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OnArticle Not Understanding Extraordinary Language in the BuddhistOn Not Understanding Tantra of Japan Extraordinary Language in the Buddhist Tantra of Japan Richard K. Payne ID

InstituteRichard of K. Buddhist Payne Studies, The Graduate Theological Union, 2140 Durant Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA; [email protected] of Buddhist Studies, The Graduate Theological Union, 2140 Durant Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA; [email protected] Received: 28 August 2017; Accepted: 6 October 2017; Published: 11 October 2017 Received: 28 August 2017; Accepted: 6 October 2017; Published: date Abstract: The question motivating this essay is how tantric Buddhist practitioners in Japan understoodAbstract: The language question such motivating as to believe this thatessay mantra, is how dhtantricara¯ n. ¯ı ,Buddhist and related practitioners forms are in efficacious. Japan “Extraordinaryunderstood language language” such is introducedas to believe as athat cover mantra, term fordhāra theseṇī, and several related similar forms language are efficacious. uses found in“Extraordinary tantric Buddhist language” practices is in introduced Japan. The essayas a cove proceedsr term to for a criticalthese several examination similar of language Anglo-American uses philosophyfound in tantric of language Buddhist to determinepractices in whether Japan. The the essay concepts, proceeds categories, to a critic andal examination concerns of thatof Anglo- field can contributeAmerican to philosophy the analysis of andlanguage understanding to determine of extraordinarywhether the concep language.ts, categories, However, and that concerns philosophy of ofthat language field can does contribute not contribute to the analysis to this analysis,and understanding as it is constrained of extraordinary by its continuinglanguage. However, focus on its foundingthat philosophy concepts, of language dating particularly does not contribute from the to this work analysis, of Frege. as it is Comparing constrained itby to its Indic continuing thought focus on its founding concepts, dating particularly from the work of Frege. Comparing it to Indic regarding language reveals a distinct mismatch, further indicating the limiting character of the thought regarding language reveals a distinct mismatch, further indicating the limiting character of philosophy of language. The analysis then turns to examine two other explanations of tantric the philosophy of language. The analysis then turns to examine two other explanations of tantric language use found in religious studies literature: magical language and performative language. language use found in religious studies literature: magical language and performative language. These also, however, prove to be unhelpful. While the essay is primarily critical, one candidate for These also, however, prove to be unhelpful. While the essay is primarily critical, one candidate for futurefuture constructive constructivestudy study isis historicalhistorical pragmatics,pragmatics, as as suggested suggested by by Ronald Ronald Davidson. Davidson. The The central central placeplace of of extraordinary extraordinary languagelanguage indicatesindicates that that Indic Indic reflections reflections on on the the nature nature of oflanguage language informed informed tantrictantric Buddhist Buddhist practice practicein in JapanJapan andand are not simply simply cultural cultural baggage. baggage.

Keywords:Keywords:tantra; tantra; mantra;mantra; dhdharaā¯ raṇn.ī¯ı;; Esoteric Esoteric Buddhism; Buddhism; Japan; Japan; ritual; ritual; language; language; philosophy philosophy of of language;language; Shingon Shingon

1.1. Introduction Introduction VisualizingVisualizing the the syllable syllable AA (ajikan,(ajikan, 阿阿字観字 ) is the second second of of two two practices practices preliminary preliminary to starting to starting thethe fourfold fourfold training training (shido(shido kegykegyo,ō¯ , 四四度加行度加行)) of of a a Shingon Shingon priest priest (acarya, (acarya, ajari, ajari, 阿闍梨阿闍梨). A). variant A variant formform of of this this practice practice is is also also taught taught as as a a stand stand alone, alone, oror singlesingle practice,practice, particularlyparticularly for lay lay adherents adherents to theto Shingon the Shingon tradition. tradition. The practiceThe practice involves involves gazing gazing at a whiteat a white circle circle on a blackon a black background background in which in is inscribedwhich is the inscribed syllable the A insyllable Siddham A in script, Siddham developing script, developing an eidetic imagean eidetic of it, image and then of it, manipulating and then themanipulating image in various the imag ways.e in variousThe syllable ways. A is a seed syllable (b¯ıja) mantra and is explained as having The syllable A is a seed syllable (bīja) mantra and is explained as having a threefold significance: a threefold significance: it is the origin of all being, present in all being, and the destruction of all it is the origin of all being, present in all being, and the destruction of all being. To someone familiar being. To someone familiar with Hindu conceptions, that triad of meanings would be reminiscent of with Hindu conceptions, that triad of meanings would be reminiscent of the relations between the the relations between the three deities Brahma, Visnu, and Siva´ (trimurti),¯ grouped together as creator, three deities Brahma, Viṣṇu, and Śiva (trimūrti),. . grouped together as creator, sustainer, and sustainer, and destroyer, respectively. Focusing more specifically on A as a syllable, however, tantric destroyer, respectively. Focusing more specifically on A as a syllable, however, tantric symbolism symbolismlinks it to these links three it to thesefunctions three through functions its role through in Sanskrit. its role According in Sanskrit. to the According theory of to phonematic the theory of phonematicemanation emanation(Padoux 1990), (Padoux A is the1990 first), A syllable is the firstof the syllable phonemic of the sequence phonemic of syllables sequence by of which syllables this by whichcosmos this is cosmos manifested is manifested and is therefore and is the therefore origin theof all origin being. of A all is being. also the A isvowel also present the vowel in each present of in eachthe ofsyllables the syllables manifested, manifested, other vowels other vowels being beingunderst understoodood as variants as variants on A. onSince A. Sincethe sequence the sequence of ofsyllables syllables is isthe the sequence sequence of manifestation, of manifestation, A is Apresent is present in all inbeing. all being. And, as And, the negative as the negative prefix, A prefix, is Aconsidered is considered to bring to bring an anend end to toall allbeing. being. This This visualization visualization practice practice employing employing the theSiddham Siddham script script syllablesyllable A A is is one one instance instanceof of “extraordinary“extraordinary language” in in Japane Japanesese tantric tantric Buddhism. Buddhism.

Religions 2017, 8, 223; doi:10.3390/rel8100223 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2017, 8, 223; doi:10.3390/rel8100223 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions 2017, 8, 223 2 of 16

