Shintō. and religions Japanese of Japanese with particular history local in interaction with the religions, Buddhism of the on focuses research His Sciences. Bernharda seniorresearchis SCHEID fellow at theAustrian Academy of andtheir roles for theconstruction ofidentity in narratives premodern Buddhist communities. Buddhist particular in include Cardiff. interests of research University His the at Studies Buddhist of Professor is DEEG Max movements inthePeople’s Republic ofChina. potentially violent religio-political phenomena such as, for instance, Islamist inChina. their regional traditions and The volume therefore of Abrahamitic contributes to ourunderstandingof most recent and the cases in problems, discussed social are diversities specific their Contemporary minorities, missionaries. religious Christian and Confucians between debates modern early the and minorities Christianity, Judaism) (Islam, and East Near the ofreligious from settlements toearly Buddhism Indian of adoption encounter with religions of the (the so-called Western Regions, starting from the Daoism on article introductory proto an from Apart religion. Chinese of volumeon these emphasis “foreign” putaspecial andlessfamiliaraspects society varyingin regionaldegrees. The essays collectedthe present in Chinese on impact have to continue and assumed generally than stronger Religionsof foreign have origin cultural Chinese shaped history much ­ typical autochthonous religion of China), the volume reflects China’s reflects volume the China), of religion autochthonous typical Printed andboundintheEU ISBN 978-3-7001-7759-3

SBph 862 Max Deeg, Bernhard Scheid (eds.) ∙ Religion in China BKGA 85 Religion inChina and Bernhard Scheid Edited by Max Deeg Major Concepts and Minority Positions MAX DEEG, BERNHARD SCHEID (EDS.)

RELIGION IN CHINA: MAJOR CONCEPTS AND MINORITY POSITIONS ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 862. BAND

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS NR. 85 ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 862. BAND

Religion in China Major Concepts and Minority Positions

Edited by Max Deeg and Bernhard Scheid Vorgelegt von w. M. Ernst Steinkellner in der Sitzung vom 24. Oktober 2014

Diese Publikation wurde einem anonymen, internationalen Peer-Review-Verfahren unterzogen. This publication has undergone the process of anonymous, international peer review.

Cover: Nanjing’s Sanzang Pagoda with the Zifeng Tower, a modern architectonical landmark, in the background. The Sanzang Pagoda is named after the famous Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang and is said to treasure some of his relics. Photo by Georg Hörmann (www.flickr.com/photos/ghoermann), 2011, reproduced with permission.

Die verwendete Papiersorte ist aus chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff hergestellt, frei von säurebildenden Bestandteilen und alterungsbeständig.

Bestimmte Rechte vorbehalten. ISBN 978-3-7001-7759-3 Copyright © 2015 by Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien Druck und Bindung: Prime Rate kft., Budapest Printed and bound in the EU https://hw.oeaw.ac.at/7759-3 https://verlag.oeaw.ac.at Dedicated to the memory of Prof. Dr. Otto Ladstätter (1933–2005)

Contents

Foreword – “cum apologia” ix Contributors xi Major Periods in Chinese History xiii

Max Deeg Religion in China: Introduction 1

Chiao Wei Daoism in China 13 Writing Times and Spaces Together: Experiments to Create

Max Deeg an Early Sino-Buddhist Historiography 29

Zhuo Xinping Religious Policy and the Concept of Religion in China 51

Irene Eber Chinese Jews and Jews in China: Kaifeng – Shanghai 65 Sin and Penance in Fujian Christianity in Erik Zürcher Late Ming Times 91

Roman Malek, S.V.D. Christendom and its Manifestations in China Today 113 Unity in Diversity: The Islamic Revival Movement in

Wang Jianping China Today 143

Dru C. Gladney Islam in China: Accommodation or Separation? 187 Index

229

Foreword – “cum apologia”

he fate of this volume of collected articles needs a slight variant of the usual “habent sua fata libelli”: “habent sua fata auctores Tlibelli”. The focus on the authors’ fate becomes obvious when the reader looks back at the event where the papers collected in this vol- ume were originally presented. This was an international workshop ‘Š‹‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‘”‰ƒ‹œ‡†„›”‘ˆǤ”Ǥ––‘ƒ†•–¡––‡”ȋȘʹͲͲͷȌƒ– –Š‡ •–‹–—–‡ˆ‘”–Š‡—Ž–—”ƒŽƒ† –‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ•‹ƒȋ  Ȍ‘ˆ the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Sadly, Prof. Ladstätter passed away „‡ˆ‘”‡™‘”‘–Š‹•˜‘Ž—‡ ‘—Ž†„‡ϐ‹‹•Š‡†Ǥ  ‹†‡–ƒŽŽ›ǡ‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡ ƒ—–Š‘”•ǡ”‘ˆǤ”Ǥ”‹ Šò” Š‡”ȋȘʹͲͲͺȌǡˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡†Š‹ƒˆ‡™›‡ƒ”•Žƒ–- er. The loss of the project’s “father” put the task of publication on the probably most inadequate shoulders imaginable. After Professor Lad- stätter’s untimely death, I simply happened to be the only contributor available in Vienna to continue the editorial task. Consequently, Prof. Dr. Ernst Steinkellner, then Director of the IKGA, asked me to continue Professor Ladstätter’s project as a single editor. While the work on the ˜‘Ž—‡ϐ‹”•–”ƒ•‘‘–ŠŽ›ǡ‘–Ž‡ƒ•––Šƒ•–‘–Š‡‡†‹–‘”‹ƒŽƒ••‹•–ƒ ‡ of Mrs. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek from the IKGA, my move from Vienna to Cardiff caused considerable delays. In addition, the IKGA was relocated and restructured twice during the same time, while Mrs. Peck-Kubaczek Ž‡ˆ––Š‡  ™‹–Š‘—–ϐ‹‹•Š‹‰Š‡”‡†‹–‘”‹ƒŽ™‘”Ǥ Šƒ†ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›‰‹˜‡ up hope that the volume could be published at all, when Dr. Bernhard Scheid, japanologist at the IKGA, contacted me and offered his assis- tance. It is therefore due to his efforts that the last obstacles in the com- plicated production process of this volume could be solved in the end. We had to make a principal decision whether to fully update the contri- butions or to edit and publish them in the form they had reached up to the last major revision by Mrs. Peck-Kubaczek. In order not to postpone the publication of the edition any longer and considering the inconve- nience and – in the case of Professor Zürcher’s essay – impossibility for a fundamental revision by the authors, we decided to publish all contributions as they were. I have only updated the “Introduction” with –Š‡‘•–‹’‘”–ƒ–”‡ ‡–’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•‹–Š‡ϐ‹‡Ž†‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ǡ x Foreword while Bernhard Scheid brought footnotes and references into a single format and took care of the layout and the index. I still hope that the essays collected in this volume will be of interest especially since they cover such a wide range of Chinese religions, including contributions on the so-called Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which are normally either restricted to very specialised contexts or treated separately from the standard set of the “Three Teachings” (san- jiao йᮉȌȂ‘ˆ— ‹ƒ‹•ǡDaoism and Buddhism – attributed to the Middle Kingdom. With this in mind I do not expect to have gained much -or gongde ࣏ᗧ‹–Š‡—††Š‹•–•‡•‡Ȍ„›–Š‹•„‡Žƒ–‡†’—„ ƒ›ٿ—’) merit lication, but at least have repaid a small amount of my “Bringschuld” for the support and friendship I have received during my time in Vienna and afterwards from the directors, Professor Steinkellner and his suc- ‡••‘”ǡ–Š‡Žƒ–‡”Ǥ ‡Ž—–”ƒ••‡”ȋȘʹͲͳͶȌǡƒ†‘–Š‡”‡„‡”•‘ˆ–Š‡ IKGA.

ƒ”†‹ˆˆǡʹͶthƒ” ŠʹͲͳͶ

Max Deeg Contributors

  ‡‹ǡ ’”‘ˆ‡••‘” ‡‡”‹–—•ǡ ‘–”‹„—–‡† •‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž› –‘ –Š‡‡•- tablishment of a department for Chinese Studies at the University of Trier. He received his PhD in philosophy, ethnology, and linguistics at –Š‡‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‹‡ƒǤ‹ ‡ͳͻ͹ͳŠ‡Šƒ•„‡‡™‘”‹‰ƒ•”‘ˆ‡••‘” of Chinese Studies in Bonn and Trier. His major research topics inclu- †‡ǣŽ‹‰—‹•–‹ •ȋƒŽ•‘Ž‡š‹ ‘‰”ƒ’Š›ƒ†‡‘Ž‘‰‹••ȌǡŠ‹‡•‡’Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š›ǡ Chan Buddhism and Daoism.

Max DEEG is Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Cardiff. He received his PhD in Indian Studies at the University of Würzburg. ”‘ ʹͲͲʹ –‘ ʹͲͲ͸ Š‡ ™ƒ• ’”‘ˆ‡••‘” ƒ– –Š‡ •–‹–—–‡ ˆ‘” ›•–‡ƒ–‹  Theology at the University of Vienna. His research interests include in particular Buddhist narratives and their roles for the construction of identity in premodern Buddhist communities.

”‡‡‹•‘—‹• ”‹‡„‡”‰”‘ˆ‡••‘”‘ˆƒ•–•‹ƒ–—†‹‡•ȋ‡‡”‹–—•Ȍ at the Department of East Asian Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusa- lem, and senior fellow of the Truman Research Institute. She has pub- lished widely on religion in China, the Jewish diaspora in China and on Chinese literature.

Dru C. GLADNEY is Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College. He was Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa ˆ”‘ͳͻͻ͵ȂʹͲͲ͸ƒ†Šƒ•™‘”‡†ƒ•’”‘ˆ‡••‘”ŠǤ Ǥƒ–‡–”ƒŽƒ–‹‘ƒ- lities University, Beijing, and Shanghai University. His research topics include ethnic and cultural nationalism in Asia, in particular the peop- Ž‡•ǡ’‘Ž‹–‹ •ǡƒ† —Ž–—”‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‹Ž‘ƒ†ƒ†—•Ž‹Š‹‡•‡ȋ‘” —‹ȌǤ

Roman MALEK, S.V.D., is Professor of Religious Studies at the Philoso- phisch-Theologische Hochschule St. Augustin near Bonn. He is a missio- ƒ”›‘ˆ–Š‡–‡›Ž‡””†‡”ȋǤǤǤȌǡ•‹‘Ž‘‰‹•–ƒ†ˆ‘”‡”‡†‹–‘”‹ Š‹‡ˆ‘ˆ xii Contributors

Monumenta Serica – Journal of Oriental Studies, China Heute, and editor of the Monumenta Serica Monograph Series. He has published widely on religion, particularly on Christianity, in Chinese culture.

WANG Jianping is Professor of Muslim Studies at the World Religion Re- search Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He received his PhD in History of Religions at the University of Lund, ™‡†‡Ǥ ”‘ͳͻͻ͵–‘ͳͻͻͺŠ‡™ƒ•ƒ”‡•‡ƒ” Šˆ‡ŽŽ‘™ƒ––Š‡ ‡„”‡™ University of Jerusalem. He has published widely on Islam in Asia.

ZHUO Xinping is Director of the World Religion Research Institute and the Christianity Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci- ences in Beijing. He received his PhD in Religious Studies at the Lud- wig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich. He is interested in theoretical approaches to religions in contemporary China, particularly in their relations to Western religious theories.

”‹o ȋȘʹͲͲͺȌ™ƒ•”‘ˆ‡••‘”‡”‹–—•‘ˆƒ•–•‹ƒ ‹•–‘”›ƒ– the University of Leiden, where he chaired the Institute of Chinese Stu- †‹‡•ˆ”‘ͳͻ͹Ͷ–‘ͳͻͻͲǤ ‹•”‡•‡ƒ” Š‹–‡”‡•–•‹ Ž—†‡†–Š‡”‡ ‡’–‹‘‘ˆ foreign complex systems of thought in premodern China, in particular ‘ˆ—††Š‹•ȋŠ‡—††Š‹•–‘“—‡•–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡͳͻ͹ʹȌǡ„—–ƒŽ•‘‘ˆŠ”‹•- tianity and the Jesuit mission. Major Periods in Chinese History

Shang ၟ†›ƒ•–›ǡ ƒǤͳͷ͹ͲȂͳͲͶ͸ Zhou ࿘†›ƒ•–›ǡͳͲͶͷȂʹͷ͸ Qin ⛙†›ƒ•–›ǡʹʹͳȂʹͲ͸ Han ₎†›ƒ•–›ǡʹͲ͸ȂʹʹͲ Three Kingdoms (Wei 㨯, Shu ⻎, Wu 藀ȌǡʹʹͲȂʹͺͲ Jin ᫲†›ƒ•–›ǡʹ͸ͷȂͶʹͲ Southern and Northern Dynasties (Nanbeichao ༡໭ᮅ ȌǡͶʹͲȂͷͺͻ Sui 㝳†›ƒ•–›ǡͷͺͳȂ͸ͳͺ Tang ၈†›ƒ•–›ǡ͸ͳͺȂͻͲ͹ Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (Wudai shiguo ӄԓॱ഻ȌǡͻͲ͹Ȃͻ͸Ͳ Song Ᏽ†›ƒ•–›ǡͻ͸ͲȂͳʹ͹ͻ Yuan ඖ†›ƒ•–›ǡͳʹ͹ͳȂͳ͵͸ͺ Ming ᫂†›ƒ•–›ǡͳ͵͸ͺȂͳ͸ͶͶ Qing Ύ†›ƒ•–›ǡͳ͸ͶͶȂͳͻͳͳ ‡’—„Ž‹ ‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡͳͻͳʹȂͳͻͶͻ ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹ ‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡͳͻͶͻȂ’”‡•‡–

Religion in China Introduction

Max Deeg

–Š‡‡•–ǡDzŠ‹‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ•Ȍdzƒ†DzŠ‹‡•‡•’‹”‹–—ƒŽ‹–›dzŠƒ˜‡”‡- ceived a great deal of attention in the last years. This can generally Ibe observed in the popular interest in such esoteric themes such as Fengshui 付≤, and interest in the intellectual and spiritual background of the highly popular Chinese medicine and pre-“wellness” phenome- na Taiqiquan ཚᾥᤣ and Qigong ≓࣏. Qigong has also brought Chinese religions into the headlines of the newspapers: through the controver- sy between the Chinese government and the Falungong ⌅䕚࣏ and its leader Li Hongzhi ᵾ⍚ᘇ the public has become aware that there is at Ž‡ƒ•– ‘ϐŽ‹ – ‘ ‡”‹‰”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡•ǯ‡’—„Ž‹ ‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡƒ modern communist-socialist state which, since the coming to power of the Communist party and especially after the brutal sweepings of the Cultural revolution, was popularly believed to have gotten rid of its Dz‘’‹—ˆ‘”–Š‡’‡‘’Ž‡Ǥdz‡•’‹–‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ‹‡•‡†‡• ”‹’–‹‘•ƒ† ‡- sus-like documents, it seems that the real status quo of religions – those organized in state-recognized associations, the religious underground ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•ǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•–Š‡†‹ˆˆ—•‡”ƒ‰‡‘ˆDzˆ‘Ž”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•dz–Šƒ–ϐŽ‘™ as an undercurrent in Chinese traditions – in the Peoples’ Republic is rather unclear and in constant motion,ͳ and the notion of “religious fever” (‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ϔ‹‡„‡”, Ch. zongjiao-re ᇇᮉ⟡Ȍ‹Š‹ƒƒ•‹–Šƒ•„‡‡ described by Roman Malekʹ still has to be proven in situ. The study of religions in mainland China and their development there must counter- balance the previous focus on Taiwan that has, until recently, dominat- ed the Western discourse on traditional Chinese religions. This stands

ͳ The description of the state of religions in mainland China in MacInnis’ Religion in Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ›ȋƒ ‹•ͳͻͺͻȌ‹•ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›‘—–†ƒ–‡†ƒ†‡‡†•ƒ•‡“—‡ŽǤ ʹ ‡‡ǡ‡Ǥ‰ǤƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷǢ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’’ǤʹͲ͵ȂʹͲ͹Ǥ

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’ǤͳȂͳʹǤ ʹ ƒš‡‡‰ true, even though religious studies have begun to develop in Taiwan, after a long period of state-supported secularity, for a while now. A new development is also to be seen in mainland China where Chinese reli- gions are now not only studied in the context of historical and sociolog- ical studies but as an academic subject in the framework of an emerging Religious Studies discipline, established as independent disciplines e.g. at Renmin University (‡‹Œ‹‰Ȍǡƒ† —†ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ȋŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ȌǤ Š‡’‘’—Žƒ”‹–‡”‡•–‹Š‹‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ•Ȍ‹–Š‡‡•–Šƒ•‹–• ‘”- relation in academic research. The number of publications on Chinese religions has increased considerably over the last few decades. A jour- nal exclusively dedicated to the study of Chinese religions published in a Western language͵ is just one indication of this development, and introductions and anthologies in the form of textbooksͶ show that, at least in North American universities and colleges, Chinese religions have gained a place in the curricula of humanities departments. Exten- sive bibliographies and overviews on the subject have been publishedͷ and a useful survey on the current state of affairs has been made avail- able͸ which, for the earlier periods, has now been complemented by a series of monographs͹. This trend will hopefully continue for the sake ‘ˆ• Š‘Žƒ”•™Š‘ǡ‹ƒ††‹–‹‘–‘–Š‡‹”‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽϐ‹‡Ž†•‘ˆ‡š’‡”–‹•‡ǡ™ƒ– to maintain a general overview of this branch of Religious Studies, a subject that, due to its wealth of historical sources and contemporary developments, is virtually exploding in terms of research and publica- tions. In this context, the title of the present volume reads rather presump- tuous. Collecting representative papers on “Chinese religion” tries to achieve the impossible. The contributions to this volume also seem to underline this very point: they had to decide between providing a gen- ‡”ƒŽ‘˜‡”˜‹‡™‘ˆ–Š‡‹”•—„Œ‡ –Ǧ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋŠ‹ƒ‘Ȍ‘”ƒ†‡–ƒ‹Ž‡†•–—†›‘ˆƒ •‹‰Ž‡ƒ•’‡ –‹‘‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ‡‡‰ǡò” Š‡”ȌǤ Owing to the particular history of the present volume (see the Fore- ™‘”†Ȍǡ ‡”–ƒ‹Žƒ —ƒ‡‹–Š‹• ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ‡••ƒ›•—•–„‡ˆ”ƒŽ›ƒ†- mitted. The question of the religious nature of Confucianism, for in-

͵ The Journal of Chinese Religions of the Society for the Study of Chinese Religions. ͶŠ‘’•‘ͳͻ͸ͻǢ‘‡”ͳͻͻͷǤ ͷ Š‘’•‘ͳͻͺ͹ǢŠ‘’•‘Ȁ‡ƒƒͳͻͻ͵Ǥ ͸ ˜‡”›‡”ǡ‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͷƒƒ†ͳͻͻͷ„Ǥ ͹ ƒ‰‡”™‡›ȀƒŽ‹‘™•›ʹͲͲͻǢƒ‰‡”™‡›ȀòʹͲͳͲǤ  –”‘†— –‹‘͵ stance, would certainly have deserved a chapter of its own.ͺ The reader may also wonder why there is no chapter on folk religion or popular religion (minjian zongjiao ≁䯃ᇇᮉȌǤ ˆƒ –ǡ‹’‘”–ƒ–™‘”Šƒ•„‡‡ done in these areas in recent years,ͻ which was, however, not available at the time when the present contributions were written. To give an outline of this volume, we may divide Chinese religions – in a quasi traditional sinocentric manner – into two main groups: autochthonous and foreign in origin.ͳͲ From such a perspective, the present volume has a clear emphasis on the latter group: one paper on —††Š‹•ȋ‡‡‰Ȍƒ†ƒ‘–Š‡”‘ —†ƒ‹•ȋ„‡”Ȍƒ†–™‘‡ƒ Š‘Islam ȋ Žƒ†‡›ǡƒ‰Ȍƒ†‘Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ȋò” Š‡”ǡƒŽ‡Ȍǡ™Š‹Ž‡‘Ž›‘‡ article is about an “autochthonous” religion, ƒ‘‹•ȋŠ‹ƒ‘ȌǤ‡ƒ•‘• can be brought forward for this imbalance and particular emphasis on “minority religions” such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. From the advent of Chinese studies in the West, promulgated by the Jesuit mis- sionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see the article by ”‹ Š ò” Š‡” ‹ –Š‹• ˜‘Ž—‡Ȍǡ –Š‡ ‹’‡”‹ƒŽ •–ƒ–‡ Dz”‡Ž‹‰‹‘dzǡ •‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡† Confucianism, was primarily studied as it was conceived by tradition- al Chinese scholars as well as Western missionaries and scholars of sinology as the Chinese mainstream religiosity, whereas Buddhism, as a foreign and thus corrupt and inferior religion, was rather neglected.ͳͳ –Š‡‘–Š‡”Šƒ†ǡ•‹‘Ž‘‰‹•–•‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–‰‡‡”ƒ–‹‘Ȃ‡Ǥ‰Ǥ–Š‡ ”‡ Š scholars Abel Remusat, Édouard Chavannes, and Paul Pelliot – were es- pecially interested in Buddhist material in Chinese because it provid- ed sources that documented the connection between China and what the Chinese called “Western Regions” (Xiyu 㾯ฏȌǡƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š‹‰‡‡”ƒŽ the study of Chinese Buddhist texts never reached the same degree of importance for the study of ( †‹ƒȌBuddhism as their Tibetan equiv- alents. Dealing mainly with “foreign” religions, the overall framework of this volume can be seen as mirroring the way in which religions have

ͺThe discourse on whether Confucianism is a religion or not reaches back to the Jesuit mission and the Rites Controversy but also has been taken up again recent- ly by the representatives of New Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism such as Du Weiming ᶌ㏝᰾. ͻ ‡‡ǡˆ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ‡‹™‡”–ʹͲͲ͵ǡŠƒ—ʹͲͲͷǡ˜‡”›‡”ʹͲͲͻǡ‘”Šƒ„‡”Žƒ‹ʹͲͲͻǤ ͳͲ Š‹•†‹˜‹•‹‘‹•ǡ‘ˆ ‘—”•‡ǡŠ‡—”‹•–‹ ƒ††‘‡•‘– ‘’Ž›™‹–Š ”‹–‹ ƒŽ• Š‘Žƒ”•Š‹’Ǣ it does not take into account the blending of religious traditions often considered typical Chinese and called syncretistic. On this point, see the article by Roman Malek in this volume. ͳͳ On the “Orientalist” development and background of sinology, see DeegʹͲͲ͵Ǥ been4 adapted and integrated intoMax Chinese Deeg society in the past and in the present, how they have become amalgamated with Chinese culture, but also how they have kept their own inherent features in the midst of the

culturalChinese culturalprocess ofmainstream attraction12 anddiscourse. repulsion Concentrating can be studied on “minority” more eas- ilyor “marginal”in the case religions of Islam, Judaism not only and makes Christianity sense in qualitythan with – the accultur mutual- Buddhism, with quantity,ated and historicallynamely, that diversified neglected topicsphenomenon of study such are toas be promoted. its long history in China – but also based on the argument of reversed the advantage of showing that we should beware of rashly speaking of ChineseThe diversity religion of intopics the singular,in the papers postulating, of this volumeof course, definitely not the hasex- istence of a single Chinese religion, but rather something like a typical sanjiao heyi 三教合一 Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism) Chinese “religiosity” projected by the traditional concept of - , “The three teachings ( whichare one.” leads A careful us back approach to the topic should, of the however, acculturation not prevent and adaptationus from look of foreigning for unvaryingreligions into elements a Chinese in the environment. development of religions in China – Daoism is treat- ed in an overview by Chiao Wei. After giving a condensed survey of theAs beginnings the only “autochthonous” of Daoism with religion the (philosophical) in this volume, writings of Laozi (Daodejing) and Zhuangzi, the establishment of institutionalized Dao- ism through Zhang (Dao)ling and the development of Daoist canonical scriptures, Chiao goes on to explain the basic ideas and elements un- derlying Daoist religion (cosmogony, soteriology, alchemy for longevity or immortality, etc.). Chiao describes the development of the different branches (or schools) of Daoism (Zhengyi 正一, Quanzheng 全真), their present state and their (historical) relationship with the relevant im- perial rule. He sees a relation between Daoist virtues and the strength and endurance of the Chinese in the hard struggle of survival. He then discusses basic Daoist concepts (dao, ziran, wuwei) and their meaning - vival of forthe thesuccess past ofand, Daoism possibly, lies for in itsthe giving future. a Chiaomodel finally or orientation points to both the re to Daoism in modern China, especially in the southern provinces;

Cf. Malek in this volume. 12  –”‘†— –‹‘ͷ the lower classes and the intellectual classes in a world of increasing disintegration.ͳ͵ ƒš‡‡‰–ƒ‡•—’–Š‡–‘’‹ ȋƒ†’”‘„Ž‡Ȍ‘ˆ–Š‡•‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ȋ‘”sini- ‹œƒ–‹‘Ȍ‘ˆ–Š‡ˆ‘”‡‹‰”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Buddhism into the Chinese self-aware- ness of their culture, an awareness that was already strongly developed at the time of Buddhism’s appearance. Deeg concentrates on the early centuries of reception and acceptance of Buddhism in China, especially –Š‡’‡”‹‘†‘ˆ–Š‡‘—–Š‡”ƒ†‘”–Š‡”›ƒ•–‹‡•ȋƒ„‡‹ Šƒ‘Ȍǡƒ† shows how early Chinese Buddhism tried to make the concrete histor- ical timetable of Chinese antiquity compatible to the Heilsgeschichte of Indian —††Š‹•ǡƒ•†‡ϐ‹‡†„›–Š‡†ƒ–‡•‘ˆ„‹”–Šǡ‡Ž‹‰Š–‡‡–ƒ† -of the Buddha. Deeg argues that a pro-Buddhist interpre ƒٿ¢˜”‹‹”ƒ’ tation can be found in some of the earliest Chinese efforts of “writing times and spaces together:” the death of the Buddha coinciding with the shift from the Shang tyranny and the beginning of the reign of the Zhou, which thus portentously interconnects traditional Chinese histo- riography with the Buddhist calculation of time. In the model of history that is discussed, the Chinese idea of the rise and fall of dynasties – spe- ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›–Šƒ–‘ˆ–Š‡Š‘—Ȃ‹•ƒ†‡ ‘’ƒ–‹„Ž‡™‹–Š–Š‡Buddhist idea of the decay of the Buddhist teaching, the decay of the dharma, which itself is closely connected to early Chinese Buddhist messianic ideas •—””‘—†‹‰–Š‡ϐ‹‰—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡ˆ—–—”‡Buddha Maitreya (‹Ž‡ȌǤŠ‹•ǡ‘ one hand, proved very fertile, but at the same time, in the subsequent development of Buddhism it attracted the suspicion and hostility of most of the later Chinese dynasties. Zhuo Xinping, director of the Department of Religious Studies at the Š‹‡•‡ ƒ†‡›‘ˆ‘ ‹ƒŽ ‹‡ ‡ȋŠ‘‰‰—‘Š‡Š—‹‡š—‡›—ƒȌǡ‹ his article “Religious Policy and the Conception of Religion in China” touches on the highly sensitive topic of how and under which circum- stances religions in the Peoples’ Republic of China are recognized as such. Zhuo gives an overview of the different positions of various in- tellectual and ideological groups towards the concept of religion, espe- cially the critical voices in late imperial and early republican China. He ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›‰‹˜‡•ƒ‘—–Ž‹‡‘ˆ–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ’‘•‹–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Communist Party

ͳ͵ To the selected bibliography of mainly German works – the original paper was written in German – one might add, in addition to other numerous books on the •—„Œ‡ – ‹ ‰Ž‹•Šǡ ”‡ ‡– ‹’‘”–ƒ– ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘• Ž‹‡ ‘Š ʹͲͲͲ ‘” ”‡‰ƒ†‹‘ ʹͲͲͺǤ‘™ƒŽ•‘ƒ Š”‘‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽŽ›ƒ””ƒ‰‡†ǡ„‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹ ƒŽ‘˜‡”˜‹‡™‘ˆ–Š‡Daoist ƒ‘Šƒ•„‡‡’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ǣ Š‹’’‡”Ȁ‡”‡ŽŽ‡ʹͲͲͶǤ ͸ ƒš‡‡‰ concerning the role and function of religion in a socialist society and state, including the recent positive development of the Party’s recog- ‹œ‹‰ȋ™‘”Ž†Ȍ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ•ƒ‹’‘”–ƒ–ƒ†‹†‹•’‡•ƒ„Ž‡‡Ž‡‡–‘ˆ society. Most interesting is the fact that a theory such as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” can be considered a factor in the conceptualiza- tion of an acceptable relationship between religion and a socialist state. Zhuo’s paper shows how closely religious policy and the problem of a –Š‡‘”‡–‹ ƒŽȂƒ†‘‡ƒ›ƒ††ǣ‘”ƒ–‹˜‡Ȃ ‘ ‡’–ƒ††‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘‘ˆ religion are interwoven. At the same time, however, it is astonishing how similar the modern approach in the study of religion is to this un- derstanding of religion in its social and cultural function – despite a rather normative tendency. This might point to more liberal tendencies in religious policy developing in China, as Zhuo indicates in his paper. Irene Eber, writing on Jews in China, divides her paper into two main •‡ –‹‘•ǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•–‹•†‡†‹ ƒ–‡†–‘–Š‡Jewish community in Kaifeng be- ginning with the erecting of a synagogue in the southern Chinese city in ͳͳ͸͵Ǥ„‡”‹•‡˜‡“—‹–‡ ‘˜‹ ‡†‘ˆ„‡‹‰ƒ„Ž‡–‘–”ƒ ‡–Š‡ϐ‹”•–Jews in China to the Tang period, based on indications of Jewish merchants having been in China at that time. The Kaifeng community, though still attested by early Catholic missionaries in China, ceased to exist at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Eber sees the slow loss of Jewish ‹†‡–‹–› ‘‡ –‡†–‘–Š‡ˆƒ ––Šƒ–•‘ ‹ƒŽƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‘™ƒ•†‡ϐ‹‡†”ƒ–Š‡” „›Ž‹‡ƒ‰‡ƒ†ƒ‰ƒ–‹ ‰”‘—’•–Šƒ„›ƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‘™‹–Šƒ”‹–—ƒŽ ‘—‹- ty. Nevertheless, within the framework of this lineage identity, the Jews of Kaifeng managed to retain their Jewish identity by means of sini- cized practices (holidays, keeping of the ‘”ƒŠǡ ƒŽ‡†ƒ”ȌǤ –‡”‡•–‹‰Ž› enough, today there is a revival of Jewish identity through conversion in Kaifeng, with some of the converts even studying in Israel. In the sec- ond section, Eber discusses the case of the Jewish diaspora in Shanghai that existed from the middle of the nineteenth century and that was of “—‹–‡Š‡–‡”‘‰‡‡‘—•‘”‹‰‹ȋ„‘–Š”‹‡–ƒŽƒ†—”‘’‡ƒȌǤŠ‡•Š‘™• how the different communities developed organizational structures (•›ƒ‰‘‰—‡•ǡ• Š‘‘Ž•ǡ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘‘”‰ƒ•Ȍ–Šƒ–Žƒ•–‡†—–‹Ž–Š‡‰”ƒ†—ƒŽ ‡š‘†—•ƒ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡„”‡ƒ†‘™‘ˆ–Š‡–”‡ƒ–›’‘”– situation. The Shanghai communities were clearly an atypical case of a religious community, as they existed in the atypical environment of the most westernized city of China. Today, a small Jewish community has survived only in Hong Kong.  –”‘†— –‹‘͹

