A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Thomas John McConochie (馬常思)
School of Humanities and Languages
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of New South Wales
January 2017
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Abstract
This dissertation proposes that the Zhuangzi contains some elements of mysticism, but not in the straightforward manner that scholars have typically suggested. A review of theories of mysticism shows that ‘mysticism’ in English-language literature covers a linguistically and culturally bound set of ideas originating in analyses of religious and philosophical traditions in Western culture. In this usage, the term refers to a wide variety of characteristics and phenomena associated with particular religious experiences. It is, therefore, problematic to study the Zhuangzi as if the text unambiguously presents a doctrine of mysticism according to the frames of reference defined in these Western studies of religion. This dissertation demonstrates that some dominant interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, which hold that mysticism is a core feature of the text, have not shown an awareness of the problematic nature of the term in its original contexts of use. This dissertation presents a more nuanced understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi through careful analyses of key passages of the text that contain mystical elements.
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Acknowledgements
Thank you to my supervisor, Associate Professor Karyn Lai (賴蘊慧). Karyn encouraged me to pursue my interest in the Zhuangzi when we met at the 2012 Australian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy conference. During my candidature at UNSW, Karyn and I have worked closely together, not only on this PhD project, but also during my time as a postgraduate teaching fellow in 2014. Thank you for all your support, encouragement, and mentorship.
Thank you to my co-supervisor, Dr. Michaelis Michael for giving me feedback on parts of this dissertation and for your encouragement.
Thank you to my wife, Kristina, for your love and support.
I was awarded an Australian Postgraduate Scholarship to undertake this PhD project. I thank Prof. John Makeham (ANU) and Dr. Jack Bowers (ANU) for supporting my application.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ...... i
Acknowledgements ...... ii
Part One: The Research Background ...... 1
1. Introduction ...... 3
1.1. Aims ...... 3
1.2. Significance ...... 3
1.3. Methodology...... 3
1.4. A Note on Citations of the Zhuangzi ...... 5
1.5. A Note on Romanisation ...... 6
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation ...... 6
2. Mysticism ...... 9
2.1. Origins of the Term ...... 9
2.1.1. Usage in the 18th Century ...... 11
2.1.2. Usage in the 19th Century ...... 28
2.2. Main Issues in the Study of Mysticism ...... 30
2.2.1. Mysticism is One-and-the-Same ...... 31
2.2.2. There Several Different Kinds of Mystical Experience ...... 32
2.2.3. There is a Common Core of Mystical Experience which Mystics Variously Interpret...... 34
2.2.4. Mysticism and Drugs ...... 37
2.2.5. Constructivism ...... 43
2.2.6. De-Constructionism ...... 51
2.2.7. Who can be a ‘Mystic’? ...... 53
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2.2.8. Radical Empiricism & New Directions for the Study of Mysticism ...... 57
2.3. Examples of Mystical Texts ...... 60
2.3.1. Revelations of Divine Love ...... 61
2.3.2. The Story of My Heart...... 63
2.4. Conclusions ...... 64
Part Two: Analysis of Interpretations of Mysticism in the Zhuangzi ...... 67
3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy ...... 69
3.1. Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China ...... 69
3.1.1. Taoist Yoga: Nanguo Ziqi as a Zhuangzi-Daoist-Mystic ...... 70
3.2. China in Antiquity ...... 73
3.2.1. Via Purgativa ...... 76
3.2.2. A Systematic Method of Mysticism from Laozi to Zhuangzi ...... 77
3.3. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy...... 80
3.4. The World of Thought in Ancient China ...... 84
3.4.1. Explaining the Mysticism of Mind Fasting in More Detail ...... 89
3.5. Disputers of the Tao ...... 91
3.6. ‘Two Notes on the Translation of the Taoist Classics’ ...... 94
3.6.1. Mind-Fasting; The Gui and the Shen Lodge Within Me ...... 95
3.7. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy...... 97
3.8. Introduction to Chinese Philosophy ...... 101
3.9. Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy ...... 104
3.10. Conclusions ...... 108
4. Introductions to Daoism ...... 110
4.1. Taoist Meditation ...... 110
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4.2. Taoism: Growth of a Religion ...... 111
4.3. Daoism Handbook ...... 112
4.3.1. ‘Mind-Fasting’ According to Daoism Handbook ...... 113
4.3.2. ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ According to Daoism Handbook ...... 113
4.3.3. A Different Characterisation of the Zhuangzi ...... 115
4.4. Daoism and Chinese Culture ...... 116
4.5. Introducing Daoism ...... 121
4.5.1. Different Representations of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ ...... 122
4.6. The Daoist Tradition ...... 124
4.7. An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies...... 130
4.8. Conclusions ...... 133
5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism ...... 135
5.1. ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’ in Mysticism and Religious Traditions ... 135
5.1.1. ‘If a Mirror is Bright, no Dust Settles on It’ ...... 139
5.2. Mysticism and Kingship in China ...... 142
5.3. Early Chinese Mysticism ...... 144
5.4. ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’ ...... 148
5.5. ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’...... 149
5.6. ‘Just Say No to “No-Self” in the Zhuangzi’ ...... 153
5.7. ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’ ...... 154
5.7.1. ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ Corresponds to a Rhetorical Structure of Mystical Praxis 156
5.8. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Origins of Taoist Mysticism 158
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5.8.1. Interpreting ‘The Dao’ ...... 158
5.8.2. Priority on Practices ...... 160
5.8.3. Original Tao and the Zhuangzi ...... 164
5.9. ‘Bimodal Mystical experience in the “Qiwulun 齊物論” chapter of the the Zhuangzi 莊子’ ...... 166
5.10. ‘Confucianism and Daoism’ in Comparative Mysticism ...... 174
5.11. ‘Mysticism’ in Zhuangzi Text and Context ...... 176
5.12. Conclusions ...... 180
6. Translations of the Zhuangzi ...... 182
6.1. Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer ...... 182
6.1.1. The Self ...... 182
6.1.2. Dao and God ...... 183
6.1.3. Comparing Zhuangzi with Ancient Greek Philosophers ...... 185
6.1.4. Comparing Zhuangzi with Christianity ...... 187
6.1.5. Contribution to the Ruling Theory of Daoism ...... 188
6.2. Musings of a Chinese Mystic ...... 191
6.2.1. Quietism and the Zhuangzi ...... 192
6.2.2. Eliminating Self ...... 194
6.2.3. Denouncing the Mysticism of the Zhuangzi ...... 195
6.3. Chuang-Tzŭ: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang...... 196
6.3.1. The Great Clump ...... 198
6.3.2. True People ...... 201
6.3.3. Mind like a Mirror ...... 203
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6.3.4. Riding the Wind and the Free Person ...... 203
6.4. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu ...... 206
6.4.1. Ineffability of the Metaphysical Ultimate...... 206
6.4.2. Experiencing the Metaphysical Ultimate...... 208
6.5. Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters ...... 209
6.5.1. Everything is One ...... 209
6.5.2. Experiencing the Common Ground ...... 210
6.6. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings ...... 211
6.6.1. The Mysticism ‘Wild Card’ ...... 213
6.7. Conclusions ...... 214
7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi ...... 217
7.1. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because the Text is Spiritual ...... 217
7.2. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because Mysticism is Incompatible with First- Rate Philosophy ...... 218
7.2.1. Issues in Logic are not Necessarily Disincentive to take Texts Seriously 220
7.2.2. Overlap between Philosophy and Mysticism ...... 222
7.3. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because Mysticism is Meaningless ...... 225
7.3.1. ‘Mystical Boundary’ Translation ...... 226
7.3.2. Different Meanings for ‘Mysticism’ in the Zhuangzi ...... 228
7.4. The Zhuangzi is not Mysticism because the Zhuangzi is Philosophy ...... 232
7.5. Zhuangzi is not Mystical because he is not an Anti-Rationalist ...... 234
7.6. Zhuangzi is not Mystical because he is an Anti-Rationalist ...... 237
7.6.1. Zhuangzi, Hui Shi, Hermits, and Mystics...... 239
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7.6.2. Overlap between ‘Anti-Rationalism’ and ‘Mysticism’ ...... 240
7.7. Conclusions ...... 243
Part Three: The Dao of Zhuangzi’s Great Pervader ...... 245
8. Merging with the Great Pervader ...... 247
8.1. Issues Interpreting ‘tong yu da tong’ ...... 248
8.1.1. Image: Hu Jiaxiang’s Diagram Explanation of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ 250
8.2. Issues Interpreting ‘Merging’ ...... 251
8.3. Issues Intepreting ‘datong’ ...... 252
8.4. Sitting and Forgetting (坐忘) ...... 254
8.4.1. The ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ Dialogue ...... 255
8.5. Regarding Dao ...... 257
8.6. My Teacher! My Teacher! ...... 260
8.7. Manifesting a Connection with Dao ...... 263
8.8. The Teacher who is the Great Ancestor ...... 266
8.8.1. Inconsistency Arising from Interpreting the ‘Great Ancestor as Teacher’ to be dao. 274
8.9. Dao Pervades (tong 通) and Unifies ...... 275
8.10. Da Tong Means the Great Dao ...... 282
8.10.1. The Great Image ...... 284
8.11. Supporting Interpretations of Mysticism ...... 286
8.12. Secondary Evidence to Support Interpretations of Mysticism ...... 289
8.12.1. Guo Xiang’s Explanation of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ ...... 289
8.12.2. Cheng Xuanying’s Explanation of Merging with Da Tong ...... 290
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8.13. The Second Occurrence of Da Tong (大通) in the Zhuangzi ...... 292
8.13.1. Is the Second Occurrence of Datong Equivalent to the First? ...... 294
8.14. Conclusions ...... 295
8.14.1. Implications for Interpreting the Zhuangzi as a Mystical Text ...... 296
9. Conclusions of the Dissertation ...... 298
10. Appendix: Table of Features of Mysticism Scholars Indicate in the Zhuangzi . 303
10.1 Critical Reflections on the Sources in the Table of Features ...... 323
Bibliography ...... 325
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Part One: The Research Background
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Aims
In this dissertation, I challenge existing interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. I argue that the Zhuangzi is not the self-evident work of mysticism that scholars have interpreted it to be, nor should we be too quick to superimpose a label used primarily in a diverse range of contexts relating to Western philosophical and religious ideas. In order to develop this thesis, I present a critique of interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Therein, I show how scholars’ interpretations of mysticism are problematic when we consider the Zhuangzi. I contribute to studies of mysticism in the Zhuangzi with my own evaluation of the mystical aspects of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. I argue that we can interpret the passage as mystical through a more nuanced understanding of mysticism and more detailed interpretation of how ideas of an ultimate dao in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage relate to other parts of the Zhuangzi.
1.2. Significance
This dissertation presents a nuanced interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Therein, I give a detailed examination of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. I do not merely assent to dominant ideas to the effect that the Zhuangzi is mystical. Instead, I examine the claims scholars have made about mysticism in the Zhuangzi and assess their convincingness. I show that commonly accepted ideas of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are not strongly supported by argumentation.
This represents an important contribution to Zhuangzi studies because it demonstrates how problematic dominant interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are. In the future, scholars will not be able to accept widely propagated views on mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Instead, scholars will need to be more aware of the complex and nuanced problems of understanding mysticism in general, and the further complexities of labelling the Zhuangzi mystical. As a result, scholars taking into account this research will be able to be more specific about what they mean by mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Scholars will be able to specify what parts of the Zhuangzi are evidence of mysticism, and they will be able to explain how and why we can understand those sections of the text to be mystical.
1.3. Methodology
In this dissertation, I critically analyse studies of the Zhuangzi which suggest that the text espouses mysticism, or embodies elements of mysticism. In that regard, I begin by
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1. Introduction exploring what ‘mysticism’ means in scholarly literature. In the main, scholars use the term ‘mysticism’ in religious and philosophical studies to denote claimed experiences of an Ultimate. I have drawn this understanding from books and articles beginning from when mysticism was first used in the English language, as well as from works by scholars who have made influential contributions to the study of mysticism. The findings here will provide important terms of reference for this dissertation’s understanding of mysticism.
Secondly, I turn to commentaries and studies on the Zhuangzi that characterise the text as espousing mysticism. I analyse and systematically chart how these commentaries and studies attribute mysticism to the Zhuangzi. In order to carry out this analysis, I have selected as widely as possible secondary sources that attribute mysticism to the Zhuangzi. I have classified these studies into various sections in this dissertation. They are: introductions to Chinese philosophy, studies which situate the Zhuangzi in a broader context of Chinese mysticism, introductions to Daoism, and English translations of the Zhuangzi.
Third, I analyse and translate passages in the Zhuangzi that arguably show evidence of characteristics of mysticism. I have selected especially the ‘mind-fasting’ (xin zhai 新齋) and ‘sitting and forgetting’ (zuowang 坐忘) passages because scholars often label them as examples of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. I translate these passages with the help of commentaries and studies in the English and Chinese language literature. My results show that these passages do not communicate mysticism in as straight-forward a manner as scholars have claimed. This is because scholars often interpret passages to the effect: when Zhuangzi says x, he means y; or here, x is talking about union with the ultimate dao.
However, a more literal account of what the Zhuangzi actually says at those points of the text shows that the text does not self-evidently discuss an ‘ultimate dao’ at those points. Moreover, there are methodological difficulties in scholars’ explanations of the Zhuangzi to the effect I paraphrased above. Such interpretations and explanations do not rest on analyses, but rather on conflating scholars’ views on what the text means with what the text says in its own terms. I explain these difficulties in this dissertation in order to provide more detailed analyses which can support the claims of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
I bring the first three sections together to assist in my evaluation of the Zhuangzi as a mystical text: is it a mystical text, and if so, how? Do scholars who interpret the Zhuangzi as communicating a message of mysticism rely on common and convincing notions of mysticism? If so, what are some of the features of mysticism that are typically identified as evident in the Zhuangzi? I argue that we can interpret the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue to
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1. Introduction be mystical because we can plausibly interpret part that dialogue to communicate meaning to the effect of experiencing an ultimate dao. However, this interpretation requires a more nuanced analysis of the Zhuangzi than scholars have hitherto given. I provide such an analysis in this dissertation.
The methodology of this dissertation is primarily philosophical. This means that I engage in the ideas presented in literature on mysticism, literature on the Zhuangzi, and in the received text of the Zhuangzi. I evaluate the convincingness of theories and interpretations by explaining their strengths and weaknesses. I explain how some theories of mysticism are relevant and plausible for interpreting ideas in the Zhuangzi and also how some are not.
Translation also forms part of my methodology. In order to engage with the ideas of the Zhuangzi, we need to know what those ideas are in the original language and appreciate the difficulty of communicating them through translation. At several points in this dissertation, I show that parts of some scholars’ interpretations of the Zhuangzi are not effective because those scholars have relied on, or given, inaccurate translations of content from the Zhuangzi. These inaccuracies in translation are often the result of scholars mistaking their interpretation of what the text means (something mystical) with what the text literally communicates. By treating ideas in the Zhuangzi with attention to what they say in the original language, we gain greater appreciation of how interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi do not always accurately reflect what the Zhuangzi communicates.
1.4. A Note on Citations of the Zhuangzi
In this dissertation, I cite from the Zhuangzi according to the Harvard-Yenching concordance.1 Although the Harvard-Yenching concordance has been superseded by the concordance from the Chinese University of Hong Kong,2 the former is the concordance that most scholars have cited in Chinese philosophy literature. Thus, it has been more convenient to continue using the Harvard-Yenching concordance. Citations to the Harvard-Yenching concordance are given in the following way: chapter/page/line(s) of text.
1 William Hung, ed., Zhuangzi Yinde, Reprint, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Series no.20 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 2 Dim Cheuk Lau, ed., A Concordance to the Zhuangzi 莊子逐字索引, Chinese University of Hong Kong Institute of Chinese Studies the ICS Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series. Philosophical Works No. 43 香港中文大學中國文化硏究所先秦兩漢古籍逐字索引叢刊. 子部 ; 第 43 種 (Honk Kong 香港: The Commercial Press 商務印書館, 2000).
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1. Introduction
Throughout this dissertation, I give my own translations of quotations from the Zhuangzi together with the source text. This shows my original engagement with the source text. This aspect of my methodology enhances my arguments that the Zhuangzi does not say what many scholars interpret to be its meaning in as straight-forward a manner as scholars imply.
Apart from my own translations, explanations, and interpretations of the Zhuangzi, I have also included citations from scholarly English translations of the Zhuangzi. It is not necessary for the reader to really consult other translations, but doing so would give the reader further examples of different translations and interpretations of the Zhuangzi. Were the reader to consult other translations, he/she would find that my translations are closest to those of A.C Graham’s. This is because both Graham and I give translations that tend to be more faithful to what the source text literally says. I think it is important to consider what the source text of the Zhuangzi literally communicates when we come to engage with its philosophical ideas. Doing so shows us that what the source text literally communicates can be ambiguous and that the source text does always present ideas in as systematic or clear a manner as many scholars imply.
1.5. A Note on Romanisation
I use Hanyu Pinyin Romanisation without indicating Mandarin Chinese tones through diacritic marks. This has been a standard way of Romanising Mandarin Chinese in scholarly writing since the 1990s. However, much of the literature that I cite and quote contains Wade- Giles Romanisation. Therefore, the reader will find both Hanyu Pinyin and Wade-Giles Romanisation throughout this dissertation.
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is in three parts. These parts organise the dissertation from the most general points to the most specific. Part one consists of this introduction chapter and the next chapter on mysticism. In part two, I present my critique of interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This critique spans from chapters two through to seven. Part three presents my arguments concerning the mystical dimensions of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ section of the Zhuangzi. I have also included the conclusion chapter of this dissertation in part three.
This dissertation does not contain a traditional literature review chapter. The Zhuangzi has been so extensively studied, and the idea that it is a work of mysticism has been so widely accepted and transmitted, that a short literature review chapter would not sufficiently address
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1. Introduction the topic. Instead, I present several chapters (3-6) wherein I assess interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. These chapters are organised according to groups of literature which have transmitted interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, within each chapter, I present my critiques of these bodies of literature in chronological order. In this way, the reader can see how interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi developed over time.
In Chapter 2, ‘Mysticism’, I demonstrate that mysticism is a more complex topic than scholars who label the Zhuangzi mystical allow. Considering mysticism in detail provides a theoretical framework for understanding mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Chapters 3 through 6 present my assessment of interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Chapter 3 is entitled ‘Introductions to Chinese Philosophy’. In that chapter, I show how mysticism in the Zhuangzi has been characterised in introductions to Chinese philosophy. Chapter 4 is entitled ‘Introductions to Daoism’. This chapter presents my critique of how introductions to Daoism have presented interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Chapter 5 is entitled, ‘The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism’. This chapter examines contributions wherein scholars present the Zhuangzi as an example of Chinese mysticism. Chapter 6 is entitled, ‘Translations of the Zhuangzi’. This chapter presents my assessment of how scholars have related ideas of mysticism in the Zhuangzi through translations. I focus on English translations of the Zhuangzi for they are the most voluminous and influential, owing to the widespread use of the English language. In fact, in the conclusion of the chapter, I include some reflections on how the first German translation of the Zhuangzi was made from one of the first English translations.
In chapter 7, ‘Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi’, I present counter-arguments to interpretations that mysticism is not part of the Zhuangzi. This chapter presents a more nuanced understanding of problems in labelling the Zhuangzi mystical as well as difficulties in arguing against interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
In chapter 8, ‘Merging with the Great Pervader’, I supply arguments to support interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The first is an argument supporting the idea that the usage of ‘da tong 大通’ in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue of the Zhuangzi is a metaphor for an ultimate dao (道). The second is that on this basis, the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is an example of mysticism because it relates ideas of experiencing, or uniting with, a metaphysical ultimate. This chapter is significant because the arguments I supply fill a missing step in argumentation that I identify in part two (chapters 3-6) of this dissertation.
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1. Introduction
Chapter 9, ‘Conclusions of the Dissertation’, is the conclusion chapter of this dissertation. In this conclusion chapter, I summarise significant findings of research presented in this dissertation. I also include reflections on the significance of my findings concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi and the larger Daoist tradition.
Appendix 1 is entitled ‘Table of Features of Mysticism that Scholars Indicate in the Zhuangzi’. This appendix graphically shows where and how scholars have indicated mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The appendix also contains my reflections on the characterisations of mysticism in the table.
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2. Mysticism 2. Mysticism
The aim of this chapter is to understand how the term ‘mysticism’ has been used in scholarly literature. This will provide a background of literature against which we can begin to understand applications of the term ‘mysticism’. This is important because scholars in Chinese philosophy have interpreted mysticism to be part of the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi. Before we examine what they mean in the following chapters, we need first to understand the intellectual context from which these scholars might have derived their usage of the term.
In this chapter, I present three arguments. First, ‘mysticism’ comes from Indo- European languages and Western religious contexts, so it is problematic to apply the term and many of its associated meanings to the Zhuangzi. Second, philosophers of religion have given, and continue to give, different definitions of what counts as mysticism. Therefore, in order to arrive at an understanding of mysticism that is general enough to include the Zhuangzi, we need to present core elements of mysticism from the literature. Third, the core of mysticism arising from this literature includes a variety of experiences combining unusual psychological experiences which are related to one’s religious and/or philosophical commitments, especially concerning an ‘ultimate’.
I have drawn from a wide variety of texts and views on mysticism. My rationale has been to develop an understanding of mysticism from the most original and authoritative sources on the subject. A further reason is to show how understandings and connotations of mysticism have varied over time in literature dedicated to the subject drawn mainly from Western sources and focussing mostly on Western religious traditions. Since there is such variation in understandings of mysticism within the Western tradition alone, it seems problematic to apply the label of ‘mysticism’ to the Zhuangzi, as if there were a univocal consensus on ‘mysticism’ that we can easily apply to disparate traditions.
2.1. Origins of the Term
There have been many definitions of mysticism. Many focus on explaining mysticism in terms of cultivating experiences of altered states of awareness that a person interprets to be of religious and/or philosophical significance. For example, the entry on mysticism in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy gives a description of mysticism based on James’ Varieties of Religious Experience and his four ‘marks’ of ‘the mystical consciousness’. Additionally, the author writes:
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2. Mysticism
Perhaps we should add a fifth, that mystical experiences often, perhaps characteristically, involve what is now called an ‘altered state of consciousness’—trance, visions, suppression of cognitive contact with the ordinary world, loss of the usual distinction between subject and object, weakening or loss of the sense of the self, etc.3
Furthermore, the entry in the Penguin Dictionary of Psychology describes mysticism as: ‘A doctrine that knowledge of ultimate reality (theological or otherwise) comes about in nonordinary [sic] ways, i.e. through means other than sensory input and cognitive processes.’4 Giving an account of all definitions of mysticism would not be constructive because it would merely be a long list of descriptive entries. Therefore, in this chapter, I engage with explanations of mysticism that have been cited widely in scholarly literature.
The term ‘mysticism’ is etymologically related to the words ‘mysterious’ and ‘mystery’. The root-word for these English terms is the Greek μυω (muo), meaning ‘to close’ or ‘to conceal’.5 The ancient Greeks used this term, and its other forms: ‘in connection with the Mystery religions, that is, with those cults whose essential rites were kept hidden from all but the initiated.’6As scholars such as Louis Bouyer have pointed out, the way people use terms like ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical’ in modern English shows that the terms have taken on a broader meaning than their derivation.7 This broader meaning includes traditions and beliefs that earlier usages of terms like mysticism did not include. In this way, terms like ‘mystical’, ‘mysticism’, and ‘mystic’ have come to denote mysterious, unfathomable, and profound experiences and ideas that form part of esoteric doctrines and spiritual practices.8
3 George I. Mavrodes, Mysticism (Oxford University Press, 2005). 4 Arthur S. Reber, Rhianon Allen, and Emily S. Reber, Penguin Dictionary of Psychology (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 494. 5 David Baumgardt, Great Western Mystics: Their Lasting Significance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1–2; F.C. Happold, Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology, Revised (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970), 18; Julia Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1983), 226–27; Louis Bouyer, ‘Mysticism/An Essay on the History of the Word’, in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 43; Robert Alfred Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics (Kessinger Publishing, n.d.), 15–18; Jerome Gellman, Mysticism, 2011. 6 Bouyer, ‘Mysticism/An Essay on the History of the Word’, 43. See also Baumgardt, Great Western Mystics: Their Lasting Significance, 1–2. 7 Bouyer, ‘Mysticism/An Essay on the History of the Word’, 43–45; Evelyn T. Underhill, ‘The Essentials of Mysticism’, in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 26–27; Margaret Smith, ‘The Nature and Meaning of Mysticism’, in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 19. 8 See also Bernard McGinn, ‘Christian Mysticism’, in Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 157–158, et passim.
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2. Mysticism
In order to get a clearer idea of what counts as secret and esoteric practices labelled mystical, both in general and in the Zhuangzi, we must first explain more about what terms such as ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’, ‘mysticism’, and ‘mystical experience’ connote. I explain these features of mysticism below.
2.1.1. Usage in the 18th Century
Scholars were using the terms ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’, and ‘mysticism’ in the eighteenth century. These terms were used in scholarly literature in a number of fields to describe people and practices that were spiritual yet esoteric, and, in their view, deviant. Below, I consider several examples. They come from Henry Coventry’s Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion,9 William Hurd’s A New Universal History of the Religions,10 David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,11 and the 3rd edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica.12 These sources represent some of the earliest usages of terms like ‘mystic’ and ‘mysticism’ in the English language. They provide valuable insight into the historical development of the idea of mysticism which also reveals how problematic it can be to think of non-Western traditions, such as Daoism and the Zhuangzi, as mysticism.
2.1.1.1.Mysticism as False Religion
Henry Coventry includes a discussion of mystics and mysticism in his book Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion. The inclusion of mystics and mysticism in a book explicitly denouncing what the author calls ‘false religion’ shows that Coventry does not hold mystics and mysticism in esteem. On the contrary, what Coventry writes about mystics and mysticism reveals the disdain in which he holds them. For example, Coventry writes that, in his view, mysticism arises from misplaced passions, especially among women, and men possessed of too many feminine
9 Henry Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion (London: J. Roberts, 1736). 10 William Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, Ceremonies and Customs, of the Whole World, Or, A Complete and Impartial View of All the Religions in the Various Nations of the Universe, Both Ancient and Modern, from the Creation Down to the Present Time ...: Together with the History of the Reformed Churches ... : To Which Is Added, A Geographical Description of the Various Parts, the Religious Rites and Ceremonies of Whose Inhabitants Are Faithfully Described, 5th ed. (London: Richard Evans, 1782). 11 The dialogues are contained within David Hume, Hume on Religion (London: Collins, 1963). 12 Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature: Constructed on a Plan by Which the Different Sciences and Arts Are Digested into the Form of Distinct Treatises or Systems, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: A. Bell and C. Macfarquhar, 1797).
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2. Mysticism characteristics.13 In fact, the section on false religion arising from female character traits leads into the section on mysticism; Coventry explicitly links the two. Coventry links mysticism with misplaced feminine passions in the following way: ‘It is this way of thinking and talking [i.e., with misplaced feminine passions] in Religion (said I,) that, I suppose, has given rise to what is called Mystical Theology, the teachers whereof have been accordingly styled Mystics.’14 By linking mysticism with misplaced female passions, Coventry reveals both his misogyny and his disdain towards what he considers to be the false religion of mysticism.
Coventry criticises female mystics harshly. However, in doing so, he describes some core features of mysticism, so it is worth analysing his denouncement of female mystics in order to get a more general understanding of features of mysticism. He writes: ‘whilst these raptur’d Inamoratos imagine they are paying homage to the Divinity, they are actually in reality but worshipping the Idol of their own Inclinations. They are a sort of religious Debouchees [sic] . . . who have found out the Art of reconciling Grace and Nature, Piety and Sensuality.’15 In Coventry’s view, people (but especially women) who claim to have direct experience of the love of Jesus, especially where they liken Jesus to a romantic lover, are debouched practitioners of false religion. He sees mystical claims of direct experience of Christian divinity as impious and not in keeping with the true spirit of Christianity.
Coventry includes quotations from primary sources of mystical literature as examples of what he sees as debouched and impious ways of practicing Christianity. Many of the quotations are in Latin without English translation, so they are of little help to the modern reader. However, some are in English translation. One example is Coventry’s quotation from Thomas à Kempis’ (1380-1471 CE) Confessions which he counts among examples of Books of Devotion (I discuss Kempis’ mysticism in the sections below). It reads: ‘My dearest Lord, when shall I enjoy and talk with thee alone, in Language soft and tender, sweet and charming as the unreserved Reinterments, and endearing Whispers of the most passionate Lovers?’16
In this example, we can see that the mystic, Thomas à Kempis, expresses wishes to have direct experiences of God. That such experiences might be possible are not part of ordinary Christian faith, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox, according to Coventry. Hence, Coventry denounces those ideas and teachings.
13 See Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion, 47 et passim. 14 Ibid., 54–55. 15 Ibid., 52. 16 Coventry cites the source as ‘Thomas a Kempis, translated by Stanhope, p.325’. See ibid., 53.
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Moreover, Kempis relates his desired experience of God in terms ordinarily reserved for romantic love among people. A man relating a relationship with God in terms usually used to express romantic love with a woman would likely have appeared perverse, with homo- erotic connotations. This would not have been accepted according to the standards of gender, sexuality, religious experience, and expression of 18th century England. Hence, the use of language, and the ideas it expresses, are also part of the reasons why Coventry denounces mystics like Thomas à Kempis as practitioners of false religion.
Language usage is also a feature of the esotericism of mysticism. In the example from Thomas à Kempis quoted above, he uses language in a context which is mysterious and unlike the core doctrines of Christianity, or at least the exoteric interpretations and experiences of them which were (and still are) mainstream. Using language in non-ordinary ways contributes to the mysteriousness of the experiences, beliefs, and doctrines that religious thinkers, such as Thomas à Kempis, sought to express. This is part of what makes them mystics.17
2.1.1.2.Mystics as Part of the History of Religious Rites
William Hurd’s ‘Account of the Mystics’ exemplifies 18th century usage of the term ‘mystic’ and scholarly attitude towards mysticism. Hurd presents a critique of mystics as a series of sects of Christians. He begins his account by writing: ‘We have left our account of these smaller sects, till the concluding part of this work, because they were never . . . properly embodied.’18 As becomes clear from Hurd’s account, he does not consider religious views or experiences that are not part of a Church to be properly ‘embodied’ forms of religion.
Hurd gives general accounts of several mystics, saving the most eminent for last. They are: Saint Austin (354-480);19 the Anglo-Saxon monk, Bede (673-735); Saint Bernard (1090- 1153);20 [Thomas a] Kempis (1380-1471), Bona, and Drexilius; and finally, the French Catholic mystic, Madame Guyon (1648-1717). Hurd only gives general descriptions of Saint Austin, Bede, Saint Bernard, and Kempis, Bona, and Drexilius. What he writes about St.
17 See also the section ‘Linguistic Considerations’ in Steven T. Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, in Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16–20. 18 Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 766. 19 For excerpts from St. Austin with some discussion, see Bernard McGuinn, ‘Christian Mysticism’, in Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 202–4. 20 For excerpts from St. Bernard with discussion, see ibid., 177–79, 208–10.
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Austin, as well as Kempis, Bona, and Drexilius, reveals more of his views on how mysticism is a form of dissent.
Hurd writes of St. Austin: ‘As far as we know, the first Mystic writer was St. Austin, bishop of Hippo, Africa.’21 However, Hurd defends St. Austin as not being a complete dissident. He writes: ‘but this celebrated father did not dissent from the religion as established in the empire.’22 Here, we can see that Hurd offers a reason for not holding St. Austin in complete disdain: it is that St. Austin was not a complete dissident. This implies that mystics often are dissidents who dissent from their religion in order to practice their own impious beliefs.
Nonetheless, Hurd labels St. Austin a mystic because some of his religious practices and ideas were esoteric and mysterious. The brief explanation Hurd gives tells us that St Austin gathered young men who ‘lived with him in cloisters adjoining to his church and he taught them those notions which are to be found in his confessions.’23 From Hurd’s account, we can see that St Austin had unusual notions on religious practice which set him apart from the mainstream followers of his faith. Hurd’s defence of St. Austin as not completely dissenting from his established religion shows that Hurd holds mystics to be in danger of being religious dissidents. This means that their notions on religious experience and practice must be at variance with orthodoxy. This is a mark of mystery and esotericism concerning spiritual and religious experience and practice that warrants the label of mysticism.
Hurd gives us no details of Kempis,24 Bona, and Drexilius. He only tells us that there are ‘many fine things’ in their writings.25 He continues: ‘we must now consider them as a general sect ; [sic] and strange as it may appear, a woman was chiefly concerned with the institution of them.’26 The woman to whom Hurd alludes is the French Catholic mystic, Madame Guyon.27
21 Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 766. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Henry Coventry, in an earlier work than Hurd’s, quotes from Kempis’ confessions. See Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion, 53. 25 Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 767. 26 Ibid. 27 On Madame Guyon, see Mystics of the North-East: Including I. Letters of James Keith, M.D., and Others to Lord Deskford, II. Correspondence between Dr. George Garden and James Cunningham (Aberdeen: The Third Spalding Club [in association with] Aberdeen University Press, 1934), 14–20, 100, 111, 121, 142; Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, Book X. See also Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 767.
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Madame Guyon is the mystic to whom Hurd devotes the most attention in his ‘Account of the Mystics’. First, Hurd explains that Guyon is a mystic because of the views she expressed and published concerning spiritual matters of religious experience. Hurd describes them thus: ‘[Guyon] published several pieces on divine love, spiritual mindedness, the elevation of the soul to Christ, the looking above all earthly things, to reject or at least consider, the externals of religion as mere trifles, and to retire within themselves for the purposes of contemplation [sic].’28 Here we see elements of mysticism in Hurd’s account of Guyon. They include a more direct way of experiencing elements of one’s religious beliefs. For Guyon, her followers (and Christian mystics generally) this includes ideas such as ‘the elevation of the soul to Christ’ without the mediation of a Catholic priest.
A further part of Guyon’s teaching that Hurd relates as mystical is her idea of seeking religious experience by retiring within oneself for the purposes of contemplation. This entails placing less emphasis on ‘the externals of religion’ and more emphasis on one’s own experiences and practices of one’s religion. As Hurd explains, for Guyon, a French Catholic woman, ‘the externals of religion’ meant ‘the popish religion [which] consists chiefly in ceremonies’.29 Here we can see that it is a mark of mysticism for one to claim a direct experience of the divine. In the context of Catholicism, such an idea, let alone claims to have experienced it for oneself, is inherently heterodox and esoteric, for it undermines the role of Catholic priests and church dogma.
Hurd relates the consequences of Guyon’s teachings. They include being censured by the pope and subsequently retiring to Holland (where the Pope’s influence was not so great).30 Hurd then gives a critique of how Guyon’s teachings were practiced by followers in England. He writes: ‘They ran into wild extravagancies, and although they were at first very inoffensive, yet in the end they became most mysterious indeed.’31 Here, we see that ‘wild extravagancies’ and mysteriousness concerning spiritual matters and religious experience are marks of mysticism.
Hurd does not give a detailed account of the mysterious extravagancies of Guyon’s followers. However, he continues to judge Guyon, her followers, and all mystics, through an unfavourable analogy. He writes: ‘As all violent disorders in the human body either kill or cure, so violences in religion have the same effect. This was the case with the Mystics, who,
28 Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 767. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
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2. Mysticism by their violent attachment to things above religion, lost what reason they had.’32 Here, we can see Hurd’s unfavourable appraisal of the value of mystical teachings. He slanders them as not being rational and placing too much value on ‘things above religion’.
Hurd ends his critique of mystics with a summary of the worth of mystical ideas and practices. He writes:
Upon the whole, the Mystics, [sic] who at present seem to have hearts inclined towards piety, but very confused heads, with minds susceptible of serious impressions of religion, by neglecting the use of reason they run into a vast number of absurdities. . . . although we would not call them criminal, yet we are certain that they are mistaken.33
Hurd’s account of mystics is one of the earliest literary explanations of mysticism. In it, Hurd does not claim there to be a universal mystical experience that different mystics from different sects all experience, let alone those from different religious traditions. He is using the term ‘mystic’ to label certain deviant practitioners of Christianity and their ideas. Nonetheless, we can see some general features of mysticism in Hurd’s account. They are: mysteriousness, claims of direct experience of the divine, esotericism, and a more individual and personal kind of religious experience.
In a later part of this dissertation, the reader will see more connections between associating mysticism with ‘anti-rationalism’ as a feature of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, according to some scholars. When scholars have labelled the Zhuangzi mystical because they see advocacy of ‘non-reason’ or ‘anti-rationalism’ in the text, they do not make any link with literature on mysticism. Instead, they present these interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi as if they are self-evident and not dependent on a larger context of interpreting mysticism. However, at this point, I suggest that associating mysticism with the non-rational has been part of a larger context for understanding, identifying, and interpreting examples of mysticism since at least the 18th century. The reader will see further evidence of this aspect of identifying mysticism in the below section on quietism.
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.
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2.1.1.3.Quietists as a Sect of Mystics
Hurd writes that there are overlaps between those who are termed ‘quietists’ and those who are termed ‘mystics’. However, Hurd distinguishes quietism from mysticism for two main reasons. The first is the most explicit. It is the association of quietism with Catholicism. Hurd writes: ‘Of all the sects we have hitherto treated of, this [quietism] bears the most resemblance to that of the Mystics, only that this sect has long been confined to the Roman Catholic Church, whereas the Mystics joined the Protestants.’34 However, the reader will recall that Hurd includes Madame Guyon, the French Catholic, among the mystics in his ‘Account of the Mystics’ earlier in the same work. It therefore seems that quietism is a more particular kind of mysticism, one that is associated with the Catholic church, at least in Hurd’s usage.
The second reason for distinguishing quietism from mysticism appears to be that quietism is a more organised form of religious practice and belief, whereas mysticism is not. We can see this throughout Hurd’s account of quietism. He gives more details of historical figures, their beliefs, practices, and contributions to quietism. For example, Hurd explains the derivation of the terms ‘quietism’ and ‘quietists’ (whereas he gives no explanation of the etymology of mysticism). He writes: ‘The name [Quietism] is taken from an absolute state of rest and inaction which the soul is supposed to be in, when arrived at the state of perfection.’35
Hurd continues to elaborate upon the quietists’ beliefs of the state of perfection of the soul. He writes: ‘In this state it [the soul] has no occasion for prayers, or hymns, or vows . . . It is now changed, and it is transformed, as it were, sunk and swallowed up in the Divine Being, insomuch, as not to know its being distinguished from God himself.’36 Here, we see important features which overlap between mysticism and quietism. Through a process of contemplation and quietening the soul, quietists claimed to experience ‘sinking’ into the ‘Divine Being’ in a state we can call non-dualistic experience of their ultimate. This is a significant feature of mystical experience that Hurd presents more explicitly in his account of quietists than of mystics.
The overlap between quietism and mysticism becomes clearer in the next section of Hurd’s article. He quotes a letter from one Bishop Burnet concerning the quietists. Part of the letter reads: ‘He [Michael de Molinos, the founder of the Quietist sect] is a Spanish priest . . .
34 Ibid., 775. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.
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2. Mysticism and is certainly a very ill reasoner when he undertakes to prove his opinion. He hath writ [sic] a book, which is entitled il Guida Spirituale [sic], or the Spiritual Guide, which is a short abstract of the Mystical Divinity’.37 Here, we see Hurd quoting Bishop Barnet on the fundamental aspects of quietist belief, which the Bishop says relate to ‘the Mystical Divinity’. Hence, there is overlap in the fundamental beliefs of quietists and mystics. The main reason to distinguish them, it seems, is that quietists are a more organised sect within the Catholic church, whereas mystics are not.
Bishop Burnet summarises the main tenets of quietist and mystic belief. He writes: ‘the substance of the whole is reduced to this, that in our prayers and other devotions, the best methods are to retire the mind from all gross images, and so to form an act of faith, and thereby to present ourselves before God’.38 Thus, quietists and mystics share belief that one can have individual and direct contact with God through clearing one’s mind of ‘gross images’. In literature on mysticism, these kinds of locutions are taken to be evidence of apophatic (i.e., clearing away, saying away) meditation/contemplation practices (as will become clearer in later parts of this dissertation). Through such practices, people claim to experience quietude, calmness, and often consider the practice and the experience as religiously significant. It is common to present such mind-quietening practices as leading to an experience of what one believes to be the Ultimate of one’s religious/philosophical beliefs. Bishop Barnet and William Hurd both identify these features of experiencing the Ultimate in their discussions of quietist/mystic beliefs concerning the methods of practicing their religion
2.1.1.4.Mystics of the North-East
In Mystics of the North-East, G.D. Henderson collates letters exchanged between followers of the mystic, Madame Guyon, as well as those of some of her followers. One of the Scottish followers of Madame Guyon, James Garden, also authored a book of his own concerning theology, called Comparative Theology.39 However, none of these Scottish ‘Apostles of Mysticism’ actually use terms like ‘mystic’ in these letters. Moreover, James Garden’s Comparative Theology does not use terms such as ‘mystical’ and ‘mysticism’. How
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 James Garden, Comparative Theology; or The True and Solid Grounds of Pure and Peaceable Theology (Glasgow: R & A Foulis, 1752). See also Mystics of the North-East: Including I. Letters of James Keith, M.D., and Others to Lord Deskford, II. Correspondence between Dr. George Garden and James Cunningham.
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2. Mysticism then, does the editor of Mystics of the North-East work justify calling them ‘mystics of the north-east’?
One reason is because these works contain utterances that are evidence of a generalised understanding of ‘mysticism’ current in Henderson’s time. For example, Garden writes:
But inasmuch as the inward manifestations of the Holy Ghost do require a calm and composed mind; . . . and the sweet and gentle voice of the Holy Spirit, teaching and admonishing in the bottom of the heart, cannot be heard and observed by unregenerate men, because of the obstreperous noise and din blustering and tumultuating [sic] passions and lusts: therefore it became necessary to call in the assistance of a gross and corporeal way of teaching, such as might make its way into the mind through the senses.40
The above passage shows how James Garden (one of the ‘mystics of the north east’) expressed ideas concerning how to experience profound teachings in his religion. He holds that having a ‘calm and composed mind’ is best for experiencing the ‘inward manifestations’ of the Holy Ghost. It is also clear that Garden thought that outward, ‘corporeal’ ways of teaching his religion are not as good as experiencing the ‘inward manifestations’ of the Holy Ghost for one’s self.
These are some notable features of Garden’s thought which qualify him a ‘a mystic’, at least according to the editor of Mystics of the North-East. They are features of Garden’s thought that the editor may have had in mind when writing that for Garden: ‘the highest attainment being the enjoyment of the immediate presence of God, thorough penitence, self- denial, renunciation of the world’.41 These are more general features of mysticism: going on a quest to experience one’s Ultimate through individual practices. These individual practices take people’s attention away from the external aspects of their religion and allow them to focus more on the internal and purportedly more profound aspects of religion.
40 Garden, Comparative Theology; or The True and Solid Grounds of Pure and Peaceable Theology, 47–48. 41 Mystics of the North-East: Including I. Letters of James Keith, M.D., and Others to Lord Deskford, II. Correspondence between Dr. George Garden and James Cunningham, 14.
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2.1.1.5.Mysticism in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Discussion of mystics (and by extension, mysticism) occurs in part of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.42 It is not surprising that the topic of mysticism emerges in Hume’s inquiry into the philosophy of religion; mysticism is a special topic within this field. Hume’s discussion of mysticism in the Dialogues represents one of the earliest discussions of mysticism by a major philosopher.
However, mysticism only occurs within the broader context of Hume’s arguments in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume is not interested in researching mysticism for its own sake. Instead, mysticism features as one of the absurdities in the philosophy of religion that he ultimately seeks to discredit.43 Nonetheless, by discussing how mysticism features in Hume’s Dialogues, we can gain deeper understanding of the complexities of mysticism and how mysticism has been understood in major works in the philosophy of religion. This will ultimately form part of a background theory of mysticism and inform our understanding of how problematic it is to label the Zhuangzi a work of mysticism.
The first allusion to mysticism in the Dialogues occurs in relation to a broader topic in the philosophy of religion which Hume engages more directly: the problem of ascribing human attributes to a Supreme Being. This occurs within the broader context of Hume’s criticism of argument from design.44The character, DEMEA, critiques the idea of ascribing human attributes to a Supreme Being with reference to Plotinus. Hume writes:
The ancient PLATONISTS . . . were the most religious and devout of all the PAGAN philosophers: yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, expressly declare, that intellect of understanding are not to be ascribed to the Deity, and that out most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of
42 The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are a profound contribution to the philosophy of religion and I cannot do justice to their entire scope of significance here. For discussion on the scope and significance of the Dialogues, see Richard Wollheim, ‘Introduction’, in Hume on Religion (London: Collins, 1963); Paul Russell, ‘Hume on Religion’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/hume- religion/; William Edward Morris and Charlotte R. Brown, ‘David Hume’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2015, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/hume/. 43 See also ‘8. Hume’s Genealogy of Religion: Causes and Dynamics of Religious Belief’ in Paul Russell, ‘Hume on Religion’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/hume-religion/. 44 See the section ‘4. The Argument from Design’ in ibid.
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veneration, reverence, gratitude or love; but in a certain mysterious self- annihilation or total extinction of all our faculties.45
This is an allusion to Plotinus’ involvement with the mystery religions in what is usually called ‘mysticism’.46 Hume does not draw out this topic any further at this point of his Dialogues. He paraphrases some of Plotinus’ ideas in order to support his own conclusion that we ought not to imagine that a Supreme Being would be human-like. Hume presents this conclusion thus: ‘by representing the Deity as so intelligible, and comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole universe.’47 Hume’s paraphrase of Plotinus, one of the most well-known and philosophical of all mystics, supports his conclusion of the non-human characteristics of a Supreme Being. It appears that Hume makes use of mystics’ commitments when they help argue against the absurdities of theist positions, such as argument from design. However, this does not mean that Hume finds mysticism free from absurdities, either.
Hume’s judgement of mystics (and by extension, mysticism) occurs within the broader context of his enquiries into the philosophy of religion. To summarise, when Hume has more to say about mystics, he has already presented the following ideas through the characters in his dialogue: 1) that there is a Supreme Being, or Deity, who is Author of the Universe; 2) that the Supreme Being must not be human because many of the imperfections of humanity would have no place in a Supreme Being; 3) that there are elements of the Supreme Being which are therefore beyond the human and unintelligible to humans.48 It is against this background of ideas that Hume introduces his critique of mystics and mysticism in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Part IV of the Dialogues begins with the character, Cleanthes, attempting to critique the position of Demea concerning knowledge of the Supreme Being. Cleanthes argues that Demea’s position concerning the ineffability of the Supreme Being is incompatible with the position of theism which Demea hitherto maintained. This position of theism entails that there is a God and that humans can know something of God. Cleanthes presents his critique thus:
45 Hume, Hume on Religion, 130. 46 See also Plotinus, The Enneads: Abridged with an Introduction, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Plotinus, The Enneads: A New, Definitive Edition with Comparisons to Other Translations on Hundreds of Key Passages (Burdett, New York: Published for the Paul Brunton Philosophic Foundation by Larson Publications, 1992). 47 Hume, Hume on Religion, 130. 48 Ibid., 131.
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Or how do you MYSTICS [sic], who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics and Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting the production [of the universe] by a mind … resembling the human [mind] … they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific intelligible cause.49
Here, we see Hume critiquing mystics for claiming to know something of ‘the ultimate’ which they also claim is ‘unknowable’ and ‘ineffable’. If the ultimate is truly ineffable and unintelligible, then it does not follow that some people (i.e., mystics) can have experiences of ‘the ultimate’ and claim to know something of ‘the ultimate’. Hume uses the characters in the Dialogues to point out this problem in mystical claims concerning the Ultimate.
Hume (through the character of Cleanthes) carries on this critique. He writes: ‘And their [mystics’] conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, if they refuse to call the universal, unknown cause a God or Deity; and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets, as you shall please to require of them.’50 This is a criticism of typical mystical ideas such as ‘the ultimate’ being unknowable, yet claiming to have knowledge of how ‘the ultimate’ is unknowable, or what the unknowable features of ‘the ultimate’ are. One common feature is ineffability. Thus, one mystic, Meister Eckhart, coined the term of ‘Godhead’ as a place-holder for ‘God’ who is not totally know-able to human minds.51 Nonetheless, Hume only alludes to these kinds of ideas, so we can only take them as his indications of general problems in the kinds of mysticism known to him.
Next, Demea points out that Cleanthes labelling him as a mystic is ad hominem. He says: ‘who could imagine … that CLEANTHES … would attempt to refute his antagonists, by affixing a nick-name to them; and like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning?’52 In this way, Hume shows that dismissing people’s claims about larger issues in the philosophy of religion merely by calling them mystics in a pejorative sense is a kind of name-calling, i.e., ad hominem. Such behaviour does not engage a person’s arguments, but merely attacks the person and belittles
49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., 131–32. 51 See Reiner Schürmann, Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher (Bloomington, 1978), 45–47; McGuinn, ‘Christian Mysticism’, 223–29. 52 Hume, Hume on Religion, 132.
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2. Mysticism him as ‘a mystic’. It is not a constructive way of inquiring into the issues, as Hume points out in this part of the Dialogues.
Thereupon, Hume, through the character of Demea, moves on to engage some aspects of Cleanthes’ larger arguments. The bigger issue here is that the mind of a Supreme Being ought not to be like the mind of a human. Human minds are subject to change, disorder, incomplete ideas, etc. However, the mind of a Supreme Being would not be like that. Hume puts it thus:
How is this [the human mind] compatible, with that perfect immutability and simplicity, which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and future … He is entire in every point in space; and complete in every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution.53
This appears to take the main topic of the dialogue away from mystics and back towards larger issues like the nature of a Supreme Being and the problems of ascribing human characteristics to a Supreme Being. However, Hume’s usage of the term ‘mystic’ returns in Cleanthes’ response to Demea. Cleanthes says: ‘I can readily allow … that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme Being … are complete MYSTICS, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, ATHEISTS, without knowing it.’54
Then, Cleanthes explains why he calls mystics a type of atheist. He says: ‘For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes, of which we have no comprehension; yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes, which are absolutely incompatible with the intelligent nature, essential to him.’55 This is a criticism of mystical claims that the Deity is unknowable to human minds. It is predicated on having already accepted that aspects of the Deity are knowable to human minds. These are aspects such as the Deity having intelligence and creating the universe according to ‘intelligent design’. This is part of the main argument which the character Cleanthes presents in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It entails rejecting mystical claims such as paradoxical experiences of a Supreme Being who is
53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 133. 55 Ibid.
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2. Mysticism incomprehensible to imperfect humans, but then proceeding to tell others about such an ineffable experience.
The discussion of mystics in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is significant in several respects. First, we can see that Hume uses the term mystic in a different sense from the sense which had formed by the early 20th century with William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience. Hume associates mystics with temerity, i.e., reckless confidence that might be offensive. Hence, he is not holding mystics aloft and considering them sacred. Hume does not see mysticism as any kind of ‘fountain head of all genuine spirituality’.56 Second, Hume is not using the term ‘mystic’ to signify union with the absolute. Yet, claiming union with the absolute has become a common mark for the labelling of mysticism in modern usage. Instead, Hume is associating mystics with what we might call ‘reason-be-damned extravagance’, following Leigh Schmidt’s arguments of the historical usage of terms like ‘mysticism’.57 Hume is criticising mystics for holding the Ultimate (i.e., ‘the Deity’) to be incomprehensible, yet also asserting that they know something about it.
Hume also points out that there is a great deal of bigotry and ad hominem in the philosophy of religion as far as mystics are concerned. The bigotry and ad hominem with which 18th century scholars treated mystics and mysticism is even clearer in the 3rd edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I analyse the earliest Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on mysticism below.
2.1.1.6.Encyclopaedia Britannica
The third edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica from 1797 contains entries on ‘mysteries’, ‘mystical’, and ‘mystic’. These entries represent the earliest attempts to produce scholarly articles to explain the general phenomena of mysticism. Therein, we can see how the authors of the encyclopaedia understood and portrayed ‘mysticism’. It is a rather negative account. They write:
The mysteries were the offspring of bigotry and priestcraft ; [sic] they originated in Egypt, the native land of idolatry. In that country the priesthood ruled predominant . . . All the orientals [sic], but more especially the Egyptians, delighted in mysterious and allegorical
56 See Leigh Eric Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71, no. 2 (2003): 281. 57 See ibid., 279.
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doctrines. Every maxim of morality, every tenet of theology, every dogma of philosophy, was wrapt [sic] up in a veil of allegory and mysticism. This propensity, no doubt, conspired with avarice and ambition to dispose them to a dark and mysterious system of religion. Besides, the Egyptians were a gloomy race of men ; [sic] they delighted in darkness and solitude. Their sacred rites were generally celebrated with melancholy airs, weeping, and lamentation. This gloomy and unsocial bias of mind must have stimulated them to a congenial mode of worship.58
Thus, we have one of the earliest usages of the term ‘mysticism’. The author of the entry applies the term with prejudice and bigotry of his own amidst conjectures as to why the ancient Egyptians may have been predisposed to include mysteries, i.e., mystery cults, as part of their sacred rites. This usage of mysticism does not connote the same things that have become common since the early twentieth century (i.e., an experience of ‘oneness’, quieting the mind, etc.). Instead, it denotes mystery, vagueness, obtuseness, and rites shut off to the uninitiated.
Moreover, the author uses the label as part of an explanation of what he judges to be repugnant aspects of Egyptian religion. He presents aspects of Egyptian religion, including mysticism, in pejorative ways. For example, he calls Egypt ‘the native land of idolatry’.59 Such judgments and use of language are founded on starting assumptions that Christianity is true, and that all other religions are not only false, but degenerate. It is an example of the kind of bigotry and ad hominem concerning mystics to which Hume alludes in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Although the term ‘mysticism’ existed at the time of writing the 3rd edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, there is no separate entry for ‘mysticism’ in that edition. There is, however, an entry on ‘mystics’. It reads: ‘MYSTICS, mystici, a kind of religious sect, distinguished by their professing pure, sublime, and perfect devotion, with an entire disinterested love of God, free from all selfish considerations.’60 The encyclopaedists thus summarise what they saw to be the distinguishing features of ‘the mystics’.
58 Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature: Constructed on a Plan by Which the Different Sciences and Arts Are Digested into the Form of Distinct Treatises or Systems, 580. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., 598.
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The Britannica entry relating the practices of the mystics writes that generalised features of mysticism involve:
passive contemplation . . . silence, tranquillity, repose, and solitude, accompanied with such acts as might tend to extenuate the body, [are] the means by which the hidden and internal world [is] excited to produce its latent virtues, and to instruct men in the knowledge of divine things. For thus they reasoned ; [sic] those who behold with a noble contempt all human affairs, who turn their eyes away from terrestrial vanities, and shut all the avenues of the outward senses against the contagious influences of the material world, must necessarily return to God, when the spirit is thus disengaged from the impediments that prevented that happy union.61
Although the authors of the entry do not cite primary sources of mysticism, they must have read some examples to have arrived at generalised features of mysticism that match well with those adduced by scholars in the 20th century. This is because 20th century scholars whose works on mysticism I cite in this dissertation draw from a range of mystical texts that they analyse in order to arrive at generalised features by which we can recognise mysticism. Moreover, their conclusions as to the features of mysticism are largely in agreement with those quoted from the 3rd edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica above. For such separate studies into the nature of ‘mysticism’ to arrive at conclusions so closely in agreement suggests some consensus among scholars regarding generalised aspects of mysticism.
It is, however, clear that the scope of ‘the mystics’ was largely confined to Europe and especially to Christianity for the authors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is also clear that the authors of Britannica took a negative view of mystics. This is further evident where those authors label mystics fanatical and pretentious. They write: ‘The number of mystics increased in the fourth century, under the influence of the Grecian fanatic, who gave himself out for Dionysius the Areopagite . . . by pretending to higher degrees of perfection than other Christians.’62 Moreover, the authors use derogatory language throughout their summary of the
61 Ibid.. See also Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Harold David Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Walter T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960). 62 Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature: Constructed on a Plan by Which the Different Sciences and Arts Are Digested into the Form of Distinct Treatises or Systems, 598.
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2. Mysticism history and development of ‘the mystics’ as a kind a religious sect. For example, they write: ‘In the twelfth century, these mystics . . . forced the word of God into a conformity with their visionary doctrines, their enthusiastic feelings, and the system of discipline which they had drawn from the excursions of their irregular fancies.’63 Thus, the trend in the eighteenth century was to use mysticism as a label with derogatory connotations for esoteric sects (or individual practitioners) of Christianity.
Historically, ‘mystic’ and related terms were applied to ‘sects’ of Christians by English-speaking philosophers, theologians, and encyclopaedists. In the 18th century, Europeans were not very knowledgeable about non-European people, traditions, religions, and practices. Consequently, the meaning of terms like ‘mystic’ was largely confined to what they knew, i.e., distinctly European practices. However, greater contact with other people, cultures, and religions during the 19th century led to scholars applying terms like ‘mystic’ to other traditions that were not part of the term’s original derivation.
A reason for labelling these other traditions ‘mystical’ seems to be general similarities between them and those already identified in the Christians originally labelled ‘mystics’. For example, renouncing worldly concerns, withdrawing to a more private lifestyle, engaging in meditative practices to calm the mind, and the belief and claim that through such practices, one can experience God, Allah, Brahman, Dao, i.e., the ‘Ultimate’, or at least what the subject believes to be ultimate.64
Nonetheless, it should also be evident that 18th century writers, such as Hurd, held mystics in contempt. Even their use of words like ‘mystic’ were pejorative. Scholar of religious history, Leigh Schmidt, gives an overview that shows how philosophers and theologians in the eighteenth century addressed mysticism in works on what they called ‘false religion’ and misguided spiritual practices.65 Schmidt concludes: ‘Mysticism . . . came into being in Anglo-American discourse as a term charged with the reproaches of misplaced sexuality, unintelligibility, pretension, and reason-be-damned extravagance.’66 We need to
63 Ibid. 64 See Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics; see also: Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’; Leigh Eric Schmidt, ‘The Aspiring Side of Religion: Nineteenth Century Religious Liberalism and the Birth of Contemporary American Spirituality,’ Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality 7, no. 1 (2007): 89–92; Schmidt, Restless Souls: the Making of American Spirituality. 65 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, 276–79. See also Coventry, Philemon to Hydaspes: Relating a Conversation with Hortensius, Upon the Subject of False Religion, 56–57, et passim; Hurd, A New Universal History of the Religious Rites, 766–67; Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature: Constructed on a Plan by Which the Different Sciences and Arts Are Digested into the Form of Distinct Treatises or Systems, 598. 66 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 279.
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2. Mysticism note, however, that this is at odds with both Greek Orthodox and other non-protestant theologies which sees the mysteries as part of the traditional approach to doxa.
Notwithstanding those criticisms, the terms mysticism, mystical, and mystic were consistently used to describe esoteric forms of spirituality. Mystics establish themselves as such, and are recognised as such, through their practice of professions of esoteric spirituality. Their professions entail using language in such a way as to help create the air of the spiritual, the sublime, and the mysterious concerning their quest for experiences of their ultimate. This appears to be a general feature of mysticism, whatever the religious tradition to which the expression of mysticism belongs.67
2.1.2. Usage in the 19th Century
Usage of terms like ‘mystic’ began to change during the 19th century. During the 19th century, some Protestants were: ‘explicitly challeng[ing] the captious pigeonholing of the mystics’.68 One such thinker, Joseph Priestly, remarked: ‘though the ideas of the mystics are very confused . . . they had a notion of the necessity of aiming at something of inward purity’.69 It seems odd that scholarly attitudes towards mystics and mysticism could have changed from bigotry and slander during the 18th century to praising them for piety during the 19th century.
Leigh Schmidt, argues that these reactions against using ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystic’ as derogatory terms are indicative of more liberal attitudes towards religion which developed during the 19th century. He writes that the development of more liberal and tolerant attitudes towards religion: ‘provided a basis for the nineteenth-century invention of mysticism as the fountainhead of all genuine spirituality.’70 Schmidt argues that the broadening definition and application of the term ‘mysticism’ was concomitant with the development of religious liberalism in the 19th century, especially in America.71 Hence, although terms like ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’, and ‘mysticism’ had been used as pejoratives for esoteric forms of spirituality in the 18th century, their connotations changed considerably during the nineteenth.
67 See also Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 20. 68 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, 281. 69 Joseph Priestly, The Theological and Miscellaneous Works, vol. 5 (London: Smallfield, 1817), 354– 55. See also Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, 282. 70 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 281, et passim. 71 See: Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’; Schmidt, Restless Souls: The Making of American Spirituality. See also Gordon Lynch, The New Spirituality: An Introduction to Progressive Belief in the Twenty-First Century (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 22–31, 50–53.
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Steven Katz reasons similarly to Smith in his summary of the emergence of the academic study of mysticism. Katz writes:
I would suggest that perhaps the most important [reason for the emergence of the academic study of mysticism] was the loss of traditional religious commitments by many men and women who still had a deep interest in and commitment to some sense of “the spiritual” . . . and wished to confirm the existence of such metaphysical realms and access to such Absolutes outside of the boundaries of religious orthodoxy.72
The loss of traditional religious commitments and the increasing liberalisation of Western culture help explain the change in understanding towards mysticism that developed throughout the nineteenth century.
During the nineteenth century, people came to use ‘mysticism’, ‘mystical’, and ‘mystic’ as terms with positive connotations. A major contribution to literature of the era is Robert Vaughan’s book, Hours with the Mystics.73 This work is mostly in the form of dialogues wherein a group of three interlocutors discuss mysticism (there are also sections of Vaughan’s own prose). It is a systematic account through which Vaughan’s characters discuss the etymology and history of the word ‘mystic’, what they understand it to mean, and how ‘mysticism’ has been manifest in a number of traditions throughout the world. The scholarly discussion of matters concerning generalised features of mysticism makes Hours with the Mystics a significant contribution to literature on mysticism. It should therefore come as no surprise that this work had a considerable influence on other 19th century literature on mysticism.
For example, Schmidt demonstrates that Vaughan’s work had considerable influence on encyclopaedists. He writes: ‘The summary overview that the [Encyclopaedia] Britannica offered in 1858 was essentially a miniaturized replica of Vaughan’s panoramic perspective’.74 Thus, in the nineteenth century, Vaughan and Britannica popularised among scholars the idea that mysticism was a positive kind of spiritual practice. They even went so far as to claim that mysticism is: ‘the highest form of spirituality’.75
72 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 4. 73 Robert Alfred Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics: A Contribution to the History of Religious Opinion, 5th ed. (London: Slark, 1888); Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics. 74 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 283. 75 Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, volume 2, 351. See also Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 283.
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This new construal of ‘mysticism’ gained wider dissemination in America through the activities of Transcendentalists. This included the Transcendental Club. Schmidt explains that they were: ‘a symposium of Unitarian ministers and intellectuals formed in 1836 to discuss the philosophical and religious scene’.76 One member of this club, Bronson Alcott, went on to form another, the Mystic Club, in 1882.77 Through the activities of these Transcendentalists: ‘the term [mysticism] was . . . dislodged from both its Catholic and Enlightenment roots. . . . it was becoming loosely spiritual, intuitive, emancipatory, and universal.’78 This new idea that mysticism is ‘loosely spiritual’ means that mysticism came not to be exclusively associated with the kind of spirituality found in Christianity to which terms like ‘mystic’ and ‘mystic theology’ were originally applied in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.79
Hence, by the late nineteenth century, mysticism had been transformed. In scholarly (and presumably common) parlance, people came to understand ‘mysticism’ as self-contained kind of experience that is vaguely spiritual, perhaps religious, but positive despite being esoteric. Moreover, this understanding and historical context formed the background against which scholars of religion undertook studies of mysticism during the twentieth century.80 These studies have led to controversy concerning the main issues of mysticism, as I explain below.
2.2. Main Issues in the Study of Mysticism
There are several main issues in the study of mysticism. First, what mysticism is. Second, what mystical experiences are like. Third, what mystical experiences are experiences of. When scholars have tried to answer these questions, controversy has resulted. Several scholars have engaged in polemics to prove their interpretation of some of these (and related) issues over the interpretations of others. I hold that each has contributed to the overall understanding of mysticism. In the sections below, I analyse these contributions in order to suggest how they can help us understand mysticism in the Zhuangzi and Daoism.
There have been several positions regarding to what mysticism is. They include: mysticism is one-and-the-same everywhere; there is a common core of mysticism which
76 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 284; see also: Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1835-1838 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 502; Joel Myerson, ‘A Calendar of Transcendental Club Meetings’, American Literature Review 44, no. 2 (1972): 202. 77 Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’, 285. 78 Ibid., 286. 79 See ibid., 275–80. 80 See also Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 4.
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2. Mysticism mystics variously interpret; and there are several different mysticisms. I explain these positions in the sections below.
2.2.1. Mysticism is One-and-the-Same
The interpretation of mysticism that I first address is the idea that mysticism is one- and-the-same everywhere. This entails the belief that all mystics experience the same thing, i.e., the mystic experience. Scholars who have espoused this view sometimes give an account of what they think this purportedly perennial mystic experience is of. This is usually expressed to the effect: mysticism is the same everywhere; it is the direct experience of God attained through esoteric, spiritual means, such as meditation and chanting, etc.81 Sometimes, those who espouse this position substitute a different ‘Ultimate’ for God, such as Brahman, or ‘the Ultimate Reality’.82 Nonetheless, the argument is that these things are all really one-and- the-same. On this assumption, it follows that those who claim to have experienced union with, or direct experience of, any place-holder for ultimate reality are in fact experiencing the same thing. In other words, proponents of this view hold that there is no real difference between the ‘ultimates’ that different mystics experience. They believe there to be a ‘perennial philosophy’ which different mystics articulate in different ways, yet is ultimately the same for all of them.
There are, however, some methodological problems with this assumption. Firstly, it entails a commitment to the belief that all those different expressions of ‘the ultimate’ are in fact equivalent. In other words, it involves a fallacy of equivocation. This is because closer examination of different religious doctrines (with which mystics are often associated)
81 See Encyclopaedia Britannica; Or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature: Constructed on a Plan by Which the Different Sciences and Arts Are Digested into the Form of Distinct Treatises or Systems, 578–79, 589–90, 598; Edward Granville Browne, A Year Among the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, Character & Thought of the People of Persia, Received During Twelve Months’ Residence in That Country in the Years 1887-1888, 3rd edition (London: A. & C. Black, 1950), 136; Underhill, ‘The Essentials of Mysticism’, 31; Edward Granville Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 416–44. 82 Evelyn T. Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness, 12th ed. (London: Metheun & Co., n.d.); Underhill, ‘The Essentials of Mysticism’; Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West: A Comparative Analysis of the Nature of Mysticism. (New York: Collier books, 1962); See Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1947); Aldous Huxley, ‘The Doors of Perception’, in The Doors of Perceptions and Heaven and Hell (Aylesbury: Penguin Books in Association with Chato and Windus, 1973); Aldous Huxley, ‘Heaven and Hell’, in The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell (Aylesbury: Penguin Books in Association with Chato and Windus, n.d.); Alan Watts, Myth and Ritual In Christianity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 14 et passim; Frithjof Schuon and Huston Smith, The Transcendent Unity of Religions (Wheaton, Ill., U.S.A: Quest Books, 1984); Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Primordial Tradition, 1st edition (New York: Harpercollins, 1976); See also Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 31– 32.
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2. Mysticism concerning ‘the ultimate’ usually reveal differences in how ‘the ultimate’ is related, or what it is thought to entail. That is to say, what Christians mean by ‘God’ is different to what Daoists mean by the ‘Great Dao’, and this is different again from what Hindus mean by ‘Brahman’. Even though ‘God’, ‘the Great Dao’, and ‘Brahman’ may be the ultimates in their respective traditions, it does not follow that a mystic from one tradition would have knowledge or experience of the ultimate of a different tradition. 83 Thus, Robert Forman offers this criticism of the perennial philosophy and those who have espoused it:
perennialists often seemed academically irresponsible. . . . they often misquoted, mistranslated, misrepresented, and misinterpreted their sources in order to make them appear identical. . . . Perennialists like these [Rudolph Otto and Aldous Huxley] thus benuded the individual mystics and mystical traditions of their specific teachings. The various traditions seemed to disappear into some bland, characterless anonymity.84
2.2.2. There Several Different Kinds of Mystical Experience
Forman’s criticism of perennialists benefits from late 20th century hindsight. However, as early as the mid-twentieth century, scholars specialising in the study of religion had presented arguments against the perennial philosophy. In Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, Robert Zaehner offers a counter-argument to the perennial philosophy position popularised by public intellectual, Aldous Huxley. Through close analysis of Huxley’s claims of experiencing ‘oneness’ with the legs of a chair (through using the psychotropic drug, mescalin) are the same as Hindu mystics’ experiences of Brahman (attained through yoga, meditation, and contemplation), Zaehner concludes that those experiences are not the same.85 In sum, the descriptions which Huxley gives of his claimed union with a chair are not consistent with the descriptions of union with Brahman from sacred Hindu texts, such as the Upanishads. Zaehner shows that they are not doctrinally or phenomenologically equivalent (though he does not use such explicit jargon).86
83 See also Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 10; Steven T. Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 47–48. 84 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 32. 85 Robert C. Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane. An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 10–12, 14–15, 20–23, 27–29. See also Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (London: Chatto & Windus, 1954), 41, 43, 18–19, 31, 49, 27, 14–16, 58, 55. These page numbers correspond to the order in which Zaehner refers to them. 86 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 28–29. See also W. R. Inge, ‘The Perennial Philosophy’, Philosophy 22, no. 81 (1947): 66–70.
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Zaehner argues that there are three kinds of mystical experience. They are: nature mysticism; theistic mysticism; and monistic mysticism. Nature mysticism means: ‘go[ing] through something of tremendous significance beside which the ordinary world of sense perception and discursive thought is almost the shadow of a shade.’87 Zaehner gives the label ‘theistic mysticism’ to preternatural experiences wherein one: ‘see[s] God as incomparably greater than oneself, though He is, at the same time, the root and ground of one’s being.’88 ‘Monistic mysticism’ is a label Zaehner gives to preternatural experiences in which one: ‘maintain[s] that soul and God are one and the same and that all else is pure illusion.’89 Thus, Zaehner’s contribution reveals problems with the idea that mysticism is all one-and-the-same.
Zaehner’s contribution also emphasises the role of experience in all forms of mysticism. In doing so, he postulates that there are several kinds of mystical experience that are not doctrinally equivalent. Nevertheless, Zaehner holds that there is a core kind of experience that allows us to recognise the doctrinally different kinds of mysticism. Hence, he concludes that the essence of mysticism lies in: ‘praeteratural [sic] experiences in which sense perception and discursive thought are transcended in an immediate apperception of a unity or union which is apprehended as lying beyond and transcending the multiplicity of the world as we know it.’90
Zaehner’s theory of mysticism holds that mysticism must involve a transcendent ultimate. It is therefore hard to interpret the Zhuangzi as a doctrine of mysticism in accordance with Zaehner’s theory. The Zhuangzi does not present clear ideas of a transcendent absolute. Moreover, scholars generally hold that Warring States era Chinese philosophy does not usually postulate a transcendent realm of absolutes.91 Even where some classical thinkers might arguably hold an idea of a transcendent realm, such a realm is not the preoccupation of their thought. Instead, they were more concerned with the right way to live in the world.92 If we are to think of the Zhuangzi as communicating a doctrine of mysticism,
87 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 199. 88 Ibid., 204. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid., 198–99. 91 See JeeLoo Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2006), 5–12, 87; Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 268–69; Bryan W. Van Norden, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 11. 92 See Karyn L. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17.
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2. Mysticism or relating examples of mystical experiences, then we ought not to conceive of mysticism in the Zhuangzi as necessarily involving merging with a transcendent absolute.
2.2.3. There is a Common Core of Mystical Experience which Mystics Variously Interpret
The idea that mysticism is a label for altered states of consciousness that share common characteristics has been developed at different stages. Most notably, we begin with William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience. Then, we have Walter Stace’s Mysticism and Philosophy. Next, we have several contributions from Robert Forman.93 Most recently, we have several contributions from Jason Blum.94 These scholars’ contributions present more sophisticated explanations of what mysticism is, and their main theses are not unsympathetic to each other.
One of the earliest and most influential contributions is the chapter ‘Mysticism’ in the Varieties of Religious Experience. Therein, James analyses a large number of primary sources of mystical experiences which he arranges in serial order from those: ‘which claim no special religious significance . . . [to] those of which the religious pretensions are extreme.’95 James proposes that the essence of mysticism arose from states of consciousness with four main characteristics: ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity. He writes and that states of consciousness with these qualities: ‘mark out a group of states of consciousness peculiar enough to deserve a special name . . . called the mystical group.’96 In this way, James reveals his position that mysticism is a kind of altered state of consciousness that may have spiritual significance to the subject and may even be interpreted as significant according to some religious doctrine. However, James does not state that he thinks mysticism is inherently
93 Robert K. C. Forman, ‘Introduction’, in The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K. C. Forman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3–49; Robert K.C. Forman, ‘What Can Mysticism Teach Us About Consciousness?’, in Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, ed. Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Alwyn C. Scott (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 53–70; Robert K. C. Forman, ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61, no. 4 (1993): 705–38; Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness; Donald Rothberg, ‘Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism’, in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 163–210. 94 Jason N. Blum, ‘Radical Empiricism and the Unremarkable Nature of Mystic Ineffability’, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 24, no. 3 (2012): 201–19; Jason N. Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82, no. 1 (2014): 150–73. 95 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (Washington: Longmans, Green, and Co. American Psychological Association, 1902), 373. 96 Ibid., 371–72.
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2. Mysticism religious.97 He grounds mysticism in the realm of experience which is later interpreted according to one’s religious and philosophical commitments.
While James’ contribution to analyses of experiences and states of consciousness called ‘mystical’ is significant, it is not without weaknesses. Firstly, James does not actually give a definition of mysticism. Instead, he defines what he calls ‘marks’ of ‘mystical consciousness’. Moreover, James’ marks are vague and do not tell the reader specific about what mysticism is.98 They serve as only a rough phenomenological guide to identifying mystical experiences, but they do not tell us more about mysticism. This is to say that there is more to mysticism than transitory states of, say, ineffability. For example, many of the mystics whom James quotes relate their experiences with reference to what they consider to be the Ultimate. They believe their experiences to relate to their professed Ultimate in some way, perhaps even as direct experiences of their Ultimate. However, James does not point out this idea of an Ultimate as a significant feature of a broader part of the meaning of mysticism.
Nevertheless, James’ contribution represents the beginning of sophisticated attempts to analyse core components of mystical experience. Scholars accordingly often cite the account of mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience. One occasionally sees scholars citing James’ Varieties as an appeal to authority in their discussions of mysticism.99 However, from the second third of the twentieth century, scholars have sought to advance understanding of the core of mystical experiences further than James’ preliminary work.100
Walter Stace’s book, Mysticism and Philosophy, presents a stronger form of the thesis that there is a common core to mystical experience which mystics variously interpret. Stace’s exposition on the core of mystical experiences represents a significant contribution to the philosophical study of mysticism. The main contribution he makes is to postulate what psychological experiences later dubbed ‘mystical’ actually are. Stace begins ‘ab initio . . . to
97 See also: John E. Smith, ‘William James’ Account of Mysticism; A Critical Approach’, in Mysticism and Religious Transitions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 249; Mavrodes, Mysticism; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 38–39. 98 See also Hodges, ‘The Claims for Mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience,’ 396–411; Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 147–148, 153. 99 Bryan Van Norden’s treatment of ‘mysiticm’ in his Introduction to Chinese Philosophy is based almost exclusively on an appeal to authority of Varieties. See: Van Norden, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy, 133, 262; Alexus McLeod, ‘[Review of] Van Norden, Bryan, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy’, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10, no. 4 (2011): 570. See also Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 3, 16, 20, 41–43, 51, et passim; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 20–21, 35, 44, 67–68, et passim; Baumgardt, Great Western Mystics: Their Lasting Significance, 7–8; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 127. 100 See Steven T. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 3.
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2. Mysticism arrive inductively at their [mystical experiences’] core characteristics’ because other scholars’ attempts to elucidate the core of mysticism ‘have plainly been more or less haphazard.’101 Hence, Stace sets out to systematically analyse reports of mystical experiences and thereby arrive at generalised qualities common to the experiences themselves. Thus, Stace’s theory of mysticism represents advancement over James’ ‘marks’ by which we can recognise ‘the mystical consciousness’ yet do not tell us what the experience actually is. Moreover, Stace’s theory is also more inclusive than Zaehner’s definition because it can account more for non- theistic traditions.
Stace concludes that there are two types of mystical experiences. The first is extrovertive mystical experience; the second is introvertive mystical experience. Both types of experience are ‘two species of one genus’ because they are both kinds of unusual psychological experiences that contain: ‘a general experience of unity which the mystic believes to be in some sense ultimate and basic to the world’.102 The main difference between these two species of mysticism is that in the extrovertive mode, the unity is mostly perceived or apprehended; in the introvertive mode, the unity is experienced.103 Stace concludes that there are also a number of other characteristics typical of the psychological experience dubbed ‘mystical’, but that ‘the unifying vision’ is ‘the nucleus round which . . . [they] revolve.’104
Yet, there are also weaknesses in Stace’s approach. Stace demonstrates bias in favour of introvertive mysticism and monotheistic religions. Firstly, he gives fewer examples of extrovertive mysticism than introvertive. This is partly because mysticism which fits into his extrovertive category is less frequently recorded than mysticism which we could call introvertive, as Stace points out.105 However, it is also because there are relevant examples that Stace did not know about which weakens his claim to be presenting the most representative examples extrovertive mystical experience. Harold Roth has suggested that examples of ‘mystical’ elements from the Zhuangzi fit well with Stace’s theory of extrovertive mysticism.106 Yet, Stace’s investigations into mysticism do not include examples
101 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 45. 102 Ibid., 131–32. 103 See: ibid., 79, 110, 131–133, et passim. 104 Ibid., 132–33. 105 Ibid., 63. 106 Harold David Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, China Review International 2, no. 1 (Spring) (1995): 167–69; Harold David Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, in Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, ed. Mark Csikszentmihalyi Ivanhoe and Philip J (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 66; Harold David Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun 齊物論” Chapter of the Zhuangzi
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2. Mysticism from Daoism except for two quotations from the Laozi.107 Nonetheless, there were several English translations of the Zhuangzi available when Stace was researching for the book, at least three of which label the Zhuangzi mystical.108
Another weakness in Stace’s approach is that he devotes more discussion and analysis to forms of mysticism in monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam. In his discourse on extrovertive mysticism, Stace gives devotes: 3 pages to Eckhart (monotheistic); about one to St. Teresa (monotheistic); 2 pages to Jakob Boehme; 6 pages to ‘N.M.’; 2 paragraphs to Sri Ramakrishna; one paragraph to Plotinus; and 1 page to R.M. Bucke.109 Conversely, Stace writes more extensively on introvertive mysticism and in more detail on introvertive mysticism from monotheistic traditions. He writes: 3 pages on the Mandukya Upanishad; 4 pages to J.A. Symonds (monotheistic); 4 pages to Jan van Ruysbroeck (monotheistic); 4 pages to Eckhart (monotheistic); 3 pages to St John of the Cross wherein he also compares the experiences of St John and St Teresa with those of Eckart (all monotheistic); about one page to Plotinus; about one page to both Al-Ghazali and Mahmud Shabistari (monotheistic); 2 paragraphs to Jewish mysticism (monotheistic); and about three pages to Mahayana Buddhism. If the Zhuangzi is a source of mysticism, as many scholars have claimed, then it is conspicuously absent from analyses in classic works on mysticism, such as Stace’s Mysticism and Philosophy.
2.2.4. Mysticism and Drugs
James’ chapter on mysticism makes it clear that mystical experiences occur during altered states of consciousness. Various drugs (the sort which we nowadays call ‘narcotics’) are also capable of inducing altered states of consciousness wherein a person is capable of having the kinds of experiences that we could call mystical. James includes several examples
莊子 [B]’, in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 16–17; Harold David Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” Chapter of Zhuangzi [A]’, Journal of Chinese Religions 28, no. 1 (2000): 35. 107 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 168, 225. See also Walter T. Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics (New York: The New American Library, 1960), 102–9. 108 Herbert A. Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer (London: Bernard Quartich, 1889); Youlan 馮友蘭 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang (New York: Paragon Book Reprint, 1933); Lionel Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic: Selections from the Philosophy of Chuang Tzŭ (London: John Murray, 1906). 109 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 63–78.