Religions 2017, 8, 223 2 of 16 Religions 2017, 8, 223 2 of 16 Having introduced the category “extraordinary language,” Section2 explains how that phrase Religions 2017, 8, 223 Having introduced the category “extraordinary language,” Section 2 explains2 of 16 how that phrase is being used and why. Section3 provides the reader with examples of extraordinary languageHaving in introduced the category “extraordinary language,” Section 2 explains how that phrase is being used and why. Section 3 provides the reader with examples of extraordinary language in the Having introduced the category “extraordinary language,” Section 2 explains how that phrase is being used and why. Section 3 provides the reader with examples of extraordinary language in the thetantric tantric traditions traditions and and the the tantric tantric penumbra penumbra in Japan. in Japan. Section Section 4 explicat4 explicateses the thequestion question motivating motivating this is being used and why. Section 3 provides the reader with examples of extraordinary language in the tantric traditions and the tantric penumbra in Japan. Section 4 explicates the question motivating this thisinquiry, inquiry, my my thesis thesis regarding regarding the the answer answer to to that that question, question, and and the the significance significance that answering the tantric traditions and the tantric penumbra in Japan. Section 4 explicates the question motivating this inquiry, my thesis regarding the answer to that question, and the significance that answering the questionquestion has. has. Section Section5 then5 then considers considers whether whether the the modern modern academic academic philosophy philosophy of of language language has has anyany inquiry, mytools thesis (concepts, regarding categories, the answer concerns) to that question, that can contributeand the significance to our understanding that answering extraordinary the question language has. Section 5 then considers whether the modern academic philosophy of language has any question has. Sectiontools (concepts, 5 then considers categories, whether concerns) the modern that academic can contribute philosophy to ofour language understanding has any extraordinary and its use in tantric rituals in Japan. Section6 will examine some of the ways that extraordinarytools (concepts, categories, concerns) that can contribute to our understanding extraordinary tools (concepts,language categories, and itsconcerns) use in thattantric can rituals contribute in Japan. to our Section understanding 6 will examine extraordinary some of languagethe ways andthat its use in tantric rituals in Japan. Section 6 will examine some of the ways that language has been explained in religious studies. The primary focus here is critical, in preparation for language andextraordinary its use in tantric language rituals has in been Japan. explained Section in6 religiouwill examines studies. some The of primary the ways focus that here extraordinary is critical, in language has been explained in religious studies. The primary focus here is critical, in more adequate studies in the future, ones that appreciate the important role of Indic understandings of extraordinarypreparation language has for been more explained adequate in studiesreligiou ins studies. the future, The onesprimary that focus appreciate here is the critical, important in preparation role of Indic for more adequate studies in the future, ones that appreciate the important role of Indic language in the development of tantric Buddhist praxes in East Asia. preparation forunderstandings more adequate of studies language in the in future,the developmen ones that appreciatet of tantric theBuddhist important praxes role in of East Indic Asia. understandings of language in the development of tantric Buddhist praxes in East Asia. understandings2. Why of language “Extraordinary in the developmen Language”?t of tantric Buddhist praxes in East Asia. 2. Why “Extraordinary Language”? 2. Why “Extraordinary Language”? 2. Why “ExtraordinaryThe use Language”? of language forms such as mantra, as for example in ritualized practices, diverges from The use of language forms such as mantra, as for example in ritualized practices, divergesThe use from of language forms such as mantra, as for example in ritualized practices, diverges from ordinary forms of language use, which a majority of those working either in the philosophy of language The use ofordinary language forms forms of such language as mantra, use, as which for example a majority in ritualized of those practices, working diverges either infrom the ordinaryphilosophy forms of of language use, which a majority of those working either in the philosophy of ordinary formsorlanguage in of linguistics language or in characterize use,linguistics which characterize asa majority communicating of as those communicating information. working either information. This, in however,the philosophy This, proves however, of to belanguage proves problematic toor bein linguistics characterize as communicating information. This, however, proves to be language orwhen inproblematic linguistics attempting characterizewhen to understandattempting as communicating to the understand ways that information. the mantra ways and that This, similar mantra however, uses and of provessimilar language to uses be are ofproblematic employedlanguage are when in attempting to understand the ways that mantra and similar uses of language are problematictantric whenemployed traditions.attempting in tantric Sinceto understand thesetraditions. language the Sinceways forms thatthese domantra lang not functionuage and similarforms in the usesdo ordinary, ofnot language function communicative are in employedthe ordinary, fashion, in tantric traditions. Since these language forms do not function in the ordinary, employed inI will communicativetantric refer traditions. to them fashion, as Since “extraordinary Ithese will referlang language”uage to them forms inas the do“extraordinary literalnot function sense of language”in “outside the ordinary, thein ordinary.”the literalcommunicative Thesense idea of fashion, I will refer to them as “extraordinary language” in the literal sense of communicativethat“outside languagefashion, the I is willordinary.” identical refer withto Thethem communication idea as “extraordinarythat language is one language” ofis theidentical fundamental in with the literalcommunication constraints sense of on the“outsideis philosophyone of the the ordinary.” The idea that language is identical with communication is one of the “outside theof fundamentalordinary.” language, whichThe constraints idea takes that the on language discursivethe philosophy is oridentical propositional of language, with communication formwhich as takes basic. theis The onediscursive effects of the of or thisfundamental propositional constraint constraints on the philosophy of language, which takes the discursive or propositional fundamentalwill constraintsform be examinedas basic. on theThe more philosophy effects fully of below. this of language, constraint which will be takes examined the discursive more fully or propositional below. form as basic. The effects of this constraint will be examined more fully below. form as basic. TheAn effectsAn important important of this constraint constraint constraint onwill on an anbe interpretive interpretiveexamined more project project fully such such below. as as this this one one isis thatthat wewe shouldshould notAn presume important constraint on an interpretive project such as this one is that we should not presume An importantthatthat the the constraint function function on of of an extraordinary extraordinary interpretive project language language such is is as uniform unif thisorm one across acrossis that all weall usages.shouldusages. not WeWe presume are,are, afterafter all,thatall, examining examiningthe function of extraordinary language is uniform across all usages. We are, after all, examining that the functionphenomenaphenomena of extraordinary that that stretch stretch language over over perhaps isperhaps uniform as as muchacross much asall as five usages.five millennia,millennia, We are, fromfromafter all, VedicVedic examining toto contemporarycontemporary phenomena times. that stretch over perhaps as much as five millennia, from Vedic to contemporary times. phenomenaEven thatEven stretch limiting limiting over our our perhaps consideration consideration as much to asto tantric fivetantric millennia, use use means mean froms that that Vedicwe we areto are contemporaryattempting attempting toto times. understandunderstand Even limiting across aour consideration to tantric use means that we are attempting to understand across a Even limitingmillennium millenniumour consideration and and a half ato half andtantric atand least use at mean fiveleast linguistics thatfive welinguistic andare attempting religious and religious cultures. to understand Insteadcultures. across of Instead assuming a millennium of uniformity,assuming and a half and at least five linguistic and religious cultures. Instead of assuming millenniumthe anduniformity, assumption a half and the should atassumption least be five just thelinguisticshould opposite—usages be and just religious the opposite—usages should cultures. be considered Instead should of inassuming theirbe considered individual uniformity, in context, their the assumption should be just the opposite—usages should be considered in their uniformity, thoughtheindividual assumption at the context, same should time though withinbe just at athe frameworkthe opposite—usages same thattime allows within should for a systematic framework be considered comparisons. that inallows their Further, forindividual systematic the goalcontext, though at the same time within a framework that allows for systematic individual context, though at the same time within a framework that allows for systematic comparisons. Further, the goal of a single, comprehensive explanatory theory of mantra and other ofcomparisons. a single, comprehensive Further, the explanatory goal of a single, theory comp of mantrarehensive and otherexplanatory related formstheory is of a chimera—specificmantra and other comparisons. Further, the goal of a single, comprehensive explanatory theory of mantra and other related forms is a chimera—specific context and use are determinative, and those are stunningly contextrelated and forms use is are a determinative,chimera—specific and context those areand stunningly use are determinative, variant. Nor and can wethose presume are stunningly a single related forms is a chimera—specific context and use are determinative, and those are stunningly variant. Nor can we presume a single lineal developmental history, such as might be constructed as linealvariant. developmental Nor can we history,presume such a sing asle might lineal be developmental constructed as history, running such from as Vedic,might tobe tantric,constructed to East as variant. Nor can we presume a single lineal developmental history, such as might be constructed as running from Vedic, to tantric, to East Asian Buddhist tantra. Our attention here is on extraordinary Asianrunning Buddhist from Vedic, tantra. to Our tantric, attention to East here Asian is on Buddh extraordinaryist tantra. languageOur attention in the he tantricre is on traditions extraordinary and running from Vedic, to tantric, to East Asian Buddhist tantra. Our attention here is on extraordinary language in the tantric traditions and tantric penumbra of Japan, which although still a rather broad language in the tantric traditions and tantric penumbra of Japan, which although still a rather broad language intantric the tantric penumbra traditions of Japan,and tantric which penumbra although of still Japan, a rather which broad although swath still does a rather provide broad a largelyswath coherent does provide a largely coherent historical and cultural context. swath does provide a largely coherent historical and cultural context. swath does historicalprovide a andlargely cultural coherent context. historical and cultural context. 3. Extraordinary Language in Japanese Buddhist Tantra and the Tantric Penumbra 3.3. Extraordinary Extraordinary Language Language in in Japanese Japanese Buddhist Buddhist Tantra Tantra and and the the Tantric Tantric Penumbra Penumbra 3. Extraordinary Language in Japanese Buddhist Tantra and the Tantric Penumbra The Shingon and Tendai traditions of Japan inherit the variety of language forms found in Indic The ShingonThe andThe Shingon Tendai Shingon traditions and and Tendai Tendai of Japan traditions traditions inheri of tof the Japan Japan variety inherit inheri of languaget the the variety variety forms of oflanguage languagefound in Indic formsforms foundtantra,found inemploying Indic mantra (shingon, 真言), dhāraṇī (darani, 陀羅尼 ), and vidya (myōshu, 明呪) in 真真言言 陀陀羅尼羅尼 明呪明 tantra, employingtantra,tantra, mantra employing employing (shingon, mantra mantra 真言 (shingon, (shingon,), dhāraṇī (darani,),), dh dh ara¯陀羅尼āran.ṇ¯ıī (darani,(darani,), and vidya (my),), ō andandshu, vidya明呪) (my in ōritualoshu,¯shu, contexts,) in as well as in written forms—the latter usually in Siddham script. Such practices have ritual contexts,ritualritual as contexts,well contexts, as in aswritten as well well asforms—the as in in written written la forms—thetter forms—the usually in latter la Siddhamtter usually usually script. in in Siddham Siddham Such practices script.script. have SuchSuch practicesspreadpractices well have beyond the specifically tantric traditions into the tantric penumbra in Japan. Such uses spread wellspread beyondspread well the well beyondspecifically beyond the the specificallytantric specifically traditio tantric nstantric into traditions thetraditio tantric intons intopenumb the the tantric ratantric in penumbra Japan. penumb Such inra uses Japan. in Japan. are Such foundSuch uses useson are the continent (Copp 2011), which is the proximate source for usages in Japan. As are found onfound arethe found oncontinent the on continent the(Copp continent (2011),Copp which2011(Copp), whichis2011), the proximate iswhich the proximate is sourcethe proximate sourcefor usages for source usages in Japan. for in usages Japan. As described Asin Japan. described above, As visualization of the bīja mantra A has been promoted among Shingon adherents as described above,above,described visualization visualization above, of visualization ofthe the bī bja¯ıja mantra mantra of the A Ahasbī hasja been mantra been promoted promoted A has beenamong among promoted Shingon Shingon amongadherents adherents Shingon as asa standalone aadherents standalone aspractice. Other mantra and dhāraṇī practices were also promoted by Shingon teachers. a standalonepractice. practice.a standalone Other Other practice. mantra mantra andandOther dhdh mantraaraā¯ raṇn.ī¯ı practices practices and dh wereā wereraṇī alsopractices also prom promoted wereoted by also by Shingon Shingonpromoted teachers. teachers. by Shingon For For example, example,teachers. the Clear Light mantra (kōmyō shingon, 光明眞言) was promoted by Myōe Kōben (明 For example,the theFor Clear Clearexample, Light Light the mantra mantra Clear (k(k Lightomy¯ōmy o¯ōmantra shingon, (kō 光光明眞言my明ō shingon,言) was promoted promoted光明眞言) by was by My My promotedōeoe¯ K Kōbenoben¯ by(明 ( 明My恵ō,e 1173–1232) Kōben (明 in medieval Japan and continues to be taught today (Unno 2004). Since both mantra 恵 恵, 1173–1232) in medieval Japan and continues to be taught today (Unno 2004). Since both mantra , 1173–1232)in medieval in medieval Japan Japan and and continues continues to to be be taught taught today today (Unno (Unno 2004 2004).). Since Since both both mantra mantra andand dh dhara¯ āran. ¯ṇıī are are discussed in this essay as instances of extraordinary language, distinctions between and dhāraṇīdiscussed areand discussed dhā inraṇ thisī inare essaythis discussed essay as instances as in instances this ofessay extraordinary of asextraordinary instances language, of language, extraordinary distinctions distinctions language, between between distinctions the twothe two that between that might might be appropriate for other kinds of inquiries will not be emphasized. the two thatbe mightthe appropriate two be appropriatethat might for other be for appropriate kindsother ofkinds inquiries for of inquiriesother will kinds not will beof not inquiries emphasized. be emphasized. will not be emphasized. Similarly, dhāraṇī are used in rituals and ceremonies of the Zen tradition, such as in the ritual of Similarly, dhāSimilarly,raṇī are used dh āinra ritualsṇī are usedand ceremonies in rituals and of the ceremonies Zen tradition, of the such Zen as tradition, in the ritual such of as “invokingin the ritual the of sage” (shukushin, 祝聖; (Mohr 2008, pp. 207, 215); regarding a different pronunciation Similarly, dhara¯ n. ¯ı are used in rituals and ceremonies of the Zen tradition, such as in the ritual of 祝聖 祝聖 “invoking the“invoking“invoking sage” (shukushin, the the sage” sage” (shukushin, (shukushin,; (Mohr 2008,祝 聖;( pp.;Mohr (Mohr 207, 2008215); 2008,, regarding pp. pp. 207, 207, 215); 215);a different regarding regarding pronunciation aa differentdifferent pronunciationandpronunciation meaning of these characters see (Mohr 2008, p. 323, n. 1)). Also, many sects, including Zen, use and meaning of these characters see (Mohr 2008, p. 323, n. 1)). Also, many sects, including Zen, use andand meaning meaning of of these these characters characters see see (Mohr (Mohr 2008 2008,, p. p. 323, 323, n. n. 1)). 1)). Also,Also, manymany sects,sects, includingincludingfunerary Zen,Zen, markers use that are both shaped like stupas representing the five elements of Indian cosmology funerary markersfunerary that are markers both shaped that are like both stupas shaped representing like stupas the re fivepresenting elements the of fiveIndian elements cosmology of Indian (pañcacakra, cosmology gorinsotoba, 五輪率都婆) with inscriptions in Siddham script of the five seed (bīja) (pañcacakra, gorinsotoba,(pañcacakra, 五輪率都婆gorinsotoba,) with 五輪率都婆 inscriptions) with in inscriptionsSiddham script in Siddhamof the five script seed of(b ītheja) five seed (bīja)

