem templju na Blej- agrarian production by introducing new agricul- skem otoku se po svojem namenu in zasnovi tural plants, brought from Tibet in 1939. For this približuje delno uresničeni nameri o akademiji purpose, a new Ahnenerbe research unit was set in psevdoreligioznem središču SS na pozno- up near Graz. It was headed by the Tibet expedi- renesančnem gradu Wewelsburg v Westfaliji. tion leader dr. Ernst Schäfer and its mission was to Poleg slikovite pokrajine z gozdnatimi griči in develop new crops.19 grapami ter majhimi kmetijami je Himmlerja prevzela trikotna tlorisna zasnova gradu ter The Wewelsburg Castle and Himmler's njegova lega nedaleč od prizorišča odločilne plan on the Knightly order of SS bitke v Tevtoburškem lesu leta 9. n. št., v kateri so Germani pod vodstvom Arminja uničili tri The purpose and the design of the architectural rimske legije. concept of the sacral structures with the Wotan Grad, ki ga je leta 1934 Himmler vzel v 100- temple on the Bled Island as its central point bears letni najem od okrožja Paderborn, je bil najver- a close resemblance to the partially realized design jetneje izbran na predlog Karl Maria Wiligu- of an academy and a pseudo-religious SS center ta-Weisthorja, vodje oddelka za prazgodovino at the Late-Renaissance castle Wewelsburg in pri Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) in Westphalia. Himmler was impressed by the pic- takrat najbolj vplivnega mistika v organizaci- toresquelandscape of forest-covered hills, ravines, ji SS. Himmler je želel Wewelsburg oblikovati and small farms, as well as by the triangular po vzoru redovnih gradov nemškega viteškega ground plan of the castle and Wewelsburg's prox- reda, po končni zmagi pa naj bi postal središče imity to the site of the decisive battle of Teutoburg novega sveta. Alegorično središče sveta je bila forest in 9. A.D. where the Germanic tribes led by tema, ki jo je Wiligut pogosto omenjal, zato Arminius destroyed three Roman legions. skoraj ni dvoma, da je on prepričal Reichsfü- In 1934, Himmler leased the castle from the hrerja v koncept kvazipoganskih praks, kot district of Paderborn for 100 years. The site had tudi v zamisel o viteškem redu Schutzstaffel. probably been chosen on the suggestion of Karl Po odstranitvi Wiliguta, certificiranega dušev- Maria Wiligut-Weisthor, the head of the prehis- nega bolnika, ki se je prikazoval kot potomca torydepartment of Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt Arminija in varuha svetega znanja starih Ger- (RuSHA) and the most influential mysticist in manov, je pri načrtovanju in izvedbi projekta the SS organization at the time. Himmler wanted imela pomembno vlogo tudi posebna sekcija to model Wewelsburg on the castles of the German Ahnenerbe. Knightly Order and intended making it the center Večino gradbenih del, ki so potekala med of the new world order after the final victory. 1939 in 1943 pod vodstvom glavnega arhitek- Since Wiligut liked to talk about an allegorical ta Hermanna Bartelsa, so opravili zaporniki iz center of the world, it is almost certain he was the v ta namen ustanovljenega koncentracijskega one who convinced the Reichsführer to introduce

19 Pringle 2006, 218−220. 19 Pringle 2006, 218−220.

46 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Arhitekturni načrt ureditve gradu Wewelsburg z okolico iz Architectural plans for remodelling the Wewelsburg Castle leta 1944 (po Hüser, Brebeck 2002) and its surroundings, 1944 (taken from Hüser, Brebeck 2002)

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 47 taborišča Niederhagen. Glede na projektni na- quasi-pagan practices and form the Schutzstaffel črt in maketo iz leta 1944 je bil severni stolp as a knightly order. After the removal of Wiligut, gradu zamišljen kot središče monumentalne a certified mental patient who claimed to be a de- krožne instalacije premera 1,2 kilometra, ki scendant of Arminius and the guardian of sacred so jo sestavljale krožno in radialno potekajo- knowledge of the old Germans, a special section če ceste, spremljajoče stavbe ter koncentrični of Ahnenerbe played an important role in the de- pregradni zidovi. Tloris kaže, da je bila dovozna sign and the implementation of the project. cesta zasnovana kot drog, osrednja stavba in- Most of the construction work between 1939 stalacije pa kot sulična ost, ki se konča v sever- and 1943 under supervision of the head architect nem stolpu gradu. Načrtovana oblika osrednje Hermann Bartels was done by the prisoners from stavbe z gradom posnema slavno sulično ost iz the concentration camp Niederhagen that was muzeja Hofburg na Dunaju, ki je bila po takra- established for that purpose. According to the ar- tnem prepričanju ost, s katero je rimski centu- chitectural schematics and the model from 1944, rion Longinus med križanjem zabodel Kristusa, the north tower was conceived as the center of the in je bila takrat že v posesti nacistov. Izvedba monumental circularly shaped installation of a tega megalomanskega projekta bi povzročila 1,2 km diameter. The inside would consist of ra- popolno izginotje vasi Wewelsburg, saj so bili v dial and circular roads, buildings and concentric načrtu tudi dolinska zapora, lastna elektrarna, partition walls. The ground plan reveals that the avtocestni priključek in letališče. access drive was designed in the shape of a shaft and the central building as spear-head in the Zaradi vojnih dogajanj sta bili v okviru north tower of the castle. The design of the central gradbenega načrta deloma urejeni le dve dvo- building and the castle imitates the famous lance rani v severnem stolpu, zamišljenem kot sre- from the Hofburg Museum in Vienna. The lance, dišče sveta. Iz romanike in klasicizma prevzete already in the hands of Nazis, was then consid- gradbene forme so v obeh prostorih ustvarjale ered to be the lance Roman centurion Longinus slovesen in dinamičen videz, sodobna izvedba used to stab Jesus during crucifixion. The imple- pa je slonela na betonski osnovi s prevleko iz mentation of this megalomaniac project would naravnega kamna. Nekdanja cisterna v kleti je completely eradicate the Wewelsburg village be- bila spremenjena v kripto, zgrajeno po vzoru cause the plans foresaw a valley dam, a power mikenskih kupolastih grobnic, ki naj bi bila v plant, freeway access and an airport. spomin na mrtve. V središču prostora z moj- Due to war events, only two halls in the north strsko izvedeno akustiko in osvetlitvijo je bil tower, designed to be the center of the world, urejen plinski priključek za napajanje sklede were partially completed in the framework of the z večnim ognjem, obkrožen z 12 betonskimi building plan. The architectural forms were an podstavki neznane namembnosti. Na zenitu imitation of the Classical and Romanesque styles kupole je bila vzidana reliefna svastika s kraki giving the two rooms a solemn and dynamic look. v obliki črke sig v runski pisavi. The modern elements of the building consisted of Pritličje stolpa, v katerem je bila prej kapela, natural stone covered concrete. A former cistern so preuredili v Obergruppenführersaal, dvorano in the cellar was remodelled into a crypt inspired z 12 stebri. Središče talnega mozaika iz belo si- by Mycenaean vaulted tombs and intended for vega marmorja je sestavljal temno zelen motiv commemoration of the dead. The room had ex- sončnega kolesa iz treh obročev z dvanajstimi cellent acoustics and illumination. In the center, kraki, ki je bil najverjetneje izdelan po vzoru there was a gas connection where a bowl with an okrasnih sponk alamanskih žensk iz 3. stoletja eternal flame was to be installed. It was encircled n. št. in je danes v skrajno desničarskih in ezo- by 12 concrete pedestals of unknown purpose. In teričnih krogih znan kot črno sonce (Schwarze the zenith of the vault, a relief of a swastika was Sonne). V zvezi z arhitekturno zasnovo kom- walled in, shaped as the Sig-rune. pleksa in njenimi konceptualnimi navezavami The former chapel on the ground floor was na legendo o kralju Arthurju in vitezih okrogle turned into the Obergruppenführersaal, a mize so se pojavile tudi špekulacije, da je bila twelve-pillared chamber. The central motive of the središčna vdolbina v spodnji dvorani predvide- grey-white marble floor mosaic was a dark green na za sveti gral, ki je navduševal Himmlerja in sun wheel. It was composed of three rings with Wiliguta. twelve »spokes« and was probably inspired by

48 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA V stavbi hotela Park je bil med vojno sedež gestapa in During the war, the Park Hotel was used as Gestapo and varnostne službe. Hotel so porušili leta 1975 (zbirka Polda Security Service headquarters. The hotel was demolished in Kolmana). 1975 (Leopold Kolman's collection)

Na blejsko zgodbo spominjajo tudi name- the brooches Alemannic women wore in the third re o sestankih, slovesnih prisegah in porokah century. Currently, it is known as the Black Sun vodij SS, ki naj bi potekale na Wewelsburgu, (Schwarze Sonne) to the extreme right and eso- čeprav je o njih le malo znanega. Tako naj bi teric groups. The architectural design of the com- Wiligutov prijatelj Manfred von Knobelsdorff plex and its conceptual links to the legend of King na gradu izvajal različne rituale irminizma, Arthur and the knights of the Round Table have religije, nastale po Wiligutovi zamisli. Eden given rise to the speculation that the central niche teh dogodkov je bila krstna ceremonija za naj- in the hall was intended for the Holy Grail, a top- starejšega sina SS-Obergruppenführerja Kar- ic of fascination to both Himmler and Wiligut. la Wolffa 4. januarja 1937, pri kateri sta bila Another element reminiscent of the Bled story navzoča tudi pomembna člana SS Reinhard is the intention of holding meetings, ceremonial Heydrich in Karl Diebitsch. V ceremonijah je oaths and weddings of the SS leaders such as al- bil uporabljan domnevno starogermanski iz- legedly took place at Wewelsburg even though raz Got, ki sta ga razvila Diebitch in Wiligut there is a lack of information on them. Wiligut's zaradi razlikovanja boga SS od tradicionalnega friend Manfred von Knobelsdorff allegedly per- krščanskega Gott. Himmler in Wolff sta v po- formed various rituals of Irminism (religion govorih za boga uporabljala izraz Uralten, kar professed by Wiligut) at the Wewelsburg castle. naj bi se nanašalo na prastaro germansko bo- One of these events was the baptism of the eld- žanstvo.20 est son of SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff on 4 Na Wewelsburgu je bil načrtovan tudi mu- January 1937. Among the guests at the ceremony zej, v katerem naj bi razstavili tako original- were prominent SS members Reinhard Heydrich ne eksponate germanskega izvora, na primer and Karl Diebitsch. The supposedly old Germanic

20 Padfield 1990, 175,176.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 49 meče, ščite, keramične posode in nakit, kot word Got was used, propagated by Diebitch in njihove posnetke in umetniško izdelane pred- Wiligut in order to make a distinction between mete z obeležji večnega Rajha. Med izdelki the SS God and the traditional Christian Gott. In posebne sekcije Ahnenerbe, ki veljajo danes conversation, Himmler and Wolff alluded to God v določenih krogih za prvovrstno zbirateljsko by the word Uralten that was supposed to refer to blago, izstopajo svečniki s simbolom SS, pr- an ancient Germanic deity.20 stani ter srebrne in lesene skodele z runskimi The plans for Wewelsburg included a museum napisi, na trgu pa se je pojavil eden od stolov z with original artefacts of Germanic provenance, bogato rezbarjenim okrasom. Stoli naj bi bili e. g. swords, shields, ceramic vessels, and jew- izdelani prav za Himmlerja. Med ikonografski- elry, as well as replicas and objects of artistic mi motivi na kovaških izdelkih, rezbarijah, sli- merit bearing symbols of the eternal Reich. The kah in bronasti plastiki je eden najbolj značil- Ahnenerbe special section's products are consid- nih Irminsul, drevo usode in Votanov simbol. ered to be first-rate collectibles in some circles, Z muzejem na gradu Wewelsburg je poveza- especially candlesticks decorated with the SS sym- na tudi mala bronasta plastika doprsja mlade- bol, and the silver and wooden bowls with runic niča, ki je bila najdena leta 1923 med ostanki inscriptions. Even one of the carved chairs alleg- rimske vile pri Šentjurju pri Celju. Med drugo edly made for Himmler appeared in the market. svetovno vojno je plastiko, ki so jo ob najdbi One of the most distinctive iconographic motives prepoznali kot Germanika, Avgustovega po- appearing on forged iron works, carvings, paint- svojenca in prvo zgodovinsko osebnost rimske- ings, and bronze statues is Irminsul, tree of des- ga sveta, ki je dobila ime po Germanih, štajer- tiny and the symbol of Wotan. ski Gauleiter dr. Siegfried Uiberreiter poklonil There is another connection to the Wewelsburg Himmlerju. Ob koncu vojne je bila najdena na museum: a small bronze bust of a youth that was »Himmlerjevem gradu«, ki je bil v britanski discovered in the remains of a Roman villa in zasedbeni zoni, po restituciji pa jo je vlada LRS Šentjur pri Celju in 1923. The statuette was iden- zaupala Narodnemu muzeju v Ljubljani.21 tified as Germanicus, the adopted son of Augustus and the first famous personage of the Roman Pričevanja in viri world to receive an agnomen after Germania. During the Second World War, it was present- Glavni vir za poskus pojasnitve te blejske ed to Himmler by the Gauleiter of Styria, dr. epizode so pričevanja Jožeta Jana - Iztoka, Siegfried Uiberreiter. After the war, it was found obveščevalca VOS za Gorenjsko, ki jih dopol- in »Himmler's castle« in the British occupation njujejo poročilo iz arhiva OZNE ter navedbe zone. After its restitution, it was entrusted to the drugih medvojnih prebivalcev Bleda. Jan je National Museum of Slovenia by the government svoje medvojno udejstvovanje opisal v dveh of the People's Republic of Slovenia.21 feljtonih. Prvega, ki je izhajal pod naslovom »Koordinate na nedrčku« v Nedeljskem dnev- TESTIMONIES AND SOURCES niku med julijem in septembrom leta 1968, sta pripravila s tedanjim urednikom časopisa The main source for the attempt to illuminate Miranom Sattlerjem, feljton v treh nadaljeva- the Bled story is the testimony of Jože Jan - Iztok, a njih Moje obveščevalne akcije 1943–1945 pa je Security and Intelligence Agency (VOS) informer leta 1991 objavila Revija Obramba. V Janovem for Gorenjska. Other sources consist of a report pripovedovanju je največ pozornosti pritegnilo from the archives of the Department for Protection pridobivanje informacij o nemški raketni bazi of the People (OZNA) and the statements of peo- Peenemünde in jedrskem raziskovalnem cen- ple who resided in Bled during the war. Jan de- tru na polotoku Rügen.22 Pred nekaj leti se je scribed his wartime activities in two sets of in- priprave dokumentarne oddaje o njegovih sti- stallments. The first set appeared in the Nedeljski kih z nemškimi znanstveniki in posredovanju dnevnik newspaper from July to September 1968

21 Petru 1970. 20 Padfield 1990, 175, 176. 22 Janove navedbe o obiskih in delovanju berlinske pisateljice in nasprotnice režima 21 Petru 1970. Inge van Straaten na Bledu potrjuje županov dopis na okrajnega vodjo NSDAP 14. julija 1944 (Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4, šk. 94, 3150/197/10).