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2. Mysticism in Varieties: his own experience using nitrous oxide, as well as other people’s records of their experiences of drugs like chloroform, and ether.110 James writes of his own experience:
One conclusion was forces upon my mind . . . our normal waking consciousness . . . is but one special type of consciousness . . . there lie potential [other] forms of consciousness entirely different. . . . they are in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. . . . my own experiences . . . converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance.111
James takes the kinds of drug-induced experiences he cites as examples of ‘the anaesthetic revelation’. Moreover, he quotes writings from sources that ‘believe in the anaesthetic revelation’ and for whom: ‘it is a monistic insight, in which the other in its various forms appears absorbed into the One.’112 It is clear that the kinds of experiences James’ sources had during their drug-induced ruminations and subsequent reflections were of spiritual significance to them. Moreover, they are evidence of some other features of mysticism which James has not set out in his ‘marks’. These are the features of believing their altered states of consciousness to relate to metaphysical ideas such as experiencing, or being absorbed into, ‘the One’.
Therefore, it is not that taking mind-altering drugs is mysticism in itself. Drug-taking and concomitant unusual experiences only become a kind of mysticism when they are believed to have relevance to some greater quest or idea. Perhaps, in a less developed form, drug-induced states may lead to an ‘artificial mystic state of mind’,113 as James concludes. It would, however, be easy to misunderstand this point and to mistake drug-induced hallucinations for genuine mystical experiences, or to believe that merely taking mind- altering drugs is mysticism.114
110 James, Varieties, 1902, 377–84. 111 Ibid., 378–79. 112 Ibid., 379. 113 Ibid. 114 See also Bharati, the Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 42–44, 52; Anthony Kenny, What Is Faith? Essays on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 42.
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This is the starting point of Robert Zaehner’s contribution to the study of mysticism. Zaehner argues that public intellectual Aldous Huxley’s writings on mysticism are representative of the fallacious idea that all mystical experiences are the same, and that taking hallucinogenic drugs is mysticism.115 Zaehner’s contribution to the study of mysticism is significant for several reasons. First, it is the response of an academic to a challenge issued by a public intellectual.116 Second, it demonstrates weaknesses in Huxley’s arguments and interpretations. Specifically, Zaehner demonstrates that Huxley’s experience of ‘unity’ or ‘oneness’ with a chair is not the same thing as the doctrine of oneness with Brahman espoused in the Upanishads, contrary to Huxley’s claims.117 Third, Zaehner’s polemic with Huxley shows the implausibility of using drugs such as mescalin as a substitute for religion and genuine mystical experience. This is because hallucinogens (especially those such as mescalin which simulate the kinds of visual hallucinations similar to those suffered by schizophrenics) have no inherent religious or mystical value. Zaehner demonstrates this with appendices recounting three unrelated mescalin experiments, including his own. These experiments were interviews conducted with a subject under the influence of mescalin as well as the subject’s later reflections.118 The experiments show that mescalin is just an hallucinogen which produces different results in different people. Whether or not the altered perceptions and consciousness induced by the drug have religious significance or are mystical depends on the subject’s pre-conceptions as well as his own body’s reactions to the drug.
Nevertheless, some of Zaehner’s conclusions concerning the essence of mysticism and its various types leaves his theory susceptible to criticism for being too restrictive. That Zaehner’s definitions of mysticism are too narrow has indeed been among the main criticisms scholars have made.119 Hence, philosophers of religion began to undertake more extensive and philosophically sophisticated studies of mysticism in order to identify core characteristics that include a larger variety of experiences and traditions.
In doing so, Walter Stace also has something to say about drugs and mystical experience. Stace appeals to the principal of causal indifference to argue that it is possible to induce mystical experience through drugs. He holds that if two people have mystical
115 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane. See also Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy; Huxley, ‘The Doors of Perception’, 1973; Huxley, ‘Heaven and Hell’. 116 See Huxley, ‘The Doors of Perception,’ 61–64. 117 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 32–34, 51–52, 84, et passim. 118 See ibid., 208–26. 119 See Bharati, the Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 61, 62, et passim; Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ 25, 32, et passim; Smart, ‘Understanding Religious Experience,’ 13–14; Smart, ‘Interpretation and Mystical Experience,’ 1965; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 35–36, 97.
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2. Mysticism experiences and describe them in such ways that ‘the phenomenological characteristics [of both] . . . entirely resemble [each other] . . . then the two experiences cannot be regarded as being of two different kinds.’120 This reasoning may be sophisticated, but there are some problems with just how broad the implications are.
Firstly, it appears that Stace treats mystical experiences as equivalent to any hallucinating state of mind. For example, he writes:
This [the principal of causal indifference] will follow notwithstanding the lowly antecedents of one of them [mystical experiences], and in spite of the understandable annoyance of an ascetic, a saint, or a spiritual hero, who is told that his careless and worldly neighbour . . . has attained to mystical experience by swallowing a pill.121
In other words, Stace does not make it a necessary condition that mystical experience be especially spiritual or significant, and not simply an hallucination. The criterion for labelling certain experiences mystical and not simple hallucinations is not clear at that point of Stace’s study.
Furthermore, my above point answers a problem that Stace raises. He writes: ‘It is still a question whether in fact any mescalin experience ever is intrinsically similar to, or descriptively indistinguishable form, the [mystical] experience of a saint . . . we do not yet know enough about these drugs to answer it with any confidence.’122 However, as I have already shown above, Robert Zaehner addresses the issue with confidence in Mysticism: Sacred and Profane. Therein, he argues that hallucinations induced by drugs such as mescalin are not intrinsically similar to mystical experiences. Moreover, we should note that Zaehner published these conclusions several years before Stace published Mysticism and Philosophy. This shows that Stace did not take into due consideration the compelling arguments and experiment results that Zaehner had published.
Secondly, we ought not to regard all mystical experiences as being equivalent or even similar to hallucinations or altered perceptions of the environment caused through drugs. For example, Robert Forman describes what he calls ‘the Pure Consciousness Event (PCE)’ as ‘one common [type of] mystical experience [that is] . . . a transient phenomenon during which
120 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 29. 121 Ibid., 30. 122 Ibid.
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2. Mysticism the subject remains conscious . . . yet devoid of all mental content.’123 As an example, he describes his own experience caused through apophatic meditation. He writes: ‘for some indeterminate length of time prior to the knocking [at my door] I had not been aware of anything in particular. I had been awake but with no content for my consciousness.’124 Hallucinogens, and particularly those which people have claimed can induce mystical experience, do not have this effect.125 Therefore, we cannot say that Forman’s experience is of the same type as an hallucination induced through drugs which some people might deem a mystical experience. Thus, Stace’s appeal to the principal of causal indifference admits overly broad criteria for judging certain psychological states to be mystical experiences.
Moreover, the stage in the book where Stace appeals to the principal of causal indifference occurs before he has presented any conclusions as to what mystical experience actually is. Therefore, at that part of the book, it is vague for Stace to write of persons A and B both having mystical experiences, one brought on by drugs and the other by some other means. ‘Some other means’ is problematic. I take it to mean asceticism, chanting, etc., but this is because I have read other sources of mystical texts and philosophical analyses of mysticism, not because Stace makes it evident at this stage of his book. Furthermore, by ‘drugs’ Stace definitely means ‘hallucinogens’ such as mescalin. Thus, at this stage of the book, we can infer that Stace holds visual hallucinations, whether induced by drugs or some other means, can be part of mystical experience. However, as I have shown above, some types of mystical experience do not contain visual hallucinations, such as the Pure Consciousness Events that Robert Forman describes. Therefore, I think that the scope of Stace’s principal of causal indifference is not as wide as he presents it to be. It is not as accurate to say: mystical experiences whether induced by drugs or achieved by other means, are still the same type of experience, as it is to say: visual hallucinations, whether induced by drugs or achieved by other means, are the same type of experience.
It may be easier to see these concerns in Venn diagrams. Consider the following:
123 Forman, ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’, 708. 124 Ibid.. See also Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 48. 125 See Bharati, the Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism; Huxley, ‘The Doors of Perception,’ 16, 19–21, 23–25, 30–31, 46; Huxley, ‘Heaven and Hell,’ 113–123; James, Varieties, 378–384; Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience.
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2.2.4.1.Diagram: Overlap of Visual Hallucinations
Visual halluciantion resulting from drugs
Visual hallucination Mystical resulting from experiences other means like ascetic practics
This diagram shows some overlap between visual hallucination resulting from drugs, visual hallucination resulting from ascetic practices, and mystical experiences. We can say that visual hallucinations resulting from either drugs or ascetic practices are the same type of experience, i.e., visual hallucinations. However, ‘mystical experiences’ is still too vague a category for us to say that it directly overlaps with visual hallucination. Consider the following diagram:
2.2.4.2.Diagram: Altered States of Consciousness
Visual hallucinations resulting from drugs
Altered states Visual Hallucinations Being drowsy of resulting from consciousness asectic practics
Mystical experiences
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I think this diagram can help us understand overlap between mystical experiences and visual hallucinations. The above representation of the overlap between drugs and mystical experience is more directly related to the larger category of altered states of consciousness. This is consistent with part of Stace’s position of what mystical experiences are. Stace writes: ‘We start with a psychological fact the denial of which could only proceed from ignorance. Some human beings do occasionally have unusual experiences which come to be distinguished as ‘mystical.’’126 Furthermore, Stace’s exposition on core elements of mysticism shows his conclusions that mystical experiences are a category of psychological experiences with a number of common traits.127
It is those other significant features (like ‘oneness’, and ‘the ultimate’) that set mystical visions apart from mere visual hallucinations. Steven Katz expresses this idea clearly in Comparative Mysticism. He writes: ‘“Mysticism” and “mystical experience” are not to be equated with certain psychedelic drug-induced experiences. The latter are the consequence of transformations in one’s subjective awareness of oneself and the world. Such experiences do not necessarily bring one into contact with God or the Ultimate Reality.’128 Katz further clarifies possible overlaps between drug-induced experiences and mysticism. He writes: ‘However, there are religious traditions in which drugs are used as part of a larger process aimed at inducing not only altered states of consciousness but also contact with, [or] experience of, transcendent realities or Reality.’129 Thus, mysticism and drugs may be connected in some circumstances, but there is no necessary link between them.
2.2.5. Constructivism
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis represents the most significant response to earlier theories concerning mystical experience, but particularly Stace’s. This collection of essays present what scholars have subsequently labelled the ‘constructivist’, or ‘contextualist’, theory of mystical experiences.130 The most representative essay to provide an argument for this position is Steven Katz’s ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.131
126 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 5. 127 Ibid., 31–33, 62, 85, 131–133, et passim. 128 Steven T. Katz, ed., ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, in Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3–4. 129 Ibid., 4. 130 See Almond, ‘Mysticism and Its Contexts,’ 1988; Almond, ‘Mysticism and Its Contexts,’ 1997; Philip C. T. Almond, Mystical Experience and Religious Doctrine: An Investigation of the Study of Mysticism in World Religions (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1982); Forman, ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’; Forman, ‘Introduction’; Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay.’ 131 Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.
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Therein, Katz addresses the problem: if mystical experiences are various interpretations of the same psychological experience (what Stace calls ‘unitive consciousness’ or ‘the unifying vision’), then why does a Hindu always have a Hindu experience, and a Christian, a Christian experience? Why do Hindus not have Christian experiences and vice versa?
Katz argues that the reason is because there is no common core of mystical experience. This is to say that Katz argues that there is no ultimate ground in which all mystics take part and then variously interpret. Instead, Katz argues that religious and/or philosophical doctrines combine with an individual’s pre-conceptions in order to construct culturally, linguistically, and conceptually bound mystical experiences.132
Although Katz raises some critical questions in his inquiry, there are several weaknesses that scholars have demonstrated in his argument and methodology. Firstly, Katz’s argument rests on an appeal to an assumption about the nature of knowledge and experience. Katz presents this appeal thus: ‘let me state the single epistemological assumption that has exercised my thinking . . . there are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences.’133 However, scholars pointed out that appealing to an assumption about the nature of knowledge and experience causes parts of Katz’s argument to be invalid.134 For example, Katz gives examples and analyses of mystical experiences which, to put it bluntly, he reasons come about because his assumption is true, so he presents those examples as evidence to confirm that his assumption is true. This is a kind of circular reasoning which even scholars who defend Katz’s basic ideas of contextual mediation in mystical experiences also concede (as I discuss in further detail below).135
Scholars have also argued that Katz’s main position in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ contains the logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc (which is sometimes called ‘putting the cart before the horse’, or ‘mistaking the consequent for the antecedent’). A consequence of Katz’s argument is that records of mystical experience are taken not to be consequences of mystical experiences, but rather as causes of mystical experiences. To paraphrase, Katz assumes that in order to have a mystical experience, one must first of all be
132 Ibid., 25–27, 62–65, et passim. 133 Ibid., 26. 134 See Almond, ‘Mysticism and Its Contexts,’ 1988, 45–46; Donald Rothberg, ‘Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism,’ in the Problem of Pure Consciousness, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 163–210; Forman, ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity,’ 707–708; Forman, ‘Introduction,’ 1–9; Nagatomo, ‘A Critique of Steven Katz’s ‘Contextualism’: An Asian Perspective,’ 186, 188, 190, et passim. 135 See Torben Hammersholt, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 81, no. 2 (2013): 467–90.
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2. Mysticism indoctrinated into some religious (or indeed mystical) system that is already recorded and transmitted through doctrine and dogma. The implications of such reasoning are that mystical experiences are constructed subsequently through doctrine wherein the mystical experience is already recorded.
Thus, by reasoning that mystical experiences are constructed through indoctrination into pre-existing mystical systems, Katz implies that people can only have mystical experiences through pre-existing mystical systems. However, this does not explain how mystical systems, doctrines, and experiences came into existence. If mystical experiences are constructed through textually transmitted doctrine, then what led to the creation of the doctrine itself? Katz’s theory cannot answer this question.136
Torben Hammersholt has given some defence of these aspects of ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ in his article, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’.137 Therein, Hammersholt explains elements of Katz’s theory of mysticism which he argues have been criticised too harshly due to scholars’ misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Nonetheless, Hammersholt’s article also shows there to be aspects of Katz’s theory of mysticism which we (and indeed Hammersholt) ought not to accept.
Hmmersholt’s elaborations on points in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ are detailed and helpful for getting a clearer understanding of parts of Katz’s arguments. Throughout the article, Hammersholt uses analysis, reasoning, generalisation, and simplification to explain: ‘the meaning of certain important but difficult passages [in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.]138 Yet, the need to explain Katz’s arguments and reasoning in clearer terms than Katz himself articulates shows that the original article is not well argued. This is to say, the passages are not difficult because they are beyond the comprehension of readers, but rather because they are not well articulated. They contain circular reasoning fallacies and do not demonstrate adequate burden of proof to be wholly convincing.
For example, Hammersholt often refers to Katz’s later publications and supplies his own explanations in order to clarify ambiguities in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’. This proves that in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, Katz’s theories
136 Robert Forman makes this criticism in the most detail. See Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 44–46, 51–53; See also Nagatomo, ‘A Critique of Steven Katz’s “Contextualism”: An Asian Perspective’; Almond, ‘Mysticism and Its Contexts’, 1988. 137 Hammersholt, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’. 138 See: ibid., 468, 472, 475, 476, 477, 483, 484.
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2. Mysticism are not sufficiently articulated and that he does not provide sufficient burden of proof to support them. Consider that Hammersholt’s article has a section which argues that ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ does not advocate complete constructivism.139 This section of Hammersholt’s article is necessary because Katz had planned an article called ‘Mystical Experience and Theological Truth’ in order to offer ‘a complete defence of this position’ (i.e., his position that mystics construct their experiences in ways mediated by language and epistemological commitments).140 However, Hammersholt must also lament and offer the excuse that the article ‘was never published’.141 This appears to be an overly generous application of the principle of charity, for Hammersholt is defending ideas in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ by explaining what he thinks Katz might have written in an article that was never published.
In other parts of Hammersholt’s article, he must quote from Katz’s later publications in order to clarify what he thinks Katz probably meant in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’. To be sure, Katz has developed his theories of mysticism to be more convincing over the years, most notably in his introduction to Comparative Mysticism. However, in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, there are ambiguities that prevent Katz’s theory from being wholly convincing.142 Hence, the arguments presented in ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’ are unable to be completely understood or adequately supported in that article’s own terms and arguments.
Although Hammersholt’s analyses help clarify many elements of Katz’s theory, there are still some elements that scholars have been right to critique. The first is circular reasoning. In fact, Hammersholt agrees with this in his conclusion. He writes: ‘[Katz] seems to some degree vulnerable to a charge of circularity: The mystical data are taken as confirmation of his epistemological hypothesis, but at the same time, the analysis of the data presupposes, or leans on, the epistemological hypothesis. There may be some truth to this.’143
Although Hammersholt presents many sophisticated analyses that help us understand more of Katz’s theory of mysticism, there is one aspect of Hammersholt’s argument which I
139 Ibid., 472–74. 140 Ibid., 472. See also Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, 66 note 1. 141 Hammersholt, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’, 472. See also Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, 66, note 1. 142 See for example, Hammersholt’s quotations from Katz’s later articles in order to explain the ambiguity of his ‘no unmediated experiences’ epistemological assumption/fact/hypothesis. Hammersholt, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’, 476–77. 143 Ibid., 487. See also Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’, 167.
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2. Mysticism think we ought not to accept. Hammersholt argues: ‘his [Katz’s] central idea that mystical reports differ because mystical experiences differ and that the explanation for this is contextual mediation is intuitively strong and plausible, and in my opinion, the burden of proof lies with scholars who wish to argue otherwise.’144 This argument would have us accept Katz’s theory of mysticism simply because other scholars may not have argued otherwise. However, whether or not we accept an argument should not depend on whether anyone argues otherwise. It should depend on the strength of the argument presented to us in its own terms. Many scholars do not find Katz’s arguments convincing on those arguments’ own terms and reject them for the kinds of reasons I have given above. Therefore, reasons to reject Katz’s arguments about mysticism are stronger than reason Hammersholt gives to accept Katz’s arguments about mysticism.
There is another point in Hammersholt’s argument quoted above which I must respectfully explain is not very convincing. He reasons that we can accept Katz’s theory of mysticism because it appears intuitively plausible. However, just because something is intuitively plausible does not mean that it is true. Thus, we should not accept Katz’s thesis on the basis of it being intuitively plausible.
Moreover, Hammersholt indicates that he also rejects parts of Katz’s theory of mysticism. He writes: ‘I am not sure that Katz is right in assuming that mystical reports always mirror mystical experiences and that words in mystical reports always are descriptions in the sense he proposes. In my PhD dissertation, A Critical Analysis of the Comparative Study of Mysticism with Perspectives from Early Buddhism (2011), I suggest he is not.’145 Thus, even a disinterested, scholarly defender of Katz’s theories on mysticism is critical of Katz’s theories to the extent that he does not fully support them.
2.2.5.1. An Argument for Contextualism/Constructivism
Steven Katz gives a more convincing account of his theory of mysticism in his ‘General Editor’s Introduction’ to Comparative Mysticism.146 Section one of the chapter is edifying because Katz stipulates a general definition of mysticism complete with four qualifications that clarify nuances and misunderstandings. Katz defines mysticism in
144 Hammersholt, ‘Steven T. Katz’s Philosophy of Mysticism Revisited’, 487. 145 Ibid. 146 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013.
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Comparative Mysticism thus: ‘Mysticism is the quest for direct experience of God, Being, or Ultimate Reality, however these are understood, that is, theistically or non-theistically.’147
This definition from Katz is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it is the first time Katz has published a definition of mysticism. As I have shown above, in his earlier articles, Katz does not define mysticism which contributes to problems in his arguments to the effect that there is no core of mysticism, even though Katz recognises commonalities amongst a plurality of mysticisms. Indeed, there must be some kind of common core, or general set of features, evident in all kinds of mysticism in order for us to recognise them as such. Katz’s above definition gives convincing, general criteria by which we can define and recognise mysticism: a tradition of questing for experiences of ‘the Ultimate’.
Secondly, Katz’s definition contains four qualifications of nuances of mysticism and mystical experience. The first qualification is that mysticism does not necessarily involve ‘loss of self’. There are quests for experiences of ‘the Ultimate’ that do not involve ‘non- dualistic experience’ or ‘non-self’. The second qualification is that mysticism is not merely an unusual kind of psychological experience. Unusual, subjective psychological experiences can feature in mysticism as part of a quest for experiences of the Ultimate, but they are not the ultimate themselves, nor are they the goal of mystical quests. In other words, mysticism is more than just pleasant subjective psychological states. The third qualification follows closely from the second. This qualification holds that psychedelic drug-induced experiences are not equivalent to mystical experiences. Some kinds of mysticism might involve psychedelic drugs as part of a quest to experience the Ultimate, but merely using hallucinogenic drugs without participating in any such quest is not mysticism. The fourth qualification is that mysticism involves many phenomena. This means that we should not give undue emphasis to any one particular feature or nuance of mysticism at the expense of other features. An example would be considering mystical traditions which lay emphasis on non-dualistic experiences of union with the Ultimate as superior to traditions which do not contain evidence of, or belief in, non- dualistic union with an Ultimate. Those other traditions might cultivate direct experiences of their Ultimate, but without conceiving of such as experiences as ‘non-dualistic unions’.148
The consequences of these qualifications are that Katz’s definition is able to encompass virtually all known (and potentially unknown) kinds of mysticism. His definition self- evidently includes both theistic and non-theistic traditions. This is important for interpreting
147 Ibid., 3. 148 Ibid., 3–4.
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2. Mysticism mysticism in the Zhuangzi and other aspects of Daoism because mysticism in the Zhuangzi and the Daoist tradition is basically non-theistic. Moreover, as I have indicated earlier in this chapter, several scholars’ definitions of, and conclusions concerning, mysticism are difficult to reconcile with the Zhuangzi and Daoism because those definitions and conclusions stress theism and non-dualistic unity with an Ultimate.
Section two of Katz’s ‘General Editor’s Introduction’ is entitled ‘Epistemological Considerations’. This section is a revised, and clearer, version of the main arguments from Katz’s first, and most influential, article on mysticism, ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.149 For example, in the ‘Introduction’, Katz does not introduce his thesis that all experience is mediated through epistemological processes as an assumption which supports his data which supports his assumption (unlike in ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism’. Instead, Katz presents the thesis of all experience being processed through epistemological processes as a fact which he then argues to support.150 Revising and re-presenting his ideas in this way makes for a stronger argument that avoids technicalities of faulty reasoning for which Katz’s original article has been justly critiqued.
2.2.5.2. Merits of the Constructivist Theory of Mysticism
There are elements of the constructivist theory of mysticism that are appealing on the level of common sense. For example, that a person would conscientiously embark upon a quest to achieve a kind of inner experience the content (or even non-content) of which is conditioned by his prior expectations. I think it is reasonable to conclude that there have indeed been people labelled ‘mystics’ who have done that.
Suppose a Daoist sets out on a quest to experience oneness with Dao. Surely his quest is informed by his preconceptions about what the quest should entail and what the experience should be. He can, therefore, only attain an experience of Dao as a result of that quest. This supports Katz’s contextualist theory of mystical experience. It seems to me that Daoist mysticism could be mediated in this way. However, I do not agree with Katz’s assumption- cum-fact that the experience of dao itself would contain epistemological and linguistic content.
Experiences of Dao are related in terms of negative content in Daoist literature (such as the Zhuangzi). Thus, the Daoist who sets out to experience Dao is actually setting out to
149 Ibid., 4–12; cf. Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’. 150 See Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 5.
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2. Mysticism experience a state that comes with ‘forgetting’ positive content. It might be that Daoists, and other practitioners of meditative techniques, really do experience negative content. That is to say, a state of consciousness that really is ineffable because the neo-cortex is not engaged in the production of language as a result of meditational and contemplative techniques. Thus, ideas such as ‘Dao which can be spoken of is not constant Dao’ may actually be descriptions of states experienced and subsequently interpreted to be consistent with pre-existing philosophical, and theological ideas.151
Katz would appear to give an answer to this kind of objection in part 4 (‘Linguistic Considerations’) of his ‘General Editor’s Introduction’ in Comparative Mysticism. Therein, Katz argues that mystics’ use of apophasis does not genuinely describe nothingness or non- content. Instead, Katz holds that mystics’ descriptions of negative-content are actually linguistic mechanisms which they employ in order to condition themselves, and others, to have an experience of that something, i.e., ‘Ultimate’, which they attribute with the kinds of negative content they describe. He presents these conclusions thus: ‘mystics reveal, however, unintentionally, more of the “truth” they have come to know in language than their overt negations of meaning and content would suggest. . . . urgently desirous of sharing these extraordinary truths and experiences, they utilize language to convey meaning(s) and content(s)’.152
However, an implication of thinking about mystics’ use of language in this way is not consistent with the principle of charity. This is because Katz takes for granted that his assumptions about the nature of language, experience, and reality are objectively true. That is to say, Katz does not recognise the culturally conditioned limitations of his privileging one form of epistemological assumptions as if they are objectively true.153
Consequently, Katz does not take seriously the possibility that mystics (or humans generally) are capable of having experiences that are not mediated and interpreted through language. The result is that Katz must ‘explain away’ claims of experiences unmediated through language that mystics from disparate traditions have made. Donald Rothberg states most bluntly the implications of the ungenerous way in which Katz studies mystical
151 See also Blum, ‘Radical Empiricism and the Unremarkable Nature of Mystic Ineffability’, 214–17. 152 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 20. 153 For detailed critiques of this aspect of Katz’s methodology, see Rothberg, ‘Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism’, 179 et passim; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 162–64; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 34–35; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 128– 29; Forman, ‘Introduction’, 1997; Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness; Nagatomo, ‘A Critique of Steven Katz’s “Contextualism”: An Asian Perspective’.
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2. Mysticism traditions. He writes: ‘To study mystical traditions in this way is to study many of them as devalued, on fundamental issues as deluded.’154 There are, however, more generous ways of understanding how apophasis operates in mystical traditions and experiences.
2.2.6. De-Constructionism
Robert Forman has proposed alternative theories to Katz’s theory of mysticism. He has criticised constructivist theories of mysticism in several articles and books (some of which I have already cited). In Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, Forman argues that constructivism may be a cogent account of ordinary experience, but it is not wholly adequate to explain mystical experience. He substantiates this point by comparing theories of knowledge and experience expounded by Buddhists from the 5th century CE with constructivist theories of mysticism from the 20th century.155 Forman shows that in one sense, Yogācāra Buddhists’ and constructivists’ theories of ordinary knowledge and experience are in agreement. However, in another sense, Yogācāra Buddhists maintain that ordinary knowledge, sense-experience, and mental acts must be overcome and eliminated (in other words de-constructed) in order to gain what they term ‘enlightenment’.156
Moreover, the kind of elimination of ordinary sense-perception, mental content, and experience described by Yogācāra Buddhists, such as Paramārtha, is consistent with what Forman calls ‘the Pure Consciousness Event’. This is a term he coins to describe a common type of mystical experience similar to Stace’s category of introvertive mysticism.157 Forman’s position that some kinds of mystical experiences, such as the Pure Consciousness Event, are cross-culturally identical which differ in interpretation is debatable. Nevertheless, his identification of common elements of at least some types of mysticism gives his theory of mysticism an advantage over Katz’s in that he stipulates what happens in some forms of mystical experiences, whereas Katz does not.
Forman gives a definition of mysticism at the beginning of Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness. He holds that mysticism is a label we give to psychological experiences that are regarded as significant in a spiritual or religious sense. Forman delimits his criteria for judging certain psychological states to be mystical, thus:
154 Rothberg, ‘Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism’, 182. 155 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 81–92. 156 See also Rothberg, ‘Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism’, 168. 157 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 90–92.
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I propose using the term mysticism [sic] for trophotropic [sic] states [of consciousness]. . . . and only for those people who write about experiences on the trophoptropic side of our chart [of states of conscious arousal]. . . . I can thus concur with Ninian Smart’s definition of mysticism: ‘Mysticism describes a set of experiences or more precisely, conscious events, which are not described in terms of sensory experience or mental images.’158
By ‘trophotropic’, Forman means: ‘hyperaroused states, marked by low levels of cognitive and physiological activity’.159 These conditions form part of a generalised core of mystical experience, according to Forman. This places mystical experience mainly in the realm of psychological states. It may appear that in doing so, Forman does not account for philosophical or theological claims of experiencing ‘ultimates’ or noetic qualities of mystical experience. However, Forman continues to account of those issues: it is just that in his understanding, they are not the primary issues of mystical experience.
Forman concurs with Stace’s typology of ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ mysticism. However, he argues that Stace’s typology does not go far enough in distinguishing different forms of both ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ mysticism.160 Forman’s own ‘Pure Consciousness Event’ is one other form of ‘introvertive mysticism’. This entails apophatic meditation to remove thoughts from consciousness until one reaches a state of being awake in meditation, yet without cognitive content in one’s mind. Moreover, Forman cites the sahaja samadhi of Ramana Maharhi as well as what he calls ‘Dualistic Mystical Experience’ as examples of other forms of ‘extrovertive mysticism’. These entail retaining some of the feeling and mental state achieved from introvertive mystical experience after returning to normal consciousness.161
None of these other types of mystical experience have an experience of unity with ‘the Ultimate’ as ‘the nucleus round which [all other aspects of mysticism] revolve’, contrary to
158 Ibid., 5–6. See also Roland Fischer, ‘A Cartography of the Ecstatic and Meditative States’, in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1980), 270–85; Smart, ‘Interpretation and Mystical Experience’, 75. 159 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 4. 160 Ibid., 6. See also Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 17, 26, 28; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 64–66; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 128. 161 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 6–7, 131–157, et passim. See also Arthur Osborne, Ramana Maharshi and The Path of Self Knowledge (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973), 204; The Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi (London: Rider, 1959), 47; Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 29.
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Stace’s typology.162 Nevertheless, they accord with other aspects of Stace’s theory of mysticism, especially the phenomenology of mystical experience. Hence, Forman suggests that there are forms of mysticism and mystical experience wherein something that is ‘ultimate’ or ‘basic to the world’ may not actually centre on unity with a metaphysical ‘Ultimate’.163
Forman does not give an explanation of any purported core of all mysticism. Instead, he points out problems with constructivist theories of mysticism and offers counter examples of mystical experiences which he argues constructivist theories cannot account for. Moreover, Forman emphasises that the counter examples of mystical experiences he offers, such as the ‘Pure Consciousness Event’:
[are not] the only form of important mystical phenomena. There are many other interesting mystical phenomena . . . I do not claim, and I do not believe, that it [the Pure Consciousness Event] is everywhere believed to be ultimate or salvific. . . . although it may play an important role in the more advanced forms of the mystical life.164
By ‘the mystical life’, Forman means a lifestyle wherein a person believes mystical experience to be important, although he does not state this explicitly. Thus, Forman challenges constructivist theories of mysticism.
2.2.7. Who can be a ‘Mystic’?
There is an issue of language I wish to address here. Forman labels people from a variety of traditions and eras ‘mystics’. However, if we were to approach many of them, particularly those who do/did not speak English, and ask then to teach us their mystic ways, they would not understand us. The obvious reason is because a Yogācāra master who lived during the 4th century CE would not understand the English language. The deeper reason is because it may not be possible to translate our locution into his language. The so-called Yogācāra mystic may have no word in his language that corresponds to Forman’s (or anyone’s) usage of the English term ‘mystic’.
162 See Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 132–33. 163 See also John Blofeld, Beyond the Gods: Buddhist and Taoist Mysticism (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1974), 106–7. 164 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 7.
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Terms like ‘mystic’ and ‘mysticism’ are words in European languages that are bound to culturally and historically specific meanings, senses and usages, as I have already shown above. For Forman to label Paramārtha, the 5th century Yogācāra master, a ‘mystic’ means applying a label to him that he would not understand (at least not at first). In other words, Forman is still working within the construct called ‘mysticism’ which was developed, mostly by English speaking people, during the 18th and 19th centuries. If we accept that this construct is meaningful and general enough to apply it to other people, cultures, and traditions, then Forman’s usage is not problematic. However, Forman, like other scholars of mysticism, does not address this issue directly.
Agenhananda Bharati165 directly addresses the issue of applying the label ‘mystic’ to people who may not have a corresponding word in their own language.166 He argues that ‘mystic’ is a label we can give to any person who is: ‘a seeker of intuitive union with the cosmic ground, who chooses experiments which would lead to such intuition, preferring the available enstatic or euphoric experiments to available less ecstatic and less euphoric ones [Bharati’s italics].’167 Bharati concludes that these features: ‘could be ascribed to all mystics at all times, regardless of what people in their societies call them, or even what they call themselves.’168
Bharati argues that ‘mystic’ is a valid label for people who make etic statements to the effect ‘I am a mystic’. By this, he means that ‘mystic’ is a term we can apply to a person who, in his/her own language, communicates that he/she has embarked on a quest to attain: ‘intuition of numerical oneness with the cosmic absolute [Bharati’s italics]’.169 Hence, Bharati argues that there are objective criteria for labelling a person ‘a mystic’, even though that person may not have such a word in his/her own language.
Oneness and union with something believed to be the Ultimate are features common to many mystical traditions. This is especially true of the Upanishads, from which Bharati draws extensively for his understandings of mysticism. Insofar as we understand oneness with something to be part of certain kinds of mysticism and mystical experience, Bharati’s idea of
165 Agenhananda Bharati is the monastic name of Austrian-born Leopold Fischer. 166 See: Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 16, 21–31. 167 Ibid., 28. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid., 25. On etic and emic, see Marvin T. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture, Reprint 1970 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Company, 1968), 571– 75.
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2. Mysticism assessing a person’s etic use of language provides convincing criteria for determining whether someone is ‘a mystic’.
Not only is Bharati’s criterion for labelling someone a mystic plausible in its own terms (bearing certain qualifications in mind), but it is more critical than some other scholars’ definitions of ‘a mystic’. For example, Stace considers anyone who has had a ‘mystical experience’ to be ‘a mystic’.170 However, such a definition of ‘mystic’ is very wide because it does not allow the possibility that a person could have a ‘mystical experience’ but not consider himself/herself ‘a mystic’. Moreover, literature on mysticism contains several examples of scholars who claim to have had mystical experiences yet do not consider themselves to be mystics.171 Therefore, I agree with Bharati that we can tell if a person is ‘a mystic’ by observing whether or not he/she makes statements consistent with criteria by which we may judge him/her to be so. Nevertheless, an interpretive difficulty exists for determining if the subject’s utterances could be taken to refer to an ‘ultimate’ or ‘cosmic ground’.
Determining such a meaning would require detailed analysis of the person’s tradition and the ideas which he/she expresses. For example, a Warring States era Daoist (let us call him Zhuangzi) would not say ‘I have experienced the cosmic ground’. This is because the Daoist tradition, and classical Chinese language, do not have lexical equivalents of ‘the cosmic ground’. In order to apply Bharati’s criteria for labelling Zhuangzi a mystic, we would have to: firstly, study the ideas Zhuangzi presents in his own terms; and secondly, determine if any of those terms are communicating something to the effect of ‘a cosmic ground’, or an ultimate. This is not an impossible task, but it is not as straight-forward as Bharati makes it sound (I explain this point in further detail in part 3 of this dissertation).
Moreover, there are some methodological difficulties with accepting Bharati’s definition of mystic as a criterion for all forms of mysticism. Bharati assumes that all forms of mysticism must ultimately be primarily concerned with attaining union with ‘the ground’, i.e., a metaphysical ultimate not unlike that found in the Upanishads. This assumption leads a latter part of Bharati’s analysis to be in conflict with his earlier definition of mysticism involving experiments with enstatic experiences. Thus, Bharati writes that mystics whose experiences and practices contain enstatic states, but without merging with a metaphysical
170 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 36. 171 See Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience, xiv–xv; James, Varieties, 378–379; Graham, ‘Mysticism and the Question of Private Access,’ 270–272; Paper, the Spirits Are Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion, 132.
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2. Mysticism ultimate, are ‘a bit more complicated.’172 Thereupon, Bharati concludes ‘I would call them mystics by courtesy.’173
This, however, results in an example of a no true Scotsman fallacy in Bharati’s definition of ‘a mystic’, and by extension ‘mysticism’. Bharati’s definition of mysticism would allow for a mystic whose idea of ‘intuitive union with the cosmic ground’ does not mean ‘merging’ in non-dualistic experience with the metaphysical ultimate. However, Bharati would have us believe that a person whose mystical tradition corresponds to all aspects of his definition except for the idea of non-dualistic merging with a metaphysical ultimate is only ‘a mystic by courtesy’. This inherently creates a dichotomy privileging religious, philosophical, and mystical traditions that believe in non-dualistic union with an ultimate over those which do not. Thus, although Bharati’s definitions of mystic and mysticism hold good for those privileged traditions, under close critical reading, they are still too narrow to be identify for all forms of mysticism.
Again, it is in Steven Katz’s work that we can find a plausible solution for a methodological problem in the study of mysticism, such as ‘who can be labelled a mystic?’. In the conclusion of his introduction to Comparative Mysticism, Katz gives an unequivocal explanation of what all mystics have in common. Katz writes:
As a consequence of the epistemological and socioreligious factors at work in the creation of religious experience, it can now be understood that mystics — and this is what makes them mystics — have what philosophers call knowledge by acquaintance as compared with knowledge by description. They possess firsthand, existential knowledge of what their co-religionists know only through propositions. Moreover, it is the search after such immediate, if mediated, experience, and the report of such experience, that comprises the bulk of the world’s mystical literature.174
A person who claims to have knowledge by acquaintance with the ultimate concerns of his/her religious or philosophical tradition is one whom we may label ‘a mystic’. This explanation is general enough to include mystics who espouse non-dualistic union with a metaphysical absolute, as well as those who do not. However, the reader should also bear in
172 Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 27. 173 Ibid. 174 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 20.
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2. Mysticism mind the qualifications that Katz gives in his initial definition of mysticism at the beginning of his introduction to Comparative Mysticism (discussed above).175 Bearing those qualifications in mind keeps Katz’s explanation of what mystics are from being too general.
2.2.8. Radical Empiricism & New Directions for the Study of Mysticism
Scholarship on mysticism holds that what we label mystical experiences entail altered states of consciousness. 20th century polemics about altered states of consciousness called mystical experiences rely on analyses of subjective accounts of those experiences as well as subsequent interpretations given to them by the subject (which may have been influenced by the subject’s antecedent beliefs). In the early 21st century, it appears that science may be able to offer empirical evidence of what happens in a person’s brain and consciousness which scholars can use to support arguments concerning mystical experience.
Based on such developments, Jason Blum has argued that radical empiricism offers a more accurate account of consciousness and mystical experience than the neo-Kantian epistemology that scholars such as Katz drew from in the 20th century. Blum argues:
Recent scientific evidence suggests not only that nondiscursive [sic] dimensions of consciousness can be identified, but that they constitute aspects of consciousness that appear to be more foundational to it than its cognitive, conceptual components. This indicates that the roles of emotion and language in experience—both mystic and otherwise—need to be fundamentally reconsidered.176
Such scientific evidence concerning the brain and consciousness challenges Katz’s theory of mysticism which holds linguistic elements of consciousness to be more fundamental than non-linguistic elements. If we interpret Katz more strongly, then his epistemological commitments deny the possibility of human experience, including consciousness, that is not mediated thought language. Hence, neuro-scientific evidence that Blum cites presents a serious challenge to Katz’s theory of mysticism because it offers evidence of consciousness unmediated language. Hence, Blum concludes:
Subjective accounts of experience from mystics cross-culturally emphasize shared dimensions of experience—such as ineffability—that
175 See ibid., 3–4. 176 Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’, 156.
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challenge the neo-Kantian model of conceptual, linguistic consciousness. These findings suggest that radical empiricism—in acknowledging emotions as basic constituents of experience, and in recognizing that all experience is not necessarily susceptible to linguistic articulation—is a more accurate description of the nature of consciousness. These findings are underscored by recent developments in neuroscientific and psychological studies of consciousness, which indicate the existence of nonlinguistic, affective conscious capacities. . . . Radical empiricism, in addition to more accurately reflecting the latest developments in our understanding of brain architecture and the functionality of consciousness, also indicates productive lines of inquiry into mystical experience and claims of ineffability.177
The implications of these neuroscientific studies of consciousness are that there may be a common core of mystical experience. This is not the common core of perennial philosophy, i.e., a shared mystic object that all mystics experience but interpret in different ways. It is, rather, ‘[a product] of the shared structure of the human brain.’178 Blum explains: ‘Medieval Christian preachers and ancient Chinese monks may both report ineffability, for example, not because they are both experiencing an identical mystic object that transcends human description, but because they both share the built-in, natural human capacity for nonlinguistic experience.’179 Consequently, Blum argues that mystical experience may be an appropriate label for states of consciousness humans can attain wherein the neo-cortex (which is responsible for language and discursive thinking) becomes less active than normal, but the sub-cortical region of the brain (responsible for emotion, feeling, and ‘affective experiences’) remains active.180
These developments indicate fascinating new means of future research into mystical experiences. However, it seems that Blum is working within the construct of mysticism in similar ways to other scholars whose works I have cited. This is to say that Blum does not appear to recognise that different people, speaking different languages, in different cultures,
177 Ibid., 170–71. 178 Ibid., 168. 179 Ibid.; See also Kenneth R. Pelletier, Toward a Science of Consciousness (New York: Delacorte Press, 1978); Forman, ‘What Can Mysticism Teach Us About Consciousness?’ 180 Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’, 160–162, 165–166, 170, et passim. By ‘affective experiences’, Blum means ‘nondiscursive elements—such as emotions, sensations, and felt qualities . . . [which] cannot be reduced to conceptual or linguistic forms.’; See ibid., 151, 157–159, especially note 6.
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2. Mysticism with different beliefs and practices, at different periods, do not conscientiously practice ‘mysticism’. ‘Mysticism’ is not a term or concept that many so-called ‘mystics’ would comprehend. Nonetheless, as Wayne Proudfoot argues:
The fact that the concept [of mysticism] is of recent vintage . . . does not mean that we cannot employ it to refer to a particular pattern of phenomena . . . there do seem to be expressions, experiential reports, and practices that are sufficiently similar across different traditions to warrant use of the term mysticism and attention to some common characteristics181
2.2.8.1. ‘Words Are not Just Blowing Air’
We can support this continued use of the term ‘mysticism’ with reference to the Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi writes:
‘Words are not just Blowing Air’ Passage
My Translation Source Text
‘Words are not just blowing air: words say 夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未 something. However, what they say is not fixed, so do they really say anything? Or 定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言 have they never really said anything at all? . . . How can words exist and not be 邪？ . . . 言惡乎存而不可？ . . . right [regarding to what they are naming]? . . . Thus, we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Mohists: 故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非 they affirm what the other denies and deny what the other affirms. They want to make right what the other makes wrong and make wrong what the other makes right. Thus, [I
181 Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 124.
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2. Mysticism say] there is nothing better than using 其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫 illumination!
若以明。182
It is possible to ‘use illumination’, or on another interpretation, ‘use clarity’, when it comes to the appropriateness of terms like ‘mysticism’. This term refers to a meaningful pattern of phenomena. Through philosophical analysis it is possible to get a clearer idea of the kinds of experiences that scholars describe as ‘mystical’ and place under the label of ‘mysticism’. These terms are not just blowing air: they mean something.
The ‘words are not just blowing breath’ passage relates to philosophy of language positions entailed in many expressions of mysticism. Many mystics and mystical systems claim that there are aspects of experience, the divine, and reality which language cannot adequately express because those aspects are purportedly objective, whereas human language pertaining to those aspects is subjective and epistemologically mediated. If the Zhuangzi does indeed contain expressions of mysticism and accounts of mystical experience (as many scholars claim), then we should expect to also find passages in the text which communicate mystical ideas of language and meaning. The ‘words are not just blowing breath’ is one possible example.
2.3. Examples of Mystical Texts
By ‘mystical text’, I mean a text which has a clearly communicated, self-evident purpose to relate its author’s ‘mystical experiences’ and insights gained from them, to the reader. Authors of ‘mystical texts’ do not need to actually use terms like ‘mystical’. There are several features of mysticism that are form the content what scholars usually consider to be ‘mystical texts’. Firstly, accounts of unusual inner experiences (i.e. mental states, or altered states of consciousness) that the subject feels have been beneficial, significant, spiritual, or religious. Secondly, subsequent reflections and interpretations on such experiences as well as the subject’s own estimation of their significance. These take the form of expressions to the
182 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/23-4/2/27.
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2. Mysticism effect that the subject estimates those unusual practices and experiences to be of great personal, spiritual, or religious significance. Thirdly, concomitant reflections on matters that pertain to what the subject identifies as relevant topics with respect to the experiences and his/her own estimations of their significance.183 This is where subjects often interpret their experiences according to their pre-existing religious and philosophical beliefs.
I have made the criteria by which we can judge a text to be mystical have from generalised examples of mystical texts. In order to better demonstrate what these general criteria, I give examples from mystical texts in the sections below.
2.3.1. Revelations of Divine Love
Revelations of Divine Love is a mystical text. The text relates the author’s (a woman known as Julian of Norwich) recollections of her experiences during a time of illness. Moreover, she tells us that those states were not mere visual hallucinations (in fact she emphasises that she did not see them with her eyes but with her mind),184 but rather ‘revelations of divine love’. This is to say, that during her time of illness, Julian of Norwich had experiences known only to her which she felt were of the greatest spiritual and religious significance.185 After recovering from what all about her believed would be a fatal illness, she concluded that those revelations were a direct experience of God, Jesus, and the Trinity, and that she had been blessed by them and allowed to live so that she might come to love God more fully. Thus, much of her book is dedicated to explaining how these experiences allowed her to appreciate the doctrines of her religion (Catholicism) more fully, intimately, and directly.
Throughout the text, Julian of Norwich gives details of her revelations. There are several instances of her experiences that are examples of what we can call mysticism. For example, she interprets her near fatal illness in an esoteric manner which relates to an experience of ‘the Ultimate’, which for her was God. Julian writes she actually wanted to experience the suffering of her illness so that she might have come to know God more fully. In the illness, she recalls unusual mental states such as focusing on a crucifix until:
183 cf. a narrower definition of ‘mystical texts’ proposed by Carl Keller: Carl A. Keller, ‘Mystical Literature’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven. T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 77–78. The usage I have proposed here is more inclusive of non-theistic traditions. 184 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), 64–65, 67, et passim. 185 Here, by ‘spiritual’ I mean pertaining chiefly to her in an individual manner. By ‘religious’, I mean primarily in relation to doctrine and dogma.
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my sight began to fail, and the room became dark about me . . . except for the image of the cross which somehow was lighted up; but how was beyond my comprehension. . . . Then the rest of my body began to die, and I could hardly feel a thing. . . . Suddenly all my pain was taken away, and I was fit and well as I had ever been186
These kinds of experiences are examples ascetic practices that produce an altered state of consciousness, the entire process of which the subject feels is spiritually significant. Julian of Norwich says she wanted to experience this illness and the states quoted above so she would be able to attain: ‘true contrition, genuine compassion, and . . . genuine longing for God.’187 In other words, Julian interpreted her illness as part of a quest for experiencing the absolute of her religion.
This is one example of what can be summarised as the essence of all mysticism. For example, Steven Katz gives a concise definition of mysticism thus: ‘Mysticism is the quest for direct experience of God, Being, or Ultimate Reality, however these are understood, that is, theistically or non-theistically.’188 Julian of Norwich interpreted her illness as part of a quest for Ultimate Reality as she understood it, i.e., revelations from God.
In another part of the text, Julian relates the significance of experiences of her illness to experiences of the Ultimate of her faith. She writes: ‘But what he is who is in truth Maker, Keeper, and Lover I cannot tell, for until I am essentially united with him [sic] I can never have full rest or real happiness; in other words until I am so joined with him that there is absolutely nothing between my God and me.’189 We can interpret this kind of locution as the idea of an experience of ‘union’ or ‘unity’ with ‘the Ultimate’ that is a common characteristic of mysticisms which scholars have described.190
Thus, Revelations of Divine Love contains elements consistent with ‘mystical experience’ and ‘mysticism’. But what makes it a ‘mystical text’ on the whole? I suggest it is because the text on the whole is concerned primarily with those unusual experiences outlined above and with the author’s own estimations of their importance. Moreover, she relates them together with what she concludes are relevant topics for interpreting them. For example,
186 Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 65. 187 Ibid., 64. 188 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 3. 189 Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 68. 190 See Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy; Bharati, the Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 65–69.
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Catholic doctrines like the last rights which she says strengthened her and allowed her to receive more revelations that were more intense.191
2.3.2. The Story of My Heart
The Story of My Heart is an example of a different kind of mystical text. The author, Richard Jefferies, is an atheist, but he still believes in a soul (which he sometimes calls ‘psyche’).192 Throughout the book, Jefferies relates his experiences and motivations for nurturing ‘soul-thought’ and ‘soul-life’. Jefferies ideas of nurturing ‘soul-life’ are his own practices because they are not the doctrine or dogma of any institutionalised religion. Yet, he relates them to experiences of his idea of ‘the ultimate’, i.e., non-ordinary experiences of nature. His ideas of ‘soul-life’, experiences of nurturing ‘soul-life’, and what he relates of them are consistent with features of mysticism.
The practices Jefferies describes are consistent with the phenomenology of Zaehner’s ‘nature mysticism’ as well as Stace’s ‘extrovertive mysticism’. Zaehner quotes Jefferies’ accounts of his preternatural experiences wherein Jefferies muses that he: ‘might have the inner meaning of the sun, the light, the earth, the trees, the grass’ within himself.193 Thus, Zaehner concludes that Jefferies’ unusual experiences were a ‘communion’ consistent with ‘nature mysticism’. That is to say: ‘the person . . . feels that he has gone through something of tremendous significance beside which the ordinary world of sense perception and discursive thought is almost the shadow of a shade.’194
Stace classes ‘nature mysticism’ as a sub-type of ‘extrovertive mysticism’. He thinks that it is basically the same as extrovertive mysticism, but that it is not as highly developed.195 The more vivid of Jefferies’ experiences, and his accounts of them, accord with Stace’s ‘extrovertive mysticism’ because they relate what is consistent with his criterion of ‘the unifying vision’. In one example, Jefferies writes: ‘I spoke with my soul to the earth . . . the rich blue of the unattainable flower of the sky drew my soul towards it, and there it rested . . . By all these I prayed ; [sic] I felt an emotion of the soul beyond all definition’.196 Thus, Jefferies also says that his experience was ineffable. This is a common feature in the
191 Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 65–69. See also Happold, Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology, 322–32. 192 Richard Jefferies, The Story of My Heart: My Autobiography (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883), 1–3, 38, 47–51, et passim. 193 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 47. See also Jefferies, The Story of My Heart: My Autobiography, 72. 194 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 48, 199. 195 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 80–81. 196 Jefferies, The Story of My Heart: My Autobiography, 4–5.
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2. Mysticism description of mystical experiences, one that William James uses as a ‘mark’ of their nature.197
It is evident that Jefferies’ experiences wandering about in nature are consistent with several features of several theories of mysticism. More generally, Jefferies’ experiences, his accounts of them, his reckoning of their significance to his ‘soul-life’, and what he presents as relevant topics against which to understand them (like atheism, spirituality, and religion), are consistent with a general understanding of mysticism in the works of philosophers of religion. Hence, scholars have sometimes quoted and analysed passages from the Story of My Heart as part of their accounts of mysticism.198
The texts I have referred to above are not exhaustive of commonly recognised mystical texts. They are, however, representative examples of what scholars generally mean by ‘mystical texts’. If one were to argue the Zhuangzi is a mystical text, it might be appropriate to draw explicit comparisons between the Zhuangzi and texts like Revelations of Divine Love, the Story of My Heart, or any number of other texts that scholars call mystical. However, no scholar who has labelled the Zhuangzi a mystical text or claimed that mysticism is at the heart of the Zhuangzi has made such comparisons.
While it might be edifying to make detailed comparisons of phenomenological features of mystical experiences recorded in the Zhuangzi and other mystical texts (like those outlined above), I think we must first ask some more general questions. For example, does the Zhuangzi contain evidence of commonly recognised features of mysticism? If so, what does the Zhuangzi relate in its own terms that we can interpret as examples of commonly recognised features of mysticism? How can we plausibly interpret those sections of the text as relating something ‘mystical’?
2.4. Conclusions
Mysticism involves altered states of consciousness. Common features of the kinds of altered consciousness labelled ‘mystical’ seem to be at the core of mysticism. There are, however, various philosophical positions about the phenomenological, epistemological, and metaphysical features of mysticism and purported cores of mystical experience. Scholars have
197 James, Varieties, 1902, 371. See also Blum, ‘Radical Empiricism and the Unremarkable Nature of Mystic Ineffability’; Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’. 198 Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 45–49; Happold, Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology, 384–93.
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2. Mysticism largely dismissed perennial philosophy as naïve because of the position’s equivocation of incompatible truth claims concerning ultimate reality as well as features of mystical experience. Yet, more philosophically detailed explanations of mysticism have yielded differing taxonomies of mystical experience as well as difference claims about what lies at the core of mysticism and mystical experiences. Many scholars have been critical of one another’s methodologies in the analysis of mystical experiences. Yet, none appear to doubt that the kinds of experiences, and religious traditions, the details of which they argue about, are indeed mystical. Thus, it seems that by the late 20th century, scholars within the philosophy of religion reached a stale-mate in how to understand and analyse mystical experience.
Yet, in recent years in the early 21st century, neuroscientific data has provided some scope for renewed interest in mystical experience. For example, neuroscientific data suggests that all humans have some capacity for conscious experiences that stem from activity in the sub-cortical regions of our brains rather than activity in the neo-cortex.199 Such evidence can be taken to support claims that different mystics from different traditions do indeed share in the same kind of experience inasmuch as effects of ‘quietening the mind’ and experiencing ineffable forms of consciousness, for the sub-critical region of the human brain is thought not to involve language. As Jason Blum concludes: ‘neuroscientific and psychological evidence . . . suggests a competing explanation for such cross-cultural similarities [that we find in accounts of different mystical experiences].’200
As interesting as these new developments in the study of consciousness and mystical experience may be, they are far removed from the Zhuangzi. When it comes to studying mysticism in the Zhuangzi, we must rely on more traditional, textual, and philosophical forms of analysis and argumentation. Thus, I find much that is convincing in Steven Katz’s explanations of mysticism in Comparative Mysticism. The definition of mysticism which Katz provides therein, as well as the qualifications of nuanced issues concerning mystical experiences, provide a general description of mysticism that is generous enough to include aspects of the Zhuangzi.
199 See also Robert KC Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and the Perennial Philosophy’, in The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3–44. 200 Blum, ‘The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism’, 168. See also Forman, ‘Introduction’, 1998, 33.
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This does not mean that I find other aspects of other scholars’ studies of mysticism unconvincing. Indeed, throughout this dissertation, I draw from several interpretations of mysticism (including those from James, Zaehner, Stace, Katz, and Forman) in order to expand on other scholars’ work claiming that the Zhuangzi is mystical in such a way as to show how we can plausibly interpret the Zhuangzi to show evidence of mysticism. This is significant for studies of mysticism in the Zhuangzi because it considers how we can support scholars’ claims of mysticism in the Zhuangzi by situating the Zhuangzi in relation to the study of mysticism more broadly. Yet, considering the Zhuangzi in the wider context of mysticism presents problems concerning the applicability of ‘mysticism’ as part of the meaning of the text.
The earliest English literature on mysticism comes from the 18th century, a time of religious oppression and bigotry.201 As such, literature from that era presents mysticism as a kind of impious deviation from more proper forms of religion, namely, Christianity.202 Many of the terms commonly associated with mysticism and the nature of mystical experience are derived from specifically Christian concepts, beliefs, practices, and theology. Such concepts and beliefs have no analogues in the Zhuangzi, Daoism, and Chinese religion in general.
Hence, the meaning of terms like ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experience’ is problematic in itself. As I have shown in this part of the dissertation, scholars’ understanding of mysticism has changed considerably over the past 300 years. Moreover, earlier connotations of terms like mysticism and mystical experience could not have included ideas from the Zhuangzi because the Zhuangzi does belong to an esoteric sect of Christianity. How, then, can we justify labelling the Zhuangzi a work of mysticism, or say that mysticism is at the core of the text? In the next chapters, I analyse how the Zhuangzi has been characterised as mystical.
201 See also ‘10. Was Hume an Atheist?’ Russell, ‘Hume on Religion’, 2014. 202 See McGinn, ‘Christian Mysticism’, 157 et passim.
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Part Two: Analysis of Interpretations of Mysticism in the Zhuangzi
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy 3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy
There are a number of introductions to Chinese philosophy. In several of these contributions, authors write that the Zhuangzi is mystical. In this chapter, I explain how these sources have transmitted interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The reader will see that some of these sources do in fact present arguments to support the author’s interpretation of mysticism. However, as I demonstrate, those arguments and interpretations are not convincing for several reasons. The first is due to difficulties in the reasoning of what the authors argue. The second is because some arguments are not convincing due to anachronisms in how the authors would have us interpret the Zhuangzi. The third is because many of the interpretations are not actually supported by arguments: scholars merely propound the view that the Zhuangzi is mystical.
3.1. Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China
Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China is the earliest example of what we can think of as an introduction to Chinese philosophy. The book mostly consists of Arthur Waley’s translations and explanations of sections from the Zhuangzi, Mengzi 孟子, and Hanfeizi 韓非 子. The sections of text which Waley translates and discusses are what he considers to be representative of their respective philosophies of Daoism, Confucianism, and Legalism (whom Waley usually calls ‘Realists’ or ‘the School of Law’).203
Waley quotes examples of ‘mystic practices’ from the Zhuangzi and the Liezi 列子 in his discussions of Daoism.204 His view of Daoism is that it was a ‘way of thought’, that is to say a school of thought, self-consciously transmitted among the authors of texts like the Zhuangzi and the Liezi. Hence, Waley refers to, and quotes from, the Liezi in order to further explain the mystical aspects of Daoism which he presents as also evident in the Zhuangzi.
Waley identifies elements of mysticism where these texts relate esoteric practices and experiences that have spiritual and/or religious significance. For example, Waley adduces examples from Liezi to support his conclusion that the word ‘you 游/遊’ meaning, ‘“to wonder, to travel” . . . in its Taoist acceptation, is a spiritual not a bodily journey.’205 These
203 See Arthur T. Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939), 199 et passim. 204 Ibid., 29, 59–67, 76–79. 205 Ibid., 60–61. See also Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion, trans. Phyllis Brooks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997)171-175; Angus Charles Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1981), 8; Shaoyan 陈绍燕 Chen, ‘Mysticism Is the Home of
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy examples include where the Liezi relates ‘the sight-seeing that can be done within’ and ‘[going on] distant journeys of the soul’206 without leaving one’s seat. Thus, Waley gives examples from Daoist texts, but mainly the Liezi, that show connections between ‘mysticism’ and esoteric, ‘inner’ experiences that have spiritual significance for the subject.
3.1.1. Taoist Yoga: Nanguo Ziqi as a Zhuangzi-Daoist-Mystic
In the section of the book on ‘Taoist yoga’, Waley gives one example from the Zhuangzi: the Ziqi dialogue.207 Waley paraphrases and translates the text thus:
Waley’s Translation Source Text My Translation of the Source Text
Nan-kuo Tzu Ch’i, was 南郭子綦隱几而坐，仰天 Nanguo Ziqi sat against a observed by his pupil Yen- 而噓，嗒焉似喪其耦。顏 stool. He looked up to the ch’eng Tzu Yu to be sitting 成子游立侍乎前，曰： sky (tian 天) and sighed. He with his face turned upwards 210 「何居乎？形固可使如槁 looked dazed and like he to Heaven, breathing gently had lost his mate. Yancheng 木，而心固可使如死灰 through parted lips, Ziyou was standing in 乎？今之隱几者，非昔之 motionless as a ploughman attendance. He said: ‘What 隱几者也。」209 whose mate has left him. is this? Can the body really ‘What is this?’ said Yen- be made to be like withered ch’eng Tzu Yu. ‘Can limbs wood? Can the heart really indeed be made to become be made to be like dead as a withered tree, can the ashes? The man who is heart indeed be made to resting against the stool now become as dead ashes? is surely not the same as he What is now propped upon was before.’ that stool is not he that a
Zhuangzi’s Epistemology (神秘主义是庄子认识论的归宿)’, Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 1983, no. 6 (1983): 69. 206 Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 60–61, 63–67. 207 See the Zhuangzi Yinde, 3/2/1–9. 209 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 3/2/1-2. 210 The meaning of da yan 嗒焉 is difficult to understand. It is the subject of lengthy explanations in the commentaries on the Zhuangzi. See Qingfan 郭慶藩 Guo, Zhuangzi Ji Shi 莊子集釋, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju: Xinhua Shudian Beijing Faxingsuo Faxing 中華書局 : 新華書店北京發行所發行, 1961), 43–44.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy little while ago propped himself upon that stool.208
Waley’s remarks on the above passage show that he identifies mysticism where the Zhuangzi relates aspects of inner experience that have spiritual significance for the subject. He writes: ‘It is evident that . . . some kind of trance-state is being described. But the language is conventional and imprecise. . . . It is possible that many commonplace words had, in connection with mystic practices, a technical sense that now escapes us.’211 Here, it should be understood that that cultivation of trance-states is inherently spiritually significant; Waley associates trance-states with mysticism. Another reason is that ‘the sky’ (tian 天) was also spiritually significant in the view of the authors of the Zhuangzi because they viewed it as a non-anthropomorphic deity, as well as being literally ‘the sky’.
Moreover, Waley is identifying the use of language in the text as evidence of mysticism. On the one hand, he holds that the use of language has a technical sense in relation to the cultivation of ‘inner experiences’. This refers to parts of the text like ‘can the heart really be made to be like dead ashes 心固可使如死灰乎?’ On the other hand, Waley’s remarks indicate that kinds of inner experiences of spiritual significance which are difficult (perhaps impossible) to express in language are ‘mystical experiences’.
The above locution, ‘can the heart really be made to be like dead ashes?’, is another example. Surely the authors of the Zhuangzi do not mean that they cultivate the experience of making their hearts literally resemble piles of ash. They are using language in such a way as to evoke some element of their inner experience of ‘resting against a stool, looking up to the sky, and sighing as they breathe’. This is an aspect of mysticism, mystical experience, and mystical texts that has only recently been clearly explained according to a theoretical framework by scholars such as Steven Katz: mystics use language in such a way as to relate their experiences in ways which communicate their mysteriousness, esotericism, and significance in ways that readers will recognise.212
208 Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 59. 211 Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 59–60. 212 See the ‘Linguistic Considerations’ section in Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 16–20; Steven T. Katz, ‘The “Conservative” Character of Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3–60; Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’.
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Nonetheless, scholars such as Waley noticed these aspects of mystical language in his translations, interpretations, and discussions of the Zhuangzi. However, Waley did not have the meta-language to explain the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi. He could only, in effect, point out that some parts of the text were ‘mystical’ according to an understanding of mysticism that appears to have operated implicitly for him.
Notwithstanding Waley’s insights, quoting the Ziqi dialogue and stating that it evidently relates a trance-state is not the same as arguing that the text does indeed relate what we would call ‘trance’. Waley’s reasoning that the text relates trance which is also a kind of mystic practice is not supported by argument, or analysis. Furthermore, it remains for anyone to argue that the Ziqi dialogue does indeed relate a description of trance and that we should accept as necessarily mystical.213 This seems to be an unquestioned interpretation of the text that scholars have accepted and propounded for generations.
There is another aspect of Waley’s explanations of Daoist mysticism in Three Ways of Thought that I must clarify. A term from the Liezi which he translates as ‘sight-seeing’ is ‘guan 觀’. Waley notes: ‘The word is applied to looking at waterfalls, views, etc.; but also to mystic contemplation.’214 However, it is not clear how the mundane term ‘guan 觀’ (meaning ‘to look’, or ‘observe’) acquires a mystical sense. I suggest the term acquires this sense from the context in which it is used in the stories concerning ‘the sight-seeing that can be done within’ in the Liezi section Waley translates. In those contexts, the term is being used in an esoteric sense, a special kind of ‘viewing’ that relates to a broader quest to experience aspects of existence which are of an ‘ultimate’ nature to Daoists. These are aspects such as relating to the natural world in a more harmonious, less contrived way than human society often imposes, and conceiving of nature as following a ‘great dao’. Following this Daoist path requires a ‘viewing’ and ‘sightseeing’ in a different sense. This is a ‘viewing’ not of external things, but of the internal aspects of one’s own mind and experience. This minor point aside,
213 Moreover, other scholars also present their conclusion that the Ziqi dialogue relates either ‘trance’ or ‘meditation’ but do not adduce an argument to convince the reader of that concluson. See: David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 57–58; Huang Jinhong 黄錦鋐, A New Translation Zhuangzi Reader 新譯莊子讀本, 2nd ed. (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju 三民書局, 2009), 26, 31; Lisa Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’, in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Phillip J. Ivanhoe (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 30–31; Arthur T. Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (London: Allen And Unwin, 1949), 116–20; Burton Watson, trans., Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 128, 132–33; Arthur T. Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), 199/XV/30. 214 Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 61.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy we can see that Waley identified contemplation of spiritual matters, such as ‘wandering’ (you 遊), as an aspect of mystical experience evident in texts like Liezi and the Zhuangzi.
3.2. China in Antiquity
Henri Maspero gives one of the earliest arguments to convince readers that mysticism is at the heart of the Zhuangzi, and Daoism in general. Maspero argues that evidence of mysticism exists throughout the text of the Zhuangzi, but especially in the core chapters attributed to the original Master Zhuang (i.e., the Inner Chapters). In sum, he identifies these elements as: acquiring sagehood which necessarily means gaining wisdom that goes beyond science and philosophy; rejecting book-learning; and abandoning reason in favour of ‘understanding of the supreme reality that is beyond perceptible things, the Absolute which the school called Tao.’215
There are, however, some interpretive issues in Maspero’s explanations of Daoist mysticism. Firstly, Maspero discusses Daoism as if Daoists self-evidently talk about a supreme reality that is beyond the mundane and perceptible limitations of the phenomenal world. However, Daoist literature does not have self-evident metalanguage like ‘supreme reality’. Moreover, Maspero informs his readers that Daoists formed a homogenous school centred upon understanding an absolute dao as if this were an explicitly communicated purport recorded in Daoist texts. However, there is also no textual evidence that Warring States era Daoists ever had such a clear and unanimous conception of an ultimate that was the purport of their school.216
Maspero thus misrepresents, and indeed misunderstands, what Daoist texts, such as the Zhuangzi, literally say in their own terms. This is a significant issue in 19th and early 20th century scholarly literature on Daoism and the Zhuangzi. This issue is all the more significant because those first generations of scholars, such as Maspero, helped create and transmit the first widely received understandings of Chinese thought among Western people. These interpretations include the now deeply imbedded ideas of what Daoism is, and what the representative texts and ideas of Daoism are. They are, unfortunately, rooted in misunderstandings of Chinese culture and Daoist ideas.217
215 Henri Maspero, China in Antiquity, trans. F.A. Kierman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 307. 216 See also Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 202. 217 See also Louis Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 4–7.
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Unaware of these limitations of his approach to Daoism and Chinese thought, Maspero continues to explain what he sees as the essential qualities of Daoist mysticism. Maspero’s explanations include fallacies of equivocation related to those I explained in the ‘mysticism is all one-and-the-same’ section of Chapter 2. Maspero describes Daoist mysticism in the Zhuangzi as if it involves the same experiences of Christian mysticism, even though Daoism and Christianity have mutually exclusive truth-claims concerning what ‘absolute reality’ is. Maspero equivocates Daoism with all other forms of mysticism, but especially Christian mysticism, thus:
pass[ing] through those great stages which mystics have described in all times and all countries: the period of detachment from the exterior world; the period of renunciation . . . corresponding to the via purgativa of Christian writers; then ecstasies . . . and finally the mystical union which is ‘the Great Mystery’. And the mystical life also includes, in addition to meditation, all sorts of regular exercises — breathing exercises, for example, which preserve youth . . . and gives longevity.218
Maspero thus summarises what he concludes are the essentials of mysticism in general. He presents them as part of his interpretation that they are evident in the Zhuangzi which makes the Zhuangzi an overall work of mysticism. However, there are several methodological issues in Maspero’s characterisation of the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism and with his characterization of mysticism in general. I explain these issues below.
To have arrived at these conclusions concerning the essence of mysticism implies that Maspero was familiar with mystical texts and literature about mysticism. I believe that he was familiar with such literature because he refers to phenomenological features and uses jargon that is common among scholarly studies of mysticism. However, it is not evident which literature in particular Maspero was drawing from. He does not refer to any specific mystical texts or literature about mysticism from which he has been able to make these conclusions. Hence, he gives these features of a supposedly panoramic mysticism common to all people as if they are easily discernible facts. However, those generalised features are not easily discernible, even in mystical texts from the same religious tradition (such as The Cloud of Unknowing or Revelations of Divine Love).219 This means that it should be even more
218 Maspero, China in Antiquity, 307–8. 219 See Clifton Walters, trans., The Cloud of Unknowing (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961); Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy problematic to identify mysticism as the core of the Zhuangzi because the text is noted for its obscurity and esotericism, even within the tradition to which it belongs (namely, Daoism).
Maspero’s summary of the ‘the mystical life’ contains some assumptions that philosophers of religion have argued are not accurate. The first is that mysticism is a kind of experience that is independent of doctrines, dogma, philosophical, or theological commitments. Maspero writes: ‘The mystical life alone allows of laying hold upon the Tao, after one has passed through those great stages which mystics have described in all times and in all countries’.220 This shows that Maspero is treating all mystics as experiencing and describing the same objective ultimate reality. It is an example of the idea that mysticism is all one-and-the-same, and that people from different religious and philosophical traditions are all practitioners of the one overarching mysticism.
This cannot be true at face value because many people who have subsequently been labelled ‘mystics’ would not have thought of themselves as such, for they had no such word in their own language. Moreover, the practices, beliefs, traditions, and interpretations of many so-called mystics, are not drawn from ancient Greek mystery cults from which Indo-European words like ‘mysticism’ or ‘mystique’ are derived. There is therefore, no face value reason why we should call these people, practices, and experiences ‘mystical’.
Furthermore, if all mystics from all times and countries experience the same ultimate reality, then why do they not present a unanimous view on what the ultimate reality is, or what experiences of the ultimate reality are like? In Maspero’s description quoted above, he refers to the ultimate reality accessible through the mystical life as ‘the Tao’. If ‘the Tao’ is the same objective ultimate reality for all mystics, then why do Christian mystics not speak of ‘the Tao’? It appears that Maspero uses the terms ‘mystic’ and ‘mysticism’ in an uncritical manner in this regard.
Maspero’s definition of ‘the mystic path’ contains some problems in reasoning. His explanation of ‘the mystical union which is “the Great Mystery”’ entails a circular reasoning fallacy. Maspero argues that one of the reasons the Zhuangzi is mystical is because it involves ‘mystical union’ with ‘the Great Mystery’. However, this means we must already accept that: 1) ‘the Great Mystery’ is mystical; and 2) uniting with it is a kind of ‘mystical union’. In other words, Maspero is arguing that the Zhuangzi is mystical because it involves mystical union with something that is mystical. This argument should not persuade the reader that the
220 Maspero, China in Antiquity, 307–8.
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Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. Moreover, at that point in the book, Maspero has yet to give specific examples from the text of the Zhuangzi which he thinks are evidence of this mysticism. Without analyses of parts of the text which purport to account for a ‘Great Mystery’, there is no reason to accept Maspero’s explanations of these aspects of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. However, giving specific examples from the Zhuangzi is the next step in Maspero’s chapter on the Zhuangzi.
3.2.1. Via Purgativa
Maspero gives examples from the Zhuangzi in order to illustrate what he argues is the mysticism at the heart of the text. The first example he quotes and interprets is the ‘mind- fasting’ passage from chapter four, ‘In the Human World’ (Ren Jian Shi 人間世). Maspero argues that it is an example of:
a whole way of life . . . an illumination in which the neophyte felt himself truly changed: the psychological equilibrium which had been normal previously was upset, giving way to a totally new condition. . . . This conversion is followed by a long phase of purification (via purgativa) which Chuang-tzu calls the fasting of the heart’221
Maspero’s description of the mind-fasting passage is generally accurate. If we take the dialogue at face-value, then it advocates going through a process of ‘mind-fasting’ in order to ‘give way to a totally new condition’.
However, Maspero’s interpretation that this process is presented as a kind of ‘purification’ in the text of the Zhuangzi is problematic. The Zhuangzi does not say that mind- fasting is a kind of ‘purification’, especially not in the sense Maspero appears to use the term. Maspero explains the ‘purification’ he attributes to mind-fasting in the Zhuangzi in terms of Christian concepts such as via purgativa. Yet, Maspero does not explain what ‘via purgativa’ is or how mind-fasting in the Zhuangzi is similar to it.
However, it is not appropriate to equate the ‘mind-fasting’ of the Zhuangzi with the ‘via purgativa’ of Christian mystics. Via purgativa is a specific term from Christian mysticism. It connotes Christian theological commitments such as belief in a personal God who transcends the universe and with whom it is possible to commune. The kind of
221 Ibid., 308. I have changed Maspero’s square brackets around ‘via purgativa’ to round brackets in order to be clear about Maspero’s insertion of the term.
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‘purification’ connoted by via purgativa is not equivalent to any idea of ‘purification’ that might exist in the Zhuangzi. Purification in Christianity involves ridding oneself of sin and vices in order to be more worthy of communion with God.222 Such beliefs do not exist in the Zhuangzi.
Maspero’s argument would be more convincing if he explained what via purgativa meant to those he identifies as ‘Christian writers’, and what general features of it are similar to the mind-fasting of the Zhuangzi. However, his assumptions that the reader already shares his understandings of mysticism and via purgativa allow him to equate the term with mind- fasting in the Zhuangzi without an argument to convince readers of this term’s appropriateness. In other words, there is an embedded equivocation in Maspero’s understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. He treats culturally bound concepts like the ‘via purgativa’ of Christian mystics as if they are universal among disparate traditions like the early Daoism of the Zhuangzi and Christianity.
3.2.2. A Systematic Method of Mysticism from Laozi to Zhuangzi
The next step in Maspero’s argument is to present textual evidence from the Zhuangzi and the Laozi that accords with what he identifies as the struggle which all mystics undertake in their practices. He summarises this struggle in general terms:
as with all mysticisms, it [mind-fasting] demands renunciation and detachment from external things, simplification, unification, and concentration of the mind so that the soul ‘emptied’ of all external influence can grasp reality and enter into an immediate and direct unity with the Absolute.223
Thereupon, Maspero refers to parts of the Zhuangzi which he thinks are specific examples of how this ‘mystic struggle’ was manifest for the authors of the text. They include: ‘giv[ing] themselves over to the hermit life’; ‘purification at home’ (without becoming a hermit); and also ‘the neophyte detaches himself from the artificial so as to return to primitive simplicity . . . by “controlling the human and by obeying the Heavenly”.’224
222 See also McGinn, ‘Christian Mysticism’, 159–62. 223 Maspero, China in Antiquity, 308. 224 Ibid., 308–9; Maspero is quoting ‘Lao-tzu, sec. 59. p.23’ from Father Leon Wiener’s Chinese to French translation. For the translator’s explanation, see ibid., 494–95.
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This part of Maspero’s argument would be more convincing were it not for some methodological issues. Maspero is referring to different parts of the Zhuangzi out of context and presenting them as if they were originally intended to be read in this systematic manner. He refers to ‘Chuang-tzu., ch 20, p.73’ and ‘Chuang-tzu., ch 7, p.267’ in the French translation he used, in that order. These chapters were certainly written by different authors quite some time apart. Chapter 20 ‘The Mountain Tree’ (Shan Mu 山木) is attributed to writers from the ‘School of Zhuangzi’; chapter 7 (‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’) is attributed to Zhuangzi himself.225 It is not likely that part of an intended doctrine of mysticism in the Zhuangzi could have been to first read and then practice something from chapter 20 and subsequently do the same for part of chapter 7. It would mean that chapter the ‘Mountain Tree’ chapter was written before the ‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ chapter, and that Zhuang Zhou wrote the ‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ chapter in order to further elaborate on points from the ‘Mountain Tree’ chapter. However, this is not possible because the ‘Mountain Tree’ chapter was composed many decades after the ‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ chapter.226
The final aspect of the Daoist mystic struggle Maspero quotes is not from the Zhuangzi, but rather from the Laozi. By quoting from the Laozi in this manner, Maspero reveals his supposition that the Laozi was included together with the Zhuangzi in a systematically organised doctrine of mysticism which existed among Daoists in the Warring States era. However, scholars do not generally hold that the texts of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi were circulated as part of any systematic, unified, school of Daoism during the Warring States era.227 Moreover, we now know that there were several different versions of the Laozi circulating during the Warring States era from excavations at the Mawangdui 馬王堆 and Guo Dian 郭店 caves in the late 20th century.228 Thus, the texts Maspero refers to are not homogeneous and do not lucidly communicate a unified system, mystical or otherwise. Therefore, Maspero’s argument concerning the stages of the Daoist mystics’ struggle is not
225 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 115–18. 226 See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters; Liu Xiaogan, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters (Ann Arbor, 1994); Harold David Roth, ‘Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?’, in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. Jr Henry Rosemont (La Salle: Open Court, 1991), 79–128. 227 See Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 4, 17, 89, 142–43; Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 166. 228 See also Feng Li, Early China: A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 216–24.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy convincing because he presents his reconstructions of Daoist practices as if they were clearly intended to be undertaken according to the order in which he presents them.
The next step in Maspero’s argument contains the same methodological difficulty. He argues that once the neophyte has accomplished mind-fasting and the struggle outlined above, he then experiences states of ecstasy. Yet, the textual evidence Maspero cites to support this interpretation of how the mysticism of the Zhuangzi unfolds is also out of context; it comes from different parts of the text and was written at different times by different people. For example, Maspero argues that a linear progression of the mystic path unfolds in this order:
1. one must first mind-fast as related in chapter 4 of the Zhuangzi; 2. then go through the mystic struggle to attain a mental state of ‘the void’ derived from chapters 20 and 7 of the Zhuangzi as well as chapter 52 of the Laozi; 3. after which, one can ‘gain “a piercing vision”. . . and “see That which is Unique”’229 derived from chapter 24 and perhaps chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi (Maspero’s citation is not clear). 4. after one accomplishes this: ‘At this moment, his breathing grows weak, he is detached from his body, as if he had lost his companion: “His body is like the stump of a tree, / his heart is like a dead cinder.”’230 Here, Maspero is referring to chapters 2 and 23 of the Zhuangzi with the quotation coming from chapter 23.
Hence, Maspero holds that during the Warring States era, practitioners of Daoist mysticism systematically went through a process of exercises written down in different parts of the Zhuangzi by different people in different centuries. This seems implausible because of the disparity in centuries between the composition of the earlier and later chapters. This is to say that it would not be possible to include something from a chapter written later as a step in a process to get to a state related in a chapter written earlier, perhaps even a century or more earlier.
The next part of Maspero’s argument is also not very convincing for methodological reasons. Therein, he argues that after a neophyte goes through the process described above, he attains union with the Dao, i.e., the Ultimate.231 However, Maspero does not cite parts of texts
229 Maspero, China in Antiquity, 309. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid., 309–10.
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Maspero ends his exposition on the mysticism of ‘The Taoist School’ by concluding that mystical experience is at its heart. He reiterates his position ‘the fasting of the heart’ (i.e., mind-fasting) is at the core of Daoist mysticism. He continues with a broader claim about mysticism in Daoism. He writes: ‘the mystical experience dominated their entire philosophy. From it they derived what was original in their metaphysics, from it they got their psychology, and finally it furnished the principles for their philosophy of government.’232 Thus, Maspero concludes that mysticism is at the heart of early Daoism, but especially the Zhuangzi because most of the textual evidence he quotes to support his interpretation comes from that text.
However, while there is merit to Maspero’s argument, there are also some issues that prevent it from being totally convincing. He does not analyse of the passages he quotes in order to demonstrate that they are consistent with any theory of mysticism. Instead, the reader must take Maspero’s word that: 1) these out-of-context quotations are all related to one another; and 2) that they are representative of the mysticism construct which he states is evident, not only in the text of the Zhuangzi, but also in all of the Daoist classics. In sum, Maspero does not present a strong enough argument to support his interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and Daoism.