Religions 2017, 8, 223 2 of 16

Having introduced the category “extraordinary language,” Section 2 explains how that phrase is being used and why. Section 3 provides the reader with examples of extraordinary language in the tantric traditions and the tantric penumbra in Japan. Section 4 explicates the question motivating this inquiry, my thesis regarding the answer to that question, and the significance that answering the question has. Section 5 then considers whether the modern academic philosophy of language has any tools (concepts, categories, concerns) that can contribute to our understanding extraordinary language and its use in tantric rituals in Japan. Section 6 will examine some of the ways that extraordinary language has been explained in religious studies. The primary focus here is critical, in preparation for more adequate studies in the future, ones that appreciate the important role of Indic understandings of language in the development of tantric Buddhist praxes in East Asia.

2. Why “Extraordinary Language”? The use of language forms such as mantra, as for example in ritualized practices, diverges from ordinary forms of language use, which a majority of those working either in the philosophy of language or in linguistics characterize as communicating information. This, however, proves to be problematic when attempting to understand the ways that mantra and similar uses of language are employed in tantric traditions. Since these language forms do not function in the ordinary, communicative fashion, I will refer to them as “extraordinary language” in the literal sense of “outside the ordinary.” The idea that language is identical with communication is one of the fundamental constraints on the philosophy of language, which takes the discursive or propositional form as basic. The effects of this constraint will be examined more fully below. An important constraint on an interpretive project such as this one is that we should not presume that the function of extraordinary language is uniform across all usages. We are, after all, examining phenomena that stretch over perhaps as much as five millennia, from Vedic to contemporary times. Even limiting our consideration to tantric use means that we are attempting to understand across a millennium and a half and at least five linguistic and religious cultures. Instead of assuming uniformity, the assumption should be just the opposite—usages should be considered in their individual context, though at the same time within a framework that allows for systematic comparisons. Further, the goal of a single, comprehensive explanatory theory of mantra and other related forms is a chimera—specific context and use are determinative, and those are stunningly variant. Nor can we presume a single lineal developmental history, such as might be constructed as running from Vedic, to tantric, to East Asian Buddhist tantra. Our attention here is on extraordinary language in the tantric traditions and tantric penumbra of Japan, which although still a rather broad swath does provide a largely coherent historical and cultural context.