Erich Zürcher presents the topic of how early Jesuit missionaries and autochthon Christians in the South Chinese area of Fujian acted and reacted during the late Ming dynasty in the process of adopting and maintaining a religious self-identity. He focuses on the aspects of “guilt – sin – remorse – confession – absolution – penance.” Dealing ™‹–Š–Š‹• ‘’Ž‡š‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ‘ ‡’–•‹•‘”‡–ŠƒŒ—•–‹ϐ‹‡†ǡ„‡ ƒ—•‡ some of them – especially the Christian concept of “sin” – have been used in the past to show the uniqueness of the Christian world view and soteriology, a world view that is not found in this particular way in Chi- ‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋǨȌ‘”‹‘–Š‡””‡Ž‹‰‹‘•Ǥò” Š‡”ǡ‘–”‡•–”‹ –‹‰Š‹•‡Žˆ to Jesuit writings but also using original Chinese sources, shows where Christianity was able to build upon already existing religious ideas in Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism. He shows thereby which of its features were actually incompatible with traditional Chinese religions and thus felt to be “foreign” by the Chinese Christians as well as their Chinese fellowmen. This has led to the contemporary Chinese judgment of Christianity as a “strict” religion. The paper clearly shows that both statements concerning typical Chinese religiosity and also questions of how far a foreign religion was adapted – sinisized – must be tested and validated by thorough and careful study of original sources and docu- ‡–•Ǣ‹–‹•™‘”–Š™Š‹Ž‡‡–‹‘‹‰–Šƒ–ò” Š‡”•–”‡••‡•–Š‡“—ƒŽ‹–›‘ˆ some of his sources as being prescriptive and normative, thus avoiding the decontextualization and defunctionalization of sources that is so often met with in the study of historical religious documents. Roman Malek, in his contribution on “Christendom in China,” stress- es the fact that the history of Christianity, as a foreign and “marginal” religion and with regard to its function in the respective historical Chi- ‡•‡ ‘–‡š–ǡ”‡ϐŽ‡ –•–Š‡•–ƒ–‡ƒ†–Š‡ Šƒ‰‡•‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›ƒ• well as Chinese “Christendom.” The term “Christendom” is deliberately used throughout because of its broader generic meaning. Malek gives an overview of the history of Christianity in China under the rule of the ‘—‹•–ƒ”–›ǢŠ‡’”‡•‡–•–Š‡™‹†‡˜ƒ”‹‡–›‘ˆChristian orga- ‹œƒ–‹‘•ǡˆ”‘–Š‘•‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†–‘—†‡”‰”‘—† ‘—‹- ties, but also stresses the fact that Christianity has also taken on other forms of social appearance such as so-called Cultural Christianity, Elite Christianity, etc. Malek gives a clarifying sketch of a variety of catego- ”‹‡•–Šƒ–ƒ–ϐ‹”•–‰Žƒ ‡•‡‡’—œœŽ‹‰ǡƒ•ˆ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡DzChristendom” „‡–™‡‡‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽ‹–›ƒ†ƒ•–ƒ–—•–Šƒ–‹•‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†ǡ„‘–Š‹‹–• Catholic and Protestant forms, and describes in detail developments in ͺ ƒš‡‡‰ the Underground ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Šƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•‹–•”‡Žƒ–‹‘–‘–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ Church, which is still an open issue in China. He refers to the increas- ing number of newly founded Christian groups and sects, which are primarily located in the countryside and grouped around charismatic leaders. One tends to ask – after Malek’s description of these groups in the categories used by Christian “cult”-specialists in the West, though Š‡”‡Œ‡ –•–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ‹‡•‡–‡”‹‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆDz•—„˜‡”•‹˜‡dzƒ†Dzortho- dox” – why these groups are still labeled as Christian. If one retains the attribute “Christian,” the problem of sinicization slips in here through the backdoor again, and could be expressed by the term “synchretism.” The relatively open character of Chinese “Christendom” is also seen in the notion of “Cultural Christians,” that is, members mainly of the intellectual elite who do not belong to one of the organized forms of Christianity in China and who therefore lack the formal “requisites” of membership such as baptism, but who derive their “Christendom” in the form of a weltanschauung. It seems that “Cultural Christians” form the bridge between “formal” Christianity and the phenomenon that Malek calls “Christianity as an object of academic research.” For Malek, the future of “Christendom” in China is safe, although it is clear that not all its forms as described here will survive. In his paper, Wang Jianping presents an astonishing and detailed overview of Muslim activities in today’s China, correcting, as it were, the general idea that this religion is concentrated in China’s most West- ern areas. He shows how in the relatively stable political structure of Chinese Muslims, traditionally organized in small, independent com- munities (jama’atȌ™‹–Š —Ž–—”ƒŽŽ›ƒ†Ž‹‰—‹•–‹ ƒŽŽ›†‹ˆˆ‡”‡–”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ backgrounds (Uighurs, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, —‹ǡ‡– ǤȌǡƒ‹†‘ˆDz‡ —‡- ical” self-awareness of Islamic universality (ummaȌŠƒ••–ƒ”–‡†–‘†‡- velop that crosses ethnic and denominational borderlines and thus sometimes is even able to oppose state authority successfully. Wang clearly points out that the conditions for this change of attitude and options is due to the liberalized economic situation in China during the ͳͻͺͲ•–Šƒ–Ž‡ƒ†–‘ƒŠ‹‰Š‡”†‡‰”‡‡‘ˆ‘„‹Ž‹–›ƒ†‡ ‘‘‹ ƒŽ‹†‡’‡- dence of Chinese Muslim community members, creating interregional as well as international movement (pilgrimage, exchange of akhonds, i.e. •Žƒ‹  –‡ƒ Š‡”•Ȍǡ ƒ† ƒŽ•‘ –Š‡ ‡ ‡••ƒ”› ‡†— ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‹ˆ”ƒ•–”— - ture (madrasas, i.e. Quran schools, materials distributed by traditional media such as books and periodicals, as well as modern media such ƒ•˜‹†‡‘•ǡ•ǡ™‡„•‹–‡•ǡ‡– ǤȌ–‘‘—”‹•Š–Š‡Dz‡˜‹˜ƒŽ‘˜‡‡–‘ˆIs-  –”‘†— –‹‘ͻ

Žƒdzȋƒ‰Ȍ‹Š‹ƒǤ –ƒŽ•‘„‡ ‘‡• Ž‡ƒ”–Šƒ–™‹–Š‹–Š‡ˆ”ƒ‡™‘” of the Chinese policy of recognizing Muslims as ethnic minorities with the corresponding privileges, this new search for a common identity leads to a kind of encapsulation. It has also led to the “radicalization” of – for instance – the independence movement in Xinjiang and to so- cial friction in other regions, problems that the authorities have had to deal with. The example of Chinese Muslims shows how a tradition- ƒŽŽ› ™‡ŽŽǦ”‘‘–‡† ƒ† —‹–‡† ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ ™‹–Š ‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽ ‘‡ –‹‘• –‘ the international community is able to become a strong partner in the state-religion dialogue, but also how the suspicion of the state can be aroused against such semi-independent groups that have a long history in China. As Wang stresses at the end of his article, the future of Mus- lims in China will strongly depend upon how the centralized govern- ment and the Communist Party navigates between the Scylla of control and the Charybdis of tolerance in yielding religious, administrative and economical freedom. What is touched on in Wang’s paper is the very topic of Dru Gladney’s contribution: the question of accommodation (•‹‹ ‹œƒ–‹‘Ȍ‘ˆMuslim communities into Chinese society, especially the group labeled as the Hui. Gladney emphasizes the problems of expressions such as Hui or Uighur in terms of ethnicity as well as cultural, historical and linguistic ƒ•’‡ –•Ǥ ‡–‘— Š‡•‘ —””‡–†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–‹‡•ǡ•— Šƒ•Muslim separatism within the Uighurs in Xinjiang and the connected problems (alleged ter- ”‘”‹•ǡ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‡ƒ –‹‘•ǡ‡ ‘‘‹ †‡ Ž‹‡Ȍƒ†–Š‡‹”Šƒ†Ž‹‰ by the Chinese authorities, thus adding, as it were, the puzzle piece of Islam in China that was missing in Wang’s paper. Gladney’s focus is on Chinese Hui Muslims, their establishment in China and their integration ‹–‘‘”ƒ†ƒ’–ƒ–‹‘–‘–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‡˜‹”‘‡–ǢŠ‡†‡• ”‹„‡• the different waves, forms and layers of •Žƒ‹Š‹•–‘”›ǣϐ‹”•–ǡ–Š‡–”ƒ- ditional Chinese Islam, called gedimu in Chinese (from Arab. “ƒ†Ä, Dz‘Ž†dzȌǡ™‹–Š‹–••–”‘‰mosque and village-centered structure, and then the advent, development and characteristics of the different —ϐ‹‘”†‡”• (Qadiriyya, ƒ“•Š„ƒ†‹››ƒǡ‡– ǤȌ–Šƒ–™‡”‡ƒ„Ž‡–‘ ”‡ƒ–‡–”ƒ•Ǧ”‡‰‹‘- al network structures. A third wave was caused by the higher degree of mobility and a strengthening of Muslim self-identity after the fall of the Qing dynasty and during the republican period. Muslims, coming back from pilgrimages to Arabia, introduced Wahhabi reform Islam (Ikhwan —•Ž‹”‘–Š‡”Š‘‘†Ȍ–‘Š‹ƒǤ‘•–‹–‡”‡•–‹‰Ž›ǡ–Š‹•‰”‘—’™ƒ•‹ line with the Chinese reformers’ ideas of nationalism and modernism. ͳͲ Max Deeg

This group also initially supported the communists because of their concepts of equity, autonomy and freedom of religion, until being disap- pointed by the development of religious policy in the PRC. This changed again with ‡‰‹ƒ‘’‹‰ǯ•’”ƒ‰ƒ–‹ ”‡ˆ‘”’‘Ž‹ ›ƒˆ–‡”ͳͻ͹ͺǡ ”‡ƒ–- ing, however, a new group of problems similar to the ones caused by the rising Han domination of social and economic resources. Gladney does not consider the friction and contradiction between orthodox Muslim concepts and the adaptation to traditional Chinese practices to be part of phenomena such as •› Š”‡–‹•ȀDz•‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡdz„—–”ƒ–Š‡”Ȃ”‡ˆ‡”- ring to Max Weber – as an ongoing process of “inculturation” of Islam in China, a process of making sense of a religious tradition in a cultural environment that has not risen from this religious tradition. The out- come of this process is not at all clear, not least because of the current mobility of Chinese Muslims across the borders of China into Islamic “internationalism.” Both articles on Islam in China excel in their detailed knowledge of ’”‹ƒ”›ƒ†•‡ ‘†ƒ”›•‘—” ‡•ǡƒ†”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡š–‡•‹˜‡ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹–Š‡ regions, thus delivering a picture of the changing and shifting state of this religion, which has existed in China from the days of the Arabian conquest of Central Asia during the period of the Tang dynasty. It was able to keep its stronghold in this region under centuries of Chinese administration, and even spread to parts of China that were culturally dominated by the Han ethnicity. The volume thus presents historical facets of religions in China span- ning a period of more than two thousand years in an open framework that is supplemented by an overview of the state of religions in China ˆ”‘ƒDz‹•‹†‡dz˜‹‡™ȋŠ—‘Ȍƒ†Ȃ‹–Š‡ ƒ•‡‘ˆ–Š‡–™‘ ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”› religions “Christendom” and Islam – an “outside” view (Malek, Glad- ‡›ȌǤŠ‡„‘‘Š‘’‡•–‘ ‘–”‹„—–‡–‘–Š‡•–—†›‘ˆƒ•’‡ –•‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•Ȃƒ‡Ž›ǡˆ‘”‡‹‰ƒ†Ȁ‘”‹‘”‹–›”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ƒ†–Š‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• situation in present China – that have been somewhat neglected top- ics in mainstream Western sinological circles, and also in China itself due to the political situation there during most of the second half of the twentieth century.  –”‘†— –‹‘ͳͳ

References

Šƒ„‡”Žƒ‹ʹͲͲͻȂ ‘ƒ–ŠƒŠƒ„‡”Žƒ‹ǡChinese Gods: An Introduction to Chinese Folk ReligionǤ ‘‰‘‰ǣŽƒ •‹–ŠʹͲͲͻǤ Šƒ—ʹͲͲͷ– Adam Yuet Chau, Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contem- ’‘”ƒ”›Š‹ƒǤ–ƒˆ‘”†ǣ–ƒˆ‘”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ʹͲͲͷǤ Deeg ʹͲͲ͵ȂMax Deeg, “‘Wer eine kennt, kennt keine...’– Zur Notwendigkeit der Un- terscheidung von Orientalismen und Okzidentalismen in der asiatischen Religi- ‘•‰‡• Š‹ Š–‡Ǥdz ǣǤ ŠƒŽǡǤ‡‡‰ǡǤ ”‡‹„‡”‰‡”ǡŠǤŽ‡‹‡ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion im ’‹‡‰‡Žƒ„‹‡––Ǥ•‹ƒ–‹• Š‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‰‡• Š‹ Š–‡‹’ƒ—‰•ˆ‡Ž†œ™‹• Š‡”‹‡–ƒ- lismus und OkzidentalismusǤ’’•ƒŽƒǣ’’•ƒŽƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ǡʹͲͲ͵ǡ’’Ǥʹ͹Ȃ͸ͳǤ KohnʹͲͲͲȂ‹˜‹ƒ‘Šȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ƒ†„‘‘‘ˆƒ‘‹•Ǥ‡‹†‡ǡ‘•–‘ǡڎǣ”‹ŽŽǡʹͲͲͲǤ ƒ‰‡”™‡›ȀƒŽ‹‘™•›ʹͲͲͻȂ ‘Šƒ‰‡”™‡›Ƭƒ” ƒŽ‹‘™•›ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡƒ”Ž›Š‹‡•‡ ‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǥ ƒ”– ‡ǣ Šƒ‰ –Š”‘—‰Š ƒ ȋͷ͸ͻͶ Ǧ͸͸Ͷ ȌǤ ʹ ˜‘Ž•Ǥ ‡‹†‡ǡ ‘•–‘ǣ ”‹ŽŽǡʹͲͲͻȋ ƒ†„‘‘‘ˆ”‹‡–ƒŽ–—†‹‡•Ȁ ƒ†„— Š†‡””‹‡–ƒŽ‹•–‹ͶǡʹͳǦͳȌǤ ƒ‰‡”™‡›ȀòʹͲͳͲȂ ‘Šƒ‰‡”™‡›Ƭò‡‰œŠ‹ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡƒ”Ž›Š‹‡•‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǥƒ”– ™‘ǣŠ‡‡”‹‘†‘ˆ‹˜‹•‹‘ȋ͸͸ͶǦͻ;ͿȌǤʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥ‡‹†‡ǡ‘•–‘ǣ”‹ŽŽǡʹͲͳͲǤ ƒ ‹•ͳͻͺͻȂ‘ƒŽ†ƒ ‹•ǡ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ›Ǥ‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†”ƒ –‹ ‡Ǥ New ‘”ǣ”„‹•‘‘•ǡͳͻͺͻǤȋ ‡”ƒ–”ƒ•Žƒ–‹‘ǣ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‡—–‹‰‡Š‹ƒǤ‘Ž‹–‹ —†”ƒš‹•Ǥ–Ǥ—‰—•–‹ǡ‡––‡–ƒŽͳͻͻ͵ȏMonumenta SericaȐǤȌ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷȂ‘ƒƒŽ‡ǡDzŠ‹ƒ‹Ǯ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ϐ‹‡„‡”ǯǫdzStimmen der ZeitͳʹȋͳͻͻͷȌǡ ’’ǤͺͲͺȂͺʹʹǤ ƒŽ‡ ͳͻͻ͸ Ȃ ‘ƒ ƒŽ‡ǡ ƒ• ƒ‘ †‡• ‹‡Ž•Ǥ ‹‡ ”‡Ž‹‰‹Ú•‡ ”ƒ†‹–‹‘ Š‹ƒ•Ǥ ”‡‹„—”‰ǡƒ•‡Žǡ‹‡ǣ ‡”†‡”ǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ˜‡”›‡”ʹͲͲͻȂƒ‹‡ŽǤ˜‡”›‡”ǡLocal Religion in North China in the Twentieth ‡–—”›ǤŠ‡–”— –—”‡ƒ†”ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‘—‹–›‹–—ƒŽ•ƒ†‡Ž‹‡ˆ•Ǥ Leiden, ‘•–‘ǣ”‹ŽŽʹͲͲͻǤ ˜‡”›‡”ǡ‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͷƒȂƒ‹‡ŽǤ˜‡”›‡”ǡ‡–ƒŽǤǡDzŠ‹‡•‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ȂŠ‡–ƒ–‡‘ˆ Field, Part I: Early Religious Traditions: The Neolithic Period through the Han Dy- ƒ•–›ȋ ƒǤͶͲͲͲǤǤǤ–‘ʹʹͲǤǤȌǤdz ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡•‹ƒ–‹ ‘ ‹‡–›ͷͶǡͳȋͳͻͻͷȌǡ’’Ǥ ͳʹͶȂͳ͸ͲǤ ˜‡”›‡”ǡ‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͷ„Ȃƒ‹‡ŽǤ˜‡”›‡”ǡ‡–ƒŽǤǡDzŠ‹‡•‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ȂŠ‡–ƒ–‡‘ˆ Field, Part II: Living Religious Traditions: Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Popular Religion.” ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡•‹ƒ–‹ ‘ ‹‡–›ͷͶȋͳͻͻͷȌǡ’’Ǥ͵ͳͶȂ͵ͻͷǤ Pregadio ʹͲͲͺ Ȃ ƒ„”‹œ‹‘ ”‡‰ƒ†‹‘ ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ Š‡  › Ž‘’‡†‹ƒ ‘ˆ ƒ‘‹•Ǥ London, New ‘”ǣ‘—–Ž‡†‰‡ʹͲͲͺǤ  Š‹’’‡”Ȁ‡”‡ŽŽ‡ ʹͲͲͶ Ȃ ”‹•–‘ˆ‡”  Š‹’’‡”ǡ ”ƒ ‹• —• ‡”‡ŽŽ‡ ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡ The Taoist ƒ‘Ǥ ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ‘’ƒ‹‘–‘–Š‡ƒ‘œƒ‰Ǥ͵˜‘Ž•ǤŠ‹ ƒ‰‘ǡ‘†‘ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–› ‘ˆŠ‹ ƒ‰‘”‡••ǡʹͲͲͶǤ SeiwertʹͲͲ͵Ȃ —„‡”–‡‹™‡”–ȋ‹ ‘ŽŽƒ„‘”ƒ–‹‘™‹–Šƒ‹•ŠƒȌǡPopular Religious Mo- ˜‡‡–•ƒ† ‡–‡”‘†‘š‡ –•‹Š‹‡•‡ ‹•–‘”›Ǥ‡‹†‡ǡ‘•–‘ǣ”‹ŽŽǡʹͲͲ͵ȋŠ‹ƒ –—†‹‡•͵ȌǤ ‘‡”ͳͻͻͷȂ‡„‘”ƒŠ‘‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‹‡•‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ȃ–Š‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆ‘—” ‡•Ǥ New ͳʹ Max Deeg

‘”ǡšˆ‘”†ǣšˆ‘”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͷǤ Š‘’•‘ͳͻ͸ͻȂƒ—”‡ ‡ ǤŠ‘’•‘ǡŠ‹‡•‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǣ –”‘†— –‹‘Ǥ Belmont: ‹ ‡•‘—„Ž‹•Š‹‰ǡͳͻ͸ͻǤ Š‘’•‘ͳͻͺ͹Ȃƒ—”‡ ‡ ǤŠ‘’•‘ǡChinese Religion in Western Languages: A ‘’”‡Š‡•‹˜‡ ƒ† Žƒ••‹ϔ‹‡† ‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š› ‘ˆ —„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘• ‹ ‰Ž‹•Šǡ ”‡ Šǡ ƒ† ‡”ƒ–Š”‘—‰ŠͷͿ;ͶǤ— •‘ǡ”‹œ‘ƒǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ”‹œ‘ƒ”‡••ͳͻͺ͹Ǥ Š‘’•‘Ȁ‡ƒƒ ͳͻͻ͵ Ȃ ƒ—”‡ ‡ Ǥ Š‘’•‘ǡ ƒ”› ‡ƒƒǡ Š‹‡•‡ ‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǥ —„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•‹‡•–‡”ƒ‰—ƒ‰‡•ͷͿ;ͷ–Š”‘—‰ŠͷͿͿͶǤ Los Angeles: Ethnographics ”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͵Ǥ Daoism in Chinaͳ

Chiao Wei

he original meaning of Dao 䚃 was “path.” Laotse 㘱ᆀ under- stood Dao as the source of all things, and after his time still other Tmeanings such as “method” appeared. Precursors of Daoism can be found in the shamanism of antiquity and the idea of eternal life of –Š‡‹Ǧ ƒ’‡”‹‘†ȋʹʹͳȂʹͷȌǤŠ‡ ‘ ‡’–‘ˆ›‹ and ›ƒ‰ and –Š‡–Š‡‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹˜‡‡Ž‡‡–•ȋ™Š‹ Š„‘–Š†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡† ƒǤ͵ͲͲȌƒŽ•‘ Šƒ†ƒ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘Daoism. But although the Daoist religion uses the terms of the Daoist philosophies and regards Laotse’s Daodejing 䚃ᗧ㏃ and the works of Zhuangzi 㦺ᆀ to be canonical scriptures, the religion †‹ˆˆ‡”••‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›ˆ”‘Daoist philosophies. For the most part, their connection is only the name, which was used by the Daoist religion as a recognized placard in order to achieve wider propagation. Daoism as a religion emerged only long after the lives of the two Daoist philosophers Laotse and Zhuangzi and it took a long time to establish itself in China. The religion is said to have been founded by Zhang Ling ᕥ䲥 during the reign of the Emperor Shun of Han ╒丶ᑍ ȋ”Ǥ ͳʹͷȂͳͶͶ ȌǤ Zhang Ling venerated Laotse as the true founder of the Daoist religion and the Daodejing as its holy scripture. According to tradition, Laotse appeared to Zhang Ling while he was meditating in a cave on the Heming 古匤, and instructed him to be a master and lead the people back to the correct path. Subsequently Zhang Ling trained many students to become Daoist priests and treated the sick with his healing powers. He had patients brought into a quiet room in which they had to confess their transgressions. These confessions were then written down by a Daoist priest. This confession, which was related to their illness, was offered to heaven in three ways: placed on a moun- tain, buried in the ground and sunk in a river.

ͳ This chapter was translated from the original German by Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek.

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ȂʹͺǤ ͳͶ Chiao Wei

In subsequent generations, the position of the spiritual leader of the Daoist religion was inherited and the seat of the leader was moved from Heming to Mount Longhu (Lunghu-shan 嗉㱾ኡ, Dragon Tiger Moun- –ƒ‹Ȍ‹Jiangxi ⊏㾯. ͳͻͶͻ–Š‡Daoist leader went into exile in Taiwan. However, since ͳͻͺͲ‘—–Longhu has again become full of life, as I saw with my own ‡›‡•‹ͳͻͻͺǤŠ‡”‡•‹†‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‡Ž‡ƒ†‡”Šƒ•„‡‡”‡‘˜ƒ–‡†ƒ†–Š‡ Chinese government is interested in letting the Daoist religion spread. As a result, today pilgrims are again coming to Jiangxi. Various factors were important for the emergence of the Daoist re- ligion. It initially developed out of shamanism and the folk religions of the time. In Chinese antiquity the rulers in heaven (Di ᑍȌ™‡”‡™‘”- shiped, as was nature, especially mountains, rivers, thunder and stars. Ancestor worship also played a large role in the development of Dao- ism. A forerunner of Daoist amulets is found in the way that offerings were presented to the ancestors by priests or shamans. This took place in a special manner, the shamans receiving a sign from each spirit that was then written down. Legends about the shenxian ⾎ԉ, the immortals, and sorcery are also basic elements of Daoism. The belief in shenxian can be considered one of the most fundamental features of the Daoist religion. Immortality is described as having the following traits: immortals look like normal persons, immortality is attainable, and immortality lends supernatural powers that allow a person to take on other forms, move mountains, cause rain to fall and accomplish other miraculous things. The belief in shenxian’”‘„ƒ„Ž›‡‡”‰‡†‹–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–Š ‡–—”›Ǥƒ‰‹ ‹ƒ•ȋ fangshi ᯩ༛Ȍ‘ˆ–Šƒ––‹‡’”‘ˆ‡••‡†–Šƒ–‘‡ ‘—Ž†ϐ‹†ƒ‡›–‘‹‘”–ƒŽ‹–›‘ –Š‡‹•Žƒ†•‹–Š‡‘ ‡ƒǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•–‡’‡”‘”‘ˆ–Š‡‹†›ƒ•–›ȋʹʹͳȂʹͲ͸ Ȍ‡˜‡•‡–‘—–•Š‹’•–‘Ž‘‘ˆ‘”–Š‹•‡›ƒ•†‹†’‡”‘”Wu ╒↖ᑍ ‘ˆ–Š‡ ƒ†›ƒ•–›ȋ”ǤͳͶͲȂͺͺȌǤ As mentioned above, another source of the Daoist religion was the original Daoist philosophy. Both Laotse’s Daodejing and the work of Š—ƒ‰œ‹ ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡† –Š‡ Daoist religion. An example is found in the chapter ƒ‹›‘—: “He who cares for his body and can save his energy will- live forever.”ͳ †ƒϐ‹ƒŽ‹’‘”–ƒ–„ƒ•‹•ˆ‘”–Š‡Daoist religion was Confucianism, especially the concept of loyalty and reverence.ʹ

ͳ ˆǤ —‘ͳͻͺ͸ǡ Šƒ’Ǥͳͳǡ’Ǥͳ͹͵Ǥ ʹ ˆǤ‡ͳͻͻͳǡ’ǤͳͶˆǤǢŠƒ‰ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’ǤͳͻǤ ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ͳͷ

Another factor that must be mentioned with regard to the emergence of Daoism is the historical or social environment in which it emerged. The social conditions of the period were quite favorable for the religion ƒ’’‡ƒ”‹‰ǡ™Š‡”‡„›–Š”‡‡ƒ•’‡ –•ƒ”‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–ǣͳȌŠ‡ ƒ”—Ž‡”• were deeply superstitious and believed in omens and spirits. They thus tended to distance themselves from the strictly rational and intellectu- al world of the Confucianists. This made for fertile ground for the Dao- ‹•–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǯ•†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–ǤʹȌŠ‡‹†‡ƒ‘ˆ‹‘”–ƒŽ‹–›Šƒ†ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›ˆƒ•- cinated a long line of emperors, as mentioned above. During the reign of Emperor Wu, a number of magicians were trained to this end. This aspiration of the rulers to immortality was also emulated by the gen- ‡”ƒŽ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘Ǥ͵Ȍ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ ƒ†›ƒ•–›ȋ ƒǤʹͲͲȌƒ—„‡” of wars were fought that made the life of the people ever more intoler- able. They sought refuge and shelter in religion. The Daoist religion as propagated by Zhang Ling offered the longed-for relief. To spread his teachings he used the Taipingjing ཚᒣ㏃,͵ the “peace text,” a text that describes the means for society to return to harmony. Daoism is a pantheistic religion. Its cosmos not only includes a spir- itual ruler, but also the “three pure wise ones” sanqing й␵ ȋ ŽŽ—•ǤͳƒǦ ͳ Ȍƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•ƒ•–”‹‰‘ˆ‘–Š‡”•’‹”‹–•™Š‘ϐŽ‘ƒ–‹Š‡ƒ˜‡ǡ‘”Ž‹˜‡‘ or below the earth. In addition to these, there are many xianren ԉӪ, immortals, who move in heaven, or live on mountains, islands or other special places. There is, however, a well-established hierarchy between the spirits and the immortals. Tao Hongjing 䲦ᕈᲟ ȋͶͷ͸Ȃͷ͵͸Ȍǡ ‹ Š‹• Š‡Ž‹‰ ›‡™‡‹–— ⵏ䵸ᾝսെ (Catalogue of the Ranking of the Spirits ƒ† ‘”–ƒŽ•ȌǡŽ‹•–‡†͸ͺͺ•’‹”‹–•ƒ† Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡†–Š‡ƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘•‡˜- en degrees.Ͷ The system of degrees mirrors the feudal or ruling system of the period. These spirits or heroes were adopted from Chinese folk religion, sagas or even Buddhism.

͵ The Taipingjing is extant in three versions, by Gan Zhongke ⭈ᘐਟ, Yu Ji Ҿਹ and Zhang Ling ᕥ䲥ǡ„—–ƒŽŽ–Š”‡‡ƒ”‡‹ ‘’Ž‡–‡Ǥ –Š‡‹‰”ƒȋͳ͵͸ͺȂͳ͸ͶͶȌ‘Ž› ͷ͹‘ˆ–Š‡‘”‹‰‹ƒŽͳ͹Ͳ˜‘Ž—‡•™‡”‡•–‹ŽŽ‡š–ƒ–ǤŠ‡™‘”’‘”–”ƒ›•ƒ„”‘ƒ†„ƒ† of traditional Chinese ideas, including, among other things, ›‹ and ›ƒ‰, the the- ‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹˜‡‡Ž‡‡–•ǡƒ•–”‘‘›ǡ’”‘’Š‡•‹‡• ‘ ‡”‹‰–Š‡™‘”Ž†‘ˆ•’‹”‹–•ǡ ƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•†‡• ”‹’–‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡•‘ ‹ƒŽ ‘†‹–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒƒ”‘—†ʹͲͲǤŠ‡™‘”ǡ regarded to be the fundamental scripture of the Daoist religion, is most likely not the work of a single author, but rather a collection of texts by various authors. In –Š‡ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ ”‡ˆ‡”–‘–Š‡•–ƒ†ƒ”†‡†‹–‹‘‘ˆƒ‰ͳͻͺͷǤ Ͷ ƒ‘ͳͻͺͷǡ˜‘ŽǤͷǡ’’ǤͲͲͳͻȂ͵ʹǢˆǤƒŽ•‘ ‹ͳͻͻͶǡ’Ǥ͹ͻͻǤ ͳ͸ Chiao Wei

Of the few texts from the early period of Daoism that have come down to us, the most important are the Daodejing and the ƒ‹’‹‰Œ‹‰Ǥ With time, however, Daoist texts and texts about Daoism became more ƒ†‘”‡—‡”‘—•Ǥ›ͳͶͷ͹ǡ‹–Š‡‹‰’‡”‹‘†ǡƒ–‘–ƒŽ‘ˆͷǡͶͺͷ˜‘Ž- umes had been written, but since this time no new works have been added to the corpus of Daoist writings. Although Daoists regard the Daodejing their main text, it does not ˆ—Žϐ‹ŽŽƒŽŽDaoist needs with regard to a holy scripture. Therefore addi- tional texts were produced, of which the oldest and most important is the Taipingjingǡ™Š‹ Š†ƒ–‡•–‘ͳ͵ͲǤ –™ƒ•ƒŽŽ‡‰‡†Ž›”‡˜‡ƒŽ‡†–‘‘‡ of the authors, Yu Ji Ҿਹ, by an immortal. The most important topics may be summarized as follows: First, ›—ƒ“‹ݳ≓ȋ–Š‡‘”‹‰‹ƒŽ’‘™‡”Ȍ is the source of the world but it is subordinate to the Dao. Yangqi 䲭≓ ȋƒŽ‡ ’‘™‡”Ȍǡ heqi ઼≓ (Šƒ”‘›Ȍƒ†›‹“‹䲠≓ȋˆ‡ƒŽ‡’‘™‡”Ȍƒ”‡ derived from ›—ƒ“‹. These three qiȋ’‘™‡”•Ȍǡ ‘””‡•’‘†‹‰–‘Š‡ƒ˜‡ǡ earth and human beings, must be in harmony with one another in or- der for peace and stability to prevail in the world. Natural phenomena are ƒ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡’‘Ž‹–‹ •ƒ†•–ƒ–‡‘ˆ–Š‡ —””‡–•‘ ‹‡–›Ǥƒ–—- ral catastrophes occur when political affairs are not in order, and can be prevented only when such affairs are well ordered, as, for example, desisting from capital punishment and the rich donating some of their wealth to the poor. Next, a system of shenxian, supernatural beings, exists. It is divided into six categories, of which shenren ⾎Ӫ occupy the highest position, followed by the zhenren ⵏӪ, xianren ԉӪ, daoren 䚃Ӫ, shengren 㚆Ӫ and xianren 䌒Ӫ.ͷƒ Š–›’‡‘ˆ•—’‡”ƒ–—”ƒŽ„‡‹‰Šƒ•ƒ•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ˆ— - tion. In order to help heaven rule the world, the supernatural beings communicate with heaven, to which the shenren and zhenren are clos- est. Third, human beings must take responsibility for the transgressions and sins of their ancestors and relatives. Because of this concept, hu- mans must diligently strive to do good deeds. The responsibility of the individual extends to the whole society. Ultimately all humans are ex- horted to do no evil so that the requirements for Šƒ”‘›ƒ”‡ˆ—Žϐ‹ŽŽ‡† and the world remains in order. On one hand the Taipingjing asserts that human beings have a prede- termined destiny that is subject to the power of fate, and on the other

ͷƒ‰ͳͻͺͷǡ’ǤʹͺͻǤ ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ͳ͹ hand it emphasizes that one can master one’s fate through one’s own actions.͸ It is, however, also stated that very few persons can become a shenxian, not even one in ten thousand.͹ But if a person always per- forms good deeds and strives for the Dao, he or she can reach their personal best. For certain chosen ones who strive for the Dao, the metamorphosis into a shenxian will be successful, but in any case, the average person who strives for the Dao will live a long life. Even sim- pletons, if they strive for the Dao, will be granted a relatively long life,ͺ and thus it is clear that in any case striving for the Dao is worthwhile. In order to reach the Dao and become immortal, the following points must be observed: One must be loyal to one’s rulers, honour one’s teachers and revere one’s parents. In this case xiao ᆍ, reverence, is of particu- lar importance. In the Taipingjing it is stated: “No one who strives for the Dao will succeed in attaining it if they lack piety.”ͻ In addition to moral requirements, the care of the body and soul is important: they should both be strengthened through mental and physical exercises. An immortality potion will be given from heaven to the person who has earned it through exceptional achievements. One must test one’s conscience, repent one’s transgressions and reprimand oneself daily, both in the morning and in the evening. One must be honest at all times. In addition, there are other commandments for immortality, but all of them will not be listed here.ͳͲ Taken as a whole, the Taipingjing delineates an ideal world in which justice, peace and harmony prevails, a world that will exist when hu- man beings behave in the manner described. The ideal world of the Taipingjing prompted many followers to strive for the Dao. Another important early Daoist text is the Š‘—›‹ ƒ–‘‰“‹ઘ᱃৳਼ ཱྀ.ͳͳ –™ƒ•™”‹––‡‹ͳͶʹƒ† ‘ ‡”•–Š‡’”‘†— –‹‘‘ˆƒ‹‘”-