50 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA podatkov Sovjetom lotila RTV Slovenija, ven- under the title of »Koordinate na nedrčku« (Bra dar oddaja ni bila predvajana. Coordinates). It was written in collaboration Jan, ki je kot predvojni komunist zahvaljujoč with the then editor of the Nedeljski dnevnik, družinskim stikom s Paarom ušel domobran- Miran Sattler. The second set was published in skim preganjalcem in se naselil v hišo izselje- three installments in the Obramba magazine in nih staršev na Rečici, je v začetku leta 1943 na 1991 and was titled »Moje obveščevalne akcije Gorenjskem oblikoval samostojno obvešče- 1943-1945« (My Activities as an Intelligence valno mrežo, ki je prek Staneta Kersnika - Je- agent in 1943-1945). The part of Jan's narrative lovčana tujim vojaškim misijam posredovala that attracted most intention was his account of podatke o nemških oboroževalnih centrih in obtaining information on the German rocket de- objektih v Rajhu, zbirala pa je tudi podatke o velopment facilities at Peenemünde and the nu- 22 načrtovanih vojaških akcijah Nemcev proti OF clear research center on Rügen. Some years ago, in partizanom. RTV Slovenija (Slovenian national television) Kersnik je Jana povezal s Francem Sokličem, began preparing a documentary on Jan's contacts lastnikom trafike v Hotelu Park, ki je Janu po- with German scientists and communicating the sredoval stik z dvema nemškima podoficirjema data to the Soviets. However, the documentary SS-policije, od katerih je bil eden vodja radijske was never finished. postaje na Blejskem gradu, drugi pa vodja tele- Although Jan had been a communist even before the war, he managed to escape the Slovenian fonske centrale v hotelu Park. Oba podoficir- Home Guard (domobranci) due to his family ja sta bila koroška Nemca, ohranilo pa se je le contacts with Paar. He settled in his deported par- ime Rudolfa Weisa iz St. Veita (Glan). ents' house in Rečica. In the beginning of 1943, he Po Janovih besedah sta mu zaupnika več- established an independant information network krat pripovedovala o dveh posebnih službah in the Gorenjska region. This network imparted oziroma nalogah, zaradi katerih naj bi tja med the information on German armament centers vojno večkrat prišel tudi Himmler. Vodstvo na- and the Reich's facilities to foreign military mis- cistične stranke (Zentralleitung der NDSAP) je sions with the help of Stane Kersnik - Jelovčan. It imelo na Bledu poseben urad, ki je snoval novo also collected data relating to German plans for Hitlerjevo religijo, dva inženirja SS pa naj bi po military operations against the Liberation Front naročilu Urada za utrjevanje nemštva (Verein (OF) and the partisans. für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums) dela- Kersnik introduced Jan to Franc Soklič, the la na projektu Elektrizitäts werke Niedertauern owner of a newspaper stand at the Park Hotel. in podnaslovom Südwall - als endgültige Lösung Through him Jan met two German SS police of- der Slowenischen Frage. Dokumentacijo o obeh ficers one of whom was the head of the radio službah je Jan pridobil šele po umiku Nemcev z communication station at the Bled castle and the Bleda, ki se je zgodil v noči z 8. na 9. maj 1945. other of whom was the head of the telephone ex- Sedež omenjenega urada stranke naj bi bil v change at the Park Hotel. Both were Carinthian reprezentančni vili Podhorn (Bonačeva vila), Germans, however, only one of them is known by ki se je imenovala po prvi lastnici Amaliji name: Rudolf Weis from St. Veit an der Glan. Podhorn iz družine ljubljanskega industrialca Jan claims his two acquaintances often told 23 Ivana Bonača. Število uslužbencev urada ni him about two special services or issues that znano, zasnova vile z večjim dnevnim prosto- supposedly brought Himmler to Bled several rom v pritličju in več spalnicami v nadstropju times during the war. The Nazi Party leadership pa je omogočala delo okvirno 8 do 10 osebam. (Zentralleitung der NDSAP) had a Bled depart- Na sedežu urada naj bi bila »obsežna knjižnica ment entrusted with designing Hitler's new re- filozofskih in verskih knjig z vsega sveta, tudi ligion while two SS engineers were allegedly or- zelo starih, ki so bile pisane na pergamentu in dered by the Association for the Strengthening papirnatih zvitkih«. of Germanism (Verein für die Festigung des

23 Benedik 1984, 210. 22 Jan’s claims about the visits and activities of the Berlin writer and regime opponent Inge van Straaten in Bled are corroborated by the mayor’s letter to the district NSDAP leader of 14 July 1944 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4, box 94, 3150/197/10)

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 51 Velik sklepni dokument z zlato obrobo in deutschen Volkstums) to develop a project named usnjeno vezavo z letnico 1943 ali 1944 je po Elektrizitäts werke Niedertauern and subtitled Janu vseboval »nekakšno nacistično sveto pi- Südwall - als endgültige Lösung der Slowenischen smo«. Poglavje o svetišču na Blejskem otoku Frage. Documentation on both services was only je bilo opremljeno s skicami templja in zlate- obtained by Jan after the German retreat from ga kipa Votana, vrhovnega boga zahodnoger- Bled (that took place in the night from 8 May to manskih ljudstev, ki v skandinavskem panteo- 9 May 1945). nu ustreza Odinu. Votana, ki je bil upodobljen The headquarters of the aforementioned Party v dokumentu, je Jan po spominu opisal kot department were supposedly in the representative pošast. Na oltarju naj bi po posebnem proto- Podhorn villa (the Bonač villa) that was named kolu potekale krvne prisege vodilnih ljudi no- after its first owner Amalija Podhorn, a relative vega rajha.24 of the Ljubljana industrialist Ivan Bonač.23 The V okviru priprav za gradnjo svetišča naj bi number of the department's employees is un- začeli graditi na mestu, kjer je stala , kralje- known. However, the design of the villa (a large va rezidenca Suvobor (na mestu današnje living room on the ground floor and several bed- Vile Bled), internat za izbrance, ki bi bili po rooms upstairs) would offer work space to ap- šolanju posvečeni na Blejskem otoku. Glede proximately 8 to 10 persons. The department's na načrte, navedene v dokumentu, naj bi bile headquarters apparently included »a large library tamkajšnje vile rezervirane za vojne junake, of philosophy and religious books from every cor- nosilce viteškega križca (Ritterkreusträger). ner of the world, some very old and written on Neizseljeni del prebivalstva bi postal osebna parchment or scrolls«. last novega plemstva, za katerega bi bil Bled According to Jan, a large concluding document nekakšen ekskluzivni nacistični raj.25 Janovo with gold borders and leather binding, dated pričevanje o arhitekturni ureditvi kompleksa 1943 or 1944, contained »some sort of a Nazi dopolnjuje še nepreverjeni podatek o načrtu, bible«. The chapter dealing with the Bled Island ki naj bi ga našli pri obnovi vile Podhorn v za- temple contained sketches of the temple and of the četku devetdesetih let, in na katerem naj bi k golden statue of Wotan, the main god of the West templju na otoku vodil most.26 Omeniti velja Germanic peoples and the equivalent of Odin še pričevanje Franca Jarca, ki je med leti 1930 in the Scandinavian pantheon. Jan remembered in 1941 poveljeval blejskim orožnikom, med Wotan's depiction in the document as a monster. vodjo pa je vodil občinski prijavni urad.27 Jarc There was an altar where blood oaths of the lead- je ob več priložnostih razlagal o načrtih za po- ers of the new Reich were to take place using a roke, ki naj bi potekale na otoku po nacistični special protocol.24 ceremoniji. As part of the preparations for the construc- Dokumentacijo urada, ki naj bi je bilo za to- tion of the temple, the site of the »Suvobor« (the vornjak, je Jan poslal v Ljubljano z naročilom, king's residence and the location of the present day da knjižnico odpeljejo v NUK, sklepni doku- Bled Villa) was to be rebuilt as a boarding school ment pa je odposlal s posebno pošto.28 Dose- for selected individuals. After their schooling they danja poizvedovanja za arhivom, ki ga je imela would be ordained at the Bled Island. According med pripravami poročila OZNA, in sklepnim to the document, the villas in Bled would be re- dokumentom obravnavanega urada, niso dala served for war heroes, i. e. Knight's Cross recipi- oprijemljivejših rezultatov. Knjige iz Federal- ents (Ritterkreuzträger). The undeported popula- nega zbirnega centra, ki so prihajale iz knji- tion would become personal property of the new žnic okupatorjevih inštitucij, večinoma hrani nobility that would live in Bled as in some sort of Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, starejše in dra- exclusive Nazi paradise.25 Jan's testimony on the gocenejše primerke ter rokopise pa je prevze- architectural arrangement of the complex is cor- mala Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica.29 roborated by information (as yet uncomfirmed)

24 Jan 1991, 51. 23 Benedik 1984, 210. 25 Ib., 52. 24 Jan 1991, 51. 26 Za podatek se zahvaljujem Marjanu Jarcu. 25 Ib., 52. 27 Benedik 2003, 77. 28 Jan 1991, 52. 29 Kodrič-Dačić 2000.

52 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Mladinski letoviški dom nacionalsocialističnega skrbstva The youth holiday home of the National Socialism welfare v vili Vovk, ki je delovalo pod okriljem Urada za utrjevanje system in the Vovk villa, organized under the auspices of nemštva (arhiv Gorenjskega muzeja v Kranju; št. neg. the Association for the Strengthening of Germanism (the 373/10) archives of the Museum of Gorenjska in Kranj; neg. Number 373/10)

Teoretično bi moralo morebitne zaplembe on a plan that was allegedly found during reno- z Bleda najprej prevzeti skladišče FZC v Kra- vation of the Podhorn villa in the early 1990's nju, vendar v Knjigi prevzetih in inventiranih and that foresaw a bridge leading to the island knjig in knjižnic v NUK knjižnica obravnava- with the temple.26 It is worth mentioning, too, nega urada ni omenjena. Ne omenja je niti the testimony of Franc Jarc who commanded the seznam knjig, ki je bil izročen verski komisiji Bled gendarmerie in 1930 – 1941 and managed pri Slovenskem narodnoosvobodilnem svetu. the municipal registration office during Second Manj verjetna in upajmo tudi neuresničena je World War.27 Jarc often mentioned the plans for možnost, da je bil v povojnem pomanjkanju weddings that would take place on the island in a surovin del gradiva skupaj s »plažo« in propa- Nazi influenced ceremony. gandno literaturo odpeljan v mline Papirnice The documents of the Office (apparently a Vevče kot »švabski papir«. full truck load) were sent to Ljubljana by Jan Drugi vir podatkov o delovanju omenjene- with the instructions to transport the library to ga posebnega urada je zapisnik iz dosjeja raz- the National and University Library (NUK). vpitega hauptsturmführerja (stotnika) gestapa He sent the concluding document through special Helmuta Rozumeka v arhivu OZNE, ki ga hra- mail.28 So far, the inquiries about the archives ni Arhiv Republike Slovenije.30 V mapi nekda- (in the hands of OZNA during the preparation njega policijskega inšpektorja, ki je med leti of the report) and the concluding document of the 1942 in 1944 poveljeval IV. oddelku varnostne Office concerned had no tangible results. The ma- službe ter povzročil partizanskemu gibanju z jority of books from the Federal Collection Center

