1111 2 3 4 5111 LINGUISTIC STRATEGIES IN 6 7 DAOIST ZHUANGZI AND 8 CHAN BUDDHISM 9 10 11 2 3111 As the first systematic attempt to probe the linguistic strategies of 4 Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism, this book investigates three 5 areas: deconstructive strategy, liminology of language, and indirect 6 communication. It bases these investigations on the critical examin- 7 ation of original texts, placing them strictly within soteriological 8 contexts. 9 While focusing on language use, the study also reveals some import- 20111 ant truths about the two traditions, and challenges many conven- 1 tional understandings of them. Responding to recent critiques of 2 Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought, it brings these traditions into 3 a constructive dialogue with contemporary philosophical reflection. 4 It “discovers” Zhuangzian and Chan perspectives and sheds light 5 on issues such as the relationship between philosophy and non- 6 philosophy, de-reification of words, relativizing of the limit of 7 language, structure of indirect communication, and use of double 8 negation, paradox, tautology, irony, and poetic language. 9 30111 Youru Wang teaches Asian thought in the Philosophy and Religion 1 Department at Rowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey. His area 2 of speciality is Chinese Buddhist thought and early Daoist thought. 3 His articles have appeared in journals such as International Philosophical 4 Quarterly, Philosophy East and West, Asian Philosophy, and Journal of Chinese 5 Philosophy. 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 LINGUISTIC 6 7 STRATEGIES IN 8 9 DAOIST ZHUANGZI 10 11 AND 2 3111 CHAN BUDDHISM 4 5 6 The other way of speaking 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 Youru Wang 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 First published 2003 4 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE 5 Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada 6 by RoutledgeCurzon 7 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 8 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. 9 RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group 20111 © 2003 Youru Wang 1 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or 2 reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, 3 mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter 4 invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without 5 permission in writing from the publishers. 6 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 7 A catalogue record for this book is available 8 from the British Library 9 Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data 30111 A catalog record for this book has been requested 1 ISBN 0-203-45114-7 Master e-book ISBN 2 3 4 ISBN 0-203-45776-5 (Adobe eReader Format) 5 ISBN 0–415–29783–4 (Print Edition) 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 TO MY FATHER, WANG DANRU 4 5 (1904–1990) 6 7 AND MY MOTHER, CA XINRU 8 9 20111 (1916–2003) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 CONTENTS 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 Acknowledgments ix 4 Abbreviations xi 5 6 1 Introduction 1 7 8 9 PART I 20111 Deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and in 1 Chan Buddhism 17 2 3 2 Understanding deconstruction through the 4 Zhuangzi and Chan 19 5 6 3 Zhuangzi’s dao deconstructs . . . and Zhuangzi 7 deconstructs his dao 30 8 9 4 The deconstruction of Buddha nature in 30111 Chan Buddhism 52 1 2 PART II 3 The liminology of language in the Zhuangzi 4 and in Chan Buddhism 81 5 6 7 5 What is a liminology of language? 83 8 6 Zhuangzi’s liminology of “speaking non-speaking” 95 9 40111 7 The Chan contribution to the liminology of 1 language 109 21111 folio vii CONTENTS

1111 PART III 2 Pragmatics of indirect communication in the 3 Zhuangzi and in Chan Buddhism 123 4 5111 8 The displacement of indirect communication 125 6 7 9 The pragmatics of “goblet words”: indirect 8 communication in the Zhuangzi 139 9 10 10 The pragmatics of “never tell too plainly”: indirect 11 communication in Chan 161 2 3111 Concluding remarks 187 4 5 6 Notes 192 7 Glossary 223 8 Bibliography 231 9 Index 245 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio viii 1111 2 3 4 5111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 The present book is the result of a long time of preparation, study, 4 and work. The process of writing and revising even accompanied me 5 from Philadelphia to Hong Kong and back to New Jersey. Although 6 it is a result of my own personal struggles and endeavors, I would like 7 to express my thanks and appreciation to those who have offered help 8 and assistance during this long process. 9 Among the friends and teachers who read a portion or the whole 20111 of this manuscript in its earlier or later form and offered useful correc- 1 tions and suggestions, special thanks go to Sandra A. Wawrytko, 2 Thomas Dean, Joseph Margolis, Shingenori Nagatomo, and Judith 3 Berling. I cannot express my deep gratitude in words to my mentor, 4 Charles Wei-hsun Fu, who died unexpectedly, but whose presence is 5 discernible between the lines of each page. 6 I have presented material from several chapters at a number of 7 scholarly conferences, including department seminars, and have 8 received valuable comments and response from critics, including 9 anonymous readers who reviewed articles derived from a few chap- 30111 ters. I benefited from all of these critiques. However, I choose, among 1 them, Dale Wright, Chen Te, and Qingjie Wang for special thanks. 2 I want to thank Chen-kuo Lin for providing me with important 3 scholarly information. 4 My friends Judy Buck Glenn and Jess Row did editorial work for 5 the earlier version and the revision of this manuscript. They deserve 6 my sincere thanks. The tireless moral support of my two colleagues, 7 Dianne Ashton and David Clowney, is invaluable to me. I feel 8 honored and grateful to have been a recipient, during the period of 9 writing and revision, of the Rocky Foundation Award for Buddhist 40111 Studies, the China Times Cultural Foundation Award for Young 1 Scholars, and the research grants from the Arts and Language Panel 21111 folio ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1111 of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and from the College of 2 Arts and Sciences of Rowan University. 3 My wife’s tolerance, and varied assistance, has permitted the 4 attainment of the goal for this undertaking. My parents’ expectations 5111 for me have long been a driving force in my struggles. Although my 6 father did not live to see the publication of this book, his personality 7 and academic achievement have always been an invisible but gener- 8 ative source for all my endeavors. My mother was very proud of every 9 accomplishment I achieved in academic studes, especially this book. 10 Unfortunately she died right before it was published. I dedicate this 11 book to both of them. 2 A portion of chapter 3 appeared under the title “Philosophy of 3111 Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi” in Journal of 4 Chinese Philosophy, vol. 27, no. 3, 2000, pp. 345–60. 5 A slightly different version of chapter 7 appeared under the title 6 “Liberating Oneself from the Absolutized Boundary of Language: 7 A Liminological Approach to the Interplay of Speech and Silence 8 in Chan Buddhism” in Philosophy East and West, vol. 51, no. 1, 2001, 9 pp. 83–99. 20111 Chapter 10 was published in a slightly different version under 1 the title “The Pragmatics of ‘Never Tell Too Plainly’: Indirect 2 Communication in Chan Buddhism” in Asian Philosophy, vol. 10, 3 no. 1, 2000, pp. 7–31. I want to thank the editors of these journals 4 for permission to include these in this book. 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio x 1111 2 3 4 5111 ABBREVIATIONS 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 BG Baizhang Guanglu. GY, fascicle 1. CJ, vol. 11. 4 CF Huangbo Chanshi Chuanxin Fayao. CJ, vol. 13. 5 CJ Chanzong Jicheng. Reprint of the collection of Chan school from 6 HTC. 25 vols. Taibei: Yiwen Yinshu Guan, 1968. 7 DL Dongshan Liangjie Chanshi Yulu. CJ, vol. 13. 8 DY Yuezhou Dazhu Huihai Heshang Yu. JCL, fascicle 28, T, vol. 51, 9 no. 2076. 20111 GY Guzunsu Yulu. 48 fascicles. CJ, vols 11–12. 1 HTC Xu Zang Jing/Hsu Tsang Ching. Reprint of Dainippon zokuzo¯kyo¯ 2 (Nakano Tatsue, ed. Kyoto: Zo¯kyo¯ shoin, 1905–12). 150 vols. 3 Taibei: Xinwenfeng Chuban Gongsi, 1968–70. 4 JCL Jingde Chuandeng Lu. 30 fascicles. T, vol. 51, no. 2076. 5 LY Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao Chanshi Yulu. GY, fascicle 4. CJ, vol. 11. 6 SL Shenhui Heshang Chanhua Lu. Yang Zengwen, ed. Beijing: 7 Zhonghua Shuju, 1996. 8 TTaisho ¯ shinshu¯ daizo¯kyo¯. Takakusu Junjiro¯ and Watanabe 9 Kaigyoku, eds. Tokyo: Daizo shuppan kai, 1922–33. 100 vols. 30111 WH Wudeng Huiyuan. 20 fascicles. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984. 1 3 vols. 2 WL Huangbo Xiyun Chanshi Wanling Lu. CJ, vol. 13. 3 WLL Huangbo Duanji Chanshi Wanling Lu. Pei Xiu, ed. T, vol. 48, no. 4 2012B. 5 ZY Zhuangzi Yinde. A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, Harvard-Yenching 6 Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20. Taibei: 7 Chinese Materials and Research Aids Service Center, 1966. 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio xi 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 1 4 5111 INTRODUCTION 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 A twofold task 3111 4 Since the 1980s, the study of Daoist philosophy has faced new 5 challenges and criticisms especially from Derridean thinkers and 6 scholars who are under Derridean influence. Despite sporadic efforts 7 to point out the analogy between Derrida’s “trace” or “differance” and 8 Zhuangzi’s “dao” (in contrast to frequent discussions of deconstruc- 9 tion in Buddhism), and despite praise of the Zhuangzi as the ultimate 20111 text of the 1980s,1 Daoism has been accused of logocentrism. Robert 1 Magliola, among others, has asserted that to identify or even find 2 analogous the classical Daoist and Derridean thought would be 3 dishonest. Daoism, according to him, “in its characteristic form from 4 the beginning down to contemporary times has been logocentric.”2 5 Chan Buddhism has encountered a similar problem. Hitherto 6 most discourses on Buddhist deconstruction have not significantly 7 referred to Chan Buddhism, but rather to Na¯ga¯rjuna, Pra¯sangika, 8 and Chinese Ma¯dhyamika. Although a few scholars have suggested 9 that Chan put into practice Ma¯dhyamika Buddhist deconstruction,3 30111 the mainstream of Chan Buddhist tradition has been conspicuously 1 censured for logocentrism one way or another. For example, Bernard 2 Faure unhesitatingly located the mainstream of Chan Buddhism 3 within logocentrism. He particularly singled out the Chan master 4 Linji, considering him “clearly logocentric,” and emphasized the 5 connection of Linji’s thought with Zhuangzi’s in that regard.4 6 My work will, to some extent, address the issue of whether 7 Zhuangzi and Linji are logocentric or not. However, my concern 8 here is not merely with this specific question. The whole situation, as 9 demonstrated by these two cases, has raised a more fundamental and 40111 more general task for contemporary Chinese thinkers and scholars 1 of Chinese philosophy, especially of Daoism and Chan Buddhism. 21111 This task is twofold. folio 1 INTRODUCTION

1111 First, how to recontextualize and reinterpret Daoist and Chan 2 Buddhist thought in terms of the postmodern condition? Given that 3 there is no pure objectivity or full presence of an original movement 4 of thought but only a web of textuality weaving human under- 5111 standing and making impossible any escape from the alternation of 6 context, every interpretation is a recontextualization. No interpreta- 7 tion can take place outside a context, but context is always on the 8 move. The changeability and inexhaustibility of context are deter- 9 mined by the flux and contingency of human existence as being- 10 in-the-world. In this view, living traditions are always in the process 11 of reinterpretation and revitalization. 2 One of the major factors that makes our present context of inter- 3111 preting Daoism and Chan different from that in the 1960s or 1970s 4 is obviously the so-called postmodern condition, or what I term post- 5 modern discourse, a large range of phenomena that recently has 6 dominated the Western intellectual arena. This includes poststruc- 7 turalism, postmodernism, neopragmatism, and so on, as well as those 8 who respond to the ideas propounded by these currents and there- 9 fore contribute to this discourse.5 No matter how divergent these 20111 currents are, they provide some similar vocabularies, metaphors, 1 beliefs, or attitudes, indicating a departure from modern philosophy 2 or the discourse of Enlightenment, and even from the entire tradi- 3 tion of Western metaphysics. Since the interpretation of Daoism and 4 Chan in the West has largely become an inseparable part of the 5 Western linguistic game, I doubt that it can ever escape every current 6 context. Even in the East, the introduction of postmodern discourse, 7 among other things, has increasingly constituted a new element in 8 the context for reinterpretation of traditions. At any rate, Daoist and 9 Chan Buddhist thought must meet the challenges of poststructuralist, 30111 postmodernist or neopragmatist views as well as the criticisms from 1 thinkers or scholars who are under the impact of these views, in order 2 to revitalize themselves. In other words, the postmodern condition 3 demands that we use new vocabularies to retell old stories. 4 Second, how can Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought participate 5 in postmodern discourse? It is hard to imagine that Daoist and Chan 6 Buddhist thought could take part in postmodern discourse without 7 recontextualization and reinterpretation. On the other hand, the 8 revitalization of Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought could perhaps 9 be advanced through participation in postmodern discourse. These 40111 two sides of the task are thus dialectically interrelated. Without taking 1 up the first, the second would have no basis; in undertaking the 21111 second, the first would eventually be fulfilled. This relationship also folio 2 INTRODUCTION

1111 answers the question of whether Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought 2 should or could participate in postmodern discourse. As suggested 3 above, the context of reinterpretation of Daoist and Chan Buddhist 4 thought has been increasingly global. In fact, a presentation of Daoist 5111 and Chan Buddhist thought in a Western language such as English 6 cannot avoid using Western contemporary terms, ideas and concepts. 7 Furthermore, the possibility of Daoist and Chan Buddhist participa- 8 tion in postmodern discourse is based on the following observations: 9 (1) Postmodern discourse creates new opportunities for a redis- 10 covery of Daoist and Chan Buddhist traditions by renewing Western 11 interest in the flux and contingency of the world and human exis- 2 tence, in multiperspectivism, in non-dualistic approaches, in dialectic 3111 negation and other linguistic strategies, in the paradoxical and ironic, 4 etc., all of which have long been the foci of these two Eastern tradi- 5 tions. However, only when the West has begun to shift its focus, 6 yield to new directions and adopt new vocabularies, can it acquire 7 paradigms for understanding these Eastern traditions anew. 8 (2) Daoist and Chan Buddhist traditions do have something to 9 say, to offer. They have a long history and a rich legacy of dealing 20111 with issues postmodern thinkers have just begun to tackle. Therefore, 1 they can make unique contributions to postmodern discourse by 2 addressing those issues from Daoist and Chan Buddhist perspectives. 3 My entire project thus echoes the call of this twofold task. Whether 4 or not my treatise accomplishes the task will be left to reader’s 5 judgment. 6 7 Three related areas and a focus on the 8 use of language 9 30111 This book is a philosophical investigation of linguistic strategies in 1 Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism, specifically an investigation 2 of the otherness of language use in these two traditions. However, 3 the investigation is conducted in three areas or under three cate- 4 gories: deconstructive strategy, liminology of language, and indirect 5 communication. Different linguistic strategies or different uses of 6 language in philosophical and religious discourse have drawn 7 contemporary Western thinkers’ close attention and have entailed a 8 variety of new discussions. Among various conceptions, deconstruc- 9 tive strategy, liminology of language, and indirect communication 40111 have become three important categories for the study of linguistic 1 strategies. The exploration of these three areas has not only opened 21111 language possibilities for philosophical and religious discourse, but folio 3 INTRODUCTION

1111 has also helped to change the way of Western thinking. However, 2 although the probe of linguistic strategies in Western traditions has 3 been favored recently, very little has been done to investigate Eastern 4 traditions in these three areas. The distinctiveness of language use in 5111 the traditions of Daoism and Chan Buddhism has been generally 6 acknowledged by Western scholars, but it has not been closely exam- 7 ined in terms of the best contemporary theory and insight. 8 My investigation might be the first systematic attempt to take a 9 close look at the linguistic strategies of Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan 10 Buddhism and related issues. The work is divided into three parts, 11 each of which investigates one of these three areas. Each part has a 2 similar structure: the opening chapter discusses the definition of the 3111 category that is to be used in the ensuing chapters to investigate the 4 Zhuangzi and Chan. A second and third chapter pursue its relevant 5 investigation in the Zhuangzi and Chan. In addition to this main 6 body of work, the book also includes an introductory chapter and 7 concluding chapter for the whole investigation. 8 The first part investigates deconstructive strategies in the Zhuangzi 9 and Chan Buddhism. The central point of this investigation indicates 20111 how the use of deconstruction as a linguistic strategy is demanded 1 by soteriological/practical concerns and how its purpose or goal is 2 beyond linguistic or textual spheres, a characteristic that we do not 3 see in Derridean deconstruction. In chapter 2, based on an analysis 4 of the Derridean and other Western philosophers’ discussion on 5 deconstruction, I define deconstruction as a contextual strategy or a 6 situational operation of overturning oppositional hierarchies with 7 the characteristic of self-subverting. I argue that this definition can 8 be used to start the examination of deconstructive strategy in the 9 Zhuangzi and Chan without falling prey to generalization. While 30111 deconstructive strategy in the Zhuangzi and Chan bears a family 1 resemblance to Derridean deconstruction, it is a deconstruction in 2 the other context, or is the topology and alterity of deconstruction. 3 Examining the otherness of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and Chan 4 helps to explore deconstruction from these other perspectives and to 5 reflect upon Derridean deconstruction and contemporary Western 6 philosophy. For example, the Zhuangzi and Chan can shed light on 7 the issue of the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy, 8 between a philosophical theme and a deconstructive strategy, an 9 issue that contemporary Western philosophers are still debating. It 40111 also helps to rediscover and reinterpret the Zhuangzi and Chan. 1 In the preliminary remarks of chapter 3, I indicate that my 21111 investigation differs from the works of some other scholars in that folio 4 INTRODUCTION

1111 mine is not another comparison between Derrida and Zhuangzi, not 2 confined to Zhuangzi’s undoing of conceptual–linguistic hierarchies. 3 Nor does it focus merely on Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of Confu- 4 cianism and Moism. To show the distinctiveness of Zhuangzi’s 5111 deconstruction and the inner connection between his undertaking 6 and his strategy, I first investigate Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change 7 involving three areas: infinite transformations of things, things 8 transforming of themselves, and the dynamic interrelationship of 9 things. The philosophy and its soteriological motif – accommodat- 10 ing one’s mind to infinite changes of things – underlies his use of 11 deconstructive strategy, and his strategy serves this theme in an 2 illuminating way. In examining Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of self, I 3111 reveal that Zhuangzi’s teaching of “no-self” overturns the closure of 4 self, but at the same time eludes falling into its opposite – non-self – 5 while resting in the third category – “forgetting self.” Finally, I 6 explore how Zhuangzi performs a deconstructive operation on the 7 primitive Daoist notion of dao as one or as nonbeing. 8 Chapter 4 is a systematic examination and constructive interpre- 9 tation of Chan Buddhist thought concerning its attitude towards the 20111 notion of Buddha nature and its deconstructive strategy. Scholars 1 of Buddhism have long debated over the issue of Buddha nature. 2 Recently, it is again a central issue in the debate between Japanese 3 scholars of Critical Buddhism and other Buddhist scholars. This 4 chapter delves into the inner struggle between the reification and 5 deconstruction of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhist thought as a crit- 6 ical response to the recent critique of Chan Buddhism. The chapter 7 has three parts, the first of which analyzes how the notion of Buddha 8 nature evolved in the Indian tradition of tatha¯gatagarbha thought, iden- 9 tifies reifying and deconstructive tendencies within that tradition, and 30111 reveals how further deconstruction is called for. It is a basic situation 1 Chan Buddhists must face. Part two examines the deconstruction of 2 Buddha nature in The Platform Su¯tra. The target of Huineng’s decon- 3 structive operation is Shenxiu’s reification of “the pure mind.” 4 Special attention is given to the inner connection between Huineng’s 5 strategy and his soteriological theme – free flowing together with all 6 thoughts and things. His notion of no-thought thus opposes both the 7 absence of thought and the attachment to thought. The pragmatic/ 8 functional context of the Chinese term zixing (self nature) is also 9 clarified to dismiss any misunderstanding. Part three probes decon- 40111 struction in the school of Hongzhou Chan, a main target of which is 1 Shenhui’s reifying tendency. The Hongzhou notion of renyun 21111 (following along with the movement of all things and circumstances) folio 5 INTRODUCTION

1111 is particularly examined in relation to its strategy, including the use 2 of both kataphatic and apophatic language. 3 The second part of the book investigates liminology of language 4 in the Zhuangzi and Chan. Liminology is a new category which has 5111 recently appeared in Western philosophical discourse. My book is the 6 first work that investigates the Daoist and Chan Buddhist liminology 7 of language. In chapter 5, I utilize David Wood’s coinage liminology 8 to develop a new study of the limits of language and the strategies of 9 dealing with them. In terms of the discussions of contemporary 10 thinkers on these points, I formulate three major aspects of a limi- 11 nology of language. (1) Radical problematization of the limit or 2 boundary of language. (2) Insight into the mutual connection and 3111 transition between two sides of the boundary of language, between 4 speaking and non-speaking, etc. (3) Play at the limit or boundary of 5 language. These three aspects are three levels within the liminology 6 of language. The first, the experientio-analytic level, can lead to a 7 metaphysical or trans-metaphysical view of the limit of language. The 8 second level reflects a completely trans-metaphysical wisdom, while 9 the third is practical. The core of this liminology of language is to 20111 de-absolutize the limit of language, keeping it in a relational perspec- 1 tive and exploring novel linguistic strategies to negotiate the limit. All 2 three aspects are useful in understanding, reinterpreting or rediscov- 3 ering the Zhuangzi and Chan concerning their attitude towards the 4 limit of language and their linguistic strategies. 5 Chapter 6 takes a liminological approach to Zhuangzi’s view of 6 language and his strategy of “speaking non-speaking.” The contra- 7 diction between Zhuangzi’s seemingly negative attitude towards 8 language and his productive use of language is an age-old puzzle. 9 Modern scholars either repeat this puzzle or completely neglect it. 30111 My liminological approach attempts to solve this problem by first 1 analyzing all Zhuangzi’s claims about the inadequacy of language. A 2 careful reading and contextual analysis of these claims breaks the 3 myth of Zhuangzi’s complete negation of language. What appears as 4 a negative attitude towards language is always related to his rejection 5 of a conventional way of using language, which could be called 6 descriptive, entitative, or metaphysical. Zhuangzi instead always calls 7 for a different use of language. His notion of “speaking non-speaking” 8 shows his profound understanding of the mutual connection and 9 transition between speaking and non-speaking. Zhuangzi is a master 40111 of crossing the boundaries of language, a master of play at the limits 1 of language, who is quite consistent. “Speaking non-speaking” thus 21111 promotes a marginal speech rather than retreating into a silence. folio 6 INTRODUCTION

1111 In chapter 7, I point out that the Chan Buddhist claims of the inad- 2 equacy of language have their root in Indian Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism. 3 However, a close examination of the context of Indian Maha¯ya¯na 4 Buddhist claims shows that they actually point to the inadequacy of 5111 referential, or cognitive language in religious/soteriological practice. 6 My analysis reveals that the radical Chan emphasis on non-reliance 7 on words aims particularly at freeing Buddhists from the restriction 8 of the referential, entitative, or cognitive use of language. But Chan 9 Buddhists also make very clear the necessity or inevitability of using 10 language. The issue for them is not the abandonment of language 11 but how to use it differently. Since the Chan masters penetrate into 2 the non-dualistic relation between speech and silence, they demon- 3111 strate their profound understanding of the interplay between them. 4 As a result, they are more flexible, more skillful in using and creating 5 unconventional language that overcomes the limitation of conven- 6 tional language and best serves their soteriological practice. Their 7 strong objection to reliance on words and their creative use of words 8 are simply two sides of one coin. The chapter translates and presents 9 many textual materials from Chan recorded sayings to Western 20111 readers for the first time, concerning the Chan Buddhist notion of 1 relativizing the limits of language and other important views. These 2 materials and/or notions have long been neglected by modern 3 scholars both in the West and in the East. 4 The third part of this book investigates pragmatics of indirect 5 communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan. Chapter 8, on one 6 hand, surveys contemporary Western philosophers’ inquiries into the 7 indirect feature of communication and, on the other, re-examines 8 Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. Both inquiries 9 deviate from the classical notion of communication as a direct 30111 conveyance of information or knowledge. They allow the reposi- 1 tioning of indirect communication within philosophical discourse, 2 freeing it from the oppressive hierarchy of direct/indirect communi- 3 cation while paying more attention to various indirect strategies 4 of communication. Based on this survey, indirect communication 5 is defined as listener- or reader-oriented, and non-teleological; it 6 assumes an interactive relation between the speaker and the listener; 7 it abandons the correspondence theory of language; it is concerned 8 with the existentio-practical dimension of what is communicated; 9 it considers meaning open-ended and indeterminate; it adopts indi- 40111 rect language, such as metaphorical, poetic, paradoxical language. 1 Although Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist approaches are more 21111 analogous to Kierkegaard’s, Zhuangzi and Chan do share some folio 7 INTRODUCTION

1111 important views with contemporary philosophers on the indirection 2 of communication. 3 Chapter 9 contributes to the Zhuangzian pragmatics of “goblet 4 words,” words that accommodate themselves to endless changes. 5111 Zhuangzi’s soteriological/philosophical theme – accommodating 6 one’s mind to endless changes – underlies his use of “goblet words.” 7 The goal of communication for Zhuangzi is to awake such a state 8 of mind, which requires sharing and participation. The process of 9 communication is open-ended: it opens to each person’s situation and 10 each person must realize it by him- or herself. Thus “goblet words” 11 must be edifying, evocative, and different from direct, straightforward 2 words, which Zhuangzi last rejects. The chapter examines Zhuangzi’s 3111 manifesto of indirect communication as found in the last chapter of 4 the book Zhuangzi. One of the characteristics of Zhuangzian commu- 5 nication is that the determinate role of the author disappears in the 6 shifting and multiplying of meanings and viewpoints. The reader’s 7 active participation becomes central. There is no objective message to 8 be conveyed. Based on such an understanding of the structure of 9 communication, various strategies of “goblet words” are used by 20111 Zhuangzi, including denegation, paradox, and irony, as examined in 1 this chapter. 2 Chapter 10 studies the Chan pragmatics of “never tell too 3 plainly.” This study of Chan linguistic strategies is first a critique of 4 the modern orthodox interpretation of Chan, such as D. T. Suzuki’s, 5 that neglects the importance of linguistic strategies. In this regard the 6 study could be seen as a late follow-up to Hu Shi’s pioneering insight. 7 The chapter argues that Chan “transmission from mind to mind” 8 does not mean direct communication. Rather, it involves the rich 9 resources of indirect communication. First, we must grasp the non- 30111 dualistic and existentio-practical dimensions of Chan enlightenment 1 experience, which underlie all Chan communicative activities. In 2 terms of these dimensions, the experience, realization or resonance 3 of enlightenment is called communication. This long forgotten Chan 4 definition of communication is found in an appendix to the text 5 of Chan master Huangbo Xiyun’s recorded sayings, which helps 6 to explain why Chan Buddhists favor the strategy of “never tell too 7 plainly.” Since the primary goal is other sentient beings’ own enlight- 8 enment and the realization of enlightenment is situational, the master 9 cannot link his or her enlightenment directly with the students’ and 40111 has nothing to impose on them. The master must say something 1 to evoke, inspire or intrigue only. The listener must be creative, 21111 engaging and free to search out his or her own answer. This structure folio 8 INTRODUCTION

1111 determines the Chan preference for “living words.” Three types of 2 living words – paradoxical, tautological and poetic – are investigated 3 in detail in this chapter. 4 Chapter 11, the final chapter, briefly addresses three issues to 5111 conclude the whole investigation. First, I point out that the focus on 6 linguistic strategies in these two traditions should not be lost, despite 7 the fact that this investigation is at the same time the investigation of 8 many other things. It is important to note that linguistic strategy 9 never becomes a solely linguistic issue in these two traditions. It is 10 always demanded by, and is inseparable from, practical matters and 11 concerns. Second, although this book might become a starting point 2 for a closer comparison between Zhuangzi and Chan in these three 3111 areas, it is not a comparative study in its present form. My project is 4 to let Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists rediscover themselves and 5 address postmodern issues from their own perspectives. However, I 6 address two crucial aspects of difference between them concerning 7 these three areas, supplementing preceding discussions for those who 8 might be interested. Third, I stress that utilizing contemporary 9 insights to rediscover old traditions has been proven to be not only 20111 important but also fruitful if we have the right methodology. 1 Contemporary Western philosophy can certainly benefit from our 2 investigation of these three areas in the Zhuangzi and Chan. 3 One crucial point I would like to make and add to this introduc- 4 tion is the underlying or intrinsic connection among these three 5 areas. It is necessary to note that they are not put together arbitrarily. 6 The linguistic twisting and detouring of liminological play are, by 7 nature, indirect. Indirect communication is, therefore, intrinsic to 8 the liminology of language. Both liminological play and indirect 9 communication function deconstructively. Meanwhile, deconstruc- 30111 tive operation indispensably leads to trans-conventional uses of 1 language such as liminological play and indirect communication. 2 These interconnections will be clearer in the ensuing investigation. 3 It is quite obvious that the investigation of these three areas has one 4 focus, that is, the use of language. If there is one thread running 5 through the treatise, it is the study and exploration of different 6 linguistic strategies, of the otherness of language uses. Western philos- 7 ophy in this century has been marked by a “linguistic turn.” 8 Recently, Habermas and Rorty have talked about “the turn to prag- 9 matics” and the pragmaticization of linguistic analysis.6 Eastern 40111 philosophies and religions such as Daoism and Chan Buddhism 1 might have no need for similar reorientations since, from the very 21111 beginning, the issue of language has been a central theme in their folio 9 INTRODUCTION

1111 philosophical and religious discourses. The remarkable opening 2 paragraph of Laozi’s Dao De Jing is a well-known illustration of this 3 point. Furthermore, the long history of Daoist and Chan Buddhist 4 discourses on language has been characterized by a predominantly 5111 pragmatic concern with language use. This is not to say that the 6 Western turns are of no importance in recognition of Eastern tradi- 7 tions. On the contrary, they inspire us to investigate unique ways 8 of using language in the Zhuangzi and Chan and to rediscover their 9 significance. 10 11 A postmodern approach without 2 postmodernism 3111 4 The preceding discussion has partially indicated the methodology of 5 my project. One might think that I take a postmodern approach to 6 Zhuangzi’s and Chan Buddhist thought. However, I myself might 7 call it a postmodern approach without postmodernism. This needs 8 to be further explained as follows: 9 (1) In utilizing postmodern terms and concepts, I do not conceal 20111 the fact that the project is somehow in line with what constitutes the 1 main elements of postmodern discourse. These main elements are 2 beliefs or attitudes such as anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism, 3 anti-realism, a post-metaphysical or post-epistemological standpoint, 4 a rejection of correspondence theory of truth, knowledge, and 5 language, a rejection of meta-narratives, of ahistoricity, etc., that are 6 shared by different philosophical currents.7 Some similar, if not the 7 same, beliefs or attitudes were unmistakably held by the Zhuangzi and 8 Chan, although under the shadow of modern Western discourse they 9 were misconceived or misconstrued in one way or another. Hence, 30111 the postmodern approach here is meant to probe alternative inter- 1 pretations, or to disclose additional dimensions, of the Zhuangzi and 2 Chan. We perhaps have neglected these dimensions or interpreta- 3 tions under the influence of modern Western discourse. We can now 4 pursue this examination by using certain terms or vocabularies of 5 postmodern discourse in which the Zhuangzi and Chan may find new, 6 or better, means of expression in Western language. 7 (2) Obviously, by taking a postmodern approach, my book devi- 8 ates from various modern Western approaches. For example, in 9 investigating uses of Chinese language and Chinese philosophical 40111 views of language, it keeps a distance from structuralist approaches. 1 Structuralist approaches, such as a Chomskyan endeavor, attempt 21111 to establish a universal grammar or a deep linguistic structure “prior folio 10 INTRODUCTION

1111 to any linguistic experience,” thereby providing a framework for 2 theories and uses of language.8 Such an undertaking treated linguistic 3 analysis as a meta-science. Indeed, like finding a once-for-all solu- 4 tion, it sought, by theoretic abstraction, a contextless or changeless 5111 foundation at the price of concrete, dynamic features of language 6 use. I share the radical view with contemporary thinkers that there 7 is no nature of language outside concrete, contingent, dynamic uses 8 of language. 9 My study of the pragmatics of the Zhuangzi and Chan also differs 10 from Anglo-Saxon pragmatics, such as John Searle’s study of speech 11 acts. Although his account of illocutionary acts appears to be useful 2 to my project in certain aspects, Searle’s normalization of speech 3111 acts, his privileging of the speaker’s intention, dismissing “the fringy,” 4 centering on rules and saturated contexts, and so on, certainly 5 would not meet with my favor.9 I consider his approach and much 6 of Anglo-Saxon pragmatics another version of scientism as far as 7 their methodology is concerned. The problem reveals that not only 8 is “the linguistic turn” a continuation of Western metaphysical tradi- 9 tion, as Rorty has admitted,10 “the turn to pragmatics” also requires 20111 deconstruction. 1 My adoption of the term pragmatics is rather close to Deleuze’s or 2 Lyotard’s use of the term.11 It comprises a critique of Anglo-Saxon 3 pragmatics in the sense that neither intention nor conventional rules 4 can ensure a shared structure for all language use. The pragmatics 5 of the Zhuangzi and Chan, therefore, is one narrative among many, 6 a narrative without meta-. It attempts to delineate the linguistic strate- 7 gies of the Zhuangzi and Chan in their concrete, multi-factorial 8 complexities, without imposing any fixated structure on them. In this 9 light, it stands in sharp contrast to Chad Hansen’s approach to 30111 Chinese views of language and the whole of Chinese thought. My 1 contention here is not to define whether Hansen’s understanding of 2 the Chinese use of mass terms is correct or not. We need to pay atten- 3 tion to his methodology. As he acknowledged once, he was trained 4 by an analytic tradition which regarded philosophical analysis of 5 language as meta-science. He himself still follows that direction.12 6 This most explicitly reveals the root of his linguistic determinism – a 7 belief that a certain grammatical structure, in his case the mass noun 8 syntax, underlies various Chinese uses of language and the Chinese 9 way of thinking. It is a variation on the Chomskyan theme of scien- 40111 tism.13 Although an inquiry into the linkage between linguistic 1 features and language use is worthwhile, a holistic approach to 21111 language use is more fundamental and offers a better interpretation. folio 11 INTRODUCTION

1111 (3) A postmodern approach without postmodernism signifies, 2 moreover, the following two points. First, it does not subscribe to all 3 theories of postmodernism.14 In dealing with postmodernism, it 4 follows rather the principle of interpretation. That is to say, prag- 5111 matically, I select and adopt some terms, concepts, as interpretive 6 devices. If I favor some terms or concepts that are created by post- 7 modern thinkers, it is only because I can make use of them in 8 exploring alternative interpretations of the Zhuangzi and Chan. Put 9 it another way, for the purpose of interpreting the Zhuangzi and Chan, 10 I take something useful from postmodernism, although I do not 11 advocate all theories of postmodernism. In addition, I do not think 2 that postmodernism or even postmodern discourse can exhaust the 3111 Zhuangzi and Chan, despite the fact that it is useful to borrow vocab- 4 ularies from it for the development of alternative interpretations. 5 Second, the approach tends to avoid falling prey to the weaknesses 6 of postmodernism. It takes a critical stand towards postmodernsim 7 and keeps pace with the most recent tendencies in superseding post- 8 modernism. This attitude is also based on my belief that the Zhuangzi 9 and Chan are among those great traditions that provide us with 20111 resources for superseding postmodernism. Therefore, this interpre- 1 tation of the Zhuangzi and Chan proceed in such a way as to address, 2 and not simply be addressed by, the concerns of postmodern 3 discourse from a Daoist or Chan Buddhist point of view, as I 4 suggested earlier. 5 6 The continuity/discontinuity between 7 the linguistic strategies of the 8 Zhuangzi and Chan 9 30111 No one would deny the apparent fact that ideologically there is a 1 close relation and even intimacy between the Zhuangzi and Chan. 2 Reading the Zhuangzi helps us gain a deeper understanding of Chan, 3 and reading the Chan stories and instructions helps us become better 4 acquainted with Zhuangzi, as Kuang-ming Wu properly observed.15 5 However, what draws our attention and brings our discussions of the 6 Zhuangzi and Chan together here are their linguistic strategies, espe- 7 cially their deconstructive operation, liminological play, and indirect 8 communication. If we intend to pursue a fruitful study of these kinds 9 of linguistic strategy in the history of Chinese philosophy and reli- 40111 gious thought, we must turn to the Zhuangzi and Chan. Zhuangzi and 1 the Chan masters are, without question, the most outstanding and 21111 accomplished users of these strategies among all Daoist and Chinese folio 12 INTRODUCTION

1111 Buddhist schools. The employment of these strategies is part and 2 parcel of the legacy of Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist trans- 3 metaphysical and trans-conventional wisdom. In the history of 4 Chinese thought, “Confucian writings, in contrast, are generally 5111 prosaic, straightforward, and commonsensical.”16 The Confucian 6 strategy serves Confucian moral metaphysics and conventionalism, 7 despite the fact that Neo-Confucianism absorbs, more or less, Daoist 8 and Chan Buddhist strategies.17 Although a systematic investigation 9 of different strategies employed by different schools would be quite 10 helpful in understanding the entirety of Chinese philosophy, doing 11 so would be beyond the reach of this treatise. 2 By putting the Zhuangzi and Chan together, I do not jump to the 3111 simple conclusion that Zhuangzi is a pre-Chan master or that 4 the Chan masters are post-Zhuangzian Daoists. Rather, I center 5 on the linguistic strategies themselves, on the development of these 6 strategies, on similarity and difference, continuity and discontinuity, 7 between the strategies of the Zhuangzi and Chan. In my view, simi- 8 larity and difference, continuity and discontinuity, etc., are not only 9 two inseparable sides, they are also contingent upon how we look at 20111 things or relations. From the point of view of continuity, the Chan 1 linguistic strategy can be regarded as an echo of or an inheritance 2 from Zhuangzi. The Chan strategy does remind us of Zhuangzi in 3 many ways. No one can deny their similarities. As a matter of fact, 4 Zhuangzi influenced Chan in such a profound way that one cannot 5 imagine what the Chan linguistic strategy would be without 6 Zhuangzi’s imprint. However, from the point of view of disconti- 7 nuity, the Chan linguistic strategy is, after all, a synthesis of Buddhist 8 and Daoist teachings and strategies. In carrying into practice its 9 own mission, Chan Buddhism enriches and develops Zhuangzi’s 30111 strategy in an utterly Buddhist way. In this sense, the Chan masters 1 are definitely not post-Zhuangzian Daoists. The Zhuangzi and Chan 2 respectively make their own contributions to similar strategies. To 3 reveal this continuity of discontinuity, or the discontinuity of conti- 4 nuity, in the study of the linguistic strategies of the Zhuangzi and 5 Chan, is one of the purposes of this treatise. 6 7 Further methodological considerations 8 9 Redefining Western concepts or categories 40111 1 Since we cannot avoid using Western concepts or categories when 21111 presenting the Zhuangzi and Chan in a Western language such as folio 13 INTRODUCTION

1111 English, we must carefully redefine the concepts or categories we are 2 using if we are to avoid reading Western thought into the Zhuangzi 3 and Chan. We must make clear in what sense those concepts or cate- 4 gories are being used. In other words, we must redefine them in such 5111 a way that the underlying differences are fully discernible. As the 6 preceding discussions have shown, I attempt to define or redefine 7 those concepts or categories in terms of the contexts of the Zhuangzi 8 and Chan and our present context. The redefinition of each concept 9 or category used in the interpretation of classical texts is indeed an 10 integral part of a recontextualization. Such a redefinition might 11 involve something similar to what Gadamer called “the fusion of 2 horizons” of both the past and the present in a general under- 3111 standing. There is no formation of one horizon merely belonging to 4 the past or to the present.18 A Derridean thinker might question “the 5 fusion of horizons” by imputing it to a totalizing horizon. But is not 6 every formation of a new horizon based on a fusion of horizons, 7 although this new horizon is nonetheless a link within a chain of 8 incessant formations of new horizons? 9 “The fusion of horizons” thus legitimizes the necessity of taking 20111 into account the tradition that has historically come down to us 1 in an understanding or interpretation. From this point of view, 2 redefining Western concepts or categories, making them fit into 3 the contexts of the Zhuangzi and Chan, is an inseparable component 4 of our interpretation of the Zhuangzi and Chan. Technically, those 5 concepts or categories that cannot fit into the contexts of the Zhuangzi 6 and Chan have to be left out. On the other hand, if our redefinition 7 of Western concepts or categories cannot provide a basis for a 8 coherent analysis of the Zhuangzi and Chan, our interpretation would 9 probably fail. 30111 1 Dimensional analysis 2 3 The methodology of dimensional analysis is of great importance in 4 clarifying ancient thought such as is found in the Zhuangzi and Chan. 5 It is helpful in solving age-old puzzles or difficulties that are due to 6 being addressed by authors at very different levels. It is not only a 7 methodology, but is in a way related to so-called perspectivism. This 8 kind of perspectivism, or more exactly, multi-dimensional perspec- 9 tivism,19 remains an issue in postmodern discourse. From a Daoist or 40111 Chan Buddhist point of view, we might agree: “After metaphysics, 1 the nonobjective whole of a concrete lifeworld, which is now present 21111 only as horizon and background, evades the grasp of theoretical folio 14 INTRODUCTION

1111 objectification.”20 However, we might still argue that this non- 2 hypostatized dimension, horizon or background of the whole should 3 not be totally abandoned. Alas! Deconstructionism keeps questioning 4 the whole or the healthy.21 It is fair to say, however, that in his 5111 famous essay “Differance,” Derrida does mention the “unfolding of the 6 same as differance,” “the sameness of differance.”22 This view implies a 7 dimension of sameness or even wholeness. Yet Derrida and his 8 followers often privilege difference over identity, the divided over the 9 whole. Zhuangzi or a Chan master would probably ask Derridean 10 thinkers: if you appreciate perspectivism, why do you privilege the 11 dimension of difference over the dimension of wholeness? Zhuangzi 2 might be the earliest thinker to demonstrate a multi-dimensional 3111 perspectivism without privileging any single dimension, a perspec- 4 tivism which allows for, among others, a dimension of wholeness 5 without hypostatization.23 Multi-dimensional perspectivism is also 6 demonstrated by the Tiantai Buddhist school’s three-dimensional 7 truth, the Huayan Buddhist school’s four-dimensional dharma 8 realm and Chan Buddhist discourse. The application of dimensional 9 analysis embedded in an understanding of multi-dimensional pers- 20111 pectivism is, it appears to me, an indispensable approach to 1 Zhuangzi’s and Chan Buddhist discourses themselves. 2 3 4 Textual studies 5 Even though this treatise relies heavily on my own reflections on 6 deconstructive strategy, liminology of language and pragmatics of 7 indirect communication, textual studies must be an essential part 8 of the project. The reason is that a reinterpretation of the Zhuangzi 9 and Chan is first of all an investigation of the texts of the Zhuangzi and 30111 Chan. Those who believe, under the impact of deconstructionism 1 or postmodernism, that they can easily label something, for example 2 a Daoist text, as “logocentrism” without justification on textual 3 grounds, are naive. Deconstructionism or postmodernism has pro- 4 duced an ironic phenomenon. On the one hand, deconstructionism 5 or postmodernism has radically blurred the traditional distinction 6 between philosophy and literature, philosophical criticism and 7 textual criticism. Deconstruction has largely become a strategy of 8 reading or rereading texts. Philosophical criticism has gotten more 9 involved with text-reading because of deconstructionism. On the 40111 other hand, postmodernism or deconstructionism has nurtured 1 the tendency to dismiss or ignore the necessity of legitimation, includ- 21111 ing that of text-critical justification.24 What I discern from this folio 15 INTRODUCTION

1111 phenomenon is an unnoticed dialectic. A hermeneutician, no matter 2 how radical he or she is, cannot succeed without engaging in a care- 3 ful reading of particular texts. One has to become familiar with a 4 text before one can defamiliarize it. For this reason, I must secure my 5111 reinterpretation of the Zhuangzi and Chan on a firm textual ground. 6 My treatise will include, as much as possible, a re-examination of the 7 great exegetic tradition of the Zhuangzi, an assimilation of Japanese 8 scholars’ exegetic works on Chan, and etymological explorations. 9 A seemingly trivial study of etymology might turn out to be the 10 source of a philosophical insight or shed light on a new understand- 11 ing of topics. 2 3111 Comparative studies 4 5 The last point I would like to make concerning my methodology is 6 that the aim of this treatise is not comparative philosophy, although 7 it involves comparative studies. It attempts to transcend the limit of 8 mere comparison while taking up comparative studies. In other 9 words, it will not make comparison for the sake of comparison itself. 20111 As stated above, my major goal is to investigate the Zhuangzi and 1 Chan, probing the possibilities of Daoist and Chan Buddhist perspec- 2 tives with respect to postmodern discourse. In the encounter between 3 Eastern and Western ideas, comparison is both unavoidable and 4 mandatory. Nevertheless, the ground of my discussion is to be found 5 in the Eastern tradition of the Zhuangzi and Chan. This awareness 6 of our own ground or our own tradition can only benefit us, just as 7 Rorty’s awareness of his American pragmatist ground does not 8 hinder him from participating in postmodern discourse, and is neces- 9 sary in voicing our own opinions within the pluralism of postmodern 30111 discourse. If an Eastern critique of Western discourse, of which the 1 Kyoto school is among the famous precursors, remains possible and 2 renewable, I hope my treatise will somehow contribute to it. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 16 1111 2 3 4 5111 Part I 6 7 8 9 DECONSTRUCTION IN 10 11 THE ZHUANGZI AND 2 3111 IN CHAN BUDDHISM 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 2 4 5111 UNDERSTANDING 6 7 DECONSTRUCTION 8 THROUGH THE ZHUANGZI 9 10 AND CHAN 11 2 3111 4 5 Much ink has been spilt over the topic of deconstruction. Now it is 6 commonly recognized that deconstruction or deconstructive strategy 7 used or exemplified by Derrida is intended to dismantle all totalizing 8 attempts to establish a closed conceptual system for all theorizing 9 and truth-claims. It is to subvert any maintaining of an originary foun- 20111 dation for the link of language and the world and any final vocabu- 1 lary for presenting such a view. However, although three decades 2 have passed after Derrida’s first attack on Saussurean structuralism 3 and Husserlian phenomenology, the philosophical scene around 4 deconstruction continues to draw our attention. On the one hand, we 5 see the unceasing articulation of high expectations and strong desires 6 for “going beyond deconstruction.” This articulation is based on the 7 criticism of deconstruction as non-philosophy, as lack of constructive- 8 ness, as the narrowing down of the sphere of philosophy, and so forth. 9 On the other hand, we witness that Derrida is still going strong – 30111 to borrow Rorty’s words uttered in 1991.1 Derrida has become more 1 articulate in addressing ethical, political, and religious issues and in 2 applying deconstructive operations to these areas. His recent works 3 continue to be thought-provoking and have acquired wide attention. 4 We also observe that the impact of deconstruction has spread from 5 literary criticism and philosophy to religious thought, from the 6 humanities to various social sciences. It has given rise to numerous 7 new studies, new examinations and new discussions. All these facts 8 indicate that what Christopher Norris calls “the deconstructive 9 turn” might be much broader, and more profound, than we have 40111 acknowledged.2 1 Perhaps the very idea of “going beyond deconstruction” could be 21111 both right and wrong. It could be right to say that deconstruction folio 19 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 will eventually have had its day, if this means that deconstruction will 2 not dominate our intellectual arena forever. The philosophical scene 3 will move on, once the deconstructive turn runs its course, once 4 deconstructive operations become an integral part of our philosoph- 5111 ical tradition. In this sense “going beyond deconstruction” will 6 be somewhat like Hegel’s aufheben. However, it would be wrong to 7 think that we should turn our back on deconstruction in order to 8 move forward. David Wood has correctly pointed out that going 9 beyond deconstruction should not be understood as “going round 10 deconstruction, as one might take a detour round a traffic accident.”3 11 In my understanding, something beyond deconstruction must grow 2 out of deconstruction. It must be so, if we assume that decon- 3111 struction “is based on a move which can be constructed within 4 philosophical discourse, and that once this has happened, there is no 5 going back.”4 There is no way to simply supersede deconstruction 6 from the outside, just as deconstruction has not fallen from the sky 7 but is a continuation of the critique of Western metaphysics from 8 within. The view that deconstruction is not only interruptive but 9 also continuous with the philosophical tradition of Kant, Hegel, 20111 Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger is clearly revealed 1 by many recent studies.5 The source of deconstruction is affirmed 2 as well by the discovery of the strategic link between deconstruction 3 and negative theology. Of similar significance is the strategic com- 4 patibility between deconstruction and Eastern religio-philosophical 5 discourses such as Daoism and Buddhism, as explored by some 6 scholars. This compatibility plainly shows the topology and alterity 7 of deconstruction. 8 So much so, as indicated in the above discussion, that a further 9 study of deconstruction, particularly like the present one, would have 30111 to face a sharp question: “What are you going to add to this reper- 1 toire?” My general answer will be twofold. First, to understand 2 deconstruction through the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism. Second, 3 this understanding of deconstruction through the Zhuangzi and Chan 4 Buddhism will also be an attempt to understand the Zhuangzi and 5 Chan Buddhism through deconstruction. This interweaving or inter- 6 relationship will unfold in the following elucidation of the theme. 7 However, before we move on, it is necessary to clarify our concept 8 or definition of deconstruction. 9 This leads us to a difficult task. As Christopher Norris has noticed, 40111 any attempt to define deconstruction must soon run up against the 1 obstacles that Derrida has shrewdly placed in its path.6 For example, 21111 Derrida has claimed that deconstruction is neither an analysis nor folio 20 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION

1111 a critique. It “is not a method,” “not even an act or an operation.”7 2 Similarly, differance “is neither a word nor a concept.”8 We may have 3 reason to conclude that Derrida prefers defining deconstruction in a 4 negative manner, namely, in terms of what deconstruction is not. But 5111 Derrida also drives this negativity home. If deconstruction is not . . . , 6 it is not anything. Therefore, if the question – “What is deconstruc- 7 tion?” – is to be imposed, Derrida must say that it is “nothing.”9 8 A main purpose of this negative strategy is of course to avoid, if he 9 possibly can, presenting deconstruction as a generalized idea assumed 10 to comprehend all differences in its local application. It opposes any 11 attempt “to reduce deconstruction to a concept definable in terms 2 of method or technique.”10 Derrida himself makes this even 3111 more explicit: “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X’ or 4 ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point.”11 5 My understanding of Derrida’s point is that deconstruction, as a 6 provisional name, designates a singular event of overturning. In 7 this event, any hierarchical system of thought must inevitably be 8 reinscribed within a different order of textual signification. Decon- 9 struction, in this sense, is always detailed, contextual, specific, and 20111 differential. Once it sediments or is generalized into a concept, it 1 must be deconstructed as well. Since the name deconstruction, even 2 when presented in the negative form “is not,” is inscribed in the 3 language of predication, it is deconstructible. 4 Derrida’s situation becomes one in which, on the one hand, he 5 must use the language of predication; on the other hand, he must 6 constantly deconstruct it even if he uses the name of deconstruction. 7 This is the way that Derrida keeps himself both inside and outside. 8 In his own words, he stays “neither inside nor outside.” He explains 9 it as follows: 30111 1 In a certain sense it is true to say that “deconstruction” 2 is still in metaphysics. But we must remember that if we 3 are indeed inside metaphysics, we are not inside it as we 4 might be inside a box or a milieu. We are still in metaphysics 5 in the special sense that we are in a determinate language. 6 . . . Accordingly, we cannot really say that we are “locked 7 into” or “condemned to” metaphysics, for we are, strictly 8 speaking, neither inside nor outside.12 9 40111 Deconstruction is thus on the threshold. It functions and inscribes 1 itself inside predicative language and at the same time opens and 21111 points to the outside. It connects the inside with the outside. folio 21 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Derrida acknowledges that while his deconstruction puts aside all 2 the traditional philosophical concepts, it reaffirms “the necessity of 3 returning to them, at least under erasure.”13 Elsewhere he mentions, 4 as he always insists, that one must always, economically and strate- 5111 gically, borrow the syntactic and lexical resources of the language 6 of metaphysics at the very moment that one deconstructs this 7 language.14 Derrida, obviously, does not believe in any decisive 8 ruptures, any unequivocal breaks, with the tradition of Western 9 metaphysics. “Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old 10 cloth that must continually, interminably be undone.”15 11 These statements indicate, it seems to me, two fundamental 2 elements in Derrida’s deconstruction. First, the recognition of the 3111 necessity and inevitability of using or borrowing predicative, referen- 4 tial, metaphysical language. Second, the different, transformative 5 way of using or borrowing this language. These two intermingled ele- 6 ments determine that there will always be a risk in this special using 7 or borrowing of predicative, metaphysical language, a risk of being 8 reappropriated by oppositional conceptualization. It is true that 9 deconstruction attempts to make reappropriation difficult by mark- 20111 ing “intervals,”16 but these intervals do not warrant the impossibility 1 of reappropriation. They only anticipate continuous deconstruction. 2 To realize this as being risky and precarious is to realize the 3 profound contingency and flux underlying all philosophical dis- 4 courses. This recognition can bring about two consequences signifi- 5 cant to our present discussion. First, in its negative aspect, since the 6 discourse of what deconstruction is not runs, nonetheless, the risk of being 7 reappropriated, it has no ultimate superiority over the discourse of 8 what deconstruction is. This point is also supported by the fact that 9 every discourse of what is not presupposes, implies, and inherently 30111 involves its other – the discourse of what is. Second, in its positive 1 aspect, the necessary repetition or return of predicative language 2 opens the possibilities of its different use. “Under erasure” is one 3 alternative, one possibility (if it means negative); “under restriction” 4 might be another possibility (if it means positive). In fact, Derrida 5 himself has defined deconstruction positively as “a kind of general 6 strategy,” or “a double gesture.”17 This general strategy includes 7 two basic phases according to him. First, it “must traverse a phase of 8 overturning.”18 “To deconstruct the opposition . . . is to overturn 9 the hierarchy at a given moment.”19 Second, it “must also mark the 40111 interval between inversion . . . and the irruptive emergence of a new 1 ‘concept,’ a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, 21111 included in the previous regime.”20 Elsewhere Derrida also identifies folio 22 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION

1111 deconstruction with “critical operation,”21 “internal critique,”22 and 2 so forth.23 3 The problem then becomes why Derrida switches from this posi- 4 tive manner to that negative manner, if we do not simply follow 5111 Rorty’s conclusion that the early Derrida is still somewhat on the 6 wrong track.24 John Caputo’s interpretation may provide a better 7 hint for solving this problem. Caputo thinks that differance, at least the 8 first three or four times Derrida used it, is not a word or a concept; 9 after that it increasingly becomes a familiar word and a generalized 10 concept. “But at least the first couple of times he uses you see 11 what he is up to, what he is pointing to. Once it sediments and 2 becomes part of the established vocabulary of ‘deconstruction,’ he 3111 has to move on and try it another way.”25 Although Caputo here is 4 referring to the stylistic change between Derrida’s early writings and 5 his later writings, this interpretation fits, too, the strategic shift in 6 Derrida’s defining of deconstruction. This interpretation suggests 7 that Derrida’s strategies for defining deconstruction are completely 8 contextual, situational, and pragmatic. The different contexts and 9 situations demand different strategies. We must not understand 20111 this differentiation as merely external. It is at the same time internal. 1 The internality lies in that either what deconstruction is or what 2 deconstruction is not is always inscribed “in a chain of possible substi- 3 tutions” and is determined by its other.26 4 Now let me demonstrate by an analysis how Derrida’s account of 5 what deconstruction is not could be substituted by an account of what 6 deconstruction is without losing proximity to what he means. For 7 instance, when Derrida clarifies the statement “deconstruction is not 8 an analysis,” he points out: “[T]he dismantling of a structure is 9 not a regression toward a simple element, toward an indissoluble origin. 30111 These values . . . are themselves philosophemes subject to decon- 1 struction.”27 In other words, deconstruction is not an analysis that 2 inquires into a final factor or an indivisible source of any system of 3 thought. This implies that deconstruction can be a kind of analysis 4 aiming at subverting all oppositional hierarchies and showing the 5 baselessness of these hierarchies. When Derrida discusses his notion 6 that deconstruction is not even an operation, he explicates: “[I]t does 7 not return to an individual or collective subject who would take the 8 initiative and apply it to an object.”28 “[I]t is an event that does not 9 await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject. 40111 ... It deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed.”29 1 This emphasizes that first, deconstruction is not context-free. It 21111 cannot be reduced to a simple method, a set of rules or procedures folio 23 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 applicable to every text, every theme, every situation. Second, there 2 is no determining subject able to escape from deconstruction. The 3 deconstruction that a subject employs is itself deconstructible. This 4 implies that deconstruction can be a contextual strategy or a situa- 5111 tional operation of overturning that carries at the same time a trace of 6 self-subverting. Thus deconstruction can be defined, in positive terms, 7 as analysis, critique, operation, or event, under certain restrictions. 8 Putting all these discussions together, it now seems legitimate 9 to claim what deconstruction is. It is a contextual strategy or a situational 10 operation of overturning oppositional hierarchies with the characteristic of self- 11 subverting.30 This is the definition of deconstruction from which I will 2 start to examine deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and in Chan 3111 Buddhism. One may object: “Isn’t it inappropriate to apply the 4 concept of deconstruction to the different traditions of the Zhuangzi 5 and Chan Buddhism, if you accept that deconstruction should not 6 be a generalized concept?” Our reply is that although our definition 7 of deconstruction runs the risk of generalization, we have imposed 8 some restrictions on it. In other words, we admit that there is a kind 9 of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and in Chan Buddhism, but this 20111 deconstruction is contextual and different. 1 We could justify our position by appealing to Wittgenstein’s notion 2 of family resemblance. There are strategic similarities between 3 Derridean deconstruction and the traditions of the Zhuangzi and 4 Chan Buddhism. Deconstruction in the traditions of the Zhuangzi 5 and Chan Buddhism bears, therefore, a family resemblance to 6 Derridean deconstruction. We maintain this family resemblance 7 as far as their strategies are concerned. On the other hand, we 8 could insist that deconstruction in the traditions of the Zhuangzi 9 and Chan Buddhism is deconstruction in the other context, or, is the 30111 other deconstruction – to use Derridean terminology. It is the topol- 1 ogy and alterity of deconstruction. It is the same of non-identity. 2 Obviously, our study of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and in 3 Chan Buddhism is not intended simply to find out Chinese precur- 4 sors for Derridean deconstruction, nor to produce a Chinese version 5 of Derridean thought. We have no intention of putting the mantle of 6 Chinese thought on Derridean deconstruction. That would be not 7 only meaningless, but also ridiculous. Our investigation of decon- 8 struction in these two traditions, on the contrary, will be conducive 9 to reflection upon Derridean deconstruction itself. The intention is 40111 to see and to understand deconstruction through other eyes and other 1 minds, to explore deconstruction from other perspectives. Let me use 21111 an example to illustrate this point. folio 24 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Controversies about the nature of Derrida’s work have been on- 2 going. On the one hand, Christopher Norris and Rodolphe Gasche 3 have argued that Derrida’s work is a genuinely philosophical inquiry. 4 It continues the tradition of modern Western philosophy, taking 5111 seriously the standard rules of philosophy, making philosophical 6 arguments, and doing philosophical critiques. Norris even writes: 7 Derrida’s arguments, “amount to a form of Kantian transcendental 8 deduction. . . . [T]hey pose the question: what must be the necessary 9 presuppositions of our thinking about language if language is to make 10 any kind of coherent or intelligible sense?”31 Gasche asserts: “Derrida 11 is primarily engaged in a debate with the main philosophical ques- 2 tion regarding the ultimate foundation of what is.”32 This interpreta- 3111 tion conveys a partial truth, since it bases itself solely on the fact 4 that Derrida does have a philosophical theory or a philosophical 5 thesis, as others have maintained.33 Despite this, it polarizes its claim 6 – the continuity of Derrida’s thought with the well-established 7 tradition of Western philosophy – so conspicuously as to jeopardize 8 the originality of Derrida’s work.34 It entails Rorty’s question: “Is 9 Derrida a transcendental philosopher?” 20111 Rorty, on the other hand, attempts to dismiss this aspect of 1 searching for the transcendental conditions of possibility of lan- 2 guage in Derrida. Rorty thinks that if this aspect really exists as 3 Norris and Gasche have portrayed it, it is a mistake made by the 4 early Derrida. But, thankfully, Derrida has moved away from this 5 wrong direction, from the standard rules of philosophy.35 Rorty rests 6 this argument mainly upon his reading of Derrida’s later, more 7 playful writings. Rorty’s view may also, it seems to me, be supported, 8 to a certain degree, by Derrida’s own claim that deconstruction 9 attempts to find a non-philosophical site “from which to question 30111 philosophy.”36 1 My purpose here is not to pursue a close examination of Derrida’s 2 writings or to define more accurately the nature of Derrida’s work, 3 which would be beyond the scope of this study. I want to draw atten- 4 tion first to the point that the polarization in defining the meaning 5 of Derrida’s contribution may well mirror the domination of oppo- 6 sitional thinking even over those who are sympathetic to Derrida. 7 Deconstruction is presented by them either as standard philosophy 8 or as non-philosophy, as complete continuity or as radical disruption, 9 and so forth. Peter Dews, in addressing the difficulty of seeing decon- 40111 struction as both a continuation of the tradition and a radical break 1 with the tradition, raises a question: can you both have your cake 21111 and eat it?37 Although I am not engaging myself in a debate with folio 25 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Dews, my comment on Dews’ question would probably be: Why not? 2 Why should we not have both or neither? 3 John Caputo, on the other hand, has tried to mediate between 4 these opposing views. His attempt is worth mentioning for our 5111 discussion. Caputo, if I understand him correctly, argues that 6 Derrida is very close to the edge of transcendental philosophy, insofar 7 as he addresses the conditions of the possibility of speaking and 8 writing by the notion of archi-writing or differance. But this being 9 almost transcendental or quasi-transcendental is a “broken, split 10 transcendental.”38 Derrida’s quasi-theory “is a theory which says 11 that you cannot have a theory in a strong sense, without the 2 ‘quasi’.”39 For Derrida believes that sooner or later the differential 3111 play in what your theory is trying to stick together will make it come 4 undone. That goes for differance, for archi-writing, for deconstruction, 5 too. Therefore, Derrida is a philosopher, a certain kind of philoso- 6 pher. But “Derrida is also not a philosopher, not a transcendental 7 philosopher.”40 What constitutes Derrida’s “transcendental” motif is 8 precisely this marginality, this non-positionality of being inside/ 9 outside. In other words, Derrida borrows transcendental argument 20111 to perform the deconstruction of philosophy, including the decon- 1 struction of transcendental philosophy. 2 Caputo’s interpretation indicates that the debate about the nature 3 of Derrida’s work involves how one should understand the relation- 4 ship between philosophical inquiry and deconstructive strategy, 5 especially the strategy of self-erasing. It involves as well how one 6 should understand the relationship between philosophy and non- 7 philosophy, continuity and discontinuity, and so forth. Caputo’s 8 discussion at the same time raises, it seems to me, the following ques- 9 tions: Do philosophy and deconstruction absolutely conflict with each 30111 other? Must we choose only one of them? Why should we not both 1 have our cake and eat it? 2 Joseph Margolis also has pointed out: deconstruction “serves 3 Derrida’s philosophical purpose.”41 “Deconstruction does not pre- 4 clude philosophy: it serves it by non-philosophical means.”42 This 5 view, along with Caputo’s,43 suggests to me that philosophy and 6 non-philosophy, inquiry and deconstruction, continuity and discon- 7 tinuity, could both be integral elements of one project. They could 8 be inseparable, indispensable to each other. Moreover, one may ask 9 that if deconstruction serves philosophy, if it forcefully questions 40111 philosophy from the other side of philosophy, can we ultimately 1 justify saying that they are completely disjunctive? Can we justify 21111 saying that they do not involve each other, nor rely on each other? folio 26 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION

1111 The question could also be: why cannot an undertaking be both 2 philosophy and non-philosophy or be neither? Does not the polar- 3 ization in understanding the relation of philosophy and deconstruc- 4 tion mirror, nonetheless, the clinging to oppositional thinking in 5111 Western philosophy? 6 It is here that our investigation of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi 7 and Chan Buddhism will be particularly instructive, although the 8 meaning of this investigation will not be confined to this aspect. 9 Zhuangzi’s thought and Chan Buddhist thought are typical of both 10 philosophy and non-philosophy, or better, of neither philosophy nor 11 non-philosophy. Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhist thinkers are well 2 known for their attempt to overturn every binary distinction and for 3111 their use of the strategy of self-cancellation or self-erasure. They 4 present a kind of therapeutic philosophy. While being critical, this 5 philosophy does not avoid addressing the relational understanding of 6 the structure of the world in which human beings exist. However, 7 their strategies of self-cancellation interrupt the fixation on any philo- 8 sophical theory, doctrine, or method. 9 This philosophy/non-philosophy serves their soteriological prac- 20111 tices – to be awakened to dao or to realize Chan Buddhist 1 enlightenment. In other words, the deconstructive strategy not only 2 serves their therapeutic philosophies. Both philosophy and decon- 3 struction serve their soteriological practices. From their perspective 4 of ultimate liberation, everything, including philosophy, can and 5 must be transcended. Even the perspective of ultimate liberation itself 6 can be deconstructed. Therefore, if you think Zhuangzi is a philoso- 7 pher or is doing philosophy, Zhuangzi would laugh at you. If you 8 believe that the Chan masters just cancel out everything, you would 9 probably get hit by their sticks. This way of non-attachment enables 30111 Zhuangzi and the Chan masters to open their minds to endless 1 philosophies and endless deconstructions. They would not see any 2 necessity to put philosophy and deconstruction in complete opposi- 3 tion. As a matter of fact, philosophy and deconstruction are 4 inseparable in their discourse. They function holistically. This 5 demonstrates that the investigation of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi 6 and Chan Buddhism may provide inspiration and insight for our 7 contemporary philosophical discourse. 8 As I stated earlier, our task is twofold. In addition to our effort to 9 understand deconstruction through the other eyes of the Zhuangzi and 40111 Chan Buddhism, this investigation will allow us to see the Zhuangzi 1 and Chan Buddhism anew. It will allow us to use new vocabularies 21111 to tell the old stories for contemporary audiences. More than that, it folio 27 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 will throw new light on our understanding of these two traditions. 2 David Loy has correctly observed that 3 4 Buddhism includes a strong ontotheological element, yet it 5111 also contains the resources that have repeatedly decon- 6 structed this tendency. Thanks to sensitivities that Derrida’s 7 texts have helped to develop, it is possible to understand the 8 Buddhist tradition as a history of this struggle between 9 deconstructive delimitation and metaphysical reappropria- 10 tion, between a message that undermines all security by 11 undermining the sense-of-self that seeks security, and a 2 countervailing tendency to dogmatize and institutionalize 3111 that challenge.44 4 5 The same holds true for Chan Buddhism and Daoism. Rather than 6 simply putting one label of logocentrism on a whole tradition, as 7 Magliola once did,45 Loy’s view allows us to see each tradition as an 8 ever-renewing process of inner struggles between the sedimentation 9 of its vocabularies and their deconstruction. It urges us to undertake 20111 more analysis within each tradition. Thus the history of Chan 1 Buddhist thought, in large part, can be viewed as a history of the 2 struggle between the metaphysical appropriations of such soteriolog- 3 ical–functional terms as Buddha nature or Buddha mind and their 4 deconstruction. Many movements in the history of Chan Buddhist 5 thought can be reviewed in this light and acquire new meanings. By 6 the same token, the Zhuangzi can be regarded not only as the criti- 7 cism of other traditions, such as Confucianism and Moism, but also 8 as the deconstruction of the metaphysical appropriation of dao within 9 its own tradition – Daoism. The continuity and discontinuity of 30111 Zhuangzi’s thought with that of Laozi and that of primitive Daoists 1 then can be better understood in terms of the deconstructive opera- 2 tion that Zhuangzi performed on them. 3 When I use the term metaphysical appropriation, I use it in a broad 4 sense. In other words, there is no exact counterpart to Western meta- 5 physics in the traditions to which we are referring. Therefore, I use 6 it in the sense of being almost metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical. 7 It denotes the move from a soteriological–pragmatic employment 8 of words to an ontological understanding of words based on an 9 oppositional or binary conceptualization. My ensuing investigation 40111 will carry out this contextual difference, making it clear as this term 1 is applied. 21111 folio 28 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION

1111 An important contextual difference between Derridean decon- 2 struction and Zhuangzi’s and Chan Buddhist deconstruction is that 3 the latter does not start its deconstructive project with subverting an 4 intralinguistic structure. To be fair to Derrida, we must say that 5111 although Derrida starts with a theory of language, with the over- 6 turning of an intralinguistic structure, he reaches out toward 7 something beyond the merely linguistic. Derrida’s deconstruction has 8 profound ethical and social–political implications, as contemporary 9 thinkers now have increasingly recognized.46 However, we must also 10 acknowledge that what characterizes Derrida’s enterprise, to a large 11 extent, is nonetheless a rereading of philosophical texts. It seldom 2 directly addresses the problems within our life and practice. 3111 It is at this point that the uniqueness of Zhuangzi’s and Chan 4 Buddhist deconstruction comes to light. Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists 5 consider that the self-identity of the human subject is the root for the 6 pursuit of self-identity in all things, words, or meanings. They, there- 7 fore, concern themselves primarily with existentio-practical transfor- 8 mation or liberation from any egocentric appropriation, with how one 9 should become a selfless person, a “true person.” In other words, 20111 deconstruction in these traditions is first and foremost the deconstruc- 1 tion of self. It is in this sense that we may say that their critique of logo- 2 centrism always pertains to their critique of egocentrism.47 Although 3 they subvert all conceptual hierarchies in such a radical way that even 4 Derridean philosophers may be amazed, their deconstruction always 5 serves the purpose of soteriological practice. Thus the starting point 6 and goal of their deconstruction are always beyond linguistic and tex- 7 tual spheres. As a consequence, the deconstructive operation in the 8 Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism is never restricted to merely rereading 9 of texts. This otherness of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and Chan 30111 may also pave the way for a possible critique of Derridean decon- 1 struction from a Daoist or Chan Buddhist point of view. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 29 1111 2 3 3 4 5111 ZHUANGZI’S DAO 6 7 DECONSTRUCTS . . . 8 AND ZHUANGZI 9 10 DECONSTRUCTS HIS DAO 11 2 3111 4 5 Preliminary remarks 6 7 Despite Magliola’s claim that Daoism is logocentric, scholars such as 8 Michelle Yeh, Chi-Hui Chien, and Wayne D. Ownes have done a 9 serious and good job of recognizing a similar strategy of deconstruc- 20111 tion in the Zhuangzi.1 They draw our attention to the possibility 1 of contemporary rediscoveries or reinterpretations of the Zhuangzi. 2 The ensuing discussion of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi might be 3 regarded as a follow-up to their precursory works. However, my 4 study will be different from, and also complementary to, theirs in 5 three main aspects. 6 First, these previous works inquire into the deconstructive opera- 7 tion of the Zhuangzi mainly by demonstrating the parallels between 8 Derrida’s notion of differance or trace and Zhuangzi’s notion of dao, 9 between Derridean strategy and Zhuangzi’s. They take a compara- 30111 tive approach between Derrida and Zhuangzi, which has the vantage 1 point of revealing the striking similarities between the two undertak- 2 ings. When deconstructive strategy had not yet been commonly 3 established as a new paradigm for rediscovering other traditions, this 4 approach had the merit of calling attentions. However, the weakness 5 of mainly drawing parallels is that it may neglect or insufficiently 6 explicate the unique characteristics of Zhuangzi’s deconstructive 7 operation. Since both our understanding of deconstructive strategy 8 and that of Zhuangzi’s thought are, generally speaking, more 9 advanced, it is possible for us to do something more than mere com- 40111 parisons, to probe more systematically the otherness of Zhuangzi’s 1 deconstruction. Therefore, this chapter will not take the form of yet 21111 another comparison between Derrida and Zhuangzi (even though it folio 30 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 cannot avoid comparison at certain points). Rather, it will use rede- 2 fined terms or concepts to examine more closely the different context 3 anddifferentcharacteristicsofZhuangzi’sdeconstruction, to find inter- 4 nal connections between Zhuangzi’s undertaking and his strategy. 5111 Second, to show similarities between Derrida and Zhuangzi, most 6 of the previous works focus on Zhuangzi’s undoing of conceptual– 7 linguistic hierarchies, on his deconstruction of the self-identity of 8 any word sign. This approach does make a contribution to our 9 understanding of Zhuangzi, since Zhuangzi’s thought does involve 10 this important aspect. However, this aspect is only a part of what 11 Zhuangzi deconstructs through his project. Zhuangzi’s soteriological 2 or therapeutic philosophy is concerned primarily with the existentio- 3111 spiritual transformation of personhood. For this reason Zhuangzi’s 4 deconstruction of conceptual–linguistic hierarchies is always related 5 to, becomes a part of, and serves the deconstruction of the self- 6 identity of the human subject. In other words, the deconstruction of 7 egocentrism is the goal of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of logocentrism. 8 This indicates the uniqueness of Zhuangzi’s deconstructive opera- 9 tion. Wayne D. Ownes, in his comparative study of Derrida and 20111 Zhuangzi, has paid more attention to this existential–transforma- 1 tional feature of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction. My study will go further 2 to reveal how Zhuangzi subverts the notion of self and self-existence, 3 and how Zhuangzi’s notion of “forgetting self” eludes the binary 4 distinction of self/non-self. It also will reveal how Zhuangzi closely 5 relates his deconstruction of the self-identity of things and words with 6 his deconstruction of the self-identity of the human subject. 7 Third, the previous works on Zhuangzi’s deconstruction have 8 noticed Zhuangzi’s overturning of conceptual hierarchies or binary 9 distinctions, such as those of Confucianism and Moism. But they 30111 have not yet explored how Zhuangzi subverts the concepts or ideas 1 that he inherited from primitive Daoists, and how Zhuangzi makes 2 a difference within his own tradition – Daoism. This subversion or 3 differentiation of one’s own tradition, it seems to me, is essential for 4 a genuine deconstructive operation. It is a virtually indispensable and 5 vital element of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction. 6 Some more conventional studies of Zhuangzi’s thought have 7 addressed the relationship between Zhuangzi’s thought and that of 8 other Daoists.2 However, at the very most, they only present certain 9 explanations of the difference between Zhuangzi and Laozi, or 40111 between Zhuangzi and primitive Daoists. They have not critically 1 examined how Zhuangzi’s dao defamiliarizes and goes beyond other 21111 Daoist notions of dao. folio 31 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Recently, Chad Hansen has attempted to offer an analysis of 2 Zhuangzi’s thought by regarding Zhuangzi’s notion of dao as the refu- 3 tation of Shendao’s absolute Monism.3 This approach allows us to 4 see more clearly the development of philosophical debate and criti- 5111 cism within Daoist tradition. As a matter of fact, Zhuangzi not only 6 deconstructs Shendao’s monistic dao, but also deconstructs Laozi’s 7 “constant dao.” Although Zhuangzi does not make direct comments 8 on the text of the Dao De Jing, several of his important statements can 9 be definitely seen as a critique or a discontinuation of Laozi’s quasi- 10 metaphysical or quasi-reifying notion of dao. This chapter will thus 11 investigate those deconstructive operations that Zhuangzi performs 2 upon other Daoist notions of dao. The investigation of this decon- 3111 struction of dao within Daoist tradition will lead us closer to the 4 self-deconstructing character of Zhuangzi’s notion of dao. 5 As we have indicated, Zhuangzi’s deconstructive strategy serves his 6 main philosophical thesis. Both his strategy and his philosophy serve 7 his goal of soteriological practice. What, then, is his main philo- 8 sophical thesis that lays the foundation for his deconstruction? We 9 must investigate this thesis before we can turn to his deconstructive 20111 operation. 1 2 Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change 3 4 Scholars have admitted that among the pre-Qin philosophers, 5 Zhuangzi is the one who most noticeably explicates the notion of 6 change.4 Fung Yu-lan’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, in explaining 7 Zhuangzi’s thought, uses a special section to introduce Zhuangzi’s 8 “philosophy of change.”5 Unfortunately, this brief section consists 9 mainly of several quotations from the Zhuangzi without the author’s 30111 interpretation. Fung’s general view of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of 1 change, however, can be observed from his comment on Guo 2 Xiang’s “Commentaries on the Zhuangzi.” Fung regards this Daoist 3 philosophy of change as “Heraclitean.”6 4 Chad Hansen has expressed strong objection to seeing Zhuangzi’s 5 philosophy of change as “a Heraclitus-like metaphysical theory of 6 change in the world of appearance” for two main reasons.7 First, the 7 conceptual scheme of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change is different 8 from the Western or Greek one. Heraclitus identifies the flux and 9 change of things with the manifestation of ultimate reality – Logos 40111 itself. His notion of change works within the Greek framework of 1 searching for the epistemic truth of the individual object.8 Zhuangzi’s 21111 philosophy of change deals with the fluidity and relativity of things folio 32 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 and perspectives themselves. It works within the Chinese conceptual 2 scheme of making pragmatic sense of part–whole relations rather than 3 the epistemic truth of the individual object. Second, Hansen thinks 4 that Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change amounts to no more than “a 5111 sociolinguistic theory” about “changing our modes of dividing and 6 distinguishing.”9 It concerns only linguistic change, not objective 7 change. Therefore, it is “radically different” from a Heraclitus-like 8 problem of change.10 9 Hansen is right in making a distinction between Chinese and 10 Greek conceptual schemes, between Zhuangzi and Heraclitus. He 11 is also right in pointing out that Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change 2 does not focus on recognizing the “real” change of objects. In my 3111 view, Zhuangzi lets us face any natural change, the change of the 4 natural world, including the change within human beings. How- 5 ever, Zhuangzi does not lead us to an epistemic or scientific theory 6 of change in objects. His philosophy attempts to make pragmatic 7 sense of these changes, namely, advises us to accommodate our mind 8 to infinite changes, changes of things, words, and perspectives. Thus 9 Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change involves a theory of language, but 20111 it does not confine itself to such a theory. 1 I define Zhuangzi’s philosophy mainly as a soteriological or thera- 2 peutic philosophy,11 a philosophy freeing human minds from any 3 fixation and guiding them in going along with all changes. From this 4 standpoint, my interpretation of Zhuangzi’s philosophy differs from 5 Hansen’s. Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change is obviously more than 6 a “sociolinguistic theory” of change. The ensuing examination of 7 Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change will place this philosophy strictly 8 within its soteriological context, and attempt to expose the soterio- 9 logical meaning of Zhuangzi’s discourse of change. It is from this 30111 soteriological meaning of flux and change that Zhuangzi starts his 1 deconstructive operation. Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change contains 2 the following essential notions. 3 4 Infinite transformations of things 5 6 A central notion of Zhuangzi’s philosophy is called wuhua, the trans- 7 formation of things. This notion of wuhua involves several important 8 aspects. First, Zhuangzi holds that the change and transformation of 9 things is universal. All things undergo changes and transformations 40111 all the time and without exception. This “transformation of things” 1 encompasses the change of natural things as well as that of human 21111 beings. Neither things nor human beings can ever escape change and folio 33 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 transformation. What we identify as a thing involves various changes. 2 It is always transformed from, and into, the other. Thus transforma- 3 tion takes place among myriad things and also within each and every 4 thing. For example, Zhuangzi observes: 5111 6 Pleasure and anger; sorrow and joy; worry and regret. . . . 7 These are all like musical sounds from empty tubes, like 8 fungi produced from mere vapors – day and night they 9 replace each other before us, and no one knows where they 10 sprout from.12 11 2 [T]hings have their life and death – you cannot rely upon 3111 their fulfillment. One moment empty, the next moment full 4 – you cannot depend upon their form. . . . The life of things 5 is a gallop, a headlong dash – with every movement they 6 alter, with every moment they shift.13 7 8 With these statements Zhuangzi announces the impossibility of any 9 static, unchanging existence (or non-existence). He equates existence 20111 and the world with movement, change and transformation. 1 Second, Zhuangzi emphasizes that the transformations of things 2 are infinite. He repeatedly points out: “Myriad transformations 3 never begin to reach an end.”14 “The four seasons rise one after the 4 other, the ten thousand things take their turn at living. . . . At the 5 end, no tail; at the beginning, no head . . . the constancy of change 6 is unending, yet there is nothing that can be counted on.”15 Zhuangzi 7 makes quite clear that all things are in the process of constant change 8 and transformation. The world of things is the world of flux and flow. 9 This flux has no beginning and no end. It is limitless. This infinity 30111 of change and transformation, according to Zhuangzi, is due to 1 the infinity of time, due to temporality and temporization. As he 2 observes, “The years cannot be held off; time cannot be stopped.”16 3 “There is no limit to the capacities of things, no stopping to time, no 4 constancy to the differentiation of lots, no [fixed] reason for begin- 5 ning and end.”17 Zhuangzi further writes: 6 7 I look for the roots of the past, but they extend back and 8 back without end. I search for the termination of the future, 9 but it never stops coming at me. Without end, without stop- 40111 ping, it is the absence of words, which shares the same 1 principle with things themselves.18 21111 folio 34 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 Here Zhuangzi’s principle inquires into the condition of the possi- 2 bilities of limitless things, limitless words, limitless capacities, limitless 3 differentiations, limitless beginnings and ends. This condition is the 4 temporization of existence. It is time or temporization that always 5111 makes possible the absence of things, the absence of words, and 6 so forth. Meanwhile, it is time or temporization that always brings 7 into being different things, different words, and so on. The differen- 8 tiation of things and words, the coming-and-going of different things 9 and words, is limitless because of eternal temporization.19 Since 10 existence and time are inseparable, as Zhuangzi always mentions 11 them together, temporization is differentiation, and differentiation is 2 temporization. Zhuangzi uses reason to show that there is no fixed 3111 reason for this eternal transformation of things. Zhuangzi’s reason is 4 dao, his understanding of the sameness of differentiation, the way of 5 change.20 6 7 Things transforming of themselves 8 9 A logical consequence is implied in Zhuangzi’s emphasis on “no 20111 beginning and no end” of myriad transformations. If there is 1 no beginning and end for the world of changes, any notion of a First 2 Cause, a Creator, or an Origin behind all changes is inevitably 3 undermined, or must be simply refused. As we know through 4 Western onto-theologies, the notion of a First Cause, a Creator 5 or an Origin presupposes a beginning or an end of the changing 6 world. Zhuangzi, in fact, refutes a similar notion. He does several 7 things to undercut this notion. First, he questions the existence of 8 a True Ruler (zhenzai) as the cause or source of all changes. As we 9 have noted, after his discussion of various phenomena of change, 30111 Zhuangzi asserts that no one knows where these changes come 1 from.21 This denial of a primordial knower of all changes is followed 2 by his questioning of True Ruler: 3 4 Let it be! Let it be! Morning and evening we have these 5 changing things. What about their origins? . . . we do not 6 know what cause them to be so. It seems as though there 7 were some True Ruler, but we have no particular evidence 8 for it. We may have faith in it, yet we cannot make out its 9 features . . . Do they really have a True Lord over them all?22 40111 1 This skeptical attitude toward the True Ruler is consistent with his 21111 insistence on no beginning and end of myriad transformations. It folio 35 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 indicates that Zhuangzi’s interest is not to identify a First Cause, a 2 Creator or an Origin, which explains all changes, but to see myriad 3 transformations as they are, as living situations themselves. 4 Second, Zhuangzi clarifies that the Daoist sage, the authentic 5111 person (zhenren), does not control those changes with supernatural 6 powers. “In the process of change, he has become a thing [among 7 other things], and he is merely waiting for some other change that 8 he doesn’t yet know about.”23 The authentic person, like any other 9 human beings, was just born from and into endless changes. He is 10 only a part of the change. This clearly shows that Zhuangzi’s 11 discourse of change is concerned with change as existential condi- 2 tion, as the condition of possibilities of more changes. Every human 3111 being is caught in a web of change and in the flux of change. The 4 difference between the authentic person and ordinary people is that 5 the former opens his or her mind to endless changes. He or she lives 6 with a positive attitude toward changes and without any fear or worry 7 about losing self. 8 Finally, Zhuangzi brings to the fore the point that change or trans- 9 formation is immanent in all things themselves. He tells us: “Things 20111 will transform of themselves, that is certain!”24 “You have only to 1 rest in no-action and things will transform themselves. . . . Things will 2 live naturally and of themselves.”25 The “no-action” of Zhuangzi’s 3 naturalism here involves, theoretically, the refusal of the metaphys- 4 ical fabrication of any transcendent Origin, Creator, or First Cause. 5 This “no-action” also allows the dissolving of the center – human 6 subjectivity – into the flow of myriad transformations. 7 8 The dynamic interrelationship of things 9 30111 The above-mentioned views – that changes are immanent in all 1 things and that things are always on the move – provide Zhuangzi 2 with a dynamic perspective of the interrelationship of things. This 3 perspective on the dynamic interrelationship of things is an integral 4 part of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change. It further justifies the 5 possibility of infinite transformations of things. This dynamic inter- 6 relationship of things lies in the following aspects. First, everything 7 and its other are mutually conditioned and mutually dependent. 8 Zhuangzi uses his category “this (shi)” and “that (bi)” to denote this 9 relationship of a thing and its other. The word “thing (wu)” refers to 40111 different pairs of things, qualities, functions, feelings, views, and 1 so forth. For example, the various pairs of things that Zhuangzi 21111 mentions in his discourse involve day and night, being and nonbeing, folio 36 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 life and death, big and small, fullness and emptiness, usefulness and 2 uselessness, completion and destruction, and so on. All these pairs 3 can be put under the category of “this” and “that,” namely, one thing 4 and its other. Zhuangzi points out: 5111 6 “[T]hat” comes out of “this” and “this” depends on “that” – 7 which is to say that “this” and “that” give birth to each other. 8 But where there is birth there must be death; where there 9 is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability 10 there must be unacceptability; where there is unaccepta- 11 bility there must be acceptability. Where there is recogni- 2 tion of right there must be recognition of wrong; where 3111 there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of 4 right.26 5 6 In a word, without “this” there is no “that”; without “that” there is 7 no “this.” Neither “this” nor “that” can be independent, isolated 8 from each other. This implies that when one thing transforms, the 9 other would inevitably follow, and vice versa. 20111 However, Zhuangzi’s perspective of the interrelationship of 1 things shows more insights into the inner dynamism of things. Things 2 are not only mutually dependent but also mutually involved. This 3 mutual involvement means that everything has its “other,” or the 4 trace of its “other,” within itself. The other has its absent presence in 5 the one. This absence, this trace of the other, paves the way for the 6 transformation of everything, and makes possible the subversion of 7 everything. Since everything involves its other, there is no absolute 8 distinction between them. As Zhuangzi rightly observes, everything 9 has a “this” and a “that.”27 When we identify a thing as “this,” we 30111 just suppress its inherent “that.” By discriminating something, we 1 conceal something else.28 But when we shift to the angle of “that,” 2 “that” still can be seen.29 Thus by spacing and temporization, a “this” 3 is also a “that,” a “that” is also a “this.”30 “One moment empty, the 4 next moment full.”31 A thing is transformed from and into its other 5 because of this mutual involvement. This interchangeability (tong) is 6 essential to the chain of infinite transformations, to the constancy 7 ( yong) of changes, and is pragmatically significant ( yong). “To have 8 achieved this understanding . . . is called dao.”32 9 This is our general depiction of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change. 40111 Two issues need to be further addressed here. First, it is true that 1 Zhuangzi has a main philosophical thesis – the infinite transfor- 21111 mations of things. His writings make possible a certain kind of folio 37 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 philosophical theory of change, and he gives reasons. But Zhuangzi 2 is a typical marginal figure. He stays on the margin of philosophy. He 3 plays at the borderline between philosophy and non-philosophy. 4 He is not serious in pursuing any system or theory of philosophy. 5111 This is illustrated by the fact that Zhuangzi’s discourse of change 6 does not tend to provide an epistemic or scientific theory of the 7 change of objects. As we know, Zhuangzi focuses on the pragmatic 8 sense of infinite transformations of things. 9 Furthermore, Zhuangzi does not regard his discourse of change as 10 “final vocabularies,” to borrow Rorty’s words, or as a closed theory, 11 about change. His perspective of change inquires into the condition 2 of possibilities of all changes. Nevertheless, it is still only one perspec- 3111 tive among many perspectives, and this perspective mainly has its 4 soteriological use. Zhuangzi even questions any fixed distinction 5 of change and non-change. After his discussion of the authentic 6 person’s positive attitude toward change, he asks: “Moreover, when 7 he is changing, how does he know that he is really changing? And 8 when he is not changing, how does he know that he hasn’t already 9 changed?”33 This amounts to saying that you cannot even have your 20111 theory of change after presenting a quasi-theory of change. It demon- 1 strates Zhuangzi’s typical way of self-interrogating and self-canceling. 2 Although Zhuangzi makes possible a philosophy of change, he is fully 3 aware that what makes it possible also makes it impossible. He does 4 not see any necessity of fixing himself on a theory. He consistently 5 keeps himself in motion. 6 This leads us to another issue. What is the inner connection 7 between Zhuangzi’s thesis – the infinite transformations of things – 8 and his deconstruction, including the above-mentioned self-efface- 9 ment? First, without his thesis there would be no deconstruction. 30111 Zhuangzi’s notions of change and transformation provide theoretic 1 justifications for his soteriological motif – to accommodate one’s 2 mind to endless changes of things, words or perspectives. His under- 3 standing of the relativity and infinity of things even becomes, we may 4 say, part and parcel of his soteriological motif. This is to say that his 5 use of deconstructive strategy is determined, to a large extent, by his 6 motif. The strategy and the motif are inseparable. For example, 7 because Zhuangzi understands the trace of the other within every- 8 thing and the interchangeability between a thing and its other, he 9 deconstructs the self-identity of everything. He shows the possibility 40111 of returning to the surface for every repressed other, the always- 1 already-being-there of the other, such as his subversion of the useful 21111 ( youyong) by exposing its uselessness (wuyong). folio 38 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 The notion of infinite transformations of things also determines 2 the thoroughness or depth of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction. Negative 3 theologians such as Pseudo-Dionysius in the West use quasi- 4 deconstructive strategies. The Pseudo-Dionysius subverts every 5111 predicate, but he cannot deny the existence of the First Cause, the 6 God.34 His theological motif limits his use of the strategy. Zhuangzi’s 7 notion of things transforming of themselves, on the contrary, allows 8 him to deconstruct every transcendent Cause or Origin without 9 reservation. He, therefore, can even deconstruct dao itself if any- 10 body understands it in a reifying way (we will further discuss this 11 aspect later). Zhuangzi’s profound understanding of the infinite self- 2 transforming of things likewise facilitates his radical self-canceling or 3111 self-deconstructing. Only when he is awakened to the ineluctable 4 undoing of every closed theory by infinite changes can he deliberately 5 elude every possibility of closure through self-effacement. 6 Second, deconstruction serves his thesis in an illuminating way. If 7 Zhuangzi’s motif demands his use of deconstructive strategy, his use 8 of the strategy makes a unique contribution to his motif. For one 9 thing, after revealing that a repressed “that” can always rise to 20111 the surface and overturn a privileged “this,” Zhuangzi proposes the 1 notion of dao, which privileges neither “this” nor “that,” locates its 2 pivot in the center of the circle of things and responds to their infi- 3 nite transformations, to endless “this” and “that.”35 This is typical 4 of Zhuangzi’s deconstructive strategy. It forcefully demonstrates 5 Zhuangzi’s thesis – to go along with infinite transformations of things 6 – and shows the pragmatic meaning, the application, of this thesis. 7 Also, as we have indicated, Zhuangzi’s motif is a soteriological or 8 therapeutic motif. In carrying out its therapeutic effect, deconstruc- 9 tive strategy as negative strategy has its irreplaceable role to play. We 30111 will discuss this therapeutic function and effect of Zhuangzi’s various 1 negative strategies in detail in the later sections of this treatise. Here 2 suffice it to say that deconstruction, in serving Zhuangzi’s motif, is 3 not passive but active, not negative but positive. This will be clearer 4 in the following examination of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of self and 5 his deconstruction of dao. 6 7 The deconstruction of self 8 9 Zhuangzi’s thesis of infinite transformations of things regards the 40111 transformation of human being as one among myriad transforma- 1 tions of things. However, Zhuangzi pays special attention to the 21111 change that all human beings inevitably undergo. This observation folio 39 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 of the constant changes that human beings undergo constitutes the 2 foundation and the essential content of Zhuangzi’s teaching of “no- 3 self.” In the first chapter, Zhuangzi declares that the perfect person 4 has no self.36 The second chapter also begins with Zhuangzi’s descrip- 5111 tion of the state of “losing self.”37 This notion of no-self is based on 6 Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the identity of self or the self-identity 7 of the human subject. For Zhuangzi, there is no permanent self over 8 and above all everyday personal changes. Even the commonly 9 supposed identity or continuity of a person, which persists through 10 changes, is only an illusion. Zhuangzi pointedly asks: “[W]e go 11 around telling each other, I do this, I do that – but how do we know 2 that this ‘I’ we talk about has any ‘I’ to it?”38 Zhuangzi deconstructs 3111 the self in the following main aspects. 4 First, Zhuangzi undercuts the identity of self by showing that no 5 human physical form can ever escape from change. As far as their 6 physical forms are concerned, human beings consist of change. They 7 are born from and into various changes. Only in the process of 8 change do they become human beings, and they are just waiting for 9 some other changes that they have not known about. These changes 20111 “never come to an end.”39 For instance: 1 2 Intermingling with nebulousness and blurriness, a transfor- 3 mation occurred and there was vital breath; the vital breath 4 was transformed and there was form; the form was trans- 5 formed and there was birth; now there has been another 6 transformation and she is dead. This is like the progression 7 of the four seasons.40 8 9 Zhuangzi indicates that once we look at human existence with this 30111 relational eye, we discover that human existence is caught in a web 1 of change. Once we find that human existence is nothing but a 2 process of change, we have no reason to attach ourselves to the illu- 3 sory self-identity and to complain about change. 4 Second, if physical form does not provide grounds for the identity 5 or continuity of self, neither do feelings or emotions. Zhuangzi, as we 6 have noted, holds that feelings or emotions, such as pleasure and 7 anger, sorrow and joy, worry and regret, are just like different things 8 replacing each other day and night41: 9 40111 Our joy has not ended when grief comes trailing it. We have 1 no way to bar the arrival of grief and joy, no way to prevent 21111 them from departing. Alas, the people of this world are no folio 40 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 more than travelers, stopping now at this inn, now at that, 2 all of them run by “things.” . . . And yet there are those who 3 struggle to escape from the inescapable – can you help but 4 pity them?42 5111 6 Zhuangzi suggests that feelings or emotions, like all other things, are 7 transient. The coming and going of these feelings or emotions, the 8 changes in them, will never reach an end. However, people who 9 attach to “self” attach to these feelings or emotions. They mistakenly 10 think that self stands behind these feelings or emotions. They do not 11 know that they are run by these feelings or emotions, run by “things,” 2 without any self-identity. To stabilize the unstable is what they are 3111 desperately pursuing. 4 Third, Zhuangzi dismantles the identity of the self as thinking 5 subject. The identity of the thinking subject presupposes two things. 6 First, the identity of thought, or of conceptual system. Second, the 7 identity of subject as opposed to its other, the object of thought. 8 Zhuangzi points out: “Without other there is no I; without I no 9 choice between alternatives.”43 This clearly states that the existence 20111 of any “I,” any subject, is possible only with the existence of “other,” 1 the object. There is no independent, self-existent “I,” or subject. 2 Every “I” is relative to, and dependent on, the other. Therefore, any 3 absolute distinction between subject and object, between “I” and 4 “other,” is completely rejected by Zhuangzi. A perfect example of 5 this rejection is Zhuangzi’s blurring of the person, who is dreaming 6 of being an object, and the object, of which the person is dreaming.44 7 It illustrates Zhuangzi’s view that the borderline between subject and 8 object has never been clear-cut. Another example is his questioning 9 of the distinction between the person who is awake and the person 30111 who is dreaming.45 These examples demonstrate Zhuangzi’s ironic 1 way of subverting the identity of the self as thinking subject. 2 Moreover, the saying, that without I there is no choice between 3 alternatives, indicates that the supposed self-identity of the thinking 4 subject is the root of various formations of privileged distinctions. 5 This thinking subject, the cogito, functions as the mind of privileging 6 hierarchical concepts (chengxin), always asserting or denying some- 7 thing to establish and sustain its self-identity. Zhuangzi’s subversion 8 of the self then focuses on the subversion of this privileging mind, on 9 the subversion of all conceptual hierarchies. Zhuangzi explicates, as 40111 we have noted above, that every privileged binary distinction always 1 involves the suppressed other within its closure. Since no conceptual 21111 closure can stay outside the process of change, outside spacing, and folio 41 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 temporization, its alleged identity is only built on running water. At 2 any time it can be subverted from within. 3 With respect to the thinking subject, Zhuangzi points out that 4 whenever you discriminate and argue for something, you lose sight 5111 of something else.46 Something else is just covered by your discrimi- 6 nating thinking. Therefore, your discrimination does not secure the 7 self-identity of your privileged concepts. However, you believe that 8 you are different from others in what you privilege and wish to 9 enlighten others through your privileging.47 This is to use your priv- 10 ileging mind to justify your privileging, “but who will not have such 11 a privileging mind?”48 Since everybody has this privileging mind 2 and can privilege something, your mind and your privileging are 3111 not different from others. As a consequence, it is not legitimate 4 for anyone to claim that he or she is able to judge what is absolutely 5 right or absolutely wrong. Zhuangzi’s point is very clear: a person’s 6 privileging cannot justify the self-identity of privileged concepts, nor 7 can this privileging justify the self-identity of this person as thinking 8 subject. 9 Facing the conflicts of various privileged distinctions, such as “the 20111 rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Moists,”49 Zhuangzi’s 1 criticism shows his profound insight into the root of the problem. He 2 does not establish one more privileged distinction or conceptual hier- 3 archy among many, but attempts to eschew any dualistic way of 4 thinking. His criticism centers on the problem of self-identity and the 5 privileging mind. The key to solving the problem is the practice of 6 no-self. However, Zhuangzi distinguishes his notion of no-self from 7 the opposition between self and non-self, between self-identity and 8 the annihilation of self. 9 Zhuangzi vehemently opposes any self-attachment or egocentrism 30111 based on an illusory self-identity. This does not mean that Zhuangzi 1 advocates a nihilistic notion of self that denies the existence of empir- 2 ical self 50 and negates the possibility of spiritual progress and 3 freedom. For example, Shendao, the primitive Daoist, has a notion 4 of “abandoning self (quji).”51 This notion admires a state of being that 5 is none other than mere things, without any possibility of spiritual 6 progress and freedom. It leads to an ideal “not for the conduct of the 7 living but only for the dead.”52 Therefore, it is said in the Zhuangzi 8 that Shendao does not “really understand dao.”53 Zhuangzi’s own 9 notion of no-self avoids this extremism. 40111 To avoid falling into the trap of oppositional category while 1 subverting the closure of self, Zhuangzi appeals to the third category 21111 – “forgetting self (wangji)” which asserts neither self nor non-self. folio 42 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 Zhuangzi’s notion of no-self is precisely the notion of forgetting 2 self. Sigmund Freud once included the action of forgetting in the 3 phenomena of parapraxis.54 Mark Taylor further defines this para- 4 praxis as “the inscription of the boundary, threshold, margin, or 5111 limit.”55 Zhuangzi’s “forgetting” is a similar marginal notion.56 It 6 plays at the boundary between self and non-self. While it transcends 7 the closure of self, it dose not attempt to annihilate all individual lives. 8 It merely opens their closure and leads them to the authenticity of 9 life that lies precisely in the absence of the distinction between self 10 and other. The point is to change people’s minds. The Chinese word 11 wang consists of two components, the upper part wang, meaning “to 2 lose,” and the lower part xin, meaning “mind.” To forget is to lose 3111 one’s discriminating and privileging mind.57 4 Therefore, by emphasizing “forgetting self,” Zhuangzi first asks 5 people to free their minds from the distinction between subject 6 and object, between self and other, between right and wrong, and 7 between other things. It is important to note that Zhuangzi’s teach- 8 ings of forgetting right and wrong (including forgetting Confucian 9 virtues), forgetting things, forgetting people, forgetting life (and 20111 death), forgetting the world, forgetting Heaven, etc.,58 all point to the 1 root – “forgetting self (and other).”59 They are the components of 2 Zhuangzi’s teaching of “forgetting self.” As Guo Xiang’s Commentaries 3 on the Zhuangzi rightly observes, Zhuangzi’s “forgetting self” means to 4 do away with the distinction between other and self, thing and person. 5 “Once forgetting self (wo ziwang), what thing is left in the world for 6 cognition?”60 Zhuangzi’s teaching of “sitting down and forgetting” 7 as “casting off form and doing away with knowledge”61 points to the 8 same thing. “Casting off form” means forgetting the physical distinc- 9 tion between self and other. “Doing away with knowledge” means 30111 forgetting the self as knowing subject and the thing as known object. 1 Once self is forgotten, what object is there left for grasping, and 2 who is the subject of privileging and craving? 3 However, second, Zhuangzi plainly states that forgetting self is not 4 an annihilation of conventional self, but merely a radical transfor- 5 mation of the latter. Transcending the distinction of self and other 6 does not mean abandoning the world and socio-individual life. It 7 means to be open to the dynamic relationship of self-other, to the 8 relativity and mutual involvement of self and other, and to the infi- 9 nite transformations of the world. This is called “the fitting of the 40111 mind (xinzhishi).”62 Zhuangzi advises people that instead of fixing 1 the mind on binary distinctions, “it would be better to forget binary 21111 distinctions and to go along with the transformation of dao.”63 People folio 43 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 should forget each other in the art of dao, just as fishes forget each 2 other and enjoy the rivers and lakes.64 The purpose of this forgetting 3 is obviously to achieve freedom – a free embracing of changes, a free 4 transformation with others (either with people, things or opinions), a 5111 free flowing together with others. 6 This openness to the other, to changes and differences, has, with- 7 out doubt, strong socio-ethical implications, even though its tone is 8 soteriological.65 It de-legitimizes any egocentric concern, any self- 9 attachment. It encourages an attitude of “following along with things 10 (shunwu)” or “following along with people (shunren)”66 under various 11 circumstances. For example, Zhuangzi recommends: “If he acts like 2 a baby, then you act like a baby along with him. If he acts uncon- 3111 ventionally, then you act unconventionally along with him. If he acts 4 without restraint, then you act without restraint along with him.”67 5 This is not a suggestion for a completely negative or passive strategy. 6 For Zhuangzi observes very clearly: “If you can accomplish this, then 7 you can (lead him and) enter into the ideal state.”68 The ideal state 8 for Zhuangzi is “following along with things the way they are and 9 admitting no personal preference.”69 In other words, the realized 20111 spontaneity (or naturalness) and relativity is the ideal state in which 1 conventional self is deconstructed and transformed. Everyone is able 2 to ramble in the realm of infinity via this realized spontaneity and 3 relativity, and make it his or her home.70 4 In this general picture of Zhuangzi’s discourse of “no-self,” we see 5 a typical deconstructive strategy employed by Zhuangzi: overturning 6 the hierarchy of self/non-self and appealing to the third category that 7 eludes the previous binary distinction. However, the otherness of 8 Zhuangzi’s deconstruction is also quite clear. First, deconstruction 9 here is not confined to the reading of a particular philosophical text. 30111 The target is the conventional idea of self or self-identity. Second, the 1 deconstruction of self or self-identity is the core of Zhuangzi’s decon- 2 struction of all linguistic–conceptual hierarchies. By focusing on the 3 issue of self, Zhuangzi’s deconstruction has more direct bearing on 4 existentio-practical affairs, on soteriological or therapeutic practices. 5 6 The deconstruction of dao 7 8 The notion of dao occupies a central place in Daoist discourse. Chad 9 Hansen has argued that dao is not exactly a metaphysical concept in 40111 Shendao’s, Laozi’s, or Zhuangzi’s Daoism. Their primary use of dao 1 is prescriptive and pragmatic, namely, seeing it as the guidance for 21111 human action or behavior. However, Hansen admits that a reality folio 44 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 concept nonetheless stands behind Shendao’s use of dao. Laozi, to 2 some extent, does not overcome Shendao’s influence, but is “less 3 metaphysical than Shendao.” Only Zhuangzi reaches maturity in 4 completely refuting primitive Daoists.71 This suggests to me that 5111 while the overall context for the discourse of dao in Daoism is not 6 metaphysical but pragmatic and prescriptive, there are reifying or 7 totalizing expressions of dao involved in Daoism, which can be 8 regarded as metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical elements. In this 9 light, it is appropriate to see the related discourse of Zhuangzi as the 10 deconstruction of these metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical elements. 11 Zhuangzi’s deconstruction involves his deconstruction of Shendao’s 2 notion of dao, his deconstruction of some of Laozi’s expressions of 3111 dao, and his self-deconstruction when he attempts to elude any meta- 4 physical reappropriation of his notion of dao. 5 6 The deconstruction of dao as nonbeing 7 8 The Dao De Jing shows that Laozi is ambiguous concerning his view 9 of being and nonbeing. On the one hand, Laozi is aware that dao 20111 transcends the distinction of being and nonbeing. For instance, Laozi 1 holds that being and nonbeing “spring forth from the same source, 2 and yet they differ in name. This sameness is called ‘profoundly 3 dark’.”72 He also points out: “being and nonbeing give birth to each 4 other.”73 These statements indicate that the distinction between 5 being and nonbeing is relative. Being and nonbeing involve each 6 other. Dao subverts the self-identity of either being or nonbeing. In 7 this sense there is no priority of nonbeing over being. On the other 8 hand, Laozi privileges nonbeing over being, identifying dao with 9 nonbeing, one way or another. In chapter 40, Laozi writes: “The ten 30111 thousand things in the world originate in being; being originates 1 in nonbeing.”74 This clarifies his early statement that nonbeing is 2 named the origin of heaven and earth, while being is named the 3 mother of ten thousand things.75 However, this contradicts the claim 4 of the sameness and relativity of being and nonbeing. Elsewhere 5 Laozi gives the following description to dao: 6 7 We look but see it not;/It is named “the invisible.”/We listen 8 but hear it not;/It is named “the inaudible.”/We try to seize 9 it but find it not;/It is named “the intangible.”/These three 40111 elude our scrutiny, /And thus are intermingled into one./ 1 . . . /Continuous, unceasing, and unnamable;/It returns to 21111 “no-thing.”76 folio 45 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 From this statement and some others, we see quite clearly that the 2 movement of dao is regarded by Laozi as starting from nonbeing (or 3 nothingness) and returning to nonbeing. Although being and 4 nonbeing are both included in the movement of dao, dao is allied to 5111 nonbeing. Dao privileges, and resides in, nonbeing. It sounds like a 6 dialectic of nonbeing. The text of Dao De Jing does not allow us to 7 conclude with this aspect of Laozi’s thought. As we have mentioned, 8 the other side of Laozi’s thought can subvert this dialectic closure of 9 nonbeing. However, this privileging of nonbeing over being could 10 easily lend itself to a metaphysical appropriation of Laozi’s thought, 11 one that will deviate further from Laozi’s pragmatic concern. 2 Zhuangzi pushes ahead with Laozi’s subversive side of dao, and 3111 forcefully questions the legitimacy of the priority of non-being to 4 being. Zhuangzi states: 5 6 There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet begin- 7 ning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a 8 not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is non- 9 being. But I do not know, when it comes to nonbeing, which 20111 is really being and which is nonbeing.77 1 2 Zhuangzi is emphasizing that we cannot find a reason to support such 3 a logocentric closure of nonbeing. First, the distinction between being 4 and nonbeing, just like all binary distinctions, can never, and will 5 never, be clear-cut. Being and nonbeing always rely on each other 6 and involve each other. Each transforms itself from and into the 7 other. They can by no means establish their own identities within 8 changing situations. If we keep up with living flux, how can we isolate 9 and distinguish being from nonbeing, and vice versa? 30111 Second, the vulnerability of the imagined priority of nonbeing also 1 lies in the fact that there are always third possibilities outside any 2 closure of nonbeing and being. Nonbeing is caught in the chain of 3 infinite transformations. If nonbeing is prior to being, then “a not yet 4 beginning to be nonbeing,” namely, nonbeing of nonbeing, is prior 5 to nonbeing. This nonbeing of nonbeing is neither nonbeing nor 6 being. It is the third possibility.78 It makes all closures open to change, 7 to disruption. Zhuangzi’s dao apparently is allied to this third possi- 8 bility. However, even this third possibility is part of the chain of 9 further transformation, according to Zhuangzi. It can be replaced by 40111 another possibility or by other possibilities without exception. 1 A primary meaning of Zhuangzi’s dao then, in my understanding, 21111 is this chain and process of transformation itself. It has no beginning folio 46 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 and end. Transformation is always possible, even before any single 2 possibility of transformation is found. Therefore, “Dao cannot be 3 thought of as being, nor can it be thought of as nonbeing. In calling 4 it dao we are only adopting a temporary expedient.”79 By calling dao 5111 “a temporary expedient,” Zhuangzi suggests that even the term dao 6 is ineluctably in the chain of transformation and substitution. As a 7 matter of fact, it is replaceable by a series of other terms such as tianni 8 (the balancing of nature), tianlai (the piping of nature), baoguang 9 (shaded light), lianghang (double walking), and ming (enlightenment) in 10 the Zhuangzi.80 By this de-sedimentation of the term dao, Zhuangzi 11 eschews any reifying appropriation of dao, and maintains the 2 prescriptive and pragmatic character of his dao. His main purpose in 3111 doing so is to free our minds from any fixation either on being or 4 nonbeing, to keep up with living flux and transformation. 5 6 The deconstruction of dao as one 7 8 In the above-quoted verses from chapter 14 of the Dao De Jing, Laozi 9 not only shows his preference for nonbeing, but also for oneness in 20111 interpreting his dao. In other words, dao is considered one as opposed 1 to many. Elsewhere Laozi says: “The ten thousand things are alive 2 by virtue of the one.”81 This notion of oneness is prominent in Laozi’s 3 thought of dao. As Zhuangzi correctly observes, Laozi heads his 4 doctrine of dao “with the concept of great oneness.”82 5 Chad Hansen has tracked this preference for the oneness of dao 6 back to Shendao, the primitive Daoist. For Shendao asserts: “The 7 great dao can embrace but it cannot distinguish. . . . Dao is that which 8 leaves nothing out.”83 Hansen calls Shendao’s thesis a thesis of “All 9 is one,” and defines it as an absolute monism.84 In Hansen’s view, 30111 Zhuangzi is critical in refuting Shendao’s monism. Thus, some 1 important passages in the Zhuangzi are seen simply by Hansen as 2 commentaries on Shendao’s thought. 3 I do not want to deny Hansen’s contribution to distinguishing 4 Zhuangzi’s thought from Shendao’s monism, for it is insightful. But 5 what about its relationship with Laozi’s dao? Those passages in the 6 Zhuangzi, it seems to me, are more likely the commentaries on some 7 passages in the Dao De Jing. To facilitate his own interpretation of 8 Laozi, Hansen either neglects those passages showing Laozi’s quasi- 9 monistic view or simply emphasizes their prescriptive function.85 40111 However, this neglect is inconsistent with his position that a prescrip- 1 tive or pragmatic theory can involve a certain kind of metaphysical 21111 point of view or element, as in the case of primitive Daoism. My view folio 47 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 is that Zhuangzi refutes both Shendao’s and Laozi’s preference 2 for oneness. As far as their influences in the Daoist tradition are 3 concerned, Laozi is, without question, greater than Shendao. As our 4 textual evidence indicates, Laozi hence becomes reasonably the 5111 primary target of Zhuangzi’s deconstructive operation. 6 The oneness of Laozi’s dao contains two major meanings. First, dao 7 as one is the origin, source or foundation of myriad things. Look at 8 the following passages in the Dao De Jing: 9 10 Bottomless,/It seems to be the “ancestor” of the ten thousand 86 11 things. 2 Dao is “something” elusive and evasive./Evasive and elu- 3111 sive!/Yet within it there is “image.”/Elusive and evasive!/ 4 Yet within it there is “something.”87 5 6 There is “something” nebulously complete in and by itself, 7 /Which comes before Heaven and Earth./Silent, boundless, 8 standing alone, and changeless;/ . . . /It may be considered the mother of the world./I do not know its name;/I give it 9 88 20111 the name “dao.”/I am compelled to name it “great.” 1 Although scholars have ruled out the accountability of these meta- 2 phorical expressions of dao as cosmic origin, these statements do 3 involve the ontological implication of dao as the primordial source of 4 the world.89 Although we should not see Laozi’s notion as purely 5 “metaphysical” in the Western sense of this word,90 the problematic 6 of the reification of this oneness should not be simply ignored. 7 Second, dao as one is the totality or the whole of myriad things. 8 Laozi says: “The great dao flows everywhere,/ . . . /The ten thousand 9 things derive their life from it,/ . . . /It accomplishes its task without 30111 claiming anything.”91 “Dao in the world is likened to the sea,/Into 1 which flows rivers and streams.”92 This amounts to saying that dao is 2 the whole within which everything thrives. Dao as totality embraces 3 everything, leaving nothing outside. Here we see the overlapping of 4 Shendao’s monistic view and Laozi’s. We also see that the two mean- 5 ings of Laozi’s oneness of dao are closely interrelated. Dao for Laozi is 6 both the original source and the whole of everything. Now let us see 7 how Zhuangzi performs a deconstructive operation upon them. 8 Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of dao as one is a part of his decon- 9 struction of all conceptual oppositions between nonbeing and being, 40111 one and many, self and other, and the like. For Zhuangzi, dao cannot 1 be reified, since dao is neither an entity nor a concept. Dao designates 21111 the absence of things, namely, the absence of fixed distinctions folio 48 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 between things such as between one and others. Dao denotes the 2 chain and process of infinite transformations, denotes dynamic inter- 3 relations. This chain or process brings everything into being, makes 4 possible all distinctions, but does not claim anything for itself or 5111 attempt to fixate on anything. Laozi’s dao of wuwei (no-action) has 6 implied this meaning. 7 However, Zhuangzi tries to make clear that not only does dao claim 8 nothing, but dao itself is not a thing. When we conceive dao as one or 9 as nonbeing, we have already fallen into the realm of things, the 10 realm of fixed binary distinctions. We have distorted dao. Therefore, 11 Zhuangzi insists that dao cannot be identified as anything. “That 2 which treats things as things is not limited by things.”93 Things have 3111 their limits such as that all things have their beginning and end. But 4 “dao has no beginning, no end.”94 The conception of dao as an origin 5 or source presupposes a beginning of all transformations, and affirms 6 an original presence. Contrary to Laozi’s saying that there is some- 7 thing which comes before heaven and earth, Zhuangzi asks: 8 9 There is that which comes before heaven and earth, but is 20111 it a thing? That which treats things as things is not a thing. 1 Things that come forth can never precede all other things, 2 because there were already things existing then; and before 3 that, too, there were already things existing – so on without 4 end.95 5 6 In other words, we have no way to break the chain of substitution and 7 interrelation. Even if we assume something original or primordial, this 8 “something” or one thing nonetheless is caught in the relation with its 9 other. Its other and its other’s other are always traceable without an 30111 end. The closure of any “great one,” any divine origin or source, has 1 always already been leaking away. Here Zhuangzi uses the same 2 strategy he employed in overturning Laozi’s privileging of nonbeing. 3 Zhuangzi is fully aware of the problems inherent in Laozi’s and 4 Shendao’s preference for oneness. Zhuangzi himself never declares 5 that everything is one in the way Shendao does, unless he is quoting 6 something like Hui Shi’s opinion.96 The dismantling of their prefer- 7 ence for oneness culminates in one of Zhuangzi’s most powerful 8 philosophical criticisms: 9 40111 Since all things are one, how can there be anything to talk 1 about? But since I have already said that all things are one, 21111 how can there be nothing to talk about? One and speech folio 49 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 makes two, two and one makes three. Continuing on in this 2 fashion, even the cleverest mathematician couldn’t keep 3 up, how much less an ordinary person! Therefore, if in 4 proceeding from nonbeing to being we arrive at three, how 5111 much farther we shall reach when proceeding from being to 6 being. We need not proceed at all if we understand the 7 mutual dependence of “this” and “that.”97 8 9 Zhuangzi first reveals the difficulty of Shendao’s, and also Laozi’s, 10 monistic view that dao includes everything, but itself cannot be distin- 11 guished. Zhuangzi’s point is that you claim that dao cannot be 2 distinguished but actually you make the distinction – dao is one. Once 3111 you make the distinction that dao is one, the original one and the one 4 you talk about become two. 5 However, Zhuangzi does not say that we should stop speaking 6 completely. Rather, he discloses that whether dao is one or not is 7 really a way of talking about things. Since the distinction of dao as 8 one is none other than a way of talking about things, it is part of the 9 chain of substitution and interrelation. In this sense Zhuangzi talks 20111 about the relation among one, two and three. It seems like a direct 1 commentary on the first line of chapter 42 in the Dao De Jing: “Dao 2 gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; 3 three gives birth to ten thousand things.”98 Zhuangzi suggests that 4 we cannot justify such a theory of dao as origin. It is nothing but a 5 human calculation or fabrication that comes out of the privileging 6 mind. It does not represent any reality. Zhuangzi urges us to use such 7 “final vocabularies” no more! 8 This is not yet the end of Zhuangzi’s deconstruction. Zhuangzi 9 does two more things to dismantle the preference for oneness. First, 30111 contrary to the monist’s claim that many are one, Zhuangzi some- 1 times emphasizes that one is many. For instance, Zhuangzi insists: 2 “Dao has no boundaries.”99 “Dao is everywhere. . . . It is in the ant 3 . . . in the panic grass . . . in the tiles and shards . . . even in the piss 4 and shit.”100 If dao is the chain of infinite transformations, it does not 5 claim its own existence. It de-centers itself and becomes inseparable 6 from all things. On the other hand, no thing can escape from this 7 chain. Thus everything can have its own dao. Various daos are the 8 same of difference, the same of no self-identity. Dao is the presence 9 of absence. It is not a closure but an open chain – the crucial point 40111 that let us distinguish Zhuangzi’s dao from any monism. 1 However, as we can see now, Zhuangzi privileges neither one nor 21111 many. An essential step that Zhuangzi takes to distinguish himself folio 50 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS

1111 from both monism and, may I call it, blind pluralism is to see the 2 whole as perspective only. In other words, while we disagree with 3 monism, we do not have to utterly abandon the perspective of whole, 4 or to avoid addressing issues such as the condition of the possibilities 5111 of things. Zhuangzi emphasizes that we can look at things “from the 6 point of view of their differences,” but we can also look at them “from 7 the point of view of their sameness.”101 It is in this perspectival 8 context that Zhuangzi talks about oneness or wholeness. However, 9 this oneness or wholeness is only one perspective among many. 10 We can have this perspective of oneness just as we can have other 11 perspectives. This does not mean that all perspectives have equal use. 2 The perspective of wholeness has its unique use in liberating people 3111 from their limited views or perspectives, in making them open to 4 limitless changes. It is a kind of soteriological or therapeutic use. In 5 this aspect, Zhuangzi shares nothing with some contemporary 6 Western philosophers, such as postmodernists. He would probably 7 criticize the latter’s view as one-sided, namely, as privileging many 8 over one. 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 51 1111 2 3 4 4 5111 THE DECONSTRUCTION 6 7 OF BUDDHA NATURE IN 8 CHAN BUDDHISM 9 10 11 2 3111 Preliminary remarks 4 5 Although much has been said about deconstruction in Ma¯dhyamika 6 Buddhism, very little has been done in the study of deconstructive 7 strategy in Chan Buddhism. In his study of deconstruction in 8 Na¯ga¯rjuna’s thought, Magliola adds several passages which discuss 9 the same topic in Chan/Zen Buddhism. Magliola’s major contribu- 20111 tion is his distinction between logocentric and differential trends in 1 Chan/Zen Buddhism.1 This distinction allows us to take a fresh look 2 at, and to re-examine, those inner struggles in the evolution of Chan 3 Buddhist thought. However, Magliola’s study of deconstruction in 4 Chan is not systematic despite its insights. He uses only a few cases 5 to show the deconstructive tendency in Chan, without applying his 6 distinction to a closer examination of the different schools of Chan 7 thought. Thus his study leaves only the impression that the decon- 8 structive or differential trend is connected with the Southern School 9 of Chan. He does not justify this thesis through a closer doctrinal and 30111 textual–contextual investigation. 1 Bernard Faure, on the other hand, touches upon the issue of 2 logocentric and differential trends in Chan in his comprehensive 3 critique of the Chan tradition. Faure’s study has two main problems. 4 First, since his study is a criticism, he only shows what he thinks is 5 the logocentric side of Chan, without providing a constructive 6 study of deconstruction in Chan. Second, he criticizes Magliola for 7 relating his logocentric/differential distinction to the historically well- 8 defined distinction between Northern and Southern Chan. Faure 9 believes that this hasty connection is “counterproductive.”2 His 40111 own approach, as opposed to Magliola’s, is to suggest that it is impos- 1 sible to identify one school or one figure in the Chan tradition as 21111 either logocentric or deconstructive. He asserts that there are “only folio 52 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 combinations” of these two types in the Chan tradition.3 It appears 2 that this position of “combination only” avoids a one-sided view and 3 the error of jumping-to-a-conclusion. However, by concluding that 4 there are only combinations, Faure turns away from the necessity 5111 and possibility of analyzing and identifying individual deconstruc- 6 tive trends in Chan Buddhism, and from the necessity and even 7 the possibility of a coherent interpretation of Chan thought. The 8 coherent interpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought obvious- 9 ly demands more than a mere criticism. It is true that the thought of 10 one school or one figure may involve elements of two trends. But 11 this fact does not preclude the possibility of its being coherently inter- 2 preted as representative of one trend. 3111 The present chapter, therefore, will attempt to investigate a 4 major deconstructive trend in Chan Buddhism, namely, that of the 5 Huineng and the Hongzhou Chan.4 This investigation will aim to 6 accomplish the following things. First, it will reveal how it is possible 7 to rediscover or reinterpret the mainstream of Chan. I am fully aware 8 that this investigation will run the risk of being accused of relying on 9 traditional oppositions, since the Huineng and the Hongzhou Chan 20111 are part of Southern Chan. However, the Hongzhou Chan not only 1 subverts the logocentrism of Northern Chan, but also performs its 2 deconstructive operation upon the logocentric trend within Southern 3 Chan itself. Therefore, our investigation will not be confined to the 4 opposition between Northern and Southern Chan. Moreover, a 5 critical examination, it seems to me, should not be restricted to over- 6 turning the hierarchy of orthodoxy/non-orthodoxy, as the critical 7 historians have done. It should also make possible a reinterpretation 8 or rediscovery of orthodoxy itself. Here we want to make a distinc- 9 tion between the historical orthodox form of Chan and the modern 30111 orthodox interpretation of Chan. Our interpretation will definitely be 1 different from the modern orthodox interpretation, but this does not 2 mean that the orthodox thought in the history of Chan is necessarily 3 and completely wrong. In this sense Faure’s equation of the histori- 4 cal orthodox form of Chan with the modern orthodox interpretation 5 of Chan in his criticism of Magliola is hermeneutically incorrect.5 6 Second, our investigation will be about the deconstruction of 7 Buddha nature in Chan Buddhism. There are many Buddhist terms 8 and concepts, such as nirva¯na, parama¯rtha, ´us¯nyata¯, the uses of which 9 are soteriological and functional,˙ not metaphysical. The concept of 40111 Buddha nature is one of them. The advent and prevalence of this 1 concept in the Buddhist world, especially in East Asia, constitute one 21111 episode in the long evolution of Buddhist thought. The notion of folio 53 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Buddha nature originates from the doctrine of tatha¯gatagarbha and is 2 nurtured by the Chinese transformation of Buddhist thought. Like 3 all other Buddhist soteriological terms, the words “Buddha nature” 4 can be easily reified or sedimented into a logocentric term, since the 5111 words, after all, come out of the conventional vocabularies of binary 6 discrimination. Chan Buddhism, like other sinitic Buddhist schools, 7 uses the notion or concept of Buddha nature. The central Chan 8 notion of “self nature” may appear nothing but a Chan version of 9 the idea of Buddha nature. However, upon closer inspection, one 10 may note that the mainstream of Chan Buddhism does not engage 11 so much in developing a theory of Buddha nature as in decon- 2 structing the concept of Buddha nature. The Chinese adaptation of 3111 the tatha¯gatagarbha thought eventually evolved into the deconstruction 4 of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhism, as demonstrated by Huineng, 5 the Hongzhou school and others. What a dialectic of history! 6 In deconstructing Buddha nature, Chan Buddhists, to some extent, 7 restore the spirit of the Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ and Ma¯dhyamika, while tran- 8 scending their limits in echoing the call of practice. In other words, 9 Chan Buddhists use a deconstructive operation as a negative strategy 20111 inherited both from their Indian predecessors and from indigenous 1 Daoists, but with noticeable flexibility and simplicity. They are even 2 more thoroughgoing in self-deconstructing. We will see how Chan 3 Buddhists use a deconstructive strategy to serve their soteriological 4 thesis and practice, and how they elude the dichotomy of self and 5 non-self. 6 Third, the investigation into the deconstruction of Buddha nature 7 in Chan Buddhism will be an inquiry into the context of inner 8 struggles within the evolution of Chan Buddhist thought. We will 9 provide a contextual analysis of those inner struggles between the 30111 reification of soteriological terms and the deconstructive operation. 1 Here we raise the question of the contextual analysis of Chan 2 Buddhist sayings. For even a “careful” textual reading may not be 3 necessarily a persuasive contextual understanding. Recent critical 4 readings of major Chan texts by Matsumoto Shiro¯, a figure from 5 Critical Buddhism, is just one example. Matsumoto does a great deal 6 of philological work to draw parallels between the Chan master 7 Linji’s words and the Upanishadic terminology of a¯tman. He con- 8 cludes that Linji’s thought is under the Hindu influence of a¯tman.6 9 This premature conclusion ignores or even cancels out the entirely 40111 different context of the Chinese use of Buddhist soteriological terms. 1 Closer attention is thus called for in the analysis of context 21111 in understanding culturally–historically deferred/different Buddhist folio 54 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 discourses. For our present purpose, we will analyze in what specific 2 context a Chan Buddhist criticism can be called a deconstructive 3 operation, and a Chan Buddhist saying a reifying expression – the 4 target of that deconstruction. This Chan context of struggles between 5111 reification and decomposition is certainly different from the Euro- 6 pean context of struggles between metaphysical appropriation and 7 deconstruction, and from the Indian context of struggles between 8 Buddhism and Brahmanism. Outside this historically–culturally 9 specific context, there would be no Chan deconstruction but only the 10 imposition of labels. Therefore, our investigation will start with an 11 analysis of this specific context of Chan deconstruction. We will reveal 2 what Chan Buddhists have inherited when they utilize Buddhist 3111 doctrines, what happened in the world of Chan thought, and what 4 called for a Chan deconstructive operation. To do this, we must back- 5 track to Indian tatha¯gatagarbha thought, which has important bearings 6 on the Chan reification of Buddha nature and its ensuing decon- 7 struction by Chan. 8 9 Context: the necessity of deconstruction 20111 1 The rise of the tatha¯gatagarbha thought of Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism met 2 the need to complement the emptiness teaching of the Ma¯dhyamika 3 school. This need involves two interrelated areas: the practical and 4 the theoretical. First, practically, Buddhist thinkers, especially those 5 of tatha¯gatagarbha thought and the Yoga¯ca¯ra school, feel that the 6 relentless denial and negation of Na¯ga¯rjuna in destroying all wrong 7 views is effective but not sufficient for conveying the positive value 8 of Buddhist practice. In other words, although the teaching of 9 emptiness is not negative or nihilistic, its apophatic language and 30111 its strategic avoidance of any constructive view have their limits in 1 affirming soteriological purposes or benefits. It does not provide 2 direct answers or solutions to some crucial questions of soteriological 3 practice. For example, one question tatha¯gatagarbha thought tries to 4 answer is how it is possible to find the link between sentient beings, 5 who are actually wandering in the sam. sa¯ra, and their practical goal – 6 the attainment of nirva¯na.7 Apparently, this is not the central concern 7 of Ma¯dhyamika philosophy.˙ Yet it is of soteriological importance to 8 many practitioners and has a great bearing on the thrust of their 9 practice. 40111 This example points to the theoretical aspect as well. Theore- 1 tically, it is far from the case that Ma¯dhyamika has accomplished so 21111 much that other Buddhists have nothing more to say. The teaching folio 55 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 of emptiness constitutes foundational work for Maha¯ya¯na discourse 2 in correcting wrong views, and is open to the affirmation of authentic 3 existence and the world as such. However, it focuses on demolishing 4 all metaphysical views and leaves the latter somewhat unfulfilled or 5111 insufficiently explained.8 6 These issues also can be viewed from the angle of language 7 use. Maha¯ya¯na Buddhists, after Ma¯dhyamika, face the question “Is 8 apophatic language the only language we can use?” This question, 9 put another way, asks whether there is any possibility of using other 10 kinds of language. Ma¯dhyamika philosophy claims that negative 11 terms such as emptiness are only useful conventional designations 2 for soteriological purposes.9 Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism, including Ma¯d- 3111 hyamika, regards the use of all terms or concepts as upa¯ya. This 4 implies that neither apophatic nor kataphatic language should be 5 privileged ultimately. Negative language, therefore, has no absolute 6 priority over positive language. Understood in this way, the possibil- 7 ity of using positive language is unhesitatingly explored by the 8 expounders of tatha¯gatagarbha thought and the Yoga¯ca¯ra school in 9 echoing their practices. 20111 Another point is that negative terms, like all other terms, can be 1 reified or substantialized. This is precisely the reason Ma¯dhyamika 2 thinkers constantly invoke the strategy of self-deconstructing to 3 empty emptiness. It proves from the other side that negative language 4 has no ultimate superiority over positive language. The point, then, 5 is not what kind of language can be appropriately used, but how to 6 avoid reification or substantialization. Are there any possibilities 7 of using positive language while avoiding reification by imposing 8 restrictions on it? The Buddhists of tatha¯gatagarbha thought and the 9 Yoga¯ca¯ra school think there are. Although Ma¯dhyamika decon- 30111 struction has made constructive discourse more difficult – similar to 1 what Derrida has done to Western philosophy – the Buddhist 2 thinkers nonetheless persevere with intellectual courage and subtlety. 3 This is the general background of the venture of tatha¯gatagarbha 4 thought. The fundamental concern of tatha¯gatagarbha thought is to 5 assert the possibility or potential of attaining nirva¯na or liberation for 6 all human beings. This concern is represented by the˙ common teach- 7 ing of this tradition that all sentient beings have the tatha¯gatagarbha 8 within themselves, which enables them to be eventually enlightened. 9 Tatha¯gatagarbha literally means the womb or matrix of the Tatha¯gata, 40111 the Buddha. The Chinese translation of this word is rulaizang (the 1 embryo-container of Buddha) or foxing (Buddha nature). Takasaki 21111 Jikido¯ has observed that the meaning of the word tatha¯gatagarbha in the folio 56 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 use of this tradition is closely related to other words such as tatha¯gatago- 2 tra, buddhadha¯tu, dharmadha¯tu. From this observation he suggests that 3 what is called Buddha nature involves the nature (dha¯tu/svabha¯va) of 4 the Buddha and the cause (hetu) of the Buddha, as these Sanskrit 5111 words signify.10 Since tatha¯gatagarbha or Buddha nature appears to 6 involve something like the “essence” of Buddha, it entails the ques- 7 tion of whether it is a substantialist concept. Also since tatha¯gatagarbha 8 thought reintroduces the notion of self, along with other kataphatic 9 terms, into Buddhist discourse, from the very beginning it runs the 10 risk of being reappropriated by the Brahmanical metaphysical notion 11 of Self (a¯tman). 2 However, things are not as simple as they appear. Ma¯dhyamika 3111 claims that all things are devoid of self-existence, and refuses to take 4 a stand concerning the existence of things. Historically, scholars have 5 argued: is it not itself a position concerning the nature of things 6 to claim that all things are devoid of self-existence? Is emptiness 7 not itself an interpretation of the nature of things?11 Although 8 Ma¯dhyamika claims that to avoid substantialization, emptiness is 9 only a conventional designation manifesting dependent co-arising, it 20111 cannot be denied that this claim addresses, after all, the issue of the 1 nature of things. If Ma¯dhyamika nonetheless refers to the nature of 2 the existence of things in a certain way, why cannot the tatha¯gatagarbha 3 tradition try another way? The point again is not that some words 4 cannot be used, but how to use them. The exponents of tatha¯gata- 5 garbha thought are fully aware of the risk and understand that they 6 must use positive language differently. They make various efforts to 7 impose restrictions on their use of kataphatic terms. Although in a 8 few cases tatha¯gatagarbha is equated with Self without clarification,12 9 in most cases some kind of restriction is apparent. Of course, we must 30111 examine carefully whether their efforts have been successful. 1 The main clarifications made by the exponents of tatha¯gatagarbha 2 thought can be divided into two interrelated kinds. One I like to call 3 strategic, as far as the content of this clarification is concerned. 4 Another kind is theoretical, namely, of restrictions more substantially 5 imposed upon the explanation of tatha¯gatagarbha thought. Both are 6 crucial to a non-substantialized tatha¯gatagarbha thought. 7 First, some tatha¯gatagarbha texts clarify that the teaching of tatha¯gata- 8 garbha is nothing but a temporary expedient ( fangbian) and a 9 practical/soteriological strategy. For instance, the Maha¯parinirva¯na 40111 Su¯tra mentions that ordinary people do not understand the Buddha’s˙ 1 teaching of no-self and ask if there is no self, who keeps the rules of 21111 discipline, and who transgresses those rules. To those who have a folio 57 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 deep attachment to the sense of self and worry about the loss of self, 2 the Buddha says: “I have not preached that all sentient beings are 3 without self. [On the other hand,] I always proclaim that all sentient 4 beings possess the Buddha-nature. What else can the Buddha-nature 5111 be if not the self?”13 However, the Buddha continues: “The Buddha- 6 nature is in fact not the self. For the sake of [guiding] sentient beings, 7 I describe it as the self.”14 The text also shows how effective this 8 strategy is in attracting non-Buddhists to Buddhist practice. 9 This point is supported by other tatha¯gatagarbha texts. The 10 Ratnagotravibha¯ga points out that the teaching of tatha¯gatagarbha is 11 intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning “affection for 2 one’s self” – one of five defects caused by non-Buddhist teachings.15 3111 The Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra, though representing a syncretism between 4 tatha¯gatagarbha thought and the Yoga¯ca¯ra school, regards the teaching 5 of tatha¯gatagarbha as one form of skillful means (upa¯ya), just as the teach- 6 ing of no-self is. However, the purpose of tatha¯gatagarbha teaching “is 7 to make the ignorant cast aside their fear when they listen to the 8 teaching of egolessness,” and “to awaken the philosophers from their 9 clinging” to the Self.16 Finally, the text emphasizes that tatha¯gatagarbha 20111 thought should not be considered identical to the metaphysical Self. 1 Rather it is identical to the teaching of no-self.17 These clarifications 2 show us that the context of tatha¯gatagarbha thought is pragmatic and 3 soteriological. The purpose of this teaching is not to reintroduce 4 the metaphysical Self into Buddhism, or to smuggle the Brahmanical 5 Self in by the back door, through an investigation of the ontological 6 structure of self. Rather it is to lead more people to the Buddhist 7 path and to the teaching of no-self more effectively through some- 8 thing that looks like a notion of self, namely, appears to presuppose 9 something within each self. 30111 Noticing this context is important. It will help to avoid jumping to 1 the conclusion that tatha¯gatagarbha thought is simply another case of 2 metaphysical imagination. However, a soteriological theory also can 3 be based on a metaphysical notion or seek support from a meta- 4 physical notion, just as the metaphysical theory of Brahmanism can 5 entail its own soteriology. Merely giving strategic reasons is not 6 sufficient in defining a teaching of tatha¯gatagarbha as clearly distin- 7 guishable from any metaphysical notion of self or from any theory of 8 essence. Thus, the thinkers of the tatha¯gatagarbha thought must 9 provide more substantial reasons for the non-substantialized explana- 40111 tion of this teaching. 1 One further clarification of tatha¯gatagarbha thought made by some 21111 texts is the emphasis on the meaning of tatha¯gatagarbha or Buddha folio 58 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 nature as cause or causal element. The Ratnagotravibha¯ga plainly states 2 that the tatha¯gatadha¯tu (the synonym for tatha¯gatagarbha in the text) is 3 the cause of the acquisition of the Buddhahood. The Sanskrit word 4 dha¯tu here, it underscores, “is especially used in the sense of ‘hetu’ (a 5111 cause).”18 Thus the tatha¯gatagarbha, or Buddha nature, is at the same 6 time called “the cause of Buddha nature (rulaixingyin or foxingyin in 7 Chinese).”19 The Ratnagotravibha¯gaalso quotes a passage from another 8 tatha¯gatagarbha text, the S´rı¯ma¯la¯devı¯simhana¯da (hereafter S´rı¯ma¯la¯) Su¯tra, 9 to explain the notion of the Buddha ˙nature as cause: “[I]f there were 10 no [tatha¯gatagarbha], there would be neither aversion towards suffer- 11 ing nor longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards [nirva¯na].”20 2 According to this su¯tra, although the tatha¯gatagarbha is obscured˙ by 3111 defilements in unenlightened beings, this tatha¯gatagarbha nonetheless 4 determines their possibility or potential of attaining Buddhahood. In 5 this connection, the notion of tatha¯gatagarbha is nothing but a soterio- 6 logical notion of the inner cause or thrust for liberation within all 7 sentient beings. It serves the soteriological purpose of affirming the 8 possibility and potential of realizing enlightenment within sentient 9 beings and encouraging them to move forward on the Buddhist path. 20111 This accent on the soteriological–causal dimension of the tatha¯gata- 1 garbha thought is undeniable. 2 However, the problem with these two texts is that they declare a 3 tatha¯gatagarbha not only responsible for the final liberation, but also 4 for samsaric life.21 Soteriologically, this view explains that when 5 defiled or covered by defilement, the tatha¯gatagarbha entails samsa¯ra as 6 well. What is underlined is thus a turn from defilements to the˙ orig- 7 inal purity. In this aspect it reflects an early attempt of the tradition 8 to stress the importance of existential transformation for every 9 human being through soteriological practice. However, the texts 30111 themselves do not warrant this soteriological understanding. They 1 open themselves to ontological or even cosmological interpreta- 2 tion due to their implications of the tatha¯gatagarbha as the only basis 3 of the world. The problem demonstrates that if a causal theory is to 4 be non-substantialist, it must clarify itself in such a way as to avoid 5 lending itself to any interpretation of a metaphysical essence or 6 cosmological origin. 7 A better clarification of the Buddha nature as non-substantialized 8 causal element or relation comes in the Maha¯parinirva¯na Su¯tra. This 9 scripture considers the Buddha nature to be identical ˙to the twelve- 40111 fold chain of interdependent arising (dva¯das´a¯n˙ga pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da). 1 “This twelvefold chain of interdependent arising is called Buddha 21111 nature.”22 “Because there is cause, or cause vis-à-vis cause, . . . it is folio 59 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 called Buddha nature.”23 “All sentient beings must have such a 2 twelvefold chain of interdependent arising; therefore it is said that all 3 sentient beings have Buddha nature.”24 Since the statement that 4 all sentient beings have Buddha nature may leave the impression 5111 that it presupposes something permanent, the scripture explains that 6 it is said thus because the chain of interdependent arising is perma- 7 nent.25 This amounts to saying that change and causal relation are 8 permanent. It does not affirm any entity as permanent. The Buddha 9 nature thus is none other than a web of causal relations and the real- 10 ization of this. 11 Once the Buddha nature is regarded as cause and causal relation, 2 the scripture continues to propose two types of cause – the Buddha 3111 nature as direct cause and the Buddha nature as auxiliary cause. The 4 tatha¯gatagarbha is direct cause (zhengyin), and the practice of the six 5 pa¯ramita¯s is auxiliary cause ( yuanyin).26 Causal analysis of this kind 6 makes the theory of Buddha nature more tenable as well as distin- 7 guishing it from a metaphysical theory of essence or origin. However, 8 in the tatha¯gatagarbha tradition the Buddha nature is described not 9 only as a cause, but also as an effect or fruit. In describing this 20111 fruit or the reality of Buddhahood, tatha¯gatadha¯tuor buddhadha¯tuis used 1 also in the sense of nature or svabha¯va. To avoid substantializing 2 Buddha nature, something more must be done to clarify the special 3 meaning of this “nature.” This awareness leads to another effort at 4 de-substantialization. 5 The effort is to identify the Buddha nature with emptiness. The 6 Maha¯parinirva¯naSu¯tra maintains: “What is empty is Buddha nature.”27 7 ˙ 8 When you see the Buddha nature, you see no more the 9 inherent nature of all dharmas. . . . Because you do not see 30111 the inherent nature of all dharmas, you see the Buddha 1 nature. . . . If you still see this inherent nature, you do not 2 see the Buddha nature. . . . Prajñ¯paa ¯ramita¯ is empty, . . . tathata¯ 3 is empty, nirva¯na is empty, . . . all dharmas are empty.28 4 ˙ 5 This is a good example of integrating tatha¯gatagarbha thought with the 6 teaching of the Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ and Ma¯dhyamika. Emptiness is main- 7 tained in the original sense of being without self-existence or inherent 8 nature.The Buddha nature is empty in nature, just like other Buddhist 9 soteriological terms – Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯, tathata¯, nirva¯na, and so on. The 40111 Buddha nature is also beyond the dichotomy of ˙existence and non- 1 existence. “For the sake of accommodating the conventional world, 21111 it is said that nirva¯na exists.”29 So is the Buddha nature. The Buddha ˙ folio 60 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 nature abides nowhere. Because it is good for being a temporary 2 expedient, it is said that the Buddha nature can be seen in sentient 3 beings.”30 These statements make tatha¯gatagarbha thought resistant to 4 any understanding of the Buddha nature as substance or essence. 5111 Another forceful clarification is the identification of the Buddha 6 nature and the Middle Way. The Maha¯parinirva¯naSu¯tra declares: 7 “The Middle Way is called Buddha nature. . . . You˙ do not follow 8 the Middle Way, therefore, you do not realize the Buddha nature.”31 9 “The Buddha nature is the ultimate meaning of emptiness and this 10 ultimate meaning of emptiness is called Middle Way.”32 Here we see 11 a perfect accord with Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Ka¯rika¯ 24:18, the identification of 2 emptiness, interdependent arising, and the Middle Way. The scrip- 3111 ture just extends this identical relation to the Buddha nature. 4 In explaining this relation of identity among emptiness, the Middle 5 Way and the Buddha nature, the scripture emphasizes something 6 typical of tatha¯gatagarbha thought, asserting that the Buddha nature 7 and the ultimate meaning of emptiness must go beyond both “empty 8 (s´u¯nya)” and “nonempty (as´u¯nya).” The Middle Way has neither 9 fixation on “empty” nor on “nonempty.” A dialectic result of freeing 20111 oneself from the attachment to any one-sided views is that the wise 1 attain the skillful or situational use of either term. In other words, the 2 supreme wisdom transcends conventional binary distinctions, but 3 nonetheless makes use of them strategically in the world of conven- 4 tions. This point obviously is supported by Na¯ga¯rjuna’s famous 5 statement about the relation of parama¯rtha and samvrti.33 Na¯ga¯rjuna’s 6 thought implies as well that as conventional designation,˙ ˙ emptiness, 7 just like nonemptiness, cannot be privileged ultimately. 8 Derived from, and complementing, the thought of Ma¯dhyamika, 9 the following notion is expressed by the scripture: “Only seeing that 30111 all are empty without seeing the nonempty side – this cannot be 1 called Middle Way. Only seeing that all have no self without also 2 seeing the self – this cannot be called Middle Way.”34 This is to say 3 that empty and nonempty, self and nonself, are equally partial in 4 terms of the ultimate Middle Way. From the transcendent perspec- 5 tive of the Middle Way, one should not fix on one side while ignoring 6 the other. Thus the scripture provides legitimation for, and also 7 restriction on, the use of terms, such as nonemptiness, self, perma- 8 nence, purity, and existence, in tatha¯gatagarbha thought. The restric- 9 tion is that, although their use is inevitable, these terms must be 40111 used in a relational perspective. They must be de-sedimented and 1 regarded as expedient only. In this way the tatha¯gatagarbha or Buddha 21111 nature eschews reification. folio 61 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 However, in the texts of the Ratnagotravibha¯ga and the S´rı¯ma¯la¯Su¯tra, 2 it is said that the tatha¯gatagarbha or Buddha nature is only empty of 3 adventitious defilements that cover it, but not empty of its own innate 4 purity.35 It is appropriate, and even necessary, to talk about the 5111 existence (or nonemptiness) of purity, permanence, joy, and so on, 6 as practical virtues from a soteriological perspective.36 However, 7 without insisting at the same time on its strategic nature or the ulti- 8 mate transcendence of both as´u¯nya and s´u¯nya in the sense of the 9 Middle Way, the texts lose the capacity to resist reification. 10 One tatha¯gatagarbha text of extreme importance for East Asian 11 Buddhism worth mentioning here is the Dacheng Qixin Lun (The 2 Awakening of Faith in the Maha¯ya¯na), a blending of Indian Maha¯ya¯na 3111 Buddhist thought and indigenous Chinese mind–nature theory.37 4 Some scholars have suggested that this text contributes to the further 5 substantialization of tatha¯gatagarbha thought.38 However, this is not 6 true. At least two crucial points made by the text contribute to the 7 de-substantialization of the Buddha nature. First, while the text, 8 following its Indian precursor, describes the tatha¯gatagarbha or the 9 mind of suchness as both “truly empty” and “truly nonempty,” it 20111 places both of these terms strictly in the sphere of conventional 1 conceptualization and binary distinction. The higher meaning of 2 suchness, however, is beyond both: 3 4 All words and speeches are dependent designations without 5 [corresponding] reality. . . . What is termed suchness is with- 6 out any form of existence as well. Suchness is, so to speak, 7 the limit of conceptualization wherein the word is used to put 8 an end to other words. But the whole [or the body] of such- 9 ness has no existence to be put an end to, for all things truly 30111 exist as they are; nor is there anything to be established par- 1 ticularly, for all things are equally in the state of suchness.39 2 3 This passage clearly shows that it is not legitimate to regard the 4 tatha¯gatagarbha or the mind of suchness as an entity, substance or 5 essence. The Buddha nature itself is not an entity over and above the 6 true existence of all things, namely, over and above the interdepen- 7 dent arising of all things. The Buddha nature merely denies or 8 empties the self-existence of all things, while at the same time 9 affirming the interrelated, non-self-identical existence of all things 40111 through this denial or emptying. 1 This “double character” also is made clear by the discussion of 21111 “truly empty” and “truly nonempty” as provisional distinctions. The folio 62 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 so-called “empty” side is not a form of existence, nor is it a form of 2 nonexistence. Because the minds of all unenlightened beings are 3 deluded by binary conceptualization, emptiness is taught. “Once 4 they are free from their deluded minds, they will find that there is 5111 nothing to be emptied.”40 The so-called “nonempty” side manifests 6 the dharma body empty of delusion, but nonetheless “has no form 7 of existence to be grasped.”41 Thus “empty” and “nonempty” intrin- 8 sically involve each other. The double character is not “hardly 9 conceivable” in this text, as Gadjin Nagao claims,42 but more skill- 10 fully maintained than in the S´rı¯ma¯la¯Su¯tra and the Ratnagotravibha¯ga. 11 Second, the text identifies the one mind of suchness with “the mind 2 of the sentient being.”43 This one mind thus has two aspects: the mind 3111 of suchness and the mind of the cycle of life and death, namely, the 4 enlightened mind and the deluded mind. The enlightened mind 5 and the deluded mind are the same mind. They are non-dualistic. 6 Since this one mind has these two aspects, the text stresses: “What is 7 called enlightenment means that the whole of the mind frees from 8 [deluded] thoughts. The characteristic of that which is free from 9 thoughts is equal to the sphere of emptiness.”44 “One instant of 20111 thought corresponds to suchness. . . . Because it is far away even from 1 subtle [deluded] thoughts, the insight into the nature of the mind [the 2 suchness] is gained.”45 Notice the clarification made here concerning 3 the whole of the mind – it is equal to emptiness.46 More importantly, 4 these statements suggest a way of existentializing the issue of Buddha 5 nature. As a Chinese commentator later elucidates: 6 7 This one mind is none other than the presently deluded 8 mind of the sentient being. . . . When it is deluded, the circle 9 of life and death starts and the whole of the mind of such- 30111 ness is in the state of life and death; when it is enlightened, 1 the circle ends and this mind of life and death itself is the 2 whole of [the mind of ] suchness.47 3 4 The central concern of the notion of one mind, according to this 5 understanding, is the existential–practical transformation of the 6 human mind from the deluded to the enlightened. In other words, it 7 is the transformation of the human subjectivity from the inauthentic, 8 illusory self-existence to the authentic, relational existence. The 9 notion of one mind is just a provisional means to encourage this exis- 40111 tential transformation. All the uses of other similar terms are basically 1 related to this existential–soteriological dimension, and this dimen- 21111 sion is underscored and supported by the notion of one mind.48 folio 63 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Since the Buddha nature is non-dualistic from “the presently deluded 2 mind of the sentient being,” it is not regarded as substance or essence 3 behind the existential function of ordinary minds. In this aspect the notion 4 noticeably bridges the gap between tatha¯gatagarbha thought and Chan 5111 Buddhist ideology. 6 This survey of tatha¯gatagarbha thought shows that it is premature to 7 see the whole tatha¯gatagarbha tradition as the metaphysical reappro- 8 priation of Buddhist thought. Rather, the articulation and evolution 9 of tatha¯gatagarbha thought involve the very effort to resist any meta- 10 physical appropriation. In this aspect, it can even be said that 11 tatha¯gatagarbha thought involves the use of certain deconstructive, 2 or even self-deconstructive, strategies. However, this struggle within 3111 tatha¯gatagarbha thought becomes or provides the context for further 4 struggles between metaphysical appropriation and deconstruction. In 5 other words, tatha¯gatagarbha thought, on the one hand, meets the need 6 of Buddhist soteriological practice, and on the other, calls for its 7 further deconstruction. We may cautiously define this call or neces- 8 sity for deconstruction as follows in terms of the above survey of 9 tatha¯gatagarbha thought: 20111 First, any attempt to equate tatha¯gatagarbha thought with the meta- 1 physical Self without any clarification amounts to a metaphysical 2 appropriation; it inevitably calls for a deconstructive effort. 3 Second, the terms used in tatha¯gatagarbha thought, such as Buddha 4 nature, self, nonempty, permanence, purity, rely heavily on the 5 restriction or clarification of their soteriological context and dimen- 6 sion. They must be regarded as temporary expedients. Apart from 7 this context and dimension, or without being treated as temporary 8 expedients, they lead to a kind of reification or sedimentation that 9 calls for deconstruction. 30111 Third, theoretically, tatha¯gatagarbha thought needs a series of 1 careful clarifications or modifications to resist any metaphysical 2 appropriation. Due to the insufficient clarification or explanation of 3 non-substantialist tatha¯gatagarbha thought present in some texts, an 4 ensuing deconstructive operation may be necessary. 5 Fourth, even when its soteriological context is clear, the emphasis 6 on its strategic use is present, and the theoretical explanation is 7 sufficient, possibilities always exist for misunderstanding or misinter- 8 preting it as something quasi-reifying or quasi-metaphysical. The 9 deconstruction of these understandings or interpretations is always 40111 required. 1 Fifth, as we have indicated, the advent of tatha¯gatagarbha thought 21111 meets the need of Buddhist soteriological practice. When practice folio 64 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 moves forward, it may change the needs, and theories may always 2 fall behind practice. The call for the deconstruction of Buddha nature 3 may be rooted in the development of Buddhist soteriological prac- 4 tice itself that is, in turn, determined by various social-cultural and 5111 historical factors. 6 All these necessities are of two kinds – one is internal to tatha¯gata- 7 garbha thought; another is external. They are interrelated. Those 8 internal elements or external appropriations that become the target 9 of deconstruction may be defined as quasi-reifying or quasimeta- 10 physical, since the context determines that they are nonetheless 11 different from a metaphysical notion in the Western sense. What we 2 have surveyed thus becomes the overall background and context 3111 for the Chan Buddhist deconstruction of Buddha nature. Chan 4 Buddhism cannot have fallen from the sky without inherited intel- 5 lectual or spiritual resources. The thought of Buddha nature is part 6 of that heritage. Thus Chan Buddhism, almost from the beginning, 7 was involved in the struggle between the substantialization of the 8 Buddha nature and its deconstruction. 9 20111 Dao must flow freely – the 1 deconstruction of Buddha nature 2 in the Platform Su¯tra 3 4 Huineng’s deconstructive operation and its target – Shenxiu’s 5 doctrine of linian – in terms of the Platform Su¯tra, all concern the under- 6 standing of Buddha nature. Huineng’s famous verse about enlight- 7 enment most clearly shows his subversion of Shenxiu’s tendency to 8 reify enlightenment and the Buddha nature. “Originally there is no 9 tree of enlightenment,/Nor is there a stand with a clear mirror./ 30111 From the beginning not a thing exists;/Where, then, is a grain of dust 1 to cling?”49 This verse radically denies the Buddha nature as some- 2 thing entitative or substantial by undermining the dichotomy that 3 Shenxiu’s verse maintains between the Buddha nature and the de- 4 luded mind in the metaphor of mirror and dust. However, to see 5 more completely Huineng’s deconstructive endeavor, we must 6 examine more details of Huineng’s and Shenxiu’s doctrines. 7 Shenxiu draws his idea of linian (being free from thoughts) from 8 the text of the Dacheng Qixin Lun. In a treatise on the five expedient 9 means of the Maha¯ya¯na, which is believed to be the collection of his 40111 teachings, Shenxiu quotes passages directly from the Dacheng Qixin 1 Lun. For example, “What is called enlightenment means that the 21111 whole of the mind is free from [deluded] thoughts. . . .”50 The use of folio 65 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 the term linian (being free from thoughts) here thus appears to be the 2 starting point of Shenxiu’s own interpretation of linian. As we have 3 discussed, the Dacheng Qixin Lun identifies the Buddha nature, or the 4 mind of suchness, with emptiness in an effort at de-substantialization. 5111 By emphasizing yinian xiangying (the corresponding of one instant 6 of thought) or linian, and by identifying suchness with the minds of 7 sentient beings, it also suggests a way of existentializing the issue 8 of Buddha nature. However, that is only a suggestion in the text as 9 it stands. It relies on further interpretation. Moreover, despite this 10 treatise’s identification of the mind of suchness with the mind in 11 samsa¯ra, it puts a great deal of emphasis on this mind of suchness and 2 its˙ purity.51 As a result, the idea of linian could entail very different 3111 understandings. 4 Shenxiu’s interpretation is a quasi-reifying one. It is not utterly 5 reifying, mainly because the general context of his doctrine is soterio- 6 logical–practical and he maintains certain non-dualistic clarifica- 7 tions, though not always clearly, as some critical historians have tried 8 to reveal.52 Nevertheless, the criticisms from other Chan Buddhists 9 should not be seen as merely polemic and sectarian. There are 20111 obvious doctrinal and practical reasons that require the deconstruc- 1 tion of Shenxiu’s interpretation in the history of Chan Buddhism. Let 2 us look at how Shenxiu interprets linian first: 3 4 The mind of the Buddha is pure and detached from being 5 as well as nonbeing. If the body and the mind are not 6 aroused, one constantly maintains the true mind. What is 7 suchness? When the mind does not move, that is suchness; 8 when the form is not in motion, that is also suchness.53 9 30111 The whole [or essence] and the function are clearly distin- 1 guishable: being free from thoughts is the whole; seeing, 2 hearing, feeling and knowing are the function.54 3 4 Question: By what means can one achieve Buddhahood? 5 Answer: One achieves Buddhahood with the whole [or 6 essence] of the pure mind.55 7 8 Shenxiu’s interpretation clearly leaves room for a logocentric hier- 9 archy that privileges pure over impure, motionlessness over motion, 40111 the true mind over the ordinary mind, the whole (ti) over the func- 1 tion ( yong), even transcendence over immanence. Although the 21111 Buddha nature or the mind of suchness in the Dacheng Qixin Lun folio 66 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 involves the aspects of pure and impure, true and deluded, ti and 2 yong, Shenxiu places his notion of linian solely on the side of pure, true 3 and ti. Thus “being free from thoughts” not only means being free 4 from deluded thoughts, but also from motions and actions, including 5111 seeing, hearing, feeling, knowing, and thinking. By entering into this 6 “pure” and “quiet” state, Shenxiu and his followers believe that they 7 can attain liberation. 8 What kind of liberation are they searching for? Does not it reflect 9 a sort of Chan escapism?56 Related to this escapism is inevitably a 10 tendency towards reification, pointing to an enchanted place, a foun- 11 dation. Although Shenxiu does talk about the identification between 2 ti and yong, ti is like something from which yong flows and to which it 3111 also returns. This dialectic of ti and yong looks somewhat analogous 4 to a Hegelian dialectic, insofar as it privileges ti. 5 Such a notion of linian becomes the target of Huineng’s deconstruc- 6 tive operation. It is true that Huineng’s idea of wunian (no-thought or 7 no-thinking) also comes from the Dacheng Qixin Lun in which two 8 terms, linian and wunian, are almost synonyms. However, if we look at 9 Huineng’s creative interpretation of wunian, we must admit the great 20111 difference between Shenxiu’s linian and Huineng’s wunian. To subvert 1 Shenxiu’s linian, Huineng does not simply fall back on the opposite of 2 Shenxiu’s abandonment of all thoughts, such as an emphasis on the 3 importance of thoughts. Rather, Huineng proposes something that is 4 neither Shenxiu’s nor its opposite. Huineng’s endeavor is a typical 5 deconstructive one. He interprets wunian as follows: 6 7 No-thought means not to be carried away by thought in the 8 process of thought.57 . . . Successive thoughts do not stop; 9 prior thoughts, present thoughts, and future thoughts follow 30111 one after the other without cessation. . . . If one instant of 1 thought clings, then successive thoughts cling; this is known 2 as being fettered. If in all things successive thoughts do not 3 cling, then you are unfettered. Therefore, we consider this 4 non-abiding essential.58 . . . But do not stop thinking about 5 everything and eliminate all thoughts. As soon as thought 6 stops, one dies and is reborn elsewhere.59 7 8 What is no-thought? The [dharma] of no-thought means: 9 even though you see all things, you do not attach to them, 40111 . . . Even though you are in the midst of six dusts, you do 1 not stand apart from them, yet are not stained by them, and 21111 are free to come and go.60 . . . If you do not think of anything folio 67 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 in order to stop all thoughts, that is bondage by [dharmas]. 2 That is called a one-sided view.61 3 4 Huineng does several things to dismantle Shenxiu’s misleading 5111 ideas. First, Huineng appeals to the causal chain of thoughts and 6 things. All thoughts and things are interrelated and one causes 7 another. We all live with this flow of thoughts and things, and no one 8 can stop it. Huineng regards this unceasing flow, this non-abiding, as 9 the essential condition for human existence or human nature (weiren 10 benxing).62 11 Both freeing from thoughts (here referring to Shenxiu’s idea) and 2 attachment to thoughts (a common illness addressed by Buddhist 3111 soteriological discourses) are, for Huineng, two extremities that run 4 counter to this essential condition or nature. For this reason, they are 5 a hindrance to the way of liberation. Huineng’s solution to this 6 problem is to maintain the Middle Way. Though difficult, his advice 7 is not to stop something that you will never be able to stop, but to 8 detach yourself from it. This is none other than flowing together with 9 thoughts and things. To some extent, to practice this (as a soterio- 20111 logical expedient) is to return to your own nature. 1 Next, in relation to this advice, Huineng proposes his thesis 2 that dao must flow or circulate freely (dao xu tongliu).63 He asks: “Why 3 should dao be impeded instead?64 If the mind does not abide in things, 4 the dao circulates [or flows] freely; if the mind abides in things, it 5 becomes entangled.”65 He also names this mind of dao the “straight- 6 forward mind (zhixin)” and teaches his disciple about “only practicing 7 straightforward mind, and in all things having no attachments what- 8 soever.”66 In other words, they should “practice the straightforward 9 mind at all times, whether walking, standing, sitting, or reclining.”67 30111 These statements, tinged with a Daoist spirit, make it clear that 1 for Huineng, enlightenment or the realization of the Buddha nature 2 should not impede the living flux of the everyday world. Enlight- 3 enment or dao is rather the unimpeded or straightforward flowing 4 together with thoughts and things in all everyday circumstances. 5 Huineng’s deconstruction of Shenxiu’s idea apparently serves this 6 soteriological motif. From this perspective of free flowing together 7 with all thoughts and things Huineng strongly opposes Shenxiu’s way 8 of “contemplating the mind and contemplating purity, not moving 9 and not activating the mind.”68 Huineng’s thesis foreshadows, or is 40111 echoed by, the Hongzhou notion of renyun (following along with the 1 movement of all things or circumstances), a thesis central to main- 21111 stream Chan, although not always properly understood as such. folio 68 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 The consequence of Huineng’s interpretation of wunian is signifi- 2 cant. For instance, the affirmation of the causal chain and unimpeded 3 flux of thoughts and things provides the legitimacy for the emphasis 4 on the existential awakening of the human mind. According to 5111 Huineng, the imagined cessation of this causal chain and flux leads 6 nowhere but to continuous sufferings. Only by practicing non- 7 attachment within this chain or flux of thoughts and things can we 8 hope to attain liberation.69 For it is this chain or flux that also makes 9 possible the transformation or awakening of the human mind or 10 thought from delusion to enlightenment. The reason is obvious: this 11 flux (or the change of all individual thoughts or objects) brings about 2 passion, craving, impermanence, disillusionment, as well as enlight- 3111 enment. Although one instance of suffering does not necessarily entail 4 enlightenment, how could there be enlightenment without the afflic- 5 tion resulting from passion? They are not only interrelated, but also 6 mutually involved. Therefore, Huineng stresses: “[T]he very passions 7 are themselves enlightenment ( ji fannao shi puti).”70 On the other 8 hand, since the existence of a person is the flow of thoughts and feel- 9 ings, the existential difference of the mind and thought is always pos- 20111 sible. In this sense Huineng underscores: “[U]nawakened, even a 1 Buddha is a sentient being,” and “even a sentient being, if he is awak- 2 ened in an instant of thought, is a Buddha.”71 “When past thoughts 3 are deluded, this is the common man; when future thoughts are awak- 4 ened to, this is Buddha.”72 In other words, “[E]ven these sentient 5 beings, filled with passions and troubles,” are able to “gain enlight- 6 enment” through the change of one instant of thought.73 This empha- 7 sis on the existential transformation of the human mind and thought 8 has, without doubt, the consequence of excluding any substance, 9 essence or foundation outside the function of the human mind. Nor 30111 does it tend to reify the human mind or subjectivity itself, since the 1 goal of this transformation is to flow together with all things through 2 an empty mind, the mind devoid of self-attachment. Thus Huineng’s 3 teaching develops the existentializing point of the Dacheng Qixin Lun 4 concerning the realization of the Buddha nature, without relying 5 too much on a “true mind” distinguishable from the mind of the 6 sentient being. 7 It is also in this context that Huineng’s use of the term zixing (self 8 nature) should be correctly understood. Throughout the Platform 9 Su¯tra, Huineng seldom uses the term “Buddha nature.” He substi- 40111 tutes “self nature” for “Buddha nature.” At first sight, this use is no 1 different from those in the previous texts of tatha¯gatagarbha thought, 21111 since these texts refer to the tatha¯gatagarbha as the mind of self nature folio 69 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 and purity as well. It is true that there are linguistic and phrasal links 2 between the Platform Su¯tra and those texts of tatha¯gatagarbha thought, 3 especially the Dacheng Qixin Lun. 4 However, upon closer inspection, Huineng’s use of “self nature” 5111 is actually unique, for it tends to emphasize more plainly the possi- 6 bility of existential awakening within the living body and mind of 7 every sentient being. It underlines the point that every human being 8 can actualize this possibility or fulfill this goal through the practice 9 of non-attachment in all everyday circumstances. As we have indi- 10 cated, it does not stress the need to establish a Buddha nature or true 11 mind clearly distinguishable from the living mind of every sentient 2 being, namely, the mind in samsa¯ra. Attaining Buddhahood is but the 3111 existential transformation of the˙ same mind of the human being in 4 everyday life. This point is made much clearer than in the Dacheng 5 Qixin Lun. The meaning of this term, therefore, is soteriological, func- 6 tional and non-substantialist. 7 Huineng’s point is clearly non-substantialist, since “self nature” 8 here does not mean something existent in and by itself, or self- 9 identity. No such meaning is involved in the use of this term at all. 20111 Rather, Huineng points out: “Human nature is empty (shiren 1 xingkong).”74 Here empty is used, first of all, in the same sense as the 2 Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ and Ma¯dhyamika would maintain, namely, devoid 3 of self existence or self nature. Second, it is used in the post- 4 Ma¯dhyamika sense as the Yoga¯ca¯ra school and some tatha¯gatagarbha 5 texts would maintain, namely, that emptiness, or being devoid of self 6 existence, is the nature of all things. This understanding of the empty 7 nature of all things, in its best form, is maintained as something like 8 the condition of the possibilities of all things. It is not an origin or 9 essence of all things, but nonetheless involves everything. Everything 30111 becomes possible because of this emptiness, this web of relativity. 1 Huineng’s saying that the self nature involves the 10,000 things 2 should be understood in terms of this meaning.75 Clearly this view 3 involves an objective or cognitive element, insofar as it describes 4 the condition of the possibilities of all things. We may call it quasi- 5 transcendental or ontologically neutral, since it can lead to a reified 6 view by substantializing this condition or to a de-substantialized view 7 by stressing its pragmatic, expedient function. However, when 8 Huineng states that emptiness is human nature or human nature is 9 empty, he does not stop with this second usage, but gives the term 40111 new meanings. His use of the term involves the meanings of rela- 1 tionality, the existential changeability of personhood, and the 21111 accomplishment of action. folio 70 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 To make this point clearer, I must clarify the linguistic–cultural 2 background of Huineng’s use of the term xing (nature) or renxing 3 (human nature) in relation to the term zixing. Scholars have com- 4 monly accepted that the Confucian, especially Mencian, emphasis on 5111 the innate goodness of human nature had great impact on the 6 Chinese Buddhist acceptance of tatha¯gatagarbha thought. However, 7 scholars also have recently revealed that the notion of human nature 8 in Chinese philosophy is different from the Western notion of human 9 nature as a changeless essence contained in all individual human 10 beings. For instance, Tang Junyi, in his extensive study on renxing, 11 explicates that the classical Confucian conception of xing is concerned 2 primarily with the existential changeability and growth of each living 3111 human being. The xing is discussed from a practical and dynamic 4 perspective. The meaning of xing involves directionality, relationality, 5 and existential–practical development.76 In the Mencian theory of 6 mind–nature, the xing is explained in terms of the growth of each indi- 7 vidual mind. “It should not be termed an essence or principle deeply 8 rooted in the mind.”77 9 In a similar vein, Roger Ames radically questions the adequacy of 20111 the translation of the Chinese term renxing as “human nature” in its 1 Western sense.78 Ames clarifies the Chinese meaning of xing as “a 2 creative act.”79 “[X ]ing denotes the entire process of being a person. 3 . . . [A] person is not a sort of being, but first and foremost a doing 4 and making.... [X ]ing is not reducible to what is innate or a priori.”80 5 These expositions have, to some extent, clarified the linguistic- 6 cultural background of Huineng’s use of xing as well. 7 Let us now look at one example of Huineng’s use of xing in the 8 Platform Su¯tra: 9 30111 . . . immediately awakened. It is like the great sea which 1 gathers all the flowing streams, and harmonizes the small 2 waters with the large waters as a whole. This is realizing your 3 own nature. [Such a person] does not abide either inside or 4 outside; he is free to come or go. Readily he casts aside the 5 mind that clings [to things], and there is no obstruction to 6 his passage.81 7 8 Realizing one’s own nature here is not explained in terms of what 9 one recognizes but how one acts, how one achieves the existential 40111 transformation of the mind, and how one practices the free flowing 1 together (or being harmonized) with all things. The focus is not on 21111 the cognitive element contained in the second usage, but on the folio 71 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 existential function of the mind and pragmatic wisdom (zhi), on the 2 practical–behavioral carrying out of non-attachment. The usage of 3 xing here is plainly operational. We have no difficulty in detecting 4 the underlying accord of Huineng’s usage with the Confucian one, 5111 despite its Buddhist context. The understanding of this unique usage 6 is crucial to avoid any accusation that Huineng’s, or his followers’, 7 “self nature” represents a substantialist view. The usage is also a good 8 example to demonstrate the Chinese transformation of the original 9 Buddhist usage. 10 11 No root, no foundation, no mind, no Buddha – 2 deconstruction in the Hongzhou Chan 3111 4 A main target of the Hongzhou school’s deconstruction is Shenhui’s 5 teaching of “establishing awareness and cognition (li zhijian)”82 6 in relation to his understanding of the Buddha nature. Although 7 Shenhui is on the side of Huineng and makes a significant contri- 8 bution to the criticism of Shenxiu’s idea of linian, scholars have 9 indicated that Shenhui’s thought deviates from Huineng’s in some 20111 important aspects.83 Shenhui’s own interpretation of wunian, if we 1 make a careful comparison between it and Huineng’s, is problem- 2 atic. This fact, to a great extent, results in the Hongzhou school’s 3 deconstructive operation. The Hongzhou school should be consid- 4 ered the true inheritor of Huineng’s thought in those essential 5 aspects. Since the context of Shenhui’s teaching is soteriological, and 6 in some aspects he does stand with Huineng and with Hongzhou, we 7 may define only some elements of his thought as quasi-reifying or 8 quasi-logocentric. However, these elements make the difference 9 between the Hongzhou and Shenhui’s teachings and make a decon- 30111 structive operation indispensable. 1 Two major interrelated problems exist in Shenhui’s teaching. First, 2 he privileges a kind of awareness or intuitive knowledge over ordi- 3 nary, discriminative cognition. The former is called “empty tranquil 4 awareness (kongji zhi zhi),”84 and the latter refers to ordinary activi- 5 ties of seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing ( jian wen jue zhi) with 6 respect to discriminative consciousness. All such ordinary activities 7 must be emptied or transcended in the state of wunian, according to 8 Shenhui.85 This disruption of ordinary cognitive activity is overem- 9 phasized by his interpretation of awareness. As he states, “This 40111 awareness does not have any causal link, since it is the prajña¯ wisdom 1 of the original whole [or essence] of emptiness and tranquillity itself 21111 that is aware.”86 By cutting off this causal link, Shenhui shows his folio 72 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 tendency to isolate this awareness from all everyday activities. He 2 equates the achievement of this awareness with the attainment of 3 Buddhahood. In Zongmi’s terms, he considers “the one word aware- 4 ness [or intuitive knowledge] the gate to all wonders.”87 5111 Second, in using the category of ti and yong to explain awareness, 6 Shenhui favors the ti and sees awareness as the benzhi zhiyong, that is, 7 as the function of the wisdom of the ti itself that relies on no other 8 conditions. For instance, he states: “In the whole (ti) of emptiness and 9 tranquillity, there is the original wisdom, the illuminating function 10 ( yong) of which is called awareness.”88 It is true that this view involves 11 the identification of the ti and the yong, since the yong is only the 2 yong of the ti and the ti is that which functions ( yong). However, upon 3111 closer examination, we find that in fact he cancels out yong in favor 4 of ti. Zongmi’s explanation is revealing on this point. He asserts: 5 “[Shenhui’s notion of ] the awareness of tranquillity points to the 6 ti.”89 It is the ti that is aware of itself and of all things. This ti is also 7 equivalent to the mind of non-abiding, the Buddha nature or self 8 nature. Since this ti does not rely on any causal link or causal condi- 9 tion, it is clearly distinguishable from the mind in samsa¯ra. This is an 20111 apparent departure from Huineng’s notion of self nature˙ or the mind 1 of non-abiding that is identified with the mind of one instant of 2 thought, namely, the mind of the sentient being. 3 As we have noted, the mind of non-abiding, in Huineng, is the 4 existential awakening of the same mind of the sentient being. It does 5 not presuppose a foundation-like “whole of mind” (xinti). Shenhui’s 6 privileging of the ti, it seems to me, falls back on Shenxiu’s notion 7 of true mind (zhenxin) and to that of the Dacheng Qixin Lun. There 8 seems to be no fundamental difference between Shenhui’s xinti and 9 Shenxiu’s zhenxin in their quasi-reifying aspect. Although Shenhui 30111 shows the non-objectified feature of this “mind of emptiness and tran- 1 quillity” by relating it to wisdom and to the function of awareness, it 2 is not clearly distinguishable from an absolutized subjectivity – an 3 inverted substance. 4 The Hongzhou school overturns Shenhui’s position in both of 5 these respects. First, the Hongzhou school strongly opposes any char- 6 acterization of the realization of the Buddha nature or enlightenment 7 as zhijian or zhijie. It challenges two opposed positions: equating 8 enlightenment with ordinary cognition and equating enlightenment 9 with awareness or intuitive knowledge isolatable from ordinary 40111 cognitive activities. The second position is Shenhui’s. The Hongzhou 1 position is best represented by the following exposition found in the 21111 sayings of Huangbo Xiyun: folio 73 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 [Y]ou students of the dao . . . will realize your original mind 2 only in the realm of seeing, hearing, feeling and knowing. 3 Although the original mind does not belong to seeing, 4 hearing, feeling and knowing, this mind cannot be separated 5111 from them. You should not simply start your cognitive 6 maneuver from them, nor allow them to give rise to any 7 conceptual thought; yet nor should you seek the mind apart 8 from them or abandon them in your pursuit of the dharma. 9 Do not let your mind be identical with them nor separated 10 from them . . . be free everywhere, and nowhere is a place 11 where the dao cannot be practiced.90 2 3111 The point of the Hongzhou school expressed here by Huangbo is 4 evident: although enlightenment cannot be pursued through mere 5 cognition, it cannot be isolated from all activities that may be related 6 to a further cognitive maneuver. The prerequisite for enlightenment 7 is the cessation of one’s cognitive maneuver – the illusory grasping 8 of the object of self-identity. However, of equal importance is not 9 separating oneself from everyday activities. For the Hongzhou school 20111 holds that seeing, hearing, feeling and knowing are part of our 1 everyday activities. All everyday activities are opportunities or neces- 2 sary conditions for the realization of enlightenment. This under- 3 standing is due to the Hongzhou school’s belief in the Maha¯ya¯na 4 dictum that without samsa¯ra or samvrti there is no nirva¯na or parama¯rtha, 5 a strictly relational perspective.˙ Enlightenment˙ ˙ is only˙ the establish- 6 ment and function of the attitude of non-clinging within ordinary 7 activities. The Hongzhou masters often ask where one can go or how 8 one can be enlightened apart from this conventional world and 9 everyday activities. As authentic followers of the Middle Way, the 30111 Hongzhou masters see Shenhui’s isolation of awareness from ordi- 1 nary activities as another kind of attachment or fixation. From a 2 relational perspective, it must be overturned. 3 Second, the Hongzhou school invalidates Shenhui’s logocentric 4 hierarchy of ti and yong. Shenghui’s ti is independent of all conditions 5 ( yuan). Zongmi defines Shenhui’s hierarchy as “the original [or self ] 6 function of the self nature (zixing benyong),” while the Hongzhou posi- 7 tion is criticized by him as only “the application [of the self nature] 8 in various conditions (suiyuan yingyong).”91 Since Shenhui’s ti or self 9 nature is independent of all conditions, its own yong is abstracted from 40111 everyday activities and all circumstances. Shenhui and Zongmi 1 prefer this kind of self function. However, without that “application 21111 in conditions,” how can there be any real function at all? There is folio 74 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 no doubt that Shenhui’s view results in the cancellation of yong in 2 favor of ti. From the Hongzhou perspective, on the contrary, there 3 is only “application in conditions,” and there is no such thing as the 4 “self function of the self nature.” The Hongzhou position, as formu- 5111 lated by Zongmi, is as follows: 6 7 If one examines the nature of this whole [or essence], he will 8 find that ultimately it can neither be perceived nor realized 9 just as the eye cannot see itself, and so forth. If one considers 10 its application, he will see that every move and every action 11 that he takes is the Buddha nature, and that there is nothing 2 else that can either realize it or be realized.92 3111 4 The stance of the Hongzhou Chan here is to restore more com- 5 pletely the existential–soteriological and pragmatic–behavioral 6 concern of Buddhism in the Chinese context. It strives against any 7 quasi-metaphysical or quasi-reifying use of the Chinese category of 8 ti and yong, including Shenhui’s. The Hongzhou Chan does not 9 oppose the use of the term ti itself. What the Hongzhou masters are 20111 concerned with is how one should use it. It is all right for them to 1 use the ti as equivalent to the realization of the Buddha nature or 2 enlightenment. However, it must be used in the perspectival, rela- 3 tional, dynamic, pragmatic–behavioral sense and as temporary 4 expedient only, just as xing is used in the Platform Su¯tra that we have 5 discussed above. Since the ti or the Buddha nature or enlightenment 6 is not any kind of substance or entity, we can neither perceive nor 7 grasp it. 8 If we consider the ti as a dynamic whole or a web of relativity in 9 which we live and act every day and with which we attempt to live 30111 and act in harmony, then every move or action is connected to, or 1 a part of, that whole. Precisely for this reason the Hongzhou masters 2 emphasize that all everyday activities are nothing but the function of 3 the Buddha nature. The ti (or the Buddha nature), the yong (function 4 or application) and the yuan (temporal conditions) cannot be separ- 5 ated. This identical relation favors yong and subverts Shenhui’s 6 privileging of the ti. One may object that this seems to be the cancel- 7 lation of ti. However, if the ti is only a temporary expedient and is 8 understood in the sense of action, application and relation, there 9 is no need to cancel it out. The ti cannot exist in and by itself, and 40111 cannot be independent of this practical–behavioral context. 1 Although Zongmi’s formulation of the position of the Hongzhou 21111 school is fair, his interpretation of it is definitely wrong. For example, folio 75 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 Zongmi explains the Hongzhou position as follows: “[T]he black- 2 ness itself is the bright pearl, and the substance of the bright pearl is 3 ever invisible. If one wants to know the pearl, blackness itself is bright- 4 ness.”93 Metaphorically, Zongmi means that the Hongzhou school 5111 mixes the ordinary activities of the unenlightened person with the 6 activities of the enlightened person. In that case, Hongzhou Chan 7 runs the risk of denying the necessity of Buddhist practice, which is 8 a complete misunderstanding of Hongzhou. The central point of the 9 Hongzhou teaching is, of course, not to cancel Buddhist practice, but 10 to further remove all hindrances to this practice. 11 One such hindrance is the tendency toward reification. As is indi- 2 cated in Zongmi’s own description, Hongzhou Chan takes as its 3111 motto “let the mind be free (renxin)”: 4 5 Dao is the [ordinary] mind itself, and one cannot use the 6 [Buddha] mind to cultivate the [ordinary] mind; evil is also 7 the mind itself, and one cannot cut off the [evil] mind by 8 means of the [other] mind. Do not cut and do not produce; 9 letting the mind follow along with all circumstances and 20111 letting it be free, this is called liberation.94 1 2 Thus, the Hongzhou identification of all activities of the ordinary 3 mind with the Buddha nature is intended to deconstruct the dualistic 4 distinction of the ordinary mind and the Buddha nature, to recover 5 enlightenment as the existential–practical transformation of the ordi- 6 nary mind. The Hongzhou view is not to demolish the existential 7 changeability of the sentient being, but to reaffirm it through over- 8 turning the original hierarchy of the Buddha nature and the ordinary 9 mind. It echoes and develops Huineng’s teaching by placing more 30111 weight on the relation between all activities of the ordinary mind and 1 the realization of the Buddha nature. 2 The Hongzhou view must be understood in terms of this relational 3 perspective. As we have mentioned, everyday activities, for the 4 Hongzhou school, are the necessary condition for enlightenment in 5 the first place. Without samsa¯ra, there is no nirva¯na; therefore, the 6 ordinary mind is dao. I call˙ this the pre-enlightenment˙ aspect. The 7 Hongzhou view also involves a post-enlightenment aspect, which 8 reminds us that we must verify our own enlightenment in everyday 9 activities. After realizing enlightenment, we are still ordinary people 40111 doing ordinary tasks. The only difference, as pointed out by many 1 Chan masters, is that we now have an attitude of non-attachment and 21111 that attitude always works in everyday activities. To an enlightened folio 76 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 eye, then, every action is or can be seen as a function of the Buddha 2 nature. The relational perspective, therefore, is an enlightened per- 3 spective, not an unenlightened one. 4 However, the disclosure of, and emphasis on, this enlightened 5111 perspective is extremely important for unenlightened practitioners, 6 leading them in the right direction – to resist any separation of 7 enlightenment from everyday activities. Here our distinction of pre- 8 and post-enlightenment aspects is only intended for the purpose of 9 analysis. Generally speaking, the Hongzhou view advises students to 10 realize the mutual conditioning and mutual involvement of the 11 enlightened and the unenlightened. This does not confuse the two, 2 but rather sees them in the living reality of change and flux. The 3111 promotion of Buddhist practice is possible only within this living 4 reality of change and flux. 5 To flow together with this ever-changing reality is called renyun in 6 the Hongzhou school. The result of their deconstructive maneuver 7 is not to replace all old binary distinctions or logocentric hierarchies 8 with new ones. Rather, its standpoint or its strategy is to eschew or 9 detach from any dualistic oppositions. In other words, the Hongzhou 20111 masters keep themselves busy moving with all things and circum- 1 stances, staying with neither the Buddha nor the sentient being, 2 neither the extraordinary nor the ordinary, neither grasping nor 3 rejecting, neither nihilistic nor permanent, neither knowledge nor 4 non-knowledge, and so on. This elusive position is referred to by the 5 Chinese words renyun zizai, meaning “following along with the move- 6 ment of all things or circumstances and being free.”95 It constitutes 7 both part of the deconstructive strategy of Hongzhou and the under- 8 lying thesis that this deconstructive strategy ultimately serves. In the 9 recorded sayings of famous Hongzhou masters, we find frequent use 30111 of these words and similar expressions: 1 2 Following along with the movement of all things and in this 3 way living out your time.96 4 At all times . . . never attach yourself to one thing; just follow 5 97 6 along with the movement of all things the whole day long. 7 Following along with the movement of all things without any 8 restriction is called liberation.98 9 40111 Merely according to circumstances as they are, use up your 1 past karma; following along with [the change of ] circum- 21111 stances, put on your [different] clothes.99 folio 77 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 A similar expression is also found in Master Linji’s quotations. “The 2 mind changes in accordance with the myriad circumstances;/the way 3 it changes is truly profound./If you can realize its nature through this 4 flow,/you will have neither joy nor sorrow.”100 5111 In view of these understandings, the soteriological goal of Buddhist 6 practice, for Hongzhou Chan, should by no means be static or isolat- 7 able. The goal is to keep us moving or flowing with all things or 8 circumstances. The masters know very well that the living process of 9 change and flux will ruthlessly undercut every fixed position and 10 every attachment to self or self-identity without ever stopping. Reality 11 itself is deconstructive. Enlightenment cannot occur outside this flow. 2 Enlightenment is nothing but being harmonious with change and 3111 flux. An enlightened person would find inexhaustible wonders by 4 living a life in harmony with change and flux. This is the exact 5 content and context of the Hongzhou teaching of realizing the “self 6 nature” or “self mind,” insofar as the Hongzhou masters do use these 7 words sometimes. However, the profundity of this soteriological motif 8 pushes their deconstruction completely home, just as their decon- 9 structive strategy helps to reveal the profundity of this motif. 20111 A remarkable characteristic of the Hongzhou deconstruction is its 1 self-cancellation or self-effacement. This self-deconstruction is as 2 compelling as its deconstruction of the position of others. One famous 3 case is Mazu Daoyi’s self-effacement of his notion of “the mind is 4 Buddha.” When the notion is first taught by Mazu, it involves an 5 attempt to oppose the misunderstanding of the Buddha nature as 6 something outside or separable from the ordinary mind. It is itself a 7 kind of deconstructive operation upon the reifying view of the 8 Buddha nature. However, after he teaches this notion for a certain 9 period, it is inevitably sedimented or abstracted from the original 30111 context. His students display a tendency to attach themselves to this 1 notion. Then Mazu starts to teach a different notion that apparently 2 runs counter to his original teaching, a notion now emphasizing that 3 there is neither mind nor Buddha.101 In this way Mazu keeps himself 4 moving with different situations, avoids misleading students and 5 helps them to eschew sedimentation, fixation, and reification. This 6 self-effacement indicates that for Mazu, there is no need to establish 7 any logocentric hierarchy. He does not privilege any notion at all. 8 He is able to use any kataphatic terms in his soteriological teaching, 9 whenever the situation requires; but he is always also able to decon- 40111 struct the terms he has used. 1 Another famous example is Linji. Much attention has been paid 21111 to his notion of “an authentic person without rank.” But little heed folio 78 DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA NATURE

1111 has been paid to his self-erasing of this “authentic person without 2 rank.” The saying that there is an authentic person without rank, 3 just like many other sayings, is a kind of soteriological expedient 4 pointing to the existential transformation of personhood. The words 5111 themselves do not designate the reality of any metaphysical Self or 6 absolutized subjectivity. Linji knows well that someone, among his 7 audiences, may understand the notion in a reifying way. Therefore, 8 soon after proposing of this notion, he suddenly declares: “What kind 9 of shitty ass-wiper this authentic person without rank is!”102 It lets 10 people know that Linji himself is not so serious about this notion. In 11 fact, this non-serious attitude is simply a strategy of self-erasing. The 2 aim of this strategy is similar to Mazu’s. 3111 However, Linji may be the one, among all Chan masters, who uses 4 the clearest language to deconstruct all kataphatic terms that Chan 5 Buddhists have been using, including those used by himself. Let us 6 take a quick look at some of his sayings: 7 8 [M]y insight is different: I make no choice between the 9 secular and the sacred without, nor do I stay in the root and 20111 foundation within.103 1 [Y]ou must understand right now that the person here 2 listening to the Dharma has no [fixed] form, no characteris- 3 tics, no root, no foundation, no [particular] place he abides, 4 yet he is vibrantly alive.104 5 6 There is no Buddha, no [Dharma], no training, and no real- 7 ization. What are you so hotly chasing? Putting a head on 8 top of your head, you blind fools? Your head is right where 9 it should be. . . . Do not be deceived. If you turn to the 30111 outside, there is no [Dharma]; neither is there anything to be 1 obtained from the inside.105 2 3 Linji also points out: “The true dao is without substance.”106 As we 4 can see, all those terms, such as ti (substance), ben (foundation), xin 5 (mind), fo (Buddha), fa (dharma), zheng (realization), used either by 6 others or by Linji himself, have no legitimate reification. In this 7 aspect, Linji is unmistakably clear and quite radical. He is most 8 resolute and exemplary in taking a stance of flowing freely with all 9 things and circumstances. His de-reifying maneuver, as it stands in 40111 the text, should not be ignored by any scholar who intends to treat 1 him with a fair and critical attitude. The entire Linji Lu is full of the 21111 spirit and energy of deconstruction and self-deconstruction. folio 79 DECONSTRUCTION

1111 One characteristic of his discourse, shared by the discourse of 2 other Hongzhou masters, is the use of both kataphatic and apo- 3 phatic language. The Hongzhou masters both reconstruct and de- 4 construct Buddhist themes, notions and concepts. On the one hand, 5111 they ceaselessly deconstruct all terms including their own; on the 6 other, they never stop using positive terms. Deconstruction, for the 7 Hongzhou school, is not the end of all kataphatic discourses; it is 8 the companion of kataphatic discourse. The principle is to meet the 9 requirements of all flowing situations. The move and development 10 of situations call forth both the continuous use of positive language 11 for soteriological purposes and the continuous use of deconstructive 2 language for the same purposes. The Hongzhou masters are always 3111 aware of this call of practice. They echo it and do both at all times 4 without hesitation. This may be a good lesson for our contemporary 5 thinkers in dealing with the post-deconstruction situation. 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 80 1111 2 3 4 5111 Part II 6 7 8 9 THE LIMINOLOGY OF 10 11 LANGUAGE IN THE 2 3111 ZHUANGZI AND IN 4 5 CHAN BUDDHISM 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 5 4 5111 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY 6 7 OF LANGUAGE? 8 9 10 11 2 3111 One of the categories Western culture in twentieth century has 4 claimed to discover, according to Michel Foucault, is the limit.1 5 Inquiries into limits, such as the limit of man, the limit of conscious- 6 ness, the limit of reason, the limit of philosophy, the limit of science, 7 the limit of logic, the limit of language, etc., have extended over 8 a considerable part of Western discourse via various approaches. 9 However, recent Western discourse on the limit has much to do with 20111 the central theme of what Foucault called “the finitude of man and 1 the return of time.”2 Based on the dimensions of contingency, tem- 2 porality and historicity, postmodern discourse throws new light on 3 the limit and the limitless, the finite and the infinite, possibility and 4 actuality, with respect to philosophy, language, and so forth. This dis- 5 cussion of the limit distinguishes itself from previous ones by empha- 6 sizing: (1) a double, or, I might call, a dialectical, relation of the limit 7 and the limitless; (2) a transformation of, or a double play at, the limit. 8 Regarding the relation of the limit and the limitless, contemporary 9 thinkers take a position of what I call the immanent transcendence of 30111 the limit. While maintaining the impossibility of the absolute, of the 1 Limitless (be it God, Man, or the transcendental signified), contem- 2 porary thinkers do not give up the dimension of the limitless or the 3 infinite. While focusing on the limit or limitedness of the human exis- 4 tential situation, contemporary thinkers do not neglect the respon- 5 siveness of the limit or limitedness to the limitless. For example, 6 Foucault and Derrida assert that the limited, or every limit itself, is 7 open to limitless transformations. In other words, because of the limit 8 or limitedness, limitless substitutions of the limit are possible. Because 9 of the finite, infinite supplements of the finite are possible.3 The very 40111 limit that conditions the limited is also the condition of the possibil- 1 ities of more and different limitedness, the condition of the possi- 21111 bilities of going beyond itself. In this way it responds to the limitless. folio 83 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 In this view, the world consists of only the limited, but the changes 2 of the world, of the limited, or the transformations of the limit, are 3 limitless. The notion of an absolute, immovable limit, along with the 4 notion of a separated realm of transcendence, is apparently aban- 5111 doned. Limitlessness or what is beyond the limit is considered 6 inherent in the limit or limitedness. The limit simultaneously affirms 7 and subverts itelf through the limitlessness it inevitably carries within. 8 Every limit is thus in the endless process of transformations and 9 substitutions. In Foucault’s genealogical investigation, the problem of 10 limits is always and closely related to the problem of mutations, trans- 11 formations and the like.4 2 This kind of understanding directs us toward an important point – 3111 the transformation of the limit. In his seminal analysis of the limit and 4 transgression, Foucault pointed out: “The limit and transgression 5 depend on each other . . . a limit could not exist if it were absolutely 6 uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it 7 merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows.”5 Foucault, 8 therefore, concerned himself with the historicity of limits and the pos- 9 sibilities of going beyond them.6 The idea that no limit is absolutely 20111 uncrossable contributes to the contemporary understanding of limits 1 as both inevitable and relative. As a result, limits are seen more as 2 historically transformed and transformable. 3 The postmodern view of the transformation of the limit is also 4 reflected in postmodern thinkers’ rethinking of the end or the death 5 of philosophy. Derrida, among others, has stated: “I try to keep 6 myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and not death, 7 for I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death 8 of philosophy. . . .”7 An end or a death is more like an uncrossable 9 barrier that contradicts Derrida’s “double play” at the limit, an oper- 30111 ation that works within the limits of certain conceptual schemes, 1 while allowing their self-erasure. This “double play” rests upon his 2 understanding of the double structure of textuality – “the internal, 3 regulated play” – that simultaneously “inscribes and overflows the 4 limits of such a discourse.”8 Derrida’s own play, as such, is based on 5 the possibility and inevitability of the transformation of limits. 6 It is against this background of postmodern discussions of the 7 limit that David Wood’s coinage “liminology” is to be understood. 8 As Wood characterizes it, liminology is “a new kind of writing” 9 suggested by Derrida’s works, which radically problematizes the 40111 boundaries, thresholds, and brinks of philosophy, and “plays on and 1 around” them.9 Although Wood does not say much in defining a 21111 liminology, we can see the connection between his brief description folio 84 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE?

1111 and the general background I have outlined. The difference between 2 my discussion of liminology and his will be that I will not confine 3 liminology to a Derridean mode, but pay attention also to what other 4 contemporary thinkers have said about the issue of limits and how 5111 to deal with them, thus attempting to define liminology against a 6 much larger backdrop. 7 An etymological investigation of the term “liminology” shows that 8 the root of the term lies not in the English word “limit” but in the 9 Latin form limin- or limen, which carries the meaning of threshold and 10 is close to the meaning of boundary, margin, limit, etc. By putting 11 weight on the meaning of threshold, liminology signifies the trans- 2 formation of, or the play at, the limit. This transformation or play is 3111 itself paradoxical and parapraxical.10 What J. Hillis Miller explains 4 about the double antithetical prefix “para” fits such a liminology very 5 well: it is 6 7 something inside a domestic economy and at the same time 8 outside it, something simultaneously this side of a boundary 9 line, threshold, or margin, and also beyond it. . . . It is 20111 also the boundary itself, the screen which is a permeable 1 membrane connecting inside and outside. It confuses them 2 with one another, allowing the outside in, making the inside 3 out, dividing them and joining them. It also forms an 4 ambiguous transition between one and the other.11 5 6 Along this line of thinking, liminology as playing at, or a transforma- 7 tion of, the limit, does not simply relate itself to the limit as black to 8 white, the outside to the inside, and “does not seek to oppose one 9 thing to another.”12 Rather, it eludes every fixed binary division. It 30111 takes into consideration both the limit and what is beyond the limit, 1 both this side of a boundary line and the other side. It starts with a 2 radically different concept of limit as threshold, as the dynamic 3 connection and transition between the two sides. 4 Obviously, liminology can cover a wide range of topics. There can 5 be different liminologies: a liminology of philosophy, a liminology of 6 logic, a liminology of language, and so on. Nevertheless, this chapter 7 will confine the scope of its inquiry to the liminology of language, 8 despite the fact that the limit of language is also the limit of philoso- 9 phy, and thus it is difficult to draw a clear-cut demarcation between 40111 the two. 1 In terms of what contemporary thinkers have enunciated, I shall 21111 attempt to encapsulate liminology of language as follows. folio 85 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 (1) Radical problematization of the limit, boundary, or margin of 2 language. 3 When the early Wittgenstein said: “There is indeed the inexpress- 4 ible. . . . Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,” he 5111 was thematizing and problematizing the limit of language.13 For 6 Wittgenstein, language has its limit in the attempt to describe some- 7 thing that is indescribable. One must rest in silence when one runs 8 up against this limit of language. Yet does not the liminology of 9 language radically call into question Wittgenstein’s absolutization 10 of the limit of language? 11 French thinker Maurice Blanchot’s criticism of the early Wittgen- 2 stein and his rethinking of Bertrand Russell’s original comment on 3111 the Tractatus is noteworthy at this point. Russell expressed his “dis- 4 comfort” with Wittgenstein’s notion of the inexpressible by arguing: 5 (1) the fact that Wittgenstein still says a good deal about what cannot 6 be said suggests some other way out; (2) the limit of a certain struc- 7 ture of language may not be the limit of a different structure of 8 language.14 Thus Russell challenges, to some extent, Wittgenstein’s 9 absolutization of the limit of language. Blanchot recasts Russell’s 20111 themes in a much sharper form. For Blanchot, Russell’s comments 1 entail the notion that 2 3 [w]hat is inexpressible is inexpressible in relation to a 4 certain system of expression; . . . the Other of any speech is 5 never anything but the Other of a given speech or the 6 infinite movement through which a mode of expression . . . chal- 7 lenges or obliterates itself in some other mode.15 8 9 Wittgenstein would be in a very weak position if he wanted to 30111 defend himself here. His absolutization consists precisely in that he 1 considers the limit of a propositional language to be the limit of all 2 language, especially when he writes: “The right method of philoso- 3 phy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the 4 propositions of natural science.”16 In this way he confines language 5 to a propositional, referential or logical use. Outside this use there is 6 only a realm of silence, which is close to a realm of transcendence 7 beyond the human ken. Such an absolute limit inevitably spells the 8 end of philosophy. Ironically, such a view is not only rejected by 9 recent developments in Western philosophy, but also contradicted by 40111 Wittgenstein himself in that he does not keep completely silent about 1 what cannot be said, as Russell observes. The later Wittgenstein turns 21111 his back on this view, considering the propositional or referential use folio 86 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE?

1111 of language to be merely one use among many. There are many 2 language-games, just as there are many forms of life. 3 Russell’s thesis that the limit of a certain structure of language may 4 not be the limit of a different structure of language, and Blanchot’s 5111 reformulating of that thesis, has been supported by more recent 6 advancements in philosophy. Several major philosophers have 7 recently revealed that a network of basic assumptions, beliefs, con- 8 ceptual schemes, or a frame of references, always constitutes the 9 human horizon at a certain time.17 This network or frame sets up the 10 limit to what can be said, thought, understood, communicated and 11 even noticed at that time. It also sets up the limit of language, if lan- 2 guage here is understood as the totality of available procedures for 3111 observation, description, and explanation.18 Until that network or 4 frame shifts, the incommensurability between different assumptions, 5 different conceptual schemes, and different systems of expression, 6 cannot be acknowledged.19 7 This elaboration indicates that the question of the limit of language 8 depends, to a great extent, on how our minds conceive of it. 9 The limits of language are the necessary limits of a given structure 20111 or system of language. When one is confined within a structure or 1 system, the limits are inevitably conceived as uncrossable. However, 2 there are many different structures or systems of language, and many 3 different uses of language, just as there are many different forms of 4 life and many different cultures. Moreover, even within one culture, 5 the limit of a given system of language or expression at one time will 6 be transformed when this system of language or expression gives way 7 to another. The limit is never absolute. 8 Blanchot’s criticism of the early Wittgenstein is also grounded in 9 his realization that the inadequacy of language “runs the risk of never 30111 being sufficiently inadequate,” otherwise, “we would all have been 1 satisfied with silence long ago.”20 This peculiar character of being 2 never completely inadequate is determined by the double structure 3 of language. To use Foucault’s expression, language is “always exces- 4 sive and deficient.”21 First, it is deficient. This deficiency, this lack of 5 language, does not only mean the absence of what has to be signified, 6 but the absence of the center. To speak is to bring this kind of absence 7 into play.22 At the same time it is excessive, because what is deficient 8 becomes the condition for the possibilities of more speaking, more 9 signifying, more language. “[L]anguage can no longer avoid multi- 40111 plying itself.” “[I]t is always beyond the limit in relation to itself,” 1 and “is fated to extend itself to infinity without ever acquiring the 21111 weight that might immobilize it.”23 To simplify, the point Blanchot, folio 87 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Foucault, and other contemporary thinkers are trying to make is that 2 the development of different usages, of different linguistic strategies, 3 is always possible, and, therefore, there is no set, absolute limit. The 4 liminology of language thus announces itself to “have little affinity” 5111 with the early Wittgenstein,24 and, in fact, sees the latter’s absoluti- 6 zation of the limit of language as a form of logocentrism. 7 (2) Insight into the mutual connection and transition between this 8 side of the boundary of language and the other side, between speak- 9 ing and non-speaking (or silence), etc. 10 One of the most attractive sentences in the Tractatus is this: “[I]n 11 order to draw a limit to thinking we have to be able to think both 2 sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think 3111 what cannot be thought).”25 However, having limited language or 4 meaning to logical use or propositional function, Wittgenstein 5 declares: “[W]hat lies on the other side of the limit will be simply non- 6 sense.”26 In doing so, Wittgenstein not only defines language as the 7 totality of propositions, but also establishes an uncrossable borderline 8 between language (speech), meaning, thinking, on one side, and 9 silence, nonsense, the unthinkable, on the other. The contradiction 20111 inherent in this claim is, as we have hinted, that once Wittgenstein has 1 talked about what cannot be said or has thought about what cannot be 2 thought, the border between the two sides has already been somehow 3 crossed. Surprisingly, at the end of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein suggests 4 5 an explanation for this contradiction by advising people to treat his words as a ladder – after they have climbed up on it, people should 6 27 7 throw it away. Does not this advice suggest also that the other side of 8 the limit is somehow attainable if people can use language in a differ- 9 ent way, such as using it as a ladder? Furthermore, does not it suggest 30111 alternative explanations for the opposite sides of the limit than that to 1 which the early Wittgenstein had committed himself? 2 Recent developments in Western philosophy have moved away 3 from making such clear-cut demarcations about the two sides of the 4 limit. We have seen the emergence of insights into the mutual 5 connection and transition between two sides of the boundary of 6 language, between speaking and non-speaking (or silence), etc. These 7 kinds of insights radically blurs traditional distinctions by “allowing 8 the outside in, making the inside out,” or by rethinking the Other of 9 language, and therefore provides legitimation for relativizing the 40111 limit of language. 1 In Heidegger’s existential analysis of discourse as the articulation 21111 of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world, he does not consider silence folio 88 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE?