͸ Ibid. ͹ „‹†Ǥǡ’ǤͶ͵ͺǤ ͺ „‹†Ǥǡ’ǤʹͺͻǤ ͻ „‹†Ǥǡ’Ǥ͸ͷ͸Ǥ ͳͲ „‹†Ǥǡ’Ǥ͹ͳ͹Ǥ ͳͳ The Š‘—›‹ ƒ–‘‰“‹ is said to have been composed by Wei Boyang 兿՟䲭 around ʹͲͲǤŠ‡™‘”†‡ƒŽ•™‹–ŠƒŽ Š‡›ƒ†’”‘˜‹†‡•ƒ‡–Š‘†ˆ‘”–Š‡ƒ –—ƒŽ’”‘- duction of an immortality potion. Its three parts deal with the I Ching “Book of Changes,” the thoughts of the Yellow Emperor and those of Laotse. The I Ching determines the exact point in time that is favourable for the manufacture of the immortality potion. The thoughts of the Yellow Emperor and Laotse form the basis ˆ‘”–Š‡Dz’”‘†— –‹‘dz™‹–Š‹–Š‡Š—ƒ„‘†›‘ˆƒȋ‹ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽǫȌDz‹‡”’‘–‹‘dz ͳͺ Chiao Wei tality potion. If translated literally, its title can have a number of mean- ings. The text deals with alchemy, describing chemical substances, their volumes and weights. It also describes details about making such ƒ’‘–‹‘ǡ‹ Ž—†‹‰–Š‡–‡’‡”ƒ–—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”‡ǡ–Š‡’‘–‹‘ǯ•‡ˆˆ‡ –•ǡ‡– Ǥ A primary goal of Daoist believers is a long or, if possible, eternal life, which should be attained in one’s own body. According to the Daoist religion, anyone can reach this goal if various methods are followed and particular exercises are performed. These include a special diet, breath- ‹‰‡š‡” ‹•‡•ǡ‡†‹–ƒ–‹‘ǡ•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ‡†‹ ƒ–‹‘•ƒ†–Š‡’‡”ˆ‘”ƒ ‡‘ˆ Daoist religious services. Over time, these methods resulted in guides for longevity, as well as important practical works in medicine, chem- istry and pharmacology. The rituals in the Daoist religion are based on the idea that one’s life is dependant on one’s own behavior. Whether one’s life is short or long is not only dependent on heaven, destiny or an outside power, but on human beings themselves and how they shape their lives. A person can thus lengthen his life and even reach immor- tality by practicing various exercises. This is the particularly positive Daoist concept of life. But Daoists do not merely want to lengthen their life, they want to be- come an immortal, a xianren. In addition to magical potions, the Daoist religious way of thinking is also essential here. The Daoists derived the possibility of immortality from the mystic character of the Dao and its eternal nature. The Dao itself cannot be visualized. It is endowed with its own vital energy and its own will power. The Dao created every- thing in the world and exists within all things, including human beings. One can reach the Dao only if one follows certain rules and performs certain exercises. If one attains the Dao one also attains the mystic vi- tal energy and, like the Dao, will have eternal life. The possibility of humans to continue to live as an immortal is explained with the help of the theory of jing ㋮ȋ’”‹ƒ”›ƒ––‡”ǡ„‡‹‰Ȍǡqi ≓ȋ„”‡ƒ–ŠȌƒ†shen ⾎ ȋ•’‹”‹–ȌǤ –Š‡Daoists’ opinion, the three factors jing, qi and shen are the fundamental factors of human life. If one dies young it is because the jing was spent, the qi exhausted and the shen wasted away. However, if one knows how to be frugal with these powers and takes care of them,

–Šƒ–•Š‘—Ž† ‘ˆ‡”‹‘”–ƒŽ‹–›ǤŠ‡ƒŽ Š‡›•‡ –‹‘—‹ϐ‹‡•ƒŽŽ–Š”‡‡’ƒ”–•ȋ–Š‡ word can‡ƒ•Dz–Š”‡‡dzȌǤŠ‡™‘”‹• ‘’‘•‡†‹–Š‡ˆ‘”‘ˆƒ’‘‡ƒ†‹•˜‡”› †‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž– –‘ —†‡”•–ƒ†Ǣ —‡”‘—• ‘‡–ƒ”‹‡• ‡š‹•–ǡ –Š‡ ‘•– ˆƒ‘—• „‡‹‰ that of the philosopher Zhu Xi ᵡ⟩ȋͳͳ͵ͲȂͳʹͲͲȌǤˆǤŠ—ͳͻͺͻǡ’’ǤͳˆǤǢ‹‰ͳͻͺͺǡ ’’Ǥͳʹ͵ˆˆǤ ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻ it is possible to attain immortality. The Daoist methods should enable the spirit and body to live forever. With these methods the individual should be able to overcome the boundaries of life. According to the Dao- ist concept it is possible to achieve immortality through transforma- tion. Master Ge Hong 㪋⍚ȋʹͺ͵Ȃ͵Ͷ͵Ȍ•ƒ‹†ǣDz”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‹•ƒ‘”ƒŽ part of heaven and earth. Therefore, the dead can be revived and one can transform a man into a woman.”ͳʹ One is able to transform one- self into another shape such as a bird or another creature. In the Daoist point of view, life can be prolonged through the ingestion of herbs or ‡”–ƒ‹‡†‹ ‹‡•Ǥ ˆ‘‡ϐ‹†•–Š‡”‹‰Š–‡†‹ ‹‡ǡ–Š‹•™‹ŽŽƒŽ•‘‡ƒ„Ž‡ one to have a long life. Master Ge Hong adds: “One can care for the body with herbs and medicine so no diseases can develop from within nor infect it from without. In this way one can have a long life.”ͳ͵ The Daoist schools are as diverse as the sources of Daoism them- selves. Only the two most important of these schools of Daoist religious –Š‘—‰Š– ƒ„‡†‡ƒŽ–™‹–ŠŠ‡”‡ǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•–• Š‘‘Ž ƒŽŽ•‹–•‡ŽˆZhengyi-pai ↓а⍮, the “correct” or “true school”. It developed out of the Tianshi- dao ཙᑛ䚃 school and is based on Mount Longhu in the Jiangxi prov- ‹ ‡Ǥ‘ƒ•–‡”‹‡•ƒ”‡‘ˆ‘•’‡ ‹ƒŽ‹’‘”–ƒ ‡‹–Š‹•• Š‘‘ŽǢ‹–•ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™- ers are allowed to have a family. The leadership of the Tianshi School is hereditary. Its followers revere the shenxian, the immortals and the spirits. They paint magical paintings and pray using magic formulas in order to beckon the spirits and banish evil demons. In Daoist reli- gious services, in which prayers are said, good fortune is summoned and bad luck is warded off. The patriarch, the highest religious leader of the Zhengyi-pai school, is called the “heaven’s master of Zhang” Zhang Tianshi ᕥཙᑛ. Zhang is venerated as having been the founder of the Daoist religion in the later Han period. The title was bestowed by the emperor and is hereditary. The second school calls itself the “School of All Truths”, Quanz h e n - dao ޘⵏ䚃. It was founded by Wang Chongyang ⦻䟽䲭, who was origi- nally a Confucianist, during the Jin 䠁†›ƒ•–›ȋͳͳͳͷȂͳʹ͵ͶȌǤˆ–‡”Šƒ˜- ing met a xianren he gave up his vocation and converted to the Daoist religion. He attempted to combine Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. For this reason he required his followers to recite the works Daodejing,

ͳʹ ˆǤ ‡ͳͻͺ͸ǡŠ’–Ǥͳ͸ǡ’Ǥ͹ͳǤŠ‡ƒ‘’—œ‹ by Ge Hong is a supplement to the Š‘—›‹ cantongqi. It contains above all a detailed description of breathing exercises that must be observed when producing the immortality potion. ͳ͵ „‹†Ǥ‡‹’‹ƒǡ Šƒ’Ǥ͵ǡ’ǤͺǤ ʹͲ Chiao Wei

Xinjing ᗳ㏃ (the —††Š‹•– ‡ƒ”–—–”ƒȌǡƒ†Xiaojing ᆍ㏃ (the Confu- cian classic on ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ’‹‡–›ȌǤ„‘˜‡ƒŽŽŠ‡ƒ†‘’–‡†ƒ‰”‡ƒ–†‡ƒŽˆ”‘Chan Buddhism. The Quanzhen School does not concern itself particularly with magic formulas or alchemy. It requires its adherents to follow a ‘ƒ•–‹ Ž‹ˆ‡ǤŠ‡›—•–ƒ ‡’–ƒŽŽˆ‘”•‘ˆ‹•—Ž–ƒ†•‡ŽϐŽ‡••Ž›Š‡Ž’ others. Murder and sexual intercourse are forbidden. In their place one is required to fast and sleep very little. All desires are to be eradicated. Only then can one recover one’s original spirit. Often the followers of this school live many years as hermits in caves on mountains where they practise rigid discipline. Jing, qi and shen (primary matter, breath, •’‹”‹–Ȍƒ”‡ƒ†‡•–”‘‰‡”–Š”‘—‰Š‡†‹–ƒ–‹‘ƒ†‘–Š‡”‡š‡” ‹•‡•‹‘”- der to reach heaven by passing through the fontanel. This is the goal of this school. On the way, the body is left behind and can decompose with no further thought. The Daoist Association of China resumed its activities with China’s ‘’‡‹‰–‘–Š‡‡•–‹ͳͻͺͲǤŠ‹•‘”‰ƒ‹•ƒ–‹‘”‡’”‡•‡–•–Š‡‹–‡”‡•–• of the followers of the Daoist religion in China. In the same year renova- tion began in Beijing on the “White Cloud Monastery,” Baiyunguan ⲭ 䴢㿰ȋ ŽŽ—•Ǥʹƒ†͵Ȍǡ„—‹Ž–‹͹͵ͻǤ –™ƒ•”‡‘’‡‡†‹ͳͻͺʹǤ –‹•ƒ‘- astery of the Quanzhen School. In the same year, twenty-three monas- teries were chosen as major Daoist monasteries, including the above- mentioned Baiyun monastery and the residence of Master Zhang on the Longhu-shan. This is regarded as the seat of the Zhengyi School. Its last spiritual head, Zhang Enbo ᕥᚙⓕ, the leader of the sixty-fourth gen- ‡”ƒ–‹‘ǡ†‹‡†‹ͳͻ͸ͻ‹ƒ‹„‡‹Ǥ–’”‡•‡–‘Ž›Š‹•’—’‹Ž‹•ƒ –‹˜‡ƒ––Š‡ residence. Through these activities the Daoist religion is slowly expe- riencing a renaissance in China. Contacts to Taiwan and other regions Šƒ˜‡„‡‡”‡‡™‡†Ǥ›ͳͻͻʹƒ›Žƒ”‰‡‘ƒ•–‡”‹‡•‘”–‡’Ž‡•Šƒ† been reopened, about four hundred in total, mostly in large or middle- sized cities. Over a thousand small monasteries had been reopened. In that year about twelve thousand Daoist priests of the Quanzhen School Ž‹˜‡†‹–Š‡•‡‘ƒ•–‡”‹‡•Ǥ ƒ††‹–‹‘–Š‡”‡™‡”‡ƒ„‘—–ϐ‹ˆ–›–Š‘—•ƒ† Daoists of the Zhengyi School, living primarily with their families, and about ten thousand youth acolytes of the same school. In the meantime –Š‡•‡ϐ‹‰—”‡•—•–„‡Š‹‰Š‡”Ǥ The development and spread of Daoism was always dependent on the favour of imperial patrons and their milieu. The Tang and Song rul- ‡”•ǡˆ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹‡†•–”‘‰Ž›™‹–ŠDaoism, supported the Daoists ϐ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽŽ›ƒ†Š‡Ž’‡†–Š‡ƒ Š‹‡˜‡Š‹‰Š”‡•’‡ –Ǥ––Š‡•ƒ‡–‹‡–Š‡ ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳ

Daoists were always loyal to the respective rulers and always consid- ered themselves to be their subjects. Daoism, especially the Quanzhen School, strived for synthesis with Confucianism and Buddhism. It was tolerant towards Buddhism, despite the fact that Buddhist and Daoist dogma are far removed from one another. Buddhism is striving for a future nirvana, Daoism for paradise in the here and now. However, a bond between the two positions is particularly useful in a world which is becoming ever closer. Daoism is a particularly receptive religion and has always been able to adapt itself. Following setbacks in the attempts to prepare an immortality potion, it began to concentrate on medita- tion and the strengthening of the spirit in order to attain immortality. The —ƒœŠ‡ Š‘‘Žǡ™Š‹ Š†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡†‹–Š‡—ƒ’‡”‹‘†ǡ•‹‰‹ϐ‹‡† a reform with respect to the Zhengyi School. It demanded considerably more discipline from those who had dedicated their lives to Daoism, a monastic life in a monastery or the life of a hermit on a mountain. According to the Daoist concept, the shenxian also live in the earth, in mountains and in rivers. Thus, humans make contact with the shenxian ‘–Š‡‡ƒ”–Šƒ†ƒŽ•‘‹–Š‡‘—–ƒ‹•ǡ•— Šƒ•‘–Š‡ϐ‹˜‡Š‘Ž›‘—- tains which include the Emei-shan and the Qingcheng-shan. These mountains are venerated and considered holy, because people believe that shenxian live there or that they are the place where Daoists have attained immortality. It is said that the founder of the Quanzhen School, Wang Chongyang, attained immortality on Mount Hua, and Lü Dong- bin ੲ⍎䌃, one of the “Eight Immortals”,ͳͶ on Mount Zhongnan. Conse- quently, mountains have become the object of pilgrimages. The belief in a close relationship between humans and the spir- its reaches into the distant past in China. The idea that spirits live in homes in the form of stove spirits, or that there are spirits of wealth or of doorways has been held since early times. The idea that immortals inhabit the world around us has emerged from the Chinese mentality that has been shaped by realistic and pragmatic thinking. Accordingly, one does not want to enter paradise only after death, but rather here

ͳͶ The “Eight Immortals,” Li Tieguai ᵾ䩥ᤀ, Lü Dongbin ੲ⍎䌃 and others, appear in Š‹ƒˆ‘”–Š‡ϐ‹”•––‹‡‹–Š‡•‹š–Š ‡–—”›ǤŠ‡›™‡”‡—•‡†ƒ•ϐ‹‰—”‡•‹–Š‡ƒ–”‡ pieces and on occasion were given the leading roles. The “Eight Immortals” were a favourite motif in porcelain painting of the Ming period, for example for birthdays and weddings. Due to this they became well known everywhere, and even today –Š‡›•–‹ŽŽ‡Œ‘›‰”‡ƒ–’‘’—Žƒ”‹–›‹Š‹ƒǤ‡ ƒ‘ˆ–‡•–‹ŽŽϐ‹†•ƒŽŽ’‘” ‡Žƒ‹ ϐ‹‰—”‡•’‘”–”ƒ›‹‰–Š‡DzEight Immortals”. ʹʹ Chiao Wei and now. This idea most likely has to do with the living conditions in China, conditions that are dependent on the environment. It is well known that the Chinese culture emerged from the catchment-basin of the Yellow River. Life in this area, because of the adverse natural con- †‹–‹‘•ǡ™ƒ•‡š–”‡‡Ž›†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–Ǥ ‘–•—‡”•–—”‡†–‘ ‘Ž†™‹–‡”• ƒ†’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆ†”‘—‰Š–ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‡†™‹–Š–‹‡•‘ˆϐŽ‘‘†‹‰Ǥ ”‘‡ƒ”Ž‹‡•– times humans had to battle with the powers of nature to ensure their survival. Daily life meant daily struggle. Hence the wish for a pleasant life already in this world is understandable. As documented in the earli- est texts, the desire for long life and wealth was already formulated in Chinese antiquity. Immortality was seen to be eternal life in this world. This indicates an acceptance of the real world in which one yearns to continue living. Š‡”‡•‹Ž‹‡–ƒ†—–‹”‹‰ϐ‹‰Š–‹‰‡‡”‰›‘ˆ–Š‡•‡’‡‘’Ž‡‡ƒ„Ž‡† their survival in this region. This is part of the Chinese heritage that has become the Chinese tradition. It is just this tradition that has been ƒ‘˜‹‰ˆ‘” ‡‹–Š‡‡ ‘‘‹ ‡š’ƒ•‹‘•‹ ‡ͳͻͺͲǤŠƒ–™Š‹ ŠŠƒ• „‡‡ƒ ‘’Ž‹•Š‡†‹Š‹ƒ ƒ„‡ƒ ”‡†‹–‡†–‘–Š‹•ϐ‹‰Š–‹‰•’‹”‹–ƒ† to pragmatic thinking. Daoism has been built on a realistic foundation. ˜‡‹ˆ‹–•‰‘ƒŽ‹•‹‘”–ƒŽ‹–›ǡ‘‡‹••ƒ–‹•ϐ‹‡†™‹–Šƒ––ƒ‹‹‰Ž‘‰Ž‹ˆ‡ and remaining healthy. In addition to the spiritual and physical exercis- es of the individual, good deeds also play an important role. The accu- —Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‰‘‘††‡‡†•‹•‹’‘”–ƒ–ˆ‘”‘‡ǯ•†‡• ‡†ƒ–•ǡ™Š‘’”‘ϐ‹– ˆ”‘–Š‡ǤŠ‡ƒ‰ƒ‹ǡ‘‡ǯ•ˆ‡ŽŽ‘™ ‹–‹œ‡•ƒŽ•‘’”‘ϐ‹–ǤŠ‹•ƒ ——Žƒ- tion of good deeds is called jide ぽᗧǤ It is said that good deeds will be rewarded in heaven. For this reason there is a strong incentive for such „‡Šƒ˜‹‘—”Ǥ‘ ‹‡–›’”‘ϐ‹–•ˆ”‘‹–Ǥ The Daoist concept of justice was often the moving force behind the numerous peasant uprisings against corrupt leadership and social in- justices. In these uprisings the peasants carried banners bearing the names of Daoist spirits or gods. Thus, Daoism can be regarded as a ben- efactor of the masses and it recruited many followers in this way. How- ever, ƒ‘‹•Šƒ•‘–‘Ž›Š‡Ž’‡†’‡‘’Ž‡ƒ•ƒ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǣ‹–• ‘–”‹„—–‹‘• to medicine, pharmacy, Qigong ≓࣏, etc., have also resulted in many „‡‡ϐ‹–•Ǥ To conclude I would like to outline a few more fundamental Daoist concepts, and show how they were not only of importance in the past, but are also important in the present and will be in the future. ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ʹ͵

Š‡ϐ‹”•–‹’‘”–ƒ– ‘ ‡’–‹•–Šƒ–‘ˆdao fa ziran 䚃⌅㠚❦. Literally this means: “The Dao follows the œ‹”ƒǤdz But what does ziran‡ƒǫ  this context it is not a synonym for nature, but rather an equivalent of the expression, also of importance, wuwei ❑⡢, which means “not interfering.” To be more accurate, ziran is the passive form of wuwei. It is a tenet of the Dao or a form of the ƒ‘–Šƒ–‹•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†‡‹–Š‡” by humans nor by nature. With respect to this ziran-wuwei, in Dao the natural development and course of things is perceived as not needing interference.ͳͷ The principal of harmony in the relationship between humans and nature derives from this concept. Humans should main- –ƒ‹ƒŠƒ”‘‹‘—•”‡Žƒ–‹‘•Š‹’™‹–Š–Š‡‡˜‹”‘‡–ȋƒ–—”‡Ȍǡˆ‘ŽŽ‘™ the laws of nature, and not pursue their own greed as that would seri- ously upset the balance between humans and nature. Ziran is the main concept of Daoism. One who abides by this concept will guide all things in the proper direction. The next important concept is the above-mentioned wuwei. As al- ”‡ƒ†›•–ƒ–‡†ǡ–Š‹•‡ƒ•Dz‘––‘‹–‡”ˆ‡”‡dzǤ Šƒ’–‡”͵͹‹Laotse’s Daodejing it reads: Dao chang ™—™‡‹‡”™—„—™‡‹䚃ᑨ❑⡢侴❑н⡢. This translates as: “The Dao never acts, but there is nothing it does not do.”ͳ͸ Wuwei is the most important principle of Daoism and is derived from the thought dao fa ziran, which means, as explained above, that the Dao follows the natural course of events. This natural course is converse- ly wuwei. Accordingly, one lets affairs develop in their own way. For this reason Laotse says: Wo wu wei er min zi hua ᡁ❑⡢㘼≁㠚ॆ. This means: “Although I do not act, the people step forward themselves.”ͳ͹ It is important here to note that wuwei does not mean that one should do nothing at all. Rather it means that one should not guide the course ‘ˆ‡˜‡–•ƒ”–‹ϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›ǡ‘‡•Š‘—Ž†‘–ƒ’’Ž›ƒ›ˆ‘” ‡–‘–Š‡Ǥ ‘–Š‡” words, one should leave things in peace, should let them develop ac- ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š‡‹”‘™Žƒ™•ƒ†‘–†‡•‹”‡–‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡–Š‡‹ƒ’ƒ”–‹ —- lar manner or to steer them in another direction. The interpretation of wuwei in the Huainanzi ␞ইᆀ expresses this even more clearly: “With respect to wuwei, humans should let things take their own course. Only then should one act oneself.” Thus, wuwei means that one should let things develop in their own individual manner.ͳͺ

ͳͷ Wang ͳͻͺ͸ǡ‘ŽǤ͵ǡŠ’–Ǥͳ͹ǡ’ǤͳͲǢŠ’–Ǥ͸Ͷǡ’Ǥ͵ͻǤ ͳ͸ „‹†ǤǡŠ’–Ǥ͵͹ǡ’ǤʹͳǤ ͳ͹ „‹†ǤǡŠ’–Ǥͷ͹ǡ’Ǥ͵ͷǤ ͳͺ ƒ‘ͳͻͺ͸ǡ‘ŽǤ͹ǡŠ’–Ǥͳǡ’ǤͺǤ ʹͶ Chiao Wei

Next follows the thought fan zhe dao zhi dongͳͻ ৽㘵䚃ѻअ which means: “The Dao moves by returning.” This is a further important Dao- ist principle, namely, that movement does not advance forward, but rather returns to its original starting point. This starting point is the Dao. According to the Daoist opinion, humans have moved ever further from the ƒ‘„‡ ƒ—•‡‘ˆ˜ƒ”‹‘—•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡•‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†Ǥƒ†—Ž–Šƒ• long lost the ideal condition of a small child. For the Daoist it is there- fore important to return to this ideal condition. Then one becomes reu- nited with the Dao. Daoists also believe that this return, namely the renunciation of fame, wealth and any kind of pleasure, will ensure a long life, if not even immortality. Daoists have observed in nature that plants and animals have different life spans. Turtles, cranes, pine trees and cypress trees all live for quite a long time. They all have a longer life span than humans. From this observation they have come to the conclusion that life spans are relative. In their opinion, since humans are the highest living creature, their life span should be very long and potentially they can be immortal. The Chinese philosopher Jiang Shen 㭓ըȋ͹ͻͻ–ͺͺͳȌ™ƒ•‘ˆ–Š‡‘’‹- ion that fan zhe dao zhi dong illustrates the Daoist trait of searching for immortality within oneself. Daoists do not take the view that hu- mans must control nature in order to attain longevity. On the contrary, humans should regulate themselves to lengthen their lives. The Daoist sciences and practices do not aim to contain nature, but rather to con- trol the human ego. It is questionable whether one can actually attain longevity in this way. However, in any case this idea may be a possible ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ –‘ ’”‡•‡–Ǧ†ƒ› •— ‡••Ǧ‘”‹‡–‡† ƒ† ’”‘ϐ‹–Ǧ ‡–‡”‡†Ž‹ˆ‡- styles. In China today Daoism is experiencing a revival, and in some areas, especially in the southern provinces, one could even speak of a renais- sance. In these areas Daoist priests are dealing with taking care of the ill, with funerals, etc. Today there are even Daoist newspapers and soci- ‡–‹‡•Ǥ ‹‡–‹ϐ‹ ”‡•‡ƒ” Š‹•ƒŽ•‘–ƒ‹‰ƒ‹–‡”‡•–‹Daoism and there is a collection of new scholarly literature. Since its founding, the Daoist religion has concentrated on serving the masses. It became the support and salvation for many peasants. For this reason it has survived through the long Chinese history despite many hurdles. In the Chinese countryside today, new problems are de-

ͳͻ ƒ‰ͳͻͺ͸ǡŠ’–ǤͶͲǡ’ǤʹͷǤ ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ʹͷ veloping because of globalization. The Daoist religion can also offer its ƒ••‹•–ƒ ‡Š‡”‡Ǥ ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ‘–‘Ž›–Š‡ƒ••‡•‘ˆ’‡ƒ•ƒ–•ϐ‹†•‘Žƒ ‡ in Daoism, but it is also a refuge for many intellectuals in times of be- coming disoriented or unsuccessful. With its help one can retreat into nature or into one’s home in the hope of being able to unify oneself with heaven and the Dao. One can also cherish hopes of being able to become a zhenren (a ƒ‘‹•–•ƒ‹–ȌǤ

References

ƒ‘ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ ƒ‘‘—儈䃈ȋͳͺͲǫȂǫȌǡHuainanzi zhu ␞ইᆀ⌘ (Commentary on Hainanzi’s Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š‹ ƒŽ”‹–‹‰•ȌǤZhuzi jicheng 䄨ᆀ䳶ᡀ (Collection of Chinese Philosophi- ƒŽ”‹–‹‰•Ȍǡ‘ŽǤ͹Ǥ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‘‰Š—ƒ‘‘‘Ǥѝ㨟ᴨተǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ‡ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ ‡ ‘‰㪋⍚, ƒ‘’—œ‹ᣡᵤᆀȋƒ‘‹•–”‹–‹‰•‘ˆƒ‘’—œ‹ȌǤZhuzi jicheng 䄨 ᆀ䳶ᡀȋ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š‹ ƒŽ”‹–‹‰•Ȍǡ‘ŽǤͺǡNeipian ޗㇷ (Inner Šƒ’–‡”•ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‘‰Š—ƒ‘‘‘Ǥѝ㨟ᴨተǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ —‘ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ —‘‹‰ˆƒ䜝ឦ㰙, Zhuangzi jishi ᒴᆀ䳶䟻ȋ‘‡–ƒ”›‘Š—ƒ‰œ‹ȌǤ Zhuzi jicheng 䄨ᆀ䳶ᡀȋ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š‹ ƒŽ”‹–‹‰•Ȍǡ‘ŽǤ͵ǡWaip- ian ཆㇷȋ—–‡”Šƒ’–‡”•ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‘‰Š—ƒ‘‘‘Ǥѝ㨟ᴨተǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ‹ͳͻͻͶȂ‹Š‹–‹‰䯄Ცӝȋ‡†ǤȌǡDaojiao dacidian 䚃ᮉབྷ䂎ި (Dictionary of the ƒ‘‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ —ƒš‹ƒŠ—„ƒ•Š‡㨟༿ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ‹‰ͳͻͻͳȂ‹‰‹–ƒ‹যᐼ⌠, Zhongguo daojiaoshi ѝ഻䚃ᮉਢ (History of the Chinese ƒ‘‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤŠ‡‰†—ᡀ䜭: Sichuan People‘s Publishing House ഋᐍӪ≁ࠪ⡸⽮, ͳͻͺͺǤ ‡ͳͻͻͳȂ‡ ‹›—ԫ㒬᜸, Zhongguo Daojiaoshi ѝ഻䚃ᮉਢ (History of the Chinese ƒ‘‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤŠƒ‰Šƒ‹к⎧: Shanghai People‘s Publishing House к⎧Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮, ͵ͳͻͻͳǤ ƒ‘ͳͻͺͷȂƒ‘ ‘‰Œ‹‰䲦ᕈᲟ, Š‡Ž‹‰›‡™‡‹–— ⵏ䵸ᾝսെ(Catalogue of the Rank- ‹‰‘ˆ’‹”‹–•ƒ† ‘”–ƒŽ•ȌǡZhengtong Daozang ↓㎡䚃㯿ȋƒ‘‹•–ƒ‘ȌǤƒ‹„‡‹ 㠪े: Xin Wenfeng Publishing House ᯠ᮷䊀ࠪ⡸ޜਨǡͳͻͺͷǡ‘ŽǤͷǤ ƒ‰ͳͻͺ͸Ȃƒ‰‹⦻ᕬȋʹʹ͸ȂʹͶͻȌǡLaozi zhu 㘱ᆀ⌘ȋ‘‡–ƒ”›‘ƒ‘œ‹ȌǤZhu- zi jicheng 䄨ᆀ䳶ᡀȋ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š‹ ƒŽ”‹–‹‰•Ȍǡ‘ŽǤ͵Ǥ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ Zhonghua Book Co. ѝ㨟ᴨተǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ƒ‰ ͳͻͺͷ Ȃ ƒ‰ ‹‰ ⦻᰾, Taipingjing hejiao ཚᒣ㏃ਸṑ (Commentaries on the ‡ƒ ‡‡š–ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‘‰Š—ƒ‘‘‘Ǥѝ㨟ᴨተ, ͵ͳͻͺͷǤ Šƒ‰ͳͻͻ͸ȂŠƒ‰ ‹–ƒ‘ᕥ䠁☔, Daojiao wenhua guankui 䚃ᮉ᮷ॆ㇑リ (A Glimpse ‹–‘–Š‡—Ž–—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‘‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤƒ Šƒ‰ই᰼: Jiangxi People‘s Publishing House ⊏㾯Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ Š—ͳͻͺͻȂŠ—‹ᵡ⟩, Š‘—›‹ ƒ–‘‰“‹ ઘ᱃৳਼ཱྀ (Commentary on and Interpreta- –‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Dz‘‘‘ˆŠƒ‰‡•dzȌǡ”‡’”‹–Ǥƒ‹Œ‹ཙ⍕: Tianjin Guji Publishing House ཙ⍕ਔ㉽ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͺͻǤ ʹ͸ Chiao Wei ŽŽǤͷƒǣ ␵ݳ࿻ཙሺ⦹ Yuqing Yuanshi Tianzun ŽŽǤͷ„ǣ к␵⚥ᇍཙሺ Shangqing Lingbao Tianzun Tianzun Lingbao Shangqing ŽŽǤͷ ǣ ཚ␵䚃ᗣཙሺ Taiqing Daode Tianzun

ŽŽ—•–”ƒ–‹‘•ͷƒȂ : The Three Pure Ones of Daoism ƒȌŠ‡ ƒ†‡—”‡‡Ž‡•–‹ƒŽ‘”†‘ˆ–Š‡”‹‘”†‹ƒŽ‡‰‹‹‰ „Ȍ Š‡—’”‡‡—”‡‡Ž‡•–‹ƒŽ‘”†‘ˆ–Š‡—‹‘—•”‡ƒ•—”‡  ȌŠ‡ ”ƒ†—”‡‡Ž‡•–‹ƒŽ‘”†‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‘ƒ†‹–•‹”–—‡• ƒ‘‹•‹Š‹ƒ ʹ͹

ŽŽ—•–”ƒ–‹‘͸: White Cloud Temple, Beijing Baiyunguan ⲭ䴢㿰, Entrance Gate

Illustration 3: White Cloud Temple, Beijing Baiyunguan ⲭ䴢㿰, Hall of the Three Pure Ones and the Four Guardians й␵ഋᗑ⇯ ʹͺ Chiao Wei

Further Reading

Fischer, Theo, —Ǧ™‡‹Ǥ‡„‡•—•–†‡•ƒ‘Ǥ‡Ž•„ƒ ŠȀ‡—™‹‡†ǣ‹‡‹Ž„‡”• Š—”ǡͳͻͺͻǤ ò‰ǡ ƒ•ȋ™‹–Š —Ž‹ƒŠ‹‰ȌǡChristentum und chinesische Religion. München: Piper, ͳͻͺͺǤ Robinet, Isabelle, Geschichte des Taoismus. ò Š‡ǣ‹‡†‡”‹ Š•ǡͳͻͻͷǤ Seidel, Anna, ƒ‘‹•—•ǡ †‹‡ ‹‘ˆϔ‹œ‹‡ŽŽ‡ ‘ Š”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ Š‹ƒ•. Tokyo: Deutsche Ge- •‡ŽŽ• Šƒˆ–ˆò”ƒ–—”Ǧ—†ڎ‡”—†‡•–ƒ•‹‡•ǡͳͻͻͳǤ ƒŽˆǡ —– ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ƒ‘ ˆò” †‡ ‡•–‡Ǥ ‹‡ ‹ˆòŠ”—‰Ǥ —•‰‡™¡ŠŽ–‡ ‡š–‡. München: ڕ‡ŽǡͳͻͺͻǤ Writing Times and Spaces Together Experiments to Create an Early Sino-Buddhist Historiography

Max Deeg

ne of the most interesting kinds of processes in the history of ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ•Ȍ‹•–Šƒ–™Š‹ Š‘ —”•™Š‡ƒ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•–”ƒ•ˆ‡””‡† Oto a new cultural environment. Numerous theoretical terms of religious studies are used to describe this process: synchretism, adap- tation, change of paradigms, inculturation, ethno-religiosity and more. Expressed in these terms is the obvious shift of basic social, cultural, and religious notions that occurs when two cultural entities come into contact. This shift can be almost one-sided if the giving culture has a stronger impact on the reviving culture which has been on a lower cultural level before the contact. This was the case with the European tribal cultures such as the Celtic and Germanic when they came into contact initially with the Roman civilization, and later with Christian- ity. It is also the case with the peripheral nations of the Sinitic sphere, outstanding examples being Japan and Korea. What happened there is, at least as far as we can judge from the extant sources, that the receiv- ‹‰ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‡–‹–‹‡•™‡”‡ƒŽ‘•– ‘’Ž‡–‡Ž›†”‘™‡†ƒ†‡™Ž›ȋ”‡Ȍ •Šƒ’‡†„›–Š‡‹”ƒ•–‡”Ǧ —Ž–—”‡ȋ•Ȍ‹–‡”•‘ˆ„‘–Šƒ–‡”‹ƒŽƒ†‹–‡Ž- lectual life. The case is different, however, when a historically mature culture ™‹–Š•–”‘‰ —Ž–—”ƒŽ•‡ŽˆǦ ‘ϐ‹†‡ ‡ ‘‡•‹–‘ ‘–ƒ –™‹–Šƒ‘–Š‡” culture borrowing from its cultural reservoir only selected items as, for example, China’s adaptation of Buddhism from the Indian culture. Here it is quite fascinating to see what has been borrowed and how that which was borrowed has been changed or adapted to the already existing environment, a process usually called the “sinicization” (Greg-

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’ǤʹͻȂͶͻǤ ͵Ͳ Max Deeg

‘”›  Š‘’‡Ȍͳ or “•‹‹ϔ‹ ƒ–‹‘dz ȋ‡Ǥ‰Ǥ ‡–‡” Ǥ ”‡‰‘”›Ȍʹ of Buddhism – the counter-concept, as it were, of Hu Shi’s “‹†‹ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘dz of Chinese culture͵. While it is clear that Buddhism in China in its mature peri- od, beginning with, let us say, the Sui period, has indeed undergone a change that may be described by the terms just mentioned – leading to such typical Chinese schools and “sects” as Huayan 㨟೤ and Chan ⿚ which never had a direct †‹ƒƒ ‡•–‘”‘” ‘—–‡”’ƒ”–Ȃ‹–‹•†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž– to trace the earlier transformation of general cultural concepts in the context of both classical Chinese thinking and Buddhist ideas inherited from the Indian motherland of this religion. Two of these general cultural concepts and elementary categories of human thinking are certainly time and space, belonging to the cat- egories which the German philosopher Immanuel Kant has described as a priori, irreducible and independent. One would expect, therefore, concepts of time and space in different cultures to be similar. I will, however, not deal here with the abstract concepts of time and space that concerned Kant, but I would like to give examples of how concrete historical time and geographical gaps between two cultures were dealt with in early Chinese Buddhism, looking particularly at the fourth and ϐ‹ˆ–Š ‡–—”›Ǥ The absolute meaning willingly ascribed by most human beings to absolute dates in the framework of religious and cultural starting ’‘‹–•ǡ–‘–‡’‘”ƒŽϐ‹š’‘‹–•Ž‹‡–Š‡„‹”–Š‘ˆJesus Christ, the hajj of Muhammad, obscures some problems. Why is it – one could ask – that •‘ƒ›’‡‘’Ž‡ƒ”‡‡š ‹–‡†ƒ„‘—–ƒ›‡ƒ”Ž›†ƒ–‡–Šƒ–‹•†‡ϐ‹‡†„›ƒ†‹•- tance of time to an event in history that is not even accurately dated or determined, and this even though many of these people claim to stand totally outside the religious context that gives this date its meaning, as for instance Christmas in the Christian tradition being the date of the „‹”–Š‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ˜‹‘—”ǫ‡ ‘—Ž†ƒŽ•‘ƒ•™Š‡–Š‡”–Š‡‰Ž‘„ƒŽ˜ƒŽ‹†‹–›‘ˆ our Western time system is really and universally recognized by other traditions and cultures. And whether there are historical examples of a ‘ϐŽ‹ –„‡–™‡‡–™‘–‹‡•›•–‡•‹‘‡ƒ†–Š‡•ƒ‡ —Ž–—”‡Ǥ‘‰‹˜‡ only one example of such a problematic discussion: some time ago the question was raised in a German-language internet forum that discuss- es religious matters, of whether there will be more terrorist attacks on

ͳ Š‘’‡ͳͻͺͶȋͳͻͻ͹ȌǤ ʹ ”‡‰‘”›ͳͻͻͳǤ ͵ Traditionally written Hu Shih 㜑ሖǡȋͳͺͻͳȂͳͻ͸ʹȌǢ‘Dzindianization” cf. —ͳͻ͵͸Ǥ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” ͵ͳ

ͻȀͳͳƒ†™Š›–Š‹•†ƒ–‡™ƒ• Š‘•‡ƒ–ƒŽŽ„›–Š‡DzIslamist” terrorists in ʹͲͲͳǡ’‡‘’Ž‡™Š‘‘‡™‘—Ž†‡š’‡ ––‘Šƒ˜‡”‡ˆ‡””‡†–‘–Š‡Islamic calendar. All these questions may seem to be out of place in the context of Chi- nese Buddhism, but they are in some way all connected with the prob- lem of how the Chinese, as a people with an ancient historiographical tradition of their own, dealt with Buddhist historical concepts in gen- eral, and in particular, concerned themselves with the starting point of this religion, the life of its founder. The questions may generally show us how relative time systems are and have been, and that there is a need to come to terms with them if they come into contact, especially if both or even if one of them claims a higher degree of “truth” as conveyed and legitimized by a religious context. In the example that I will deal with, the main point seems to be that socially and culturally used time sys- tems, which are very often brought into historiographical genres, are ƒ‹’—Žƒ–‡†‹‘”†‡”–‘‰‹˜‡ϐ‹š‡†•–ƒ”–‹‰’‘‹–•‹–Š‡’ƒ•–ǤŠ‡–‹‡ „‡–™‡‡–Š‡•‡’‘‹–•ƒ†Žƒ–‡”’‡”‹‘†•‹•—•—ƒŽŽ›ϐ‹ŽŽ‡†™‹–Šƒ•–”‹‰‘ˆ events that are then transmitted as “history.” –Š‡ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ǡ ™‘—Ž†’”‘˜‹•‹‘ƒŽŽ›Ž‹‡–‘†‡ϐ‹‡Š‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š› as the attempt to structure time and space into a converging line of narration, of writing time and space together. It should be stressed that in the discussion of historiography, space for the most part seems to be a neglected factor. The reason for this is quite obvious for me: usually –Š‡DzŠ‹•–‘”›dz‘ˆƒ•’‡ ‹ϐ‹‡†–‹‡ǡ —Ž–—”‡‘”•‘ ‹ƒŽ•–”ƒ–—‹•’”‡•‡–‡† ƒŽ‘‰ƒŽ‹‡–Šƒ––Š‡–‡š––”‹‡•–‘’‘”–”ƒ›ƒ•„‡‹‰ƒ ‘•–ƒ–ǡϐŽ‘™‹‰ stream of time in which the events are to be placed. The spatial, that is, –Š‡‰‡‘‰”ƒ’Š‹ ƒŽˆ”ƒ‡™‘”‘ˆŠ‹•–‘”›‹•—•—ƒŽŽ›™‡ŽŽǦ†‡ϐ‹‡†‘”’”‡- sumed. However, historiography always has a serious problem when two traditions that do not come from the same cultural and geograph- ical environment, from the framework of the same “cultural memory,”Ͷ must be harmonized. The problem then consists in closing the obvious geographical gap when parallelizing sometimes entirely contrary time- tables of two or more traditions and in order to get rid of the vexing problem of different time concepts in two different realms of space. To accomplish this goal, often the initial step of the compilers of historical texts is to synchronize the starting points of the respective cultures or traditions.