30 AS 1931, tehnična enota 409, mapa 122 ZA (Helmut Rozumek). 26 I thank Marjan Jarc for the data. 27 Benedik 2003, 77. 28 Jan 1991, 52.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 53 igro na več straneh veliko žrtev in medseboj- (FZC) that were acquired from the libraries of the nega sumničenja, je tudi nepodpisano poroči- institutions of the occupying army are kept at the lo o različnih obveščevalno zanimivih osebah, Institute of Contemporary History. The older and ki so se med vojno zadrževale na Bledu, dati- more valuable documents as well as the handwrit- rano z 21. 7. 1945. V četrtem poglavju, ki nima ten ones were sent to the NUK.29 In theory, the navedenega vira, vendar je mogoče sklepati, da documents confiscated in Bled should have been ga je napisal avtor poročila, je omenjen dr. Zi- sent to the FZC storehouse in Kranj first, however, egler, v katerem lahko prepoznamo Matthesa therecords of the received and inventoried books do Zieglerja (1911–1992), protestantskega teolo- not mention the library of the Office concerned. ga in enega vidnejših nemških nacistov. Ne- Likewise, it is not mentioned in the list of books znani avtor poročila je iz »dela arhiva«, ki ga je submitted to the Committee for Religion of the pridobila OZNA, razbral, da je bil do prihoda Slovenian National Liberation Council (SNOS). na Bled Ziegler zaposlen v Amt Rosenberg, kjer In an unlikely and hopefully hypothetical scenar- naj bi deloval v oddelku za cerkveno politiko, io, part of the archives was perceived as »German na Bledu pa naj bi po nalogu Zentralleitung der paper« and taken to the Vevče paper mill together NSDAP izvajal »nadzor nad verstvi, posebej with »pulp fiction« and propaganda literature due nad katoliško vero«. V tem poročilu vila Pod- to the shortage of raw materials after the war. horn ni predstavljena kot sedež urada, temveč kot bivališče Zieglerjeve družine, kar bi lah- Another souce of data on the activities of the ko potrjeval tudi naslov Schloß 206 v sezna- special Office concerned is the minutes from the mu priseljenih Nemcev, ki ga hrani izpostava file on the infamous Gestapo Hauptsturmführer Zgodovinskega arhiva Ljubljana v Kranju.31 Helmut Rozumek. This file from the OZNA ar- Ziegler je v kartoteki prebivalstva imenovan c h i v e s i s k e p t a t t h e A r c h i v e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f kot Dienstleiter, na povojnem pripisu na kar- Slovenia.30 Rozumek was an ex-police inspector tici prebivalstva pa je označen kot strankarski who commanded the IV department of the Security propagandist. Na Bled naj bi se preselil iz Pos- Service from 1942 to 1944 and caused many dama 8. novembra 1943, z ženo Lilli in petimi deaths and much mutual distrust in the partisan otroci pa je bil nastanjen v vili Beli dvor. Dr. movement. His file contains an unsigned report, Zieglerja navaja Benedik tudi kot vodjo blej- dated from 21 July 1945, on several individuals ske pisarne NSDAP, ki naj bi imela sedež na who spent time in Bled during the war and were njegovem domačem naslovu skupaj s Koroško o f i n t e r e s t t o i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e s . C h a p t e r 4 o f deželno zvezo.32 the report mentions dr. Ziegler which can be taken to refer to Matthes Ziegler (1911 – 1992), a prot- Poročilo OZNE opisuje Zieglerja kot zelo estant theologian and one of the better known visoko in vplivno osebnost, piscu je bilo zna- German Nazis. The source is not stated, however, no tudi njegovo osebno poznanstvo s Hitler- i t c a n b e s u r m i s e d t h e c h a p t e r w a s w r i t t e n b y t h e jem. Na Bledu naj bi imel stike z generalom author of the report. From »part of the archives« SS (Oberguppenführer) in vodjo 18. vojaško- obtained by OZNA the unknown author inferred policijskega okrožja Erwinom Rössenerjem, that Ziegler worked for Amt Rosenberg's depart- podpolkovnikom SS (Obersturmbannführer) ment charged with overseeing church policy prior in poveljnikom SD Aloisom Perstererjem ter to his arrival to Bled. In Bled, he allegedly »su - majorjem SS (Sturmbannführer) Njuwboksem pervised religions, particularly the Catholic one« (zapisan tudi kot Njuboks) iz Nachricshtendi- on orders of Zentralleitung der NSDAP. The re- enst SD-West v Bruslju.33 Poročilo navaja, da port does not allude to the Podhorn villa as to the naj bi se pri Zieglerju ustavljali tudi drugi vi- Office headquarters but as to the Ziegler fam - soki obiskovalci iz Rajha. Na podlagi njegovih ily residence. This is possibly confirmed by the

31 Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4, šk. 94. 29 Kodrič-Dačić 2000. 32 Benedik 1984, 99. 30 AS 1931, technical unit 409, file 122 ZA (Helmut Rozumek). 33 Zelo verjetno gre za Alfreda Helmuta Naujocksa (1911-1966?), ki je bil že leta 1941 odpuščen iz SD. Leta 1943 je bil poslan na vzhodno fronto, zaradi slabega zdravja pa so ga leto pozneje nastavili kot intendantskega uslužnebenca enot v Belgiji. Tam je bil vpleten v smrti večih članov odpora, še istega leta pa je bil po napredovanju v Obersturmführerja premeščen v Rösenerjev štab HSSPF Alpenland.

54 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA stikov avtor izraža podrobneje neutemeljeno address Schloß 206 in the list of German settlers domnevo, da je Ziegler deloval kot zveza med kept by the Historical Archives Ljubljana's Unit SD in Vatikanom. Zaznamek se konča s pri- for Gorenjska, Kranj. 31 Ziegler is included in the pombo, da bi lahko njegovo pravo vlogo poja- residents' records as a Dienstleiter while an af- snila njegova tajnica Helena Weiss,34 ki je bila terwar note on the residents card states he was med 1941 in 1943 zaposlena pri blejskem ge- a party propagandist. He had supposedly moved stapu, pred tem pa v centralnem vodstvu NS- to Bled from Potsdam on 8 November 1943 DAP. a n d l i v e d w i t h h i s w i f e L i l l i a n d t h e i r fi v e c h il - dren in the Beli dvor villa. On the other hand, Sklep Benedik specifies dr. Ziegler was the head of the NSDAP's Bled Office and states its headquarters Razmeroma pozna datacija sklepnega do- shared Ziegler's home address together with the kumenta Zieglerjevega urada je presenetlji- Carinthian Landbund.32 va, saj kaže vztrajanje naročnika kljub preo- The OZNA report describes Ziegler as a very bratu na evropskih bojiščih, zaradi katerega important and influential personage. The author naj bi bila od januarja 1943 vsa gradbena of the report was aware even of Ziegler's per- dela v Rajhu, ki niso bila neposredno name- sonal acquaintance with Hitler. In Bled, Ziegler njena vojnim prizadevanjem, zaustavljena. allegedly kept in contact with the SS general Iz dostopnih virov tudi ni mogoče razbrati (Oberguppenführer) and the leader of the 18th neposredne povezave med teoretskimi izho- army and police district Erwin Rössener, the dišči in infrastrukturnimi projekti sakralne- SS lieutenant colonel (Obersturmbannführer) ga kompleksa ter gradnjo »grajskega hotela« and the SD (Security Service) commander Alois na mestu nekdanjega dvorca Suvobor, ki ga je Persterer, and the SS major (Sturmbannführer) nemška oblast namenila za Hitlerjevo mla- Njuwboks (also referred to as Njuboks) from 35 dino (Kvart und Freunde). Po načrtih neke- t h e N a c h r i c s h t e n d i e n s t S D - W e s t i n B r u s s e l s . 33 ga arhitekta iz Beljaka so Nemci novi stavbi Report states that all other important Reich visi- kraljeve rezidence dodali dva stranska trak- tors paid calls on Ziegler. Based on Ziegler's con- ta, s katerima je v nemškem slugu zgrajeni tacts, the author presents a detailed and unfound - kompleks dobil tloris v približni obliki črke ed hypothesis on Ziegler's acting as a contact 36 H. Pri izvedbi je sodeloval tudi Plečnikov between SD and Vatican. The note ends with a učenec Danilo Fürst, od leta 1941 zaposlen r e m a r k t h a t Z i e g l e r ' s t r u e r o l e c o u l d b e e x p l a i n e d v projektivnem uradu za Gorenjsko, ki ga je by his secretary Helena Weiss 34 who worked for vodil sudetski Nemec arhitekt Just. Stavba s the Bled Gestapo from 1941 to 1943 and had strmo streho iz skodel je bila skoraj konča- been previously employed at the NSDAP central na, vendar brez ometov in notranjih nape- leadership. ljav. Konec vojne je dočakala skoraj opusto- šena. Morda so bila v okviru pripravljalnih Conclusion del opravljena tudi poskusna arheološka izkopavanja zgodnjesrednjeveškega grobišča It is surprising that the concluding docu- v okolici že porušenega dvorca Suvobor, ki ment of the Ziegler's office is dated relatively late so potekala julija 1943 v okviru Inštituta za since this shows the client persisted inspite of the preučevanje koroške dežele.37 changes in the battlefield situation that were supposed to bring an end to all construction work in

34 Bivanje H. Weiss na Bledu je dokumentirano v seznamu priseljenih Nemcev z 31 The Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4, box dne 1. 4. 1945 in seznamu članov NDSAP z dne 4. 10. 1912 (Zgodovinski arhiv 94. Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4; šk. 94). 32 Benedik 1984, 99. 35 Prim. Prelovšek 1998, 26. 33 Probably Alfred Helmut Naujocks (1911−1966?) who had been dismissed from 36 Prelovšek 1998, 12. the SD in 1941. In 1943, he was sent to the Eastern Front. Due to poor health, he 37 Knific 1984, 100. was transferred to an army commissariat department in Belgium in the following year. There, he was implicated in the deaths of several Resistance members. Later in the same year, he was promoted to Obersturmführer and transferred to the staff of Rösener’s HSSPF Alpenland. 34 H. Weiss’ stay in Bled is documented in the list of immignant Germans of 1 April 1945 and in the list of the NDSAP members of 4 October 1912 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4; box 94).

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 55 Zahvale the Reich that was not directly connected to the war effort from January 1943. The sources avail- Za pojasnila o arhitekturnem preureja- able do not permit understanding of the connec- njem Vile Bled se zahvaljujem dr. Damjanu tion between theoretical premises, infrastructural Prelovšku z Direktorata za kulturno dedi- projects of the sacral structures, and the build- ščino Ministrstva za kulturo. Pri poizvedbi ing of a »castle hotel« on the former site of the o gradivu FZC so mi pomagali mag. Ljuba Suvobor Palace that the German authorities in- Dornik Šubelj iz Arhiva RS, dr. Eva Kodrič 35 tended for Hitler's Youth (Kvart und Freunde). -Dačić, mag. Jasna Horvat iz Narodne in The Germans, using the plans drawn by an archi- univerzitetne knjižnice ter Nataša Petrov iz tect from Villach, added two side wings to the new Informacijsko-dokumentacijskega centra building on the site of the king's residence. The Ministrstva za kulturo. Za pomoč pri iska- side wings gave the ground plan of the complex nju primernih ilustracij hvala tudi Miji Mra- (built in German style) the approximate shape of vlje iz kranjske enote Zgodovinskega arhiva the letter H.36 One of the individuals involved in Ljubljana in Mateji Likozar iz Gorenjskega the performance of works was Plečnik's disciple muzeja ter Leopoldu Kolmanu z Bleda. Upra- Danilo Fürst. From 1941, Fürst was employed at vičene pripombe ob prvi različici besedila je the Gorenjska Design Office headed by a Sudeten prispeval kolega mag. Martin Premk. German, architect Just. The building with a steep Literatura shingled roof was roughly finished, even though without wall coatings and fittings. At the end of Benedik, B.: Počitniške vile so bile ponos blej- the war, it was almost in ruins. The trial archeo- skega letovišča, Kronika, Časopis za slo- logical excavation of the early medieval cemetery vensko krajevno zgodovino 32, 1984, str. near the site of the already demolished Suvobor 197–213. Palace that took place in July 1943 under the pa- Benedik, B.: Nemški okupatorji v blejskih ho- tronage of the Research Institute for the Land of telih in vilah, Kronika, Časopis za slovensko Carinthia was possibly carried out in the frame- 37 krajevno zgodovino 36, 1988, str. 96–100. work of preparatory works. Benedik, B.: Bled nekoč in danes, Bled 2003. Brückner, W.: Volkskunde und Nationalsozia- Acknowledgements lismus. Zum Beispiel Matthes Ziegler, Baye- rische Blätter für Volkskunde 13, 1986, str. I am grateful to Dr. Damjan Prelovšek from the 189–192. Directorate for Cultural Heritage of the Slovenian Ferenc, T.: Nacistična raznarodovalna politi- Ministry of Culture for his explanations on the ka v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945, Knjižnica architectural remodelling of the Bled Villa. For NOV in POS 35, Maribor 1968. help with my inquiries on the FZC materials, I Forte, K. (Marko Selin): Nič več strogo zaupno, am indebted to Ljuba Dornik Šubelj. M. A., from knjiga II, Nacistične obveščevalne službe in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr. Eva njihova dejavnost pri nas. Ljubljana 1978. Kodrič-Dačić and Jasna Horvat, M. A., from the Hüser, K., Brebeck, W. F.: Wewelsburg 1933– National and University Library, as well as to 1945, Münster 2002. Nataša Petrov from the INDOK Center of the Jan, J.: Moje obveščevalne akcije 1943–1945, Ministry of Culture. For their help in searching Revija Obramba 5, 1991, str. 52–53; 6/7, for appropriate illustrations, I thank Ms. Mija str. 4245; 10, str. 51–53. Mravlje from the Historical Archives Ljubljana's Kodrič - Dačić. E.: Federalni zbirni center in Unit for Gorenjska, Kranj, Ms. Mateja Likozar. njegov prispevek k dopolnitvi fondov na- from the Museum of Gorenjska, and Mr. Leopold rodne in univerzitetne knjižnice, Knjižnica Kolman from Bled. My colleague Martin Premk, 44/4, 2000, str. 51–63. M. A., contributed some excellent remarks to the Knific, T.: Arheološki zemljevid blejskega kota first version of the text.

35 Prim. Prelovšek 1998, 26. 36 Prelovšek 1998, 12. 37 Knific 1984, 100.

56 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA v zgodnjem srednjem veku, Kronika 32, Bibliography 1984, str. 99–110. Nicholas, L.: The Rape of Europa, London Benedik, B.: Počitniške vile so bile ponos blejskega 1994. letovišča, Kronika, Časopis za slovensko kra- Padfield, P.: Himmler, Reichsführer-SS, Lon- jevno zgodovino 32, 1984, pp. 197–213. don 1990. Benedik, B.: Nemški okupatorji v blejskih hotelih Petru, S.: Nenavadna pot Germanika med leti in vilah, Kronika, Časopis za slovensko krajev- 1941–1945. Argo 9/2, 1970, str. 43–44. no zgodovino 36, 1988, pp. 96–100. Prelovšek, D.: Villa Bled, Piranesi 5, št. 7/8, Benedik, B.: Bled nekoč in danes, Bled 2003. 1998, str. 8–25. Brückner, W.: Volkskunde und Nationalsozia- Pringle, H. A.: The Master Plan: Himmler‘s lismus. Zum Beispiel Matthes Ziegler, Baye- Scholars and the Holocaust. London 2006. rische Blätter für Volkskunde 13, 1986, pp. Rosenberg, A.: Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Ja- 189–192. hrhunderts, Berlin 1930. Ferenc, T.: Nacistična raznarodovalna politika v Steigmann-Gall, R.: The Holy Reich. Nazi Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945, Knjižnica NOV Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945. in POS 35, Maribor 1968. Cambridge 2003. Forte, K. (Marko Selin): Nič več strogo zaupno, Wedekind, M.: The Sword of Science: Geman knjiga II, Nacistične obveščevalne službe in Scholars and National Socialist Annexati- njihova dejavnost pri nas. Ljubljana 1978. on Policy in Slovenia and Norther Italy. V: Hüser, K., Brebeck, W. F.: Wewelsburg 1933– I. Haar, G. C. Iggers (ur.), German Scho- 1945, Münster 2002. lars and Ethnic Cleansing 1919–1945, New Jan, J.: Moje obveščevalne akcije 1943–1945, Re- York, Oxford 2005, str. 110–138. vija Obramba 5, 1991, pp. 52–53; 6/7, pp. 42–45; 10, pp. 51–53. Kodrič-Dačić. E.: Federalni zbirni center in njegov prispevek k dopolnitvi fondov narodne in univerzitetne knjižnice, Knjižnica 44/4, 2000, pp. 51–63. Knific, T.: Arheološki zemljevid blejskega kota v zgodnjem srednjem veku, Kronika 32, 1984, pp. 99–110. Nicholas, L.: The Rape of Europa, London 1994. Padfield, P.: Himmler, Reichsführer-SS, London 1990. Petru, S.: Nenavadna pot Germanika med leti 1941–1945. Argo 9/2, 1970, pp. 43–44. Prelovšek, D.: Villa Bled. - Piranesi 5, No. 7/8, 1998, pp. 8–25. Pringle, H. A.: The Master Plan: Himmler‘s Scho- lars and the Holocaust. London 2006. Rosenberg, A.: Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Ja- hrhunderts, Berlin 1930. Steigmann-Gall, R.: The Holy Reich. Nazi Con- ceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945. Cam- bridge 2003. Wedekind, M.: The Sword of Science: German Scholars and National Socialist Annexation Policy in Slovenia and Northern Italy. V: I. Haar, G. C. Iggers (ed.), German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing 1919–1945, New York, Oxford 2005, pp. 110–138.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 57 58 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Preoboroževanje enot zagrebško-ljubljanske armadne oblasti s tehniko iz programa zahodne vojaške pomoči v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja

Rearmament of the Zagreb-Ljubljana Army Authority with Technical Assets from the Western Military Assistance Programme in the 1950s •

mag. Dmitar Tasić

Izvleček Abstract

Prispevek obravnava problematiko preobo- The article discusses the problem of the rearma- roževanja Jugoslovanske ljudske armade (JLA) ment of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) with v 50. letih 20. stoletja z zahodno oborožitvijo. western weapons, which took place in the1950s. Preoboroževanje se je izvajalo kot posledica za- The rearmament was a result of the exacerbation ostritve odnosov z vzhodnim blokom po objavi of relations with the eastern block after the adop- resolucije Informbiroja. Za zahodne sile, ZDA, tion of the Resolution of the Communist Party Veliko Britanijo in Francijo je bilo pomembno, Information Bureau. The most important con- da ustrezno zavarujejo prehod do Italije, ob sideration for the western powers (USA, Great morebitnem napadu sovjetskih in njenih sa- Britain and France) was to ensure a safe passage telitskih enot, prek Ljubljanskih vrat, torej čez to Italy through the Ljubljana Gate (Slovenia) slovensko ozemlje. Opisani sta dve tristranski in case of attack by Soviet forces or its satellites. jugoslovanski konferenci in reorganizacija Two tripartite Yugoslav conferences and the re- enot JLA. Nove enote so v primerjavi s starimi organisation process of the YPA are described. As dobile večjo ognjeno moč in bile tudi organiza- opposed to the old units, the new units gained cijsko bolje postavljene. greater firepower and were better organised.

Ključne besede: Jugoslovanska ljudska ar- Keywords: Yugoslav People’s Army, Yugoslavia, mada, Jugoslavija, preoboroževanje, Ljubljan- rearmament, Ljubljana gate, the Bled Agreement, ska vrata, Blejski sporazum, Nato, American NATO, American Military Assistance Staff, Cold Military Assistance Staff, hladna vojna. War.

Resolucija Informbiroja, ki je bila sprejeta The Resolution of the Communist Information junija 1948, je v temeljih spremenila podobo Bureau, adopted in June 1948, fundamen- mednarodnih odnosov v jugoslovanski sose- tally changed international relations around ščini. Še včerajšnji zavezniki so postali zaprise- Yugoslavia. Former allies became sworn enemies, ženi sovražniki, hkrati pa so sovražniki postali while, under the stress of the situation, enemies po sili razmer zavezniki. Jugoslavija je v nekaj became allies. Within a period of few years,

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 59 letih prehodila pot od »najzvestejšega satelita« Yugoslavia went from “the most devoted satel-

ZSSR do države z »lojalnim in kooperativnim lite” of the USSR to adopting a “loyal and coop- pristopom« do zahodnih držav (beri ZDA).1 erative approach” towards western countries (i.e. Tako je Jugoslavija nadaljevala svojo udeležbo v USA)1 Consequently, Yugoslavia continued to dogajanjih hladne vojne, vendar zdaj na drugi participate in Cold War developments; however strani in ne več znotraj sovjetskega bloka.2 no longer as a part of the Soviet block, but on the opposite side. 2 Jugoslovansko državno vodstvo je bilo pri- siljeno, da se obrne proti Zahodu, saj se je Yugoslav state authorities were forced to soočalo z nevarnostjo z Vzhoda, ekonomsko turn towards the West due to threat from the krizo, nekaj zaporednimi sušnimi leti in z do- East, economic crisis, several successive years of trajanostjo virov Jugoslovanske armade (JA). drought and the decrepit resources of the Yugoslav Združene države Amerike so skupaj z drugimi Army (YA). The United States of America along zahodnimi silami, zlasti z Veliko Britanijo in with several other western countries, particularly Francijo, pokazale pripravljenost, da podprejo Great Britain and France, demonstrated the will jugoslovanski upor proti ZSSR. Podpora se je to support the Yugoslav revolt against the USSR. kazala v množici neuradnih in uradnih stikov Support included a number of formal and informed predstavniki Jugoslavije in ZDA v začet- mal exchanges between Yugoslav and US repre- ku 50. let, ki so pripeljali do sklenitve spora- sentatives in the early 1950s, which subsequently zuma o prejemanju ameriške vojaške pomoči.3 led to the Military Assistance Agreement between Sprejem Grčije in Turčije v Nato leta 1952 je the United States and Yugoslavia. 3 In 1952, the še bolj aktualiziral približevanje in sodelovanje integration of Greece and Turkey into NATO z Jugoslavijo. Diplomatska sprememba je bila contributed to the popularity of approaching uradno objavljena prav na ozemlju Slovenije. Yugoslavia and developing cooperation with it. V nekaj letih (1948–1954) je jugoslovanska The diplomatic change was officially announced zunanja politika prehodila pot od skupnih in the Slovenian territory. Within a few years načrtov za oblikovanje Balkanske federacije z (1948-1954) Yugoslav foreign policy moved from Bolgarijo in Albanijo do sklepanja vojaškega common plans to create a Balkan federation with zavezništva z dvema članicama Natovega zave- Bulgaria and Albania to entering into a military zništva, in sicer Grčijo in Turčijo, oba sporazu- alliance with two NATO countries, Greece and ma pa sta bila podpisana na Bledu. Turkey. Both agreements were signed at Bled. Vojaški pomen Slovenije, opremljenost Military Significance of Slovenia, Jugoslovanske armade in prvi stiki z Equipment of the Yugoslav Army and zahodnimi predstavniki First Contacts with Representatives from the West Na jugoslovanskem vojskovališču je imela slovenska, natančneje tako imenovana lju- Within Yugoslav battlespace, the Slovenian bljanska smer, za razliko od južne in central- route (more precisely the “Ljubljana route”), as ne, majhno globino in neposredno kopensko opposed to south and central routes, was not very povezavo z Zahodno Evropo. Učinkovit prodor deep and it provided a direct land connection with sovjetskih in satelitskih sil iz zahodne Madžar- Western Europe. An effective penetration of Soviet ske po dolini reke Drave proti Ljubljanskim and satellite forces from west Hungary through vratom in naprej proti Trstu bi jim zagotovil iz- the Drava valley and toward the Ljubljana gate hod na Jadransko morje, neposredno bi ogrozil and Trieste would provide access to the Adriatic Italijo, zavezniške zračne in pomorske povezave Sea and pose a direct threat to Italy as well as to

1 Lorejn M. Lis, Održavanje Tita na površini – Sjedinjene države, Jugoslavija i Hladni 1 Lorejn M. Lis, Održavanje Tita na površini – Sjedinjene države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat, BMG, Belgarde 2003. rat, BMG, Belgarde 2003. 2 Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, Globus, Zagreb 1988, p. 58, Hereinafter: 2 Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, Globus, Zagreb 1988, p. 58, Hereinafter: Bekić 1988 Bekić 1988 3 For details see: Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951−1958, 3 For details see: Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951−1958, Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005, pp. 28−36. Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005, pp. 28−36. Hereinafter: Laković 2005 Hereinafter: Laković 2005

60 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA v tem delu Sredozemlja ter postavil velik del allied air and maritime connections in this part Zahodne Evrope v doseg sovjetskih vojaških of the Mediterranean. A large part of the Western sil. Zahodni vojaški predstavniki so v stikih Europe would fall within the range of the Soviet z jugoslovanskimi kolegi redno kazali veliko Armed Forces. In meetings with their Yugoslav zanimanje za jugoslovanske obrambne načrte colleagues, western military representatives re- na ljubljanski smeri. Po večdnevnem bivanju peatedly showed interest in the Yugoslav Ljubljana v Washingtonu, zaradi pogovorov o ameriški defence line. On 10 July 1951 in Paris, after hav- vojaški pomoči Jugoslaviji, se je načelnik Ge- ing spent a few days in Washington due to talks neralštaba JA general Koča Popović srečal s po- about US military assistance for Yugoslavia, the veljnikom zavezniških sil v Evropi generalom Chief of YA General Staff, General Koča Popović, Eisenhowerjem 10. julija v Parizu.4 Ameriške- met the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, ga generala so zanimale številne podrobnosti General Eisenhower4. The US General was inter- o JA, njeni formaciji, moči, kakovosti oboroži- ested in many details concerning the YA, its for- tve. Popović je ameriškega kolega seznanil, da mation and strength as well as the quality of its bi bila v primeru uspešnega preoboroževanja weapons. Popović informed General Eisenhower enot JA z zahodno oborožitvijo obramba Lju- that a successful rearmament of YA units with bljanskih vrat zagotovljena, še posebej, če bi se westernweapons would enable successful defence zgodil napad le satelitskih sil.5 of the Ljubljana gate, especially in the event of a satellite forces attack. 5 Za ZDA je pošiljanje vojaške pomoči Jugo- slaviji pomenilo krepitev južnega in jugovzho- The USA saw the potential provision of mili- dnega krila Natovega zavezništva v Evropi, kar tary assistance to Yugoslavia as an opportunity so bodoči ameriško-jugoslovanski stiki tudi to reinforce the southern and eastern block of potrdili. Načelnik Združenega generalštaba the NATO alliance in Europe. This assumption ameriške vojske, general Lawton Collins, je was confirmed by future US-Yugoslav contacts. med sestankom v Beogradu oktobra 1951. leta During his visit to Belgrade in October 1951, izrazil zadovoljstvo glede jugoslovanskih načr- General Lawton Collins, Chief-of-Staff of the tov, da za obrambo ljubljanske smeri predvidi United States Army, expressed his contentment sile šestih pehotnih in ene oklepne divizije. with the Yugoslav intention to deploy six infantry Med obiskom je general Collins obiskal tudi and an armoured division to defend the Ljubljana Ljubljansko in Skopsko vojaško oblast.6 Nasle- route. General Lawton also visited with Ljubljana dnji mesec, in sicer 14. novembra, so v Beogra- and Skopje military authorities.6 The following du podpisali sporazum med ZDA in Jugoslavijo month, 14 November, in Belgrade, the Military o posredovanju vojaške pomoči.7 Assistance Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia was signed. 7 Konec vojne in prva povojna leta je JA priča- kala z raznovrstno oborožitvijo. V njenih eno- The weapons of the YA at the end of WW II tah so imeli jugoslovansko, trofejno nemško and in the early after-war period were diverse. in italijansko ter tudi zavezniško oborožitev in They included Yugoslav weapons, German opremo: ameriško, britansko in sovjetsko. Ju- and Italian trophy weapons as well as allied – goslovanska vojaška industrija se ni obnavljala American, British and Soviet – weapons and dovolj hitro, da bi lahko nadomestila odvi- equipment. The Yugoslav military industry was snost od ZSSR, ki se je kazala v prvih povojnih not revamping fast enough to compensate for its letih. Povojni poskus unifikacije oborožitve je dependence on the USSR in the early post-war propadel po zaustavitvi dobav iz ZSSR. V upo- period. The post-war attempt to unify the weap- rabo so vrnili velike količine trofejne oboroži- onry failed after the supply from the USSR ended. tve, počasi pa se je kot največja težava pokazalo Vast amounts of trophy weapons were returned

4 Laković 2005, pp. 38−43. During his stay in Washington, General Koča Popović met 4 Laković 2005, pp. 38−43. During his stay in Washington, General Koča Popović met Averel Hariman, Robert Joyce, General Omar Bradley and General Clyde Eddleman Averel Hariman, Robert Joyce, General Omar Bradley and General Clyde Eddleman as well as the Secretary of State Dean Achenson. (note by D. Tasić). as well as the Secretary of State Dean Achenson. (note by D. Tasić). 5 Laković 2005, p. 46. 5 Laković 2005, p. 46. 6 Laković 2005, pp. 53−58. 6 Laković 2005, pp. 53−58. 7 Laković 2005, p. 59. 7 Laković 2005, p. 59.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 61 Tank M4 A3 Sherman M4 A3 Sherman tank pomanjkanje rezervnih delov. Uporabljali so into use; however the supply of spare parts soon 61 vrst oborožitve z 49 vrstami streliva, ki je became a major problem. Yugoslav units used 61 imelo popolnoma različne kalibre. Kot primer different types of weapons with 49 types of am- lahko navedem, da so v oklepnih enotah imeli munition of completely different calibres. For ameriške tanke stuart in sovjetske T-34, v le- example, armoured units used American Stuart talstvu sovjetska jurišna in lovska letala jak-3, tanks and Soviet T-34 tanks and air forces used jak-9 in iil-2, ameriške lovce-bombnike thun- the Soviet Jak-3, Jak-9 and Il-2 attack and fighter derbolt, nemške lovce prestreznike messer- aircraft, American Thunderbolt fighter-bombers, schmidt 109, britanske lovce prestreznike spi- German Messerschmitt 109 fighter-interceptor tfire, hurricane, izvidniška letala mosquito in aircraft, British Spitfire and Hurricane fighter- še nekatera druga letala. Podobno je bilo tudi interceptor aircraft, Mosquito reconnaissance v šolskem in transportnem letalstvu. Vojna aircraft and others. The situation in the Air Force mornarica je bila še na začetku. Primanjkova- training and transportation units was similar. In li so kakovostni sistemi zvez, radarji, rezervni that period, the development of the Navy had only deli, inženirski material in drugo.8 Na jugo- just started. The forces lacked quality communi- slovanski strani so bile v začetku petdesetih cation systems, radars, spare parts, engineering let, natančneje 1950. leta, izpeljane večje or- materials etc. 8 In the early 1950s, more precisely ganizacijsko-formacijske spremembe na ravni in 1950, the entire YA faced significant organi- celotne vojske. Do te reorganizacije je bila za sational and formational changes. Until the re- obrambo Slovenije in Hrvaške pristojna Peta organisation process, the defence of Slovenia and vojaška oblast s poveljstvom v Zagrebu. V svoji Croatia was within the competence of the “Fifth sestavi je imela 10. in 12. armado, ki sta imeli Military Authority”, which was based in Zagreb. poveljstvi v Ljubljani in Zagrebu. S spremem- Its organic units included the 10th and 12th Army bami je bilo opredeljeno, da se Peta vojaška with their respective headquarters in Ljubljana oblast v vojni reorganizira v Peto armadno and Zagreb. After the implementation of changes

8 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 8 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 42−47. 42−47.