3.3. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
Wing-tsit Chan’s Source Book introduces the thought of the Zhuangzi in a chapter entitled ‘The Mystic Way of Chuang Tzu’.233 In this work, Chan attributes mysticism to the Zhuangzi in an obtuse manner. For example, Chan writes ‘He [Zhuangzi] is mystical, but at the same time he follows reason as the leading light.’234 This neither explains anything about mysticism to the reader, nor indicates what content in the Zhuangzi is mystical. Instead, Chan describes the Zhuangzi in a way which assumes that mysticism is opposed to reason, yet the Zhuangzi somehow manages to have both. The only other discussions of ‘reason’ in Chan’s Source Book relate to mostly the Neo-Confucian and Neo-Daoist ideas of ‘li 理’
232 Ibid., 310. 233 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 177–210. 234 Ibid., 177.
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(‘principle’).235 The reader must infer that Chan understands mysticism to relate to ideas and experiences which are not guided by reason, as well as attempts to communicate such ideas and experiences in language which might also feature an absence of reason. Moreover, Chan must see enough evidence ideas, experiences, and non-rational ways of communicating them in the Zhuangzi, in order to characterise the thought of the Zhuangzi a ‘mystic way’.
There is one other instance of using the term ‘mysticism’ in the chapter. It is where Chan writes: ‘his [Zhuangzi’s] poetic mysticism . . . [is among things which have] remained inexhaustible sources of inspiration for the Chinese.’236Again, this does not tell the reader anything about mysticism except that Chan believes it to be conveyed through sections of the Zhuangzi that we could call ‘poetic’ or ‘poetry’, i.e., verse.237 The idea seems to be that vagueness and non-ordinary language elements of the Zhuangzi (and the ideas to which they refer) are mystical. This seems to be because poetry is often taken as communicating ideas, feelings, and experiences that effect the reader in ways which ordinary use of language does not. Hence, by associating the ‘poetry’ of the Zhuangzi with mysticism, Chan appears to be linking mysticism in the Zhuangzi with epistemological issues of language, such as how people use language to communicate inner experiences.
Again, it seems that scholars labelling the Zhuangzi mystical, such as Chan, have identified aspects of mysticism which Steven Katz has since articulated with more clarity. The aspects of mysticism that Chan identifies are consistent with what Katz summarises in the ‘Linguistic Considerations’ section in his ‘General Editor’s Introduction’ to Comparative Mysticism.238 In general, these aspects of mysticism are that mystics use language in such a way that readers (and perhaps listeners) will recognise the significance of the mystics’ experiences. That is to say, mystics use language to emphasise, and perhaps even condition, the mysteriousness and profundity of the experiences they undertake as part of their broader quest. On a generous interpretation, it appears that Chan identifies some aspects of these linguistic considerations in the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. It is to his credit that he could do
235 See the index entries under ‘principle’ and ‘reason’ ibid., 848–49; See also Antonio S. Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 321–22. 236 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 179. 237 Zhuangzi does indeed contain sections of text that are written in verse in classical Chinese. One such section is the ‘great knowledge’ verse from chapter two, Qiwu Lun 齊物論. However, Chan does not render it as verse in English, or even make a note of it. A.C. Graham strives to render verse throughout Zhuangzi into English. See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters. See also Benjamin Isadore Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 198. 238 See Steven T. Katz, ed., Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16–20.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy this in the 1960s, more than a decade before Steven Katz published any articles on mysticism which could have assisted Chan in his explanations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
The kinds of inner experiences in the Zhuangzi that scholars often label mystical are present in the chapters of the Zhuangzi that Chan presents in English translation. They are the ‘Ziqi of South Wall’ dialogue, the ‘self and other’ passage from chapter 2, (‘Qiwu Lun 齊物 論’), and the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue from chapter 6 (‘Da Zong Shi 大宗師’).239 Giving an interpretation of mystical elements in those passages would support Chan’s overall characterisation of Zhuangzi’s thought as a ‘mystic way’. However, Chan does not present any such analysis. In this sense, Chan has only transmitted the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is mysticism and supported the interpretation by presenting translations of the text. Nevertheless, stating that the Zhuangzi is mystical and supporting such an interpretation by merely translating sections of the text without argument or analysis is not a convincing way to transmit that interpretation.
Chad Hansen gives a stronger version of this kind of critique of the way scholars transmit their interpretations of Daoism in his book, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. Therein, Hansen contrives a story through which he criticises the received interpretation of the Laozi and Daoism in general. The ‘punchline’ of the story is where the cave-dwelling proponent of the dominant view of paradoxical-mystical-metaphysical-absolute supports his interpretation by saying: ‘Well, look at the text!’240
This is not to say that we should take Hansen’s critique of the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism over Chan’s interpretation outright. There are several issues in Hansen’s critique that would be an injustice to Chan’s Source Book if I did not point them out. First, Hansen’s critique relies on his own contrivance of what the ‘ruling theory’ (of which Chan is a proponent) says about Daoism. Hansen does not cite any proponents’ arguments in order to analyse and refute them, yet he wants his readers to accept his position over these generalised ‘others’ whose interpretations he says are wrong. In other words, Hansen’s counter-argument is weak because he does not cite the arguments which he counters; he merely contrives a parody of them. This is the second problem with Hansen’s critique: it is a straw man fallacy.
239 See Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, 1939, 59–60; Raymond Van Over, Chinese Mystics (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 47–48; Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’; Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: the Heart of Chinese Wisdom, 124, 180; Harold David Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun 齊物論’ Chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子,’ in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 15–32. 240 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 200.
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Hansen’s comical and hyperbolic contrivance of the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism presents the arguments, interpretations, and indeed the proponents of those arguments and interpretations, in a poor light just so he can refute them.
As the reader will have perceived, this entails a third problem: Hansen’s refutation of the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism includes argumentum ad hominem. Hansen presents proponents of the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism as eccentric, foolish, cave-dwelling hermits who rely on the authority of tradition, their garb, and the sound of their voices in order to dupe thers into accepting their interpretations. This is plain where Hansen writes: ‘suppose that someone lived in the cave [where the obscure text was kept]. He had been studying the text for a long time, had a long beard, hypnotic eyes, and a deep authoritative voice, and a special cap which he claimed helped his intuition. . . . Do not let the long beard intimidate you!’241 However, despite these problems with how Hansen challenges the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism, his main points have merit. They are relevant to the weaknesses in Chan’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi in his Source Book.
The issue is that the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism often does not convincingly account for what the texts of Daoism actually say in their own terms. Scholars approach the texts of Daoism having already accepted unsupported conclusions and interpretations of what the texts say. For example, that Zhuangzi is mystical because he plainly talks about a metaphysical absolute with which one merges in mystical union. However, as I have already pointed out (in my above critique of Henri Maspero’s interpretations) the Zhuangzi does not contain meta-language like ‘metaphysical absolute’ or ‘mystical union’. Therefore, it is not possible for Zhuangzi to plainly present mystical ideas, let alone doctrines. In Hansen’s criticism of these kinds of issues in interpreting Daoism, he concludes: ‘you do not lessen the explanatory burden on an interpretive theory by observing simply that the orthodoxy accepts it. . . . The ancestry of a bad interpretation does not make it a good interpretation.’242
Understood in this way, Chan’s interpretation is a ‘bad’ one. However, as I have explained above, it is to Chan’s credit that he identifies parts of mysticism in the Zhuangzi that accord with more recent explanations of mysticism from Steven Katz. They are the issues of linguistic considerations in communicating mysterious inner experiences and their significance.
241 Ibid. 242 Ibid.
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By interpreting Chan’s introduction to the Zhuangzi in this more generous way, we can understand why he characterises the Zhuangzi’s thought to be mystical. The excerpts which Chan selects and translates contain examples of linguistic markers of mystical language use which Chan associates with not using reason and ‘poetry’.243 However, Chan does not give explanations to support his characterisation of the Zhuangzi as a ‘mystic way’. He merely asserts that Zhuangzi has a mystic way and presents examples of his own translation, as if the translation ‘speaks for itself’. This, however, is not a convincing reason to accept the interpretation that Zhuangzi has a mystic way and that mysticism is at the core of the Zhuangzi.
3.4. The World of Thought in Ancient China
In The World of Thought in Ancient China, Benjamin Schwartz gives reasons for labelling the Laozi and the Zhuangzi mystical. To begin, Schwartz explicitly labels both the texts the Laozi and the Zhuangzi as works of mysticism that come from a unified Daoism. He writes: ‘In considering the rise of what I shall without apology call the mystical Taoism of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu (since mysticism is what the two texts have in common), I shall attempt to relate them to the context of the Confucian and Mohist controversies that may provide its immediate background.’244
Thereupon, Schwartz relates some of the immediate background of what he considers to be the Daoist mysticism of Laozi and Zhuangzi. He writes that ideas much emphasised in Daoist texts, such as the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, are also evident in the texts of other schools of thought, namely, Confucianism and Mohism. He gives special attention to the ‘madman of Ch’u’ from the Analects and the Zhuangzi and the notion of ‘wuwei 無爲’ in the Analects and in the Zhuangzi.245
Schwartz thereby argues that the Daoists of the Warring States period drew from sui generis Chinese ideas and developed them further than any other school of thought. Schwartz holds that further developments of these ideas took them into the realm of mystical Daoism. Thus, he writes: ‘Even if this Taoism can be called mystical, it is, . . . a mysticism which
243 We can see some elements of mysticism that Chan identifies in other contexts in an earlier book wherein he explains mystical trends in Pure Land and Tibetan Buddhism in China. From that account, we can deduce that Chan associates mysticism with mysterious practices and activities that have spiritual significance for practitioners. See Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 68–78. 244 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 187. 245 Ibid., 188–89. For the ‘madman’, see Waley, The Analects of Confucius, xviii/5/219. For wuwei in the Analects, see ibid., XV/4/193.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy arises in a Chinese context. . . . It is a mystical outlook that remains irreducibly Chinese and entirely sui generis.’246 This characterisation of mysticism does not contain the equivocation of Daoist and Chinese spiritual practices with Christian and Western ones, as we have seen in characterisations such as Maspero’s, above.
The reasons that Schwartz gives for labelling the Laozi and the Zhuangzi works of mysticism show that he understands them to contain a metaphysical component at the heart of mysticism. This metaphysical component is a belief in ‘an inexpressible underlying unity’, or ‘ground of reality’.247 Schwartz writes: ‘In all of them [i.e., mysticisms] we find some notion of “ground of reality” or ultimate aspect of reality . . . which cannot be discussed in the categories of human language.’248
Schwartz proceeds to state that this notion of a metaphysical ground of reality in mysticism combines with epistemological theses concerning the capability of human language to describe it. Here thereby holds that ineffability of the ultimate metaphysical ground of reality is a component of mysticism evident in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. Schwartz expresses it thus:
In most orientations which have been called mystical . . . there is the assumption that finite humans . . . can achieve oneness or some kind of mystic union with the ultimate ground of reality . . . [these] factors are . . . present in and even central to the visions of the Lao-tzu and the sections of the Chuang-tzu book that belong to the ‘historic’ Chuang-tzu.249
Nonetheless, at that point in the book, Schwartz has merely stated his conclusions that these elements of mysticism are evident in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. He has not yet given an argument to substantiate these interpretations. Moreover, from the quotation above, the reader can see that Schwartz presents his conclusions not as interpretations, but rather as if here were merely describing what is self-evident in the texts of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. As I have already indicated, this is a methodological issue with scholars’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi: they present their interpretations as if they are merely introducing their readers to what the texts of Daoism say in their own terms. However, this is not the case, as I will have recourse to demonstrate throughout this dissertation. Having thus described the Laozi and
246 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 187–88. 247 Ibid., 189, 193. 248 Ibid., 193. 249 Ibid., 193–94.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy the Zhuangzi as works of mysticism in the above quotations, the burden of proof is on Schwartz to demonstrate what content in those texts is evidence of mysticism.
However, Schwartz’s arguments for treating the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism could be more convincing. Firstly, his treatment of mysticism and his account of it in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi does not present textual analysis to support his conclusion that they are works of mysticism. Rather, Schwartz presents his conclusions that they are works of mysticism supported by his own generalisations that those texts talk about a metaphysical absolute with which humans can unite. As Harold Roth notes, Schwartz’s approach to identifying mysticism in these early Daoist texts is: ‘hardly a thorough textual analysis . . . Schwartz downplays the importance of such [specific mystical] techniques and emphasizes, instead, the vision of reality with which they are associated. In my opinion, he does not need to take such an approach.’250
This is because there is more evidence of mystical techniques in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi than evidence of metaphysical ultimates. It is possible to show what those texts relate in their own terms and analyse those parts of the texts according to a theory of mysticism. In the Zhuangzi, we have the ‘Nanguo Ziqi’, the ‘mind-fasting’, and the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogues which scholars often label mystical, as the reader shall see throughout this dissertation. Yet, Schwartz’s explanation of the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism does not present analysis of these parts of the text.
These criticisms notwithstanding, Schwartz includes an explanation of the ‘mind- fasting’ dialogue to support his position that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. He holds that it is evidence of: ‘true gnosis [that] requires nothing less than the shattering of our ordinary understanding of the world’.251 Schwartz presents his interpretation of the outcome of this ‘gnosis’ through ‘mind fasting’, thus:
the chi’i [qi 氣]. . . is already conceived of as a ‘metaphysical,’ mystical reality which serves . . . to connect the world of the manifold, determinate, and discrete to the world of nonbeing. . . . the kind of ‘emptying of the
250 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 60. For other critiques of Schwartz’s methodology in this regard, see Frederick W. Mote, ‘Review of The World of Thought in Ancient China’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 50, no. 1 (1 June 1990): 397–98, 401–2, doi:10.2307/2719236. 251 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 217.
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mind’ of all consciousness of the determinate which we find in so much literature on ‘meditational’ techniques.252
Nonetheless, Schwartz does not demonstrate that ‘fasting of the mind’ is gnosis of, and union with, ‘the ultimate ground of reality’. This means that Schwartz has not given sufficient burden of proof to support his interpretation because the main feature of mysticism he argues is evident in both the Laozi and the Zhuangzi is that the texts relate gnosis of ‘the ultimate ground of reality’. Consequently, his argument is unconvincing.
Schwartz’s explanation of ‘mind fasting’ also contains an example of begging the question. Schwartz already holds that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. As evidence to convince his readers that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism he writes that ‘mind fasting’ involves qi which is mystical. In terms of methodology, Schwartz appeals to a part of the text which he presents to the reader as already being self-evidently mystical in order to support his conclusion that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. The step in the argument (qi is mystical) already has the conclusion (Zhuangzi is mystical) embedded into it in order to support the conclusion (Zhuangzi is mystical). It is circular reasoning that makes for an invalid argument supporting Schwartz’s interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Schwartz presents the mysticism of the Zhuangzi as similar to mysticism analysed in Western literature. He identifies Western literature on mysticism as: ‘the writings of . . . Underhill, Stace, Jones, and Scholem, and among authorities on Indian thought’.253 However, the only writing from those scholars that Schwartz cites is Scholem’s Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.254 Apart from that, Schwartz does not explain what those writings are or what content in the Zhuangzi is similar to accounts of mysticism in those sources.255 Thus, it is not
252 Ibid., 218. 253 Schwartz, the World of Thought in Ancient China, 193. 254 Ibid., 199, 144 (note 113). See also Gershom Gerhard Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken Books, 1961). 255 Moreover, he does not give bibliographic details for works by those other authors. Thus, a reader unfamiliar with literature on mysticism would not know what works he is even referring to, let alone what arguments, analyses, and conclusions upon which Schwartz draws his understanding of mysticism. For my own convenience as well as that of the reader, I list those other scholars’ main works on mysticism. See: Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy; Evelyn T. Underhill, The Mystic Way: A Psychological Study in Christian Origins (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1913); Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness; Rufus M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: MacMillon, 1909); Rufus M. Jones, ‘Mysticism in Present-Day Religion’, Harvard Theological Review 8, no. 02 (1915): 155–65; Rufus M. Jones, New Studies in Mystical Religion (Kessinger Publishing, 1927). See also Matthew S. Hedstrom, ‘Rufus Jones and Mysticism for the Masses’, Cross Currents 54, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 31–44; Ann Loades, ‘Evelyn Underhill (1875– 1941): Mysticism and Worship’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 10, no. 1 (2010): 57–70; Lawrence Cunningham, ‘Evelyn Underhill’s Mysticism: An Appreciation’, Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality 12, no. 1 (2012): 106–12.
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It is not clear how Schwartz’s usage of ‘gnosis’ relates to mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Schwartz does not define ‘gnosis’ anywhere in The World of Thought in Ancient China. Moreover, ‘gnosis’ is obviously not an indigenous Chinese word. Thus, it is not clear how the notion of ‘gnosis’ relates to any intellectual activity in Warring States China, including Daoist mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Nevertheless, it is evident that Schwartz thinks that ‘gnosis’ is part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi as well as mysticism generally. In the paragraphs below, I engage with the problem of interpreting the Zhuangzi to contain ‘gnosis’.
Gnosis is a loan word from the Greek ‘gnosis’ which means ‘knowledge’. The Gnostics lived throughout the Mediterranean and Egypt during the first centuries CE and used Greek as their lingua franca. They were sects and cults for whom gnosis took on a more esoteric significance. For them, gnosis was not just about knowing mundane facts, but was rather about ‘the ultimate nature of reality.’257
The ancient Gnostics had their own ideas about the true nature of reality that were quite different from the Zhuangzi. I infer that Schwartz uses the term gnosis in relation to the Zhuangzi in a modified sense that does not connote the specific nuances of ancient Gnostics, but rather communicates some of the term’s more general features. For example, scholars studying gnosis and Gnosticism tell us that Gnostics made speculations about the true nature of reality: ‘through intuition, or rather through revelation, through gnosis . . . the Gnostics built a pure mental construction . . .upon an a priori vision of the universe.’258 Thus, we see
256 See also Mote, ‘Review of The World of Thought in Ancient China’, 397–98. 257 Jacques Lacarrière, The Gnostics, trans. Nina Rootes (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1977), 15. See also Werner Foerster, Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, ed. and trans. R. McLachlan Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 1–2; Robert M. Grant, Gnosticism: A Source Book of Heretical Writings from the Early Christian Period (New York: Harper Brothers, 1978), 15–16; Stephan A. Hoeller, What Is a Gnostic?, vol. 2013, 11 July 2013 (The Gnosis Archive, n.d.); Stephen A Hoeller, ‘What Is a Gnostic’, Gnosis: A Journal of Western Inner Traditions 23, no. Spring (1992); Stephan A. Hoeller, The Gnostic World View: A Brief Summary of Gnosticism, vol. 2013, 11 July 2013, n.d.; Stephan A. Hoeller, The Gnostic Jung and The Seven Sermons to the Dead (Wheaton, Ill.: Theosophical Publishing House, 1982), 168; Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 8–9, et passim; Eric Wilson and Wilson Eric, Secret Cinema : Gnostic Vision in Film (New York: Continuum, 2006), xi–xiii, 3-6, et passim; The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-31, 1978, vol. 1, Studies in the History of Religions (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980). 258 Lacarrière, The Gnostics, 18.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy that gnosis refers to a kind of introspection pertaining to what the subject believes is the true nature of reality.
3.4.1. Explaining the Mysticism of Mind Fasting in More Detail
Hence, we now have a clearer understanding of how Schwartz uses the term ‘gnosis’. The sections of the Zhuangzi that he refers to as showing evidence of ‘gnosis’ are ones wherein the text relates practices that are supposed to yield knowledge of what in the Zhuangzi’s terms is basic to the true nature of reality. This is most evident where Schwartz analyses the Zhuangzi’s ideas on ‘mind fasting’ and ‘qi’. The ‘mind fasting’ dialogue says:
As Quoted by Schwartz Source Text My Translation
Unify your will. Don't listen 仲尼曰：「若一志，无聽 Confucius said: ‘Unify your with your ears, listen with 之以耳而聽之以心，无聽 will. Do not listen with the your mind—no, don't listen 之以心而聽之以氣。聽止 ears, but rather with the with your mind, but listen mind. Then, do not listen 於耳，心止於符。氣也 with the ch'i; hearing stops with the mind, but rather 者，虛而待物者也。唯道 with the ears; the mind stops with qi. Listening stops with 集虛。虛者，心齋也。」 at signs (or concepts?) [sic], the ears. The mind stops 260 but ch'i is empty and yet all with what it tallies. Qi waits things depend on it; the tao for things in emptiness. gathers in emptiness alone. Only Dao gathers in Emptiness is the fasting of emptiness. Emptiness is the the mind.259 fasting of the mind.261
259 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 218 Schwartz cites the ‘mind fasting’ passage as ‘Watson, Chuang-tzu, chap.3 p.21’. However, it is actually from chapter 4, pp.57-58. Moreover, Schwartz has not accurately quoted Watson’s translation. cf. Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 57–58. 260 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 9/4/26-28. 261 cf. Brook Ziporyn, Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), 26–27.
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Here, Schwartz’s understanding of dao is that dao is a metaphysical Ultimate. On such an understanding, the Zhuangzi advocates that people can experience Dao ‘gathering’ in the emptiness of ‘mind-fasting’. This accords with Schwartz’s claim that mystics from various cultures ‘can achieve oneness or some kind of mystic union with the ultimate ground of reality’.262 Moreover, the practice of ‘mind-fasting’ is esoteric, beyond ordinary sense perception and language, and presented as inherently beneficial. These also seem to be plausible explanations as to why Schwartz calls that section of the text ‘mystical’.
‘Mind fasting’ does not proceed to conclusions through reasoning. It is rather emptying the mind of positive content. According to the Zhuangzi, one can experience qi and Dao ‘gathering’ by doing this. Thus, Schwartz writes that these experiences in the Zhuangzi are a kind of ‘gnosis’. I think we can interpret his application of ‘gnosis’ to the Zhuangzi to be to the effect: knowledge of what the subject thinks is the true nature of reality gained through introspective practices.
Schwartz’s usage allows for some overlap between gnosis and mysticism. This is consistent with some observations on Gnosticism in the literature. For example, Werner Foerster writes: ‘We might indeed set Gnosis alongside mysticism. There the aim is a vision . . . coloured by religion, which can be set alongside gnostic knowledge. . . . In Gnosis it is not a matter of an experience, in which cognitive perception is . . . eliminated, but actually of a cognition.’263 Here, we can deduce that Forester identifies apophatic practices (i.e., negative content, introspection that clears the mind of cognition) as part of mysticism, whereas they are not part of Gnosticism. Other sources on Gnosticism also see some overlap between Gnosticism and mysticism. However, these sources have a strong focus on, and detailed usage of, ‘Gnosticism’, but a less detailed focus on the term ‘mystic’.264 Hence, I would like to leave the topics of Gnosticism, gnosis, and their relation to mysticism, and return to analysis of scholars’ treatments of mysticism in their introductions to Chinese philosophy.
262 Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 193–94. 263 Foerster, Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, 2. 264 See: Stephan A. Hoeller, ‘Jung, Kabbalah, and Gnosis’, Psychological Perspectives 55, no. 2 (2012): 164, 168, 172, 176, et passim; Dominic White Op, ‘Contemporary Spiritualities and Christianity: Is There an Authentic Christian Gnosis?’, New Blackfriars 93, no. 1047 (2012): 581, 584.
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3.5. Disputers of the Tao
In Disputers of the Tao, A. C. Graham presents a different account of Chinese philosophy from that of Benjamin Schwartz.265 There, he also labels the Zhuangzi mystical, but for different reasons to Schwartz. One of Graham’s legacies for the interpretation of the Zhuangzi is his explicit link of mysticism with ‘anti-rationalism’. In Graham’s view, Zhuangzi (the author and the Inner Chapters) has a doctrine of mysticism that is rooted in a philosophy of ‘anti-rationalism’. This is an idea that Graham reiterated in several publications, and I have more to say about it at later parts of this dissertation.
In Disputers of the Tao, Graham presents his thesis of mysticism rooted in anti- rationalism in the Zhuangzi at the beginning of a section entitled, ‘The assault on reason’.266 Therein, Graham introduces his reasons for labelling the Zhuangzi mystical anti-rationalism thus:
Like all great anti-rationalists, Chuang-tzu has his reasons for not listening to reason. . . . it will take only one more step to observe that to analyse is to make distinctions, and dismiss reason for the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world, transforming ‘All are one’ from a moral into a mystical affirmation.267
As Disputers of the Tao is one of Graham’s final publications, it contains many more examples of what Graham holds to be mysticism in the Zhuangzi than in his earlier publications. However, the examples of mysticism that Graham gives are not sustained analyses the feature as part of an argument to convince readers that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi. Instead, Graham merely refers to characters, stories, and excerpts from the Zhuangzi as mystical, as if the mysticism of those sections of the text is self-evident, and as if mysticism is self-evident as the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi. For example, he writes:
The stories about craftsmen help us to find our bearings when Chuang-tzu is at his most mystical. . . . for him, and for Taoists in general,
265 See also Benjamin Schwartz, ‘A Review of “Disputers of the Tao” Philosophic Argument in Ancient China by A.C. Graham’, Philosophy East and West 42, no. 1 (1992): 3–15; Angus Charles Graham, ‘Response to Benjamin Schwartz’ Review of “Disputers of the Tao”’, Philosophy East and West 42, no. 1 (1992): 17–19.. 266 Angus Charles Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1989), 176 et passim. 267 Ibid., 176; cf. Angus Charles Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, History of Religions 9, no. 2/3 (1969): 137–41; Angus Charles Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-Tzu (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 9.
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illumination is not an all or nothing satori [sic], and . . . there are only differences of degree between Cook Ting’s perfect grace in carving an ox and the ecstasy of Tzu-chi’i of Nankuo.268
Graham then quotes his own translation of the ‘Ziqi dialogue’ in order to demonstrate what he means by that last statement. From this, we learn that Graham understands mysticism to involve: ‘illumination’; ‘all is one’; practices that are spiritual and unusual (like trance or meditation) or which have taken on these qualities (like butchering an ox); and ‘ecstasy’. However, Graham does not analyse the purportedly mystical sections of the dialogues in the quotation above, or in the Zhuangzi in general. He may have well-founded reasons for describing parts of the text as ‘mystical’ but he does not often state those reasons for his readers.
This kind of presentation of the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism is deeply ingrained into Graham’s writings on the Zhuangzi. He has already concluded that mysticism arising from ‘anti-rationalism’ is the core meaning of the Zhuangzi. Hence, Graham then only provides passing references and occasional examples of what he sees as the mysticism of the Zhuangzi.
Nevertheless, we can discern what Graham understands to form part of the Zhuangzi’s mysticism. Firstly, mysticism contains ‘illumination’. Graham’s usage of this term implies that it means grasping something special, extraordinary, and beyond the mundane. Secondly, Graham holds that that there are differences of degree between different types of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and in general. This means that Graham does not treat all varieties of mysticism as one-and-the-same. Consequently, Graham’s understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and in general is more nuanced than several other scholars’ whose work I have cited above. Third, mysticism involves practices which are unusual and beneficial. In the cases Graham refers to, the mystical dimension of the Cook Ding story demonstrates butchery that goes beyond the mundane skill itself and has taken on a more profound and spiritual significance,269 and the Ziqi dialogue describes Ziqi to be in ‘trance’ or ‘meditation’.270
268 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 189. 269 See also Lee H. Yearley, ‘Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State,’ in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism and Ethics in the the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg Ivanhoe and Phillip J (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 152–182.. 270 See also Waley, The Way and Its Power, 116–20; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 49, 105; Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture, 57–58; Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’, 30–31; Huang, Zhuangzi Duben, 26, 31.
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Graham explores the topic of mysticism at other points of the book.271 This gives us more examples of his general understanding of mysticism which may have led him to conclude that the Zhuangzi is mystical. For example, Graham’s exposition on the ‘Inward Training (neiye 内業)’ chapter of the Guanzi (管子) suggests that mysticism involves ‘contemplation’ and ‘meditation practices’ which in the case of Warring States China, may well have descended ‘from the trance of the professional shaman’.272 Hence, it is likely that Graham’s understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is informed by his understanding of mysticism in contemporaneous sources, such as the Guanzi.
In Disputers of the Tao, Graham reveals more of his understanding of mysticism when he concludes his exposition on what the Laozi is about.273 Graham asks: ‘what of the vision of oneness it [the Laozi] shares with Chuang-tzu? Can it really be advising rulers that to govern their states requires nothing less than the ultimate mystical illumination?’274 Here, we can see that Graham understands the Zhuangzi and the Laozi to have a metaphysical dimension to their mysticism. Graham calls it a ‘vision of oneness’. Moreover, he links this dimension with the experience of ‘illumination’.
We can therefore see that Graham holds these texts to relate several different layers of mysticism: the metaphysical, the experiential, and the epistemological. The metaphysical is ‘the vision of oneness’ which in the context of Daoism refers to an ultimate dao that pervades all. The experiential refers to practices such as ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘illumination’. They feature as part of a quest to experience a life along the path of their ultimate dao. The epistemological refers to issues of ‘knowing’ or ‘understanding’ the ‘oneness’ which is the ‘ultimate dao’, and also to issues of its ineffability.
Graham makes two interconnected moves in characterising the Zhuangzi as a mystical text. He maintains that the Zhuangzi is unlike Western philosophical texts in that it takes a mystical approach. At the same time, he also asserts that Westerners have had too narrow a usage of terms like ‘mystical’ and ‘mysticism’. He writes: ‘The Western classification of certain experiences long absent from or marginal to our tradition as “mystical” is closely connected with our un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality’.275 This is actually a
271 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 100–105, 234–35. 272 Ibid., 100. On the ‘Inner Training’ chapter of Guangzi, see Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism. 273 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 234–35. 274 Ibid., 234. 275 Ibid.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy reiteration of ideas first published in his introduction to The Book of Lieh-tzu.276 Graham expands on those ideas in Disputers of the Tao, by proposing that experiences called ‘mystical’ have:
both a deep and a shallow end. At the deep end the theoretical limit would be the step from the fluidity to the disappearance of distinctions, in the absolute illumination . . . At the shallow end, the self-cultivation may serve as a means to relaxation, poise, loosening of habit, creativity, quickening of responsiveness. The author of Lao-tzu certainly sounds familiar with the deep end.277
Nevertheless, Graham does not include these questions and considerations in an investigation of the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi. Thus, we can only infer that he also thought that the kinds of things he associates with the Laozi, and Daoism in general, are also evident in the Zhuangzi. We can learn more of Graham’s conclusions concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi from some of his other publications.
3.6. ‘Two Notes on the Translation of the Taoist Classics’
We can better understand Graham’s labelling Zhuangzi a mystical writer in Disputers of the Tao if we hold his ideas there in relation to ideas he expresses in a contemporaneous article. In ‘Two Notes on the Translation of the Taoist Classics’, Graham considers evidence of Zhuangzi’s mysticism in his explanations of ‘Chuang-tzu and the Rambling Mode’. ‘The Rambling Mode’ is Graham’s critique of poor translations of the Zhuangzi. He writes: ‘this extraordinary style, which drifts inconsequentially between sense and nonsense, is an invention of translators, to which we resort when losing our grip and meandering from sentence to sentence without any sense of direction.’278
One reason Graham gives for translators resorting to ‘the Rambling Mode’ is the kind of experiences Zhuangzi describes. He writes: ‘Chuang Tzu is a mystical writer, and presents those who like myself are not mystics with the problem that often the choice of Chinese words is determined by a kind of experience which we have never shared.’279 Here, we can
276 See Angus Charles Graham, The Book of Lieh-Tzu (London: John Murray, 1960), 5 et passim. 277 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 235. 278 Angus Charles Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, in Interpreting Culture Through Translation: A Festschrift for D.C. Lau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 131. 279 See Angus Charles Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, in A Companion to A. C. Graham’s Chuang Tzu, ed. Harold David Roth (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003),
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy see that Graham judges the Zhuangzi to be mystical because it relates inner experiences and philosophical ideas based on experiences which relate to metaphysical and theological commitments. One example Graham gives of Zhuangzi’s relation of mystical experience shows similarities to his more general claims about mysticism in Disputers of the Tao. Graham quotes the ‘Ghosts residing within you’ description. It reads:
3.6.1. Mind-Fasting; The Gui and the Shen Lodge Within Me
Source Text Graham’s Translation My Translation
夫徇耳目內通而外於心 If you are inwardly fluid, If your ears and eyes 知，鬼神將來舍，而況人 guided by the ears and the pervade internally and you eyes, and expel the heart’s put the mind’s knowledge 乎280！ knowledge, the spirits of the outside, then ghosts and air and the earth will come spirits will come to dwell to rest in you, not to mention within you. How much more other men!’281 so for other men?
The above quotation comes from the end of the ‘mind-fasting’ dialogue which I have already explained is a part of the text that scholars label mystical. Graham quotes a different, less well-known, part of the text, giving different reasons as to why it is mystical, in his view. He writes: ‘The first half of the sentence suggests to me LSD experiences in which I ceased to will and conceptualize and attention roamed freely over sights and sounds. I may well be misunderstanding it . . . I have no idea what it feels like to have the kuei [鬼] and shen [神] settling in me’.282 Here we can see that Graham associates mysticism with non-conceptual experiences brought on through trance, spirit possession, and mind-altering drugs. These are
151. The original publication is Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991. There, the quotation is on page 139. 280 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 9/4/32. 281 Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991, 140; See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 9/4/32. 282 Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991, 140.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy the kinds of practices and experiences we can associate with ‘the trance of the professional shaman’ in Disputers of the Tao which Graham links with mysticism.
The reader may also recall my discussion of mysticism and drugs in the previous chapter. From the quotation above, it is clear that Graham associated drug-induced, mind altering experiences with mystical quests in his own experience. He has more to say on the matter in a later article.283 It would be a fallacy of equivocation for Graham to think that his drug-induced experiences in the late 20th century were the same experiences as Zhuangzi records in the ‘mind-fasting’ dialogue or elsewhere in the Zhuangzi. Fortunately, Graham writes that the unusual inner experiences in the Zhuangzi only remind him of his own experiences. We can therefore say that Graham took the experiences to be similar, but not the same.
Graham’s final remarks on ‘the Rambling Mode’ of Zhuangzi translation help us further understand his interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Graham explains:
The Rambling Mode is essentially translator’s English . . . but in mystical writing we do find it actually employed in original composition. This in turn modifies the expectations of the student of Eastern wisdom, so that it seems entirely natural to assume that a Chinese mystic would be thinking in rambled Chinese.284
Here, Graham is saying that in the Zhuangzi, we do occasionally find descriptions of experiences that do not make much sense in the original language. This does not mean that the experiences are complete fictions, not meaningful, or not a serious concern for the authors of the text. However, using language to try to describe them results in some very strange- sounding ideas. Consider again the ‘ghosts and spirits lodging within you’ locution. The original wording sounds strange in classical Chinese language because it speaks of ghosts and spirits ‘lodging’ (she 舍) within a person who has completed ‘mind-fasting’.
The difficulty of putting those kinds of experiences into language, let alone translating them into another language, contributes to the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. It is an example of the linguistic considerations of constructing mystical texts, and relating mystical experiences, that scholars often do not appreciate, as Steven Katz most strongly argues.285 However,
283 See Graham, ‘Mysticism and the Question of Private Access’. 284 Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991, 140. 285 See Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 16–20.
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Graham clearly had an appreciation of these aspects of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, although he did not relate this aspect of the Zhuangzi to any mysticism theory (other than perhaps his own ideas on mysticism).
3.7. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy
JeeLoo Liu considers the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism in An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy.286 Liu describes the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is mystical as part of a summary of several competing interpretations of the Zhuangzi’s overall position on truth, reality, and knowledge. These positions are: 1) Radical (hard) scepticism or perspectivism; 2) soft scepticism or language scepticism; 3) therapeutic scepticism or methodological scepticism; 4) Asymmetrical relativism; 5) Anti-rationalism or mysticism; and 6) Realism.287 Liu’s purpose in summarising these competing interpretations of the Zhuangzi’s epistemology is to demonstrate: ‘the confusing and confused state of our interpretation of Zhuangzi.’288 In this way, Liu presents a literature review that prepares the reader for her own conclusions and arguments concerning the Zhuangzi’s view of truth, reality, and knowledge.
Liu does not conclude that Zhuangzi had a doctrine of mysticism, or that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. On the contrary, Liu writes: ‘his [Zhuangzi’s] view is a combination of realism with respect to Dao and the world as a whole, relativism with respect to our conceptual schemes and our judgements, and scepticism about the possibility of knowledge.’289 Thereupon, Liu gives explanations of these conclusions concerning the Zhuangzi’s overall position on knowledge. She explains that Zhuangzi maintains the following three theses:
1. Realism: There is Dao existing independently of our perspectives and outside our conceptual schemes. This Dao is the Truth, the Reality, or the way the world is. 2. Conceptual Relativism: All our thought is internal to our conceptual scheme, and our judgements are always reflections of our own perspectives.
286 Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. 287 See ibid., 154–57. 288 Ibid., 157. 289 Ibid.
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3. Knowledge Skepticism: We can never have knowledge about the absolute Truth, nor can we ever describe it with our language. There is no truth in the semantic sense (from A, B).290
Thus, Liu concludes that Zhuangzi was a philosopher whose main purport in writing the core of the Zhuangzi (i.e., what became the first seven chapters) was to impart the above philosophical theses. Liu formulates arguments from the Zhuangzi consistent with those theses in a lucid and convincing manner by quoting from Watson’s translation of the Zhuangzi and then re-formulating Zhuangzi’s words in the meta-language of philosophy.291
Nevertheless, aspects of Liu’s discussion of the Zhuangzi contain some overlap with interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. For example, Liu concludes that Zhuangzi holds a thesis of an ultimate reality, a Dao that is independent of human perspectives and conceptual schemes. Moreover, Liu points out that throughout the Zhuangzi, there appear stories of characters who have attained understanding of this Dao. She writes: ‘Zhuangzi did not think that the knowledge of Dao could be obtained through reason or empirical investigation; instead, people need to cultivate a higher level of intuitive understanding, which he called ‘illumination’ (ming [明]), of the whole facet of Dao.’292 Cultivating non- rational, intuitive insights into what one believes to be the ultimate ‘Truth’ is a common mark of what scholars label ‘mysticism’. It is, therefore, a viable interpretation of the Zhuangzi, especially the sections of the Zhuangzi that Liu cites, even though Liu does not present an argument to that effect.
Another point in Liu’s discussion of epistemology in the Zhuangzi is in agreement with interpretations of mysticism. Liu points out that throughout the Zhuangzi there are descriptions of teachers dismissing would-be students who want to learn about Dao. Liu concludes: ‘if there are people who have truly understood Dao, they cannot teach others since no human descriptions would have been adequate.’293 It is consistent with the ‘ineffability mark’ of mysticism for the Zhuangzi to contain stories to demonstrate that some people can attain intuitive insights about Dao which cannot be expressed in language. This ‘mark’ (i.e., phenomenological characteristic) has appeared frequently in literature on mysticism ever since it was first given by William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience.294
290 Ibid., 158. 291 Ibid., See 158, et passim. 292 Ibid., 165. 293 Ibid., 166. 294 See James, Varieties, 1902, 371.
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Passages in the Zhuangzi which contain ineffability claims about an ultimate Dao can, therefore, support an argument that the text contains a message of mysticism. Yet, Liu argues that the Zhuangzi contains ineffability claims concerning an ultimate Dao, but does not interpret these claims as communicating a thesis, or overall message, of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Liu quotes Burton Watson’s interpretations of the Zhuangzi wherein Watson concludes that the Zhuangzi is mystical. However, Liu does not quote the main conclusion which Watson draws (that Zhuangzi’s thought is mystical). She quotes the parts of Watson’s conclusions that are most strongly in agreement with her own arguments. For example, Liu concurs with Watson’s assessment of the Zhuangzi regarding the matter of knowers of Dao. Liu remarks: ‘In the Zhuangzi, there are also many stories of the teachers’ dismissal of students’ attempt[s] to have knowledge of Dao. Perhaps it is best as Watson put it: “Most of the philosophers of ancient China are addressed to the political or intellectual elite; Chuang Tzu’s is addressed to the spiritual elite.”’295
This is where Liu ends her quotation of Watson. However, Watson’s conclusion that the Zhuangzi is addressed to a spiritual elite follows from his belief that the Zhuangzi is a mystical work. Watson writes: ‘Chuang Tzu, like most mystical philosophies, has seldom been embraced in its pure form except by more than a small minority. Most of the philosophers of ancient China are addressed to the political or intellectual elite; Chuang Tzu is addressed to the spiritual elite.’296 In other words, Liu concurs with Watson that the Zhuangzi has a spiritual dimension and is addressed to a spiritual elite, but she does not go so far as Watson in concluding that this is because Zhuangzi was a mystic, and that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism.
Nonetheless, Watson stresses throughout his introduction to the Zhuangzi that this spiritual dimension, and the spiritual elite to whom the Zhuangzi is addressed, show that the Zhuangzi is not just about doing philosophy: there is a practical and personal aspect to the enterprise of the Zhuangzi.297 Watson frequently writes that these spiritual matters of the Zhuangzi are mystical (as I show in greater detail in Chapter 6 of this dissertation).
295 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 5; cited in Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 166. 296 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 4–5. 297 See also Franklin Perkins, Heaven and Earth Are Not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indiana University Press, 2014), 5.
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What of the knowers of Dao? They are the spiritual elite whom Watson calls mystics, but Liu does not. Liu remarks: ‘even if there are people who have truly understood Dao, they cannot teach others since no human descriptions would have been adequate. . . . in the whole Zhuangzi, the people who have learned Dao (or Truth in the metaphysical sense) are given descriptions so fanciful that they seem unreal’.298 Here, Liu recognises that in the Zhuangzi, there are claims of an ultimate metaphysical aspect of reality into which people can gain insight, but not necessarily articulate in language. Scholars could use these aspects of the text to support an interpretation that the Zhuangzi espouses a doctrine of mysticism (as Watson does). However, Liu does not take that step. She concludes that these parts of the text espouse philosophical doctrines of both realism and scepticism. Thus, Liu writes: ‘Zhuangzi’s point is that there is Truth in the metaphysical sense and there is true knowledge, but true knowledge is almost humanly impossible. Ordinary human knowledge should all be considered “little knowledge” and “little understanding.” They are the proper objects of Zhuangzi’s skepticism.’299
Therefore, it seems that Liu only entertains the idea that there may be some element of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. She points out that A.C. Graham’s and Jung Lee’s antirationalist/mystic interpretations of the Zhuangzi: ‘point to a different epistemic mode that Zhuangzi advocates: abandon reason’.300 Liu summarises that for Graham, this means employing ‘pure spontaneity’ which: ‘plays down or denies the place of reason in becoming aware of objective reality.’301 For Jung, ‘abandoning reason’ in the Zhuangzi means: ‘If one abandons all conceptual schemes and uses a “heightened mode of noesis”, then one can apprehend reality “in a direct and unmediated way.”’302 Liu concludes that for both Graham and Jung: ‘in Zhuangzi’s view true knowledge is possible as long as one employs this different epistemic mode.’303 However, this ‘different epistemic mode’ is what Liu presents as Graham’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s ‘anti-rationalism’ and Jung’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi’s ‘mysticism’. The two labels appear to be different, but they are not. For in Graham’s view, ‘anti-rationalism’ leads to mysticism, and the Zhuangzi contains both (I
298 Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 166. 299 Ibid. The italics in the quotation are Liu’s. 300 Ibid., 157. 301 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 194 quoted in; Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 156–57. 302 Jung H. Lee, ‘Disputers of the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-Tzu on Meaning, Truth, and Reality’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25, no. 4 (1998): 458–59; quoted in Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 157. 303 Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 157. See also Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 194; Lee, ‘Disputers of the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-Tzu on Meaning, Truth, and Reality’, 163, 458–59.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy discuss this point further in Chapter 7, ‘Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi’).
This, however, is as far as Liu engages with interpretations that the Zhuangzi contains mysticism: she summaries two scholars’ conclusions to that effect, but does not investigate the interpretations further. Hence, although Liu focuses her discussion on philosophical issues in the Zhuangzi, we can see that some of those issues (like ‘a different epistemic mode’ and spiritual matters concerning Dao) are also relevant to mysticism.
3.8. Introduction to Chinese Philosophy
Karyn Lai introduces her readers to interpretations that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism in An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy. This occurs in two parts of Lai’s introduction to the Zhuangzi. The first is in the section ‘Interpretations of Zhuangzi’s Scepticism’,304 and the second is in the section ‘Cultivating Knack’.305 Although Lai introduces her readers to these possible interpretations, she does not go so far as to endorse them in her own argument. Nevertheless, by studying how Lai presents these possible interpretations of the Zhuangzi, we can further our understanding of what issues scholars see as part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
The first instance where Lai introduces the possibility of interpreting Zhuangzi as a mystic is in her summary of interpretations of ‘the happy fish dialogue’.306 Lai summarises four interpretations of the dialogue. The first interpretation is: ‘Zhuangzi is merely an inept logician who fails to grasp Hui Shi’s questions; their interchange marks a futile dialogue between Zhuangzi the mystic and Hui Shi the logician.’307 Lai has an endnote which reads: ‘According to Chad Hansen, this is the dominant understanding of the dialogue. (2003, 145,147).’308 Both Lai and Hansen are correct to state that seeing Zhuangzi as a mystic who fails to grasp his teacher’s logic is a dominant understanding of the ‘happy fish dialogue’. It is, moreover, a dominant understanding of the Zhuangzi as a whole.
Nevertheless, Lai only introduces the mystic interpretation as one of four possible interpretations. Her own view is that in the ‘happy fish dialogue’ has more significance for understanding Zhuangzi’s philosophical ideas relating to relativism and perspectivism. She
304 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 152–56. 305 Ibid., 156–66. 306 See Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 110; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 45/17/87-91. 307 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 153. 308 Ibid., 169; See also Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 145, 147.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy writes: ‘Zhuangzi gives a reason for relativist comparisons; he suggests that they might be due to variations across perspectives.’309 Thereupon, Lai introduces her readers to the various interpretations of Zhuangzi’s scepticism. Lai’s own conclusion is that: ‘If Zhuangzi is an ethical sceptic at all, he is sceptical about conventional ethical norms, their corresponding practices and their implementation in human society.’310 Hence, while Lai introduces her reader to an interpretation that ‘the happy fish dialogue’ relates something of Zhuangzi the mystic, she neither affirms, nor denies that position. Instead, Lai pursues an inquiry into the more mainstream philosophical concern of Zhuangzi’s theses of relativism, perspectivism, and scepticism.
The second instance where Lai introduces her readers to interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is in the section on ‘cultivating knack’. This is where Lai introduces readers to ‘knack’ in relation to conceptions of mind (xin 心) in the Zhuangzi. Lai writes: ‘We are left to wonder whether Zhuangzi intends to replace xin, the mind-heart, with dao.’311 This ‘replac[ing] xin … with dao’ is reminiscent of claims that the Zhuangzi contains a mystical doctrine because it advocates identifying oneself with the Ultimate, i.e., the dao.
Lai does not make this claim explicitly. Instead, she entertains the possibility during her investigation into the how cultivating ‘knack’ in the Zhuangzi is different from conventional knowledge. This line of inquiry relates to epistemological and experiential aspects of mysticism. If the Zhuangzi advocates cultivating a kind of knowing that is different from conventional knowledge, that is part of some larger quest to experience an ‘ultimate’, and which its proponents insist is mysterious and ineffable, then it is broadly consistent with characteristics of mysticism.
Lai presents this possibility in her explanation of the significance of mind-fasting in the Zhuangzi. She refers to Schwartz’s interpretation of mind-fasting as part of her explanation.312 Lai writes:
The Zhuangzi associates the mind-heart with the negative effects of civilisation and therefore advocates the ‘fasting of the mind-heart’. . . . Benjamin Schwartz suggests that for Zhuangzi, qi [in fasting the mind] is a ‘mystical reality’ which serves . . . to connect the world of the manifold,
309 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 153–54. 310 Ibid., 156. 311 Ibid., 160. 312 See also Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 218–19, 234.
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determinate, and discrete to the world of nonbeing’ (1985: 218). He also notes that this might have connection s with mediation techniques.313
The idea that the meditation technique of mind-fasting allows one to ‘replace listening with qi’ which then allows dao to coalesce, is an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The interpretation, argued by Schwartz, and cited by Lai, is that through the meditation practice of ‘fasting the mind’ one has experiences of ‘qi’ which connects one with a ‘dao’ conceived of as an ultimate, metaphysical substance.
However, Lai neither affirms nor rejects Schwartz’s interpretation of ‘mind-fasting’ as a kind of mystical cultivation connecting one to the ultimate dao. Lai is presenting Schwartz’s interpretation as one possible way of understanding the Zhuangzi’s view on ‘knack’ and how cultivating ‘knack’ relates to ethics and epistemology.314 The epistemological aspects relate to elements of mysticism, but Lai only pursues them because epistemological theses are a main concern of philosophy generally; she does not argue that the epistemological aspects of these ideas in the Zhuangzi form part of a mystical quest.
The third instance where Lai introduces readers to interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi closely follows the second instance. It is where Lai considers the spiritual or religious implications of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Lai writes: ‘The spiritual or religious implications of Zhuangzi’s philosophy have been affirmed by a number of scholars.’315 Mysticism forms part of these affirmations of Zhuangzi’s spirituality. For example, Lai reminds her readers of Schwartz’s interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. She writes: ‘Schwartz describes Zhuangzi’s philosophy of “mystic gnosis” at a few points in his analysis (1985: 215-217).’316 Lai also introduces her readers to Harold Roth’s interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. She writes: ‘[Harold] Roth argues that Zhuangzi recommends a deep mystical tranquillity through meditative contemplation (1999).’317
Having thus introduced her readers to these possible interpretations of the spiritual aspects of Zhuangzi’s philosophy, Lai then presents her own views. Lai concludes: ‘the aim of Zhuangzi’s [spiritual] liberation entails freedom not from life in the world but from its
313 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 160. See also Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 218. 314 See Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 160 et passim. 315 Ibid., 161. 316 Ibid.; See also Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 215–18. 317 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 161. See also Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy conventions and ideologies.’318 Lai does not take up the interpretation that the spiritual implications of Zhuangzi’s philosophy make the Zhuangzi a work of mysticism, or that the spiritual dimensions of the text arise because the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. In this instance, Lai explains the spiritual dimensions of the Zhuangzi as relating ethical issues of freeing one from conventions and ideologies. This may form part of a larger mystical quest, but Lai does not take her interpretation of the Zhuangzi that far.
Thus, on the whole, the mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi are tangential to Lai’s main discussion. As we have seen, Lai does not deny that mysticism is relevant to the Zhuangzi, and several of the sources she considers interpret mysticism as an important part of the Zhuangzi. Lai’s discussion is focussed on more mainstream philosophical concerns of the text. They are epistemological issues of scepticism concerning language and reality, as well as perspectival issues concerning morality and knowledge.319
3.9. Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy
Bryan Van Norden’s Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy contains a section on Daoist mysticism. Van Norden focuses his discussion of Daoist mysticism on the Laozi with some brief comments on the Zhuangzi.320 He introduces mysticism as the fifth of the five major themes of the Laozi thus: ‘Since the highest kind of knowledge transcends language, the Daodejing advocates a kind of mystical knowledge.’321 From this, we can infer that Van Norden holds ineffable knowledge to be part of the essence of mysticism, and that he finds evidence of it in the Laozi.
Van Norden confirms this assessment in his account of mysticism in the Laozi later in the chapter. He writes: ‘Broadly speaking, mysticism is the view that there is 1. a kind of knowledge 2. That cannot be adequately expressed in words 3. but is important to human life in general.’322 Thus, we have what Van Norden identifies as the essence of mysticism evident in texts like the Laozi, and by extension, the Zhuangzi, because he also holds mysticism to be an important part of the latter text. In Van Norden’s view, mysticism is a broad epistemological commitment to the position that there is some objective knowledge about life which is nevertheless ineffable.
318 Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 161. 319 See ibid., 146-152-156. 320 Van Norden, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy, 133–38. 321 Ibid., 125. 322 Ibid., 133.
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Such a characterisation of mysticism seems unproblematic. However, the method in which Van Norden supports such a characterisation is somewhat problematic. Firstly, he draws almost only from William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience for his understanding of mysticism. He writes: ‘My definition is only one possible characterization. The first and second traits I identify are what William James identifies as the two most important characteristics of mysticism’.323 This comes close to being an appeal to authority. It comes close to construing all forms of mysticism as corresponding to what James describes in The Varieties of Religious Experience. However, there are many different characterisations of mysticism apart from the one on which Van Norden bases his own. Hence, it appears that Van Norden’s characterisation of mysticism too closely follows James’ to be totally convincing as representative of mysticism generally.
Other than the characterisation of mysticism derived from James’ Varieties, Norden does not give citations to other studies of mysticism. Yet, he refers to ‘mystical strands of thought’ from religious traditions and ‘mystical elements’ in the thought of Plato, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein.324 However, Van Norden does cite works by those philosophers in order to substantiate his claim that their work represents mystical elements of Western philosophy. This lessens the convincingness of his account of mysticism in general, as well as the applicability of this concept to Chinese thought, Daoism, and the Zhuangzi.
Van Norden lists those eminent Western philosophers whose works contain ‘mystical strands of thought’ in order to support a more general step in reasoning concerning mysticism in Chinese thought. He presents his reasoning thus:
Every major religious tradition has mystical strands of thought . . . In addition, many great philosophers have mystical elements in their thought, from Plato . . . to Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein . . . Consequently, it would actually be quite surprising if there were not a significant mystical element in early Chinese thought.325
In this way, Van Norden assumes that there ought to be mystical elements in Chinese thought because there are mystical elements in Western thought. However, this reasoning does not strongly support a conclusion that Chinese thought probably contains mysticism. Chinese thought, culture, and religion are dissimilar to Western culture, thought, and religion
323 Ibid., 262, note viii. 324 Ibid., 133. 325 Ibid.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy in many respects. Therefore, there ought to be no a priori reason to assume that Chinese thought would contain mysticism at all, let alone mysticism that is similar to Western mysticism. Therefore, Van Norden’s assumption that Chinese thought probably contains mysticism, and his reasoning to support the assumption, seems unwarranted.
Nevertheless, Van Norden gives an edifying contrast between Christian and Daoist mysticism. He argues that Christians and Daoists have opposite conclusions as to what: a) mystical knowledge is; b) what it means in terms of ‘real world’ activity or ‘real life’; and c) its ethical implications.326 This supports his conclusion that not all mysticisms are the same and that there are a variety of mysticisms, even though they may share generalised features such as claims of ineffability of an ultimate, metaphysical reality. He writes: ‘It might seem that, because they deny that the knowledge they seek can be expressed in words, that all forms of mysticism are the same. However, traditions assign different roles to mystical experience, depending of their overall philosophical framework.’327 This is an important methodological strength of Van Norden’s account of mysticism because it demonstrates epistemological sophistication regarding the plurality of mystical traditions. Thus, Van Norden does not simply treat mysticism in the Laozi and Zhuangzi as being the same as mysticism from other traditions.
Although Van Norden devotes more attention to discussing mystical aspects of the Laozi, he also identifies mysticism as part of the main message of the Zhuangzi. He writes: ‘Zhuangzi is ultimately a mystic. A mystic thinks that there is a kind of knowledge important to human life that cannot be described in words.’328 This aspect of epistemology is the main feature Van Norden uses to identify texts like the Laozi and the Zhuangzi as mystical.
Moreover, Van Norden argues that the mystical aspect of the Zhuangzi forms part of the overall cohesiveness of the text as therapeutic philosophy. He writes that therapeutic philosophy does not try to convince readers of a specific doctrine, but rather aims to ‘alter your behavior and attitudes.’329 Van Norden’s position is that not only do the mystical parts of the Zhuangzi have this effect, but that they allow us to better understand his differences with Hui Shi. Thus, he writes: ‘Interpreting Zhuangzi as a therapeutic mystic helps shed light on his disagreement with Hui Shi. . . . The point of Zhuangzi’s writings is to open us up to new
326 Ibid., 133–34. 327 Ibid., 133. 328 Ibid., 154. 329 Ibid.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy ways of relating to the world, not to talk us out of one fixation and into another [as Hui Shi attempted].’330
The reader may recall my analysis of Karyn Lai’s discussion of interpreting interactions between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi to show Zhuangzi as a mystic in the ‘happy fish dialogue’. Therein, I stated that both Lai and Hansen are correct to point out that interpreting the ‘happy fish dialogue’ as evidence of Zhuangzi the mystic, and that interpreting the Zhuangzi as mysticism on the whole is a dominant interpretation of the text. In the quotation above, Van Norden characterises Zhuangzi as a mystic on the whole through reference to Zhuangzi’s interactions with Hui Shi generally. This would include the ‘happy fish dialogue’, but also other records of disagreements between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi. In this way, Van Norden interprets the stories of Zhuangzi and Hui Shi as evidence of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in a more general, but stronger, way than either Lai or Hansen discuss.
However, if Zhuangzi is a mystic and espouses mysticism, as Van Norden maintains, then this is tantamount to reasoning that Zhuangzi and the Zhuangzi espouse a specific doctrine of mysticism. Yet, Van Norden also maintains that the Zhuangzi does not try to convince readers of any specific doctrine. The contrary nature of Van Norden’s conclusions in these regards is difficult to reconcile.
Van Norden’s account of the mystical aspects of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi is brief. Firstly, his only analyses of mysticism are to cite parts of those texts which express ideas to the effect there is something basic to the universe/life that language cannot communicate. This is especially true of his account of the Zhuangzi, as I have shown above. However, in a section on the mysticism of the Laozi, he quotes part of the text which pertains to esoteric practices such as cultivating qi.331 Van Norden concludes: ‘“Concentrating your qi” refers to . . . refining the qi through guided breathing exercises . . . the result is a state of equanimity in which one can experience the Way.’332
Thus, we can infer that Van Norden recognises that mysticism is not just about thinking that there are important things in life that language cannot communicate. His quotations of parts of the Laozi pertaining to cultivating qi show that he also recognises mysticism to encompass practices. Yet, he does not refer to any evidence of practice in the Zhuangzi in order to support his interpretation that Zhuangzi is a mystic. He appears to label Zhuangzi a
330 Ibid., 154–55. 331 Ibid., 135. 332 Ibid.
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3. Introductions to Chinese Philosophy mystic based only on his characterisation of mysticism derived from James’ ineffability and noetic quality marks.
Thus, it appears that Van Norden gives an explanation of mysticism that is too general. It can admit any kind of ineffable knowledge that can be important in human life into the realm of mysticism. For example, learning to ride a bicycle requires ‘ineffable’ knowledge that would qualify as mystical according to Van Norden’s definition. No matter how well we explain how to ride a bicycle to someone who has never done it before, the knowledge she gains from our explanation will not be sufficient for her to be able to actually ride a bicycle. He/She must first of all acquire the knack for it, which is incommunicable in language. However, bicycle riding is not mysticism.333
Nevertheless, it is clear that Van Norden has identified an aspect of mysticism present in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi: knowledge important to human life that cannot be expressed in words. Merely holding an opinion to that effect is not mysticism. It is when one believes such an idea, incorporates it into one’s philosophical and/or religious framework and then proceeds to cultivate experiences of the purported ineffable, metaphysical Ultimate, that one enters into the realm of mysticism. These are aspects of mysticism in the Zhuangzi which do not come through perhaps as strongly as they could in Van Norden’s account of mysticism in Introduction to Chinese Philosophy. I point them out here in order to enrich our understanding of the complexity of interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
3.10. Conclusions
Introductions to Chinese philosophy have reiterated interpretations that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism, or that mysticism a part of the text. However, there is little consistency in the reasons scholars give for labelling the Zhuangzi mystical. Nor is there a consensus on which sections of the text form the core of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Thus, no unanimous views on the meaning of mysticism in the Zhuangzi emerge from introductions to Chinese philosophy. Instead, what emerges is a ‘confusing and confused state’334 of interpretations of mysticism in the text. This arises partly from how scholars give different interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, and refer to different, and not necessarily related, parts of the text to support their interpretations.
333 See McLeod, ‘[Review of] Van Norden, Bryan, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy’, 570. 334 Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 157.
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Furthermore, several scholars discuss mysticism as the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi as if that is what the text self-evidently says. If the text of the Zhuangzi self-evidently communicated a doctrine of mysticism, then it would not be very likely that different scholars could label different parts of the text, or different ideas from the text, ‘mystical’ for different reasons: there would be a univocal mystical core to the text. However, the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism has been transmitted through introductions to Chinese philosophy without a clear demonstration of a univocal core of the text. Scholars have merely continued to transmit interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in a haphazard way.
Perhaps literature introducing the Zhuangzi as part of Daoism in general contains more detailed explanations of mysticism in the text. This is the topic for the next chapter.
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4. Introductions to Daoism 4. Introductions to Daoism
Introductions to Daoism often contain a chapter on the Zhuangzi. If there is not a whole chapter on the Zhuangzi, then there is sometimes a section on the Zhuangzi within a chapter that characterises the Zhuangzi as belonging to early Daoism. These introductions often raise the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Yet, discussions of the Zhuangzi in introductions to Daoism do not present sustained analysis of mysticism in the text. Instead, they raise the issue only tangentially, or present general overviews of what the Zhuangzi’s mysticism involves. This is not the same as arguing that mysticism is the core message of the Zhuangzi. Therefore, I argue that we should not totally accept the characterisations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi from these sources.
4.1. Taoist Meditation
Isabelle Robinet was a French Sinologist who contributed to revisionist understandings of Daoism as a heterogeneous religious tradition. The topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi arises in a few places in some of her works. Robinet’s work builds on existing scholarship on mysticism in the Zhuangzi, focussing not on establishing that the Zhuangzi is mystical, but on exploring how the text is mystical.
In Taoist Meditation, Robinet claims that the Zhuangzi represents the best example of contemplative Daoist mysticism within a more general discussion of Daoist practices, focussed on the Mao Shan (茅山) sect of Daoism.335 She begins thus: ‘The oldest and best example of contemplative and mystical Taoism is found in the Chuang-tzu.’336 However, Robinet points out that the Zhuangzi exemplifies one kind of Daoism which differs from others. Thereupon, she lists distinguishing features of other kinds of Daoism. These include the Yellow Turbans who ‘made use of healing and therapeutic methods’, as well as other Daoist techniques such as ‘sexual techniques’, ‘respiratory techniques’, and the ‘Pao-p’u-tzu [抱朴子] . . . [which] started to record he Great Purity revelations’.337 This list distinguishing features of different kinds of Daoism is how Robinet introduces features of yet another kind of Daoism: the Mao Shan sect. She notes that the Zhuangzi is an important source of Daoist
335 The Mao Shan sect is also known as the Shang Qing Sect (上清) Sect. 336 Isabelle Robinet, Taoist Meditation: The Mao-Shan Tradition of Great Purity, trans. Norman J. Girardot and Julian F. Pas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 48. 337 Ibid.
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4. Introductions to Daoism mysticism as a fact within her more general discourse on how the Mao Shan sect fits within the broader context of Daoism.
It is important within the literature that connections are made between what has traditionally been divided into the two areas of ‘philosophical Daoism’ and ‘religious Daoism’. Robinet’s work brings together strands from these two areas, challenging the often unquestioned issue of a dichotomy. However, in Taoist Meditation, Robinet places the Zhuangzi within a chronology of Daoist practices and links it with the practices of a specific sect (i.e., the Mao Shan sect). These causal connections remain tenuous unless substantiated by detailed historical, anthropological, philosophical, and religious research into connections between the Zhuangzi and Daoist religious practices.
4.2. Taoism: Growth of a Religion
In Taoism: Growth of a Religion, Robinet introduces mysticism as one of the main themes in the Zhuangzi which contributed to the development of Daoist religion. She states that ‘mystic flights’ are ‘a characteristic feature of Taoism’ and that they were a ‘new element, taken up at many points in the Zhuangzi’.338 Thereupon, Robinet lists examples of mystic flights in the Zhuangzi, commenting that ‘Zhuangzi alerts us right away that this is an important theme, a key to his whole endeavour.’339 The examples she lists are: the Peng fable, as well as ‘his [Zhuangzi’s] characters (Zi Qi, Lao Dan [i.e., Laozi], Nie Que, chaps. 2, 21, 22) fall into an ecstatic state, leaving their bodies “like dead wood”’.340 It seems that Robinet cites these examples in order to substantiate connections between the Zhuangzi and Daoist religious practice. However, without empirical studies to demonstrate these connections, it is not clear that these examples really are part of Daoist religious practice that has grown out of the Zhuangzi.
Although Robinet describes the Zhuangzi as mystical in Taoism: Growth of a Religion, there are several assumptions which weaken the convincingness of such a depiction of the Zhuangzi. Firstly, Robinet does not relate the Zhuangzi to any other account of mysticism. This means that the reader can only take Robinet’s discussion of mysticism in the Zhuangzi at face value, as if it is a fact that the text is mystical. Secondly, Robinet’s presentation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in this book includes neither argument, nor analysis. Consequently, the reader is not able to follow a clear explanation of reasoning to convince him/her that
338 Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion, 32. 339 Ibid. 340 Ibid., 32–33.
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4. Introductions to Daoism mysticism is in fact a main theme of the Zhuangzi, or even which parts of the Zhuangzi in particular are evidence of mysticism. Therefore, we should not accept that the Zhuangzi is a doctrine of mysticism based on Robinet’s account in Taoism: Growth of a Religion.
4.3. Daoism Handbook
‘The Zhuangzi and Its Impact’ is a chapter dedicated to the Zhuangzi in the anthology, Daoism Handbook.341 In this chapter, Victor Mair introduces the reader to: ‘the significance of the text for philosophy and religion’,342 especially organised Daoism as a religion. The chapter provides a broad account of the main issues involved with Zhuangzi studies. Mair recounts the history of the text, its authorship, its gradual influence on literati, the thought it represents, and the commentaries on the Zhuangzi.
Mair includes a section relating what he considers to be the most outstanding themes of the Zhuangzi. This includes his summary of their usage in what he considers to be the main chapters of the text. Mair writes:
if we accept the received text as a whole, it does present us with an analyzable and interpretable body of thought . . . As such, the Zhuangzi presents certain key concepts which are widely recognized as being characteristic of the work. Among these, the most outstanding are spontaneity, the perfected person or true man, heart-mind, fasting of the heart-mind, sitting and forgetting, and the Great Clod.343
However, in the following section, entitled ‘MAIN CHAPTERS’ [sic], Mair does not supplement these summaries of outstanding concepts with textual evidence from the Zhuangzi. For example, Mair lists ‘fasting of the heart-mind’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ as two of the ‘most outstanding concepts’ in the Zhuangzi. These concepts appear in chapters 4 and 6 of the Zhuangzi, respectively. Yet, Mair does not mention these concepts in his summaries of the chapters to which they belong.344 In my view, it would have been helpful to include explanations of those outstanding concepts among the chapter summaries which Mair provides.
341 Victor H. Mair, ‘The Zhuangzi and Its Impact’, in Daosim Handbook, ed. Livia Kohn (Boston: Brill, 2000), 30–52. 342 Ibid., 31. 343 Ibid., 42. 344 Ibid., 43.
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4.3.1. ‘Mind-Fasting’ According to Daoism Handbook
Nevertheless, Mair elaborates on the concepts of ‘mind fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the subsection ‘DAOIST TECHNIQUES’ [sic] within the final section of the chapter, entitled ‘Practice’.345 Therein, Mair relates how ‘mind fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ came to be incorporated into the practices of organised religious Daoists from the 7th century onwards. Mair relates the interpretation given to ‘mind fasting’ by Daoists of later centuries through his own summary of their interpretations. However, Mair does not provide citations for the sources he summarises in his own words.346 It is, therefore, not clear if he is summarising from Daoist texts or from his own observations of Daoist practitioners.
Notwithstanding, Mair offers critical conclusions to how ‘mind fasting’ has been interpreted and elaborated upon by practitioners of Daoist religion. He writes: ‘this elaborate description goes beyond what was in the Zhuangzi itself, so that there was either a tradition of oral exegesis accompanying the text, or subsequent Yogic practices were grafted onto the text by way of elaboration.’347 In this way, Mair does not conflate the practice of ‘mind fasting’ in Daoist religion with the content of the Zhuangzi, as if the practice recorded in the text is the same as the practices of sects of Daoist religion (which is an issue I have pointed out in Robinet’s interpretations above).
4.3.2. ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ According to Daoism Handbook
Next, Mair summarises how the practice of ‘sitting and forgetting’ has been elaborated in organised Daoism. He writes: ‘In later Daoism a technical term used to describe a state of deep trance or intense absorption, the notion of zuowang 坐忘 occurs first in the Zhuangzi’.348 Thereupon, Mair quotes from Watson’s translation of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage in the Zhuangzi. It reads: ‘I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare (see Watson 1968, 90).’349 Mair explains: ‘The idea here as well as in the later tradition is a mental state of complete unknowing that involves a loss of personal identity and self and is utter immersion in the nonbeing of the universe.’350
345 Ibid., 45–46. 346 Ibid. 347 Ibid., 46. 348 Ibid. 349 Ibid.; see also Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 90. 350 Mair, ‘The Zhuangzi and Its Impact’, 46.
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Although Mair justly introduces zuowang (‘sitting and forgetting’) as one of the main ideas and practices in the Zhuangzi and the Daoist tradition, there are some issues in his interpretation and presentation that I would be remiss not to point out. First, Mair appears to follow Livia Kohn’s translation of ‘zuowang 坐忘’ as ‘sitting in oblivion’.351 This translation is erroneous because ‘wang 忘’ only communicates a lexical meaning to the effect of ‘to forget’, or ‘forgetting’. Kohn’s translation and interpretation of ‘oblivion’ has been justly critiqued by Harold Roth, who points out that the Zhuangzi does not discourse on ‘oblivion’, let alone treat oblivion as any lofty goal, mystical or otherwise (I discuss this point further in the next chapter).352 Second, Mair’s explanation of the meaning of ‘zuowang’ appears didactic, rather than a process of reasoning and argumentation. He reiterates commonly accepted interpretations to the effect that ‘zuowang’ is about being immersed in a kind of non- dualistic identity with the universe. Yet, the text does not clearly state such an idea and Mair has not given reasons to interpret the text in such a way.
There appears to be some incongruity regarding the role of mysticism in the Zhuangzi when we consider how Mair’s descriptions of ‘sitting and forgetting’ relate to interpretations of mysticism in the text. Mair’s interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ entails going through practices to attain ‘unknowing’, ‘loss of personal identity and self’ and ‘immersion in the nonbeing of the universe’ is consistent with many scholars’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Yet, Mair does not conclude that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is an example of mysticism.
Moreover, Watson, whose translation Mair quotes, is one of many scholars who have interpreted Zhuangzi to be a mystic (as I explain in Chapter 6). It seems incongruous for Mair to point out features of the Zhuangzi that many take as evidence of mysticism, quote from a translation made by a scholar who is a proponent of such a view, but not address such a view.
Furthermore, the kind of description Mair gives to ‘sitting and forgetting’ is consistent with what A.C. Graham called ‘an English-speaking mystigogue’s literary models’.353 An example of ‘mystigogue’ language in Mair’s characterisation of the Zhuangzi is the term ‘unknowing’. Going through esoteric practices to attain a state of ‘unknowing’ is an idea well-known in literature on mysticism. This is because the term ‘unknowing’ features
351 See Livia Kohn, Seven Steps to the Tao: Sima Chengzhen’s ‘Zuowanglun’ (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag - Wort und Werk, 1987); Livia Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 352 See Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 161 et passim. 353 Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991, 140.
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4. Introductions to Daoism prominently in the mystical text entitled The Cloud of Unknowing to which works on mysticism refer.354 Other examples are the ideas that the Zhuangzi relates ‘loss of personal identity and self’ and ‘immersion in the nonbeing of the universe’. Ideas to this effect are the very reasons why many scholars appear to label the Zhuangzi and ‘sitting and forgetting’ in particular, examples of mysticism. Yet, Mair does not go so far as to support such a view, even though the kinds of descriptions he gives are consistent with such a view.
4.3.3. A Different Characterisation of the Zhuangzi
Mair makes no mention of mysticism in this chapter on the Zhuangzi. This seems like an oversight because the chapter, ‘The Zhuangzi and Its Impact’, introduces two of the purportedly most mystical parts in the text: ‘mind fasting’; and ‘sitting and forgetting’. Furthermore, Mair cites Livia Kohn’s work wherein she concludes that the Zhuangzi, and those techniques, are mystical. Mair writes: ‘Sitting in oblivion [sic] [i.e., sitting and forgetting] . . . was taken up by the twelfth patriarch of Shangqing [Daoism], Sima Chengzhen (647-735) who developed the method . . . into a seven stage process for attaining the Dao, written in a treatise known as Zuowang lun 坐忘論, (CT 1036; see Kohn 1987).’ 355 In Kohn’s 1987 publication which Mair cites (Seven Steps to the Tao), as well as other publications, she maintains that the Zhuangzi contains a doctrine of mysticism. This is because ‘attaining the Dao’ is usually understood to signify union with a metaphysical Ultimate through spiritual practices, such as ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the case of the Zhuangzi, as well as the Zuowang Lun.
Mair’s explanation of the Zhuangzi presents a different view from that outlined by the editor, Livia Kohn, in her introduction to Daoism Handbook. Kohn outlines that ‘comparative mysticism’ is part of the philosophical approach to understanding Daoism, especially texts such as the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. Kohn writes: ‘Regardless of period and working definition, the study of Daoism . . . [has] been approached from four major angles [sic]: 1. Philosophy — the study of the ancient texts Laozi and Zhuangzi and their commentaries as well as later texts from the viewpoint of philosophy or comparative mysticism.’356 If comparative mysticism is the first of four major angles for studying the Zhuangzi, as Kohn
354 See Walters, The Cloud of Unknowing; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 18–19; H. P. Owen, ‘Experience and Dogma in the English Mystics’, in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 149–51. 355 Mair, ‘The Zhuangzi and Its Impact’, 46. See also Kohn, Seven Steps to the Tao: Sima Chengzhen’s ‘Zuowanglun’. 356 Daoism Handbook (Boston: Brill, 2000), xxx. The other angles are: history and literature; ritual; and practices and techniques.
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4. Introductions to Daoism writes, then it seems odd not to include this angle on a chapter about the Zhuangzi in Daoism Handbook.
Mair’s contribution on the Zhuangzi in Daoism Handbook fits into the second of what Kohn identifies as the four major angles of studying Daoism: history and literature.357 We can verify this observation by comparing it with Mair’s views expressed in the introduction to his translation of the Zhuangzi. Mair writes: ‘I view the Chuang Tzu primarily as a work of literature rather than as a work of philosophy’.358 This characterisation appears to create a false dichotomy between literature and philosophy. A strict reading entails commitment to the idea that ‘literature’ and ‘philosophy’ are completely separate.
However, I think it ought to be unproblematic to consider ‘philosophy’ to belong to the broader category of ‘literature’. Thus, Mair’s characterisation of the Zhuangzi as literature to the exclusion of philosophy, though original, is somewhat perplexing. The perplexing nature such a characterisation is greater when we recall that many of the descriptions Mair gives of parts of the Zhuangzi are consistent with reasons for interpreting the text to contain mysticism.
In sum, Mair does not focus on the mystical elements of the Zhuangzi in his contribution to Daoism Handbook. This seems odd because experts on the Zhuangzi had been labelling it mystical for more than 100 years before Daoism Handbook was written. Since Mair’s interpretation of the meaning of the text diverges from the dominant view, it would have been helpful for him to have given reasons for accepting his interpretation over the dominant one.
4.4. Daoism and Chinese Culture
Daoism and Chinese Culture gives a general introduction to Daoism. The author, Livia Kohn, begins by introducing the Laozi and the Zhuangzi as the foundational texts of Daoism. In this book, Kohn gives a concise account of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and Daoism in general.
Chapter 2 introduces the Zhuangzi. Therein, Kohn provides a systematic, but didactic, overview of the Zhuangzi text. This involves describing the worldview of Zhuang Zhou, the author of the Inner Chapters, and the different ways scholars have interpreted the Zhuangzi.
357 Ibid. 358 Victor H. Mair, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), xi.
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Kohn relates that scholars interpret the basic idea of the Zhuangzi in a number of different ways. They are: mysticism of union with Dao; a philosophy of life which praises eccentricity; social thought emphasising stratification and limitation; and as a work of literature.359
Although Kohn recounts these different ways of interpreting the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi, it is clear that mysticism is the interpretation that she finds most convincing. This is clear because Kohn presents a section on mysticism to conclude the chapter on the Zhuangzi, following her summary of the main points of each of the seven Inner Chapters. She begins by stating: ‘This selfless perception of a mind completely merged into and pervaded by Dao is also at the heart of the classification of the ancient Daoist works as mystical texts.’360
The next step in Kohn’s explanation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is to summarise her interpretation of what merging one’s mind with dao involves. She writes that it generally involves belief in ‘a pure force’ that cannot be comprehended through sensory perception, as well as processes one must go through in order to attain perception of dao.361 Kohn makes these claims as if all Daoist texts plainly state them. However, it would be more convincing if Kohn were to cite parts of the Zhuangzi that are evidence of what she summarises as general features of Daoist mysticism.
For example, Kohn makes it sound as though the Zhuangzi uses equivalent terms for ‘ground’ and ‘pure force’ in classical Chinese language. However, this is not the case; there are no such locutions in the Zhuangzi. Kohn does not tell the reader that we must interpret the Zhuangzi in order to arrive at the understanding that the text relates something of a ‘ground’. Nor does she point to any passage or relevant Chinese terms in the Zhuangzi that say anything to this effect.
Similarly, Kohn does not refer to the Zhuangzi when she explains the processes that classical Daoist texts relate which we can consider evidence of mysticism. For example, she writes: ‘as described in the Daode jing [sic], practitioners should embrace simplicity, both physically and mentally, and, as outlined in the Zhuangzi and the Guanzi, leave the senses behind and attain a state of “seeing things as equal” and “having no feelings.”’362 Yet, Kohn does not explain why she introduces mysticism in the Zhuangzi by referring to the Laozi. Furthermore, it is not clear what part of the Zhuangzi corresponds to ‘seeing things as equal’
359 Livia Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 3rd ed. (Three Pines Press, 2012), 34. The 1st edition was published in 2001. 360 Ibid., 39. 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid.
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4. Introductions to Daoism or ‘having no emotions’. Kohn presents her interpretations to the reader as if they are what the Zhuangzi says, but she does not give citations and analyses to substantiate these interpretations.
Kohn gives general examples of Daoist mystical practices. However, the examples she gives are not from the Zhuangzi, but rather from the Laozi. Kohn writes: ‘This [kind of process] involves a withdrawal from ordinary sensory experience and a refocusing of one’s goals, a tendency to ‘diminish and again diminish’ (Daode jing 48)’.363 Kohn has not argued that chapter 48 of the Laozi is related to processes of mystical experience evident in the Zhuangzi. It is, therefore, unclear why Kohn is citing the Laozi in a section of the book that is supposed to be introducing the mysticism of the Zhuangzi.
It seems chapter 48 of the Laozi and the overall mysticism of the Zhuangzi are connected in general ways, according to Kohn’s interpretations. She states that these passages from the Laozi, and presumably the Zhuangzi in general, empty the mind of worldly concerns, thereby allowing one to perceive Dao.364 Kohn gives some general references to content from the Zhuangzi in the following explanation of what it means to perceive Dao. She writes: ‘This new vision then leads to a complete letting go of all personality, to a merging with the ‘Great Thoroughfare,’ the attainment of nonaction [sic] in all aspects of life and thought, the realization of perfect happiness and free and easy wandering.’365
However, these allusions to content from the Zhuangzi are so general that they are not as helpful as they could be in identifying examples of mysticism in the text. First, it is not clear what Kohn is alluding to in the Zhuangzi that talks about ‘letting go of all personality’. Perhaps Kohn is referring to where the text reads: ‘The attained person has no self. The spirit person has no achievements. The sage has no reputation 至人無己，神人無功，聖人無 名’.366 Perhaps, Kohn is alluding to the ‘Ziqi of South Wall’ passage. The passage begins thus:
Nanguo Ziqi sat against a table. He breathed deeply and looked up at the sky. He was dazed and looked as though he had lost his other. Yancheng Ziyou was waiting on him. He said: . . . ‘The person who is reclining against the table now is surely not the same as he was before 南郭子綦隱
363 Ibid. 364 Ibid. 365 Ibid. 366 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 1/1/17-22.
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几而坐，仰天而噓，嗒焉似喪其耦。顏成子游立侍乎前，曰 . . . 今之 隱几者，非昔之隱几者也367
On the other hand, perhaps it is a reference to ‘sitting and forgetting’ and the ‘Great Thoroughfare’. There, the text reads: ‘I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare 墮肢體，黜聰明，離形去知，同於大通’. 368 It is possible to interpret all three of the above quoted passages from the Zhuangzi as relating ideas of ‘letting go of all personality’. However, it is not clear which, if any, of these parts of the text Kohn refers to in the sections of Daoism and Chinese Culture discussed here.