Ͷ ••ƒͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ͵ʹ Max Deeg

Before we switch to our direct subject, Chinese historiography, let —•ϐ‹”•–Šƒ˜‡ƒ•Š‘”–Ž‘‘ƒ–ƒˆ‡™‡•–‡”Š‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹ ƒŽ–”ƒ†‹–‹‘•ǡ be it only for the sake of a comparative view point. The European his- toriographers of antiquity (Herodot, Thukydides, Xenophon, Polybios of Megalopolis, Tacitus, Sallustus, Caesar, ‹˜‹—•Ȍ†‹†‘–‡‡†–‘Šƒ”- monize different cultural stringsͷǢ–Š‡›‘Ž›’‘”–”ƒ›‡† Š”‘‘Ž‘‰›ƒ† history in the well-known and accepted pattern of connecting a cer- tain event with a certain important personality, usually a ruler. It was not until old pagan traditions met with the even more powerful Jew- ish-Christian conceptions that European historiographers met the dif- ϐ‹ —Ž–›‘ˆ ‘„‹‹‰–Š‡‹ ‘’ƒ–‹„‹Ž‹–‹‡•‘ˆ–™‘–”ƒ†‹–‹‘•Ǥ—”‘’‡ƒ medieval “universal histories” in Europe (Gioacchino da Fiore, Vincent †‡‡ƒ—˜ƒ‹•Ȍ͸ were thus primarily concerned with what their authors and readers thought to be world history in the soteriological and es- chatological framework of Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›Ǣ–Š‡› ‘„‹‡†‡˜‡–•ˆ”‘–Š‡ Old Testament with subjects of the Greek and Roman antiquity or those of their own cultural antiquity into one chronological line, very often starting from the creation of the world, continuing with the subsequent Biblical history of mankind, jumping to the story of Troy, the found- ing of Rome and the life of ‡•—•„‡ˆ‘”‡ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›ƒ””‹˜‹‰‹–Š‡‹”‘™ present. Sometimes the events in the different cultural regions were presented in the form of synchronized annals. The inconsistencies and gaps in such historiographical concepts and patterns, which are obvi- ‘—•ˆ‘”ƒ‘†‡””‡ƒ†‡”ǡ™‡”‡‡ƒ•‹Ž›‡Ž‹‹ƒ–‡†ƒ†ϐ‹ŽŽ‡†„›ƒ•›–Š‡- sis of Jewish “historiography”, antique culture and Christian soteriolo- gy. Ecclesiastic historiography, from Eusebios of Caesarea on, used the antique past, both Occidental and Oriental, to depict the traces of God’s masterplan for the world even in a past not yet Christian. Despite the strong Christian domination, even pagan history was used by Christian authors, as can be seen in the ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘–Š•, written by the Roman minister of the Germanic-Gothic rulers of Italy, Cassiodorus. Another approach to autochthon history is the Heimskringla, the “Circle of the ‘‡ȋ‘ˆƒ‹†ȌǡDz‘ˆ–Š‡‡†‹‡˜ƒŽ ‡Žƒ†‹ Christian author Snor-

ͷ This is especially true for the historiographies of the Roman Empire (cf. Christ ͳͻͺͺȌǡ„—–™ƒ•‘–•‘•–”‹ –‹–Š‡ ƒ•‡‘ˆ–Š‡ ”‡‡Š‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‡”•™Š‘ƒŽ•‘ inserted geographical and ethnographical material, and sometimes tried to par- allelize the information which they gained about foreign nations with their own Š”‘‘Ž‘‰›ƒ•–”ƒ ‡†„ƒ –‘–Š‡›–Š‹ ƒŽ’ƒ•–‘ˆ–Š‡‰‘†•ȋ ˆǤ • Š‹–œ‡”ͳͻͺͺȌǤ ͸ ˆǤ‡‡ͳͻͺͺǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” ͵͵

”‹–—”Ž—•‘ȋͳͳ͹ͻȂͳʹͶͳȌǡ͹ in which the mythical past of the Germanic gods and forefathers is – in a similar manner to the stories of Chinese antiquity – presented in euhemerized form, thus dethroning the old Pagan gods in their ancient heavenly abodes and making them rulers ‘‡ƒ”–ŠǢ–Š‡›™‡”‡‡˜‡–Š‘—‰Š––‘Šƒ˜‡ ‘‡ˆ”‘ƒ–‹“—‡”‘›ƒ• the similarity between its name and that of one of the old gods, Thor, ‹’‹Ž‡†ǤŠ‹•Š‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡‹‰•ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡•—Ž–‡†‹–Š‡Christianiza- tion of the Scandinavians. Similar phenomena of writing beyond cultural boundaries, or better: of combining two cultural histories can be observed in the early histo- riographical traditions of Buddhist countries such as Tibet, Korea or Japan. Tibetan historiography, paradigmatically represented by works such as the ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡Šƒ”ƒ (Š‘•ǯ„›—‰Ȍ„›Bu ston written in ͳ͵ʹʹǡ‘”–Š‡•‘ ƒŽŽ‡†Ž—‡ƒŽ• (‘†›‹›—Ž†— Š‘•†ƒ‰ Š‘••”ƒ „ƒŒ‹Ž–ƒ”„›—‰„ƒǯ‹”‹’ƒ‡„–Š‡”•‰‘’‘ǡ‡„•‰‘Ȍ„› ‘•Ž‘–•ƒ„ƒ œŠ‘—†’ƒŽǡ™”‹––‡ ƒǤͳͶ͹͸Ȁ͹ͺǡ™ƒ•ˆ”‘–Š‡˜‡”›„‡‰‹‹‰Ž‹‡ƒ” chronological and Buddhist, starting with the life of c¢›ƒ—‹ǡ ‘˜‡”- ing the advent and development of Buddhism in Tibet and continuing up to the days of the authors. In Japan and Korea the oldest historiogra- phies were conceived in two complementary ways: the Japanese Kojiki ਔһ䁈ȋ™”‹––‡͹ͳʹǡ ‘˜‡”‹‰–Š‡’‡”‹‘†‘ˆ‡ƒ”Ž‹‡•–ƒ–‹“—‹–›—–‹Ž–Š‡ ”‡‹‰‘ˆ—‹‘‡Û᧘ਔཙⲷǡͷͻʹȂ͸ʹͺȌƒ†–Š‡Korean Samguk-sagi й഻ਢ䁈 (written by Kim Pu-sik 䠁ᇼ䔮ǡͳʹth ‡–—”›Ȍ™‡”‡›–Š‹ ƒŽ Š‹•–‘”‹‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘—–”‹‡•ǯ’ƒ•–Ǣ–Š‡Japanese Nihongi ᰕᵜ䁈 (or: Ni- hon-shokiǡ™”‹––‡͹ʹͲǡ ‘˜‡”‹‰–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž›’‡”‹‘†—’–‘–Š‡”‡‹‰‘ˆ‡- ’”‡•• ‹–Û‡Û ᤱ㎡ཙⲷǡ͸ͻͲȂ͸ͻ͹Ȍͺ and the Korean ƒ‰—Ǧ›—•ƒй഻ 䚪һ (Chin. ƒ‰—‘Ǧ›‹•Š‹Ȍͻ written by the monk Ž›Ü а❦ȋŠ‹Ǥ‹”ƒȌ at the end of the thirteenth century, both start with the pre-Buddhist past of the countries, and then also deal, one more and the other less, with Buddhist history. These Asian traditions of historiography did not have too many problems with the discontinuity of the autochthon and Buddhist tradition because they were either cultivated and dominated by Buddhism, or had to match the achievements of Chinese culture and the introduction of Buddhism with strong secular powers, therefore avoiding an absolute concentration on matters Buddhist even to the ex- tent of excluding the early Indian history of Buddhism.

͹ ‡‡‡ ͳͻͻͶǤ ͺ ˆǤƒ–‘ͳͻͻͲǡ’ǤͶʹǤ ͻ ˆǤ ƒƒ†‹–œͳͻ͹ʹǤ ͵Ͷ Max Deeg

Concepts of historiography that are able to jump back and forth in two different cultural traditions and layers without feeling a sort of discontinuity, as was more or less the case in the medieval European and the early Japanese, Korean and Tibetan traditions of historiogra- phy, were obviously not possible for Buddhism in China, not least of all because the Chinese, with their classics, the Shujing ᴨ㏃, Chunqiu ᱕⿻ and the Shiji ਢ䁈, already had an orthodox historiography that Bud- †Š‹•Šƒ†–‘†‡ƒŽ™‹–Š™Š‡‹–‡–‡”‡†Š‹ƒƒ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ‡- –—”›ǤŠ‡Š‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‡”ϐ‹”•–Šƒ†–‘ ‘„‹‡–™‘†‹ˆˆ‡”‡–•–”‹‰• of chronological and historical traditions together – he then also had to close the geographical gap between China and India, the motherland of Buddhism. In the early period of Buddhism in China only universalist concepts seemed to be able to compete with and to match the classical Chinese Š”‘‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽƒ†Š‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹ ƒŽ‘†‡ŽǢ–Š‡›™‡”‡ƒ„Ž‡–‘•Š‘™–Šƒ– in a soteriological framework of religion, in our case Buddhism, China and India were part of a common scenario. The Buddhist ƒ„—†˜Ä’ƒǡ able to cope with an indo-centric interpretation as well as a wider geo- graphical approach, became the matrix in which spaces were brought togetherͳͲǢ–Š‡Buddhist conception of the two soteriologically import- ant periods, which sandwich the historical present between the age of the Buddha c¢›ƒ—‹ƒ†–Š‡ ‘‹‰kalpa of the future Buddha Mai- treya, paved the way for a convergence of the time line of traditional China that began in the ancient times of the legendary rulers and the line of time of Buddhist history from the days of the Buddha, not least because they both converged in the future at the climax of the arrival of Maitreya (Mile ᕼंȌǤͳͳ History was extended beyond the limits of the historical present by the powerful instrument of Buddhist prophecy, .Chin. shouji ᦸ䁈 ,ƒپƒ”ƒ¢›˜ .Skt To give you just one example for the thesis that the bringing togeth- er of data from the autochthon Chinese antiquity and the information about the story of the Buddha was crucial for at least one kind of inter- action between Chinese culture and Buddhism, I would like to draw attention to the text Lihuo-lun ⨶ᜁ䄆, the ”‡ƒ–‹•‡‘ˆ‡‘˜‹‰‘—„–•, a text incorporated into the Buddhist apologetic collection Hongming-ji ᕈ᰾䁈ƒ•‹–•ϐ‹”•–’ƒ”–Ǥ‹–Š‘—–‡–‡”‹‰–Š‡†‹• —••‹‘ ‘ ‡”‹‰–Š‡

ͳͲ ‡‡‡‡‰ͳͻͻͻƒǤ ͳͳ For the complex of ƒ‹–”‡›ƒǡ•‡‡‡‡‰ͳͻͻͻ„Ǥ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” ͵ͷ dating of this text,ͳʹ it can well represent a relatively early example of the contest between ideas seen as being traditionally Chinese and the answers of a Buddhist apologist, Master ‘—ȋœ‹Ȍ ⢏ ᆀ  The apologist does not really try to harmonize the standpoint of the traditionalist with his own Buddhist one, but the line of argumentation of the de- baters very often clearly refers to the mythical and semi-mythical his- tory of China of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi ⲷᑍȌǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•–‘Yao ๟, Shun 㡌, Kongzi ᆄᆀ (‘ˆ— ‹—•Ȍƒ†Laozi 㘱ᆀ. Mouzi’s point and manner of argument frequently consists in showing that the old Chi- nese traditions are by no means any more reliable than the Buddhist texts. In the seventh chapter of the Lihuo-lunǡˆ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ™‡ϐ‹†–Š‡ following dialogue: A critic asked: If the Way of the Buddha is so eminently respectable and great, why did not Emperors Yao and Shun, or the Duke of Chou ઘޜ, or ‘ˆ— ‹—•’”ƒ –‹ ‡‹–ǫ –Š‡‡˜‡Žƒ••‹ •‘‡•‡‡•‘‡–‹‘ȏ‘ˆ Buddhist teaching]. ... Mou-tzu said: ... Yao served Yin Shou and Shun •‡”˜‡†—Šǯ‡‰Ǥƒȏ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ–Š‡Duke of Chou] studied with Lü Wang, and Confucius with Lao Tan. Yet none of these persons appear in the Seven Classics! ...ͳ͵ One important feature of the quoted passage is that it clearly shows that apologists of Buddhism had to deal with the historicity of the Bud- dha and his teaching in the light of the Chinese traditional past. In our example the author is using a well-set example of argumentum ex silen- tio, a counter-proof derived from the silence of the Chinese historical sources. The thesis presented here is that early Sino-Buddhist non-canonical and non-commentary literature often was a program to combine the two cultural spaces, the Buddhist religious space with that of China’s glorious traditional past. The protagonists of this process were so suc- cessful in connecting the traditional Chinese space and time concep- tions with those of Indo-Buddhism, that the later Buddhist historiog- raphers of the Tang and Song periods could write diachronic sequences in the purely chronological „‹ƒ‹ƒ 㐘ᒤ style without serious prob- lems of incompatibility between the two traditions. However, I will not

ͳʹ ò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ȂͳͷǤ ⢏ ...ͳ͵ ǤʹͳͲʹǤʹ„Ǥʹ͸ˆˆǤ୿ᴠDŽ֋䚃㠣ሺ㠣བྷDŽ๟㡌ઘᆄᴧн؞ѻѾDŽг㏃ѻѝн㾻ަ䗝DŽ н㾻ᯬгءᆀᴠDŽᴨнᗵᆄ шѻ䀰DŽ  ๟һቩ༭DŽ㡌һउᡀDŽᰖᆨੲᵋDŽшᆨ㘱㙳DŽӖ ㏃ҏ–”ƒ•Žƒ–‡†„› ‘ŠǤ‡‡ƒ‹‡‡ƒͳͻͻͶǡ’Ǥ͹ͻǤ ͵͸ Max Deeg deal with this later period, the outlines of which have been thoroughly investigated by H. Schmidt-Glintzer in his work on Buddhist sectarian historiographyͳͶ, but rather will attempt to look for early traces – ex- periments as I have called it rather provisionally in the title – of Bud- dhist chronology and historiography and of the religious environment in which these were able to rise.

Writing Pasts and Spaces Together

The beginning of Buddhist time calculation is usually the date of the of c¢›ƒ—‹‡ƒ”–Š‡‘”–ŠIndian town ƒٿ¢˜”‹‹”ƒ’ physical death or of —䋐ƒ‰ƒ”ƒǤŠ—•ǡŠ‹‡•‡—††Š‹•–•ǡ‹‘”†‡”–‘•Š‘™–Š‡Š‹•–‘”‹ ‹- ty and antiquity of their religious tradition from a relatively early peri- od, were preoccupied with the question of when, according to their own Chinese traditional chronology, the Buddha had lived. It is generally assumed that the historical research of the date of the Buddha was connected to two problems with which the Chinese Buddhists were confronted: The competition with the Daoists, who had come forth with the Laozi-huahu-jing 㘱ᆀॆ㜑㏃, the 󖔃‘ˆLaozi con- ˜‡”–‹‰–Š‡ȋ‡•–‡”Ȍ„ƒ”„ƒ”‹ƒ•,ͳͷ forced the Buddhists to prove that the Buddha had actually lived before Laozi, and thus they attempted to trace his lifetime back as far as possible into the past. This kind of calcu- lation stood in a certain contradiction to the ideology of the three stag- es or ages: that of the true dharma, the semblance of the dharma, and mofa ᵛ⌅ȌǤͳ͸ In this – ⌅ۿ ϐ‹ƒŽdharma (zhengfa ↓⌅ – xiangfa‡Š–ˆ‘ framework Chinese Buddhists wanted to know where their own pres- ent position in the soteriological process was: According to the dating of the Buddha into the Chinese antiquity of the early Zhou dynasty and –Š‡•–ƒ†ƒ”††‹˜‹•‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡’‡”‹‘†•‹–‘ϐ‹˜‡Š—†”‡†›‡ƒ”•‘ˆzheng- fa plus one thousand years of xiangfa,ͳ͹ Buddhism would have reached the Middle Kingdom under the reign of Han Mingdi ╒᰾ᑍȋʹͺȂ͹ͷȌ

ͳͶ  Š‹†–Ǧ Ž‹–œ‡”ͳͻͺʹǤ ͳͷ ‡‡ò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’ǤʹͻͲˆˆǢ‘Šͳͻͻͷǡ’’ǤͳͻͷˆˆǢ‘ŠͳͻͻͺǢ‡‡‰ʹͲͲ͵Ǥ ͳ͸ ‘”–Š‡–”ƒ•Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡•‡–‡”•ǡ•‡‡ƒ––‹‡”ͳͻͻͳǤ ‹胕󖔃Ǣ”ƒ†ٿ—’ƒٿͳ͹ As in the ƒ†”ƒ‰ƒ”„Šƒ•ó–”ƒǢƒŽ•‘ͳǡͲͲͲ’Ž—•ͷͲͲ‹–Š‡ƒ”— the ƒŠ¢¢›¢•ó–”ƒϐ‹ˆ–‡‡’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆͳͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ǣƒ––‹‡”ͳͻͻͳǡ’’ǤͶͺˆˆǤ‡ƒ› -and the transmis ƒٿ¢ͲͲǦ›‡ƒ”’‡”‹‘†„‡–™‡‡‹”˜͵‡Š–”‡Š–‡Š™‘–•ƒ‡–ƒŽ— ‡’• sion of the dharma–‘–Š‡ƒ•–Šƒ••‘‡–Š‹‰–‘†‘™‹–Šƒ•›•–‡‘ˆϐ‹˜‡’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆ ͵ͲͲ›‡ƒ”•‡ƒ ŠǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” ͵͹ towards the end of the period of the semblance of the dharma (xiangfaȌǤ This led to another trend: the tracing of the arrival of Buddhism back to a past beyond the date given in the traditional, well-known story of Han Mingdi’s dream of the Golden Man ( jinren 䠁ӪȌƒ†–Š‡Ž‡‰‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ†- ˜‡–‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–Buddhist missionaries, ¢ä›ƒ’ƒ¢–ƒᒣ‰ƒȋShe Moteng ᭍᪙偠Ȍƒ†Dharmaratna (Zhu Falan ㄪ⌅㱝Ȍǡƒ†–Š‡ϐ‹”•–Buddhist scripture in China (the 󖔃‹ ‘”–›Ǧ™‘Šƒ’–‡”•, Sishier-zhang-jing ഋॱҼㄐ㏃ȌǤͳͺ All these attempts or experiments may be described as actions of writing times together. The successful early datings in China of the Buddha’s life, his nir- and his birth, were made by a process of compatibilisation of the ƒٿ¢˜ old Chinese chronicles and the Buddhist scriptures. The ƒŠ¢’ƒ”‹‹”- 󖔃 reports in all its versions that a heavy earthquake shook the•ƒٿ¢˜ regions in the moment of the “Great Extinction” of the Buddhaͳͻ. The legends about the birth of the Buddha also report that the night was bright when the Great Teacher was born. What had to be done now was to check the Chinese chronicles for similar kinds of natural phenomena or omina. These were easily found in the old Chinese records. This way of dating is presented in early his- toriographical accounts on Buddhism such as Fei Changfang’s 䋫䮧ᡯ ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹↧ԓйሦ䁈ȋǤʹͲ͵ͶȌˆ”‘ͷͻ͹ǡ–Šƒ–„‡‰‹•ƒ‡ ›- clopedic history with a discussion of the various dates of the Buddha’s †‡ƒ–ŠǢ ‡‹Š‹•‡Žˆ•—’’‘”–•–Š‡†ƒ–‡‘ˆ‹‰Zhuang 㦺⦻ of Zhou ȋ͸ͻ͸Ȃ ͸ͺʹȌǤʹͲ

ͳͺ About other legends of an earlier arrival of —††Š‹•‹Š‹ƒǡ•‡‡ò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹǡ Shilifang ᇔ࡙䱢 arriving with otherƒٿǤͳͻˆˆǤǣ‡Ǥ‰Ǥ–Š‡•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡Indian 䔃ƒ’’ monks and •ó–”ƒs at the court of Qin Shihuangdi 〖࿻ⲷᑍȋʹʹͳȂʹͲͺȌƒ•”‡- ported in the ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹. ͳͻ The Buddha, in connection with the earthquake at his decision to give up the op- tion for the prolongement of his life, gives eight causes for such earthquakes, the last six of which are – cum grano salis: the descent of the bodhisattva from —ᒲ‹–ƒ Š‡ƒ˜‡ǡ–Š‡„‹”–Š‘ˆ–Š‡„‘†Š‹•ƒ––˜ƒǡ–Š‡ƒ––ƒ‹‡–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰Š–‡‡–ǡ–Š‡ϐ‹”•– -Wald :ƒٿ¢˜”‹ ǡ –Š‡ ‰‹˜‹‰ —’ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ’”‘Ž‘‰‡‡– ‘ˆ Ž‹ˆ‡ ƒ† –Š‡ ϐ‹ƒŽ‘”‡• ǤʹͷͳˆǤ’’‡‡•‡ƒ—“Š–”ƒ‡ƒٿ¢ͳͻͶͶǡ’’ǤͳͲ͵ˆǤǢˆ‘”–Š‡‹”˜–†‹Š • ʹͲ This date is also adopted in the well-known chapter Shilao-zhi 䟻㘱ᘇ of the Wei- shu 兿ᴨ (translated after Tsukamoto ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥͳ͵ʹȌǣDzc¢›ƒȋ—‹Ȍ™ƒ•–Š‡•‘‘ˆ the king of ƒ’‹Žƒ˜ƒ•–—ȋ ‹ƒ™‡‹™‡‹Ȍ‹India (‹ƒœŠ—ȌǤǤǤǤIn the night of the eighth day of the fourth month he was born from the right hip of his mother. ... The time when c¢›ƒȋ—‹Ȍ™ƒ•„‘”™ƒ•–Š‡‹–Š›‡ƒ”ȋ‘ˆ–Š‡”‡‹‰Ȍ‘ˆ‹‰Zhuang of Š‘—Ǥȋ –Š‡ȌChunqiu is reported that in the seventh year of Duke Zhuang of Lu, ‹™‹–‡”ǡ‹–Š‡ˆ‘—”–Š‘–Šǡ–Š‡ϐ‹š‡†•–ƒ”•™‡”‡‘–˜‹•‹„Ž‡ǡȋ„—–‡˜‡”–Š‡Ž‡••Ȍ ͵ͺ Max Deeg

A detailed discussion of all the dates that were usual in Buddhist his- toriography – including the so-called dotted record (dianji 唎䁈Ȍ™Š‹ Š ƒٿ¢ͶͺͷǤǤˆ‘”–Š‡‹”˜ˆ‘‡–ƒ†– ‡””‘ ›Ž‡˜‹– ‡Œ„‘ƒ‘––•‡•‘Ž •‡‘ – can be skipped because extensive work has been done on this topic in the volumes edited by Heinz Bechert on the Dating of the Historical —††Šƒ.ʹͳ In addition, some years ago a very good condensed discussion of the whole complex was published by Hubert Durt.ʹʹ There is, however, another interesting and early example showing –Š‡„ƒ•‹ ‹–‡”‡•––Šƒ–Š‹‡•‡—††Š‹•–•Šƒ†ȋƒ†Šƒ†–‘Šƒ˜‡Ȍˆ‘”–Š‹• kind of computation. This evidence is – as far as I know – the oldest Chi- nese source of its kind. It is found in Faxian’s ⌅亟ȋ͵͵͹ǫȂͶʹʹǫȌFoguo-ji ֋഻䁈, the Report on —††Š‹•–‹‰†‘•, also called Gaoseng-Faxian- -亟ۣ ȋǤʹͲͺͷȌǤFaxian, after having crossed the Karako⌅ܗzhuan 儈 rum mountain range (Xueshan 䴚ኡǡ–Š‡‘™‘—–ƒ‹•Ȍǡʹ͵ arrived at the upper stream of the river Indus at a place that he calls Tuoli 䱰↧ ƒ† ™Š‹ Š Šƒ• „‡‡ ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹‡† ™‹–Š ‘†‡” Darel in northern Paki- stan. In Tuoli there was a colossal wooden standing statue of Maitreya, made by an artisan who had been taken to the —ᒲ‹–ƒŠ‡ƒ˜‡„›ƒar- hat in order to create an image of Maitreya. As can be seen from other short accounts of Chinese monks who traveled there around the same and in the ۣܗtime such as in the fragments of the Mingseng-zhuan ᰾ -ȋǤʹͲͷͻȌǡ–Š‡•’‘–™ƒ•ƒ˜‡”›’‘’—Žƒ”pilgrimۣܗGaoseng-zhuan 儈 age site to visualize Maitreya. Faxian interpolates an explanation of the historical meaning of the Maitreya statue into his narrative thread of the journey: Š‡‘•ȏ‹Š‹ƒȐƒ•‡†Faxian if he knew when the Buddhist dhar- ƒŠƒ†ϐ‹”•– ‘‡–‘–Š‡ƒ•–Ǥȏ ƒȐš‹ƒƒ•™‡”‡†ǣǮ ˆ›‘—ƒ•–Š‡’‡‘- ’Ž‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡ ‘—–”‹‡•ȏ–Šƒ–‹•ǣ‘”–Š™‡•–India], they all say that there ‹•ƒ‘Ž†–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ȏ•ƒ›‹‰Ȑ–Šƒ–ˆ”‘–Š‡ȏ–‹‡‘ˆȐ–Š‡ ‘•–”— –‹‘‘ˆ -who crossed this ri •ƒٿthe Maitreya statue there were Indian 䔃ƒ ˜‡”ȏ–Š‡ †—•ȐǤǯŠ‡•–ƒ–—‡™ƒ•ƒ†‡‘”‡–Šƒ͵ͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡ †‘‹”‡’‡Š–‹‰‹‡„•ƒ†‡‘ ‡”–‹‘Ȑ ‡”‡•–‹of the —††Šƒǡȏ ƒٿ¢˜”‹

–Š‡‹‰Š–™ƒ•„”‹‰Š–ǤŽ–‘‰‡–Š‡”–Šƒ–ƒ‡•›‡ƒ”•—–‹Ž–Š‡‡‹‰Š–Š›‡ƒ”‘ˆ–Š‡ȋ‡”ƒȌ —†‹‰ȋͷͷͲȌ‘ˆ–Š‡‡‹ȋ†›ƒ•–›ȌǤdz Another very popular calculation was that of the Buddha’s birth into the reign of King Zhao ᱝ of Zhou, respectively the date of into the reign of King Mu ぶ of ZhouǤ ƒٿ¢˜”‹‹”ƒ’ his ʹͳ ‡ Š‡”–ͳͻͻͳȂͳͻͻ͹ǡƒ”–‹ Ž‡•„› ”ƒ‡ǡ ‹”ƒƒ™ƒǡŠ‡ǡ—”–ǡŠ‹Š—ƒ•ƒ†‹ƒǢ —”–ͳͻͻͶǤŽ•‘ǡ•‡‡–Š‡†‹• —••‹‘‹ǣò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’Ǥʹ͸ͻˆˆǤ ʹʹ —”–ͳͻͻͶǡ•‡‡‡•’Ǥ’’Ǥʹ͵ˆˆǤ ʹ͵ On the route from Khotan to ƒ†Š¢”ƒ–ƒ‡„› ƒš‹ƒǡ•‡‡‡‡‰ʹͲͲͲǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” ͵ͻ

of ‹‰‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡Š‘—ȏ†›ƒ•–›ȐǤŠ‡Ǯ ”‡ƒ–‡ƒ Š‹‰ǯ•–ƒ”–‡†™‹–Š this statue. Who, other than the great master Maitreya, who will be the successor of c¢›ƒȏ—‹Ȑǡ ‘—Ž†•’”‡ƒ†–Š‡Š”‡‡ ‡™‡Ž•ȏtriratna] and let the people outside †‹ƒ‘™–Š‡†Šƒ”ƒǫ‡ ƒ—•‡‘‡‘™• –Šƒ–†‡•–‹›‹•‘–•‘‡–Š‹‰™Š‹ Š‡ȏŠƒ˜‡—†‡” ‘–”‘ŽȐǡ–Š‡”‡ are good reasons that the dream of the emperor Ming of the Han was in ˆƒ –ȏƒ•‹–Šƒ•„‡‡”‡’‘”–‡†ȐǤʹͶ Important here is that Faxian does not give the usual calculation go- of the Buddha, but gives the date of ƒٿ¢˜”‹ ing straight back to the the transmission of the dharma across the river †—•ǡ™Š‹ Š•‹‰‹ϐ‹‡• the line between India proper and the regions beyond. Thus, geography seems to be just as important for him as mere chronology. The inten- tion of the story of the colossal Maitreya statue seems to be to show that three hundred years after the death of the Buddha, the dharma had ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›”‡ƒ Š‡†–Š‡‡•–‡”‡‰‹‘•ƒ†ǡ•—„•‡“—‡–Ž›ƒ†—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ- ly, also China and thus this occurred so early that it still fell into the era of the “true dharma” (saddharmaȀ zhengfa ↓⌅ȌǤ Another striking fact of this report is that Faxian obviously tries to bolster the Chinese computations through Indian traditions: he asked the people of the region („‹–—”‡ ᖬ൏ӪȌǤ„˜‹‘—•Ž›Faxian’s intentions are to show that this tradition was not only invented by Chinese Bud- dhists, but was also to be found in India. Faxian supports his computation by relating an episode that oc- cured at the end of his stay in †‹ƒ’”‘’‡”ƒ”‘—†ͶͳͲǤ Ceylon he had the opportunity to see the procession of the tooth-relic of the Bud- dha. A man who represented the king and rode on the royal elephant, of the Buddha to ƒٿ¢ͳǡͶͻ͹›‡ƒ”•Šƒ†’ƒ••‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡‹”˜–ƒŠ–†‡‹ƒŽ the present.ʹͷ Needless to say, no chronology of this kind can be found in any Indian Buddhist source. If one tries to determine the reason lying behind the dating present- ed by Faxian one cannot rely, however, on later Chinese sources. The ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹ mentions Faxian’s report but obviously does not under-