62 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA oblast in 5. armado s poveljstvom v Zagrebu. the Fifth Military Authority was reorganised V njeni sestavi sta bila dva korpusa in ena sa- into the Fifth Army Authority and the 5th Army mostojna tankovska divizija. V Ljubljani je bilo with commands in Zagreb. Two corps and an in- poveljstvo 23. korpusa, ki bi se v vojni razvil v dependent Tank Division were assigned to the 5th 10. operativno skupino, ki pa je imela v svoji Army. The 23rd Corps was based in Ljubljana. In sestavi pet pehotnih divizij: 33., 129., 60., 1. in the event of war it would reorganise into the 10th 69.. V Zagrebu je bilo poveljstvo 11. korpusa, ki Operational Group which would include the fol- je imelo v svoji sestavi: 14., 137., 6., 56. in 85. lowing five Infantry Divisions: 33rd, 129th, 60th, pehotno ter 118. gorsko divizijo. V Sisku je bil 1st and 69th. The headquarters of the 11th Corps sedež poveljstva 20. tankovske divizije. was in Zagreb. It included the 14th, 137th, 6th, Ameriški vojaški strokovnjaki so opazili v 56th and 85th Infantry Divisions and the 118th analizah stanja in potreb JA po oborožitvi in Mountain Division. The 20th Tank Division was opremi očitno pomanjkanje težke artilerije in based in Sisak. prevladovanje zastarelega letalstva. Američani so želeli, da bi prek dobav prvih kontingentov The analyses of the situation and needs in pridobili jugoslovansko soglasje za nadaljeva- the YA carried out by American military experts nje strateških pogajanj, hkrati pa so se želeli iz- identified a severe lack of heavy artillery and the ogniti vzbujanju občutkov političnega pogoje- prevalence of obsolete aircraft. The first few US vanja, na kar so bili Jugoslovani zelo občutljivi. deliveries were aimed at acquiring Yugoslav con- Na začetku so se dogovorili, da bodo dostavi- sent for the continuation of strategic negotiations. li oborožitev in opremo, ki je ostala iz druge However, they did not wish to arouse the feeling svetovne vojne. V pogajanjih so predvideli, da of political conditioning which the Yugoslavs were moderno oborožitev pripeljejo leta 1952. Med very sensitive to. The initial agreement was to de- pogajanji, ki so potekala na Bledu 19. julija liver weapons and equipment from World War 1952. leta, sta zahtevala ameriška predstavni- II. According to the negotiations, modern equip- ka generala Eddlman in Olmsted, zaradi vztra- ment would be delivered in 1952. Based on the janja veleposlanika ZDA v Jugoslaviji Georga insistence of George Allen, the US Ambassador Allena, da se odobreni kontingent tankov in to Yugoslavia, during negotiations at Bled, on artilerijskih sredstev razporedi v enotah v se- 19 July 1952, the US representatives, General verozahodnem delu države, torej v Sloveniji in Eddleman and General Olmsted demanded that na Hrvaškem. S tem bi okrepili obrambo Lju- an approved contingent of tanks and artillery be bljanskih vrat in severne Italije. Poleg tega so deployed within the north-western units, i.e. in za to leto obljubljali okrepitev programa, kakor Slovenia and Croatia. This would reinforce the de- tudi pospešitev dobave reaktivnih letal. Takšen fence of the Ljubljana gate and north Italy. In ad- pristop se je pokazal kot koristen in Tito je dition, they promised to enhance the programme poudaril, da v tistem trenutku niso obstajale and expedite the delivery of jet planes. The adopt- nikakršne ovire za začetek pogajanj o usklaje- ed approach proved useful and Tito emphasized vanju modalitet skupne obrambe. V naslednje that, at the time, no obstacles existed concerning pogovore so se vključili tudi predstavniki obo- the beginning of negotiations about the coordina- roženih sil Velike Britanije in Francije. Tako so tion of common defence modalities. The repre- bili postavljeni temelji za nadaljevanje, zdaj že sentatives from the Armed Forces of Great Britain tripartitno-jugoslovanskih strateških poga- and France participated in subsequent talks. The janj. Prva konferenca je bila novembra 1952. above-mentioneddevelopments provided the basis leta v Beogradu. for the continuation of tripartite Yugoslav strategic negotiations. The first conference was held in Prva tripartitno-jugoslovanska November 1952 in Belgrade. konferenca The First Tripartite Yugoslav Conference Na čelu tripartitne delegacije zahodnih sil, ki je med 15. in 20. novembrom 1952 obiskala The tripartite delegation of the western pow- Beograd, je bil ameriški general Thomas Troy ers, which visited Belgrade between 15 and 20 Handy, ki je bil tudi poveljnik zavezniških sil v November 1952, was led by US General Thomas Nemčiji. Tokratni pogovori so bili zelo težki in Troy Handy who was at the time the Supreme

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 63 Allied Commander in Germany. As opposed to the earlier talks, these talks were hard. General Handy was mandated to discuss exclusively military issues without assuming any obligations whatsoever. The talks were marked by several considerations: numerous differences in intelligence, especially concerning the number of Soviet forces surrounding Yugoslavia and the quality of satellite units’ weapons; the denial letalo T-33 (šolsko, reaktivno); T-33 (trainer, jet plane) of Yugoslavia’s proposal that the western representatives introduce in detail their views, plans po tem so se razlikovali od prejšnjih. General and variations as well as their determination to Handy je imel mandat, da se pogovarja samo o provide conditions for the defence of the Ljubljana vojaških vprašanjih, brez sprejemanja kakršnih gate. However, the latter was not to take place in koli obveznosti. Pogovore so zaznamovale šte- the form of cooperation with western forces de- vilne razlike v obveščevalnih podatkih, pred- ployed in Austria and Italy but only in the form vsem o številu sovjetskih sil, ki so obkrožale of providing material assets to Yugoslavia. 9 The Jugoslavijo, in kakovosti oborožitve satelitskih already agreed positions and resolutions that enot, nato o zavračanju jugoslovanskega pre- the units of the Ljubljana Army be equipped only dloga, da bi zahodni predstavniki podrobneje with US weapons were reaffirmed. This would -fa predstavili svoje poglede, načrte in različice, cilitate the supply and reduce the diversity of the kot tudi vztrajanje na zagotavljanju pogojev Yugoslav weaponry. 1 0 On the fourth day of the za obrambo Ljubljanskih vrat, vendar ne kot conference, General Handy realised that the as- sodelovanje z zahodnimi silami v Avstriji in sumed approach, which pushed Yugoslavia from severni Italiji, temveč le v obliki posredova- being a potential ally to being a simple candidate 9 nja materialne pomoči Jugoslaviji. Potrdili so for assistance, was inappropriate and unsuccess- že prej sprejeta stališča in sklepe, da se enote ful. He therefore agreed to give Yugoslavia infor- Ljubljanske armade opremijo izključno z ame- mation about allied forces in Austria and Italy. riško oborožitvijo s ciljem lažjega oskrbovanja Due to the small size of NATO forces and western ter zmanjšanja raznolikosti v jugoslovanski plans to withdraw forces in the event of a Soviet 10 oborožitvi. Ko je general Handy četrtega dne attack, thereby revealing the flank of Yugoslav konference spoznal, da je takšen pristop, ki je forces, Yugoslavia realized that NATO had no de- jugoslovansko stran potisnil iz položaja more- fence strategy concerning Austria and nor did it bitnega zaveznika v položaj navadnega prosilca wish to develop closer contacts with Yugoslavia pomoči, neustrezen in neuspešen, je odobril, and coordinate its defence plans. The continua- da se jugoslovanski strani predstavijo podatki tion of the talks was therefore useless. The next o zavezniških silah v Avstriji in Italiji. Majh- day, 20 November, the talks were concluded with nost Natovih sil in zahodni načrti, da se njiho- courteous statements regarding the success of the ve sile v primeru sovjetskega napada umaknejo meeting and the recognition that cooperation was ter tako odkrijejo jugoslovanski bok, je vodilo to be continued.11 jugoslovansko stran k sklepu, da Nato nima pripravljene strategije za obrambo Avstrije ali The continuation and the characteristics of the ne želi vzpostaviti tesnejših stikov z Jugoslavijo subsequent Yugoslav communications with the ter tako koordinira obrambne načrte. To spo- USA, Great Britain, France, Greece and Turkey znanje je zaznamovalo nesmiselnost nadalje- in the light of concluding the Balkan Pact in vanja pogovorov, ki so bili naslednjega dne 20. 1953/54 prove that the lessons learned during novembra zaključeni z vljudnostnima izjava- the first tripartite Yugoslav conference were se- ma o uspešnosti srečanja in z izkazano potrebo riously considered. Yugoslavia realised that the 11 po nadaljevanju sodelovanja. West lacked proper understanding of Yugoslavia’s

9 Laković 2005, pp. 71−73. 9 Laković 2005, pp. 71−73. 10 Laković 2005, p. 94. 10 Laković 2005, p. 94. 11 Laković 2005, pp. 94−102. 11 Laković 2005, pp. 94−102.

64 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Nadaljevanje in značilnost poznejših jugo- existing standpoints and its actual needs as well slovanskih stikov z ZDA, Veliko Britanijo in as that western military representatives did not Francijo, pa tudi z Grčijo in Turčijo v konte- share the same idea of cooperation and informa- kstu sklepanja Balkanskega pakta 1953./54. tion exchange and that they did not act in a unified leta, dokazujejo, da so bile izkušnje iz Prve manner. Consequently, all of the aforementioned tripartitno-jugoslovanske konference resno facts reinforced the position of Yugoslav govern- obravnavane. Spoznali so, da na Zahodu ni ing authorities to oppose Yugoslavia’s integration obstajalo pravo razumevanje trenutnega jugo- into NATO. The alternative was to enhance re- slovanskega položaja in njenih realnih potreb, lations with Greece and Turkey. 1 2 Nevertheless, da so si zahodni vojaški predstavniki drugače the communications continued and the Belgrade predstavljali sodelovanje in izmenjavo podat- talks set up a more serious cooperation between kov ter da niso nastopili enakopravno. Vse Yugoslavia and the West. 13 to je posledično okrepilo stališče jugoslovanskega vodstva proti vstopu Jugoslavije v Nato. The Second Tripartite Yugoslav Kot alternativa tem razmeram se je pokazala Conference okrepitev stikov z Grki in Turki.12 Kljub temu so nadaljevali s stiki, beograjski pogovori pa so The new situation in foreign policy (the death pomenili uvod v resnejše sodelovanje med Ju- of Stalin, the formation of an alliance with goslavijo in Zahodom.13 Greece and Turkey as well as the unique end to Yugoslavia’s diplomatic isolation) and the analysis of former talks contributed to the changes in the behaviour of the USA, Great Britain and France. 1 4 In July 1953, representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) were invited to Washington to continue negotiations. In addition to the provision of military assistance, they especially stressed the importance of military negotiations. 1 5 The return of General Eddleman into the US negotiations group, who was considered in favour of Yugoslavia, introduced another approach. The expectations were achieved. The scope and significance of the talks between Letalo F-84G in T-33; F-84G in T-33 Thunderjet aircraft Yugoslav representatives and the representatives of the USA, France and Great Britain, held in Washington in August 1953, exceeded all previ- Druga tripartitno-jugoslovanska oustalks. 16The western representatives expressed konferenca their concern about the “lack of effective coordi- nated defence arrangements between Yugoslavia Nove zunanjepolitične okoliščine (Stali- and other forces of the free world”. They stressed nova smrt in sklepanje zavezništva med Jugo- the importance of the Yugoslav territory for the slavijo, Turčijo in Grčijo ter svojevrsten izhod defence of “NATO’s south wing” as well as the Jugoslavije iz diplomatske osamitve) in ana- fact that defence against Soviet aggression was lize prejšnjih pogovorov so vplivale na to, da not only within the domain of Yugoslavia but je prišlo do sprememb v ravnanju/stališčih/ also of their respective governments. They wel- ravnanju ZDA, Velike Britanije in Francije.14 comed the Ankara agreement which connected Predstavniki JLA so bili povabljeni julija 1953 Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey. They also

