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The Idea of Zhi in the Zhuangzi

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The idea of zhi in the Zhuangzi Wai Wai Chiu A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of New South Wales School of Humanities Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences December 2012 Abstract This thesis analyzes the idea of ‘zhi’—ψ⍮ω, knowledge, knowing, wisdom—in the rd nd text of the Zhuangzi, compiled around the 3 to 2 century B.C.E. In particular, it argues that the idea of knowledge is not conceptually independent of practice and ideal personality. This feature is shared by the Zhuangzi and other ancient Chinese texts. To show this, the first three chapters explicate the idea of knowledge in three texts of around the same period, namely the Analects, the Daodejing, and the Mozi. The Zhuangzi inherits certain views from each of them. Among them are: the view of the Analects that attaining knowledge implies transforming one’s emotions and sentiments; the view in the Daodejing that there is a distinction between conventional and non- conventional knowledge; and the view of the Mozi that people have an inclination to insist on what they think is right practice, which provokes disputation. However, the Zhuangzi challenges the Confucian-Mohist conception of knowledge as reliable correct practice, because the project to fix the correct way of practice is undermined by the indeterminacy of language and justification. Contrary to this indeterminacy, a person’s completed heart takes for granted that there is a fixed scheme of distinctions by which correct practice is ensured. This is a characteristic of petty knowledge, which stands in contrast to great knowledge. Zhuangzi’s great knowledge is a meta-praxis that makes one refrain from attaching oneself to a fixed way of practice. The process of attaining great knowledge is continuous with the process of fasting the heart. By doing so, a person is free from the attachments and psychological disturbances that accompany petty knowledge. For Zhuangzi, being such a person is the end of knowledge. i Acknowledgements It would not have been possible to complete this thesis without the influence and assistance I have received from others. The gratitude and respect I owe to them extends beyond the acknowledgements here. Since I cannot mention all their names, I focus on those who helped me in the process of planning, writing and finishing. Although they are credited for being the source of support, they have no responsibility for any mistakes or misinterpretations in this thesis. First, I would like to thank my principal supervisor, Associate Professor Karyn Lai, for her continuous encouragement, suggestions and detailed comments on both style and content of this thesis. Her insight that it is more fruitful if we do not read the Zhuangzi as prescribing a solution to philosophical issues shaped my understanding of the text. Her emphasis on the clarity of language also helped me to think through several difficulties during writing. Besides theoretical concerns, the most valuable lesson I learned from her is her calm character, for it is the basis of clear thought and efficacious action. Next, I would thank Professor Chris Fraser at the University of Hong Kong, and Professor Kwong-loi Shun and Professor Xiao-gan Liu at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. I benefited greatly from their lectures as well as from personal discussions. Their methodology of interpreting ancient Chinese texts and conducting research helped me to start my work with conceptual tools and kept me reflecting on what I had written. Their works taught me how to locate a philosophical problem within a text and analyze it both in a historical context and a contemporary context. Also, I am grateful to Paul D’Ambrosio, Michaelis Michael, Gerry Nolan, Winnie Sung and Ranie Villaver who spent time reading draft versions of this thesis and giving ii me valuable feedback. They provided me with new perspectives so that I could evaluate my work in ways that I would not have found out by myself. The critical questions they asked pushed me to refine my understanding of the Zhuangzi, and pre-Qin Chinese thought in general. When I was planning the scope for my thesis, it was Suki Ng who gave me inspiration and reminded me of the subtle interactions between the Analects, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. I was fortunate to have his comments. From time to time I received encouragement and technical assistance from Dido Tam. Furthermore, her specialization in Chinese literature helped me to better understand the Chinese language, especially the nature of narrative and poem, and made me realize that knowledge knows no bounds. Last but not least, I wish to express my gratitude to the sky and rain in Sydney, for they are the first to understand the nature of my work and its association with my personality. iii Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................ i Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... ii Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 Aim and significance ............................................................................................. 1 Background of the thesis ........................................................................................ 2 Structure and writing style of the Zhuangzi ..................................................... 2 Intellectual background .................................................................................. 4 The issue of authorship and the emphasis on the Inner Chapters ..................... 6 Translations and commentaries ....................................................................... 8 Past work on zhi in the Zhuangzi .................................................................... 9 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 12 A philosophical reading of the text ............................................................... 12 Zhi and its related terms in the Zhuangzi ....................................................... 15 The use of contemporary philosophical terms ............................................... 17 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 21 Chapter 1 The idea of zhi व in the Analects: account of practical knowledge ........ 24 1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 24 1.2 The term ‘zhi’ before the Analects ................................................................ 24 1.3 The term ‘zhi’ in the Analects ....................................................................... 25 1.4 The skill of knowing people ......................................................................... 31 1.4.1 Picking out advisors ............................................................................. 32 1.4.2 Seeking and giving practical advice ..................................................... 33 1.4.3 Criticizing, appreciating or comparing people ...................................... 34 1.5 Means of ‘knowing people’ in the Analects .................................................. 37 1.5.1 Observation of speech and behaviour of others .................................... 38 1.5.2 Cultivation of one’s sentiments ............................................................ 42 1.5.3 The use of models ................................................................................ 46 1.6 Criteria of knowledge in the Analects ........................................................... 50 1.6.1 The appropriate performance ............................................................... 50 1.6.2 The relevance of words and discursive knowledge ............................... 54 1.6.3 The elimination of huo ༝ .................................................................... 57 1.7 Value of knowledge in the Analects .............................................................. 59 iv 1.7.1 The effect on personality and socio-political life .................................. 59 1.7.2 Knowledge as means or end? ............................................................... 62 1.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 63 Chapter 2 The idea of zhi व in the Daodejing: twofold view of knowledge .......... 64 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 64 2.2 Value of knowledge in the Daodejing ........................................................... 64 2.2.1 Two views of knowledge ..................................................................... 65 2.2.2 Conventional knowledge and its effect on government......................... 66 2.2.3 Conventional knowledge and its effect on self-cultivation .................... 70 2.2.4 Knowledge as upheld in the Daodejing ................................................ 75 2.3 Great knowledge, dao ሐ and practice ......................................................... 81 2.4 Means of obtaining great knowledge ............................................................ 86 2.4.1 Reduction (sun ៊)............................................................................... 87 2.4.2 Contemplation ....................................................................................
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