Merging with the ‘Great Thoroughfare’ is a reference to a term from the Zhuangzi. Scholars have interpreted the idea of a ‘da tong’ (大通) in the Zhuangzi as a way of referring to an ultimate dao (as I explain in more detail in Chapter 8). Cultivating practices and beliefs about merging with an ‘Ultimate’ metaphysical substance would constitute an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi according to widespread understandings of mysticism. However, in this section on Daoist mysticism, Kohn has not told the reader that ‘Great Thoroughfare’ refers to such an interpretation of ‘Dao’. The reader has to already know this in order to see the connection to emptying the mind of worldly concerns, thereby perceiving Dao.
In a different section of the chapter, Kohn writes that merging with Dao is part of the core of Daoist mysticism. She writes:
true happiness and fulfilment can be found in a life without obligation and worries, in a free mind and through the perfect harmony of one’s inner core with the Dao. . . . This selfless perception of a mind completely merged into and pervaded by Dao is also at the heart of the classification of the ancient Daoist works as mystical texts.369
Here also, there are some details of content in the Zhuangzi that Kohn has not explained. The reader must already know the content of the Zhuangzi, and its possible English translations, in order to recognise these details. In the quoted text above, Kohn refers to Daoist mysticism in the Zhuangzi involving one’s mind being ‘pervaded’ by Dao. This term ‘pervaded’ is one
367 Ibid., 3/2/1-2. 368 Zhuo Chen et al., ‘Mystical Experience Among Tibetan Buddhists: The Common Core Thesis Revisited.(Report)’, The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50, no. 2 (2011): 90; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 17/6/92-93. 369 Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 39.
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4. Introductions to Daoism possible English translation of ‘tong 通’. At several points in the Zhuangzi, Dao is spoken of as something that ‘pervades’.370 The most well-known is the interpretation that in ‘sitting and forgetting’ one ‘merges with’ the ‘Great Pervader’, i.e., da tong (大通), which refers to ‘the ultimate Dao’. Kohn, does not explain this important point of interpreting the text.
Nor does Kohn explain this interpretation at another point in her introduction to the thought of Zhuangzi. Kohn introduces ‘sitting and forgetting’ thus:
In addition, chapter 6 has the classical description of the unified and untrammelled mind in a state it calls zuowang or ‘sitting in oblivion,’ which plays an important role in later Daoist meditation: ‘I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off form, do away with understanding, and completely join the Great Thoroughfare.’371
Kohn does not point out that this is an example of Daoist mysticism. She does not explain how we can interpret ‘completely join[ing] the Great Thoroughfare’ as an example of merging with the ultimate Dao, thereby making ‘sitting and forgetting’ an example of mysticism. Without arguments to substantiate interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, readers are not given valid reasons to support such interpretations.
In Kohn’s summary of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, she writes that it involves ‘the realization of perfect happiness and free and easy wandering.’372 This is an allusion to chapter 1 of the Zhuangzi, entitled ‘Free and Easy Wandering’ (Xiao Yao You 逍遙遊). Does this mean that Kohn interprets chapter 1 of the Zhuangzi to relate a mystical quest to perceive Dao?
Kohn’s introduction to the content of chapter 1 of the Zhuangzi does not argue that the chapter relates mystical quests for the attainment of Dao. She summarises the overall message of chapter 1 thus: ‘Freedom and ease in life do not come from wishing to attain one single goal that is the same for all . . . but from realizing who one is and where one stands in the world and doing what one knows best to the fullest of one’s ability.’373 This is a reasonable summary of what chapter 1 of the Zhuangzi relates in its own terms. However, the term ‘dao’
370 See Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/35-36; 9/4/27-33; 17/6/92-93. 371 Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 37. Furthermore, Kohn does not give a reference to what part of the text she is quoting, apart from the indication that it is from ‘chapter 6’. Nor is it clear whose translation Kohn is using or from which version of the received text it has been translated from. 372 Ibid., 39. 373 Ibid., 34.
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4. Introductions to Daoism does not occur in that chapter. Therefore, it seems that the idea that chapter 1 in the Zhuangzi relates a mystical quest to perceive Dao is Kohn’s own interpretation: it is not what the text relates in its own terms.
4.5. Introducing Daoism
Introducing Daoism is very similar to Daoism and Chinese Culture. In fact, as one reviewer has noted: ‘[Introducing Daoism] appears like a note form summary of her [Kohn’s] broad range of published works, especially her Daoism and Chinese Culture.’374 The ‘note form’ of Introducing Daoism makes the book more accessible to undergraduate students, which fulfils part of the intention of the book.
Nevertheless, some of the same strengths and weaknesses in Daoism and Chinese Culture are also present in Introducing Daoism. For example, quoting from an unidentified English translation of the Zhuangzi and giving a reference only to the chapter from which it comes.375 This criticism is not just one of technicality; not giving specific references to the Zhuangzi causes Kohn to misrepresent some of the content of the Zhuangzi. For example, in the section which introduces ‘sitting and forgetting’ from chapter 6, Kohn quotes part of the text that is not in fact from the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. Yet, the way she presents it suggests that the passage she is quoting actually is the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. Kohn introduces sitting and forgetting thus: ‘Another way to reach the unified and untrammelled mind is to practice “sitting in oblivion.” This indicates a state of complete forgetfulness of self and other, high and low, life and death . . . through a seven stage process toward the ideal mind. Zhuangzi says:’376
However, what Kohn quotes Zhuangzi saying about ‘sitting and forgetting’ is not what the Zhuangzi says in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. Kohn presents the following as if it were the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage in the Zhuangzi:
Zhuangzi says: Practice concentration for three days, and you can put the world outside your mind. Then go on for seven days . . . After nine more days . . . you attain a level of clarity like the early morning sun. . . .
374 Joachim Gentz, ‘Introducing Daoism. By Livia Kohn. New York: Routledge, 2009. 296 Pp. ISBN- 10: 0415439981 ISBN-13: 978-0415439985 (Pbk.).’, Numen 57, no. 5 (1 January 2010): 622. 375 See Livia Kohn, Introducing Daoism (JBE Online Books, 2009), 40–41; See also Gentz, ‘Introducing Daoism. By Livia Kohn. New York’, 623. 376 Kohn, Introducing Daoism, 40.
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Eventually you transcend even this and attain utmost freedom by going beyond even life and death . . . (ch.6).377
The above quotation is not the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. It is from a passage known as the ‘woman crookback’, or ‘self-reliant woman’ (nüyu 女偊) dialogue from earlier in Chapter 6.378 This dialogue has no clear connection to the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue which appears towards the end of the chapter. It is a strange error for Kohn to misrepresent this part of the Zhuangzi as the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue, especially in a textbook meant to introduce undergraduate students to Daoism.
The misrepresentation will be clearer below. The reader will see that Kohn presents her translation as if: 1) it is the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage; and 2) it is written in prose wherein Zhuangzi is directly relating stages of sitting and forgetting meditation to the reader. Kohn’s presentation is erroneous on both counts.379 The translation she gives, the lack of context to accompany it, and the interpretation she gives of it, are all problematic.
4.5.1. Different Representations of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’
Kohn’s representation of Watson’s translation of the Source text ‘sitting and forgetting’ Woman Crookback dialogue
‘Practice concentration for Nan-po Tzu-k’uei said to the 南伯子葵問乎女偊曰：「子 three days, and you can put the Woman Crookback, ‘You are 之年長矣，而色若孺子，何 world outside your mind. Then old in years and yet your 也？」曰：「吾聞道矣。」 go on for seven days, and you complexion is that of a child. 南伯子葵曰：「道可得學 abandon all things . . . After Why is this?’ 邪？」曰：「惡！惡可！子 nine more days . . . you attain a ‘I have heard the Way!’ 非其人也。夫卜梁倚有聖人 level of clarity like the early 之 才，而無聖人之道 . . .吾 morning sun. . . . Eventually ‘Can the Way be learned?’ 欲以教之 . . . 吾猶守而告 you transcend even this and asked Nan-po Tzu-k’uei. attain utmost freedom by going 之，參日而後能外天下； 已 ‘Goodness, how could that be? 外天下矣，吾又守之，七日 Anyway, you aren’t the man to
377 Ibid., 41. 378 See Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 82–83; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16–6/36–17/6/45. 379 As Gentz points out in his review, there are quite a few errors in Introducing Daoism. See Gentz, ‘Introducing Daoism. By Livia Kohn. New York’.
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4. Introductions to Daoism beyond even life and death . . . do it. Now there’s Pu-liang 而後能外物；已外物矣，吾 (ch.6)’380 Yi—he has the talent of a sage 又守之，九日而後能外生； but not the Way of a sage . . . I 已外生矣，而後能朝徹；朝 thought I would try to teach 徹，而後能見獨；見獨，而 him . . . So I began explaining 後能無古今；無古今，而 後 and kept at him for three days, 能入於不死不生。382 and after that he was able to put the world outside himself. When he had put the world outside himself, I kept at him for seven days more, and after that he was able to put things outside himself. When he had put things outside himself, I kept at him for nine days more, and after that he was able to put life outside himself. After he had put life outside himself, he was able to achieve the brightness of dawn, and when he had achieved the brightness of dawn he could see his own aloneness. After he had managed to see his own aloneness, he could do away with past and present, and after he had done away with past and present, he was able to enter where there is no life and no death.’381
380 Kohn, Introducing Daoism, 41. 381 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 82–83. 382 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/36-17/6/42.
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In the example above, Kohn does not explain how she arrives at her conclusions concerning the meaning of the text. The ‘woman crookback’ passage, which Kohn misrepresents as if it were the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage, does not talk about ‘complete forgetfulness of self and other, high and low’. Hence, I think Kohn’s introduction of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in Introducing Daoism is an example of a weakness much more strongly criticised by Joachim Gentz. He writes: ‘there are no attempts to interpret meanings of texts or practices à la Robinet . . . or in the way Kohn did herself in Early Chinese Mysticism and other books.’383
Notwithstanding Gentz’s criticism, it is clear that Kohn has interpreted meanings in parts of the Zhuangzi in Introducing Daoism. However, the reasoning to support her interpretations is not clear. This is especially problematic because in Introducing Daoism, Kohn writes with a didactic tone in order to teach undergraduate students about Daoism. Yet, what students appear to be learning from the book are Kohn’s unsubstantiated interpretations about Daoism, not what the texts of Daoism say for themselves.
4.6. The Daoist Tradition
The Daoist Tradition is a contribution to revisionist scholarship on Daoism. In this book, Louis Komjathy aims to introduce readers to Daoism as: ‘an indigenous Chinese religion . . . supported by Daoist studies, that is, the specialized academic field dedicated to studying and understanding Daoism.’384 Komjathy argues that this entails rejecting ‘the dominant received view of Daoism’ which holds that Daoism is a ‘bifurcated tradition’ of philosophy and religion.385 Komjathy writes that such an understanding of Daoism is: ‘Rooted in colonialist legacies . . . [and] is epidemic among non-specialist accounts of Daoism, including among non-specialist educators and world religion textbooks (see Dippmann 2001), not to mention various popular constructions (see Chapter 16)’.386 Komjathy further criticises
383 Gentz, ‘Introducing Daoism. By Livia Kohn. New York’, 623; See also Robinet, Taoist Meditation: The Mao-Shan Tradition of Great Purity. 384 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 4. 385 Ibid. Komjathy calls this the ‘’Victorian’ or ‘Leggean view’ of Daoism’ because of James Legge’s influence in transmitting it. I would prefer to call it the ‘Victorian view’ because other scholars of the Victorian era, such as Herbert Giles, helped transmit this view before Legge. See Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, xvi. Therein, Giles writes: ‘modern Taoism is but a hybrid superstition . . . Its teachings are farther removed from the TAO of Lao Tzu than ritualism from the Christianity of Christ’. See also James Legge, The Texts of Taoism, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), 42–44. In those pages, Legge characterises Daoism of his day has having strayed from the doctrines of Laozi and into contemptible superstition. 386 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 4–5. See also Jeffrey Dippmann, ‘The Tao of Textbooks: Taoism in Introductory World Religion Texts’, Teaching Theology & Religion 4, no. 1 (2001): 40–54.
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4. Introductions to Daoism the popular view of ‘bifurcated Daoism’. He argues: ‘It involves a systematic misunderstanding and misrepresentation of classical Daoism (see Chapters 2 and 3) . . . Reference to so-called “philosophical Daoism” and/or “religious Daoism” should be taken ipso facto as inaccuracy and misunderstanding with respect to the Daoist tradition.’387
In contrast to the received, non-specialist view, Komjathy proposes a different view of classical Daoism. He argues that classical Daoism (Daoism before it become an organised religion, i.e., Daoism of the Warring States and Han eras), always included elements of religious experience. Komjathy writes:
classical Daoism . . . consisted of inner cultivation lineages that expressed religious commitments (see Roth 1999a; also LaFargue 1992). These lineages had distinctive cosmological and theological views (Dao), emphasized specific practices (apophatic meditation), and aimed at specific experiences (mystical union with the Dao)388
Thus, Komjathy introduces mystical experience as an integral element of classical Daoism, including the Zhuangzi. He calls this revisionist position the ‘lineal’ or ‘continuous tradition’ view of classical Daoism. Komjathy maintains: ‘there was an actual Daoist religious community during the Warring States period and Early Han dynasty. . . . [because] there is a great deal of evidence for the social reality of the proposed inner cultivation lineages.’389
The Zhuangzi is one source of evidence from which Komjathy draws to support this position. He argues that there is evidence of lineages of inner-cultivation practices throughout the Zhuangzi. He analyses a section from Chapter 23 of the Zhuangzi (a section which he calls ‘The Family of the Way’) in order to show that compilers of the Zhuangzi had a self- conscious awareness that they were part of a religious community.390 Komjathy argues that the Zhuangzi authors were participating in a religious community, part of whose lineage was to hand-copy and transmit their ideas and beliefs.
Part of the ‘Family of the Way’ example is where the Zhuangzi says that there were three kinds of ancients with understanding. The lowest level of understanding is: ‘the point where some of them believed that things have never existed . . . where nothing can be
387 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 5. 388 Ibid.; See also Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism; Michael LaFargue, The Tao of the Tao Te Ching: A Translation and Commentary (SUNY Press, 1992). 389 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 7. 390 Ibid., 7–8.
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4. Introductions to Daoism added.’391 The next level of understanding is: ‘Those at the next stage thought that things exist. They looked upon life as a loss, upon death as a return — thus they had already entered the state of dividedness.’392 The highest level of understanding is: ‘Those at the next state said, “In the beginning there was nonbeing. Later there was life, and when there was life suddenly there was death. We look upon nonbeing as the head, on life as the body, on death as the rump. Who knows that being and nonbeing, life and death are a single way? I will be his friend!”’393
Komjathy argues that this passage is evidence of different lineages of inner cultivation practices known to the authors of the Zhuangzi. He analyses details from the concluding paragraph of the ‘Family of the Way’ passage to support this conclusion. The authors of that passage of the Zhuangzi summarise: ‘These three groups, while differing in their viewpoint, belong to the same royal clan; though in the case of the Zhao and Jing families, whose names indicate their line of succession, and that of the Qu family, whose names derives from its fief, they are not identical.’394 Komjathy interprets these comments to mean that: ‘“Daoists” are located in specific families and lineages, some of which are identified by actual biological ancestry and others of which are identified by geographical location.’395 This seems a reasonable conclusion given that the three states of understanding concerning life and death attributed to the three families are consistent with views expressed in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi.396
Komjathy continues with more references to the Zhuangzi. He argues: ‘Chapter 15 distinguishes “Daoist” practice from five lower-level forms of self-cultivation (see chapter 10 herein). In contrast to these, “Daoist” practitioners (shi [士]) are committed to apophatic meditation with the goal of mystical union with the Dao (see chapter 11 herein).’397 Hence, Komjathy associates the Zhuangzi with a religiosity that includes the mystical experience of union with Dao. What, then, is the mystical experience of union with Dao?
391 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 257; quoted in Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 7. 392 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 257; Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 7–8 quoted in. 393 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 257; quoted in Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 8. 394 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 257; quoted in Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 8. 395 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 8. 396 See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 59–60, 65, 72–75, 78–79, 86, 87–89, 96–99. 397 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 8.
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Komjathy gives a succinct explanation of what he means by mystical experience in a section ‘Revelation and mystical experience’ in chapter 3, ‘Ways to Affiliation’. He explains that mystical experience (along with revelation) has historically been one path to affiliation with sects of religious Daoism. Komjathy writes:
Mystical experience refers to an experience of that which a given individual or community identifies as sacred. There is no single, essential, and ‘ultimate’ form of mystical experience; there are, rather, many types of mystical experiences, which differ according to the community and tradition involved and which assume different soteriologies and theologies.398
Thereupon, Komjathy quotes several examples of accounts of the foundations of sects of organised Daoism. Only one of these accounts is of mystical experience: the account of
Wang Zhe (王喆), the nominal founder of Quanzhen (全真) Daoism.399 Komjathy writes: ‘In
1161, at the age of forty-eight, Wang had a mystical encounter with one or more Daoist immortals . . . The Quanzhen tradition claims that one of these immortals transmitted a “secret formula in five sections” (miyu wupian) (see Komjathy 2007a).’400
In this story of the beginnings of Quanzhen Daoism, we can see what Komjathy means by mystical experiences being experiences of what individuals or communities identify as sacred. According to Quanzhen tradition, Wang Zhe had encounters with Daoist immortals who transmitted secret knowledge only to him. This entails another level of meaning to mysticism which Komjathy has not explicitly pointed out: secret, mysterious knowledge, only attainable by those who have the experience.
We can see another nuance of mysticism from Komjathy’s account of Wang Zhe’s mystical experience. The experience of the sacred in that case was not one of unity with an ultimate dao. There is no mention of dao or of oneness in that passage. It qualifies as mystical according to Komjathy’s definition because it is an experience of the sacred. Another reason is that the experience involved secret knowledge not otherwise attainable. This is reminiscent
398 Ibid., 54. 399 See also Stephen Eskildsen, The Teachings and Practices of the Early Quanzhen Taoist Masters (SUNY Press, 2004); Louis Komjathy, Cultivating Perfection: Mysticism and Self-Transformation in Early Quanzhen Daoism (BRILL, 2007). 400 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 57. See also Komjathy, Cultivating Perfection.
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4. Introductions to Daoism of the ‘noetic quality’ criterion of mysticism expounded by William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience.401
Although Komjathy associates the Zhuangzi with mysticism, his main explanation of mysticism in organised Daoism does not contain any reference to the Zhuangzi. Admittedly, this is because the Zhuangzi is not a work of organised Daoism. In order to get more understanding of what Komjathy identifies as mysticism in the Zhuangzi, we must examine chapter 11, ‘Meditation’.
Komjathy refers to content from the Zhuangzi as part of his explanation of Daoist apophatic meditation and concomitant mystical experiences associated with it. Firstly, he explains that classical Daoist texts use several technical terms to refer to apophatic meditation. Two of these terms are from the Zhuangzi: ‘“fasting the mind-heart” (xinzhai); and “sitting-in-forgetfulness” (zuowang)’.402 Komjathy explains how these passages from the Zhuangzi are examples of apophatic meditation. Komjathy summaries apophatic meditation thus: ‘[apophatic meditation] emphasizes emptiness and stillness; it is contentless [sic], non- conceptual, and non-dualistic. One simply empties the heart-mind of all emotional and intellectual content.’403
Thereupon, Komjathy quotes examples of classical Daoist texts, the Laozi, the Nei Ye, and the Zhuangzi to demonstrate examples of Daoist apophatic meditation. Komjathy concludes his exposition on descriptions of classical Daoist apophatic meditation practices with examples from the Zhuangzi (the ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ passages). He concludes: ‘With respect to actual method, adepts sought to empty the heart-mind of emotional and intellectual activity; they endeavoured to enter a state of stillness, wherein perceptual and cognitive activity decreased.’404
The next step in Komjathy’s exposition of Daoist meditation practices evident in the Zhuangzi is to relate them to theories of mysticism. He writes: ‘This was a hyperaroused [sic] and hyperquiescent [sic] state (see Fischer 1980; Forman 1990), that is, a condition characterized by deep relaxation and decreased physiological activity.’405 Next, Komjathy
401 See William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (London: Folio Society, 2008), 322. 402 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 206. 403 Ibid. 404 Ibid., 209. 405 Ibid.; See also Fischer, ‘A Cartography of the Ecstatic and Meditative States’; Robert K. C. Forman, ed., The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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4. Introductions to Daoism presents some stronger assertions about the mystical nature of the Daoist meditation evident in the Zhuangzi and other classical Daoist texts. He writes: ‘According to the texts of classical Daoism, apophatic meditation eventually leads to the dissolution of self, to the end of subject- object dichotomies and separate identity. Through dedicated and prolonged practice, one may attain a state of mystical union with the Dao and become the embodiment of the Dao in the world.’406 Thus, Komjathy asserts that the Zhuangzi relates meditation practices which lead to mystical union with Dao.
There is a difficulty with Komjathy’s usage of the terms ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experience’. He uses these terms to mean ‘an experience of the sacred’. However, this definition is very wide. According to this usage, at least one other kind of religious experience could be labelled ‘mystical experience’, even though it is generally not believed to be by practitioners of that religion. I refer to the experience of attending mass in Catholicism. When Catholics consume bread symbolising the body of Christ and drink wine symbolising the blood of Christ, it is an experience of the sacred. According to a straight-forward interpretation of Komjathy’s use of ‘mystical experience’ in The Daoist Tradition, attending mass qualifies as mystical experience. By extension, all practicing Catholics qualify as ‘mystics’. Nevertheless, attending mass is not believed to be ‘mystical experience’ by practicing Catholics or scholars.
With a more generous interpretation of Komjathy’s use of ‘mystical experience’ in The Daoist Tradition we can reconcile this difficulty. From the context of what Komjathy relates of Wang Zhe’s (the nominal founder of Quan Zhen Daoism) mystical experience, we can see that a nuance in his meaning of mystical experiences being ‘experiences of the sacred’. The nominal founder of Quan Zhen Daoism had a purportedly direct and unmediated encounter with Daoist immortals. Whereas, attending mass is an indirect and mediated encounter of the sacred in Catholicism. Herein lies the difference: mystical experiences are purportedly direct and unmediated encounters with the sacred.
There are several difficulties with Komjathy’s conclusions about what the Zhuangzi relates concerning mysticism. Firstly, it appears as though Komjathy’s account says that the Zhuangzi tells the reader that the meditation practices it records are mysticism. There is, however, no such word as ‘mysticism’ in classical Chinese language. Thus, the Zhuangzi cannot explicitly tell the reader that it is presenting mysticism, or that its meditation practices lead to mystical union with Dao. Secondly, Komjathy’s account says that the Zhuangzi tells
406 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 209.
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4. Introductions to Daoism readers that its meditation practices lead to ‘union with the Dao’ and that practitioners ‘become the embodiment of the Dao in the world’. However, the text of the Zhuangzi does not make any such claims directly. In fact, the word ‘dao’ (道) does not occur in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage of the Zhuangzi. Komjathy’s conclusion that this passage is talking about uniting with dao is not supported by textual analysis or argument.
This is not to say that Komjathy’s interpretations of ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are wrong. Scholars specialising in Daoism generally accept that the ‘mind- fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ passages from the Zhuangzi relate apophatic meditation practices. The problem I see is a methodological one. The interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ talks about dao is not supported by textual analysis or argument. Yet, scholars have accepted and transmitted the view that the dialogue informs the reader about uniting with dao many times over.
Nevertheless, that dialogue does not self-evidently talk about dao. The text of the Zhuangzi does not directly say that it is advocating mystical union with the dao or becoming the embodiment of dao in the world. In my view, this is an interpretation of the meaning, or significance, of the text which scholars have readily accepted and transmitted. I do not think that this view is necessarily wrong, but scholars could support such a view with more detailed analysis and argumentation.
4.7. An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies
Steve Coutinho’s An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies introduces the Zhuangzi as a primarily work of philosophy (not religion). In summarising what he calls ‘Zhuangzian philosophy’, Coutinho contrasts his own interpretation against older interpretations of religious mysticism in the Zhuangzi. He accurately identifies attributions of mysticism in the Zhuangzi thus: ‘From a religious point of view, the text has been treated as espousing a mystical doctrine of an absolute, metaphysical Dao that lies beyond the reach of language.’407 However, Coutinho does not characterise the Zhuangzi as presenting a doctrine of mysticism as its core. He characterises the overall philosophy of the Zhuangzi thus: ‘[a] worldview and way of life as a nature-oriented form of pragmatism involving mind-body discipline and
407 Steve Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 83.
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4. Introductions to Daoism cultivation of tranquillity; it is existential in spirit and comparable, but not identifiable, with the way of life recommended by the ancient Stoics.’408
Coutinho considers the relevance of mystical practices to philosophical thought in the Zhuangzi. For my purposes in this dissertation, it is interesting to see Coutinho’s discussion of features of ‘mind-body discipline’ and ‘cultivation of tranquillity’ in Zhuangzian philosophy. Coutinho discusses some of these features in chapter 5, which is entitled ‘The Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters of the Zhuangzi: From Anarchist Utopianism to Mystical Imperialism’.409 He argues that the Outer and Miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi develop two distinctive strands of thought, in addition to expanding of the thought of the Inner Chapters. They are: 1) ‘a quasi-anarchistic type of utopianism’; and 2) ‘a composite theory of rulership based on a form of mystical cultivation.’410
An explanation of this composite theory based on mystical cultivation follows in the last section of the chapter, entitled ‘Han Syncretism: Mystical Rulership’.411 Therein, Coutinho shows how parts of Han Dynasty syncretist chapters develop ideas from the Inner Chapters. These ideas and techniques are what Coutinho presents as mystical. They are ideas and techniques such as those from chapter 28 of the Miscellaneous Chapters (Rang Wang 讓 王). Coutinho focusses on a passage which advocates ‘the genuineness of dao lies in regulating one’s person . . . [and] the means by which to keep the person whole and nurture life. (312-[3]13)’.412 Coutinho argues that this Miscellaneous Chapter passage expands on ideas and techniques expressed in chapter 7 of the Inner Chapters (‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’). These ideas and techniques include: ‘“Let your mind wander in the natural, blend your energy with the vacant, follow along with things as they are of themselves, and do not accommodate impartiality toward oneself—then the empire will be governed” (94).’413 Coutinho identifies these features of the text as evidence of mystical rulership. He writes:
This is a kind of mystical rulership, also hinted at in the Laozi, rooted in Daoist cultivation, but now combined with a concern for the details of rule. Thus the practice of cultivation of life tendencies is now combined
408 Ibid. 409 Ibid., 126, 139 et passim. 410 Ibid., 127. 411 Ibid., 139–42. 412 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 312–13 quoted in ; Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 139. 413 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 94; Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 139.
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with a distinctive interpretation of ‘wuwei’ and promoted as a quasi- anarchistic method of ruling a vast empire.414
What is the ‘Daoist cultivation’ to which Coutinho refers? In the quotation above, he summaries the general methods of ‘cultivation of life tendencies’ and ‘wuwei’. Coutinho gives examples of how these methods of mystical rulership are presented in the Zhuangzi. I discuss them below.
Coutinho gives more examples of mystical practices, techniques, and ideas developed in the Zhuangzi. He writes that they are evident where the text relates: ‘the way of the sage [being] rooted in stillness, emptiness, and wuwei.’415 Thereupon, Coutinho quotes two passages from chapter 13 from the Outer Chapters, “The Way of Heaven” (Tian Dao 天道). Coutinho argues that these passages relate some of Zhuangzi’s mystical practices and aspects of mystical rulership. The first passage says: ‘Emptiness, stillness, limpidity, vacancy, silence, wuwei—these are the level of the cosmos, the pinnacle of the dao and its potency. Therefore the emperor, the king, the sage rest in them.’416 The second passage says:
The potency of emperors and kings takes the cosmos as the ancestral, the way and its potency as principal (zhu 主), and wuwei as constant. . . . The heavens do not actively give birth, yet the many things are transformed; . . . The emperor and the king do not actively administer, yet the world is benefited. (144-[1]45)417
Coutinho identifies the above two passages as ‘mystical’ but does not explicitly relate them to any theory of mysticism. Through private correspondence with Coutinho, I have learned that he uses the term ‘mystical’ to describe certain ‘spiritual’ and ‘meditative’ practices that rulers were expected to undertake. Moreover, he is not sure if there is a word in English other than the adjective ‘mystical’ that can capture the full significance of such strange forms of practice.
For the Zhuangzi, these ideas and practices relate to ‘the level of the cosmos’ and ‘the pinnacle of the dao’. In the passages quoted above, Coutinho has shown how the Zhuangzi
414 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 140. 415 Ibid., 141. 416 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 142 cited in; Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 141. 417 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 144–45 quoted in; Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 141–42.
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4. Introductions to Daoism advocates cultivating experiences like ‘emptiness’. The passages of the Zhuangzi which Coutinho quotes do not tell us how the ruler cultivates ‘emptiness’ and ‘wuwei’ in order to reach ‘the level of the cosmos, the pinnacle of the dao and its potency’. Nevertheless, we can see they advocate that the ruler actually attain such states and experiences in order to rule in the capacity of what the authors consider a ‘sage’. It appears that it is for these reasons that Coutinho interprets these parts of the Zhuangzi as relating mysterious, esoteric practices, which he goes so far as to call ‘mystical’.
4.8. Conclusions
Different introductions to Daoism present different ideas of what Daoism is. All of them claim to be authoritative and representative of the real Daoism. Some emphasise the religious aspect of the Daoist tradition; some emphasise the philosophical aspects. All of those critiqued here mention mysticism, especially in relation to the Zhuangzi.
Yet, what do they say about mysticism in the Zhuangzi? Is it an idea of unity with a metaphysical ‘Ultimate’ that the text self-evidently communicates is part of its core thesis? Kohn’s accounts seem to suggest this. On the other hand, Komjathy’s account suggests that inner-cultivation practices such as apophatic meditation (‘sitting and forgetting’) that lead to an experience of the sacred are what is mystical in the Zhuangzi. Komjathy’s account holds that mysticism is only one element of the Daoist tradition. Mysticism forms only one part of his introductions to the Zhuangzi and the larger Daoist tradition. Consequently, Komjathy does not present mysticism as the core thesis of the Zhuangzi.
Coutinho treats the Zhuangzi primarily as a work of philosophy and not religion. This makes his introduction to the Zhuangzi distinct from those of Kohn and Komjathy. Nevertheless, Coutinho maintains that mysticism forms part of one strain of philosophy presented in the Zhuangzi. He focusses on explaining how this interpretation of mysticism is evident in the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters of the Zhuangzi. This is a different part of the text to present as the mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Most scholars who have held the Zhuangzi to contain a doctrine of mysticism have hitherto focussed on content from the Inner Chapters. They present their interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi as though Zhuang Zhou, the author of the Inner Chapters was a mystic who wrote the majority of the Inner Chapters in order to communicate his mystical ideas to readers. Coutinho’s interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is, therefore, quite different from most other scholars’ interpretations.
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Perhaps we might find a more focussed account of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in contributions that situation the Zhuangzi in the context of Chinese mysticism more generally. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism 5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism
There are a number of works which situate the Zhuangzi in the context of Chinese mysticism. However, these works often only mention the Zhuangzi in passing because the text is not the main focus of their research. Their main purpose is to explain the development of Chinese religion or Chinese mysticism in general. Mysticism in the Zhuangzi only forms one part of those inquiries. Consequentially, this body of literature does not often present strong arguments to convince readers that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. Thus, in this chapter, I examine how these enquiries present the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism. I argue that this body of literature does not present convincing enough arguments to accept that mysticism is the core doctrine of the Zhuangzi.
5.1. ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’ in Mysticism and Religious Traditions
Julia Ching engages with elements of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in several contributions.418 These contributions present Ching’s findings from broader research into Chinese religion and mysticism in general. However, these contributions do not present strong arguments to convince the reader that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. Instead, Ching refers to parts of the Zhuangzi having already accepted an interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism, and that the parts of the Zhuangzi which she cites are examples of mystical experience.
Ching’s account of mysticism is most explicit and concise in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’. In this article, Ching explains the meaning of mysticism through the etymology of the word followed by a summary of its usage. Ching writes: ‘As I understand it, etymologically the word referred to the mysterious and esoteric, with special reference to ritual mastery.’419 It is, however, not clear whence this etymology is derived. Ching is presenting her understanding of the origins and development of the meaning of the terms ‘mystic’ and ‘mysticism’ without informing the reader what those origins are. Nevertheless, her summary is accurate, but a reader can only be sure of this if he/she has already read
418 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’; Julia Ching, Chinese Religions (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993); Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom. 419 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confuican and Taoist Mysticism,’ 266–267. See also Louis Bouyer, ‘Mysticism/An Essay on the History of the Word,’ in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 1–2; Jerome Gellman, Mysticism, 2011; David Baumgardt, Great Western Mystics: their Lasting Significance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism literature which discusses the etymology of mysticism. Otherwise, one must accept Ching’s summary at face value.
Notwithstanding this minor oversight, Ching gives a concise summary of how the term ‘mystic’ came to be used in Christian and Western discourse. Ching relates the changes in connotations in terms like ‘mystic’ since they entered into Christian usage in the 5th century CE, following Pseudo-Dionysius’ treatise, The Mystical Theology.420 She writes: ‘in that usage [the term] has come to signify a special communion with God in unusual experiences involving the entire psyche, the whole person.’421 These changes are in theological and doctrinal connotations. Prior to Pseudo-Dionysius’s treatise, ‘mysticism’ was associated with the Hellenistic mystery cults. What happened in those cults was secret. Hence, Ching’s explanation that mysticism refers to mysterious and esoteric forms of ritual mastery. How then, does the Zhuangzi, and Daoism in general, exhibit features of mysterious and esoteric forms of ritual mastery, according to Ching?
Ching outlines general features of mysticism of ‘Classical Taoism’ (which includes the Zhuangzi) in the next section of the article. She writes: ‘They [the classical Daoists] aimed at losing their own selves, at transcending their ordinary sense experience and discursive reasoning. . . . Classical Taoism is mystical in its inspiration . . . centred upon man’s union with the Tao through contemplation of nature.’422 Ching’s characterisation of Daoist mysticism in the quotation above contains elements of mysticism in the Zhuangzi that I have pointed out in other scholars’ works in previous chapters. Here, Ching is mentioning these elements of mysticism in Daoism generally, yet they are in agreement with features of mysticism other scholars have seen in the Zhuangzi. However, no other scholars have hitherto identified mysticism in the Zhuangzi, or Daoism, with the symbolism of mirrors. Ching’s article and insights into mysticism in the Zhuangzi are highly original in this respect.
Nevertheless, the sections of the Zhuangzi containing mirror symbol metaphors that Ching cites do not show evidence of the main feature of mysticism Ching gives in the quotation above, i.e., being ‘centered upon man’s union with the Tao through contemplation of nature’. Instead, the mirror symbol passages show evidence of other elements of
420 In fact, Ching does not refer to the text by name. She makes only an elliptical reference to the text as ‘a treatise on theology written by Pseudo-Dionysius’. See Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 227; A public domain online English translation of The Mystical Theology can be found in the following link ‘Dionysius the Areopagite, Works (1897) p.130-137. The Mystical Theology’, accessed 13 March 2016, http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/areopagite_06_mystic_theology.htm. 421 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 226–27. 422 Ibid., 230.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism mysticism, such as ‘emptiness’, ‘stillness’, passivity, and ‘pure spirit’ which a person can gain through contemplation, i.e., ‘using his mind like a mirror’.423 For example, Ching quotes the ‘mind like a mirror’ passage from chapter 7 (‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ Ying Di Wang 應帝王). It says: ‘Be empty, that is all. The perfect man uses his mind like a mirror — going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing.’424 This does not say ‘union with Dao’. It appears to be mystical because it is an example of mysterious, unusual practices.
The next section of the Zhuangzi that Ching presents as mystical is the ‘sage’s mind in stillness’ passage from chapter 13 (Tian Dao 天道). It says: ‘Water that is still gives back a clear image . . . And if water . . . possesses such clarity, how much more must pure spirit. The sage’s mind in stillness is the mirror of Heaven and Earth, the glass of the ten thousand things.’425 This passage does not say ‘union with Dao’, either. It appears to be mystical, according to Ching, because it talks about ‘pure spirit’ (jing shen 精神) in relation to stillness of the mind. This passage might relate to Ching’s interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi communicating ideas of transcending sense experience and discursive reasoning, but it does not appear to be a clear indication of centring on union with dao through contemplation of nature.
There are some methodological issues which do not enhance the convincingness of Ching’s presentation of content from the Zhuangzi. Ching introduces quotations from the Zhuangzi as if they are all by the same author (Zhuang Zhou, the author of the Inner Chapters). She writes: ‘The Taoist Chuang-tzu . . . has usually been considered a mystic. In his writings, he has used both symbols — that of the mirror and that of clear water — to represent the mind of the sage.’426 Thereupon, Ching quotes the ‘mind like a mirror’ passage from chapter 7, followed by the ‘sage’s mind in stillness’ passage from chapter 13 (Tian Dao 天道).427 Then, she quotes a sentence from chapter 25 (Ze Yang 則陽), followed by two sentences from chapter 5 (The Tally of Complete Virtue De Chong Fu 德充符).428
423 Ibid., 237–38. 424 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 97; cited in Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 238. 425 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 142; cited in Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 238. 426 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 237. 427 Ibid., 238. Ching quotes from Watson’s translation. See Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 97, 142. 428 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 238. See also Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 290, 70.
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Ching quotes passages from the Zhuangzi as though they are meant to be read linearly as part of a system of mysticism that was written down by Zhuang Zhou. This is, however, not possible because scholars have demonstrated that Zhuang Zhou did not write the content of chapters 13 or 25.429 Nor, is there any indication in the Zhuangzi that those particular passages ought to be singled out and read together in a linear order, as if they were part of a mystical quest that the authors indicate to their readers. The Zhuangzi does not contain that kind of ‘meta-level’ editing, or overall writing structure.
Furthermore, Ching quotes the last two sentences about using one’s mind like a mirror out of context. Ching presents them as though they are from prose sections wherein the author is telling the reader about experiences of the sage whom we are to take as a mystic. The two sentences quoted from chapter 5 are from a dialogue. They are not Zhuangzi’s prose addressed directly to the reader, as Ching presents them. They read: ‘If a mirror is bright, no dust settles on it; if dust settles, it isn’t really bright.’430 These sentences, quoted in this context, do not appear to be meaningful by themselves. In ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’, Ching quotes them close to the ‘mind like a mirror’ passage in order to show a relationship between the two passages. She explains the relationship thus: ‘the mind itself must be kept free of dust’.431
However, the ‘keeping your mind free of dust like a mirror’ in chapter 5 seems to be different from the ‘using your mind like a mirror’ from chapter 7. This is because there is more context to the passage from chapter 5 than Ching communicates in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’. The line ‘if a mirror is bright, no dust settles on it’ is uttered by the character Shen
Tujia (申徒嘉) who is rebuking Zheng Zichan (鄭子產) for treating him badly, as though he were not a good person. From the context of the whole dialogue, Zhuangzi conveys to his readers that reformed criminals like Shen Tujia can be good people. The text reads:
429 See Angus Charles Graham, ‘How Much of the Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?’, in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 283–321; Roth, ‘Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?’; Xiaogan, Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters; Xiaogan Liu, ‘Zhuangzi’s Philosophy: A Three Dimensional Reconstruction’, in Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy (London: Springer, 2015), 193–220. 430 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 70; cited in Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 238. 431 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 238.
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5.1.1. ‘If a Mirror is Bright, no Dust Settles on It’
Watson’s Translation Source Text
Shen-t’u Chia said, ‘People 申徒嘉曰：「自狀其過以不當亡者眾，不狀 who excuse their faults and claim they didn’t deserve to 其過以不當存者寡。知不可奈何而安之若 be punished — there are lots of them. But those who don’t 命，惟有德者能之。. . . 人以 其全足笑吾不 excuse their faults and who admit they didn’t deserve to be spared — they are few. To 全足者多矣。我怫然而怒，而適先生之所， know what you can’t do anything about, and to be 則廢然而反。不知先生之洗我以善邪！吾與 content with it as you would with fate — only a man of 夫子遊十九年矣，而未嘗知吾兀者也。433 virtue can do that. . . . There are lots of men with two feet who laugh at me for having only one. It makes me boil with rage, but I come here to the Master’s place and I feel calmed down again and go home. I don’t know whether he washes me clean with goodness, or whether I come to understand things by myself. The Master and I have been friends for nineteen years and he’s never once let on that he’s aware I’m missing a foot.432
432 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 70–71. 433 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 13/5/19-23.
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The point of the dialogue is about ‘virtue’ or ‘potency’ (de 德) and how even an ex- criminal might have it. It is not really an expression of ‘using your mind like a mirror’ to attain mystical experiences like union with dao. Ching’s interpretation of the passage is therefore unconvincing. The passage does not strongly support her interpretation of a message of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
These passages do not talk about merging with an ultimate dao or losing one’s self in nature. However, these features are what Ching defines as the most important elements of Daoist mysticism earlier in the article. Therefore, these examples of mirror and water metaphors for sagely states of mind in the Zhuangzi cannot be examples of mysticism for those reasons. Yet, Ching’s inclusion of those passages in her article suggests that they are evidence of a clear doctrine of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Furthermore, some of Ching’s conclusions concerning mirror metaphors contradict her summary of features of Daoist mysticism from the introduction of the article. For example, Ching concludes: ‘Looking into the mirror stands for looking into one’s own depths, finding one’s real self. . . . In the case of the Taoist, the “real self” is the universe.’434 This statement is contrary to how Ching characterises Daoist mysticism earlier in the article. At that point, she writes that Daoist mysticism means: ‘losing their own selves . . . [and is] centred upon man’s union with the Tao through contemplation of nature.’435 It is, therefore, not clear if Ching holds Daoists to be mystics because they lose their selves or find their real selves.
Even though Ching claims that Daoist mysticism centres on union with dao through contemplation of nature, this feature does not appear as frequently as some other elements of mysticism which are evident in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’. Thus, we find that mysticism is nuanced and some aspects may feature more prominently than others. ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’ shows that although claiming union with a metaphysical ‘Ultimate’ may be a profound aspect of mystical experience, it is not always essential. It is not present in the passages from the Zhuangzi containing mirror symbol imagery which Ching quotes in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’. These passages appear to be mystical because they are evidence of mysterious and esoteric practices that are significant according to philosophical and religious
434 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 242. 435 Ibid., 230.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism concerns. They may be important features along a quest to experience an ‘Ultimate’ like union with dao, but they are not ‘union with dao’ by themselves.
Ching also quotes the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue as an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. However, her explanation of this mystical section of the Zhuangzi could be more thorough. Firstly, it is a terse interpolation into a section of the chapter that deals with Confucian mysticism. It is relevant because it follows Ching’s quotation of Analects 17.19, wherein Confucius is recorded to have propounded ideas more sympathetic to the Zhuangzi’s thought than to that of the Ru (儒). Ching quotes: ‘[Confucius said:] “I would prefer to be wordless.” Tzu-kung, (his disciple) said, “If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we . . . have to record?” The Master said: “Does Heaven speak? The fours seasons pursue their courses and all things are continually being produced.”’436
Ching concludes that this passage from The Analects is similar to the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. She writes: ‘It [this passage] recalls to mind that Confucius . . . [in] Chuang-tzu, and who is clearly a Taoist mouthpiece, offering a mystical teaching.’437 This mystical teaching is the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. Ching quotes the dialogue in order to contrast Confucianism and Daoism. Ching summarises that Confucianism emphasises ‘the ethical meaning of human relationships’, whereas Daoism focuses on ‘turning away from society to the contemplation of nature, seeking fulfilment in the spontaneous and “trans-ethical”.’438 However, there is no analysis of mysticism in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. Ching appears to quote the passage on the understanding that the reader will also recognise the passage as mysticism.
There are several reasons why Ching’s interpretation of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage are not strong arguments. Firstly, Ching quotes ‘sitting and forgetting’ as an example of an ultimate, metaphysical Dao that teaches people how to attain union with itself, even though that is how she characterises the core of the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. Ching writes: ‘the Tao, a metaphysical Absolute in Lao-tzu, represents a philosophical transformation of the earlier personal God of ancient Chinese religion. Certainly, the way it teaches leads to union with itself — a way of passive acceptance and mystic contemplation. Such was the teaching of the great Taoist thinkers, of Lao-tzu and even of Chuang-tzu.’439 However, the term dao (道) does not occur in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. Ching has not analysed the
436 Analects 17.19 in ibid., 231. Ching does not indicate whose translation she is using. 437 Ibid., 232. 438 Ibid. 439 Ibid.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism passage in order to explain how we can accept the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ involves a metaphysical, ultimate dao which is the same as a purportedly metaphysical dao in the Laozi. This is another example of accepting interpretations of what Daoist texts mean without accounting for what the texts say in their own terms.
Moreover, it is absurd to say that the Dao actively teaches anyone anything, let alone how to attain union with itself. Ching wants us to accept that the Dao is a non- anthropomorphic metaphysical entity. Such a dao would, therefore, be without a will or personality with which it can actively do anything, much less teach people to attain union with itself. These aspects of Ching’s interpretation of dao are not internally consistent, nor do they match with canonical descriptions of dao. For example, the Laozi relates that dao manifests non-action (wuwei 無為). This is most explicit in the famous passage: ‘The way never acts yet nothing is left undone [道常無為而無不為].’440
Secondly, Ching’s explanation of dao in ‘sitting and forgetting’ contains an example of circular reasoning. Ching quotes ‘sitting and forgetting’ as an example of Zhuangzi’s overall mystical teaching. However, the conclusion that it is mystical is ingrained in the reasoning used to support the same conclusion. The idea that the ultimate dao of Zhuangzi is a mystical teaching is supported by the idea that it is ‘a way of passive acceptance and mystical contemplation.’441 In other words, Ching explains that the Zhuangzi is a mystic teaching because it is mystical. These are not convincing arguments to accept that mysticism is a core teaching of the Zhuangzi.
5.2. Mysticism and Kingship in China
Ching writes of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in Mysticism and Kingship in China. The main focus of the book, however, argues that ‘the heart of Chinese wisdom’ contains religion, philosophy and textual tradition all at once.442 Mysticism is but one part of this kind of wisdom. Thus, it is only in chapter six that Ching addresses the topic of mysticism. She writes that ‘nature mysticism’ is the kind that kings, shamans and ‘private mystics’ (which includes Zhuangzi) in China have most usually practiced. She defines it as: ‘a transformed consciousness [brought on through trance] in which the person experiences a sense of inner
440 Laozi 37. See D.C. Lau, trans., Tao Te Ching. Translated by D C Lau (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 96. 441 Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 232. 442 Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, xvii.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism peace and stillness, sometimes even a sense of oneness of interconnectedness to the universe or all things.’443
However, Ching does not show how such nature mysticism is evident in the Zhuangzi. Instead, she summarises the Zhuangzi’s philosophy thus:
an ardent plea for spiritual freedom . . . a self-transcending liberation from the limitations of one’s own mind . . . such freedom can only be discovered in nature itself, in the Tao. This involves a higher level of knowledge, the knowledge of wisdom . . . such mystical knowledge comes only with ‘forgetting’ the knowledge of all things and of the self.444
Yet, Ching does not demonstrate what specifically in the Zhuangzi has this effect. There is no analysis of the Zhuangzi in order to show that certain parts of the text communicate this kind of wisdom. Ching only mentions mysticism in the Zhuangzi in order to argue that there is interchangeability between mystical techniques as practiced by shamans and kings, and ‘private mystics’ represented in the Zhuangzi. She remarks: ‘it does not appear that every person who concentrates his or her own spirit, and guards his own breath be a shaman.’445 Ching then cites the examples of the ‘crookback’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogues from chapter six of the Zhuangzi and concludes that Zhuangzi’s Yanhui (顏回): ‘is a private mystic pursing apophatic meditation.’446
However, Ching does not include the locution concerning ‘unifying with the Great Thoroughfare’ (tong yu datong 同於大通) in her quotation of Yanhui, the private mystic, in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. This is peculiar because Ching’s main criterion for labelling experiences mystical has hitherto been that the experiences relate a claim of union
443 Ibid., 173. 444 Ibid., 177. 445 Ibid., 180. See also, the section ‘The Ascension of Huangdi: Divine Kingship’ in Michael J. Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 242–45. Therein, Puett analyses evidence which shows that kings were also interested in concentrating spirits in their own person with the help of fangshi 方士 in order to gain divine power. 446 Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, 180. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/36-17/6/45, 17/6/89-17/6/93. On apophatic meditation, see Peter Moore, ‘Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 113; Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, 175; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 62, 88–89 note 14; Gellman, Mysticism.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism with an ‘Ultimate’.447 The interpretation that unifying with the Great Thoroughfare is one of Zhuangzi’s references for an ‘Ultimate’ is a common aspect of interpreting the Zhuangzi to have a mystical message. By not including this part of the text in her analysis, Ching presents a weak interpretation of mysticism in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue.
Hence, in Mysticism and Kingship in Ancient China, Ching reiterates the interpretation that mysticism is part of ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. However, she does give an argument to support that interpretation. Moreover, the features of mysticism which she gives concerning mysticism in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue are different from those she gives in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’. Thus, the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi that Ching presents in Mysticism and Kingship in Ancient China is less detailed and less convincing than in ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited’.
5.3. Early Chinese Mysticism
Early Chinese Mysticism represents the earliest attempt to explain ‘the development of the indigenous Chinese mystical tradition.’448 From the beginning of the book, Livia Kohn makes it clear that this includes the Zhuangzi. She writes that texts like the Laozi and the Zhuangzi form part of: ‘[t]hree major mystical forms and traditions’ and that ‘the entire history of early Chinese mysticism is deeply rooted in the Lao-Zhuang tradition.’449 Hence, explaining the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi are relevant to the main theme of Early Chinese Mysticism.
Kohn presents a framework for understanding mysticism in chapter one of Early Chinese Mysticism. She adopts a ‘contextualist/constructivist’ position by holding that mysticism and mystical experiences are derived from: ‘peak-experiences [that] only become mystical when they are shaped by a person’s prior beliefs and consciously related to a given religious worldview.’450 Kohn thereby borrows Abraham Maslow’s term ‘peak experience’ and explains it thus: ‘[it] offers . . . a psychological root of the mystical experience—claiming neither that all such experiences are the same nor that all peak-experiences are mystical (See Maslow 1964, 1970)’.451 We can see from Kohn’s writing that she and Maslow regard ‘peak-
447 Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, xi, xvi, 174-175, et passim. 448 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 3. 449 Ibid. 450 Ibid., 21. 451 Ibid.; See also Abraham H. Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), xi–xii, 59-68, et passim; Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968). (Kohn cites from later editions).
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism experiences’ to be unusual psychological states, or events, that the subject finds worthwhile and positive.452 Moreover, we can see that Kohn treats mysticism as primarily lived experience and not philosophical reflection on metaphysical issues of uniting with an ‘Ultimate’. This approach differs from earlier scholarship which presents the Zhuangzi as mysticism.
Kohn’s approach to mysticism theory in Early Chinese Mysticism is syncretic. As outlined above, part of her account is in accordance with ‘contextualist/constructivist’ theories which hold that people ‘construct’ mystical experiences out of pre-existing theological and philosophical commitments. On the other hand, other parts of Kohn’s account are more in accordance with perennial philosophy theories which hold that mystical experiences, and metaphysical mystical realities, exist objectively and independently of theological and philosophical systems. The latter commitment seems to be at odds with the former because ‘contextualist/constructivist’ theories of mysticism categorically reject perennial philosophy positions.453
Hence, Kohn’s account of mysticism theory results in an amalgam of ideas concerning that do not complement one another. It is problematic for Kohn to draw from the ‘contextualist/constructivist’ theories of Steven Katz and Wayne Proudfoot as well as the ‘anti-constructivist’ and ‘perrenialist’ theories of Sally King and Huston Smith.454 Katz and Proudfoot’s theories hold that all experience is mediated by language and cognitive content. King and Smith’s positions hold that mystical experiences share identical features of non- linguistic and non-conceptual content.455 The articles in which King and Smith express these views entail rejecting Katz’s theory of mysticism. Thus, these scholars’ views on mysticism
452 Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences, 59–68; See also Joseph Havens, ‘[Review of] Mysticism and the Modern Mind’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 1, no. 2 (1962): 234–35. Therein, Havens suggests that Maslow’s idea of ‘peak experiences’ would complement the anthology of articles on mysticism he is reviewing; See also Alfred P. Stiernotte, Mysticism and the Modern Mind (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959). 453 See Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, 57 et passim. 454 See Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 20 et passim; . See also Katz, ‘Langauge, Epistemology, and Mysticism’; Proudfoot, Religious Experience; Sallie B. King, ‘Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56, no. 2 (1988): 257–79; Huston Smith, ‘Is There a Perennial Philosophy?’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, no. 3 (1987): 553–66; see also: Steven T. Katz, ‘On Mysticism’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion LVI, no. 4 (1988): 751–57; Sallie B. King, ‘On Mysticism’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion LVI, no. 4 (1988): 759– 61; Huston Smith, ‘On Mysticism’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion LVI, no. 4 (1988): 757–59. 455 See King, ‘Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism’, 272–73; Smith, ‘Is There a Perennial Philosophy?’, 260 et passim.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism are not compatible. Yet, Kohn draws from all of them as though they are part of an unfolding narrative for understanding mysticism.
Kohn relates these incompatible theories to her own idea of a ‘transcendent principle’ that exists and is evident in all forms of religion and mysticism.456 However, there is no evidence that the authors of ancient Daoism believed in, or talked about, a transcendent dao which exists in all forms of religion.457 Nor does Kohn provide an argument to convince her readers that we should interpret ancient Daoist texts, such as the Zhuangzi, to espouse such a view. Thus, I concur with Harold Roth’s critique of this aspect of Early Chinese Mysticism. Roth writes that Kohn’s interpretation of early Chinese mysticism: ‘contain[s] much that simply does not fit with the Chinese model’.458
Moreover, it appears that Kohn holds the latter, perennial, position to be more fundamental to mysticism than the constructivist theories with which she begins her account. She writes: ‘I think mysticism rests . . . [on] a foundation within the fundamental makeup of humanity that allows for the experience of something higher and purer and greater.’459 Kohn writes that the means by which people access this fundamental, mystical aspect of humanity is: ‘[w]ith the help of a variety of practices — such as fasting, austerities, meditations, and trances — . . . ideas and conceptions are cleared away. . . . The personality of the individual, disrupted by the experience of something higher and greater, is reintegrated on a higher and greater level.’460 Thus, Kohn presents what she understands to be the fundamentals of mysticism. Therefore, in order to convince readers that the Zhuangzi is indeed a work of mysticism, the burden of proof is on Kohn to argue that the Zhuangzi is mystical according to the definition she gives in chapter one.
However, proving that the Zhuangzi contains the kind of mysticism outlined in chapter one does not form a large part of the book. The section in which Kohn deals most explicitly with mystical elements of the Zhuangzi (‘The Free and Easy Wandering of the Zhuangzi’) is largely descriptive and does not analyse mysticism in the Zhuangzi. In that section, Kohn
456 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 19–20, et passim. 457 See also Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 161–62; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 12–17; Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. 458 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 161. 459 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 20. 460 Ibid., 21. See also Arthur J. Deikman, ‘Deautomatization and the Mystic Experience’, in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 240–60.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism expands on the interpretations and conclusions regarding the overall philosophy of the Zhuangzi from eminent scholars, especially A.C. Graham and Fukunaga Mitsuji.461
Nevertheless, Kohn puts forth the idea that ‘forgetting’ is part of the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. However, she does not engage in textual analysis to support her interpretations of the meaning of what she translates as ‘sitting in oblivion’ (zuowang 坐忘), i.e., ‘sitting and forgetting’. Kohn writes that Zhuangzi’s idea of ‘zuowang’ means: ‘merg[ing] one’s mind with the Tao . . . with chaos or Hundun. In different chapters, this process is described in different ways.’462 Yet, from what is expressed in the Zhuangzi, it is not clear that ‘sitting and forgetting’ relates to merging with the dao, with chaos, or Hundun. The Zhuangzi does not say that these concepts are related. Furthermore, none of those terms appear in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. Kohn does not support her statements that the Zhuangzi relates all of these ideas at different points of the text. Kohn has made a methodological error of mistaking her interpretation of what the text means for what the text literally says in its own terms.463
In another part of the book, Kohn mentions the ‘Ziqi’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogues as evidence of early Chinese mysticism.464 These passages from the Zhuangzi are the only ones that she identifies under the ‘mystical practice in’ entry for the Zhuangzi in the index.465 Yet, in the main body of the text, Kohn neither argues that these passages are mystical, nor makes explicit her criteria for labelling them so. The reader must recall that ‘ascetic practices’, ‘trance-states’, and ‘becoming fully one with the Tao’ inform Kohn’s criteria for identifying mysticism.
Moreover, the ‘Ziqi’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogues do not explicitly use the term ‘dao’. Without an argument to convince readers that those passages are mystical because they have a meaning of merging with dao, we should not accept that those passages relate such an idea. Kohn, does not show her readers how those dialogues in the Zhuangzi relate merging with something higher, purer, or greater, that is ‘the Dao’.
461 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 52–58; see also: Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters; Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China; 福永司光 Fukunaga Mitsuji, ‘So Shu no yo ni tsuite’, Shinagaku 支那学 12 (1946): 33–73. 462 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 56. 463 Harold Roth has given a much more thorough review and critique of these parts of Kohn’s book. See: Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 158, 159–161, et passim. 464 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 85. 465 Ibid., 85, 218.
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Kohn only has recourse to refer to these parts of the Zhuangzi in a chapter which mainly deals with ascetic practices of religious Daoists seeking immortality. That is to say, she does not set out to explain these parts of the Zhuangzi in themselves, but only to show that ascetic practices have been important to Daoists since pre-Han times. Kohn writes that they are examples of: ‘[a]scetic pursuits of altered states of consciousness . . . [that the Zhuangzi relates as] glimpses of trance states.’466 There is no analysis to convince the reader that these dialogues do indeed relate trance states and no argument that these dialogues are examples mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
We should, however, recognise that Early Chinese Mysticism represents the earliest attempt to explain Chinese mysticism according to a systematic account of mysticism theory. It is, as Roth points out, ‘an ambitious project. [And] Kohn is at her best in detailing the mystical philosophies from her textual sources.’467 However, the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi itself only fit into Kohn’s grander vision of the text forming part of the foundations of Daoist mysticism, and Daoist religion on the whole. These aspects of Daoism flourished around the 6th century CE, during the early Tang dynasty. It is with these aspects, and this era, of Daoism and Daoist mysticism, that Kohn’s book makes the most significant contribution.468
5.4. ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’
In ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’, Harold Roth argues that: ‘we can certainly find “psychology”’ in pre-Qin texts.469 By ‘psychology’, Roth means: ‘a generic term referring to any theories of the nature and activity of the human mind. . . . [including] “religious” or “mystical” experience.’470 Hence, Roth makes reference to ‘the fasting of the mind’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ from the Zhuangzi as examples of mental disciplines that are among techniques of self-cultivation. He argues that these passages are evidence that pre-Qin philosophers (such as Zhuangzi) held: ‘[that] certain aspects of . . . psychological experience are associated with . . . physiological substrates or conditions.’471
466 Ibid., 85. 467 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 157. 468 Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 9, 129–138, 139–161, 162, et passim. See also Kohn, Seven Steps to the Tao: Sima Chengzhen’s ‘Zuowanglun’; Livia Kohn, Taoist Mystical Philosophy: The Scripture of Western Ascension (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991). 469 Harold David Roth, ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 51, no. 2 (1991): 600. 470 Ibid., 600–601. 471 Ibid., 602.
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However, Roth makes it clear that the Laozi and the Zhuangzi texts alone do not comprise the whole of Daoist philosophy. He therefore focuses the article on elucidating evidence of self-cultivation in ‘[o]ther equally important texts’.472 These texts are the Guanzi 管子 and the Huainanzi 淮南子. Nevertheless, Roth holds that all early Daoists contain a degree of mysticism. This includes the Zhuangzi. He writes:
What we find instead [of a self-conscious ‘Lao-Zhuang’ transmission of Daoism], especially in the Shih-chi, is evidence of Taoism being equated with the teachings Huang-Lao . . . that embraced both mystical and political concerns in a philosophy advocating a minimalistic and naturalistic government overseen by a ruler who has experienced the ground of the cosmos — the Tao — through techniques of self- cultivation.473
Hence, Roth establishes a main criterion which uses to find evidence of mysticism common to early Daoist texts such as the Guanzi, Zhuangzi, and Huainanzi. In Roth’s view, ideas of experiencing an ultimate dao through techniques of self-cultivation are where these texts communicate ideas which we can call ‘mystical’.
Roth’s analysis of these aspects of mysticism in the Guanzi and the Huainanzi is edifying. They are original contributions to those hitherto under-researched works of classical Chinese thought. However, such aspects of early Daoist mysticism in the Zhuangzi are beyond the main scope of the article. This is due to part of Roth’s purpose in the article which is to draw closer attention to the role of the Guanzi and the Huainanzi as among the earliest works of Daoist thought.
5.5. ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’.
Roth develops a fuller account of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’. He begins this article by outlining the strengths of Kohn’s Early Chinese Mysticism, but devotes most of the article to addressing weaknesses in Kohn’s interpretation and methodology concerning mysticism theory and how she applies it to the Zhuangzi. Roth criticises Kohn’s: ‘characterization of the ultimate mystical experience of merging with the Tao as an experience of “oblivion.”’474 This is
472 Ibid., 604, 607, et passim. 473 Ibid., 604–5. 474 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 159.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism because if that characterisation were accurate: ‘Kohn would be hard-pressed to differentiate this state from dreamless sleep or even death . . . a very odd mystical goal indeed.’475 Roth makes it clear that the ‘wang’ (忘) of ‘zuowang’ (坐忘) which Kohn renders as ‘oblivion’ does not mean ‘oblivion’ at all, but rather its normal, literal, meaning of ‘forgetting’. Thus, he demonstrates that Kohn mis-translates the term due to mistaking her own interpretation of what it means for what the text literally says.476
Thereupon, Roth offers his own interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Roth presents his conclusions that sections of the Zhuangzi, like ‘sitting and forgetting’, are examples of ‘introvertive mystical experience’ (i.e., introspective contemplation through which a person claims experiences of unity with an ultimate) according to the phenomenology developed by Walter Stace.477 Roth writes: ‘The wang of zuo-wang represents a systematic process of forgetting ego-based distinctions and emotions, a process of “mental fasting” that leads to profound experiences of the emptiness and tranquillity wherein the Way is found (4/68).’478
Roth further explains the idea of merging with an ‘Ultimate’ as part of the mysticism of Zhuangzi’s ‘sitting and forgetting’. He writes: ‘That this passage from Zhuangzi 6 provides a rough phenomenological description of an experience of a unitive consciousness, in which the individual merges with the Tao, is clearly indicated in the further identification of this “undying, unloving” [sic] force’.479 However, I remind the reader that the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage does not say ‘dao’. Roth’s explanation of mystical dimensions of ‘sitting and forgetting’ is sophisticated in terms of phenomenological analysis of lived experience of sitting and forgetting (zuowang). However, it does not explain what in ‘sitting and forgetting’ is evidence of an ultimate dao.
Roth interprets other parts of the Zhuangzi in order to substantiate the interpretation of an ultimate dao. To this purpose, he cites the ‘dao is at home where it intrudes’ passage.480 He concludes:
475 Ibid. 476 Ibid., 159–61. 477 Ibid., 160. See also Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 85–111. 478 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. Roth’s reference is to the chapter of the Zhuangzi and the page number of A.C. Graham’s translation, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters. 479 Ibid. 480 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/36-17/6/45; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 87.
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This is, of course, the ‘teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ of the title of Zhuangzi 6, the Tao. The attainment of such a unitive consciousness completely devoid of all categorization and perception can be thought of as one of two primary modes of mystical experience in the Zhuangzi, a mode that fits well into Walter Stace’s category of ‘introvertive’ mystical experience.481
Nevertheless, explaining the mysticism of the dao which is at home where it intrudes still does not explain how we can interpret ‘sitting and forgetting’ to contain an ultimate dao. As I have pointed out, the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage days not contain the term dao. Thus, it is not a convincing interpretation for scholars to re-iterate that Zhuangzi holds that people can merge with dao through ‘sitting and forgetting’. Such an interpretation requires more explanation than scholars have hitherto given.
Roth gives more explanation of mysticism in other parts of the Zhuangzi. He proposes that the ultimate mystical achievement in the Zhuangzi is not the introvertive type exemplified by ‘sitting and forgetting’. Instead, he proposes that the ultimate mystical goal in the Zhuangzi is an ‘extrovertive’ type for which he finds evidence in sections of text that pertain to ‘the axis of the Way’ (daoshu 道樞).482 Roth writes:
the ultimate attainment [of mysticism in the Zhuangzi] is the application of this ‘axis of the Way’ to the concrete problems of human life so that ‘there is no limit to responding . . . to what is it ... or to what is not it’ (2/53). Zhuangzi’s sage develops a consciousness freed from the ego- perspective by its experience of complete unity so that upon its return to the dualistic world it can adapt and spontaneously respond to any situation that arises, like the monkey keeper in the ‘three every morning’ story (2/54).483
481 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. 482 Ibid., 160–61. Therein, Roth summarises ‘extrovertive’ mystical experience as: ‘full participation in the world free from the biased strategies and perspectives of one’s limited ego’. See also Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 66. On ‘the axis of the Way’ daoshu 道樞, see Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/4/19-20. 483 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160.
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Roth quotes more examples of passages from the Zhuangzi which show a different kind of engagement in the world. He uses them to argue that the Zhuangzi does not talk about ‘oblivion’ as Kohn maintains in Early Chinese Mysticism. Roth explains:
This then is the freedom of the Peng, a freedom not of oblivion, but of clarity, a freedom that enables one to be untouched by die conflicting points of view that divide up die human world, a freedom to be fully present wherever one is, a freedom to respond spontaneously and harmoniously to whatever arises. It is clearly not an escape from the world to some more real Absolute, but a full participation in the world free from the biased strategies and perspectives of one’s limited ego.484
Roth presents his conclusions about the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi to rival those of Kohn. He supports his conclusions with quotations from Graham’s translation of the Zhuangzi and interprets those sections of the text according to a consistent theoretical background derived from Walter Stace’s phenomenology of mystical experience. This represents progress in terms of interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi according to methodology and theory derived from studies of mysticism.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the scope in which Roth presents his interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Roth does not present arguments to convince his readers that the sections of the Zhuangzi which he quotes do indeed conform to Stace’s phenomenology. Nor does he explain Stace’s phenomenology of mysticism in the main body of his article. Roth presents his interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and then gives endnotes with references to Stace’s work, Mysticism and Philosophy. However, in order to better understand Stace’s phenomenological typology of mysticism and mystical experiences, as well as how the Zhuangzi might fit in with it, the reader must already be familiar with Stace’s work. Furthermore, in note fourteen, Roth writes that more detailed study is needed if we are to more fully understand the types of experiences that ‘fall within Stace’s extrovertive category.’485 Although Roth argues that ‘the extrovertive mystical experience found in the Zhuangzi represents the most profound level of this continuum [of extrovertive mystical experience]’,486 the scope to develop those ideas does not exist in the article.
484 Ibid., 160–61. 485 Ibid., 172. 486 Ibid.
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5.6. ‘Just Say No to “No-Self” in the Zhuangzi’
Chris Jochim raises the issue of mysticism in ‘Just Say No to “No-Self” in the Zhuangzi’. Jochim’s main purpose in the article, however, is to argue that the Zhuangzi does not present a doctrine of ‘no-self’ or even of ‘self’ (as some scholars have claimed),487 but rather that the Zhuangzi has ‘a consistent message about the art of living’.488 Thus, it is not Jochim’s main purpose to explain mysticism in the Zhuangzi; mysticism can only feature in relation to the main topic of ‘no-self’ in the Zhuangzi within the scope of Jochim’s article.
Even so, the topic of mysticism is relevant to Jochim’s article. For example, he maintains that the Zhuangzi’s message about ‘the art of living’ is conveyed: ‘by means of philosophical dialogues . . . and metaphorical tales . . . or reaching states beyond flying (with hints of mystical experience).’489 Jochim engages with the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi by drawing on research which can: ‘help to open the door to accepting that certain fantastic tales as well as more straight-forward accounts of ecstatic states in the Zhuangzi mark the beginnings of a mystical tradition in Daoism.’490 Thus, Jochim concludes that the Zhuangzi shows some evidence of the beginnings of Daoist mysticism. In his interpretation, this kind of mysticism is centred on attaining ecstatic states which do not necessarily entail doctrines of ‘no-self’ such as those found in another religious and philosophical traditions. Jochim makes this point in contradistinction to popular interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi which hold that it is centred on attaining states of ‘no-self’.
Furthermore, Jochim confers with Harold Roth’s interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi which I outlined above. Jochim quotes Roth in order to affirm that sections of the Zhuangzi, such as ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’, ‘refer to practices that lead to a mystical state: [that is to say,] “consciousness devoid of egoistic bias”’.491 Jochim thereupon assimilates Roth’s and Lee Yearley’s interpretations that the Zhuangzi: ‘advocates a mystical
487 See Chris Jochim, ‘Just Say ‘No’ to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi,’ in Wandering at Ease in the the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 40–46. 488 Ibid., 36. 489 Ibid. 490 Ibid., 61. See also Paper, The Spirits Are Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion, 125, 132–35, 139–40, 154; Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’. 491 Jochim, ‘Just Say “No” to “No Self” in Zhuangzi’, 62. See also Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160–61.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism goal of participation in the world, not that of merging with a transcendental Absolute. This is the goal of an intraworldly mysticism: joining the flow of life.’492
Hence, Jochim presents an understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi different from other scholars in that he does not think the Zhuangzi has a doctrine of unifying with an Ultimate. Instead, he thinks that the most important part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is where the text relates practices and experiences which relate to ‘consciousness devoid of egoistic bias’ and ‘joining the flow of life’. Admittedly, analysing these practices is tangential to Jochim’s purpose. Nevertheless, even though Jochim argues that the Zhuangzi does not have a doctrine of no-self, he maintains that those practices like ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are evidence of mysticism for other reasons. In general, those reasons involve the understanding that mysticism is rooted in experience, not only belief in an ineffable Ultimate.
5.7. ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’
‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’ sounds like an unlikely article in which to find explanation of the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi. However, Roth has recourse to refer to his own conclusions regarding the ‘bimodal’ (i.e., alternating between both introvertive and extrovertive) mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi in his account of mysticism theory and how it applies to the Laozi.493 Roth holds that: ‘[w]hile evidence for its [bimodal mystical experience’s] presence is not as strong in the Laozi as in the Zhuangzi, it is . . . most certainly there.’494 Roth supports this conclusion by cross- referencing technical terms and the ‘rhetorical structure’ of relating mystical praxis in the Laozi with other early Daoist texts, including the Zhuangzi.495 Thus, Roth situates some of the mystical elements of the Zhuangzi in relation to other early Daoist texts, like the Laozi.
Roth begins his discussion of the greater context of early Daoist mystical practices with a quotation and explanation of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage from the Zhuangzi. Roth
492 Jochim, ‘Just Say “No” to “No Self” in Zhuangzi’, 62. On ‘intraworldly mysticism’, see Lee H. Yearley, ‘Three Ways of Being Religious’, Philosophy East and West 32, no. 4 (1982): 439–51; Lee H. Yearley, ‘The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-Tzu’, in Experimental Essays on Chuang-Tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 125–39; Yearley, ‘Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State’; Lee H. Yearley, ‘Daoist Presentation and Persuasion: Wandering among Zhuangzi’s Kinds of Language’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 33, no. 3 (2005): 503–35; See also Steven Burik, The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism (State University of New York Press, 2009), 96–97. 493 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 66. 494 Ibid. 495 Ibid., 67–71, 86–87.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism writes: ‘A familiar place to begin discussing the greater context of early Daoist mystical praxis is with the Zhuangzi passage on “sitting and forgetting.”’496 Thereupon, he shows how the passage relates apophatic practices (i.e., negating, emptying, removing) that is evidence of the understanding of mysticism that Roth uses throughout the article. We can summarise this understanding thus: mysticism involves the cultivation of apophatic practices which are believed to relate to philosophical and theological commitments of an Ultimate. Roth argues:
To let ‘organs and members drop away’ (duo zhi ti 墮肢體) means to lose visceral awareness of the emotions and desires . . . To ‘dismiss eyesight and hearing’ (chu cong ming 黜聰明) means to deliberately cut off sense perception. To ‘part from the body and expel knowledge’ (lixing quzhi 離 形去知) means to lose bodily awareness and remove all thoughts from consciousness. To ‘merge with the universal thoroughfare’ (tong yu datong 同於大通) seems to imply that, as a result of these practices, Yan Hui has become united with the Dao.497
Roth argues that these elements of apophatic meditation, evident in texts like the Zhuangzi, follow: ‘a rhetorical structure of mystical praxis in early Daoism’.498 This ‘rhetorical structure’ consists of: 1.) preamble; 2.) sorites-style argument (if x then y, if y then z etc.); and 3.) dénouement.499 However, Roth does not explain how ‘sitting and forgetting’ follows this structure. He includes a table at the end of the chapter showing how a passage from chapter 23 of the Zhuangzi (Geng Sangchu 庚桑楚) follows this structure along with passages from contemporaneous texts.500 Therefore, in the section below, I would like to explain how ‘sitting and forgetting’ corresponds to Roth’s rhetorical structure of mystical praxis.
496 Ibid., 68. 497 Ibid., 69. On ‘apophasis’, see ibid., 61–62, 89–90 note 14; Mark Csikszentmihali, ‘Mysticism and Apophatic Discourse in the Laozi’, in Religous and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, ed. Mark Csikszentmihali Ivanhoe and Phillip J (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 33–58; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 125, 228 note 1; Gellman, Mysticism. 498 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 70. 499 Ibid. 500 Ibid., 86–87.
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5.7.1. ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ Corresponds to a Rhetorical Structure of Mystical Praxis
The ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue corresponds to Roth’s rhetorical structure of mystical praxis. The initial conversion between Yanhui and Confucius concerning Yanhui’s steps towards ‘improvement’ is the preamble. Yanhui tells his master that he ‘improves’ by ‘forgetting’ about things like ‘rites and music’, ‘humanness and rightness’, etc. However, his master tells him that it is still not enough of an ‘improvement’ to just forget about those things.
Then comes the sotires-style argument. Yanhui relates what it means to practice ‘sitting and forgetting’. If one can practice ‘sitting and forgetting’, then he goes through the process of experiencing: ‘organs and members drop away’ (duo zhi ti 墮肢體) . . . ‘dismiss eyesight and hearing’ (chu cong ming 黜聰明) . . . ‘part from the body and expel knowledge’ (lixing quzhi 離形去知) . . . ‘merge with the universal thoroughfare’ (tong yu datong 同於大通). Here we can see that Zhuangzi is arguing to the effect ‘if x, then y’. In the context of ‘sitting and forgetting’, he is saying that each of the experiences related follows on from the previous.
The conclusion of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is the dénouement. Confucius tells Yanhui that the latter has been profoundly transformed through ‘sitting and forgetting’. Consequently, Confucius, the Ru master, says that he would like to follow Yanhui, the Ru student, as his disciple.
This is a radical idea proposed by Zhuangzi. He is showing how the practice of ‘sitting and forgetting’ leads to a more profound kind of ‘improvement’ than that which the followers of Confucius and the Ru could attain. Moreover, this superior kind of improvement entails ‘forgetting’ about much-emphasised parts of Confucian self-cultivation because they are less in harmony with the way the world really is. Daoists, on the other hand, cultivate simplicity (pu 樸) in order to be more in harmony with the way the world really is. This entails ‘forgetting’ many human-made, contrived ways of being in the world, such as those emphasised by the Ru (I discuss these points further in Chapter 8).
The profundity, discernible through attention to context of Chinese intellectual history, combined with interpretations of the specific content of ‘sitting and forgetting’, are why the passage stands out as an example of Zhuangzi’s mysticism. The phenomenological descriptions in ‘sitting and forgetting’ sound like descriptions of ‘mystical experience’ from other traditions. On the understanding that ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’ communicates ideas
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism that one can experience an ultimate dao, then ‘sitting and forgetting’ fits well with theories of ‘introvertive mysticism’ developed by Walter Stace and expanded upon by Roth.
Although the interpretation fits well with existing theories of mysticism, the manner in which Roth presents the interpretation could be elaborated upon further. He writes: ‘“To merge with the universal thoroughfare” (tong yu datong 同於大通) seems to imply that, as a result of these practices, Yan Hui has become united with the Dao.’501 Here, Roth presents the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is an example of mystical praxis involving an ultimate dao only by noting that it is implied in the source text. There is no further reasoning to demonstrate how the Zhuangzi implies such a meaning.
Roth does, however, supply an endnote with some further information about his interpretation of ‘the Dao’. Nevertheless, the endnote does not argue that Yanhui in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue experiences union with ‘the Dao’ through ‘sitting and forgetting’. It rather refers the reader to A. C. Graham’s explanation of his interpretation of Zhuangzi’s thesis of an ultimate dao. Roth writes that it is an example of: ‘the imagery of the character “Dao” in Zhuangzi [sic]’.502 Thereupon, he quotes Graham’s explanation: ‘Chuang- tzu . . . sees man as coinciding with the Way by ceasing to draw distinctions. To be on the unfathomable path is to merge into the unnameable whole, so that what we are trying to pin down by the name “Way” is revealed as nothing less than the universe flowing from its ultimate source . . .’503 Nevertheless, this is not an analysis of the source text of the Zhuangzi that gives reasons for interpreting ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’ to mean merging with an ultimate dao.
Thus, while Roth’s inclusion of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the context of early Daoist mystical praxis is edifying, it leaves some aspects of the received interpretation unexplained. Moreover, most of ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’ focusses on the Laozi and the ‘Inner Training’ section of the Guanzi. It is not a detailed explanation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
501 Ibid., 69. 502 Ibid., 92. 503 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 188; quoted in Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 93.
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5.8. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Origins of Taoist Mysticism
Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Origins of Taoist Mysticism is a significant contribution to the understanding of Daoist mysticism, including the place of the Zhuangzi within that tradition. In this book, Roth examines ‘Inward Training from the standpoint of the modern comparative study of mystical experience.’504 By focussing on the comparative study of mystical experience, Roth is able to elucidate how Inward Training: ‘represents the earliest extant presentation of a mystical practice that appears in all the early sources of Taoist thought, including . . . the Chuang Tzu.’505 Therefore, Roth has recourse to include the mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi in this book which relate to those of Inward Training.
Roth presents his conclusions for labelling texts like Inward Training and the Zhuangzi ‘Taoist’ in the introduction chapter. He argues that unanimity in certain positions of cosmology, inward training, and political thought are the marks of ‘Daoism’.506 Furthermore, Roth holds that: ‘[t]he common thread that ties together these three philosophical orientations . . . is their shared vocabulary of cosmology and mystical self-transformation.’507 Hence, he categorises the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi along with the text of Inward Training as examples of an ‘individualist’ type of Daoism. Mysticism forms a central part of this kind of Daoism and the Zhuangzi as one of its main exponents, according to Roth. He writes: ‘[This] first type — represented textually by Chuang Chou’s “inner chapters” of the Chuang Tzu . . . is exclusively concerned with cosmology and the inner transformation of the individual leading to the mystical experience of attaining union with the Way.’508
5.8.1. Interpreting ‘The Dao’
There is an issue of interpretation concerning Daoist mysticism in Roth’s discussion of cosmology in the Individualist strand of Daoist thought. It is the interpretation of ‘the Dao’. At this point of Original Tao, it appears that Roth interprets classical Daoist thought, but especially the Zhuangzi, to espouse a concept of an absolute, cosmological Dao. This is
504 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 3. cf. Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China, 109–17. Puett analyses Neiye with a different focus. He concludes that the main point of the text is to provide a cosmology and a manual for improving one’s life by ‘becoming like a spirit’. 505 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 2. 506 Ibid., 7. 507 Ibid., 8. 508 Ibid., 7.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism evident in Roth’s summary of the three general categories of ideas distinctive to classical Daoist thought. The first category is: ‘1. Cosmology: a cosmology based on the Tao as the predominant unifying power in the cosmos’.509 Roth maintains this usage of ‘the Dao’ unapologetically, and without qualification throughout the book. He does not defend this interpretation against other interpretations which argue that Daoists do not self-evidently write of a transcendent, metaphysical-cum-cosmological dao (such as Chad Hansen’s).510 Instead, Roth maintains the traditional interpretation of ‘the Dao’ as if it is self-evident.