12 Bekić 1988, p. 445. 12 Bekić 1988, p. 445. 13 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zbornik dokumenata, Belgrade 2005, p. 20; 13 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zbornik dokumenata, Belgrade 2005, p. 20; (Hereinafter: (Hereinafter: Balkanski pakt 1953/1954). Balkanski pakt 1953/1954). 14 Laković 2005, p. 109. 14 Laković 2005, p. 109. 15 Bekić 1988., p. 531. 16 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 356; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 65 v Washington na nadaljevanje pogajanj. Po- adopted the seven-item agenda which envisaged leg ponujanja vojaške pomoči so posebej po- a detailed exchange of all essential information, udarjali strateška vojaška pogajanja.15 Vrnitev especially regarding the provision of assistance to generala Eddlmana, za katerega so mislili, Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet or satellite at- da je naklonjen Jugoslovanom, v pogajalsko tack; the analysis of defence plans with special fo- skupino ZDA, je nakazal drugačen pristop. cus on Slovenia; as well as the information about Ta pričakovanja so se tudi uresničila. Pogovo- the readiness of the YPA, its mobilisation plans ri, ki so jih imeli jugoslovanski predstavniki and logistic capabilities for providing an effec- s predstavniki ZDA, Francije in Velike Brita- tive resistance.17 Later in the talks, the western nije v Washingtonu avgusta 1953. leta, so z representatives learned about the organisation 16 obsegom in pomenom presegli vse prejšnje. and formation of the YPA, its mobilisation, man- Zahodni predstavniki so izrazili zaskrbljenost ning, training and education systems pertain- »zaradi odsotnosti učinkovitih usklajenih ing to individual services (Army, Air Force and obrambnih aranžmajev med Jugoslavijo in Navy). They were also introduced to a long list drugimi silami svobodnega sveta«. Poudarili of Yugoslav requirements concerning weapons so pomen jugoslovanskega ozemlja za obram- and the support equipment. The Yugoslav repre- bo »južnega krila območja Nata«, kakor tudi sentativesfocused on presenting formation differ - stališče, da obramba pred sovjetsko agresijo ni ences between the “new” and the “old” Infantry le odgovornost Jugoslavije, temveč tudi njiho- Division, since the rearmament of the divisions vih vlad. Pozdravili so sklenitev Ankarskega with US weapons in the areas of Ljubljana and sporazuma, s katerim se je Jugoslavija poveza- Zagreb was already in motion. la z Grčijo in Turčijo. Sprejeli so dnevni red s sedmimi točkami, v katerih so bili predvideni Formations of Units With New izčrpna izmenjava vseh bistvenih podatkov, Weaponry s poudarkom na zagotavljanju pomoči Jugo- slaviji, če bi prišlo do sovjetskega ali satelit- Formation of the “old” Infantry Division: skega napada, analiza obrambnih načrtov s • three Infantry Regiments posebnim pogledom na Slovenijo, kakor tudi • Artillery Regiment podatki o stanju pripravljenosti JLA, njeni • Anti-Tank Battalion composed of two batter- mobilizacijski načrti in logistične sposobnosti 17 ies of 76 mm self-propelled guns, 76 mm Anti- za izvajanje učinkovitega odpora. V n a d a l j e - Tank Batteries and supply services vanju pogovorov so bili zahodni predstavniki temeljito seznanjeni z organizacijo in forma- • Anti-Aircraft Battery with six 37 mm guns cijo JLA, sistemi mobilizacije, popolnjevanja, and four 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns usposabljanja in šolanja po zvrsteh – kopen- • Liaison Battalion composed of one Staff Com- ski vojski, letalstvu in mornarici, kakor tudi pany, one Wire-Liaison Company and rear- z dolgimi seznami jugoslovanskih potreb po area institutions oborožitvi in spremljajoči opremi. Še pose- • Engineer Battalion composed of one Staff Pla- bej so prikazali razlike v formaciji »stare« in toon, two Engineer Companies, one Flame- »nove« pehotne divizije, saj je preoboroževa- Thrower Company and a supply unit nje divizij z ameriško oborožitvijo na območju • Reconnaissance Company Ljubljana-Zagreb že potekalo. • Chemical Company • Motorised Transport Company with 36 trucks Formacije preoboroženih enot • necessary rear-area and supply units

Formacija »stare« pehotne divizije: The Infantry Regiment included: • trije pehotni polki, • three Infantry Battalions with three Rifle

15 Bekić 1988., p. 531. 17 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne 16 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, pp. 354−355; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 356; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. reg. br. 1/1, copy. 1/1, copy. 17 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, pp. 354−355; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

66 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • artilerijski polk, Companies, a Machine Gun Company, a Sup- • protitankovski (PT) divizion z dvema bateri- port Company and supply services jama samohodnih topov 76 mm, protitanko- • 76 mm Gun Battery vske baterije 76 mm in službe oskrbovanja, • 120 mm Mortar Battery • protiletalska (PL) baterija s šestimi topovi • 57 mm Anti-Tank Gun Battery 37 mm in štirimi mitraljezi PL 12,7 mm, • bataljon zvez od štabne čete, čete za žično The Artillery Regiment included: zvezo in zalednih ustanov, • two 76 mm Gun Battalions, one with 12 and • inženirski bataljon s sestavo: štabni vod, one with 8 weapons dve inženirski četi, vod plamenometalcev in • 105 mm Howitzer Battalion with eight weap- enote za oskrbo, ons and two supply services • izvidniška četa, • kemijska četa, The basic equipment of the “old” division’s • moto-transportna četa s 36 tovornjaki, war formation included: • potrebni zaledni in oskrbovalni deli. 5162 rifles, 2705 submachine guns, 275 hand-held rocket launchers, 18 x 75 mm recoil- Pehotni polk je imel v svoji sestavi: less guns, 319 light machine guns, 81 heavy ma- • tri pehotne bataljone s tremi strelskimi če- chine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 12 x 57 mm tami, čete mitraljezov, čete za podporo in anti-tank guns, 12 x 76 mm guns, 18 x 120 mm službe za oskrbovanje, mortars, 28 x 76 mm ZIS-2 guns, 8 x 76 mm • baterijo topov 76 mm, self-propelled guns, 8 x 105 mm howitzers, 28 x • baterijo minometov 120 mm, 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 6 x 37 mm • baterijo topov PT 57 mm, anti-aircraft guns, 48 flame throwers, 74 different radio stations, 7 radio receivers, 222 tel- Artilerijski polk je imel v svoji sestavi: ephones, 5 Jeeps, 88 x 3-tonne trucks, 20 special • dva diviziona topov 76 mm, enega z 12, dru- motor vehicles, 506 two-axle and 378 single-axle gega z 8 orožji, carriages. The peacetime strength of the “old di- • divizion havbic 105 mm z osmimi orožji in vision” was 7,000 to 8,000 men. In war, the službi za oskrbo. number would increase to 12,000.

Osnovna oprema »stare divizije« v vojni The basic equipment of the “new” division’s formaciji je imela: war formation included: 5162 pušk, 2705 brzostrelk, 275 ročnih 7252 rifles, 2609 submachine guns. 322 metalcev raket (RRB), 18 netrzajnih topov 75 hand-held rocket launchers, 45 x 75 mm recoil- mm, 319 lahkih mitraljezov, 81 težkih mitra- less guns, 320 light machine guns, 81 heavy ma- ljezov, 54 minometov 82 mm, 12 protitanko- chine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 16 x 57 mm vskih (PT) topov 57 mm, 12 topov 76 mm, 18 anti-tank guns, 12 x 76 mm guns, 18 x 120 mm minometov 120 mm, 28 topov ZIS-2 76 mm, mortars, 36 x 90 mm self-propelled guns, 36 x 8 samohodnih topov 76 mm, 8 havbic 105 105 mm howitzers, 12 x 155 mm howitzers, mm, 28 PL mitraljezov 12,7 mm, 6 PL topov 24 x 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 108 x 12.7 mm 37 mm, 48 plamenometalcev, 74 različnih ra- anti-aircraft machine guns, 31 tanks, 332 differ- dijskih postaj, 7 radijskih sprejemnikov, 222 ent radio stations, 11 radio receivers, 152 Jeeps, telefonov, 5 džipov, 88 tritonskih tovornjakov, 586 motor vehicles of different types. In war, the 20 posebnih motornih vozil, 506 dvoosnih in strength of the division was 13,500 men. 378 enoosnih vozov. Moč »stare« divizije je v mirnodobnem času znašala od 7000 do 8000 The difference between the “old” and the “new” vojakov, v vojni pa bi se to število povečalo na divisions was that the Artillery Regiment of the 12.000 vojakov. “new” Infantry Divisions was composed of four battalions: 3 x 105 mm Howitzer Battalions and V osnovni opremi »nove divizije« je bilo v 1 x 155 mm Howitzer Battalion. vojni formaciji: The Anti-Tank Battalion was equipped with 16 7252 pušk, 2609 brzostrelk, 322 ročnih x 57 mm guns. metalcev raket (RRB), 45 netrzajnih topov 75 There was also a battalion with 18 x 90 mm

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 67 mm, 320 lahkih mitraljezov, 81 težkih mi- self-propelled guns. The Anti-Aircraft Battery traljezov, 54 minometov 82 mm, 16 topov PT was replaced by the Anti-Aircraft Battalion with 57 mm, 12 topov 76 mm, 18 minometov 120 24 x 40 mm guns. mm, 36 samohodnih topov 90 mm, 36 havbic 105 mm, 12 havbic 155 mm, 24 topov PL 40 Motorised Transport Company had 90 mm, 108 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, 31 tankov, vehicles. 332 različnih radijskih postaj, 11 radijskih Anti-tank batteries of the Infantry Regiment sprejemnikov, 152 džipov, 586 motornih vozil were replaced with a 57 mm self-propelled Battery različnih vrst. V vojni je divizija štela 13.500 with 6 x 90 mm self-propelled guns. vojakov. There was an important innovation – every fifth Infantry Division had a tank battalion with Razlika med »starimi« in »novimi« divizi- 31 tanks. jami je bila ta, da je v »novih« pehotnih di- vizijah artilerijski polk imel štiri divizione: tri All of the above-mentioned units were much divizione havbic 105 mm in divizion havbic bigger and stronger in comparison to the “old” 155 mm. division. If the fire power, liaison, engineer and Divizion PT je imel 16 topov 57 mm. transport capabilities of the old and the new types Obstajal je tudi divizion z 18 samohodnimi of divisions were measured by the numeric index topovi 90 mm, namesto baterije PL pa je bil of 100, the index of the “new” or the “Ljubljana divizion PL s 24 topovi 40 mm. Division” would be 141 for fire power, 110 for Moto-transportna četa je imela 90 vozil. liaison, 330 for engineer and 446 for transport Pehotni polk je imel namesto baterij PT 57 capabilities. The process of rearmament brought mm samohodno baterijo s šestimi samoho- about a significant difference in the strength be- dnimi topovi 90 mm. tween the old division and the Ljubljana Division. Pomembna novost je bila, da je imela vsaka The rearmament was also carried out in the Tank pehotna divizija tankovski bataljon, ki je štel Division and Mountain Division. 31 tankov. The Tank Division included: Vse to je bilo precej več in tudi močnejše v • two Tank Brigades primerjavi s »staro« divizijo. Če bi primerja- • Motorised Infantry Regiment li ognjeno moč, zveze, inženirske zmožnosti • Artillery Regimen in transport divizije starega in novega tipa z • Chemical Company označenim numeričnim indeksom 100, ima • Liaison Battalion, composed of one Staff Com- »nova« ali ljubljanska divizija indeks ognje- pany, one Wire-Liaison Company and supply ne moči 141, zvez 110, inženirski indeks 330, services transportni 446. S preoboroževanjem so dobi- • Reconnaissance Battalion, composed of one li precejšnjo razliko v moči med staro divizijo Motorised Infantry Company, one Armoured in ljubljansko divizijo. Preoboroževanje so iz- Reconnaissance Company, one Motorcycle vedli tudi v tankovski in gorski diviziji. Company, one 82 mm Mortar Platoon and supply services Tankovska divizija je imela: • Self-Propelled Gun Battalion, composed of • dve tankovski brigadi, four batteries, one staff platoon and a supply • pehotni motorizirani polk, service • artilerijski polk, • 37 mm Anti-Aircraft Battalion, composed of • kemijsko četo, two 37 mm Gun Batteries and one 12.7 mm • bataljon zvez, ki so ga sestavljali štabna četa, Anti-Aircraft Company četa za žične zveze in službe za oskrbovanje, • 37 mm Anti-Aircraft Battalion, composed of • izvidniški bataljon s sestavo: četa motorizi- two 37 mm Gun Batteries and one 12.7 mm rane pehote, oklepna izvidniška četa, moto- Anti-Aircraft Company ciklistična četa, vod minometov 82 mm in • Engineer Battalion, composed of two Engineer službe za oskrbovanje, Companies, one Pontoon Company, one Re- • divizion samohodnih topov s štirimi baterija- connaissance Platoon and one Liaison Squad mi, štabnim vodom in službo za oskrbovanje, • Motorised Transport Battalion, composed of

68 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • divizion PL 37 mm, ki je imel v svoji sestavi two Motorised Transport Companies, one Li- 2 bateriji topov 37 mm in četo PL 12,7 mm, aison Squad and workshops • inženirski bataljon z dvema inženirskima • Repair Battalion for combat vehicles, com- četama, pontonirsko četo, izvidniškim vo- posed of one Special Works Company, one dom in oddelkov zvez, Evacuation/Recovery Platoon, one Motorised • moto-transportni bataljon z dvema moto- Transport Platoon and a Supply Squad transportnima četama, oddelkom zvez in delavnicami, The Tank Brigade included: • bataljon za popravilo bojnih vozil s sestavo: • three Tank Battalions with two Tank Compa- četa za specialna dela, vod za evakuacijo ozi- nies, one Staff Platoon and the required supply roma izvleko, mototransportni vod in odde- units lek za oskrbovanje. • Motorised Infantry Battalion, composed of four Submachine Gun Companies, 82mm Tankovska brigada je imela: Mortar Companies, two Anti-Tank Platoons, • tri tankovske bataljone z dvema tankovski- two Liaison Platoons and supply units ma četama, štabni vod in potrebne enote za • Engineer Platoon oskrbovanje, • Reconnaissance Company and a supply • bataljon motorizirane pehote, ki je imel v service svoji sestavi štiri čete avtomatičarjev, mi- • Staff Company nometne čete 82 mm, PT-voda, voda zvez in • Anti-Tank Battalion with two 76 mm ZIS-3 Gun Batteries delov za oskrbovanje, • 37mm Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion with two • inženirski vod, Batteries, one Staff Platoon and one Supply • izvidniško četo in službo za oskrbovanje, Platoon • štabno četo, • protitankovski divizion z dvema baterijama The Motorised Infantry Regiment included: topov ZIS-3 76 mm, • three Motorised Infantry Battalions, composed • divizion topov PL 37 mm z dvema bateri- of three Motorised Infantry Companies, one jama, štabnim vodom in enim vodom za Machine Gun Company, one 82 mm Mortar oskrbovanje. Company, one Anti-Tank Platoon, one Liaison Platoon and a supply service Polk motorizirane pehote je imel: • 76 mm Anti-Tank Battalion with two Batter- • tri bataljone motorizirane pehote s tremi ies, one Staff Platoon and one Supply Platoon motoriziranimi pehotnimi četami, eno mi- • Liaison Company tralješko četo, minometno četo 82 mm, vo- • Reconnaissance Company dom PT, vodom zvez, službo za oskrbovanje, • Submachine Gun Company • divizion PT 76 mm z dvema baterijama, • 120 mm Mortar Battery štabnim vodom in vodom za oskrbovanje, • 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Com- • četo zvez, pany and supply service • izvidniško četo, • četo avtomatičarjev, Artillery Regiment was composed of: • minometno baterijo 120 mm, • 76 mm Anti-Tank Gun Battalion, composed of • četo mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm in službo za three batteries oskrbovanje. • two battalions with two 122 mm Howitzer Batteries Artilerijski polk je imel v svoji sestavi: • Staff Batteries • divizion topov PT 76 mm s tremi • 120 mm Mortar Batteries and supply services baterijami, • dva diviziona z dvema baterijama havbic The Mountain Division included: 122 mm, • three Mountain Regiments • štabne baterije, • Artillery Regiment • minometne baterije 120 mm ter službe za • Engineer Battalion oskrbovanje. • Liaison Battalion