Religions 2017, 8, 223 3 of 16 3. Extraordinary Language in Japanese Buddhist Tantra and the Tantric Penumbra The Shingon and Tendai traditions of Japan inherit the variety of language forms found in Indic tantra, employing mantra (shingon,funerary 真言ReligionsReligions markers), dh 2017 2017āra, ṇ8,that ī,8 223,(darani, 223 are both 陀羅尼 shaped), and like vidya stupas (my representingōshu, 明呪) thein five elements of Indian cosmology3 of 16 3 of 16 ritual contexts, as well as in written(pañcacakra, forms—the gorinsotoba, latter usually五 in輪 Siddham率都婆 )script. with Such inscriptions practices in have Siddham script of the five seed (b¯ıja) spread well beyond the specificallymantras tantricmantrasmantras for traditio the for for five thens the intofive elements. five theelements. elements. tantric Across Acro penumb Across Buddhist ssBuddhist raBuddhist in Japan. Asia, Asia, Asia, Such aa variety a uses variety of of othe otherof other such suchr such uses uses uses of the of of thewritten the written written form form are found on the continent (Coppform 2011), areareare found, found,found,which such suchissuch the asas proximateas on on on amulets, amulets, amulets, source stele, stele, stele, for and and usagesand prayer pray pray iner wheels Japan.erwheels wheels (As Copp(Copp (Copp 2014 2014). ).2014). FoundFound Found inin the the in Pure Purethe Land PureLand Land described above, visualization oftraditions the bītraditionstraditionsja mantra of Japan, of Aof Japan,has Japan, the been the practice the promoted practice practice known known among known as as Shingon nenbutsu asnenbutsu nenbutsu adherents (念念仏 (念仏,, buddh buddh as, buddh āanusm¯nusmānusmṛti)r.ti) isṛti) isa recitation is a a recitation recitation of the of of name thethe name a standalone practice. Other mantraname and ofof dhAmit Amitāraāabhaṇā¯bhaībha practices Buddha Buddha were (阿弥陀 ( 阿弥陀阿 also陀, Amida)prom, Amida) oted in inbythe in the theShingon form form form of theteachers.of of the expression the expression expression NAMO NAMO NAMO AMIDA AMIDA AMIDA BUTSU. BUTSU. BUTSU. Within Within For example, the Clear Light mantraWithin (kthetheō themy ShinShinō Shin shingon, tradition tradition 光明眞言 ( (眞宗(眞宗宗,), Shin-shwasShin-sh, Shin-sh promotedu),ū¯ ),ū however,),however, however, by My ō thisthise Kthis ō phrasephraseben phrase (明 isisdistinguished distinguishedis distinguished fromfrom from aa mantra mantra a mantra and and and 恵, 1173–1232) in medieval Japanexplained and explainedcontinuesexplained as a spontaneous toas as bea a spontaneous taughtspontaneous expressiontoday expression (Unnoexpression of 2004). gratitude of ofgratitude Since gratitude forboth Amida’sfor mantra forAmida’s Amida’s assurance assurance assurance that that each thateach will eachwill be bewill born born be in bornin in and dhāraṇī are discussed in thisSukh essayavat¯SukhSukh as ¯ıinstances afterāāvatvatī ī death.after after of death.extraordinary death. Despite Despite Despite this language,this sectarian this sectarian sectarian distinctions delineation, delineation, delineation, between it it is is functionallyit functionally is functionally andand and structurally structurally similar similar similar to to the two that might be appropriateto for mantra othermantramantra and kinds andand apparently of apparently apparentlyinquiries originated will originated originated not be as emphasized. as a mantra,asa mantra,a mantra, with with with the the sectarian thesectarian sectarian interpretation interpretation interpretation a a later later a addition. lateraddition. addition. Similarly, dhāraṇī are used Likewise,in ritualsLikewise,Likewise, and in ceremonies the in in Nichirenthe the Nichiren Nichiren of the sects, sects,Zen sects, the tradition, the namethe name name ofsuch of thetheof as the Lotus in Lotusthe s ritualū sutratra¯ sū istra of isrecited is recited recited in the in in formthethe form of the of of phrase the the phrase phrase NAMU NAMU 祝聖 MYOHO RENGE KYŌ—a practice known as daimoku (題目) and an instance of the cult of the book “invoking the sage” (shukushin,NAMU ; (MohrMYOHO MYOHO 2008, RENGE RENGE pp. 207, KYKY 215);ŌO—a¯—a regarding practice practice a known knowndifferent as as pronunciation daimoku (題題目 目) and anan instanceinstance ofof thethe cult cult of of the the book and meaning of these characters see (Mohr(Schopen 2008, 1975). p. 323, Both n. 1)).of these Also, practices—reciting many sects, including the name Zen, useof a Buddha and the name of a text—have book ((SchopenSchopen 19751975).). Both Both of of these these practices—reciting practices—reciting the the name name of a of Buddha a Buddha and and the name the name of a text—have of a funerary markers that are both shaped likeIndic stupas analogues. representing Like Shin-sh the fiveū, elementsNichiren-sh of Indianū is part cosmology of the tantric penumbra in Japanese religious text—haveIndic Indic analogues. analogues. Like LikeShin-sh Shin-shū, Nichiren-shu,¯ Nichiren-shū is upart¯ ispart of the of thetantric tantric penumbra penumbra in Japanese in Japanese religious (pañcacakra, gorinsotoba, 五輪率都婆culture.) with inscriptions This is also inevidenced Siddham byscript the ofobject the offive cult seed veneration (bīja) (gohonzon, 御本尊, also mandara religiousculture. culture. 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Question,The Thesis, question Thesis, and motivating Significance and Significance the larger project of which this is a part (Payne 2018) originates from attempting to understand the extent to which extraordinary language became a common element The questionThe question motivating motivating the larger the larger project project of which of whic thish this is ais parta part (Payne (Payne) originates 2018) originates from from found in the explicitly tantric Buddhist traditions in Japan, in other traditions, and in the popular attemptingattempting to understand to understand the extent the to extent which extraordinaryto which extraordinary language became language a common became element a common found element religious culture of Japan. 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The corollary The corollary of this of is this that is that understandingsunderstandingsThe significance of language of language of werethis thesis not were incidental is not that incidental it challenges baggage baggage carried two conceptionscarried from India from of throughIndia Buddhism through China fairly China to Japanwidely to Japan but weresharedbut an were integral in religiousan integral part studies of part Esoteric andof Esoteric popular praxis. praxis. religious culture. First, the understanding of Buddhism as a Thereligion, significanceThe whensignificance religion of this of thesisis this understood isthesis that is it that challengesin such it challenges modern two conceptions Euro-Americantwo conceptions of Buddhism terms of Buddhism as fairlyessentially widelyfairly the widely sharedindividualshared in religious in religiousquest studies for studies transcendence. and popularand popular religiousInstead, religious it culture. is cumorelture. First, appropri First, the the understandingate understandingto understand of of Buddhismthat Buddhism during as a as a religion,importantreligion, when whenperiods religion religion of its is history, understoodis understood Buddhism in suchin has such modern cons moderntituted Euro-American aEuro-American civilization, terms i.e., termsnot as essentiallya culturalas essentially form, the the something located within a society, but as something much more comprehensive. At other times, of individual quest for transcendence. Instead, it is more appropriate to understand that during course, it has not had the same definitive role and has instead constituted one of several different, important periods of its history, Buddhism has constituted a civilization, i.e., not a cultural form, something located within a society, but as something much more comprehensive. At other times, of course, it has not had the same definitive role and has instead constituted one of several different,

Religions 2017, 8, 223 4 of 16 individual quest for transcendence. Instead, it is more appropriate to understand that during important periods of its history, Buddhism has constituted a civilization, i.e., not a cultural form, something located within a society, but as something much more comprehensive. At other times, of course, it has not had the same definitive role and has instead constituted one of several different, not infrequently antagonistic, institutions within a society. In contrast to both of these, the conception of Buddhism in terms of an individual quest for transcendence has marginalized the importance of understandings of language and other aspects of Buddhism as a culture, such as medicine (Gyatso 2015) and embryology (Andreeva and Steavu 2016), astronomy and astrology (Kotyk 2017), and other cultural technologies. Second, this challenges the rather widely shared understanding that practice and doctrine, or theory and method, exist in isolation from one another. This is found, for example, throughout much of Buddhist modernism and conditions both popular and academic representations of Buddhist praxis. In this view, practice and doctrine can be understood without reference to one another—one version of this that accords neatly with conceptualizing Buddhism as an individual quest for transcendence is that practices are context-neutral and value-free mental technologies of liberation.