Roth elaborates upon this interpretation of ‘the dao’ in a section called ‘Technical Terminology’. He writes:
For Taoists, the Way is the ultimate power in the cosmos, paradoxically transcendent yet immanent. As a unitive principle beyond the grasp of any specific thing in the cosmos (and sometimes referred to simply as ‘the One’ or by such metaphors as the ‘unhewn’ (p’u, 樸) and the ‘simple’ (su, 素), it mysteriously operates within to facilitate the generation of all phenomena and the serve as the inner guiding force throughout every moment of their lives. Although it is ineffable and so cannot be known as an object, the early Taoist sources maintain that it can be merged with, accorded with, or, in other words, directly experienced. Such an experience occurs only after the arduous practices referred to, sometimes metaphorically, in the selections below, and sometimes involve total self- transcendence.511
This is not, however, an argument to convince readers that early Daoists proposed an absolute dao. It is, rather, an elaboration upon this interpretation that Roth has already accepted as a presupposition of Original Tao. This elaboration can only appeal to the reader if the reader already agrees with Roth’s interpretation of an ultimate, cosmological dao that Daoist texts, such as the Zhuangzi, self-evidently communicate. The burden of proof ought to
509 Ibid. 510 See Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation; Chad Hansen, ‘A Tao of Tao in Chuang-Tzu’, in Experimental Essays on Chuang-Tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 24–55; Chad Hansen, ‘Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi’, in Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discorses on the Zhuangzi, ed. Scott Cook (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 128–62; Laozi, Tao Te Ching on The Art of Harmony: The New Illustrated Edition of the Chinese Philosophical Masterpiece, trans. Chad Hansen, 1st edition (London: Duncan Baird, 2009). 511 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 44.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism be on Roth to demonstrate where early Daoists (such as the authors of Neiye and the Zhuangzi) say that one can merge with the ultimate dao.
Roth demonstrates this proof in regards to Neiye through his translation and analysis of that text, especially where the text explicitly relates ideas about dao.512 However, in Original Tao, Roth does not explain where the Zhuangzi relates ideas about an ultimate, cosmological dao. This is understandable because Neiye is the main focus of Original Tao, not the Zhuangzi. However, that does not mean that we should accept that those some features of mysticism from Neiye are also evident in the Zhuangzi without argument.
Merging with a metaphysical Ultimate is not, however, the main mark Roth sees as evidence of early Daoist mysticism evident in the Zhuangzi and the Neiye. This differs from his earlier characterisations of mysticism (in the articles I have discussed above). It also differs from the marks of mysticism that other scholars writing of mysticism in the Zhuangzi have given (such as those of Ching and Kohn discussed above). However, as will become clearer below, Roth emphasises more detailed and nuanced aspects of the lived experience of Daoist mysticism as recorded in texts like Inward Training and the Zhuangzi. It does not mean that union with an Ultimate is not part of Daoist mysticism: it means that Roth sees other aspects practices as the main marks of Daoist mysticism.
5.8.2. Priority on Practices
The main mark Roth sees as evidence of early Daoist mysticism is shared vocabulary relating to practices. He writes: ‘The common thread that ties together these three philosophical orientations of early Taoism . . . is their shared vocabulary of cosmology and mystical self-transformation. . . . derived from a common meditative practice first enunciated in Inward Training’.513 Hence, Roth begins Original Tao by outlining these commonalities between Inward Training and the Zhuangzi (and other early Daoist texts) through analysis of technical terms which the texts share. This is evident where Roth writes: ‘[t]his shared vocabulary helps distinguish the meaning of the category ‘Taoism’ . . . a point made in greater detail throughout this book.’514
This characterisation differs from Roth’s position concerning an absolute Dao in ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’. In that article, Roth presents an
512 See ibid., 52–57, 72–73, 78–79. 513 Ibid., 8. 514 Ibid.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi which lays more importance on union with an Ultimate. 515 However, it appears that in Original Tao, Roth emphasises the practices associated with ideas of an Ultimate rather than on locutions expressing conceptions of an Ultimate as main marks of mysticism in Daoist texts.
We can see what Roth holds to be elements of mysticism from his introduction to the text of Inward Training. For example, he describes the text as: ‘poetic verses on the nature of the Way . . . and of a method of self-discipline . . . [which is] a mystical practice whose goal is a direct apprehension of this all-pervading cosmic force.’516 Thus, the text of Inward Training shows evidence of a general feature of mysticism which Roth identifies as ‘direct apprehension of an all-pervading cosmic force’. If this is a general feature of Daoist mysticism, and all mysticism generally, then we can expect to find the same feature of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, according to Roth.
Roth also outlines other features of mysticism in Inward Training. He writes that Daoist mysticism exemplified in Inward Training is concerned with:
an inner life of mind and body . . . [that] with self-discipline . . . can lead to health, vitality, psychological clarity, a sense of well-being, a profound tranquillity, and, ultimately, to a direct experience of the Way and an integration of this experience into one’s daily life.517
Therefore, other Daoist practices that are not from Inward Training, yet have the same effects, would also be mystical, according to Roth’s characterisation above. There must be evidence of such practices in the Zhuangzi for Roth to include it alongside Inward Training as a text of early Daoist mysticism, as he does throughout the book.
Roth relates more generalised elements of mysticism at the beginning of the chapter ‘Inward Training in the Context of Early Taoist Mysticism’. He holds that practices described in Inner Training ‘and its companion texts’, like the Zhuangzi, are similar to those of other mystical traditions. He writes: ‘[t]hey are essentially apophatic . . . a systematic process of negating, forgetting, or emptying out the contents of consciousness . . . found in the ordinary
515 See Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69 and above. 516 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 11. 517 Ibid.; These general characteristics of mysticism are very similar to what some scholars have argued are the most important aspects of mysticism and mystical experience. See Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, 198–99; Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, 32– 33, 48–49, 62, 65–67, et passim.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism experience based in the ego-self.’518 Roth interprets the records of these experiences to also claim that they result in ‘tranquillity’, and ‘a fully concentrated inner consciousness of unity’.519
These features of Daoist mysticism in Inward Training are consistent with Walter Stace’s category of introvertive mysticism, which emphasises experiencing ‘unitive consciousness’.520 However, in Original Tao, Roth seeks to expand the understanding of mysticism beyond Stace’s categories. It is in Original Tao that Roth expands on his earlier interpretations of mysticism theory derived from Stace’s model in ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism’.521 The expanded understanding Roth proposes includes less bias in favour of introvertive mysticism, giving extrovertive mysticism more credit, and acknowledging forms of mysticism that show an interaction between the two modes. He gives one characterisation of this expanded understanding of mysticism, thus:
Some sources [on mysticism] imply further that this condition of unitary conscious is temporary and that upon returning to normal differentiating consciousness the concerns of the self that had previously characterized one’s conscious experience are no longer present. Therefore the sage thus transformed becomes selfless, impartial, unmoved by common passions and prejudices, and singularly able to respond spontaneously and harmoniously to any situations that arise and to exert a numinous influence upon them [sic].522
Roth thus outlines the general features of mysticism that he sees in Inward Training. By extension, these same general features must also be evident in the Zhuangzi for him to frequently include the Zhuangzi alongside Inward Training as texts which exemplify early Daoist mysticism.
In the text quoted above, Roth uses the term ‘numinous’. This term has a particular meaning and connotation in its original usage. Rudolf Otto coins the term in order to describe an experience of something ‘wholly other’ that only the human spirit (i.e., the numen) can
518 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 125; Forman, ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’, 708; Forman, ‘Introduction’, 1997, 28. 519 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 125. 520 See Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 131–33. 521 See Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 172, note 14, and above. 522 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 125.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism feel, and which, he argues, is the essence of all religion.523 However, Otto’s own usage is restricted to monotheistic religions wherein there is already a concept of something ‘wholly other’, i.e., transcendent and divine. As such, the term is not universally applicable to all religious experience, as Otto supposes.524 This is especially true of early Daoist mysticism and Chinese thought of the Warring States era. This is because Chinese thought of that era was not concerned with transcendent deities and experiencing something ‘wholly other’, but rather with an imminent, naturalistic conception of the universe.525 How can Roth justify using Otto’s term in relation to early Daoist mysticism?
The answer is that Roth uses the term in a modified sense. He gives an explanation several pages later in the chapter in order to clarify: ‘terminological usage that could cause some confusion’.526 Moreover, Roth redirects his readers to chapter two where he also explains his reasoning for translating ‘shen’ (神) as ‘numen/numinous’.527 By cross- referencing these explanations, I understand that Roth uses ‘numen/numinous’ to convey ‘the sense of an other power’ [sic] and ‘the aura of something mystical or holy’.528 This is not the same sense of ‘wholly other’ (i.e., transcendent and divine) that Otto coined the term to describe. Only after cross-referencing Roth’s explanation on pages 133-134, do his translations from much earlier in the book and his references to where the text of Neiye speaks of ‘the numinous’ become clearer.529
Roth gives an account of mysticism theory in a section entitled ‘What is Mysticism?’530 In this section, Roth draws from influential studies of mysticism in order to develop his own hermeneutic for the interpretation mysticism in Inward Training and other early Daoist texts, including the Zhuangzi. Therein, Roth gives a more detailed explanation of Stace’s contribution to mysticism theory than in his previous articles. As such, his claims that the
523 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6–11, et passim. 524 See also Ninian Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth (London: SCM Press, 1964), 131–134, et passim; Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1970), 13–14; Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 131–33. 525 See also: Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. 526 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 133. 527 Ibid., 43–44, 133. 528 Ibid., 43. 529 Ibid., 13, 62–63, 70–71, 126, et passim. On the difficulties in translation shen 神, see Willard J. Peterson, ‘Making Connections: “Commentary on The Attached Verbalizations” of The Book of Change’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42, no. 1 (1982): 103–10; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 226; Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture, 236–37; Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China, 21–23. 530 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 127–34.
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Zhuangzi represents ‘bimodal’ (containing both introvertive and extrovertive) mystical experience are more developed than in his earlier articles.531
However, Roth’s concluding remarks on mysticism theory do not do justice to his exposition. The paragraph which links his writing on mysticism theory to how it is evident in Inward Training appears to contain an example of circular reasoning. It reads: ‘the central elements of mysticism are mystical practices, mystical techniques, and mystical philosophy.’532 This is tantamount to saying: We can recognise mysticism because it is mystical.
However, if we bear in mind what Roth writes of mysticism and the mystical elements of Inner Training earlier in the book, we can understand him more generously. Roth holds the central elements of mysticism in early Chinese contexts to be:
an inner life of mind and body . . . [that] with self-discipline . . . can lead to health, vitality, psychological clarity, a sense of well-being, a profound tranquillity, and, ultimately, to a direct experience of the Way and an integration of this experience into one’s daily life.533
By ‘mystical techniques’, Roth means apophatic meditation which is intended to assist in bringing about those effects quoted above. The reader must cross-reference these aspects of Roth’s usage of mysticism because he does not make it explicit in the summary concluding the section on mysticism theory in Original Tao.
5.8.3. Original Tao and the Zhuangzi
The most relevant part of Original Tao for understanding mysticism in the Zhuangzi is a section entitled ‘Inward Training and the Chuang Tzu’.534 Therein, Roth gives examples from the Zhuangzi that parallel Inward Training in order to argue: ‘inner cultivation is one of the most prevalent and significant influences in the Chuang Tzu collection.’535 This section of analysis of commonalities between the Zhuangzi and Inner Training is a significant advance
531 Ibid., 128, 132. See also Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’. 532 Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 134. 533 Ibid., 11. 534 Ibid., 153–61. 535 Ibid., 153.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism in giving arguments for interpreting the Zhuangzi to contain mysticism. Nevertheless, there are some methodological issues that I raise below.
Firstly, Roth holds that in the Zhuangzi, elements of chapter 2 (‘Qiwu Lun’) are derived from chapter 6 (‘Da Zong Shi’). One example is ‘the unique phrase “the ‘That’s it’ which goes by circumstance” (yin shi 因是)’.536 Roth explains this phrase to be: ‘[a] label for the free and selfless cognition of . . . [those] who “pervade and unify” (t’ung wei-i 通為一)’.537 Thereupon, Roth claims that these phrases from chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi are derived from the ‘“merging with the Great Pervader” (t’ung yü ta- t’ung 同於大通)’ passage in chapter 6.538 However, there is no evidence that the former of the two concepts is derived from the latter. Moreover, Roth does not give an argument to support this claim.539
Secondly, Roth claims that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is ‘the first of the two classical descriptions of mystical practice in the Chuang Tzu’ and that ‘mind fasting’ is the second.540 My understanding would reverse the order: ‘mind fasting’ is the first description of mystical practice in the Zhuangzi, and ‘sitting and forgetting’ is the second. This is because ‘mind fasting’ occurs first in the text, in chapter four; ‘sitting and forgetting’ appears second, in chapter six. Perhaps Roth means that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is the main, or the most commonly cited, or just the most popular description of a practice related in the Zhuangzi which scholars call ‘mystical’. However, he does not explicitly indicate this. Taken at face- value, Roth’s account confuses the order of the text (assuming that one reads the text in a linear way).
Thirdly, confusing the order of ‘mind fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ leads to further complications. In Roth’s phenomenological analysis of ‘mind fasting’, he concludes that where the passage talks about the Way settling in emptiness, and that mind-fasting is emptiness, it means: ‘[t]his is the “merging with the Great Pervader” spoken of in the previous passage [i.e., “sitting and forgetting”].’541 Yet, as I have indicated, ‘sitting and forgetting’ is not previous but subsequent to the ‘mind fasting’ passage. Roth’s interpretation that ‘mind-fasting’ is elaborating on ‘sitting and forgetting’ does not follow. Moreover, the ‘mind-fasting’ passage does not mention ‘the Great Pervader’. The ‘great pervader passage’
536 Ibid., 154. 537 Ibid. 538 Ibid., 153–54. 539 Ibid., 154. 540 Ibid. 541 Ibid., 155.
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(i.e., the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage) does not mention ‘mind-fasting’, either. Nor does the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage explicitly say anything about ‘the Way’ (i.e., dao). Hence, Roth’s interpretations of the relationships between ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are not so clear to the reader in Original Tao.
5.9. ‘Bimodal Mystical experience in the “Qiwulun 齊物論” chapter of the the Zhuangzi 莊子’
‘Bimodal Mystical experience in the ‘Qiwulun 齊物論’ chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子’ is one of only a few articles that explicitly addresses the issue of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.542 The article is significant because Roth situates the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in relation to interpretations of Zhuangzi’s views on epistemology.543 By doing so, Roth fills a gap in literature on epistemology in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Roth explains: ‘most of the authors [who have published articles concerning epistemology in the Zhuangzi] either deny, neglect, or at best, only point to the mystical dimension of the text. I hope to demonstrate that this mystical dimension is critical to the understanding of its philosophy.’544 Roth is correct to say that many scholars ‘only point to the mystical dimension’ of the Zhuangzi. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, scholars have transmitted interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi for over a century without analysis or convincing arguments.
Thereupon, Roth summarises his earlier research on the origins of Daoism being rooted in ‘inner cultivation’.545 He relates that these origins of Daoism are inherently mystical, in his view. Roth writes: ‘related lineages of the Daoist tradition . . . share a common basic practice of breathing mediation. This practice led its adepts to profound mystical experiences that provided insights into the nature of the world and the fundamental moving power that infused it what they called the Dao.’546 At this point, we can see that the interpretation of Daoist
542 This version of the article is more concise than an earlier version. See: Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’. 543 See also Chen, ‘Mysticism Is the Home of Zhuangzi’s Epistemology (神秘主义是庄子认识论的归 宿)’. 544 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 31; See also Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 15. 545 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 15–17. See also Roth, ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’; Harold David Roth, ‘Redaction Criticism and the Early History of Taoism’, Early China 19 (1994): 1–46; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’; Harold David Roth, ‘Evidence for Stages of Meditation in Early Taoism’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 60, no. 2 (1997): 295–314; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism. 546 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 32.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism mysticism which Roth presents here has ‘the Dao’ as its Ultimate. However, it is not clear if this interpretation of ‘Dao’ is the same as the one which he presented in Original Tao. Is this interpretation of ‘Dao’ a metaphysical absolute that is ‘transcendent yet immanent’, as Roth maintains in Original Tao?547
We find some answers in Roth’s explanation of what mystical experiences of ‘inner cultivation’ are like. Roth summaries that classical Daoists texts record practices to the effect: ‘following or guiding the breath while one is in a stable sitting position. As one does this the normal contents of consciousness gradually empty out and one comes to experience a tranquillity that, as one’s practice develops, becomes quite profound.’548 He supports this summary with references to technical terms from contemporaneous classical Daoist texts, the Lüshi Chunqiu 3.15, Guanzi 13.2b, and Laozi chapter 56. Roth argues that these texts contain terms indicating: ‘empty[ing] out the contents of consciousness until a condition of union with the Way is achieved.’549 He gives the following examples from those texts, respectively: ‘attaining the One’ (deyi 得一)’, ‘attaining the empty Way’ (de xu dao 得虛道), and ‘the Profound Merging’ (xuan tong 玄同).’550 These are not examples from the Zhuangzi. Yet, Roth uses them to support his interpretations of mysticism in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. It makes for difficult burden of proof for Roth to argue that the Zhuangzi also contains these ideas.
Nevertheless, Roth argues that classical Daoist adepts were transformed by these experiences of ‘the Dao’ and that their texts communicate something of their transformed way of experiencing the world. He states that this is what is signified by ideas from the Laozi such as ‘embracing the One’ (bao yi 抱一) and ‘doing nothing, yet having nothing undone’ (wuwei er wu buwei 無爲而無不爲 ).551 Roth concludes his introduction by stating that the author of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi was also transformed by these kinds of experiences of the ultimate dao. Roth writes: ‘the author of the “inner chapters” of Zhuangzi [sic] was aware of
547 See Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 44. 548 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 32. 549 Ibid. 550 Ibid. Roth does not give citations for these quotations in the shortened version of the article. In the original article, he cites them thus: ‘These three phrases that symbolize union with the Way are from the following sources: ’Lunren‘ in Lushi chunqiu 3.15; Xinshu shang in Guanzi 13.2b; and Laozi, chapter 56.’ 551 Ibid., 32–33.
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— and likely followed — such inner cultivation practice and that it directly informs his epistemology.’552
Roth then presents a literature review of works on mysticism.553 In this section, he summarises Stace’s theory of ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ mysticism and relates it to the Zhuangzi in general terms.554 Roth summarises Stace’s theory of ‘introvertive’ mysticism thus: ‘He [Stace] defines the former [introvertive mysticism] as a “unitary” or “pure” consciousness that is non-temporal and non-spatial and is experienced when the individual self loses its individuality in the One.’555 Roth summarises Stace’s definition of ‘extrovertive’ mysticism thus: ‘He [Stace] defines the latter [extrovertive mysticism] as “the unifying vision—all things are One” coupled with “the more concrete apprehension of the One as an inner subjectivity, or life, in all things.”’556
Roth concludes that Stace’s theory ‘needs certain modifications’ if we are to apply it to the Zhuangzi because Stace values introvertive mysticism over extrovertive mysticism and draws largely from Indo-European sources for his analyses.557 However, in the case of Chinese mysticism, and mysticism in the Zhuangzi, the classical practitioners appear to value the kinds of experiences that correspond to Stace’s extrovertive mysticism category. Hence, Roth distinguishes his interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi from that of Lee Yearley. Roth concludes: ‘what Yearley calls “intraworldly mysticism” is not an entirely new mode of mystical experience, but rather a uniquely “Zhuangzian” form of Stace’s extrovertive mode.’558 Thus, Roth aims to demonstrate how mystical ideas in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi correspond to this uniquely Zhuangzian form of extrovertive mysticism.
Nevertheless, the first examples of mysticism that Roth gives from the Zhuangzi do not come from the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter. Nor are they examples of extrovertive mysticism. They are examples of introvertive mysticism. They are the ‘mind fasting’ (xin zhai 新齋), the
552 Ibid., 33. 553 The literature review section on mysticism is much shorter in the 2003 version of the article. cf. Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 16–17. 554 Ibid.; See also Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 66, 111, 131–32; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’. 555 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 33. 556 Ibid.; See also Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 111, 131. 557 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 16–17. This criticism applies mostly to Mysticism and Philosophy. Stace draws from more non-Indoeuropean sources in a book published earlier. See Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics, 88–109. 558 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 16–17. See also Yearley, ‘Three Ways of Being Religious’, 445, et passim; Yearley, ‘The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-Tzu’, 130– 31; Yearley, ‘Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State’; Yearley, ‘Daoist Presentation and Persuasion: Wandering among Zhuangzi’s Kinds of Language’, 525–26.
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‘breathing from the heels’ (xi yi zhong 息以踵), the ‘sitting and forgetting’ (zuowang 坐忘), and the ‘self-reliant woman’ (nü yu 女偊) sections.559 Roth’s purpose is to show that the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter contains references to those kinds of experiences and that they relate to other ways of thinking, living, and experiencing the world which we can call ‘extrovertive mysticism’. Accordingly, Roth concludes that extrovertive mysticism appears more frequently in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter than other parts of the Zhuangzi which relate what we would call ‘introvertive mystical experiences’.560
There is an interesting difference in Roth’s conclusions concerning ‘sitting and forgetting’ in ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’ and two of his other publications. Roth gives different interpretations of the metaphysical meaning of ‘the Dao’ and the locution ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’. In ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’ Roth writes: ‘Note here the anti-metaphysical tendency of this final phrase: it implies the reality of the Way without establishing it as any kind of abstract metaphysical absolute.’561 However, this conclusion is present in neither ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, nor Original Tao.562 These three works were all published in the same year (1999), yet they present different interpretations of ‘the Dao’. In ‘Early Daoist mystical Praxis’ and Original Tao, Roth treats ‘the Dao’ as a metaphysical absolute; in ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’, he attempts to argue that ‘the Dao’ is not a metaphysical absolute. Notwithstanding this inconsistency, Roth maintains that mysticism is an important part of the Qiwu Lun chapter of the Zhuangzi. He holds that main marks of this mysticism are the different ways of understanding the world following inner cultivation practices.
In the following section of the article (‘Epistemology in the “Qiwulun”’),563 Roth gives an account of scholarship on scepticism in the ‘Qiwu Lun’. He shows differences between Chad Hansen’s, Lisa Raphals’, and Phillip Ivanhoe’s conclusions about the scepticism of the Zhuangzi: they all argue that the Zhuangzi presents a kind of scepticism, but have different
559 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 36–37; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 9/4/24- 34; 15/6/6-7; 17/6/89-93; 16/6/36-17/6/45. 560 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 19. 561 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 37; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 18. 562 See Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 157. 563 In the 2003 version of the article, the section is entitled ‘Skepticism in the ‘Qiwulun’’. cf. Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 19–21.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism conclusions as to just what kind.564 Hansen argues: ‘there is, for Zhuangzi, no standpoint from which anything can be known to be objectively true.’565 Thus, Hansen argues that the Zhuangzi presents a strong form of scepticism. On the other hand, Raphals argues that Zhuangzi uses sceptical strategies, but does not ultimately advocate a doctrine of scepticism. This is because Zhuangzi distinguishes between ‘small knowing’ (xiao zhi 小知) and ‘great knowing’ (da zhi 大知).566 Roth summarises:
The presence of the latter notion [‘great knowing’] shows that the author did not adhere to skeptical doctrines because he asserts the existence of a greater form of knowledge, something a true skeptic would never do. A true skeptic would say that we cannot know whether or not there are greater or lesser forms of knowing because we cannot know for certain whether knowing knows anything real.567
Roth then explains the differences between Hansen’s and Raphals’ interpretations of scepticism in the Zhuangzi. He writes: ‘Hansen argues that it [Zhuangzi’s scepticism] is applied to all forms of knowing; Raphals argues that there is a kind of knowing that is exempted from his skeptical critique, “illumination.”’568 Thus, we can see that Raphals holds that Zhuangzi thought there was a kind of knowing which are beyond scepticism.
Roth concurs with Raphals’ interpretation of scepticism in the Zhuangzi and seeks to expand on it. He writes: ‘I will argue that this [kind of knowing called “illumination”] represents a distinctive mode of knowing that arises in the sage after the penultimate introvertive mystical experience of merging with the Dao’.569 Here, we see that Roth expands on Raphals’ interpretation of ‘illumination’ (ming 明) into the realm of mysticism, something which Raphals only hints at.570
Roth’s expansion of Raphals’ interpretation of ‘ming’ (‘illumination’) is appropriate and edifying. In Raphals’ article, she acknowledges the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi
564 Ibid.; See also Hansen, ‘A Tao of Tao in Chuang-Tzu’, 45, et passim; Philip J. Ivanhoe, ‘Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61, no. 4 (1993): 639–54; Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’. 565 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 38; See also Hansen, ‘A Tao of Tao in Chuang-Tzu’, 44–45. 566 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 38–39; See also Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’, 30, et passim. 567 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 38–39. 568 Ibid., 39. 569 Ibid. 570 See Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’, 30.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism and the possible relation of ‘ming’ (‘illumination’) and ‘great knowing’ to mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Raphals writes: ‘What is his [Zhuangzi’s] experience of, and attitude toward, great knowing?’571 Thereupon, she lists three possibilities. The first is that ‘Zhuangzi writes as a seeker of great knowledge who has not yet experienced it’.572 The second is that Zhuangzi does not have great knowledge, but seeks it even though he is sceptical as to whether it is even possible. The third is that ‘unitive mystical experience is the source of the knowing that Zhuangzi refers to as “great”’.573
Since Raphals’ article is focused on scepticism, she explains that she focusses on the second interpretation, but does not exclude the possibility that mysticism does have some part in Zhuangzi’s epistemology. She explains it thus: ‘For the purposes of this discussion, I adopt a skeptical reading, but one that does not preclude the third, mystical approach.’574 Moreover, in endnote 29, Raphals writes: ‘These three readings merit a separate study.’575 Roth’s ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’ is a separate study of the mystical approach to interpreting the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter. It is an appropriate extension of research into mysticism in the Zhuangzi that Raphals indicates in ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’.
Roth also expands on Phillip Ivanhoe’s interpretations of scepticism in the Zhuangzi. He accepts the following conclusions from Ivanhoe: 1) Zhuangzi was not a sense skeptic; 2) Zhuangzi was not an ethical skeptic; 3) Zhuangzi was an epistemological skeptic about intellectual knowledge but not of intuitive knowledge; and 4) Zhuangzi was a language skeptic who mistrusted proposals about what is right and wrong (not that there are no right or wrong actions) and who doubted the ability of words to express the Dao.576
In this way, Roth shows that there are aspects of mysticism in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi which he can explain further than Raphals and Ivanhoe. Roth shows that Ivanhoe’s and Raphals’ analyses allow that the Zhuangzi: ‘excludes an important mode of knowledge from his sceptical probing . . . intuitive knowledge of the Dao . . . [and] the great
571 Ibid. 572 Ibid. 573 Ibid. 574 Ibid., 31. 575 Ibid., 45. 576 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 39; See also Ivanhoe, ‘Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao’, 641–49.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism knowledge of illumination.’577 Roth concludes: ‘In my analysis these are simply two aspects of the same cognitive mode that arises within the extrovertive mystical experience.’578
In the following section (‘Two Distinctive Modes of Consciousness in the “Qiwulun”’), Roth argues that two distinct modes of consciousness are related in the ‘Qiwu Lun’.579 He argues that these modes are related through two technical terms. The first is ‘weishi 為是’, meaning ‘(the “that’s it” which deems, or the contrived “that’s it”)’.580 The second is ‘yinshi 因是’, meaning ‘(the “that’s it” which goes by circumstance, or the adaptive “that’s it”)’.581 Roth concludes: ‘[t]he former involves a rigid attachment to oneself and one’s intellectual commitments; the latter involves a complete freedom from such an attachment, a freedom to act spontaneously as the situation demands. . . . . each represents a distinct mode of consciousness containing its own distinctive mode of knowing.’582
Roth explains that the Zhuangzi advocates ‘yinshi’ as a superior way of understanding and interacting with the world. He argues that acting in accordance with a ‘yinshi’ way of thinking is what the Zhuangzi means by ‘using illumination’ (yi ming 以明). The example he uses is the monkey keeper from the ‘three in the morning’ (zhao san mu si 朝三暮四) story. Roth concludes: ‘the monkey keeper is able to shift his conceptual categories — his way of conceiving the same underlying reality — to harmonize with that of the monkeys because his is not attached to any one particular way of seeing this reality.’583 Thus, Roth outlines the relation between Zhuangzi’s epistemological views and the interpretation of mysticism in the ‘three in the morning’ story. Attaining a state of perceiving the same underlying reality from different perspectives but not privileging one’s own perspective is a kind of extrovertive mysticism. It is an example of what Stace calls ‘The more concrete apprehension of the One as an inner subjectivity . . . in all things’.584
Roth argues that the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter contains several metaphors which describe such a mystical way of thinking. These metaphors are: ‘at the point of rest on the potter’s wheel . . . 休乎天均’, ‘using illumination . . . 以明’, ‘opening things up to the light of
577 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 21. 578 Ibid. 579 Ibid., 21–24. 580 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 22. 581 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 22. 582 Ibid. 583 Ibid., 23. 584 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 131.
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Heaven . . . 照之於天’, ‘great knowledge’, and ‘greatly awakened [大覺]’.585 Nevertheless, these metaphors are not descriptions of mystical praxis. They are descriptions of ways of thinking or acting that the Zhuangzi recommends.
Much of Roth’s work on mysticism emphasises the role practices and ‘inner cultivation’, including the introduction section in ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’. However, much of the article presents Roth’s interpretations of Zhuangzi’s stories concerning epistemological issues. Links between the metaphors, the stories, and more straight-forward accounts of inner-cultivation practice are tenuous. The stories and metaphors in the Zhuangzi that Roth analyses do not relate inner-cultivation practices. It therefore seems that Roth relies on a generous interpretation that the stories and metaphors he analyses are based on, and relate to, inner-cultivation practices of emptying the mind and experiences of dao.
Roth argues that attaining the ‘yinshi’ mode of thinking rests upon having had introvertive mystical experiences and that there is evidence of this kind of mysticism in the ‘Qiwu Lun’.586 Thereupon, Roth quotes the ‘Dao pervades and unifies’ passage in order to show that the Zhuangzi conveys: ‘[that] people who can penetrate through da 達 the . . . weishi mode. . . . possess the exact same ability that the Way has to “pervade and unify” (tong wei yi 通為一) all things.’587 Roth reasons that because people cannot know the Way as an object, it follows that: ‘it can only be “known” when the distinction between self and other . . . dissolves in the introvertive mystical experience of uniting with [it]’.588 Hence, Roth concludes that the ‘yinshi’ mode of thinking arises due to introvertive mystical experience and that the kind of ‘illumination’ it brings afterwards is mysticism of the extrovertive type. Furthermore, he explicitly tells the reader the significance of his conclusions concerning the interaction of two modes of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Roth expresses it thus:
The depiction of this mode of consciousness in the text of the Zhuangzi constitutes a major contribution to the cross-cultural study of extrovertive mystical experience that sets this mode squarely on a par with the
585 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 42; cf. Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 23. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 5/2/45, 5/2/47, 6/2/66, 6/2/82. Roth does not give the exact terms from the Zhuangzi for ‘greatly awakened’, but includes a citation to where they occur in the Harvard Yenching concordance. 586 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 24–28. 587 Ibid., 24–45. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4-5-37. 588 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 25.
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introvertive, thereby helping to counteract the Stacian bias and clearly indication the bimodal character of mystical experience in early China.589
Thus, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’ makes a significant contribution to situating the Zhuangzi within a broader context of mysticism. However, the article does not demonstrate that the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage relates an experience of an ultimate dao. This same oversight exists in Roth’s articles relating mysticism in the Zhuangzi to Daoist mysticism more broadly: he states that ‘sitting and forgetting’ implies merging with an ultimate dao, but does not give an argument to support that interpretation.590 In a later part of this dissertation, I give my own analysis to support such an interpretation, thereby contributing to our understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
5.10. ‘Confucianism and Daoism’ in Comparative Mysticism
Livia Kohn includes an excerpt from the Zhuangzi as a source text of Daoist mysticism in Steven Katz’s compendium of excerpts from mystical texts, Comparative Mysticism.591 Therein, Kohn refers to the Zhuangzi as containing examples of a more general Daoist mysticism. The chapter is an impressive collection of excerpts from mystical elements in the larger Daoist and Confucian traditions. In the section below, I discuss Kohn’s characterisation of the Zhuangzi in this chapter on Confucian and Daoist mysticism.
Kohn characterises mysticism in the Zhuangzi as relating practices concomitant with philosophical claims of ineffability. Kohn presents this as philosophical claims such as ineffability of the ultimate reality into which mystics, such as Zhuangzi, have gained insight. Kohn includes one (but only one) excerpt from the Zhuangzi to support this interpretation of mysticism in the text. This excerpt comes from the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter, which Kohn uses at the beginning of ‘Selection 3: The Issue of Language and Ineffability’.592 Therein, Kohn presents the excerpts from the Zhuangzi as evidence of the following characterisation of mysticism:
589 Ibid., 29. 590 See Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’, 37; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 18; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 157; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69. 591 Livia Kohn, ‘Confucianism and Daoism’, in Comparative Mysticism: An Anthology of Original Sources, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 479–538. 592 Ibid., 496–98.
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words are an empty cultural convention, whose meaning shifts with the times and circumstances and which do not have any value on their own. They detract from, rather than help to understand, reality as it is. Mystical practice, as a result, includes a critical understanding of the ultimate relativity of all verbal utterings and the eventual overcoming of language in a state of no-mind and no-speaking.593
The passages in the excerpt which Kohn includes show some of Zhuangzi’s well- known language scepticism. They begin with the ‘words are the chirping of birds’ passage. Then there is the ‘shi fei of Mohists and Confucians’. Next is the ‘relativity of this and that’ passage. The ‘pivot of Tao’ passage is next. Then comes the ‘ten thousand things are one horse’ passage. Next is the ‘relativity of acceptable and unacceptable’ passage. The ‘Tao pervades and unifies’ passage follows. Finally, there is the ‘three in the morning’ passage. I have already discussed some of these passages in this dissertation. At least one (the ‘words are the chirping of birds’ passage) features in a later part of this dissertation (in the ‘Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi’ chapter).
From Kohn’s chapter introduction, and the introduction to selection 3, it is not clear how those excerpts from the Zhuangzi relate a mystical practice of ‘no-mind and no speaking’. It is true that the passages in the excerpt relate to Zhuangzi’s ideas concerning the problems of using language to accurately communicate about objective reality and of his moral relativism. However, the extract from the Zhuangzi which Kohn quotes does not clearly communicate any mystical practice.
This ‘no-mind and no-speaking’ feature of Daoist mysticism is evident in the excerpts Kohn has included from Daoist texts of later periods, such as the Scripture of Western Ascension (Xi Sheng Jing 西升經).594 Most of the examples of Daoist mysticism in ‘Confucian and Daoism’ are from Daoism’s medieval period (200-900 CE). Kohn includes only one excerpt from the Zhuangzi, as I have outlined above. It therefore, does not present a strong argument for mysticism as a core part of the Zhuangzi.
Thus, while the chapter presents representative examples of mysticism from later developments in Daoism, it does not resolve issues I have outlined in the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. For example, interpreting the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage to
593 Ibid., 496. 594 See ibid., 498–500; See also Kohn, Taoist Mystical Philosophy: The Scripture of Western Ascension.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism relate ideas of experiencing an ultimate dao. This is a common interpretation of ‘sitting and forgetting’ and a main reason why scholars label that dialogue an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Yet, as I have indicated, and will show in greater detail in a later chapter, the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue does not self-evidently proclaim experiencing an ultimate dao. While Kohn’s contribution to Comparative Mysticism does not advance our understanding of this issue, it is edifying for introducing readers to a larger range of sources of Daoist mysticism apart from the frequently cited classics, the Laozi and the Zhuangzi.
5.11. ‘Mysticism’ in Zhuangzi Text and Context
In the chapter, ‘Mysticism’, in Zhuangzi: Text and Context, Livia Kohn presents mysticism as one of the main interpretations of the Zhuangzi. She writes: ‘Mysticism is the one label that has been attached to the Zhuangzi more often than others.’595 Thereupon, Kohn cites many instances of where scholars have claimed that mysticism is an important part of the Zhuangzi. In this way, Kohn provides her readers with an extensive discussion of sources on mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Kohn’s discussion of mysticism in the Zhuangzi reiterates the fact that many scholars have claimed that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi. In this sense, the chapter functions well as an overview of the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Nevertheless, it seems that Kohn’s intention is to present different views on mysticism in the text, rather than engage with the arguments for those views. However, it would have been helpful if Kohn had presented arguments to support interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Instead, Kohn only quotes instances where scholars have described the text as mystical.596 Such a presentation of the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi does not allow readers to understand scholars’ reasons for interpreting mysticism to be a core meaning of the text.
There seem to be inaccuracies in Kohn’s citations and her discussions of scholars’ arguments do not fully explain issues in the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. For example, Kohn’s citation and discussion of Robert Zaehner’s book, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, is an example of where the chapter could benefit from greater accuracy in citations. Kohn writes: ‘Reformulated in terms of ecstasy and embrace (Western) versus blur and spiritual dislocation (Eastern) by Arthur C. Danto (1972), this [typology of mysticism] was further expanded in the 1960s. Thus, R.C. Zaehner distinguishes three types of mysticism . . .
595 Livia Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context (Three Pines Press, 2014), 181. 596 See ibid., 181–82, 185–86.
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(1961).’597 This implies that Robert Zaehner composed his influential book, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, in the 1960s. This is incorrect. Zaehner wrote Mysticism: Sacred and Profane in the 1950s.598 The book was first published in 1957. It appears that Kohn has mistaken the date of a reprint edition which she has used in her research for the original publication, and decade, in which Zaehner’s book was written.
Mistaking the reprint date for the original publication date is a simple error which we can easily overlook. However, in this instance, such an error leads to confusion concerning historic details in the development of mysticism. Kohn refers to Zaehner’s book as though Zaehner wrote it in order to expand upon typologies of mysticism developed by Arthur Danto. This is not true. Zaehner wrote Mysticism: Sacred and Profane in order to challenge Aldous Huxley’s interpretations of mysticism and mystical experience which Huxley expressed in his book, The Doors of Perception.599 The first few chapters of Zaehner’s book refute Huxley’s claims concerning mystical experience. After refuting Huxley’s ideas, Zaehner gives his own analysis of a variety of mystical experiences in order to advance his own thesis concerning a typology of mystical experiences. Hence, Zaehner did not write Mysticism: Sacred and Profane in order to advance Danto’s ideas.
There are several instances where it would have been helpful for Kohn cite primary sources more precisely. One example is mixing specific and adequate references with vague and inadequate references. In one instance, Kohn writes: ‘One acts through the self as a spontaneous, independent organism, not by an organised object-centered self. In this sense, the zi can give rise to an inner feeling of shame (Lunyu 12.23) . . . It can develop spontaneous knowledge (Zhuangzi, ch. 2), or attain true spontaneity within (ch. 6).’600 Here, Kohn gives an adequate reference to content from the Lunyu. Yet, she gives an inadequate reference to content from the Zhuangzi. Referring the reader to the entirety of chapters 2 and 6 of the Zhuangzi is of little help should the reader wish to see what the Zhuangzi says concerning ‘spontaneous knowledge’ or ‘attain[ing] true spontaneity within’.
A consequence of such imprecision is that a reader would find it difficult to locate what content in the source text communicates what Kohn has citied. In the example above, Kohn writes as though the Zhuangzi explicitly says that the ‘self’ (zi 自): ‘can develop spontaneous
597 Livia Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context (Three Pines Press, 2014), 183. See also Arthur Coleman Danto, Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy (New York: Basic Books, 1972). 598 See Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane. 599 See Huxley, The Doors of Perception, 1954; Huxley, ‘The Doors of Perception’, 1973. 600 Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context, 2014, 193.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism knowledge’ and ‘attain true spontaneity within’. However, a reader would find it impossible to locate what content in the Zhuangzi makes such a statement. This is because the Zhuangzi does not contain locutions in classical Chinese language which literally say that the self (zi 自) can develop spontaneous knowledge, and the self (zi 自) can attain true spontaneity within. The Zhuangzi does not make such univocal claims about ‘the self’. These are arguable interpretations about a meaning of ‘self’ in the Zhuangzi, but they are not faithful summaries of what the Zhuangzi says about ‘the self’ in its own terms.
Issues in representing other scholars’ interpretations impacts Kohn’s discussion of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in Zhuangzi: Text and Context. Kohn inaccurately construes arguments concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi from Robert Allinson and Wayne Alt. Kohn writes as though both scholars argue for some interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi when the truth is actually the opposite: both Allinson and Alt argue against interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Kohn cites Allinson as a scholar who holds that ‘self transformation’ is the main aim of the Zhuangzi. However, she includes this discussion within a section on self transformation that begins by saying ‘Almost but not quite mystical is the verdict of several other scholars who read the Zhuangzi mainly as a work of self-transformation’.601 Thus, Kohn presents Allinson as one of those scholars who say that Zhuangzi is almost but not quite mystical. However, this is not true; Allinson argues that mysticism has no part in the Zhuangzi.
Kohn’s subsequent discussion of Allinson’s interpretation of self transformation in the Zhuangzi might seem to account for Allinson’s denial of mysticism as an important part of the text. However, on a close reading, we can see that Kohn does not succeed in addressing Allinson’s denial of mysticism as part of the Zhuangzi. Kohn’s final sentence about Allinson’s interpretation reads: ‘The Zhuangzi in this understanding, therefore, guides people in an expansion and transformation of the self to higher and vaster levels of being (2003, 493)-a key characteristic that would qualify as “mystical” in the reading of many other comparative scholars’.602 In my view, this is where Kohn conflates what other scholars say about mysticism in the Zhuangzi with what Allinson says. This way of including Allinson’s interpretations of self-transformation in Zhuangzi among those which hold that Zhuangzi is
601 Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context, 2014, 185. 602 Ibid., 186; See also Robert E. Allinson, ‘On Chuang Tzu as a Deconstructionist with a Difference’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30, no. 3–4 (1 September 2003): 487–500.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism almost mystical is not a faithful representation of Allinson's arguments against mysticism in text.
Allinson expresses his view that mysticism in not part of the Zhuangzi in several points in Chuang-tzu for Spiritual Transformation.603 I engage with Allinson’s arguments in more detail in chapter seven of this dissertation. Here, it is enough to show one instance where Allinson makes it clear that he does not believe that mysticism is part of the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi. He writes: ‘I have attempted to lift the Chuang-Tzu out of the realm of being . . . a paradoxical and mystical congeries which would make it a minor philosophical work.’604. Hence, Allinson wants to present the Zhuangzi as a work of first-rate philosophy and not a piece of mysticism.
The chapter ‘Mysticism’ in Zhuangzi: Text and Context also contains inaccuracies in the presentation of Wayne Alt’s arguments concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Kohn presents Alt as arguing for an interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Kohn writes: ‘It [the Zhuangzi] proposes the experience of oneness, an immediate merging with “an undifferentiated world, finding true knowledge only on the intuitive level,” in a mystical state of illumination where all distinctions collapse, “and it is no longer I who act but heaven” (Alt 2000, 3, 12).’605 However, such a construal does not faithfully represent Alt’s position concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
The main point Alt’s article ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’ is to argue against the interpretation that Zhuangzi was an anti-rationalist who advocated mystical experience. Alt writes:
I shall argue that Zhuangzi neither advocated nor adopted an antirationalist position. . . . Nor did he seek the sort of mystical understanding that Graham describes as ‘the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world.’ . . . Zhuangzi sought ming [sic] ‘clarity’ 明, and was willing to make whatever distinctions he needed to achieve it.606
603 See Robert E Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 8, 13. 604 Ibid., 13. 605 Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context, 2014, 181. cf. Wayne Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, SINO-PLATONIC PAPERS February, no. 100 (2000): 3, 12. 606 Ibid., 2; see also: Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: the Inner Chapters, 9.
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Kohn’s representation of Alt’s argument concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi does not assist the reader to better understand the difficulties of interpreting mysticism in the text. Instead, Kohn misconstrues Alt’s argument and conflates Graham’s with Alt’s. This is because it does not say ‘an undifferentiated world, finding true knowledge only on the intuitive level’ on page two or three of ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’.607 The clause ‘and it is no longer I who act but heaven’ comes from A. C. Graham’s article ‘Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of “Is” and “Ought”’.608 Alt quotes it in order to dispute it, not because he agrees with it as part of an interpretation that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi. Thus, the inaccuracies in Kohn’s presentations of other scholars’ arguments do not help readers better understand mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
5.12. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have assessed literature which situates the Zhuangzi within a spectrum of Chinese mysticism. It is evident that the scholars whose work I have critiqued in this chapter believe there to have been a more general tradition of Chinese mysticism to which the Zhuangzi belongs. Some scholars give different interpretations and different details of what Chinese mysticism involves, or what features of this mysticism are evident in the Zhuangzi. Hence, we can see differences among these scholars’ works concerning features of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This is especially evident in contributions from Livia Kohn and Harold Roth. How are we to decide whose accounts of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are more convincing?
Roth’s accounts of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are more convincing than Kohn’s. Firstly, Roth argues more explicitly than Kohn and explains features of mysticism in the Zhuangzi with quotations and analyses of textual evidence. Furthermore, Roth relates his explanations and interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi to theories of mysticism developed from literature on mysticism. Thus, Roth’s accounts of mysticism in the Zhuangzi give a fuller account than other contributions.
Nevertheless, many of Roth’s contributions that further our understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are not explicitly focussed on the Zhuangzi. They most often occur in a context of relating the Zhuangzi to Inward Training or the Laozi. The former text is the one which Roth holds to be richer in the lore of ‘inner cultivation’ (nei ye 内業) and mysticism
607 Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context, 2014, 181; Kohn cites the quoted text as coming from page 3. In fact, it is on page 2 of Alt’s article. See Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, 2. 608 See Angus Charles Graham, ‘Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of “Is” and “Ought”’, in Experimental Essays on Chuang-Tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 9. cf. Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, 12.
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5. The Zhuangzi and Chinese Mysticism than the Zhuangzi. Hence, there are some aspects of mysticism in the Zhuangzi which have been outside the scope of Roth’s contributions. One aspect is the interpretation that ‘da tong 大通’ in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue refers to an ultimate dao. This is an aspect of mysticism in the Zhuangzi I explore in a later chapter of this dissertation.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi 6. Translations of the Zhuangzi
Scholars who have translated the Zhuangzi often label the text mystical. In this chapter, I analyse how scholars who have translated the Zhuangzi present their interpretations of mysticism in the text. In this way, I show that interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi transmitted through translations are problematic because they are not in agreement with one another, nor do they give convincing accounts of mysticism.
6.1. Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer
Mysticism in the Zhuangzi is highlighted in the title of Herbert A. Giles’ translation, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer.609 However, Giles himself does not discuss the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. Instead, he invites a chapter from his colleague, Aubrey Moore, to discuss the philosophy of the Zhuangzi.610 Moore characterises Zhuangzi as a mystic. He writes: ‘Chuang Tzŭ has nothing of the sceptic in him. He is an idealist and a mystic, with all the idealist’s hatred for a utilitarian system, and the mystic’s contempt for a life of mere external activity.’611 Yet, as will become clear below, Moore does not present clear reasons for labelling Zhuangzi a mystic.
Moore supports the above characterisation of Zhuangzi as a mystic with a quotation from chapter one of the Zhuangzi. It reads: ‘“The perfect man ignores self; the divine man ignores action; the true sage ignores reputation” (p.5).’612 However, Moore does not explain how the quotation supports his above characterisation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. There is no analysis or reasoning to connect the steps in the interpretation he presents.
6.1.1. The Self
The meaning of terms like ‘self’ and ‘ignores self’, and their relation to mysticism in the Zhuangzi, is a philosophical problem which is problematic in Giles and Moore’s interpretations. In the English-language philosophical literature. ‘self’ is often understood as a free willing, autonomous person. The problem is that Giles appears to translate ‘ji 己’ as ‘self’ as if the two terms are equivalent. Moreover, Giles’ and Moore’s interpretations of mysticism
609 Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer. 610 Moore alerts the reader to this fact. He writes ‘THE translator of Chuang Tzu has asked me to append a note on the philosophy of chaps. I-VI.’ Aubrey Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, in Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1889), xviii. 611 Ibid., xx. 612 Ibid., xx. See also Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, 5; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/1/21-22 至人無己，神人無功，聖人無名.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi in the Zhuangzi include the idea that the Zhuangzi advocates experiences of ‘obliterating self’ and attaining ‘unity with God’. Thus, ‘self’ would appear to be an important part of Zhuangzi’s mysticism, yet neither Moore, nor Giles explain what conception of ‘self’ they see in the Zhuangzi. They write about this complex idea as if its meaning and significance are self-evident to the reader, but this is not the case.
In contradistinction to the notion of ‘self’, Giles and Moore propose that the Zhuangzi upholds the notion of ‘no-self’. This is problematic because the notion of ‘no-self’ has a central place in Buddhist philosophical discussions. Do Giles and Moore mean that Zhuangzi has a similar or equivalent idea to anatman (non-self) from Buddhist doctrines? They present a notion of ‘non-self’ in the Zhuangzi as if there is a widely shared consensus on its meaning, but this is not the case.
Moore and Giles’ treatment of the term implies that the Zhuangzi contains a doctrine of ‘no-self’ which is part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. However, as Chris Jochim has argued, it is not likely that the Zhuangzi has a doctrine of ‘no-self’ that is equivalent to no-self doctrines from other traditions. It is more likely that the nominalised ‘ji’ in ‘the attained person has no ego 至人無己’613 means something in the Zhuangzi’s own terms. There is no face-value reason to take Zhuangzi’s ideas of ‘no self/no ego’ as equivalent to ‘no-self’ doctrines from other cultures.614 Perhaps it is part of some mystical doctrine, but it would not be in so straightforward a sense as Moore and Giles imply.
Perhaps by ‘ignores self’, Moore means something to the effect that a person attains a state of non-dualistic experience where the ‘perfect man’ unifies with everything, or Dao, or the Ultimate. This would accord with commonly accepted ideas on the meaning of mysticism. Perhaps there is an implicit connection between Moor’s characterisation of mystics’ contempt for a life of mere external activity and Zhuangzi’s ideas of ‘ignoring self’.
6.1.2. Dao and God
We can see that Moore makes these connections by examining his remarks about chapters 6 and 7 of the Zhuangzi. Moore writes: ‘It is here that we reach (in chaps. vi, vii) what properly constitutes the mysticism of Chuang Tzu. . . . the teaching of Chuang Tzu [was:] “The true sage takes his refuge in God, and learns that there is no distinction between
613 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/1/21-22. 614 See Jochim, ‘Just Say ‘No’ to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi’.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi subject and object. This is the very axis of TAO” (p.18).’615 Thus, Moore conveys ideas about mysticism which he sees as evident in the Zhuangzi. They are the general marks of experiencing non-dualistic states with a metaphysical Ultimate. In Moore’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi, that Ultimate seems to be both ‘God’ and ‘TAO’.
However, this is a problematic point in both Moore’s interpretation and Giles’ translation. The Zhuangzi does not contain a notion of ‘God’ like that of the Christian traditions which Giles and Moore take to be normative. Yet, Giles and Moore interpret the Zhuangzi as if the text contains ideas of a personal God similar to that of Christianity.
This kind of orientalist reading of ancient Chinese texts is typical of the Victorian era and has been justly criticised by scholars such as Louis Komjathy, as I have indicated.616 To recapitulate, a personal God is not a feature of Chinese philosophy of the Warring States to early Han eras (when the Zhuangzi was composed). Nor, is a personal God an idea in the thought of Guo Xiang, who compiled the received text of the Zhuangzi in the 3rd century CE. It is inaccurate to translate terms in the Zhuangzi, like tian and dao, as ‘God’. For Moore to compound the already inaccurate interpretation and translation with his own explanations and interpretations makes the overall interpretation of the Zhuangzi in Giles’ translation misleading.
We can see more evidence of these kinds of interpretations in Moore’s comments on the significance of chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi. He concludes:
As in the moral and active region we escape from the world and self . . . so in the speculative region we get behind and beyond the contradictions of ordinary thinking . . . The sage knows nothing of the distinction between subjective and objective. . . . the sage sees the many disappearing in the One, in which subjective and objective . . . meet and blend.617
In the above quotation, Moore has given another name to Zhuangzi’s Ultimate: ‘the One’. It appears that Moore equates at least three different ideas as an Ultimate in the Zhuangzi: God, Tao, and the One. As evidence to support his interpretations, Moore quotes from parts of Giles’ translation of chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi. He writes: ‘The sage “blends everything into
615 Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xxiii. 616 See Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 4 et passim. 617 Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xx.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi one harmonious whole, rejecting comparison with this or that . . . (p.29)[”]. . . . He is “embraced in the obliterating unity of God,” . . . (p.31).’618
Yet, when we consider what the source text literally says, we find methodological difficulties with Moore’s interpretations and Giles’ translations. The source text for the ‘sage blends everything’ quotation above runs thus:
The sage appears foolish and dazed. He participates with the 10,000
harvests and unifies them into purity… and harmonises with them by
means of Heavenly allotment (聖人愚芚，參萬歲而一成純…和之以天 倪)619
The Zhuangzi passage suggests the following: unification (yi 一), harmonisation (he 和), and Heavenly allotment (tian ni 天倪). Giles’ translation of the text involves a number of extrapolations that make for an unconvincing interpretation of its meaning as evidence of mysticism. First, the term ‘blending’ is used in place of unification. The sage in Giles’ scheme is an active agent, who sets out to ‘blend’ the ten thousand harvests. Note, however, that the text itself is ambiguous on whether the sage is the active agent or whether the sage harmonises himself with the ten thousand harvests. Second, Giles’ translation contains the phrase ‘rejecting comparison of this or that’. However, the source text does not contain that phrase. It appears to be an example of overly free translation. Third, Giles has translated ‘tianni 天倪’ as ‘God’. This is an inaccurate understanding and translation of the meaning of ‘tianni’. The source text does not relate being embraced in an obliterating unity with God. Being embraced in an obliterating unity with God may have been an element of mysticism which Giles and Moore saw in the Zhuangzi, but evidence of it is not present in the part Giles’ translation which Moore quotes.
6.1.3. Comparing Zhuangzi with Ancient Greek Philosophers
Moore compares similarities in the thought of the Zhuangzi and of the ancient Greek philosophers, Heraclitus and Parmenides. He holds that they have in common ‘disparagement of sense knowledge . . . [and] true belief in the One’.620 In this way, Moore elaborates on
618 Ibid., xx. See also Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, 29. 619 Zhuangzi Yinde, 1956, 2/6/27; 7/2/90 and 7/2/92. Cf. Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 19; 郭慶藩 Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi Ji Shi, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju: Xinhua Shudian Beijing Faxingsuo Faxing 中華書 局 : 新華書店北京發行所發行, 1961), 100–101. 620 Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xx–xxi.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi some features of what he interprets is a doctrine of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This far, he has compared similarities between ‘the ONE’ of Heraclitus and the ‘blend[ing] everything into one harmonious whole’ of the Zhuangzi. He then goes on to equate them: ‘it seems to me the ‘One’ of Chuang Tzu is . . . the living Unity of Heracleitus [sic], in which contraries co- exist.’621 Here, Moore does not establish that Zhuangzi holds a view of sense knowledge that is the same as Heraclitus or Parmenides. He presents this conclusion to the reader in a didactic manner, as if he is merely introducing what the Zhuangzi says in its own terms.
Moore sees these similarities between the ‘Identity of Contraries’ (Qiwu Lun 齊物論) chapter of the Zhuangzi and the received fragments of Heraclitus’ thought.622 In particular, he quotes Giles’ translation ‘The sage “blends everything into one harmonious whole, rejecting comparison with this or that[”]. . . (p.29)’.623 This, Moore thinks, is similar to Heraclitus’ locutions to the effect: ‘the true wisdom that “All things are ONE.”’624 Thus, Moore writes: ‘Heracleitus [sic]. . . seems to have been a man after Chuang Tzu’s own heart not only in his obscurity . . . but in his indifference to worldly position . . . and in his supercilious disregard for the learned’.625 I appreciate Moore’s indications of similarities between the thought of Heraclitus and the author of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi concerning indifference to worldly position and disregard for the learned; perhaps such similarities could be the starting point for a separate inquiry of comparative philosophy. Yet, the affinity of ideas may not be as straight-forward as Moore implies when it comes to more abstract, philosophical aspects. It is possible that an ancient Greek philosopher such as Heraclitus would have meant something by his ‘ONE’ that is different from statements about ‘oneness’ or ‘blending things into one harmonious whole’ in the Zhuangzi. In my view, more detailed comparison and argumentation is needed before we can have a clearer understanding of similarities between abstract philosophical ideas in Heraclitus and the Zhuangzi.
In the next section of the article, Moore contrasts mysticism in the Zhuangzi with Western mysticism from ancient Greece until the 19th century (his own era). He writes:
Heracleitus is not a mystic, though he is the founder of a long line, which through Plato, and Dionysius the Areopagite, and John the Scot in the ninth century, and Meister Eckhart in the thirteenth, and Jacob Bohme in
621 Ibid., xxi. 622 Ibid., xx–xxiii. 623 Ibid., xx. See also Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, 29. 624 Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xxi. Moore cites from ‘Heracl. Eph. Rell. i’. 625 Ibid., xxi.
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the sixteenth, reaches down to Hegel. . . In Greek thought the attempt to get rid of consciousness, and to become the unconscious vehicle of a higher illumination, is unknown till the time of Philo. Yet this is the teaching of Chuang Tzu.626
In the above quotation, Moore presents his view that the Zhuangzi goes further than ancient Greek philosophers in presenting a doctrine of mysticism. An important feature of this doctrine, as Moore sees it, is to get rid of consciousness. However, Moore does not elaborate on what he means by consciousness, or what he thinks the Zhuangzi presents as a notion of consciousness. Nevertheless, Moore presents quotations of Giles’ translation as evidence: ‘“The true sage takes his refuge in God, and learns that there is no distinction between subject and object. This is the very axis of TAO” (p.18). Abstraction from self, then, is the road which leads to TAO (chap.vi).’627 However, Moore does not justify this conflation of God with TAO. This kind of conflation is historically and conceptually inappropriate, as I have explained above.628
6.1.4. Comparing Zhuangzi with Christianity
Moore also presents questionable comparisons between the Zhuangzi and Christianity. He writes: ‘The protest of Chuang Tzu against externality, . . . might easily be translated into Christian language. For Christianity also teaches inwardness’.629 Moore reasons that Zhuangzi is similar to Christianity (and also Buddhism) because it contains teachings that ‘appealed to those deeper instincts of humanity’.630 According to Moore, the most profound of these ‘deeper instincts of humanity’ evident in the Zhuangzi is that ‘the sage seeks for the Absolute, the Infinite, the Eternal. He seeks to attain to TAO. It is here that we reach (in chaps. vi,vii) what properly constitutes the mysticism of Chuang-Tzu.’631 Here, we see that for Giles and Moore, ideas of attaining Dao in the Zhuangzi are what they equate with inwardness and attaining the Absolute from doctrines more familiar to them, such as those found in
626 Ibid., xxiii. 627 Ibid., xxiii; Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, 18. 628 James Legge also criticises Giles’ inaccurate translations of Chinese terms as ‘God’. See Legge, The Texts of Taoism, 1962, 1:17–19 On page 17, Legge writes: ‘Everywhere on his [Giles’] pages there appears the great name ‘God ;’ [sic] — a blot on his translation more painful to my eyes and ears than the use of ‘Nature’ for TAO . . . I know that Mr. Giles’ plan in translating is to use strictly English equivalents for all kinds of Chinese terms. The plan is good where there are in the two languages such strict equivalents; but in the case before us there is no ground for its application.’ 629 Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xxiii. 630 Ibid. 631 Ibid.
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Christianity. They do not specify which Christian doctrines; they appear to assume that the doctrines of Christianity are normative and that the reader is already familiar with them.
Such comparisons between Zhuangzi and Christianity are further evidence of the orientalist mode of interoperating the Zhuangzi in Moore and Giles’ thought. They compare the Zhuangzi to Christianity because in their minds Christianity is ‘true’, or at the least, a more familiar and ‘proper’ standard against which ‘other’ traditions and thoughts can, and should, be judged. To put it another way, neither Moore nor Giles compare Christianity to the Zhuangzi because, from their point of view, the Zhuangzi could never have the same normativity as Christianity. Thus, the manner in which Moore compares the Zhuangzi to Christianity inherently places the Zhuangzi in an inferior position as an ‘other’ which must be understood according to normative traditions of Western thought, religion, philosophy, and morality, such as those of Christianity. This does not make for a culturally sensitive introduction to the thought of the Zhuangzi, or Daoism.
6.1.5. Contribution to the Ruling Theory of Daoism
Furthermore, Giles and Moore write as if ‘dao’ in the Zhuangzi and Daoism in general is a self-evidently unambiguous expression of a metaphysical absolute akin to ‘God’ from Western traditions. This kind of interpretation of Chinese classical texts is problematic because it is rooted in ethnocentric Western preoccupations as to what philosophical texts ought to be about. Moreover, this kind of interpretation reveals an ingrained idea among writers on mysticism that there is an objective Absolute which various cultures experience and express differently.
However, Daoist texts, such as the Zhuangzi, do not unambiguously present discourses on a mystical union with a metaphysical absolute called ‘the dao’. They do not present meta- language familiar to Western enthusiasts of mysticism such as ‘merge with the ultimate’. Such language did not exist in Classical Chinese language contemporaneous with the Zhuangzi, so it is not possible for the Zhuangzi to self-evidently present ideas to the reader as ‘mystical quests’ for ‘union with the ultimate’. These are interpretations that Giles’ translation and Moore’s introduction helped to create and transmit to Western readers.
Chad Hansen has challenged this kind of interpretation of Daoism, which he calls ‘the ruling theory’ or ‘standard interpretive theory’ of Daoism, in A Daoist Theory of Chinese
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Thought.632 Hansen reasons that Daoists would not have radically altered the meaning and reference of dao from a general guiding discourse, path, or way of doing something (as the term was generally used in Classical Chinese language and thought) to an absolute metaphysical entity. Hansen shows that on a basic linguistic level, we can plausibly interpret classical Daoist texts to discourse on dao in ways that do not present dao as a metaphysical ultimate. Thus, instead of ‘The Dao which can be told is not the constant Dao’, we can plausibly interpret the opening words of the Laozi to say ‘Ways that can be told are not constant ways’.633 In his own translation of the Laozi, Hansen interprets the opening line to mean: ‘Ways can be guided; they are not fixed ways’.634
Thus, we see that the philosophical interpretation of what Daoism discourses about influences our understanding of what the texts literally say and philosophically communicate at certain points. We can easily understand this point in relation to the interpretation of Daoist meanings of ‘dao (道)’. If we are already committed to interpretations of a mystical Absolute, then we easily interpret many, if not all, Daoists discourses on dao to be about just such a metaphysical Absolute. However, if we consider Chinese intellectual history in our reading of these texts, we can see that there is no face-value reason to assume that all Daoist discourses on dao self-evidently talk of a metaphysical, mystical Absolute. Dao has many plausible meanings besides a metaphysical, mystical Absolute. We should, therefore, consider the possibility that Daoists texts have something to say about these other meanings of dao, and that they are not exclusively concerned with discoursing on dao as a metaphysical, mystical Absolute.
This is not to say that no Daoist discourses on dao could be about an absolute dao. In fact, there arguably is a kind of absolute, or great, dao in Daoism, called ‘the Great Dao’ (dadao 大道).635 This kind of dao is not self-evidently a metaphysical Absolute, but it is evidently greater than many, and possibly all, other kinds of dao. Hence, I think that we can call such a dao a kind of ‘Absolute’ in that it is greater than all other kinds and also bearing in mind that it is not a self-evident metaphysical object, as Hansen strongly argues. Hansen gives the following interpretation of the Great Dao in the Laozi: ‘If we assimilate the entire scope of daos to a single cosmic “performance-dao”, we can call that Great Dao. Great Dao would be the entire history of everything from the Big Bang to the featureless fizzle we are
632 See Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 26–27, 50, 215 et passim. 633 See ibid., 216. 634 Laozi, Tao Te Ching on The Art of Harmony, 38. 635 The term dadao occurs in the Laozi chapters 18, 25, 34, & 53.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi destined to become.’636 Therefore, it is clear that some Daoists have had ideas of an ultimate, all encompassing, Great Dao. However, discerning the nature of Great Dao in the many contexts in which the idea may occur requires philosophical, linguistic, and historical sensitivity. This kind of sensitivity is not often present in early attempts to translate and interpret Daoist texts, such as those of Giles and Moore. These authors were already committed to metaphysical, mystical interpretations of Daoists texts. Thus, they did not engage in deeper philosophical reflection on what the texts might more pragmatically communicate, grammatically as well as philosophically.
Hansen argues that Daoists, such as Laozi and Zhuangzi, are not advocating a metaphysical, mystical, ultimate dao. Instead, Hansen sees classical Daoists as participating in the philosophical discussions of classical China wherein they present critiques of Confucian and Mohist ‘ways’, i.e., their guiding discourses (dao). Thus, Hansen concludes: ‘For Laozi, what lacks constancy is not the experienced world of particular physical objects, but the system of name use. No unchangeable systems of discourse exist. This is so not because things change, but because names (and their distinctions) do.’637 In sum, Hansen argues that classical Daoists, such as Laozi and Zhuangzi, discourse on a plurality of ways as guiding principles: this is how we should ordinarily understand dao in classical Daoist texts, according to Hansen.638 It is with this interpretation of the purport of classical Daoist texts that Hansen challenged the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism, of which Giles’ work, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, is one of the main sources.
In sum, the way in which Moore (and Giles) present the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism is problematic. Moore’s understanding of the Zhuangzi does not come from an engagement with the text on its own terms. For Moore, the Zhuangzi does not appear to have its own integrity as a text with its own voice. It only has legitimacy when compared with Western thought, including Christian doctrines. This approach is rooted in Victorian-era colonialism and ethno-centrism which saw colonised people and their traditions, including their intellectual traditions, as ‘other’ and ‘lesser’ than those of the West.639
Giles’ translation and Moore’s explanation of the Zhuangzi helped propagate the understanding that the Zhuangzi must be approached in relation to Western thought in order
636 Laozi, Tao Te Ching on The Art of Harmony, 28. 637 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 218. 638 Ibid., 267–68; See also Laozi, Tao Te Ching on The Art of Harmony, 26–28, 38. 639 See also Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 4–5. Therein, Komjathy presents very strong criticism of ‘the ‘Victorian’ or ‘Leggean view’ of Daoism’.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi to be understood. Hence, Giles’ translation and interpretation of the Zhuangzi is a product of his times and contains short-comings typical of the age. It has provided a base from which more culturally sensitive engagement with the Zhuangzi, Daoism, and Chinese thought began.
6.2. Musings of a Chinese Mystic
Lionel Giles labels Zhuangzi a mystic in Musings of a Chinese Mystic.640 This implies that the thought of the Zhuangzi is mystical and that the text contains a doctrine of mysticism. However, L. Giles’ book does not present detailed analysis to help the reader understand the purportedly mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi. For example, Giles writes: ‘[Zhuangzi] deposes Tao from its premier position as the Absolute, and puts T’ien in its place. Tao becomes a mystic moral principle . . . The truth is that neither consistence of thought nor exact terminology can be looked for in Chinese philosophy’.641
Here, Giles appears to use the term ‘mystic’ with its connotations of ‘closed off’, ‘mysterious’, and ‘esoteric’. However, he provides no analysis which explains Zhuangzi’s mystic dao to the reader. Moreover, Giles purpose in the quotation above is to demonstrate that Chinese philosophers, such as the authors of the Zhuangzi, did not use terms consistently. We can infer that in Giles’ understanding, lack of consistency with doctrines concerning the nature of ultimate reality partly constitutes mysticism. This will become clearer below where I demonstrate Giles’ closing remarks disparaging mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Giles’ purpose in disparaging Chinese philosophers’ use of terminology is to move beyond what he sees as the ‘barren discussion as to the relative position of Tao and T’ien . . . [and on to] Chuang Tzu’s greatest achievement in the region of pure thought’.642 It is in this section of Giles’ introduction to the Zhuangzi that we see more of his understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. For example, Giles writes that according to the Zhuangzi: ‘Contraries no longer stand in sharp antagonism, but are in some sense actually identical with each other, because there is a real and all-embracing Unity behind them.’643 This is an allusion to content from chapter two of the Zhuangzi (Qiwu Lun). Yet, a reader can only make this connection if he/she is already familiar with the Zhuangzi.
As we read Giles’ introduction to the Zhuangzi, we have to keep in mind that Giles thinks Zhuangzi is a mystic. Therefore, when he points out significant features of thought in
640 Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic. 641 Ibid., 17. 642 Ibid. 643 Ibid., 18.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi the Zhuangzi, there is likely to be a connection between their content and his interpretation of mysticism. In the quotation above, the connection is between interpretations of unity with an ultimate Reality articulated in the Zhuangzi and the idea that unity with an Ultimate is a feature of mysticism. Giles gives further evidence of these connections. He writes:
[Zhuangzi] is an idealist . . . and will not seriously question the existence of a permanent Reality underlying the flow of phenomena. True wisdom then consists in withdrawing from one’s own individual standpoint and entering into ‘subjective relation with all things.’ He who can achieve this . . . is able to descry an ultimate Unity in which they are merged, a mysterious One which ‘blends, transcends them all.’644
Lionel Giles’ quotations are from Herbert Giles’ translation of the Zhuangzi. Lionel Giles does not give footnotes for these quotations, so it would be an onerous task to locate his quotations in H. Giles’ translation of the Zhuangzi. Nevertheless, it is clear that L. Giles sees features of thought which he takes to be consistent with a received idea of doctrines of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. They are ideas like an ultimate Reality, entering into subjective relation with everything, perceiving an ultimate Unity with a mysterious One, etc.
Yet, it is not clear what exactly in the text of the Zhuangzi corresponds to these ideas. Giles has not properly quoted or analysed content from the Zhuangzi as evidence of these interpretations. He merely quotes from H. Giles’ translation in an ad hoc manner among his own interpretations and introductions of what the Zhuangzi says. This is neither a sophisticated, nor edifying way of introducing readers to the thought of the Zhuangzi.
6.2.1. Quietism and the Zhuangzi
Following from these ideas, Giles relates what he considers to be ‘the quietist ideal’ of the Zhuangzi. By ‘quietist’, Giles means that the Zhuangzi wants us to take Dao as ‘our model’ in order to balance our minds, thereby becoming: ‘passive and quiescent, making no effort in any direction.’645 Giles explains that: ‘[this] consists in following nature, or taking the line of least resistance. The attainment of this state, and the spiritual blessings accruing therefrom, constitute the main theme of Chuang Tzu’s discourse.’646 Thus, we can see that quietism, and associated ideas like attaining states of spiritual blessings, form part of Giles’
644 Ibid., 18–19. 645 Ibid., 19. 646 Ibid.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi understanding of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.647 In this way, Giles associates quietism with the main theme of the Zhuangzi in his view, i.e., ‘musings of a Chinese mystic’.
However, the Zhuangzi does not actually say ‘take the line of least resistance’, contrary to Giles’ explanation to that effect. Nevertheless, we can understand the skill masters in the Zhuangzi to ‘take the line of least resistance’ in their activities.648 They attain states where they no longer need to force things, so Giles is not wrong to say that the Zhuangzi has a message of ‘take the line of least resistance’.
It is still, however, not clear how ‘taking the line of least resistance’ would be part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The practice of mysticism surely requires a great deal of effort. One must go through mind-conditioning (or de-conditioning) practices over a long period of time in order to realise mystical experience and gain ‘knowledge by acquaintance’649 of one’s mystical tradition. Perhaps in the Zhuangzi, mystical quests involve cultivating practices and training in order to attain a state of ‘taking the line of least resistance’ or ‘going with the flow’, as Chris Joachim has suggested in one article.650 Nevertheless, Giles’ introduction to Musings of a Chinese Mystic does make such an interpretation clear.
The problems in L. Giles’ explanation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are still more complex. As part of his explanation quoted above, Giles writes that Zhuangzi has a quietist, mystic message which involved ‘mak[ing] no effort in any direction’. This, however, is an inappropriate understanding of the Zhuangzi. Just because the skill masters in the Zhuangzi attain a state of ‘going with the flow’, it does not mean that they put no effort into what they are doing. The Cook Ding story illustrates my point here: Cook Ding still has to actually perform the activity of butchering. He is exceptional in that he masters the activity through not forcing things. He has a special method of cultivating a dao of butchering which has significance for ‘the secret of nurturing life’ (Yang Sheng Zhu 養生主), the theme of the chapter.651 In order to have achieved such a state, Cook Ding must have gone through many years of effort and cultivation of his knack, as he does indeed say in the dialogue.652
647 For more on quietism in the Zhuangzi and early Daosim, see Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’; Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 28, 30, 46; Waley, The Way and Its Power, 43–51, 116–20; Ching, Chinese Religions, 92, 94. 648 On skill masters in the Zhuangzi, see Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 178–80; Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 156–59. 649 See also Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 20. 650 See Jochim, ‘Just Say ‘No’ to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi’. 651 See also Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 63–64. 652 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 8/3/9-11.
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Giles makes it sound as though the authors of the Zhuangzi contains statements to the effect of instructing readers that they can attain spiritual blessings by following a quietist, mystic path explained within the text. However, the quotation which Giles uses as evidence of such a doctrine of quietism, spiritual blessings, and mysticism does not contain such terminology. As evidence of these labels, L. Giles quotes from H. Giles’ translation of the Zhuangzi: ‘Resolve your mental energy into abstraction, your physical energy into inaction. . . . fall in with the natural order of phenomena, without admitting the element of self.’653 The quoted part of the text does not explicitly talk about ‘quietism’, ‘spiritual blessings’, or ‘mysticism’. The source text does not communicate in its own terms what Giles claims are the main points of the text.
6.2.2. Eliminating Self
From the quotation above, we can see that according to Giles, ‘elimination of self’ is part of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This raises the question of what ‘elimination of self’ means. Giles explains it thus: ‘elimination of self . . . is in truth, the substitution of . . . Tao for one’s own narrow individuality.’654 However, the text of the Zhuangzi does not say ‘elimination of self’ in classical Chinese language. This is Giles’ own interpretation of what the Zhuangzi communicates based on his understanding of H. Giles’ translation.
Moreover, as I have pointed out above, H. Giles’ translation, together with Moore’s introduction, contain several inaccuracies in lexical choices (for instance ‘God’ for ‘tian 天’), but also in how they present the ideas of the Zhuangzi (like ‘ignores self’). L. Giles appears to have taken such translations and presentations of the Zhuangzi’s thought to be correct and faithful representations of the source text. He has then expanded upon their transmission with his own explanations and interpretations of the meaning of what the Zhuangzi communicates.
We can see further examples of these kinds of interpretations in how Giles continues to explain ‘elimination of self’. These further explanations of ‘elimination of self’ also relate some of Giles’ interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Giles writes:
Tao . . . is also profoundly unconscious — a strange attribute, which at once fixes a gulf between our idea of a personal God. . . . Chuang Tzu
653 Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic, 19 Giles does not give a citation for this quoted part of the translated text of the Zhuangzi. It is, therefore, difficult to verify if the source text really says what he has quoted from H. Giles’ translation. . 654 Ibid., 18–19. See also Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, 230, 242.
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would have us strive so far as may be to a like unconsciousness. But . . . . he advocates not universal suicide . . . but a state of mental abstraction which shall involve at least a total absence of self-consciousness.655
Here, Giles is continuing the Victorian-era legacy of viewing non-Western ideas, concepts, and philosophies, in relation to supposedly normative, Western ideas, concepts, and philosophies. In the quotation above, Giles is conveying the idea that not having a personal god is ‘strange’ and that substituting a non-personal Dao for one’s own individuality (i.e., union with Dao) needs to have its ‘strangeness’ explained-away.
Hence, Giles argues that illustrations from the Zhuangzi, such as the Cook Ding story,656 are examples of ‘[the] application of Tao in the humble sphere of handicrafts serv[ing] to point the way towards the higher regions of abstract contemplation’.657 But what in the Zhuangzi constitutes examples of the higher regions of abstract contemplation to which Giles alludes? Giles only mentions the Cook Ding story, but does not analyse what the text says in order to explain how it is an example of higher abstract contemplation. He gives some general explanations like ‘the mind must be freed from its own criteria, and all one’s trust must be placed in natural intuition.’658 Although these ideas may be evident in the Zhuangzi, Giles has not identified them clearly, nor has he explained how they are related as part of a doctrine of mysticism in the text.
6.2.3. Denouncing the Mysticism of the Zhuangzi
Having thus indicated what he considers to be elements of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, Giles then appraises the thought of the Zhuangzi. These appraisals make it clear that Giles considers mysticism in the Zhuangzi to be a weakness in its thought. Giles writes: ‘In order to set forth his views with more startling effect, he [Zhuangzi] certainly laid undue stress on the mystical side of Lao Tzu’s philosophy, to the exclusion of much that was better worth handling.’659 By ‘better worth handling’, Giles means the Zhuangzi’s ‘doctrine of spontaneity’ associated with inaction (wuwei 無為).660 It seems peculiar to label the Zhuangzi mystical on the whole, give many examples of elements of the its thought which relate to a broader
655 Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic, 19–20. 656 The Cook Ding story is at the beginning of chapter three of the Zhuangzi (Yangsheng Zhu 養生主). It is well-known to experts on the Zhuangzi, some of whom also argue that there is something mystical in it. See Yearley, ‘Zhuangzi’s Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State’. 657 Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic, 20. 658 Ibid., 21. 659 Ibid., 21–22. 660 Ibid., 22; On spontaneity in the Zhuangzi, see Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 6–8.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi category of mysticism, but then go on to elaborate on elements of the text which Giles judges to be better because they better ‘meet the necessities of actual life.’661 Even so, that is exactly what Giles does.
Giles concludes his introduction to the thought of the Zhuangzi by denouncing the place of mysticism in the text. He writes: ‘a far greater number of readers will be attracted by his [Zhuangzi’s] originality and grace [of philosophical thought and Classical Chinese prose] than repelled by the rather fantastic vagaries of his mysticism.’662 Thus, Giles concludes his exposition on the philosophy of the Zhuangzi by telling us that he considers mysticism, especially that of the Zhuangzi, to be vague and repelling. Therefore, while acknowledging that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi, Giles’ contribution does not analyse what parts of the text are examples of this mysticism. Nor does Giles explain the significance of mysticism to an overall message of the Zhuangzi, even though Giles’ book entails that mysticism is part of the overall meaning (for it is entitled Musings of a Chinese Mystic).
Furthermore, Giles is wrong in his assertion to the effect that mysticism is not something people studying the Zhuangzi would find appealing. Interpreting the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism is a view that scholars have propounded for over a century. Moreover, this dissertation is a sustained inquiry into the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi: mysticism in the Zhuangzi is the raison d'être of this dissertation.
6.3. Chuang-Tzŭ: A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang
Feng Youlan’s 馮友蘭 translation of the Inner Chapters contains an introduction wherein he explains some of the main points of the Zhuangzi’s philosophy. In regards to the meaning and significance of Daoism (including the Zhuangzi), Feng writes: ‘Some people said that Taoism is naturalistic and scientific, while others said that it is mystic and religious. In fact it is both.’663 Hence, mysticism forms a basic part of the meaning and significance of the Zhuangzi and Daoism in Feng’s view.