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 69 • Anti-Tank Battalion Gorska divizija je imela: • Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Company • tri gorske polke, • Reconnaissance Company • artilerijski polk, • Automobile Company • inženirski bataljon, • Chemical Company • bataljon zvez, • supporting units and supply units • divizion PT, • mitralješko četo PL, The Artillery Regiment included: • izvidniško četo, • Mountain Gun Division with 12 x 76 mm • avto četo, mountain guns • kemijsko četo, • two Mountain Howitzer Battalions, each • pomožne enote in enote za oskrbovanje. with two batteries of 8 x 100 mm mountain howitzers Artilerijski polk je imel: • divizion gorskih topov z 12 gorskimi topovi The Mountain Regiment included: 76 mm, • three Mountain Battalions • dva diviziona gorskih havbic, vsak z 8 gor- • one Mortar Company with 4 x 120 mm skimi havbicami 100 mm v dveh baterijah. mortars • one Mountain Gun Battery with 4 x 76 mm Gorski polk je imel: mountain guns • tri gorske bataljone, • Submachine Gun Company • minometno četo s štirimi minometi 120 mm, • Liaison Company • baterijo gorskih topov s štirimi gorskimi to- • Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Company povi 76 mm, • regimental supply units and assisting units • četo avtomatičarjev, • četo zvez, The Tank Division was equipped with: • mitralješko četo PL, 4034 rifles, 2185 submachine guns, 111 hand- • polkovne enote za oskrbovanje in pomožne held rocket launchers, 214 light machine guns, enote. 18 heavy machine guns, 33 x 82 mm mortars, 36 x 76 mm ZIS-3 guns, 8 x 120 mm mortars, 12 Tankovska divizija je imela: x 122 mm howitzers, 12 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft 4043 pušk, 2185 brzostrelk, 111 ročnih me- machine guns, 24 x 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, talcev raket (RRB), 214 lahkih mitraljezov, 18 135 tanks, 16 x 76 mm self-propelled guns, 26 težkih mitraljezov, 33 minometov 82 mm, 36 armoured vehicles, 30 armoured personnel car- topov ZIS-3 76 mm, 8 minometov 120 mm, 12 riers, 12 tank-repair workshops, a mobile bridge havbic 122 mm, 12 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, with 15-tonne loading capacity, 12 Jeeps, 564 24 topov PL 37 mm, 135 tankov, 16 samoho- trucks, 139 towing vehicles, 191 special vehi- dnih topov 76 mm, 26 oklepnih avtomobilov, cles, 288 different radio stations and 47 radio 30 oklepnih transporterjev, 12 tankovskih receivers. delavnic, premični most z nosilnostjo 15 ton, 12 džipov, 564 tovornjakov, 139 vlačilcev, 191 The Mountain Division was equipped with: specialnih vozil, 288 različnih radijskih postaj 6649 rifles, 2677 submachine guns, 168 in 47 radijskih sprejemnikov. hand-held rocket launchers, 314 light machine guns, 81 machine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 18 Oprema gorske divizije je imela: x 57 mm recoilless guns, 24 x 76 mm mountain 6649 pušk, 2677 brzostrelk, 168 ročnih me- guns, 12 x 76 mm anti-tank guns, 16 x 100 mm talcev raket (RRB), 314 puškomitraljezov, 81 mountain howitzers, 33 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft mitraljezov, 54 minometalcev 82 mm, 18 netr- machine guns, 116 radio stations, seven radio zajnih topov 57 mm, 24 gorskih topov 76 mm, receivers, nine special vehicles, 56 trucks, 2235 12 topov PT 76 mm, 16 gorskih havbic 100 mm, carriers, 635 two-wheelers, 313 two-axle car- 33 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, 116 radijskih postaj, riages and 4432 horses. The Mountain Division sedem radijskih sprejemnikov, devet specialnih was composed of 11,798 soldiers.

70 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Brzostrelka Thompson M-1 Thompson M-1 Sub Machine Gun vozil, 56 tovornjakov, 2235 sedel, 635 dvoko- Later during the conference, the participants lesnikov, 313 dvoosnih vozov in 4432 konjev. analysed the defence plans in detail, particularly Gorska divizija je imela 11.798 vojakov. the Ljubljana direction. They highlighted the sub- V nadaljevanju konference so podrobno ana- stantive changes in western positions, which rec- lizirali obrambne načrte, zlasti ljubljansko smer, ognised the strategic significance of a successful izpostavili pa so vsebinsko spremembo v zaho- defenceof Yugoslavia, expressed doubts about the dnih stališčih: priznavanje strateškega pomena possibility of a military conflict in the event of an uspešne obrambe Jugoslavije, dvom v možnost attack by Soviet or satellite forces and tried to per- omejenega vojaškega spopada ob sovjetskem suade conference participants that in such a case ali satelitskem napadu in prepričevanje, da se the tripartite forces would join Yugoslavia and bodo v takšnem primeru tripartitne sile pridru- provide “operational and material assistance”.18 žile Jugoslaviji in ji dajale »tako operativno kot The conference participants also continued to tudi materialno pomoč«.18 Hkrati so nadaljevali exchange and analyse a vast amount of informa- z izmenjavo in analizo velikega števila podatkov, tion which both parties were interested in. The za katere sta bili zainteresirani obe strani, med prevailing analyses regarded the future delivery njimi pa so prevladovale analize, ki so se nanaša- of western military assistance based on the needs le na prihodnje dobave zahodne vojaške pomoči, of the YPA. General Vučković stressed that the predvsem na podlagi potreb JLA, ki jih je ob tej main goal was to rearm the YPA according to the priložnosti predstavila zelo podrobno. General model of the of the Zagreb-Ljubljana authority Vučković je poudaril, da je glavni cilj, da se celo- divisions. 19 tna JLA preoboroži po vzoru divizij iz ljubljansko- zagrebške oblasti.19 Tactical and Technical Characteristics of Individual Western Weapon Systems Taktično-tehnične karakteristike posameznih zahodnih oborožitvenih Due to their characteristics, quantity and the sistemov period in which they were used, tanks, artillery weapons, aircraft and engineer equipment domi- Med številnimi oborožitvenimi sistemi, nated within the numerous weapon systems reki so jih dobili na podlagi programa vojaške ceived from the Military Assistance Programme. pomoči, so po lastnostih, količini in obdobju Sherman and M47 Patton tanks, 12.7 Browning uporabe izstopali tanki, artilerijska orožja, machine guns, 155mm howitzers, 90mm self- letala in inženirska oprema. Tanka sherman propelled guns, Bailly bridges and very simple in M 47 patton, mitraljez browning 12,7 mm, types of folding spades were used by numerous

18 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne 18 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 413; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 413; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy. 1/1, copy. 19 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne 19 Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 414; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 414; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy. 1/1, copy.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 71 Letalo F-86E sabre F-86E Sabre aircraft havbice 155 mm, samohodni topovi 90 mm, YPA generations. A lot of them were used until mostovi tipa bailly pa tudi najpreprostejše the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. preklopne lopatke so uporabljale številne ge- neracije nabornikov JLA, mnogi med njimi The YPA received a total of 599 x M4A3 celo do vojn na jugoslovanskih tleh v 90. letih Sherman tanks, which was the latest and the 20. stoletja. most sophisticated model. Its characteristics were not as good as those of the T-34; however JLA je dobila skupno 599 tankov sherman the M4A3 was much easier to manoeuvre. The v različici M4A3, ki je bila njegova zadnja in tank crew was composed of 5 people. It reached a najbolj izpopolnjena. Po lastnostih je zao- maximum speed of 47 km/h and it had a range of stajal za tankom T-34, vendar ga je bilo laže 160 km. It was powered by a 44 Hp petrol engine. upravljati. Posadka tanka je štela 5 članov, The greatest disadvantages included substantial največja hitrost je bila 47 km/h, akcijski radij fuel consumption, which is characteristic of all pa 160 km. Poganjal ga je bencinski motor s American tanks, and a short range which subse- 400 KM. Največje pomanjkljivosti tanka so quently required a great reliance on logistics. The bile prevelika poraba goriva, kar je lastnost tank’s 76mm gun was too big and created a high vseh ameriških tankov, majhen akcijski ra- silhouette which made the tank a very vulnerable dij in zato posledično prevelika odvisnost battlefield target. In contrast to the aforemen- od logistike. Njegov top kalibra 76 mm je bil tioned deficiencies the tank provided sustainabil- presežen, visoka silhueta pa ga je ustvarila za ity, high protection of the crew and a good quality lahko ranljivo tarčo na bojišču. Nasproti tem engine. 20 pomanjkljivostim so postavljali potrebe po

20 Laković 2005, p. 274. The tank was additionally armed with two 7.62 mm M1919A4 20 Laković 2005, p. 274. The tank was additionally armed with two 7.62 mm M1919A4 machine guns and a 12.7 mm HB M2 anti-aircraft machine gun attached to the machine guns and a 12.7 mm HB M2 anti-aircraft machine gun attached to the turret. turret.

72 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA vzdržljivosti, veliki varnosti posadke in kako- The M47 Patton was the other type of tank vosten motor.20 that the YPA received. They received a total of M 47 patton je bil drugi tank, ki ga je do- 319 such tanks. As the above-mentioned tank, bila JLA. Vseh skupaj je dobila 319 primerkov. the M47 Patton had a 5-member crew and was Tako kot prejšnji je tudi ta tank imel posadko not as good as the Soviet tanks. Its advantages s petimi člani in je prav tako zaostajal za sov- and disadvantages were similar to those of the jetskimi tanki. Slabosti in dobre lastnosti so Sherman; however, the range was shorter, only bile podobne kot pri shermanu, akcijski radij 130 km. It was powered by an 810 Hp engine je bil še manjši, le 130 km, motor pa je imel and was equipped with a more powerful 90mm 810 KM. Imel je močnejši top – 90 mm. Re- gun. The engine tank had a volume of 881 litres zervoar za gorivo je imel prostornino za 881 while the tank engine volume of the Soviet T-34 litrov, sovjetski T-34 pa za 540 litrov. Poraba was 540 litres. The fuel consumption was 7 li- goriva je znašala sedem litrov na kilometer, tres per kilometre which was much more than the kar je precej več kot T-34, pri katerem je zna- consumption of the T-34 which ranged between šala od 1,6 do 2,3 litra.21 Tank patton je bil le 1.6 and 2.3 litres. 2 1 The Patton tank was only a začasna rešitev, zato se ni obdržal v ameriških temporary solution and was therefore no longer oboroženih silah, temveč so ga podarjali kot used by the US Armed Forces. It was given away vojaško pomoč ali prodajali zainteresiranim as military assistance or sold to interested coun- državam. V posameznih državah so ga upora- tries. In some countries, including Yugoslavia, bljali tudi do 90. let 20. stoletja. JLA pri tem Pattons remained in use until the 1990s. 22 ni bila izjema.22 Kakovost artilerijske oborožitve JLA so pre- The quality of the YPA’s artillery was signifi- cej izboljšali s pošiljkami, in sicer z 2876 kosi cantly improved with additional weapon deliver- ameriškega in 450 francoskega ter britanske- ies: 2876 pieces of American weapons and 450 ga orožja (topovi in havbice). Najpomemb- pieces of French and British weapons (guns and nejše so bile havbice M2 kalibra 203 mm in howitzers). The most important pieces included M1 kalibra 155mm, havbice 105 mm modela the addition of 203 mm M2 howitzer, 155 mm M2 in M3 ter topovi M2 kalibra 155 mm (66 M1 howitzer, 105 mm M2 and M3 howitzers kosov). Vsi modeli so imeli izjemne taktično- and 155 mm M2 guns (66 pieces). All models tehnične lastnosti in so jih uporabljali vse do possessed extraordinary tactical and technical 80. let, med drugim tudi v (SE DA IZPISATI?) characteristics and were used until the 1980s, oboroženih silah ZDA. Jugoslovanska vojaška also in the US Armed Forces. In the 1960s, the industrija je dobila licence za proizvodnjo ve- Yugoslav military industry acquired the neces- čine naštetih modelov v 60. letih 20. stole- sary licences for the production of the majority of tja.23 the above-mentioned models. 23

Kopenska vojska je dobila:24 YPA Land Forces received the following Orožje in oprema Dobavljena količina equipment:24 brzostrelka 11,43 mm – thompson 34.000 Weapons and equipment Quantity delivered mitraljez 12,7 mm 2466 11.43 mm Thompson submachine gun 34.000 reaktivni metalec 60 mm 1000 12.7 mm machine gun 2466 reaktivni metalec 90 mm 4090 60 mm jet thrower 1000 top 37 mm 210 90 mm jet thrower 4090 top PT 57 mm M-1 280 37 mm gun 210 top PL 40 mm M-1 381 57mm M-1 anti-tank gun 280 netrzajni top 57 mm 360 40 mm M-1 anti-aircraft gun 381 netrzajni top 75 mm 760 57 mm recoilless gun 360 top PL 90 mm M1A3 in A1 100 75 mm recoilless gun 760