5. Philosophy of Language

5.1. Language as Communication It is almost universally accepted in modern studies of language (i.e., both modern philosophy of language and much of linguistics) that there is an identity between language and communication. This goes largely unquestioned and so becomes axiomatic: that is, it is presented as simply a fact, one that does not require further explanation or justification. This exclusive focus on language as communicative in turn then limits the language uses under consideration to those that accord with this presumption—suggesting that something of a petitio principii fallacy is at work. A key instance of this identification of language and communication is that, given the understanding that to communicate fundamentally means to convey information, the declarative form is taken as fundamental to all other forms of language use. In his succinct overview of modern academic philosophy of language, Scott Soames explicitly tells us that the philosophy of language as the field is known today takes the declarative sentence and the transfer of information as the starting point of inquiry (Soames 2010). The two are directly related as form and function—declarative sentences have the form that they do in order to fulfill the function of communicating information. This understanding of language then also determines the nature of the third basic concept: meaning. Meaning is understood to be the information communicated. This in turn constitutes a particular theory of mind, one in which non-linguistic or pre-linguistic meaning is encoded in language, communicated from one person to another, and then decoded out of language. This model informs a great deal of the thinking about language, though it has been the subject of serious critique (Deacon 2011). Thus, for example, Henriette de Swart says, Speaker and hearer use language to communicate. Typically, communication involves a message encoded by the sender into some kind of signal and sent through a channel to the receiver, who receives the signal and decodes the message. In a regular speech situation, there is a speaker who is the sender, and the message is what she wants to get across to the hearer, who is the receiver. The signal consists of sound waves, which encode words and sentences, the channel is the air, and the hearer decodes the sound waves. (de Swart 1998, p. 1) Anything other than the information, the meaning, that is received in the process of communication is “noise.” This can be referred to as the “encoding–decoding” theory of language, which is at the same time a theory of mind, also serving for example as a model of memory in some theories. The encoding–decoding model, however, necessarily runs into the problem of the homunculus (Deacon 2012, pp. 69–72) or what Daniel Dennett has called the “Cartesian theater” (Dennett 1991, pp. 101–39). Who or what conceives the thought to begin with, that is, prior to its being encoded, and Religions 2017, 8, 223 5 of 16 who or what understands the thought after it has been decoded? And, if one identifies language and communication, what is the nature of the message to be communicated—is it itself linguistic in nature, or is it conceptually formulated in something like “mentalese”? This is not to assert that there may be some, perhaps more basic, level of cognition that functions to understand the pre-encoding and post-decoding meaning, but the majority of presentations of the encoding–decoding model do not attempt to address the issue (for alternative conceptualizations, see (Lohmar 2012)). Taking the declarative form as basic, however, is simply stipulative. It is not empirical, but an arbitrary starting point. It is a decision about what to take as fundamental, and once that step is taken in establishing the nature of language, the problems that the philosophy of language attempts to address largely follow from that decision. That decision was made at the historical origins of philosophy of language. Such an interest in origins of the philosophy of language might be considered misguided, an instance of the genetic fallacy. However, as we will see, the philosophy of language continues to be defined by reference to the ways its tasks were determined at its origins.

5.2. History of the Philosophy of Language—In Brief The philosophy of language continues to work largely within the constraints imposed by its own history. Philosophy of language was born from the work of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, despite some authors pointing to earlier discussions (such as Plato’s Cratylus and Sophist) (Lamarque 1997, pp. 1–9). As T. Givón notes with sweet irony at the opening of his work on syntax, “Unfortunately, in tracing one’s intellectual lineage as far back as one can see, one often succeeds most admirably” (Givón 2001, I: 1). In other words, such claims are to be understood as constructs initiated for various rhetorical reasons, such as claiming legitimacy on the grounds of a supposed ancient origin, rather than as empirically objective statements of genealogy (in contrast, see (Crivelli 2008)). Despite locating ideas about language in the writings of Plato, we note that Heck and May say that “Frege’s contributions to philosophy of language are so numerous and so fundamental that it is difficult to imagine the field without them” (Heck and May 2008). The concerns, concepts and categories identified by Frege and his followers, e.g., Russell and Whitehead, remain foundational for the philosophy of language. Since its inception, the focus on the propositional form and the information it conveys has motivated the issues of the truth of statements as perhaps the central organizing concern for the philosophy of language. “Analytic philosophy of language may be said to begin with Frege’s determination that the fundamental thing about the meaning of a sentence is its truth-value” (Morris 2007, p. 231). In pursuit of this conception of meaning a fundamental distinction is made between sentences (what is spoken or written) and propositions (what is thought or conceived). While this might initially seem clear-cut and unproblematic, Ruth Kempson has demonstrated that it is not a simple distinction (Kempson 1977, p. 36). Further issues then cluster around this central concern with the truth of statements. John Searle explains that “The philosophy of language consists in the attempt to analyse certain general features of language such as meaning, reference, truth, verification, speech acts, and logical necessity” (Searle 1971, p. 1). These concerns have also informed the philosophy of religious language, which we consider next.

5.3. Philosophy of Religious Language William P. Alston succinctly divides religious language into either speaking to God or speaking about God (Alston 2007). While this is not exactly a universally appropriate place for such an inquiry to start, it does demonstrate the continuing determinative role of theology for the study of religion, including religious language, in Euro-American contexts. Its relevance to this inquiry arises when the standard encoding–decoding model of language is applied to extraordinary language. What concept or thought is being communicated? To whom is it being communicated? The philosophy of religious language in theistic traditions simply extends the standard model by saying that religious language is communication with God or with a god. But mantra and dhara¯ n. ¯ı, at least in Japanese Esoteric Buddhist ritual performances, are not communicative, they are not addressed to anyone or anything. Religions 2017, 8, 223 6 of 16

Alston’s understanding of “religious language” is constrained by a theological commitment in such a fashion as to make it irrelevant to understanding mantra and dharan¯ . ¯ı. Dan R. Stiver has suggested that historical forms of the philosophy of religious language can be divided into three general understandings. The first is the negative way (via negativa) in which “all words must be denied or negated in order to understand Ultimate Reality truly” (Stiver 1996, p. 15). The second is univocal, that is, since revelation is definitive, there can be no equivocation (Scotus). And the third is an interpretative orientation based on analogy (Aquinas). Although the author claims to be compiling a survey of the philosophy of religious language, the scope of the study is limited by the same kind of theological commitments as is noted above regarding Alston. We note that there is one exception to the exclusive focus on Christianity in Stiver’s work. That exception is a one paragraph discussion of Zen koans,¯ which are explained as an instance of the negative philosophy of religious language that uses language instrumentally to overcome language. He says that a koan¯ is “a seemingly nonsensical riddle that is to be the means to satori, or Enlightenment” (Stiver 1996, p. 19). Indeed, Stiver goes on to claim, rather unhelpfully, that “The nonsense is the point” (Stiver 1996, p. 20). Theistic traditions can extend the concept of language as communication to religious language by simply extending the model to include communicating with a deity. However, when we consider the actual use of ritual language in tantric practices, it is not always—and indeed perhaps rarely—directed to a deity in the same sense. Mantra may be directed to objects or uttered in conjunction with actions, making those actions ritually effective.

5.4. Philosophy of Language and Indic Understandings of Language Since one of my claims is that understanding the use of extraordinary language in Japanese tantra is best approached from Indic understandings of language, we next consider the question of whether the philosophy of language is conceptually powerful enough to subsume those understandings. Like Searle, Scott Soames attributes the key developments in the philosophy of language to Frege and Russell. These include the development of symbolic logic, the analysis of quantification, the application of logical ideas and techniques to the semantics of natural language, the distinction between sense and reference, the linking of representational content to truth conditions, and the compositional calculation of the contents of compound expressions from the semantic properties of their parts [which] are all due to Frege and Russell. Philosophy of language, as we know it today, would not exist without them. We can take each of these key developments in sequential order so as to consider the relation between philosophy of language and Indic ideas of language. We can here only treat each in a summary fashion.