Feng identifies several aspects of mysticism which he argues are important to major themes of the Zhuangzi. For example, there is the idea that ‘all is one’ which we commonly find in mystical texts and writings on mysticism. Feng identifies this idea where the Zhuangzi discourses on dao. Feng quotes from chapter 22 of the text ‘Knowledge Wandering North’
661 Giles, Musings of a Chinese Mystic, 22. 662 Ibid., 36. 663 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 5.
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(Zhi Bei You 知北遊) as evidence of an ‘all-is-one’ idea regarding a conception of dao in the Zhuangzi. He quotes: ‘You should not specify any particular thing [about dao]. There is not a single thing without Tao . . . There are three terms: complete, all-embracing, and the whole. These three names are different, but denote the same reality; all refer to the one thing.’664 In this way, Feng indicates that, in his understanding, knowledge of how all things refer to the same all-embracing reality of dao relates to the generally mystic and religious aspect of Daoism and the Zhuangzi.
Feng further emphasises this aspect of unity. He elaborates on how the Daoist idea of an ultimate Dao relates to unity. He writes:
Tao is not something transcending the world. It is in the world. . . . It is the whole. . . . The whole of the spontaneity or naturalness of the world. . . . Everything spontaneously just is what it is . . . Taoism destroyed the popular . . . conception of God . . . In this respect, Taoism is naturalistic. Yet, since there is the total spontaneity of all things, there is still unity in of the world665
The popular conception of ‘God’ to which Feng refers most likely refers to ‘Tian’ (天), the supreme deity of the early Zhou dynasty (1046-771 BCE).666 This implies that in the Zhuangzi, and Daoism, ‘unity with the Ultimate’ probably does not mean unity with a transcendent ‘God’. Instead, Feng is pointing out the ‘oneness’, ‘the Ultimate’, etc., in the Zhuangzi is more about dao which has no personal characteristics, but is rather like the totality of what spontaneously exists.667 For Feng, mystical unity in the Zhuangzi pertains to this kind of oneness.
Feng not only argues that the Zhuangzi contains an ‘all is one’ idea, but that the text shows evidence that people can have the experience of ‘identify[ing] ourselves with the universe’ in what he calls ‘pure experience’.668 Feng supports his explanation of experiencing oneness in the Zhuangzi with a well-known quotation from chapter 6, ‘The Great Ancestor as
664 Ibid., 6; Cf. Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 59/22/46-47.‘汝唯莫必，無乎逃物。至道若是，大言亦然。 周、遍、咸三者，異名同實，其指一也。’. 665 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 6–8. 666 See also Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). 667 See also Burik, The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism, 96–97. 668 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 15–17.
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Teacher’ (Da Zong Shi 大宗師). He writes: ‘The ignorant do not see that no matter how well you conceal things, smaller ones in larger ones, there will always be a chance for them to escape. But it you conceal the universe in the universe, there will be no room left for it to escape. That is the great truth of things.’669 Feng interprets the passage thus: ‘This shows that if we identify ourselves with the universe, we can never be lost. If we can see all things as one, and identify ourselves with the one, then, through all the changes of the world, our existence will eternally endure.’670
What does it mean to identify ourselves with the one, or the universe, or dao? Feng continues to explain this idea. Feng continues his explanation of identifying ourselves with ‘the one’ in what he calls ‘pure experience’. He writes: ‘Pure experience is the experience in which we have no intellectual knowledge, in which we simply take the immediate presentation.’671 That is to say, Feng holds that in the Zhuangzi there is evidence on unmediated consciousness that forms part of identifying oneself with the whole.
However, if we put the passage which Feng quotes in context, we can see that the Zhuangzi does not have as straightforward a message to the effect of identify yourself with the whole. In context, the Zhuangzi says:
6.3.1. The Great Clump
Brook Ziporyn’s Translation Source text
The Great Clump burdens me with physical 夫大塊載我以形，勞我以生，佚我以 form, labors me with life, eases me with old 老，息我以死。故善吾生者，乃所以善 age, rests me with death. So it is precisely 吾死也。夫藏舟於壑，藏山於澤，謂之 because I consider my life good that I 固矣。然而夜半有力者負之而走，昧者 consider my death good. You may hide a 不知也。藏大小有宜，猶有所遯。若夫 boat in a ravine or a net in a swamp, thinking 藏天下於天下，而不得所遯，是恆物之 it is secure there. But in the middle of the night, a mighty one comes along and carries 大情也。 it away on his back, unbeknownst to you in your slumber. When the smaller is hidden
669 Ibid., 14–15; cf. Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 43; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/25-26.‘昧者不知也。藏大小 有宜，猶有所遯。若夫藏天下於天下，而不得所遯，是恆物之大情也’. 670 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 15. 671 Ibid., 15.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi within the larger, there remains someplace into which it can escape. But if you hide the word in the world, so there is nowhere left for anything to escape to, this is an arrangement, the vastest arrangement, that can sustain all things.
This human form is merely a circumstance 特犯人之形而猶喜之，若人之形者，萬 that has been met with, just something 化而未始有極也，其為樂可勝計邪！故 stumbled into, but those who have become 聖人將遊於物之所不得遯而皆存。善妖 humans take delight in in nonetheless. Now 善老，善始善終，人猶效之，又況萬物 the human form in its time undergoes ten 之所係，而一化之所待乎！673 thousand transformations, never stopping for an instant — so the joys it brings must be beyond calculation! Hence, the sage uses it to roam [you 遊] in that from which nothing ever escapes, where all things are maintained. Early death, old age, the beginning, the end — this allows him to see each of them as good. People may try to model themselves on him. But they would be better off emulating what ties all things together, on which depends even their slightest transformation, on which depends to total mass of transformation that they are!672
This quotation comes from a section of text in the Zhuangzi which deals with life and death. Feng does not include the beginning of the quotation, a well-known reference to the Great Clod (Da Kuai 大塊) as a synonym for an ultimate dao. Moreover, the whole passage, quoted in full above, shows that the Zhuangzi is communicating a message that has more to
672 Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 43. 673 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/24-29.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi do with reconciling oneself with the process of life and death as an ongoing transformation. It does not explicitly say identify yourself with the whole.
Feng argues that parts of chapter two (Qiwu Lun) of the Zhuangzi exemplify what he calls pure experience. They are the ‘knowledge of the ancients was perfect’ and the ‘there are some that have no knowledge of the fact that they have no knowledge’ passages.674 Feng quotes from his own translation of the Zhuangzi in his introduction: ‘The knowledge of the ancients is perfect. . . . At first, they did not yet know that there were things (they had experience, but no intellectual knowledge.)’675 Feng reasons that passages such as this in the Zhuangzi are evidence that: ‘in the state of pure experience, what is known as the union of the individual with the whole is reached.’676
Yet, Feng’s explanation of the meaning of the text does not contain analysis of the quoted source text. He presents an interpretation as if the conclusions he has reached are what the text self-evidently means. It is as though Feng sees his role as the translator/interpreter of the archaic classical Chinese text as one wherein he re-tells the self-evident meaning of the text in a more modern language and in a more systematic manner. However, he has not explained the connections between the quoted parts of the Zhuangzi and his explanations. His reasoning process appears to run thus: The Zhuangzi says a. This means b. However, there is no explanation to the effect a in the Zhuangzi means b because of c. This final ‘because of c’ step in reasoning is not present in Feng’s introduction to the Zhuangzi. (I have more to say about this kind of methodological short-coming in the interpretation of Classical Chinese texts in chapter 8 of this dissertation).
In Feng’s introduction to the Zhuangzi, the connection between what he calls ‘pure experience’, the individual being absorbed or unified with the whole, and mysticism is implicit. However, in the main body of his translation, Feng adds a more explicit connection. He writes: ‘In these paragraphs, Chuang Tzu gradually passed from the discussion of the rational knowledge of the nondistinction [sic] of right and wrong to that of the mystic experience of union of the individual with the whole.’677 We can therefore see that Feng understands the Zhuangzi to contain a doctrine of oneness which makes the text mystical.
674 See Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 53-55-56; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/5/40-43; 2/5/47-51. 675 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 16, 53. 676 Ibid., 16. 677 Ibid., 54.
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There are more connections between pure experience and mystical experience. For example, Feng acknowledges that he has borrowed the term ‘pure experience’ from William James and quotes James in order to further explain this idea. He writes: ‘We simply take “the that at its face value, neither more nor less; and taking it at its face value means, first of all, to take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves with abstract talk about it.” — James, “Essays in Radical Empiricism,” pp.13, 48.’678Again, in the main body of his translation, Feng makes the connections between these ideas of pure experience, oneness, and mysticism more explicit. He writes: ‘Chuang Tzu gradually passed . . . to the mystic experience of union of the individual with the whole. This union is attained in the world of pure experience, to use James’s terminology.’679 Here, Feng equates his usage of James’ ‘pure experience’ with mystic experience as he interprets it in the Zhuangzi.
6.3.2. True People
Feng argues that descriptions of the ‘true man’ (zhenren 真人) and the ‘perfect man’ (zhiren 至人) from the Zhuangzi are exemplars of people who have had ‘pure experience’ (which Feng equates with mystic experience, as we have seen above). They are the ‘true men of old’ and the ‘mind like a mirror’ passages from chapter 6, ‘The Great Ancestor as Teacher’, and chapter 7, ‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ (Ying Di Wang), respectively.680 Feng quotes from his own translation of the Zhuangzi to explain the ‘true man’. He writes: ‘Living, he experienced no elation; dying, he offered no resistance; unconsciously he went, unconsciously he came, that is all.’681 Feng presents this as an example of the ‘perfect man’682 ‘respond[ing], but without knowledge . . . [because he is] [i]n the state of pure experience’.683 However, it is not clear whether the part of the Zhuangzi which Feng quotes shows evidence of being absorbed into the whole. We can therefore reason that mysticism is not just about oneness. There are other marks of mystical experience.684
678 Ibid., 15. See also William James, Essays in Radical Empericism (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 13, 48. 679 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 54–55. 680 See Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 15/6/6-8; 21/7/32-33. 681 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 17. Cf. Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 15/6/6-8‘古之真人，其寢不夢，其覺無憂，其 食不甘，其息深深. . . . 古之真人，不知說生，不知惡死；其出不訢，其入不距；翛然而往，翛 然而來而已矣’. 682 It would be more accurate to say the ‘true man’. The part of the text Feng quotes from says ‘zhenren 真人’ not ‘zhiren 至人’. It seems that Feng treats them as synonyms. 683 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 17. 684 See also Daniel Coyle, ‘On the Zhenren’, in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 200–201, 204–5.
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Feng explains some of these other marks. The first is the perfect man responding but without knowledge because he is in the state of ‘pure experience’, as we have seen above. Feng treats locutions in the Zhuangzi such as ‘翛然而往，翛然而來而已矣’ as indications of markers of pure experience (which he holds is a mystical union with the whole). However, I am not so sure that the Zhuangzi is relating mystical union with the whole at that point. Firstly, the text does not explicitly say anything to that effect. Secondly, Feng translates ‘翛然 而往，翛然而來而已矣’ as ‘unconsciously he went, unconsciously he came, that is all’. Yet, this translation attributes explicitly-expressed ideas of consciousness and unconsciousness to the authors of the Zhuangzi, which is not accurate. A less fanciful interpretation of what the text says allows us to translate ‘翛然而往，翛然而來而已矣’ as ‘they came with ease and they left with ease, and that is all’.
This interpretation of ‘xiaoran 翛然’ accords with more ordinary usage of the term that is also explained in commentaries.685 Commentators explain ‘xiaoran 翛然’ in ways that emphasise the air of ease which the term expresses. For example, Guo Xiang’s comment explains the whole sentence as: ‘Such a marvellous principle means that one can come and go without difficulty 奇之至理, 故往來而不難’.686 Lu Deming’s Collected Explanations contains the explanation: ‘Coming and going with an air of ease 往來不難之貌’.687 Cheng Xuanying’s Subcomentary reads: ‘an expression that is unconnected. One is at ease and transformed, so he can roam in accordance with any principle. 無係貌, 翛然獨化，任理遨 遊’.688
Neither the Zhuangzi nor the commentaries say ‘unconsciously’. However, they do emphasise that the perfected person has attained a state of going about things with ease. He/She attains this air of ease through things like ‘sleeping without dreaming’, ‘breathing deep breaths’, ‘not loving life or hating death’ and so on. These appear to be more experiential markers of what Feng calls ‘pure experience’ (which he equates with mystical experience). These markers might tangentially relate to harmonising with all things in a kind of union. More directly, they indicate experiences which Feng associates with mysticism, even though they do not explicitly say ‘unite with the Ultimate’ or ‘unconsciousness’ in the text of the Zhuangzi.
685 See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:229–30. 686 Ibid., 1:229. 687 Ibid., 1:229–30. 688 Ibid., 1:229.
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6.3.3. Mind like a Mirror
The next marker Feng points out is the ‘mind like a mirror’ passage. Feng quotes from his translation: ‘“The mind of the perfect man is like a mirror. It does not move with things, nor does it anticipate them. It responds to things, but does not retain them. Therefore, he is able to deal successfully with things, but is not affected.”— Chapter VII’.689 Feng argues that the ‘mind like a mirror’ passage shows that the ‘perfect man’ has attained unison of activity and tranquillity. The connection to mysticism here is the unison of contraries which Feng reasons comes about where the Zhuangzi relates ‘pure experience’. Here, ‘responding but not storing 應而不藏’ in the Zhuangzi is consistent with Feng’s adopted idea of pure experience involving accepting ‘the that at its face value’.690
We can make the connections between uniting contraries and mysticism in the Zhuangzi in Feng’s understanding with more analysis of Feng’s introduction. Feng’s understanding of uniting the contraries of activity and tranquillity in the ‘true men of old’ and ‘mind like a mirror’ passages relates to his interpretation of the Qiwu Lun chapter of the Zhuangzi. Feng quotes from the Qiwu Lun chapter: ‘“So a beam and a pillar are identical; so are ugliness and beauty, greatness, wickedness, pervasiveness, and strangeness.” — Chapter II’.691 From this, Feng concludes: ‘Thus in the state of pure experience, what is known as the union of the individual with the whole is reached.’692
As we have seen above, ‘pure experience’ is a term Feng uses to indicate the experiential aspects of mysticism. Where the Zhuangzi explicitly relates unity of contraries, Feng argues it is evidence of mysticism. This is the case for those parts of the Qiwu Lun chapter in Feng’s introduction quoted previously. Where Feng identifies the Zhuangzi referring to unison of contraries, he draws a connection to mysticism and pure experience. This is the case with the ‘true men of old’ and the ‘mind like a mirror’ passages above.
6.3.4. Riding the Wind and the Free Person
Feng’s explanation of the ‘Liezi riding the wind’ passage from chapter 1, Xiaoyao You, is another example of his interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Feng reasons that the
689 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 17. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 21/7/32-33. ‘至人之用心若鏡，不將不 迎，應而不藏，故能勝物而不傷’. 690 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 15. See also James, Essays in Radical Empericism, 13, 48. 691 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 16. See also ibid., 52; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/35. ‘故為是舉莛與楹，厲與 西施，恢恑憰怪，道通為一’. 692 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 16.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi passage is evidence of ‘[t]he perfect man, who is in identity with the universe . . . [being] absolutely free.’693 Feng quotes from the Zhuangzi: ‘“But if one chariots on the normality of the universe, and rides on the transformation of the six elements, and thus makes an excursion to the infinite, what has one to depend upon?” — Chapter I.’694 For Feng, identifying oneself with the universe is mystical. In this example, chartering on the normality of the universe (乘 天地之正), riding on the transformation of the six elements (御六氣之辯), and making an excursion to the infinite (遊無窮者) is what Feng interprets as the Zhuangzi’s locutions to that effect.
Moreover, this above example is another one that refers to the ‘perfect man’ (zhi ren). Hence, Feng quotes the Zhuangzi’s conclusion about riding the wind: ‘So Chuang Tzu said: “The perfect man has no self; the spiritual man has no achievement; the sage has no name.” — Chapter I.’695 Thus, we can see that Feng reasons that where the Zhuangzi talks about ‘perfect people’ being ‘without self’ in relation to ‘chartering on the normality of the universe’, it is evidence of ‘pure experience’. Furthermore, we must recall that Feng’s usage of ‘pure experience’ is synonymous with ‘mystical experience’. These kinds of descriptions of the perfect person throughout the Zhuangzi are part of the reason why Feng concludes the Zhuangzi is mystical.
Feng rightly identifies the parts of the Zhuangzi quoted above as relating to an idea of freedom in the text. He calls it ‘absolute freedom’. It is with this idea of absolute freedom coming from identifying oneself with the universe that Feng goes on to compare mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi and mystical aspects of Western philosophical works and thinkers. For example, Feng points out parallels between the tenets of the Zhuangzi’s Daoism exemplified by the perfect man, Spinoza’s ‘love of God’, and Bertrand Russell’s ‘free man’s worship’. With regards to Spinoza and the Zhuangzi comparisons, Feng quotes:
the free man is born neither to weep nor to laugh, but to view with calm and steadfast mind the eternal nature of things. . . . to know the eternal we must forget about ourselves. . . . We must recognize that our mere selves can never give us ultimate fulfilment of blessedness of soul. Only by
693 Ibid., 18. 694 Ibid., 19; See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/1/21-22. ‘若夫乘天地之正，而御六氣之辯，以遊無 窮者，彼且惡乎待哉！’. 695 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 19. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 2/1/21-22. ‘至人無己，神人無功，聖人無 名’.
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losing ourselves in nature . . . can we . . . find the final completion and salvation of our lives. This the free man understands.696
Thus, Feng identifies commonalities between thought in the Zhuangzi and the thought of Spinoza. These commonalities relate to Feng’s understanding of mysticism. They include: viewing the eternal nature of things; forgetting about ourselves in order to find fulfilment in more spiritual and rewarding experiences, like being part of nature, and contemplation of our lives, dissolution of self and other, and so on. Hence, Feng quotes from an introduction to the thought of Spinoza in order to introduce the thought of the Zhuangzi.
Not only does Feng see similarities between the thought of Spinoza and the Zhuangzi, but he also sees them between the thought of Bertrand Russell, Spinoza, and the Zhuangzi. He relates ideas about experiencing nature, and being ‘without self’ between the Zhuangzi, Spinoza, and Russell. Feng writes: ‘This attitude towards the universe [in the Zhuangzi and Spinoza] is the same as is expounded by Russell.’697 Thereupon, Feng quotes Russell:
To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irrestible [sic] forces [of death, change, and the universe] . . . — to feel these things and know them is to conquer them. . . . to think of them greatly, to feel their passionless splendour, is greater still. And such thought makes us free men; we no longer bow before the inevitable . . . but we absorb it, and make it part of ourselves. To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things— this is emancipation, and this is the free man’s worship. And this liberation is effected by a contemplation of fate698
In this way, Feng illustrates similarities between thought in the Zhuangzi, Spinoza, and Russell. Bearing in mind what Feng has already written about ‘pure experience’, ‘true men’, and parts of the text which Feng thinks are descriptions of their experiences, we can see the connections. Feng is showing us that Spinoza and Russell thought about matters of contemplation of nature which he maintains are the same as ideas in the Zhuangzi. Feng concludes that all three sources bear a meaning of ‘being absorbed into the whole’ which he
696 ‘Joseph Ratner, The Philosophy of Spinoza, “Introduction”, lxix’. Cited in Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 20. See also Baruch Spinoza, The Philosophy of Spinoza - Special Edition: On God, on Man, and on Man’s Well Being (El Paso: El Paso Norte Press, 2010), 35. 697 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 20. ‘698 ‘Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, 55’. Cited in ibid., 17–18. See also Bertrand Russell, A Free Man’s Worship and Other Essays (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1976), 17–18.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi maintains is a feature of mystical experience and doctrines of mysticism. Hence, Feng’s conclusion: ‘Taosim . . . give[s] us a conception of the universe that is at once both mystical and naturalistic’.699
6.4. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu
In The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Burton Watson refers to the content of the Zhuangzi as mystical and to the author as a mystic.700 This is plain where he explains the historical background and Zhuangzi’s motivation for writing such a text as the Zhuangzi. Watson writes:
all the philosophers of ancient China addressed themselves to the same problem: How is man to live in a world dominated by chaos, suffering and absurdity? . . . Chuang Tzu’s answer is a wholly different type of thinking. It is the answer of a mystic, and in attempting to describe it here in clear and concrete language, I shall undoubtedly be doing violence to its essentially mystic and indescribable nature. Chuang Tzu’s answer to the question is: free yourself from the world.701
Thus, by page three of Watson’s introduction to his translation of the Zhuangzi, he has already expanded the idea that Zhuang Zhou (the author of the Inner Chapters) was a mystic and that the Zhuangzi (the text) is ‘essentially mystic[al]’. We can see that ineffable knowledge, experiences, and ways of thinking form part of what Watson holds to be mysticism evident in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, he writes that this mysticism is part of a larger overall message of the Zhuangzi which is to ‘free yourself from the world’. This reasoning parallels Feng’s argument that ‘absolute freedom’ is important in the Zhuangzi’s philosophy and his linking of ‘absolute freedom’ with mysticism. However, Watson is not as explicit as Feng.
6.4.1. Ineffability of the Metaphysical Ultimate
Scholars, such as Watson, point out that ineffability is a feature of ‘the Way’ i.e., the dao (道), the Ultimate. This relates to two aspects of an understanding of mysticism. The first is theses about ‘ultimate reality’ which corresponds to what we can call metaphysical aspects
699 Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 23. Feng writes more explictley on the naturalistic elements of Zhuangzi and Daoism earlier in his introduction. See ibid., 6–8, 13–15. 700 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 3–7, 12–13, 17. 701 Ibid., 3.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi of mysticism. The second is theses concerning the nature and language to expresses insights into, and experiences of, purported aspects of ‘ultimate reality’. These aspects relate to what we can call epistemological features of mysticism. They are typically theses to the effect that human language is not capable of adequately expressing the nature of ultimate reality.
Watson emphasises that second aspect of mysticism in his introduction to the Zhuangzi. He argues that ineffability claims are a mark of mystical experience evident in the Zhuangzi. He writes:
like all mystics, Chuang Tzu insists that language is in the end grievously inadequate to describe the true Way, or the wonderful freedom of the man who has realized his identity with it. . . . that he is giving only a ‘rough’ or ‘reckless’ description of these things and what follows is usually a passage of highly poetic and paradoxical language that in fact conveys little more than the ineffability of such a state of being.702
Watson identifies another aspect of language usage in the Zhuangzi as an example of mysticism. He writes that in the Zhuangzi there are examples of using language in a way to convey rejection of conventional values and embracement of something more splendid. Watson writes: ‘Chuang Tzu . . . like so many mystical writers . . . rejects the conventional values of words . . . deliberately employing them to mean the opposite of what they ordinarily mean in order to demonstrate their essential meaninglessness.’703 This relates to another nuance of language and epistemology. Watson is arguing the Zhuangzi employs language in such a way as to demonstrate that ordinary use of language does not, and perhaps cannot, convey accurate representations or descriptions of the true nature of reality, or a more profound dao that exists in all aspects of the world.
As an example, Watson quotes the ‘Dao is in the shit and piss’ passage.704 He reasons that the passage shows: ‘In order to pry men loose from their conventional concepts of goodness and beauty, for example, Chuang Tzu deliberately glorifies everything that to the ordinary eyes appear sordid’.705 In this way, Watson is not saying that the Zhuangzi text at
702 Ibid., 6. 703 Ibid., 17. 704 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 59/22/43-46 ‘東郭子問於莊子曰：「所謂道，惡乎在？」莊子曰：「無 所不在。」東郭子曰：「期而後可。」莊子曰：「在螻蟻。」曰：「何其下邪？」曰：「在稊 稗。」曰：「何其愈下邪？」曰：「在瓦甓。」曰：「何其愈甚邪？」曰：「在屎溺。」東郭 子不應。’. 705 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 18.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi that point is recording mystical experience. Instead, he is making an implicit link between the text of the Zhuangzi and his understanding that mystical writers and doctrines of mysticism contain locutions which indicate ‘something beyond both beauty and ugliness’.706
This ‘something beyond both beauty and ugliness’ pertains to Watson’s understanding of an ineffable Ultimate in the Zhuangzi. This relates to the metaphysical aspects of mysticism that Watson holds are evident in the Zhuangzi. It also shows a link between the epistemological aspects and the metaphysical aspects of thought in the Zhuangzi which correspond to an understanding of mysticism. This understanding holds that mysticism involves commitments or doctrines concerning the nature or reality which entails the epistemological commitment that language is unable to accurately convey the nature of reality. Watson’s labelling of the Zhuangzi as mystical is to the effect that the Zhuangzi communicates an understanding of an ultimate nature to reality (a dao that is in everything) which language cannot express.
6.4.2. Experiencing the Metaphysical Ultimate
A further level of this metaphysical aspect of mysticism is a thesis that one can experience at least a part of the ultimate reality. Watson writes that unity with the Ultimate is a feature mysticism evident in the Zhuangzi. He elaborates that we can achieve such a unity through what the Zhuangzi calls ‘wuwei 無爲’ (inaction). Watson writes: ‘In such a state, all human actions become as spontaneous . . . as the natural world. Man becomes one with Nature, or Heaven, as Chuang Tzu calls it, and merges himself with Tao, or the Way, the underlying unity that embraces man, Nature and all that is in the universe.’707 We thus have Watson’s conclusions that the Zhuangzi contains an ‘all-is-one’ idea and that people can merge with this unity.
Hence, Watson introduces readers to his translation of the Zhuangzi by telling them that the Zhuangzi is a mystical text. Watson thereby conditions readers to understand the Zhuangzi as relating an overall meaning of mysticism according to how he has introduced and discussed the topic in his introduction. This has had major implications for the received interpretation of the Zhuangzi in the English speaking world due to the centrality of engaging
706 Ibid. 707 Watson, the Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 6.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi with the Chinese intellectual tradition through English translations.708 I comment more on this topic in the conclusion chapter of this dissertation.
6.5. Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters
A.C. Graham outlines features of what he thinks is the mysticism of the Zhuangzi in his translation, Chuang-Tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book of Chuang-Tzu.709 One main example is that the Zhuangzi contains an ‘all-is-one’ idea. However, Graham presents his conclusions that the Zhuangzi’s ‘all is one’ is mystical with little exposition or analysis. Graham writes that Zhuangzi: ‘reach[es] the conclusion that we should abandon reason for the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world, transforming “All are one” from a moral into a mystical affirmation. It is in “The Sorting that Evens Things Out” [i.e. ‘Qiwu Lun 齊物論’] that Chuang-tzu takes this step.’710 Here, we must infer that Graham holds the experience of ‘all is one’ to be mystical and that he finds evidence of such ideas in the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. However, Graham does not quote from the Zhuangzi to support this conclusion: he appears to present it with the understanding that the reader will also find it self-evident in the text.
6.5.1. Everything is One
Nevertheless, Graham points out complexities with the Zhuangzi’s ‘all is one’ idea in a chapter wherein he explicates what he calls ‘the unifying vision’ of the Zhuangzi. For example, Graham writes: ‘in surrendering to Heaven he [the sage] treats everything as one. . . . [However] the sage . . . cannot find words for the totality which he experiences.’711 Here, Graham argues that the Zhuangzi appears to reject the idea that ‘Everything is one’ . . . [because] in adding to what is one the proposition that it is one we arrive at two’.712 This appears to contradict Graham’s earlier conclusion that the Zhuangzi contains an ‘all is one’ idea. Yet, there is a solution. Graham reasons: ‘In practice he [Zhuangzi] speaks only of the sage treating things as one, never of things truly being one. . . . oneness [in knack stories] . . .
708 See also 何颖, ‘The Transmission of Zhuangzi in [the] English[-Speaking] World 庄子在英语世界 的传播’, Journal of [the] Educational Instutitue [of] Jilin Provence 吉林省教育学院学 27, no. 8 (2011): 43–46. 709 Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-Tzu, 9, 20–21. The original publication is now out of print. See the reprint Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9, 20–21. See also Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, 1969 Parts of Graham’s exposition on Zhuangzi’s thought are drawn from this earlier article. 710 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9. 711 Ibid., 20. 712 Ibid.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi is more like the “Unity within variety” of Western aesthetics.’713 Thus, Graham argues that there is a solution to the apparent problem of the Zhuangzi’s ‘all is one’ idea.
Graham’s explanations of what the Zhuangzi means by the sage treating all things as one relates to his interpretation of mysticism. He explains that in the Zhuangzi’s thought: ‘[i]t is at the common point from which all start that they are found to merge together and with oneself in a single whole.’714 Graham interprets that what the Zhuangzi refers to in various parts of the text as ‘merging with a single whole’ is an ‘underlying common ground’ i.e., the Ultimate, the Absolute, the One, the Way, etc. He then contrasts Western and Chinese interpretations of an ‘underlying common ground’. Graham writes that Western mystical traditions understand it to be ‘pure Being’, ‘ultimate Reality’ and ‘personal salvation’ whereas: ‘the goal of Chinese philosophy is the Way by which to live and die, achievement of which may or may not incidentally involve exposure of illusion in our everyday world’.715
Thus, Graham contrasts what he holds to be the different form of mysticism in the Zhuangzi from the more ‘familiar’ mysticisms of the West. However, he tells us nothing explicit about what ‘mystical tradition in the West’ actually is or what sources he has drawn from to make these comparisons and contrasts with the Zhuangzi. We must infer that his general understanding of mysticism includes ‘merging oneself with a single one’, as well as ideas of an ‘Absolute’, for which he finds evidence throughout the Zhuangzi.716
6.5.2. Experiencing the Common Ground
We can see further connections between Graham’s interpretations of concepts in the Zhuangzi with his understanding of mysticism. This is evident where Graham emphasises differences between Western and Chinese understandings of the ‘underlying common ground’. He points out the assumption in Western philosophy and mysticism of ‘[a] reality beyond appearances’ that we should strive to know and only then attain the proper way to live. This assumption does not exist in Chinese thought, Daoism, and the Zhuangzi in particular. On the contrary:
713 Ibid. 714 Ibid., 21. 715 Ibid. 716 We can learn more of Graham’s understanding of mysticism from some of his other publications. See: Graham, The Book of Lieh-Tzu; Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, 1969, 137–41; Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 100–105, 234–35; Graham, ‘Mysticism and the Question of Private Access’, 265–83; Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 2003, 151–52; Graham, ‘Two Notes on the Translation of Taoist Classics’, 1991.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi
For Taoism what matters is that the man who withdraws to the ‘gate’ . . . has a clear course ahead of him, and all his actions become ‘Doing Nothing’, spontaneous motion which is plumb with the Way. He also becomes capable of lucidly mirroring heaven and earth, but if that is illumination of reality it is of the reality of the concrete.717
Thus, Graham concludes that the philosophy and mysticism of the Zhuangzi differ from the philosophy and mysticism of the West with regards to the interpretation of the ‘underlying common ground’. In the west, coming to know or experience ‘the common ground’ is something people have to strive for. According to Graham, in the Zhuangzi, and Daoism generally, it is something one accomplishes by ‘Doing Nothing’ i.e., wuwei 無爲. Moreover, the ‘underlying common ground’ is not ‘the reality beyond appearances’ in the Zhuangzi, but is rather ‘the reality of the concrete’.
In several regards, Graham’s interpretations and explanations of the Zhuangzi are in agreement with those of Feng and Watson. Each finds evidence of mysticism in relation to philosophical concepts within the text. Feng and Graham point out the ‘all is one’ idea which we can deduce informs their conclusions that the Zhuangzi is mystical. Feng, Watson, and Graham all emphasise the idea of ‘Doing Nothing’ (wuwei) in the Zhuangzi, with Watson making the closest connections between this concept and an understanding of mysticism.718
Yet, none of these scholars present arguments to convince readers that the Zhuangzi is mystical. They appear to have begun their introductions having already accepted the received view that the Zhuangzi is mystical. Thus, they do not so much argue that the text is mystical as reiterate the interpretation that the text is mystical, according to their own understanding.
6.6. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings
In Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings, Brook Ziporyn writes that interpreting mysticism as the core meaning of in the Zhuangzi is one of many positions that scholars have been ‘aggressively argued for’.719 Nevertheless, the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi form only a minor part of Ziporyn’s introduction to his translation. Ziporyn lists a few examples of mysticism in the text with glosses to the content of his translation. He writes: ‘There are places where Zhuangzi speaks as if he were a mystic in the traditional sense . . . . Like a
717 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 21. 718 Feng’s treatment of wuwei is the most implicit and he quotes more from Guo Xiang’s commentary than from Zhuangzi. See: Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 9, 11, 17–18. 719 Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, xvii–xviii.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi mystic, Zhuangzi often seems to speak of a state that transports one beyond ordinary reason and sensation and puts one in touch with an alternate, life-changing realm of experience (e.g., at 2:16; 2:41; 4:10; 6:54)’.720
Here, we see some of Ziporyn’s understanding of mysticism ‘in the traditional sense’. This sense appears to includes ideas that there is knowledge beyond ordinary reason that is profound and worth pursuing. Thus, Ziporyn emphasises epistemological aspects of mysticism which he thinks are evident in the Zhuangzi. These alternative and life-changing states are the ‘axis of the way’ (dao shu 道樞) of 2:16, the ‘dream within a dream leading to great awakening’ of 2:41-2:42, the explanations of ‘emptiness’ following ‘mind-fasting’ of 4:8-4:10, and the ‘sitting and forgetting’ of 6:52-6:54. With the exception of the ‘dream within a dream leading to great awakening’ passage (2:41-2:42), all the other passages are ones which scholars frequently label mysticism and interpret as part of the core message of the Zhuangzi.
However, Ziporyn does not include an argument that these aspects of the Zhuangzi are the overall purpose of the text. Indeed, Ziporyn lists many other features of Zhuangzi’s thought that fit well with other categories of knowledge, such as scepticism, monism, dualism, theism, agnosticism, relativism, etc.721 Ziporyn’s purpose in the introduction section is to alert the reader to the multiple perspectives of thought in the Zhuangzi. He does not go so far as to argue in favour of treating any particular perspective in the Zhuangzi as the core of the text.722
This is a sensible, value-neutral way for a translator to present the introduction of a philosophical text, one that is in accordance with professional translator standards of neutrality and faithfulness to source-text.723 It sets Ziporyn’s translation apart from those of other scholars who didactically tell the reader what the real significance of the Zhuangzi is on their own authority. As we have seen, all the scholarly translations presented up to this point have emphasised mysticism as part of the core meaning of the Zhuangzi. However, Ziporyn
720 Ibid., xvii. 721 Ibid., xvii–xviii. 722 However, Ziporyn refers the reader to an online article wherein he expresses his own interpretation of the overall meaning of the text. See Brook Ziporyn, ‘Zhuangzi as Philosopher’, accessed 2 October 2012, http://www.hackettpublishing.com/zhuangziphil. 723 See AUSIT National Council, AUSIT Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct (Canberra: AUSIT National Council, 2012); ‘Code of Ethics’, accessed 30 March 2016, http://ausit.org/AUSIT/About/Ethics___Conduct/Code_of_Ethics/AUSIT/About/Code_of_Ethics.aspx.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi presents mysticism as only one possible component of a ‘wildcard’ concerning Zhuangzi’s ‘great knowledge’.724
Nevertheless, I do not concur with Ziporyn’s claim that many scholars have ‘aggressively argued’ that the Zhuangzi is mystical. On the contrary, many scholars have labelled the Zhuangzi mystical without argument to support the conclusion. In other instances, scholars identify elements of the text that accord with an implicit understanding of what mysticism is. Ziporyn’s references to mysticism in his introduction to Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings is one example of this last category. He writes that Zhuangzi sometimes appears to be a mystic in the traditional sense but does not tell the reader what the traditional sense of being a mystic is: it is implicit in his understanding of the elements of mysticism in the Zhuangzi to which he refers.
6.6.1. The Mysticism ‘Wild Card’
Ziporyn presents his own interpretation of the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi in an article linked to his translation. He refers the reader to this article in the introduction to the translation.725 In ‘Zhuangzi as Philosopher’, Ziproyn argues that mysticism in the Zhuangzi forms part of the concept of ‘Genuine Knowledge’. Ziporyn interprets ‘Genuine Knowledge’ in the Zhuangzi as: ‘a wild card that is never discarded because it is found valuable no matter what set of rules might apply at any given time and how they might change. And this is why the Zhuangzi of the Inner Chapters can appear to be at times a mystic, at times a skeptic [etc.,]’.726 Hence, mysticism is only one of the many positions that fit with what Ziporyn calls the Zhuangzi’s ‘wild card’. This ‘wild card’ metaphor is how Ziporyn explains the many different ways of interpreting the overall meaning of the Zhuangzi.
Ziporyn’s ‘wild card’ metaphor is an ingenious way of reconciling the multiple perspectives of thought in the Zhuangzi, including mysticism. Nevertheless, in my view, it appears to be a way of trying to account for all the different strands of thought as if they are part of an integrated whole. Perhaps there is no integrated whole. However, not having an integrated whole would fit with Ziporyn’s ‘wild card’ metaphor. Perhaps the overall meaning for the text as a whole is that there is no overall meaning for the text as a whole. This would allow the reader to ‘play’ his/her ‘wild card’ for interpreting parts of the Zhuangzi as communicating a message of mysticism, or relativism, and so on. This aspect of Ziporyn’s
724 See Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, xvii–xviii; Ziporyn, ‘Zhuangzi as Philosopher’. 725 Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, xviii. 726 Ziporyn, ‘Zhuangzi as Philosopher’.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi introduction to his translation of the Zhuangzi is what makes his interpretation of the text a highly original contribution to translations and introductions to the Zhuangzi.
6.7. Conclusions
Translations of the Zhuangzi are most often how students (and even scholars) study the philosophy of the Zhuangzi. The standard English translations are Watson’s The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu and Graham’s Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters. The standard English translation in use for almost 100 years before these was Herbert Giles’ Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer. All of these scholars present the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism in their introductions to their translations. Thus, people studying the Zhuangzi are often introduced to the text being told that it is a work of mysticism: this is a standard interpretation of the Zhuangzi readily transmitted and absorbed through standard translations.
I cannot emphasise enough the impact of Giles’ translation on the dominant interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Giles’ English translation was the main source text for the first German ‘translation’ of the Zhuangzi, entitled, Talks and Parables of Zhuangzi (Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse), made by Martin Buber in 1909 and published in 1910.727 That is to say, Martin Buber made German translations of sections from Giles’ English translation of the Zhuangzi. Not only did Buber accept many of Giles’ translations and interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, but he added his own, mystical commentary in German. In this way, Buber took Giles’ influential English-language interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, transformed it again, and propounded his re- worked interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in German.728 Thus, not only was Giles’ interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi influential in the English speaking world, but it has exerted a strong influence on the transmitted understanding of Daoist mysticism to German-speaking people, too.
Giles’ translation has also exerted a strong influence on those who sought to expand on interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi with their own musings. For example, in his autobiography, John Blofeld writes that Giles’ translation of the Zhuangzi was helpful in his
727 Martin Buber, Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse, 1st ed. (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1910); See Jonathan R. Herman, I and Tao: Martin Buber’s Encounter with Chuang Tzu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) Therein, Herman gives insightful analysis and back-translation. 728 See Herman, I and Tao: Martin Buber’s Encounter with Chuang Tzu, ix, 4, 7, 169, 177, 184-185, 187, 192-201.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi own mystic quest.729 Having already made his own personal commitments to Buddhist and Daoist mysticism, Blofeld drew from Giles’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi to elaborate on his own experiences.
Another example of Giles’ influence is the now obscure book, Chinese Mystics, by Raymond van Over.730 The book consists of van Over’s introduction to mysticism in general followed by an anthology of reprints from English translations of Chinese mystical texts. The excerpts from the Zhuangzi are all reprints of Herbert Giles’ translation. In this way, van Over further propagated Giles’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi from almost 100 years earlier.
Furthermore, Watson acknowledges the influence of Giles’ understanding of the meaning of the Zhuangzi as a source by which he could judge the accuracy of his own translation. Watson writes: ‘Giles . . . is very free in his rendering [of the Zhuangzi] . . . In spite of his offensive “literary” tone, however, he generally gets at what appears to me to be the real meaning of the text.’731 As I have shown in this chapter, mysticism is what Giles and Watson both consider to be the real meaning of the Zhuangzi. Through analyses of Giles’ and Watson’s interpretations and translations of the Zhuangzi, we can see some of the common understandings of mysticism in the Zhuangzi that Watson accepted from Giles. Moreover, we can also see the difficulties and methodological issues in merely accepting and perpetuating interpretations of mysticism: they are often founded, not in detailed study and argumentation, but rather in vague interpretations that scholars readily accept and pass on.
Translators have expounded and transmitted an interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism. However, the reasons they give are not always the same. Nor are the parts of the text to which they refer as examples of mysticism the same. Even though translators are largely in agreement that there is some kind of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, they do not present a unanimous view of what the most significant features of mysticism are, or what parts of the Zhuangzi constitute the most significant features of its mysticism. Thus, we see that translators of the Zhuangzi are in agreement concerning the presence of mysticism as part of the overall meaning of the text.
729 See John Eaton Calthorpe Blofeld, The Wheel of Life: The Autobiography of a Western Buddhist, 2nd ed. (London: Century, 1987), 19. 730 Van Over, Chinese Mystics. 731 Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 27.
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6. Translations of the Zhuangzi
However, there is another side to interpretations of the role of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Some scholars reject the idea that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi’s core message. By engaging with these contributions to literature on the Zhuangzi, we can gain deeper insight into interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, as well as problems in those interpretations. This is the topic for the next chapter.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi 7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi
In previous chapters, I introduced the reader to research background on interpreting the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism. In doing so, I have shown that interpreting mysticism to be at the core of the Zhuangzi is an interpretation that scholars have made without convincing arguments or supporting textual analysis. There is another side to interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi: arguments that the Zhuangzi is not mystical. In this chapter, I show several reasons why arguments to this effect are not convincing. In general, the arguments are weak. There are also several logical fallacies which undermine the validity of the arguments. Consequently, I do not think these arguments can convince readers that mysticism is not part of the Zhuangzi.
7.1. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because the Text is Spiritual
Robert Allinson presents his theory of a unified message in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi in Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation.732 Therein, he argues that ‘spiritual transformation’ is the overall goal of the Zhuangzi. Allinson argues that this interpretation of spiritual transformation excludes the interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. He writes:
Spiritual transformation is unlike mystical transformation, because there is no sense of becoming one with the cosmos. One does not lose one’s identity in some kind of undifferentiated union with the all. . . . If one means by mystical transformation a state in which all distinctions merge with all others, then the state of spiritual transformation is by no means a state of mystical transformation.733
Allinson gives a second instance of denying any connection between spiritual transformation and mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This instance is in the next paragraph after the one quoted above. The topic sentence reads: ‘Spiritual transformation is also unlike mystical transformation because there is no special, secret knowledge which one must learn or to which only a special group of initiates is privy.’734 Allinson continues with reasons to support this view. He writes: ‘The state of spiritual transformation which is the core message of the Chuang-Tzu is available to all and is not dependent upon either the special understanding of
732 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters. 733 Ibid., 8. 734 Ibid.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi hidden truths or the special practice of certain exercises, techniques of breathing, or meditation [unlike mysticism].’735
In the quotation above, Allinson identifies elements of mysticism so that he can deny that they are present in the Zhuangzi. They are: ‘secret knowledge’; ‘hidden truths’; ‘oneness’; and ‘the practice of certain exercises, techniques of breathing, or meditation’. His purpose is to argue that these aspects of mysticism are not part the overall meaning of the text. However, this is not convincing because the elements of mysticism which he denies are part of the Zhuangzi are actually part of the Zhuangzi.
Much of the Zhuangzi, especially the Inner Chapters, communicates ‘hidden truths’, esoteric meaning, metaphorical meaning, and allegorical meaning through which it expresses more profound philosophical ideas. One example is the fable of Kun and Peng which begins the text. This fable does not communicate literal truth about giant birds. It rather communicates ‘disputation over the small and the big’ (xiao da zhi bian 小大之辯) in terms of creatures’ perspectivally and relativistically conditioned ‘knowledge’.736 This meaning is ‘hidden’ under the surface level. Hence, Allinson’s reasoning that the Zhuangzi is not mystical because it does not convey ‘hidden truths’ is not convincing.
The Zhuangzi contains examples of exercises and techniques of breathing and meditation. They are the well-known examples of ‘mind-fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’. Allinson’s claim that the Zhuangzi cannot be mystical because it does not relate such techniques is therefore false. ‘Mind fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are two well-known examples of ‘practices of certain exercises, techniques of breathing, or meditation’ that scholars label mystical. Allinson has not given an argument to discount the interpretation that those sections of the Zhuangzi relate mystical practices. Nor has Allinson given an alternate explanation to the effect that those practices are not evidence of ‘mysticism’, but rather of what he calls ‘spiritual transformation’.
7.2. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because Mysticism is Incompatible with First-Rate Philosophy
Allinson presents another argument to support his interpretation that Zhuangzi is spiritual but not mystical. This argument is to the effect that Zhuangzi cannot be mystical because mysticism is incompatible with first-rate philosophy. He presents this interpretation
735 Ibid. 736 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 1/1/1-17.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi in the concluding paragraphs of his introduction to Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation. I outline this argument below and then counter it.
The first step of this argument is where Allinson presents his idea that the Zhuangzi has sophisticated methodology. Allinson holds that having a sophisticated methodology excludes the possibility of mysticism. Allinson begins by writing: ‘The value of the text [the Zhuangzi] does not only lie in the end-goal . . . but in the rich methodology which is employed’.737 Here, Allinson is presenting his interpretation that the Zhuangzi has a sophisticated, philosophical methodology for achieving ‘spiritual transformation’. Moreover, Allinson presents his idea of spiritual transformation as excluding the possibility of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Hence, arguing that the Zhuangzi presents a sophisticated methodology of spiritual transformation entails reasoning that such a methodology excludes mysticism.
Allinson confirms that this interpretation of methodology in the Zhuangzi precludes the possibility of mysticism. He holds that to think otherwise about Zhuangzi’s methodology leaves us with only two other ways to interpret the text. He writes:
Either we view the Chuang-Tzu as a piece of charming mysticism which possesses an undeniable literary fascination but is of interest only to serious Sinologues, [sic] or we consider it to be a minor philosophical work which, because of its obscurity and incoherence, is a showpiece for the various and contradictory ideas that were co-temporary [sic] with its time of composition.738
Here, Allinson reveals more of his interpretation that mysticism is incompatible with first-rate philosophy. He holds that treating the Zhuangzi as mysticism would make it of interest to only ‘serious Sinologues’. Allinson does not define what he means by ‘serious Sinologues’, but it is evident that Allinson does not consider them to be first-rate philosophers who understand the spiritual transformation which Allinson holds to be the true meaning of the Zhuangzi. This is because Allinson is listing these alternative views of the Zhuangzi as inferior to the one he is proposing, which holds that the Zhuangzi has a philosophically and methodologically sophisticated message of ‘spiritual transformation’.
Allinson expands on these ideas in order to support his interpretation that the Zhuangzi for spiritual transformation is superior to the Zhuangzi for mysticism. He writes: ‘I have
737 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 13. 738 Ibid.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi attempted to lift the Chuang-Tzu out of the realm of being . . . a paradoxical and mystical congeries which would make it a minor philosophical work.’739 This communicates Allinson’s interpretation that mysticism cannot be part of the Zhuangzi because mysticism is incompatible with first-rate philosophy. Allinson holds mysticism to be a feature of ‘minor philosophical work[s]’.
Allinson then explains what he sees as problematic about interpreting the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism. He writes: ‘What is most distressing about this last alternative is that since mystics and minor philosophers of paradox have carte blanche to commit all sorts of logical fallacies, there is a disincentive to explore the possible systematic methodology contained in paradoxical language forms.’740 Thus, we can see that Allinson holds interpreting the Zhuangzi to contain mysticism would be disincentive to explore possible systematic methodology in places where the text relates paradoxes.
7.2.1. Issues in Logic are not Necessarily Disincentive to take Texts Seriously
Allinson’s argument implies that first-rate philosophers do not commit logical fallacies and that first rate philosophies do not contain logical problems. This is not true. Rene Descartes’ most influential work of first-rate philosophy contains a logical problem known as the ‘Cartesian circle’. It is an example of circular reasoning (i.e., begging the question, or perditio principii). In sum, Descartes attempts to prove the existence of God by arguing that God guarantees the possibility of ‘clear and distinct perception’ and that that we can use ‘clear and distinct perception’ to discover the existence of God.741 In other words, using ‘clear and distinct perception’ to discover the existence of God presupposes that God exists in order to give us the possibility of ‘clear and distinct perception’. Lex Newman explains this element of circular reasoning in the following way in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:
Vicious Circularity interpretation:
Arc 1: The conclusion that an all-perfect God exists is derived from premises that are clearly and distinctly perceived — i.e., premises that are accepted because of first accepting the general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived.
739 Ibid. 740 Ibid. 741 See the Third and Fourth Meditations in Meditations on First Philosophy in René Descartes, Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Sooter, & Dougald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 98–100.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi
Arc 2: The general veracity of propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived is derived from the conclusion that an all-perfect God exists.
Thus rendered, Descartes’ broader argument is viciously circular.742
Newman goes on to present different interpretations of the ‘Cartesian circle’. He argues that Descartes’ methodology does not present simple circular reasoning. Instead, Newman presents several ways of interpreting Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct perception’ thesis so that it is not a kind of circular reasoning.743
For our purposes here, it is not necessary to go into more detail on the ‘Cartesian circle’. It is sufficient to say that Allinson’s idea that the work of first-rate philosophers does not contain problematic logic is not convincing. Rene Descartes is an influential philosopher, but his Meditations on First Philosophy contain complex and highly nuanced problems in logic.
Moreover, we should not accept Allinson’s claim that the presence of logical fallacies is ‘disincentive to explore the possible systematic methodology’ in a philosopher’s work. In the case of Descartes, the presence of the logical fallacy of circular reasoning has proven to be an incentive to study, explore, and more generously interpret his work. In addition to the entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, there are several scholarly articles and at least one anthology dedicated to further exploring epistemological issues raised by the ‘Cartesian circle’.744 Therefore, even if we accept there to be logical problems with the Zhuangzi, and even if we accept that those logical problems arise due to mysticism, it should not be disincentive to explore the philosophical merits of the text. Nor should we easily dismiss a philosopher’s work as ‘minor’ because of the presence of logical errors, as Allinson suggests we do.
Allinson believes that mysticism and ‘minor philosophical work[s]’ are similar for several reasons. The first is a propensity for ‘mystics and minor philosophers of paradox . . . to commit all sorts of logical fallacies’.745 Allinson sees mystical doctrines and logical
742 Lex Newman, ‘Descartes’ Epistemology’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/descartes- epistemology/. 743 See section 6.2 in ibid. 744 See Willis Doney, ‘The Cartesian Circle’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1955, 324–38; Lynn E. Rose, ‘The Cartesian Circle’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1965, 80–89; Willis Doney, Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); Dugald Murdoch, ‘The Cartesian Circle’, Philosophical Review, 1999, 221–44. 745 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 13.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi fallacies as: ‘disincentive to explore the possible systematic methodology contained in paradoxical language forms.’746 Furthermore, Allinson holds that his treatment of the Zhuangzi allows it: ‘[to] assume its rightful place as a masterpiece of the first philosophical order . . . [which] is more consonant with the historical fascination and influence his [Zhuangzi’s] work has exercised over the centuries.’747 Hence, Allinson holds that mysticism is not compatible with first rate philosophy. Consequently, he believes that if we are to treat the Zhuangzi as first rate philosophy, we must not treat it as mysticism.
The reasoning in Allinson’s argument above represents another example of begging the question. It contains the ingrained conclusion mysticism is not part of first rate philosophy. In order to accept Allinson’s argument that the Zhuangzi cannot be mysticism because that would diminish the Zhuangzi from being first-rate philosophy, we must first of all accept the ingrained conclusion mysticism is not part of first-rate philosophy. This circular reasoning renders Allinson’s arguments at that point invalid. In the section below, I offer counter- examples against Allinson’s argument.
7.2.2. Overlap between Philosophy and Mysticism
Scholars have considered aspects of the thought of several first-rate philosophers to be mystical. For example, scholars regard Plotinus as an important philosopher who also had mystical experiences and whose thought contains examples of mysticism.748 Furthermore, Bertrand Russell’s discussion on the mystical elements of Plato’s thought shows that mysticism and first-rate philosophy are not as mutually exclusive as Allison supposes.749 Moreover, William Guthrie’s exposition on the thought of ancient Greek philosophers acknowledges the influence of mysticism on their beliefs and philosophies, but especially on
746 Ibid. 747 Ibid. 748 See P. A. Meijer, Plotinus on the Good or the One (Enneads VI, 9): An Analytical Commentary (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1992); The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 76; John M Dillon, ‘Plotinus: An Introduction’, in The Enneads (London: Penguin, 1991), xc, et passim; Paul Henry S.J., ‘The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought’, in The Enneads: An Introduction (London: Penguin Books, 1991), lxxi–lxxxiii; John Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): An Introduction (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1983), 9–10; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 67, 104, 110, 112–113, et passim; Plotinus, The Enneads: A New, Definitive Edition; Porphyry, ‘On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of His Work’, in The Enneads: A New, Definitive Edition with Comparisons to Other Translations on Hundreds of Key Passages (Burdett, New York: Larson Publications, 1992), 1–22. The same passages are also available in an abridged version. See Plotinus, The Enneads: Abridged with an Introduction; Porphyry, ‘On the Life of Plotinus and His Work’, in The Enneads: Abridged with and Introduction, ed. Stephen Mackenna and John M. Dillon (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 749 Russell, A Free Man’s Worship and Other Essays, 20–30.
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Pythagoras and his followers.750 Thus, I do not concur with Allison’s conclusion that mysticism and first-rate philosophy are incompatible. It therefore follows that we can treat the Zhuangzi as an example of first-rate philosophy which also contains elements of mysticism.
There are further reasons to question Allinson’s position that ‘Chuang-Tzu for spiritual transformation’ must exclude the possibility of mysticism. Allinson’s dichotomy of mysticism and spirituality rests on a particular delineation between the two. However, there are plausible ways to conceive of the relation between the two. Firstly, scholars of the philosophy of religion — and mysticism in particular — generally acknowledge that mysticism is spiritual. For example, John E. Smith writes ‘it is generally admitted that mysticism is an essentially individual and personal form of spirituality which must be studied in and through the expressions of individual experience.’751 Wayne Proudfoot shows a connection between mysticism and spirituality when he describes how people within religious traditions typically prepare to have mystical experiences. He writes that preparations involve: ‘intensive study, usually under the tutelage of a guide, guru, or spiritual director of the doctrines and beliefs of the tradition within which the mystic will interpret and understand what is happening to him.’752 Thus, we see that mysticism can overlap with the spiritual. As such, I do not think we can discount the possibility that mystical transformation and spiritual transformation could also be linked.
Allinson’s usage of the term ‘spiritual transformation’ does not account for overlapping meaning between ‘the spiritual’ and ‘the mystical’. He writes: ‘[s]piritual transformation . . . is an experience one undergoes which is transforming of one’s personality and one’s perspective. . . . It is not so much a change in a particular belief or viewpoint as it is a change which takes one beyond all viewpoints.’753Allinson thinks that such an understanding of spirituality excludes all types of mysticism. However, this cannot be true because people who have had mystical experiences have reported that those experiences transformed their personalities and viewpoints.754
750 William Keith Chambers Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle (London: Routledge, 2012), 22, 32–34, 36, 47, 50, 77–78, 92, 117. 751 Smith, ‘William James’ Account of Mysticism; A Critical Approach’, 247. See also ibid., xviii–xix; Smart, The Philosophy of Religion, 8–10, 13–14; Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 122, 134, 147; Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 95–96, 106, et passim; Robert K. C. Forman, Grassroots Spirituality (Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2004), 73–74; Lynch, The New Spirituality: An Introduction to Progressive Belief in the Twenty-First Century, 30–31, 36–37, 50–51, 68, 70, et passim. 752 Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 147. 753 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 8. 754 See Plotinus, The Enneads: A New, Definitive Edition, 29–31; Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error: An Annotated Translation of Al-Munqidh Min Al Dal-Al and Other Relevant Works of Al-Ghazali
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Hence, Allinson’s argument contains a false dichotomy. It does not consider the possibility that something other than spiritual transformation could be an experience that transforms one’s personality and perspective. Yet, there are recorded examples of mystical experience wherein authors claim that those experiences transformed their perspective. This is at odds with Allinson’s characterisations of the spiritual and the mystical.
Allinson’s treatment of the non-logical elements of the Zhuangzi does not strongly support the conclusion that the Zhuangzi is not mystical. Consider how Allinson elucidates the ‘sage description’ following the ‘chirping of birds passage’ in ‘Qiwu Lun’. He writes: ‘[t]hat there is no logical answer does not mean that there is no answer; it also does not follow that the answer . . . is an illogical answer. What does follow is that whatever answer there is to the question will not follow logically from the posing of the question.’755 However, the non- logical may be an indication of mysticism. Indeed, Walter Stace argues that ‘paradoxicality’ is an important feature of mystical experience and adduces examples from a variety of recorded mystical experiences to support this conclusion.756 Therefore, if Allinson wants to discount the possibility that paradoxes in the Zhuangzi are possible evidence of mysticism, then the burden of proof is on him to demonstrate that we should not associate the non-logical with mysticism.
Allinson does not satisfy such a burden of proof in his interpretation of the Zhuangzi. He argues that paradoxes in the Zhuangzi are devices to ‘convince the intuitive or aesthetic dimensions of the mind’ which forms part of the Zhuangzi’s aim to inspire spiritual transformation in the reader by means of ‘alteration of subjective apprehension’.757Allinson thinks that these are the true reasons for paradoxes and statements to the effect ‘there is something that is true that cannot be stated directly’ in the Zhuangzi.758 However, claims that one has experienced, or gained special access to, ‘something that is true that cannot be stated directly’ is a common ‘ineffability mark’ of mysticism prominent in classical scholarly
(Louisville: Fons Vitae, 1999), 77–83; Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 61–69, et passim; Walters, The Cloud of Unknowing, 43–44, 52--62, 142–144, et passim; Jefferies, The Story of My Heart: My Autobiography, 1–13, 184–188, et passim; Horatio F. Brown, John Addington Symonds: A Biography Compiled from His Papers & Correspondence, vol. 2 (London: J.C. Nimmo, 1895), 77–80; James, Varieties, 1902, 378–79. See also Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 75. 755 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 25. See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/23-27, 5/2/40-47. The ‘chirping of birds passage’ is how Allinson refers to a passage that is actually Zhuangzi’s musings on weather language is meaningful or meaningless. Therein, language is likened to the chirping of birds: we think it is meaningful but it may just fall short of getting across the true nature of things. 756 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 62, 92–93, et passim. 757 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 24. 758 Ibid.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi works.759 Claims in the Zhuangzi to the effect there is something true about ultimate reality which human language cannot state directly could therefore be evidence of mysticism.
Yet, Allinson does not consider this possibility. He maintains that such claims exist in the Zhuangzi for the purpose of ‘spiritual transformation’ only. He elaborates by saying that such claims in the Zhuangzi exist for spiritual transformation ‘[but] not because the Chuang- Tzu is a mystical text — whatever that means’.760 Herein is another aspect of Allinson’s argument concerning the presence of paradoxes and ineffability claims in the Zhuangzi which makes it less convincing. Allinson is not certain what a mystical text is, yet he dismisses the idea that the Zhuangzi might be (at least in part) a mystical text in spite of this shortcoming.
Nevertheless, Allinson is correct that posing paradoxes and statements claiming to have understanding of some profound truth which is incommunicable does not necessarily make a text mystical. Such devices can be used for enterprises other than mysticism, such as the ‘spiritual transformation’ Allinson argues is the core meaning of the Inner Chapters. However, mysticism is not just about posing paradoxes. Some of the strongest evidence of mysticism in the Zhuangzi comes from the descriptions of esoteric practices that bring a sense of unity with something like ‘the Great Thoroughfare’ or understanding that comes from something beneficial and profound like ‘mind-fasting’. These parts of the Zhuangzi do not feature in Allinson’s interpretation of the text. Perhaps this is because their mystical dimensions do not fit with his interpretation that the Zhuangzi has on overall message of inspiring spiritual transformation in the reader.
7.3. The Zhuangzi is not Mystical because Mysticism is Meaningless
Chad Hansen dismisses the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a mystical text in A Daoist theory of Chinese Thought. Hansen argues that where texts like the Zhuangzi (and the Laozi) philosophise about ‘dao 道’, there is no linguistic evidence that ‘dao 道’ is an ineffable, metaphysical, mystical absolute.761 In rejecting this aspect of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, we see what Hansen identifies as part of mysticism generally: belief in a metaphysical absolute that is ineffable (yet is somehow know-able and beneficial). Hansen objects to the traditional view that the overall message of texts like the Zhuangzi, the Laozi,
759 See James, Varieties, 1902; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy. 760 Allinson, Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters, 24. 761 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 206–207, 216–218, 227–229, 270–272, 285–288, 291, et passim.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi and Daoism in general, is one of mysticism wherein the mystic unifies himself with ‘the Dao’ conceived as a metaphysical absolute.
However, Hansen does not explicitly object to the idea that the Zhuangzi is a work of philosophy wherein there may be other evidence of mystical experiences.762 Moreover, Hansen actually attributes a kind of mysticism to the Zhuangzi at one point in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. For example, he concludes: ‘monism cannot be the point of Zhuangzi’s mysticism. . . . Knowing our knowledge is limited and that there are other possibilities is as far as we can go!’763 Therefore, although Hansen rejects the traditional interpretation that Daoism is mostly concerned with a metaphysical, monistic absolute, he allows that there is a different kind of mysticism evident in the Zhuangzi.
This allowance is plain where Hansen gives an explanation of what he sees as the point of Zhuangzi’s mysticism. Hansen quotes his own translation of the Zhuangzi 5/2/60-62 wherein he renders ‘而不知其所由來，此之謂葆光’ as ‘That’s the mystical boundary — the shaded light.’764 Thus, Hansen attributes mysticism to the Zhuangzi to the extent that he is confident in translating terms in the source text of the Zhuangzi as ‘mystical’.
However, we may object to Hansen’s interpretation of that section of the Zhuangzi. His translation is overly free and does not accurately communicate what the source text says. What the source text actually says does not support his interpretation of its meaning pertaining to Zhuangzi’s mysticism. Consider the following translations:
7.3.1. ‘Mystical Boundary’ Translation
Hansen’s Translation Source Text My Translation
Who can know an unspeakable 孰知不言之辯，不道之 Who can understand an distinction? How can a non- 道？若有能知，此之謂 ineffable distinction, or a guiding dao be a dao? Having 天府。注焉而不滿，酌 way that cannot be this kind of knowing ability spoken? To be able to 焉而不竭，而不知其所 would be being able to put nature know this is called ‘the 由來，此之謂葆光.766 in storage. There would be no Heavenly storehouse’.
762 See also Steve Coutinho, ‘Conceptual Analyses of the Zhuangzi’, in Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy (London: Springer, 2015), 167, et passim. 763 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 291–92. 764 Ibid., 292. 766 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 5/2/60-62.
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filling or draining the storehouse. You can pour water into it That’s the mystical boundary — and it will not be filled. the shaded light.765 You can bale water from it and it will not be
exhausted. However, you do not know where it comes from. This is called the shaded light.767
We can see interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi evident in Hansen’s translation of the passage above. He translates ‘而不知其所由來’ as ‘That’s the mystical boundary’. However, that is not an accurate translation: there is neither a technical nor a general term for ‘mystical’ in that clause. Thus, Hansen’s translation is overly free. It presents inaccurate translations of the source text because of overlaying the translator’s interpretation of what the text means (something mystical) with what it literally says (‘you do not know where it comes from’).
If we consider the clause in more detail, we can see why Hansen might associate this passage with mysticism. Firstly, the passage discusses knowing things that are ineffable; this rightly informs Hansen’s understanding of mysticism. Many scholars take ineffability claims in the Zhuangzi as evidence of mysticism, as the reader will recall from previous chapters. Secondly, the way the author describes being able to have such knowledge employs metaphors that have spiritual significance. One example is the ‘Heavenly storehouse’ (tian fu 天府). ‘Heaven’ generally has spiritual significance, not only for the authors of the Zhuangzi, but also for many Chinese thinkers of the Warring States era. This is because they conceived of Heaven as having a role in ‘mandating’ the natural order of the cosmos.768 Mysticism is inherently concerned with the spiritual, as the reader will also recall from previous chapters. Thirdly, the conclusion of the passage holds that the ability to know ineffable things like ‘ineffable distinction, or a way that cannot be spoken’ is called ‘the shaded light’ (baoguang 葆光). The usage of this term — which is paradoxical in itself — in concluding ruminations
765 Ibid. 767 See also: Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 293. 768 See also: Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery, 15–16; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi on being able to know ineffable things makes it one of praise and profundity.769 A common feature of mysticism is the presence of paradoxes and non-logical elements which adherents believe are beneficial, profound, and part of their method of attaining to their Ultimate.770 Hence, Hansen has reason to associate this passage with his understanding of mysticism. Nevertheless, directly translating some of the language in the source text of the Zhuangzi into such explicit terms as ‘that’s the mystical boundary’ is an overly generous way of interpreting such mysticism.
7.3.2. Different Meanings for ‘Mysticism’ in the Zhuangzi
Although Hansen presents strong arguments against misleading interpretations and translations of ‘dao’, he does not fully address the dimensions of mysticism or how there might be evidence of mystical experiences in the Zhuangzi. Mysticism does not have to be entirely concerned with an ineffable monistic absolute, but this is the only aspect of mysticism that Hansen dismisses from ideas like dao. He bases his rejection of the Zhuangzi being a mystical text entirely with this focus: he does not account for other elements of mysticism which may be present in the Zhuangzi.
Scholars have addressed other elements of mysticism which they argue are evident in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, in doing so, they qualify that Chinese mysticism, or Daoist mysticism, is not the same as Christian, Jewish, or a generalised Western mysticism. For example, Livia Kohn argues that in the Zhuangzi, and Daoist mysticism generally, there is a focus on ‘process-oriented approach[es]’ that are not the same as Western mysticisms of union with a transcendent ‘divine other’.771 Similarly, Harold Roth has argued that the Zhuangzi contains evidence of ‘the lore of inner cultivation’ which he sees as a unifying thread of early Daoist mysticism. This ‘lore’ focusses on processes of cultivating qi (which Roth usually translates as ‘vital essence’) and non-sensory experience of ‘shen 神’ (or ‘numen’) and dao.772 The understanding that has emerged from scholarship by Kohn and Roth is that practices like ‘mind-fasting’ (which involves cultivating qi) and ‘sitting and forgetting’
769 For exegesis of baoguang, see the commentaries collected in 郭慶藩 Guo Qingfan, the Zhuangzi Ji Shi, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju: Xinhua Shudian Beijing Faxingsuo Faxing 中華書局 : 新華書店 北京發行所發行, 1961), 89, note 33. 770 See: James, Varieties, 1902, 413, 416, 419–420, et passim. 771 Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 39; See also Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition; Kohn, Taoist Mystical Philosophy: The Scripture of Western Ascension; Kohn, Seven Steps to the Tao: Sima Chengzhen’s ‘Zuowanglun’; Burik, The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism, 96. 772 See Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 156– 161, et passim.
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(which involves cultivation of non-sensory experience) are the main elements of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Hence, we have more reason not to be persuaded by Hansen’s arguments that mysticism is not an important part of the Zhuangzi.
The way Hansen treats the topic of mysticism in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought is not internally consistent. He writes: ‘I have tried without success to follow a number of accounts [of what mysticism is].’773 Thereupon, Hansen contrives a summary of explanations of mysticism in order to support his conclusion: ‘we can always dismiss such theories on their face. The mystical interpretation is a cry of despair. The evidence for it is the alleged unintelligibility of the text as it stands!’774 The reasoning presented by Hansen at that point of A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought is a straw man argument. Hansen presents a parody of accounts of what mysticism is in order to dismiss them at face value. He does not quote from any scholarly source on mysticism, nor does he give any bibliographic references to any of the sources whose arguments he is parodying. Thus, Hansen’s argument that we should dismiss interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, and early Daoism, is not convincing.
Hansen’s straw man argument also contains the fallacy of appeal to emotion. He introduces the reader to his interpretation of mysticism through the use of pejorative language intended to elicit a negative reaction to the topic of mysticism in general, and especially to the interpretation of mysticism in Daoist texts. He writes: ‘I have tried without success to follow a number of accounts [of what mysticism is]. I shall only try to mimic what I take to be what I am hearing so the reader can understand my frustration.’775 Thereupon, Hansen gives his straw man parody of mysticism, as I have outlined above. By introducing readers to the topic of mysticism in such hyperbolic and pejorative ways, Hansen attempts to elicit ‘frustration’ in his readers towards to topic of mysticism.
This is not a convincing way to refute scholars’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. It does not engage with substantial arguments concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, Hansen attempts to convince readers to adopt his position by explaining his own emotional state in order to influence readers to approach the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi with frustration and face-value rejection. These steps in Hansen’s deliberately portray interpretations of mysticism in Daoism in a poor way just so Hansen, and the reader, can reject them. That is not a valid way to convince readers to reject interpretations of
773 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 227–28. 774 Ibid., 228. 775 Ibid., 227–28.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Hence, the reader ought to reject Hansen’s arguments against mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Another reason to reject Hansen’s arguments against mysticism in the Zhuangzi is his contrary position in his own understanding of mysticism. For example, Hansen writes: ‘I surely fall into the category of those to whom mystical language has no meaning.’776 By this account, Hansen does not understand several explanations of what mysticism is and informs his readers that mysticism is meaningless to him. Yet, he presents his own thoughts on mysticism throughout the book. This is a contrary position to take. It results in an account of mysticism that is internally inconsistent throughout the book.
Furthermore, Hansen contradicts his statement that he does not understand mysticism and that it has no meaning to him at several points in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. For example, when he thanks ‘causal antecedents’ that assisted him writing the book, he writes: ‘[t]he electromagnetic field coursing through my computer no doubt flows from the Big Bang (Mysticism is an easy matter these days of black holes and singularity.)’777 Hansen’s words here indicate that he believes he has an adequate understanding of mysticism and that it is an ‘easy matter’ that involves ‘black holes and singularity’. Such flippant and hyperbolic remarks add to the internally contrary account of mysticism throughout A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought.
Another example of this contrary position towards mysticism is Hansen’s explanation of mysticism in the Mengzi 孟子. Hansen explains that he thinks Mencius has a doctrine of ‘moral mysticism’. He writes: ‘Mencius’ account of this moral sage [who cultivates qi] leads us back to the doctrine of moral mysticism based on qibreath [sic].’778 Hansen then explains what he thinks the mysticism of qi in the Mengzi entails. He writes: ‘We can be in harmony with a universal world force. The floodlike qi flows between the sage and the world. The qi unites the sage’s dao, the sage’s actions, and the dao of the whole world.’779 Such conclusions regarding mysticism in the Mengzi are not consistent with Hansen’s claims that he does not understand what mysticism is.
It is unconvincing to attribute mysticism to the Mengzi, yet deny that mysticism has an important role in the Zhuangzi. This is because scholars do not often consider mysticism to be
776 Ibid., 404, note 438. 777 Ibid., x. 778 Ibid., 175. 779 Ibid.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi a core doctrine of the Mengzi, whereas the interpretation of mysticism as a core doctrine of the Zhuangzi is common. Hansen’s interpretation run counter to how scholars usually think of the place of mysticism in the Mengzi and the Zhuangzi: he would have us take Mengzi for a mystic and Zhuangzi for a philosopher with no interest in mysticism.
Moreover, in the above example, we can see that Hansen recognises some typical mystical ideas to be present in the Mengzi. They are ideas such as: 1) practices to cultivate something esoteric and profound, like qi; and 2) uniting one’s own dao with the dao of the whole world (i.e., uniting with some kind of ‘Absolute’). Thus, if Hansen can conclude that Mengzi is mystical because he advocates practices involving qi, then it should follow that practices involving qi in the Zhuangzi may also be mystical. Consider the example of ‘mind- fasting’ wherein the Zhuangzi talks of qi. The passage relates that ‘fasting the mind’ involves: ‘not listening with the mind, but rather listening with qi. Listening stops with the ears; the mind stops with what it tallies. Qi is empty and waits on things. Only dao gathers in emptiness. Emptiness is mind-fasting.’780 If we assess the Zhuangzi according to the criteria by which Hansen concludes Mencius’ ideas relate a kind of mysticism,781 then the ‘mind- fasting’ example from the Zhuangzi would qualify as an instance of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This is because Zhuangzi advocates a practice of cultivating qi and merging with dao. This is consistent with reasons Hansen gives for labelling the Mengzi mystical.
Hansen thinks that the main requirement people use in labelling texts (like the Laozi and the Zhuangzi) mystical is ‘the alleged unintelligibility of the text as it stands!’ This is false: unintelligibility is not a key factor of determining whether a text is mystical or if what it relates is mystical experience. The reader will not find studies of mysticism outlining unintelligibility as a main feature of mysticism.
Furthermore, at some points, Hansen indicates that he does not understand what mysticism is and tells the reader that he does not understand several accounts of mysticism. Yet, at other points, he writes as though he has an adequate understanding of mysticism. This makes for contrary interpretations of what is and is not mysticism throughout the book. Consequently, I think we should not be persuaded by any of Hansen’s arguments concerning mysticism in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought.
780 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 9/4/26-28 ‘无聽之以心而聽之以氣。聽止於耳，心 止於符。氣也者，虛 而待物者也。唯道集虛。虛者，心齋也’; cf. Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 27. 781 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 175–176, 193, 195, et passim. See also Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 226–46.
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7.4. The Zhuangzi is not Mysticism because the Zhuangzi is Philosophy
In ‘Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi’,782 Hansen argues that the Zhuangzi cannot be a work of mysticism because it is a work of philosophy. In doing so, he assumes, without justification, that philosophy and mysticism are mutually exclusive. Therein, Hansen is critical of supposedly mystical elements in the Zhuangzi. He dismisses the interpretation that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism and argues that the Zhuangzi communicates a more profound philosophy of scepticism.
Hansen holds that treating the Zhuangzi as a mystical text has largely given way to more sophisticated interpretations of its philosophy. He writes: ‘Today, it is more common for a work on Zhuangzi to discuss scepticism or relativism than mysticism.’783 Nevertheless, Hansen reasons that because: ‘[t]raditionalists are loathe to exchange the loveable, comic- strip religious mystic for a sceptical linguistic philosopher. . . . [it has led to] chronic nostalgia for the lost “guru,” and several writers have challenged the characterization of Zhuangzi as a “relativist skeptic”.’784 Thus, Hansen portrays mystics and mysticism as ‘loveable’, comedic and inferior to the serious business of being ‘a sceptical linguistic philosopher’. This is an ungenerous portrayal of interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. It relies on invective against supposedly inferior commitments of mystics and presupposes that philosophical positions, such as relativistic skepticism, are inherently superior to mysticism.
Such a portrayal does not do justice to the seriousness of mysticism. It is yet another example of argumentum ad hominem from Hansen concerning interpretations of mysticism in Daoism and the Zhuangzi. In this example, Hansen would have his readers believe that mystics are not serious which makes their beliefs and writings worthless, or at least far less deserving of attention than the musings of serious philosophers. However, many mystics who have left writings of their experiences give every indication that they took their experiences seriously. Hansen’s dismissal of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is predicated on accepting his value-judgement that mystics and mysticism are not serious and not as worthy of consideration as the ‘serious’ philosophy of scepticism. Yet, he does not give an argument that the Zhuangzi is not mystical. He only dismisses the possibility because he assumes that
782 Hansen, ‘Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi’. 783 Ibid., 128. 784 Ibid., 128–29. See also Philip J. Ivanhoe, ‘Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?’, in Essays on Skepticism, Relativism and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjelberg Ivanhoe and Philip J (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 196–214; Bryan W. Van Norden, ‘Competing Interpretations of the Inner Chapters of the “Zhuangzi”’, Philosophy East and West 46, no. 2 (1996): 247–68; Raphals, ‘Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus’.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi his interpretation of the philosophical worth of the Zhuangzi precludes the possibility that the Zhuangzi could contain any mysticism.
In contradistinction to how he portrays mysticism, Hansen argues that the Zhuangzi represents ‘naturalistic monism’. He explains that naturalistic monism ‘accept[s] natural differences in things, but no dualisms. Naturalistic monism envisions a continuity of nature.’785 Hansen also argues that we should bring this understanding of monism to passages in the Zhuangzi which deal with ‘one-ness’ and ‘unity’, such as the passage that describes Zhuangzi’s philosophy regarding his wife’s death.786 He argues that this type of monism is philosophical and not mystical because it is not: ‘a combination of an epistemological and a linguistic thesis. Mystics typically allege that they have found a special epistemological access to some incommunicable content.’787 Hansen sees no evidence of epistemological access to incommunicable content in the Zhuangzi. Thus, he writes: ‘I see no prima facie reason to read references to unity or oneness in the Zhuangzi as Parmenidean rather than naturalistic monism or to link them to the mystical epistemology of Indo-European traditions.’788
However, such an understanding of mysticism is narrow. Gaining ‘special epistemological access to some incommunicable content’ does not need to be the main factor in determining whether a whole text, or part thereof, is mystical. Passages in the Zhuangzi such as the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue describe practices that transcend ordinary sense perception, and bring a sense of unity with what is arguably an ‘Ultimate’, but there is no explicit declaration that the content of the experience is incommunicable.
Therefore, Hansen’s dismissal of linking references to oneness in the Zhuangzi with mysticism should not persuade us that passages such as ‘sitting and forgetting’ are not mystical. Moreover, Hansen’s position that there is no face value reason to link references to oneness in the Zhuangzi with Indo-European traditions of mystical epistemology does not exclude the possibility that there may be reasons to link such references, or indeed other aspects of the text, to non-Indo-European forms of mysticism. This is how scholars such as Livia Kohn and Harold Roth have argued we ought to interpret the mystical dimensions of the Zhuangzi, as I have indicated above.
785 Hansen, ‘Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi’, 139. 786 Ibid.; See also Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 46/18/15-19. 787 Hansen, ‘Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi’, 158, note 30. 788 Ibid., 140.
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7.5. Zhuangzi is not Mystical because he is not an Anti-Rationalist
In ‘The Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, Wayne Alt challenges interpretations of the role mysticism has in the Zhuangzi’s philosophy. His purpose is to reject scholars’ justifications for labelling Zhuangzi an anti-rationalist due to what they interpret as his mysticism.789Alt writes:
I shall argue that Zhuangzi neither advocated nor adopted an antirationalist position. . . . Nor did he seek the sort of mystical understanding that Graham describes as ‘the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world.’ . . . Zhuangzi sought ming ‘clarity’ 明, and was willing to make whatever distinctions he needed to achieve it.790
Thus, Alt argues that Zhuangzi cannot be an ‘anti-rationalist’ because one needs to maintain some degree of rationality in order to understand what ‘clarity’ is.791 This means that Zhuangzi cannot not be a mystic because a mystic is a kind of anti-rationalist.
Alt presents this position as a counter-argument to that of Angus Graham. It is helpful to see how Graham presents the connection between anti-rationalism and mysticism. He writes:
Like all great anti-rationalists, Chuang-tzu has his reasons for not listening to reason. . . . the point of the whole series [of Hui Shi’s paradoxes] is to show that since division leads to self-contradiction everything is one. . . . it will take only one more step to observe that all reasoning depends on making distinctions, and to reach the conclusion that we should abandon reason for the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world, transforming ‘All are one’ from a moral into a mystical affirmation. It is in ‘The Sorting that evens things out’ that Chuang-tzu takes this step.792
Thus, we can see that Graham holds that what he calls the ‘anti-rationalism’ of Zhuangzi leads to a concomitant doctrine of mysticism. Since Alt disagrees with the interpretation that Zhuangzi is an anti-rationalist, he consequently rejects Graham’s interpretation that Zhuangzi is also a mystic. If Zhuangzi is not an anti-rationalist (as Alt
789 Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, 1, 3, 12, 18–20, 22. 790 Ibid., 2; see also: Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9. 791 Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, 12–14. 792 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi argues), then it follows that Zhuangzi does not advocate a doctrine of mysticism that develops from a doctrine of anti-rationalism.