1111 – the other side of language – the mark of an impassable boundary 2 of discourse. On the contrary, he sees it as one of the essential 3 possibilities of discourse. He writes: “[T]o keep silent does not mean 4 to be dumb. . . . As a mode of discourse, reticence [a]rticulates the 5111 intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise 6 to a potentiality-for-hearing.”28 Here silence is treated as a different 7 mode of speech; silence and speech are not isolated from each 8 other, but mutually involved. I consider this insight into the mutual 9 connection and transition between two sides of the boundary of 10 language a dynamic and relational understanding of the limit 11 of language, in contrast to a static, non-relational one. It is this 2 kind of dynamic, relational understanding that Heidegger carries 3111 into his later analysis of the being of language.29 We are told by 4 Heidegger: “Everything spoken stems in a variety of ways from the 5 unspoken . . .”;30 “What is unspoken is not merely something that 6 lacks voice, it is what remains unsaid, what is not yet shown, what has 7 not yet reached its appearance.”31 On this account, the disjunction 8 between speaking and silence no longer lasts. Neither speaking nor 9 silence stands in and by itself. Speaking always has its absent presence 20111 in silence; silence, too, has only its non-absent absence in speaking. 1 Consequently, this dynamic, relational understanding provides new 2 angles from which to look at the issue of the limit of language. For 3 instance, it implies that there are some things that cannot be put 4 5 into words now – at a certain time in history – but remain open to 6 the possibilities of later transformations. In other words, the limit 7 or inadequacy of language is relative and conditioned by historical 8 transformations. Heidegger’s claim that all language is historical 32 9 supports such an understanding. In addition, the sphere of language 30111 in Heidegger’s holistic view of the being of language is much broader 1 than the early Wittgenstein’s. 2 Echoing Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty also takes a dynamic, rela- 3 tional approach to speaking and silence. He emphasizes: “[W]e must 4 consider speech before it is spoken, the background of silence which 5 does not cease to surround it and without which it would say noth- 6 ing.” “[W]e must uncover the threads of silence that speech is mixed 7 together with.”33 There is no radical discontinuity between silence 8 and speech for him. Because he sees them in an utterly relational 9 way, he pays special heed to “expressive silences” in signification.34 40111 However, from the perspective of mutual involvement, not only is 1 silence speech, but speech is also silence. In other words, not only can 21111 silence function as speech, but speech can also function as silence. folio 89 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 When Merleau-Ponty distinguishes creative language from empirical 2 language,35 he states: “True speech . . . is only silence in respect to 3 empirical usage.”36 One thing he suggests here is that true speech not 4 only speaks something, but also keeps silent about something else. 5111 Speech and silence are always interwoven. This gives a great insight 6 into the interplay of speech and silence. It is a more comprehensive 7 understanding of the mutual connection and transition between the 8 two sides of the boundary of language. 9 Along this line of thinking, Derrida holds: “[S]ilence plays the irre- 10 ducible role of that which bears and haunts language, outside and 11 against which alone language can emerge. . . .”37 Elsewhere he claims: 2 “Even if I decide to be silent, . . . this silence yet remains a modality 3111 of speech.”38 4 For Foucault, “the inadequacy, the profound silence, of a philo- 5 sophical language,” brings about “a philosophy which regains its 6 speech and finds itself again . . . in the marginal region which borders 7 its limits.”39 Foucault’s view can be regarded, to some extent, as a 8 footnote to Blanchot’s following statement: 9 20111 [T]he other of a language is always posed by this language 1 itself as that by way of which it looks for a way out, . . . Which 2 means not only that the Other is already part of this language, 3 but that as soon as this language turns around to respond to 4 its Other, it turns toward another language; a language that, 5 as we ought not ignore, is other, and also has its Other.40 6 7 Blanchot’s message, like Foucault’s, still conveys two major points. 8 First, what lies on the other side of the limit is always connected 9 with, part of, or has its trace in, this side of the limit. The Other of 30111 language, the inexpressible, or silence, exists always in relation to a 1 language, to a certain system of expression, or to a given speech. 2 Second, the response to the Other of language always gives rise to 3 the development of a different function of language, a different way 4 of signification, a different expression, etc. 5 In short, no matter what differences all these thinkers’ statements 6 may involve, and no matter how divergent their projects may be, 7 they do respectively make their own contribution to a typical attitude 8 that obscures the conventional divisions, and, in effect, de-absolutizes 9 the boundary of language. This kind of insight puts these thinkers 40111 on the right footing for engaging in what Blanchot calls “the play of 1 maneuvers” instead of surrendering themselves to an absolutely 21111 uncrossable limit.41 folio 90 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE?

1111 (3) Play at the limit of language. 2 The consequence of overturning fixed binary divisions and relativ- 3 izing the limits of language is that once philosophical discourse is 4 freed from the static, non-relational understanding of the limit 5111 and function of language, options for novel linguistic strategies and 6 styles are given their due. Thus we see, in Heidegger, the experi- 7 ment of using philosophical tautology, his turn toward poetic and 8 evocative language, his crossing out words he uses to mark their 9 self-erasure, and his innovation in terminology. Correspondingly, we 10 see, in Derrida, the effort to develop undecidable concepts which can 11 no longer be enclosed in traditional oppositions, his preference 2 for neither/nor, his playful and elusive style. In Kierkegaard, we see 3111 the strategies of indirect communication, use of metaphor, parable, 4 irony; and so forth. 5 All these strategies can be seen as a kind of play at the limit of lan- 6 guage. They aim particularly at eschewing the trap of a propositional, 7 logical or descriptive language. To that language and its user, this 8 kind of play may look neither serious nor unserious, neither normal 9 nor abnormal, neither negative nor positive. It goes beyond every 20111 polarity. It is a transformation of language, a kind of linguistic 1 wrestling, twisting or detouring, an employment of language against 2 itself, an inscription with self-erasure, to negotiate the limit of lan- 3 guage. The liminology of language, as such, can be regarded as an 4 experiment in the production of linguistic strategies and styles, such 5 as successive double negation, indirect communication, adopting 6 poetic or evocative language, using irony, paradox, oxymoron, even 7 tautology, reticence, etc. Thus, the liminology of language opens 8 up great possibilities for ever differing–deferring practices of lan- 9 guage. It is the possibility of such opening up itself. 30111 All these three aspects are closely interrelated. To my under- 1 standing, they are what the liminology of language is all about. 2 We may also conceive these three aspects as three levels within the 3 liminology of language. The first is the experientio-analytic level. 4 Problematizing starts with the analysis of our experience of the limit 5 of language. It can lead to a metaphysical or trans-metaphysical view 6 of the limit, since the interrogation of the limit cannot avoid 7 answering the question of what lies on the other side, and therefore 8 on both sides, of the limit of language. The liminology of language 9 outlined above is particularly allied to the trans-metaphysical view of 40111 the limit. The second level in the liminology of language is trans- 1 metaphysical.42 The postmodern thinkers subvert the metaphysical 21111 appropriation – the absolutization – of the limit of language, and folio 91 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 reveal that the problem of the limit of language depends, to a great 2 extent, on how we look at both sides of the limit, with a static, non- 3 relational view or a dynamic, relational view. The third level – the 4 exploration and development of novel linguistic strategies and styles 5111 as the consequence of trans-metaphysical insight and pragmatic 6 wisdom – is practical. As we can see now quite clearly, the second 7 and third levels are fundamental to the liminology of language. 8 Without the second and third, how far a “radical problematization” 9 can go would still be a question. With the second and third levels, 10 the limit of language is legitimately relativized, and new possibilities 11 for coping with the limit of language are explored practically. 2 It is especially in probing these two crucial aspects that we come 3111 to see the significance of inquiry into the liminology of language in 4 the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism. First, we find that the Zhuangzi 5 and Chan reach the de-absolutization of the limit of language by a 6 complete penetration into the non-duality between speech and 7 silence, speaking and non-speaking, etc. In blurring or even invali- 8 dating an absolute distinction between speech and silence, speaking 9 and non-speaking, and in perceiving a dynamic connection and tran- 20111 sition between the two sides of the boundary of language, Zhuangzi 1 and the Chan masters, who are no less radical than our contem- 2 poraries, exemplify their great wisdom and insight. 3 Second, the Zhuangzi and Chan demonstrate a marvelous inter- 4 play between speech and silence, speaking and non-speaking, a 5 skillful performance of linguistic twisting and detouring, and various 6 effective strategies for coping with the limit of language, which go 7 far beyond the current Western imagination. All these indicate 8 that the Zhuangzi and Chan are great resources for a liminology of 9 language. 30111 Finally, the first aspect – radical problematization of the limit of 1 language – is also important to the study of the Zhuangzi and Chan. 2 The contemporary insight that the inexpressible is always inexpres- 3 sible in relation to a certain system of expression will definitely 4 help us to better understand the Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist 5 claim of the inadequacy of language. Although Zhuangzi and Chan 6 Buddhists did not make their claims very clear, a careful reading and 7 analysis of the texts will find that the inadequacy of language is in 8 fact the inadequacy of certain dominant uses of language. Indications 9 of opposition to any absolutized boundary of language are easily 40111 discernible in the Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist discourse, 1 although they focused instead on the transformation and overcoming 21111 of various relative limits of language. folio 92 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE?

1111 This section, therefore, carries out a twofold task in using the 2 liminology of language as an interpretive device: first, to rediscover 3 the traditions of the Zhuangzi and Chan in relation to postmodern 4 concerns with the limits of language and how to deal with them, to 5111 allow these two traditions to address the issues from their own 6 perspectives, and to arouse contemporary interests in using these two 7 traditions for the development of a liminology of language; second, 8 to attempt an alternative interpretation of the Zhuangzi and Chan 9 concerning their views of language and their uses of language. 10 Much has been said about Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist views 11 of language and their uses of language. Nevertheless, it seems to me, 2 a question remains unanswered. The question is how a school such 3111 as Chan can contain within itself the most radical negation of letters 4 and words, and yet be “replete with practically every kind of literary 5 production,” as Nishitani once said about Chan (Zen) Buddhism.43 6 Zhu Ziqing, a well-known modern Chinese writer and literary 7 theorist, also once referred to this puzzle: “Chan Buddhists were 8 renowned for so-called abandonment of language. . . . But mean- 9 while Chan Buddhists used language most briskly and flexibly.”44 20111 The same question can easily be asked of the Zhuangzi. 1 Putting it another way, how can one bridge the gap between their 2 apparently negative attitudes toward language and their most orig- 3 inal and productive uses of language? What is the intrinsic relation 4 between these two aspects, and how should we interpret that rela- 5 tion coherently? The investigation of the liminology of language 6 in the Zhuangzi and Chan, I believe, will offer a valuable clue to the 7 solution of this long-standing problem, and will be conducive to 8 a better understanding of Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist views of 9 language. 30111 Notwithstanding the importance of our investigation, we must be 1 alert to differences between a Western postmodern liminology of 2 language and a Daoist or Chan Buddhist approach. In addition to 3 what I have discussed about the limitation of a postmodern approach 4 to Zhuangzi’s and Chan Buddhist thought,45 I would like to address 5 here two points regarding contextual differences to which our inquiry 6 into the liminology of language must pay careful attention. As I indi- 7 cated earlier, the postmodern thinkers base their de-absolutization of 8 the limit of language upon the dimensions of contingency, tempor- 9 ality and historicity. To be fair to these thinkers, I also pointed out 40111 that they did not abandon the dimension of the limitless or infinite. 1 I characterized their position as immanent transcendence. What I 21111 want to add here is that their dimension of the limitless is not folio 93 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 equivalent to the dimension of the timeless. It must be acknowledged 2 that they privilege the dimension of time over the dimension of the 3 timeless. 4 However, Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists reach the relativization 5111 of the limit of language mainly by penetration into the non-duality 6 between speech and silence, speaking and non-speaking, etc. 7 Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists are fully aware of the contingent 8 nature of the world and human life, including human speech. 9 Nevertheless, temporality or historicity is contained in their trans- 10 temporal or trans-historical dimension, a dimension of interweaving 11 time and the timeless, namely, a dimension of time in the timeless or 2 of the timeless in time. Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists believe that the 3111 perspective of the timeless is inseparable from, and can be realized 4 within, the perspective of time or temporality. There is no separate 5 world of the timeless. Attaining the timeless for Zhuangzi means to 6 identify oneself with, and to follow, the infinite process of change and 7 transformation of all things in the temporal world. Chan Buddhists 8 hold a similar view. The Indian emphasis on the attainment of the 9 timeless nirva¯na is transformed into the Chan emphasis that enlight- 20111 enment must˙ be realized and verified in getting along with all changes 1 in this mundane world. These positions also can be characterized as 2 immanent transcendence. However, they still involve a perspective of 3 the timeless that postmodern thinkers have missed. The Zhuangzian 4 and Chan Buddhist trans-temporal or trans-historical dimension 5 overflows any single dimension of temporality or historicity.46 This 6 may be one of those underlying principles that spell out undertakings 7 different from postmodernism, and is one of the reasons that post- 8 modern discourse cannot exhaust the Zhuangzi and Chan. 9 Furthermore, an inquiry into the liminology of language, or any 30111 intellectual maneuvers, has only a secondary place in Zhuangzian 1 and Chan Buddhist practices. If Zhuangzi and the Chan masters 2 demonstrate their great wisdom and insight with respect to a limi- 3 nology of language, their wisdom and insight come out of their 4 existentio-spiritual awakenings, out of their primary concerns with 5 everyday soteriological practices within a variety of contexts. Of 6 course, this is not to deny the significance of our inquiry into the limi- 7 nology of language in the Zhuangzi and Chan, and not to negate the 8 meaningfulness of disclosing some dimensions or angles that so far 9 have perhaps been neglected in the study of the Zhuangzi and Chan. 40111 After all, these dimensions or elements are part of the heritage of the 1 Zhuangzi and Chan, even though they cannot cover the whole range 21111 of their concerns and practices. folio 94 1111 2 3 6 4 5111 ZHUANGZI’S LIMINOLOGY 6 7 OF “SPEAKING 8 NON-SPEAKING” 9 10 11 2 3111 Preliminary remarks 4 5 Of recent studies in Zhuangzi’s view of language, two tendencies are, 6 for my discussion, worthy of mention. One is represented by A. C. 7 Graham, who notes the contradictory sides of Zhuangzi concerning 8 the latter’s negative attitude toward language and his productive use 9 of language: “The irony is especially acute in the case of [Zhuangzi], 20111 a master of sophisticated argument, aphorism, anecdote, lyrical 1 prose and gnomic verse who professes a boundless scepticism about 2 the possibility of ever saying anything.”1 However, Graham goes on 3 to center himself around the one side, namely, the explanation of 4 Zhuangzi’s use of language, his modes of discourse, without offering 5 any convincing solution to the above-mentioned contradiction. The 6 only interpretation regarding that contradiction Graham provides is 7 the suggestion that Zhuangzi merely has the good sense to remind 8 people of the limitations of the language, which he uses to guide them 9 toward an altered perspective on the world and a way of living,2 30111 namely, that Zhuangzi does not totally reject language. Graham 1 gives no detailed clarifications for the following questions: In what 2 context does Zhuangzi’s apparently negative attitude towards 3 language take place? What kind of inadequacy of language is it that 4 Zhuangzi so strongly urges people to be aware of? How is Zhuangzi’s 5 use of language a response to the limitations that he himself divulges? 6 What is the intrinsic relation between Zhuangzi’s seemingly negative 7 attitude towards language and his highly original, productive use of 8 language? As long as these critical questions are not answered, the 9 contradictory sides of Zhuangzi concerning his view of language will 40111 continue to disturb readers. Since Graham does not successfully solve 1 this problem, he basically repeats the puzzle of Zhuangzi, as most of 21111 his predecessors did.3 folio 95 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Another tendency is represented by Chad Hansen. In a way that 2 is somehow connected with Graham’s interpretations of Zhuangzi, 3 Hansen develops his strong argument for the adequacy of language 4 in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.4 We do not deny that his interpretation, 5111 which is based on the second chapter of the Zhuangzi, has a kind of 6 clarity and consistency.5 However, the problem with Hansen’s inter- 7 pretation is that he does not do justice to the text concerning the 8 contradictory sides of Zhuangzi. As opposed to Graham’s merely 9 repeating Zhuangzi’s contradiction, Hansen simply rules out the 10 contradiction by ignoring those textual materials, which clearly 11 demonstrate Zhuangzi’s view of the inadequacy of language. Hansen 2 never mentions that even in the text of the second chapter, Zhuangzi 3111 states: “If dao is made clear [by words], it is not dao. If words are 4 argumentative, they do not reach the point.”6 For Hansen, this kind 5 of textual evidence concerning the inadequacy of language simply 6 does not exist or is irrelevant to his interpretation. He thus bases his 7 interpretation on incomplete knowledge of the text or neglect in lieu 8 of reconciliation of the contradictory sides. 9 Tang Junyi, in examining Zhuangzi’s opinion of the relation 20111 between language and dao, suggests that there are different meanings 1 or levels concerning Zhuangzi’s view of language: the meaning or 2 level of the inadequacy of speaking; the meaning or level of being 3 beyond the opposite of speaking and silence; the meaning or level of 4 the adequacy of both speaking and silence, and the like. Even the 5 text of the inner chapters contains these meanings or levels rather 6 than showing only one of them.7 This analysis indicates that if an 7 interpretation of Zhuangzi’s view of language intends to do justice to 8 the text, it has to deal with all these meanings or levels without 9 neglecting any. It has to discover the intrinsic relations among these 30111 meanings or levels, on which a comprehensive understanding of 1 the text can eventually be built, if it is concerned with its own 2 cogency, without leaving out the contradictory sides. In this view, the 3 approach of this chapter will differ significantly from both Graham’s 4 and Hansen’s. The chapter will not merely restate the contradictory 5 sides of Zhuangzi nor will it ignore them. It will attempt to shed new 6 light on the long-standing contradiction via a liminological approach. 7 It will analyze, both textually and theoretically, the different mean- 8 ings or levels concerning Zhuangzi’s view of language, and will 9 pursue a coherent interpretation by inquiring into their intrinsic 40111 relations. 1 21111 folio 96 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 The context of the inadequacy of language 2 in the Zhuangzi 3 4 I would argue that we should not consider Zhuangzi to be against all 5111 speaking, all uses of language, and should not take Zhuangzi’s words such as buchen (being not named) or buyan (having no word) out of 6 8 7 their context or at their face value. However, it is quite necessary, 8 first of all, to give a contextual analysis of the meanings of these 9 words. One approach to Zhuangzi’s contradictory views of language 10 is the attempt to treat the inner chapters and the outer and the 11 mixed chapters separately, and to base the study solely on the inner 2 chapters. This is a popular approach. For instance, Tang Junyi, 3111 among others, once pointed out the reason for taking this approach, 4 that in the outer and the mixed chapters some views of the inade- 5 quacy of language go so far as to extend the original view of the inner 6 chapters to extremity, therefore deviating from the general purport 9 7 of Zhuangzi. It follows from this clarification that we should not 8 identify those extreme views as consistent with Zhuangzi’s. 9 This approach has its own advantage in solving the contradiction 20111 by excluding some textual materials from the study. However, it does 1 not justify the position that we should examine the inner chapters only 2 and ignore the outer and the mixed chapters. Here I would like to 3 make clear that despite the understanding that the views of Zhuangzi 4 of the inner chapters are of extreme importance, I will not confine 5 my analysis to these alone. A main reason is that if the views of the 6 inadequacy of language in the outer and the mixed chapters are ana- 7 lyzable, and if the result of this analysis serves our purpose well, 8 namely, proves to be consistent, why should we give up on this 9 attempt? Compared with the Dao De Jing, the Zhuangzi contains, no 30111 doubt, more detailed discussions on the inadequacy of language. 1 However, do not these discussions provide more opportunities for a 2 textual/contextual analysis of the inadequacy of language? In what 3 follows, I shall demonstrate, case by case, that through a careful read- 4 ing or analysis of the Zhuangzi one can be led to the realization that 5 what Zhuangzi regards as the limit of language is always related to 6 a prevalent way of using language, a particular way that language 7 functions. 8 (1) In the “Qi Wu Lun” chapter, Zhuangzi’s discussion of the inad- 9 equacy of language does not confirm that he holds a general view of 40111 the inadequacy of language. Expressions concerning the inadequacy 1 of language, such as “being not named,” “having no word,” and 21111 so on, are closely related to Zhuangzi’s attitude towards the bian folio 97 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 (disputes) of his time. Only in the context of his criticism of bian are 2 words such as buchen and buyan used. In the statement “If words ( yan) 3 are argumentative (bian), they do not reach the point,”10 we see 4 quite plainly that the noun yan on which Zhuangzi expresses his 5111 negative view is modified and specified by the adjective bian. Hence, 6 our first observation could be this: what is inadequate here is yanbian, 7 the language of bian, or the disputatious use of language, not language 8 per se. However, Zhuangzi does not completely reject dispute, since 9 he favors a kind of “great disputation” in contrast to the yanbian 10 he discredits. What, then, is Zhuangzi’s exact point in his criticism 11 of yanbian? 2 In classical Chinese, the character bian (dispute) is the synonym of 3111 another bian (discriminate), because the former contains the meaning 4 of the latter. The character bian (discriminate) also has a synonym 5 pan which, structurally consisting of “half” and “knife,” means both 6 to decide (to judge) and to divide (to cut into half). Dispute, as such, 7 implies using language to discriminate, to divide. For Zhuangzi, 8 a crucial point of his criticism of bian is that wherever there is 9 dispute, something is left unseen. Wherever there is division, some- 20111 thing is left undivided.11 Every doctrine, every philosophical position, 1 in setting up a hierarchy, a system of right (shi) and wrong ( fei), a 2 fixed binary division, conceals something. Something else is being 3 covered up by every seeing of something. This covering up, this 4 closure, has no secure ground, not only because one thing and its 5 other are mutually dependent or mutually conditioned, but also 6 because it is always possible to shift the angles from which one looks 7 at them. 8 To subvert the closure, Zhuangzi does not stand on the same level 9 as his contemporary disputers do. He turns to tianlai, the piping of 30111 heaven: the differences among the myriad sounds are brought into 1 being naturally, and the making and ceasing of these sounds, their 2 changes, also come naturally.12 Heaven (nature) privileges neither the 3 Confucians’ sound nor the Moists’. The relativity of dispute thus is 4 the natural condition of the possibilities of all disputes. This relativity 5 is the dimension of dao, a great dispute about all disputes. 6 In breaking down the logocentric closure of disputes Zhuangzi 7 comes to criticize a particular view of language or a particular way 8 of using language, which legitimizes the logocentric closure of these 9 disputes. This view or this way of using language is especially 40111 reflected in the disputes about the relation of name (ming) and actu- 1 ality (shi) among Confucians, Moists, and Dialecticians. The disputes 21111 about the relation of name and actuality in the pre-Qin period start folio 98 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 with the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names. Although 2 the rectification of names is not a theory of knowledge, but rather is 3 a moral–political doctrine, it assumes a correspondence, one-name- 4 one-thing, relation between language and (moral) reality.13 It is 5111 therefore not without any intrinsic bearing on a more descriptive or 6 referential notion of language, such as Xunzi’s realistic development 7 of this Confucian doctrine.14 8 In Zhuangzi’s time, the descriptive, cognitive, or reifying function 9 of language was specified especially by Neo-Moists and Dialecticians. 10 Neo-Moists inherit Mozi’s search for more objectivity and realism in 11 their disagreement with Confucian reliance on conventions. They 2 propose a correspondence theory of knowledge and language by 3111 emphasizing that referring and saying merely tell people what an 4 object actually is.15 Gongsun Long, a Dialectician, claimed: “A name 5 is what designates an actuality.”16 Meanwhile, for him, a name also 6 designates the universal underlying this particular.17 The increasing 7 prevalence of such descriptive, referential and reifying uses of 8 language is precisely what constitutes the main feature of the dispu- 9 tatious language ( yanbian) at that time. 20111 Zhuangzi pointedly questions the reliability of the correspondence 1 (one-name-one-thing) relation between language and reality. He 2 illustrates his view in a well-known parable of the monkey trainer. 3 The trainer’s daily plan, that the monkeys got three acorns in the 4 morning and four at night, irritated the monkeys. But his proposal 5 that they got four in the morning and three at night pleased them. 6 “There was no change in the reality behind the words, and yet the 7 monkeys responded with joy and anger.”18 The story indicates 8 that there is no underlying reason why the expression “four in the 9 morning and three at night” is more attractive to the monkeys, 30111 even though the reality (seven a day) remains the same. It symbol- 1 izes that choosing words and names is a matter of contingency and 2 convention, if not totally arbitrary. Zhuangzi explicitly asserts the 3 conventional nature of language and refutes the view that the names 4 of things represent the reality: “A road is made by people walking on 5 it; things are so because they are called so.”19 6 This statement does not mean that Zhuangzi adheres to conven- 7 tionalism. Rather, for him, convention is always on the move. He 8 maintains that language is inconstant.20 Facing the objection that 9 language is not only blowing breath and that language designates 40111 something, Zhuangzi replies that what language designates is never 1 fixed.21 For instance, one thing can be named differently by different 21111 speakers with different standpoints. folio 99 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 No thing is not “that” (bi ); no thing is not “this” (shi). If you 2 take the standpoint of “this,” from the standpoint of “that,” 3 “this” still cannot be seen; but from your own standpoint, 4 “this” can be realized.22 5111 6 Thus the supposed one-name-one-thing relation between language 7 and reality is like something naively built on running water. The 8 disputatious language based on such a descriptive or referential view 9 of language only misleads people. The sage, therefore, rejects this 10 kind of disputatious language. 11 (2) Contrary to Zhuangzi’s rebuttal of those who seek to grasp 2 reality by involving themselves in the yanbian, the Zhuangzi contains 3111 some positive images of artisans, such as a butcher, wheelwright, and 4 the like, who demonstrate superb mastery of their arts, but are unable 5 to describe how their jobs are done. In the stories about these 6 artisans, we find that Zhuangzi’s account of linguistic inadequacy 7 mainly alludes to the failure to capture living artistic experiences. 8 A most famous parable is about Wheelwright Bian, who describes 9 his situation: 20111 1 When I chisel a wheel, if the blows of the mallet are too 2 gentle, the chisel slides and won’t take hold. But if they’re 3 too hard, it bites in and won’t budge. Not too gentle, not to 4 hard – you can get it in your hand and feel it in your mind. 5 You can’t put it into words, and yet there’s a knack to it 6 somehow. I can’t teach it to my son, and he can’t learn 7 it from me.23 8 9 The inadequacy of language here comprises two points. First, 30111 Wheelwright Bian’s story is just like those things that often happen 1 in our own times – merely telling or learning guiding principles, 2 procedures, concepts, and so on, cannot assure us of achieving the 3 state of art, which certainly goes beyond any objective knowledge. 4 The state of art is a harmonious moment. Although it is the outcome 5 of the practical function of the body and mind and the mastery of 6 object, this harmonious state transcends both the subject and the 7 object. In this regard, the dimension of practice or of experience in 8 art always exceeds conceptualization, simply because any conceptu- 9 alization is always an objectification that has to be overcome before 40111 attaining the state of art. That is also the point Cook Ding, another 1 well-known artisan of Zhuangzi’s, conveys when he talks about the 21111 way of art surpassing mere technique, which obviously is understood folio 100 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 as a kind of objective knowledge. “Perception and understanding 2 have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants.”24 3 Second, since what can be taught and learned through words are, 4 under common circumstances, objectified and conceptualized proce- 5111 dures or principles, they are not equivalent to living experiences. 6 From the viewpoint of living artistic experience, what records or 7 describes other masters’ experiences is not of great importance. The 8 essential thing for a successful performance of art is the engaging 9 subjectivity of each artisan, which finally transcends itself and objec- 10 tivity. For this reason, Wheelwright Bian downplays books and 11 words.25 The inadequacy of language involved in these parables 2 means quite clearly: the limit of a descriptive, categorical language. 3111 (3) In the outer and the mixed chapters of the Zhuangzi, more cases 4 directly concern the view that words are not sufficient to convey the 5 experience of dao (in relation to artistic experiences and yet beyond 6 them).26 In these cases, the meaning of the inadequacy of language 7 becomes clearer. 8 As I mentioned earlier, Zhuangzi’s notion of dao addresses the rela- 9 tivity of all disputes. It is a dispute about all disputes. Dao also reveals 20111 the relativity of all beings, things, words, and the like.27 Thus the 1 notion of dao does not avoid addressing the condition of the possi- 2 bilities of all beings, things, words, and indeed regards this relativity 3 as the condition of possibilities, as we have seen in the notion of 4 tianlai. However, one thing that distinguishes Zhuangzi’s dao from any 5 ontological or metaphysical claim is that for Zhuangzi, this view of 6 the condition of possibilities is nonetheless an understanding of the 7 functioning of the world in which we human beings live, a view 8 that exists among many views, a perspective that exists among other 9 perspectives. The special use of this view or this perspective lies in 30111 the fact that it serves a soteriological purpose or, generally speaking, 1 guides people towards their existentio-spiritual awakening from any 2 one-sided, absolutized views or perspectives. That is all! After serving 3 its purpose, it can simply be forgotten or be thrown away, just as a 4 ladder can be abandoned after being climbed. Dao, in this sense, is 5 a holistic dimension, or a dimension of wholeness, although it does 6 not hypostatize anything.28 Since it is not a dimension of things 7 or entities, the question of the inadequacy of using a discriminative, 8 entitative language to convey the dimension arises. 9 Human language, in its discursive use, is preponderantly discrim- 40111 inative, entitative, and even metaphysical. When dimensionally or 1 perspectivally referring to the overall condition of the possibilities of 21111 things, to the non-discriminative whole of the life-world, it inevitably folio 101 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 misleads and betrays. Zhuangzi is acutely aware of the risk of adopt- 2 ing “dao” as a temporary expedient to convey the holistic dimension.29 3 Therefore, he points out: “[T]hat which words can adequately 4 describe, that which knowledge can reach to, extends only as far as 5111 the level of ‘things,’ no farther.”30 Obviously, dao is not a thing: 6 7 While there are names and realities, you are in the presence 8 of things. When there are no names and realities, you exist 9 in the absence of things. You can talk about it, you can think 10 about it; but the more you talk about it, the farther away 11 you get from it.31 2 3111 This paragraph reminds us of Zhuangzi’s refutation of the corre- 4 spondence relation between names and realities and his rejection of 5 the discriminative, disputatious use of language in the “Qi Wu Lun” 6 chapter. Since dao designates no entity, it cannot be inquired about 7 by descriptive language, and “even if it is asked about, there can be 8 no answer.”32 By the same token, “Eloquence is not as good as 9 silence.”33 It is not difficult to see here that Zhuangzi endeavors, 20111 through emphasizing non-speaking or silence, to eschew the lin- 1 guistic trap of a metaphysics of presence, to suspend the linguistic 2 re-presentation of things, to interrupt turning away from the soterio- 3 logical or therapeutic function of the discourse. 4 In sum, the contextual analysis of Zhuangzi’s discussions on the 5 inadequacy of language resists the myth of Zhuangzi’s complete 6 negation of language. What appears as a negative attitude towards 7 language is always related to a particular function of language, a 8 prevalent or conventional way of using language, which could be 9 called descriptive, entitative, reifying, or metaphysical. 30111 1 How Zhuangzi does not reject all speaking 2 3 If the preceding examination correctly reveals that there is no total 4 rejection of language advocated by Zhuangzi, but a negation or 5 silencing of a particular function of language, a conventional way of 6 using language, then we find that Zhuangzi stands in a position that 7 is not in conflict with a positive attitude towards speaking. The point 8 Zhuangzi tries to make is rather how to speak differently, how to 9 use language differently. Here I want to make explicit that both 40111 practically and theoretically, Zhuangzi does not reject speaking 1 and language in favor of complete silence. Since what Zhuangzi 21111 negates is merely a particular use of language, when he, in some other folio 102 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 occasions, refers to the use of language positively, or talks about 2 different uses of language, there is certainly no inconsistency involved 3 in his attitude towards language. The text itself supplies a good many 4 examples that support or can justify this point. 5111 (1) In the chapter “The Great Ancestral Teacher,” Zhuangzi first 6 states that being absent-minded, the true man (the Daoist ideal 7 person) is forgetful of his words.34 This notion of the forgetfulness of 8 language (wangyan) is developed further in a well-known passage in 9 chapter 26: 10 11 The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten 2 the fish, you can forget the trap. The rabbit snare exists 3111 because of the rabbit; once you’ve gotten the rabbit, you can 4 forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once 5 you’ve gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. Where 6 can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a 7 [few] word[s] with him?35 8 9 As we can see quite clearly, Zhuangzi considers language to be as 20111 necessary as other human tools from a pragmatic point of view. We 1 use language to serve our purpose, just as we use a trap to catch fishes 2 or a snare to capture rabbits. In terms of this perspective, the notion 3 of the forgetfulness of language presupposes the use of language. 4 Only after using language can people forget language. Forgetfulness 5 reaches a higher level of using language that never falls into the trap 6 or snare of words. Therefore, the notion does not suggest the aban- 7 donment of language, but teaches us to speak better or communicate 8 better, to obtain a better consequence, as Zhuangzi puts this point 9 so well: Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can 30111 have a few words with him? 1 (2) In chapter 25, Zhuangzi declares: 2 3 Dao, the delimitation of things – neither speech nor silence 4 is sufficient to convey it. Neither speech nor silence – herein 5 is [to be found] the highest form of discourse.36 6 7 This statement is pivotal to Zhuangzi’s position. It demonstrates 8 that from a de-absolutized perspective of dao, Zhuangzi does not priv- 9 ilege either speech or silence. He is more flexible and skillful in 40111 avoiding a logocentric hierarchy of speech and silence than people 1 used to imagine. For him, speech and silence are all relative, just like 21111 anything else. Each has its limit in a particular use. Thus we could folio 103 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 distinguish Zhuangzi’s thought from those onto-theologies of speech 2 or silence, such as the Indian Vedic notion of divine speech (va¯c) and 3 the Upanishadic notion of the highest state of silent sleep.37 4 In contrast to these metaphysical determinations of speech and 5111 silence, Zhuangzi suggests two things: (i) The best way is to detach from 6 either speech or silence. Once you realize the relativity of all speech 7 and silence from the perspective of dao, you have more freedom in 8 using speech or silence flexibly, skillfully, deconstructively.38 (ii) There 9 might be an ingenious way to develop a new strategy that stands 10 between speech and silence, that cannot be reduced to a conventional 11 speech or silence, for coping with the limit of speech or silence, as we 2 will see later on in the discussion of his liminological play. 3111 (3) Zhuangzi evidently favors a kind of paradoxical language, 4 which he calls diaogui in chapter 2. No matter how bizarre it appears, 5 a great sage, according to Zhuangzi, understands such a language.39 6 Elsewhere he also indicates that he is good at “absurd speech” (miuyou 7 zhishuo), “extravagant words” (huangtang zhiyan) and so on.40 A more 8 comprehensive characterization is Zhuangzi’s use of language as 9 “goblet words” (zhiyan), namely, as those that are like a goblet that 20111 tips when full and rights itself when empty.41 They adapt to and 1 follow along with changes in things and people. They are not fixed 2 signifiers or signifieds. Therefore, though they seem outlandish or 3 absurd, deviating from common sense or formal logic, they are in 4 harmony with what is natural (what is spontaneously so), with the 5 flux of all things and circumstances. These characterizations of 6 the peculiar use of language confirm that Zhuangzi does allow for a 7 positive role that language plays. 8 (4) To avoid a metaphysics of presence, to de-center dao, Zhuangzi 9 stresses that dao has no specific presence. Dao is not a particular thing. 30111 But “there’s no escape from things.”42 Since dao is a dimension of 1 spontaneity, a perspective on the natural condition of the possibili- 2 ties of things, “whenever you point to one thing among many, this 3 thing contains or manifests the perspective (or principle) of what is 4 natural.”43 Therefore, as Zhuangzi says, dao manifests itself “in ants,” 5 “in panic grass,” “in tiles and shards,” and even “in piss and shit.”44 6 “The supreme dao is like this, and so too are great words.”45 Here 7 “great words” (dayan) also means the speaking or language of dao. Just 8 as dao cannot escape from things (even though it is not a thing), the 9 language of dao cannot escape from the language of things (even 40111 though they are different). This is an important view to de-constitute 1 any possible ontological status of dao and any transcendental ground 21111 of a meta-language or an utter silence. For Zhuangzi, the language folio 104 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 of dao must be a transformation of the language of things, not an 2 abandonment of any speaking or language. 3 4 “Speaking non-speaking” as a marginal, 5111 liminological play of language 6 7 Thus the question Zhuangzi faces is that if he does not want to retreat 8 into a complete silence, nor surrender himself to a conventional way 9 of speaking, what can he do? The answer Zhuangzi gives is “speak- 10 ing non-speaking” ( yan wuyan), which plainly develops from Laozi’s 11 notion of “the teaching of non-speaking” (buyan zhijiao).46 However, 2 Zhuangzi does not merely interpret Laozi’s “the teaching of non- 3111 speaking.” The primitive form of buyan zhijiao cannot match the sophis- 4 tication and richness of Zhuangzi’s liminology of yan wuyan. “Speaking 5 non-speaking” has been a puzzle to readers generation after genera- 6 tion. Zhuangzi’s so-called negative attitude towards language has 7 always been labeled by his emphasis on “non-speaking.” Strictly 8 speaking, “non-speaking” is merely an incomplete form of his notion. 9 The complete form should be “speaking non-speaking” or “the speak- 20111 ing of non-speaking.” The oft-omitted part is crucial to an appropriate 1 understanding of Zhuangzi’s view of language and his strategy.47 2 3 The mutual connection and transition between 4 speaking and non-speaking (or silence) 5 6 “Speaking non-speaking” concerns both speaking and non-speaking. 7 Resting on his pragmatic wisdom and trans-metaphysical insight, 8 Zhuangzi frees himself from attachment to either speaking or silence, 9 as noted in the foregoing discussion. This also enables Zhuangzi to 30111 conceive the speaking–silence relation in a non-static, mutually pen- 1 etrating, or mutually transitional way. For Zhuangzi, there has never 2 been an absolute distinction between speaking and non-speaking (or 3 silence). The “Qi Wu Lun” chapter records the following words: “He 4 speaks without saying anything; he says something without speaking.”48 5 On close inspection, the notion of “speaking non-speaking” contains 6 several profound meanings. First, the negation or silence of a certain 7 way of speaking has to be brought into effect by language or speaking 8 itself. Notice what Zhuangzi tells us: “Speak non-speaking!” Zhuangzi 9 must be aware that silence becomes silence only in relation to speak- 40111 ing. Silence makes sense only within the domain of language. In other 1 words, to maintain an authentic silence or non-speaking, he may have 21111 to speak first. Hence, we eventually get the whole book Zhuangzi. folio 105 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Second, silence can be a sign. As Merleau-Ponty observes, “The 2 absence of a sign can be a sign.”49 Within the context of the Zhuangzi, 3 silence or non-speaking especially says “no” to descriptive, entitative 4 or reifying speech. Besides, by negation or silencing of descriptive, 5111 entitative or reifying language, something outside the language, some- 6 thing that is beyond the limit of this kind of language, is being pointed 7 to. Precisely in the sense of this transitionary relationship, we come to 8 understand what Zhuangzi states: with non-speaking, you may say 9 nothing throughout your life, in which case you will never have 10 stopped speaking.50 11 Third, inversely, speaking might turn out to be as silent as non- 2 speaking under certain circumstances. On the negative side, no 3111 matter how long a reifying speech may last, it will never hit the mark, 4 never point to dao. In this connection, it says nothing. On the posi- 5 tive side, a person, with words such as “non-speaking,” may speak 6 throughout his life without having ever fallen into the trap of conven- 7 tional, reifying speech. When Zhuangzi writes: “[Y]ou may speak 8 all your life long and you will never have said anything,” he mainly 9 refers to the latter.51 Zhuangzi’s discernment of the dynamic, transi- 20111 tionary relation between speaking and non-speaking opens great 1 possibilities for his coming to grips with the limit of language, and 2 breaks new ground for a liminological play. 3 4 The similar patterns between “the speaking of 5 non-speaking” and “the use of the useless” 6 7 If we do not treat “speaking non-speaking” in isolation from 8 Zhuangzi’s other teachings, namely, if we give heed to the similar 9 strategies Zhuangzi adopts for some of his other teachings, we may 30111 have a clue to a better understanding of “speaking non-speaking.” 1 A similar strategy can first be seen in Laozi’s notion of “taking 2 action of non-action” (wei wuwei).52 Laozi’s point is not that we 3 completely abandon any action. He is concerned with how we act 4 better or do better by way of non-action or non-doing. “Taking 5 action of non-action” is neither a conventional way of doing things 6 nor a complete abandonment of action. Zhuangzi inherits Laozi’s 7 notion of “taking action of non-action” and applies the same strategy 8 to his own teaching. 9 One of the most illuminating examples is Zhuangzi’s well-known 40111 notion of “the use of the useless.” Reversing the conventional view 1 of what is useless, Zhuangzi underscores that the useless has its use 21111 (wuyong zhi weiyong):53 folio 106 LIMINOLOGY OF “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING”

1111 The cinnamon can be eaten and so it gets cut down; the 2 lacquer tree can be used and so it gets hacked apart. All men 3 know the use of the useful, but nobody knows the use of the 4 useless!54 5111 6 Here I am not exploring the various meanings or implications of “the 7 use of the useless,” but rather calling attention to his strategy. Taking 8 into account Zhuangzi’s other statement – “A man has to understand 9 the useless before you can talk to him about the useful”55 – we 10 discover that “the use of the useless” can be defined neither as a total 11 negation of any use nor as an affirmation of conventional use. It is 2 an unconventional use by way of being conventionally useless. The 3111 strategy is plainly analogous to the one Zhuangzi takes in his saying: 4 “Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a 5 [few] word[s] with him?” What is common to all these expressions: 6 the action of non-action, the use of the useless, the speaking of non- 7 speaking? A play at the boundaries between action/non-action, 8 useful/useless, speaking/non-speaking, a dazzling move to let the 9 outside in, or bring the inside out, a kind of linguistic twisting, a delay 20111 or detour. It works in such a way as to overturn every conventional 1 and logocentric hierarchy. 2 3 The liminological nature of 4 “speaking non-speaking” 5 6 Now we might conclude that “speaking non-speaking” is a trans- 7 conventional, marginal speech.56 It speaks by way of non-speaking. It 8 is a kind of linguistic twisting and detouring as play at the boundary 9 between speaking and silence, speech, and non-speech. It is neither a 30111 continuation of conventional, reifying speech, nor utter silence. Since 1 it is marginal and playful, it evades every binary distinction. In this 2 sense, it is beyond speech and silence. Its liminological nature gener- 3 ally involves two aspects. On the one hand, since the nullity that lan- 4 guage carries within itself can be announced only by language – the 5 only tool Zhuangzi can use – a possible way out is to use language 6 against itself, to allow language to do violence to itself. That is to say, 7 he speaks something (in the sense of adopting) and at the same time 8 he erases it, announces its nullity, in order not to speak something, in 9 order not to fall into the metaphysical or logocentric trap of language. 40111 The strategy can even be traced back to the remarkable opening 1 paragraph of the Dao De Jing in which Laozi says in the same man- 21111 ner: “The dao that can be spoken of is not the enduring dao.”57 folio 107 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 The consequence of such a self-erasure is the shaping and devel- 2 opment of a new linguistic strategy, a new linguistic style. Therefore, 3 on the other hand, by the withdrawal of metaphysical or reifying 4 language, by only suggesting that something not being said is 5111 speaking, by producing in the language effects relative to that which 6 is not in the language, the so-called unsayable or unnamable (namely, 7 what language is inadequate to convey) is being shown, or being 8 approached. If my interpretation of Zhuangzi’s strategy, or my 9 delineation of his linguistic twisting and detouring as play at the 10 boundary between the sayable and the unsayable, makes sense, then 11 the seeming inconsistency of his swing between speech and silence, 2 between the so-called negative attitude towards language and his 3111 highly productive speaking–writing, can definitely be solved. 4 5 “Speaking non-speaking” and the pragmatics 6 of indirect communication 7 8 Zhuangzi’s “speaking non-speaking,” as a liminological play of lan- 9 guage, as a kind of linguistic twisting and detouring, is, by nature, 20111 indirect. Its strategy thus has much to do with what is called indirect 1 communication. For example, Zhuangzi’s liminology uses indirect 2 language. This indirect language, or generally speaking, metaphor- 3 ical language, serves as a means to overcome the limit of direct 4 language, such as descriptive, cognitive, or propositional, language. 5 Zhuangzi is a great master of indirect communication and metaphor- 6 ical language. His “dwelling words” ( yuyan) and “double-layered 7 words” (chongyan) are all metaphorical.58 Paradoxical words, as a sort 8 of linguistic twisting, also are indirect and can be included in the 9 broad sphere of metaphorical language. Insofar as Zhuangzi uses 30111 language metaphorically, the conventional distinction between the 1 logical and the paradoxical becomes peripheral. 2 Moreover, within the domain of indirect communication, para- 3 doxical language is no longer subsidiary to formal language. For 4 Zhuangzi, there is no fundamental difference between philosophy 5 and literature, philosophical language, and metaphorical language. 6 This, of course, enhances his capability of dealing with the limit of 7 language. Our investigation of Zhuangzi’s liminology of language 8 thus inevitably leads to the investigation of Zhuangzi’s pragmatics of 9 indirect communication. However, such a study cannot be “a formal 40111 pragmatics,” but only a contextual investigation of the strategies of 1 indirect communication. Since this investigation covers a wide range 21111 of issues and many details, I must leave it for a separate chapter. folio 108 1111 2 3 7 4 5111 THE CHAN 6 7 CONTRIBUTION TO 8 THE LIMINOLOGY 9 10 OF LANGUAGE 11 2 3111 4 5 Preliminary remarks 6 7 (1) The emergence of the Chan liminology of language has its root in 8 both the Buddhist tradition and the Daoist, especially Zhuangzi’s 9 legacy. It is an established fact that the Chan masters openly 20111 favor Zhuangzi’s vocabulary, his linguistic strategy, and his view of 1 language. This does not mean that the Chan masters simply followed 2 or copied Zhuangzi’s view and strategy. If that were the case, the 3 Chan discourse would not be the second great resource for the limi- 4 nology of language after the Zhuangzi. In putting into practice their 5 own soteriological or therapeutic mission, Chan Buddhists create 6 their own liminology which absorbed, enriched and developed 7 Zhuangzi’s liminology of “speaking non-speaking.” Accordingly, 8 this chapter will not focus upon how the Chan masters adopted 9 Zhuangzi’s vocabulary and strategy, but rather on the “topology” 30111 of the liminology of language, namely, on how the Chan masters 1 engage in the similar liminological play within altered – i.e. Buddhist 2 – contexts, and how they make their own contribution to the liminol- 3 ogy of language. In this way, we will see, more clearly, similarity/ 4 difference, continuity/discontinuity, between Zhuangzi’s and Chan 5 Buddhist liminology of language. 6 (2) A liminological approach to the contradictory phenomena of 7 the so-called Chan denial of language and the great Chan art 8 of speaking is incompatible with some dominant modern inter- 9 pretations of the Chan/Zen view of language. For instance, echoing 40111 logical positivism, Fung Yu-lan interprets Chan thought as a philos- 1 ophy of silence, which says nothing about the noumenon – the 21111 unknowable.1 This makes the Chan view somewhat close to the early folio 109 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Wittgenstein’s absolutization of the limit of language. It fails to 2 appreciate the trans-metaphysical meaning of the Chan insight 3 into a complete interplay between speaking and silence. Similarly, 4 D. T. Suzuki sometimes assumes a dichotomy between silence 5111 and verbalism, placing Chan at one extremity of this dichotomy.2 6 The dominant modern interpretations of the Chan/Zen view of 7 language have inevitably given rise to various criticisms. 8 Dale Wright and Bernard Faure have provided pioneer works 9 in the recent rethinking of the relationship between Chan/Zen and 10 language.3 Both criticize the assertion that Chan/Zen simply tran- 11 scends or negates language. Both attempt a reconfiguration of the 2 role of language in Chan/Zen and provide textual evidence to justify 3111 it. Generally speaking, my investigation of the Chan view of language 4 can be regarded as part of this tendency to shape a better under- 5 standing of that view. However, Wright’s approach relies heavily on 6 reflections drawn from contemporary Western philosophy.4 Faure’s 7 study contains extensive historico-textual materials from Chan/Zen, 8 but does not engage fully in a systematic, theoretical interpretation. 9 Both fail to provide a more systematic reconstruction, or a more 20111 comprehensive and coherent understanding, of the Chan view of 1 language. A systematic analysis and interpretation of Chan notions 2 of language has yet to be achieved. It is to this kind of analysis, 3 reconstruction, or understanding that, I believe, my liminological 4 approach will eventually contribute. 5 6 The context for the Chan Buddhist view 7 of the inadequacy of language 8 9 Undeniably, the Chan attitude toward language has its doctrinal or 30111 ideological foundation in Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism. For this reason, our 1 inquiry into the Chan notion of the inadequacy of language must 2 start with an examination of this foundation. A careful contextual 3 analysis of the Maha¯ya¯na discourse on the inadequacy of language 4 will reveal what is meant by the inadequacy of language. 5 A very influential notion of the inadequacy of language in 6 Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism derives from Ma¯dhyamika philosophy. In the 7 Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ (hereafter Ka¯rika¯ ) 18:7, Na¯ga¯rjuna states: 8 “When the object of thought is no more there is nothing for language 9 to refer to. The true nature of things neither arises nor perishes, as 40111 nirva¯na does not.”5 This statement has been considered foundational 1 to the˙ so-called Ma¯dhyamika negation of language.6 As Kalupahana 21111 correctly observes, it is possible for interpreters of Na¯ga¯rjuna to folio 110 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 assume that the “ineffable” is identical to s´u¯nyata¯, parama¯rtha, or nirva¯na. 2 Nevertheless, Kalupahana states: “[T]he first line of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s˙ 3 statement should prevent anyone from reaching such a conclusion.”7 4 A scrutiny of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s entire work, and of Candrakı¯rti’s interpre- 5111 tation of it, shows that Na¯ga¯rjuna specifically negates a cognitive, 6 entitative, or descriptive language, as well as a correspondence 7 relation between language and object. 8 According to Na¯ga¯rjuna and Candrakı¯rti, soteriological terms 9 such as “devoid of self-existence,” “not devoid of self-existence,” and 10 so on, should no longer be asserted as predicates (even though they 11 have the form of predicates).8 These terms should no longer serve the 2 purpose of describing subjects, simply because noun words such as 3111 nirva¯na, parama¯rtha, or s´u¯nyata¯, in the Buddhist discourse, are not enti- 4 ties, ˙and, therefore, not the objects of any cognitive activities. Words, 5 sentences, and speeches are, in fact, prescriptions for curing people’s 6 illness by merely recommending the attitude and behavior of non- 7 clinging to things. Ma¯dhyamika philosophy provides great insight 8 into the intrinsic link between descriptive, imputative language, 9 and cognitive reification. For Ma¯dhyamika, the world of ordinary 20111 language is the realm of naming and things named, knowing and 1 things known, and so forth.9 Language constitutes the world, insofar 2 as the external world as object always means the object grasped in 3 thought, and insofar as language always imputes specific attributes 4 to the object of thought.10 5 Referred to as prapañca, this entified world constructed through 6 cognitive language is considered by Ma¯dhyamika to be the root 7 of all kinds of metaphysical thinking and all forms of clinging 8 and suffering. A primary goal of the Ma¯dhyamika teaching of empti- 9 ness is to bring prapañca to an end.11 It is within this context that 30111 Na¯ga¯rjuna’s verse 18: 7 can be properly understood. Na¯ga¯rjuna 1 asserts that when a referent no longer exists, referential language is 2 no longer adequate. Elsewhere he also suggests, as we have seen, that 3 when language no longer functions by reference to objects, it ceases 4 to name things, such that it no longer serves discursive thought 5 or makes cognitive assertions. Both point to the inadequacy of the 6 referential, cognitive function of language – the predominant use of 7 language. 8 The inadequacy of language is also addressed by many Maha¯ya¯na 9 scriptures. Despite various negative statements about language 40111 in various scriptures, a close examination often discloses that the 1 alleged inadequacy of language is always related to a certain mode 21111 of speaking, or a particular function of language. Among these folio 111 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Maha¯ya¯na scriptures, the Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra, well known for its connec- 2 tion with the tatha¯gatagarbha theory and early Yoga¯ca¯ra thought as 3 well as its great impact on Chan, is deserving of special attention. 4 Notwithstanding a general claim of the inadequacy of words and 5111 letters, the Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra offers a specific account of what it 6 emphatically opposes: 7 8 Said the Blessed One: Even when there are no [corre- 9 sponding] objects there are words, Maha¯mati; for instance, 10 the hare’s horns, the tortoise’s hair, a barren woman’s child, 11 etc. . . . they are neither entities nor non-entities but expressed 2 in words. If, Maha¯mati, you say that because of the reality of 3111 words the objects are, this talk lacks in sense. . . . [W]ords, 4 Maha¯mati, are an artificial creation. . . . [T]he validity of all 5 things has nothing to do with the reality of words.12 6 7 This is simply an explicit negation of the imagined correspondence 8 relation between language and objects,and,therefore,of a descriptive, 9 entitative, or cognitive use of language. The Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra stresses 20111 the inner realization of supreme wisdom mainly by meditational 1 practice and experience. This kind of “inner realization” cannot be 2 achieved by any cognitive activity using discriminative language and 3 dualistic thinking, since no such objective, isolated state of mind exists, 4 to which a cognitive language can refer. “What has been realized by 5 the Tatha¯gatas, [that] is my own realization. . . .”13 Everybody has 6 to realize his or her own enlightenment by engaging his or her own 7 subjectivity. Since no awakened state of mind stands behind each 8 general term or expression, nothing can be grasped or gained through 9 restricting oneself to “the words of the canonical texts.”14 30111 The Chan masters align themselves with the Maha¯ya¯na critique 1 of the descriptive, entitative, or cognitive use of language. While the 2 Chan masters claim that language is inadequate, this claim is in- 3 separable from their denial of the appropriateness of a cognitive 4 maneuver (zhijian, or zhijie). For instance, Baizhang Huaihai states: 5 6 You must stop all cognition of being or of non-being, stop all 7 desires and pursuits. . . . Nowadays there are cognitions or 8 opinions about the Buddhas. But what people know about, 9 what they seek after, or what they attach themselves to, all 40111 can be called the waste of the illusory knowledge produced 1 by cognitive language. They can also be called “coarse 21111 language” (cuyan) or “dead language” (siyu).15 folio 112 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 Why are cognitive discourses coarse (not refined) or dead (not living) 2 language? Because they are the pitfalls of a deceptive correspondence 3 relation between language and reality. Chan masters often advise 4 their disciples that the Buddhist reality “is not something that can be 5111 obtained through [descriptive] words and language.”16 “Those who 6 search for written words, and thereby look for the corresponding 7 reality, become even more impeded by them.”17 8 A similar, but more forceful, critique appears in the recorded 9 sayings of Linji. Linji repeatedly points out: Buddha, dharma, dao, “all 10 are empty names and designate no true reality.”18 All Buddhist 11 doctrines and teachings are “simply medicines to cure diseases of the 2 moment”; “None of them designate any true reality.”19 He further 3111 declares: 4 5 The various phenomena in this world and other worlds are 6 in all cases devoid of self-nature. . . . They are empty names, 7 and the words used to describe them are likewise empty. 8 But you think these idle names represent realities. This is a 9 great error.20 20111 1 His simile – “All sounds, names, words, phrases are like changes of 2 robes” – expresses his belief that language, like other useful things 3 or tools, serves only practical purposes and is always in the process 4 of change due to different contexts and situations. Similarly, one 5 person can wear and change different robes, but you cannot claim 6 that a robe defines the reality of the person.21 Thus the radical Chan 7 emphasis on non-reliance upon words, or, in Baizhang Huaihai’s 8 terms, on non-restriction of words,22 aims particularly at freeing 9 Chan Buddhists from the restriction of the descriptive, entitative, or 30111 cognitive use of language. The result of asserting “the inadequacy 1 of language” is not to turn completely away from language, as we 2 will see, but to turn “within language.” 3 4 Addressing the necessity or inevitability 5 of using language 6 7 Between pointing out the insufficiency of language in conveying dao 8 and engaging in marginal speech, Zhuangzi does not straightfor- 9 wardly answer the question of why it is necessary or inevitable to use 40111 language. Zhuangzi only hints that the language of dao cannot escape 1 from the language of things.23 In this respect, however, the Chan 21111 masters are quite different. Informed by the Ma¯dhyamika analysis of folio 113 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 the twofold truth, of the relation between language and the world, 2 and so forth, the Chan discourse is able to be more specific regarding 3 the need to speak. 4 When analyzing the twofold truth – samvrti (worldly convention) 5111 and parama¯rtha (higher meaning or truth)˙ ˙ – Na¯ga¯rjuna explains: 6 “Unless worldly convention is accepted as a base, the higher mean- 7 ing cannot be taught; if the higher meaning is not understood, nirva¯na 8 cannot be attained.”24 Candrakı¯rti clarifies that one of the meanings˙ 9 of samvrti is “the world of ordinary language.”25 Thus, for Ma¯dhya- 10 mika,˙ to˙ accept worldly convention as a base is to accept conventional 11 language as a base. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s verse unmistakably shows his insight 2 into the need to use language. Sengzhao, the Chinese Ma¯dhyamika 3111 thinker who had a great impact on Chan, grasps Na¯ga¯rjuna’s 4 point very well. He writes: “Though language cannot fully express 5 the nameless dharma, without using language, the dharma cannot be 6 conveyed.”26 7 The situation a Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist faces here is very much analo- 8 gous to the one the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi faced long ago, namely, 9 how to find a way out between the conventional use of language 20111 and complete silence. However, the context of this problem now 1 presupposes the understanding of both the insufficiency of language 2 and the necessity of using it as primordial to the Buddhist philosophy 3 of the Middle Way. The Middle Way maintains a nirvanic dimen- 4 sion in the everyday world without presupposing a transcendental 5 realm. By the same token, it pinpoints the insufficiency of conven- 6 tional language without postulating any sacred language (whether a 7 meta-language or complete silence). This position is like a thread 8 running through the Buddha’s teaching, Ma¯dhyamika discourse, and 9 Chan practice, advising Buddhists to avoid sliding into any extremist 30111 attitude toward language. 1 The Middle Way thus provides a solid ground for a Buddhist 2 liminology of language. If language use was not necessary and 3 inevitable, the Buddha would have remained silent forever. Then he 4 would never have been the Buddha for sentient beings. Only to the 5 extent that neither retreat into complete silence nor ignorance of 6 linguistic insufficiency are satisfactory does a liminological exercise 7 become credible. The fact that Zhuangzi, as a precursor, promi- 8 nently engaged in marginal speech qualifies him as practicing a kind 9 of Daoist Middle Way. However, Chan Buddhists more plainly 40111 thematize the issue of the necessity or inevitability of using language, 1 while simultaneously addressing the insufficiency or inadequacy 21111 of language. folio 114 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 Following Na¯ga¯rjuna and the Maha¯ya¯na notion of upa¯ya (skillful 2 means), the Chan masters express their concern about the necessity 3 of language use from a heuristic or pedagogic perspective. The 4 Platform Su¯tra contains the following explanation: “All the sutras and 5111 written words . . . are established for men. . . . Should deluded people 6 ask the wise, the wise will expound the Dharma for the stupid and 7 enable them to understand and gain a deep awakening.”27 The Jingde 8 Chuandeng Lu, fascicle 7 records: 9 10 One day Mazu Daoyi asked Zhizang: “Why don’t you read 11 sutras?” Zhizang said: “What is the difference between a 2 sutra and me?” Mazu said: “However that may be, you 3111 should get it in the future for the sake of other people.”28 4 5 This use of language, including reading scriptures and preaching, 6 “for the sake of other people,” in Huangbo Xiyun’s terms, is using 7 “words for accommodating and guiding people” ( jieyin zhici).29 The 8 Chan masters are fully aware that they cannot avoid using language 9 to accommodate and guide people: “When host and guest meet each 20111 other, there cannot but be exchanges of words and remarks.” 1 Therefore, they ask their disciples to “pay strict attention” to the use 2 of language.30 For this reason, Huineng, Baizhang and Linji all 3 formulated and handed down to their disciples a special use of 4 language. Huineng taught his disciples how to preach Dharma by 5 “utilizing the thirty-six pairs of opposites and going around without 6 attaching to either side.”31 Baizhang preferred using “the sentences 7 that cut off the connection with two opposites.”32 Linji talked about 8 “one phrase with three dark gates and three vital seals,” and so on.33 9 Nevertheless, these highly skillful uses of language in diverse 30111 contexts are not easy for most Chan students to practice. Oftentimes 1 these skillful uses are the feats of enlightened ones. In the process of 2 study and practice, in the encounter with Buddhist traditions, the 3 task of keeping a focus on existentio-spiritual awakening, eschewing 4 the trap of certain prevalent uses of language, remains. Hence, 5 Chan masters fight tirelessly against any search through words 6 and letters. This position does not necessarily require the abandon- 7 ment of language. The Platform Su¯tra shows an unusual discernment 8 concerning the hidden relation between a negation of language and 9 the inevitable use of language. 40111 1 People who attach to emptiness . . . simply say that we 21111 should not use written words. Since they have said that, folio 115 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 language also becomes inappropriate for them. However, 2 such linguistic expressions already have a form of written 3 words. Again, they say that direct dao does not establish any 4 written words. But merely these two words – “not establish” 5111 – are already written words.34 6 7 Huineng is explicating here that even if people negate language one 8 way or another, when they convey this negation, they cannot help 9 but use language. Chan masters have no illusion that they can get 10 rid of language in their this-worldly enterprise of “curing people’s 11 illness.” On this account, the Chan critique of the conventional use 2 of language is by no means tantamount to the rejection of language. 3111 It is better understood as an effort to find an alternative way of 4 communication, an alternative way of using language. 5 6 Unveiling the non-duality between 7 speech and silence 8 9 Detachment from dualistic thinking is one of the chief characteristics 20111 of Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism. Na¯ga¯rjuna’s famous eight negations – the 1 negations of four pairs of opposites – in the dedicatory verses of 2 his ka¯rika¯ set a pattern for subsequent development of non-dualistic 3 discourse in various schools of Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism.35 The 4 Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra presents its account of non-duality as follows: 5 6 [W]hat is meant by non-duality? It means that light and 7 shade, long and short, black and white, are relative terms, 8 . . . and not independent of each other; . . . for the condition 9 of existence is not of mutually exclusive character. 30111 Therefore, it is said that all things are non-dual as are 1 [nirva¯na] and [samsa¯ra].36 2 ˙ ˙ 3 It is logical to include the pair of speech and silence in the Maha¯ya¯na 4 reflections on non-duality. The Vimalakı¯rti Nirdes´a Su¯tra seems to be 5 on the verge of addressing this topic, when it touches upon the rela- 6 tion between speech and silence in the discussion of “the dharma gate 7 of non-duality.” However, it leaves the impression that the best 8 entrance into non-duality is silence, and therefore may lend itself to 9 the privileging of silence over speaking.37 40111 Despite this, the Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ tradition and other Maha¯ya¯na 1 scriptures provide provocative views in blurring an absolute demar- 21111 cation between speaking and non-speaking. For example, in the folio 116 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 Vajracchedika¯Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯Su¯tra (or Diamond Su¯tra) we read: “What do 2 you think, Subhuti, is there any [dharma] which the Tatha¯gata has 3 taught? – Subhuti replied: No indeed, O Lord, there is not.”38 This 4 view contradicts the conventional opinion that the Buddha taught or 5111 spoke something. The distinction between what is spoken and what 6 is not spoken, between speaking and non-speaking, is obscured.39 7 This idea is further articulated by the Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra: “It is said 8 by the Blessed One that from the night of the Enlightenment till 9 the night of the [parinirva¯na], the Tatha¯gata in the meantime has 10 not uttered even a word,˙ . . . for not-speaking is the Buddha’s 11 speaking.”40 All these expressions imply the non-duality of speech 2 and silence, or the dynamic, transitional relation between them. 3111 However, in most cases, these implications are not fully developed. 4 Only when we delve into Chan discourse do we find clear-cut state- 5 ments about the non-duality of speech and silence. 6 In his Wanling Lu, Huangbo Xiyun unequivocally states: “Speaking 7 is silence ( yu ji mo); silence is speaking (mo ji yu); speaking and silence are 8 non-dualistic ( yumo buer).”41 Another Chan master, Dazhu Huihai, 9 construes Vimalakı¯rti’s silence as being beyond speaking and non- 20111 speaking, a silencing of the duality between silence and speech – a 1 strategy very similar to Ma¯dhyamika’s emptiness of emptiness and 2 Zhuangzi’s nothingness of nothingness.42 By these statements, Chan 3 masters demonstrate that they apply the principle of pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da 4 (interdependent arising) to the issue of speech and silence, presenting 5 a non-isolated, truly relational understanding of speech and silence. 6 Speech and silence thus no longer have their self-identity, for one 7 always functions in relation to the other, and always has its absent pres- 8 ence in the other. Each always retains traces of the other. Sengzhao’s 9 saying – “Speech always has something unspoken” – might be a good 30111 footnote to the Chan notion of the speech–silence relation.43 Chan 1 masters might add one more point to Sengzhao’s saying: silence always 2 speaks. 3 As soon as the Chan masters bring speech and silence within the 4 reach of relational, non-dualistic understanding, the functions of 5 speech and silence are liberated from the conventional fixation. As a 6 consequence, Chan Buddhists acquire a better grasp of the Buddha’s 7 strategy and better guidance for their own soteriological practice. On 8 the one hand, silence is no longer considered mere silence. “The 9 Tatha¯gata’s silence speaks just as his speech does ( yu yi shuo mo yi 40111 shuo).” “The Tatha¯gata always speaks – there has never been such a 1 time the Tatha¯gata does not preach.”44 One of the examples used to 21111 illustrate this point is the Buddha’s silence in the face of fourteen folio 117 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 metaphysical questions, signifying the Buddha’s refusal to take a 2 stand in metaphysical debates. This case, as well as Vimalakı¯rti’s 3 silence mentioned above, indicates that silence, in certain Buddhist 4 contexts, is close to a special kind of negative expression that brings 5111 into effect the negation of dualistic thinking. 6 On the other hand, speech does not always or necessarily mean 7 speaking. “Though the Buddha has preached for forty-nine years, he 8 virtually does not say a word.”45 The Chan master here is clarifying 9 that the Buddha’s words are only intended to accommodate and 10 guide people. Words simply cannot replace the realization of enlight- 11 enment, which involves going through one’s own existentio-spiritual 2 transformation. There is no reality to which the words correspond. 3111 In the entitative, reifying, or metaphysical sense, the Buddha says 4 nothing. Therefore, Chan Buddhists regard their saying as non- 5 saying and practice a sort of self-erasing saying, to avoid being 6 entangled by saying or misleading people. 7 8 The Chan liminological play of language: a 9 saying as non-saying or a self-erasing saying 20111 1 Insight into the non-duality of speech and silence is significant to the 2 Chan liminology of language. Once the absolute, impassable demar- 3 cation between silence and speech is obscured, the path for playing 4 on the borders of language is opened. In other words, the limino- 5 logical play of language is based upon, and made possible by, a 6 trans-conventional attitude toward the limit of language. This in turn 7 is cultivated by the philosophy of the Middle Way, by the non-static, 8 relational understanding of speech and silence, by the detachment 9 from any duality, and so forth. However, freedom from fixation on 30111 either silence or speech enables Chan Buddhists, first of all, to relo- 1 cate (or redefine) the positive role of language within the framework 2 of the liminology of language. 3 While addressing the necessity or inevitability of language use 4 still leaves the role of language somewhat negative, the Hongzhou 5 sect sheds light on the positive relation between the Buddha mind 6 and language. Hongzhou Chan tends to deconstruct the dichotomy 7 between the whole of the mind (ti) and function ( yong) by canceling 8 the quasi-metaphysical issue of the whole of the mind and empha- 9 sizing that the everyday activities of the human mind are nothing but 40111 the function of the Buddha nature itself.46 The everyday activities of 1 ordinary mind and the realization of the Buddha nature or Buddha 21111 mind are non-dualistic. Accordingly, using language, as an everyday folio 118 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 activity, is certainly relevant. When someone asked: “How can we 2 recognize our own mind (as the Buddha mind)?” Huangbo Xiyun 3 replied: “That which speaks (namely, asks the question) is your 4 mind.”47 In other words, you should not attempt to attain enlight- 5111 enment outside everyday activities. Speaking and writing, just like 6 other everyday activities, can definitely be useful for triggering 7 enlightenment. “Speaking, silence, move, rest – all sounds and forms 8 – are the Buddha’s business.”48 Dazhu Huihai also points out: “If 9 separated from language, there would be no Buddha mind.”49 10 Therefore, “The Buddha mind, having no fixed form and charac- 11 teristic, can neither be separated from nor tied to language ( feili yuyan 2 feibuli yuyan).”50 This is the best characterization of the Chan position 3111 concerning language. In terms of this position, none of the one-sided 4 interpretations of the Chan view of language can stand up to scrutiny. 5 Hongzhou Chan further claims: 6 7 1 The Tatha¯gata’s preaching is the Dharma (rulai shuo jishifa); the 8 Dharma is the Tatha¯gata’s preaching ( fa jishishuo); the Dharma and 9 the preaching are non-dualistic ( fashuo buer).51 20111 2 You just speak anytime and can speak of either events (shi) or the 1 principle (li) without being hindered. The fruit of enlightenment 2 is also like this.52 3 3 The enlightened person’s letters and words all come from the 4 great wisdom and serve the great function right now and right 5 here, having never been trapped by emptiness.53 6 7 The enlightened person “always speaks in terms of function (suiyong 8 er shuo), having no fixation whatsoever on either affirmation or 9 negation.”54 30111 These statements reveal, first of all, that the Chan masters’ central 1 concern is not whether silence or speech is preferable, but how to 2 become enlightened. Once enlightened, hence free from any fixation, 3 one is then a master of using language, a master of playing on and 4 around the limit of language. There is no necessity to remain silent 5 forever.55 Second, when a logocentric hierarchy of silence and speech 6 is completely abandoned, the function of language, or how to use 7 language, in the soteriological practice, becomes fundamental. We 8 should not misunderstand the Hongzhou Chan masters’ view as a 9 return to the logocentrism of speech. After noting: “The Tatha¯gata’s 40111 silence speaks just as his speech does. While the Tatha¯gata speaks all 1 day long, no word is actually spoken,” Huangbo Xiyun further 21111 comments: “Though it is the case, we consider silence essential.”56 folio 119 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