ʹͶ ǤʹͲͺͷǤͺͷͺƒǤͳͳˆˆǤ ⵮ܗ୿⌅亟DŽ֋⌅ᶡ䙾ަ࿻ਟ⸕㙦DŽ亟ӁDŽ䁚୿ᖬ൏ӪDŽⲶӁDŽਔ㘱 ൘֋⌕⍩ᖼйⲮ䁡・ۿDŽᖼׯᴹཙㄪ⋉䮰DŽ啾㏃ᖻ䙾↔⋣㘵DŽۿ⴨ۣDŽ㠚・ᕼं㨙㯙 DŽ䶎ཛᕼंབྷ༛㒬䓼䟻䘖DŽᆠ㜭Ԕۿ↔ᒤDŽ䀸ᯬઘ∿ᒣ⦻ᱲDŽ⭡㥢㘼䀰DŽབྷᮉᇓ⍱࿻㠚 йሦᇓ䙊䚺Ӫ䆈⌅DŽപ⸕ߕ䙻ѻ䮻ᵜ䶎ӪһDŽࡷ╒᰾ᑍѻདྷᴹ⭡㘼❦⸓DŽ ͷ ǤʹͲͺͷǤͺ͸ͷƒǤʹͲˆˆǤǡ ‡•’Ǥ ʹ͸ˆǤǣ ⌕⍩ᐢֶаॳഋⲮҍॱгᒤDŽц䯃⵬⓵ (“Since theʹ ‡Ȑ–Š‡Ǯ‡›‡‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†ǯȏ–Š‡Buddha] has ‹•ǡͳǡͶͻ͹›‡ƒ”•Šƒ˜‡’ƒ••‡†ȏƒٿ¢˜”‹ ’ƒ••‡†ƒ™ƒ›ǤdzȌ ͶͲ Max Deeg stand the motivation behind its dating and in turn calculates a slightly incorrect date: “If one calculates the birth date of the Buddha according to the Faxian-zhuan ǡ‹–‹•–Š‡ʹ͸th year Jia-wu of the reign of Wu Yi of the ‹†›ƒ•–›ȏͳͳͻͺȂͳͳͻͷȐǢ–‘–‘†ƒ›ǡ–Š‡ͳ͹th year Ding-si‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ‡’‡”‘”ȏkaihuang: Wendi ᮷ᑍȐ‘ˆ–Š‡—‹ȏ†›ƒ•–›Ȑȏͷͻ͹Ȑǡͳǡ͸ͺͳ years have already passed.”ʹ͸ The pattern that I would suggest to interpret these dates is the “writing together of times” of the Buddhist and Chinese history and the incorporation of the meaning attributed to each in the framework of both Buddhist eschatology as well as the traditional Chinese theories of the historical rise and fall of dynasties. To understand Faxian’s dates I would thus suggest the following: the date of the —††Šƒǯ•†‡ƒ–Š ‘—–‹‰„ƒ ˆ”‘ǤǤͶͳͲǡ™‘—Ž†„‡‹ the case of both years indicated by ƒš‹ƒǣͳǤȌ͵ͲͲ›‡ƒ”•‡ƒ”Ž‹‡”–Šƒ the beginning of the reign of King Ping ᒣ‘ˆŠ‘—ȋ͹͹ͲȂ͹ʹͻǤǤȌƒ† ʹǤȌ–Š‡’‡”‹‘†‘ˆͳǡͶͻ͹›‡ƒ”•ǡ„‘–Š—„‡”•‹†‹ ƒ–‹‰–Š‡”‡‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ kings Wen ᮷ or Wu ↖ȋͳͲ͹͵ȂͳͲ͸ͺǤǤȌʹ͹ of Zhou, the traditional lib- erators from the Shang ୶ tyranny and the founders of the Western ZhouʹͺǤ‘‘‹‰ˆ‘”ƒ‘‡Ǧϐ‹ŽŽ‡†’‡”‹‘†‹–Š‡Š‹‡•‡’ƒ•––‘”‡ϐŽ‡ – the life and death of the Buddha and with his death the beginning of the period of the true dharma in India, the transfer of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming ཙભȌˆ”‘–Š‡Šƒ‰–‘–Š‡Š‘— was an appropriate date. Seen from the standpoint of Buddhist teleology, the spread of the dharma eastward across the Indus during the reign of King Ping is not less meaningful: The expulsion of the Zhou and the move of the capital to Luoyang ⍋䲭 under ‹‰‹‰•‹‰‹ϐ‹‡•–Š‡„‡‰‹‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ•–‡” Zhou, which is traditionally seen as being the beginning of the end of

ᒤ⭢ॸDŽ㠣Ӻ䮻ⲷॱгᒤбᐣޝ͸ ǤʹͲ͵ͶǤʹ͵ƒǤͳ͸Ǥ ׍⌅亟ۣ᧘֋⭏ᱲࡷ⮦⇧ц↖҉Ҽॱʹ -—„‡”–—”–ȋͳͻͻͶȌˆ‘ŽŽ‘™•–Š‡Lidai-san ॱа. In his calculation,ޛⲮޝׯᐢаॳ „ƒ‘ǦŒ‹without checking the results, and further takes this to be the date of the rather than Fei Changfang’s computation of the Buddha’s birth. It ƒٿ¢˜”‹ Buddha’s should be noticed that Fei made a similar mistake, because he calculated the birth would thenƒٿ¢of the —††Šƒǡƒ””‹˜‹‰ƒ–ͳͲͺͶȋ–Š‡‹”˜ – ƒٿ¢˜”‹ date – not the Šƒ˜‡„‡‡ƒ”‘—†ͳͲͲͲȌǤ ʹ͹ According to the classical chronology presented by Sima Qian ਨ俜䚧Ǣ ˆǤ ‹‡- Šƒ—•‡”ͳͻͻͶǡ’ǤͷͻǤ ʹͺ ƒš‹ƒǯ•†ƒ–‡•ǡ‹–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ƒ•‡ǡ™‘—Ž†”‡•—Ž–‹–Š‡›‡ƒ”ͳͲ͹Ͳǡƒ†‹–Š‡•‡ ‘†ǡ ͳͲͺ͹Ǥ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” Ͷͳ this dynastyʹͻ. This was, in the Buddhist time-conception as presented by Faxian, balanced on a soteriological level by the eastward move of the dharma. Speaking in Buddhist terms of teleology, the decline of the Eastern Zhou corresponded to the decline of the true dharma in the second half of its period. To give one more example for this kind of calculation: the apologetic collection Guang-hongming-ji ᔓᕈ᰾䁈ȋǤʹͳͲ͵Ȍ‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‰Ǧ‘Dao- xuan 䚃ᇓ contains a treatise, the Erjiao-lun Ҽᮉ䄆, the Dispute on the Two Teachings, attributed to Shi Daoan 䟻䚃ᆹ – not the famous Daoan of the fourth century, but a monk from the second half of the sixth cen- tury – in which he presents us with several chronological calculations including the one preferred by —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒȋ͵Ͷ͵ȂͶͳ͵Ȍǣ Further: according to the annual record of dharma-master —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒ ƒ†–‘–Š‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡•–‘‡Ǧ’‹ŽŽƒ”ȏǫȐȏ–Š‡†ƒ–‡Ȑ‹•’‡”ˆ‡ –Ž›‹†‡- tical with the Š—“‹—Ǧˆ—ǣ–Š‡ƒ–Š¢‰ƒ–ƒ™ƒ•„‘”‹–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–Š›‡ƒ”‹Ǧ chou of King Huan of Zhou, he had left his home in the twenty-third year Kui-wei of King Huan, had attained enlightenment in the tenth year Jia- wu of King Š—ƒ‰ƒ†‡–‡”‡†‹”˜¢ᒤƒ‹–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡–Š›‡ƒ” ‹ƒǦ•Š‡‘ˆ ‹‰‹ƒ‰Ǥ‘–‘†ƒ›–Š‹•ƒ‡•ͳǡʹͷͲ›‡ƒ”•͵Ͳ. This chronology is not any less interesting than Faxian’s, because it seems to indicate a different result from a different temporal point of view, although it is grounded on a similar soteriological concept: Pre- •—’’‘•‹‰ͷͲͲǦ›‡ƒ”’‡”‹‘†•ǡ–Š‡mofa period would be just at its peak ƒ”‘—†ͷ͹Ͳǡ–Š‡†ƒ–‡–Š‡Erjiao-lun™ƒ•™”‹––‡Ǣ„—–‹–™‘—Ž†ƒŽ•‘‡ƒ that —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒŠƒ†–Š‘—‰Š–Š‹•‡Žˆ–‘„‡Ž‹˜‹‰‹ƒ–‹‡™Š‡–Š‡ mofa’‡”‹‘†Šƒ†Œ—•–„‡‰—ȋǤ͵͸͵ǣ͸ͺ͹ǤǤǡ–Š‡†ƒ–‡‘ˆ–Š‡‡Ž‹‰Š–- enment of the Buddha, ’Ž—• ͳͲͲͲ ›‡ƒ”•ȌǤ ’‡ƒ‹‰ ‹ eschatological terms one could argue that the end of the three periods of the dharma, be it apocalyptic or not, had been expected to take place at the begin- ‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–Š ‡–—”›ƒ†–Šƒ–Buddhist timetables were reshaped

ʹͻ As Sima Qian states (ShijiͶȌǣDz––Š‡–‹‡‘ˆKing Ping the house of the Zhou degen- erated and the strong ones among the feudal lords subjugated the weak ones.” Cf. —Šͳͻͻͳǡ’ǤͳͻͶǤ It may be well possible that the reluctance of the Chinese Bud- dhist authors to adopt a date of the Buddha falling into the era of the Eastern Zhou had something to do with the negative image of that period. Ͳ ǤʹͳͲ͵ǤͳͶʹƒǤͳͻˆˆǤ৸׍Ӱ⌅ᑛᒤ㌰৺⸣ḡ䣈DŽі㠷᱕⿻ㅖ਼DŽྲֶઘẃ⦻ӄᒤ↢⅑͵ ҉с⭏DŽẃ⦻Ҽॱйᒤ↢⅑ⲨᵚࠪᇦDŽ㦺⦻ॱᒤ↢൘⭢ॸᡀ֋DŽ㽴⦻ॱӄᒤ↢൘⭢ ⭣⓵ᓖDŽ㠣ӺаॳҼⲮӄᒤ. This is also already referred to in the ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹ ȋǤʹͲ͵ͶǤʹ͵ƒǤͳͻˆǤȌǤ Ͷʹ Max Deeg accordingly – as is so often the case when expectations of a near end ‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†‘”ƒ’‡”‹‘†ƒ”‡‘–ˆ—Žϐ‹ŽŽ‡†Ȃ„›„”‹‰‹‰–Š‡Buddha’s dates closer to the historical present and by extending the timetables of decay͵ͳ. Now, to return to the Foguoji: The part of Faxian’s report which I have just discussed is clearly interwoven with a complex of information belonging to the same framework of ideas: the timetable of the decay of the dharma and the advent of Maitreya, and the underlying conception of •‘–‡”‹‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽŠ‹•–‘”›ǤŠ‡—„‡”ͳǡͶͻ͹‹•–‘‘‡šƒ ––‘„‡™‹–Š‘—– meaning, the meaning certainly being that the mofa period would come to an end in only a few years͵ʹ. It also indicates the expectations and hope for the future beyond this eschatological timetable.

Writing Spaces and Future Times Together

Writing spaces together is a process in early Chinese Buddhism that attempts to imbed and integrate China as a geographical and cultural entity into the Indian Buddhist teleological and soteriological master- plan. Such an attempt can, for instance, be seen in the protoarchaeolog- ical discoveries of stupas and inscriptions in China during the reigns of various emperors which were ascribed to the ideal Buddhist ruler, the cakravartin 䑍ƒǡ–Š—••Š‘™‹‰–Šƒ–Š‹ƒ™ƒ•ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡ Buddhist holy geography in the time of the famous Mauryan king͵͵. It is again Faxian who gives us an early report about a tradition which obviously tried to embed China into a soterio-eschatological Buddhist geography and timetable, this time in rather mythological ranges. Fa- xian reports that, during his two-year stay in c”ăᒣ¢ǡŠ‡Š‡ƒ”†ƒ Indian monk (tianzhu-daoren ཙㄪ䚃ӪȌ•‹––‹‰‘ƒŠ‹‰Š Šƒ‹””‡ ‹–‹‰ a •ó–”ƒ about the destiny of the Buddha’s alms bowl, the „—††Šƒ’¢–”ƒ (ˆ‘„‘֋㕭Ȍǡ™‹–Š–Š‡ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ ‘–‡–ǣ–Š‡„‘™Ž™ƒ•ϐ‹”•–‹ƒ‹ä¢ŽÄǡ then in ƒ†Š¢”ƒǡ™Š‡”‡Faxian had seen it in the city of —”—ᒲƒ’—- ”ƒǡ–Š‡ ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”›‡•Šƒ™ƒ”Ǣƒˆ–‡”•— ‡•‹˜‡’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆͳǡͳͲͲ›‡ƒ”•

͵ͳ Already clear in the ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹ȋǤʹͲ͵ͶǤʹ͵ƒǤʹͳˆˆǤȌǡƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘™Š‹ Š–Š‡’‡- riods of zhengfa and xiangfaŽƒ•–ͳǡͲͲͲ›‡ƒ”•‡ƒ Šƒ†–Š‡mofaŽƒ•–•ͳͲǡͲͲͲ›‡ƒ”•Ǥ ͵ʹ For general considerations on Buddhist eschatological, millenaristic and apoca- Ž›’–‹ ‹†‡ƒ•ǡ•‡‡ƒ––‹‡”ͳͻͻͳǢ —„„ƒ”†ʹͲͲͳǡ’’Ǥ͵͸ˆˆǤǢ‡‡‰ͳͻͻͻ„Ǥ ͵͵ Š‡‘–‹‘ƒ†ˆ— –‹‘‘ˆ䑍ƒǡAyu-wang 䱯㛢⦻, and the monuments ascribed to him in Chinese Buddhist and secular writing is a subject upon which more re- •‡ƒ” Š‡‡†•–‘„‡†‘‡Ǥ Šƒ˜‡†‹• —••‡†–Š‹•„”‹‡ϐŽ›‹‡‡‰ʹͲͲͳǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” Ͷ͵

‡ƒ Š–Š‡„‘™Ž™‹ŽŽ‰‘–‘–Š‡ ‘—–”›‘ˆ–Š‡‡•–‡”—‡•Š‹ȋ‘—œŠ‹Ȍ ᴸ ∿, to Š‘–ƒȀ—–‹ƒ Ҿ䰀, to —«ƒȀ— ‹ ቸ㥘ǡŠ‹ƒȀ ƒǦ†‹ ╒ൠ, Cey- Ž‘ȀŠ‹œ‹Ǧ‰—‘ᑛᆀ഻ and then back to Middle India (Zhong-tianzhu ѝ ཙㄪȌǤŠ‡–Š‡„‘™Ž™‹ŽŽ”‹•‡–‘–Š‡—ᒲ‹–ƒŠ‡ƒ˜‡ȋ‘—•Š—Ǧ–‹ƒ ތ㺃 ཙȌ–‘Maitreya, and after seven heavenly days will return to earth, to ƒ„—†˜Ä’ƒȋƒˆ—–‹ 䯫⎞ᨀȌǤŠ‡¢‰ƒ-king ¢‰ƒ”ƒȋHai-longwang ⎧喽 ⦻Ȍ™‹ŽŽ‡‡’‹–‹Š‹•’ƒŽƒ ‡‘–Š‡‰”‘—†‘ˆ–Š‡‘ ‡ƒ—–‹ŽMaitreya attains enlightenment. After the bowl has disappeared, the dharma will decline, the world and mankind will degenerate until men only reach –Š‡ƒ‰‡‘ˆϐ‹˜‡›‡ƒ”•ƒ†ƒŽŽ‡˜‹Ž’‡”•‘•™‹ŽŽŠƒ˜‡‹ŽŽ‡†‘‡ƒ‘–Š‡”Ǥ The righteous will again practice a moral life until they again live to the ƒ‰‡‘ˆͺͲǡͲͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ǤŠ‡Maitreya will come down to the earth.͵Ͷ It is interesting to note that Faxian emphasizes that the recitator had pro- hibited the spoken text to be written down – Faxian obviously ignored this, but his observation nevertheless leaves us open to speculations about the original form of the •ó–”ƒ. Here we can see an attempt to extend the historiographical line be- yond the present, in this case by again using the tool that seems to be typical for the Buddhist manner of dealing with history: a prophecy. Š‡ϐ‹”•–“—‡•–‹‘™Š‹ Š Šƒ˜‡ƒ•‡†›•‡Žˆ‹•™Š‡–Š‡”•— Šƒ•ó–”ƒ, with a geographical knowledge about the regions of Central Asia and China and their subsequent incorporation into a soteriological legend or myth, could really have been composed and recited in the south- ernmost part of the Buddhist oikumene, in Ceylon. There is no tradi- tion, whatsoever, in other, autochthonous southern Buddhist sources that would indicate the existence of a legend about the Buddha’s bowl. ȋŠ˜ǤȌǡ–Š‡Great Chronicle of ‡›Ž‘, thereƒ•ٽƒ˜¢Šƒ However, in the Ȍƒ”‡ٿƒƒ•‹Ž¢ȋƒ”‡ٿƒ¢is a report, that Mahinda’s companion, the ä” Sumana, brought the relics of the Buddha to Ceylon in the bowl of the Buddha͵ͷ, and according to the same source, the bowl would have been on the island at the time Faxian was there, probably under the reign of

͵Ͷ ǤʹͲͺͷǤͺ͸ͷ ǤͳˆˆǤ ͵ͷ Š˜Ǥͳ͹ǤͳʹǢƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘ʹͲǤͳ͵–Š‡„‘™Ž™ƒ•‡•Š”‹‡†„›‹‰‡˜¢ƒᒢ‹›ƒ–‹••ƒǢ ʹ͵ǤͶͺ”‡Žƒ–‡•–Šƒ–‹‰ƒŠƒ¢‰ƒ”‡• —‡†–Š‡„‘™Žˆ”‘ƒƒ––ƒ ‘ˆ–Š‡Ꮥƒ‹Žƒ•ǡ „—––Šƒ–‹–™ƒ•–ƒ‡„›–Š‡–‘–Š‡ƒ‹Žƒ†ȋͷͷȌǢ͵͹Ǥͳͻʹǣ—†‡”–Š‡”‡‹‰‘ˆUpa- tissa the bowl is suddenly back in ‡›Ž‘Ǣ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘͸ͳǤͷ͸ƒ†͸ͳȋ ƒ›ƒ„¢Š— ǤȌǡ͸ͶǤ͵Ͳ ȋƒ”ƒƒƒ„¢Š—Ȍǡ͹ͲǤʹ͸͸ƒ†͵ͳͲȋ ƒŒƒ„¢Š—Ȍǡ͹ʹǤʹͻ͹ȋƒƒ„Šƒ”ƒᒤƒȌǡ passim. The Žƒ•–‡–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡„‘™Ž‹•‹–Š‡‹††Ž‡‘ˆ–Š‡ˆ‘—”–Š ‡–—”›ȋƒ”ƒƒƒ„¢Š— ǤȌǤŠ‡alms bowl is still said to be enshrined in a small †ƒ‰‘„ƒ near Kandy (Gei- ‰‡”ͳͻͺ͸ǡ’Ǥʹͳ͵ȌǤ –‹•‹’‘”–ƒ––‘‘–‹ ‡–Šƒ––Š‡„‘™Žǡ–‘‰‡–Š‡”™‹–Š–Š‡–‘‘–Š ͶͶ Max Deeg the King ’ƒ–‹••ƒƒ†Ȁ‘”‹‰ƒŠ¢¢ƒǤ‡•’‹–‡–Š‹•ǡ‹–‹•ƒŽ•‘ Ž‡ƒ” that the relic did not have the same value and function in Ceylon as it had in other Buddhist regions.͵͸ The legend that Faxian heard seems to originate from the Indian Northwest, from ƒ†Š¢”ƒǡ ™Š‡”‡ ™‡ Šƒ˜‡ ‡‘—‰Š ‹ŽŽ—•–”ƒ–‹‘• ‹ works of art to appreciate the importance of this relic͵͹. Finally Faxian’s report on the bowl in —”—ᒲƒ’—”ƒȀ —Ž‘—•Šƒ ᕇ⁃⋉ȋ‡•Šƒ™ƒ”Ȍ͵ͺ is the oldest witness for its existence – not mentioning the contradicto- ry statement in —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒǯ•„‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›ǡƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘™Š‹ Š–Š‡„‘™Ž should already have been in Kashgar (Shale ⋉ंȌ‹‡–”ƒŽ•‹ƒƒ––Šƒ– time͵ͻǢ‹–Š‡•—„•‡“—‡––™‘ ‡–—”‹‡•–Š‡„‘™Ž™ƒ•ƒŽ•‘Ž‘ ƒ–‡†‹ Persia,ͶͲ and according to the Weishu 兿ᴨ, was even brought to China. This capability of the bowl to be in different places, sometimes at the same time, had already caused Huijiao ភⲾǡ‹Š‹•ǫ„‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›‘ˆ–Š‡ and the bowl of ƒڍÄٿڍ— monk Zhimeng Ც⥋, to state that relics like the the Buddha have supernatural powers.Ͷͳ Although we do not have an In- dian text on the bowl, the oldest Chinese •ó–”ƒ catalogue, Sengyou’s ܗ ⾀ Chu-sanzang-jiji ࠪй㯿䁈䳶ȋǤʹͳͶͷȌ‡–‹‘••ó–”ƒs on the subject which, unfortunately, are now lost. The best example of the bowl going to foreign regions, and maybe as far as to China, is found in the fourth century apocryphal Fo-miedu-hou-guanlian-zangsong-jing ֋⓵ᓖᖼἪ ↋㪜䘱㏃ȋǤ͵ͻʹȌǡ–Š‡󖔃‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘ˆϔ‹‹‰ƒ† ”‡ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡—†- ‡Š–‘–›ŽŠ‹–‹••–ƒ–‡†–Šƒ––Š‡„‘™Ž™‹ŽŽϐ ‹Š™‹ǡƒٿ¢˜”‹ dha after the black-haired people and will convert them to the dharma and lead them ‹Ȁ Za-ahan-jing 䴌䱯ਜ਼㏃ȋǤͻͻȌǡƒƒ‰¢–—›ٽƒ to good conduct. The

relic, was a kind of royal talisman, but was never connected to any Buddhist escha- tological conception. ͵͸ •ƒ•›„‘Ž‘ˆ„—††Šƒ•Š‹’ǡ ˆǤƒ‰Ǧ‘—–ƒ‹–ͳͻͻͶǤ ͵͹ See —™ƒ›ƒƒͳͻͻͲǤ ͵ͺ ǤʹͲͺͷǤͺͷͺ„ǤʹͳˆˆǤ -ȋǤʹͲͷͻǤ͵͵Ͳ„ǤʹͷȌƒ†Chu-sanۣܗͻ Biography of —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒ‹Gaoseng-zhuan 儈͵ zang-jiji ࠪй㯿䁈䳶ȋǤʹͳͶͷǤͳͳͶƒǤ͵ȌǢ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ‰Ǧ‘—–ƒ‹–ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥ͸ͷǤ ͶͲ According to Xuanzang ⦴ྈ. ‡‡ƒ‰Ǧ‘—–ƒ‹–ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥ͸ͷǤ Ͷͳ ǤʹͲͷͻǤ͵Ͷ͵ Ǥ͹ˆˆǤ։↧ሻ䙺ᯩ⋉䮰䁈ࡇ䚃䐟DŽᱲᡆн਼DŽ֋串僘㲅Ӗ҆⡭DŽሷ⸕䙺ᖰཙ ㄪ䶎→а䐟DŽ串㦜䵸䚧ᱲቸ⮠ѝ㘉DŽ᭵ۣ䘠㾻㚎䴓ԕֻҏ (“I have enquired into the s and sometimes they are not theƒٿrecords and the routes of the travelling 䔃ƒ ‡”ƒȏƒ”‡ȐȌƒڍÄٿڍ‡•ǡȏ™Š‡”‡ȐȌ–Š‡Buddha’s ƒŽ•„‘™Žȏƒ†ȐȌŠ‹•— ƒŽ’‡Š–†ƒǡ‡ƒ• not either. ‡•Š‘—Ž†‘™ȏ„›–Š‹•–Šƒ–ȐȌ–Š‡”‡‹•‘–‘Ž›‘‡™ƒ›–‘–”ƒ˜‡Ž–‘ and the bowl are miraculously moving and sometimes ƒڍÄٿڍȏƒ†–Šƒ–ȐȌ–Š‡—ƒ‹† ™ƒ†‡”–‘†‹ˆˆ‡”‡–’Žƒ ‡•ǡȏƒ†–Šƒ–Ȑ‹–‹•–Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‘ƒ‡ ‘””‡•’‘†- ‹‰•‡•‡‘ˆ™Šƒ–Šƒ•„‡‡”‡’‘”–‡†ǡ•‡‡ƒ†Š‡ƒ”†dzȌǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” Ͷͷ a passage that was probably inserted into the collection later, has the -when the dharma de ,ƒٿ¢––Šƒ–ͳǡͲͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ƒˆ–‡”Š‹•‹”˜ ‹†‡”’ Buddha -his tooth and his bowl will go to the East. The north ,ƒڍÄٿڍ— clines, the western origin of such legends around the bowl are indirectly support- ed by the Lianhuamian-jing 㬞㨟䶒㏃ȋǤ͵ͺ͸Ȍǡ–Š‡󖔃‘ˆ‘–—•Ǧ ƒ ‡, ™Š‹ Š™ƒ•–”ƒ•Žƒ–‡†‹ͷͺͷ„›ƒ”‡†”ƒ›ƒäƒ•/Naliantiyeshe 䛓䙓ᨀ㙦 㠽, who came from the northwestern region of India, where at that time theories about the decay of the dharma were widely known. A direct indication of such an origin in northwest India is found in a description of the lost 󖔃‘ˆ–Š‡—††Šƒǯ•„‘™Ž, ‘„‘ǦŒ‹‰֋㕭㏃, which was al- ready lost at the time Sengyou compiled his catalogue at the beginning of the sixth century. This account is found in the Buddhist encyclopedia ƒ›—ƒǦœŠ—Ž‹⌅㤁⨐᷇ȋǤʹͳʹʹȌǣ–Š‡•ó–”ƒ was of North-Indian origin, brought to China by the meditation-master ƒᒣ‰Šƒ›ƒäƒ•Ȁ‡‰Œ‹ƒ›‡•Š‡ ܗ䘖㙦㠽, and it described the voyage of the bowl from India to China. This correponds well to the facts about the •ó–”ƒ as heard by Faxian in Ceylon. It is clear from these examples that the pilgrim record of Fax ian is structured on references to the same framework of beliefs and ideas: upon entering India Faxian reports on the Buddhist soteriological time- table, and at the point of leaving India via c”ăᒣ¢Š‡”‡ˆ‡”•–‘–Š‡ same, entwining them with the help of a calculated number of years. ͳǡͶͻ͹›‡ƒ”•ƒ”‡ ‡”–ƒ‹Ž›‡ƒ––‘‹†‹ ƒ–‡–Šƒ–Faxian presumed the present in which he lived to be the end of the dharma, so that there was only one hope for salvation left: the coming of Maitreya or, as an alter- native and option, the ascencion to —ᒲ‹–ƒǡƒˆ–‡”†‡ƒ–Š‘”„›˜‹•—ƒŽ‹œƒ- tion, to receive this bodhisattva’s blissful teaching.

Conclusion

Finally let us return to the broader context of early Chinese Buddhism. As I hope to have shown, it was not incidential that Faxian started and ended his report on Buddhist India with references to the synchronol- -and Chinese traditional history, and to es ƒٿ¢˜”‹ ogy of the Buddha’s chatological concepts concerning Maitreya. My opinion is that Faxian belonged to the inner circle of the master Shi Daoan 䟻䚃ᆹȋǤǤ͵ͳʹȂ ͵ͺͷȌǣŠ‹•’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”‹–‡”‡•–‹–Š‡‹ƒ›ƒ, which was the reason for his journey, seems to indicate this, but it would also explain his special in- terest in Maitreya and the legends and prophecies centered around this Ͷ͸ Max Deeg

ϐ‹‰—”‡ǤŠ‹•ǡFaxian would have shared with his presumed master, who ‹͵ͺͷŠƒ†˜‘™‡†–‘„‡”‡„‘”‹–Š‡—ᒲ‹–ƒŠ‡ƒ˜‡‡ƒ”MaitreyaͶʹ. The interest of Daoan in the legend of the Buddha’s bowl is shown, again, in the Chu-sanzang-jiji, where, in a list of extracts from different •ó–”ƒs for the daily use of the monks, Daoan quotes the ‘Ǧ•Š‘—Ǧ•Š‹„‘ǦŽ—Œ‹֋ਇ ⸣㕭䤴䁈, ‡ ‘”†‘ˆ–Š‡—††Šƒreceiving the stone ƒŽ•„‘™Ž, from the Buddha-vita (TaiziǦȌ—‹›‹‰Ǧ„‡“‹ǦŒ‹‰ ཚᆀ ⪎៹ᵜ䎧㏃ȋǤͳͺͷȌ–”ƒ•- lated by Zhi Qian ᭟䅉 ȋ–Š‹”† ‡–—”›ȌǤ The computations of the dates of the Buddha by means of Chinese chronology may go back to Daoan as well. As is well-known, he was the ϐ‹”•–Š‹‡•‡ Ž‡”‹ ™‹–Šƒ ”‹–‹ ƒŽŠ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ•‡•‡ǣŠ‡ ‘’‹Ž‡†–Š‡ϐ‹”•– •ó–”ƒ catalogue, which is known as Zongli-zhongjing-mulu ㏌⨶⵮㏃ⴞ䤴 and which is preserved in the Chu-sanzang-jijiǤ†‡ϐ‹‹–‡”‡ƒ•‘ˆ‘”–Š‹• interest was the need for a distinction between true teachings and false teachings in the texts in a period in which the dharma was considered to be nearly extinguished. Daoan was also interested in geography, especially that of the pe- ripheries of both China and India, and especially that of Northwest India, exactly the region in which the giant Maitreya was standing as a symbol of the dharma-connection between India and the Eastern realms, and also as a reminder that the end of the dharma was near. It is not yet clear where the basic motivation for Daoan’s famous vow to be born in Maitreya’s heaven, —ᒲ‹–ƒǡ ƒ‡ˆ”‘ǡ„—–‹–•‡‡•’‘••‹„Ž‡–Šƒ– this – and maybe the compilation of the catalogue – had something to do with the idea that the end of the dharmaǡͳǡͷͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡†‡ƒ–Š of the Buddha, ™‘—Ž†„‡‡ƒ”–Š‡–‹‡‘ˆŠ‹•‹’‡†‹‰†‡ƒ–Šȋ‹͵ͺͷȌǤ This probably presupposed historical calculations of the kind that are ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹Faxian’s account. What I have tried with my two examples is to show that the ear- ly attempts to create a Sino-Buddhist prototype of historiography by parallelizing Chinese and Indian antiquity arose from the pressure to harmonize the Buddhists’ own religious past, which was located in In- dia, with the Chinese sense and need for historical credibility. This was reinforced by the belief that the end of the dharma was near, and the need, therefore, to determine exactly which period one was living in. In order to achieve this, not only histories had to be combined, but also

Ͷʹ Reported in Gaoseng-zhuan ͷǡ ǤʹͲͷͻǤ͵ͷ͵ƒǤǢ ˆǤ •—ƒ‘–‘Ȁ —”˜‹–œ ͳͻͺͷǡ ’’Ǥ ͹ͷ͵ˆˆǤǢò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’ǤͳͻͶˆǤ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” Ͷ͹ two basically different sacred spaces. It was this need for an inclusivis- tic sacred geography and its actual creation – to embed China into the sacred space of Buddhism – which, ironically, proved to be one of the most successful tools for Chinese Buddhists to emancipate themselves more and more from their Indian motherland.