However, Alt neither argues that the Zhuangzi is not mystical, nor that scholars’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are wrong. Alt argues that scholars who hold that certain parts of the Zhuangzi are evidence of mysticism associated with ‘anti-rationalism’ are wrong because Zhuangzi was not an anti-rationalist. Alt argues: ‘a state of mind in which one ceases to judge between what is and is not would be a state of confusion not at all conducive to ordinary, let alone enlightened, practice.’793 On Alt’s understanding, for Zhuangzi to have been a mystic, and for the Zhuangzi to be advocating a mystical doctrine, he must have made some distinctions. At the very least, he would have distinguished his own enlightened mystical doctrine from other doctrines. This entails using reason. Yet, if Zhuangzi were first of all an ‘anti-rationalist’ who rejected the possibility of using reason to understand ultimate reality, then it would not be possible to then use reason to discern his mystical doctrine concerning ultimate reality.794
Alt adduces several examples from the Zhuangzi to show that Zhuangzi did not recommend abandoning all distinctions as part of a mystical absorption into the Absolute, contrary to Graham’s claims. One example is that Cook Ding from chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi, ‘The Secret of Nurturing Life’ (Yangsheng Zhu 養生主). Alt argues that the Cook Ding in the Zhuangzi: ‘distinguishes the jian [sic]閒 ‘spaces’ in an ox’s carcass’.795 Another example is that Wheelwright Bian from chapter 13, ‘The Way of Heaven’ (Tian Dao 天道). Alt holds that the wheelwright must: ‘[make] distinctions for the practice of [his] craft’.796 Thus, it is clear that the Zhuangzi advocates making distinctions in some of the text’s most well-known ‘skill stories’. Consequently, Alt convincingly argues that Zhuangzi is not a straight-forward ‘anti-rationalist’ whose main thesis is that we should attain a state of not making any distinctions, thereby experiencing a mystical absorption into the ultimate ‘all is one’, as Graham claimed.
In the next stage of Alt’s argument, he concedes that not using reason in some contexts does form part of the Zhuangzi’s message. However, he makes it clear that those situations are more nuanced than how Graham presents them. Moreover, Alt argues that these nuanced
793 Alt, ‘Zhuangzi, Mysticism and the Rejection of Distinctions’, 19. 794 Ibid., 5, et passim. 795 Ibid., 12. 796 Ibid.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi interpretations of not using reason do not justify Graham’s labelling of the Zhuangzi as advocating a mystical doctrine. I explain these steps in Alt’s arguments below.
Alt concedes that there are some parts of the Zhuangzi which advocate not using reason or making distinctions to some extent, in some contexts. He writes: ‘To attain perfection in their actions, perhaps artisans and sages should stop thinking about the moral and practical worth of what they are doing. Moreover, when performing a task, perhaps we should stop thinking altogether, even about the distinctions necessary to complete the task.’797 Nevertheless, Alt reasons that artisans and sages (such as those described in the Zhuangzi) never leave behind all distinctions when they engage in their crafts or practices. He writes: ‘swimmers and carpenters, even when acting with undivided attention, do not refuse to distinguish up from down or right from left. And anglers who succeed know the difference between a bite and a snag.’798 Therefore, if such people really stopped making any distinctions during the performance of such activities, they would be unable to act with the skill of a consummate master or sage. Hence, Alt concludes: ‘Graham's claim that Zhuangzi abandoned distinctions, either for the mystical experience of “an undifferentiated world,” or the practical result of having the “undivided attention” of a master artisan or a sage, is simply erroneous.’799
Throughout the article, Alt raises objections to Maspero and Graham’s claims that Zhuangzi is an ‘anti-rationalist’. This means that Alt engages with the term ‘anti-rationalist’ as those scholars present it, drawing out the logical implications, and showing the absurdities to which they lead. Alt presents convincing arguments in these regards. This entails pointing out that neither Maspero, nor Graham gives clear explanations of what ‘anti-rationalism’ is.
The interpretations of ‘anti-rationalism’ which Alt disputes are strong claims to the effect that Zhuangzi had a doctrine of ‘not using reason’. In both Maspero and Graham’s work (and Alt’s disputation with it), it is clear that they think Zhuangzi had a doctrine of ‘not using reason’ which led him to a further ‘mystical affirmation’. That is to say, Graham and Maspero argue that Zhuangzi had a doctrine of ‘not using reason’ which they interpret led him to become a mystic and to espouse a further doctrine of mystical insight into ‘the ultimate’. Alt focusses on showing Maspero and Graham’s interpretation of ‘anti-rationalism’ in the Zhuangzi to be false. As a corollary to Alt’s rejection of Maspero and Graham’s strong
797 Ibid., 15. 798 Ibid. 799 Ibid., 16.
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‘anti-rationalism’ thesis, it follows that the Zhuangzi is does not espouse a further mystical doctrine based on ‘anti-rationalism’.
Alt’s article shows that the Zhuangzi does not present a doctrine of mysticism based in ‘anti-rationalism’ in Graham’s sense. However, a mystical doctrine in the Zhuangzi does not need to be based on a pre-existing doctrine of ‘anti-rationalism’. In fact, interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi from Livia Kohn and Harold Roth have nothing to say about ‘anti- rationalism’ forming part of a doctrine of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Therefore, while Alt’s argument against Graham and Maspero’s interpretations of anti-rationalism-cum-mysticism are edifying, the scope to argue against other interpretations of mysticism is not present in the article.
7.6. Zhuangzi is not Mystical because he is an Anti-Rationalist
Labelling Zhuangzi an ‘anti-rationalist’ is one interpretation that scholars advocated throughout the 20th century. Furthermore, labelling Zhuangzi mystical has often been concomitant with the interpretation that he is an ‘anti-rationalist’. For example, Henri Maspero writes: ‘What is peculiar to the school of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu is that, instead of being purely intellectual . . . it is based principally on the practice of mysticism. . . . One must not rely on books: they are “the dregs and refuse of the ancients.” Reasoning itself must be abandoned, for it obscures the true knowledge that is intuitive.’800 Another example is Graham’s conclusion that mysticism is one of the ‘reasons for not listening to reason’ that makes Zhuangzi an ‘anti-rationalist’. He interprets one of the main aims of the Zhuangzi to be: ‘abandon[ing] reason for the immediate experience of an undifferentiated world, transforming “All are one” from a logical into a mystical affirmation.’801 Thus, we have an association of anti-rationalism with mysticism in the Zhuangzi as expounded by two influential scholars in the early and late 20th century, respectively.
JeeLoo Liu points out the association of anti-rationalism with mysticism as one of the competing interpretations of the Zhuangzi’s view on truth, reality, and knowledge. Liu writes:
Both Graham’s anti-rationalist and [Jung] Lee’s mystic interpretations point to a different epistemic mode that Zhuangzi advocates: abandon reason; employ what Graham calls ‘pure spontaneity’ and what Lee calls ‘a distinct form of numinous knowing, a knowing which is ‘the oversight
800 Maspero, China in Antiquity, 307. 801 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9.
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which is seeing things as they are’.’ According to both commentators, in Zhuangzi’s view true knowledge is possible as long as one employs this different epistemic mode.802
It is plain that several scholars of the Zhuangzi associate anti-rationalism with mysticism. Yet, some scholars accept an anti-rationalist interpretation whilst rejecting the interpretation of mysticism.803 Thus, the state of scholars’ interpretation of the Zhuangzi is even more ‘confusing and confused’ than Liu argues.804 In the section below, I demonstrate some issues that arise from an interpretation of the Zhuangzi that embraces the label ‘anti- rational’ while rejecting the label ‘mystical’.
In The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, Karen Carr and Phillip Ivanhoe argue that both Zhuangzi and Søren Kierkegaard present doctrines of anti-rationalism. The first instance where they define what is common to the anti- rationalism of both thinkers is in the ‘General Introduction’. They write:
Because of their respective views on religion, Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi represent a distinctive kind of view, which we label antirationalism . . . marked, on the one hand, by the belief that the improper use of reason is harmful in the pursuit of religious truth, and on the other, a thorough- going realism which makes truth claims non-arbitrary, universal, and putatively objective.805
At other points in the book, Carr and Ivanhoe give more detailed accounts of their usage of ‘antirationalism’. The most significant are in chapter two, which is entitled: ‘Antirationalism’. Therein, they explain: ‘antirationalism is a philosophical position about how one grounds certain kinds of truth claims, particularly those concerned with establishing the proper ands of human life. . . . it [antirationalism] denies that reason alone will enable one to choose and pursue the proper goal of life.’806
802 Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 157; see also: Lee, ‘Disputers of the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-Tzu on Meaning, Truth, and Reality’, 447– 70. 803 Carr and Ivanhoe, the Sense of Antirationalism: the Religious Thought of the Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. 804 See also Liu, ‘Zhuangzi’s Philosophy: A Three Dimensional Reconstruction’, 193–94. 805 Carr and Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, xvii–xviii. 806 Ibid., 45.
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Carr and Ivanhoe present an interpretation that Zhuangzi has a doctrine of antirationalism. They also argue that their interpretation of the Zhuangzi entails rejecting the interpretation that Zhuangzi has a doctrine of mysticism and that he was a mystic. However, the grounds on which Carr and Ivanhoe reject the interpretation that Zhuangzi was a mystic, and that mysticism forms part of the meaning of the Zhuangzi, are not convincing. Their arguments do not give convincing definitions of ‘mystic’ and ‘non-mystic’. Nor do their arguments strongly support their definition of ‘non-mystic’ which they seek to apply to Zhuangzi. Moreover, their arguments do not demonstrate burden of proof that mysticism is not part of the meaning of the Zhuangzi.
7.6.1. Zhuangzi, Hui Shi, Hermits, and Mystics
Carr and Ivanhoe argue that passages in the Zhuangzi recording dialogues between Zhuangzi and Huizi 惠子 support their interpretation that Zhuangzi was not a mystic, and that the Zhuangzi has no doctrine of mysticism. They write: ‘These passages are important for they illustrate . . . something that is well-attested throughout the text: Zhuangzi was not a hermit, a contemplative mystic seeking to rid himself of all earthly desires and attachments. In many ways, his life appears quite normal and conventional.’807 This rejection of the interpretation that Zhuangzi was a mystic contains several unexamined assumptions which detract from its convincingness. I explain them below.
Firstly, it defines ‘mystics’ as hermits who shun worldly matters and who are abnormal and unconventional. There is, however, no reference to any primary source of mysticism or secondary source about mysticism to support this definition. This leads Carr and Ivanhoe’s definition of ‘mystic’ to present a false dichotomy. They give only two possibilities for the meaning of ‘mystic’ and interpreting Zhuangzi to be ‘a mystic’. They are: 1) either Zhuangzi was a hermit contemplating to rid himself of earthly desires and who was abnormal and unconventional, thereby making him a ‘mystic’, or 2) he was none of those things. This presentation of what it means to be ‘a mystic’ does not allow that mysticism and being ‘a mystic’ could encompass more than, or aspects other than, those which Carr and Ivanhoe present. As will become clear below, it is a weak definition of ‘mystic’ and Carr and Ivanhoe’s arguments that Zhuangzi was not ‘a mystic’ are not convincing as a result.
Secondly, Carr and Ivanhoe’s definition of ‘mystic’ includes and unwarranted equivocation of ‘mystic’ with ‘hermit’. Literature on mysticism contains many examples of
807 Ibid., 6.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi scholars (and at least one public intellectual) who have reported their own mystical experiences. At least one person among them has also professed to be a mystic in addition to his usual vocation. For example, the public intellectual, Aldous Huxley, professes to have had mystical experiences in at least two publications.808 Huxley’s strongest critic, Robert Zaehner, informs his readers that part of his disagreements with Huxley concerning mystical experience come from his own mystical experience, which he presents as more sacred than the profane kind Huxley reports.809 Zaehner spent much of his academic career as the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions at Oxford University, specialising in the study of Zorastrianism; he was not a hermit who sought to rid himself of human desires. Agehananda Bharati, the anthropologist, ordained Hindu monk, and self-proclaimed mystic, was an active scholar at Syracuse University for over 30 years. He has much to say about his own mystical experiences in The Light at the Center, none of which is in accordance with Carr and Ivanhoe’s definition of ‘mystic’.810 Jordan Paper professes to have had similar mystical experiences to those described by Bharati in his book, The Spirits Are Drunk.811 Furthermore, Paper writes that his own mystical experiences, and his reading of Bharati’s work, have allowed him to make sense of some arguably mystical passages in the Zhuangzi.812 Paper is not a hermit, either.
Therefore, we can see that Carr and Ivanhoe’s equating ‘mystics’ with ‘hermits’ is unwarranted. It, therefore, does not follow that Zhuangzi could not have been a mystic if he was not a hermit. As we see in the counter-examples above, people who are not hermits have professed themselves to be mystics and to have had mystical experiences.
7.6.2. Overlap between ‘Anti-Rationalism’ and ‘Mysticism’
Carr and Ivanhoe do not give further details, definitions, or references to what they mean by ‘mystic’ or ‘mysticism’ beyond their equivocation of ‘mystic’ with ‘hermit’. They do not give other reasons to reject the interpretation that Zhuangzi was a mystic and that the Zhuangzi communicates a mystical doctrine. Yet, they reject the possibility that Zhuangzi was ‘a mystic’, and that mysticism is part of the meaning of the Zhuangzi, despite embracing the interpretation that Zhuangzi was an anti-rationalist, a label which has been applied to the Zhuangzi concomitant with that of ‘mystic’.
808 Huxley, The Doors of Perception, 1954; See Huxley, ‘Heaven and Hell’. 809 See Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, xx. 810 See Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism. 811 See Paper, The Spirits Are Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion, 132. 812 Ibid.
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One scholar to have made this claim is Angus Graham, whose interpretation of ‘anti- rationalism’ Carr and Ivanhoe embrace and expand upon. They dedicate a section of chapter two, ‘Antirationalism’, to explaining how they expand on the usage of ‘anti-rationalism’ developed by Graham.813 This entails explaining how their interpretation of antirationalism differs from that proposed by Graham. However, Carr and Ivanhoe do not give reasons to reject Graham’s association of ‘antiraiontalism’ with ‘mysticism’. Yet, Graham strongly associates ‘antirationalism’ with ‘mysticism’. At several points, in several publications, Graham presents his interpretation that Zhuangzi’s ‘anti-rationalist’ led him to also espouse ‘mysticism’.814 Thus, Carr and Ivanhoe engage with the anti-rationalist interpretation of the Zhuangzi but dismiss the link between anti-rationalism and mysticism that scholars whose work they cite, such as Graham, conclude exists in the text.
In relating Zhuangzi’s rebellion against mainstream forms of ‘spirituality’ and ‘religion’ current in his day, Ivanhoe includes his interpretation of the ‘mind-fasting’ dialogue.815 This dialogue is one that scholars have often labelled ‘mystical’. Ivanhoe’s conclusions support his interpretation that Zhuangzi is an anti-rationalist thinker, which entails some level of religiosity. Thus, Ivanhoe also concludes that there is a spiritual aspect to mind-fasting.
However, his analysis of mind-fasting is also consistent with well-known elements of mysticism from classic works such as Mysticism and Philosophy, as well as works by Harold Roth on the Zhuangzi (cited earlier). Ivanhoe writes: ‘Yan Hui is to loosen and eventually slough off the authority the heart and mind has over him, i.e. free himself from the emotional and cognitive fetters that limit and constrict his understanding and perception.’816 These analyses are consistent with what Roth has argued is part of the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. Roth writes: ‘[Extrovertive mystical] experience entails an ability to live in the world free from the limited and biased perspective of the individual ego.’817 Freeing oneself from
813 See Carr and Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, 47–48. 814 See Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, 1969, 139–41; Graham, Chuang- Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 9; Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 189–90; Angus Charles Graham, Unreason within Reason: Essays on the Outskirts of Rationality (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992), 99, 105–9. See also Graham, ‘Mysticism and the Question of Private Access’. 815 Carr and Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, 15. 816 Ibid. 817 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 66; see also: Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi emotional and cognitive fetters that limit and constrain one’s understanding and perception though practices like ‘mind-fasting’ are consistent with Roth’s application of Stace’s theory of extrovertive mysticism to the Zhuangzi. Ivanhoe does not label mind-fasting mystical, but this does not mean that it is not. It rather seems that there are connections between ‘the spiritual’ and ‘the mystical’ which Ivanhoe has not considered in his arguments concerning the anti-rational aspects of the Zhuangzi.818
Part of the Carr and Ivanhoe’s definition of anti-rationalism overlaps with part of what scholars have meant by ‘mysticism’ since the early 20th century. They write:
antirationalist thinkers . . . do not wholly reject rationality; and they find it not only inadequate but also potentially inimical to a proper appreciation of how things really are. Moreover, they insist that there are alternative and reliable sources of understanding, sources that by their very nature cannot be described in the objective and precise language of rationality.819
Ineffability and noetic quality are the two primary ‘marks’ William James ascribes to the state of consciousness he calls ‘mystical’. He writes: ‘The subject of it [i.e. mystical experience] immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given by words. . . . [Mystical experiences] are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect’.820 James’ conclusion that mystics, through their experiences, gain insight into ‘truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect’ is in accordance with Carr and Ivanhoe’s claim that anti-rationalists insist they have access to ‘reliable sources of understanding . . .[that] cannot be described in the objective and precise language of rationality’. Thus, I find evidence in Carr and Ivanhoe’s definition of ‘antirationalism’ to support the conclusion that there is overlap between ‘antirationalism’ and ‘mysticism’.
Thus, some of Carr and Ivanhoe’s interpretations of the Zhuangzi are consistent with elements of mysticism, even though they may not acknowledge it. For example, Ivanhoe concludes: ‘Zhuangzi’s turn away from reason and toward pre-reflective intuitions and
818 See also: Smith, ‘William James’ Account of Mysticism; A Critical Approach’, 247; Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism’’; Schmidt, Restless Souls: The Making of American Spirituality; Schmidt, ‘The Aspiring Side of Religion: Nineteenth Century Religious Liberalism and the Birth of Contemporary American Spirituality’, 90. 819 Carr and Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, 48. 820 James, Varieties, 1902, 371.
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7. Countering Arguments Against Mysticism in the Zhuangzi tendencies was in part motivated by his desire to achieve a sense of unity with the world.’821 Achieving a sense of ‘oneness’ or ‘unity’ with the world, ‘the Ultimate’, etc., is consistent with several understandings of mysticism.822 Ivanhoe and Carr claim that Zhuangzi sought oneness with the world, yet deny that he was a mystic. It, therefore, seems that there several aspects of their interpretations of the Zhuangzi are not incompatible with interpretations of mysticism in the text, even though they deny that Zhuangzi was a mystic.
7.7. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have shown why some arguments to the effect the Zhuangzi is not mystical are unconvincing. One reason is due to false dichotomies between mysticism and philosophy among interpretations of the Zhuangzi. Another is presenting an inconsistent account of mysticism. A further kind of inconsistency is one which would have us believe that the Mengzi is mystical but that the Zhuangzi is not, even though the same criteria by which one might judge the Mengzi to be mystical can also apply to the Zhuangzi. Another reason is that scholars sometimes reject the possibility that the Zhuangzi could be mystical, or contain a doctrine of mysticism, too readily. They might reject one aspect of mysticism, but not consider other possible aspects of mysticism that might be evident in the Zhuangzi. Sometimes, this is only due to the scope of a scholar’s paper. As such it should not be taken as a criticism of the main points in such works.
A significant finding in this chapter is the contradictory interpretations of ‘anti- rationalism’ in the work of Wayne Alt and Phillip Ivanhoe. Alt denies that Zhuangzi was a mystic because he argues that Zhuangzi was not an anti-rationalist. On the other hand, Ivanhoe denies that Zhuangzi was a mystic because he argues that Zhuangzi was an anti- rationalist. How can the two scholars both deny that Zhuangzi was a mystic due to contradictory conclusions regarding Zhuangzi’s purported ‘anti-rationalism’?
These contradictory interpretations of ‘anti-rationalism’ and their relation to mysticism lie at the heart of Alt’s and Ivanhoe’s contrary positions. Alt’s article is primarily a counter- argument to the interpretation of ‘anti-rationalism’ popularised by Angus Graham. Graham’s interpretation holds that Zhuangzi had a doctrine of ‘not using reason’ (i.e., anti-rationalism) that was a necessary step in order to achieve the mystical goal of union with ‘all-is-one’.
821 Carr and Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, 51. 822 See: James, Varieties, 1902; Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane; Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy; Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics; Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism; Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013.
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Ivanhoe, on the other hand, interprets the ‘anti-rationalism’ of Zhuangzi to be a self-contained philosophical position. That is to say, Ivanhoe does not interpret ‘anti-rationalism’ to be a step along a mystic path of ceasing to use reason to distinguish oneself from ‘the all’. While Ivanhoe has a more detailed engagement with the idea of ‘anti-rationalism’, he does not engage with other aspects of mysticism scholars find in the Zhuangzi. Hence, his rejection of mysticism in the Zhuangzi is not convincing because he has not disproven that content of the Zhuangzi is mystical, or that mysticism is a viable interpretation of the text. Moreover, several aspects of Ivanhoe’s explanations of ‘anti-rationalism’ are consistent with commonly accepted ideas of what mysticism entails. This lessens the convincingness of his rejection of mysticism as a viable interpretation of content in the Zhuangzi.
Thus, when it comes to mysticism, I think that scholars could read the Zhuangzi more closely and sensitively. By reading the text more closely, scholars could use primary source evidence to support their claims either for or against mysticism in the Zhuangzi. By reading the text more sensitively, scholars could present their arguments in the strongest way. In the next chapter, I present my own arguments for interpreting mysticism in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue of the Zhuangzi.
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Part Three: The Dao of Zhuangzi’s Great Pervader
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader 8. Merging with the Great Pervader
In previous chapters, I have assessed interpretations that mysticism is at the core of the Zhuangzi. I have concluded that interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are not supported by methodologically rigorous argumentation, which weakens their validity. I have also given counter arguments to interpretations that the Zhuangzi does not contain mysticism. Hence, I think we should take a fresh look at what we might mean when we claim that mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi. In this chapter, I investigate the topic of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in further detail. I examine the claims of mysticism in a specific part of the text, the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue.
It is important to consider how we can justify interpreting sections of the Zhuangzi as mystical. In recent years, scholars have argued that other kinds of ‘isms’ are appropriate interpretations of the Zhuangzi. Sometimes, scholars discuss these other ‘isms’, such as scepticism, relativism, perspectivism, etc., in their own right. Sometimes scholars have sought to propose some (or any) other ‘ism’ as a superior interpretation of the Zhuangzi than mysticism. Yet, scholars, non-specialists, and students continue to include labels of mysticism and mystical in relation to the Zhuangzi in their discussions. However, a general point in this dissertation is that there are seldom any convincing reasons given for interpreting parts of the Zhuangzi to communicate a kind of mysticism. Nor do many instances of labelling parts of the Zhuangzi, or the whole text, mystical in some way relate terms such as ‘mystical’ to any theory of mysticism. Therefore, in this chapter, I would like to offer arguments in relation to a theory of mysticism I have developed herein to support interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and especially in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ section of the text.
The methodological standards I aspire to achieve include: 1) analysing parts of the Zhuangzi as part of my interpretations and arguments in such a way as to be free of informal reasoning fallacies (of which there are many instances in secondary literature concerning mysticism in the Zhuangzi); 2) representing content from the Zhuangzi through translations (usually my own) that are faithful to what the source text says; 3) considering the complex history and authorship of the Zhuangzi and how these impact interpretations of mysticism in the text; 4) supporting labelling parts of the Zhuangzi mystical with respect to a theory of mysticism developed herein; 5) drawing from hermeneutic methods to interpret mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi in a cohesive manner.
Scholars have often claimed that the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage of the Zhuangzi is mystical. One reason is because the passage describes a practice consistent with the
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader phenomenology of introvertive mysticism as postulated by Walter Stace in Mysticism and Philosophy.823 One aspect of this kind of mysticism is the experience of unity with something believed: ‘to be ultimate and basic to the world’.824 In this respect, scholars claim that the locution ‘I make myself the same as the Great Thoroughfare’ (tong yu da tong 同於大通) in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage implies that Zhuangzi’s Yanhui has become united with ‘the Dao’.825 Such an interpretation assumes that Zhuangzi holds a thesis of an ultimate dao which is a metaphysical entity. However, scholars have not given arguments to demonstrate that interpretation. The Zhuangzi does not tell the reader that ‘the Great Thoroughfare’ refers to ‘the ultimate dao’. Moreover, it is not clear in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue that datong or dao is a metaphysical entity.
8.1. Issues Interpreting ‘tong yu da tong’
Scholars have reiterated the interpretation that da tong means the ultimate dao many times. Yet, no scholar has given a convincing argument to support this interpretation. For example, Harold Roth writes: ‘To “merge with the universal thoroughfare” (tong yu datong 同於大通) seems to imply that, as a result of these practices, Yan Hui has become united with the Dao.’826 Here, Roth presents the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is an example of mystical praxis involving and ultimate dao only by noting that it is implied in the source text. There is no further argument to demonstrate how the Zhuangzi implies such an interpretation.
Roth does, however, supply an endnote with further information about ‘the Dao’. Nevertheless, the endnote does not argue that Yanhui in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue experiences union with ‘the Dao’ through ‘sitting and forgetting’. The endnote refers the reader to A. C. Graham’s explanation of his interpretation of Zhuangzi’s thesis of an ultimate dao. Roth writes that it is an example of: ‘the imagery of the character “Dao” in Zhuangzi.’827 Thereupon, he quotes Graham’s explanation: ‘Chuang-tzu . . . sees man as coinciding with the Way by ceasing to draw distinctions. To be on the unfathomable path is to merge into the
823 See Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [A]’; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism. 824 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 132. 825 See: Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 85; Ching, Chinese Religions, 92–94; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69, 93; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 154, 157; Chen, ‘Mysticism Is the Home of Zhuangzi’s Epistemology (神秘主义是庄子认识论的归宿)’, 70. 826 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69. 827 Ibid., 92.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader unnameable whole, so that what we are trying to pin down by the name “Way” is revealed as nothing less than the universe flowing from its ultimate source . . .’828 Yet, this is not an analysis of the source text of the Zhuangzi. Graham’s work on the Zhuangzi is often meticulous, so it is likely that he has reasons for interpreting the Zhuangzi in this way. However, his reasons for interpreting ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’ to mean merging with an ultimate dao are not explicit in this instance.
This problematic interpretation is not limited to Anglophone readings of the Zhuangzi. The Chinese scholar, Chen Shaoyan 陈绍燕 presents a standard interpretation of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in Chinese. She first of all quotes the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue in full and then gives an interpretation its meaning. In a free translation, she writes to the effect:
After abandoning the burden of body and getting rid of ‘three in the morning’ knowledge, one can make oneself identical with the simplicity of Heaven and Earth. One will be able to mould into whatever transformations come [one’s way]. Having attained this state, the knower can merge into unity with the Great Dao.829
This explanation of the meaning of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage is problematic for several reasons. First, there is no analysis to show how ‘sitting and forgetting’ is related to ‘three in the morning’. Second, there is no analysis of the Zhuangzi to show how ‘sitting and forgetting’ communicates anything concerning the Great Dao, that is to say, the ultimate dao. The interpretation has been presented as if it is an uncontroversial point in the source text.
The methodological problem of merely quoting source text and then presenting one’s interpretation without argument is also evident in a more recent article from a Chinese scholar. Hu Jiaxiang 胡家祥 holds that ‘mind fasting’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are the main points of the entire text of the Zhuangzi.830 This position is not supported by any
828 Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 188; quoted in Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 93. 829 Chen, ‘Mysticism Is the Home of Zhuangzi’s Epistemology (神秘主义是庄子认识论的归宿)’, 70. The source text reads: ‘在摆脱了躯壳的累赘, 丢弃了“ 朝三暮四” 的智慧之后, 就可以把自己等同 于天地大炉中的一块朴金, 任凭造化的大冶去陶铸。达到这种境界, 认识者就可以与大道融通为 一了’. A more literal translation could be: ‘After abandoning the burden of body, and getting rid of “three in the morning” knowledge, one can make oneself the same as an unadorned piece of metal from the great stove of Heaven and Earth, thereby molding oneself with transformations. Having attained this state, the knower can merge into unity with the Great Dao’. 830 Jiaxiang 胡家祥 Hu, ‘The Main Characteristics and Contemporary Significance of Chuang-Tzu’s Aesthetic (庄子美学的基本特点及其现代意义)’, Journal of South-Central University for
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader argumentation but it is not my focus here. Hu’s position includes the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ means merging with the Great Dao. He presents the interpretation thus:
In order to see this directly, we can use this diagram . . . 1. Forget rites and music[.] Drop off limbs and body[.] Leave form (transcend senses)[.] Have no likes[.] 2. Forget humaneness and rightness[.] Dispel keen hearing and keen sightedness[.] Get rid of understanding (transcend comprehension)[.] Have no constants[.] 3. Merge with the Great Pervader (the Great Dao, the great transformations)831
8.1.1. Image: Hu Jiaxiang’s Diagram Explanation of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’
The round brackets in the quotation above are Hu’s own explanations of the meaning of the excerpts from ‘sitting and forgetting’. He quotes them as part of a diagram meant to show a linear progression of the processes of ‘sitting and forgetting’ which culminates in merging with the Great Pervader. In the quotation, Hu writes that datong means the Great Dao, or the great transformations, only by stating so in round brackets. It is tantamount to reasoning to the effect: when Zhuangzi says a he means b or c (which are the same, anyway).
This is a deeply entrenched methodological problem with interpreting Chinese texts: explaining jargon (a) with more jargon (b) which the author presents as meaning the same thing as yet more jargon (c). Furthermore, the author then equivocates all of them to the effect of: a means b or c; b and c mean the same thing, anyway, so a means c. In the case of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the Zhuangzi, this manifests as interpreting datong to mean dadao, which in
Nationalities (Humanities and Social Sciences) 中南民族大学(人文社会科学版) 23, no. 4 (July 2003): 97–102. 831 Ibid., 98 The source text reads ‘为了直观，我们不妨列一图表...1. 忘礼乐 堕肢体离形（超越感 性）无好[.] 2. 忘仁义 黜聪明去知（超越知性）无常...3. 同于大同（大道，大化）’.
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English is called ‘the Dao’. This approach compounds non-analytical interpretations with equivocation of jargon.
Hu adds a paragraph stating his interpretation of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in his own words. The concluding sentence reads ‘Through these two layers of shedding away, the soul goes beyond life and death, as well as separating from right and wrong. Thereupon, it melds into the great transformations and manifests the Great Dao.’832 However, this is not an argument to convince readers of the truth, validity, or even plausibility of the interpretation. It is merely where Hu states his interpretation. There is no analysis of the text to allow readers to understand how he came to his conclusions.
8.2. Issues Interpreting ‘Merging’
A further methodological issue is the interpretation of ‘merging’. In typical interpretations of mysticism in ‘sitting and forgetting’ the ‘tong 同’ of ‘tong yu datong 同於 大通’ is interpreted to say ‘merge’. It is, however, not clear in what sense scholars take this ‘merging’. Does it mean to experience a transitory state of non-dualistic experience brought about through the apophatic meditation of ‘sitting and forgetting’ and a concomitant experience of dao? Does it mean ‘uniting’ in a non-dualistic state with a metaphysical ‘Great Pervader’ which is a metaphor for the ultimate dao? Does it mean ‘merging’ with the ultimate metaphysical dao, yet maintaining a separate awareness or identity (i.e., not in a non-dualistic state)? Does it mean ‘merging’ in a non-metaphysical way, wherein the Daoist gains more insight into how to ‘merge’ with the ultimate dao through shedding away unnatural contrivances that hinder his/her connection with dao?
The interpretation of ‘tong’ in ‘tong yu datong’ is problematic. The term could have several meanings. Some of the meanings come from how the term can be used as different parts of speech, as Chinese grammar allows. In the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue, tong is used as a verb. Even when we identify this aspect of the term’s meaning, we are still left with several nuances of what the term could mean in the context of the dialogue. This is because tong has several meanings even when used as a verb. Nonetheless, there is a cluster of root meanings of ‘sameness’, ‘similarity,’ ‘together with’, ‘in a group’, and ‘going along with’. If we interpret the tong of tong yu datong with each of these meanings, we get the following translations:
832 Ibid.通过这两重去弊，心灵便外生死而离是非，于是融入大化，呈现大道.
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I am the same as the Great Pervader I am similar to the Great Pervader I am together with the Great Pervader I am grouped with the Great Pervader I go along with the Great Pervader
Based on the meaning of the words in the text, any of the above interpretations of ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’ are viable. Moreover, the above translations all differ from those appearing in translations used by scholars.833 However, in my view, scholars have not fully considered the multiplicity of possible meanings for ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’. When they have come to interpret and translate the text, they have done so with a pre-conceived idea of what the text says, and means, due to their commitment that the overall meaning of the dialogue, and the text, is one of mysticism. This interpretation contains embedded ideas that mysticism involves ‘merging’ with a metaphysical ultimate in a kind of non-dualistic ‘unity’. Thus, scholars interpret ‘tong yu datong 同於大通’ to say, or imply, this kind of mysticism.
8.3. Issues Intepreting ‘datong’
As the reader can see, scholars assume that datong is another way of saying ‘the Great Dao’. They support their interpretation by noting that the Zhuangzi implies as much, or with quotations of another scholar with a similar view, or by equivocating datong with other jargon, such as dadao (大道), or dahua (大化). Although there may be reasons for making those connections, scholars have not explained them to their readers. In my view, this has come about because the interpretation is so wide-spread that scholars do not examine their assumptions and interpretations about the meanings of these terms.
There are issues in the meanings of what the source text literally says in terms of its own jargon. This has implications for how we can plausibly interpret the meaning of terms in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue with our interpretations of mysticism in the text. For example, there are several translations of ‘datong’ that scholars use in English translations. The most common is ‘Great Thoroughfare’ from Burton Watson’s translation, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu.834 However, there are other English translations such as ‘universal thoroughfare’,835 and ‘Transforming Openness’ where Ziporyn substitutes ‘dahua 大化’ for
833 See Feng, Chuang-Tzŭ, 128; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 90; Graham, Chuang- Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92; Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 49. 834 See Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 90. 835 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92.
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‘datong 大通’ following a parallel passage in the Huainanzi.836 Harold Roth gives different translations (‘universal thoroughfare’ and ‘Great Pervader’) in different publications, and uses both at different points in Original Tao.837
These alternate translations and interpretations of datong reveal significant methodological issues for interpreting the meaning of the text. Firstly, the differences in translation show that the source text does not present an unambiguous univocal statement in what it literally says. Secondly, scholars give different translations in order to better communicate their interpretation of what the source text means, according to the scholars’ own interpretations. Thus, translating ‘datong’ as ‘Great Thoroughfare’ fits better with the interpretation that the source text refers to a metaphysical entity, namely the dao, which is the ‘thoroughfare’ along which everything traverses. In that sense, ‘great’ is a literal translation of ‘da 大’, which fits well with the interpretation that Zhuangzi is referring to the ‘Great Dao’, a metaphysical absolute which is part of his mysticism. On the other hand, translating ‘da 大’ as ‘universal’ is a freer translation, but one which also reveals scholars’ interpretation that Zhuangzi’s meaning pertains to a metaphysical ultimate along which everything traverses.
In my view, ‘Great Pervader’ is the most accurate translation of ‘datong 大通’. Firstly, ‘da 大’ has the sense of ‘great’ in the source text. Hence, translating ‘datong’ as ‘universal thoroughfare’ is mistaking the scholar’s interpretation of the concept’s meaning for what the source text communicates in its own terms. Secondly, translating ‘tong 通’ as ‘Thoroughfare’ loses some of the meaning of ‘tong 通’ being a verb that has been made into a noun. Thus, in a surface-level grammatical sense, ‘Great Pervader’ is a more accurate translation than ‘Great Thoroughfare’ or ‘universal pervader’.
Moreover, I think that in the Zhuangzi, there is a subtle meaning of ‘tong 通’ relating to ‘dao 道’. At several points in the text, ‘dao 道’ is discussed in terms of ‘pervading’ (‘tong 通’). One example is the ‘Dao Pervades and Unifies’ passage that I discuss later in this
836 Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 49. 837 ‘universal thoroughfare’ in Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69; ‘Great Pervader’ in Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 37; ‘Great Pervader’ in Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’; ‘Great Pervader’ in Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism, 155; ‘universal thoroughfare’ in ibid., 157.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader chapter.838 Through a close reading of the source text, we can make these connections in the meaning of dao and datong clearer to readers.
The interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ communicates some aspect of merging with a ‘Great Dao’ is widespread to the point that scholars often accept and propound the interpretation without analysis or argument. Therefore, in this chapter, I explore the concept of the Great Pervader (datong 大通) in the Zhuangzi. I argue that there is evidence in the Zhuangzi to support the interpretation that ‘datong’ is another way of referring to an ultimate, metaphysical dao. I further investigate whether such an understanding of the meaning of the passage supports the interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. I conclude that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is an example of mysticism but that to convincingly argue this interpretation requires a more detailed and nuanced reading of the text than scholars have offered. I offer such an interpretation in this chapter.
8.4. Sitting and Forgetting (坐忘)
The ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage occurs in chapter 6, ‘The Great Ancestor as Teacher’ (Da Zong Shi 大宗師). The content of this chapter pertains to teachers and teachings held to be superior to what was ordinarily supposed to be profound at time of the chapter’s composition. The author of the text parodies Confucians by contriving dialogues wherein Confucius and his best disciple, Yanhui, espouse values inconsistent with those of Confucians. These values are presented as superior to the kinds of virtues Confucians highly valued. They are Daoist values of self-cultivation and ways of living in society and the world. They emphasise practices aimed at shedding away the artificial and unnatural contrivances such as the rituals and ethics that Confucians would have people uphold as important parts of living within society.839 The ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue contains some examples.
838 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 42–44; See also Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 24–27. 839 See Shih Hu, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, 2nd ed. (New York: Paragon Book Reprint, 1968), 143–44; Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 10–13, 31–33; Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 64–69, 141, 188.
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8.4.1. The ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ Dialogue
The ‘Sitting and Forgetting’ Dialogue
My Translation Source Text
Yan Hui said: ‘I’m improving!’ 顏回曰：「回益矣。」仲尼 Confucius replied: ‘What does that 曰：「何謂也？」曰：「回忘仁義 mean?’ Yan Hui said: ‘I have forgotten 矣。」曰：「可矣，猶未也。」 humaneness and rightness!’ Confucius replied: ‘Very well, but you’re still not there yet.’
The next day, they met again. Yan 他日復見，曰：「回益矣。」曰： Hui said: ‘I’m improving!’ Confucius said: ‘What does that mean?’ Yan Hui 「何謂也？」曰：「回忘禮樂矣。」 said: ‘I have forgotten the rites and 曰：「可矣，猶未也。」 music!’ Confucius replied: ‘Very well, 他日復見，曰：「回益矣。」曰： but you’re still not there yet.’ 「何謂也？」曰：「回坐忘矣。」仲 The next day, they met again. Yan 尼蹴然曰：「何謂坐忘？」 Hui said: ‘I’m improving!’ Confucius said: ‘What does that mean?’ Yan Hui said: ‘I sit and forget!’ Confucius was
taken aback and said: ‘What does it mean to ‘sit and forget’?’ 顏回曰：「墮肢體，黜聰明，離形去
Yan Hui replied: ‘I drop off my 知，同於大通，此謂坐忘。」 limbs and body, I dispel keen hearing
and clear sightedness, separate [myself
from] form and get rid of understanding and [I make myself] the same as the Great Pervader. This is called ‘sitting and forgetting’.’
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Confucius said: ‘Since you are the 仲尼曰：「同則无好也，化則无常 same [as the Great Pervader], you must 也。而果其賢乎！丘也請從而後 have no more likes. Since you have been 也。」841 transformed, you have no more constants. You are, as expected, indeed a worthy!840 I beg to be allowed to follow after you as your disciple!’
In the following sections, I argue that ‘da tong’ in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is a metaphor referring to the ultimate dao. I begin by analysing how the Zhuangzi describes features of an ultimate dao. In doing so, I show how features of the ‘great pervader’ (i.e., da tong) relate to the concept of an ultimate dao in the Zhuangzi. Then, I analyse how commentaries on the Zhuangzi support the interpretation that da tong is a synonym for an ultimate dao. It is through this explanation of the text that we can support the interpretation that the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
We can translate ‘da tong’ as ‘the Great Pervader’. This is because ‘da’ means ‘great’ and ‘tong’ is normally used as verb meaning ‘to pervade’, or ‘to traverse’, etc. In the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage, ‘da 大’ in the locution, ‘tong yu da tong 同於大通’, is and adjective modifying the noun ‘tong 通’ connected by the preposition ‘yu 於’ to ‘tong 同’ which is being used as an intransitive verb. So, through the process of sitting and forgetting, one can tong (go along, unite, unify, identify, be similar, be the same) yu (with) datong (the great pervader). As I have explained in earlier chapters of this dissertation, scholars often interpret this to imply, or self-evidently mean, uniting with an ultimate dao. However, as I have just shown, the text does not literally, or self-evidently, communicate such an idea. In the sections
840 As Watson points out: ‘Chuang Tzu probably intends a humorous reference to the words of Confucius in Analects VI, 9’. Watson, the Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 91. See also the Analects of Confucius, 117–118/VI/9: ‘Incomporable indeed was Hui! A handful of rice to eat, a gourd full of water to drink . . . to Hui’s cheerfulness it made no difference at all.’ 841 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 19/6/89-93 The character ‘无’ appears more frequently than ‘無’ in the received text of the Zhuangzi.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader below, I explain how we can plausibly interpret ‘datong’, the ‘Great Pervader’, as a metaphor for an ultimate dao.
8.5. Regarding Dao
If the ‘Great Pervader’ is the ultimate dao, then it would make sense that the ultimate dao would be described in terms of pervading all things. The ultimate dao would be described in terms which suggest, or perhaps clearly communicate, that it is ‘ultimate’.
Elsewhere in chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi, there are descriptions of dao that correspond to these ideas. In the ‘Regarding Dao’ passage, Zhuangzi gives examples of people who have ‘attained dao’ (‘得之’ where ‘之’ is a pronoun for ‘道’). Zhuangzi only vaguely tells us what dao is. Nevertheless, by reading the passage, we can see that Zhuangzi describes dao in terms which suggest that he holds a conception of a metaphysical ultimate dao.842
The ‘Regarding Dao’ Passage
My Translation Source Text
Regarding Dao, it is real (qing 情)843 and 夫道，有情有信，無為無形；可傳而 it is reliable; yet it has no action and no 不可受，可得而不可見；自本自根， form. It can be transmitted but not received; it can be obtained but not seen. 未有天地，自古以固存；神鬼神帝， It is itself the root and the branch; it 生天生地；在太極之先而不為高，在 existed before Heaven (tian 天) and Earth. It hallows ghosts and emperors. It gives birth to Heaven and Earth. It is
842 See also Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 89, 93–94, 149, 155, 160. 843 Wang Shumin quotes several discussions on how to interpret ‘qing’. See Shumin 王叔岷 Wang, Zhuangzi Jiao Quan 莊子校詮, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo 中央研 究院歷史語言研究所, 1988), 230–31. However, the sources which tell the reader that ‘qing’ means ‘shi’ (reality) merely reiterate this interpretation that is without explanation. It is an interpretation to the effect ‘A means B’, as I discussed in the beginning of this chapter. No explanation of interpreting ‘qing’ is given in Zhuangzi Ji Shi. See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:246–47; The Kangxi Zidian (康熙字典) gives the following listing of ‘qing’ in the sense of ‘shi’. It reads ‘又情，實也。《論語》上好信，則 民莫敢不用情’. See ‘康熙字典情的解释|康熙字典情的意思|汉典“情”字的康熙字典’, accessed 20 July 2016, http://www.zdic.net/z/19/kx/60C5.htm.
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more senior than the Supreme Ultimate 六極之下而不為深；先天地生而不為 (tai ji 太極), but it is not high; it is lower 久，長於上古而不為老。844 than the six extremes, but it is not deep. It existed before Heaven and Earth, but it
is not long-lasting; it is older than high antiquity, but it is not ancient.
In the ‘Regarding Dao’ passage, Zhuangzi presents an idea of a dao that is all- pervasive. Zhuangzi describes a dao that ‘is its own root and branch’ (自本自根), and which ‘existed before Heaven and Earth’ (生天生地). He says that this dao ‘gives life to Heaven and Earth’. Zhuangzi describes this dao in even loftier terms when he says that it is ‘more senior than the Supreme Ultimate’ (在太極之先). It appears that Zhuangzi describes this dao in loftier terms than the ‘Supreme Ultimate’ because it is his idea of an ultimate dao. If ‘datong’ is a synonym for an ultimate, metaphysical dao, then it is likely to be this dao which Zhuangzi describes in the same chapter.845
The connections between ‘datong’ and a metaphysical ultimate dao are not explicit in the text. Nowhere in the text of the Zhuangzi does it say datong is a synonym for my conception of a metaphysical ultimate dao. However, by reading the Zhuangzi philosophically, we can analyse the connections between the attributes of the ultimate dao and the ‘Great Pervader’. If they share enough attributes, then we can plausibly reason that the ‘Great Pervader’ is synonymous with the ultimate dao.
I have developed this aspect of my methodology from Steve Coutinho’s ideas on reading Daoist texts philosophically. Coutinho explains that ‘A major component of philosophical method is attempting to construct clarifications and definitions when these are
844 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/29-36. 845 Zhuang Zhou might not have originally presented these ideas in the same scroll (juan 卷) or chapter (pian 篇). It might be the case that Guo Xiang grouped these ideas together in the same chapter because he saw connections between them. Nevertheless, scholarly consensus holds that most, if not all, of the content of the Inner Chapters comes from a single author. That author may not have presented his ideas in the order that we now have them. However, the connections between the ideas would be the same, no matter what order they were presented in, or who arranged them in that order.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader not explicitly given in the text.’846 Coutinho also encourages readers ‘to notice problems in the articulation of these [Daoist philosophical] concepts and in the relationships between them, identify objections to a philosophical view that must be answered if it is to be taken seriously, and provide arguments in favor of the position when convinced of its plausibility.’847
In this dissertation, I am attempting to construct clarifications of how datong could refer to an ultimate metaphysical dao in the Zhuangzi and how we can plausibly interpret that part of the text as relating mysticism. In doing so, I am explaining problems in philosophical positions concerning interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi, but especially with interpreting the ‘sitting and forgetting’ section. Thus, I have explained why we ought to be critical of scholars’ interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi and in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ section. Moreover, I am answering questions that arise from scholars’ interpretations of the text, as well as from the text itself, so that we can take interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi seriously. Furthermore, in this chapter, I provide arguments in favour of the position that datong in ‘sitting and forgetting’ refers to an ultimate, metaphysical dao. This in turn, supports interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
Why would Zhuangzi relate ‘sitting and forgetting’ with ‘the Great Thoroughfare’ and not directly with ‘the ultimate dao’? I suggest it is because if the ultimate dao is ineffable, then it might be more effective to use a metaphor which relates attributes associated with the ultimate dao. In the case of ‘sitting and forgetting’, one must ‘pass through’ (tong 通) the process of ‘dropping off limbs’, ‘dispelling keen hearing and clear sightedness’, ‘separating [oneself from] form and getting rid of understanding’ in order to ‘merge with the Great Pervader’ (datong 大通). The emphasis is on the lived experience of going through that process by which one can attain a greater kind of ‘pervading’. This kind of ‘pervading’ is
846 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 14. 847 Ibid., 14–15; There are other ways of reading the Zhuangzi which do not place as much emphasis on reading the text philosophically. For example, Michael Saso explains how several eminant Daoist priests in Taiwan read the text as a manual of meditation. See Michael R. Saso, The Teachings of Taoist Master Chuang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Michael R. Saso, ‘The Chuang-Tzu Nei-P’ien: A Taoist Meditation’, in Experimental Essays on Chuang-Tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 140–57; Livia Kohn and Harold Roth read the Zhuangzi as containing nacent elements of Daoist religion. See Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition; Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture; Kohn, ‘Confucianism and Daoism’; Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism; Louis Komjathy presents a stronger interpretation of the Zhuangzi as a work pirmarily of significance to Daosit religion. See Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction; Victor Mair interprets the Zhuangzi to be primarily a work of literature, not philosophy. See Mair, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu, xi.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader bringing benefit from the experience of ‘sitting and forgetting’ which discards contrived aspects of living so that one can be more in touch with a dao that is more natural.
8.6. My Teacher! My Teacher!
There is another passage in chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi which scholars often interpret as relating ideas concerning an ultimate dao. These ideas are that the ultimate dao encompasses all things. It also relates ideas of an ultimate dao that is beyond the dao of Confucians and their ideals. The passage is as follows:
‘My Teacher, My Teacher’ Passage
My Translation Source Text
Yierzi 意而子 went to see Xuyou 許 意而子見許由，許由曰：「堯何以資汝？」 由. Xuyou said: ‘What bounty has 意而子曰：「堯謂我：『汝必躬服仁義，而 Yao 堯 given to you?’ 明言是非。』」許由曰：「而奚為來軹？夫 Yierzi said: ‘Yao said to me: ‘You 堯既已黥汝以仁義，而劓汝以是非 矣，汝將 must devote yourself to humaneness and rightness. You must clearly say 何以遊夫遙蕩、恣睢、轉徙之途乎？」意而 what is right and what is not.’’ 子曰：「雖然，吾願遊於其藩。」許由曰： Xuyou said: ‘Then what are you 「不然。夫盲者無以與乎眉目顏色之好，瞽 doing coming here to join me. Yao has already branded you with 者無以與乎青黃黼黻之 觀。」 humaneness and rightness. He has already cut off your nose with right and wrong. How could you wander (遊) along the free and unrestrained path?’
Yierzi said: ‘Be that as it may, I would still like to wander along its fence.’
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Xuyou said: ‘Oh but you cannot. Eyes without pupils cannot appreciate the fineness of an eyebrow or the colour of a face. Nor can blind people see greens and yellows and fine robes.’
Yierzi said: ‘When Wuzhuang 無莊 lost his looks, when Juliang 據梁 lost his strength, when the Yellow 意而子曰：「夫無莊之失其美，據梁之失其 Emperor 黃帝 lost his wisdom, they 力，黃帝之亡其知，皆在鑪捶之間耳。庸詎 were all in the process of being smelted and hammered. How do we 知夫造物者之不息我黥而補我劓，使我乘成 know that the maker of things will not 以隨先生邪？」 extinguish my branding [made with humanness] and replenish my nose
[that has been cut-off with rightness], thereby making me whole again so I
can follow you as my teacher?’
Xuyou said: ‘Ah! We cannot know that. I will tell you the basic reasons why.’ [Then he said]: ‘My teacher! My teacher! My teacher chops up the myriad things, yet is not righteous. 許由曰： 「噫！未可知也。我為汝言其大
My teacher blesses all people, yet are 略。吾師乎！吾師乎！齏萬物而不為義，澤 not humane. My teacher is older than antiquity, yet is not ancient. My 及萬世而不為仁，長於上古而不為老，覆載
teacher covers Heaven and bear up 天地、刻彫眾形而不為巧。此所遊已。」848 Earth, and carves up all forms, but is not skilful. This is where you must
wander.’
848 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 6/19/14-6/19/15.
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It is significant that this passage expresses dao in terms that go beyond the way of Confucianism. Confucians emphasised the role of their teachers. Their teachers had a duty to transmit the proper way of behaving, learning, studying, of engaging in rites (li 禮) and music (yue 樂). Confucians emphasised rightness (yi 義) and humanness (ren 仁) and saw it as part of their duty, their dao, to instruct their followers in the proper ways of these matters.849 Steve Coutinho explains these fundamental concepts of Confucianism thus: ‘The goal of Confucianism is to cultivate what invests human life with deep significance: virtue and culture. Humans are capable of acting with ceremonious respect, li 禮, and of doing what is right, yi 義.’850
However, a common theme among Daoist texts is that the Confucian way is not as natural as the Daoist way. In order to cultivate a more natural way of living, Daoists urge us to forget about the contrivances of Confucianism. Hence, Coutinho writes:
The Daoists consider human-oriented endeavour of such magnitude to be counterproductive and disastrous, an artificial fabrication at odds with the natural way. . . . they account for our deviation from a more primordially natural way with our predilection for linguistic activity and manipulative transformation of our environment in accordance with artificially induced dissatisfactions.851
Some of the artificially induced dissatisfactions that Zhuangzi critiques in the ‘My Teacher’ passage above include ren, yi, and also the authority of world-transforming Confucian sage-kings. Confucians often appealed to the authority of ancient sage kings concerning matters of ren and yi. They claimed that they were maintaining and transmitting the best way to live which had been established by their sage-kings, but particularly the founders of the Zhou Dynasty.852 One of the main sage-kings, to whose authority Confucians appealed, was Yao (堯).
849 See also Li, Early China, 211et passim. 850 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 33. 851 Ibid.; See also Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China, 131–32. 852 See Carine Defoort, ‘Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate’, Philosophy East and West 51, no. 3 (2001): 396–97; Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy, 323–24; Peimin Ni, ‘The Changing Status of Chinese Philosophy’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40, no. 3–4 (1 September 2013): 285–86; Coutinho, An
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In the passage above, Zhuangzi presents the Confucian ideal sage-king, Yao, as mutilating people through humanness and rightness. Zhuangzi thinks that Confucian humaneness and rightness are taking something away from people. This something is a more natural way of living in the world. It is a Daoist ideal of living more simply and accepting the world as it naturally exists, without ren or yi.
In the dialogue, Zhuangzi presents a character who says that he has a teacher who goes beyond those ideals of Confucianism. The teacher Zhuangzi most admires is one who can ‘carve up the myriad things’ (齏萬物) but without yi. This teacher can ‘bless all people’ (澤 及萬世) but does not need ren to do it. Moreover, this teacher is older than the time of high antiquity to which Confucians appeal as their ideal society. This teacher ‘bears up all of Heaven and Earth’ (覆載天地).
This teacher is not a person. This teacher is not a sage-king or even a Daoist sage.853 This teacher is an impersonal, ultimate dao, the natural way, free from the counterproductive artifice manufactured by humans. One can go along (tong 通) this dao without Confucian ideals. Indeed, one needs to ‘forget’ about those contrivances in order find this dao. Hence, the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue shows Yanhui ‘forgetting’ about rites and music. By understanding that the ultimate dao is something we can ‘pervade’ (tong 通), we can see a clearer connection between the ‘great pervader’ in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ and the ultimate dao. Understood in this way, we can plausibly interpret ‘sitting and forgetting’ as a way of manifesting a connection with an ultimate dao.
8.7. Manifesting a Connection with Dao
There are further examples of characters in the Zhuangzi who manifest connections with dao. One example is Huzi (壺子) from chapter 7, ‘Responding to Emperors and Kings’ (Ying Di Wang 應帝王).854 In that dialogue, Huzi shows that his practice of manifesting his dao is superior to the magical dao of a shaman, with whom his student, Liezi (列子), is
Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 32–33,37; Kathleen Higgins, ‘Music in Confucian and Neo- Confucian Philosophy’, International Philosophical Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1980): 433–451; Lunyu 論語, n.d., 6.30; 8.19; 14.42; 20.1. 853 In other parts of the Zhuangzi, the authors give names of people who are models of good teachers. There are many examples in the ‘Regarding Dao’ passage, quoted above. 854 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 20/7/15-21/7/31.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader impressed. The Shaman goes with Liezi to meet Huzi as a kind of challenge to test the shaman’s fate-discerning powers. Huzi says to Liezi:
I have shown you all of its [this dao’s] patterns, but I have not yet shown you all of its manifestations. How could you have attained this dao? . . . Try coming here with the shaman and I will show you. 吾與汝既其文， 未既其實，而固得道與? . . . 嘗試與來，以予示之.855
Thereupon, there is a series of exchanges between the shaman and Huzi wherein the shaman’s magic is not powerful enough to divine Huzi’s fate. The shaman cannot tell Huzi’s fate because Huzi cultivates a practice manifesting his connection with dao. This practice involves the ‘mechanisms’ (ji 機) of ‘heavenly soil’ (tianrang 天壤) that ‘issue from the heels’ (fa yu zhong 發於踵), and which ‘balance the mechanisms of qi’ (heng qiji 衡氣機).856 These practices culminate with Huzi manifesting himself as ‘not yet having emerged from [his] ancestor’ (weishi chu wu zhong 未始出吾宗).857 Huzi’s practices, his appearances, and his dao, are too profound for the shaman and his magic, so the shaman gives up and flees.
These practices of manifesting a dao exhibit technical terms found elsewhere in the Zhuangzi. Some are ‘issuing from the heels’ (fa yu zhong 發於踵), ‘qi’ (氣), and ‘the ancestral’ (zong 宗).858 ‘The ancestral’ is of particular significance in relation to ‘sitting and forgetting’, the ‘Great Pervader, and the ‘ultimate dao’. The ultimate dao is commonly interpreted to be ‘the teacher who is the great ancestor’. This is a connection between the ideas of chapter 6 and chapter 7 of the Zhuangzi. The Huzi dialogue shows a clearer example of practices that manifest a dao than the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. Thus, we see that Zhuangzi held that one could manifest dao through practices. This evidence supports the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is a practice wherein one can manifest a connection with dao.
Furthermore, the Huzi dialogue is an example of a function of mystical language which Steven Katz explains in Comparative Mysticism, albeit in a more nuanced sense. This is the function that mystics give to language in order to covey power. Katz writes: ‘most mystical
855 Ibid., 20/7/18-19. 856 Graham gives an excellent explanation and translation for ‘ji 機’. He defines the meaning of this word as: ‘germ, ‘thing that makes it go’’. See’ Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 286. 857 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 20/7/28-29. 858 There are more technical terms from other parts of the Inner Chapters. Graham cross references all of them. See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 98.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader traditions are keenly sensitive to the energizing ontic possibilities that (certain) language, employed with spiritual integrity and in an efficacious manner, is said to possess.’859 The Huzi dialogue contains language that shows how Zhuangzi holds ‘the conception that language directly aids in mystical ascents to other worlds and realms of being.’860 This is evident where Huzi is able to show Liezi and the Shaman that he has ‘attained dao’ (de dao 得道). Huzi’s attainment of dao does not literally transport him to another realm of being, but rather brings him into another state of being. Hence, it is a more nuanced sense of the power of mystical language than in Katz’s examples.
Huzi uses language in an efficacious manner to show that his power and his dao are greater than those of the shaman. He expresses his connection with dao in elliptical terms like his attainment of ‘not yet having emerged from my ancestor’ (weishi chu wu zhong 未始出吾 宗).’861 Another example is where Huzi says: ‘Just then, I showed him the patterns of earth. The shoots did not quiver, nor did they straighten. He must have seen me restricting the mechanisms of power (鄉吾示之以地文，萌乎不震不正。是殆見吾杜德機也)’.862 Locutions such as these show how language usage in the Zhuangzi relates to ideas of cultivating a kind of power (de 德). This power is connected to other stages and manifestations of connections to dao (道). Moreover, this power, the language used to describe, manifest, and show it (shi zhi 示之) to others, is presented as superior to the power of shamans. This use of language in the Zhuangzi is in accordance with Katz’s theories of how mystical language and traditions express power.
The ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue also shows mystical language used to express power. At the end of the dialogue, Confucius (the master) says to his student, Yanhui, ‘Since you are the same [as the Great Pervader], you must have no more likes. Since you have been transformed, you have no more constants. You are, as expected, indeed a worthy! I beg to be allowed to follow after you as your disciple!’863 This shows the power that Yanhui has cultivated through his practice of ‘sitting and forgetting’. Yanhui’s explanation of his practice to his master is so profound, as is the purported practice itself, that the master begs his student
859 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 19. 860 Ibid. 861 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 20/7/28-29. 862 Zhuangzi Yinde, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Series no.20 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, n.d.), 20/7/21; cf. Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 97; Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 52. 863 See Zhuangzi Yinde, 19/6/89–93; cf. Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 49; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader to take him as a disciple. Such is the power of mystical language and mystical experience. It could conceivably transform a disciple into the master of his master.
8.8. The Teacher who is the Great Ancestor
What of the interpretation that ‘sitting and forgetting’ relates ideas of merging with a metaphysical ultimate dao? This has surely been the feature of mysticism scholars have most often indicated exists in the text. Yet, none have hitherto given convincing arguments as part of their interpretations. In the sections below, I engage with the problem of identifying datong as dao which is also the ‘great ancestor’.
The teacher of the ‘my teacher, my teacher’ passage in chapter 6 is not a person like Huzi or Yanhui. This teacher is impersonal. This is the teacher that ‘has no actions and no form’ (wuwei wuxing 無為無形) spoken of in the ‘regarding dao’ passage. This teacher does not have ‘ren’ or ‘yi’ because it is more fundamental than those contrivances. This teacher is a dao that is beyond those Confucian ideals. It is the ultimate dao which Daoists, such as Zhuangzi, postulated exists as something more basic to living happily than the contrivances of other schools, but especially Confucianism.
Through considering how the ‘my teacher, my teacher’ passage relates to the other passages around it, and throughout the chapter in general, it is possible to give more arguments to support identifying this teacher as the ultimate dao. Secondary literature on the Zhuangzi suggests that this teacher is the ultimate dao.864 However, this interpretation is not without difficulties. First, there are difficulties in how scholars present reasoning to support the interpretation that dao is ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’. Second, taking a non- personal metaphysical substance (the dao) to be ‘teaching’ leads to some absurdities. I engage with these difficulties below and offer some solutions.
Scholars have interpreted ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ to be dao. I have already discussed Julia Ching’s characterisation of the Dao which teaches mystical union with itself in chapter 5. To reiterate, Ching’s argument at that point is circular because it attempts to show that Zhuangzi is mystical because it contains an idea of a mystical dao which teaches people how to attain mystical union with it. 865 That is, however, not an
864 See Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 232; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 91–92, 231–33, 238; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. 865 See Ching, ‘The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian and Taoist Mysticism’, 232.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader analysis of the Zhuangzi which shows plausible reasons for interpreting ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ to be dao. Nor does it show why we should interpret the ‘Great Pervader’ to be dao.
Harold Roth presents an interpretation that ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ is ‘the Dao’. He presents this interpretation as part of his criticism of Livia Kohn’s interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in her book, Early Chinese Mysticism. Roth argues that the ‘zuowang’ and ‘xinzhai’ passages in the Zhuangzi do not relate goals, as Kohn claims, but rather practices. Roth writes: ‘zuo-wang and xin-zhai (fasting of the mind) refer to self- cultivation practices, not to the goals of these practices.’866 Roth elaborates: ‘That this passage from Zhuangzi [chapter] 6 provides a rough phenomenological description of an experience of a unitive consciousness, in which the individual merges with the Tao, is clearly indicated in the further identification of this “undying, unliving” force:’.867 Thereupon, Roth quotes part of the ‘Woman with the Dao of a Sage’ passage from Graham’s translation.868 Roth quotes: ‘That which kills off the living does not die, that which gives birth to the living has never been born. As for the sort of thing it is, it is there to escort whatever departs, is here to welcome whatever comes, it ruins everything and brings everything about. Its name is “At home where it intrudes.” (6/87)’869 Lastly, Roth presents his interpretation that these different names and descriptions are all referring to the same, metaphysical dao which is the ultimate in Zhuangzi’s philosophical-religious commitments. He writes: ‘This is, of course, the “teacher who is the ultimate ancestor” of the title of Zhuangzi 6, the Tao.’870
Yet, this interpretation leaves some details unaccounted for. There are several terms and descriptions that Roth holds are all referring to the same thing, a metaphysical dao. They include: ‘undying, unliving force’; ‘at home where it intrudes’; and ‘teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’. However, the reasoning Roth uses to support this interpretation is simply to say ‘of course [they refer to the Tao]’. This is reminiscent of Chad Hansen’s criticisms of the ‘ruling theory’ of Daoism where scholars have an unconvincing interpretation which they support by saying to the effect ‘look at the text’;871 there is no convincing argument. Why should we accept that ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ is ‘the Tao’ because scholars
866 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. 867 Ibid. 868 See Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/36-17/6/45; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 87; Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. 869 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160; Graham, Chuang- Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 87; Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/36-17/6/45. 870 Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160. 871 See Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation, 200.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader say ‘of course [it is]’? The text of the Zhuangzi does not explain that ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’ is ‘the Tao’.
In his contribution to philology on the Zhuangzi, Wang Shumin (王叔岷) reiterates traditional interpretations that ‘the Ancestral Teacher’ is ‘the Dao’. He writes: ‘This chapter expresses the way of the inner sage which lies in melding heaven with humanity, and obscuring [the distinction between] life and death. This is attained through sitting and forgetting and merging into unity with Dao. This is what is called the great ancestor. 此篇發 明内聖之道，旨在泯合天人，冥絕生死，達于坐忘，而與道合爲一，此所宗師者也’.872 Thus, we can see that Wang isolates main themes of Chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi which are implicitly in agreement with interpretations of mysticism that Western scholars give. These include ‘merging’ with dao which is what the ‘Ancestral Teacher’ really is, even though the source-text does not actually say so.
This way of engaging with the text and presenting an interpretation contains methodological problems which are systemic in Chinese scholarship. Firstly, the author merely states his interpretation of the overall meaning of the chapter. There is no argument to substantiate the general claim. Secondly, the manner in which the author presents his interpretation constitutes an appeal to authority. In this case, the author is presenting his own interpretation as authoritative and as something the reader ought to accept at face value. Furthermore, Wang’s interpretation is imbedded into the Chinese tradition of revering the authority of past scholars’ interpretations. Hence, it is not his own original interpretation that he presents as an authority to be accepted; it is the traditional interpretation that scholars have accepted and propounded for generations. There is, however, no reason to accept the interpretation other than face-value acceptance that it is the traditional interpretation that scholars much more learned than the reader have concluded is the real meaning (i.e., appeal to authority).
Secondly, the claim is based on a conclusion, or perhaps presupposition, that there is an overall, self-evident meaning of the chapter. Such a position does not recognise that the text does not explicitly state any overall purpose, hypothesis, or thesis. Moreover, there are no ‘linking sections’ between the stories and dialogues that comprise the chapter. To say that the chapter has an overall meaning is not to recognise that it is only through the reader’s own engagement with the text, forming connections between the sections and themes, that the
872 Wang, Zhuangzi Jiao Quan 莊子校詮, 1:205.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader reader can interpret an overall meaning. That is to say, the ‘overall meaning’ that Wang states for the chapter is not one that the text of the Zhuangzi presents in a clear way. Rather, it is the traditional interpretation that Chinese (and non-Chinese) scholars have accepted for generations based on their interpretations of the vague connections, images, and ideas of the content that comprises the chapter.
This interpretative process has been aided by the title of the chapter, ‘The Great Ancestor as Teacher’. The title informs the readers that the content of the chapter does indeed relate to the idea of a ‘Great Ancestral Teacher’ in some way. However, the source-text never directly tells the reader what the connections are, or even what the ‘Great Ancestral Teacher’ is. Moreover, we have no way of knowing if the content of Chapter 6, and the order in which it is presented in the received text, is what the original author intended. Perhaps Guo Xiang is largely responsible for collating the content of the chapter because that was his interpretation of what the text ought to be.
Nonetheless, according to the principle of charity, it is still worthwhile engaging with the received text. The ideas presented in Chapter 6 do indeed fit well together, regardless of who put them together in the received order. The content of Chapter 6 relates different aspects of ‘teachers’, ‘ancestors’ or ‘the ancestral’, ‘dao’, critiquing Confucianism and proposing something the author considered superior (i.e., Daoism), and, of course, ‘sitting and forgetting’. Thus, I concur with Steve Coutinho’s explanations of hermeneutic methodology for interpreting Daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi. He explains: ‘granted that the texts are jumbled anthologies, it does not follow that we should not read them in an optimally cohesive way. It is always an advisable strategy to search for maximal cohesion where possible’.873 I think that by engaging with the source-text of the Zhuangzi we can interpret connections between ideas in parts of the text concerning dao, pervading, the ‘great ancestor as teacher’, and the ‘great pervader’ so as to enhance our understanding of the cohesion of these concepts.
Angus Graham also gives an indirect interpretation that dao is the ‘teacher who is the great ancestor’. Graham comments ‘The rhapsodic address to the Way as “My Teacher” must have especially appealed to the Syncretist editor, for it inspired the chapter title “Teacher who is the ultimate ancestor” [Da Zong Shi 大宗師], and is quoted as Chuang-tzu’s in a Syncretist essay (p.260 below).’874 Merely stating that the ‘My Teacher! My Teacher’ passage is a ‘rhapsodic address to the Way’ is not an argument to convince readers that Zhuangzi meant
873 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 13. 874 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader dao to be the great teacher: it is merely how Graham presents his own interpretation of the text on his own authority that these connections between dao and the great ancestral teacher are intended by Zhuangzi.
Through a close reading of the text we can elaborate on the connections that Graham indicates. The Syncretist essay Graham cites is from the Outer Chapter, ‘The Way of Heaven’ (Tian Dao 天道). Therein, the author writes:
Syncretist Essay Quoting Zhuangzi
Graham’s Translation Source Text
Seeing in the clearest light of the Power 夫明白於天地之德者，此之謂大本大 which is in heaven and earth — it is this 宗，與天和者也；所以均調天下，與人 that is meant by being, from the ultimate 和者也。與人和者，謂之人樂；與天和 root and ultimate ancestor (da zong 大宗), 者，謂之天樂。莊子曰：「吾師乎！吾 in harmony with Heaven; it is the means to 師乎！虀萬物而不為戾，澤及萬世而不 adjust and attune the empire and be in 為仁，長於上古而不為壽，覆載天地、 harmony with men. Being in harmony with 刻雕眾形而不為朽，此之謂天樂。875 men is called ‘the joy from man’, being in harmony with Heaven is called ‘the joy from Heaven’. In the words of Chuang-tzu, ‘My teacher, O my teacher! He chops up the myriad things but is not cruelty, his bounty extends to a myriad ages but it is not goodwill, he is elder to the most ancient but it is not living long, he overhangs heaven and bears up earth and cuts up and sculpts all shapes but it is not skill.’ This is called heavenly enjoyment.
875 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 33/13/10-34/13/13.
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There are many aspects of the Syncretist essay quoting the ‘My Teacher!’ passage which affirm interpretations of how ideas of the ultimate dao are related in the Zhuangzi. The methodology of discoursing on dao in the Zhuangzi is primarily a hermeneutic one which relies on imagery and implicit connections. As Coutinho explains:
Daoist discourse tends to function more hermeneutically by depicting worldviews in an attempt to help make sense of the fundamental phenomena of existence . . . Imagery and metaphor play an essential role in such explanations by overlaying patterns of similarity that help shape understanding of the phenomena in question.876
Describing dao as covering Heaving and bearing up the Earth suggests that dao is all pervasive. The two sections of text quoted share this feature, but each also relates other features of dao that affirm the understanding that the Zhuangzi contains ideas of an all- pervasive, metaphysical dao. Hence, these are further reasons to understand that the Great Pervader (i.e. the Great Thoroughfare) is the ultimate dao. It is arguably a consistent feature of Daoist thought that the ultimate dao pervades everything. Thus, when writers such as Zhuangzi speak of a ‘great pervader’, they may be alluding to the ultimate dao.
Furthermore, we see the importance of being in tune with the ‘ultimate ancestor’ in order to live in harmony with nature and society. The Syncretist essay states that understanding the power of heaven and earth comes from harmonising (he 和) with Heaven which comes from the ‘Great Root’ and the ‘Great Ancestor’ (夫明白於天地之德者，此之 謂大本大宗，與天和者也). Thus, the ‘Great Root’ and the ‘Great Ancestor’ are important concepts imbedded into Daoist ideas of living in harmony with the natural world. Moreover, in sorites-style argument typical of Warring States and Han Dynasty Chinese thought, these concepts of ‘great root’ and ‘great ancestor’ lead inexorably into living in harmony with the human world.877 Thus, the Syncretist writers continue to state ‘[being in harmony with Heaven] is the means by which one attunes the Empire and harmonises with people’ (所以均 調天下，與人和者也). Thereupon, the Syncretist authors state the significance of harmonising with Heaven and the human. They state ‘Harmonising with people is called humanly enjoyment; harmonising with Heaven is called Heavenly enjoyment (與人和者，謂 之人樂；與天和者，謂之天樂).’ Thereupon, the Syncretist authors quote Zhuangzi’s ‘My
876 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 13. 877 See Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 70.
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Teacher, My Teacher’ passage from the Inner Chapters. Their own interpretation is that Zhuangzi’s ‘My Teacher, My Teacher’ passage relates to what they call Heavenly enjoyment (Tian Yue 天樂).
Nevertheless, the Syncretist essay contains examples of the methodological difficulty which I indicated in the beginning of this chapter: conflating jargon to explain more jargon. However, this is a difficulty readers of ancient Chinese texts must deal with if we are to read texts closely and in a generous way. The relationship between, and possible equivalence of, ‘Great Root’, ‘Great Ancestor’, ‘Great Pervader’, and ‘Great Dao’, and how authors use them, is an example of ‘imagistic style that seems far too vague and open to interpretation.’878 Yet, we have seen similar interpretations from scholars that these terms all refer to Zhuangzi’s idea of a metaphysical dao. Hence, I concur with Coutinho’s view that it is a philosophically worthwhile project to read the different strands of the Zhuangzi as cohesively as possible.’879 By analysing the vague connections between concepts relating to dao in the Zhuangzi, we can present them in an optimally cohesive way.
During the formation of the received text of the Zhuangzi, authors were influenced by the jargon of previous contributors. Thereupon, they incorporated earlier jargon into their own thinking and writing and used it as an authoritative way to introduce their own jargon. For them, it was enough to say something to the effect: a means b which is the same as c, and so we get d. For the Syncretist writers of the Tian Dao passage considered here, they reason that the ‘Great Root’ (a) is also the ‘Great Ancestor’ (b) and that one can ‘harmonise with heaven’ (c) by ‘seeing the potency in Heaven and Earth’ (d). Furthermore, through close engagement with the text, we can see how all these ideas vaguely relate to dao. I explain this further below.
There are more implicit connections between the Syncretism’s jargon and the ideas in the Inner Chapters. The Syncretist writer uses jargon from the ‘Regarding Dao’ passage which describes dao as ‘its own root and its own branch’ (自本自根).880 This is an important description of dao, for it is one of very few descriptions of dao in the Zhuangzi. Moreover, this metaphor of a metaphysical dao comes from a chapter entitled ‘The Teacher who is the Great Ancestor (Da Zhong Shi 大宗師)’. Thus, the Syncretist takes Zhuangzi’s descriptions of dao, mixes them with the technical term in the chapter title, and modifies them into ‘the
878 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 13. 879 Ibid. 880 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/29.
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Great Root and the Great Ancestor’ (大本大宗)’.881 Nevertheless, the Syncretist authors do not explain the connections between the terms they borrow from the Inner Chapters and their own thought, but for the attentive reader, these implicit connections can seem so clear that they do not warrant analysis or explanation.
One example is how A.C. Graham affirms such connections. Graham states that the Syncretist essay as an example of how the Zhuangzi refers to ‘the Way’ (i.e., dao).882 Thus, he writes: ‘The rhapsodic address to the Way as “My Teacher” must have especially appealed to the Syncretist editor, for it inspired the chapter title “Teacher who is the ultimate ancestor”’.883 This implies that the Syncretist author also interpreted the ‘My Teacher! My Teacher!’ passage to refer to dao. Yet, the Syncretist essay does not use the term ‘dao’. Nor, does it engage in textual analysis to show how the ‘My Teacher! My Teacher!’ passage could be referring to dao.
From a modern, Western, academic institution point of view, the Syncretist text merely appropriates and conflates earlier jargon and then quotes from an earlier master (Zhuang Zhou) as an appeal to authority in order to impress the reader with the author’s elegance and learning. However, as I have argued above, by reading the Zhuangzi closely, we can understand the connections between the borrowed and transformed jargon in the Syncretist essay. I think it therefore follows that we can also understand the connections between the quoted passage and the Syncretist essay. Hence, we can plausibly reason that the Syncretist author quoted the ‘My Teacher!’ passage with the understanding that the ‘teacher’ is the ultimate, metaphysical dao because the implicit connections already exist within the dialogue from which the ‘My Teacher!’ passage comes. Moreover, we can find more cohesion among the many ways of referring to dao by noting that the Syncretist author borrows jargon referring to dao from other parts of the chapter to which the ‘My Teacher!’ passage belongs. They are the terms ‘Great Root’ and ‘Great Ancestor’.
We can interpret this teacher to be the ultimate dao. That is to say, a metaphysical dao which encompasses everything. The passages around this one also communicate ideas concerning dao. There is the ‘regarding dao’ passage,884 the ‘self-reliant woman who had the dao of a sage’ passage,885 the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage.886 Thus, Angus Graham
881 Ibid., 33/13/11. 882 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92. 883 Ibid. 884 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/29-36. 885 Ibid., 16/6/36-17/6/45. 886 Ibid., 17/6/89-93.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader comments on the significance of the ‘my teacher, my teacher’ passage. Syncretist Essay Quoting ‘My Teacher! My Teacher!’
In terms of mysticism, we can see that the cultivation of non-ordinary practices leads to living more in harmony with ‘the teacher who is the ultimate ancestor’. I suggest this is an element of mysticism applicable in a wider context throughout the Zhuangzi. It is through holding the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage in relation to these other ideas throughout the text that we can provide reasons for this conclusion.
8.8.1. Inconsistency Arising from Interpreting the ‘Great Ancestor as Teacher’ to be dao.
Interpreting the ‘Great Ancestor’ to be an ultimate metaphysical dao leads to an inconsistency given other commitments about dao. The ultimate, metaphysical dao (i.e., ‘the Dao’) is usually understood to be non-anthropomorphic. If, however, we say that dao is a ‘teacher’, it implies that dao actively engages in ‘teaching’ practices. This would be tantamount to imbuing the supposedly non-anthropomorphic, metaphysical, ultimate dao with human characteristics. Consequently, it renders traditional interpretations about the ultimate dao in the Zhuangzi inconsistent: dao is supposedly inactive, and non-human, yet it is also ‘the Great Ancestor’ which ‘teaches’ people how to wander its path. How can we deal with this problem?
First, we could be ungenerous and say that this is a contradiction which exists within the Zhuangzi. We could reason that since the authors of the Zhuangzi were not beholden to the same methodological rigour as modern, institutionalised, professional academics, then it is not surprising that we should find contradictions in their ideas. Moreover, noted scholars such as Angus Graham have pointed this out, but with more positive connotations. For example, Graham writes: ‘Might it be that in philosophy of value our [Western] culture tends to cut us off from one of the main sources of knowledge? The fact that, for example, we find Chinese thought logically undeveloped in comparison with our own is a reminder that we have no assurance whatever that all sources of knowledge are equally open to us.’887
By ‘Chinese thought’, Graham refers to the Chinese intellectual tradition, especially from the classical period. He acknowledges that explicit reasoning is not as highly developed in Chinese thought as in Western thought, but he also suggests that some of the vague,
887 Graham, ‘Mysticism and the Question of Private Access’, 281.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader implicit understandings and insights in Chinese thought might be an important part of human understanding that happens to have been overlooked in Western thought. Perhaps, this could be one way of taking an ungenerous view of issues with inconsistency in the Zhuangzi and presenting them in a more positive way.888
A more generous way of dealing with the inconsistency issue is to have a deeper and more Daoist understanding of what it means ‘to teach’, especially for a non-human dao. The kind of ‘teaching’ that the dao, which is the ‘Great Root and Great Ancestor’ (大本大宗), does would be a kind of wuwei (無爲). This is to say, dao ‘teaches’ us through not forcibly doing anything; this is something we humans could learn from.
This aspect of wuwei is something that Steve Coutinho posits is of central importance to all Daoist philosophies. He writes: ‘The means by which we engage [with the cosmos] is diminishing the force of social constructs and imitating the natural success of effortless processes, wuwei. . . . Perhaps at the root . . . is a deeper thread, a deeper commonality: a process of reversal, softening, disintergrating, wu, that allows natural phenomena to reach their fullest potential.’889 In my view, the ultimate dao would be an exemplar of this kind of wu. If we can learn from such a dao, then it can also be said to have ‘taught’ us.
8.9. Dao Pervades (tong 通) and Unifies
Dao Pervades Passage
My Translation Source Text
Permissible comes from being permissible. 可乎可，不可乎不可。道行之而成，物
Impermissible comes from being 謂之而然。 impermissible. Paths (dao 道) are formed by walking them. Things get named and then they are so.
Where does their being so come from? Their being so comes from making them so.