1111 Here “essential” does not mean something metaphysical, but func- 2 tional. Given the context, what Huangbo Xiyun refers to as silence 3 is surely not complete silence as opposed to speech, but a saying as 4 non-saying or a self-erasing saying, a strategy of silencing or negating 5111 the duality between speech and silence. This is a unique Chan usage 6 against conventional usage, a liminological play. 7 The Chan saying as non-saying, or its self-erasing saying, also 8 involves two major aspects. On the one hand, fully aware of the 9 necessity of using language for guiding people as well as the risk of 10 misleading them, the Chan masters invoke an interplay between 11 speech and silence. By sustaining the position that their words are 2 not different from silence, and that no word has been spoken about 3111 any hypostatizable reality, the Chan masters move away from enti- 4 fying and thereby help people to detach from their words. On the 5 other hand, by underlining the non-saying or silence, by treating 6 their saying as something like the finger pointing to the moon (as they 7 always say), pointing to what is absent within language, pointing to 8 what has not been spoken or what cannot be adequately spoken, 9 Chan masters actually say a great deal. In this way, Chan masters 20111 play on and around the boundary of language without being 1 obstructed. As shown in Huangbo Xiyun’s well-known maxim 2 “walking all day long without touching the ground,”57 Chan masters 3 walk on the boundary of language without falling to either side. They 4 therefore achieve their great flexibility and skillfulness in the use of 5 language. Thus the Chan masters’ radical objection to reliance on 6 words and their creative use of language can be placed within one 7 framework of the liminology of language without contradiction. 8 These are simply two sides of one single coin.58 9 30111 The Chan liminological play and its 1 pragmatics of indirect communication 2 3 The subtlety and indirection of a liminological play determine the 4 intrinsic relation between the liminology of language and the strategy 5 of indirect communication. When the Chan masters “make the 6 outside in” through liminological play, when they point to the non- 7 absent absence within language, they are not at all straightforward. 8 The reason is quite simple: “If you say that it is like something, you 9 immediately miss the point.”59 In engaging in such a liminological 40111 play, the Chan masters demonstrate that they are the masters of indi- 1 rect communication. Not only are they adept in using metaphorical 21111 and poetic language, they also establish a distinctive principle of folio 120 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO LIMINOLOGY

1111 indirect communication – “Never tell too plainly.”60 Under the guid- 2 ance of this principle, Chan masters explore the double negation, the 3 paradoxical and ironic saying, the tautological expression, the sugges- 4 tive, implicative, elusive use of language . . . in a word, linguistic 5111 twisting and detouring. The strategy is effective in evading or inter- 6 rupting correspondence theory, conventional either/or logic and 7 dualistic thinking. It opens up space for de-centered meanings, imag- 8 inative connections, and active participations. It serves Chan 9 Buddhist soteriology best. How the Chan pragmatics of indirect 10 communication function liminologically and deconstructively, is, 11 without doubt, a valuable topic, and calls for a whole chapter of 2 detailed investigation. 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 121 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 Part III 6 7 8 9 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT 10 11 COMMUNICATION 2 3111 IN THE ZHUANGZI AND 4 5 IN CHAN BUDDHISM 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 1111 2 3 8 4 5111 THE DISPLACEMENT 6 7 OF INDIRECT 8 COMMUNICATION 9 10 11 2 3111 Contemporary discussions on the 4 indirection of communication 5 6 A classical model of Western philosophical discourse on communi- 7 cation can be found in Aristotle’s works. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle 8 demarcates three components of communication: the speaker, the 9 message, and the receiver. Communication, as a transfer of informa- 20111 tion, of true knowledge or demonstrated facts, is intended to persuade 1 the listener to accept information in a direction and manner 2 desired by the speaker. All rhetorical means serve this purpose of 3 communication and help the speaker to manage the audience.1 This 4 Aristotelian conception of communication is closely related to his the- 5 ory of language, and both are rooted in the metaphysical notion that 6 human reason or science is capable of grasping an invariant structure 7 of reality.2 According to Aristotle, the written words represent the 8 spoken sounds, the spoken sounds represent the affections in the soul, 9 and the affections in the soul indicate the actual things that arouse 30111 them.3 Language, therefore, is the expression of what is present in the 1 speaker’s mind and, in the final analysis, of the reality of things. 2 Against this background theory of language, there is, in Aristotle’s 3 notion of communication, an emphasis on the origin or source of 4 communication, which determines its entire movement. Communi- 5 cation is understood as a linear, direct, teleological conveyance 6 of information, thought, and experience, from the transmitter to 7 the receiver. This classical notion of communication, along with the 8 theory of language that accompanies it, has dominated Western 9 philosophical discourse for centuries, although it has many more 40111 complicated and more sophisticated variations. 1 Contemporary Western philosophers’ inquiry into the indirection 21111 of communication reflects a rethinking of the issue of communication. folio 125 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 It is part of their wider critique of Western metaphysics, including the 2 critique of the classical notion of language and signification. 3 Heidegger makes three major points in his existentio-ontological 4 account of communication in Being and Time. First, he proposes a 5111 broader notion of communication than the classical one. Communi- 6 cation, for Heidegger, is the “mutual sharing” of Being-in-the-world 7 or Being-with-one-another.4 This “mutual sharing” is made possible 8 by the disclosedness or intelligibility of Being-in-the-world, which has 9 always been “there,” always been articulated in human existential 10 situations, even before it is appropriated. In this view, “giving infor- 11 mation,” basis of the classical notion of communication, can only 2 account for “a special case” of communication.5 The classical notion 3111 provides no existential basis for the phenomenon of communication. 4 Second, since communication in nature is the mutual sharing of 5 Being-in or Being-with, “[c]ommunication is never anything like a 6 conveying of experience, such as opinions or wishes, from the inte- 7 rior of one subject into the interior of another.”6 With this statement, 8 Heidegger invalidates quite clearly the explanation of communica- 9 tion as a linear, direct, teleological movement. 20111 Third, to legitimize this statement, Heidegger further elucidates 1 the relation between the inside and the outside in communication: 2 3 Whenever something is communicated in what is said-in- 4 the-talk, all talk about anything has at the same time the 5 character of expressing itself. In talk, Dasein expresses itself 6 not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated 7 as something “internal” over against something outside, but 8 because as Being-in-the-world it is already “outside” when 9 it understands.7 30111 1 Heidegger does not deny that everyday linguistic communication has 2 the form of communicating something. However, communication 3 cannot be understood on the basis of conveying objective – for 4 example, “scientific” – information in isolation from human existen- 5 tial situations. By the same token, the disclosedness or intelligibility 6 of Being-in-the-world is not a kind of message-sending from one 7 isolated mind to another. What seems present inside the individual 8 mind is also and already outside it. This being outside is primordial 9 to any “sharing,” and renders impossible the attempt to confine 40111 communication to a context-free, original movement. 1 In the Philosophical Investigations, the later Wittgenstein criticizes the 21111 traditional understanding of communication in a strikingly similar folio 126 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 way, although his theory of language and signification differs from 2 Heidegger’s in many aspects. While trying to make “a radical break 3 with the idea that language always functions in one way, always 4 serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts,”8 Wittgenstein raises, 5111 in his inquiry, the fundamental question of “How is telling done?” or 6 “What is the language-game of telling?” Then he writes: 7 8 I would like to say: you regard it much too much as a matter 9 of course that one can tell anything to anyone. That is to 10 say: we are so much accustomed to communication through 11 language . . . that it looks to us as if the whole point of 2 communication lay in this: someone else grasps the sense 3111 of my words – which is something mental: he as it were 4 takes it into his own mind. If he then does something further 5 with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of 6 language.9 7 8 What Wittgenstein questions here is precisely the nature of language 9 as the expression of inner thought and the linear, direct, teleological 20111 feature of communication. For Wittgenstein, there is no direct path 1 by which something mental, such as an intention or intentional 2 meaning, can simply reach its end – entering into another mind. Like 3 Heidegger’s emphasis on the fore-structure of interpretation and 4 sharing, Wittgenstein calls attention to how guesswork plays a role in 5 our communicative interaction: 6 7 “But do you really explain to the other person what you 8 yourself understand? Don’t you get him to guess the essential 9 thing? You give him examples, – but he has to guess their 30111 drift, to guess your intention.” . . . “He guesses what I 1 intend” would mean: various interpretations of my expla- 2 nation come to his mind, and he lights on one of them.10 3 4 This strongly suggests, at least it seems to me, that as long as inter- 5 pretive guesswork is involved, communication could never be linear, 6 direct, teleological, but indirect, interactive, and open-ended. 7 Merleau-Ponty alludes to the indirection of communication when 8 he posits his concept of “indirect language.” First, Merleau-Ponty 9 refutes the view that each sign, having its meaning fixed once and 40111 for all, could not conceivably bring in any opacity between itself and 1 us. This disputed view is based on the assumption that meaning 21111 transcends signs in principle. However, as Merleau-Ponty points out, folio 127 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 meaning does not actually dwell in the verbal chain or distinguish 2 itself from the chain in this way. A sign has meaning only insofar as 3 it is profiled against other signs, and its meaning is entirely involved 4 in language. Any speech, therefore, is always and only a fold in the 5111 immense fabric of language. The unfolding of meaning requires 6 that we lend ourselves to the life of sign structure, to its movement 7 of differentiation and articulation. The genesis of meaning will never 8 be completed. “There is thus an opaqueness of language. Nowhere 9 does it stop and leave a place for pure meaning; it is always limited 10 only by more language, and meaning appears within it only set in a 11 context of words.”11 2 Second, Merleau-Ponty denies the notion that before thought finds 3111 the words which are able to express it, it is already a sort of ideal 4 text that our sentences attempt to translate. For Merleau-Ponty, the 5 author himself has no text to which he can compare his writing, and 6 no language prior to language. Language is much more a sort of being 7 than a means. Since meaning is the total movement of signification, 8 our thought crawls along in language. At the very moment language 9 fills our mind up, we abandon ourselves to it, and nothing separates 20111 us from the meaning any more. Thus Merleau-Ponty claims: 1 2 [I]f we rid our minds of the idea that our language is the 3 translation or cipher of an original text, we shall see that 4 the idea of complete expression is nonsensical, and that all 5 language is indirect or allusive. . . . The relation of meaning 6 to the spoken word can no longer be a point for point corre- 7 spondence that we always have clearly in mind.12 8 9 Moreover, language’s ability “to signify a thought or a thing directly 30111 is only a secondary power derived from the inner life of language.”13 1 Here Merleau-Ponty clearly refutes the direct or corresponding rela- 2 tion between language and thought or language and things based on 3 his understanding of the unfolding of meaning as the open-ended 4 movement of differentiation. He thus responds positively to the 5 unique way language functions in the perceptual world. Although 6 this view of language is not his final theory of language, it is incor- 7 porated into the latter.14 These statements of his obviously contribute 8 to our understanding of the indirection of language and communi- 9 cation, and anticipate the rise of the poststructuralist theory of 40111 language and communication. 1 To subvert the traditional concept of communication as a 21111 linear, direct and teleological movement, Derrida inquires into the folio 128 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 condition of the possibility of communication, which he calls archi- 2 writing or differance. The traditional concept of communication – 3 “telecommunication,” according to Derrida15 – presupposes that 4 meaning can be transmitted or communicated by different means, 5111 including technically more powerful mediations, over a much greater 6 distance, but within a milieu that is fundamentally continuous and 7 equal to itself, within a homogeneous space across which the unity 8 and integrity of meaning are not affected at all. This concept is deeply 9 rooted in the traditional theory of sign as a representation of idea, 10 which itself represents the perceived thing. Communication, hence, 11 vehiculates a representation as an ideal content. Upon this examina- 2 tion, the traditional concept of communication is considered by 3111 Derrida as the communication of presence, which is indissociable 4 from the Western metaphysics of presence (the metaphysics of 5 Being).16 6 Since the traditional concept of communication is based on the 7 traditional theory of sign, Derrida’s subversion starts with the written 8 sign. Contrary to the supposition that a word signifies a presence, 9 Derrida thinks that every written sign supposes a certain absence 20111 (to be determined). What is essential to a sign is its iterability. Every 1 sign must remain legible, repeatable, despite the incessant absence or 2 disappearance of every determined addresser or addressee, of every 3 intention-to-signify or wanting-to-communicate-this, of every refer- 4 ent or signified, and so forth. This essential drifting, this structural 5 possibility of being cut off from its origin or production, from its 6 addresser or addressee, from its referent or signified, is precisely what 7 makes every sign a sign, every writing a writing, every communica- 8 tion a communication. In other words, “The possibility of repeating, 9 and therefore of identifying, marks is implied in every code, making 30111 of it a communicable, transmittable, decipherable grid that is iterable 1 for a third party, and thus for any possible user in general.”17 2 By revealing this open structure of signification, Derrida not only 3 overturns the traditional hierarchy: writing as a form of communica- 4 tion. He also replaces the concept of communication with a new one: 5 to understand communication in terms of its condition of possibilities 6 – the archi-writing. From this perspective, “[a]s writing, communi- 7 cation, if one insists upon maintaining the word, is not the means of 8 transport of sense, the exchange of intentions and meanings. . . .”18 9 The latter, Derrida emphasizes, is only an effect of the former. 40111 This brief survey of contemporary philosophical discourse on 1 communication and signification runs, I am keenly aware, the risk of 21111 reducing the essential differences among these thinkers and their folio 129 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 philosophical undertakings. As we can see from the foregoing discus- 2 sions, they address the issue of communication or signification from 3 diverse angles, either from an analysis of the existential structure of 4 Being-in-the-world, a philosophical therapy, a phenomenologist 5111 reflection, or from a deconstructive operation. Nevertheless, they do 6 express a common concern with the indirection of communication 7 from different angles. Upon close inspection, the most important 8 meanings of the “indirection” of communication, which are expli- 9 cated by, or implied in, these philosophical discourses, may be 10 summarized as follows. 11 First, the alleged origin, source or speaker’s intention cannot tele- 2 ologically determine the process and result of linguistic communica- 3111 tion. This is, in large measure, due to the open-ended structure of 4 communication, which allows for every break with the origin, source 5 or speaker’s intention, and for the “receiver’s” active participation, 6 hermeneutic guess or even intervention. 7 Second, the concept of an original thought, inner experience, or 8 pure meaning, which can be transmitted or communicated via a 9 direct path from the speaker’s mind to the receiver’s mind, is merely 20111 an illusion. It is illusory because any thought, experience, or meaning, 1 cannot be there “in and by itself.” Thought, experience, or meaning, 2 is always relational, context-bound, and without self-identity. If it is 3 called the inside, this inside is simultaneously and always already the 4 outside. It can be communicated only because of, and by, the detour 5 of “being outside.” Therefore, it is no longer purely “inside.” 6 Third, the indirection of communication presupposes the invalid- 7 ity of the correspondence theory of language, meaning and signifi- 8 cation. There is no correspondence relation between object and 9 thought, or thought and expression. Since meaning is not indepen- 30111 dent of the verbal chain or the web of language, and context is never 1 fixed, meaning is both limited and, therefore, multiplied, by the 2 operation of language. Communication takes place only within this 3 ongoing process of multiplying. 4 Fourth, the indirect feature of communication radically subverts 5 the traditional subordination of indirect communication to direct 6 communication. When maintaining the direct feature of communi- 7 cation, indirection is inevitably treated as marginal or peripheral.19 8 Since indirection is now considered a condition of the possibility 9 of all communication, direct communication, as linguistic strategy or 40111 usage, can only be regarded as an effect of that general condition, or 1 as a special case. This brings about a significant change in our studies 21111 of communicative strategy, as we will see in the following discussion. folio 130 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 The reinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s 2 “indirect communication” 3 4 A consequence of these contemporary philosophical inquiries into the 5111 indirection of communication is the re-evaluation or reinterpretation 6 of Kierkegaard’s notion of “indirect communication.” It appears 7 unavoidable that once philosophical attention is drawn to the indi- 8 rection of communication, a new light is brought to the significance 9 of Kierkegaard’s notion and his use of indirect communication. 10 Kierkegaard centers his theory of indirect communication on 11 the ethico-religious sphere. What is ethico-religious, Kierkegaard 2 argues, cannot be communicated directly. As a way of life, the ethico- 3111 religious truth is different from any kind of objective truth. At first 4 sight, Kierkegaard’s theory gets entangled in a number of binary dis- 5 tinctions such as subjective/objective, concrete/abstract, outward/ 6 inward, and so on. However, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on subjectivity 7 and inwardness does not necessarily involve the notion of a closed or 8 pure presence that a contemporary deconstructionist may anticipate. 9 In his notion of subjectivity or inwardness, Kierkegaard actually puts 20111 much weight on each individual’s inescapable choice, decision and 1 involvement. For Kierkegaard, the ethico-religious life is a process of 2 becoming, a process of personal appropriation, a process of differen- 3 tiation. The other of every subjectivity would never be the same, 4 since the existential situation that each individual faces provides no 5 objective certainty. Communication in the ethico-religious sphere, 6 therefore, has much to do with what he calls a “double reflection.”20 7 The first reflection refers to the intellectual content. The second 8 refers to the existential application of this content to each individual’s 9 life. It is this second, doubled reflection – an existentio-practical 30111 dimension – that distinguishes the communication in the ethico- 1 religious sphere from the ordinary conception of communication as 2 conveying-receiving information. 3 Kierkegaard’s point is that existential reality or ethico-religious 4 capacity is incommunicable if the ordinary mode of communication 5 is followed.21 Moreover, any direct communication in the ethico- 6 religious sphere is misleading, since it deceives people into thinking 7 that the actualization of the possibilities of being ethico-religious is a 8 result or something complete that can be sent or received through 9 communication. Thus communication in the ethico-religious sphere 40111 must be indirect, oblique and artful. It aims at arousing each indi- 1 vidual’s own response to existential problems, providing occasions for 21111 each individual to take his or her own action, to seek his or her own folio 131 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 spiritual journey. To do this, it must first disillusion each individual 2 of the possibility of gaining anything through communication. 3 “[T]he art of communication at last becomes the art of taking away, 4 of luring something away from someone.”22 This constitutes the 5111 complexity, subtlety and dialectics of communication in the ethico- 6 religious sphere. “[T]his type of communication, which seems in 7 comparison with the other to be no communication, is precisely 8 communication.”23 Kierkegaard describes the characteristic of his 9 “indirect communication” in more vivid language: 10 11 To stop a man on the street and stand still while talking to 2 him, is not so difficult as to say something to a passer-by in 3111 passing, without standing still and without delaying the 4 other, without attempting to persuade him to go the same 5 way, but giving him instead an impulse to go precisely his 6 own way. Such is the relation between one existing indi- 7 vidual and another, when the communication concerns the 8 truth as existential inwardness.24 9 20111 The contemporary reinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s “indirect 1 communication” raises two interesting issues. First, it overturns 2 the authoritative interpretation, such as Walter Lowrie’s, of 3 Kierkegaard’s later works as direct communication.25 This authori- 4 tative interpretation is clearly based on the traditional hierarchy 5 of the direct/indirect. Within this hierarchy, indirect language, 6 speech or communication, has always been excluded from the 7 mainstream of Western discourse. It could only be a special case 8 of direct communication. In a similar vein, Kierkegaard’s early, 9 “aesthetic,” or pseudonymous texts, are conceived of as marginal, 30111 unnecessary irritants. It is said, even Kierkegaard himself in his later 1 works abandoned this indirect communication and went back to the 2 direct mode of communication. 3 New interpreters argue that the later works are “just as oblique as” 4 the pseudonymous works.26 The pseudonymity is only a surface 5 feature, or a part, of the more widely conceived indirect communi- 6 cation.27 This argument is well supported by theoretical and textual 7 re-examinations of Kierkegaard’s works. For instance, in Concluding 8 Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard actually distinguishes between 9 the “form” and the “process” of communication.28 The form can be 40111 various, but the process of communication is always indirect. This 1 might provide the ground for him to assume a different form for 21111 his later “indirect communication.” In one of his later works, Training folio 132 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 in Christianity, Kierkegaard explicitly expresses his further concern 2 with indirect communication: 3 4 [I]ndirect communication can also be brought about in 5111 another way, through the relationship set up between 6 the communication and the communicator. In this case, the 7 communicator would be present, whereas in the first case 8 he was omitted. . . . [S]ince any communication concerning 9 what it means to exist demands a communicator, the com- 10 municator is the reduplication of what is communicated. . . . 11 [I]f the communicator is himself dialectically qualified, 2 . . . then all direct communication becomes simply an impos- 3111 sibility.29 4 5 This is a direct echo of the existentio-practical view expressed in his 6 early work that existential reality cannot be communicated directly, 7 and that each individual simply must live in it. 8 If the relationship between this first issue of reinterpretation and 9 our current concern with the indirection of communication is not 20111 so direct, the second appears to be the reverse. Our contemporary 1 interpreters contend that, seen from a postmodern point of view, 2 “Kierkegaard’s special theory of indirect communication, then, is also 3 a general theory of language.”30 “[I]t is Kierkegaard, a century ahead 4 of Derrida, who demonstrates that a meaning can be so long deferred 5 that it would finally be merely naive to ask for it.”31 The ethico- 6 religious dimension of Kierkegaard’s theory is not denied, yet the 7 significance of this theory certainly exceeds its ethico-religious sphere. 8 Kierkegaard’s theory of sign, which is the cornerstone of his entire 9 theory of indirect communication, is now considered the precursor of 30111 contemporary inquiries into the indirection of communication, signi- 1 fication, and language in general. This is an apparent reason why 2 Kierkegaard’s texts are still favored by postmodern readers. 3 A much-quoted paragraph from Kierkegaard’s discourse of sign is 4 most revealing: 5 6 What is to be understood by a “sign”? A sign is the negation 7 of immediacy, or a second state of being, differing from the 8 first. It is not thereby affirmed that the sign is not something 9 immediate, but that what it is as a sign is not immediate, in 40111 other words, that as a sign it is not the immediate thing it is. 1 A nautical mark is a sign. Immediately it is a post, a light, 21111 or some such thing, but a sign it is not immediately, that it folio 133 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 is a sign is something different from what it immediately is. 2 . . . [F]or a sign is a sign only for one who knows that it is a 3 sign, and in the strictest sense only for one who knows what 4 it signifies.32 5111 6 What do we observe in this paragraph? The negation of immediacy, 7 the canceling out of the correspondence relation between presence 8 and representation, the non-referential characteristic of signification, 9 all are within the reach of contemporary inquiries into the indirec- 10 tion of communication, signification, and language in general, as 11 my preceding discussion has already shown. With this theory of sign 2 in view, it is not difficult to see that Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect 3111 communication does contribute to our critique of the traditional 4 conception of communication, and our discovery of the indirect 5 feature of communication, despite its special reference to ethico- 6 religious issues. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect commu- 7 nication, due to his philosophical insight, provides a unique sample 8 in that a particular study of communication in the ethico-religious 9 sphere can also shed light on the general issue of communication and 20111 signification. This is not only because ethico-religious problems 1 occupy an irreplaceable place in human existence and are insepar- 2 able from other spheres of human existence, but also because a 3 profound understanding of communication in the ethico-religious 4 sphere must involve a profound understanding of features of human 5 communication and signification in general. 6 7 Indirect communication as linguistic strategy 8 9 A remarkable aspect characteristic of both the inquiry into the indi- 30111 rection of communication and the recovery of Kierkegaard’s indirect 1 communication is the attention to studies of indirect communication 2 as linguistic strategy, to how we communicate or use language 3 indirectly, and to indirect communication as a way of overcoming 4 the limitations of the direct mode of communication. 5 As indicated earlier, recognition of the indirection of communica- 6 tion makes possible the repositioning of indirect communication 7 within philosophical discourse. It in effect liberates indirect commu- 8 nication from the oppressive hierarchy of direct/indirect communi- 9 cation. However, contemporary inquiries into the indirection of 40111 communication or signification are, to a large extent, tinged with 1 a post-metaphysical emphasis on the strategy and pragmatics of 21111 communication or signification. Two schools, post-Wittgensteinian folio 134 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 and post structuralist, among others, have particularly contributed to 2 this emphasis. For instance, following Wittgenstein’s notion that we 3 should pay more heed to different uses of words instead of estab- 4 lishing the essence of language,33 Davidson strongly opposes any 5111 attempt to define the essence and rules of communication. He asserts: 6 “We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which 7 language-users acquire and then apply to cases.”34 Meanwhile, 8 having insight into the double structure or double play of language, 9 Derrida concentrates his philosophical writing on developing “a kind 10 of general strategy” for critiquing philosophical texts.35 These two 11 drifts conspicuously link philosophical inquiries with linguistic usages 2 and strategies. 3111 In terms of this approach, our inquiry into the indirection of 4 communication does not aim to establish any inverted hierarchy 5 of indirect/direct communication, nor attempt to discover an essence 6 of or set of rules for communication that can regulate every commu- 7 nicative action. Rather, this inquiry merely seeks to draw attention 8 to indirect methods of communication that have long been margin- 9 alized, and to recognize the importance of various indirect strategies 20111 of communication. In other words, analysis of the indirection of 1 communication must be closely related to the study of indirect uses 2 of language or indirect strategies of communication. Though the 3 former can be distinguished from the latter in the sense that an exam- 4 ination of the general feature of communicative process is not the 5 same as the study of different strategies of communication, the latter 6 is the pragmatic focus and consequence of the former. 7 It is this pragmatic focus and consequence of the contemporary 8 inquiries into the indirection of communication that has impact on, 9 and is echoed by, reinterpretations of Kierkegaard’s indirect commu- 30111 nication. Previous interpreters of Kierkegaard’s works are criticized 1 for being “so anxious to descry what he is saying that they failed to 2 take proper account of how he says it.”36 These interpreters forget 3 that the issue of how we communicate or how we communicate 4 better is a central theme of Kierkegaard’s whole theory of indirect 5 communication. As Kierkegaard himself puts it very clearly, “The 6 objective accent falls on What is said, the subjective accent on How it is said.”37 7 For Kierkegaard, this “how it is said” is more important than “what 8 is said,” not only because what is said can never be separated from 9 how it is said, but also because what is said is determined, to a great 40111 extent, by how it is said. 1 Kierkegaard’s writings are fascinating examples of the develop- 21111 ment and practice of indirect communicative strategies. Kierkegaard folio 135 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 obviously is not concerned with any essence of communication, but 2 precisely with this use and practice of indirect communication. By 3 developing a series of linguistic strategies of indirect communication, 4 including parables, irony, paradox, pseudonyms, and the like, 5111 Kierkegaard overcomes the limitations of direct modes of communi- 6 cation such as informative discourse, argumentative discourse, and 7 so on, especially in the ethico-religious sphere. Readers have often 8 misunderstood Kierkegaard’s texts because they did not have a grasp 9 of Kierkegaard’s linguistic strategies, as our contemporary inter- 10 preters point out. 11 At this point in the study of the indirect strategy of communication 2 or of the indirect use of language, we can start to see more clearly the 3111 significance of the ensuing investigation on the strategy and pragmat- 4 ics of indirect communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism.38 5 If the tradition of Western philosophy has privileged the direct use of 6 language or the direct strategy of communication, and has disfavored 7 the indirect use of language or the indirect strategy of communication, 8 the opposite is the case in the Zhuangzi and Chan. The Zhuangzi and 9 Chan are great traditions of indirect communication. Although there 20111 are no systematic theories of indirect communication in the Zhuangzi 1 and Chan compatible to contemporary Western inquiries into the 2 indirection of communication, a careful analysis of what Zhuangzi 3 and the Chan masters articulated concerning their uses of language 4 and their strategies of communication will show that they take 5 the indirection of communication into serious consideration. This 6 understanding of the indirection of communication is rooted in their 7 profound recognition of the context-bound feature of human com- 8 munication, and in their holistic, dynamic, and relational under- 9 standing of human existence and of the world. Their lack of interest 30111 in the theoretical pursuit of any essence of communication does not 1 hinder them from having opinions on fundamental issues of commu- 2 nication. These opinions are inseparable from, and implied in, their 3 emphasis on the indirect use of language or the indirect strategy of 4 communication. By investigating the strategy and pragmatics of indi- 5 rect communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan, we will see how they 6 develop these strategies of communication or uses of language as a 7 way of overcoming the limits of communication or of language. We 8 will find the underlying principles of these strategies or usages, as well 9 as discover great resources and gain inspiration for the practice of 40111 indirect communication. This investigation thus will bring the study 1 of these two great traditions of indirect communication into a post- 21111 modern focus, and help them serve our contemporary interests. folio 136 DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 Although indirect communication was until recent times forgotten 2 in Western philosophical discourse, contemporary inquiries into 3 the indirection of communication and the reinterpretation of 4 Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, especially their probing 5111 of indirect linguistic strategies of communication, have become an 6 important part of the present context in which our rediscovery of the 7 Zhuangzian and Chan strategies inevitably takes shape. This redis- 8 covery will also help to reinterpret these two traditions. For instance, 9 what is Zhuangzi’s pragmatic solution to the contradiction between 10 an utter abandonment of language or communication and the 11 conventional use of language or the conventional way of communi- 2 cation, as the preceding chapters have proposed? What is the 3111 relationship between Zhuangzi’s art of speaking or of communica- 4 tion and the central notions of his philosophy? How does Zhuangzi’s 5 strategy of communication embody his fundamental philosophy? 6 The investigation of indirect communication, it seems to me, will 7 undoubtedly shed new light on all these questions. By examining 8 Zhuangzi’s indirect communication, the veil over the explanation 9 of Zhuangzi’s attitude toward language will be further lifted: it is an 20111 attitude directed against direct language, an effort to overcome the 1 limitations of direct language or direct communication. 2 By studying indirect communication in Chan, we will greatly 3 improve our understanding of the traditional Chan teaching of 4 “the special transmission from mind to mind.” Does this teaching 5 regard Chan communication as a direct conveying and receiving of 6 messages between two minds? Does it maintain a linear, continuous, 7 teleological presence of enlightenment experience, which is context- 8 free and pure, in Chan communication? These are critical questions 9 that postmodern readers may well raise. Since Chan communication 30111 has not always been clearly understood, and has not drawn much 1 scholarly attention, a detailed investigation of indirect communica- 2 tion in Chan may provide more appropriate interpretations of these 3 issues. Of course, our study of the strategy and pragmatics of indi- 4 rect communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan will not be restricted 5 to merely answering these questions. It will involve a wide range of 6 topics that are at once crucial to a proper understanding of the 7 Zhuangzi and Chan, and have aroused broad interest in contem- 8 porary discourses and studies of linguistic strategies. 9 Finally, it might be worthwhile to insist that although there are 40111 some parallels between contemporary Western inquiries into the 1 indirection of communication and Zhuangzian and Chan Buddhist 21111 emphasis on the indirect use of language or the indirect strategy of folio 137 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 communication, the background theories for these undertakings are 2 very different. Contemporary Western inquiries into the indirection 3 of communication, such as those of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or 4 Derrida, reflect their rejection of the view of language as a medium, 5111 or as a means, functioning between an objective world and human 6 beings. They attempt to see language as a being, a holistic process in 7 which the relation of human beings and the world undergoes trans- 8 formation. Zhuangzi and the Chan masters, on the other hand, see 9 language as a means or a tool, which does not serve only as a medium 10 by which we express our innermost thoughts or form a picture of the 11 outside world. Its functions are inseparable from our broader prac- 2 tices. We use language to serve our practical purposes just as we use 3111 other means or tools to acquire food, to protect our body, or to get 4 rest. The uses of language, like the uses of other tools, are not consid- 5 ered context-free, not isolated from the user and the environment. 6 This holistic view seems similar to that of neo-pragmatists, such as 7 Rorty, who views language as a tool.39 8 However, the differences between neo-pragmatism, a secular phil- 9 osophy, and the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism, which are oriented 20111 toward religious or soteriological practices and thinking, are also 1 manifest. If one compares the Zhuangzi and Chan with Western 2 approaches to indirect communication, it is quite clear that the 3 Zhuangzi and Chan are rather more analogous to the Kierkegaardian 4 approach than to others in the sense that they are concerned with 5 religious practice in the first place, and that the existentio-practical 6 dimension is primordial to them. On the other hand, the underlying 7 principles for the Kierkegaardian and these two Chinese traditions 8 are so profoundly dissimilar that by neglecting the differences we will 9 inevitably fail to understand these separate undertakings correctly. 30111 Therefore, we must cautiously clarify all these differences when 1 adopting any Western vocabulary. I will deal with these differences 2 in more specific terms in the next two chapters. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 138 1111 2 3 9 4 5111 THE PRAGMATICS OF 6 7 “GOBLET WORDS”: 8 INDIRECT 9 10 COMMUNICATION IN 11 2 THE ZHUANGZI 3111 4 5 6 Preliminary remarks 7 8 Based upon our preceding examination, the concept of direct com- 9 munication or direct discourse can be broadly defined as follows: it 20111 is speaker-oriented and assumes a linear, teleological relation 1 between the speaker and the receiver; it presupposes a direct or 2 corresponding relation between language and thought, thought 3 and object; it regards the message or what is communicated as objec- 4 tive, context-free and separable from existentio-practical concerns; 5 it considers meaning determined, unequivocal, and transparent; it 6 confines itself to the direct use of language, namely, the descriptive, 7 cognitive, or propositional use of language. Indirect communication, 8 on the contrary, can be broadly defined as listener- or reader- 9 oriented, and non-teleologcal; it assumes an interactive relation 30111 between the speaker and the listener; it abandons the correspondence 1 theory of language; it is concerned with the existentio-practical 2 dimension of what is communicated; it considers meaning open- 3 ended and indeterminate; it adopts indirect language, such as 4 metaphorical, poetic, or paradoxical language. As our foregoing 5 investigation of the Zhuangzi has shown, Zhuangzi refutes the corre- 6 spondence theory of language. He refuses to surrender himself to the 7 descriptive, cognitive or referential use of language, displaying his 8 liminological play, a kind of linguistic twisting, to overcome the limi- 9 tation of the direct mode of discourse, and to best serve the primary 40111 purpose of his soteriological or therapeutic practice. This leads us 1 toward the further investigation of Zhuangzi’s strategy of indirect 21111 communication, his indirect modes of discourse. folio 139 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 Chapter 27 of the Zhuangzi provides its own characterization of 2 Zhuangzi’s modes of discourse, three famous modes of Zhuangzi’s 3 saying – “dwelling words” ( yuyan), “double-layered words” (chongyan), 4 “goblet words” (zhiyan)1 – which are very useful for our understanding 5111 of Zhuangzi’s strategy of indirect communication. As A. C. Graham 6 correctly observes, although this characterization of three modes of 7 discourse appears in one of the mixed chapters, it is “closely related” 8 to Zhuangzi’s view of language in the inner chapters, especially in the 9 “Qi Wu Lun” chapter.2 However, these modes of discourse, namely, 10 the characterizations of how Zhuangzi speaks, have not been suffi- 11 ciently studied by contemporary interpreters of Zhuangzi’s philoso- 2 phy. For instance, Chad Hansen, in his account of Zhuangzi’s 3111 philosophy of language, utterly disregards the three modes of dis- 4 course, despite their close relationship with the inner chapters.3 On 5 the other hand, Graham’s account of these three modes of discourse 6 is quite elementary. He does not explore the intrinsic relations among 7 these three modes, but simply mentions in passing that “spillover say- 8 ing” (his translation of zhiyan) is most important and is given more 9 space than the other two modes in chapter 27 of the Zhuangzi.4 20111 In fact, some Chinese commentators on the Zhuangzi have clearly 1 pointed out that these three modes of discourse overlap. “Dwelling 2 words” involve “double-layered words.” “Goblet words” involve the 3 other two.5 Wang Shumin propounds the suggestion that yuyan and 4 chongyan refer to the concrete aspects of Zhuangzi’s writing, and 5 that zhiyan refers to Zhuangzi’s general stance toward his use of 6 language.6 Shuen-fu Lin states that while yuyan and chongyan “seem 7 to be primarily concerned with the practical aspects of expression of 8 ideas,” zhiyan “is concerned with the more philosophical aspect 9 of [Zhuangzi]’s theory of language and self-expression.”7 While all 30111 these views need to be further clarified, they strongly indicate that 1 these three modes of discourse, as presented in the Zhuangzi, imply a 2 certain relationship beyond their surface order. This opinion will be 3 taken as a point of departure for our ensuing investigation. In other 4 words, we will not simply restate these three modes of discourse 5 in their original sequence, as Graham does. Rather, we will first 6 examine the general strategy and pragmatics of “goblet words,” 7 revealing the structural depth of Zhuangzi’s indirect communication. 8 The characterization of “goblet words” perfectly reveals Zhuangzi’s 9 profound understanding of the indirection of communication. This 40111 understanding results from, and is an integral part of, his holistic, 1 relational, and dynamic understanding of human existence and of 21111 the world. Only within the general scope and function of “goblet folio 140 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 words” will we gain a better understanding of the role of “dwelling 2 words” and “double-layered words.” We will, therefore, examine 3 these two modes of discourse within our general task of the investi- 4 gation of Zhuangzi’s indirect mode of “goblet words.” 5111 Second, we will investigate the strategies of denegation,8 paradox, 6 and irony, referred to as diaogui (paradoxical speech), miuyou zhishuo 7 (absurd speech), and the like, in the Zhuangzi. This may constitute a 8 fourth category in Zhuangzi’s modes of discourse. However, the use 9 of denegation, paradox and irony in the Zhuangzi not only is closely 10 connected with the use of “dwelling words” and “double-layered 11 words,” but also can be subsumed under the general category of 2 “goblet words.” Indeed, denegation, paradox and irony are good 3111 examples of Zhuangzi’s “goblet words.” Although they can be 4 included in the “goblet words,” each is nonetheless distinct. We 5 choose the use of denegation, paradox and irony in the Zhuangzi as a 6 special part of our investigation of Zhuangzi’s indirect communica- 7 tion for two obvious reasons: 8 1 the use of denegation, paradox and irony carries heavy weight 9 in Zhuangzi’s strategy of indirect communication and his philo- 20111 sophical style; 1 2 the use of denegation, paradox and irony in the Zhuangzi has 2 regained its attraction due to postmodern attention to the 3 strategic link between deconstruction and negative theology,9 to 4 the study of the various strategies of denegation, paradox and 5 irony. Our investigation of Zhuangzi’s use of denegation, paradox 6 and irony will address those issues that have been inquired into 7 by contemporary philosophical discourse. 8 9 30111 The pragmatics of “goblet words” and 1 Zhuangzi’s strategy of indirect 2 communication 3 4 The context of the Zhuangzian notion of 5 “goblet words” 6 The notion of “goblet words” suggests that Zhuangzi’s words func- 7 tion like a goblet that tips when full and rights itself when empty, 8 indicating how they “adapt to and follow along with the fluctuating 9 nature of the world and thus achieve a state of harmony.”10 A contex- 40111 tual analysis of this Zhuangzian notion of “goblet words” reveals: (1) 1 this notion has close connection with, and reflects quite clearly, the 21111 soteriological and therapeutic goal of Zhuangzi’s philosophy – to folio 141 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 accommodate one’s mind to, or to be flexible with, the changes of 2 all things and the shifts of meanings and viewpoints; (2) the account 3 of “goblet words” and the other two modes of discourse in the 4 Zhuangzi definitely regard these modes or strategies as alternatives to 5111 direct communication or direct discourse. 6 Concerning point (1), we find that the notion of “goblet words” 7 is inseparable from Zhuangzi’s notion of tianni (the operation/ 8 balancing of heaven/nature). The complete statement about “goblet 9 words” that appears in chapter 27 is as follows: “Goblet words come 10 forth day after day (zhiyan richu), and are in harmony with the opera- 11 tion of nature (heyi tianni); they accommodate themselves to endless 2 changes and, therefore, may live out their years ( yinyi manyan, suoyi 3111 qiongnian).”11 Except for the first clause and, therefore, the slightly dif- 4 ferent context, this statement repeats the main sentence in which 5 Zhuangzi mentions tianni in his “Qi Wu Lun” chapter: 6 7 Whether the alternating voices of disputation are relative to 8 each other or not, they may be harmonized within the operation 9 of nature and allowed to follow their endless changes so they may live 20111 out their years. What does “harmonized within the operation 1 of nature” mean? I would say, “Right may be not right; so may 2 be not so. If right were really right, then right would be 3 distinct from not right, and there would be no dispute. If so 4 were really so, then so would be distinct from not so and there 5 would be no dispute. Forget the years; forget (fixed) distinc- 6 tions. Ramble in the realm of infinity and make it your 7 home!”12 8 9 In Zhuangzi’s opinion, there is no legitimacy for any fixation on a 30111 particular view or any privileged binary distinction. Everything is 1 inherently possessed of that which we may affirm or that which we 2 may deny, and can be viewed from different angles or perspectives, 3 because everything exists in a relational web and constantly under- 4 goes a transformation that strips it of any self-identity. One thing, one 5 aspect, or one perspective, is always relative to an other, and in this 6 sense is always limited. This relativity or limitedness opens the possi- 7 bility of limitless things, aspects or perspectives. It allows more things, 8 more aspects, more perspectives to thrive without partiality. Zhuangzi 9 understands this as the operation/balancing of nature (tianni) and 40111 advises us to stay with the axis of dao and to respond to endless 1 changes,13 that is, to awaken us from our fixation on limited views or 21111 perspectives and to allow us to be nimble and flexible with things. folio 142 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 For Zhuangzi, heaven/nature teaches us this lesson without using 2 direct human language. It teaches through tianlai, the piping of heaven 3 or the sound of nature.14 The great sage understands this sound of 4 nature. For the great sage, “To know dao is easy; not to speak of it is 5111 difficult.”15 This is so because he lives in the human world. He cannot 6 escape, nor does he have to. As our preceding discussion has shown, 7 Zhuangzi understands very well that everything contains or manifests 8 the perspective of dao. Language is no exception. There must be the 9 possibility of language that is in harmony with dao, with tianni, accom- 10 modating itself to endless change. “Goblet words” are such possibili- 11 ties, as demonstrated by Zhuangzi himself. “Without “goblet words” 2 that come forth day after day and are in harmony with tianni, who can 3111 use his words for long?”16 In other words, if language is going to func- 4 tion in an ever-changing world, it must sustain itself in an ever-renew- 5 ing process. Here Zhuangzi’s concern is not only with a particular way 6 of speech, but with the more general feature of language, with the 7 open-ended and dynamic function of language. Thus we see that the 8 notion of tianni lays a foundation for Zhuangzi’s pragmatics of “goblet 9 words,” and profoundly determines Zhuangzi’s indirect communica- 20111 tion. We will see this more clearly in the ensuing investigations. 1 Concerning point (2), the account of Zhuangzi’s “goblet words” 2 and other modes of discourse in chapter 33 contrasts sharply with its 3 negation of the direct mode of discourse or of communication. The 4 relevant sentences in that chapter run as follows: 5 6 With absurd expressions, extravagant words, and unbor- 7 dered phrases, he often gave free rein to his whims, and did 8 not confine himself to straightforward language (budang), 9 nor show his preference for any particular point of view. 30111 Believing that the world was sunk in stupidity, he could not 1 discuss (with people) straightforwardly (bukeyu zhuangyu). So 2 he used “goblet words” for endless changes, “double-layered 3 words” for authenticity, and “dwelling words” for breadth. 4 . . . Although his words are irregular and paradoxical, they 5 deserve consideration.17 6 7 Here, in contrast with his positive attitude toward absurd expressions 8 (miuyou zhishuo), extravagant words (huangtang zhiyan), unbordered 9 phrases (wuduanya zhici), “goblet words,” “double-layered words,” 40111 “dwelling words,” irregular and paradoxical words (cancha chugui 1 zhici),18 etc., we see quite obviously Zhuangzi’s negative attitude 21111 toward straight-forward words (dang) or straightforward discourse folio 143 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 (zhuangyu). Among traditional Chinese commentators on the 2 Zhuangzi, Gao Heng defined dang as “straightforward saying (zhiyan),” 3 pointing out that the word zhuang in zhuangyu carries the same 4 meaning as the word dang does.19 An earlier commentator, Wang 5111 Xianqian, identified the meaning of zhuangyu as “straightforward 6 discourse (zhenglun),”20 which supports Gao Heng’s definition. 7 Although most contemporary commentators do not follow them, 8 Gao’s and Wang’s exegeses have, it seems to me, at least two merits. 9 First, they reinforce the coherence of the text by more closely match- 10 ing the focus of this paragraph on Zhuangzi’s use of language. Second, 11 they make possible the more coherent reading of Zhuangzi’s indirect 2 modes of discourse or of communication characterized in this para- 3111 graph. As Gao Heng correctly observes, miuyou zhishuo (absurd expres- 4 sions), huangtang zhiyan (extravagant words), wuduanya zhici (unbordered 5 phrases), none are straightforward.21 Thus the point becomes quite 6 clear that to give free rein to his whims, Zhuangzi uses an indirect 7 strategy of discourse instead of using direct language, thereby detach- 8 ing himself from any limited point of view. As already discussed in 9 previous chapters, Zhuangzi’s attitude toward language is closely 20111 related to his attitude toward the disputes of his contemporaries. He 1 not only opposes the fixed viewpoints of his contemporaries, but also 2 opposes these contemporaries’ increasing indulgence in straightfor- 3 ward argumentation characterized by the use of descriptive, referen- 4 tial and cognitive language. He discerns the intrinsic relation between 5 fixed viewpoints and straightforward argumentation. To give these 6 people therapy and to achieve better results, Zhuangzi must turn 7 away from their way of using language. This is the major contextual 8 meaning of his saying that since the world was sunk in stupidity, he 9 could not discuss anything with people straightforwardly. 30111 Based on Gao’s and Wang’s exegeses, the above-quoted state- 1 ments can, then, be regarded as a manifesto of Zhuangzi’s employ- 2 ment of indirect discourse or communication against direct discourse 3 or communication, and as a further account of Zhuangzi’s three 4 modes of discourse or communication, especially the mode of 5 “goblet words.” As we can see, the mode of “goblet words” now ranks 6 first among the three modes of discourse. Moreover, “absurd expres- 7 sions,” “extravagant words,” “irregular and paradoxical words,”22 8 in my view, all refer to Zhuangzi’s use of denegation, paradox 9 and irony, which can be subsumed under the general category 40111 of “goblet words.” “Unbordered phrases” is another description of 1 Zhuangzi’s “goblet words.” These accounts help us to understand the 21111 general feature of “goblet words.” However, a comprehensive study folio 144 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 of Zhuangzi’s pragmatics of “goblet words” cannot be restricted to 2 these brief descriptions. In what follows, we will examine more 3 specific aspects of Zhuangzi’s pragmatics of “goblet words,” take a 4 close look at the structural features of Zhuangzi’s indirect communi- 5111 cation, and explore these features within the central domain of 6 Zhuangzi’s thought. 7 8 The pragmatics of “goblet words” and the structural 9 features of Zhuangzi’s indirect communication 10 11 An etymological investigation of the meaning of communication tells 2 us that the Latin word communicare, which is the origin of the English 3111 word communicate, means “to share, impart, or partake.” Stemming 4 from this Latin root, the English word communicate develops its mean- 5 ings of “to convey,” “to transmit,” “to use, or enjoy, in common,” “to 6 participate,” and the like.23 Since Aristotle Western philosophical 7 discourse on communication has been oblivious to this meaning of 8 sharing or participation, and has remained stuck on the idea of the 9 conveyance of information or knowledge, until very recent times. 20111 The most often used modern Chinese translation of communicate or 1 communication is chuanda, which catches the meaning of conveyance or 2 transmission. In classical Chinese, there is no exact equivalent for com- 3 munication. The term chuan is more flexibly used either singly or in com- 4 bination with other words, such as yanchuan, chuanshu,24 and the like, in 5 the sense of linguistic communication, conveyance and transmission. 6 However, Zhuangzi insists, on many occasions, that artistic experi- 7 ence and the experience of dao cannot be expressed or conveyed by 8 ordinary use of language, as our discussion of Zhuangzi’s liminology 9 has shown. What distinguishes the mode of “goblet words” from ordi- 30111 nary modes of language lies precisely in the fact that “goblet words” 1 embody Zhuangzi’s view of communication as sharing and participa- 2 tion rather than as conveyance of information or knowledge. 3 Zhuangzi has simply no objective information or knowledge 4 to convey, nor does he wish to express a particular, cognizable posi- 5 tion among other competing positions. The primary concern of 6 Zhuangzi’s discourse or communication is about each individual’s 7 existentio-spiritual awakening or transformation, about the issue of 8 how one becomes an authentic person, or a person of dao, as can 9 be plainly seen through his teaching: “There must first be an 40111 authentic person before there can be any genuine understanding.”25 1 Here the existential transformation of the entire personhood is 21111 given full priority. Any genuine understanding can only be an folio 145 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 existential consequence of this transformation of personhood. It is 2 this existential–spiritual awakening or transformation, a new way of 3 life, that Zhuangzi wants to share with his readers. It demands the 4 reader’s participation, and invites him or her to respond from his or 5111 her own situation, discovering significance on his or her own. Insofar 6 as Zhuangzi can do nothing practically to accomplish the transfor- 7 mation of the reader’s personhood, this transformation is not 8 something that can be directly handed down from Zhuangzi to the 9 reader. It must be undertaken by the reader him or herself. Seen 10 from the perspective of conveyance or transmission, Zhuangzi’s 11 communication is no communication at all. His discourse is merely 2 edifying, evocative or therapeutic. It directs the reader toward 3111 working out his or her own health. It functions like wine in a goblet 4 that allows everybody to drink and to find its taste by him or herself 5 (no matter how different this taste might be), as a Chinese commen- 6 tator rightly describes it.26 7 Since the mode of “goblet words” presupposes sharing and partic- 8 ipation, it reveals the unique structural features of Zhuangzi’s 9 communication. Each of the three components of communication – 20111 the author, the message, the reader – plays a radically different role 1 as compared with the one in the classical Western notion of commu- 2 nication. 3 (1) The author’s strategy does not serve to determine teleologically 4 the entire movement of communication. Rather, it serves to suspend 5 or interrupt any possible deception of a linear or teleological relation 6 between the author and the reader. For Zhuangzi, there is no fixed 7 intentional meaning to convey, nor is there any position that is 8 particularly his own to assert. Zhuangzi “would tarry a while in one 9 position he fully knew to be mistaken and would then go on to 30111 another mistaken position, exposing errors as he went.”27 In this 1 way he just makes the reader question his or her own way of think- 2 ing, his or her own motive for philosophizing. To evoke such self- 3 questioning, Zhuangzi first interrogates his own statements. “I have 4 just said something, but I do not know whether what I have said is 5 really saying something or not.”28 “Do we really say something? 6 Or do we say nothing?”29 The point of this self-interrogation is quite 7 clear that even what he says is never fixed. It is impossible to be fixed, 8 since meaning is always context-bound, and context is always on the 9 move in the continuing process of signification and communication. 40111 This lack of fixed intentional meaning, lack of a particular view, 1 brings into play the shift and multiplication of meanings and view- 21111 points. Zhuangzi is happy with this shift and multiplication. He sees folio 146 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 it as spontaneously so, natural. As a Daoist ideal person, a person of 2 no-self, Zhuangzi is particularly skillful in accommodating his 3 speaking to this shifting and multiplying. In explaining Zhuangzi’s 4 mode of “goblet words,” Wang Shuzhi points out: 5111 6 A goblet tips when full and rights itself when empty, 7 following along with the changes of things and never fixing 8 on one and the same function. Having applied this to 9 language, the author adapts his speech to the changes of 10 people and has no fixed meaning to convey.30 11 2 The determinate role of the author thus disappears in this shifting 3111 and multiplying of meanings and viewpoints. Searching for the final 4 meaning of Zhuangzi’s words distorts Zhuangzi. Ask what particular 5 position Zhuangzi holds among rival positions misses Zhuangzi’s 6 point. Expect Zhuangzi to clarify his intentions and views will be 7 disappointing. These ways of understanding Zhuangzi are evidently 8 based on an utter misunderstanding of Zhuangzi’s indirect mode of 9 “goblet words,” a neglect of the profound philosophy of signification 20111 and communication central to Zhuangzi’s thought. Only within 1 the sphere and function of “goblet words,” within this structural dis- 2 appearance of the author in the shift and multiplying of meanings 3 and viewpoints, can the strategy of yuyan (“dwelling words”) and 4 chongyan (“double-layered words”) be understood correctly. 5 Yuyan is defined as “jiyu zhiyan” by Chinese commentators.31 It refers 6 to the use of parables, figurative descriptions, imaginary con- 7 versations, and so on, which makes up nine-tenths of the Zhuangzi. 8 These become the lodging or dwelling ( jiyu) places for ideas, mean- 9 ings, implications, and thus are different from the straightforward dis- 30111 cursive language normally used in argumentation. A further definition 1 of yuyan made by traditional Chinese commentators is “putting one’s 2 words into the mouths of other people.”32 Zhuangzi puts his words 3 into the months of fictitious characters, talking trees, ancient kings, and 4 even the philosophers he is criticizing. “He borrows figures from out- 5 side for the purpose of exposition.”33 In terms of this definition, 6 chongyan can be considered a subcategory of yuyan, because it puts the 7 author’s words into the mouths of those wise old men whom people 8 respect, in order to give the saying more weight. Chongyan seems 9 repeating or quoting these wise old men’s words. However, it is actu- 40111 ally a strategy of indirect communication by using pseudonymous 1 speech or pseudo-quotation. Rather than imposing the author’s 21111 authority or simply obeying wise old men’s authority, it follows the folio 147 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 authority of the inevitable multiplying of meanings, that demands the 2 reader’s existential and situational involvement. This strategy dissolves 3 the author’s authority in the play of words by not letting those wise old 4 men speak for themselves, that is, by keeping the reader at a distance 5111 from the author and any direct speaker. It draws the reader’s atten- 6 tion, eliciting not fixation but openness. Thus it is double-layered: 7 one dwells or lodges in another. The author’s saying dwells or lodges 8 in the place of wise old men’s sayings; the meaning dwells or lodges in 9 the situational reappropriation of the words. 10 Insofar as yuyan and chongyan are figurative, imaginative, and 11 double-layered, they are close to the Western category of “metaphor- 2 ical language.” However, the philosophical notion of metaphor im- 3111 plied in the Zhuangzi is quite different from the philosophical 4 conception of metaphor in Western metaphysics. First, there is 5 no privilege of discursive language over figurative, metaphorical 6 language in the Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi does not refuse to use discursive 7 language – discursive passages are intermingled with yuyan and 8 chongyan throughout the Zhuangzi. However, the distinction between 9 discursive language and figurative, metaphorical language is not 20111 essential to Zhuangzi’s view of language. What mainly defines 1 Zhuangzi’s yuyan and chongyan is “borrowing” ( ji), which also contains 2 the meaning of “by means of” or “with the use of.” Since Zhuangzi 3 holds the view that language is a means or a tool, and that language 4 is conventional, it follows that all speech – discursive or figurative 5 – is nothing but borrowing and/or using language to achieve prag- 6 matic goals. In this sense, discursive language is not different from 7 non-discursive language. This view obviously frees Zhuangzi from a 8 hierarchical confinement of discursive/figurative language, and helps 9 him to explore an alternative way of using language. 30111 Second, no fixed meaning stands behind a metaphor for Zhuangzi. 1 The Zhuangzian notion of metaphorical language is not based on 2 the notion of the proper meaning of words and the separation 3 between the sensible and the intelligible, which Heidegger has criti- 4 cized in questioning the metaphysical presupposition of the Western 5 conception of metaphor.34 Nor is this Zhuangzian notion based on 6 the thesis, to borrow Davidson’s words, “that associated with a 7 metaphor is a definite cognitive content that its author wishes to 8 convey and that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get the 9 message.”35 Our preceding investigations have made quite explicit 40111 that Zhuangzi rejects a complete genesis of meaning on the basis of 1 the natural shift and multiplying of meanings and viewpoints. This 21111 principle also applies to the case of metaphor. What characterizes folio 148 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 Zhuangzi’s metaphorical writing is his untiring play with metaphors, 2 his masterful use of metaphors in multiplying and diversifying mean- 3 ings. We are surely unable to exhaust the meanings of Zhuangzi’s 4 yuyan and chongyan. Oftentimes Zhuangzi tells a story, discusses one 5111 explanation, one meaning for it, and then goes on to discuss another 6 explanation, another meaning. Finally, he calls into question all 7 previous explanations, meanings, without providing a new one. 8 Zhuangzi enjoys staying with all possibilities, never attempting to 9 close the door on any one of them. Another strategy is that Zhuangzi 10 “does not present us with a specific metaphor but . . . an evocative 11 collage of metaphors, . . . one referring to another.”36 He keeps the 2 reader busy moving among numerous metaphors and constantly 3111 changing with them. Sometimes the reader feels as if he or she is 4 caught in a web of metaphors and is forced to play with them. The 5 consequence is that it “leaves no place free for a discourse of the 6 proper or the literal.”37 There is no “withdrawal of metaphor.” There 7 is always another metaphor, when one metaphor stops play or when 8 the reader sets up its limit. The Zhuangzi thus is a flowing and shifting 9 of stories, metaphors, meanings. 20111 Some contemporary interpreters of the Zhuangzi have seen the use 1 of yuyan and chongyan as a survivalist strategy. They emphasize that 2 by expressing his radical and unconventional ideas through yuyan 3 and chongyan, Zhuangzi hopes “to avoid all danger, harm and troub- 4 ling entanglements.”38 This is true as far as the socio-political context 5 and function of yuyan and chongyan are concerned. However, this kind 6 of interpretation often fails to account for the intrinsic relation 7 between these two modes of discourse and the mode of “goblet 8 words.” In other words, it fails to relate the use of yuyan and chongyan 9 to Zhuangzi’s more fundamental concern with the shifting and multi- 30111 plying of meanings and viewpoints. Therefore, it fails to grasp that 1 the socio-political and survivalist purpose of yuyan and chongyan only 2 comes after Zhuangzi’s understanding and mastery of the shifting 3 and multiplying of meanings and viewpoints. The general structure 4 of Zhuangzi’s indirect communication makes possible the socio- 5 political and survivalist use of yuyan and chongyan. 6 (2) The mode of goblet communication calls for a displacement of 7 the role of the reader or listener. The withdrawal of the determinate 8 role of the author or speaker paves the way for the reader’s or 9 listener’s active participation. Two main factors apparently deter- 40111 mine the necessity of this participation. 1 First, in the mode of goblet discourse or communication, the 21111 unfolding of meanings is contingent upon different readers in differ- folio 149 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 ent contexts. In other words, the shift or multiplying of meanings of 2 “goblet words” is dependent upon various readers’ participation in 3 various situations. The reader is not a passive receiver, since no objec- 4 tive meaning has been transmitted to him or her from the author. 5111 The reader’s participation thus is the condition necessary to this com- 6 munication. To find out the taste of the wine contained in a goblet, 7 people must drink the wine, experience it by themselves, and then can 8 tell what kind of taste it has. Just as taste may vary – some may claim 9 it is too sweet, some may not – the meaning differs when there are 10 different participants. However, the participation, the action of drink- 11 ing it, is indispensable to determining the taste. 2 Second, the existentio-practical dimension of what is communi- 3111 cated makes the reader’s participation central to the structure of this 4 communication. Let us quote one of Zhuangzi’s sayings before we 5 go on to discuss this point: 6 7 The teaching of the great man is like the shadow from a 8 form, the echo from a sound. When questioned, he replies, 9 sharing his thoughts without reservation and serving as the 20111 companion of the world. . . . He leads all of you teeming 1 masses back to where you belong, to wander in limitlessness, 2 passing in and out of non-attachment, . . .39 3 4 This passage, again, clearly reveals that what Zhuangzi wants to 5 share, to communicate, is an awakened way of life such as he himself 6 lives. For the sake of the listeners or inquirers, Zhuangzi, as their 7 friend and companion, inspires them to explore the meaning of their 8 own lives, to transform their own personhood, and to follow along 9 with endless changes. As for himself, he has nothing to assert, nothing 30111 to give away. Since this way of life is what Zhuangzi himself lives, the 1 listeners or readers cannot get it directly from him. They must explore 2 and live it by themselves. Unless a listener or reader echoes Zhuangzi 3 existentially by living it for him- or herself, he or she will never really 4 share it with Zhuangzi, and communication will be incomplete. Thus 5 the listeners or readers are crucial in this communication. They are 6 important, not because they are the object won over by the speaker’s 7 or author’s pre-set plan or knowledge,40 but in their own right, 8 because of their creative contribution to the communication. 9 Zhuangzi realizes this importance. His communicative strategy 40111 mainly serves to liberate the listeners or readers, to arouse and to 1 release them into their own creativity. The strategy of dissolving the 21111 author in the play of “dwelling words” and “double-layered words,” folio 150 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 this light, can be better understood as setting the reader free to 2 inquire into the meaning of one’s own life, to return to one’s natural- 3 ness, to initiate a self-transformation. While having a conversation 4 with us, Zhuangzi constantly makes us forget about him, forget about 5111 words, and thus keeps reminding us that we had better realize our 6 own situation, and find our own way. 7 (3) The function of the message, in this goblet communication, 8 therefore, is also different. The question of what is communicated 9 does not exist by itself. What is communicated is contained in, and 10 inseparable from, how it is communicated. In other words, how it is 11 communicated is more fundamental than what is communicated. 2 This characteristic can be explained in terms of the following reasons. 3111 First, since the heart of goblet communication is the evocation 4 and echoing of self-activity or self-transformation, the speaker’s or 5 author’s words are merely the occasion for this self-activity or self- 6 transformation on the part of the listener or reader. Almost anything 7 – trifles, falsehood, contradiction, irony, absurdity, exaggeration – 8 can serve to arouse such self-activity or self-transformation. The 9 accuracy and definitiveness of what is said is of little importance here. 20111 Second, since there is no definitive information or knowledge to be 1 conveyed, and since what is communicated depends so profoundly 2 on the activity and creativity of the reader, the reader is freed with 3 respect to what is communicated. This is demonstrated by the fact 4 that the meaning is always the reader’s as long as his or her under- 5 standing is provoked by the discourse, and that the meaning always 6 shifts according to the situation, the level, or the perspective of the 7 reader. The reader is also “provoked into experiencing as many sides 8 of the issue as his originality allows.”41 This freedom to explore, to 9 respond from his or her own situation, to act and transform, is pre- 30111 cisely what is communicated. As is quite clear now, the issue of what 1 is communicated never exists by itself. It is inseparable from, and 2 must be deciphered by, the entire mode of goblet communication. 3 Thus the functions of the author, the reader and the message 4 all manifest the dynamic and open-ended structure of Zhuangzi’s 5 indirect communication, which serves Daoist soteriological and 6 therapeutic practice best, and operates throughout years. 7 8 Denegation, paradox, irony, and Zhuangzi’s 9 strategy of indirect communication 40111 1 As mentioned earlier, the use of yuyan and chongyan can be placed 21111 under the category of figurative, metaphorical language, which is folio 151 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 different from the straightforward discursive language normally 2 used in argumentation. I have also pointed out that Zhuangzi 3 does not refuse to use discursive language, and that there are discur- 4 sive passages intermingled with yuyan and chongyan in the Zhuangzi. 5111 Now the question regarding Zhuangzi’s use of discursive language 6 is how Zhuangzi relates his use of discursive language to his goblet 7 communication. One might ask: does Zhuangzi turn back to direct 8 communication when he uses discursive language? The answer to 9 this question is a definitive “no.” Zhuangzi obviously retains his in- 10 direct mode of goblet communication even when he uses discursive 11 language. This is demonstrated particularly by Zhuangzi’s use of 2 denegation, paradox and irony, which characterizes his unusual 3111 or “abnormal” use of discursive language. It is as essential as the 4 use of yuyan and chongyan to Zhuangzi’s indirect mode of goblet com- 5 munication. 6 7 Denegation 8 9 The negativity of discourse has been a remarkable feature of Daoist 20111 philosophy and religious thought since the Dao De Jing. Zhuangzi 1 develops this negativity by creating new negative terms such as 2 no-mind (wuxin), no-self (wuji), no-speaking (wuyan), and adding them 3 to Laozi’s original repertoire of terms, such as no-action (wuwei), 4 no-name (wuming), nonbeing (wu). Zhuangzi’s discursive writing 5 also takes on the full form of negation more distinctively than Laozi’s. 6 In the “Qi Wu Lun” chapter we find the following passage: 7 8 There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a 9 beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet begin- 30111 ning to be a beginning. There is being. There is nonbeing. 1 There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not 2 yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. 3 Suddenly there is nonbeing. But I do not know, when it 4 comes to nonbeing, which is really being and which is non- 5 being. Now I have just said something. But I don’t know 6 whether what I have said is really saying something or 7 whether it is saying nothing.42 8 9 Here Zhuangzi engages in a series of negations, which, like other 40111 negations in the Zhuangzi, have two major features. First, all dualistic 1 concepts – being and nonbeing, beginning and end, speaking and 21111 non-speaking, and so forth – are equally or thoroughly negated folio 152 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 without privileging or affirming any one of them. Thus Zhuangzi’s 2 negation takes the form of “neither . . . nor . . . .” Neither being nor 3 nonbeing, neither beginning nor end, neither speaking nor silence, 4 neither this nor that, is asserted by Zhuangzi.43 Second, there is 5111 a kind of doubling in Zhuangzi’s negation, a negation of negation, 6 such as “a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a begin- 7 ning” or “nonbeing of nonbeing.” The double negation “nonbeing 8 of nonbeing” is discernible in the passage quoted above. Elsewhere 9 Zhuangzi even more explicitly uses this double negation. For 10 instance: 11 1 I can conceive of nonbeing, but not of the nonbeing of nonbeing. 2 Now I have just come to the stage of nonbeing; how could I ever 3111 reach such a stage of the nonbeing of nonbeing?44 4 2 Primordially, it is the nonbeing of nonbeing, which is nameless.45 5 6 This kind of thorough negation of all polarities and double nega- 7 tion46 carries the syntactic and rhetorical form of negation. However, 8 it is not mere negation. It goes beyond both negation and affirma- 9 tion. It itself is neither negative nor positive, neither apophatic 20111 nor cataphatic. On the one hand, it is apparently not an affirmation, 1 since it denies every alternative within conceptual polarity. It does 2 not even affirm itself as negation. Here the doubling, the negation of 3 negation, does not simply mean a return to affirmation. It does not 4 presuppose an essential Being or Nonbeing affirming itself ultimately 5 by a double movement. In this sense it is completely different from 6 the Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand, it is not a negation, since 7 the negation it makes denies itself as well by the doubling. It 8 denegates itself, and, therefore, is not a total negation. Nothing ceases 9 to be affirmed as it is in the ongoing process of interchanging itself 30111 and its other, in the dynamics of becoming toward its other. Thus 1 we open to endless being and nonbeing, speaking and silence, right 2 and wrong, yin and yang, and in this way we can move along with 3 them. This is Zhuangzi’s dao. With this dao, Zhuangzi would see no 4 reason to confine himself to either negation or affirmation. In this 5 sense my understanding of the Zhuangzian denegation disagrees 6 with the Derridean interpretation of denegation, as presented in 7 Mark Taylor’s writing, namely that it affirms only negation.47 This 8 Derridean interpretation still falls into a negation privileged over 9 affirmation. 40111 Zhuangzi does not privilege negativity over positivity. However, 1 Zhuangzi does see the pragmatic usefulness of denegation – the play 21111 of negativity – in his goblet communication. In the West, only folio 153 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 Kierkegaard correctly observed the intimate relationship between 2 negativity and indirect communication.48 Zhuangzi is another great 3 thinker who shows insight into this relationship, although his context 4 and entire project are different from Kierkegaard’s.49 For Zhuangzi, 5111 denegation serves the purpose of indirect communication in the 6 following ways. First, denegation performs an art of taking away. 7 Instead of giving something away to the readers, such as conveying 8 a substantialist idea or demonstrating a graspable entity, which can 9 be directly appropriated by the readers, it constantly takes something 10 away from them. It takes away every kind of conceptualization, every 11 binary distinction, every reifying thought. It intervenes and interrupts 2 their conventional thinking, seeking and expectation. By this taking 3111 away, this intervention and interruption, it opens the limitation of 4 dualistic thinking, conceptual predication and direct communication. 5 It arouses self-interrogation in the readers, turning them toward that 6 which has been turned away by dualistic thinking and conceptual 7 predication, that is, toward dao. 8 Second, denegation carries a self-erasure or self-cancellation. By 9 utilizing discursive or conceptual language in such a self-erasing 20111 manner, it becomes not solely negative, but carves out a void 1 within what is being said. This void, this absence, is what is unsayable 2 and unspoken, namely, what is inadequate to, and therefore is 3 excluded by, that which is sayable and spoken. It thus inscribes, 4 carries, points to, what is lacking in, what is outside of, this 5 conceptual and discursive language. It makes possible the sharing 6 of what cannot be directly communicated. Crossing the threshold 7 and playing at the boundary between the sayable and the unsayable, 8 denegation displays its unique function in Zhuangzi’s goblet com- 9 munication. 30111 1 Paradox 2 3 The neither/nor form of negation also brings to the fore the problem 4 of contradiction and paradox, a problem that seems embarrassing 5 to the ordinary either/or logic. The negation of the two opposite alter- 6 natives may create a serious problem for the law of the excluded 7 middle, if the latter is to be strictly maintained. Nevertheless, the 8 negative/indirect strategy of communication in the Zhuangzi is closely 9 related to this use of paradoxical terms or statements. 40111 The Daoist preference for using paradox first emerges in the Dao 1 De Jing. Laozi not only employs a good many paradoxes, but also 21111 plainly states the notion that correct speech appears paradoxical folio 154 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 (Zhengyan ruofan),50 identifying the use of paradox as a correct way of 2 speaking. Although Zhuangzi never quotes this statement, he does 3 adopt some of Laozi’s paradoxical notions, such as “taking action of 4 non-action (wei wuwei),” and invents numerous new paradoxical 5111 notions, such as “speaking non-speaking ( yan wuyan),” “the usefulness 6 of the useless (wuyong zhiyong).” In the Zhuangzi, paradoxical expres- 7 sions are referred to as diaogui, cancha chugui zhici, or miuyou zhishuo. 8 They are valued as alternatives to the direct mode of discourse, as 9 the wisdom and art of the great sage, and as particularly meaning- 10 ful for soteriological and therapeutic practice.51 These indicate the 11 unique context of Zhuangzi’s use of paradox. A contextual and 2 dimensional analysis clarifies that this peculiar use of paradox 3111 involves several important meanings. 4 5 6 DYNAMIC DIMENSION OR THE DIMENSION OF 7 INFINITE CHANGES 8 Recent criticisms of Western metaphysics have shown that the 9 Aristotelian principles of logic, the foundations of Western formal 20111 logic, are rooted in his belief in a changeless substance or essence of 1 things.52 The principle of noncontradiction and other related princi- 2 ples, on which the validity of all arguments must be built, assume the 3 exclusion of changeableness, contingency and indeterminacy in 4 reality. Although these principles of logic are still useful for valid 5 argumentation, traditional logic, based on Aristotle’s interpretation, 6 from the very beginning has its limits in dealing with the change- 7 ableness, contingency and indeterminacy of things. Traditional logic 8 is selective, abstracted from the dynamics of living actuality, and, 9 especially, staticizing the latter. As some contemporary philosophers 30111 have pointed out, in the context of changing life, the Aristotelian 1 principles of noncontradiction and the excluded middle are simply 2 inoperative.53 Traditional logic, due to its deep-rooted tendency to 3 consider all changes embarrassingly contradictory, is ill-equipped 4 for demonstrating the actual convergence and dynamic reciprocity 5 of various opposite meanings and ideas. 6 In contrast to Aristotle’s approach, Zhuangzi concerns himself with 7 how one dwells and wanders in the realm of infinite changes, taking 8 this as the central theme of his philosophy. For Zhuangzi, “myriad 9 transformations never begin to reach an end.”54 “The life of things is 40111 a gallop, a headlong dash – with every movement they alter, with 1 every moment they shift. . . . Everything will change of itself, that is 21111 certain!”55 Only when we isolate things, words, or meanings, from the folio 155 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 dynamic web of relations in which they function can we impute self- 2 identity to them. When we come to the living actuality of change and 3 transformation, it is quite clear that every privileged distinction ( fen) 4 or argument (bian) always involves and relies on its suppressed other.56 5111 The privileged one is evolved from, and moving toward, its other. 6 Therefore, in the incessant process of transformation, the distinction 7 between one and the other, this and that, a thing and nothing, is, 8 inevitably, bound to be blurred. A distinction is always relative and 9 changeable. This ever-changing context – the spacing-temporization 10 – makes it possible that A is simultaneously not-A. It is possible to look 11 at one thing from two or even many different standpoints. Therefore, 2 Zhuangzi states, the sage 3111 4 recognizes a “this”, but a “this” which is also “that,” a “that” 5 which is also “this.” His “that” has both a right and a wrong 6 in it; his “this” too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in 7 fact, does he still have a “this” and “that”? Or does he in fact 8 no longer have a “this” and “that”? . . . Its right then is a 9 single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness.57 20111 1 Here Zhuangzi’s statement that a “this” is also “that” and a “that” 2 is also “this,” as well as his numerous other statements – such as 3 “their dividing is formation, their formation is dissolution,”58 and 4 “speaking without saying something and saying something without 5 speaking,”59 – demonstrates his use of paradox to make sense of 6 actual changes and the dynamic convergence of various opposites. 7 Unlike Neo-Moists, who lean on “logical necessity” derived from 8 change to distinguish “this” from “not-this” and to serve their utili- 9 tarian purpose,60 Zhuangzi uses paradox to accommodate himself to 30111 changes, avoid staticization and serve his soteriological purpose. 1 2 PRAGMATIC DIMENSION 3 4 At the semantic level, Zhuangzi’s paradoxes do yield contradictory 5 meanings. However, Zhuangzi’s paradoxes are different from those 6 logical and semantic paradoxes treated in the analytic tradition of 7 Western philosophy, as Mou Zongsan so rightly observes.61 The 8 major differences consist of the following two aspects. First, logical 9 and semantic paradoxes serve no pragmatic purpose, and generate 40111 only nonsense in the face of semantic truth. Zhuangzi’s paradoxes, 1 on the other hand, are not nonsensical. However, the meaningful- 21111 ness and usefulness of Zhuangzi’s paradoxes lie beyond the semantic folio 156 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 level, dwelling primarily at the pragmatic and perlocutionary level. 2 Zhuangzi’s criticism of Hui Shi’s infatuation with paradoxes, due to 3 their lack of pragmatic purpose, confirms this important dimension.62 4 Second, therefore, the resolution of logical and semantic paradoxes 5111 by reformulating or imposing various restrictions on the propositional 6 language, as practiced by modern logicians,63 is not applicable to 7 Zhuangzi’s paradoxes. The latter is not a “crisis in the evolution of 8 thought”64 but an openness to the dynamics of actual change through 9 a “logical breakage,”65 a kind of negative/indirect approach. The 10 semantic contradictions thus could be preserved, need not be aban- 11 doned, and should simultaneously be transcended by using them as 2 a tool for the purpose of soteriological and therapeutic practice. For 3111 example, Zhuangzi discusses the relativity and changeability of the 4 distinction between dreaming and waking (or awareness). He indi- 5 cates that people who think they are awake are dreaming. Then he 6 adds that one who says people are dreaming is dreaming too.66 It is 7 true that we can explore the context of Zhuangzi’s saying, and try to 8 make his statement understandable. However, this does not mean 9 altering the apparent contradiction that dreaming is waking, waking 20111 is dreaming. Rather, to find out the meaningfulness of this paradox- 1 ical statement, we must particularly look into the pragmatic dimen- 2 sion of this statement. Once we realize the aim of this use of paradox 3 is to arouse in us an attitude of non-clinging to any polarity, includ- 4 ing dreaming and waking, to suspend our staticization and fixation, 5 we are no longer puzzled by its contradiction. Most of Zhuangzi’s 6 paradoxes function in much the same way. 7 8 LIMINOLOGICAL DIMENSION 9 30111 Zhuangzi does not reject logic. There is a well-known passage, in the 1 book, showing that Zhuangzi uses reductio ad absurdum to refute the 2 dialectician Hui Shi in a debate on knowing about the joy of fishes.67 3 A. C. Graham’s position that Zhuangzi rejects logic and abandons 4 reason is untenable, a misinterpretation of Zhuangzi.68 Even though 5 Zhuangzi prefers using paradox, this use of paradox cannot be 6 reduced to the illogical. Zhuangzi’s paradoxical language is different 7 from ordinary logical language, nor is it illogical, granting that 8 logic is nothing but a set of relations reflected statically by human 9 reason, and that paradoxical language reflects the relations of life 40111 dynamically. Zhuangzi’s paradox is translogical or paralogical in 1 the sense that it works or plays at the boundaries and limits of 21111 ordinary logic.69 It becomes a means to overcome the limitation folio 157 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 of ordinary logic. However, this overcoming takes the oppositions 2 and distinctions of ordinary logic as its starting point and as the raw 3 material for its advanced work. It puts ordinary logic into move by 4 breaking its rules. Obviously, in discursive discourses such as those 5111 paragraphs in the “Qi Wu Lun” chapter, paradox cannot work 6 without the pre-functioning of the boundaries and limits of ordinary 7 logic. Therefore, it is a kind of liminological play.70 It communicates 8 or shares, via negativity, something that ordinary logical language 9 cannot sufficiently or effectively communicate or share. 10 11 Irony 2 3111 Irony is closely related to the use of denegation and paradox in 4 Zhuangzi’s play of negativity and communicative strategy. When the 5 use of denegation or paradox brings about self-negation or self- 6 contradiction in an unanticipated manner, especially when it occurs 7 in a form of self-mockery or self-ridicule, it involves irony. Thus in 8 serving as the negative/indirect strategy of communication, irony, 9 denegation, and paradox can overlap. Zhuangzi, indeed, uses them 20111 together sometimes, although irony can be used independently. Here 1 I use the term irony in one of its generally accepted meanings: a 2 kind of linguistic expression showing unexpected self-cancellation or 3 self-contradiction, as if in mockery of one’s own competence. It is a 4 way of distancing oneself from what one says.71 Irony differs from 5 sarcasm, because sarcasm laughs at the hearer. “The ironist laughs 6 at himself, and invites the hearer to do likewise. . . . Irony . . . goes 7 out of itself and looks at itself with the other. This is an act of compre- 8 hensiveness, a peculiar quality of the philosopher.”72 Therefore, 9 philosophically, the use of irony can be seen as “a way of dealing with 30111 concepts,”73 of distancing oneself from concepts. 1 In this sense Zhuangzi’s use of irony goes hand in hand with his 2 use of denegation and paradox. We have seen the rhetoric of irony 3 following a long discussion of philosophical concepts such as being 4 and nonbeing: “. . . I have just said something. But I don’t know 5 whether what I have said is really saying something or whether it is 6 saying nothing.”74 We also have seen the typically ironic side of 7 Zhuangzi at the end of his discussion on dreaming and waking: 8 “Confucius and you are both dreaming! And when I say you are 9 dreaming, I am dreaming, too.”75 40111 The most famous example of irony in the Zhuangzi might be the 1 story of Zhuangzi’s dreaming of being a butterfly. Here I share 21111 Kuang-ming Wu’s unraveling of this irony: folio 158 PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”