References

-—Œ‹”Ûǡƒ–ƒƒ„‡ƒ‹ —•—ƒƒ›„T. – ƒ‹•ŠÛǦ•Š‹•ŠóǦ†ƒ‹œÛ›Û བྷ↓ᯠ؞བྷ㯿㏃ǡ‡†Ǥ ‰›‘—ǡ‘ ‡›ÛǤ‘›‘ǣƒ‹•ŠÛŠ‹•Šóƒ‹œÛ›ÛŠ—’’ƒ•ŠƒǡͳͻʹͶȂͳͻ͵ͷǤ ••ƒ ͳͻͻ͹ Ȃ ƒ ••ƒǡ ƒ•—Ž–—”‡ŽŽ‡ ‡†¡ Š–‹•Ǥ Š”‹ˆ–ǡ”‹‡”—‰—† ’‘Ž‹–‹• Š‡ †‡–‹–¡–‹ˆ”òŠ‡ ‘ Š—Ž–—”‡Ǥ ʹò Š‡ǣǤ Ǥ‡ ǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ‡ Š‡”–ͳͻͻͳȂͳͻͻ͹Ȃ Ǥ‡ Š‡”–ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‡ƒ–‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ—††ŠƒǤ͵˜‘Ž•Ǥ ږ- –‹‰‡ǣƒ†‡Š‘‡ Ƭ—’”‡ Š–ǡͳͻͻͳȂͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ‡  ͳͻͻͶ Ȃ Ǥ ‡ ǡ Snorri Sturlusons Sicht der paganen Vorzeit (Nachrichten der ƒ†‡‹‡†‡”‹••‡• Šƒˆ–‡‹ ږ–‹‰‡ǡ ǤŠ‹ŽǤǦ ‹•–ǤŽǤȌǤ ږ–‹‰‡ǣƒ†‡- Š‘‡ Ƭ—’”‡ Š–ǡͳͻͻͶǤ Š”‹•–ͳͻͺͺȂǤŠ”‹•–ǡDzڏ‹• Š‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–•• Š”‡‹„—‰Ǥdz ǣ”‘’›Ž¡‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–‡ †‡” ‹–‡”ƒ–—” Ȃ ‹–‡”ƒ–—” —† ‡•‡ŽŽ• Šƒˆ– †‡” ™‡•–Ž‹ Š‡ ‡Ž–ǡ †Ǥͷǣ ‹‡ ‡Ž– †‡” –‹‡ǡͷ͸ͶͶ˜ǤŠ”ǤȂͼͶͶǤŠ”Ǥ ”ƒˆ—”–ƒǤǤȀ‡”Ž‹ǣ”‘’›Ž¡‡‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͺͺǡ’’Ǥ ͶͲͻȂͶ͵͹Ǥ ‡‡‰ͳͻͻͻƒȂƒš‡‡‰ǡDz‰‡•–ƒŽ–—‰„—††Š‹•–‹• Š‡”‘•‘Ž‘‰‹‡ƒ—ˆ†‡‡‰˜‘ †‹‡ƒ ŠŠ‹ƒǤdz ǣ‹‡–‡”‡ŽŽ‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡReligion im Wandel der Kosmologien (Re- Ž‹‰‹‘•™‹••‡• Šƒˆ– †ǤͳͲȌǤ ”ƒˆ—”– ƒǤǤȀ‡”Ž‹Ȁ‡”Ȁ‡™ ‘”Ȁƒ”‹•Ȁ‹‡ǣ ‡–‡”ƒ‰ǡ’’ǤʹͶͳȂʹͷͶǤ ‡‡‰ͳͻͻͻ„Ȃ †ǤǡDzƒ•†‡†‡•Šƒ”ƒ—††‹‡—ˆ–†‡•ƒ‹–”‡›ƒǤ†œ‡‹–Ǧ—† ‡—‡Ǧ‡‹–Ǧ‘”•–‡ŽŽ—‰‡‹—††Š‹•—•‹–‡‹‡š—”•œ—”¢ä›ƒ’ƒǦ‡‰‡†‡Ǥdz Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft͹ȋͳͻͻͻȌǡ’’ǤͳͶͷȂͳ͸ͻǤ ‡‡‰ʹͲͲͲȂ †ǤǡDzŠ‡‘ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ ƒš‹ƒǯ•‹‰†‘‘ˆ ‹‡ ŠƒǤdz ǣƒ—”‹œ‹‘ƒ††‡‹ǡ ‹—•‡’’‡‡ƒ” ‘ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‘—–Š•‹ƒ” Šƒ‡‘Ž‘‰›ͷͿͿͽǤ”‘ ‡‡†‹‰•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘—”- teenth International Conference of the European Association of South Asian Archaeol- ‘‰‹•–•ǡŠ‡Ž†‹–Š‡ •–‹–—–‘ –ƒŽ‹ƒ‘’‡”Žǯˆ”‹ ƒ‡Žǯ”‹‡–‡ǡƒŽƒœœ‘”ƒ ƒ ‹‘ǡ‘‡ǡ ͽȂͷͺ —Ž›ͷͿͿͽǤ‘‡ǣ •–‹–—–‘ –ƒŽ‹ƒ‘’‡”Žǯˆ”‹ ƒ‡Žǯ”‹‡–‡ǡʹͲͲͲǡ‘Ž—‡ ǡ’’Ǥ ͺ͹͹ȂͺͺͺǤ ‡‡‰ʹͲͲͳȂ †ǤǡDz‘ –‡‰”ƒ–‹‘œ—”‡‰‹–‹ƒ–‹‘Ȃ‹‡䑍ƒǦ‡‰‡†‡ȋ䑍¢˜ƒ†¢- naȌ‹„—††Š‹•–‹• Š‡ †‹‡—†‹Š‹ƒǤdz ǣƒŽ–‡”‡Ž–œǡ ò”‰‡—„ƒ Šȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ‡Ž‹‰‹Ú•‡”‡š–—†•‘œ‹ƒŽ‡–”—–—”Ǥ ƒŽŽ‡ȋƒƒŽ‡Ȍǣ ƒŽŽ‡• Š‡–—†‹‡œ—””‹‡–ƒŽ- ‹•–‹ǡʹͲͲͳǡ’’ǤͳͳʹȂͳͶ͸Ǥ ‡‡‰ʹͲͲ͵Ȃ †ǤǡDzƒ‘œ‹‘†‡”—††Šƒǫ‘Ž‡‹• Š‡–”ƒ‰‡‰‹‡—†‹‡Ǯ‡‡Š”—‰†‡” ƒ”„ƒ”‡†—” Šƒ‘œ‹ǯƒŽ• ”—†Žƒ‰‡†‡•‘ϐŽ‹–•œ™‹• Š‡—††Š‹•–‡ —† Daoisten im chinesischen MittelalterǤdzIn: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaftͳͳ ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍǡ’’ǤʹͲͻȂʹ͵ͶǤ Ͷͺ Max Deeg

—”–ͳͻͻͶȂ —„‡”–—”–ǡ”‘„Ž‡•‘ˆŠ”‘‘Ž‘‰›ƒ†• Šƒ–‘Ž‘‰›(Italian School of ƒ•–•‹ƒ–—†‹‡•ǡ ƒ•‹‘ƒŽƒ’‡”•ͶȌǤ›‘–‘ǣ •–‹–—–‘ –ƒŽ‹ƒ‘†‹—Ž–—”ƒǡ —‘Žƒ †‹–—†‹•—ŽŽǯ•‹ƒ”‹‡–ƒŽ‡ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ‡‹‰‡”ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ‹ŽŠ‡Ž ‡‹‰‡”ǡ—Ž–—”‡‘ˆ‡›Ž‘‹‡†‹‡˜ƒŽ‹‡• (edited by H. Be- Š‡”–ȌǤ‹‡•„ƒ†‡ǣ ƒ””ƒ•‘™‹–œǡͳͻͺ͸ȋʹnd‡†‹–‹‘ȌǤ ”‡‰‘”›ͳͻͻͳȂ‡–‡”Ǥ ”‡‰‘”›ǡ•—‰Ǧ‹ƒ†–Š‡‹‹ϔ‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ—††Š‹•. Princeton: ”‹ ‡–‘‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͳǤ • Š‹–œ‡”ͳͻͺͺȂ ”‹–œ • Š‹–œ‡”ǡDz‹‡‰”‹‡ Š‹• Š‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–•• Š”‡‹„—‰Ǥdz ǣPro- ’›Ž¡‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–‡ †‡” ‹–‡”ƒ–—” Ȃ ‹–‡”ƒ–—” —† ‡•‡ŽŽ• Šƒˆ– †‡” ™‡•–Ž‹ Š‡ ‡Ž–ǡ †Ǥͷǣ‹‡‡Ž–†‡”–‹‡ǡͷ͸ͶͶ˜ǤŠ”ǤȂͼͶͶǤŠ”Ǥǡ ”ƒˆ—”–ƒǤǤȀ‡”Ž‹ǣ”‘’›Ž¡‡ ‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͺͺǡ’’Ǥʹ͵ʹȂʹͷ͵Ǥ ƒȀ‹–œͳͻ͹ʹȂƒ‘Ǧ —‰ ƒǡ ”ƒˆ–‘Ǥ‹–œǡƒ‰——•ƒǤ‡‰‡†•ƒ† ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ the Three Kingdoms of Ancient Koreaǡ‡‘—Žǣ‘•‡‹‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻ͹ʹǤ —ͳͻ͵͸Ȃ —Š‹Šȋ —Š‹ȌǡDzŠ‡ †‹ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒǣƒ•‡–—†›‹—Ž–—”ƒŽ Borrowing.” In: —Ž–—”ƒŽ ‘””‘™‹‰ǡ †‡’‡†‡ ‡ǡ ‘˜‡”‰‡ ‡ ƒ† ‘””‘™‹‰ ȋ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‡” ‡ƒ”›‘ˆ‡”‡ ‡‘ˆ ‹‡ ‡•Ȍ. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University ”‡••ǡͳͻ͵͸ǡ’’ǤʹͳͻȂʹͶ͹Ǥ —„„ƒ”†ʹͲͲͳȂ ƒ‹‡ —„„ƒ”†ǡ„•‘Ž—–‡‡Ž—•‹‘ǡ‡”ˆ‡ –—††ŠƒŠ‘‘†ǤŠ‡‹•‡ƒ† ƒŽŽ‘ˆƒŠ‹‡•‡ ‡”‡•›Ǥ ‘‘Ž—Ž—ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ ƒ™ƒ‹ǯ‹”‡••ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ–‘ͳͻͻͲȂŠ—‹ Š‹ƒ–‘ǡ ‡• Š‹ Š–‡†‡”Œƒ’ƒ‹• Š‡‹–‡”ƒ–—”Ǥ‹‡–™‹ Ž—‰†‡”’‘- ‡–‹• Š‡ǡ‡’‹• Š‡ǡ†”ƒƒ–‹• Š‡—†‡••ƒ›‹•–‹• ŠǦ’Š‹Ž‘Ž‘•‘’Š‹• Š‡‹–‡”ƒ–—” ƒ’ƒ• ˜‘†‡ˆ¡‰‡„‹•œ—” ‡‰‡™ƒ”–Ǥ‡”ǣ Š‡”œ‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͻͲǤ ‡‡ͳͻͺͺȂƒ—”‹ ‡‡‡ǡDz‹––‡ŽƒŽ–‡”Ž‹ Š‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–•ƒ—ˆˆƒ••—‰‡Ǥdz ǣ”‘’›Ž¡‡ ‡• Š‹ Š–‡†‡”‹–‡”ƒ–—”Ȃ‹–‡”ƒ–—”—† ‡•‡ŽŽ• Šƒˆ–†‡”™‡•–Ž‹ Š‡‡Ž–ǡ†Ǥ͸ǣ‹‡ ‹––‡ŽƒŽ–‡”Ž‹ Š‡‡Ž–ǡͼͶͶȂͷͺͶͶǡ ”ƒˆ—”–ƒǤǤȀ‡”Ž‹ǣ”‘’›Ž¡‡‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͺͺǡ ’’ǤͳʹͶȂͳͶʹǤ ‡‡ƒͳͻͻͶȂ ‘ŠǤ‡‡ƒǡ ‘™ƒ•–‡”‘—‡‘˜‡•—”‘—„–•Ǥ‡ƒ†‡”Ǧ‡- •’‘•‡–—†›ƒ†”ƒ•Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡‘—Ǧ–œ—‹ǦŠ—‘Ž—. Albany: State University of ‡™‘””‡••ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ‘ŠͳͻͻͷȂ‹˜‹ƒ‘Šǡƒ—‰Š‹‰ƒ––Š‡ƒ‘Ǥ‡„ƒ–‡•ƒ‘‰—††Š‹•–•ƒ†ƒ‘‹•–•‹ Medieval ChinaǤ”‹ ‡–‘ǣ”‹ ‡–‘‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͷǤ ‘ŠͳͻͻͺȂ †Ǥǡ ‘†‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‘Ǥ‘”†ƒ‘‹ ‹•–‘”›ƒ†›–Š. Ann Arbor: Center for Š‹‡•‡–—†‹‡•ǡŠ‡‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‹ Š‹‰ƒǡͳͻͻͺǤ —ŠͳͻͻͳȂ‹‡–‡”—Šǡ–ƒ–—•—†‹–—•Ǥƒ•Š‹ƒ†‡””‹•–‘”ƒ–‡˜‘†‡ˆ¡- ‰‡„‹•œ—ͷͶǤ ƒŠ”Š—†‡”–ƒ ŠŠ”‹•–—•Ǥ ‡‹†‡Ž„‡”‰ǣ‡†‹–‹‘ˆ‘”—ǡͳͻͻͳǤ —™ƒ›ƒƒͳͻͻͲȂ—™ƒ›ƒƒŠÛ•Š‹ǡŠ‡—††Šƒǯ•‘™Ž‹ ƒ†Š¢”ƒƒ†‡Ž‡˜ƒ– ”‘„Ž‡•Ǥ ǣƒ—”‹œ‹‘ƒ††‡‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‘—–Š•‹ƒ” Šƒ‡‘Ž‘‰›ǡͷͿ;ͽǣ”‘ ‡‡†‹‰•‘ˆ the Ninth International Conference of the Association of South Asian Archaeologists ‹‡•–‡”—”‘’‡ǡƒ”–͸. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente , ͳͻͻͲȋ‡”‹‡”‹‡–ƒŽ‡‘ƒ ǡʹȌǡ’’ǤͻͶͷȂͻ͹ͺǤ ƒ––‹‡”ͳͻͻͳȂ ƒƒ––‹‡”ǡ ‡’‘ƒ —–—”‡‹‡Ǥ–—†‹‡•‹ƒ—††Š‹•–”‘’Š‡ ›‘ˆ DeclineǤ‡”‡Ž‡›ǣ•‹ƒ —ƒ‹–‹‡•”‡••ǡͳͻͻͳǤ ‹‡Šƒ—•‡”ͳͻͻͶȂ‹ŽŽ‹ƒ Ǥ‹‡Šƒ—•‡”ǡ ”Ǥȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‡ ”ƒ† ”‹„‡ǯ•‡ ‘”†•Ǥ‘ŽǤ ǣ  ”‹–‹‰‹‡•ƒ†’ƒ ‡•‘‰‡–Š‡” Ͷͻ

Š‡ƒ•‹ ƒŽ•‘ˆ”‡Ǧ ƒŠ‹ƒ„›•—ǦƒŠǯ‹‡ǤŽ‘‘‹‰–‘Ȁ †‹ƒƒ’‘Ž‹•ǣ - †‹ƒƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͶǤ  Š‹†–Ǧ Ž‹–œ‡” ͳͻͺʹ Ȃ ‡Ž™‹‰  Š‹†–Ǧ Ž‹–œ‡”ǡ ‹‡ †‡–‹–¡– †‡” „—††Š‹•–‹• Š‡  Š—Ž‡—††‹‡‘’‹Žƒ–‹‘„—††Š‹•–‹• Š‡”‹˜‡”•ƒŽ‰‡• Š‹ Š–‡‹Š‹ƒȂ‹‡- itrag zur Geistesgeschichte der Sung-ZeitǤ‹‡•„ƒ†‡ǣ ”ƒœ–‡‹‡”‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͺʹ ȋò Š‡”•–ƒ•‹ƒ–‹• Š‡–—†‹‡ǡ†Ǥʹ͸ȌǤ  Š‘’‡ͳͻͺͶȋͳͻͻ͹ȌȂ ”‡‰‘”› Š‘’‡ǡDz ‹Ž‹ƒŽ‹‡–›ƒ†–Š‡‘‹–Š‡”ƒ –‹ ‡ of Indian Buddhism: A Question of ‘Sinicization’ Viewed from the Other Side.” In: T’oung Pao͹ͲȋͳͻͺͶȌǡ’’ǤͳͳͲȂͳʹ͸Ǥȋ‡’”‹–‡†‹ǣ ”‡‰‘”› Š‘’‡ǡ‘‡•ǡ–‘‡•ǡ ƒ†—††Š‹•–‘•Ǥ‘ŽŽ‡ –‡†ƒ’‡”•‘–Š‡” Šƒ‡‘Ž‘‰›ǡ’‹‰”ƒ’Š›ǡƒ†‡š–•‘ˆ ‘ƒ•–‹ —††Š‹•‹ †‹ƒǤ ‘‘Ž—Ž—ǣ ƒ™ƒ‹ǯ‹‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͹ǡ’’Ǥͷ͸Ȃ͹ͳǤȌ •—ƒ‘–‘ͳͻͻͲȂ•—ƒ‘–‘‡”›óǡ ‹•Š‘ǦŠƒ—”ÛǦ•Š‹Ǥ‘›‘ǣ ‡‹„‘•ŠƒǡͳͻͻͲǤ •—ƒ‘–‘Ȁ —”˜‹–œͳͻͺͷȂ•—ƒ‘–‘‡”›óƒ†‡‘ —”˜‹–œǡ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆƒ”Ž› Š‹‡•‡—††Š‹•Ǥ ”‘‹–• –”‘†— –‹‘–‘–Š‡‡ƒ–Š‘ˆ —‹›òƒǤ‘ŽǤʹǡ‘›‘Ȁ‡™ ‘”Ȁƒ ”ƒ ‹• ‘ǣ‘†ƒ•Šƒ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽǡͳͻͺͷǤ ƒŽ†• Š‹†–ͳͻͶͶȂ”•–ƒŽ†• Š‹†–ǡ‹‡o„‡”Ž‹‡ˆ‡”—‰˜‘‡„‡•‡†‡†‡•—†- -󖔃—†•‡‹‡”‡š–‡–•’”‡•ƒٿ¢˜”‹‹”ƒ’¢Šƒ•‡†‡•›Žƒ‡†‡Š ‹‡Ž‰”‡˜‡‹ǤƒŠ† chungenǤ ‘Ž Ǥ ږ–‹‰‡ǣ ƒ†‡Š‘‡  Ƭ —’”‡ Š–ǡ ͳͻͶͶ ȋ„Šƒ†Ž—‰‡ †‡” ƒ†‡‹‡†‡”‹••‡• Šƒˆ–‡œ— ږ–‹‰‡Ǣ˜‘Ž ǣͳͻͶͺȌǤ ƒ‰Ǧ‘—–ƒ‹–ͳͻͻͲȂ ”ƒ­‘‹•‡ƒ‰Ǧ‘—–ƒ‹–ǡDz‡„‘Ž†—‘—††ŠƒȂ’”‘’ƒ‰ƒ–‹‘†— bouddhisme et légitimité politique.” In: —ŽŽ‡–‹†‡Žǯ2 ‘Ž‡ ”ƒ­ƒ‹•‡†‡Žǯš–”²‡ OrientͺͳȋͳͻͻͶȌǡ’’ǤͷͻȂͺʹǤ ò” Š‡”ͳͻ͹ʹȂ”‹ Šò” Š‡”ǡŠ‡—††Š‹•–‘“—‡•–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǣŠ‡’”‡ƒ†ƒ††ƒ’–ƒ- –‹‘‘ˆ—††Š‹•‹ƒ”Ž›‡†‹‡˜ƒŽŠ‹ƒǤ‡‹†‡ǣ”‹ŽŽǡͳͻ͹ʹǤ

Religious Policy and the Concept of Religion in China

Zhuo Xinping

he concept of religion in China corresponds closely to the behav- ior of the Chinese in their social life and their cultural identity in Trelation to religion. In the process of the modernization of Chi- na during the twentieth century, religion has been understood by the Chinese in many ways. Today there is no single understanding of reli- gion and it is discussed from various viewpoints. In any case, religion is evaluated in its spiritual, cultural and social structural sense. Spir- itually, religion is seen to be a personal or mystical experience. In this sense religion should be a private matter and it is understood to be hu- man spirituality. Seen culturally, religion is understood to be a partic- ular tradition of a people or to be an expression of human civilization. Religion is namely a cultural phenomenon in the history of mankind. Seen from the viewpoint of society’s structure, religion is understood as a social organization or a political power. Religion as collective coex- ‹•–‡ ‡ƒ†ƒ•‘ ‹ƒŽ•–”— –—”‡ ‡”–ƒ‹Ž›Šƒ•‹–•ˆ— –‹‘ƒ†‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‹ society. In this case religion is interwoven with the problem complex- es of political stability, national unity and continuing social amity. In this context religion is both considered and accepted a highly complex social and cultural phenomenon. For this reason, for most Chinese to- day religious understanding is a sensitive topic. The religion politics of the Communist Party of China (Ȍƒ†–Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–‘ˆŠ‹ƒ are closely connected to this understanding. Based on the current im- provements in religious understanding as a result of China’s opening to the outside and recent economic and political reforms, it has become possible for religion politics to develop in China today.

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’ǤͷͳȂ͸ͶǤ ͷʹ Zhuo Xinping

The Historical Background of Religious Understanding in China

In China, the twentieth century began with an unfavorable climate for religion. At the turn of the century, most Chinese had nearly no strong religious self-assurance. The concept of religion was also not partic- ularly clear. The traditional religions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism experienced a decline in China just in this period. After the Opium Wars, Christianity had left a negative impression on most Chinese as being an indivisible part of imperialist aggression and col- onization. In the period of social upheaval in which China found itself at the beginning of the twentieth century, resistance developed not only towards the religious traditions of China’s past but also towards ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡• ˆ”‘ —”‘’‡ǡ ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ› Christianity. In the Rev- ‘Ž—–‹‘‘ˆͳͻͳͳ–Š‡†‡‹•‡‘ˆ–Š‡ˆ‡—†ƒŽ•›•–‡‹Š‹ƒ™ƒ•Ž‹‡† –‘–Š‡™‡ƒ‡‹‰‘ˆ–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘Š‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›Ǥ The New Culture Movement began shortly afterwards, decisive for the entire process of Chinese modernization in the twentieth century. The unmistakable and direct expression of the New Culture Movement was the ƒ› ‘—”–Š‘˜‡‡–‹–Š‡›‡ƒ”ͳͻͳͻǤŠƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ •‹‰•‘ˆ–Š‹• movement were the introduction of the concepts of “science” and “de- mocracy” to China and the criticism of imperialism and feudalism. Con- fucianism, as a feudalistic consciousness and a conservative remnant from the Chinese past, was strongly criticized in this context. The Com- —‹•–ƒ”–›‘ˆŠ‹ƒ™ƒ•ˆ‘—†‡†‹–Š‡›‡ƒ”ͳͻʹͳ‹–Š‹•ƒ–‘•’Š‡”‡ ‘ˆ–Š‡‡™ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‘˜‡‡–Ǥ —•–ƒˆ–‡”‹–•ˆ‘—†‹‰ǡ‹ͳͻʹʹǡ–Š‡”‡ was an “Anti-Christian Movement” as well as an “Anti-Religion Move- ment” all over China, especially in the intellectual circles of Beijing and Shanghai. Many Chinese communists took part in these theoretical dis- cussions against religion in general and Christianity in particular. In such movements as well in the beginning of the communist develop- ment in China, resistance towards religion was perceptible. Precisely this trend in the understanding of religion was displayed in the attitude of a group of well-known scholars in China. Emphasis on the difference between religion and philosophy was characteristic, as was the leave-taking of religion in Chinese self-awareness and in the cultural development in China. Some intellectual reformers in China carried out comparisons between philosophy and religion in which they emphasized the special meaning and function of philosophy in Chi- nese culture. In contrast they regarded religion rather condescending-  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͷ͵ ly. In their opinion, the Chinese intellectual tradition held philosophy in high esteem. It contained the principle of philosophical skepticism, ™Š‹ Š•Š‘—Ž†„‡–Š‡„ƒ•‹•ˆ‘”• ‹‡–‹ϐ‹ ‹˜‡•–‹‰ƒ–‹‘ǤŠ‹Ž‘•‘’Š›™ƒ• conscious of formulating questions. Owing to this intention, namely, to investigate these questions, rationality was thoroughly employed in philosophy. An active and curious mind leads to philosophical discov- eries and mental development. Since an attitude of faith stands behind every religion, this satisfaction in belief hinders mental exploration and intellectual curiosity and annuls the necessity for rationality. The de- cision in the past of the traditional Chinese “literati” to be interested in philosophy rather than in religion was therefore praised. Such in- tellectuals were very happy and content, because the intellectual and cultural tradition in China revealed above all a tradition of philosophy. In this heritage of ideas there should be no place for religion. One repre- sentative of this period, Liang Qichao ằ੟䎵ȋͳͺ͹͵ȂͳͻʹͻȌ‡˜‡•–ƒ–‡†ǣ “What differentiates China from other nations is that we have no reli- gion.”ͳ Thus the Chinese intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century were united in their belief that the Chinese nation was a-reli- gious and that the Chinese had developed a culture without religion. Strictly speaking, Confucianism was also considered to be a philos- ophy and not a religion. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Matteo Ricci ȋͳͷͷʹȂͳ͸ͳͲȌƒ†‘–Š‡”Jesuits who had come to China stated for the ϐ‹”•––‹‡–Šƒ–Confucianism was not a religion but was rather only a set of traditional customs. They said this in order to avoid the Chinese “Rites Controversy”. At the beginning of the twentieth century Liang Qichao also stated that Confucianism was not a religion. However, af- –‡”–Š‡Dzͳͻͳͳ‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘dzKang Youwei ᓧᴹѪȋͳͺͷͺȂͳͻʹ͹Ȍƒ†•‘‡ conservative intellectuals in China attempted to see Confucianism as the state religion and to reactivate it along these lines. However, this at- tempt failed, and in the process Confucianism as a religion was judged negatively and was highly criticized. At that time Buddhism was not considered to be a Chinese tradition but a foreign religious import. Moreover, the typical characteristics of Buddhism were regarded to be a philosophy and not a religion. Daoism was actually the only native religion in China, but it was seen in its connection with folk religions or even with superstitious practices, traditional customs, and habits of the Chinese people. For this reason Chinese intellectuals were very

ͳ ˆǤŠ—‘ͳͻͻͻǡ’Ǥ͸͹Ǥ ͷͶ Zhuo Xinping proud in their assumption that China was the only nation in the world without a religion. The Chinese intellectuals of that period realized to a certain degree that China could not be detached from the religious way of life in antiq- uity. But in this respect religion was understood to be merely a lower or more primitive step in the historical development of Chinese culture. The need for a religious way of life in the contemporary development of China was thus negated. If there was still religion in China, it should be replaced with aesthetic education. For the Chinese the process of ‡Ž‹‰Š–‡‡–•Š‘—Ž†„‡ˆ”‘”‡Ž‹‰‹‘–‘ƒ‡•–Š‡–‹ •Ǥ —‰—•–ǡͳͻͳ͹ǡ ‡Š–†ƒ”‡”‘ˆ‡”™‘Cai Yuanpei 㭑ݳษȋͳͺ͸ͺȂͳͻͶͻȌǡƒ‘–Š‡”™‡ŽŽǦ president of Beijing University during the period of the new cultural movements, published his famous talk entitled “Replace Religion with Aesthetic Education.”ʹ Cai understood religion to be an old-fashioned pedagogical method. He admitted that every nation had experienced periods in which education rested wholly in the hands of religious or- ganizations. Earlier, religious education had encompassed the basic elements of intellectual, moral, physical, and aesthetical education. Š‡•‹–—ƒ–‹‘Šƒ†ˆ—†ƒ‡–ƒŽŽ› Šƒ‰‡†–Š”‘—‰Š‘†‡”• ‹‡–‹ϐ‹  developments. Religion played an ever smaller role in the understand- ing and self-realization of the individual and his environment. Mystical phenomena could now be de-mythologized through human reason and • ‹‡–‹ϐ‹ ‡–Š‘†•Ǥƒ–—”ƒŽŠ‹•–‘”›ƒ†•‘ ‹ƒŽ ‘†‹–‹‘• ‘—Ž†„‡‡š- ’Žƒ‹‡†• ‹‡–‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›Ǥ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•Žƒ™•ǡˆ‘”‡†–Š‘—•ƒ†•‘ˆ›‡ƒ”•‡ƒ”Ž‹- er, were no longer suited to the needs of modern society. Religion had lost its importance in moral, spiritual and physical education. Religion was still of value only in the teaching of aesthetics. But Cai Yuanpei was of the opinion that even here education must depart from religion, be- cause if one held on to religion in the teaching of aesthetics, connec- tions to the intellectual and moral aspects of religion would easily oc- cur. This in turn would stand in the way of pure aesthetic perception. In contrast, this new education in aesthetics should be free, progressive and universal. For Cai, replacing religion with aesthetics education was necessary for the modern development of human society. Religion was only a temporary product of human history, and the era of religion had already passed. Cai Yuanpei, in this anti-religion movement, also criti- cized Christianity strongly. For him, it did not seem necessary for China to have a religion. In this period most Chinese intellectuals emphasized

ʹƒ‹ͳͻͳ͹Ǥ  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͷͷ that the traditional culture of China should be molded by philosophy. And this culture would be superior to all other cultures that were car- ried by a religious spirit. Although there were reactions and arguments from the Christian churches, in China the rejection of religion was over- riding.

Pointing Out the Social Aspects in the Term Religion in China

Religion is translated into Chinese as “zongjiao” ᇇᮉ. The term zongjiao is actually made up of two words, namely zong ᇇ and jiao ᮉ. Originally jiao was used very often for religious forms in Chinese history, as for example the names in Chinese for Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism which are, respectively, ru-jiao ݂ᮉ, fo-jiao ֋ᮉ and dao-jiao 䚃ᮉǤ Jiao is a Chinese word that carries the parallel meanings of religion, preach- ing, upbringing and instruction. However, in the original concept of jiao there was no obvious semantic level that indicated “religion”, but rather jiao most commonly meant instruction and upbringing. The following expression for the origin of jiao is given in the “Book of Changes” (Yijing ᱃㏃ȌǣDzŠ—•–Š‡ƒ‹–—•‡†–Š‡‰‘†Ž›’ƒ–Š–‘„‡•–‘™‹•–”— –‹‘ǡƒ† the entire world joined him.” Confucius explained the relationship be- tween tian ཙȋŠ‡ƒ˜‡Ȍǡdao 䚃ȋ’ƒ–ŠȌƒ†jiaoȋ‹•–”— –‹‘Ȍ‹–Š‡™‘” “Proportion and Centre” (Š‘‰›‘‰ ѝᓨȌ ƒ• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™•ǣ DzŠƒ– Š‡ƒ˜‡ †‡–‡”‹‡†ȋˆ‘”Š—ƒ•Ȍ‹•–Š‡‹”„‡‹‰ǤŠƒ–Ž‡ƒ†•–Š‹•„‡‹‰ȋ–‘”‹‰Š- –‡‘—•‡••Ȍ‹•–Š‡’ƒ–ŠǤŠƒ––”ƒ‹•–Š‡’ƒ–Š‹•–Š‡—’„”‹‰‹‰Ǥdz ‡‡”- ally ru-shi-dao san-jiao ݂䟺䚃йᮉǡ namely the three religions Confu- cianism, Buddhism and Daoism, can also be translated as “the three teachings of Confucius, Buddha and Dao”. The origin of the combina- tion zongjiao is found in the context of Buddhist expressions. Buddhism called that which the Buddha said “jiao”, and that which the disciples of Buddha said “zong”. Jiao is therefore the “teaching” of Buddha, whereas zong are the schools resulting from this teaching. To reiterate, in Bud- dhism zongjiao is merely the Buddhist doctrine. In this tradition jiao is not normally understood as religion, but rather as the enlightenment of the Chinese. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century did the European idea of religion enter the Chinese language, by way of Japanese, as œ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘Ǥ With this introduction of European theology, the term religion received a complex of meanings in China. In this understanding of religion the Chinese usually emphasized the concrete social existence of religion ͷ͸ Zhuo Xinping in the form of groups of people or social organizations. When speaking of religion, one meant primarily the social structure and the sociolog- ical function of religion. It is for this reason that the Chinese religion philosopher and Christian thinker Wang Zhixin ⦻⋫ᗳȋͳͺͺͳȂͳͻ͸ͺȌ at one point said: “When we think of religion we are reminded of tall temples, majestic churches and all the well-structured and well-or- ‰ƒ‹œ‡†ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽƒ•’‡ –•–Šƒ–ƒ”‡–‹‡†–‘–Š‹• ‘ ‡’–Ǥ –‹•†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‘ „‡Ž‹‡˜‡–Šƒ–ǡ‹–Š‡ϐ‹ƒŽƒƒŽ›•‹•ǡ‡˜‡”›ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽƒ•’‡ –‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘”‡- sults from a supreme spirit. Originally the word ‘religion’ didn’t only mean a system, but also human feelings of devotion and worship. In our translation of the word religion with zongjiao, the term has lost some of this original connotation. When we hear the word zongjiao we tend to imagine a structured organization with which a certain por- –‹‘‘ˆƒ‹†‹†‡–‹ϐ‹‡•Ǥdz͵ With this understanding of religion as a social structure and organization, the Chinese intellectuals considered only a minority of the Chinese population to have a religion. In this, the concepts of “spirituality” and “belief” were clearly separated from that of “religion”. To be more precise, this understanding of religion devel- oped at the expense of humanity’s religious spirit and of the existence of religious interests beyond religious organizations. Another theolog- ical philosopher and Christian thinker, Xie Fuya 䅍ᢦ䳵ȋͳͺͻʹȂͳͻͻͳȌǡ drew the following comparison in this respect: “There are, in fact, large differences between the Western concept of religio and our zongjiao . If we look for synonyms for the word religio in Chinese dictionaries, the word dao is possibly suggested. Two connotations are associated with –Š‹• ™‘”† •‹—Ž–ƒ‡‘—•Ž›ǣ •—„•–ƒ ‡ ƒ† ˆ— –‹‘ ȏǤǤǤȐǤ Š‡ ‹ƒ‰‡ ‘ˆ harmony between the individual and the cosmos resonates in dao, but it also includes aspects of activity, and the conforming of the individual to society.”Ͷ Until today, the focal point of the understanding of religion of many theoreticians of religion in China has rested primarily with the study of religious organizations or institutions. In China, a faith with- out a social organization or structure is not recognized as a religion, or as a perfected form of religion. Religion, spirituality, and faith are clearly distinguished from one another here. In this sense, religion is —†‡”•–‘‘†–‘„‡‘Ž›ƒ•—‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‹†‡ƒ•ȋ•’‹”‹–—ƒŽ‹–›‘”ˆƒ‹–ŠȌǡ religious practices and religious organization.