• symbolic logic: Douglas D. Daye has suggested that the standard argument structures employed in Indian thought indicate a quasi-variable, but symbolic logic as such requires the use of full variables (cf. Daye 1979, 1988). • quantification: It is possible to interpret the four options of the catuskoti, the fourfold arrangement of possibilities (is: “all A are B,” is not “all A are not B,” both “some A are B,” neither “some A are not B”) as having different quantifications, but as with variables, this was not developed in the direction indicated by Soames. • semantics as logic: There is a concern with semantics, but this is not formalized in logical terms; for an example of the logical treatment of semantics, see the work of Heim and Kratzer(1998). • sense and reference (Sinn and Bedeutung): Religions 2017, 8, 223 7 of 16

Mark Siderits has asserted that “It is generally accepted that Indian philosophers of language do not posit sense as a component of the meaning of an expression in addition to its reference” (Siderits 1991, p. 65). He goes on to claim, however, that “recognition of something sense-like is forced” on some thinkers, despite the tradition being “dominated by an extreme realist view of all semantic properties” (Siderits 1991, p. 65). Ołena Łucyszyna has examined in some detail the difficulties of ascertaining the view of the Sankhya school on meaning. She indicates that there is a general absence of clarity about whether meaning is referentially a particular existing entity, or a generalization (Łucyszyna 2016, pp. 305–7), though in either case there does not appear to have been any clear distinction correlating to that of sense and reference. • representational content as truth conditions: There is no corresponding inquiry in Indian thought on language. • compositional calculus:

This is an area with a well-developed correlate, particularly in the works of Bhartr.hari regarding the location of meaning in words or in sentences (sphot.a). Siderits refers to this as the “problem of sentential unity.” He suggests that there are two views generally found in Indian thought. The first is “that each word in a sentence completes its semantic function by introducing its denotation, the task being performed independently of the semantic contributions of the other words” (Siderits 1991, p. 10). The second is “that the semantic function of a word is to denote its referent in relation to the denotata of the other words occurring in a sentence in which that word occurs” (Siderits 1991, p. 10).

Thus, we can see that the categories, concerns, and concepts of the philosophy of language, such as those summarized by Soames above, do not map directly onto those of Indian thinkers. The problematic character of attempting to understand Indic thought regarding language within the framework provided by the concerns, concepts, and categories of Anglo-American philosophy of language has in fact already been noted by several authors. McRea and Patil call attention to this in their study of Jñanasr¯ ¯ımitra’s exposition on exclusion, apoha. They note for example, that although “Modern scholars have tended to view the theory as primarily a theory of meaning ... since its origins in the work of the sixth-century Buddhist philosopher Dignaga,¯ the theory of exclusion was used to address a much broader range of philosophical problems. Indeed, for Dignaga¯ and his successors, it formed the basis of their account of all conceptual awareness” (McCrea and Patil 2010, p. 1). B.K. Matilal summarized the difference between Anglo-American philosophy of language, i.e., “modern analytical philosophers” and “classical Indian philosophers.” Citing Dummett(1980, p. 442), Matilal notes that modern analytical philosophers are concerned with “the fundamental outlines of an account of how language functions—it is in this sense that the philosophy of language is to be regarded as the foundation of all the rest of philosophy. This overall concern with how our language works was not the chief concern of most classical Indian philosophers.” (Matilal 1990, p. 4). For the latter “language acquired a metaphysical importance” (Matilal 1990, p. 4). Although Bhartr.hari comes close to the concerns of modern analytical philosophers, in that he “sometimes asked questions similar to those of post-Fregean philosophers, what he supplied as answers may not engage the attention of modern analytical philosophers. Hence we must conclude that the basic attitude as well as the conclusion was very different, as far as classical India was concerned” (Matilal 1990, p. 4). Bhartr.hari’s understanding of language is deeply influenced by the identity of language and being and consequently epistemology as well. “If the language principle (´sabda-tattva)is the stuff the universe is made of, it follows that its sentient manifestations, and in particular human beings, are never divorced from language, for their capacity for knowledge (in fact their very consciousness and self-awareness ... ) is innately infused with language” (Vergiani 2016). Similarly, Vergiani notes that Bhartr.hari “presents his views on language and cognition within the framework of a grand nondualist metaphysical vision, Religions 2017, 8, 223 8 of 16 agilely moving from the ultimate essence of reality to the technicalities of Pa¯n. inian grammar, not unusually in the context of the same argument” (Vergiani 2016). In an examination of Sanskrit grammar, Houben gives a survey of the study of semantics in which he gives a qualified agreement with Frits Staal’s suggestion that “Indian linguists in the fifth century B.C. knew and understood more than Western linguists in the nineteenth century A.D.” (Staal 1988, p. 47). Houben suggests that Sanskrit authors may have been “ahead of modern developments ... in the field of semantic theory and the development of systems of knowledge representation” (Houben n.d., p. 10). Having said that he goes on to remind us that But with all this it should not be forgotten that ... semantics in the Sanskrit tradition never became the well-defined domain of a separate discipline. The exegetes, logicians and grammarians that dealt with semantic issues were first of all disputing on the ontological and epistemological status of linguistic, semantic, and ‘real-world’ entities. (Houben n.d., p. 10) In pursuing comparative studies, such as different systems of thought regarding the nature of language, it is important to avoid simply identifying corollaries between two systems of thought and concluding on the basis of those similarities that the two are the same, or further that because they appear in that way to be the same, one can be subsumed within the concepts, categories, and concerns of the other. Much of what constitutes modern philosophy of language as understood by its contemporary practitioners fails to correspond to premodern Indic ideas of language, and that which does is at best rather approximate. This intellectual limitation to the founding conceptualizations of the philosophy of language has made it a markedly “parochial” specialization with little or no attention to comparative studies. By “parochial,” I mean a highly constrained understanding as to what concerns, concepts, and categories are relevant to a philosophical inquiry into language, which serves as a self-limiting constraint on the scope of the field. More specifically for our inquiry here, the concerns, concepts, and categories of the philosophy of language do not have even approximate analogues in tantric uses of language. In conclusion to this section we can quote a passing comment from Johannes Bronkhorst. In an essay on the concept of sphot.a, the meaning of a sentence as a whole, Bronkhorst points out that The modern study of sphot.a and related issues is contaminated by ideas borrowed from Western philosophy and linguistics to the extent that a major intellectual effort is required to understand these concepts once again in their own cultural context. (Bronkhorst 2005, p. 5)

6. Explanations of Tantric Language Having examined the philosophy of language as a possible resource for understanding the use of mantra and similar language forms in Japanese tantric Buddhism and determined that its founding assumptions make it irrelevant to our concerns in this study, we now turn our attention to other explanations. As suggested to me by Ronald Davidson, there has been a shift from seeking tools of analysis in the philosophy of language to exploring the field of linguistics for this inquiry (Davidson 2016). While there may be others, I will here focus on three approaches to extraordinary language that have been developed in the Euro-American study of tantra: magical language, performative language, and pragmatics.

6.1. Magical Language The idea that extraordinary language use can be adequately interpreted under the category of “magical language” has been proposed, claiming that the latter is a meaningful category that includes mantra. While it is unnecessary to review the tendentious history of the category of magic as a scholarly term in religious studies in full here, the juxtaposition between magic and religion, and between those two and secular reason (see Comaroff 1994, p. 303) does inform representations of tantra and of the uses of extraordinary language. Religions 2017, 8, 223 9 of 16

When considering the category of magic, we note the postmodern insight that all usages of categories are located, that is, their meanings and significances change depending on the social, historical, intellectual and religious context within which they are used (for an uncontextualized use, see (Beyer 1978)). As noted by Patton Burchett, the category “magic” and its connotations in contemporary academic discourse is formulated in the nineteenth century, as part of attempts to distinguish religion from magic and superstition (Burchett 2008, p. 808). Religion was defined either as rational or as grounded in immediate experience, while magic and superstition were presented as irrational and grounded either in natural fear or in fear induced for the maintenance of social power. Application of the category magic beyond its rhetorical functions in modern discourse is doubly problematic. First, the sources upon which the characterizations of magic have been constructed are those of the ancient Near East and medieval Europe. When universalized (sublated) as categories applicable to traditions outside the historical sources of the concept, such applications are problematic, and would require adequate theorization before being deployed in analyses—what is meant by the term, and what makes it appropriate as a universal category? Second, there is also the semiotic pairing of religion and magic as opposites. In this rhetoric, the language of religion is represented as properly rational and discrete from the world to which it refers, while the language of magic improperly confuses words and their referents. This latter confusion supposedly then leads to the delusion that by manipulating words, one can control the world, a way of distinguishing between religious and magical language that remains current. Clearly, we are here in the realm of high modernism in which we moderns are distinguished from those primitives by our instrumental rationality (see Samuels 2005, p. 345, n. 12). There is more to this, however, than simply a division between “we moderns” and “those primitives.” Robert Yelle’s work indicates that Protestant concerns with definitive language came into conflict with Indic practices, such as the use of mantras. The religious engagement of Protestant missionaries contributed to interpreting Indian religious practices as confusing words and reality, which is indeed an identity asserted by some tantric metaphysical theories, but then conflating that confusion with the distinction between “true prayer and illicit magic” familiar from Reformation history (Yelle 2012, p. 116).