1111 . . . [Z]huang [Z]hou dreaming of being a butterfly. 2 Awakened, he realized that he was unmistakably [Z]huang 3 [Z]hou. And then, in this awakened state, he realized that he 4 might be a butterfly currently dreaming of being [Z]huang 5111 [Z]hou. One of the ironies here is that he had to be awak- 6 ened before realizing that he could be a butterfly, currently 7 dreaming. Awakening to a dream, and becoming certain 8 about one’s uncertainty – this is clearly a self-involved incon- 9 gruity.76 10 11 This perfect example of Zhuangzi’s use of irony demonstrates two 2 major functions of irony in Zhuangzi’s goblet communication. First, 3111 irony becomes a rhetoric of non-closure. It calls into serious question 4 any logocentric or metaphysical closure in a frivolous or humorous 5 way. The ironist’s seriousness is dissimulated by his frivolousness. His 6 frivolousness is a weapon to defeat the seriousness of any logocentric 7 or metaphysical thesis. Therefore, irony sets forth, to borrow 8 Kierkegaard’s words, no thesis (through its self-cancellation). It is a 9 perpetual agility in which the ironist posits something that is nothing, 20111 “allows nothing to endure.” It becomes “the infinitely delicate 1 play with nothingness.”77 Zhuangzi’s ironies, as quoted above, make 2 impossible any closure of either being or nonbeing, either speaking 3 or non-speaking, either dreaming or waking, either the self-identity 4 of Zhuang Zhou or that of butterfly. In this negative way, Zhuangzi’s 5 ironies share with the reader a positive message, positing a thesis of 6 non-thesis, that is, moving along with endless changes, including that 7 of one’s own.78 8 Second, the consequence of the impossibility of closure is, obvi- 9 ously, freedom. In the context of Zhuangzi’s irony, this freedom 30111 means being free to change, free to move along with “the transfor- 1 mation of all things,” namely, with the wuhua.79 In this context, the 2 ironist first frees himself. By using irony, the author detaches himself 3 from what is said, and therefore is able to free himself from any meta- 4 physical closure, any binary distinction, any self-identity, and from 5 any logocentric reappropriation of the reader.80 On the other hand, 6 Zhuangzi’s irony aims also at liberating the reader from the same 7 closure and bondage. It “liberates by destroying all dogma or 8 destroys by revealing the inescapable canker of negation at the heart 9 of every affirmation.”81 Thus, to achieve this liberation, Zhuangzi’s 40111 irony first creates a kind of therapeutic shock,82 lets the reader’s 1 conventional perception and expectation clash, in order to let them 21111 engage in reflective thinking themselves, and see the life-world and folio 159 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 themselves anew in the illumination of irony. By the negativity of 2 irony, Zhuangzi invites the reader to wander with him in the realm 3 of infinite changes. Together with the use of denegation and paradox, 4 Zhuangzi’s use of irony thus serves well the purpose of his goblet 5111 communication. 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 160 1111 2 3 10 4 5111 THE PRAGMATICS OF 6 7 “NEVER TELL TOO 8 PLAINLY”: INDIRECT 9 10 COMMUNICATION IN 11 2 CHAN 3111 4 5 6 7 Preliminary remarks 8 9 The issue of communication has been salient in Chan Buddhism ever 20111 since Chan Buddhists made the claim that Chan is a “special (or sep- 1 arate) transmission outside theoretic teachings.” This special trans- 2 mission is sometimes also identified by Chan Buddhists as “the 3 transmission from mind to mind.” The uniqueness of the claim 4 for Chan transmission or communication has drawn the attention 5 of several modern scholars and interpreters. DeMartino, in his essay 6 on Chan/Zen communication, clearly states that Chan/Zen com- 7 munication could “be spoken of as a communication that is no- 8 communication.”1 D. T. Suzuki, in his famous debate with Hu Shi, 9 reaches the same point concerning Chan/Zen communication. 30111 He writes: “Strictly speaking, . . . there is no conveying at all.”2 1 These interpretations obviously tend to draw a line between 2 Chan communication or transmission and ordinary communica- 3 tion as conveyance of information or knowledge. As my definition 4 has shown, I subsume the latter type of communication under the 5 category of direct communication. The Chan strategy of com- 6 munication, then, without doubt, fits into my category of indirect 7 communication. Hu Shi, in his important essay “Chan (Zen) 8 Buddhism in China: Its History and Method,” pays special heed to 9 one of Chan’s peculiar methods of instruction – “never tell too 40111 plainly” (bushuopo).3 Hu Shi points out that by using this method of 1 never explaining things “in too plain language,” the Chan masters 21111 let “the individual find out things through his own effort and through folio 161 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 his own ever-widening life-experience.”4 To show the practical 2 consequence of this method, Hu Shi cites a quote about bushuopo from 3 the sayings of a great Chan master Dongshan Liangjie: “It is not my 4 former master’s virtue or Buddha Dharma that I esteem, only that 5111 he did not make exhaustive explanations for me.”5 This statement 6 illustrates that in the master–disciple communication of Chan, the 7 indirect way of communication itself is inseparable from, and even 8 more important than, what is communicated. It has an important 9 bearing on the realization of enlightenment. Hu Shi’s effort to call 10 attention to the study of the Chan strategy and principle of “never 11 tell too plainly” is, therefore, significant to any more advanced inves- 2 tigations of indirect communication in Chan. Unfortunately, not 3111 much has been done in this regard since Hu Shi’s discussion. 4 It might be worth examining further here, for the purpose of our 5 ensuing study, D. T. Suzuki’s response to Hu Shi’s description of the 6 Chan method. One point Suzuki makes is that there is no prescribed, 7 or fixed, method for Chan. Chan communication as non-conveyance 8 of information or knowledge “is the awakening of the same experi- 9 ence in others by means of words, gestures, and anything the master 20111 finds suitable at the moment.”6 This comment seems quite accurate. 1 If “never tell too plainly” were someday to become a rule or pattern 2 that every Chan teacher must follow or duplicate, a great Chan 3 master might spit at it and resolve to utilize plain expressions. Here 4 I would like to make two comments as a supplement to Suzuki’s 5 point. First, the Chan strategy of “never tell too plainly” does not 6 mean to exclude any use of plain, direct expressions such as “no 7 Buddhas,” “no clinging to anything.”7 This fact is reflected in the 8 huge body of Chan recorded sayings. Second, the principle of “never 9 tell too plainly” should not be conceived of as a unified method, but 30111 as being open to a variety of strategies as Chan Buddhism itself 1 provides. Suzuki correctly observes that Chan Buddhist expressions 2 have a variety of uses and that what they mean depends on different 3 situations.8 He further emphasizes that bushuopo does not mean just 4 “not to speak plainly.” It is not merely a pedagogical method. It is 5 “inherent in the constitution of” the enlightenmental experience of 6 Chan.9 This is where Suzuki disgrees with Hu Shi. Although I do 7 not take an overall stand with Suzuki on that debate, I think that 8 Suzuki is suggesting to us that there is an underlying structure or 9 relationship in the Chan strategy of “never tell too plainly.” To inves- 40111 tigate this underlying structure or relationship will, it seems to me, 1 be crucial to our study and understanding of indirect communica- 21111 tion in Chan. folio 162 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 My argument, however, is that this investigation of the underlying 2 structure or relationship should be an integral part of our contextual 3 (or situational) investigation of Chan communicative strategy. From 4 this perspective, Suzuki’s stance seems somewhat problematic. In 5111 attempting to look beyond the so-called “pedagogical method,” 6 Suzuki tends to focus on the Chan experience of enlightenment itself. 7 For Suzuki, those great Chan masters’ strategies, whether verbal or 8 non-verbal, directly issue forth from their enlightenment experi- 9 ence.10 This leads Suzuki to leaning too much on the explanation or 10 revelation of this Chan experience itself, and to overlooking, to a 11 great extent, the importance of the contextual investigation and 2 explanation of Chan communicative strategies. This tendency is not 3111 only reflected in his debate with Hu Shi, but is also manifest in his 4 well-known study of the Chan/Zen gongan ( J. koan). In that study, the 5 focus remains on discussing the meaning of the Chan experience of 6 enlightenment (wu, J. satori) itself.11 7 This problem is closely related to, or probably caused by, two other 8 problems in Suzuki’s treatment of Chan. First, he believes in a kind 9 of “self-nature of Zen” or what he calls “Zen as it is in itself,” refer- 20111 ring especially to the Chan/Zen experience of enlightenment.12 1 Thus the Chan experience becomes ahistorical and context-free. 2 This interpretation seems to conflict with the typical Chan emphasis 3 on the realization of enlightenment within everyday/temporal situa- 4 tions. Nor is it consistent with Suzuki’s own acknowledgment that 5 Chan/Zen deals with both time and timelessness,13 namely, an inter- 6 weaving of the two dimensions, not one dimension only. Second, the 7 related understanding that Chan communicative strategies directly 8 issue forth from the masters’ enlightenment experience becomes a 9 reason for Suzuki to underestimate these strategies or methods and 30111 the related studies. 1 Concerning this last point, I have two brief comments to make. 2 First, the idea that Chan communicative strategies are manifestations 3 of, or to a large extent determined by, Chan enlightenment experi- 4 ence should underpin rather than undermine the importance of these 5 strategies. Especially from the perspective of Hongzhou Chan, as 6 indicated in the foregoing discussion, apart from everyday activities 7 including linguistic communications, there would be no realization 8 of enlightenment.14 This perspective precludes any underestimation 9 of Chan strategies and their functionality in Chan Buddhist soterio- 40111 logical practice. Second, it is important to understand properly the 1 so-called direct functioning or issuing forth of the Chan strategies 21111 from the enlightenment experience. Since Chan communication and folio 163 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 its strategies are inseparable from the Chan enlightenment experi- 2 ence, the former seems to have a direct connection with the latter. 3 However, insofar as Chan communicative strategies are the adapta- 4 tion of the enlightened one’s experience to different students and 5111 situations, this working of Chan communication is nonetheless indi- 6 rect. The Chan masters are the masters of indirect communication 7 precisely because they are so skillful in their adaptation. This adap- 8 tation cancels what Suzuki claims as the self-identity of the Chan 9 experience, and keeps this experience alive by moving along with 10 changing situations on a daily basis and by effectively arousing more 11 people to work toward their own enlightenment. 2 The ensuing study, therefore, will be directed toward both the 3111 investigation of the underlying structure of Chan communication – 4 the pragmatics of “never tell too plainly” – and of the important 5 types of Chan communicative strategies. Although this study is more 6 philosophical than historical, my interpretation of this underlying 7 structure will not be ahistorical nor will my understanding of the 8 Chan strategies be context-free. Recontextualization of Chan texts 9 will inevitably involve a kind of “fusion of horizons” – the fusion of 20111 the historical tradition and our contemporary philosophical under- 1 standing. The latter will particularly consist of the use of selected 2 vocabularies from contemporary discourses. A contemporary revisit- 3 ing of the tradition of Chan Buddhist communication will be a useful 4 resource for contemporary understanding, utilization and develop- 5 ment of various strategies of indirect communication. It will also 6 clarify what the Chan “special transmission” or “the transmission 7 from mind to mind” means or implies. However, all this must be 8 done on the basis of examining Chan texts, most of which are widely 9 known as “recorded sayings ( yulu).” 30111 1 Chan pragmatics of “never tell too plainly”: 2 contextual and structural features 3 4 To characterize and analyze the contextual and structural features 5 of the Chan pragmatics of “never tell too plainly” is to reveal the 6 rationale for this general strategy of indirect communication. Put it 7 another way, we shall attempt to see under what circumstances this 8 indirect communication works or for what reasons Chan Buddhists 9 employ this general strategy. Since Chan communicative strategy is 40111 inseparable from the goal of Chan soteriological practice – the real- 1 ization of enlightenment – my analysis of the contextual and 21111 structural features of Chan communication must link itself to the folio 164 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 understanding and interpretation of Chan enlightenment. Two main 2 dimensions of Chan enlightenment most profoundly determine the 3 underlying structure of Chan communication: the dimension of non- 4 duality and the existentio-practical dimension. These two dimensions 5111 are closely interrelated in the realization of enlightenment. 6 First, the dimension of non-duality. Chan Buddhism inherits the 7 dimension of non-duality from the Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist tradition. 8 Among the Chan contributions to the enrichment of this Maha¯ya¯na 9 dimension of non-duality, two aspects are particularly relevant to our 10 current study. 11 (1) Chan completely carries out the dimension of non-duality in 2 such a way that all the schisms between nirva¯na and samsa¯ra, between 3111 Buddhas and sentient beings, between self and˙ other,˙ etc., are ulti- 4 mately illegitimate. The consequence of this realized non-duality in 5 Chan is not only an intellectual non-commitment to any oppositional 6 thinking or binary distinction, but an active involvement in the 7 everyday world of interdependent fluidity. In the eye of an enlight- 8 ened person, this living fluidity of interdependence never becomes a 9 vacant space, a realm for escape from the everyday entanglement, 20111 nor an abyss for annihilation. Rather, it is a productive field of 1 interrelationship, a field for interaction in which the conventional, 2 samsaric separations or oppositions no longer restrict or hinder the 3 enlightened person. Enlightenment, from this Chan point of view 4 and understood as realized non-duality, can never be an isolated state 5 of consciousness, nor can it be an experience “as it is in itself.” 6 (2) Chan Buddhists most noticeably carry into effect the dimension 7 of non-duality in their communicative encounter between masters 8 and disciples, a unique form within Chan soteriological practice. 9 This application of non-duality dramatically alters the traditional 30111 pattern of Buddhist discourse or communication. The latter demar- 1 cates, by established scriptural phraseology such as “thus have I 2 heard,” the preacher and the receiver of the Buddhist dharma, facili- 3 tating the view that the Buddha conveys a kind of truth or knowledge. 4 Chan Buddhist transmission or communication, however, is “a trans- 5 mission or communication in which there is no transmitter, no 6 recipient, and nothing transmitted or communicated, and, at the 7 same time, nothing not transmitted or not communicated.”15 8 It is not too difficult to understand, in terms of non-duality, that 9 there is no transmitter, no recipient and nothing transmitted or 40111 communicated in the Chan communication, because the connection 1 between these features of Chan communication and the non-dual 21111 dimension of Chan enlightenment is quite obvious. DeMartino also folio 165 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 explains the Chan communication as “a transmission of [dharma] by 2 [dharma] to [dharma] that is [n]o-[dharma].”16 I believe this non-duality 3 explains why D. T. Suzuki interprets Chan communication as the 4 direct functioning of the enlightenmental experience itself.17 5111 However, what is most commonly misunderstood is this “dharma 6 that is no-dharma,” or the point that nothing is transmitted and at the 7 same time nothing is not transmitted. Here I mean the differentiation 8 of the dharma, or the same of non-self-identity, in the realization of the 9 enlightenment, which is so crucial to our understanding of Chan 10 communication. If we carry out the Chan dimension of non-duality, 11 and understand enlightenment as realizing and being involved in the 2 everyday world of interdependence, the dharma must be understood 3111 as differentiating itself or negating itself, not to return to itself, but to 4 be open to the living flux of interdependence. In much the same way, 5 the dharma or the enlightenment experience must differentiate or 6 negate itself to communicate or to share. Thus it does not cancel com- 7 munication in sustaining its own identity, but merely demands a 8 transformation of the latter. It makes possible a radically different way 9 of communicating, assigning a different role to each participant in 20111 the communication, and therefore best serves Chan soteriological 1 practice. 2 Second is the existentio-practical dimension. Chan enlightenment 3 is both individual and social. It is individual in the sense that it is 4 each individual’s existentio-spiritual awakening or the transformation 5 of one’s own personhood. It is social in the sense that enlightenment 6 is not, and cannot be attained by, a withdrawal from everyday activ- 7 ities or practices in the world and from all involvement with others. 8 This point is well illustrated in Mazu Daoyi’s explanation of dao (in 9 Chan, dao designates both the Buddhist Path and enlightenment): as 30111 he says, “Just like now, whether walking, standing, sitting, reclining, 1 responding to situations or handling things for people: all is dao.”18 2 In this light, the Chan emphasis on each individual’s existentio- 3 spiritual awakening or the transformation of one’s personhood does 4 not necessarily entail a kind of individualism as long as its social and 5 practical dimensions are not ignored. However, it is this emphasis on 6 each individual’s awakening or transformation, or more precisely, 7 its existentio-practical dimension, that decisively calls for the change 8 in the meaning of communication in Chan. 9 Here we need to clarify the meaning of “the transmission from 40111 mind to mind ( yixin chuanxin).” The Chan masters do use the word 1 “transmission” or “communication” (chuan) when they talk about “the 21111 special (or separate) transmission outside theoretic teachings ( jiaowai folio 166 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 biechuan)” and “the transmission from mind to mind.” However, this 2 transmission or communication never amounts to conveying some- 3 thing from the inner state of one mind to that of another. It does 4 not convey something like knowledge or cognitive truth that can be 5111 exteriorized by the transmitter and can be obtained or possessed by 6 the receiver. The Western conception of direct communication based 7 on the correspondence relation between object and thought, thought 8 and medium, finds no counterpart in Chan communication. As many 9 Chan texts reveal, Chan masters vehemently oppose any view of 10 Chan enlightenment as getting a certain kind of knowledge through 11 some media. This objection to submitting communication to medi- 2 ated cognition, however, does not necessarily mean that the Chan 3111 communication of enlightenment experience is non-mediational, as 4 D. T. Suzuki has claimed.19 What matters for Chan is that conven- 5 tional media are seen as a means to accomplish practical (especially 6 soteriological) goals, not as a medium of representing something 7 mental or material. 8 Because of this fundamental difference between conventional 9 communication and Chan transmission or communication, often- 20111 times Chan masters painstakingly point out that they transmit 1 nothing to anyone. For example, Dazhu Huihai declares: “I do not 20 2 have a single dharma to show anybody.” Linji announces: “I don’t 21 3 have a particle of [dharma] to give to anyone.” The following 4 dialogue between Huangbo Xiyun and his student may be the most 5 straightforward discussion on “the transmission from mind to mind”: 6 The student: If there is nothing on which to lay hold, how 7 is the dharma to be transmitted? 8 The master: It is a transmission from mind to mind. . . . Obtaining 9 no dharma whatever is called the transmission of mind. 30111 . . . You hear people speak of the transmission of mind 1 and then you intend to say that there is something to be 2 received. So a patriarch said: “. . . Enlightenment is 3 naught to be obtained. One who attains does not say he 4 knows.”22 5 6 Here Huangbo Xiyun makes perfectly clear that the transmission 7 from mind to mind is not a transmission in the conventional sense. 8 It transmits nothing, not even a single dharma. Therefore, paradoxi- 9 cally, this no-transmission, as he explains, is the so-called transmis- 40111 sion of mind. 1 Nevertheless, the Chan “recorded sayings” provide us with other 21111 positive terms that the Chan masters use to explain their view of folio 167 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 communication. These terms allow us to take a further look at what 2 is meant by “the transmission from mind to mind.” For instance, 3 Huangbo Xiyun himself also interprets “the transmission from mind 4 to mind” as follows: “Mind and mind verify and accord with each 5111 other ( yixin yinxin) so that they become the same (xinxin buyi).”23 It is 6 difficult to find an accurate equivalent for the Chinese character yin 7 in a single English word. As a verb, it involves the meanings of “to 8 accord or to harmonize with each other,” “to verify each other,” and 9 so forth.24 In compounds, such as “yinhe (to verify and to accord 10 with),” “yinzheng (to verify),” “yinke (to verify and to confirm),” etc., 11 these meanings are apparent and often adopted by Chan Buddhists. 2 Thus, according to Huangbo Xiyun, the transmission from mind to 3111 mind must be understood as the mutual realization or verification of 4 enlightenment. The mind of the master (the Sakyamuni Buddha is 5 seen as the first master by Chan Buddhism) and the mind of the 6 disciple are brought into harmony or accord by each one’s enlight- 7 enment. This is the meaning of transmission. Here the verification 8 ( yinzheng) of enlightenment must not be understood as merely inter- 9 ior. It must be characterized as neither interior nor exterior, since it 20111 can never be cut off from, or confined to, one side or the other. 1 Just as yin indicates to us the special meaning of Chan communi- 2 cation, the use of the term qi offers a similar clue to the understanding 3 of this meaning. Qi, as a verb, involves a stronger sense of “to accord 4 or to harmonize with each other” and “to get along with each other” 5 than the word yin does. It contains as well the meanings of “to 6 attain” and “to experience and to understand.”25 Thus in Chinese 7 compounds we see “qihe (to get along with each other, or to accord 8 with each other),” “qihui (to experience and to understand),” “qiwu 9 (to experience and to realize),” etc. The Chan masters more often 30111 use qihui or qiwu in the sense of “to be enlightened.” Huangbo Xiyun, 1 in his well-known Chuanxin Fayao, frequently uses such terms as qihui, 2 qiwu, moqi (to realize silently), and so on. 3 What draws our attention is the close relation between his use of 4 qi and his interpretation of Chan transmission or communication. 5 After his discussion of the verification and harmonization between 6 mind and mind ( yixin yinxin), he immediately talks about qihui – the 7 experience and realization of enlightenment.26 For him, being able 8 to verify and harmonize one’s mind with another enlightened mind 9 is first and foremost to experience and realize one’s own enlighten- 40111 ment (qihui). This experience and realization of one’s own enlight- 1 enment is like a person’s drinking of water (ruren yinshui). Whether 21111 the water is cold or warm, one must experience it by him- or herself folio 168 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 (lengnuan zizhi).27 Nobody can do it for him or her. It involves one’s 2 existential choice, the conversion of one’s life outlook and attitude, 3 good will and decision-making; in short, the transformation of the 4 entire personhood. 5111 On the other hand, Huangbo Xiyun unmistakably points out: 6 “Each opportunity and each situation, each move of brows and each 7 blink, if responding appropriately, all can be called [the moment of ] 8 the experience and attainment of enlightenment (qihui) or the verifi- 9 cation and realization of the way of Chan.”28 In this light, qihui is a 10 practical matter. It is inseparable from practices in the everyday 11 world and involvement with others. The Chan emphasis on qihui thus 2 most effectively embodies the existentio-practical dimension of Chan, 3111 revealing the peculiar context for the primary goal and feature of 4 Chan transmission or communication. Because of this disclosure 5 of the intrinsic relation between qihui and Chan transmission, Pei 6 Xiu, a famous lay Chan Buddhist and the editor of Huangbo Xiyun’s 7 sayings, in his “Hymn on the Transmission of Mind” (often used 8 as an appendix to Huangbo Xiyun’s sayings), summarizes: “Mind 9 cannot be transmitted. The experience, realization and resonance of 20111 enlightenment, therefore, are the transmission ( yiqi weichuan).”29 This 1 is an accurate recount of Huangbo Xiyun’s thought and an excellent 2 definition of Chan transmission or communication. 3 Once we have a clear grasp of these important dimensions of 4 Chan, which give special meaning to Chan transmission or commu- 5 nication, we are in a better position to investigate the peculiar 6 relationships among the components of this communication, the 7 unique roles these participants play, all of which constitute the under- 8 lying structure for employing the general strategy – “never tell too 9 plainly.” 30111 (1) In Chan communication as the experience, realization, and 1 resonance of enlightenment, there is no hierarchy of speaker and 2 listener, transmitter and receiver. The overturning of this hierarchy 3 is due not only to the Chan perspective of non-duality, but also to its 4 existentio-practical concern. Let us examine first the role of the Chan 5 master as a participant in this communication. In Chan communi- 6 cation, the master, the patriarch, or even the Buddha, is not a 7 dominant speaker or transmitter whose intention pre-determines the 8 process and end of communication. The role that the Chan master 9 plays rather manifests the open-ended structure of Chan communi- 40111 cation. This role can be described in the following main aspects. 1 First, Chan masters engage in the communication only in response 21111 to other sentient beings’ need for the realization of enlightenment. folio 169 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 They themselves have nothing special to deliver, nor do they have 2 any position to assert. The realization of other sentient beings’ own 3 enlightenment is the focus and primary goal of all Chan commu- 4 nicative activities in which Chan masters are involved. As indicated, 5111 this realization is the transformation of one’s entire personhood, 6 irreducible to the mere conveying–receiving of a certain intention 7 or intentional meaning. Meaning is completely contextual and 8 situational. It must be realized existentially and practically by one’s 9 own transformation. In this sense the Chan students’ naive search 10 for answers to the question – “what was the first patriarch’s inten- 11 tion in coming from the West?” – must always be rejected by the 2 Chan master. Since other sentient beings’ own enlightenment rather 3111 than one master’s intended meaning is the focus and goal of commu- 4 nicative action, what this master says is not particularly important, 5 nor is it necessary that it be consistent. It simply becomes a moment 6 of evocation or inspiration for the student’s own effort and life- 7 engagement. 8 Second, what the master says does not directly link his or her 9 enlightenment with the student’s realization of his or her own enlight- 20111 enment. It is indirect, since all sayings are situational and the 1 situations in which the master and the student realize their own 2 enlightenments are also different. To deny this situational difference 3 is to deny our everyday world of change and flux. Chan masters 4 embrace this changing reality rather than ignore it. Their indirect 5 strategy of communication reflects their insight into this situational 6 or practical difference. Therefore, “never tell too plainly” as an 7 indirect strategy is not a personal or sectarian preference, but a 8 profound recognition of the indirection of communication. Chan 9 master Guishan Lingyou once suggested that even parents’ sayings 30111 cannot have a direct relation to their son’s own realization of enlight- 1 enment – “I will not even explain directly to my son, although my 2 mouth was born with me from my parents.”30 He also says: “What 3 I can directly tell is my own understanding. How can it (directly) 4 benefit your own seeing?”31 The implication is that while enlighten- 5 ment for all Buddhists seems the same, each realization must be 6 different. What the parents or the masters understand or see would 7 never be identical with what the son or the student understands or 8 sees, for each faces a different situation, being in a different position, 9 and must find his or her own way. 40111 Third, since other sentient beings’ own enlightenment is the focus 1 and primary goal of the communication, and since their realization 21111 of enlightenment is situational, every Chan master, as a participant, folio 170 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 is not only a speaker. He is, and must first be, a listener. Chan masters 2 may happily accept Heidegger’s opinion that speaking is in itself a 3 form of listening, but would refuse to confine themselves to the reified 4 “essential being of language” that fascinated Heidegger for so long.32 5111 Chan masters listen to many different things. They, of course, listen 6 to the silent utterance of their own and others’ enlightenment experi- 7 ences, listen to the Chan language that has come down to them. This 8 kind of listening prepares them for engaging in communication. 9 However, more importantly, they listen to the silent call of a variety 10 of situations in which they encounter students. They listen to the 11 silent telling of each student’s everyday activities and practices, of his 2 or her relationship with others, and of his or her capacity. Finally, 3111 they listen to the student’s questions and words carefully. Because 4 they listen, they are able to respond and speak better. They thus are 5 able to perform an art of speaking – to speak indirectly. Chan masters 6 may agree with Kierkegaard on one thing: that indirect communi- 7 cation is what makes communication an art.33 8 Fourth, this art of speaking, based on listening, demands that the 9 Chan master must speak differently according to each different situ- 20111 ation. There is no fixed meaning to convey, nor is there any theoretic 1 principle to follow. Since Chan masters’ sayings are not intended to 2 inculcate a form of thought, formal consistency is not a restriction for 3 them. Their sayings are regulated or guided by their practical 4 purpose or effectiveness. This enhances greatly the sensibility, flexi- 5 bility and skillfulness of their response and speaking. One of the most 6 famous examples is Mazu Daoyi’s different responses and sayings to 7 different people and situations. 8 9 Question: Why do you say that mind is Buddha ( jixin jifo)? 30111 Answer: To stop children’s crying. 1 Question: What do you say when they have stopped crying? 2 Answer: It is neither mind nor Buddha ( feixin feifo). 3 Question: When there comes someone who belongs to neither of 4 these two kinds, how do you instruct him? 5 Answer: I tell him that it is not even a thing (bushiwu). 6 Question: How about when you suddenly meet someone who has 7 been on the Path? 8 Answer: I teach him to experience and realize the great dao (tihui 9 dadao).34 40111 1 Here four great notions of the Chan soteriology briefly posed by 21111 Mazu Daoyi respond to four kinds of people who are at different folio 171 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 stages of their spiritual progress. As Mazu Daoyi and his followers 2 emphatically advise, no student should get stuck in any of his words 3 or notions. They are, among numerous others, merely expedients 4 (shishe) or temporary prescriptions ( yaofang). A similar demonstration 5111 of the great flexibility and skillfulness in responding and speaking can 6 also be found in Linji’s description of his “Four Procedures.”35 7 Fifth, this great flexibility in responding and speaking reveals the 8 working of the Chan art and strategy of “never tell too plainly.” 9 The Chan masters must not perform in such conventional ways as 10 giving lectures, teaching doctrines, describing things, or explaining 11 principles for further action, but must simply evoke, inspire, arouse, 2 or intrigue. Therefore, to speak indirectly is to say something evoca- 3111 tive, inspiring, edifying. Chan masters speak to evoke the students’ 4 self-interrogation and self-transformation, to arouse the students’ 5 discovery of their own meaning of enlightenment, to encourage the 6 students to make their own existential choices. In all these aspects, 7 neither the Chan masters’ intention nor their sayings can be a substi- 8 tute for the students’ own action. A great Chan master is fully aware 9 of this difficult task: to help the students only to the degree that words 20111 will inspire or edify them, but never mislead them or hinder their 1 own realization. 2 This is the main reason that many Chan students feel so grateful 3 to their masters. One instance, mentioned at the beginning of this 4 chapter, is Dongshan Liangjie’s noted esteem for his master’s 5 strategy of “never tell too plainly.” To arouse the students’ action in 6 the right direction, the Chan masters’ evocative or edifying sayings 7 are often at the same time therapeutic. Not only do these Chan 8 masters carefully eschew any trap of reifying words, they also offer 9 “shock therapy” to those who, for instance, have been trapped by the 30111 reifying use of words and the conventional way of thinking. 1 Zhaozhou’s answer of “The cypress tree in the yard” could be a kind 2 of “shock therapy” to the student who asks what the first patriarch’s 3 intention was in coming from the West.36 The “shock therapy” 4 directs the students towards working out their own health. Sometimes 5 it has the effect of curing the disease quickly and leads the students 6 to the realization of their own enlightenment. 7 (2) If the art and strategy of “never tell too plainly” make the Chan 8 master’s speech both freer and more difficult, so does the role of the 9 student. The student, in Chan communication, is not only a listener, 40111 nor a passive receiver. If the master merely conveyed some infor- 1 mation or knowledge, some fixed meanings or formulated teachings 21111 and doctrines, some rules or principles, everything might be much folio 172 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 easier for the student. In that case there would be no authentic Chan 2 communication. The Chan student, on the contrary, must become 3 more engaged, active and creative. The master’s responses or words, 4 no matter how evocative or edifying, only push the students back on 5111 themselves. They must face their own situation and find their own 6 way to enlightenment. They must make their own decision and trans- 7 form their own personhood. They must experience and realize the 8 meaning of enlightenment in their daily activities and situations. 9 They cannot simply duplicate their master’s experience. Only in this 10 way can they realize enlightenment, echoing and resonating with 11 the master’s experience, and harmonize themselves with the master 2 and other enlightened ones. Only in this sense can communication 3111 be completed. 4 On the other hand, since the masters do not impose any positions 5 or rules on them, and do not inculcate any dogmas, the students are 6 encouraged to be unattached to what the masters say. They have 7 more freedom to search out their own solutions for the problem of 8 their lives, to explore the meaning of life and death, nirva¯na and 9 samsa¯ra, in various situations, to do whatever they believe is right˙ in 20111 their˙ daily practices. This freedom is both the condition for the 1 student’s creative involvement and the characteristic of enlighten- 2 ment. We may see this aspect more clearly from the following story. 3 4 When Mazu Daoyi heard that Master Damei Fachang lived 5 in the mountain, he sent a monk there to ask, “What have 6 you learned from Master Mazu so that you live in this moun- 7 tain?” Damei answered, “Master Mazu taught me that mind 8 is Buddha; accordingly I have settled here to live.” The monk 9 said, “Nowadays Master Mazu teaches a different Buddha- 30111 dharma.” Damei asked, “What is the difference?” The monk 1 said, “In these days he also teaches that there is neither mind 2 nor Buddha.” Damei said, “This old man confuses people 3 without an end. No matter how you insist on saying ‘There 4 is neither mind nor Buddha,’ I will pay attention only to 5 ‘Mind is Buddha’.” When Master Mazu heard the story after 6 the monk’s return, he remarked, “Oh brothers, the plum is 7 now ripe.” (For the Chinese word damei means big plum).37 8 9 This story demonstrates best the creative relation between the 40111 student and the master, especially the unique role of the student. As 1 Mazu’s student, Damei is free to choose what is right for him, or what 21111 is most suitable to his own situation. He does not depend on, or attach folio 173 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 himself to, everything his master says. From the perspective of en- 2 lightenment, whatever the master says, either “Mind is Buddha” or 3 “Neither mind nor Buddha,” is nothing but a skillful expedient 4 guiding the students toward their realization of enlightenment within 5111 each particular situation. To understand this is an important step on 6 the path to enlightenment. Therefore, the master admires Damei’s 7 attainment of freedom and non-attachment. 8 This story also well illustrates the non-existence of the hierarchy 9 between speaker and listener, transmitter and receiver, in Chan 10 communication. The student, as a creative person, a person of non- 11 attachment, is free to challenge his own master, as Damei’s words 2 show. The end of the story can be read as Mazu’s meeting the chal- 3111 lenge from his own student. Chan communication thus is perfectly 4 shown here as the mutual realization of enlightenment, as the harmon- 5 ious relation between the participants, as the achievement of qihui. 6 (3) It is hard to demarcate the message, as an element in the Chan 7 communication, from the participants and from the communicative 8 action in the way that a traditional study of communication, such as 9 an Aristotelian one, does. We have referred to the issue of message 20111 or of what is communicated in our discussion of the role of the partic- 1 ipants in Chan communication. Here I will briefly summarize the 2 germane points. 3 First, the Chan masters always underscore, as we have mentioned 4 several times, that they do not convey any message, any teaching, any 5 dharma.When Zhaozhou uses the words “The cypress tree in the yard” 6 to answer the question “What is the first patriarch’s intention in com- 7 ing from the West,” a student asks him, “Don’t you use surroundings 8 to show something?” Zhaozhou says: “I do not use surroundings to 9 show anything.”38 He is suggesting that there is not even a message 30111 behind such words as “The cypress tree in the yard.” All the Chan 1 masters’ sayings are prescriptions for curing diseases or expedients to 2 evoke self-interrogation and self-transformation. In a word, they serve 3 practical purposes. Therefore, the clarity and definitiveness of their 4 words or meanings are unimportant. For example, to answer the same 5 question, once Zhaozhou uses “The cypress tree in the yard”; another 6 time he uses “The legs of a bed”; another time he uses “Moss 7 growing on one’s front teeth.”39 These answers, of course, make the 8 student’s conventional understanding of the message very difficult. 9 Second, what is communicated is not a message, but the realiza- 40111 tion and resonance of enlightenment in everyday activities and 1 practices. In other words, the awakened participant of this com- 21111 munication him- or herself is what is communicated. Thus the folio 174 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 participants must be free from bondage of any message, any words. 2 This is precisely the main reason that the issue of what is communi- 3 cated does not exist by itself for Chan communication. It is embodied 4 in Chan communicative action, in the entire way of communicating, 5111 in the existentio-practical achievement of enlightenment itself, in the 6 creative contribution of the participants. 7 These preliminary accounts of the underlying relationship and 8 structure of Chan communication help us to understand why and 9 how Chan Buddhists employ the indirect strategy of “never tell 10 too plainly.” However, to see more distinctly how Chan Buddhists 11 communicate indirectly, we must investigate more concrete strate- 2 gies as compelling illustrations and manifestations of the general 3111 strategy of “never tell too plainly.” 4 5 “Living words”: different types of indirect 6 strategy in Chan communication 7 8 The extraordinary flexibility and skillfulness of the art and strategy of 9 “never tell too plainly” characteristic of Chan communication also is 20111 reflected in the Chan notion of “living words.” Among the well- 1 known Chan masters, Baizhang Huaihai may have been the first to 2 distinguish“living words (shengyu)”from“dead words (siyu).” Like other 3 Chan masters, he fiercely opposed any reliance on words or being 4 restricted by words. Meanwhile, he made quite explicit that he did not 5 oppose every use of language. “You must,” he said, “discriminate 6 those living and dead words . . . .”40 This notion of living words later 7 on became a focus for the development of gongan in “kanhua Chan.” 8 Yuanwu Keqin made a famous statement about “living words.” 9 30111 Examine the living words (huoju); don’t examine the dead 1 words (siju). If you gain understanding through the living 2 words, you will never forget it; if you gain understanding 3 through the dead words, you won’t even be able to save 4 yourself. If you want to take the patriarchs and Buddhas as 5 your masters, you must clearly choose the living words.41 6 7 Dahui Zonggao, the strongest advocate of “kanhua Chan,” holds the 8 same opinion.42 Generally speaking, the Chan notion of “living 9 words” apparently carries two major meanings. First, it insists that 40111 Chan Buddhists should use words in such a way as to elude every fix- 1 ation on words, to avoid falling into the trap of words. Living words 21111 are those that can point to something beyond any fixed words or folio 175 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 meanings. Living words thus function and play at the boundaries of 2 language. Second, therefore, living words best serve Chan soteriolog- 3 ical practice, never hindering but catalyzing Chan awakening 4 in a variety of contexts. It is not surprising that the art of “never tell 5111 too plainly” finds its finest expression in the notion of “living words.” 6 However, Chan Buddhists do not establish a theory of “living words.” 7 Their notion of “living words” is involved in their explanation of the 8 actual use of words. In what follows, we will examine three types of 9 “living words” as Chan strategies of indirect communication.43 10 11 The use of paradoxical language 2 3111 The use of paradoxical expression has a close connection to the use 4 of serial negation or double negation in Buddhism. Both can be 5 placed under the category of the play of negativity in discursive 6 language. The use of double negation and paradox is not an exclusive 7 possession of Chan Buddhism. It is a common feature of discourse, 8 we may say, characteristic of almost the entire Buddhist tradi- 9 tion, including Indian Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, and so forth. 20111 However, scholars have argued that although Chan Buddhists were 1 informed by the Indian Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist discourse of negativity, 2 such as the Ma¯dhyamika discourse and the Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ tradition, 3 Chan Buddhism reached the consummation of the Chinese adapta- 4 tion and simplification of the Indian Buddhist mode. Contrary to the 5 Indian mode of rigid logical analysis, such as the reductio ad absurdum 6 and the progressive negation, Chinese Buddhists prefer the simpli- 7 fied use of paradox, the juxtaposition of opposites, first exemplified 8 by the Chinese Ma¯dhyamika thinker Sengzhao, and culminating 9 in Chan Buddhists.44 The consequence of this simplification of nega- 30111 tive strategy coincides with the Chan attitude of non-reliance on 1 theoretical teachings, with its emphasis on the realization of the 2 Buddhist soteriological goal in all mundane activities. In any case, 3 the abundant use of paradoxical language is widely known as a 4 unique characteristic of Chan discourse. To understand this use of 5 paradoxical language, we must start our investigation with Baizhang 6 Huaihai’s account of “living words.” 7 Baizhang’s account of “living words” involves his advice on using 8 words or sentences that cut off two opposites: 9 40111 Cut off the supposition “it exists” and the supposition “it 1 does not exist.” Cut off the supposition “it is nonexistent” 21111 and the supposition “it is not nonexistent.” Leave no trace folio 176 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 on either side. Let nobody catch you on either side . . . 2 neither profane nor holy, neither light nor dark, neither 3 having knowledge nor lacking knowledge, neither bondage 4 nor liberation. It is not any name or category at all.45 5111 6 Therefore, “Those sayings that there is cultivation and there is real- 7 ization, that this mind is Buddha, . . . are dead words. Those sayings 8 that there is neither cultivation nor realization, that it is neither mind 9 nor Buddha, . . . are living words.”46 “Neither identity nor difference, 10 neither impermanence nor permanence, neither coming nor going – 11 these are living words. . . . [The binary distinctions of ] coming, 2 going, impermanence, permanence, Buddha and sentient beings, are 3111 dead words.”47 4 On these accounts, “living words” are, first of all, paradoxical 5 words, words that elude and violate the conventional rules of oppo- 6 sitional thinking and either/or logic. This emphasis on the use of 7 paradoxical words develops from Huineng’s similar teaching in The 8 Platform Su¯tra. Huineng teaches his disciples to preach dharma “by 9 utilizing the thirty-six pairs of opposites and going around without 20111 attaching to either side.”48 When explaining how one should use this 1 method, he further points out: 2 3 In conversation with others, externally, while within form, be 4 separate from form; internally, while within emptiness, 5 be separate from emptiness. . . . Darkness is not darkness by 6 itself; because there is light there is darkness. That darkness 7 is not darkness by itself is because light changes, becoming 8 darkness, and with darkness light is revealed. They originate 9 each from the other. The thirty-six pairs are also like this.49 30111 1 We see very clearly that the logical principles of noncontradiction 2 and excluded middle simply do not work for these Chan Buddhist 3 thinkers. However, to understand why these Chan Buddhist thinkers 4 advocate and use the paradoxical expressions of A = –A, we need a 5 three-fold dimensional analysis to look more closely into the entire 6 context of the Chan Buddhist use of paradoxical words. 7 8 Dynamic dimension or the dimension of getting along with the 9 change and flux of the everyday world 40111 1 The above-quoted paragraph from Huineng plainly shows that his 21111 preference for using paradoxical expression is concerned with the folio 177 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 “change,” contingency and indeterminacy of things, or in traditional 2 Buddhist terms, with interdependent origination. This dimension is 3 fundamental for the Chan use of paradoxical words and for Chan 4 soteriology, but has been frequently misunderstood both inside and 5111 outside Chan Buddhism. “Sitting meditation” and the realization of 6 enlightenment or Buddha nature are often conceived of as a kind 7 of escape from the flux and impurity of mundane activities to an 8 island of permanence and purity. Teachings such as “concentrating 9 the mind and entering into meditation, fixing the mind on contem- 10 plating purity, . . . controlling the mind for inner cleanness,”50 11 criticized by Shenhui, presuppose the Buddha nature as an immobi- 2 lized essence apart from flowing reality and the everyday activities of 3111 the human mind. However, the spirit of Shenhui’s criticism is greatly 4 advanced by the later development of Chan Buddhism.51 5 Among the most celebrated Chan masters, Huangbo, Linji and 6 Mazu all like to use the word renyun, which could be best translated 7 as “following along with the movement of all things or circum- 8 stances.”52 In Mazu’s sayings, we find the following expression: 9 “following along with the movement of all things and in this way 20111 living out your time.”53 Huangbo advises his students: “At all times 1 . . . never attach yourself to one thing; just follow along with the 2 movement of all things the whole day long.”54 “Following along with 3 the movement of all things without any restriction is called libera- 4 tion.”55 Linji’s more metaphorical expression goes like this: “Merely 5 according to circumstances as they are, use up your past karma; 6 following along with [the change of ] circumstances, put on your 7 [different] clothes.”56 Linji’s viewpoint is also manifested in his use 8 of this quotation: 9 30111 The mind changes in accordance with the myriad 1 circumstances; 2 the way it changes is truly profound. 3 If you can realize its nature through this flow, 4 you will have neither joy nor sorrow.57 5 6 These important and persuasive examples demonstrate that these 7 great Chan thinkers never regard liberation or enlightenment as 8 isolation or an escape from the flowing reality of the everyday world. 9 They rather consider it as a return from our isolated or fixed state of 40111 mind to this world of perpetual change and flux. They consider all 1 these changes and fluctuations to be natural and spontaneously so, 21111 and this naturalness and spontaneity a state of the enlightened mind. folio 178 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 Their use of the word renyun often occurs in tandem with their use of 2 words tinged with more apparent Daoist naturalism, such as ziran 3 (being natural or spontaneously so) and wushi (doing nothing special). 4 Accordingly, words that are connected with the fabrication and stati- 5111 cization of sequential, discriminative, reifying thinking, must be “cut 6 off.” Words that utilize oppositions and contradictions to inspire our 7 return to the world of dynamic convergence of various different 8 meanings, things, aspects, to call forth our flowing together with these 9 different meanings, things, aspects, are “living words.” 10 11 Pragmatic dimension or therapeutic dimension 2 3111 When Mazu simultaneously proposes the notion of “Mind is 4 Buddha” and the notion of “There is neither mind nor Buddha,” it 5 is an apparent contradiction. However, when facing another person’s 6 questioning of his position, as we have seen, he does not attempt to 7 solve the contradiction by reformulating his sentences or by clearing 8 up its semantic meanings. He simply asks people to look beyond the 9 semantic meanings of his sayings. In other words, the meaningful- 20111 ness is its usefulness, which lies completely in the pragmatic context, 1 namely, in the context of soteriological practice. Therefore, the forms 2 of contradiction or paradox, in Chan communication, are always 3 preserved as they are, without any need to eliminate them, but at 4 the same time are utilized to serve therapeutic or healing purposes, 5 such as “To stop children’s crying.” Baizhang Huaihai makes this 6 point very explicit, stating: “All speeches and teachings are just like 7 curing illness. Because there are different kinds of illness, we use 8 different medicines. Therefore sometimes we say ‘There is Buddha,’ 9 and sometimes we say ‘There is no Buddha.’ . . . Prescriptions are 30111 different. We should never have any restriction and fixation.”58 1 Another master, Funiushan Zizai, also explains: “Such a phrase as 2 ‘There is neither mind nor Buddha’ is a phrase for curing illness with 3 a medicine.”59 Many Chan paradoxical expressions work in the same 4 way. For the Chan masters and students, if the therapeutic functions 5 of these paradoxical expressions are effective, there are no contra- 6 dictory meanings at all within the pragmatic context.60 7 8 Liminological dimension 9 40111 The Chan use of paradoxical expressions cannot be characterized as 1 illogical or irrational, as D. T. Suzuki sometimes claims.61 It is trans- 21111 logical or paralogical. It functions and plays at the boundaries or folio 179 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 limits of ordinary logical thinking. As Huineng’s strategy has shown, 2 Chan utilizes various pairs of opposites that are commonly used as 3 the elements of the discrimination characteristic of a conventional 4 either/or logic. However, without abandoning opposites available in 5111 ordinary and religious–philosophical language, Chan masters make 6 inoperative logical rules such as those of noncontradiction and 7 excluded middle. They use contradictions and oppositions as special 8 tools to pursue a pragmatic purpose, to suspend human staticization 9 and fixation, to arouse their fellow beings’ awakening to the dynamic 10 reality of change and flux. Therefore, the boundaries or limits of 11 discriminative language, oppositional thinking, and either/or logic 2 are pre-conditions of the Chan use of paradox. By playing at these 3111 boundaries or limits, the Chan paradoxical expression works toward 4 something that ordinary logical thinking cannot arrive at, namely, 5 overcoming the latter’s limitations. This is the liminological function 6 of Chan paradoxical expressions, an important function of Chan 7 “living words.” 8 9 The use of tautological language 20111 1 The English word tautology, stemming from its Greek root, means the 2 repetition of the same idea, statement, or word. Grammatically, a 3 tautology is commonly considered meaningless or a fault of style.62 4 Philosophically (or logically), tautology is often said to be empty, 5 uninformative, or useless.63 The subject–predicate structure of 6 propositional language demands an exclusion of tautology from 7 philosophical discourse. This structure, in serving the logical prin- 8 ciple of identity and defining a thing as itself, always forces a 9 proposition to say something about the thing it represents, namely, to 30111 refer to something opposite to it negatively and thereby establish its 1 own identity, such as “A is not X” or “A is not non-A.” Thus, 2 although Western logic and its principle of identity have been 3 criticized as tautological for their ignorance of the change and flux 4 of things,64 this logical language, ironically, forbids the use of any 5 apparently tautological expression. 6 Obviously, oppositional thinking is the foundation for both the 7 principle of identity and the exclusion of tautology from philosoph- 8 ical discourses. In his critique of Western onto-theologies and his 9 search for alternatives to Western metaphysical language, Heidegger 40111 uses striking tautological expressions such as “the world worlds,” “the 1 thing things.”65 However, Heidegger is not aware of the fact that 21111 Chan Buddhists also use tautological language as “living words” in folio 180 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 their religio-philosophical discourses. The investigation of the Chan 2 use of tautological language will therefore be helpful to our explora- 3 tion of other possibilities in philosophical discourse. 4 Most tautologies deliberately used by Chan masters appear in the 5111 dialogues between the masters and the students. Being extraordi- 6 narily flexible and skillful in responding and speaking, Chan masters 7 sometimes give contradictory answers to the same question. They 8 speak as differently as they can to deal with very different situations 9 or contexts. Sometimes they keep silent, refusing to give any answer. 10 At other times they simply repeat the student’s words. Let us look at 11 the following examples: 2 3111 Question: What is one drop of water from the source of Caoxi (ruhe 4 shi caoyuan yidishui)?66 5 Answer: [It is] one drop of water from the source of Caoxi (shi 6 caoyuan yidishui).67 7 Question: What is the Buddha dharma (ruhe shi fofa)? 8 Answer: The Buddha dharma ( fofa). 9 Question: What is the dharma of all dharmas (ruhe shi fazhongfa)? 20111 Answer: The dharma of all dharmas ( fazhongfa). . . . 1 Question: What is the dao (ruhe shi dao)? 2 Answer: The dao, the dao.68 3 4 Question: What is the dao (ruhe shi dao)? 5 Answer: [It is] just the dao (zhengshi dao).69 6 7 Are these tautological answers or expressions meaningless? It is true 8 that they are uninformative, since they are not conventional answers 9 to those inquiries, not the conveyance of any information. They say 30111 nothing in the conventional sense. However, they are certainly not 1 meaningless, nor are they useless, within the context of Chan soterio- 2 logical practice. 3 The general function of Chan tautological expression in soterio- 4 logical practice can be described as follows. First, tautology is used 5 as a therapeutic tool similar to a negative strategy. It decomposes 6 or violates normal predication, refusing to formulate a definition, to 7 predicate anything. The lack of a strict subject–predicate structure 8 in Chinese grammar facilitates the Chan masters’ deliberate rejec- 9 tion of any definition. However, the pragmatic concern is still a 40111 predominant factor here. The lack of rules for subject–predicate 1 relationship does not preclude the possibility of using Chinese 21111 language in the way of predication, as those Chan students’ questions folio 181 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 imply. For these Chan masters, the students’ questions have fallen 2 into the trap of predication. The realization of the Buddha dharma or 3 the dao cannot rely on knowing the definition of the Buddha dharma 4 or the dao. It must liberate itself from any oppositional thinking and 5111 referential, propositional language, and must be achieved practically, 6 as indicated by our preceding discussion of the dimension of non- 7 duality and the pragmatic dimension in Chan. The Chan masters’ 8 answers are intended to reverse the direction of predication, to put 9 an end to oppositional thinking and referential language, thus curing 10 the students’ illness. The unconventional, tautological expression 11 produces an effect analogous to a kind of therapeutic shock to the 2 students. 3111 Second, although the tautological expressions say nothing in the 4 sense of predication, they nonetheless say something indirectly. 5 In interrupting predication, they continuously and repeatedly 6 challenge and provoke the students’ effort, guiding them toward non- 7 oppositional or non-dualistic understanding. As we can see in our 8 examples, the tautology of “the Buddha dharma” or “the dao” points 9 to the realization of enlightenment in such a way as to violate 20111 or unusually restrict ordinary naming. It provisionally utilizes the 1 naming, but transforms and presents it in an undivided manner, 2 in its full intensity, in its dynamic immanence, and without an “is 3 predication.” Chan tautological expression is thus a saying by way 4 5 of non-saying, or a saying of non-saying. It is beyond negative and 6 positive expressions. This use of tautological expressions demon- 7 strates the characteristic of the Chan use of “living words.” If living 8 words are those that have no words within themselves ( yuzhong 70 9 wuyu), the Chan tautological expressions are precisely such words. 30111 They are sayings of repeating and at the same time of pointing, 1 suggesting, but without predicating. 2 There are similarities between the Chan Buddhist use of tautology 3 and Heidegger’s. Both use tautology to decompose conventional 4 predication, to overcome oppositional thinking. Both use it as a say- 5 ing of non-saying or as a saying by way of non-saying. However, the 6 differences with respect to their uses of tautology are also discernible. 7 The Chan Buddhist use of tautology has an apparently pragmatic 8 goal, namely, it serves its soteriological purpose. Heidegger’s use is 9 closely related to his search for the understanding of Being. The 40111 tautological expression for Heidegger is to maintain the identity and 1 unity of Being.71 For Chan Buddhists, although the tautological 21111 expression aims at pointing to the Buddha dharma or the dao non- folio 182 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 dualistically, the Buddha dharma or the dao is neither identical nor 2 different. The Buddha dharma or the dao must be realized holistically, 3 but at the same time it remains open to differentiation, to different 4 people and different situations. Therefore, it is without self-identity. 5111 It is not a metaphysical notion, rather, it is a soteriological and 6 heuristic notion. 7 8 9 The use of poetic language 10 Here the term “poetic language” refers not only to words cast in a 11 conventional verse form, but also to words of poetic taste, or of poet- 2 icity, that do not conform to any conventional canon of poetry. 3111 I define “poeticity” or “poeticizing” in a broad sense, namely, I define 4 it as a kind of figurative, imaginative, or suggestive use of language 5 that echoes, or evokes co-echoing with, the rhythm of life. This allows 6 us to take into consideration more than the Chan masters’ frequent 7 borrowing and composing of verses in their communication, includ- 8 ing the entire way of poeticizing in Chan discourse. Thus, Linji’s well- 9 known verses in his explanation of “Four Procedures” are one 20111 example of using poetic language.72 Some of Huangbo Xiyun’s 1 sayings are another: 2 3 4 Mountains are mountains; water is water; monks are monks; 5 laymen are laymen. Mountains, rivers, and the great earth; 6 the sun, the moon, and the stars – none of them is outside 7 your mind. . . . The green mountains that everywhere meet 8 your gaze – this void world – are so clear and bright that 9 no single hairsbreadth is left there for your cognitive under- 73 30111 standing. 1 2 Even Zhaozhou’s famous answer, “The cypress tree in the yard,” is 3 a kind of poetic expression. 4 As Burton Watson correctly discerns, Chan masters prefer “brief, 5 highly compact poetical expressions that are suggestive rather than 6 expository in nature.” This use of poetic language “eschews specific- 7 ally religious or philosophical terminology in favor of everyday 8 language, seeking to express insight in terms of the imagery and verse 9 forms current in the secular culture of the period.”74 Observations of 40111 this kind point to the relation between the Chan use of poetic 1 language and the Chan emphasis on the realization of enlightenment 21111 within all secular activities. folio 183 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 Other scholars also see factors contributing to the evolution of 2 Chan poetic expressions from Buddhist ga¯tha¯s (hymns) – the facilita- 3 tion of poetic expressions by the analogical nature of Chinese lan- 4 guage, the centuries-long cultivation of poetic sensibilities before the 5111 golden age of Chan, the great literary notion and tradition of 6 metaphor and allegory (bixing), etc.75 Hajime Nakamura, among 7 others, particularly regards the Chan preference for figurative, sug- 8 gestive language as indicative of the “non-logical character” of Chan 9 Buddhism. He chooses Linji’s explanation of “Four Procedures” to 10 show that Linji favors using figurative language instead of giving 11 logical, speculative expositions.76 2 All these interpretations may well provide answers, from a cultural 3111 perspective, to the question of why Chan Buddhists prefer using 4 poetic language. However, they do not precisely answer the question 5 of how poetic language functions in Chan communication. The study 6 of the latter question, it seems to me, is crucial to a deeper under- 7 standing of the former question. This study will eventually reveal that 8 poetic language is not a decorative feature of Chan discourse but 9 plays a substantial role in the entire Chan communication.77 It will 20111 disclose the inner logic of Chan poeticizing. My preliminary investi- 1 gation of this question will thus elucidate, in line with this thinking, 2 the following aspects. 3 First, the Chan use of poetic language is a kind of de-familiariza- 4 tion that proceeds by deviating from or violating conventional 5 Buddhist usage and all conventional ways of thinking. There are 6 two types of de-familiarization: moderate and radical. Moderate 7 de-familiarization designates a type of poetic expression in combina- 8 tion with conventional discursive language, such as the foregoing 9 passage quoted from Huangbo Xiyun’s sayings. However, even in 30111 combination with conventional discursive language, this inclusion of 1 poetic expressions in the main part of preaching violates the rhetor- 2 ical canon of Buddhist discourse. The Chan poetic expressions are 3 no longer subsidiary to theoretical inquiries and logical expositions, 4 as those traditional Buddhist ga¯tha¯s were. Moreover, the use of 5 figurative, expressive language deliberately minimizes or marginal- 6 izes the conventional use of expository, propositional language and 7 the cognitive mode of thinking. This is more prominent in the radical 8 type of de-familiarization. 9 This radical type of de-familiarization often occurs in the master– 40111 disciple conversation. The masters give completely figurative, 1 expressive answers to the students’ intellectual inquiries, such as “The 21111 cypress tree in the yard” and “The river from the Land of Peach folio 184 PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL TOO PLAINLY”