͵ ƒ‰ͳͻͺͺǡ’ǤͳǤ Ͷ ‹‡ͳͻͷͲǡ’ǤʹͷͲǤ  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͷ͹

The Religious Politics of the Communist Party of China

The Communist Party of China (Ȍ™ƒ•ˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻʹͳ‹–Š‡ƒ–- mosphere of the new cultural and the anti-religion movements. From its founding, the CPC’s understanding of religion was closely tied to the party’s political and economic considerations. In addition, its un- †‡”•–ƒ†‹‰‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘™ƒ•†‡‡’Ž›‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›Marxist and Leninist religious theories. However, with the founding of the CPC the following principles were very clear and decisive for its relation to religion: ͳǤŠ‡”‡™‡”‡†‹ˆˆ‡”‡ ‡•‹‹†‡‘Ž‘‰›ƒ†™‘”Ž†˜‹‡™„‡–™‡‡ ‘- munism and religion. However, the CPC would not combat religion directly. Religious phenomena had surely their economic, social, and existential reasons. The CPC should be aware of these reasons, and, at the outset, reform and improve the society that was responsible ˆ‘””‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǯ•‡‡”‰‡ ‡ǤŠ—•ǡ–Š‡’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽƒ†‡ ‘‘‹  ‘ϐŽ‹ – with feudalism and imperialism should replace the battle against theocracy and superstition. ʹǤ –Š‡’”‘ ‡••‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡”‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘‹–•Š‘—Ž†„‡’‘••‹„Ž‡ ˆ‘” communists and religious followers, on the basis of mutual respect, –‘ ”‡ƒ–‡ ƒ ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ ƒŽŽ‹ƒ ‡ ‹ –Š‡ ϐ‹‰Š– ƒ‰ƒ‹•– ‹’‡”‹ƒŽ‹•ƒ† feudalism. At the ideological level there was no compromise or sim- ilarity between the CPC and religion. At the political and practical level however, there was indeed a consensus between the two and ƒ—‹ϐ‹‡†ˆ”‘–Šƒ†–‘„‡ˆ‘—†‡†ǤŠ‡ ‘—‹•–•ƒ†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”••Š‘—Ž†ϐ‹†ƒ—–—ƒŽ„ƒ•‹•ˆ‘”–Š‡Ž‹„‡”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒƒ† ƒ˜‘‹†–Š‡‹”‹†‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•ǤŠ‡–Š‡‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡—‹ϐ‹‡†ˆ”‘–™ƒ• namely one of the most important secret weapons of the CPC during the Chinese revolution. ͵ǤŠ‡ˆ”‡‡†‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•„‡Ž‹‡ˆ•Š‘—Ž†„‡”‡•’‡ –‡†ƒ†’”‘–‡ –‡†Ǥ Religious beliefs were namely the private matter of religious fol- lowers. The CPC’s duty should be the development and reform of society. With the progress and improvement of Chinese society, re- ligious followers will have no further use for their beliefs, and thus will give up their religious beliefs of themselves. In this process of social development and historical progress, religion will gradual- ly disappear from human history. For this reason it is unnecessary and improper for the –‘ϐ‹‰Š–ƒ‰ƒ‹•–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘†‹”‡ –Ž›Ǥ ͷͺ Zhuo Xinping

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, religious freedom was theoretically guaranteed in the new constitution. The principle of a ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽƒŽŽ‹ƒ ‡ƒ†—‹ϐ‹‡†ˆ”‘–™‹–Š”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•‹•ǡƒ•ƒŽ™ƒ›•ǡ emphasized by the CPC. During this time, the CPC had a theory of the Dzϐ‹˜‡ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ •dz‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹–Š‹•ˆ”ƒ‡™‘”ǡƒ‡Ž›–Šƒ–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ had a mass characteristic as well as national, international, complex, and long-term characteristics. At the same time, however, a reform or a conforming of religion itself to the new society should also be called for. All religions in China must shift from their connection to the old Chi- nese society to conformity with the new socialist society. This means that religion must overcome, on one hand, as in Buddhism and Daoism, its feudalistic elements, and on the other, as in Christianity, its impe- rialistic pressures. In reality, religion was considered for a short time, ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›ˆ”‘ͳͻͷ͹–‘ͳͻ͹͹ǡ–‘„‡‡”‡Ž›ƒ’ƒ••‹˜‡ǡ‡‰ƒ–‹˜‡ˆƒ –‘”‹ the establishment of Chinese socialism. After the Cultural Revolution, especially since the opening of China to the outside and its economic ƒ†’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ”‡ˆ‘”••‹ ‡ͳͻ͹͹ǡˆ”‡‡†‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•„‡Ž‹‡ˆ•‹•ƒ‰ƒ‹ ˜ƒŽ—‡†Ǥ ƒ††‹–‹‘–‘–Š‡Dzϐ‹˜‡ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ •dz‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǡ–Š‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Šƒ•„‡‡‹ Ž—†‡†Ǥ ͳͻͺʹǡ‘ —‡–ͷͿ, “About the basic viewpoints and basis politics in relation to religion in the so- cialist period of our nation,” was published by the CPC. This document demonstrates a new starting point for religion politics and the under- standing of religion through the opening of China to the outside. In the new state of social development of China and its relations abroad, the CPC maintains the standpoint of “extreme care”, “absolute seriousness”, ƒ†Dz ‘•–ƒ–”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‘dz‹”‡Žƒ–‹‘–‘”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•’”‘„Ž‡•Ǥ’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›ǡ the proper treatment of such religious problems by the CPC affects the stability of society, the unity of the nationalities in China as well as the ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘””‡’—–ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒ‹–Š‡™‘”Ž†Ǥ To elucidate the basic viewpoints of the CPC’s religion politics in this period, the following ten points must be noted: ͳǤ‡Ž‹‰‹‘Šƒ•ƒ’”‘ ‡••‘ˆ‡‡”‰‡ ‡ǡ†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–ƒ††‡ Ž‹‡Ǥ‡- ligion will exist for a long time in socialist society. In socialism, reli- gion may not be abolished or developed by the government. ʹǤ ”‡‡†‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•„‡Ž‹‡ˆ‹•’”‘–‡ –‡†„›–Š‡ ‘•–‹–—–‹‘Ǥ‹–‹œ‡• have not only the freedom to believe in a religion, but also the free- dom not to believe in a religion.  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͷͻ

͵Ǥ‘‡Šƒ†ǡ‹–‹•‹’‘”–ƒ––‘’”‘’ƒ‰ƒ–‡ƒ–Š‡‹•ǡ„—––Š‡†‹ˆˆ‡”- ence between theism and atheism must not be seen as a political dichotomy. The correct relationship between the two should be sol- idarity and cooperation in politics and mutual respect of beliefs. ͶǤŠ‡•–ƒ–‡•Š‘—Ž†•—’‡”˜‹•‡–Š‡Žƒ™ ‘ ‡”‹‰”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‹••—‡•ǡ protect normal religious activities and their lawful interests, and prevent and repress unlawful and criminal activities in the use of religion. ͷǤŠ‡†‹• ”‡’ƒ ›‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‹•’”‹ƒ”‹Ž›ƒ†‹• ”‡’ƒ › within the people. However, under certain circumstances it is also possible that antagonistic discrepancies arise. These two dissimilar discrepancies must be rigorously differentiated and dealt with ap- propriately and carefully. ͸ǤŠ‹ƒ™‹ŽŽƒ†Š‡”‡–‘–Š‡’”‹ ‹’Ž‡‘ˆ‹†‡’‡†‡ ‡ǡ•‡ŽˆǦ•—ˆϐ‹ ‹‡ ›ǡ ƒ†•‡ŽˆǦ‰‘˜‡”ƒ ‡‹”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•ƒ––‡”•ǡƒ†”‡•‹•–ƒ›•‘”–‘ˆ‹ϐ‹Ž- tration into religious practices through foreign enemy powers. The interference in China’s religious affairs by any religious organiza- –‹‘‘”ƒ’—„Ž‹ ϐ‹‰—”‡ˆ”‘ƒˆ‘”‡‹‰ ‘—–”›‹•‘–ƒŽŽ‘™‡†Ǥ ͹ǤŠ‡’ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•ƒ”‡‰‘‘†„”‹†‰‡•„‡–™‡‡–Š‡ CPC, the government, and the religious believers in China. Their positive role should unfold to its fullest extent. ͺǤŠ‡’”‹‡•–•‘ˆ’ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘••Š‘—Ž†Šƒ˜‡ƒ•›•- tematic education that includes administration. ͻǤ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•Š‘—Ž†„‡’‘•‹–‹˜‡Ž›‰—‹†‡†–‘ƒ –‹˜‡Ž› ‘ˆ‘”–‘–Š‡•‘- cialist society. The circle of religion should keep its activities within the lawfully allowed framework. ͳͲǤŽŽ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•ƒ†’—„Ž‹ ϐ‹‰—”‡•—•–—’Š‘Ž†–Š‡†‹‰- nity of the law, the interests of the people, the unity of the national- ities, and the unity of the state. These principles are primarily portrayed on the political and social lev- el. However, some basic theoretical considerations about the existence and function of religion in China are present in the new situation: ͳǤ‘ ‡”‹‰–Š‡ƒ–—”‡ƒ†–Š‡ ‘ ‡’–‹‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǣŠ‡ϐ‹”•–ƒ† most fundamental question concerning the understanding of reli- gion is that of the nature of religion. According to Marxist under- •–ƒ†‹‰ǡ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•ƒDz”‡˜‡”•‡†˜‹‡™‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†dz–Šƒ–”‡ϐŽ‡ –•ƒ “reversed world”. In this context, Lenin understood the thesis “reli- Ͳ Zhuo Xinping

gion is the opium of the people” to be “the cornerstone of Marxism’s entire weltanschauung on the question of religion”. However, with –Š‹•–Š‡‘”‡–‹ ƒŽ’”‡‹•‡‹–‹•˜‡”›†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‘ƒ••‡••–Š‡‡š‹•–‡ ‡‘ˆ religion in socialist China today. If religion is a “reversed awareness ‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†dzǡ‹•–Š‡‘—”•‘ ‹ƒŽ‹•–ƒ–‹‘ƒDz”‡˜‡”•‡†™‘”Ž†dzǫŠ‹•‹• really a dilemma in the discussion about the nature and existence of religion in today’s China. One must either accept this thesis and thus criticize and deny our own social basis, or simply cautiously ‹‰‘”‡–Š‹•–‘’‹ Ǥ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻ͹Ͳ•ƒ†–Š‡„‡‰‹‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ ͳͻͺͲ•–Š‹•†‹ˆˆ‡”‡ ‡‘ˆ‘’‹‹‘Ž‡ƒ†–‘Š‡ƒ–‡††‡„ƒ–‡•‹Š‹‡•‡ theoretical circles. This debate, called the “opium war between north and south China”, brought the analysis of Marxist statements about religion a step further, and had a positive effect on the under- •–ƒ†‹‰‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒǤ •— ŠƒƒƒŽ›•‹•ǡ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•†‡ϐ‹‡† as a spiritual belief or ideology. Thus the question stands: Is religion necessarily the unavoidable adversary for the Marxist or socialist ‹†‡‘Ž‘‰›ƒ†™‡Ž–ƒ• Šƒ——‰ǫ––Š‹•Ž‡˜‡Ž‹–‹••–‹ŽŽ†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–‹Š‹- na today for the Marxist theory of religion to come to a consensus or compromise, but the principle of “progressive development with time” and “progressive renewal with time” in today’s Marxism with Chinese characteristics brings us new hope. The primary distin- guishing feature of the dialectic method in Marxism is the empha- sis on the movement, development and continual transformation of ƒŽŽ–Š‹‰•Ǥ—Ž–—”ƒŽ’ƒ––‡”•ƒ”‡•—„Œ‡ ––‘ƒ ‘–‹—ƒŽ‘†‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘Ǥ Every period has its own conditions. Not only ideas and thoughts, but even epistemological norms are continually renewed. In histor- ical development both religion and Marxism can and actually will continually renew themselves and change. In the future, a consen- sus of the two will be thereby also possible. This can guarantee the ultimate normalization of the relationship between them. ʹǤ‘ ‡”‹‰–Š‡•‘ ‹ƒŽˆ— –‹‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǣ––Š‡’”‡•‡––‹‡–Š‡”‡ ƒ”‡–Š‡‘”‡–‹ ƒŽǡ•‘ ‹‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽƒ†‹†‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽ†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘•‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹ China. That is to say, the concept of religion is apprehended either from the viewpoint of its ideological beliefs or judged by its social ˆ— –‹‘ƒ†‡ƒ‹‰Ǥ ˆ‘‡Šƒ•†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–‹‡•™‹–Šƒ‹†‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽ ‘- sensus, one rather examines the meaning and value of religion from the viewpoint of its social function. In this understanding, however, both the positive and negative functions of religion are stressed. Included in religion’s positive functions in socialist China are name-  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͸ͳ

ly its function of psychological conformity, social integration, the socialization of individuals, and the awareness of equality, culture and good manners. However, the possible negative functions of re- ligion are also not ignored, such as conservatism, fatalism, fanati- cism, the psychological repression of reality, the division of society through the emphasis on individual denominations instead of social unity, etc. Here the subjective evaluation or differentiation between correct and incorrect is not mentioned, but rather only an objective description of religion’s positive or negative function for society. The active adaptation of religion to Chinese society is namely to de- velop its positive functions and avoid those that are negative. ͵Ǥ‘ ‡”‹‰ –Š‡ ‡š‹•–‡ ‡ ‘ˆ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ ‹ ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”› Š‹ƒǣ – ‹• Ž‡ƒ”–Šƒ–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘™‹ŽŽŽ‘‰‡š‹•–‹Š‹ƒƒ†™‹ŽŽ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡–Š‡ broad masses. In this respect one must answer the question: Is re- Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ„ƒ•‹ ’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡•‘ ‹ƒŽ•—’‡”•–”— –—”‡‹Š‹ƒǫ”‡–Š‡”‡- ligious faithful also a part of the broad masses that President Jiang Zemin ⊏⌭≁ emphasizes in his theory of the “Three Representa- –‹˜‡•dzǫ ͶǤ‘ ‡”‹‰–Š‡”‡Žƒ–‹‘•Š‹’„‡–™‡‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ†’‘Ž‹–‹ •ǣŠ”‘—‰Š religion’s “intermediary condition”, in modern society the political function of religion is normally indirectly realized as being “ a-polit- ical”. The principle in contemporary society is, for most states, the separation of religion and politics or of religion and government. ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ”‡ƒ‹•‹ƒ˜‡”›†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–”‡Žƒ–‹‘•Š‹’–‘ politics. It should not be entirely clear whether it exists separately from politics or inseparably. On one hand, one stresses the differ- ence between religious world views and the current mainstream of the socialist ideology, and on the other hand, religious organization has a very strong political consciousness. This is a contradiction that does not seem to be in harmony with the present day devel- opment in China. At the moment one talks about legislation for re- Ž‹‰‹‘—•ƒ––‡”•‹Š‹ƒǤ ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ•— ŠŽ‡‰‹•Žƒ–‹‘‹•˜‡”›†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž– without a consensus on the basic concept of religion and religious understanding. To put it clearly, in this state of affairs one does not understand whether such legislation should protect the rights and duties of believers or limit religious activities. ͸ʹ Zhuo Xinping

New Developments in Religion Politics and the Understanding of Religion in China

”‘‡ ‡„‡”ͳͲ–‘ͳʹǡʹͲͲͳǡƒƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‘ˆ‡”‡ ‡ƒ„‘—–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• matters and religion politics in China was convened. At the conference President Jiang Zemin listed three characteristics of contemporary world religions: ͳǤŠ‡‡š‹•–‡ ‡‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Šƒ•‹–•†‡‡’Š‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽƒ†•‘ ‹ƒŽ”‘‘–•Ǥ‡- ligion will exist for a very long time and will have lasting effects. Marxism holds the view that, with the development of social pro- ductive resources, the progress of civilization and the increase of ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹˜‡ƒ™ƒ”‡‡••‘ˆ–Š‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†–Š”‘—‰Š–Š‡•‡ǡ–Š‡‰”ƒ†- ual reduction of the basis and prerequisites for religious existence, ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘™‹ŽŽϐ‹ƒŽŽ›˜ƒ‹•ŠǤ ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Š‡†‹•ƒ’’‡ƒ”ƒ ‡‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ ‹•ƒ˜‡”›Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡”’”‘ ‡••–Šƒ–ƒ›Žƒ•–Ž‘‰‡”–Šƒ––Š‡ϐ‹ƒŽ‡š- tinction of classes and states. ʹǤ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹• Ž‘•‡Ž›–‹‡†–‘‡ ‘‘‹ ǡ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽǡƒ† —Ž–—”ƒŽ’”‘„Ž‡•ǡ ƒ†–Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡Šƒ•ƒŽƒ”‰‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘–Š‡•–ƒ„‹Ž‹–›‘ˆ•‘ ‹‡–›ǤŠ‡ prerequisite for the existence of religion is faith in broad masses of the population. This mass character of religion very often gives rise to tremendous social force. If handled correctly this force can have a very positive role in the development and the stability of society. If not, it can have a negative and even destructive function. This crucial point is dependent on the effective establishment and ad- ministration of religion. ͵Ǥ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•ƒŽ•‘˜‡”›‘ˆ–‡‹˜‘Ž˜‡†‹‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•ƒ† real battles and is therefore an important factor in international re- lations as well as in world politics. Through their expansion, some of the world’s large religions are already multi-national religions. In this sense religion is not only an important factor in internation- al relations and in world politics, but is also interwoven with their ‘–”ƒ†‹ –‹‘•ƒ† ‘ϐŽ‹ –•Ǥ ‘”–Š‹•”‡ƒ•‘‘‡—•–‘–—†‡”‡•- –‹ƒ–‡–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹ ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”›™‘”Ž†’‘Ž‹–‹ •Ǥ ˆ not handled correctly, religion can churn up a stormy sea in inter- national affairs, and can give rise to the so-called “clash of civiliza- tions”. This conference made the fundamental tasks needed for the new cen- tury in religious matters even clearer. The required work entails these  ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†–Š‡‘ ‡’–‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ͸͵

ϐ‹˜‡ƒ•’‡ –•ǣͳȌ–Š‡‹–‡‰”ƒŽ‹’Ž‡‡–ƒ–‹‘‘ˆˆ”‡‡†‘‹”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•„‡- liefs in the politics of the ǡʹȌ–Š‡ƒ†‹‹•–”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•ƒ––‡”• ‹ƒ ‘”†ƒ ‡™‹–Š–Š‡Žƒ™ǡ͵Ȍ–Š‡ƒ –‹˜‡‰—‹†‹‰‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘–‘•‘ ‹ƒŽ ‘ˆ‘”‹–›ǡͶȌ–Š‡ƒ†Š‡”‡ ‡–‘–Š‡’”‹ ‹’Ž‡•‘ˆ‹†‡’‡†‡ ‡ǡƒ—–‘‘- ›ƒ†•‡ŽˆǦ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‹Š‹ƒǡƒ†ͷȌ–Š‡‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡– and development of a patriotic united front between the CPC and the religious sphere. Š‘”–Ž›ƒˆ–‡”–Š‹• ‘ˆ‡”‡ ‡ǡ‘‡ ‡„‡”ͳ͸ǡʹͲͲͳǡƒ›‘—‰˜‹ ‡Ǧ‹- ister named Pan Yue █ዣˆ”‘–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‡‘ˆ–ƒ–‡†˜‹•‘”›‘ƒ”†ˆ‘” ‘- nomic Structure Reforms published an article entitled “The necessity for the development of Marxist religious theories over time”. In this article he described his understanding of the relationship between the Commu- ‹•–ƒ”–›ƒ†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǥ ‡•–”‡••‡†ǣͳȌ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•‘Ž‘‰‡”Dzopium for –Š‡ƒ••‡•dzǤŠ‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ ‡‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ•ƒDz–Š‡‘”›ƒ„‘—––Š‡Š‡”‡ƒˆ–‡”dz and as “wisdom for the next life” is that the Communist Party should not –”‡ƒ–‹–ƒ•ƒ‡‡›„—–”ƒ–Š‡”ƒ•ƒ‹””‘”ǤʹȌŠ‡ˆ— –‹‘‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǯ• spiritual recompensation is irreplaceable. One must respect the spiritu- ƒŽ™‘”Ž†ƒ†–Š‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•™ƒ›‘ˆŽ‹ˆ‡‘ˆ–Š‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘Ǥ͵Ȍ‡Ž‹‰‹‘Šƒ• special functions for the population as, for example, psychic, moral, and cultural functions as well functions in the service and well-being of the ’‡‘’Ž‡ǤͶȌ •‘ ‹ƒŽ‹•–•‘ ‹‡–›‹–‹•‡ ‡••ƒ”›–‘ ”‡ƒ–‡ƒ‡™• ‹‡–‹ϐ‹  and rational relationship between religion and the government as well as between religion and politics. It is namely possible that they work very well with each other. Quoting Lenin, he even implied in his article that re- ligious believers, inasmuch as they are part of the political consensus and work together on the united front, would be allowed to become members of the Communist Party. His opinion immediately set off heated debates and also sharp criticism in China. The differences of opinion regarding religion can once again be clearly observed. It is interesting to note that this article had very positive reactions in religious circles on the Chinese mainland and also received fantastic speculations in Hong Kong and its vicinity. To conclude we should observe that religious politics and religious un- derstanding in China today stands at a crossroad. The deliberation about religious matters in China is primarily motivated by political and social interests. If religion, both in China and abroad, can contribute positive- ly to Chinese development and transformation, then we certainly have wide possibilities for the active acceptance of religion by the CPC and the ͸Ͷ Zhuo Xinping

Chinese population, not only in the sense of politics, society and culture, „—–ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›ƒŽ•‘‹–Š‡•‡•‡‘ˆ™‡Ž–ƒ• Šƒ——‰ƒ†•’‹”‹–—ƒŽ‹–›Ǥ

References

ƒ‹ͳͻͳ͹– Cai Yuanpei, “Yi meiyu dai zongjiao” (Replace Religion with Aesthetic Edu- ƒ–‹‘Ȍ. Xin qingnianȋ‡™‘—–ŠȌ”Ǥ͸ȋͳͻͳ͹ȌǤ ƒ‰ͳͻͺͺ – Wang Zhixin, Zhongguo Zongjiao Sixiangshi Dagang (Outline of Chinese ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ‹•–‘”›‘ˆŠ‘—‰Š–ȌǤŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͳͻͺͺǤ ‹‡ͳͻͷͲ – Xie Fuya, Zongjiao ZhexueȋŠ‹Ž‘•‘’Š›‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǣ‘—–Š”‡•• ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ǡͳͻͷͲǤ Š—‘ ͳͻͻͻ – Zhuo Xinping, Zongjiao Lijie ȋŠ‡ —†‡”•–ƒ†‹‰ ‘ˆ ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȌǤ ‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ ‘ —‡–•ˆ‘”‘ ‹ƒŽ ‹‡ ‡”‡••ǡͳͻͻͻǤ Chinese Jews and Jews in China Kaifeng – Shanghai

Irene Eber

n both imperial and modern China, Jews were a small minority in comparison to the larger Moslem and Christian minorities. At most Ithere may have been several thousand Jews in past ages and possibly ƒ”‘—†͵ͲǡͲͲͲ„›–Š‡‹†Ǧ–™‡–‹‡–Š ‡–—”›Ǥ‡––Š‡•‡•ƒŽŽ ‘—- nities have invited considerable scholarly attention over the years, and their histories of remoter periods and more recent times have raised a number of questions. One of these, and the one to be taken up in this pa- per, is how the Jews in Kaifeng 䮻ሱ and in Shanghai, each at a different time and a different place, accommodated themselves to the Chinese environment. By Chinese Jews, I mean primarily those who settled in Kaifeng in the twelfth century, the initial group being augmented by newcomers probably over the next two hundred years. By Jews in Chi- na, I have in mind the disparate groups who arrived in Shanghai after the ’‹—ƒ”ȋͳͺ͵ͻȂͳͺͶʹȌ–Šƒ– ‘•‹•–‡†‹‹–‹ƒŽŽ›‘ˆ‘•–Ž›Sephardi Jews,ͳ then Russian, and later Central European Jews. Although we speak of Kaifeng Jews, it must be remembered that at least until the seventeenth century, Jewish communities existed in Ningbo ሗ⌒, Yangzhou ᨊᐎ, and Ningxia ሗ༿. The more recent Shang- hai communities were similarly not the only ones. There were also or- ganized communities in Harbin and Tianjin ཙ⍕, although they were

I thank Professor A. Altman for his careful comments on this paper and the Tru- man Research Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for its partial sup- port of this research. ͳ Sephardi communities were widespread throughout the Mediterranean countries, North Africa, the Balkans, but also in portions of Western and Central Europe. Sephardim have distinctive rituals, differences in liturgy and some traditions that differ from those of the Ashkenazim. Most of the Sephardim who came to Shanghai hailed originally from Iraq and are often also referred to as Baghdadis.

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’Ǥ͸ͷȂͺͻǤ ͸͸ Irene Eber smaller. In this paper I will discuss only the Kaifeng Jews, as data about the other communities is lacking, and the Shanghai communities.

Beginnings of the Kaifeng Jewish Community

Jewish merchants, having come overland, probably traded on the Chang’an 䮧ᆹ market during the Tang dynasty.ʹ They might also have reached China by sea, sailing together with Arab merchants to Guang- zhou ᔓᐎȋƒ–‘Ȍǡ„—––Š‡”‡‹•Ž‹––Ž‡‘”‘‡˜‹†‡ ‡–‘•—’’‘”––Š‹• conclusively. Nor is there evidence for the presence of an actual Jewish community during the Tang dynasty. The existence of a later Jewish community in ƒ‹ˆ‡‰‹•ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡƒ’Ž›†‘ —‡–‡†‘ϐ‹˜‡•–‡Žƒ‡‹- • ”‹’–‹‘•ǡ†ƒ–‹‰ˆ”‘ͳͶͺͻǡͳͷͳʹǡ–™‘ˆ”‘ͳ͸͸͵ǡƒ†ͳ͸͹ͻǡƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š the information on these is fragmentary.͵ ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š‡ͳͶͺͻ•–‡Ž‡ǡ –Š‡ϐ‹”•–synagogue was built in ƒ‹ˆ‡‰‹ͳͳ͸͵ǡ™Š‹ Š‹†‹ ƒ–‡•–Šƒ– „›–Š‡ƒ•—ˆϐ‹ ‹‡–—„‡”‘ˆJews had arrived to warrant a house of prayer. It can be assumed that they were merchants who came in small groups over a period of time together with other merchants headed for –Š‡ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡‡’‹”‡ǤŠ‡ͳͶͺͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘•–ƒ–‡•–Šƒ––Š‡›™‡”‡ cotton merchants from India (Tianzhu ཙㄪȌǤŠ‹••‡‡•’Žƒ—•‹„Ž‡ǡƒ• cotton began to be cultivated only during the Northern Song dynasty in the Yangzi (Changjiang 䮧⊏Ȍ delta and was not yet widely available throughout the empire. Where precisely they came from in India is not known, nor can we be certain that they were Indian Jews.Ͷ Quite like- ly they arrived in Kaifeng before the Jurchen (Ruzhen ྣⵏȌƒ”›Žƒ‹†

ʹ A selikhot or penitential prayer written on paper and dating from the Tang dy- nasty was found in Dunhuang ᮖ❼. As paper was not in general use in Europe at that time, it must be assumed that it was written in China by someone who left „›–Š‡‘˜‡”Žƒ†”‘—–‡ȋ‡”‰‡”Ȁ Š™ƒ„ͳͻͳ͵ǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ͻȂͳ͹ͷȌǤ ‹‰—”‹‡•‘ˆPersians and so-called Semitic merchants and musicians are well known. Among them are ϐ‹‰—”‹‡•‹†‹•–‹ –‹˜‡ǡ‘Ǧ‡”•‹ƒ‰ƒ”„–Šƒ– ‘—Ž†„‡‘ˆJews from farther west, or even from Franco-German lands. ͵The stelae were inscribed and erected to commemorate special events in commu- ƒŽŽ‹ˆ‡ǤŠ‡ͳͶͺͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘ ‘‡‘”ƒ–‡•–Š‡”‡ ‘•–”— –‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡synagogue „—‹Ž†‹‰•ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡†‹•ƒ•–”‘—•ϐŽ‘‘†‘ˆͳͶ͸ͳǡƒ†–Šƒ–‘ˆͳͷͳʹǡ‘–Š‡”‡˜‡”•‡•‹†‡ǡ ’”‘˜‹†‡••—’’Ž‡‡–ƒ”›‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ǤŠ‡•–‘‡™‹–Š–Š‡–™‘ͳ͸͸͵‹• ”‹’–‹‘• ȋ‘™Ž‘•–Ȍ™ƒ•‡”‡ –‡†ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡ͳ͸ͶʹϐŽ‘‘†ǤŠ‡‘ ƒ•‹‘ˆ‘”–Š‡ͳ͸͹ͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘ was the erection of the Zhao family archway. The Chinese texts can be found in Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸Ȁ ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͷȂ͵ͻǡͷͳȂͷͶǡͺͲȂͺͷǡͻͶȂͻͷǡƒ†ͳͲͶȂͳͲ͹Ǥ Ͷ Merchants from different places tended to band together for sea voyages, consti- –—–‹‰ƒ’‘Ž›‰Ž‘–•‘ ‹‡–›–Šƒ––”ƒ†‡†ˆƒ”ƒ†™‹†‡ȋ Š‘•ŠͳͻͻʹȌǤŠ‡”‡‹•ƒ’’ƒ”‡–- Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͸͹

•‹‡‰‡–‘–Š‡ ‹–›‹–Š‡™‹–‡”‘ˆͳͳʹ͸ǡ ƒ’–—”‹‰–Š‡ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ‹ ƒ—ƒ”› ͳͳʹ͹Ǥ –‹•†‘—„–ˆ—Ž–Šƒ––”ƒ†‡”•™‘—Ž†Šƒ˜‡˜‡–—”‡†‹–‘ƒ™ƒ”œ‘‡ǡ which would have endangered their merchandise, either during the hostilities, or even shortly thereafter. It is nevertheless clear that they built their synagogue when Kaifeng was under foreign rule and when it was no longer the capital. The attraction to merchants of Song ƒ‹ˆ‡‰™ƒ•–Š‡ ‹–›ǯ•ϐŽ‘—”- ishing commerce. With more than one million inhabitants within the city walls and its suburbs, Kaifeng was an “open” city, with none of the constraints that had characterized earlier Chinese cities. As argued persuasively by Heng Chye Kiang, ƒ‹ˆ‡‰„‘ƒ•–‡†ƒϐŽ‘™‡”‹‰—”„ƒ culture with commerce and consumerism a part of urban life.ͷ In this new kind of city with its unrestrained commercial and entertainment establishments, a group of foreign ‡” Šƒ–•™‘—Ž†Šƒ˜‡Šƒ†‘†‹ˆϐ‹- —Ž–›ϐ‹†‹‰–Š‡‹”’Žƒ ‡ǤŠƒ–ƒ›Šƒ˜‡„‡‡ ‘•‹†‡”‡†ƒ–‡’‘”ƒ”› ”‡•‹†‡ ‡ƒ–ϐ‹”•–ǡ„‡ ƒ‡ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡƒ’‡”ƒ‡–Š‘‡†—‡–‘–Š‡—- •‡––Ž‡† ‘†‹–‹‘•Ȃƒ’‡ƒ ‡–”‡ƒ–›™ƒ••‹‰‡†‘Ž›‹ͳͳͶͳȂ„—–ƒŽ•‘ because trading relations between the Jin 䠁 G›ƒ•–›ȋͳͳͳͷȂͳʹ͵ͶȌƒ† –Š‡‘—–Š‡”‘‰ȋͳͳʹ͹Ȃͳʹ͹ͻȌ™‡”‡ƒ‹–ƒ‹‡†Ǥ͸ The fact that they built a synagogue after Kaifeng had come under Jin control (together ™‹–Š–Š‡”‡•–‘ˆ‘”–ŠŠ‹ƒȌƒ›˜‡”›™‡ŽŽ‹†‹ ƒ–‡–Šƒ––”ƒ†‹‰ ‘†‹- tions continued to be favorable and that they had settled permanently in Kaifeng. No doubt, relations with other Jewish communities were maintained in the Jin period and especially during the subsequent Yuan dynasty. •ƒ”‡•—Ž–‘ˆ–Š‡ϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‹‰ ƒ”ƒ˜ƒƒ†•‡ƒ–”ƒ†‡‹–Š‡Mongol pe- riod, Jews from other parts of the vast Mongol empire may have set- tled in Kaifeng and in other cities. However, we know nothing about them, how they perpetuated their Judaism, how precisely they made –Š‡‹”Ž‹˜‹‰ǡ‘”Š‘™–Š‡›™‡”‡ƒ ‡’–‡†„›–Š‡‹”Š‹‡•‡Š‘•–•ǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•– further information is not until three centuries later, from the Ming dy- ƒ•–›Ǥ˜‡–Š‡ǡ–Š‡†ƒ–ƒ–Šƒ– ƒ„‡‰Ž‡ƒ‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡ͳͶͺͻƒ†ͳͷͳʹ inscriptions is very fragmentary. The information from these, useful to this topic, can be summarized as follows. The Jews had assumed, or were permitted to assume, Chinese surnames in the early years of the

ly a Kaifeng connection to both Persia and Yemen in the later liturgy of the Kaifeng ‡™•ȋ‡”„Ž‘™•›ͳͻͻͶǡ’’Ǥͷͺ͹ȂͷͻͷȌǤ ͷ ‡‰ͳͻͻͻǤ ͸ Š‹„ƒͳͻͺ͵ǡ’’ǤͳͲʹȂͳͲ͵Ǥ ͸ͺ Irene Eber

Ming dynasty. Jews from other communities contributed to the recon- struction of the •›ƒ‰‘‰—‡†‡˜ƒ•–ƒ–‡†„›ϐŽ‘‘†‹ͳͶ͸ͳǡ‹†‹ ƒ–‹˜‡„‘–Š of the prosperity of communities other than Kaifeng and of contacts between communities. Two scrolls of the Torah were provided by Ning- bo Jews, which furthermore, supports the assumption that it, too, must Šƒ˜‡„‡‡ƒϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‹‰ ‘—‹–›ƒ––Š‡–‹‡Ǥ͹

From Communal to Family Identity

The Jesuits have provided more concrete information about the Kai- feng Jews in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A famous ‡‡–‹‰–‘‘’Žƒ ‡‹ͳ͸Ͳͷ„‡–™‡‡–Š‡ ‡™Ai Tian 㢮⭠, who had come to ‡‹Œ‹‰‹•‡ƒ” Š‘ˆƒ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ’’‘‹–‡–ǡƒ†ƒ––‡‘Ricci ȋͳͷͷͳȂͳ͸ͳͲȌǤŠ‹•‡’‹•‘†‡ȂRicci assuming that Ai Tian was Christian and Ai Tian thinking that Ricci was Jewish – is well known and needs no further comment. More importantly, in the wake of this meeting a number of Jesuit fathers visited ƒ‹ˆ‡‰—–‹Ž–Š‡›‡ƒ”ͳ͹ʹ͵ǡ™Š‡–Š‡› ™‡”‡ ‘ϐ‹‡†–‘Beijing and Guangzhou by order of the Yongzheng 䳽 ↓ ‡’‡”‘”ȋ”Ǥͳ͹ʹ͵Ȃͳ͹͵ͷȌǤŠ‡ ‡•—‹–Ž‡––‡”•ǡ–‘‰‡–Š‡”™‹–Š–Š‡ͳ͸͸͵ ƒ†–Š‡ͳ͸͹ͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘•ǡ”‡˜‡ƒŽƒ’‹ –—”‡‘ˆƒ’”‘•’‡”‘—•ƒ†•— ‡••- ful community. Its members led rich Jewish lives in addition to being active in Chinese society, with a number of families reaching elite sta- –—•™Š‡•‘•”‡ ‡‹˜‡†‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ’’‘‹–‡–•‹–Š‡‹’‡”‹ƒŽ„—”‡ƒ—- cracy. A drawing of the synagogue, based on sketches prepared by Jean ‘‡‰‡‹ͳ͹ʹʹǡ•Š‘™•ƒŠ‹‡•‡Ǧ•–›Ž‡„—‹Ž†‹‰‘ˆ‹’‘•‹‰•‹œ‡Ǥͺ Un- fortunately, nothing is known of the fate of the Jews between the last Je- •—‹–˜‹•‹–‹ͳ͹ʹ͵ƒ†–Š‡ϐ‹”•–Protestant visitor, W.A.P. ƒ”–‹ǡ‹ͳͺ͸͸ǡ whose dramatic description of the visit still makes enjoyable reading.ͻ Clearly, however, by the mid-nineteenth century the Jewish commu- nity had been declining for quite some time. There was no longer a head (zhangjiao 䮧ᮉȌ‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘—‹–›ǡ–Š‡Žƒ•–‘‡Šƒ˜‹‰†‹‡†‹ͳͺͳͲǤ Circumcision was also no longer practiced and knowledge of Hebrew had ceased. Abstinence from pork was apparently still practiced, possi- bly under ‘•Ž‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ǤŠ‡synagogue had, however disappeared.

