Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Rejection of Distinctions
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SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS Number 100 February, 2000 Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Rejection of Distinctions by Wayne Alt Victor H. Mair, Editor Sino-Platonic Papers Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104-6305 USA [email protected] www.sino-platonic.org SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS FOUNDED 1986 Editor-in-Chief VICTOR H. MAIR Associate Editors PAULA ROBERTS MARK SWOFFORD ISSN 2157-9679 (print) 2157-9687 (online) SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS is an occasional series dedicated to making available to specialists and the interested public the results of research that, because of its unconventional or controversial nature, might otherwise go unpublished. The editor-in-chief actively encourages younger, not yet well established, scholars and independent authors to submit manuscripts for consideration. Contributions in any of the major scholarly languages of the world, including romanized modern standard Mandarin (MSM) and Japanese, are acceptable. 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To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. Sino-Platonic Papers, 100 (February, 2000) 1 Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Rejection of Distinctions 1. Introduction. Many Western interpreters of Zhuangzi treat the author of the inner chapters as a mystic. Some associate his mysticism with antinomianis1l4 and conclude that Zhuangzi's philosophy is "dangerous teaching for the masses. ,,1 They claim that Zhuangzi abandoned the laws of morality, thought good and evil are the same, and ignored the difference between right and wrong. A few maintain that he dismissed reason itself. Zhuangzi's moral antinomianism is a subject for another essay; here, I shall focus only on his alleged logical I, antinomianism. Henri Maspero claimed that according to Zhuangzi "reasoning itself must be abandoned,"2 and A. C. Graham thinks Zhuangzi recommended, "we should abandon reason.,,3 Graham attributes to Zhuangzi extreme and moderate versions of this advice. Since he thinks Zhuangzi understood that "reasoning depends on making distinctions,'~ the kinds of distinctions Zbuangzi sanctioned and abandoned should be a measure of his commitment to rationality. The recommendation that we refuse to make any distinctions is clearly extreme. By contrast, the advice to abandon only some distinctions, use others with care, but not allow any to distort our thoughts or interfere with our actions, is relatively moderate. 2 Wayne Alt, ~~Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Rejection of Distinctions" While it is true that Zhuangzi was suspicious of moral reasoning and disputation, and recommended that we not make moral distinctions, I shall argue that he recognized that we need some distinctions to survive, and that others are essential for a creative and happy life. Maspero and Graham, however, attribute to Zhuangzi an "anti-rationalist" position. Both claim that Zhuangzi thought reason obscures the ineffable truth and that distinctions should be abandoned completely_ Graham thinks Zhuangzi not only advised us to reject distinctions since they lead to contradictions and interfere with spontaneous action, he claims that Zhuangzi actually took his own extreme advice. I shall argue that Zhuangzi neither advocated nor adopted an anti rationalist position. He did not believe that reason obscures ineffable truth, and he never held that distinctions lead to contradictions or interfere with thought and action. He did advise us to abandon some distinctions, but he never recommended that we leave them all behind. Nor did he seek the sort of mystical understanding that Graham describes as "the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world." Rather, Zhuan¢ sought ming "clarity" I3fI, and was willing to make whatever distinctions he needed to achieve it. IfI am right, we must be cautious with Graham's translations and explanations of the passages from the inner chapters that he thinks supports an anti-rationalist interpretation of Zhuangzi. We should also beware of problems in the writings Sino-Platonic Papers~ 100.. (Feb~2000}- 3 of scholars who incorporate elements of Graham's anti-rationalist interpretation into their own attempts to explain Zhuangzi' s philosophy. 2. Maspero's sketch of Lao-Zhuang Daoism. Maspero conjectured that the Lao-Zhuang school of Daoism held that we must abandon reasoning, since " .. .it obscures the true lmowledge which is intuitive .,,5 In so far as Maspero' s sketch of classical Daoism is part of a broader account of the history of ancient China, he gives only cursory support for this conjecture. He cites a tale from the Tian Di "Heaven and Earth" chapter of the Zhuangzi.6 When the Yellow Emperor lost the "Dark Pearl," symbol of the mysterious way, he sent Knowledge, Acute Vision, and Debate to look for it. Together they failed to find it. So the Dark Pearl cannot be understood by reason. Only Xiang Wang * ~, who presumably personifies a mystical intuitive approach, was able to find it. Even iftbis were Zhuangzi's view?, we would not know what alternative to rational inquiry Xiang Wang is supposed to personify. Frank Kiennan renders Maspero's French translation of "Xiang Wang" into English as "Abstraction." James Legge's equivalent for the Chinese is "Purposeless."g Burton Watson tries "Shapeless," and Victor Mair settles on "Amorphous." Perhaps Xiang Wang's search for the Dark Pearl lacked a purpose, or, like 4 Wayne All, "Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Rejection ofDistinctionsn flowing water, took on the contours of whatever it encountered. We cannot be sure. 3. Did Zhuangzi recommend that we abandon all distinctions? A. C. Graham made his claim that Zhuangzi wanted us to abandon reason an integral part of his account of classical Chinese philosophy. His major works all defend the view that Daoist thinkers, especially Zhuangzi, should be read as responding to their "rationalist" counterparts. Zhuangzi, he thought, was reacting to the deliberations of the followers ofKongzi and Modi, and was even convinced by some of the paradoxes of the sophist logicians. Graham thinks Zbuangzi believed not only that sophists can prove contradictions but that it is possible to prove a contradiction whenever one tries to make a "distinction which is basic to analytic thought.,,9 Zhuangzi discussed different sets of contrary terms that are basic to his analysis and resolution of certain philosophical problems. Among them are the sets: shi "it" or "this" ~ and bi "other" or "that"f)t, shi "that's it"~ and fei "that's not it"~F , shi "this" ~ and bu shi "not this" ~ ~ , as well as ran "so" ~ and bu ran "not so"::f ~. Shi and fei also have pragmatic and moral uses that can be captured in English by contraries such as "suitable" and ''unsuitable,'' "correct" and "incorrect," or "right" and "wrong." Graham thinks Zhuangzi believed the use of any of these terms to make a distinction results in a contradiction. On Sino-Platonic Papers, 100 (February, 20(0) 5 these grounds, he attributes to Zhuangzi the extreme recommendation that " ... we should avoid contradiction by refusing [my italics] to make this distinction. ,,10 If we cannot distinguish· shi "what is" from fei ''what is not" without contradicting ourselves, we would be unable to make any distinction, ordinary or profound, without embracing a logical absurdity. Graham apparently thinks Zhuangzi illustrates this point by drawing a contradictory conclusion from his consideration of "the moment of death." He says, Chuang-tzu once takes up Hui Shih's observation that at the moment of death a thing is simultaneously alive, and draws the conclusion that both 'It is alive' and' It is. dead' may be simultaneously admissible. 11 The conclusion Graham attributes to Zhuangzi would have been truly astonishing had he drawn it about two English sentences. He did borrow Hui Shi's claim fang sheng fang si "Simultaneously with being alive one die~" 11 ~ 11 9E,. and conjoined it to its reversal fang si fang sheng "and simultaneously with dying one is alive" 11 9E 11 ~ 12.