1111 Blossom goes around the pavilion of white cloud.”78 Answers of this 2 kind produce elusive effects. This elusiveness becomes a decisive force 3 before which all conventional sequential thinking is doomed to lose 4 itself. Since this use of poetic expression forcefully interrupts the 5111 conventional sequential thinking represented by the student’s ques- 6 tion, it is, again, similar to a kind of “therapeutic shock.” In this 7 context, the Chan use of poetic language, it could be said, comprises 8 its apophasis, denying the student’s way of questioning and thinking. 9 However, this denial is obviously different from any direct negation, 10 for the poetic expressions here do not themselves directly engage in 11 any negation. 2 Therefore, second, although the use of poetic language within the 3111 Chan Buddhist context contains apophasis, it cannot be character- 4 ized as apophatic discourse. It rather manifests a kind of kataphasis, 5 a poetic affirmation that is different from both conventional nega- 6 tion and affirmation.79 In such poetic expressions as “The cypress 7 tree in the yard” and “The river from the Land of Peach Blossom 8 goes around the pavilion of white cloud,” we see that the everyday 9 world, as vivid as it is, is poetically affirmed or reaffirmed in its 20111 naturalistic dynamism. To borrow Heidegger’s words,”this multiple 1 ambiguousness of the poetic saying . . . leaves what is as it is.”80 2 In this way Chan Buddhism remarkably poeticizes the Maha¯ya¯na 3 belief that the nirvanic world is not different from the samsaric 4 world and the Chinese Buddhist notion of “true emptiness within 5 wondrous beings (zhenkong miaoyou).” Therefore, even though the 6 Chan masters ignore or deny the students’ questions, they nonethe- 7 less say something meaningful and positive within the dialogical 8 context by pointing to it poetically, thus guiding the students’ soteri- 9 ological practice. 30111 Third, the elusiveness characteristic of these poetic expressions 1 makes the understanding of their meanings more open to variation, 2 to situational differences. In other words, it always allows or even 3 encourages more than one understanding of what it says. The Chan 4 masters maintain the necessity of this elusiveness and multiplicity of 5 meanings in their use of poetic expressions. For instance, when 6 Zhaozhou replies: “I do not use surroundings to show something,” 7 he asserts that there is no definite cognitive content or meaning 8 hidden behind these metaphorical words – “The cypress tree in the 9 yard.” Just as Heidegger thinks the multiplicity of meanings neces- 40111 sary to thinking,81 the Chan masters consider the elusiveness and 1 multiplicity of meanings necessary to provoking each individual’s 21111 situational realization of enlightenment. folio 185 PRAGMATICS OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

1111 Scholars have divided Chan poetry into different types.82 Among 2 these types, those that demonstrate Buddhist dharmas and enlighten- 3 ment experience are of primary importance. As we have discussed 4 earlier, the Chan students must experience, realize and resonate with 5111 enlightenment existentially (practically) and non-dualistically. This 6 requires that Chan masters, in responding to the students’ inquiries, 7 must say something merely evocative, edifying, in order not to 8 mislead the students, not to hinder their own realization. That is 9 to say, they must speak indirectly. The elusiveness and multiplicity 10 of meanings inherent in Chan poetic expressions best serve this indi- 11 rection of communication. These expressions challenge students’ 2 own effort and arouse students’ creative imagination through the 3111 imagery closely associated with everyday experiences. 4 Consider the following verses: 5 6 1 What green mountain is not a place for the practice 7 of dao? 8 Must you, cane in hand, make a pilgrimage to Qing 9 Liang? 20111 Even if the golden-haired lion should appear in the 1 clouds, 2 It would not be an auspicious sight to the dharma eye!83 3 2 The happy adventure of the romantic youth, 4 84 5 His lady alone knows its sweetness. 6 7 The first case mainly suggests that you should not seek the dao 8 externally or dualistically. The second case hints that the realization 9 and resonance of enlightenment must be achieved existentially and 30111 inwardly, and cannot be externalized or objectified. However, these 1 are just hints or suggestions. They allow and even call forth divergent 2 imaginings and understandings in terms of concrete, particular, per- 3 sonal experiences, and situations of the everyday world. Thus they 4 inspire and provoke in a way that theoretic teaching and discursive 5 speech cannot do. Because of their close relationship with secular 6 experiences, these poetic expressions also demystify the Chan enlight- 7 enment experience. In the final analysis, the use of poetic language 8 as an indirect strategy is demanded by the inner structure of Chan 9 communication. As living words, Chan poetic expressions make 40111 Chan communication more effective and certainly more attractive to 1 ordinary people. 21111 folio 186 1111 2 3 4 5111 CONCLUDING REMARKS 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 Our investigation of the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism, with respect 4 to three areas of language use, have come to an end only temporarily. 5 A complete investigation of these three areas in the Zhuangzi and 6 Chan Buddhism still lies ahead of us. As is now quite clear, my inves- 7 tigation is nonetheless preliminary. Each area deserves, and calls for, 8 further studies. As I approached the end of my original project, I 9 have realized clearly that what I set up for myself and for this project 20111 as its end could be just another beginning. This undertaking has 1 exposed or revealed more questions or problems that deserve deeper 2 investigation and must be taken into consideration, thought through 3 or analyzed further. However, this fact does not reduce the signifi- 4 cance of this preliminary work. If it brings more attention to these 5 areas, points to the value of investigations of this kind, I see a merit 6 in it. I expect the continuation of my exploration in the future, 7 challenges from others and further works in the same areas done 8 by others. 9 In conclusion, I would like to briefly address three issues. 30111 First, it is now more evident than at the beginning of this book that 1 one thread running through my investigation of the three topics is the 2 investigation of linguistic strategies, of language uses, in these two 3 traditions. This focus should not be lost despite the fact that my inves- 4 tigation of linguistic strategies is at the same time the investigation of 5 many other things, as is especially shown by those chapters on decon- 6 struction. As we have noted, to investigate Daoist and Chan Buddhist 7 linguistic strategies, we must first investigate their overall concerns for 8 soteriological practices. It is only in their practices or in the pragmatic 9 contexts that these strategies play great roles. In other words, lin- 40111 guistic strategy never becomes a solely linguistic issue. It is always 1 demanded by, and is inseparable from, practical matters. Therefore, 21111 my investigation of deconstructive operations in these two traditions, folio 187 CONCLUDING REMARKS

1111 for example, covers both linguistic patterns and extralinguistic pur- 2 poses. This being simultaneously intralinguistic and extralinguistic, 3 simultaneously inside and outside, is an enduring characteristic of 4 language use in Daoism and Chan Buddhism. The intrinsic link 5111 among my investigations of deconstruction, liminology and indirect 6 communication is thus perfectly discernible. 7 Second, this book is not a comparative work on the Zhuangzi and 8 Chan Buddhism. My project is to let Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhists 9 rediscover themselves and address postmodern issues from their own 10 perspectives. To best address postmodern issues from different tradi- 11 tions, I choose the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism. After the preceding 2 investigations we might see more clearly their similarities and differ- 3111 ences, their continuities and discontinuities, between these two 4 traditions, especially in the three areas we have studied. This might 5 become a starting point for a close comparison between them 6 concerning these areas. However, this comparative study is beyond 7 the scope of my present undertaking. One may, nevertheless, ask 8 what major differences there are between these two traditions, since 9 their undertakings and perspectives do look so alike, as far as the 20111 three areas are concerned. 1 In this brief discussion, I want to emphasize two points of differ- 2 ence among others. One difference is that no matter how profound 3 Zhuangzi’s impact on Chan is, Zhuangzi’s ideas and vocabularies 4 have been assimilated and integrated into Buddhist teachings. The 5 Four Noble Truths of the Buddha’s teaching, many other notions of 6 Ma¯dhyamika, Yoga¯ca¯ra and the tatha¯gatagarbha, are maintained by 7 Chan Buddhism. These notions cannot be found in Zhuangzi’s 8 teaching, even though the Chan inheritance of these notions is 9 presented in the form of their Chinese transformation of them. In a 30111 word, it is a synthesis between Indian Buddhist teachings and indige- 1 nous philosophical–religious ideas. This synthesis makes otherness 2 both possible and inevitable between Chan and Zhuangzi. For 3 example, although Chan Buddhists talk about the identification of 4 affliction and enlightenment, which is similar to Zhuangzi’s equal- 5 ization of happiness and unhappiness, Chan Buddhists still have 6 more to say about afflictions, sufferings and how to turn them into 7 enlightenment than Zhuangzi does. 8 Furthermore, because of this Buddhist inheritance and context, 9 Chan Buddhists make their own contributions to the three areas 40111 investigated. Chan Buddhist deconstruction has its own target 1 and operates in its own context. It shows a kind of maturity and 21111 sophistication in simultaneouly using kathaphatic language and folio 188 CONCLUDING REMARKS

1111 deconstructive strategy. The Chan Buddhist liminology of language 2 spells out more plainly the necessity and inevitability of speaking. 3 Chan Buddhists utilize tautological language that Zhuangzi does 4 not use. All these facts indicate the differences between Chan and 5111 Zhuangzi that my investigation has helped to understand. 6 Third, what I indicated at the beginning – that in my investiga- 7 tion of three areas, two Chinese traditions and Western contem- 8 porary/postmodern philosophy would mutually illumine each other 9 – is also more clear. On the one hand, the study or utilization of 10 Western postmodern discourse and other contemporary philosophies 11 is definitely helpful in highlighting certain aspects of these two tradi- 2 tions. It is hard to imagine that these aspects could be highlighted 3111 without the study or utilization of Western ideas and vocabularies. 4 This kind of study or utilization enables us to look at two traditions 5 anew. This is not to say that these two traditions must rely on our 6 contemporary perspectives. Traditions stand on their own feet in the 7 sense that they constantly provide raw materials for our under- 8 standing, imagination, and rediscovery. However, no traditions exist 9 in and by themselves. They always present themselves in various 20111 historical forms and contexts. I repeat here that I advocate the 1 Gadamerian notion of “the fusion of horizons.” The implication of 2 this notion is relational and dynamic for dealing with the interpreta- 3 tion of texts and traditions. From this relational perspective, we have 4 no reason to hesitate in utilizing Western philosophy to rediscover 5 Eastern traditions. I believe that my book has proven this rediscovery 6 or reinterpretation fruitful. 7 On the other hand, I have shown that the discourses of the Zhuangzi 8 and Chan contribute to, enrich, and cast new light on contemporary 9 Western discussions of postmodern issues. Several cases from this 30111 treatise can further underline this aspect. The deconstructive opera- 1 tions of the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism show us an intrinsic link 2 between their strategies and their philosophical–religious theses. 3 Their philosophical–religious theses call forth deconstructive strate- 4 gies; their deconstructive strategies serve their philosophical–religious 5 theses. This link throws light on the contemporary debate about the 6 relation between philosophy and deconstruction, suggesting recon- 7 ciling both instead of polarizing each. 8 In the area of the liminology of language, the mastery of a 9 complete interplay between silence and speaking in the Zhuangzi and 40111 Chan Buddhism enhances our understanding and interpretation of 1 Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s relativizing of the distinction 21111 between speech and silence. It mirrors Derrida’s halfway play when folio 189 CONCLUDING REMARKS

1111 compared with his mere affirmation of silence as speaking, and his 2 lack of insight into speaking or non-speaking as silence. 3 In the area of indirect communication, the Zhuangzian and Chan 4 Buddhist emphasis on the existential–practical dimension of commu- 5111 nication reinforces the subversion of the Western privilege of direct 6 communication. My investigation of this issue strongly echoes 7 contemporary Western discourses on the indirection of communica- 8 tion. While Western thinkers start to find the possibility of indirect 9 communication for Western philosophy, the long-time tradition of 10 indirect communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan is able to provide 11 useful resources for this exploration. Western thinkers would hope- 2 fully find inspiration in these two traditions of indirect communica- 3111 tion. For example, the Chan Buddhist use of tautological and poetic 4 language not only helps us to better understand Heidegger’s use of 5 similar language, but also calls for a displacement of these modes 6 of language in Western philosophical discourse. It urges us to take 7 seriously the issue of “other possibilities of philosophical language” 8 and to see the prospect of actualizing these possibilities. All these 9 cases forcefully demonstrate that contemporary Western philosophy 20111 can benefit, one way or another, from my investigation of three areas 1 in the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism. 2 Finally, I must state that neither my approach to the Zhuangzi and 3 Chan Buddhism nor my investigation of them involve “final vocab- 4 ularies.” I am fully aware that this is impossible, and intend to avoid 5 leaving any such impressions. Great traditions such as the Zhuangzi 6 and Chan Buddhism are always ahead of us, not in the sense that 7 they contain some final or ultimate truths that we are still in the 8 process of searching for and have no hope of reaching on our own. 9 Traditions themselves are caught in the process of unfolding, in the 30111 web of textuality or ever-renewing contextualization. 1 This process of unfolding, this web of textuality or contextualiza- 2 tion, makes possible different understandings and interpretations of 3 traditions. Every understanding or interpretation of tradition has its 4 limit or is limited, but different understandings or interpretations are 5 always possible and without limit. In this sense I believe that great 6 traditions are always ahead of us. Nobody is able to exhaust them. 7 On this view, my approach to the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism or 8 my interpretation of them is only one among many. It does not 9 obstruct other approaches or other interpretations, but merely 40111 supplements them. The value of supplementation is relative, but the 1 relativity of supplementation does not cancel the value of supple- 21111 mentation itself. While I do not assert that my approach or my folio 190 CONCLUDING REMARKS

1111 interpretation is the only correct one, I have no doubt that it is valu- 2 able, and I want to share the results and value of this investigation 3 with others. If my approach or my interpretation provokes, inspires, 4 or triggers different approaches or interpretations, I will be happy, 5111 and will see this as part of the merit of my work. 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 191 1111 2 3 4 5111 NOTES 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 1 INTRODUCTION 4 1 Kupperman, 1989, 312. 5 The reader may find confusing about the words “Zhuangzi” and “the 6 Zhuangzi” I used here and throughout this book. The word “Zhuangzi” 7 refers to the person, and the words “the Zhuangzi” refer to the book of 8 which the name of Zhuangzi is also the title. Towards the relationship between the book of the Zhuangzi and Zhuangzi the person, I take a gen- 9 eral attitude that is quite close to that of Victor Mair, who once stated: 20111 “My relatively uncritical approach to the text is to consider it as an 1 anthology of [D]aoist writings in which the dominant impress derives 2 from the corporate personality that I shall, for the sake of simplicity, 3 refer to as ‘[Zhuangzi]’.” Mair, 1983, 85–6. However, when treating more specific textual issues, I take a more cautious and critical attitude 4 towards the relationship between Zhuangzi and what is said or 5 recorded in the book of the Zhuangzi to avoid any inconsistency. 6 Throughout this treatise, Chinese names and proper names are 7 rendered according to the pinyin system except for titles of sources in 8 which I leave original renderings unchanged. In quotations, those that originally appear in other than the pinyin form are changed with square 9 brackets. 30111 2 Magliola, 1984, 91. 1 3 For example, David Loy, 1992, 253. 2 4 Faure, 1993, 223. 3 5 The use of the terms “postmodern” and “postmodernism” in contem- 4 porary writings is very obscure. Sometimes they are interchangeable; sometimes they are not. Sometimes they are used in a narrow sense, 5 sometimes they are used in a broad sense. I use “postmodern discourse” 6 in a very broad sense. The philosophical currents covered by the term 7 are clearly more than a narrowly defined postmodernism, for example 8 that of Lyotard or Rorty. It also tends to include discussions such 9 as those of Habermas, which in some way still participate in and contribute to a general “postmodern discourse.” 40111 6 Cf. Habermas, 1992, 46–7; Rorty, 1982, xviii. 1 7 Cf. the entry “postmodern” in Audi, 1995, 634. 21111 8 Cf. Chomsky, 1986, 3–4. folio 192 NOTES

1111 9 Cf. Searle, 1990a, and 1969. 2 10 Cf. Rorty, 1991b, 50, and 1979, 257. 3 11 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, chapter 4; Lyotard, 1984, chapters 6 and 7. Also cf. Lecercle, 1987, 21–40. 4 12 Hansen, 1987, 309–10. 5111 13 For criticisms on Hansen’s linguistic determinism represented by his 6 book Language and Logic in Ancient China (Hansen, 1983a), cf. Chung-ying 7 Cheng, 1983, 349, and Bao Zhiming, 1985a, 206, and 1985b, 428–29. 8 For a postmodern critique of scientism or scientistic method of phil- osophy, cf. Rorty, “Pragmatism without Method,” in Rorty, 1991a, 9 63–77. Also see Rorty, 1982, introduction. 10 14 Here I use the term postmodernism in a very broad sense, which includes 11 not only Lyotard’s postmodernism but also other philosophical 2 currents in association with postmodernism such as poststructuralism, 3111 neo-pragmatism, etc. 15 Wu, 1982, 3. 4 16 Munro, 1969, 117. 5 17 I certainly disagree with Chad Hansen that conventionalism can be a 6 category which applies not only to Confucianism but also to Daoism. 7 I characterize Daoist teaching as trans-conventional. Cf. Hansen, 8 1983a, 62–3, and Heiner Roetz’s criticism of Hansen’s negligence of the post-conventional perspective in classical Chinese philosophy in 9 Roetz, 1993. 20111 18 Gadamer, 1989, 306. 1 19 I define multi-dimensional perspectivism as a philosophical position 2 that allows for the possibility of multiple perspectives on one thing due 3 to an ever-moving context of things, as opposed to realism and the correspondence theory of knowledge and language. 4 20 Habermas, 1992, 50–1. 5 21 Wood, 1990, 55. 6 22 Derrida, 1982, 17. 7 23 For a significant account of Zhuangzi’s multi-dimensional perspec- 8 tivism, see Fu, 1989. 9 24 For a forceful critique of postmodernism’s dismissal of legitimative questions, cf. Margolis, 1995a, 17, 92. 30111 1 2 UNDERSTANDING DECONSTRUCTION 2 THROUGH THE ZHUANGZI AND CHAN 3 4 1 Rorty, 1991b, 128. 2 Norris, 1983. 5 3 Wood, 1987, 175–6. 6 4 Ibid., 176. 7 5 This view has been shared by such divergent thinkers and scholars as 8 Rodolphe Gasche, Christopher Norris, David Wood, Peter Dews, and 9 Richard Rorty, despite their discrepancies and in very different direc- tions. See Gasche, 1986; Norris, 1987; Wood, 1990; Dews, 1995. Rorty 40111 also acknowledges a certain kind of continuity between deconstruction 1 and the tradition of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. See 21111 Rorty, 1982, and other books. folio 193 NOTES

1111 6 Norris, 1987, 18. 2 7 Derrida, 1988, 3. 3 8 Derrida, 1982, 3. 9 Derrida, 1988, 5. 4 10 Norris, 1987, 19. 5111 11 Derrida, 1988, 4. 6 12 Derrida, 1984, 111. 7 13 Derrida, 1988, 3. 8 14 Derrida, 1981, 10. 15 Ibid., 24. 9 16 Ibid., 59. 10 17 Ibid., 6, 41, 59. 11 18 Ibid., 41. 2 19 Ibid. 3111 20 Ibid., 42. David Wood has analytically reconstructed Derrida’s account of his general strategy as an account of three stages, namely, has ana- 4 lyzed Derrida’s first stage into two stages. See Wood, 1990, 49. 5 21 Derrida, 1981, 43. 6 22 Derrida, 1984, 116. 7 23 Based on Derrida’s own descriptions, David Wood has defined decon- 8 struction as “a critical philosophical method,” an operation of “de- familiarization.” “Deconstruction reflexively applies to philosophy 9 itself the defamiliarizing operation philosophy usually reserves for outer 20111 application.” See Wood, 1990, 44–5. 1 24 For Rorty’s view, see his “Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?”, 2 in Rorty, 1991b, 128. 3 25 Caputo, 1993, 159. Caputo’s view on the sedimentation of the term differance is similar to Rorty’s, as Caputo admits. However, this view 4 is expressed with a different direction by Rorty. See Rorty, 1991b, 5 102–3. 6 26 Derrida says: “The word ‘deconstruction,’ like all other words, acquires 7 its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substitutions, in 8 what is too blithely called a ‘context’.” See Derrida, 1988, 4. 9 27 Ibid., 3. The italics are original. 28 Ibid. The italics are original. 30111 29 Ibid., 4. The italics are original. 1 30 Derrida himself once used the term contextual strategy. See ibid., 2. 2 31 Norris, 1989, 193. The italics are in the original. 3 32 Gasche, 1986, 7. 4 33 See, for instance, Wood, 1990, 49; Margolis, 1997, 116. John Caputo also acknowledges: “Derrida does indeed have a certain ‘philosophical 5 idea’ about language. You might even say he has a (kind of) ‘theory’.” 6 Caputo himself calls this a “quasitheory.” See Caputo, 1993, 156–7. 7 34 Peter Dews has addressed the problem and difficulty caused by such a 8 view in defining the originality of Derrida’s work. See Dews, 1995, 115. 9 35 Rorty, 1991b, 128. 36 Derrida, 1984, 108. 40111 37 Dews, 1995, 141. 1 38 Caputo, 1993, 161. 21111 39 Ibid., 158. folio 194 NOTES

1111 40 Ibid., 159. The italic is original. 2 41 Margolis, 1997, 116. 3 42 Ibid., 128. 43 I must admit that Caputo’s and Margolis’ views on deconstruction go 4 in different directions. 5111 44 Loy, 1992, 227. A similar view can be found in Jackson, 1989, 565. 6 45 See Introduction of this book, note 2. 7 46 John Caputo, among others, has clearly pointed out this ethical impli- 8 cation of Derrida’s project: “the turn to the other, the openness to the other.” See Caputo, 1993, 164. 9 47 My use of the term logocentrism or logocentric is based on Rorty’s distin- 10 guishing of a broad sense of logocentrism from a narrow use of the term. 11 According to Rorty, “in the wide sense,” logocentrism includes “all the 2 invidious binary oppositions.” These binary oppositions or distinctions 3111 “are merely the ordinary strains that appear in any and every vocabu- lary (scientific, political, technical, or whatever) . . .” See Rorty, 1991b, 4 109. Rorty is arguing that logocentrism can be applied to various dis- 5 courses outside Western philosophy, the tradition of metaphysics to 6 which only a narrow sense of the term can be applied. I therefore define 7 the broad sense of logocentrism or the logocentric as an intellectual 8 maneuver to establish a fixed binary opposition, a hierarchy, a system 9 of privileged concepts, and the like. 20111 1 3 ZHUANGZI’S DAO DECONSTRUCTS . . . AND ZHUANGZI DECONSTRUCTS HIS DAO 2 3 1 See Yeh, 1983; Chien, 1990; Ownes, 1993. 2 See, for example, Tang, 1986, 284; Cui, 1992, 406. 4 3 See Hansen, 1992, 285, and 1983b, 47. I agree with Hansen that the 5 traditional account identifies Shendao’s conception of the monistic dao 6 as the only concept in both Laozi and Zhuangzi (see Hansen, 1992, 7 401, note 11 and others). 8 4 There have not been many studies contributing to the specific discus- sion of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change. Among contemporary 9 Chinese philosophers, Tang Junyi, and Xu Fuguan, in explaining 30111 Zhuangzi’s notion of dao, provide their understanding of Zhuangzi’s 1 view of change. Xu Fuguan, in particular, observes that Zhuangzi’s dao 2 is to accommodate one’s mind to all changes, an attitude more positive 3 than Laozi’s. This is accurate (see Xu, 1969, 364; Tang, 1986, 287). 4 The two recent studies of the Zhuangzi done by Chinese scholars from mainland China, however, take a more systematic approach to 5 Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change, despite the Marxist framework of 6 their interpretation. See Cui, 1992, 110; Wang, 1996, 84. I think that 7 it is really the right time to recover Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change 8 when contemporary philosophers have been increasingly paying more 9 attention to the problem of contingency and flux. 5 Fung, 1952, vol. 1, 225–6. 40111 6 See Fung Yu-lan’s Appendices to his Chuang-tzu: A New Selected 1 Translation. Fung, 1989, 122. 21111 7 Hansen, 1983b, 50. folio 195 NOTES

1111 8 Hansen, 1992, 50. For Heraclitus, see entry “Heraclitus” in Mautner, 2 1996, 186. Also see Kirk, 1983, 187. 3 9 Hansen, 1983b, 50. 10 Hansen, 1992, 50–1. 4 11 I use the term “soteriological” or “soteriology” in a very broad sense. 5111 Soteriology refers to religious–philosophical teachings or doctrines that 6 aim at leading people to their ultimate freedom or liberation. It is 7 no longer confined to the Christian context of salvation that is made 8 possible only by the work of Jesus Christ, although it acknowledges Christian teaching as one soteriology among others. A word close to 9 “soteriological” is “therapeutic.” I use this word to describe a kind of 10 teaching or practice that helps to free people from illness or suffering, 11 not in a narrow physical or medical sense but in a broad sense of exis- 2 tential–spiritual transformation, freedom or liberation. 3111 I think that Mou Zongsan is fair when he subsumes Daoist practice, including Zhuangzi’s, under the category of “soteriological practice 4 ( jietuo de shijian).” See Mou, 1983, 115. 5 12 ZY 4/2/13–14. Following the Yenching convention, I indicate the 6 page, chapter, and line number(s) from the left to the right for each 7 quoted passage. For the English translation see Mair, 1994, 13. I have 8 made minor changes. Also see Watson, 1968, 37–8. 13 ZY 44/17/45–7. Watson, 1968, 182. 9 14 “wanhua er weishi youji.” ZY 55/21/34, 16/6/27. My translation. Cf. 20111 Mair, 1994, 203, 55. 1 15 ZY 37/14/17–19. Cf. Watson, 1968, 156–7. 2 16 ZY 44/17/45. Watson, 1968, 182. 3 17 “wuliang wuqiong, shi wuzhi, fen wuchang, shizhong wugu.” ZY 42/17/15. My translation. Cf. Watson, 1968, 177; Mair, 1994, 154. 4 18 ZY 73/25/78–9. Watson, 1968, 293. 5 19 My use of the term temporization here is close to Derrida’s use in his 6 paper “Differance,” namely, temporization as differing and deferring 7 in virtue of time (see Derrida, 1982, 18). However, I use this term 8 strictly within the contextual limit of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. 9 20 One may notice the similarities between Zhuangzi’s philosophy of change and the well-known notions expressed by the Yi Zhuan (Treatise 30111 on the Classic of Change). Due to the limitation of my project, I am 1 unable to offer a study of the similarities and differences between them. 2 For a preliminary comparison between Zhuangzi’s notion of change 3 and that of the Yi Zhuan, see Chen, 1996, 91–3. For a recent inter- 4 pretation of the notion of change in the Yi Zhuan, see Fu, 1979, 348–51. 21 See note 12 of this chapter. 5 22 ZY 4/2/14–17. This translation has benefited from Chad Hansen’s 6 rendering of the passage included in his essay “A Tao of Tao in 7 Chuang-tzu.” See Hansen, 1983b, 41–2. Hansen’s related analysis in 8 that essay is beneficial for our understanding of this passage as well. 9 Also cf. Mair, 1994, 13–14. 23 ZY 18/6/78. Watson, 1968, 88. 40111 24 ZY 44/17/47. My translation. Cf. Watson, 1968, 182; Mair, 1994, 158. 1 25 ZY 28/11/53–4, 28/11/56. Watson, 1968, 122. I have made a minor 21111 change. folio 196 NOTES

1111 26 ZY 4/2/27–9. Watson, 1968, 39–40. 2 27 ZY 4/2/27. Watson, 1968, 39. 3 28 “fenyezhe, youbufenye.” ZY 5/2/57. Cf. Mair, 1994, 19. 29 ZY 4/2/27. I paraphrase Zhuangzi’s original sentence here. However, 4 my paraphrasing does not deviate from the spirit of Zhuangzi’s sen- 5111 tence. Cf. Wayne E. Alt’s translation in Alt, 1991, 68. 6 30 ZY 4/2/29. See Watson, 1968, 40. 7 31 See note 13 of this chapter. 8 32 ZY 4/2/36–5/2/37. Cf. Mair, 1994, 16 and Graham, 1981, 54. 33 ZY 18/6/78–9. Watson, 1968, 88. 9 34 See Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in Pseudo-Dionysius, 10 1987, 133. 11 35 ZY 4/2/30–1. Mair, 1994, 15. 2 36 “zhiren wuji.” ZY 2/1/21–2. Cf. Watson, 1968, 32. 3111 37 Zhuangzi uses “sangqiou” and “wusangwo” to describe the state of “no- self.” ZY 3/2/1, 3/2/3. For the meaning of the terms, see Wang, 1988, 4 vol. 1, 41; Guo, 1964, 44. 5 38 ZY 18/6/80. Watson, 1968, 88. 6 39 ZY 16/6/27. Watson, 1968, 81. 7 40 ZY 46/18/17–18. Mair, 1994, 169. 8 41 See note 12 of this chapter. 42 ZY 60/22/81–61/22/83. Watson, 1968, 247. I have made a minor 9 change. 20111 43 “Feibi wuwo, feiwo wusuoqu.” ZY 4/2/14–15. See Chad Hansen’s trans- 1 lation of this sentence in Hansen, 1983b, 41. 2 44 Namely: the famous narrative of Zhuangzi’s dreaming of being a but- 3 terfly. ZY 7/2/95. 45 ZY 6/2/83, 18/6/81. 4 46 “bianyezhe, youbujianye.” ZY 5/2/58. 5 47 ZY 5/2/44–5. Cf. Mair, 1994, 17–18. 6 48 ZY 4/2/21. My translation. Cf. ibid., 14. 7 49 ZY 4/2/26. Watson, 1968, 39. 8 50 I use the term empirical self to mean the everyday activity and experi- 9 ence of self based on the conventional distinction of self and other. Zhuangzi’s notion of no-self is not to deny such existence in the every- 30111 day sense, but only to offer a relational understanding or interpretation 1 of such existence for the soteriological purpose, to end ordinary 2 people’s attachment to the conventional self. In other words, it does not 3 offer an ontology of True Self or Eternal Self to replace any individual 4 self including physical self and psychological or emotional self. 51 ZY 92/33/45. 5 52 ZY 92/33/51. Cf. Watson, 1968, 371; Mair, 1994, 340. 6 53 ZY 92/33/54. Cf. Watson, 1968, 371. 7 54 Freud, 1960, vol. 6, 239. 8 55 Taylor, 1990, 224. 9 56 However, it may be noticed that there are profound differences between Freud’s forgetting and Zhuangzi’s. Forgetting in Freudian psy- 40111 choanalysis is a kind of everyday action occurring in the margin 1 between consciousness and unconsciousness. Zhuangzi’s forgetting is a 21111 soteriological notion. Although it is marginal, it occurs on a higher folio 197 NOTES

1111 level. It attempts to “forget what the ordinary person does not forget” 2 (wang qisuobuwang, see ZY 14/5/51). A further comparative study 3 between Freudian forgetting and Zhuangzi’s might be interesting. 57 Cf. Cua, 1977, 306. 4 58 See “wang shifei,” ZY 50/19/63; “wang renyi,” ZY 19/6/90; “wanghu wu,” 5111 ZY 30/12/45; “wangren,” ZY 64/23/77; “waisheng,” ZY 17/6/40; “wai 6 tianxia,” ZY 17/6/39; “wanghu tian,” ZY 30/12/45. The Chinese word 7 “wai” also means forgetting, see Guo, 1964, 253. 8 59 Zhuangzi says: “To forget things and to forget heaven is called forget- ting the self.” ZY 30/12/45. Mair, 1994, 109. 9 60 See Guo, 1964, 45. 10 61 “Zuowang,” “lixing quzhi.” ZY 19/6/92. Cf. Watson, 1968, 90. Here 11 “sitting down and forgetting” is not only a philosophical notion, but a 2 meditational practice. Zhuangzi’s notion of forgetting self therefore 3111 is closely related to his practice and experience of meditation as self- therapy. However, due to the limitations of the present topic, I will not 4 analyze “forgetting self ” from the perspective of meditational practice, 5 but treat it within the limit of a philosophical and ideological notion, 6 while acknowledging its connection with Daoist meditational practice. 7 62 ZY 50/19/63. Cf. Mair, 1994, 184. 8 63 “Buru liangwang er huaqidao.” ZY 16/6/23–4. Cf. Watson, 1968, 80. 64 ZY 18/6/73. Cf. ibid., 87. 9 65 The socio-ethical implication of Zhuangzi’s discourse of no-self is a 20111 topic that deserves a lot more specific studies. Here I only mention in 1 passing some of its implications. For an insightful study of Zhuangzi’s 2 teaching of no-self and its unique soteriological meaning, see Berling, 3 1985. 66 ZY 20/7/11, 74/26/37. 4 67 ZY 11/4/58–9. Mair, 1994, 36. 5 68 “Dazhi, ruyuwuci.” ZY 11/4/59. 6 69 “Shunwu ziran er wurongsiye.” ZY 20/7/11. The translation here assimi- 7 lates something respectively from Watson’s translation and Mair’s. Cf. 8 Watson, 1968, 94; Mair, 1994, 68. 9 70 ZY 7/2/92. 71 See Hansen, 1992, 208, 211, 230. 30111 72 Dao De Jing, chapter 1. The original Chinese text is in Chen, 1987. 1 Translation is mine. 2 73 Ibid., chapter 2. 3 74 Ibid., chapter 40. 4 75 Ibid., chapter 1. 76 Ibid., chapter 14. This translation is from Fu and Wawrytko’s unpub- 5 lished manuscript. I have made a minor change. 6 77 ZY 5/2/49–51. Watson, 1968, 43. 7 78 Cf. A. C. Graham’s interpretation for this paragraph: “[I]f we negate 8 the negation we do not return to the affirmation, but arrive at a third 9 possibility. . . . This brings us nearer to what the two alternatives left out.” See Graham, 1969–70, 145–6. 40111 79 ZY 73/25/79–80. Watson, 1968, 293. I have made minor changes. 1 80 ZY 7/2/92, 3/2/4, 6/2/62, 5/2/40, 4/2/31. 21111 81 Chapter 39 in Chen, 1987. My translation. Cf. Lau, 1963, 100. folio 198 NOTES

1111 82 ZY 93/33/56. Cf. Watson, 1968, 372. 2 83 ZY 92/33/44–5. Translation is from Hansen, 1992, 206. 3 84 Hansen, 1992, 285. 85 Ibid., 230. 4 86 Chapter 4 in Chen, 1987. The translation is from Fu and Wawrytko’s 5111 unpublished manuscript. 6 87 Chapter 21. Ibid. 7 88 Chapter 25. Ibid. I have made a minor change. 8 89 See, for instance, Charles W. Fu’s discussion of this point in his paper “Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger.” Fu, 9 1976, 134. 10 90 I say that it is not purely metaphysical, not only because the context of 11 Laozi’s discussion of dao is prescriptive and pragmatic, but also because 2 the distinctions of sensible and intelligible, of essence and phenomena, 3111 etc., that characterize Western metaphysics, are missing in Laozi’s philosophy. Moreover, as I have mentioned, Laozi maintains some 4 trans-metaphysical views that ultimately privilege neither being nor 5 nothingness. 6 91 Chapter 34 in Chen, 1987. The translation is from Fu and Wawrytko’s 7 unpublished manuscript. I have made a minor change. 8 92 Chapter 32. Ibid. 93 ZY 59/22/50. Watson, 1968, 241. 9 94 ZY 44/17/45. Cf. ibid., 182. 20111 95 ZY 60/22/75–6. Ibid., 246. 1 96 A. C. Graham might be the first person to note this point and carefully 2 distinguish Zhuangzi’s position from Hui Shi’s saying that heaven and 3 earth are one unit. See Graham, 1981, 56. 97 ZY 5/2/53–5. Mair, 1994, 18–19. 4 98 Cf. Fu and Wawrytko’s unpublished manuscript, and Lau, 1963, 103. 5 99 ZY 5/2/55. Cf. Watson, 1968, 43. 6 100 ZY 59/22/44–5. Cf. ibid., 240–1. 7 101 ZY 12/5/7. Ibid., 69. 8 9 4 THE DECONSTRUCTION OF BUDDHA 30111 NATURE IN CHAN BUDDHISM 1 1 Magliola, 1984, 96–7. 2 2 Faure, 1993, 225. 3 3 Ibid. 4 4 By Chan Buddhism, here I refer to the main line of Huineng through Mazu/Shitou to Linji/Caodong, etc. Mazu was seen as the founder of 5 the Hongzhou School of Southern Chan. About the main line or main 6 stream of Chan Buddhism, cf. Dumoulin, 1988. Also cf. Yanagida and 7 Umehara, 1969. 8 5 Faure, 1993, 225. 9 6 Matsumoto 1994. See also Lusthaus, 1997, 52–3. 7 For this question, see Takasaki, 1966a, 90. 40111 8 These are actually criticisms from the expounders of tatha¯gatagarbha 1 thought and the Yoga¯ca¯ra school. For criticisms and a different view 21111 of emptiness from the Yoga¯ca¯ra school, see Nagao, 1991, 53–7. For folio 199 NOTES

1111 criticisms from the thinkers of tatha¯gatagarbha thought, see Takasaki, 2 1966b, 54–7. For criticisms from a combined perspective of both 3 Tatha¯gatagarbha and Yoga¯ca¯ra, see King, 1991, 6–19. 9 See, for instance, Na¯ga¯rjuna, Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ 24:18, the English 4 translation in Sprung, 1979, 238. 5111 10 Takasaki, 1966a, 91. Also see Takasaki, 1988, vol. 1, 43. 6 11 Cf. Williams, 1989, 63. 12 For instance, the Maha¯parinirva¯na Su¯tra, on one occasion, simply declares 7 ˙ 8 that Self (¯tmana ) is the meaning of tatha¯gatagarbha, although on other occasions it distinguishes between them. See Daban Niepan Jing, T 12, 9 374:407b (following the Taisho¯ convention, I give the volume, individ- 10 ual text, and page number, including register “a,” “b,” or “c,” for each 11 quote). Also cf. Williams, 1989, 98. 2 13 T 12, 374: 525a. For the English translation see Liu, 1982, 88. 3111 14 Ibid. 15 For the English translation from Sanskrit text see Takasaki, 1966b, 4 305–6. 5 16 Lengjia Aba Duoluobao Jing (Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra). T 16, 670: 489b. For the 6 English translation see Suzuki, 1932, 69. 7 17 Ibid., 70. 8 18 Takasaki, 1966b, 290. 19 Jiujing Yicheng Baoxinglun (Ratnagotravibha¯ga), T 31, 1611: 839a. 9 20 Takasaki, 1966b, 293. Also see Shengman Shizihou Yicheng Daofangbian 20111 Fangguang Jing, T 12, 353: 222b. The English translation here is from 1 Wayman, 1974, 105. 2 21 Takasaki, 1966b, 291. Wayman, 1974, 105. 3 22 T 12, 374: 524a. 23 Ibid. 4 24 Ibid., 557a. 5 25 Ibid., 533b. 6 26 Ibid., 530c. Cf. Liu, 1982, 74. 7 27 “Xukongzhe jishi foxing.” T 12, 374: 445c. 8 28 Ibid., 521b. 9 29 Ibid., 375: 747b. 30 Ibid., 374: 519b. 30111 31 “Zhongdoazhe mingwei foxing. . . .” Ibid., 523b. 1 32 Ibid., 524b. 2 33 See Na¯ga¯rjuna Ka¯rika¯ 24:10, in Sprung, 1979, 232. 3 34 T 12, 374: 523b. 4 35 See Takasaki, 1966b, 301; Wayman, 1974, 99. Cf. Williams, 1989, 101, 105; Nagao, 1991, 57–60. 5 36 Cf. Sallie B. King’s explanation of the use of these terms in relation to 6 another Tatha¯gatagarbha-Yoga¯ca¯ra text Foxing Lun: These terms are “just 7 talking about what a Buddha is like and extolling the virtues of such a 8 being.” See King, 1997, 181. 9 37 I take a position similar to Peter Gregory’s in defining the nature of this complicated text. Gregory once wrote, “[W]hatever else the text may 40111 or may not be, it is surely a hybrid.” (See Gregory, 1986, 64.) However, 1 by the term “hybrid” or “blending,” I mean the combination of not 21111 only different Indian Maha¯ya¯na schools, but also of Indian and Chinese folio 200 NOTES

1111 thought, regardless of whether its author is of Indian or Chinese ori- 2 gin. Although this position is highly hermeneutical rather than exeget- 3 ical, it can be supported by careful examination of the use of terms in the text. Due to the limited space, however, I cannot pursue or demon- 4 strate this kind of investigation any further here. 5111 38 For instance, Paul Williams has asserted that the Buddha nature doc- 6 trine in the Awakening of Faith becomes a cosmological theory that com- 7 bines an all-pervading Buddha-essence with an aversion to all forms 8 of dualistic discrimination, namely, a metaphysical monism. See Williams, 1989, 112. 9 39 “Yiqie yanshuo jiaming wushi. . . . Yan zhenruzhe yiwu youxiang. Wei yanshuo 10 zhiji yinyan qianyan. . . .” T 32, 1666: 576a. Cf. Hakeda, 1967, 33. 11 40 Ibid. Cf. Hakeda, 1967, 35. 2 41 Ibid. The non-empty virtues of the dharma body or the mind of such- 3111 ness have nothing to do with an ontology of existence or non-existence. 42 Nagao, 1991, 60. 4 43 Hakeda, 1967, 28. 5 44 “Suoyan jueyizhe wei xinti linian. Linianxiangzhe deng xukongjie.” T 32, 1666: 6 576b; cf. Hakeda, 1967, 37. 7 45 “Yinian xiangying, . . .” Ibid.; cf. ibid., 39. 8 46 The reader may notice that I translate the Chinese word xinti as “the whole of the mind” and avoid translating it as the substance or essence 9 of the mind. To my knowledge, the Chinese word ti originally means 20111 body and the organic whole. The xinti designates the non-objective 1 dimension of the organic whole of a concrete world, a holistic dimen- 2 sion that the human mind may attain or experience. Since it is non- 3 substantialistic, it may be even distinguished from the English word “subjectivity,” which involves the meaning of substance in modern 4 Western philosophy. However, the ti in Chinese philosophy nonethe- 5 less reflects the relatively static side of the whole and is distinguished 6 from the dynamic side of the yong, the functioning of the whole. In the 7 use of these words in the text we are discussing now, the word ti is 8 related to other words such as xiang and yong. Scholars have argued 9 whether the use of these categories indicates the author is Chinese. If so, the text must be considered the product of Chinese thought instead 30111 of Indian thought. Here I do not intend to provide a philological inves- 1 tigation or a simple solution to this problem. The text itself is, I would 2 argue, more complicated than anything we can simply attribute to an 3 Indian author or a Chinese one. When ti is related to xiang, these two 4 words suggest an Indian way of thinking and involve the meanings of essence and attribute (or virtue), even though these meanings are 5 restricted by the soteriological dimension of the text. The usage of xiang 6 obviously does not come from original Chinese thought. When ti is 7 related to yong, they do appear closer to the Chinese way of thinking, 8 although one may not have sufficient reason to consider them belong- 9 ing utterly to the terminology of Chinese philosophy and involving exactly the meaning of the dynamic and static sides of the whole. 40111 William Grosnick has pointed out the similarities or connections 1 between some Sanskrit words and the Chinese yong (see Grosnick, 21111 1989). His argument forcefully opposes jumping to the conclusion of folio 201 NOTES

1111 simply seeing the text as a Chinese product. What Grosnick does not 2 take into consideration is the possibility of mutual influences and the 3 blending of Indian and Chinese understandings embodied in this his- torical text, no matter whether there is an Indian or Chinese author. 4 Since this text uses ti, xiang and yong together, at least in the extant form 5111 it is a mixture of Indian and Chinese usages. This mixture facilitates, if 6 not misleads, the later Chinese use of the text. I thus think that it is rea- 7 sonable to render xinti as the whole of mind in accordance with the 8 Chinese usage and the historical tradition of the East Asian under- standing of the text. 9 47 “. . . zhongsheng xianqian jieerxin . . . .” Zhixu, Liewang Shu. T 44, 1850: 10 428c–9a. 11 48 For a recent discussion of the existentializing point implied by the text 2 with respect to the realization of the Buddha nature, see Fu, 1990, 3111 265–304. 49 Dumoulin, 1988, 133. I have made a minor change. I am aware that 4 contemporary historians of Chan Buddhism have questioned the 5 authenticity of the Platform Su¯tra as the collection of Huineng’s teaching 6 in general and these verses historically attributed to Huineng and 7 Shenxiu in particular. My use of these materials from the Platform 8 Su¯tra does not mean that I want to ignore or completely reject those critical studies by historians. My relatively uncritical approach to the 9 text is based on the reason that the thoughts attributed to Huineng 20111 and Shenxiu in this text and others still reflect the strategies employed 1 in the history of Chan discourse, that are religiously-philosophically 2 significant and need to be studied. In other words, they are extremely 3 useful materials for our examination of deconstructive and reifying tendencies in Chan. These materials can serve the purpose of this 4 study well, helping to provide a coherent interpretation of different 5 Chan strategies, no matter whom we could identify as the real thinker 6 behind them. The significance of this text in collecting crucial 7 Chan thought and its role in the evolution of Chan thought cannot 8 be reduced for its suspicious authorship and for some historical 9 inaccuracy of its narrative. I therefore focus basically on the analysis of these thoughts themselves and the related Chan linguistic strategies 30111 demonstrated in the text, shedding new light on the understanding 1 of these inner struggles while utilizing the traditional divisions and 2 distinctions. 3 50 Dacheng Wusheng Fangbian Men. See T 85, 2834: 1273c. I have quoted 4 the same passage from the Dacheng Qixin Lun in this chapter. See note 44 above. For Shenxiu’s quotation and the relation of this treatise with 5 the Dacheng Qixin Lun, see McRae, 1986, 175, 221–3. Also see Faure, 6 1997, 41–5. 7 51 In this regard, I agree with Gadjin Nagao’s position. In his “What 8 remains in S´u¯nyata¯,” Nagao points out, the Dacheng Qixin Lun “seems to 9 put more emphasis on ‘the mind of suchness’ . . . .” See Nagao, 1991, 60. 40111 52 See McRae, 1986, 213, 225; Faure, 1997, 43–4. 1 53 T 85, 2834: 1273c. For the English translation see Faure, 1997, 43. I 21111 have made minor changes. Also see McRae, 1986, 174. folio 202 NOTES

1111 54 “Tiyong fenming . . . .” Ibid., 1274b. Cf. McRae, 1986, 178. 2 55 “. . . jiang jingxinti chengfo.” See Yinshun, 1971, 141. For the English 3 translation, cf. ibid., 195. 56 Yanagida Seizan has called this a sort of “Chan sickness,” a word taken 4 from the early Chan writings. See Yanagida, 1976, 12. 5111 57 I take this sentence basically from Wing-tsit Chan’s translation. See 6 Chan, 1963b, 51. 7 58 Yampolsky, 1967, 138. I have made minor changes. 8 59 These two sentences are taken again from Wing-tsit Chan’s translation. See Chan, 1963b, 51. 9 60 Yampolsky, 1967, 153. 10 61 Chan, 1963b, 83. I made minor changes. 11 62 Cf. ibid., 50. 2 63 Yampolsky, 1967, 136; Chan, 1963b, 46. 3111 64 Here I follow Wing-tsit Chan’s translation. Chan, 1963b, 49. 65 Yampolsky, 1967, 136. I have made a minor change. 4 66 Ibid. 5 67 Chan, 1963b, 47. 6 68 Cf. Yampolsky, 1967, 137. 7 69 “If in successive thoughts you practice it, this is called true existence.” 8 Ibid., 148. 70 Ibid. 9 71 Ibid., 151. 20111 72 Ibid., 148. 1 73 Ibid., 150. 2 74 Cf. ibid., 146; Chan, 1963b, 68. 3 75 Cf. ibid. 76 Tang, 1984, 3–11. 4 77 Ibid., 29. 5 78 Ames, 1991, 145. 6 79 Ibid. 7 80 Ibid., 149–50. 8 81 Yampolsky, 1967, 150. I have made some changes. 9 82 Lidai Fabao Ji. See T 51, 2075: 185b; Yanagida, 1976, 154. 83 See, for instance, Mou, 1977, 1041–69; He, 1987, 244. 30111 84 Here I follow Peter Gregory tentatively in translating zhi as awareness. 1 See Gregory, 1991, 215. Note that Shenhui’s notion of awareness or 2 intuitive knowledge nonetheless involves the element of cognition, even 3 though it is intuitive and different from ordinary knowledge. Cf. Jan, 4 1972, 40, note 1. 85 See Shenhui, Nanyang Heshang Dunjiao Jietuo Chanmen Zhiliaoxing Tanyu, 5 SL, 10. This edition of the recorded sayings of Shenhui, which I am 6 using here, not only is a synthesis, based on careful comparison and 7 examination, of the previous editions by Hu Shi and D. T. Suzuki, but 8 also includes the most recent discoveries of the different versions of 9 Shenhui’s sayings. 86 “. . . bujia yuanqi.” Nanyang Heshang Wenda Zazhengyi. SL, 67. 40111 87 “Zhizhiyizi zhongmiao zhimen.” Zongmi, Chanyuan Zhuquanji Duxu. See 1 T 48, 2015: 403a; Kamata, 1971, 95. Cf. Jan Yun-hua’s translation in 21111 Jan, 1972, 40. folio 203 NOTES

1111 88 Nanyang Heshang Wenda Zazhengyi. SL, 119. 2 89 “Jizhi zhiti.” Zong Mi, Yuanjue Jing Dashu Chao. See HTC 14: 279d. Cf. 3 Jan, 1972, 49. 90 CF, in CJ13: 8975a. Cf. Ui, 1990a, 14–16. Also cf. Blofeld, 1958, 36–7. 4 91 Zongmi, Zhonghua Chuanxindi Chanmen Shizi Chengxi Tu. HTC, 110: 437d; 5111 Kamata, 1971, 336. 6 92 Ibid., 435b; ibid., 307. For the English translation see Gregory, 1991, 7 237. I have made some changes. 8 93 Ibid., 436d; ibid., 326. For the English translation see Jan, 1972, 52. 94 Zongmi, Yuanjue Jing Dashu Chao, HTC, 14: 279b. For the English trans- 9 lation, cf. Jan, 1972, 47. 10 95 Cf. ibid. 11 96 “Renyun guoshi.” The saying of Mazu Daoyi. JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 2 246a. 3111 97 “. . . zhongri renyun tengteng,” by Huangbo. WL, in CJ, 13: 8987b; Ui, 1990a, 78–9. Cf. Blofeld, 1958, 90. 4 98 “Renyun buju fangming jietuo.” Ibid., 8996b. 5 99 “. . . renyun zhuyishang.” LY, in CJ, 11: 7351a; Yanagida, 1972, 79. Cf. 6 Watson, 1993, 26; Sasaki, 1975, 9–10. 7 100 Ibid., 7357b; ibid., 145. Cf. ibid., 55; ibid., 27. It is alleged that this 8 hymn was written by the Twenty-Second Indian Patriarch, Manorhita. Probably, however, it was fabricated by Chinese Buddhists. In any 9 event, the hymn quoted by Linji reflects Linji’s own thought. 20111 101 See GY, fascicle 1, CJ, 11: 7310b. Cf. Cheng, 1992, 78. 1 102 LY, in CJ, 11: 7349a; Yanagida, 1972, 52. Cf. Watson, 1993, 13. 2 103 Ibid., 7352a; ibid., 94. Cf. Sasaki, 1975, 11. 3 104 Ibid., 7353a; ibid., 105. Cf. Watson, 1993, 36. 105 Ibid., 7357a; ibid., 140–1. See Schloegl, 1976, 44–5. Cf. ibid., 53. 4 106 “Zhendao wuti.” Ibid., 7359b; ibid., 159. Cf. Watson, 1993, 62. 5 6 5 WHAT IS A LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE? 7 8 1 Foucault, 1977, 49. 2 Ibid., 85. 9 3 See Foucault, 1977, 34 and Derrida, 1978a, 289. I should not ignore 30111 the difference between Foucault’s project and Derrida’s, i.e. between a 1 genealogical investigation and a deconstructive analysis. However, the 2 difference cannot overshadow some similarities between them, such as 3 relativizing the limit, eschewing traditional oppositions, assuming 4 open-ended double structures, etc., which will be clearer in the ensu- ing discussion. Therefore, it seems tenable to assimilate expressions 5 and vocabularies from both of them for the explanation of the general 6 background of liminology. 7 4 See Foucault’s own “Introduction” to The Archaeology of Knowledge. 8 Foucault, 1972, 5. 9 5 Foucault, 1977, 34. 6 Cf. Foucault, 1984, 50. 40111 7 Derrida, 1981, 6. 1 8 Ibid., 6, 59. 21111 9 Wood, 1990, 53, 150. folio 204 NOTES

1111 10 The term parapraxical derives from parapraxis, a term which Mark 2 Taylor borrows from Freud. As Taylor defines it, “Parapraxical writ- ing is the praxis of the ‘para.’ This praxis involves the inscription of the 3 boundary, threshold, margin, or limit. . . . The ‘para’ inscribed in para- 4 praxis is ‘inside’ the written text as a certain ‘outside’ that cannot be 5111 internalized.” See Taylor, 1990, 224–5. 6 11 Miller, 1979, 219. 7 12 Cf. Foucault, 1977, 35. 13 Wittgenstein, 1922, 187–9. 8 14 See Bertrand Russell’s “Introduction” to the Tractatus, ibid., 22–3. 9 15 Blanchot, 1993, 337–8. 10 16 Wittgenstein, 1922, 187–9. 11 17 In Gadamer, this network or frame is termed “prejudice,” in Foucault, “episteme,” in Kuhn, “paradigm.” See Gadamer, 1976, 9; Foucault, 2 1970, 365; Kuhn, 1970, 10. 3111 18 I have benefited from David Wood for this understanding. See Wood, 4 1990, 17. 5 19 For a discussion of incommensurability with respect to the contribu- 6 tions of these philosophers, see Margolis, 1995a, 169–73. 20 Blanchot, 1981, 129. 7 21 Foucault, 1977, 65. 8 22 Cf. Blanchot, 1981, 129. 9 23 Foucault, 1977, 65. 20111 24 Cf. Derrida, 1989, 11. 1 25 Wittgenstein, 1922, 27. 26 Ibid. 2 27 Ibid., 189. 3 28 Heidegger, 1962, 208. 4 29 In “The Way to Language,” Heidegger explicitly states: “[O]ur saying 5 – always an answering – remains forever relational. Relation is thought of here always in terms of the appropriation, and no longer conceived 6 in the form of a mere reference.” See Heidegger, 1971, 135. 7 30 Heidegger, 1971, 120. 8 31 Ibid., 122. 9 32 Ibid., 133. I owe much of this understanding to David Wood. Cf. 30111 Wood, 1990, 16. 33 Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 46. 1 34 Ibid. 2 35 “The empirical use of already established language should be distin- 3 guished from its creative use.” Ibid., 44. 4 36 Ibid. 37 Derrida, 1978a, 54. 5 38 Derrida, 1989, 15. Derrida makes, at this point, no progress after 6 Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. It could be said that Derrida shows no 7 insight into a complete interplay between speech and silence. Derrida 8 is still very much concerned with the origin and source of speaking, how 9 speaking is necessary and possible, how speaking has its trace in silence, but not vice versa. In the ensuing discussion of Zhuangzi’s and the 40111 Chan masters’ superb understanding of the interplay between speak- 1 ing and silence, we will find that compared with Zhuangzi and the 21111 Chan masters, Derrida’s play is only a halfway measure. folio 205 NOTES

1111 39 Foucault, 1977, 41. 2 40 Blanchot, 1993, 337. 3 41 Ibid., 338. 42 I use the term trans-metaphysical in the sense that the vocabularies 4 and concepts of a metaphysical tradition are used to subvert or decon- 5111 struct the original hierarchies of that tradition, to transform that 6 tradition. 7 43 Nishitani, 1981, 31. 8 44 Zhu, 1948, 87. 45 See chapter 1 “Introduction” of this book. 9 46 The trans-temporal or trans-historical dimension of the Zhuangzi and 10 Chan Buddhism deserves a substantial study and examination. I shall 11 pursue this examination elsewhere. For a preliminary analysis of 2 Chinese, including Daoist and Confucian, views on time and the time- 3111 less, see Cheng, 1974, 155–9. However, Cheng’s paper did not refer to any Chan Buddhist view. 4 5 6 ZHUANGZI’S LIMINOLOGY OF 6 “SPEAKING NON-SPEAKING” 7 8 1 Graham, 1989, 199. Also cf. Graham, 1981, 25. 2 Ibid. 9 3 Graham mentions Bai Juyi’s poem “Laozi” in which the poet asks why 20111 Laozi writes a book of five thousand words if he believes that those who 1 speak know nothing; those who know are silent. (Cf. Waley, 1946, 190.) 2 Graham also sees this paradox in the Zhuangzi. Since Graham offers no 3 convincing solution to the contradiction, he makes no progress from these predecessors who talked about the problem. 4 4 Hansen, 1983b, 24–55. Also cf. Hansen, 1992, chapter 8. 5 5 I agree with Allinson’s comment: “Hansen’s view has the merit of clar- 6 ity and consistency.” See Allinson, 1989, 113. 7 6 My translation. ZY 5/2/59. Cf. Watson, 1968, 44; Legge, 1962, 189. 8 Here I accept Herrlee Creel’s suggestion to translate dao with lower case. Cf. Creel, 1970, 2, note 4. 9 7 Tang, 1986, 355–7, 410–12. 30111 8“Dadao bucheng, dabian buyan.” ZY 5/2/59. Cf. Watson, 1968, 44. 1 9 See Tang, 1986, 411–12. 2 10 “Yanbian er buji.” ZY 5/2/59. 3 11 ZY 5/2/57–8. Cf. Mair, 1994, 19. 4 12 ZY 3/2/8–9. Cf. Graham, 1981, 49. 13 Cf. The Analects, 13: 3, in Chan, 1963a, 40. 5 14 Cf. the Xunzi, chapter 22, “On the Rectification of Names,” in Chan, 6 1963a, 125. 7 15 Cf. Fung, 1952, vol. 1, 253 and Fung, 1966, 119–20; Graham, 1978, 8 285–7, 327–8 and Graham, 1989, 140–1; Lao, 1991, 325–6. 9 16 See Fung, 1952, vol. 1, 205 and Chan, 1963a, 243. 17 Cf. Fung, 1952, vol. 1, 206. 40111 18 ZY 5/2/39. Watson, 1968, 41. 1 19 ZY 4/2/33. Ibid., 40. 21111 20 ZY 5/2/55. Ibid., 43. folio 206 NOTES

1111 21 ZY 4/2/23–4. Cf. Graham, 1981, 52; Hansen, 1992, 280. In inter- 2 preting the original sentences to which I am referring, I agree with 3 Chad Hansen that the sentence “Saying is not only blowing breath” should be regarded as an objection to Zhuangzi’s view. But in accord 4 with this sentence, I also consider the next sentence, “Saying says some- 5111 thing,” as part of this objection. 6 22 My own translation. ZY 4/2/27. Cf. Wayne E. Alt’s translation in Alt, 7 1991, 68 and Graham, 1981, 52. 8 23 ZY 36/13/71–3. Watson, 1968, 152–3. 24 ZY 7/3/6. Ibid., 50–1. 9 25 ZY 36/13/70. Ibid., 152–3. The subjectivity mentioned here bears an 10 existentio-experiential or practical dimension, which cannot be 11 reduced to any objective or categorical “presence.” This is due to the 2 fact that the other of every subjectivity would never be the same and 3111 is always conditioned by the temporal–spatial, by the flux of natural– cultural events. 4 26 The experience of dao has a close relation with meditational experi- 5 ences in the Zhuangzi. This can be best seen in Zhuangzi’s account of 6 how one attains the dimension of wholeness in one’s meditation. “I 7 slough off my limbs and trunks, dim my intelligence, depart from my 8 form, leave knowledge behind, and go along with the universal thor- oughfare. This is what I mean by ‘sitting in forgetfulness’.” (ZY 9 19/6/92–3. Cf. Mair, 1994, 64. I have made some minor changes in 20111 the translation.) Fung Yu-lan, in his A History of Chinese Philosophy, points 1 out that Zhuangzi holds this kind of mystical experience as “the 2 supreme state,” “the highest aim of individual self-cultivation.” “In 3 such a state, the individual becomes one with the whole of the universe, and all distinctions between the self and non-self, between what is 4 internal and what is external, are obliterated.” (Fung, 1952, vol. 1, 5 129–30.) It will be significant to investigate how meditational experi- 6 ences, typical of Eastern cultures, play a role in Zhuangzi’s soterio- 7 logical or therapeutic perspective of wholeness. This investigation 8 will help to clarify the difference between Zhuangzi’s dimension of 9 wholeness and a metaphysical monism. Undoubtedly, Zhuangzi’s thought cannot be exhausted by the account of meditational experi- 30111 ences. A unique aspect of Zhuangzi’s thought consists in the fact that 1 the perspective and method derived from meditational experiences are 2 always applied to, assimilated by, and therefore become an integral 3 part of, the experience of everyday life and its philosophizing. Recent 4 interpreters of Zhuangzi, such as Wayne E. Alt and Chad Hansen, in rejecting the theme of mysticism (whether or not mysticism is an 5 appropriate category for the study of meditational experiences is a 6 different issue), utterly overlook the soteriological or therapeutic side 7 of Zhuangzi, not to mention paying no heed to meditational experi- 8 ences. Hence they fail to explain where Zhuangzi really stands after he 9 steps out of purely philosophical arguments. (Cf. Alt, 1991 and Hansen, 1983b.) This reveals the predicament of putting Zhuangzi’s thought 40111 within the framework of Western philosophy – cutting the feet to fit 1 the shoes. 21111 27 Cf. my discussion of this point in chapter 3 of this book. folio 207 NOTES

1111 28 In this regard, Zhuangzi’s notion of dao may well provide an alterna- 2 tive to both the Kantian search for the transcendental condition of pos- 3 sibility and the postmodernist, such as Rorty’s, dismissal of any perspective on the condition of possibility. For Rorty’s critique of the 4 Kantian theme and its contemporary variations, and his rejection of 5111 “the condition of possibility,” cf. his “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and 6 the Reification of Language,” and “Is Derrida a Transcendental 7 Philosopher?” in Rorty, 1991b, 52–3, 55–7, 59–60, 127–8. Zhuangzi’s 8 view also challenges the Derridean failure to distinguish between a metaphysical totalization and a therapeutic perspective of wholeness, 9 as I have mentioned in the Introduction of this book. 10 When stating that Zhuangzi’s notion of dao addresses the relativity 11 of all things, I do not accept the view that Zhuangzi is a relativist or 2 his philosophy a kind of relativism. Advocating the notion of relativity 3111 does not necessarily mean to be a relativist. This is particularly true in the case of Zhuangzi since he does not feel any need to attach him- 4 self to any “-ism.” The interpretation of Zhuangzi as relativist has 5 hitherto encountered various problems. For example, in order to con- 6 ceive Zhuangzi as a relativist, Chad Hansen completely disregards 7 Zhuangzi’s soteriological perspective of wholeness. A result of this 8 neglect is, of course, the lack of textual accuracy. Furthermore, because of his repudiation of Zhuangzi’s holistic dimension, Hansen cannot 9 coherently explicate why as relativist, Zhuangzi’s perspective on 20111 perspectives nonetheless is, according to Hansen himself, a universal 1 one or a “meta-perspective.” Hansen’s interpretation thus involves self- 2 contradiction. (Cf. Hansen, 1992, 281, 283–4, 290–1.) For a quite 3 useful account of the issue of relativism and non-relativism in the Zhuangzi, see Allinson, 1989, chapter 8. 4 29 Zhuangzi states: “In calling it dao we are only adopting a temporary 5 expedient.” ZY 73/25/80. See Watson, 1968, 293. 6 30 ZY 72/25/72–3. Ibid., 292. 7 31 ZY 72/25/76, 73/25/77. Ibid., 293. 8 32 ZY 60/22/63–4. Ibid., 244. 9 33 ZY 59/22/43. Ibid., 240. 34 ZY 15/6/16, 16/6/17. Cf. Mair, 1994, 53. 30111 35 ZY 75/26/48–9. Watson, 1968, 302. I have made minor changes in 1 the translation. 2 36 My translation. ZY 73/25/81–2. The translation of the first sentence 3 is based on the punctuation adopted by: Charles W. Fu’s unpublished 4 manuscript; Cao Chuji, Zhuangzi Qianzhu (Cao, 1982, 403); Liu Fengbao, Nanhua Xuexin Bian (see Chen, 1990, 699); Mair, Wandering on 5 the Way (Mair, 1994, 267). 6 37 Cf. Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957, 15, 68. 7 38 Tang Junyi properly observes the intrinsic connection between 8 Zhuangzi’s transcending of speech and silence and his view of using 9 both speech and silence. See Tang, 1986, 412. 39 ZY 7/2/84. For the translation and interpretation of diaogui, cf. Fung, 40111 1989, 53; Mou, 1983, 140, 142; Wu, 1990, 168. 1 40 ZY 93/33/64. Cf. Watson, 1968, 373. 21111 41 ZY 75/27/1. Cf. ibid., 303. folio 208 NOTES

1111 42 ZY 59/22/47. Mair, 1994, 218. 2 43 Wang, 1976, 190. 3 44 ZY 59/22/44–5. Mair, 1994, 217. 45 My translation. See ZY 59/22/47. Cf. Mair, 1994, 218. 4 46 Zhuangzi mentions “the teaching of non-speaking” twice. ZY 57/22/7, 5111 12/5/2. Cf. Watson, 1968, 235, 68; Mair, 1994, 211, 42. Laozi’s “buyan 6 zhijiao” appears in chapter 2 of Dao De Jing. Cf. Lau, 1963, 58. 7 47 I would like to make a distinction between non-speaking and no-speak- 8 ing. “No-speaking” can be used in a way that Zhuangzi’s notion of “no- mind” exemplifies. “No-mind” does not simply mean “having no 9 mind.” It aims at going along with things and letting your mind “move 10 freely” (Watson, 1968, 61). By the same token, “no-speaking” does not 11 mean stopping speaking or silence. It can be seen as an abbreviation of 2 Zhuangzi’s notion of “speaking non-speaking.” It is a kind of speaking 3111 by way of non-speaking, a negative way of speaking. 48 ZY 6/2/74. Cf. Mair, 1994, 21. In “Qi Wu Lun,” Zhuangzi’s blurring 4 of the distinction between speaking and non-speaking also appears in 5 a form of self-interrogation: “I do not know whether what I have said 6 is really saying something or not.” (ZY 5/2/51. Cf. ibid., 18.)] 7 49 Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 44. 8 50 ZY 75/27/6. Cf. Watson, 1968, 304. 51 Ibid. We find the striking resemblance between Zhuangzi and 9 Heidegger when we read Heidegger’s following words: “A man may 20111 speak, speak endlessly, and all the time say nothing. Another man may 1 remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great 2 deal.” (Heidegger, 1971, 122.) Both Zhuangzi and Heidegger show 3 their insights into the mutual connection and transition between speak- ing and silence, both have a dynamic, relational view of speaking and 4 silence, both reject an absolute distinction between them. However, 5 Heidegger bases his insight on a distinction between “Saying” and 6 speaking. “Saying” is more primordial than human speaking. As “the 7 essence of language” or “the origin of the word” (Heidegger, 1971, 130, 8 133), “Saying” appropriates human beings to the needfulness of 9 bringing its soundless voice to the sound of human language. It is on this ground that the Heideggerian interplay between speaking and 30111 silence – the authentic speaking which lets the silent Saying be heard, 1 or the inauthentic speaking in which nothing is said, nothing is 2 heard from Saying – is to be understood. (For a critique of the onto- 3 theological residue in the later Heidegger’s exploration of the nature 4 of language, see Rorty, “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language,” in Rorty, 1991b, 50–65.) Although Zhuangzi distin- 5 guishes the language of dao and the language of things, as our pre- 6 ceding discussion has shown, he does not assert the ontological 7 status of dao or any meta-language. Rather, he grounds his insight into 8 the interplay between speaking and silence solely on the soteriological 9 and therapeutic function and practice. 52 See chapter 3 of Dao De Jing, in Chen, 1987. Cf. Lau, 1963, 59. 40111 53 ZY 74/26/33. Cf. Watson, 1968, 299. 1 54 ZY 12/4/90–1. Cf. ibid., 67. 21111 55 ZY 74/26/31–2. Cf. ibid., 299. folio 209 NOTES