21 Taktičko-tehnički potsetnik, VIZ »Vojno delo«, Belgrade 1954, p. 232. 21 Taktičko-tehnički potsetnik, VIZ »Vojno delo«, Belgrade 1954, p. 232. 22 Laković 2005, p. 275. 22 Laković 2005, p. 275. 23 Laković 2005, p. 257. 23 Laković 2005, p. 257. 24 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 50. 24 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 50.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 73 havbica 105 mm M2 in M3 403 90 mm M1A3 and A1 anti-aircraft guns 100 top in havbica 155 mm 333 105 mm M2 and M3 howitzers 403 havbica 203 mm 24 155 mm gun and howitzer 333 samohodni top 37 in 76 mm 260 203 mm howitzer 24 samohodni top 90 mm 399 37 and 76 mm self-propelled guns 260 samohodna havbica 105 mm 56 90 mm self-propelled gun 399 oklepni avtomobil M8 265 105 mm self-propelled howitzer 56 izvidniško vozilo M3A1 300 M8 armoured vehicle 265 srednji tank M4A3 sherman 599 M3A1 reconnaissance vehicle 300 srednji tank M-47 patton 319 M4A3 Sherman middle tank 599 tovornjak-traktor 12 do 18 ton 1.001 M-47 Patton middle tank 319 tovornjak, 1,5 in 2,5 ton 10.390 12 – 18 tonne tractor-truck 1.001 most bailly 20 1.5 and 2.5 tonne truck 10.390 radijska postaja 1.399 Bailly bridge 20 radar 23 radio station 1.399 radar 23 Vojno letalstvo je dobilo:25 Orožje in oprema Dobavljena količina YPA Air Force received the following letalo F-84G thunderjet 167 equipment:25 letalo F-47 thunderbolt 150 Weapons and equipment Quantity delivered letalo C-47 (transportno) 20 F-84G Thunderjet aircraft 167 letalo T-33 (šolsko, reaktivno) 25 F-47 Thunderbolt aircraft 150 letalo izvidniško (reaktivno) 22 C-47 (transport) aircraft 20 letalo F-86E sabre 43 T-33 (trainer, jet plane) 25 helikopter S-51 10 Reconnaissance (jet) aircraft 22 letalski motor hispano 80 F-86E Sabre aircraft 43 letalski motor lycoming 500 S-51 helicopter 10 letalski motor R-1340 AN-1 210 Hispano aircraft engine 80 Lycoming aircraft engine 500 Vojna mornarica je dobila:26 R-1340 AN-1 aircraft engine 210 Orožje in oprema Dobavljena količina patruljna ladja 400 t 1 YPA Navy received the following minolovec 400 t 3 equipment:26 minolovec 137 t 1 Weapons and equipment Quantiti delivered radar 79 400-tonne patrol boat 1 motor 174 400-tonne mine hunter 3 mitraljez 12,7 mm 305 137-tonne mine hunter 1 top PL 20 mm 352 radar 79 top PL 40 mm 117 motor 174 top PL 66 mm 66 12.7 mm machine gun 305 20 mm anti-aircraft gun 352 Poleg naštete oborožitve in opreme so do- 40 mm anti-aircraft gun 117 bavili tudi strelivo in veliko količino dodatne 66 mm anti-aircraft gun 66 opreme: smodnik, eksploziv, vžigalnike, pri- kolice, avtomobilske delavnice, signalna sred- Ammunition and a significant quantity of stva, minoiskalce, plamenometalce, letalske equipment were supplied in addition to the above- bombe, letalske rakete, sanitetna, gasilska in mentioned weapons and equipment: gunpowder, druga specialna vozila, izvenladijske motor- explosives, exploders, trailers, car workshops, je, generatorje, podvodne mine, lokatorje, signalling equipment, mine detectors, flame

25 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 50−51. 25 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 50−51. 26 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51. 26 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51. 27 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51.

74 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA Havbica M1 155mm M1 155mm Howitzer agregate, filtre za vodo, inženirske stroje, orod- throwers, aircraft bombs, aircraft rockets, sani- je, vremenske postaje, črpalke in drugo.27 tation, fire fighting and other special vehicles, Z jugoslovansko-ameriškimi sporazumi je outboard motors, generators, underwater mines, bilo urejeno vprašanje obstoja ameriškega tima net sounders, aggregates, water filters, engineer- za nadzor in administriranje programa Ameri- ing equipment, tools, weather stations, pumps can Military Assistance Staff (AMAS). Člani etc. 27 tega tima so izvajali tudi nadzore (inšpekcije) in obhode preoboroženih enot. Preoboroževa- The Yugoslav-US agreements regulated the nje enot v zagrebško-ljubljanski vojaški oblasti establishment of a US team which would be re- potrjuje tudi podatek, da je bilo do konca leta sponsible for control and the American Military 1955 od skupno 285 obiskov v kopenski vojski Assistance Staff (AMAS) administration. Team kar 197 realiziranih v Peti (zagrebško-ljubljan- members carried out control and inspections of ski) vojaški oblasti. Na armadni ravni je bilo the rearmed units. The fact that rearmament was 19, korpusni 48, divizijski 83 obiskov, 17 pa jih carried out in units subordinated to the Zagreb- je bilo opravljenih v zalednih enotah.28 Ljubljana Military Authority was also confirmed by information that, by the end of 1955, 197 out Jugoslavija se je začela postopno približevati of 285 visits within the land forces had been made Zahodu, ko so se začele spreminjati zunanje- within the Fifth (Zagreb-Ljubljana) Military politične razmere zaradi resolucije IB. Politič- Authority. There were 19 army-level visits, 48 nemu je sledilo tudi vojaško približevanje. V corps-level visits, 83 division-level visits and 17 številnih stikih, ko so obravnavali predvsem visits to the rear-area units. 28 količino in modalitete dobavljanja zahodne

28 Laković 2005, p. 220. 27 Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51. 28 Laković 2005, p. 220.

VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 75 vojaške pomoči Jugoslaviji, je bila zahodna Yugoslavia had just started its gradual rap- stran opazno zainteresirana za jugoslovanske prochement with the West, when the foreign obrambne načrte na tako imenovani »severni policy situation started to change due to the smeri«, ker bi morebitni izostanek učinkovite Resolution of the Communist Information obrambe pred sovjetsko-satelitskim napadom Bureau. Political rapprochement was followed by na tej občutljivi smeri resno ogrozil pozici- military rapprochement. On numerous occasions je zahodnih zaveznikov v tem delu Evrope in when the quantity and modalities of the military Sredozemlja. Prav zato so bili prvi kontingenti assistance delivery to Yugoslavia were discussed, zahodnih oborožitvenih sistemov iz progra- western parties demonstrated an obvious interest ma vojaške pomoči sporazumno namenjeni in Yugoslav defence plans on the so-called “north enotam zagrebško-ljubljanske oblasti. Tako so route”. This was especially due to the fact that a neposredno povečali njeno ognjeno in giblji- potential lack of effective defence against a Soviet vo moč. Po začetnih težavah in nesporazumih – satellite attack on this sensitive route would ali »tipanju utripa« sta dosegli jugoslovanska pose a serious threat to the locations of western in zahodna stran visoko stopnjo izmenjave allies in this part of Europe and Mediterranean. podatkov o lastnih in sovražnikovih silah, in Consequently, the fist contingents of defence sys- sicer tako v ofenzivnih kot v obrambnih de- tems from the Military Assistance Programme javnostih. V ozračju izjemne državne, partij- were intended for Zagreb-Ljubljana Authority ske, vojaške in zunanjepolitične monolitnosti units. This directly contributed to the increase sta bila realen pomen in posebnost Slovenije of its firepower and movability. Following some poudarjena le v kontekstu njenega izjemnega difficulties and misunderstandings at the outset strateškega položaja za obrambo južnega krila or “the testing of the atmosphere”, Yugoslav and Nata. Po navezavi ponovnih stikov in ureditvi western parties attained a high-level of informa- odnosov s Sovjetsko zvezo je jugoslovansko tion exchange, both within offence and defence vodstvo izrazilo pripravljenost, da se odpove activities, concerning their own as well as enemy ameriški vojaški pomoči. Prekinitev so uradno forces. Within the context of an extremely mono- sporočili julija 1957. leta.29 Zmanjševanje na- lithic nature of national policies, Communist petosti, ki so bile posledica hladne vojne, in Party, military entities and foreign policy, the obojestranske rezerve so vplivale, da se je vo- actual significance and specifics of Slovenia were jaško sodelovanje z Zahodom, namesto vstopa emphasised only with regard to its extraordinary Jugoslavije v Nato, končalo le s sprejemanjem strategic location, important for the defence of ameriške vojaške pomoči in s podpisom bal- NATO’s south wing. After having renewed their kanskega pakta, ki je zaživel le za kratek čas. contacts and resolved their relations with the Soviet Union, Yugoslav national authorities announced their preparedness to renounce US military assistance. The renunciation was formally announced in July 1957. 2 9 The reduction of ten- sion, which emerged after the Cold War, as well as the reserves on both sides contributed to the fact that military cooperation with the West did not result in Yugoslavia’s integration into NATO, but in the US military assistance to Yugoslavia and the signing of the short-lived Balkan Pact.

Prevod iz srbskega jezika: mag. Zvezdan Marković Translate from Serbian language: ma. Zvezdan Marković

29 Laković 2005, p. 246. 29 Laković 2005, p. 246.

76 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA »Knjižna Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina, s tematiko vojaške in vojne zgodovine Slovencev in slovenskega etničnega prostora, je projekt znanstveno raziskovalnega dela delavcev in zunanjih sodelavcevVojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske. Zapisana zgodovina sveta je v veliki meri zgodovina vojskovanja, saj je politična karta sveta večinoma posledica osvajanj, državljanskih uporov in spopadov za neodvisnost.Tudi naša. V slovenski vojaški zgodovini je marsikaj ostalo neodkrito in nezapisano. Zato zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina odpira nova poglavja v nacionalni vojaški preteklosti ter s tem pomaga razumeti našo sedanjost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju slovenske vojaške misli.«

Podpolkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik, načelnik Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske,glavni urednik Zbirke Slovenska vojaška zgodovina

Slovenska partizanska in domobranska Knji`na zbirka Slovenska voja{ka zgodovina, s tematiko voja{ke in vojne zgo- vojska dovine Slovencev in slovenskega etni- ~nega prostora, je projekt znanstveno Tomaž Kladnik raziskovalnega dela delavcev in zunanjih sodelavcev Voja{kega muzeja Slovenske vojske. Zapisana zgodovina sveta je v veliki meri zgodovina vojskovanja, saj je politi~na karta sveta ve~inoma posledica osvajanj, dr`avljanskih uporov in spopadov za neodvisnost. Tudi na{a. V slovenski voja{ki zgodovini je marsikaj ostalo neodkrito in nezapisano. Zato zbirka Slovenska voja{ka zgodovina odpira nova poglavja v nacionalni voja{ki preteklosti ter s tem pomaga razumeti na{o sedanjost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju slovenske voja{ke misli.

Podpolkovnik dr. Toma` Kladnik na~elnik Voja{kega muzeja Slovenske vojske, glavni urednik

Zbirke Slovenska voja{ka zgodovina Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska omaž Kladnik T

SLOVENSKA PARTIZANSKA IN JUGOSLOVANSKA LJUDSKA NAŠE KORENINE DOMOBRANSKA VOJSKA ARMADA Ob 15. obletnici osamosvojitve Knjiga avtorja podpolkovnika dr. »Druga knjiga zbirke SLOVEN- in vojne za Slovenjo je uredništvo Tomaža Kladnika Slovenska par- SKA VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA revije Slovenska vojska vsak tizanska in domobranska vojska je nastala na osnovi moje mesec v rubriki Naše korenine je prva knjiga v zbirki Slovenska magistrske naloge in obravnava objavljalo prispevke o takratnih vojaška zgodovina. Obravnava čas, ki kronološko sledi tematiki aktualnih dogodkih s poudar- obe slovenski vojaški formaciji, prve knjige iz zbirke,« je zapisal kom na obrambnih pripravah pri ki sta bili v 2. svetovni vojni na avtor, stotnik mag. Zvezdan osamosvajanju. Aktivni udeleže- naših tleh nasprotnici in katerih Marković. »Pogovori, ki sem jih nec je bil tudi, kot poveljnik PŠ cilj je bila ustanovitev slovenske opravil s posameznimi pripa- TO Zahodnoštajerske pokrajine, vojske. Nastajali in delovali pa dniki iz nekdanje JLA, so bili avtor knjige, brigadir mag. sta v različnih okoliščinah in pod izjemno koristno dopolnil pri Viktor Krajnc. Knjiga kronološko različnimi pogoji. Kljub nepre- iskanju odgovorov na posamezna ponovno približa dogajanja v naši mostljivim razlikam in sovraštvu, vprašanja in teme iz zgodovine državi, pa tudi tiste dogodke, ki ki so si jih izkazovali pripadniki JLA, na katere nisem mogel najti na prvi pogled niso imeli nepo- obeh formacij, pa lahko ugoto- zadovoljivih podatkov v literaturi sredne povezave, se je pa kasneje vimo tudi nekatere stične točke in drugem gradivu. izkazal, a so imeli posredni ali ne- obeh vojaških sistemov. posredni vpliv. Ali, kot je zapisal avtor knjige, leto 1991 je bilo leto nevarnega življenja, dramatično in nepredvidljivo leto velikih in daljnosežnih sprememb.

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VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 77 Revija Vojaška zgodovina izhaja dvakrat letno in je v pdf formatu, brezplačno dostopna na spletnem naslovu www.vojaskimuzej.si. Tiskano revijo lahko naročite pri založbi Defensor. Naročilnico pošljite na Defensor d.o.o., Podutiška 148, 1000 Ljubljana, na Fax.: (01) 24 1026 ali na email: [email protected]. CENA POSAMEZNE ŠTEVILKE: 7 EUR

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78 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA 8.KONFERENCA MEDNARODNEGA ZDRUŽENJA ZA VOJAŠKO ZGODOVINO 8th ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MILITARY HISTORY WORKING GROUP

SLOVENIJA, LJUBLJANA, 2008

IZKUŠNJE VOJSKOVANJA EXPERIENCE of WAR

20. 4. 2008 - 23. 4. 2008 Ljubljana, Hotel Mons

Soorganizatorja - Co-hosted by: VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA • 79 VOJAŠKI MUZEJ SLOVENSKE VOJSKE LANDESVERTEIDIGUNGSAKADEMIE OSTERREICHISCHES BUNDESHEER 80 • VOJAŠKA ZGODOVINA