6.2. Contortions Needed to Avoid Connotations of “Magical Language” Thomas Kasulis has attempted a comparative study of conceptions of language in Plato and Kukai.¯ Despite writing as if the comparison is between two figures, Plato and Kukai, Kasulis is actually engaged in a three-way comparison. The invisible third term of the comparison is contemporary philosophy and philosophy of language. Implicit in Kasulis’ writing is the presumption that intellectual history is a teleological development, leading up to the form of philosophy found in the present in the West. This conception of intellectual history is reminiscent of the historiography of Hegel and Comte. Given the implicit teleology, present-day forms are functionally normative, and constitute a suppressed term of the comparison. He says, for example, that today a discussion about the nature of language “would involve an analysis of word, meaning, and reference. To the extent that the Cratylus inquires into the connection between names and the things to which they refer, the discussion is modern” (Kasulis 1982, p. 394). This teleological basis is evident when Kasulis asserts that both Plato and Kukai¯ “tried to go beyond the simply magical into the philosophical” (Kasulis 1982, p. 392). Kasulis opens by suggesting that philosophy must necessarily consider language.

Early in its development, a philosophical tradition will consider the nature of language, for language is, after all, the medium of philosophical expression. To be truly philosophical, an inquiry must have at least a rudimentary theory about the relationship between words and nonlinguistic reality. This does not mean that every cultural tradition will make the same initial decision about this relationship. We only require that a preliminary theory of language be logically consistent and a reasonable reflection of at least some aspect of language as used in everyday life. (Kasulis 1982, p. 392) Religions 2017, 8, 223 10 of 16

Rhetorically, this serves to make whatever is said about language by Kukai¯ philosophical, without critically reflecting on the significance or consequences of attributing that category to Kukai’s¯ thought. Kasulis also makes a rhetorical move establishing the meaningful comparability of Kukai¯ and Plato by setting both in opposition to what he simply claims is an archaic view of language, which is seemingly his own speculative construct of a unitary conception that “words are generally believed to have a creative, magical power” (Kasulis 1982, p. 392). In support of his suggestion that there is such an identifiably coherent “archaic view,” he provides one instance each from the Bible, R. g Veda, and Daodejing. In doing this, Kasulis first divides the field of study into magic and philosophy and then simply asserts that Plato and Kukai¯ both belong on the same side of that divide. This seems then to be taken as obviating the necessity for any further consideration of context—both are philosophers, so other factors may be passed over in silence. One of the consequences of Kasulis’ attempt to make Kukai¯ a philosopher, rather than a magician, is that then by definition, Kukai’s¯ view of language is not magical. This, however, is simply a petitio principii fallacy. Kasulis’ comparison is enabled first by decontextualizing both Plato and Kukai.¯ He then recontextualizes them as figures to be viewed with “both reverence and tolerance” (Kasulis 1982, p. 393) given that they initiate the philosophy of language in the history of thought, which is itself cast as a single, unilinear progressive sequence culminating in our present understandings. While apparently never made explicit, the absence of discussion of the limitations of the philosophy of language seem to imply that it is presumed to be universally applicable. It may be that it can be applied to any language, within the confines of the original issues that organize the field today. That kind of universality of application, however, is different from asking whether the structure of the field matches other approaches to the study of language. Indian thought provides a very useful comparison for this latter question, as it is itself a highly developed approach—one that indeed begins systematic study of language several centuries earlier than did Euro-American thinkers.

6.3. Performative Language Describing mantra as performative has been one approach to explanation within the context of philosophy of language. We will examine a specific instance, that of Harold G. Coward and David J. Goa, after introducing the concept of performative language. The concept of performative language was introduced by J.L. Austin in his 1955 lectures How to Do Things with Words (1962, 2nd ed. 1975). Influential in bringing this approach to the attention of scholars in religious studies was Tambiah application of it to ritual (Tambiah 1985). This approach challenges the conception of sentences as being meaningful by reference, that is, as answering the question “Does this sentence give an accurate representation of some aspect of the world?” This is the characteristic of declarative sentences, that is, statements of some fact—what Austin called “constative,” also called propositions in the literature. But despite their grammatical form often making them look as if they are declaratives, rather than describing some aspect of the world, performatives are an action, that is, uttering a statement is itself taking the action that otherwise be thought to be described in the statement (Austin 1975, p. 70). Familiar examples of performative language are promising and apologizing—“I’m sorry to have been late this time, and assure you that I’ll be punctual next time.” Such actions are—rather evidently it seems to me—to be ones taking place in the social, intersubjective world, that is, as part of a communicative relation between people. To my mind, however, it is necessary to distinguish between performative speech acts and the actions performed by different kinds of speech acts. The failure to distinguish these two, admittedly easily confused, dimensions leads to the frequent and I believe mistaken equation of performative language use as such and speech acts in general. Coward and Goa employ the idea of performative language in their explanation of mantra, and do conflate performative language use and speech acts in general. Discussing the use of mantra in the R. gveda, for example, they say Religions 2017, 8, 223 11 of 16

Mantras spoken in ritual activity actually do something. Thus, even from their earliest conception in the Rgveda, mantras are classical examples of what are now called “speech acts.” However, whereas modern thought emphasizes the performative nature of the speech act at the expense of its communication function, the Rgvedic seers are emphatic that while the spoken mantra can do things, the basis for that power is located in its revelation of truth (ta, satya). Although mantras from later Indian tradition can be of a nonsensical nature, in the Rgvedic period it seems clear that a mantra must reveal meaning. Indeed the original sense of mantra as a vehicle for reflection and revelation becomes operationalized by the late Rgvedic seers and priests. “Mantra is the tool, the mechanism, for yoking the reflective power of the seer into the machinery of ritual.” (Coward and Goa 2004, pp. 16–17; internal references to Austin, Tambiah, and Findly elided.)

We cite this at length in order to exemplify some of the many problems involved in such an attempt to interpret mantra by reference to the idea of performative language use, as well as incidentally some other claims made about mantra. First, what do the authors mean when they say, “actually do something”? The authors do not specify what kind of “actual effect” the mantra is supposed to have. While an interpretation of such actions according to academic conceptions of magic would conclude that the intended actual effects are physical or material in character, this does not seem to be the understanding of some members of the tradition itself. For example, the question of what effects mantra produce appears to have been of concern to Patañjali as well. George Cardona tells us that

in the course of a rite, the Agn¯ıdh officiant is supposed to heat up potsherds in which offerings will be heated by covering them with coals, and as he covers them the Agn¯ıdh is supposed to utter the mantra bh´r.gu¯ n. am¯ ángiras˙ a¯m˙ tápasa¯ tapyadhvam (Vajasaneyisa¯ mhit˙ a¯ 1.18) ‘Heat up with the ascetic heat of the Bhr.gu, of the Angiras.’˙ As Patañjali remarks, the officiant addresses the potsherds with this mantra after he puts them on the fire, although even without the mantra the fire, whose very action is to burn would heat them. A restriction is provided, whereby the act thus performed produces the good results desired, felicity. (Cardona 1990, p. 11)

Second, what do Coward and Goa mean when they claim that modern theory emphasizes performative at the expense of communicative? (there seems to be instead resistance to this division; and they seem to have confused speech acts as a general category with performatives). Third, what is “truth” (ta, satya) in their usage? Presumably they do not mean epistemic truth, since it is unlikely that truth conditions could be formulated for mantra. Given the Indic context, perhaps they mean something rather like “actuality” or “true being”? In the background, I take it, is the concept of an act of truth (P. saccakiriya, or saccavacana, Skt. satyavacana). Ronald Davidson comments on this kind of claim regarding the “truth” of a mantra, saying

the idea of a mantra-dhara¯ n. ¯ı as an act of truth expresses several somewhat problematic questions. First, it is evident that many of them cannot be truth in the sense of truth-conditional semantics, for at least some do not exclusively express statements comprehensible in natural language. Second, their presumption of efficacy appears dependent on the narrative of initial expression, and the needs of the individual in the subject case of the narrative ... the direction of fit is to refashion the world into a vessel that is in accord with the intention and desire of the speaker, who speaks the words of the Buddha through his own mouth. (Davidson 2014, p. 51)