1111 56 The trans-conventional is neither conventional nor unconventional. It 2 does not completely abandon the conventional, nor does it confine itself 3 to the conventional. In general, I prefer using trans-conventional to unconventional. 4 57 Cf. Lau, 1963, 57. 5111 58 Cf. Wu, 1990, 263–4, and Wu, 1988, 1–8. 6 7 7 THE CHAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE 8 LIMINOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 9 1 Fung, 1966, 341. 10 2 Suzuki, 1955, 141–2. 11 3 See Wright, 1992; Faure, 1993, chapter 7. 2 4 I restrict my criticism to his 1992 paper only. His more recently pub- 3111 lished book does a much better job in analyzing, and reflecting upon, the Chan texts and their view of language. See Wright, 1998. 4 5 Mervyn Sprung’s translation in Sprung, 1979, 177. Cf. David J. 5 Kalupahana’s translation of this verse: “When the sphere of thought has 6 ceased, that which is to be designated also has ceased. Like freedom, the 7 nature of things is non-arisen and non-ceased.” (Kalupahana, 1986, 268.) 8 It is interesting to read Gadjin Nagao’s translation of this verse (from Sanskrit) here: “When there is a quiescence of mental activity,/Then the 9 need for discourse ceases and/Reality, like unto cessation,/Neither arises 20111 nor passes away.” Evidently, his translation is still close to the original 1 Chinese translation. Both, if compared with Sprung’s and Kalupahana’s, 2 more easily give the impression that Na¯ga¯rjuna here is expressing a total 3 negation of language (see Nagao, 1989, 67). 6 Nagao, 1989, 67–8. 4 7 Kalupahana, 1986, 268–9. 5 8Na¯ga¯rjuna, Ka¯rika¯ 22: 11; Candrakı¯rti, Prasannapada¯. See Sprung, 1979, 6 155, 201. 7 9 Sprung, 1979, 230–2. 8 10 Ibid., 155, 178. 11 Ibid., 229. 9 12 Suzuki, 1932, 91–2. 30111 13 Ibid., 124. The square bracket is mine. 1 14 Ibid., 166. A further analysis may distinguish between two kinds of 2 inadequacy of language, which are both reflected in the Lan˙ka¯vata¯ra 3 Su¯tra. One is the cognitive, reifying use of language; another is the dis- 4 criminative nature of language itself, which is particularly linked to the issue of how to designate the non-dualistic dimension of meditational, 5 especially enlightenmental, experience. In my view, these two are 6 closely related to each other. The problematic of the latter becomes 7 prominent only in relation to the problematic of the former. Giving 8 heed merely to the latter makes both Suzuki’s and Kalupahana’s 9 accounts of the notions of linguistic inadequacy in the Su¯tra inaccurate, although they differ in that Suzuki offers a positive estimate and 40111 Kalupahana a negative one (cf. Suzuki, 1930, 105–10; Kalupahana, 1 1992, chapter 18). For a more recent exposition of the view of linguis- 21111 tic inadequacy in the Su¯tra, cf. Sutton, 1991, 156–63. folio 210 NOTES

1111 15 GY, fascicle 2, CJ, 11: 7324b. 2 16 “Buke yiyanyu qu.” CF, in CJ, 13: 8976a. Cf. Ui, 1990a, 22–3. 3 17 “Xunwen quzheng zhe yizhi,” by Dazhu Huihai, see JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 248a. Cf. Ogata, 1990, 199. 4 18 LY, in CJ, 11: 7359b; cf. Yanagida, 1972, 160–1. 5111 19 Ibid., 7361b; ibid., 171. 6 20 Ibid., 7355b; ibid., 129–30. Also cf. Watson, 1993, 47. 7 21 Ibid., 7359b; ibid., 156–7. There is no strong evidence to support 8 Faure’s accusation that Linji is logocentric and regards written words as robes, while considering speech superior to writing, and mental 9 activities superior to language (Faure, 1993, 223). As a matter of fact, 10 Linji regards all writings, speeches, mental activities as robes, because, 11 in his view, all these things are devoid of self-existence and in the 2 process of constant change. See Watson’s translation of the relevant 3111 sentences in the Linji Lu: “Because of mental processes thoughts are formed, but all of these are just robes. . . .” (Watson, 1993, 61.) For an 4 important interpretation of Linji’s view of language, see Burr, 1983. 5 22 Baizhang Huaihai’s saying “not being restricted by words (buju wenzi),” 6 GY, fascicle 1, CJ, 11: 7313a. 7 23 See chapter 6 of this book. 8 24 Ka¯rika¯ 24: 10, in Sprung, 1979, 232. 25 Sprung, 1979, 230. 9 26 Sengzhao, Zhao Lun, T 45, 1858: 153c. Cf. Robinson, 1978, 216. 20111 27 Yampolsky, 1967, 150–1. I have changed the translation of the first 1 sentence. 2 28 JCL, fascicle 7, T 51, 2076: 252a-b. Also see Ogata, 1990, 224. 3 29 CF, in CJ, 13: 8979a. Cf. Ui, 1990a, 36–7. 30 LY, in CJ, 11: 7357b; Yanagida, 1972, 145–6. Cf. Watson, 1993, 55. 4 31 “Dongyong sanshiliu dui, chumo jili liangbian.” Cf. Chan, 1963b, 120–1. 5 32 “Geduan liangtou ju.” BG, in CJ, 11: 7316a. Cf. Cleary, 1978, 34. Cleary’s 6 translation misses the meaning of “ju (sentence),” and, therefore, 7 Baizhang’s instructions about the special use of language. 8 33 LY, in CJ, 11: 7350a; Yanagida, 1972, 67. Cf. Watson, 1993, 19. 9 34 Liuzu Dashi Fabao Tanjing, T 48, 2008: 360b. Also see Guo Peng, 1981, 143. 30111 35 Cf. Kalupahana, 1986, 101; Sprung, 1979, 32. 1 36 Suzuki, 1932, 67–8. 2 37 Weimojie Suoshuo Jing, T 14, 475: 551c. English translation see Thurman, 3 1976, 77. Cf. Lu, 1972, 100. 4 38 In Conze, 1958, 52. Also see Jingang Boruo Boluomi Jing, T 8, 235: 751c. 39 This view is obviously close to Na¯ga¯rjuna’s statement of Ka¯rika¯ 25: 24 5 in which he says: “[N]o Truth has been taught by a Buddha for any- 6 one, anywhere.” (Sprung, 1979, 262.) 7 40 Suzuki, 1932, 123–4. 8 41 WL, in CJ, 13: 8994a. Cf. Blofeld, 1958, 121. 9 42 DY, in JCL, fascicle 28, T 51, 2076: 442b. Cf. Ui, 1990b, 106–7. Also cf. Blofeld, 1962, 81. 40111 43 “Yan yousuo buyan.” Sengzhao, The Reply to Liu Yimin, T 45, 1858: 157a. 1 In the transition from Zhuangzi’s liminology of language to a Chan 21111 Buddhist liminology of language, the role Sengzhao’s view played and folio 211 NOTES

1111 the contributions Sengzhao made to the liminology of language are sig- 2 nificant topics for further research. 3 44 Huangbo, WL, in CJ, 13: 8994a. 45 Huangbo, WLL, T 48, 2012B: 385c. Cf. Ui, 1990a, 70–1. The edition 4 printed in the Taisho¯ omits some sections which the edition of Changzong 5111 Jicheng includes. Therefore, on occasion I quote from different editions. 6 46 See my discussion of this point at note 46 in chapter 4 of this book. For 7 the Hongzhou sect’s radical shifting of the Chan focus from the ti to 8 the yong, also see Yanagida and Umeharai, 1969, 156–9. The term quasi-metaphysical is used here to assert, again, the difference between 9 Western metaphysics and the Chinese use of ti. The Chinese character 10 ti originally involves the meaning of body or organic whole, as indicated 11 earlier. Even if ti is distinguished from yong in Chinese philosophy, 2 at the very beginning it is made clear by Wang Bi, the Neo-Daoist, 3111 that ti and yong are united in dao or nonbeing. It has never had the meaning of essence as opposed to accidents in Western metaphysics. 4 Nor has it meant self-existence. These meanings are absent from both 5 Neo-Daoist and Chinese Buddhist uses of the term. At worst, ti is 6 relatively static in contrast to the more dynamic feature of yong. In the 7 present context, Hongzhou Chan Buddhists are obviously more con- 8 cerned with how one’s mind can respond freely to the change and flux of one’s daily life, overcoming all forms of quietism and dual- 9 istic separation. This concern underlies their claim that outside yong 20111 there is no ti. Therefore, what they oppose might be called a quasi- 1 metaphysical fixation on ti, a tendency to see the ti, the Buddha nature, 2 as separable from everyday activities, from the dynamic state of living 3 flux. 47 WLL, T 48, 2012B: 386b. Cf. Ui, 1990a, 74–5, and Blofeld, 1958, 87. 4 48 Ibid., 385c. Ui, 1990a, 68–9. 5 49 Dazhu, DY, in JCL, fascicle 28, T 51, 2076: 444a. Cf. Ui, 1990b, 128–9; 6 and Blofeld, 1962, 96. 7 50 Ibid., 444b. 8 51 Huangbo, WL, in CJ, 13: 8994a. 9 52 Mazu Daoyi’s saying, see JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 246a. 53 Dazhu Huihai’s saying, see JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 247b. Cf. Ui, 30111 1990b, 80–1. 1 54 DY, in JCL, fascicle 28, T 51, 2076: 441b. Cf. Ui, 1990b, 96–7. One of 2 the reasons I afford these quotations so much space is that they have 3 long been neglected by modern scholars and interpreters, both in the 4 West and in the East. 55 The Hongzhou Chan masters would definitely disagree with Gadjin 5 Nagao’s interpretation that the parama¯rtha should remain silent forever. 6 Cf. Nagao, 1991, 42. 7 56 WL, in CJ, 13: 8994a. 8 57 Ibid., 8996b. 9 58 It is interesting to note that Dongshan Liangjie also discusses two aspects of “non-speaking within speaking ( youjuzhong wuju)” and “speak- 40111 ing within non-speaking (wuyuzhong youyu).” The liminological play of 1 speaking and silence is a common characteristic of early Chan masters. 21111 It is absolutely not confined to the lineage of Mazu-Linji, but rather folio 212 NOTES

1111 shared by the lineage of Shitou-Caodong. For Dongshan’s discussion, 2 see DL, in CJ, 13: 9064a. 3 59 “Shuo siyiwu ji buzhong.” The saying of Nanyue Huairang. See Nanyue Huairang Chanshi, WH, fascicle 3, vol. 1, 126. This sentence was quoted 4 by Linji in the recorded sayings of Linji. Cf. Yanagida, 1972, 167–77. 5111 Also cf. Watson, 1993, 79. 6 60 “Never tell too plainly” or “never say anything too plainly” is the 7 English translation of original Chinese words “bu shuopo.” Cf. Chan, 8 1963a, 428. 9 10 8 THE DISPLACEMENT OF INDIRECT 11 COMMUNICATION 2 1 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Barnes, 1984c, 2153–4, 2159, 2163. 3111 2 For a recent critical examination of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its relation to his metaphysical theory, see Margolis, 1995b, 109–19. 4 3 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, in Barnes, 1984a, 25. This notion of lan- 5 guage has been seen as “basic and predominant through all the 6 centuries of Western-European thinking” and has been especially 7 criticized by Heidegger in his article “The Way to Language.” See 8 Heidegger, 1971, 115. 4 Heidegger, 1962, 197, 205. 9 5 Ibid., 205. 20111 6 Ibid. 1 7 Ibid. The italicization is original. 2 8 Wittgenstein, 1953, 304e. 3 9 Ibid., 363e. 10 Ibid., 83e–84e. 4 11 Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 42. 5 12 Ibid., 43. 6 13 Ibid., 44–5. 7 14 Merleau-Ponty’s view of language described and quoted here is limited 8 to his essay “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” from the work Signs. According to M. C. Dillon, this essay involves some tension 9 between infra-referentiality and extra-referentiality that is not solved 30111 until his later work The Visible and the Invisible. What I have presented 1 here shows Merleau-Ponty’s affirmation of the infra-referentiality of 2 language. It contradicts his view of the extra-referentiality of language 3 held in the early work Phenomenology of Perception and also appeared in 4 the same essay without explanation. This tension is solved when Merleau-Ponty completes his transition from the early Fundierung 5 (founding) model of language, which ignores infra-referentiality, to 6 the reversibility model of language in The Visible and the Invisible. The 7 reversibility model incorporates infra-referentiality within extra- 8 referentiality and maintains the correlation between them. Therefore, 9 what I describe and quote here belongs to a transitional work. Although his theory of language seems complicated and I cannot discuss it for 40111 its entirety, I think the view I presented here is still the important ele- 1 ment of his theory and is significant to my project. For Dillon’s detailed 21111 discussion, see Dillon, 1997, 194–223. folio 213 NOTES

1111 15 Derrida, 1982, 311. 2 16 Ibid., 316–17. 17 Ibid., 315. 3 18 Ibid., 329. 4 19 Contemporary Anglo-American studies of speech acts, including the 5111 study of indirect speech acts, base themselves nonetheless on the 6 classical model of communication. Therefore, they contribute little to 7 our understanding of the indirect nature of communication. For an influential critique of Anglo-American studies of speech acts, cf. 8 Derrida’s criticism of Austin in his Margins of Philosophy (Derrida, 1982, 9 321–7). For the subordination of the study of indirect speech acts to the 10 general theory of speech acts, cf. Searle, 1990b, 162. 11 20 Kierkegaard, 1941, 68, 71. 21 Ibid., 320. 2 22 Ibid., 245. 3111 23 Ibid., 70. 4 24 Ibid., 247. 5 25 See Walter Lowrie’s Introduction to his English translation of 6 Kierkegaard’s Training in Christianity. Kierkegaard, 1944, xvii. 26 Mackey, 1986, 185. 7 27 Poole, 1993, 4, 24. 8 28 Kierkegaard, 1941, 68–9. 9 29 Here I use Roger Poole’s translation provided in his Kierkegaard: The 20111 Indirect Communication. Poole, 1993, 256. Also cf. Kierkegaard, 1944, 1 133–4. 30 Agacinski, 1988, 20. 2 31 Poole, 1993, 2. 3 32 Kierkegaard, 1944, 124. 4 33 Wittgenstein, 1953, 31e, 11e. 5 34 Davison, 1986, 446. 35 Derrida, 1981, 41. 6 36 Poole, 1993, 2. 7 37 Kierkegaard,1941,181.The italicization and capitalization are original. 8 38 For the special meaning of the term pragmatics used in this study, see my 9 clarification in the Introduction of this book. 30111 39 Cf. Rorty, 1982, xviii–xix, and Rorty, 1991b, 127. 1 2 9 THE PRAGMATICS OF “GOBLET WORDS”: INDIRECT COMMUNICATION IN 3 THE ZHUANGZI 4 1 I adopt Kuang-ming Wu’s translation of yuyan as “dwelling words.” 5 See Wu, 1988, 5. I also adopt one of his translations of chongyan as 6 “double-layered words.” See Wu, 1990, 263. I do not conceal the fact 7 that this study benefits from Kuang-ming Wu’s precursory discussion 8 of Zhuangzi’s indirect communication in his Chuang Tzu: World 9 Philosopher at Play. However, readers may find that the ensuing investi- gation is more systematic when compared with Wu’s discussion. 40111 Furthermore, this examination of Zhuangzi’s strategy of indirect com- 1 munication is presented in a postmodern context, addressing issues that 21111 have been the primary concerns of postmodern discourse. folio 214 NOTES

1111 2 Graham, 1981, 25; Graham, 1989, 200. 2 3 See Hansen, 1992, chapter 8. I take a more comprehensive attitude 3 towards the textual materials of different chapters of the Zhuangzi. Contrary to Hansen’s ignorance of the value of the outer and the mixed 4 chapters for the study of Zhuangzi’s thought, I find no reason to neglect 5111 the significant content of those chapters in my investigation. However, 6 I maintain the principle of consistency between useful materials in 7 those chapters and Zhuangzi’s thought present in the inner chapters 8 that have been conventionally considered the core of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. 9 4 Graham, 1989, 201. 10 5 Cf. Zhang, 1993, 16–17; Qian, 1985, 228; Huang, 1974, 320. 11 6 Wang, 1988, vol. 2, 1090–1. 2 7 Lin, 1988, 384. 3111 8 Denegation is an untranslated form of the French word denegation recently adopted by some English writers. The cause for this usage is 4 connected to Derrida’s essay “How to avoid speaking: Denials.” See 5 Taylor, 1993, 36–7; and Foshay, 1994, 547. 6 9 For the study of similar strategies used by deconstruction, negative the- 7 ology and Eastern religious–philosophical traditions, see Coward and 8 Foshay, 1992 and Scharlemann, 1992. 10 Watson, 1968, 303, note 1. 9 11 ZY 75/27/5. Cf. Watson, 1968, 304; Mair, 1994, 279; Legge, 1962, 20111 vol. 2, 143. 1 12 Italics are mine. ZY 7/2/90–2. The translation is partially based on 2 Mair’s and Watson’s. See Mair, 1994, 23 and Watson, 1968, 48–9. 3 13 ZY 4/2/30–1. Cf. Graham, 1981, 53. 14 Here I follow Kuang-ming Wu’s interpretation that nature says it in 4 silence, that nature’s silence signifies, and that nature is a mute 5 metaphor, a generative expressiveness. See Wu, 1982, 44. 6 15 ZY 89/32/17. Cf. Mair, 1994, 326. 7 16 ZY 75/27/8–9. My own translation. 8 17 ZY 93/33/64–7. My own translation. Cf. Mair, 1994, 343; Watson, 9 1968, 373; Graham, 1981, 283; Legge, 1962, vol. 2, 227–8. 18 Cancha chugui zhici is the rephrasing of the original Chinese words “qici 30111 sui cancha er chugui keguan.” ZY 93/33/67. 1 19 Gao, 1982, 44. 2 20 Wang, 1992, 222. 3 21 Gao, 1982, 44. 4 22 The term chugui carries the same meaning as the term diaogui does. Both refer to paradoxical words. See Wang, 1988, vol. 3, 1348 and Chen, 5 1990, 886. 6 23 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, and The Oxford English 7 Dictionary, second edition. 8 24 ZY 36/13/65–6. 9 25 ZY 15/6/4. My translation. 26 Lin Xiyi, Nanhua Zhenjing Kouyi, in Yan, 1972, vol. 8, 1026, “ren jieke yin, 40111 yinzhi er youwei.” 1 27 Wu, 1982, 18. 21111 28 ZY 5/2/51. Mair, 1994, 18. folio 215 NOTES

1111 29 ZY 4/2/24. My translation. Cf. Graham, 1981, 52; Watson, 1968, 2 39. 3 30 See Guo, 1964, 948, “. . . suiwu erbian, fei zhiyi shougu. . . . suiren congbian, jiwu changzhu.” 4 31 This definition is provided by Xuan Ying, quoted and followed by 5111 Wang Xianqian in his Zhuangzi Jijie. See Wang, 1992, 181. 6 32 The majority of commentators since Guo Xiang have followed this 7 definition. Also see Watson, 1968, 303, note 1. 8 33 “Jiwai lunzhi.” ZY 75/27/1. Cf. Watson, 1968, 303; Mair, 1994, 278. 9 34 For a full discussion of Heidegger’s position on the concept of 10 metaphor, see Ricoeur, 1977, 280–4; Kockelmans, 1992. 11 35 Davidson, 1984, 262. 2 36 Wu, 1990, 108. 3111 37 Here I borrow Derrida’s words. See Derrida, 1978b, 22. 38 Lin, 1988, 398. The similar interpretation also appears in Liu, 1986, 4 253. 5 39 ZY 28/11/63–5. The translation is based on Mair’s and involves some 6 changes made by me. The interpretation of the last sentence follows 7 those of Guo Xiang and Cheng Xuanying. See Guo, 1964, 396–7; 8 Huang, 1974, 152; Cao, 1982, 157; Mair, 1994, 101. 40 Such as an Aristotelian “hearer,” whose function in communication is 9 merely that of a passive “observer,” or an “object” of the speaker. See 20111 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Barnes, 1984c, 2159. 1 41 Wu, 1982, 39. 2 42 ZY 5/2/49–51. Watson, 1968, 43. I made slight modifications in the 3 translation. 43 Elsewhere Zhuangzi says: “Dao cannot be thought of as being, nor can 4 it be thought of as nonbeing.” And: “There is no past and no present, 5 no beginning and no end.” ZY 73/25/79–80, 60/22/73. Watson, 6 1968, 293, 245. 7 44 ZY 60/22/67–8. My translation. Cf. Mair, 1994, 220. 8 45 “Taichu you wuwu, . . .” ZY 30/12/37–8. My translation benefited from 9 Charles W. Fu’s unpublished manuscript of translation. For Fu’s inter- pretation, which I have followed in my translation, see Fu, 1989, 392. 30111 The punctuation and reading of the original Chinese sentence I have 1 adopted in this translation were supported by a number of important 2 Chinese commentators, such as Ma Qichang (Ma, 1989, 84), Yao Nai 3 (Zhuangzi Zhangyi, quoted by Ma, 1989, 84), Liu Wendian (Liu, 1980, 4 390), Lin Yunming (Zhuangziyin, quoted by Cui, 1988, 378), etc. Also see Wang, 1988, vol. 1, 435. Wang mentions some of these commen- 5 tators’ readings, but does not follow them. 6 46 For the contextual meanings of these two passages, see the previous 7 chapter on Zhuangzi’s deconstruction. Here I restrict my discussion to 8 Zhuangzi’s use of denegation. 9 47 Taylor, 1993, 36. 48 Kierkegaard clearly connected negativity with the indirection of 40111 communication. He wrote: “The highest principles for all thought 1 can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively).” Kierkegaard, 1941, 21111 197. folio 216 NOTES

1111 49 Despite the parallels between Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard in their play 2 of negativity, Kierkegaard’s goal of “deceiving” the reader into coming 3 to Christ and his retreat into faith from reason (based on an absolute distinction between them) are obviously not shared by Zhuangzi. For 4 an elementary account of the differences between Zhuangzi and 5111 Kierkegaard, see Wu, 1982, 37–8. 6 50 Dao De Jing, chapter 78, “zhengyan ruofan,” in Chen, 1987, p. 350. Cf. 7 Lau, 1963, 140. 8 51 The soteriological and therapeutic concern in the Dao De Jing is not as explicit as in the Zhuangzi. This might be one factor, among others, that 9 underlies the contextual differences between Laozi’s use of paradoxes 10 and Zhuangzi’s. Here we confine ourselves only to the discussion of 11 Zhuangzi’s use. 2 52 “[T]here is something whose nature is changeless. . . . [I]f anything is 3111 of necessity, it will not be both so and not so.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. IV, chapter 5 (1010a–1010b), in Barnes, 1984b, 1595–6. 4 53 See Margolis, 1995b, 114–15. A similar criticism can be found in Wu, 5 1990, 260. Notably, Nishida Kitaro has also criticized Aristotelian logic 6 as a “substance logic” from the perspective of Eastern philosophy and 7 maintained that historical reality “transforms itself without underlying 8 substance or ground.” See Nishida, 1987, 62, 75, 126. A quite system- atic investigation of the limits of traditional logic in dealing with 9 changes and meaningful contradictions can be found in Melhuish, 20111 1973, especially 1, 18–19. 1 54 ZY 55/21/34. My translation. Cf. Mair, 1994, 203. 2 55 ZY 44/17/46–7. Watson, 1968, 182. 3 56 In the “Qi Wu Lun” chapter, Zhuangzi says: “That comes out of this, and this is too conditioned by that, which is to say, that and this give 4 birth to each other.” ZY 4/2/27–8. Cf. Watson, 1968, 39. 5 57 ZY 4/2/29–31. Watson, 1968, 40. 6 58 ZY 4/2/35. Graham, 1981, 53. 7 59 ZY 6/2/74. Cf. Mair, 1994, 21. 8 60 Graham, 1989, 142–3. 9 61 See Mou, 1983, 142. However, Mou incorrectly interprets Zhuangzi’s paradox as a dialectical paradox similar to Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel does 30111 utilize paradox, integrating paradox into his dialectical system, which 1 is based upon the absolute synthesis of Being overcoming all paradoxes. 2 (For a recent examination of Hegel’s use of paradox and his system, see 3 Kainz, 1988.) Zhuangzi does not fabricate a system which supersedes 4 all paradoxes. For Zhuangzi, the world and human existence are para- doxical as they are. 5 62 Zhuangzi regards Hui Shi’s use of paradoxes only for winning disputes 6 as “bewildering flamboyance,” which should be rejected by the sage 7 (see ZY 5/2/47, and Mair, 1994, 18), and as being “confined by things” 8 (see ZY 66/24/34, and Mair, 1994, 242). Cf. Schwartz, 1985, 222. 9 63 See Quine, 1976, 5, 7. 64 Ibid., 16. 40111 65 I borrow this term from Kuang-ming Wu; see Wu, 1990, 258. 1 66 ZY 6/2/83. Mair, 1994, 23. 21111 67 ZY 45/17/88–91. Mair, 1994, 165. folio 217 NOTES

1111 68 See Graham, 1981, 9. 2 69 Lyotard uses the term “paralogy” to designate the generally irregular movement of the language game, which cannot be reduced to the rules 3 of logic and allows for the formation of paradoxes. See Lyotard, 1984, 4 43, 60. According to Thomas Kent’s interpretation, paralogy subsumes 5111 and lives beyond logic. See Kent, 1993, 4–5. Here I use both “trans- 6 logical” and “paralogical” to mean that Zhuangzi’s paradox works and 7 plays at the boundaries and limits of logic. It cannot be reduced to either logic or the illogical. 8 70 For the discussion of Zhuangzi’s liminological play, with respect to the 9 use of paradoxical terms, see chapter 6 of this volume. 10 71 For the definition of irony, cf. the entry irony in Mautner, 1996, 215; 11 The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, vol. 8, 87; Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1195; Kierkegaard, 1966, 32. 2 72 Wu, 1990, 375. 3111 73 Price, 1965, 25. 4 74 See note 42 of this chapter. 5 75 ZY 6/2/83. Watson, 1968, 48. 6 76 Wu, 1990, 375. 77 Kierkegaard, 1966, 286. 7 78 We find some similar attitudes between Zhuangzi and what Rorty 8 defines as “ironists,” when we read Rorty’s description that ironists are 9 “never quite able to take themselves seriously,” because they are 20111 “always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are 1 subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.” (See Rorty, 1989, 73–4.) 2 However, the contexts and undertakings for Zhuangzi, the Daoist 3 ironist, and a “postmodern” – such as Rortian – ironist are very differ- 4 ent. A comparison between them would be interesting enough, a task 5 I will pursue elsewhere. 79 ZY 7/2/96. Watson, 1968, 49. 6 80 Cf. Kierkegaard’s observation that as the ironist, “I am free both 7 in relation to others and in relation to myself.” Kierkegaard, 1966, 8 265. 9 81 Booth, 1974, ix. 30111 82 It is interesting to note that Paul de Man observes that irony “could be a kind of therapy.” See de Man, 1983, 216. 1 2 10 THE PRAGMATICS OF “NEVER TELL 3 TOO PLAINLY”: INDIRECT 4 COMMUNICATION IN CHAN 5 1 DeMartino, 1983, 17. Italic is original. 6 2 Suzuki, 1955, 150. 7 3 Hu, 1953, 21. 8 4 Ibid. 9 5“... zhizhongta buweiwo shuopo.” DL, in CJ, 13: 9024b. For English trans- lation see Powell, 1986, 28. Although Hu’s translation of this sentence 40111 is not as complete as Powell’s, Hu’s translation of buweiwo shuopo as “he 1 never explained anything plainly to me” seems to have grasped the 21111 original point more accurately. See Hu, 1953, 21. folio 218 NOTES

1111 6 Suzuki, 1955, 150. 2 7 Suzuki also mentions that Chan “is not purposely shunning” all plain speaking. See ibid., 159. 3 8 Ibid., 158–9. 4 9 Ibid., 159–60. 5111 10 Ibid., 66. 6 11 See Suzuki, 1994 (originally included in Suzuki, 1950). I must point out 7 that contrary to Suzuki’s neglect of the study of Chan linguistic strate- gies, at least two Chinese scholars, Bao Hutian and Wu Yi, echoing 8 Hu Shi one way or another, have done some significant studies in 9 exploring these strategies. The present project of mine can be seen as 10 a further step from their precursory works. However, the works of these 11 Chinese scholars have not been widely known or studied by most of Western scholars of Chan Buddhism. See Bao, 1971, 127–44, and 2 1988, 12–24. Also see Wu, 1981, 69–81. 3111 12 Suzuki, 1955, 144. 4 13 Ibid., 153. 5 14 See chapters 4 and 7 of this book. 6 15 DeMartino, 1983, 24. Italics are original. 16 Ibid., 17. 7 17 Suzuki, 1955, 66. 8 18 Jiangxi Mazu Daoyi Chanshi Yulu, CJ, 13: 8962a. Cf. Cheng, 1992, 65. 9 As one may note, Cheng’s translation of “jiewu” as “dealing with 20111 people as they come” strays too far from the original meaning of the 1 Chinese. 19 See Suzuki, 1955, 66, 143, 147. 2 20 See his Dunwu Rudao Yaomen Lun, part II, CJ, 1: 47a. Cf. Blofeld, 1962, 3 61. 4 21 LY, in CJ, 11: 7357a; Watson, 1993, 53. 5 22 CF, in CJ, 13: 8980b. See also Ui, 1990a, 42–3; Blofeld, 1958, 59–60. The patriarch whom Huangbo mentions here is the alleged Twenty- 6 Third Indian Patriarch Haklenayasas. 7 23 Ibid., 8978a. Ui, 1990a, 30–1. 8 24 See Hanyu Dacidian, vol. 2, 513. 9 25 Ibid., 1532. 30111 26 See CJ, 13: 8978a; Ui, 1990a, 30–3. 27 Ibid., 8995a–b. Cf. Blofeld, 1958, 126. 1 28 Ibid., 8987b; Ui, 1990a, 80–1, 121. 2 29 See JCL, fascicle 9, T 51, 2076: 273a. Also see Ui, 1990a, 88–9, 145. 3 For a study of Pei Xiu’s Buddhist life and thought, including his rela- 4 tionship with Huangbo, see Jan, 1995. 30 See DL, in CJ, 13: 9023b. Cf. Powell, 1986, 25. Here I disagree with 5 Powell’s translation. 6 31 JCL, fascicle 11, T 51, 2076: 284a. 7 32 See Heidegger, 1971, 123. The Chan Buddhist insight into the non- 8 duality between speaking and listening is the foundation for their 9 understanding of the role of listening in communication. This insight is inseparable from the pragmatic wisdom that guides the Chan soteri- 40111 ological practice. However, Heidegger’s main interest is the search for 1 an understanding of the essential Being that appropriates and calls 21111 forth human listening and speaking. folio 219 NOTES

1111 33 Kierkegaard, 1941, 246. Nobody would deny the huge differences 2 between the Chan Buddhist undertaking and Kierkegaard’s, despite 3 the parallels and similarities between their insights into indirect com- munication. For one thing, the Chan art of communication involves a 4 naturalistic perspective that Kierkegaard obviously does not share. 5111 According to this perspective, indirect communication is the art of dao, 6 and is the consequence of being an enlightened person who leaves what 7 is as it is. Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication is rooted in 8 his Christian belief and in the tradition of negative theology. 34 See GY, fascicle 1, CJ, 11: 7310b–11a. Cf. Cheng, 1992, 78. 9 35 The four procedures are as follows: “Sometimes I take away the per- 10 son but do not take away the surroundings. Sometimes I take away the 11 surroundings but do not take away the person. Sometimes I take away 2 both the person and the surroundings. Sometimes I take away neither 3111 the person nor the surroundings.” See LY, in CJ, 11: 7350a; Yanagida, 1972, 69; Watson, 1993, 21–2. 4 36 Zhaozhou Zhenji Chanshi Yulu, GY, fascicle 13, CJ, 11: 7457a. 5 37 JCL, fascicle 7, T 51, 2076: 254c. Cf. Ogata, 1990, 240. 6 38 GY, fascicle 13, CJ, 11: 7457b. 7 39 Ibid., fascicle 14, CJ, 11: 7469b, 7472a. 8 40 “Xu bianta shengsiyu, . . .” BG, in CJ, 11: 7321a. Cleary, 1978, 50. 41 Foguo Keqin Chanshi Xinyao, CJ, 14: 9858a. A similar statement can also 9 be seen in his Biyan Ji, fascicle 2, in CJ, 10: 6453a. Cf. Cleary and 20111 Cleary, 1992, 134. There is no strong evidence in the text to support 1 the translators’ interpretation that this statement is made by Deshan. 2 42 Dahui repeats, in his own teaching, this statement originally made by 3 Yuanwu. See Dahui Pujue Chanshi Yulu, fascicle 14, T 47, 1998A: 870b. 43 The Chan notion and use of “living words” have not been closely 4 examined in the contemporary study of Chan thought. I find no dis- 5 cussion of the notion and use of “living words” in the early studies of 6 Chan koan, such as that of Miura and Sasaki (1965) and Suzuki’s The 7 Zen Koan as a Means of Attaining Enlightenment. Baizhang Huaihai’s impor- 8 tant account of the use of “living words” and the later development of 9 the notion of “living words” in Chan are neglected as well in writings on the history of Chinese Chan thought, such as those of Nukariya 30111 Kaiten (1925), Sekiguchi Shindai (1964), and Suzuki Tetsuo (1985). 1 Among American scholars, recently Robert E. Buswell, Jr (Buswell, 2 1987, 348) and Robert M. Gimello (Gimello, 1991, 376), both refer to 3 the notion of “living words.” Buswell also places the notion of “living 4 words” within three Chan hermeneutic devices, although he discusses it mainly from a Korean Chan perspective (Buswell, 1988, 246–8). 5 However, two books published in mainland China (Pan, 1992; Du and 6 Wei, 1993) have given more detailed studies than any others in the 7 Chan notion and use of “living words.” 8 44 In this regard, see Ch’ien, 1984. Ch’ien differentiates the Indian mode 9 of serial, progressive negation, and Sengzhao’s and Chan Buddhists’ simplified uses of paradox. Also see Ichimura, 1985. Ichimura points 40111 out that the difference between the methods of Indian Ma¯dhyamika 1 and Sengzhao, on the part of the Chinese Buddhist world, “was to be 21111 further made magnified in the Zen tradition in later periods.” folio 220 NOTES

1111 45 BG, in CJ, 11: 7316a. Cf. Cleary, 1978, 34–5. 2 46 Ibid., 7317a–b; Cf. ibid., 37–8. 3 47 GY, fascicle 2, CJ, 11: 7325b. 48 Cf. Chan, 1963b, 120–1. 4 49 The translation presented here is my own compromise, a combination 5111 and minor revision of Wing-tsit Chan’s and Yampolsky’s translations 6 of the original Chinese sentences. Cf. Chan, 1963b, 127; Yampolsky, 7 1967, 172–3. 8 50 “. . . zhuxin kanjing, . . . shexin neicheng.” See Heze Shenhui Chanshi Yulu, in Shijun, Lou, et al., 1983, vol. 2, no. 4, 89. 9 51 See Yanagida and Umehara, 1969, 128. 10 52 Here I basically repeat what I have quoted and discussed in chapter 4 11 of this book for the sake of convenience and clarity. 2 53 JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 246a. 3111 54 WL, in CJ, 13: 8987b; Ui, 1990a, 78–9. Cf. Blofeld, 1958, 90. 55 Ibid., 8996b. 4 56 LY, in CJ, 11: 7351a; Yanagida, 1972, 79. Cf. Watson, 1993, 26; 5 Sasaki, 1975, 9–10. 6 57 Ibid., 7357b; Yanagida, 1972, 145. Cf. Watson, 1993, 55; Sasaki, 1975, 7 27. 8 58 GY, fascicle 2, CJ, 11: 7327b-28a. 59 JCL, fascicle 7, T 51, 2076: 253b. Cf. Ogata, 1990, 231. 9 60 In this regard, Chung-ying Cheng’s analysis of the principle of contex- 20111 tual reconstruction, in his paper “On Zen (Ch’an) Language and Zen 1 Paradoxes,” is still valid. See Cheng, 1973, 95. 2 61 Suzuki, 1964, 58. 3 62 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2344; The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, vol. 17, 672. 4 63 See the entry tautology in Audi, 1995, 788–9. 5 64 Hegel and Wittgenstein both noted the tautology of the principle of 6 identity. Their critiques are discussed more intensively by contem- 7 porary thinkers. See Hegel, 1965, 213; Wittgenstein, 1922, 5.5303, 8 139; Toms, 1962, 55; Kainz, 1988, 45; etc. 9 65 For a detailed examination of Heidegger’s use of tautological expres- sions, see Schofer, 1972, 287–301. 30111 66 “The source of Caoxi” here designates (Caoxi) Huineng Chan or 1 Southern Chan. “One drop of water from the source of Caoxi” sym- 2 bolizes the inherited teaching of Huineng Chan. 3 67 Dafayan Wenyi Chanshi Yulu, CJ, 13: 9150b. 4 68 Touzi Heshang Yulu, in GY, fascicle 36, CJ, 12: 7771a–b, 7775b. 69 Fuzhou Dongchanyuan Kelong Liaokong Dashi. See JCL, fascicle 21, T 51, 5 2076: 376c. 6 70 Juefan Huihong says: “When there are words within the words ( yuzhong 7 youyu), these words are called dead words (siju); when there are no words 8 within the words ( yuzhong wuyu), these words are called living words 9 (huoju).” See Chanlin Sengbao Zhuan, fascicle 12, HTC, 137: 247b. 71 Schofer, 1972, 293–4. 40111 72 Linji’s verses are translated into English by Burton Watson as follows. 1 For the procedure of “taking away the person but not taking away the 21111 environment,” Linji says: “Warm sun shines forth, spreading the earth folio 221 NOTES

1111 with brocade. The little child’s hair hangs down, white as silk thread.” 2 For “taking away the environment but not taking away the person,” he 3 says: “The king’s commands have spread throughout the realm. Generals beyond the border no longer taste the smoke and dust of bat- 4 tle.” For “taking away both the person and the environment,” he says: 5111 “All word cut off Ping and Fen – they stand alone, a region apart.” For 6 “taking away neither the person nor the environment,” he says: “The 7 king ascends his jeweled hall; country oldsters sing their songs.” See 8 Watson, 1993, 21–2 and his explanation of the verses in the notes. For the original Chinese, see LY, in CJ, 11: 7350a; Yanagida, 1972, 69–70. 9 73 WLL, T 48, 2012B: 385c; Ui, 1990a, 70–1. Cf. Blofeld, 1958, 81–2. To 10 experience the poeticity of Huangbo’s sentences, we must read the orig- 11 inal Chinese. My English rendering does not preserve the original poet- 2 icity well. 3111 74 Watson, 1988, 106. 75 See Du, 1976, 197–8; Zhou, 1994, 29–34; Iriya, 1983, 77 and 1973, 4 56; Wawrytko, 1992, 344–7. Among various studies I have mentioned 5 so far, Wawrytko’s paper seems to be the only one that has paid atten- 6 tion to the theoretical issue of how Chan poetry contributes to Chan 7 enlightenment experience. 8 76 Nakamura, 1964, 193. 77 I agree with Robert Gimello’s opinion: “[O]ne must credit to poetry 9 and the other modes of literary expression associated with Ch’an med- 20111 itation an operative and transformative power.” See Gimello, 1986, 11. 1 78 Deshan Shaoyan Chanshi. WH, fascicle 15, vol. 3, 969. 2 79 Robert Gimello has insightfully argued that Chinese Buddhism in gen- 3 eral, and Huayan in particular, has moved toward a more kataphatic mode of discourse, which is a significant departure from traditionally 4 Indian forms of conceptualization and expression (see Gimello, 1976, 5 119, 122). Chan Buddhism can be regarded as a further move in the 6 same direction through its poeticizing. However, the Chan use of 7 poetic language involves both apophatic and kataphatic functions, as I 8 indicated in this discussion. 9 80 Heidegger, 1971, 192. 81 Heidegger, 1968, 71. 30111 82 Du, 1976, 1. 1 83 This poem is written to Zhaozhou by a learned monk. See JCL, fasci- 2 cle 10, T 51, 2076: 277a. The English translation of this poem is from 3 Wu, 1996, 100. I made minor changes. Also see Ogata, 1990, 349. For 4 the explanation of the verses, see Du, 1976, 213. 84 “Shaonian yiduan fenliushi, zhixu jiaren duzizhi.” Zhaojue Keqin Chanshi. WH, 5 fascicle 19, vol. 3, 1254. The English translation of the verses is from 6 Wu, 1996, 204. 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 222 NOTES

1111 2 3 4 5111 GLOSSARY 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 Bai Juyi 4 Baizhang Huaihai 5 baoguang 6 ben 7 benzhi zhiyong 8 bi 9 bian 20111 bian 1 bianyezhe youbujianye 2 bixing 3 budang 4 bujia yuanqi 5 buju wenzi 6 buke yiyanyu qu 7 bukeyu zhuangyu 8 buru liangwang er huaqidao 9 bushiwu 30111 bu shuopo 1 buyan zhijiao 2 3 cancha chugui zhici 4 Caoxi 5 Chan 6 chengxin 7 Cheng Xuanying 8 chongyan 9 chuan 40111 chuanda 1 chuanshu 21111 Chuanxin Fayao folio 223 GLOSSARY

1111 chugui 2 chumo jili liangbian 3 cuyan 4 5111 dabian buyan 6 Dacheng Qixin Lun 7 dadao bucheng 8 Dahui Zonggao 9 Damei Fachang 10 dang 11 dao 2 dao xu tongliu 3111 dayan 4 dazhi ruyuwuci 5 Dazhu huihai 6 Deshan 7 diaogui 8 Dongshan Liangjie 9 dongyong sanshiliu dui 20111 1 fa 2 fa jishishuo 3 fangbian 4 fashuo buer 5 fazhongfa 6 fei 7 feibi wuwo 8 feili yuyan feibuli yuyan 9 feiwo wusuoqu 30111 feixin feifo 1 fei zhiyi shougu 2 fen 3 fen wuchang 4 fenyezhe youbufenye 5 fo 6 fofa 7 foxing 8 foxingyin 9 Funiushan Zizai 40111 1 Gao Heng 21111 geduan liangtou ju folio 224 GLOSSARY

1111 gongan 2 Guishan Lingyou 3 Guo Xiang 4 5111 heyi tianni 6 Hongzhou 7 Huangbo Xiyun 8 huangtang zhiyan 9 Huineng 10 huoju 11 Hu Shi 2 3111 ji 4 jiang jingxinti chengfo 5 jian wen jue zhi 6 jiaowai biechuan 7 jietuo de shijian 8 jiewu 9 jieyin zhici 20111 ji fannao shi puti 1 Jingde Chuandeng Lu 2 jiwai lunzhi 3 jiwu changzhu 4 jixin jifo 5 jiyu 6 jiyu zhiyan 7 jizhi zhiti 8 Juefan Huihong 9 30111 kanhua Chan 1 koan 2 kongji zhi zhi 3 4 Laozi 5 lengnuan zizhi 6 li 7 lianghang 8 linian 9 linianxiangzhe deng xukongjie 40111 Linji 1 Linji Lu 21111 Lin Yunming folio 225 GLOSSARY

1111 Liu Fengbao 2 lixing quzhi 3 li zhijian 4 5111 Mazu Daoyi 6 ming 7 ming 8 miuyou zhishuo 9 mo ji yu 10 moqi 11 2 Nanhua Xuexin Bian 3111 Nanyue Huairang 4 5 pan 6 Pei Xiu 7 8 qi 9 qici sui cancha er chugui keguan 20111 qihe 1 qihui 2 qiwu 3 Qi Wu Lun 4 quji 5 6 ren jieke yin 7 renxin 8 renxing 9 renyun 30111 renyun buju fangming jietuo 1 renyun guoshi 2 renyun zhuyishang 3 renyun zizai 4 ruhe shi caoyuan yidishui 5 ruhe shi dao 6 ruhe shi fazhongfa 7 ruhe shi fofa 8 rulai shuo jishifa 9 rulaixingyin 40111 rulaizang 1 ruren yinshui 21111 folio 226 GLOSSARY

1111 sangqiou 2 satori 3 Sengzhao 4 shaonian yiduan fenliushi 5111 Shendao 6 shengyu 7 Shenhui 8 Shenxiu 9 shexin neicheng 10 shi 11 shi 2 shi 3111 shi caoyuan yidishui 4 shiren xingkong 5 shishe 6 shi wuzhi 7 shizhong wugu 8 shunren 9 shunwu 20111 shunwu ziran er wurongsiye 1 shuo siyiwu ji buzhong 2 siju 3 siyu 4 suiren congbian 5 suiwu erbian 6 suiyong er shuo 7 suiyuan yingyong 8 suoyan jueyizhe wei xinti linian 9 suoyi qiongnian 30111 1 taichu youwuwu 2 ti 3 tianlai 4 tianni 5 tihui dadao 6 tiyong fenming 7 tong 8 9 waisheng 40111 wai tianxia 1 wang 21111 wang folio 227 GLOSSARY

1111 Wang Bi 2 wanghu tian 3 wanghu wu 4 wangji 5111 wang qisuobuwang 6 wangren 7 wang renyi 8 wang shifei 9 Wang Shumin 10 Wang Shuzhi 11 Wang Xianqian 2 wangyan 3111 wanhua er weishi youji 4 weiren benxing 5 wei wuwei 6 wei yanshuo zhiji yinyan qianyan 7 wo ziwang 8 wu 9 wu 20111 wu 1 wuduanya zhici 2 wuhua 3 wuji 4 wuliang wuqiong 5 wuming 6 wunian 7 wusangwo 8 wushi 9 wuwei 30111 wuxin 1 wuyan 2 wuyong 3 wuyong zhi weiyong 4 wuyong zhiyong 5 wuyuzhong youyu 6 7 xiang 8 xin 9 xing 40111 xinti 1 xinxin buyi 21111 xinzhishi folio 228 GLOSSARY

1111 Xuan Ying 2 xu bianta shengsiyu 3 xukongzhe jishi foxing 4 xunwen quzheng zhe yizhi 5111 6 yan 7 yanbian er buji 8 yanchuan 9 yan wuyan 10 yan yousuo buyan 11 yan zhenruzhe yiwu youxiang 2 yaofang 3111 Yao Nai 4 yin 5 yinhe 6 yinian xiangying 7 yinke 8 yinyi manyan 9 yinzheng 20111 yinzhi eryouwei 1 yiqie yanshuo jiaming wushi 2 yiqi weichuan 3 yixin chuanxin 4 yixin yinxin 5 Yi Zhuan 6 yong 7 yong 8 youjuzhong wuju 9 youyong 30111 yuan 1 Yuanwu Keqin 2 yuanyin 3 yu ji mo 4 yulu 5 yumo buer 6 yuyan 7 yu yi shuo mo yi shuo 8 yuzhong wuyu 9 yuzhong youyu 40111 1 Zhaozhou 21111 zhendao wuti folio 229 GLOSSARY

1111 zheng 2 zhenglun 3 zhengshi dao 4 zhengyan ruofan 5111 zhengyin 6 zhenkong miaoyou 7 zhenren 8 zhenxin 9 zhenzai 10 zhi 11 zhi 2 zhijian 3111 zhijie 4 zhiren wuji 5 zhixin 6 zhixu jiaren duzi zhi 7 zhiyan 8 zhiyan 9 zhiyan richu 20111 Zhizang 1 zhizhiyizi zhongmiao zhimen 2 zhizhongta buweiwo shuopo 3 zhongdaozhe mingwei foxing 4 zhongri renyun tengteng 5 zhongsheng xianqian jieerxin 6 zhuangyu 7 Zhuangzi 8 Zhuangziyin 9 Zhuangzi Zhangyi 30111 zhuxin kanjing 1 Zhu Ziqing 2 ziran 3 zixing 4 zixing benyong 5 Zongbao 6 Zongmi 7 zuowang 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 230 NOTES

1111 2 3 4 5111 BIBLIOGRAPHY 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3111 Primary sources 4 Baizhang Guanglu GY, fascicle 1. CJ, vol. 11. 5 Biyan Ji . By Xuedou Chongxian and Yuanwu Keqin 6 . CJ, vol. 10. 7 Chanlin Sengbao Zhuan . By Juefan Huihong . HTC, vol. 8 137. 9 Chanyuan Zhuquanji Duxu . By Zongmi . T, vol. 48, no. 20111 2015. 1 Chanzong Jicheng . Reprint of the collection of Chan school from 2 HTC. 25 vols. Taibei: Yiwen Yinshu Guan, 1968. Daban Niepan Jing (Maha¯parinirva¯na Su¯tra). Dharmaksema trans. T, 3 ˙ 4 vol. 12, no. 374. Dacheng Qixin Lun . T, vol. 32, no. 1666. 5 Dacheng Wusheng Fangbian Men . T, vol. 85, no. 2834. 6 Dafayan Wenyi Chanshi Yulu . CJ, vol. 13. 7 Dahui Pujue Chanshi Yulu . T, vol. 47, no. 1998A. 8 Deshan Shaoyan Chanshi . WH, fascicle 15, vol. 3. 9 Dongshan Liangjie Chanshi Yulu . CJ, vol. 13. 30111 Dunwu Rudao Yaomen Lun . By Dazhu Huihai . CJ, 1 vol. 1. 2 Foguo Keqin Chanshi Xinyao . CJ, vol. 14. 3 Fuzhou Dongchanyuan Kelong Liaokong Dashi . JCL, fas- 4 cicle 21, T, vol. 51, no. 2076. 5 Guzunsu Yulu . Ze Zhangzhu , ed. 48 fascicles. CJ, vols. 6 11–12. Heze Shenhui Chanshi Yulu . In Shi Jun , Lou Yulie 7 , et al., eds. Zhongguo Fojiao Sixiang Ziliao Xuanbian 8 . Bejing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983. Vol. 2, no. 4. 9 Huangbo Chanshi Chuanxin Fayao . CJ, vol. 13. 40111 Huangbo Duanji Chanshi Wanling Lu . Pei Xiu , ed. T, 1 vol. 48, no. 2012B. 21111 Huangbo Xiyun Chanshi Wanling Lu . CJ, vol. 13. folio 231 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1111 Dacheng Qixin Lun 62, 65, 66, 67, “double-layered words” (chongyan) 2 69, 70, 73 108, 140, 141, 143, 147–152 3 Dahui Zonggao 175 double negation 153 Damei Fachang 173, 174 dreaming 41, 158–9 4 . 5111 dang (straightforward words) 143, dva¯da´sa¯nga pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da 144 (twelvefold chain of 6 dao as the third possibility 46 interdependent arising) 59 7 Dao De Jing 97, 107 “dwelling words” ( yuyan) 108, 140, 8 dao xu tongliu 68 141, 143, 147–52 9 Davidson, D. 135, 148 10 dayan (great words) 104 egocentrism 29 11 Dazhu Huihai 117, 119, 167 either/or logic 154, 177, 180 2 dead words 112, 175, 177, 221 elusiveness 185 3111 deconstruction: of Buddha nature empirical self 50, 197 4 52–79; of dao as nonbeing 45–7; emptiness 60, 63, 70 5 of dao as one 47–51; definition of enlightenment (wu) 69, 73–6, 78, 4, 24; Derridean 15, 19–23, 6 118, 163, 165, 166, 168, 173, 25–6; and negative theology 141; 174, 178; and affliction 69; 7 post-deconstruction situation 80; existentio-practical dimension 8 of self 29, 39–44; topology and of 166; experience of 163; 9 alterity of 20, 24 individual 166; non-dualistic 20111 deconstructionism 15 dimension of 165, 166; and 1 deconstructive strategy 19, 22, poetic language 183, 186; 2 27 post-enlightenment aspects 3 de-familiarization 184–5 76, 77; pre-enlightenment 4 definition of Chan communication aspects 76, 77; social 166; 5 8, 169 and speaking 119; and what is 6 Deleuze, G. 11 communicated 174 DeMartino, R. 161, 165 expressive silences 89 7 demystifying 186 8 denegation 141, 151–4 fangbian (expedient) 57 9 Derrida, J. 1, 5, 15, 19, 20, 21–30, Faure, Bernard 1, 52, 53, 110 30111 56, 83, 84, 90, 91, 128, 129, feixin feifo (neither mind nor 1 133, 135, 153, 189 Buddha) 171, 174 2 Dews, Peter 25 fen (distinction) 156 3 dharmadha¯tu 57 final vocabularies 190 4 dha¯tu 57, 59 forgetfulness of language (wangyan) 5 Dialecticians 99 103 6 dialectic of nonbeing 46 forgetting self (wangji) 42, 43 diaogui (paradoxical words) 104, Foucault, Michel 83, 84, 87, 90 7 141, 143, 155 “Four Procedures” 172, 183, 184 8 differance 21, 129 foxing (Buddha nature) 56 9 difference of Laozi and Zhuangzi foxingyin (cause of Buddha nature) 40111 216 59 1 direct communication 139 Freud, Sigmund 43 21111 Dongshan Liangjie 162, 172 Fung Yu-lan 32, 109 folio 246 INDEX

1111 Funiushan Zizai, 179 7, 139; as double reflection 131; 2 fusion of horizons 164, 189 indirection of communication 3 130, 170; indirect language 127; 4 Gadamer, H.-G. 14, 189 Kierkegaard’s notion of 5111 Gao Heng 144 131–134, 135; and negativity Gasche, Rodolphe 25 154, 216; as sharing and 6 ga¯tha¯s (hymnes) 184 participation 126, 145; and 7 “goblet words” (zhiyan) 104, 140–7, situational difference 170; 8 149, 150, 151, 154, 159 speaking as listening 171; 9 gongan 163, 175 Zhuangzi’s manifesto of 144 10 Gongsun Long 99 interpretive guesswork 127 11 Graham, A. C. 95, 96, 140, 157 irony 141, 158–60 2 Guishan Lingyou 170 irony as therapeutic shock 160 3111 Guo Xiang 32, 43 4 ji (borrowing) 148 5 Habermas, J. 9 jiaowai biechuan (special transmission outside teachings) 164, 166–7 6 Hajime Nakamura 184 Hansen, Chad 11, 32, 33, 44, 47, jieyin zhici 115 7 96, 140 ji fannao shi puti 69 8 Hegel, G. W. F. 20 Jingde chuandeng Lu 115 9 Hegelian dialectic 67, 217 jixin jifo (mind as Buddha) 171, 174 20111 Heidegger, M. 88–9, 91, 126, 127, jiyu (dwelling) 147 1 171, 180, 182, 185, 189, 190; 2 and Chan 182, 219; and Kalupahana 110, 111 3 Zhuangzi 208–9 kanhua Chan 175 4 Heraclitus 32 Kantian transcendental deduction 5 hetu (cause) 57, 59 25, 207 6 hierarchy of speaker/listener karma 77, 178 174 kataphatic language 56, 80, 185, 7 Hongzhou 5, 53, 68, 72–8, 80, 188 8 118, 119, 163 Kierkegaard, S. 7, 91, 131–6, 154, 9 Huangbo Xiyun 8, 73, 74, 115, 159, 171; and Chan 219; and 30111 117, 119, 120, 167–9, 178, 183, Zhuangzi 216 1 184 koan 163 2 huangtang zhiyan (extravagant words) kongji zhi zhi (empty tranquil 3 104, 143, 144 awareness) 72 4 Huineng 5, 53, 65, 67–72, 73, 76, Kyoto school 16 5 115, 116, 177, 180 6 Hui Shi 49, 157 language as a being 138 Hu Shi 161, 162 language as a tool 138 7 . huoju (living words) 175 Lanka¯vata¯ra Su¯tra 58, 112, 116, 117, 8 210 9 illocutionary acts 11 Laozi 10, 32, 45–50, 97, 105–7, 40111 indirect communication: as art of 152, 154–5 1 communication 132, 171; as art lianghang (double walking) 47 21111 of taking away 154; definition of, liminology, the term 6, 84, 85 folio 247 INDEX

1111 liminology of language 83, 85–91; mind of privileging (chengxin) 41 2 absolutization of the limit 86; mind of suchness 62, 63 3 as interpretive device 93; ming (enlightenment) 47 4 relativizing of the limit 88; miuyou zhishuo (absurd speech) 104, 5111 three levels of 91 141, 143, 144, 155 limit and the limitless 83 Moism 5 6 Lin, Shuen-fu 140 Monism 50, 51 7 linguistic analysis as meta-science moqi (realize silently) 8 11 Mou Zongsan 156 9 linguistic turn 9 Mozi 99 10 linian ( being free from thoughts) Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ 110, 116 11 65, 66, 67 multi-dimensional perspectivism 2 Linji 1, 54, 78, 79, 113, 115, 167, 14 3111 172, 178, 183, 184 4 Linji Lu 79 Nagao, Gadjin 63 5 living words 175, 176, 177, 179, Na¯ga¯rjuna 1, 52, 55, 61, 110, 111, 180, 182, 221 6 114, 115, 116 li zhijian 72 name and actuality (ming shi) 98 7 logocentrism/logocentric 1, 29, 53, neither/nor 153–4 8 66, 74, 88, 98, 159, 195 Neo-Moists 99 9 Lowrie, Walter 132 neo-pragmatism 2, 138 20111 Loy, David 28 never tell too plainly (bushuopo) 121, 1 Lyotard, J.-F. 11 161, 162, 164, 169, 170, 172, 2 175–6 3 Ma¯dhyamika 1, 54, 55–7, 60, 61, nirva¯ n.a 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 74, 76, 4 70, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 94, 110, 111, 114, 116, 165, 5 176, 188 173 6 Magliola, Robert 1, 52 Nishitani, Keiji 93 Maha¯parinirva¯n.a Su¯tra 5, 7, 57, 59, nonbeing (wu) 152, 153 7 60, 61 nonbeing of nonbeing (wuwu) 153 8 Maha¯ya¯na 7, 56, 65, 74, 110–12, non-duality of speech and silence 9 114, 115, 116, 165, 176, 185 116, 117 30111 Margolis, Joseph 26, 28, 30 Norris, Christopher 19, 20, 25 1 Matsumoto Shiro¯ 54 no-thought (wunian) 67, 69 2 Mazu Daoyi 78, 79, 115, 166, 171, 3 172, 173, 174, 178, 179 Ownes, Wayne D. 31 4 Mencian theory of mind-nature 71 5 Merleau-Ponty, M. 89, 90, 106, pan (discriminating and judging) 6 127, 128, 189, 213 98 metaphorical language 148–9 paradox 154–8, 176–80; dynamic 7 metaphysical appropriation of dao dimension of 155–6, 177–9; 8 28 liminological dimension of 9 metaphysics of presence 129 157–8, 179–80; logical/semantic 40111 Middle Way 61, 68, 74, 114 156–7; pragmatic dimension of 1 Miller, J. Hillis 85 156–7, 179; simplified use of 176 21111 mind of non-abiding 73 paralogic 158, 179, 217 folio 248 INDEX

1111 parama¯rtha 53, 61, 74, 111, 114 qihui (experience and understand) 2 parapraxis 85, 205 n. 10 168, 169, 174 3 parinirva¯n.a 117 qiwu (experience and realize) 168 4 Pei Xiu 169 Qi Wu Lun 97, 102, 105, 140, 5111 Philosophical Investigations 126 142, 158 philosophy of change 32–7; quasi-metaphysical issues 28, 32, 6 dynamic interrelationship of 75, 118, 211 7 things 36–7; infinite quasi-reifying tendencies 32, 66, 8 transformations of things (wuhua) 72, 73, 75 9 33–5; inner dynamism of things quasi-theory 26, 38 10 37; interchangeability (tong) 37; quasi-transcendental thoughts 26, 11 and no-action 36; things 70 2 transforming of themselves 35–6 quji (abandoning self) 42 3111 piping of nature/heaven (tianlai) 47, 4 98, 142–3 Ratnagotravibha¯ga 58, 59, 62, 63 5 Platform Su¯tra 65, 69, 70, 71, 75, rectification of names 99 115, 177 reductio ad absurdum 6 157, 176 play of negativity 154 relativity and relativism 207–8 7 poeticity 183 renxin 76 8 poeticizing 183, 184, 185 renxing (human nature) 71 9 poetic language 183–6 renyun 5, 68, 77, 178, 179 20111 post-Ma¯dhyamika 70 renyun zizai 77 1 post-metaphysical emphasis 134 rhetoric of non-closure 159 2 postmodern approach without Rorty, R. 9, 11, 16, 19, 23, 25, 38, 3 postmodernism 10 138; and Zhuangzi 217–18 4 postmodern discourse 2 rulaixingyin 59 5 postmodernism 12, 15 rulaizang 56 6 poststructuralism 2, 135 Russell, Bertrand 86, 87 post-Wittgensteinian approach 134 7 pragmatics, the term 11 same of non-self-identity 166 8 prajña¯ 72 sam. sa¯ra 55, 59, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76, 9 Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ 54, 60, 70, 116, 176 116, 165, 173 30111 prapañca 111 sam. vr. ti 61, 74, 114 1 pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da 117 saying as non-saying 118, 120, 182 2 principle of noncontradiction 155, scientism 11 3 177, 180 Searle, John 11 4 principle of the excluded middle self-canceling/erasing 38, 39, 78, 5 155, 177, 180 79, 108, 154 6 privilege of discursive language self-erasing saying 118, 120 148 self nature 54, 70, 78 7 progressive negation 176 Sengzhao 114, 117, 176 8 Pseudo-Dionysius 39 Shendao 32, 42, 45, 47, 48, 49, 9 pseudo-quotation 147 50 40111 shengyu (living words) 175, 182 1 qi 168 Shenhui 72, 73, 74, 75, 178 21111 qihe (accord with each other) 168 Shenxiu 5, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73 folio 249 INDEX shift and multiplying of meanings ti (the whole) and yong (function) 146, 147 66–7, 73, 74, 75, 118, 201, shiren xingkong 70 211–12 shishe (expedient) 172 tianlai (piping of nature) 47, 98, 143 shock therapy 172, 182, 185 tianni (balancing of nature) 47, 142, shunren 44 143 shunwu 44 time and the timeless 94 siju (dead words) 175 tong (interchangeability) 37 sitting down and forgetting 43 Tractatus 86, 88 siyu (dead words) 112, 175 Training in Christianity 132–3 soteriological/therapeutic transcendental philosophy 26 philosophy 27, 31, 33, 196 trans-conventionality 13, 107, 118 ´ Srı¯ma¯la¯devı¯sim. hana¯da Su¯ tra 58, 62, 63 transformation of limit 84 structuralist approaches 10 transformation of personhood 169 suiyong er shuo (speaking in terms of trans-historical dimension 94 function) 119 translogic 158, 179, 217 suiyuan yingyong 74 trans-metaphysical insight 105, ´su¯ nya (empty) 61, 62 110, 199, 205 ´su¯ nyata¯ 53, 111 trans-temporal dimension 94 survivalist strategy 149 true mind (zhenxin) 73 Suzuki, D. T. 110, 161–4, 166, True Ruler (zhenzai) 35 167, 179 svabha¯va 57, 60 Upanishad 54, 104 upa¯ ya (skillful means) 56, 58, 115 Takasaki Jikido¯ 56 use of the useless 106, 155 Tang Junyi 71, 96, 97 Tatha¯gata 56, 112, 117; and silence va¯c (divine speech) 104 117, 120; and speaking 119 Vajracchedika¯ Prajña¯ pa¯ramita¯ Su¯ tra tatha¯gatagarbha 5, 54, 55–65, 69, 70, 117 71, 112, 117, 120, 188; and Vimalakı¯rti Nirde´sa Su¯tra 116 cause 59; and emptiness 60; Vimalakı¯rti’s silence 117 empty/nonempty side of 61–2; and expedient 57; metaphysical wangji (forgetting self) 42 appropriation of 64; and Middle Wang Shumin 140, 147 Way 61; and no-self 58; and self Wang Shuzhi 147 58; and twelvefold chain 59 Wang Xianqian 144 tatha¯gatagotra 57 wangyan (forgetfulness of language) tathata¯ 60 103 tautology 180–3, 189, 190; as Watson, Burton 183 negative strategy 181; and wei wuwei (taking action of subject–predicate structure 181; no-action) 106, 155 as therapeutic tool 181, 182 Wheelwright Bian 100, 101, Taylor, Mark 43, 153 Wittgenstein, the early 86–9, 110, telecommunication 129 135 temporization 35 Wittgenstein, the later 24, 86, 126 three modes of discourse 140 Wood, David 20, 84

250 INDEX

1111 wo ziwang (forgetting self) 43 yuan (temporal condition) 75, 74 2 Wright, Dale 110 Yuanwu Keqin 175 3 Wu, Kuang-Ming 12, 158–9 yuanyin (auxiliary cause) 60 4 wu (nonbeing) 152, 153 yumo buer (non-duality of speech 5111 wuduanya zhici (unbordered phrases) and silence) 117 143, 144 yuyan (“dwelling words”) 108, 140, 6 wuhua (transformation of things) 33, 141, 143, 147–52 7 159, 8 wuji (no-self) 152 Zhaozhou 172, 174, 183, 185 9 wuming (no-name) 152 zhenglun (straightforward discourse) 10 wunian (no-thought) 67, 69, 72 144 11 wushi (doing nothing special) 179 Zhengyan ruofan 155 2 wuwei (no-action) 49, 152, 155 zhengyin (direct cause) 60 3111 wuxin (no-mind) 152 zhenren (authentic person) 36 4 wuyan (no-speaking) 152 zhenzai (True Ruler) 35 5 wuyong zhiyong (use of the useless) zhi (wisdom) 72 38, 155 zhijian (cognition) 73, 112 6 zhijie (cognition) 73, 112 7 xing (nature) 71, 72, 75 zhixin (straightforward mind) 68 8 xinti (the whole of the mind) 201 zhiyan (“goblet words”) 104, 140–7, 9 xinzhishi (fitting of the mind) 43 149, 150, 151, 154, 159 20111 Xunzi 99 zhiyan (straightforward saying) 144 1 Zhizang 115 2 yanbian (argumentative words) 98 zhuangyu (straightforward discourse) 3 yan wuyan (speaking non-speaking) 143 4 105, 155 Zhuangzi’s main philosophical 5 yaofang (temporary prescription) 172 thesis 5, 37–9, 141–2; and his 6 yin (verify and accord with) 168 deconstruction 38; and his yinhe (verify and accord with) 168 language 141; and meditational 7 yinian xiangying 66 experience 206–7 8 yinke (verify and confirm) 168 Zhuangzi’s teaching of no-self (wuji) 9 yinzheng (verify) 168 40, 42 30111 yiqi weichuan 169 Zhu Ziqing 93 1 yixin chuanxin (transmission from ziran (naturalness) 179 2 mind to mind) 164, 166–7 zixing (self nature) 5, 69, 71 3 yixin yinxin 168 zixing benyong 74 4 Yoga¯ca¯ra 55, 56, 58, 70, 112, 188 Zongmi 73, 74, 75, 76 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 21111 folio 251