888 cf. Graham’s praise of rationality in the Chinese tradition in Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 7, 204–5. 889 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 188.
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Where does their not being so come from? 惡乎然？然於然。惡乎不然？不然於不
Their not being so comes from making them 然。 not so.
Things have what is so for them. Things have what is not permissible for them. Therefore, there are no things that are not so. 物固有所然，物固有所可。無物不然， There are no things that are not permissible. 無物不可。故為是舉莛與楹，厲與西 Thus, in deeming so, if we take stalks and pillars,890 the ugly and the beautiful, the 施，恢恑憰怪，道通為一。其分也，成 也；其成也，毀也。凡物無成與毀，復 strange and the grotesque,891 dao (道) 通為一。 pervades (tong 通) them and makes them into one. Their division is their completion. Their completion is their ruin. Hence, all things are without [total] completion or ruin. They return to pervade (tong 通) into one.892
Only one who is truly intelligent understands how they pervade (tong 通) into one. Such a one does not use the ‘that’s it’ (wei shi 為是) but rather lodges it in the ordinary. 唯達者知通為一，為是不用而寓諸庸。
The ordinary is the usable; the usable pervades (tong 通). Making use of things means pervading (tong 通). Pervading means 庸也者，用也；用也者，通也；通也 attaining. [The following is modified from 者，得也。適得而幾矣。因是已。已而 Graham’s translation] ‘once you grasp them, 不知其然，謂之道。 you are almost there. The ‘That’s it’ which goes by circumstance (因是) comes to an
890 As Lu Deming points out, the contrast between stalks and pillars is one of size (the small and the big). The interpretation that 莛 means beam is probably anachronistic. See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:71, note 8. Legge points out: ‘The character used in the text means both “a stalk of grain” and “a horizontal beam.” Each meaning has its advocates.’ See Legge, The Texts of Taoism, 1962, 1:184. 891 Cheng Xuanying and Lu Deming give explanations of these characters. See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:71. 892 cf. Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 13; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 53–54.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader end. It ends, but you do not understand its so-ness. That is called dao.’893
[This is my translation] You can exhaust your spirit (shen 神) explaining how it all becomes one without understanding its 勞神明為一，而不知其同也，謂之朝 sameness. This is called three in the 三。何謂朝三？曰狙公賦芧，曰：「朝 morning. What do I mean by three in the 三而莫四。」眾狙皆怒。曰：「然則朝 morning?894 A monkey trainer gave out 四而莫三。」眾狙皆悅。名實未虧，而 acorns to his monkeys. He said: ‘I will give 喜怒為用，亦因是也。是以聖人和之以 you three acorns in the morning and four in 896 the evening.’ This angered the monkeys. So, 是非，而休乎天鈞，是之謂兩行。 the monkey trainer said: ‘OK, I’ll give you four in the morning and three in the evening.’ This delighted the monkeys. Only the name changed, but the reality was no different. Yet, it aroused both joy and anger. This is because [the monkeys] were merely [thinking about it in terms of] the ‘that’s it which goes by circumstance’ (yin shi 因是). The sage harmonises this (zhi 之)895 in terms of ‘this is it’ and ‘this is not it’ (shi fei 是非). He takes his rest in the Heavenly wheel. This called walking two ways [at once].
893 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 54 An even more literal translation of ‘已而不知其然, 謂之道’ would be: ‘It ends, and you do not know its so-ness, this is called Dao’’. 894 ‘Three in the morning and four in the evening’ (zhao san mu si 朝三莫四) has become an idiom in Chinese language. In modern Chinese, people use this idiom to describe people who change their minds a lot but without much, if any, real benefit from doing so. It also connotes being annoyed in its modern usage. 895 There are several possibilities for what the relative pronoun zhi 之 refers to in this context. Zhi 之 could refer to the monkeys. That would give a meaning like: ‘The sage harmonises them [the monkeys] in terms of ‘this is it’ and ‘this is not it’ (shi fei 是非)’. Zhi 之 could refer to the whole situation. That would give a meaning like: ‘The sage harmonises this [situation] in terms of ‘this is it’ and ‘this is not it’ (shi fei 是非)’. Zhi 之 could refer to ‘name and reality’ (ming shi 名實). That would give a meaning like: ‘The sage harmonises them [name and reality] in terms of ‘this is it’ and ‘this is not it’ (shi fei 是 非)’. 896 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/33-5/2-40.
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Scholars have discussed the ‘Dao pervades and unifies’ passage in their interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Livia Kohn includes the passage in her selection of representative texts of Daoist mysticism in Comparative Mysticism. Therein, Kohn identifies the passage as an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi in accordance with criteria of ineffability and metaphysical commitments concerning ultimate reality. Her rationale is: ‘words [for Daoists like Zhuangzi] are an empty cultural convention . . . They detract from, rather than help to understand, reality as it is. Mystical practice, as a result, includes a critical understanding of the ultimate relativity of all verbal utterances and the eventual overcoming of language’.897
In her translation, Kohn renders ‘道通為一’ as ‘the Tao makes them all into one.’898 This translation is somewhat free. More literally, ‘道通為一’ says something more like ‘dao pervades them into oneness’, or ‘dao pervades them into one’, or ‘dao traverses them in oneness’, etc. Hence, in Kohn’s translation, the sense of tong (通) meaning ‘pervade’ is lost. Consequently, if we rely only on that translation, we cannot see the hermeneutic connections between ‘dao pervades and unifies’, from Chapter 2, and ‘the Great Pervader’, from Chapter 6, of the Zhuangzi. Thus, engaging deeply with the source text on its own terms allows us to make further connections between ideas and images in the Zhuangzi which can get lost in translation. This kind of engagement allows us to make more sense of aspects of the Zhuangzi that scholars frequently state are evidence of mysticism, such as an ultimate, metaphysical dao which Zhuangzi relates in different ways.
Harold Roth shows a deep engagement with the ‘Dao pervades and unifies’ passage in ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun”’. Therein, Roth interprets the ‘dao pervades and unifies’ locution to relate more directly to mystical experiences. Moreover, in this interpretation, Roth preserves the meaning of tong (通) as ‘pervade’. He writes: ‘In this passage Zhuangzi clearly states that such people possess the exact same ability as the Way has to “pervade and unify (tong wei yi 通爲一)” all things.’899 Hence, Roth’s engagement with the source-text supports his interpretations of mysticism through drawing out the ‘pervading’ characteristic of dao. Moreover, based on this understanding, Roth is able to characterise mysticism in the Zhuangzi as one wherein there is belief in, and expression to the effect of, unifying with a metaphysical Absolute. Roth writes: ‘the Way can never be known
897 Kohn, ‘Confucianism and Daoism’, 496. 898 Ibid., 497. 899 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 25; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 43.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader as an object; it can only be “known” when the distinction between self and other . . . dissolves in the introvertive mystical experience’.900
Roth explains the significance of interpreting the passage in this way for relating it to other expressions of mysticism in the text. One such expression is the ‘Great Pervader’ from ‘sitting and forgetting’ in Chapter 6. Roth states what he sees as the connections between the ‘Dao pervades and unifies’ passage and the ‘Great Pervader’ of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. He writes: ‘Thus the extrovertive mystical experience of “pervading and unifying things” . . . depends on the introvertive mystical experience on unifying with the Way, expressed in chapter six by a similar metaphor: “merging with the Great Pervader” . . . There is a recursive relationship between these two modes of mystical experience.’901
I agree that there is a relationship between the ‘Dao pervades and unifies’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ passages. However, I would not go so far as Roth as to claim that the purported experience of the ‘dao pervades and unifies’ passage occurs due to the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. This is because I am not entirely convinced that the ‘dao pervades’ passage is relating mystical experience arising from yinshi (因是), or ‘the “that’s it” which goes by circumstance’, consciousness. Perhaps yinshi is just an abstract idea of how one can relate to the world. It is clear that yinshi does indeed relate to dao as dao is related in the ‘dao pervades’ passage. However, I see no strong connections between the purported experience of ‘sitting and forgetting’ and the descriptions of dao in the ‘dao pervades’ passage that would lead me to think that the ‘dao pervades’ passage is describing experiences of dao derived from ‘sitting and forgetting’.
Instead, I think that the connections between ‘dao pervades’ and ‘sitting and forgetting’ are more implicit and less literal than Roth interprets. The connections are hermeneutical and phenomenological, but not causal. From the ‘dao pervades’ passage, we can see that Zhuangzi describes dao as ‘pervading’ all things. From the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage, we can see that Zhuangzi describes experiences of merging with a ‘Great Pervader’. Thus, the appearance of tong at important points of the text relating to dao and purported experiences forms part of the hermeneutic method of the text as well as the phenomenological aspect of what the text purports of experiencing dao.
900 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 43; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 25. 901 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [A]’, 43; cf. Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 25 The quotation from the 2000 version of the article is not present in the 2003 version.
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For the sake of argument, let us suppose that this is enough of a connection to link the two passages as possessing different descriptions of the same, ultimate dao. It still does not follow that the awareness related in the ‘dao pervades’ passage is caused by the experiences related in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. Perhaps it is the other way around? Perhaps one can only experience ‘merging with the Great Pervader’ after one has gained awareness of ‘dao pervades’ related in Chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are connections between the ‘Dao Pervades and Unifies’ passage (from chapter 2, Qiwu Lun) the ‘Great Pervader’ idea in ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage (from chapter 6, Da Zong Shi). In the ‘dao pervades’ passage, dao is described as ‘pervading’ (tong 通) all things and making them into one. It is therefore plausible that a ‘great pervader’ (datong 大通) would be a ‘great dao’ (da dao 大道). It appears that this is how Zhuangzi’s ideas of an ultimate dao are spread throughout the text. The ideas are there, but it requires analysis on our part to make sense of them and show the relations between them in more explicit ways than in the received text.
The ‘Dao Pervades and Unifies’ passage shows typical features of mysticism. The first is the idea of an ultimate that pervades all things and makes them into one. Furthermore, this oneness involves non-dualism, or the identity of opposites. Zhuangzi expresses it in the following way:
if we take stalks and pillars,902 the ugly and the beautiful, the strange and
the grotesque,903 dao (道) pervades (tong 通) them and makes them into
one. Their division is their completion. Their completion is their ruin. Hence, all things are without [total] completion or ruin. They return to pervade (tong 通) into one.904
The second typical mystical idea in the ‘Dao Pervades’ passage is that of ineffability of the ultimate. Zhuangzi expresses it in the following way:
902 Lu Deming argues that the contrast between stalks and pillars is one of size (the small and the big). He holds that the interpretation that 莛 means beam is probably anachronistic. See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:71, note 8; Legge points out: ‘The character used in the text means both “a stalk of grain” and “a horizontal beam.” Each meaning has its advocates.’ See James Legge, The Texts of Taoism, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), 1:184. 903 Cheng Xuanying and Lu Deming give explanations of these characters. See Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:71. 904 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 4/2/35.
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Only one who is truly intelligent understands how they pervade (tong 通) into one. Such a one does not use the ‘that’s it’ (wei shi 為是) but rather lodges it in the ordinary.
The ordinary is the usable; the usable pervades (tong 通). Making use of things means pervading (tong 通). Pervading means attaining. [The following is modified from Graham’s translation] ‘once you grasp them, you are almost there. The ‘That’s it’ which goes by circumstance (因是) comes to an end. It ends, but you do not understand its so-ness. That is called dao.’905
Here, we can see Zhuangzi expressing typically mystical ideas concerning his ultimate. He holds that there is a dao which pervades all things and makes them into one. He then says that understanding such a thing requires someone who is ‘truly intelligent’ (dazhe 達者). The explanation of being ‘truly intelligent’ which Zhuangzi gives is esoteric. The literal meaning of the words he uses does not convey a clear message. Moreover, his explanation contains complex technical terms (such as yinshi 因是) that require expert analysis in order to interpret. .906 These features of language usage form part of the mysticism of the text. They help to create the sense of mystery, esotericism, and profundity that the author wants to impart concerning his ‘ultimate’ and the way of cultivating experiences of the ultimate. These are examples of the ‘power’ of mystical language that Katz makes clear in Comparative Mysticism.907
It is clear that any understanding of this ultimate is beyond the ordinary. Even though a ‘truly intelligent one’ might be able to gain some insight into the ultimate dao which pervades things into one, such a one would still come to a point where there is more to this ultimate which he cannot understand. Zhuangzi expresses this idea in the following way: ‘It ends, but you do not understand its so-ness. That is called dao.’908 If the ‘truly intelligent one’ cannot understand its ‘so-ness’, it follows that he cannot adequately express it in words. These
905 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 54 An even more literal translation of ‘已而不知其然, 謂之道’ would be: ‘It ends, and you do not know its so-ness, this is called Dao’’. 906 Angus Charles Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, in A Companion to A. C. Graham’s Chuang Tzu (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), 106, 110–12; Graham, ‘Chuang-Tzu’s Essay on Seeing Things as Equal’, 1969. 907 See Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 19. 908 Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 54 An even more literal translation of ‘已而不知其然, 謂之道’ would be: ‘It ends, and you do not know its so-ness, this is called Dao’’.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader aspects of Zhuangzi’s ultimate dao are examples of ineffability marks common in mystical traditions. It is for this reason that we can understand Zhuangzi’s idea of a dao that pervades and unifies all things into one to be part of mysticism in the text. It concerns oneness, the understanding of which is esoteric, and arguably, ineffable.
8.10. Da Tong Means the Great Dao
One of the major commentators on the Zhuangzi is the 7th century CE Daoist priest, Cheng Xuanying (成玄英). 909 In his sub-commentary, he explains why datong means the ultimate dao, which he calls the ‘Great Dao’ (dadao 大道). His explanation follows:
Cheng Xuanying Explains Why Datong Means the Ultimate Dao
My Translation Source Text
The Great Pervader means the Great Dao 大道. 大通，猶大道也。道能通生物，故 Dao is called the Great Pervader because Dao is 謂道為大通也。外則離析于形體， able to pervade all things. 一一虛假，此解墮肢體也。内則除 去心識，悗然無知，此解黜聰明 Externally, one separates from form and all empty and false things: this is to [‘]drop off limbs 也。既而枯木死灰，冥同大道，如 and body[‘]. Internally, one dispels intellectual 此之益，謂之坐忘也。911 knowing 心識,910 becoming dazed and non- knowing: this is to [‘]dispel keen hearing and keen seeing[‘]. Subsequently, one becomes like [‘]withered wood[‘] and [‘]dead ash[‘] and mysteriously unites with the Great Dao.
This kind of improvement is called sitting and forgetting.
909 On Cheng Xuanying, see Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 139–45; Harold David Roth, ‘Chuang Tzu’, in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide, ed. Michael Loewe (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), 60; Ziporyn, Zhuangzi, 221. 910 Literally: ‘mind-knowing’ or ‘knowing with the mind’. 911 Cheng Xuanying 成玄英, Zhuangzi Zhushu 莊子註疏, in Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:285.
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Here, we can see the nuanced usage of the term ‘tong 通’. Cheng uses it as both a noun and as a verb. In fact, ‘tong 通’ is usually used as a verb, meaning ‘to pass all the way through (something)’, ‘to traverse over (something or somewhere)’, or in a broader sense ‘to pervade’. When nominalised, as in the Zhuangzi and in Cheng’s own usage to explain the concept of Datong in the Zhuangzi, it means ‘the thing on which one passes through (something)’; ‘the thing on which one traverses’; ‘the pervader’; or indeed ‘thoroughfare’. In the Zhuangzi, ‘the Great Pervader (datong 大通), is being used in a metaphorical sense pertaining to the experience of ‘sitting and forgetting’. Moreover, in the text, it is not clear what this ‘Great Thoroughfare’ actually is. Hence, commentators have felt the need to offer explanations of it.
Cheng explains not only the concept of ‘the Great Pervader’, but also the experience of it that comes with ‘sitting and forgetting’. He presumably had this experience for he was an eminent Daoist priest. Hence, his explanations and interpretations of earlier Daoist concepts in the Zhuangzi are enhanced by his position as an insider who put these concepts into practice and returned to elucidate them in writing.
This is, of course, based on a generous interpretation of Cheng’s commentary as well as the historical practice of ‘sitting and forgetting’. I think that it is reasonable to interpret these aspects of the Zhuangzi, the commentaries on the Zhuangzi, and the historical development of the Daoist tradition, generously in this regard. By ‘generously’, I mean that I accept these authors really believed in what they wrote and that what they wrote was not based in fancy or contrivance, but rather in their lived experiences.
If we do not treat Daoist writings in this way, then we are guilty of not acting in accordance with the principle of charity. Moreover, we would be approaching our studies of Daoism on the presupposition that Daoist beliefs are false and that Daoist authors were simply making up their texts out of wonton fancy or ignorant self-delusion. Cheng Xuanying’s sub-commentary on the Zhuangzi does not give any indication that it is based in wonton fancy.
Cheng gives reasons to support the interpretation ‘The Great Pervader is the Great Dao’. I find it peculiar that one of the standard commentaries on the Zhuangzi gives arguments to support the interpretation that datong is a metaphor for the ultimate dao whereas secondary literature from the 20th century does not give arguments. For example, Roth only writes: ‘(tong yu datong 同於大通) seems to imply that, as a result of these practices, Yan
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Hui has become united with the Dao.’912 As I have already noted, merely stating that the text implies something is not a convincing argument to support and accept such an interpretation. Yet, according to Cheng’s explanations, the text of the Zhuangzi does not merely imply that Yan Hui becomes united with the Dao. Cheng puts into explicit terms what seems to be implicit in the text: the ‘Great Pervader’ means ‘the Great Way’ because ‘the Great Way’ pervades all things. In organised Daoism, ‘the Great Way’ is the ultimate dao which the Daoist faithful treat with theological and cosmological reverence.
In the sections above, we can see that Cheng explains his interpretation that da tong refers to a ‘Great Dao’. This ‘Great Dao’ is a metaphysical ‘ultimate’ which has been a part of Daoist thought since at least the compilation of the Laozi.913 Not only does this support the interpretation of an ultimate dao in the Zhuangzi, but it also reminds us that the Zhuangzi fits into a broader context of classical Daoism. Early Daoists transmitted and expanded on their ideas and world view which included cosmology and cultivation practices. Through these activities, an image of the ultimate dao arose in the Daoist tradition. Even though the image of an ultimate dao is one related through negatives, it is an image nonetheless, as we see below.
8.10.1. The Great Image
The Zhuangzi expands on imagery of dao. Daoist texts present philosophical ideas in ways that often rely more on imagery than on explicit argumentation. As Steve Coutinho notes ‘Daoist texts are irregular in construction . . . and are often written in a terse, imagistic style that seems far too vague and open to interpretation.’914 I think this is true of ‘sitting and forgetting’, datong, and the Great Dao in the Zhuangzi. It is not clear in the text of the Zhuangzi what the connections between those ideas are.
However, just because the connections are not clear, it does not mean that they do not exist, or that we should give up on trying to understand them. Clearly, many scholars have understood that there are connections between the Great Pervader and the Great Dao. If we consider more broadly the methodology of Daoist texts, we can come closer to understanding plausible connections between Zhuangzi’s Great Pervader and the idea of a Great Dao.
912 Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 69. 913 See the Laozi chapters 18, 25, 34, 35, 46, 53, 67. 914 Coutinho, An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies, 12–13.
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Imagery of a Great Dao is shared and developed in Daoist literature. Moreover, broader commitments to how to discourse on the Great Dao is shared and developed throughout Daoist literature.915 There are similarities between the ideas and methods in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi that can help us understand why the Zhuangzi would discourse on a Great Dao through the vague metaphor of a Great Pervader. In the Laozi, it says:
The Great Image
D.C. Lau’s Translation Source Text
‘Have in your hold the great image And 執大象，天下往。往而不害，安平大。 [sic] the empire will come to you. Coming 樂與餌，過客止。道之出口，淡乎其無 to you and meeting with no harm It [sic] 味，視之不足見，聽之不足聞，用之不 will be safe and sound. Music and food will 足既’.917 induce the wayfarer to stop. The way [道] in its passage through the mouth is without flavour. It cannot be seen, It cannot be heard, Yet it cannot be exhausted by use.916
Imagery of the ultimate dao can never be exhausted. It therefore makes sense that the Zhuangzi contains a metaphor of a ‘great pervader’ as a reference to an ultimate dao. I suggest that this idea of a ‘great image’ of an ultimate dao can help us understand what Roth and Graham refer to as ‘the imagery of the character Dao’.918 Daoists who authored parts of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi expressed different images of a great dao. For them, it is an ultimate that cannot be fully conveyed in language. Thus, the different metaphors they used for conveying some aspect of their ultimate dao cannot be exhausted.
This is an aspect of Daoism that fits well with aspects of mysticism in a variety of traditions. Language cannot fully express their conception of the ultimate (which they take to
915 See ibid., 12–14, 187–89. 916 Dim Cheuk Lau, trans., Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching (Penguin, 1963), 94. 917 Laozi, chapter 35. 918 See Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 93; Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, 188.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader be true). Thus, they cultivate a usage of language which conveys the awe, mystery, profundity, and holiness of their ultimate and the experiences by which they cultivate awareness of their ultimate.
8.11. Supporting Interpretations of Mysticism
The ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage is an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. In the paragraphs below, I support this interpretation by explaining how the passage fits with explanations of mysticism from two eminent scholars. The first is from Steven Katz. The second is from Robert Forman. By showing how ‘sitting and forgetting’ is consistent with definitions of mysticism from two leading scholars who hold differing views on some nuanced issues of mystical experience, I think we strengthen reasons for accepting ‘sitting and forgetting’ to be mystical.
‘Sitting and forgetting’ accords with different aspects of mysticism according to different scholars. This can enhance our interpretations of mysticism in that dialogue, and in the Zhuangzi in general, because it gives more of a consensus that there is something mystical in its content. How we explain that mysticism depends on our theoretical framework. The different theoretical frameworks of Steven Katz and Robert Forman both help explain different aspects of mysticism in ‘sitting and forgetting’.
Scholars have defined mysticism in many ways. An issue in the study of mysticism has been that many definitions are too narrow, so they do not admit many phenomena and experiences that scholars acknowledge are mystical. On the other hand, some definitions have been too wide, so they allow many phenomena and kinds of experiences that experts would not consider to be mystical. We have seen several examples of both broad and narrow definition in earlier parts of this dissertation.
In my view, the most inclusive definition of mysticism is the following from Steven Katz. It reads: ‘Mysticism is the quest for the experience of God, Being, or Ultimate Reality, however these are understood, that is theistically or non-theistically.’919 This definition of mysticism can accommodate the traditions, ideas, and experiences that scholars accept as mystical, including aspects of the Zhuangzi.
The above definition of mysticism can account for the interpretation of mysticism in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage of the Zhuangzi. Firstly, it is evident that the Zhuangzi
919 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 3.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader relates ‘sitting and forgetting’ as part of a quest that requires sustained effort. The reader will recall that Zhuangzi’s Yanhui must keep at his cultivation of ‘forgetting’ many of the contrivances which impede his Daoist goals over a period of at least three days. Those Daoist goals include cultivating experiences of a non-theistic Ultimate. As I have argued in the first part of this chapter, there are reasons to interpret the ‘Great Pervader’ as the Ultimate with which Zhuangzi’s Yanhui ‘merges,’ ‘unifies with,’ or ‘goes along with’. It therefore follows that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is a kind of mysticism because it is a quest for an experience of ultimate reality as Zhuangzi conceived it.
The above interpretation of mysticism is an example taking Zhuangzi’s locutions as descriptive of an experience of the Ultimate. This is what Katz identifies as the first level of linguistic features of mysticism: that mysticism employs language in certain ways (often apophasis) to refer to the Absolute.920 In the case of ‘sitting and forgetting’, Yanhui clears away sensory perception and bodily awareness in order to experience the Great Pervader, which is arguably a way of referring to Zhuangzi’s ultimate dao.
However, a deeper meaning of the descriptive function of language in mystical traditions is its transformative effect. Katz explains: ‘denotive and referential meaning is not the only sense that mystical (and other language) can have. Much classical mystical language . . . is instrumental in the transformation of consciousness.’921 The use of language in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is also mystical in this sense. The ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue uses language in such a way as to describe the transformation of consciousness that comes with engaging in the practice leading to an experience of the Ultimate.
That is to say, the dialogue does not merely give descriptions of the Ultimate, but it also relates what it is like to transform one’s consciousness through ‘sitting and forgetting’. The clearest example in ‘sitting and forgetting’ is the experience of ‘dropping off limbs and body’ (duo zhi ti 墮肢體). This fits with Katz’s theory of mystical language, thus: ‘It is the ability of language to induce “breakthroughs” of consciousness being employed “nonsensically,” literally non-sense-ically, that is fundamental to the traversal of the mystic path, the movement from consciousness A to consciousness B.’922 ‘Sitting and forgetting’ employs language ‘nonsensically’ because it is not possible to sit down and will one’s limbs
920 Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 17. 921 Ibid. 922 Ibid., 18.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader to literally drop off or for one’s body to simply stop existing. This is, rather, a device used to aid the conditioning of a practitioner’s mind along the path of traversing the Great Pervader.
We can interpret the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage to be mystical according to Robert Forman’s characterisation of typical features of mystical experience. Let us consider how well Forman’s characterisation of mystical experience fits with the description of uniting with the Great Thoroughfare in the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi describes the experience of uniting with the Great Thoroughfare through ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the following way:
I drop off my limbs and body, I dispel keen hearing and clear sightedness, separate [myself from] form and get rid of understanding and unite with the Great Thoroughfare. This is called ‘sitting and forgetting’.923
Robert Forman gives a description of features of mystical experience which fit well with the above passage. He writes:
This is a passage that touches upon many of the themes commonly seen in mystical traditions: (1) it is obviously concerned with some nonordinary [sic] experience; (2) it mentions meditation (3) it suggests that something ineffable is involved . . . [i.e., ‘separating from form and getting rid of understanding’ which would mean language is not involved]; (4) it implies an experience of unity924
Forman’s description of general features of mystical experience would make a plausible summary of the mystical aspects of ‘sitting and forgetting’. However, Forman’s summary is not originally made in relation to ‘sitting and forgetting’. Instead, Forman’s summary is of the generalised features of mysticism evident in the Mairti Upanishad.925 I quote Forman’s summary here to show that it could just as well apply to the phenomenological characteristics of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the Zhuangzi.
This suggests that the culturally, linguistically, and theologically distinct practices of ‘zuowang’ and ‘dhyana’ belong to a more general, and innate, capacity for ‘nonordinary experience’. Those kinds of ‘nonordinary experience’ are what we may call ‘mystical
923 cf. Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 92; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 90–91. 924 Forman, ‘Introduction’, 1998, 4. 925 Ibid.; Robert E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads: Translated from the Sanskrit with an Outline of the Philosophy of the Upanishads and an Annotated Bibliography (Oxford: Open University Press, 1921), 436.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader experiences’. In making this conclusion, I am not claiming that all mystical experiences are one and the same. I am claiming that there are a variety of mystical experiences. It is the similar phenomenological characteristics of those experiences which allow us to identify them as being of the same kind and to label them mystical.
8.12. Secondary Evidence to Support Interpretations of Mysticism
We can find evidence supporting the mysticism interpretation of ‘sitting and forgetting’ in the traditional commentaries. The ways commentators have explained the meaning of ‘sitting and forgetting’ are consistent with marks of mysticism. They include interpreting the Zhuangzi to relate ideas of uniting with all things, as well as phenomenological characteristics such as non-sensory experience.
8.12.1. Guo Xiang’s Explanation of ‘Sitting and Forgetting’
These ideas of uniting with all things and non-sensory experience are evident in how Guo Xiang (郭象) interprets the meaning of ‘sitting and forgetting’. He writes:
Guo Xiang’s Comment on Zuowang
My Translation Source Text
In regards to sitting and forgetting, what 夫坐忘者，奚所不忘哉?! 既忘其 is it that is not forgotten? It is to forget 跡，又忘其所以跡者。內不覺其一 the traces [of things] and also to forget the means by which those traces are 身外不識有天地，然後曠然與变化 made. Internally, one is not aware of 為體而無不通也927 one’s own body and externally, one does not recognise that the world is there.
Afterwards, one becomes vast with his body acting with the transformations and
927 Soshi Kaku Sho Chu Sakuin (Kita Kyushu Shi 北九州市: Kita Kyushu Chugoku Shoten Shi 北九州 中国書店, 1990), 6/551/162/5-6; Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:285.
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there is nowhere that he does not pervade.926
Thus, Guo Xiang interprets this section of text as relating a practice consistent with what we can call mystical experience. His exegesis is in accordance with the idea that that the core of mysticism lies in: ‘a unity which the mystic believes to be ultimate and basic to the world.’928 Guo Xiang expresses such an idea with his explanation that through ‘sitting and forgetting’ one ‘becomes vast’ to the extent that one’s ‘body acts in accordance with the transformations and there is nowhere that he does not pervade’. This is consistent with Walter Stace’s category of introvertive mysticism wherein a person experiences oneness.
Guo Xiang’s interpretation is an example of textual evidence that scholars could draw on to support their interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. However, scholars have not generally drawn from this part of Guo Xinag’s commentary in the manner I have presented here. Yet, with reference to literature on mysticism, we can see that Guo Xinag’s exegesis supports interpretations that the Zhuangzi related practices that lead to oneness with a purported ‘Absolute’.
8.12.2. Cheng Xuanying’s Explanation of Merging with Da Tong
Cheng Xuanying gives further explanations that fit with theories of mysticism. For example, his explanation of Confucius’ line at the end of the dialogue explains that the transformation Yanhui undergoes is the result of uniting with the Great Dao. In Cheng’s understanding the Great Dao is the Ultimate and foundational figures of the Daoist tradition, such as Zhuangzi, wrote texts to transmit descriptions of experiences with the Great Dao. Thus, Cheng gives the following interpretation of the conclusion of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue:
926 cf. Kohn, Early Chinese Mysticism: Philosophy and Soteriology in the Taoist Tradition, 74–75. 928 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, 132, et passim; See also John F. O’Neil, ‘Toward a New Mystical Poetics of God in the Post-Mortem Age: From God as the Supreme Being to God as the One-and-Only Being’ (State University of New York, 2009), 17. Therein, O’Neil writes that the core of mysticism lies in ‘[t]he everyday assumption of being a separate self vanish[ing]; it is melted by the encounter with the absolute Reality.’
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Cheng Xuangying Describes the Transformative Effects of Merging with the Great Dao through Zuowang
My Translation Source Text
This means that he [Yanhui] is unified 既同于大道，則無是非好惡，溟于變化，
with the Great Dao. Thus he no longer has 故不執滯守常也929 right and wrong (是非), likes and dislikes. He has been mysteriously transformed, so he is no longer impeded by sticking to constants.
This way of interpreting the text is in agreement with the label of ‘extrovertive mysticism’. Having returned to normal consciousness following the experience of ‘sitting and forgetting’ and ‘uniting with the Great Pervader’, Yan Hui has a new experience of the world, one in which he perceives the ‘unity’. Moreover, as Roth has argued, extrovertive mystical experiences related in the Zhuangzi (such as ‘being transformed to have no constants’) occur after, and possibly as a result of, introvertive mystical experiences (like uniting with the Great Pervader through sitting and forgetting).930 Thus, these two types of mystical experiences are evidently in close relation to one another in the Zhuangzi. Hence, I concur with Roth’s conclusion that the label ‘bi-modal mystical experience’ is one we can apply to the mystical aspects of the Zhuangzi.931 The ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is one example.
Furthermore, Cheng’s explanation enhances our understanding of the mystical language element of the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue. As Katz explains in Comparative Mysticism, mystical language has a function of transforming consciousness.932 As I have
929 Guo, Zhuangzi Jishi, 1:285. 930 Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ [B]’, 18–19, 26–27. 931 See: Roth, ‘Some Issues in the Study of Chinese Mysticism: A Review Essay’, 160, 167–69; Roth, ‘The Laozi in the Context of Early Daoist Mystical Praxis’, 66; Roth, ‘Bimodal Mystical Experience in the “Qiwulun” [B]’, 15–32. 932 See Katz, ‘General Editor’s Introduction’, 2013, 17–18.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader explained above, we can interpret the use of language in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue to have this kind of transformative effect on its own terms. Moreover, Cheng’s explanation of the text shows that he also interpreted ‘sitting and forgetting’ to relate a transformation. He says that the transformation is ‘mysterious’ (ming 溟) and that it shows Yanhui to be ‘merged with’ or ‘going along with’ the ‘Great Dao’.
Thus, Cheng’s commentary supports more recent, Western, interpretations of the meaning of ‘sitting and forgetting’. These understandings hold that the dialogue describes a process of questing for experiences of the Daoist Ultimate, which we can call the ‘Great Pervader’, or the ‘Great Dao’. This quest involves a transformation of consciousness that is necessary in order to experience the Ultimate. This transformation involves ‘forgetting’ or ridding oneself of impediments to experiences of the Ultimate. They include sensory experience and contrived aspects of human life that have no part in the Ultimate, such as ‘humaneness’ and ‘rightness’, as well as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.
8.13. The Second Occurrence of Da Tong (大通) in the Zhuangzi
The second occurrence of datong in the text of the Zhuangzi is in chapter 17, ‘Autumn Floods Qiu Shui 秋水’. This section of text contains further evidence to support the conclusion that datong refers to the Ultimate. It occurs in the dialogue which mocks the sophist, Gongsun Long (公孫龍), and praises Zhuangzi. The complete dialogue is too long to quote here, so I include only the most relevant parts in my arguments below. 933
This section of the text belongs to what Graham terms the ‘School of Chuang-tzu’, i.e., contributions to the text from students of Master Zhuang and like-minded thinkers.934 This is the traditional view of authorship from which I do not believe has been completely disproven. However, some scholars have challenged this view with critical questions to the effect: how can we be sure that ideas in the ‘Autumn Floods’ chapter were derived from the Inner Chapters and not the other way around?; or why should we assume that the most coherent and insightful material in the Zhuangzi could only have come from an original Master Zhuang and not a later contributor?935 In the quotations below, the reader will see that some of the
933 For the complete dialogue see Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 44/17/64-45/17/81; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 185–87; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 154–56. 934 See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: the Inner Chapters, 115–118. 935 See Esther Klein, ‘Were There “Inner Chapters” in the Waring States? A New Examination of Evidience about the Zhuangzi’, T’oung Pao 96 (2011): 299–369; Scott Barnwell, ‘Classical Daoism - Is There Really Such a Thing? Part 3 Zhuangzi 莊子’, accessed 25 January 2017, http://www.academia.edu/1836016/Classical_Daoism_-
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‘Autumn Floods’ chapter was derived from earlier content (in my view, from the Inner Chapters) because it refers to Master Zhuang as having already passed away. Regardless of the chronology of authorship, there are some stylistic features in this part of the text that are similar to content from the Inner Chapters.
First, consider the beginning of the contrived Prince Mou of Wei (Wei Mou 魏牟) telling the ‘frog in the well story’ as an analogy for the foolishness of Gongsun Lun. The text reads: ‘Gongsun Mou leant against his table and sighed deeply. He looked up to the sky, laughed, and said 公子牟隱机太息，仰天而笑曰’.936 This is similar to the first lines of the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter. They read: ‘Nanguo Ziqi sat leaning against a table. He looked up to the sky and sighed 南郭子綦隱几而坐，仰天而噓’.937
When characters in the Zhuangzi ‘lean against a table, sigh deeply and look up to the sky’ they proceed to present their thoughts on something profound. Ziqi of South Wall from the ‘Qiwu Lun’ chapter presents his thoughts on ‘the piping of Heaven’; Prince Mou of Wei in the ‘Autumn Floods’ chapter presents his conclusions as to why Gongsun Lun is flabbergasted upon hearing the words of Zhuangzi.
In the text, a contrived Prince Mou of Wei admonishes the disputer (bianzhe 辯者)938 Gongsun Long.939 Therein, we can discern that Master Zhuang had already passed away by the time this part of the text was written. This is due to the phrase ‘But he [Master Zhuang] has stepped into the Yellow Spring and ascended to the sky 且彼方跐黃泉而登大皇’.940 In ancient Chinese beliefs, the term ‘Yellow Spring’ (huang quan 黃泉) meant ‘the afterlife’ or ‘the underworld’.941 The authors of this ‘school of Zhuangzi’ chapter tell us that in death, their master: ‘begins from the Obscure Darkness and returns to the Great Thoroughfare 始於玄
_Is_There_Really_Such_a_Thing_Part_3_Zhuangzi_%E8%8E%8A%E5%AD%90; David R. McCraw, Stratifying Zhuangzi: Rhyme and Other Quantitative Evidence (Institute of Linguistics, Academia Sinica, 2010). 936 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 45/17/68. 937 Ibid., 3/2/1. 938 ‘Disputer’ (bianzhe 辯者) is a technical term used throughout the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE in Warring States China. It denotes an intellectual who engaged both textually and orally in ‘disputing’ (bian 辯 ) i.e., argumentation in order to establish his own thesis or to repudiate another’s. 939 John Knoblock explains the importance of Prince Mou of Wei to the philosophical background of the Warring States period during the 3rd century BCE. In sum, he was the patron of Gongsun Long and subsequently espoused the latter’s philosophy in the capacity of disciple. See: John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 63–64. 940 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 45/17/77. 941 See also Watson, the Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 187; Blofeld, Beyond the Gods: Buddhist and Taoist Mysticism, 38.
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冥，反於大通.’942 Hence, it seems that the ‘Great Thoroughfare’ is related to religious concerns like death and an afterlife.
Perhaps we can interpret this matter of concerning death as part of ‘the Ultimate’ which scholars say Zhuangzi merges with as part of his mysticism. However, I hasten to add that scholars have not explicitly included these elements of the second occurrence of datong in their interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. It is more common to say that the Ultimate in the Zhuangzi is an ultimate dao. Sometimes scholars specify what kind of ultimate they think that dao is. Sometimes they treat it as a metaphysical absolute.943 Sometimes, they call it a cosmological ultimate.944 It seems to me that an ‘ultimate dao’ could also include a ‘great thoroughfare’ to which people ‘return’ after death. This would be an ultimate dao with metaphysical attributes.
Accepting the traditional view that the Qiu Shui chapter was authored by people who were the students on an original Master Zhuang, the section above raises some questions concerning the religious views of Zhuangzi and his followers. While it is beyond the scope of my present study to give a complete answer to these questions, I can offer some explanation of Zhuangzi’s religious views, such as those concerning death. Death is not something to fear, but rather to accept. This is because in the philosophy espoused throughout the Zhuangzi — especially within the chapter that contains the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue — death is presented as something that is natural and ‘good’.945 This aspects of the thought presented in the Zhuangzi hold true regardless of the identities or historicity of the authors; they are aspects of the text.
8.13.1. Is the Second Occurrence of Datong Equivalent to the First?
The latter occurrence of datong appears to be derived from some understanding of the former. This is because the latter occurrence is in part of the text which scholars attribute to ‘the school of Chuang-tzu’, i.e., authors’ whose thought is similar to that of the original Master Zhuang, the author of the Inner Chapters. For the disciples of Zhuangzi, datong had
942 Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 45/17/77-78. 943 See Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China. 944 See Roth, Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism. 945 See: Hung, Zhuangzi Yinde, 16/6/20-25; Liu, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, 173–79; Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer, 74–75; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 80; Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 86; Mair, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu, 53–55; see also: Wang, Zhuangzi Jiao Quan 莊子校詮, 1:223–26; Blofeld, Beyond the Gods: Buddhist and Taoist Mysticism, 62.
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8. Traversing the Great Pervader some religious significance due to its association with death and the afterlife. It may, therefore, be reasonable to infer that datong also had some religious significance to their master, i.e., Master Zhuang who authored the Inner Chapters wherein the term datong occurs for the first time. However, there is no direct evidence in the earlier part of the text to support the conclusion that the datong Yanhui unifies with has anything to do with death or the afterlife. Yet, this does not preclude the term and the concept from having religious or spiritual significance because religion and spirituality are not only concerned with death and afterlives: religion is also concerned with life.
Moreover, it is evident in the Zhuangzi that dao relates to an ideal Daoist way of living. Having established that datong is a metaphor for dao, that dao relates to life and living, and that the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage is a kind of introvertive mysticism, I think that if the first occurrence of datong did have religious significance to Zhuang Zhou, it would have been one that was more focussed on life than an afterlife. This seems to be a point of difference between the first and second usages of datong in the Zhuangzi. The second occurrence has some association with an afterlife, whereas there is no evidence of such an association in the first occurrence. It therefore seems that the ‘school of Chuang-tzu’ expanded the scope of the term ‘datong’ to include more abstract, metaphysical, and theological concerns than the term connotes in its first usage in the Inner Chapters.
8.14. Conclusions
Datong, the Great Pervader, is a technical term in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue of the Zhuangzi. Therein, it appears as the culmination of a kind practice consistent with Walter Stace’s theory of introvertive mystical experience. It is evidence of practices of calming the mind and emptying it of content which results in an experience of ‘unity’ with something. This something is interpreted by the subject as ultimate, profound, and basic to existence. In the case of the Zhuangzi, the Great Pervader appears to be a way to refer to an ultimate dao.
The term da tong (大通) occurs only twice in the Zhuangzi. The first occurrence is in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ passage. Therein, the idea of ‘unifying’, ‘going along with’ or ‘identifying with’ the ‘Great Pervader (同於大通) is presented as something profound that results from undergoing a process of ‘sitting and forgetting’. On the surface of what is written in the text, I do not see explicit evidence to support interpretations that datong is a metaphor for the ultimate dao.
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Yet, through a close reading of the text, I have found reasons to support that interpretation. Other parts of the Zhuangzi which discourse on dao contain evidence to support the interpretation that datong refers to an ultimate dao. That is to say, throughout the Inner Chapters, Zhuangzi discourses on dao, often through allusion, prose, and dialogues. These sections of the text sometimes show exemplars of dao. Yan Hui in the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue is one such exemplar. Furthermore, parts of those some discourses on dao describe dao in terms of ‘pervading’ (tong 通). This suggests another link in meaning between a ‘great pervader’ and an ‘ultimate dao’.
An implication of this research is that datong may have been an important concept in its own right among thinkers and texts contemporaneous with the formation of the Zhuangzi. The term ‘datong’ also occurs in other Warring States to early Han Dynasty texts. They are the Wenzi (文子), the Guanzi (管子), and the Huainanzi (淮南子).946 It might be of scholarly interest to research how the term was used in its own right in a variety of texts from the Warring States and Early Han eras.
8.14.1. Implications for Interpreting the Zhuangzi as a Mystical Text
We can interpret ‘sitting and forgetting’ as an example of mysticism, but this does not mean that we should interpret the whole of the Zhuangzi as a doctrine of mysticism. It may just be that the Zhuangzi contains mysticism as one part of an overall text that has no main goal, thesis, doctrine, or objective. This seems to be the most sensible interpretation when we consider some of the intellectual history of Chinese philosophy and the Zhuangzi.
During the Spring and Autumn, Warring States, and early Han periods, Chinese intellectuals did not author meta-level ‘books’. This is to say that intellectuals of the time did not author overall coherent works organised on a macro-level to communicate an explicit thesis, or doctrine. Instead, they wrote scrolls communicating their ideas, as their ideas came to them. It was then left to disciples to copy out the texts and transmit them to their students. During this process, textual corruption took place, and students-turned-masters-in-their-own- right added their own ideas to the scrolls being copied and transmitted. This is a basic, and often overlooked, element of how texts like the Zhuangzi came to be composed.947
946 In the Wenzi, see the 道源, 精誠, 守平, 符言, and 上禮 chapters. In Guanzi, see the 輕重已 chapter. In the Huainanzi, see 俶真, 覽冥, 精神, and 詮言 chapters. See also An Liu, The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China, trans. John S. Major et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1-40-952. 947 Li, Early China, 221–224 et passim.
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The case of the Zhuangzi is even more complex. The received text is a recension by Guo Xiang who edited the work down from 52 pian 篇 to 33. He is known to have disregarded content which he considered specious or erroneously transmitted along with the Zhuangzi, especially where the content originated from another text. For example, Guo Xiang writes that he discarded parts of the Zhuangzi which he believed to have originated in the Shanhai Jing (山海經).948 This means that when we engage with the Zhuangzi, we need to be aware of authorship issues and not treat the Zhuangzi as a unified text by a single author.
It is, however, still common, especially in Chinese language articles, to speak and write of ‘Zhuangzi’, as if the Zhuangzi is a book written by a single author. It is also common among Daoist enthusiasts, both Chinese and non-Chinese, to engage with ‘Zhuangzi’ in this manner. Scholars with a more realistic view usually respond to this kind of engagement with the text by ignoring it and presenting their audience with their own interpretations. I hold that there is merit to such an approach: scholars introduce their audience to the Zhuangzi with caveats concerning the authorship of the text.949 Yet, the problems of historically received interpretations of the text remain, including approaching the text with the assumption that it presents a unified doctrine of mysticism.
948 See Livia Knaul, ‘Lost Chuang-Tzu Passages’, Journal of Chinese Religions 10, no. 1 (1982): 54– 56; Livia Knaul, ‘Kuo Hsiang and the Chuang Tzu’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12, no. 4 (1985): 429. 949 See Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 3–7, et passim.
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9. Conclusions of the Dissertation 9. Conclusions of the Dissertation
Mysticism is part of the Zhuangzi. We can understand mysticism to involve knowledge by acquaintance with philosophical-religious commitments and claims. Moreover, the kind of commitments and claims suitably called ‘mystical’ are characterised by features such as mystery, ineffability, non-sensory experience, apophasis, direct experience of an ‘ultimate’, etc. Textual records of mystical experiences and the ways in which the authors use language are another feature of mysticism. Textual records and language-use typically contain vague, paradoxical locutions that evoke the mystery, awe, and non-sensory experiences that the authors felt as part of their mystic quests. All of these features are evident in parts of the Zhuangzi, especially the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue that I have focussed on in this dissertation. Thus, it is easy to concur with many scholars’ claims that ‘sitting and forgetting’ is an example of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
It is less easy to concur with the reasons scholars give for labelling the Zhuangzi mystical. When we examine the arguments that scholars have given to support interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi, we find that many of them are unconvincing. Some of them are weak arguments. For some such arguments, I have supplied fuller arguments to help myself and my readers better understand how such interpretations could be plausible (this formed part of Chapter 8 of this dissertation). However, some interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are not convincing. Some interpretations contain informal reasoning fallacies, such as circular reasoning. Some contain no arguments at all. Some contain problems in methodology, such as mis-quoting and mis-representing other scholars’ arguments. In those cases, my criticisms warranted, but I have not made them as attacks against other scholars. I have engaged with those arguments and interpretations in order to contribute to discussions about interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi. I have pointed out difficulties in some analyses and interpretations so that I can explain that understanding mysticism in the Zhuangzi is a more complex and nuanced issue than some accounts present.
There are two related issues surfacing in my discussion of interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. They are: assuming that there is consensus about what ‘mysticism’ means; and which features in the Zhuangzi constitute mysticism. These issues contain three unwarranted assumptions: 1) the meaning and definition of mysticism; 2) passages in the Zhuangzi that show evidence of mysticism; and 3) what certain passages in the Zhuangzi communicate. I discuss these findings below.
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In regards to 1), we see that several interpretations of mysticism in the Zhuangzi give different emphasis to different aspects of meaning in the term ‘mysticism’. For example, that Zhuangzi is mystical because he espouses belief in ineffability of an ultimate metaphysical truth, or that Zhuangzi is mystical because he believes in experiencing ‘all is one’ (i.e., some kind of unity), or that Zhuangzi is mystical because he believes in ‘anti-rationalism’, or that Zhuangzi is mystical because he believes in esoteric, apophatic mediation practices, etc. There is, therefore, little agreement concerning what mysticism is, and what its main features are, among scholars who label the Zhuangzi mystical. This means that there is no single strong reason, or argument, to support an overall interpretation of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This results in interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi in an ad hoc manner; readers can accept that mysticism is part of Zhuangzi, or perhaps the core meaning of the text, according to any one of the many different interpretations available.
In regards to 2), scholars label the Zhuangzi mystical, citing different passages of the text with little overlap in the sections of text they cite. Scholars have drawn from different parts of the text in isolation from the content to which those excerpts belong in order to give examples of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. This has resulted in little consensus as to which parts of the text are mystical and why. The exception to this ad hoc identification of mysticism in the Zhuangzi are the ‘sitting and forgetting’ and ‘mind fasting’ sections, which scholars generally agree are examples of mysticism in the text. However, in discussions of those sections of the Zhuangzi in this dissertation, we have seen scholars label those sections mystical for different reasons, some of which contain circular reasoning fallacies. There is, therefore, little consensus on why those passages are evidence of mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
In regards to 3), we have seen scholars present different views on what certain passages in the Zhuangzi communicate. Sometimes, this results in contrary interpretations of the same passage(s) used to support incompatible interpretations of the overall significance of the text and the place of mysticism in it. For example, in Chapter 7, I pointed out the contradictory assertions concerning the place of ‘anti-rationalism’ and its significance for mysticism in the Zhuangzi according to Wayne Alt and Philip Ivanhoe. Alt asserts that Zhuangzi is not mystical because he is not an ‘anti-rationalist’, whereas Ivanhoe asserts that Zhuangzi is not mystical because he is an ‘anti-rationalist’. Thus, we see that there is little consensus on the meaning of some passages in the Zhuangzi.
Therefore, the Zhuangzi does not present univocal meanings in certain parts. This is partly what allows scholars to interpret the same sections of texts in different ways. This is not a bad thing in itself, but it can become problematic when scholars present contrary
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9. Conclusions of the Dissertation interpretations and arguments about what the text says. The result is that scholars sometimes mistake their interpretation of the text for what the text means, as if the text communicates such a meaning in a univocal way.
The idea that the Zhuangzi is a work of mysticism is widespread and readily accepted. Thus, it may come as a surprise to find so many instances of faulty reasoning and poor argumentation that scholars use to support, or uncritically accept, interpretations of mysticism in the text. One such idea is that mysticism is the core of the Zhuangzi, which makes the Zhuangzi a mystical text.
I, however, do not concur that mysticism is the core of the Zhuangzi; the Zhuangzi is an anthology containing different ideas and strands of thought that are interesting in their own right. Not all of them are mystical. In fact, the amount of the text that we can plausibly interpret as mystical only accounts for isolated sections of the whole. If those isolated sections truly were ‘the core’ of the Zhuangzi, then the majority of the text would have very little significance. I think that we can accept that mysticism is significant in some parts of the text, without overlooking other parts of the text that are significant for other reasons.
The work in this dissertation can contribute to ongoing research in a number of ways. I outline some of them below.
First, one of the areas of focus in the dissertation is on the centrality of translation to our understanding of the Zhuangzi. I draw attention to some of those issues in the conclusion of Chapter 6 of this dissertation. Some of the ideas discussed there substantiate existing research. For example, Jonathan Herman has made a fascinating study of the first German translation of the Zhuangzi by Martin Buber.950 Therein, Herman shows how translation is not a one-to-one substitution of words of one language with another; the translator’s own interpretation of what the meaning of the text is, and ought to be, influence the choice of words and the overall translation. Buber’s translation of Giles’ English translation of the Zhuangzi into German also portrayed the text as one of mysticism, which is unsurprising considering that Buber’s source-text presents the Zhuangzi as mysticism.951 Additionally, comparative work on translation issues from classical Chinese into English, German, and French translations that contributed to received interpretations of the Zhuangzi throughout
950 See Herman, I and Tao: Martin Buber’s Encounter with Chuang Tzu. 951 See also 何, ‘The Transmission of Zhuangzi in [the] English[-Speaking] World 庄子在英语世界的 传播’.
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Western culture, could reveal new insights both on understanding the Zhuangzi. Such work could also contribute to translation studies as an academic discipline.
Ideas from Chapter 8 of this dissertation can be extended to other texts in Chinese intellectual history, allowing for a deeper understanding of the exchange of ideas within the Chinese intellectual tradition. In Chapter 8, I engaged with interpretations of datong (大通) from the ‘sitting and forgetting’ dialogue in the Zhuangzi. In the conclusion of that chapter, I noted the occurrence of ‘datong’ as a term in texts contemporaneous with the Zhuangzi. One such text is the Huainanzi (淮南子). Harold Roth has also noted similarities between the use of datong in the Zhuangzi and the Huainanzi in his contribution to a translation and study of the Huainanzi.952 Further research into the use of the term datong in Classical Chinese texts could enhance our understanding of the lore on inner cultivation, similarity between ideas, goals, and methods between the Zhuangzi and the Huainanzi, technical terms from Daoism, and perhaps many more.
Another issue for further research is the history/status/significance of Daoism as a global religion and the role of the Zhuangzi in Daoist religion. I briefly noted this issue in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, in my discussion of Louis Komjathy’s book, The Daoist Tradition. In my discussion, I noted how Komjathy argues that elements of Daoist religion are evident in the Zhuangzi. Komjathy also includes a chapter on Daoism as a global religion, entitled ‘Daoism in the Modern World’.953 Therein, he focusses on how Daoist religion is being practiced in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Komjathy also includes examples of how Daoist religion is being practiced in England and America. He concludes the chapter, and the book, by remarking: ‘As with the revitalization of mainland Chinese Daoism from the 1980s to the present, the establishment of tradition-based global Daoism is a slow process . . . Thus, the story of “global Daoism,” at once rooted in and transcending the Chinese source-tradition, is just beginning to be composed.’954 Surely, scholarly work on the presence and history of Daoism in Australia could contribute to our understanding of global Daoism.
Some possible future research based on issues noted in passing in this dissertation could contribute more broadly to comparative philosophy. For example, it might be edifying to consider similarities between the thought of Zhuangzi and Hegel that I have noted in parts
952 See Liu, The Huainanzi, 1–40, 952. 953 Komjathy, The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction, 301 et passim. 954 Ibid., 315.
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9. Conclusions of the Dissertation of this dissertation.955 Such a project could form part of a recent development in comparative philosophy which Steven Burik calls ‘the end of comparative philosophy and the task of comparative thinking’.956 Such a project could enhance our understanding of similarities in the thought of influential scholars, such as Zhuangzi and Hegel. Furthermore, such research could contribute to developing greater mutual respect and understanding between different intellectual and cultural traditions.
The Zhuangzi is one of the most deeply studied texts of the Chinese intellectual tradition. It is surprising, but also encouraging, to think that there is still scope for many different kinds of research projects relating to the Zhuangzi.
The End
955 See Moore, ‘Note on the Philosophy of Chuang Tzu’, xxiii; Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 183. 956 See Burik, The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism.
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10. Appendix 1: Table of Features of Mysticism Scholars Indicate in the Zhuangzi 10. Appendix: Table of Features of Mysticism Scholars Indicate in the Zhuangzi
The table below presents quotations from scholars about mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The table is arranged according to alphabetical order of scholars’ surnames.
Feature of Feature of Mysticism Source Quotation Philosophy
Epistemology Beyond ordinary Chan (1969) ‘He [Zhuangzi] is reason mystical, but at the same time he follows reason as the leading light.’ (p.177)
Epistemology Esoteric use of Chan (1969) ‘his [Zhuangzi’s] language poetic mysticism . . . [is among things which have] remained inexhaustible sources of inspiration for the Chinese.’ (p.179)
Experience losing their own selves Ching (1983) ‘[t]hey [the classical Daoists] aimed at Epistemology transcending their losing their own selves, ordinary sense at transcending their Metaphysics experience and ordinary sense discursive reasoning experience and discursive union with the Tao reasoning. . . . Classical Taoism is mystical in contemplation of its inspiration . . . nature centred upon man’s union with the Tao through contemplation of nature.’ (p.230)
Metaphysics Ultimate Ching (1983) ‘the way it [the Dao] teaches leads to Epistemology The Dao union with itself — a way of passive Experience Union with ultimate acceptance and Contemplation [of mystical ultimate and union contemplation. Such with it] was the teaching . . . of Lao-tzu and even
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of Chuang-tzu.’ (p.232)
Epistemology transformed Ching (1992) ‘a transformed consciousness consciousness [brought Experience on through trance] in inner peace and which the person Metaphysics stillness experiences a sense of inner peace and oneness stillness, sometimes even a sense of oneness interconnectedness or interconnectedness to the universe or all things.’ (p.173)
Epistemology Altered state of Ching (1992) ‘a transformed consciousness consciousness Expereince [brought on through Inner peace trance] in which the Metaphysics person experiences a Oneness sense of inner peace Connectedness and stillness, sometimes even a sense of oneness of interconnectedness to the universe or all things.’ (p.173)
Ethics Spiritual freedom Ching (1992) ‘[Zhuangzi’s philosophy is] an Metaphysics Self-transcendence ardent plea for spiritual freedom . . . a self- epistemology Beyond limitations of transcending liberation the mind from the limitations of one’s own mind . . . The Tao such freedom can only be discovered in nature Higher knowledge itself, in the Tao. This involves a higher level Wisdom of knowledge, the knowledge of No self wisdom . . . such mystical knowledge comes only with ‘forgetting’ the knowledge of all things and of the self’ (p.177)
Epistemology Self cultivation (of Coutinho (2013) ‘[Mystical rulership esoteric practices) in the Zhuangzi] is Experiences rooted in Daoist Wuwei cultivation, but now Ethics combined with a sagaciousness concern for the details of rule. Thus the practice of cultivation of life
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tendencies [sic] is now combined with a distinctive interpretation of ‘wuwei’ and promoted as a quasi- anarchistic method of ruling a vast empire.’ (p.209)
‘the way of the sage is rooted in stillness, emptiness, and wuwei.’ (p.141)
Experience Oneness Feng (1933) ‘How can we actually identify ourselves with the universe? With the state of pure experience, is the answer.’ (p.15; pp.15-23)
Metaphysics Oneness Feng (1933) ‘Other philosophers (Spinoza, for Ethics instance) fully accepted the Epistemology naturalistic Experience conception of the universe . . . [but one wherein] man is still one with the universe . . . Taoism [including the Zhuangzi] also took this view. Some people said that Taoism is naturalistic and scientific, while others said that it is mystic and religious. In fact it is both.’ (p.5)
Metaphysics Tao Feng (1933) ‘Tao is the total spontaneity of all Unity things, and not something All things merging into transcending the one world. . . . Yet, since there is the total spontaneity of all things, there is still
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unity of the world, which may also be called God, if one is pleased to call it.’ (pp.7-8)
Experience Paradoxes Feng (1933) ‘In the perfect man activity and Ethics Unity tranquillity unite.’ (p.17) ‘perfect man’
Metaphysics Identified with H. Giles (1889) ‘The true sage takes divine/God/Dao/the his refuge in God’ (p. Universe 18)
Metaphysics God H. Giles (1889) ‘The true sage takes his refuge in God, Epistemology Merging of subject and and learns that there object/non-dualism is no distinction between subject and object.’ (p.18)
‘The sage ‘blends everything into one harmonious whole, rejecting comparison with this or that’ (p. 29).
‘embraced in the obliterating unity of God,’ (p. 31)
Epistemology Wisdom L. Giles (1906) True wisdom then consists in Metaphysics withdrawing withdrawing from one’s own individual Experience ultimate Unity standpoint and mysterious entering into ‘subjective relation with all things.’ He who can achieve this will ‘reject all distinctions between this and that,’ because he is able to descry an ultimate Unity in which they are merged, a mysterious One which ‘blends and transcends them all.’’ (pp.18-19)
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Epistemology Non-dualism L. Giles (1906) ‘Contraries no longer stand in sharp metaphysics Unity antagonism, but are in some sense Ultimate reality actually identical with each other, because there is real and all-embracing Unity behind them.’ (p.18)
Ethics Abstraction L. Giles (1906) ‘[Chuang Tzu’s] whole duty of man is Epistemology Non self thus summed up . . . ‘Resolve your mental Wuwei energy into Ultimate abstraction, your physical energy into Tao inaction [wuwei]. Allow yourself to fall Merging with the in with the natural Ultimate order of phenomena, without admitting the Different kinds of element of self.’’ knowledge and (p.19) knowing ‘This elimination of self is in truth the substitution of the ampler atmosphere of Tao for one’s own narrow individuality.’ (p.19)
‘[Chuang Tzu] advocates . . . a state of mental abstraction which shall involve at least a total absence of self- consciousness.’ (p.20)
‘every taint of self- consciousness must be purged away, the mind must be freed from its own criteria, and all one’s trust must be placed in natural intuition.’ (p.21)
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Epistemology Mystery/Vagueness L. Giles (1906) ‘the fantastic vagaries of his mysticism’ (p.36)
Religious Quietism Giles (1906) ‘The attainment of experience this state [of Spiritual quietism], and the spiritual blessings blessedness accruing therefrom, constitute the main theme of Chuang Tzu’s discourse.’ (p.19)
Epistemology Abandon reason Graham (1981) ‘[Zhuangzi] reach[es] the Experience Experiencing ‘all are conclusion that we one’ should abandon reason for the Ineffability immediate experience of an undifferentiated world, transforming ‘All are one’ from a moral into a mystical affirmation. It is in ‘The Sorting that Evens Things Out’ [i.e. ‘Qiwu Lun 齊物 論’] that Chuang-tzu takes this step.’ (p.9)
‘in surrendering to Heaven he [the sage] treats everything as one. . . . [However] the sage . . . cannot find words for the totality which he experiences.’ (p.20)
Ethics Doing nothing (i.e., Graham (1981) ‘For Taoism what wuwei) matters is that the Experience man who withdraws The Way to the ‘gate’ . . . has a Metaphysics clear course ahead of Illumination him, and all his Reality actions become ‘Doing Nothing’, spontaneous motion which is plumb with the Way. He also becomes capable of
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lucidly mirroring heaven and earth, but if that is illumination of reality it is of the reality of the concrete.’ (p.21)
Epistemology Underlying ground Graham (1981) ‘There is a notable difference between Metaphysics Illumination conceptualisations of this underlying reality ground in Chinese and in Western Thought. . . . if that [the Daoist way] is illumination of reality, it is the reality of the concrete [not something beyond appearance].’ (p.21)
Metaphysics Oneness Graham (1981) ‘in surrendering to Heaven he [the sage] Epistemology Ineffability treats everything as one. . . . [However] Experience Merging with the the sage . . . cannot whole find words for the totality which he experiences.’ (p.20)
‘[i]t is at the common point from which all [the myriad things] start that they are found to merge together and with oneself in a single whole.’ (p.21)
Metaphysics Oneness Graham (1989) ‘But what of the vision of oneness it Epistemology Illumination [the Laozi] shares with Chuang-tzu? Can it really be advising rulers that to govern their states requires nothing less than the ultimate mystical illumination?’ (p.234)
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Epistemology Disappearance of Graham (1989) ‘At the deep end [of distinctions mystical experience] Experience the theoretical limit would be the step from the fluidity to the disappearance of distinctions, in the absolute illumination which may still deserve to be called ‘mystical’.’ (p.235)
Epistemology Conceptualising the Graham (1989) ‘‘Mystical’ can be a ‘ultimate’ misleading word when Metaphysics applied to experience The Way conceptualised in terms experience not of reality but of the Relax body Way. The Taoist relaxes the body, calms Calm the mind the mind, loosens the grip of categories made habitual by naming, frees the current of thought for more fluid differentiations and assimilations, and instead of pondering choices lets his problems solve themselves as inclination spontaneously finds its own direction’ (p.235)
Experience Meditation Graham (1989) ‘But ‘Inward Training’, . . . is Epistemology Trance important as probably the oldest ‘mystical’ Shamanism text in China. . . . It is interesting also in Esoteric providing clear evidence that the meaning/significance mediation practiced in cultivated practices privately and recommended to rulers as an arcanum of Ecstasy government descends from the trance of the professional shaman.’ (p.100)
[t]he stories about craftsmen help us to find our bearings when Chuang-tzu is at his most mystical. . . . for him, and for Taoists in
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general, illumination is not an all or nothing satori, and . . . there are only differences of degree between Cook Ting’s perfect grace in carving an ox and the ecstasy of Tzu-chi’i of Nankuo.(p.189)
Experience Ecstatic states Jochim (1996) ‘certain fantastic tales as well as more Epistemology Esoteric use of straight-forward language accounts of ecstatic states in the Zhuangzi mark the beginnings of a mystical tradition in Daoism.’ (p.61)
Epistemology Practices Jochim (1996) [sections of the Zhuangzi, such as experience Esoteric mind-fasting and sitting and forgetting]: Altered state of ‘refer to practices that consciousness lead to a mystical state: [that is to say,] ‘consciousness devoid of egoistic bias’’ (p.62)
Experience merging one’s mind Kohn (1992) [‘sitting in oblivion’ with the Tao (zuowang 坐忘) Metaphysics means:]’merg[ing] one’s mind with the Tao . . . with chaos or Hundun. In different chapters, this process is described in different ways.’ (p.56)
Epistemology selfless perception Kohn (2001/2012) ‘This selfless perception of a mind Experience mind completely completely merged merged into and into and pervaded by pervaded by Dao Dao [evident in the Zhuangzi] is also at the heart of the classification of the ancient Daoist works as mystical texts.’ (p.39)
Epistemology Beyond sense Kohn (2001/2012) ‘as outlined in the perception Zhuangzi and the Ethics Guanzi, Equality of all things [practitioners of Daoist mysticism
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should] leave the senses behind and attain a state of ‘seeing things as equal’ and ‘having no feelings.’ (p.39)
Experience Experience of the Komjathy (2013) ‘Mystical experience sacred refers to an experience of that which a given individual or community identifies as sacred’ [on the understanding that the Zhuangzi presents meditation experiences as sacred] (p.54).
Epistemology apophatic meditation Komjathy (2013) ‘According to the texts of classical Experience dissolution of self, to Daoism, apophatic the end of subject- meditation metaphysics object dichotomies and eventually leads to separate identity the dissolution of self, to the end of attain a state of subject-object mystical union with the dichotomies and Dao separate identity. become the Through dedicated embodiment of the and prolonged Dao in the world practice, one may attain a state of mystical union with the Dao and become the embodiment of the Dao in the world.’ (p.209)
Epistemology Apophatic mediation Komjathy (2013) ‘[apophatic meditation such as that evident in experience emptiness the Zhuangzi] emphasizes emptiness Non-conceptual and stillness; it is contentless [sic], non- Non-dualistic conceptual, and non- dualistic. One simply Beyond sense empties the heart-mind perception of all emotional and intellectual content.’ (p.206)
Epistemology Emptying the mind Komjathy (2013) ‘adepts sought to empty the heart-mind experience
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of emotional and Beyond sense intellectual activity; perception they endeavoured to enter a state of stillness, wherein perceptual and cognitive activity decreased’ (p.209).
Epistemology Apophatic mediation Komjathy (2013) ‘According to the texts of classical metaphysics Non-self Daoism [including the Zhuangzi], Merging apophatic meditation Union with ultimate eventually leads to the dissolution of The Dao self, to the end of subject-object dichotomies and separate identity. Through dedicated and prolonged practice, one may attain a state of mystical union with the Dao and become the embodiment of the Dao in the world.’ (p.209)
Experience Merging with dao Lai (2008) We are left to wonder whether Epistemology Zhuangzi intends to replace xin, the Metaphysics? (if mind-heart, with Lai takes dao to be dao.’ (p.160) a metaphysical absolute)
Experience Meditation Lai (2008) ‘Roth argues that Zhuangzi Contemplation (of recommends a deep ultimate) mystical tranquillity through meditative tranquillity contemplation (1999)’ (p.161)
Epistemology Different kind of Liu (2006) ‘[antirationalist and knowledge mystic Experience interpretations of the Abandon reason Zhuangzi] point to a different epistemic Numinous mode that Zhuangzi advocates: abandon reason; employ . . .
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‘pure spontaneity’ and . . . ‘a distinct form of numinous knowing’ . . . According to both commentators, in Zhuangzi’s view true knowledge is possible as long as one employs this different epistemic mode.’ (p.157)
Epistemology Dao Liu (2006) ‘Zhuangzi did not think that the Metaphysics Higher level of knowledge of Dao understanding (besides could be obtained ordinary reason) through reason or empirical Illumination investigation; instead, people need to cultivate a higher level of intuitive understanding, which he called ‘illumination’ (ming [明]), of the whole facet of Dao.’ (p.165)
Metaphysics Ultimate Liu (2006) ‘if there are people who have truly Epistemology Dao understood Dao, they cannot teach others Language Ineffability since no human descriptions would have been adequate’ (p.166).
Metaphysics Supreme reality Maspero ‘understanding of the (1927/1978) supreme reality that Epistemology Beyond sense is beyond perceptible perception things, the Absolute which the school Absolute called Tao’ (p.307). Tao
Metaphysics Ultimate Maspero The mystical life (1927/1978) alone allows of Experience The Tao laying hold upon the Tao (p.307)
Metaphysics Detachment Maspero pass[ing] through (1927/1978) those great stages
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which mystics have Epistemology Renunciation described in all times and all countries: the Ethics Via purgativa period of detachment Experience Ecstasy from the exterior world; the period of Union with ultimate renunciation . . . reality corresponding to the via purgativa of Mystery Christian writers; then ecstasies . . . and Meditation finally the mystical union which is ‘the Special exercises Great Mystery’. And the mystical life also includes, in addition to meditation, all sorts of regular exercises — breathing exercises, for example, which preserve youth . . . and gives longevity (pp.307-308)
Experience Illumination Maspero a whole way of (1927/1978) life . . . an Epistemology Transformation illumination in which the neophyte felt Purification himself truly Via purgativa changed: the psychological Mind fasting equilibrium which had been normal previously was upset, giving way to a totally new condition. . . . This conversion is followed by a long phase of purification (via purgativa) which Chuang-tzu calls the fasting of the heart (p.308)
Experience Renunciation Maspero as with all (1927/1978) mysticisms, it [mind- Ethics Detachment fasting] demands renunciation and Epistemology Simplification detachment from Metaphysics Unification external things, simplification, Emptying the soul unification, and
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concentration of the grasp reality mind so that the soul ‘emptied’ of all unity with Absolute external influence can grasp reality and enter into an immediate and direct unity with the Absolute (p.308)
Epistemology Transcending sensory Moore (1889) ‘disparagement of knowledge sense knowledge’ (p. xx).
Ethics beyond a merely Moore (1889) ‘beyond the conventional life contradictions of ordinary thinking’ (p. xx)
Ethics beyond a merely Moore (1889) ‘beyond the conventional life contradictions of ordinary thinking’ (p. xx)
Epistemology Oneness Moore (1889) ‘the sage sees the many disappearing in Metaphysics the One’ (p. xx).
‘true belief in the One’ (p. xxi)
‘the ‘One’ of Chuang Tzu is . . . the living Unity of Heracleitus [sic], in which contraries co-exist’ (p.xxi)
Metaphysics Unity/Harmony Moore (1889) ‘the sage sees the many disappearing in epistemology the One, in which subjective and objective . . . meet and blend’ (p. xx)
‘The true sage takes his refuge in God, and learns that there is no distinction between subject and object.’ (p.xxiii)
Metaphysics Absolute Moore (1889) ‘the sage seeks for the Absolute, the Experience Infinite, the Eternal.
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He seeks to attain to TAO. It is here that we reach (in chaps. vi,vii) what properly constitutes the mysticism of Chuang-Tzu.’ (p. xxiii)
Ethics Detachment/escape Moore (1889) ‘escape from the from world world and self’ (p. Epistemology xx) Non-self
Ethics no self Moore (1889) ‘Abstraction from self, then, is the road Epistemology ultimate which leads to TAO (chap.vi).’ (p.xxiii) Metaphysics experiencing the Ultimate
TAO
Experience Altered state of Moore (1889) ‘to get rid of consciousness consciousness, and to Epistemology become the Higher illumination unconscious vehicle of a higher illumination’ (p. xxiii)
Experience Inner life Moore (1889) ‘the mystic’s contempt for a life of Ethics Deep level of human mere external life activity’ (p. xviii)
‘appealed to those deeper instincts of humanity’ (p. xviii)
Experience experienc[ing] the Roth (1991) ‘experienc[ing] the ground of the cosmos ground of the cosmos Metaphysics — the Tao — the Tao through techniques of self-cultivation.’ techniques of self- (p.605) cultivation
Epistemology Self-transcendence Roth (1995) ‘full participation in the world free from Ethics New way of interacting the biased strategies with world and perspectives of one’s limited ego’ (p.161)
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Epistemology Beyond sense Roth (1999a) ‘los[ing] visceral perception awareness of the emotions and desires . . . cut[ting] off sense perception . . . los[ing] bodily awareness and remov[ing] all thoughts from consciousness.’ (p.69)
Metaphysics Inner transformation Roth (1999b) ‘[being] exclusively concerned with experience The Way cosmology and the inner transformation of the individual leading to the mystical experience of attaining union with the Way.’ (p.7)
Epistemology Apophatic practices Roth (1999b) ‘[t]hey [practices related in the Nei Ye Experience Non self and the Zhuangzi] are essentially ‘Forgetting’ apophatic . . . a Beyond ordinary systematic process of knowledge negating, forgetting, or emptying out the contents of consciousness . . . found in the ordinary experience based in the ego-self.’ (p.28)
Epistemology Intuitive knowledge Roth (2000/2003) ‘intuitive knowledge of the Dao . . . [and] Metaphysics The Dao the great knowledge of illumination. . . . Experience Alternate forms of these are . . . two consciousness/knowing aspects of the same cognitive mode that arises within . . . extrovertive mystical experience.’ (p.21)
Epistemology Shifting conceptual Roth (2000/2003) ‘[people who use categories ‘illumination’ ming Metaphysics 明 and yinshi 因是 Perceiving underlying ways of thinking] ethics reality shift [their]
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conceptual categories — [their] way of conceiving of the same underlying reality — to harmonize with [others] . . . because [they] [are] not attached to any one particular way of seeing this reality.’ (p.23)
Epistemology Dao Roth (2000/2003) ‘it [Dao] can only be ‘known’ when the Metaphysics No self distinction between self and other . . . Non-dualism dissolves in the Unity with ultimate introvertive mystical experience of uniting with [it]’ (p.25)
Epistemology Ineffability Schwartz (1985) ‘It is rather the profound faith or Ultimate reality ‘knowledge’ in the sense of gnosis that this Source of all meaning reality incommunicable in words-is nevertheless the source of all meaning for human beings which makes mysticism in some sense a religious outlook. The ‘mystery’ is not an absence of ‘knowledge’ but a kind of higher direct knowledge of the ineffable source of all that which lends existence meaning.’ (p.193)
Metaphysics Oneness Schwartz (1985) ‘humans . . . can achieve oneness or Experience Ultimate ground some kind of mystic union with the Union ultimate ground of reality . . . [these] factors are . . . present in and even central to the visions of the Lao-tzu and the sections of the
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Chuang-tzu book that belong to the ‘historic’ Chuang- tzu.’ (pp.193-194)
Metaphysics Ineffability Schwartz (1985) ‘an inexpressible underlying unity’ epistemology Unity of the ‘ultimate’ (p.189; 193-194)
Metaphysics Qi Schwartz, 1985 ‘Here we note that the chi'i discussed in the previous chapter is already conceived of as a ‘metaphysical,’ mystical reality which serves, as it were, to connect the world of the manifold, determinate, and discrete to the world of nonbeing [as in the mind-fasting dialogue]’ (p.218)
Epistemology Gnosis Schwartz (1985) ‘Before considering his efforts to achieve this Experience Beyond ordinary gnosis, however, I must knowledge also say something Metaphysical about evidences of Illumination trancelike ‘mystic experiences’ and states meditation of mystical illumination in the qi Chuang-tzu text. The extremely crucial nonbeing chapter 2 (‘On Seeing Things as Equal’) emptying begins with the consciousness trancelike experiences of the mystic Nan-kuo- esoteric tzu.’ (p.217) meaning/practice in cultivated experiences ‘the chi’i [qi 氣]. . . is already conceived of as a ‘metaphysical,’ mystical reality which serves . . . to connect the world of the manifold, determinate, and discrete to the world of nonbeing. . . . the kind of ‘emptying of the mind’ of all consciousness of the determinate which we
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find in so much literature on ‘meditational’ techniques’ (p.218)
‘One other seemingly unlikely area in which one finds discussions of ‘mystical’ techniques is in passages dealing with skills or crafts. . . . the cicada-catcher then informs him that he is able to bring himself to a state of mind where he ‘is aware of nothing but cicada-wings not wavering, not dipping, not letting any of the ten thousand things take the place of cicada- wings-how can I help but succeed?’ (p.218)
Experience Concentrating your qi Van Norden ‘‘Concentrating your (2011) qi’ refers to . . . Metaphysics? state of equanimity refining the qi through (taking Van guided breathing Norden’s ‘the experience the Way exercises . . . the result Way’ to be a is a state of equanimity metaphysical in which one can experience the Way.’ absolute) (p.135)
Epistemology Therapeutic Van Norden ‘Interpreting Zhuangzi (2011) as a therapeutic mystic Experience New was of relating to helps shed light on his the world disagreement with Hui Shi. . . . The point of Zhuangzi’s writings is to open us up to new ways of relating to the world, not to talk us out of one fixation and into another [as Hui Shi attempted].’ (p.133; 135)
Epistemology Ineffability Van Norden ‘Broadly speaking, (2011) mysticism is the view Ethics Knowledge important that there is 1. a kind of for life knowledge 2. That cannot be adequately
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expressed in words 3. Unusual knowledge but is important to human life in general.’ (p.133)
‘Zhuangzi is ultimately a mystic. A mystic thinks that there is a kind of knowledge important to human life that cannot be described in words [and this is evident in the Zhuangzi].’ (p.154)
Epistemology Esoteric contemplation Waley (1939) ‘The word [guan 觀] is applied to looking at waterfalls, views, etc.; but also to mystic contemplation.’ (p.61)
Epistemology Trance Waley (1939) ‘some kind of trance- state is being Experience Esoteric practices and described [in the Ziqi meanings dialogue] . . . . It is possible that many commonplace words had, in connection with mystic practices, a technical sense that now escapes us.’ (pp.59- 60)
Ethics Spiritual Waley (1939) ‘[you 游/遊]‘to wonder, to travel’ . . . Epistemology Esoteric use of in its Taoist language acceptation, is a Experience spiritual not a bodily
journey.’ (p.29)
‘the sight-seeing that can be done within’ (pp.61-63)
going on ‘distant journeys of the soul’ (pp.63-67)
Epistemology Beyond ordinary Ziporyn (2009) ‘Like a mystic, reason Zhuangzi often seems to speak of a
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state that transports one beyond ordinary reason and sensation and puts one in touch with an afterlife, life- changing realm of experience (e.g., at 2:16; 2:41; 4:10; 6:54).’ (p.xvii)
10.1 Critical Reflections on the Sources in the Table of Features
In the above table of features, I have quoted what scholars have written about features of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. The reader should notice that terms from the text of the Zhuangzi do not often appear in these scholars’ summaries of what they conclude is its mysticism. This is a methodological difficulty in characterising the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism.
Scholars have summed up the mysticism of the Zhuangzi in terms which correspond to their own understanding of mysticism. Moreover, scholars seldom communicate their own understanding of mysticism to their readers. For example, scholars claim that Zhuangzi advanced a thesis of the interconnectedness of all things, or ‘oneness’. They make it sound as though Zhuangzi wrote the following: I hold that all things are one. To experience this oneness, you must walk my mystic path. Yet, there are no such locutions of oneness or mysticism in the Zhuangzi.
It would be more accurate for scholars to have made slightly different claims about the mysticism of the Zhuangzi. Consider the claim that Zhuangzi had a doctrine about a ‘common ground’ and that the Zhuangzi talks about ‘merging’ or ‘uniting’ with this ‘common ground’ through ‘mystical experience’.957 It would be more accurate to say that Zhuangzi had a doctrine of dao which he held to be an objective aspect of reality, and that he believed the kind of mediative practices, such as ‘sitting and forgetting’, can help one gain insight into, and experience of, that aspect of reality. This would count as reasons for interpreting mysticism in the Zhuangzi, on the understanding that mysticism involves cultivating experiences of what one believes to be aspects of ultimate reality.
957 See Graham, Chuang-Tzŭ: The Inner Chapters, 21; Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 193–94; Roth, ‘Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic Thought’, 605; Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 39.
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However, scholars who present the Zhuangzi as a work of mysticism often do not provide arguments and justifications for calling the Zhuangzi mystical. Instead, they apply the label as if it is a fact that the Zhuangzi is mystical and that readers can easily identify aspects of mysticism in the Zhuangzi. Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to provide a more detailed examination of mysticism in the Zhuangzi than scholars have hitherto given.
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