Fourth, what do they mean by “reveal meaning”? Are they equating “truth” (or as others do, purpose) with “meaning”? What kind of meaning are they intending to claim mantra reveal? Fifth, in the quote from Findly, it is the “reflective power of the seer” that seems to be operational. But they do not explain what that is—how is reflection powerful? How does such power effectuate Religions 2017, 8, 223 12 of 16 mantra? The assertions made by Coward and Goa appear to be dense with significance, but upon critical examination, so much is left unexplained as to leave the reader with no significance. Perhaps the philosophically most contentious issue is their assertion that performative language also communicates meaning. Whether performatives are also informative is deserving of serious reflection. While some authors maintain that a performative simultaneously functions to inform, in my own view this position conflates an action with its interpretation. If we are to take a performative as an action seriously, then just as we would separate the action of throwing a ball from interpreting the act to mean that the shortstop intends to catch the batter out at first, we should also separate verbal actions from their interpretations. Since meaning is contextual, it is analytically important to separate action—even verbal acts—from interpretation regarding the meaning of such an act. Much confusion in this area seems to result from failing to distinguish between an analysis—in which action and interpretation are separate—from a phenomenology of speech acts in which action and interpretation may be experienced as necessarily conjoined. John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken specify that “In general an illocutionary act consists of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P” (Searle and Vanderveken 2009, p. 1). However, when mantra as an entire category are identified as performative, as by Coward and Goa, we are outside the purview of Searle and Vanderveken’s initial qualifying clause, “in general”—performatives having a unique kind of illocutionary force that is not propositional. If we employ the distinction made by Searle and Vanderveken, then being performative per se—doing something in ritual—does not equate to having propositional content, i.e., meaning with truth value. For the study of extraordinary language used in ritual, propositional content needs to be analytically separated from performative illocutionary force, i.e., what is done in a ritual, including uttering a mantra, is not propositional content—an action is not a proposition. One can interpretively state a proposition about what is done, but that is a second step, i.e., a separate speech act. As a separate speech act, it and its propositional content cannot be identified with the mantra and its performative illocutionary force. Making this distinction between performative language and propositional content points to that set of speech acts that fall outside what Searle and Vanderveken have indicated to be the case “in general.” Consideration of this distinction is made difficult by the tendency of many writers to say of all speech acts that they perform some action. But a careful distinction needs to be kept between performing an act of saying something and performing an act by saying something. In other words, there is a need to clearly distinguish between performative speech acts and the performativity, i.e., illocutionary force, of speech acts. As just noted, Searle and Vanderveken indicate that speech acts have illocutionary force. Although speech acts have performativity in that sense, this does not mean that they are performative speech acts in a narrow sense as first introduced by Austin. To claim that identity is a fallacy of equivocation—two different meanings being confused/conflated because the same word is used for both. That conflation so diminishes the significance of the category of performative speech acts that it no longer has any meaning. Under this degraded concept of performative as identical with performativity, all speech acts come to be thought of as performative. Unfortunately, the blurring of these two meanings is found in Austin’s original work (Hornsby 2008, p. 905). When the performativity of speech acts is confused with performative speech acts, the significance of the difference between a (verbal) action and its (verbal) interpretation becomes lost.

6.4. Pragmatics and Extraordinary Language As mentioned above, Ron Davidson has suggested that the tools of linguistics are more appropriate for the study of extraordinary language than those of the philosophy of language. Davidson chooses pragmatics. Ray Jackendoff explains pragmatics by contrasting it with semantics, “one may view ‘semantics’ as providing the part of the conceptual structure of an utterance that is related directly to linguistic expression, and ‘pragmatics’ as providing the part that arises through Religions 2017, 8, 223 13 of 16 inference, heuristics, world knowledge, and understanding of the context” (Jackendoff 2010, p. 8). Given the character of Davidson’s inquiry, he suggests that historical pragmatics provides entrée to understanding the use of dhara¯ n. ¯ı. While pragmatics per se generally focuses on spoken source materials, historical pragmatics, which has the same goals, depends entirely on written texts as sources. Davidson’s hope is that a number of areas of investigation will be facilitated by this kind of approach to dhara¯ n. ¯ı texts: “the changing nature of Buddhist discourse, the macro social environment of India, the intermediate social environment of Buddhist monasteries and the support communities, the smaller environments of Mahayanist groups employing such phrases and placing them in their scriptures, to mention but the more urgent” (Davidson 2014, p. 10). In his examination of the ways that dhara¯ n. ¯ı are talked about, Davidson identifies nine different categories of pragmatic context. These are the following:

(1) precipitating assertives, descriptions of the situation in which a dhar¯ .an. ¯ı is to be taught; (2) directives, assertions that one should use the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (3) commissives, promises to teach the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (4) precedent or predictive assertives, previous or future uses of the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (5) benefit assertives, descriptions of the benefits to be derived from use of the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (6) hybrid warning assertives, warnings to those who do not adhere to or accept the efficacy of the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (7) expressives, praise, homage, etc., regarding the dharan¯ . ¯ı; (8) perlocutionary expressives, descriptions of the joy and amazement of the audience receiving the dharan¯ . ¯ı; and (9) the mantra-dharan¯ . ¯ı itself (Davidson 2014, p. 11). Davidson maps these different pragmatics to corresponding Sanskrit grammatical forms, demonstrating that the categories are reflections of actual textual usages. One of Davidson’s goals is to establish historical pragmatics as a tool for studying the historical development of dharan¯ . ¯ı texts. His second goal is more broadly methodological. It is “to determine if nomothetic linguistic tools can be effectively brought to bear on the evaluation of dhara¯ n. ¯ı texts, rather than inventing, on the spot, a typology of dubious validity, neither really emic nor etic, or invoking emic typologies exclusively” (Davidson 2014, p. 52). What is of value here is that such a method provides consistency across various inquiries into the use of dhara¯ n. ¯ı, and more broadly extraordinary language in general. While the specific categories identified by Davidson may not “translate” into languages other than Sanskrit, only by consistency across different studies can progress in our understanding of how extraordinary language was talked about as ritually effective be made. In relation to the question motivating my own research, how did Japanese tantric practitioners understand language in such a fashion that validated the use of extraordinary language originating in Sanskrit as effective? Understanding how extraordinary language is presented in the textual tradition is an important factor.

7. Conclusions The concerns, concepts, and categories that inform the philosophy of language preclude its application—or imposition—onto the study of extraordinary language use in tantric traditions, such as those of Japan. This becomes clear when we consider the question, how did Esoteric Buddhist practitioners in Japan conceive of language so that mantra, dhara¯ n. ¯ı, and other kinds of extraordinary language originating in the cultural context of Sanskrit could be thought to be effective? This is not simply a case of some unsophisticated and undifferentiated “archaic view of language” a là Kasulis. Instead of dismissing this as just a magical confusion of word and world, as will be explored in more specificity in additional research (Payne), this use in Japanese tantra is actively informed by Indic conceptions of language. The use of extraordinary language in Esoteric Buddhist practices in Japan indicates that Indic understandings of language formed part of the larger culture of Buddhism and accompanied practices Religions 2017, 8, 223 14 of 16 employing extraordinary language. In the study of Japanese Buddhism in European and American scholarship, little attention has been given to this kind of intellectual transmission from India through China to Japan. The central role of mantra, dhara¯ n. ¯ı, and related forms of language use in the tantric traditions is well-established, so much so that tantra and mantra are sometimes identified with one another. Mantra is so central to tantric praxis that the names used for tantric Buddhism include “mantranaya” (the method of mantra) and “mantrayana”¯ (the way of mantra). The centrality of language for these traditions indicates that further research focused on such usages is warranted. To date, however, the philosophy of language has not formulated any significant contributions toward the study of such language use because it is constrained by its own original formation. More promise is held though for the application of the analytic tools of linguistics. In addition to the application of pragmatics, as per Davidson, cognitive linguistics, socio-linguistics, historical linguistics, and semiotics (Rambelli 2013; Yelle 2013) may be of use in further studies. The complexity of the subject of extraordinary language necessitates a careful balance between overarching concepts that provide a basis for meaningful comparisons, and attention to the actual use and function in specific contexts. More generally, neither a single definition nor a single explanation of mantra, dharan¯ . ¯ı, and so on can be a meaningful goal of our studies.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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