͹ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’Ǥʹ͹Ȃ͵ͲǤ ͺ The drawing is of the •›ƒ‰‘‰—‡–Šƒ–™ƒ•”‡„—‹Ž–‹ͳ͸͸͵ƒˆ–‡”‹–Šƒ†„‡‡†‡- •–”‘›‡†„›ƒϐŽ‘‘†‹ͳ͸Ͷʹ ƒ—•‡†„›Li Zicheng ᵾ㠚ᡀȋ ƒǤͳ͸ͲͷȂͳ͸ͶͷȌ”‡„‡Ž• —–- ting the Yellow River dykes in the waning days of the Ming dynasty. ͻ ƒ”–‹ͳͺ͸͸ǡ’ǤʹǤ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͸ͻ

–Šƒ†„‡‡•‡˜‡”‡Ž›†ƒƒ‰‡†„›ϐŽ‘‘†•‹ͳͺͶͻƒ†™ƒ•†‹•ƒ–Ž‡† some time thereafter. This brief outline raises a number of questions. How had the Jews maintained their Jewish identity for seven centuries with minimal or ‘ ‘–ƒ –•™‹–Š ‘Ǧ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹•–•‘—–•‹†‡‘ˆŠ‹ƒǫ‘•‹†‡”‹‰–Šƒ– their numbers were not augmented from outside of China for some- thing like three centuries, how were they able to maintain a numeri- ƒŽŽ›ƒ†‡“—ƒ–‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ǫŠ›™‡”‡–Š‡›‘–”ƒ’‹†Ž›ƒ••‹‹Žƒ–‡†„› the Chinese society, which had erected no barriers against them and apparently did not discriminate against ‡™•ǫŠ‘—Ž†™‡•‡‡ƒ•™‡”• concerning the maintenance of Jewish identity in the strength of Jewish practices, or rather in those aspects of Chinese culture and society that ™‡”‡ ‘†— ‹˜‡–‘–Š‡‹” ‘–‹—‹‰‹†‡–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ƒ• ‡™•ǫ –Š‡ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™- ing I shall argue that it was a unique combination of both. The acquisition of Chinese surnames, mentioned earlier, may be con- sidered a major step for Jewish integration into Chinese society. This occurred at more or less the same time that the Chinese family organi- zation into lineages was adopted. Such a transition was not a major step for these Jews, since most or all were undoubtedly Sephardi, whose cus- tom it was to organize into clans. Moreover, Sephardi Jews practiced polygamy, which, depending on their means, they continued to practice in Kaifeng. Their memorial or genealogy book of some centuries lat- ‡”Ž‹•–•–Š‡ϐ‹”•–™‹ˆ‡ƒ•Jewish and other wives as Chinese.ͳͲ Possibly they took Chinese wives due to the scarcity of Jewish women. Be that as it may, it suggests more importantly a more rapid population growth than if they had been monogamous. But Chinese lineages differ in several ways from what is understood by the term clan. A lineage generally traces its origin to one ancestor, goes by one surname, is domiciled in one locality, and holds some proper- ty, including a burial ground, in common. Evidence for the assumption of such lineage organization by the Kaifeng Jews comes from two sources: inscriptions on the stelae and ‡‡–‡”‹‡•ǤŠ‡ͳ͸͸͵ƒ‹• ”‹’–‹‘‡- tions “seven surnames” (qixing гဃȌǡ Ž‡ƒ”Ž›‹†‹ ƒ–‹‰–Šƒ–Ž‹‡ƒ‰‡•ƒ”‡ „‡‹‰”‡ˆ‡””‡†–‘ǤŠ‡ͳ͸͹ͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘•–ƒ–‡•–Šƒ–•‡˜‡–›Ǧ–Š”‡‡ƒ‡• ‘•‹•–‘ˆϐ‹˜‡Š—†”‡†ˆƒ‹Ž‹‡•ȋjia ᇦȌǤͳͳ Secondly, family cemeteries

ͳͲ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻͺͶǤŠ‡‡‘”‹ƒŽ„‘‘™ƒ• Ž‘•‡† ƒǤͳ͸͹ͲǤ –‹•‘™Š‡Ž†ƒ––Š‡‹„”ƒ”› of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio. ͳͳ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’ǤͻͶǤ ‘”–Š‡Š‹‡•‡–‡š–•‘ˆ–Š‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘•ǡ Šƒ˜‡—•‡†–Š‘•‡ reproduced in White. ͹Ͳ Irene Eber came into use. Indeed, even if a Jewish cemetery had ever existed in Kaifeng, it has long disappeared. And precisely when this custom was ƒ†‘’–‡†‹•— ‡”–ƒ‹Ǥ –ƒ›Šƒ˜‡„‡‡ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡ͳ͸ͶʹϐŽ‘‘†ǡ„—–‹ƒ› event, it occurred well after the lineage family organization was preva- lent. Wang Yisha refers to several family cemeteries in Kaifeng’s suburbs and adjoining hamlets, among which the Jin 䠁 and Li ᵾ cemeteries each have a “foremost” grave, marked “Old Ancestor’s Grave”.ͳʹ Graves thus ƒ”‡†ƒ”‡‡ƒ––‘‹†‹ ƒ–‡•›„‘Ž‹ ƒŽŽ›ƒ‰ƒ–‹ ƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‘ƒ†–Š‡ original ancestor of the lineage.ͳ͵ Š‡–”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‹–‘Ž‹‡ƒ‰‡•Šƒ••‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹’Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•ˆ‘”–Š‡ “—‡•–‹‘‘ˆ‹†‡–‹–›Ǥ•ƒ”‡•—Ž–‘ˆ–Š‹•–”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ǡ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ with a larger and amorphous Jewish community beyond China’s bor- †‡”•„‡ ƒ‡Ž‡••‹’‘”–ƒ––Šƒ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘™‹–Š–Š‡Ž‹‡ƒ‰‡ƒ†ƒ‰- natic group. As long as lineages remained Jewish, individual Jews were unlikely to abandon their Jewish identity. Although Jewishness could be abandoned and forgotten by an entire family, especially if that family left Kaifeng, Jewishness continued within the lineage as long as a fam- ily remained intact and was domiciled in the same locality. There is, furthermore, no evidence that the Jews ever were a community in the sense in which we know other Jewish communities, with institutions and their designated functions. Indeed, these were not needed as the lineage performed such functions on behalf of its families. Therefore, instead of identifying with a Jewish people, Kaifeng Jewish identity be- came a family-centered identity. This transformation was accompanied and reinforced by how they ȋ‘”’‡”Šƒ’•‡˜‡‘”‡ǡ–Š‡‹”Š‹‡•‡‡‹‰Š„‘”•Ȍ ƒ‡–‘”‡‰ƒ”†–Š‡‹” Jewish practices, namely as similar to those of a religious sect. Like Chinese sects, the Jews were called a jiao ᮉ, which may be variously translated as religion, religious sect, or teaching, and this is how they referred to themselves in the inscriptions. When the word Israel (Yici- Ž—‘›‡ а䌌′ᾝȌ‘ —”•‹–Š‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘•ǡ‹–‹•‘–—•‡†ƒ•–Š‡ƒ‡ of a people, but refers to the founding or establishment of the teach- ing.ͳͶ The inscriptions, furthermore, refer to the Jews as “followers of the teaching,” that is as a sect.ͳͷ But their Chinese neighbors apparently

ͳʹ ƒ‰ͳͻͺͶǡ’’Ǥͳͺ͵ȂͳͺͶǤ ͳ͵ ‘Š‡ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥͷͳ͵Ǥ‘Š‡’‘‹–•‘—––Šƒ––Š‡Ž†Ancestor’s grave was at the apex of a triangular arrangement of graves. ͳͶ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͷǡͷʹǡͺͲǤ ͳͷ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’’Ǥͺ͵ǡͻͶǡͳͲͶǤ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͹ͳ

—•‡†‘”‡•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒ‡•ǣTiaojin-jiao ᥁ㅻᮉȋ•‹‡™Ǧ‡š–”ƒ –‹‰•‡ –Ȍǡ Jiaojing-jiao ᮉ㏃ᮉȋ• ”‹’–—”‡–‡ƒ Š‹‰•‡ –Ȍƒ†lanmao huihui 㯽ᑭഎ എ (blue cap —•Ž‹•ȌǤ‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡ƒ‡•ƒ’’‡ƒ”‘–Š‡•–‡Žƒ‡ǡƒ† Jean-Paul ‘œƒ‹ǯ•‘„•‡”˜ƒ–‹‘‘ˆͳ͹ͲͶ–Šƒ––Š‡ƒ‡Dz•‹‡™Ǧ‡š–”ƒ –- ing sect” was bestowed on the Jews by the “idolaters”ͳ͸™‘—Ž† ‘ϐ‹” that these names were not of their own invention. As admirably described by Daniel Overmyer popular sectarianism, •’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›•› ”‡–‹ •‡ –ƒ”‹ƒ‹•ǡ ‘•‹•–‹‰‘ˆ‹š–—”‡•‘ˆBuddhist, Daoist, Confucian, and ˆ‘Ž‡Ž‡‡–•ǡϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‡†‹˜ƒ”‹‘—•’ƒ”–•‘ˆ–Š‡ Chinese empire, including the North China Plain.ͳ͹ It was a localized and highly fragmented phenomenon and the sects were known by a variety of names. Part of the rural as well as the urban scene, sectar- ians shared a number of characteristics that were not too dissimilar from those of the ‡™•Ǥ‡ –ƒ”‹ƒ•Šƒ†ƒ‡‡–‹‰’Žƒ ‡Ǣƒ•‡–‘ˆ•ƒ ”‡† ™”‹–‹‰•—•‡†‘Ž›„›–Š‘•‡™Š‘’ƒ”–‹ ‹’ƒ–‡†‹•‡ –ƒ”‹ƒ™‘”•Š‹’Ǣƒ Ž‡ƒ†‡”™Š‘‡’––Š‡• ”‹’–—”‡•Ǣƒ†’”ƒ –‹ ‡••’‡ ‹ϐ‹ –‘–Š‡•‡ –•— Š as dietary customs. Which practices the Jews kept can be learned from the inscriptions, the various Jesuit reports, and the few manuscripts that have been re- covered from Kaifeng. The Jews observed the major festivals, including ‘•Š ‘†‡•Šȋ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–‘‘Ȍǡ—”‹ǡƒ†–Š‡ͻth of Av, which commemo- rates the destruction of the Temple. They prayed three times a day with a ‹›ƒȋ–‡‡Ȍǡ”‡ƒ†–Š‡™‡‡Ž›Torah portion, and on special oc- casions as required, read the haphtarah (’”‘’Š‡–‹ ’‘”–‹‘ȌǤŠ‡›‡’– the ƒ„„ƒ–ŠǡŽ‹‰Š–‹‰‘ϐ‹”‡•ƒ††‘‹‰‘™‘”ǤKosher slaughter was ’”ƒ –‹ ‡†ȋƒ•”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹–Š‡ƒ‡–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Šƒ†‰‹˜‡–Š‡ ‡™•ȌǡƒŽ- though a shokhetȋ„—– Š‡”Ȍ‹•‘–•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›‡–‹‘‡†Ǥ‹” — ‹•‹‘ was also practiced, but again a mohel (expert in ‹” — ‹•‹‘Ȍ‹•‘– mentioned. According to Donald Leslie, it is doubtful that they managed to keep the Jewish calendar in order, as periodic adjustments have to be made. It is, therefore, also doubtful that they observed the festivals at their proper times.ͳͺ They had, of course, prayer books and scrolls of the Torah, but whether they had books of the Talmud is uncertain.ͳͻ They followed rabbinic practices while praying, and one might conjec-

ͳ͸‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’ǤͳͲͺǤ ͳ͹ ˜‡”›‡”ͳͻ͹͸Ǥ ͳͺ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’Ǥͺ͸ȂͻͲǤ ͳͻ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’ǤͳͷͶǤ‡•Ž‹‡†‘—„–•–Šƒ––Š‡›Šƒ†Talmudic books, but writes that –Š‡›™‡”‡†‡ϐ‹‹–‡Ž›rabbinates. ͹ʹ Irene Eber ture that they had some Talmudic books in the early days that were later lost. Jewish practices were in some instances (Passover in spring, ƒ„‡”ƒ Ž‡•‹ƒ—–—ȌŽ‹‡†–‘Š‹‡•‡’”ƒ –‹ ‡•ƒ†‘„•‡”˜ƒ ‡•ǡ reinforcing the sectarian identity. Gradually, therefore, the connection to a foreign and universal religion was severed and ties were estab- lished to native and local religions. Therefore, not only in appearance but also in their life-style, the Jews were neither strangers nor outsid- ers in Chinese society. The •‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆJudaism allowed Kaifeng Jews to retain a Jewish identity, and it allowed them to practice a kind of —†ƒ‹•–Šƒ–ƒ••—‡†•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›Š‹‡•‡ˆ‡ƒ–—”‡•Ǥ It is obviously easier to say something about the practices that con- tinued to be in use for close to eight hundred years than it is to discuss ƒ––‡”•‘ˆ„‡Ž‹‡ˆǤŠ‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘•†‘‘–›‹‡Ž†•—ˆϐ‹ ‹‡–‡˜‹†‡ ‡ˆ‘” describing the beliefs these Jews held. A book by Zhao Yingdou 䏉᱐ᯇ – a Kaifeng Jew actively involved in community affairs – of ten chapters with the suggestive title Mingdao xu ᰾䚃ᒿ (Preface to the Illustrious ƒ›Ȍ‹‰Š–Šƒ˜‡ˆ—”‹•Š‡†•‘‡ Ž—‡•ǡ„—–‹–‹•—ˆ‘”–—ƒ–‡Ž›‘Ž‘‰‡” extant.ʹͲ However, the inscriptions indicate that the basis of their belief continued to be monotheism. There is no mention of Chinese deities in the inscriptions, and Shangdi кᑍ occurs only when quotations from the Chinese Classics are used, in particular on the horizontal and ver- tical tablets.ʹͳ Heaven (Tian ཙ is used generally when God is referred to, although Di ᑍ †‘‡•‘ —”‘ ƒ•‹‘ƒŽŽ›ǡƒ•‹–Š‡ͳ͸͸͵„‹• ”‹’–‹‘Ǥʹʹ Yet, there is also ample evidence in the inscriptions that monotheism was combined with Chinese moral precepts, such as the cardinal vir- tues of ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ’‹‡–›ȋxiao ᆍȌǡŽ‘›ƒŽ–›ȋzhong ᘐȌǡ„‡‡˜‘Ž‡ ‡ȋren ӱȌǡƒ† righteousness (›‹ 㗙ȌǤʹ͵ Aside from questions of belief, attempts to establish succession and transmission, as well as to provide Kaifeng Jewish history with a Chi- nese context are especially noteworthy. The succession always begins with Adam, moves on to Abraham, as the founder, and continues from Abraham to ‘•‡•ǤŠ‡ͳ͸͸͵ƒ‹• ”‹’–‹‘ƒ††•Noah after Adam,ʹͶ and

ʹͲ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’’Ǥ͸͸ǡͳʹ͵ȂͳʹͶǢ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’ǤͶ͹Ǥ ʹͳ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’’ǤͳʹͳȂͳͷͶǤ ʹʹ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’ǤͺͲǤ’’ƒ”‡–Ž›–Š‡‡™Š‘ ‘’‘•‡†–Š‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘•™‡”‡‘– troubled, as would be later Protestant missionaries, whether the term Tian truly ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†–Š‡‘‘–Š‡‹•– ‘ ‡’–Ǥ‡‡„‡”ͳͻͻͻǤ ʹ͵ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’ǤͺͳǤ ʹͶ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’ǤͺͲǤ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͹͵

–Š‡ͳͶͺͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘‡†•–Š‡•— ‡••‹‘™‹–ŠEzra.ʹͷ In the earliest in- scription, Adam is referred to as Adam-Pan Gu ⴈਔ,ʹ͸ that is as one per- son, and Abraham is said to be of the nineteenth generation after Adam. Š‡ͳͷͳʹ‹• ”‹’–‹‘ƒ††•–Šƒ–Adam came originally from India (Tian- zhu ཙㄪȌǤʹ͹Š‡ͳͶͺͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘’Žƒ ‡•Abraham’s establishment of –Š‡Dz–”—‡–‡ƒ Š‹‰dz‹–Š‡ͳͶ͸th year of the Zhou †›ƒ•–›ǡ‘”ͻ͹͹Ȁ͸Ǥ ‘•‡•‹••ƒ‹†–‘Šƒ˜‡Ž‹˜‡†‹–Š‡͸ͳ͵th›‡ƒ”‘ˆ–Š‡Š‘—ǡ‘”ͷͳͲȀͲͻǤ Š‡•‡†ƒ–‡•†‘‘–•‡‡–‘Šƒ˜‡ƒ›•’‡ ‹ƒŽ•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ ‡‹–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ calendar, and one wonders why they were chosen. For Ezra no dates are •—’’Ž‹‡†Ǥ‘–Š–Š‡ͳͷͳʹƒ†–Š‡ͳ͸͹ͻ‹• ”‹’–‹‘•†ƒ–‡–Š‡ƒ””‹˜ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡ teaching to the Han dynasty.ʹͺ Time and space (even the mythic time of ƒ —Ȍƒ”‡–Š‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ– ingredients that have helped move Jewish history into a Chinese histor- ical context. The important personages now have dates that coincide with the early Chinese history of the Zhou dynasty. Adam, moreover, though he is a progenitor and not a founder, is given a recognizable or- igin in India instead of an unfamiliar place. Therefore, Abraham, as his descendant, can also be placed in a known geographical area. Finally, the arrival of the religion in the Han dynasty provides the necessary starting point for Jewish development in China. Were there other writ- ings that developed these ideas more concretely, ideas that are stated ‘Ž›„”‹‡ϐŽ›‹–Š‡‹• ”‹’–‹‘•ǫ‡”Šƒ’•ǡ„—–ƒŽŽ–Šƒ– ƒ„‡•ƒˆ‡Ž›•–ƒ–- ed on the basis of the stelae is that the creation of a Jewish-Chinese history contributed to, and was part of the process of •‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘Ǥʹͻ After ǤǤǤƒ”–‹ǯ•ͳͺ͸͸˜‹•‹–ǡƒ—„‡”‘ˆ‘–Š‡”˜‹•‹–‘”•™‡––‘ Kaifeng, leaving accounts that Michael Pollak has appropriately called in a chapter heading “Outright Lies, Tall Tales, and a Few Truths.”͵Ͳ But no matter what the shortcomings of these visitors’ stories were, whether they spoke to few or many, those with whom they spoke continued to think of themselves as ‡™•Ǥ‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻ͹Ͳ•‡‘”‹‡•‘ˆŠƒ˜‹‰„‡‡ Jewish have been revived through outside contacts. Jewish visitors to

ʹͷ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’Ǥ͵ͷǤ ʹ͸ According to one of the Chinese creation myths, Pan Gu is the giant from whose body the world was created. ʹ͹ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’ǤͷʹǤ ʹͺ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸ǡ ǡ’’ǤͷʹǡͳͲͶǤ ʹͻ I am grateful to Max Deeg who, in his excellent conference lecture and essay in this volume, has helped me pinpoint the two aspects of time and space. ͵Ͳ‘ŽŽƒͳͻͺͲǡ’Ǥʹ͵ͷǤ ͹Ͷ Irene Eber

Kaifeng have imported knowledge about Jewish practices, onto which some members of erstwhile Jewish families (especially the Shi ⸣ Jin 䠁, and Zhao 䏉ˆƒ‹Ž‹‡•Ȍ‰”ƒˆ–ŠƒŽˆǦ”‡‡„‡”‡†ǡŠƒŽˆ‹ƒ‰‹‡†”‡ ‘ŽŽ‡ - tions in an attempt to reinvent Judaism.͵ͳ “Descendant of Jews” (›‘—–ƒ‹ Š‘—›‹⥦ཚᖼ㼄Ȍ‹•”‡ ‘”†‡†‹•‘‡”‡‰‹•–”ƒ–‹‘ ƒ”†•Ǥ͵ʹ But according to the legal (halakhicȌ ‡™‹•Š†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘ǡ„‡‹‰ƒ†‡• ‡†ƒ–†‘‡•‘–‡ - essarily establish the Jewishness of the person, as descent is determined by the status of the mother.͵͵ But, as Pollak, points out, it is unlikely that non-Jewish women who married Jewish men were converted after the last ”ƒ„„‹†‹‡†ƒ”‘—†ͳͺͳͲǤ͵Ͷ Thus present-day Kaifeng individuals who identify themselves as Jews can be accepted as halakhically Jewish only if they were to formally convert, although it goes without saying that the halakhic†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘Šƒ•„‡‡ ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‡†–‹‡ƒ†ƒ‰ƒ‹ǡ„‘–Š‹Israel and in the diaspora. It is possible, however, that some might be considering conversion. In recent years, a few young Kaifeng men have been mentioned as studying at Jerusalem religious schools ( ›‡•Š‹˜‘–ŠȌǡƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š™Š‡–Š‡”–Š‡‹”•–—†‹‡• ƒ”‡ˆ‘”–Š‡’—”’‘•‡‘ˆ ‘˜‡”•‹‘ƒ†Ȁ‘””‡–—”‹‰–‘Kaifeng as teachers ‹•‘– Ž‡ƒ”Ǥ—”‹‰–Š‡ʹͲͲͳȂʹͲͲʹƒ ƒ†‡‹ ›‡ƒ”ǡShi Lei studied Hebrew and Jewish subjects at Bar Ilan University. ͵ͷ An Institute of Jewish Studies has been established at He’nan University ⋣ইབྷᆖ. Presumably it will attract Kaifeng descendants as students, who would like to study their Š‡”‹–ƒ‰‡ƒ•ƒƒ ƒ†‡‹ •—„Œ‡ –Ǥ –‹•†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‘•ƒ›Š‘™™‹†‡•’”‡ƒ†ǡ how long lasting, or how genuine this interest in Judaism is. Can it lead to an actual revival of Kaifeng Judaism and what characteristics might such ƒ”‡˜‹˜ƒŽŠƒ˜‡ǫ ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽŽ›ǡ„‡‹‰Jewish in Chinese Kaifeng meant as-

͵ͳ Shi Zhongyu, for example, remembered that during the spring festival his father wrote Chinese characters with chicken blood on the door frame of his house “to guard against the devil.” With minor variations this story is repeated by others. Some remember Japanese soldiers searching for Jews in ƒ‹ˆ‡‰ȋ”‡ͳͻͺʹǢƒ›- –‡”ͳͻͺʹȌǤ ͵ʹ A photocopy of a Shi family member’s registration card is in the author’s posses- sion. ͵͵ EJͳͻ͹ͳȀͳͲǡ’Ǥʹ͵ǤŠ‡Mishnah tractate Qidushinȋ͵ǣͳʹȌ‘ˆ–Š‡Talmud states suc- cinctly that the offspring of a gentile woman (married to a ‡™‹•ŠƒȌ”‡ ‡‹˜‡ her status, to which ƒ‹‘‹†‡•ȋ‘•‡•‡ƒ‹‘Ȍȋͳͳ͵ͷȂͳʹͲͶȌƒ††‡†–Šƒ– –Š‡•–ƒ–—•‘ˆ–Š‡ˆƒ–Š‡”‹•‘– ‘•‹†‡”‡†‹–Š‹• ƒ•‡ȋ‡—•‡”ͳͻͺͶȀʹ͸ǡʹͲͳȂʹͲʹǢ ƒ„‹‘™‹–œȀ ”‘••ƒͳͻ͸ͷȀͷǡͻͺȌǤŠ‡Talmudic injunction is based on the bibli- ƒŽ’”‘‘— ‡‡–ȋšǤͳͻǣ͸ƒ†‡˜ǤʹͲǣʹ͸ȌǤ ͵Ͷ‘ŽŽƒͳͻͺͲǡ’Ǥʹ͵ͷǤ ͵ͷ „”ƒŠƒʹͲͲͳǡ’’Ǥͳǡ͸Ǥ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͹ͷ serting particularity within a society consisting of particular groups. It did not mean religious separateness. In present-day Kaifeng, the formal assumption of Judaism would have different implications and could have different consequences.

The Shanghai Jewish Communities

Whereas the Kaifeng Jews were not truly a community, Judaism being family centered and sectarian, the case of Shanghai is different. From –Š‡‹†Ǧͳͻ–Š ‡–—”›–Š”‡‡†‹•–‹ – ‘—‹–‹‡•†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡†‹Shang- hai, communities which, except for the fact that they were Jewish, had little else in common. Sephardi Jews (or ƒ‰Š†ƒ†‹•Ȍ ƒ‡–‘Shanghai ‹–Š‡ͳͺͶͲ•–‘‰‡–Š‡”™‹–Š–Š‡”‹–‹•ŠǤŠ‡› ƒ‡ˆ‘”–Š‡‘•–’ƒ”– from Iraq via India, were English speakers, and established their homes and business enterprises in the International Settlement. Russian Jews came next, some by way of ƒ”„‹‹–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž›ͳͻͲͲ•ǡƒ†–Š‡„—Žƒˆ–‡” –Š‡ ‘Ž•Š‡˜‹ ”‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘ ‘ˆ ͳͻͳ͹ǤŠ‡› •‡––Ž‡† ‹ –Š‡ ”‡ Š ‘ ‡•- sion, while the poorer among them went to live in Hongkou 㲩ਓ, which was part of the International Settlement north of Suzhou Creek 㣿ᐎ⋣. The Central European refugees, mostly German and Austrian but also •‘‡‘Ž‡•ǡœ‡ Š•ǡƒ†‘–Š‡”• ƒ‡ƒˆ–‡”ͳͻ͵͵ǡ–Š‡‰”‡ƒ–‡”’ƒ”–ƒ””‹˜- ‹‰„‡–™‡‡‘˜‡„‡”ͳͻ͵ͺƒ†‡’–‡„‡”ͳͻ͵ͻǤ‘•–‘ˆ–Š‡‡–”ƒŽ Europeans settled in Hongkou, although some took up residence in the International Settlement. A fourth and distinctly different group ar- ”‹˜‡†‹ͳͻͶͳǤ – ‘•‹•–‡†‘ˆƒ—„‡”‘ˆ•‡ —Žƒ”‘Ž‹•ŠǦJewish writers and intellectuals, a number of Polish and Lithuanian rabbis, and several religious schools together with their rabbinic teachers.͵͸ This group of mostly —Ž–”ƒǦ”–Š‘†‘š‡ȋ‘–ƒ›Šƒ†„”‘—‰Š–™‹˜‡•ƒ†ˆƒ‹Ž‹‡•Ȍ carved out a Shanghai existence for themselves vastly different from –Šƒ–‘ˆ‘–Š‡””‡ˆ—‰‡‡•ǤŠ—•‹ͳͻͶͳ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡‰Ž‹•Šǡ—••‹ƒǡƒ† German-speaking Jews in Shanghai – aside from a small group of Yid- dish speakers – each group culturally as well as religiously different from the other. Numerically, the Sephardi group remained the smallest with something over one thousand people. The Russian group was larg- ‡”ǡ—„‡”‹‰„‡–™‡‡ϐ‹˜‡ƒ†•‹š–Š‘—•ƒ†’‡”•‘•Ǥ—–ǡ„›–Š‡‡†‘ˆ

͵͸ ‘•–‘ˆ–Š‡Šƒ†ϐŽ‡†‘Žƒ†ˆ‘”‹–Š—ƒ‹ƒ„‡ˆ‘”‡—‰—•–ͳͻͶͲǤŠ‡›™‡”‡ƒ„Ž‡–‘ obtain Curacao visas that, in turn, enabled them to procure Russian and Japanese transit visas. They arrived in ۄ‡ƒ†”‡ƒ‹‡†–Š‡”‡—–‹Ž–Š‡Japanese shipped them to Shanghai. ͹͸ Irene Eber

ͳͻͶͳǡ„›ˆƒ”–Š‡Žƒ”‰‡•–‰”‘—’™‡”‡–Š‡‡–”ƒŽ—”‘’‡ƒ•ǡ™‹–Šƒ”‘—† twenty thousand Jews. In the treaty port Shanghai, the culturally and linguistically different groups of Jews found a congenial environment conducive to the maintenance of their differences. Shanghai was a mosaic of districts, consisting of the Chinese areas, the International Settlement, and the French Concession. The Inter- national Settlement was similarly a mosaic of populations made up of many different kinds of Europeans, Asians, and Chinese. The Chinese population was by far the largest, and continued to grow as refugees ’‘—”‡†‹–‘–Š‡‡–”‘’‘Ž‹•‹ͳͻ͵͹ǤŠ‡—„‡”‘ˆˆ‘”‡‹‰‡”•™ƒ•ǡ‹ ‘’ƒ”‹•‘ǡ‹•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–ǣ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡Š‹–‡—••‹ƒ•ǡJapanese, Indi- ans, Germans, French, Italians, and others, each forming a kind of en- clave in the unique treaty port setting. But these were not, as Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot write, colonialist communities. The for- eigners were rather a large collection of various kinds of people pur- suing their “interests in the interstices of empire, adroitly operating on the margins of treaty legality, using extraterritoriality, and the grey areas offered by colonial citizenship and settler autonomy, to further their own end.” The treaty system, the authors argue, enabled nationals to develop new identities,͵͹ allowing them at the same time to preserve earlier identities such as linguistic and religious. Foreigners, writes Betty Wei, and Chinese remained separate, even while working togeth- er and competing with one another.͵ͺ The millions of Chinese were far from a homogenous population, whether they lived in the Internation- al Settlement or in the Chinese-administered city. Shanghai’s Chinese population was largely made up of people who had left their native towns and villages in search of work and livelihood in the metropolis. Together with the masses of destitute refugees who arrived after the ‘—–„”‡ƒ‘ˆŠ‘•–‹Ž‹–‹‡•‹ͳͻ͵͹ǡ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ǡ–‘‘ǡ™ƒ• ‘- posed of disparate ethnic groups.͵ͻ Communication within each group, Chinese and foreign, was main- tained by means of newspapers and radio broadcasts. In addition to Chinese newspapers, English dailies and an array of weeklies in Rus- sian, Polish, German, and Yiddish were available. Among the Jewish pa- pers, some weeklies served the non- ‡™‹•Š’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ǡ‘–Š‡”••’‡ ‹ϐ‹-

͵͹ ‹ ‡”•Ȁ ‡”‹‘–ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͶȂͷǤ ͵ͺ ‡‹ͳͻͻͲǡ’ǤͳͲͶǤ ͵ͻ ‘‹‰ ͳͻͻʹ †‡• ”‹„‡• ‘‡ •— Š ‡–Š‹  ‰”‘—’ǡ –Š‡ — ŠǦƒŽ‹‰‡† —„‡‹ ’‡‘’Ž‡ǡ who hailed originally from Jiangsu ⊏㰷 Province, north of the Yangzi. Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͹͹ cally addressed religious or secular Jews. The subject of publishing will be discussed in greater detail below.

Synagogues, Rabbis, and Observances

The Shanghai Jewish communities were not only culturally diverse, re- ligious differences created additional fragmentation, especially within the Ashkenazi community, into secular, observant, and ultra-religious. This fragmentation duplicated, of course, the European Jewish religious • ‡‡ȋ™‹–Š–Š‡‡š ‡’–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡•ƒŽŽǡ–Š‘—‰ŠŠ‹‰ŠŽ›‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽBagh- †ƒ†‹’”‡•‡ ‡ȌǤ‘‰‡–Š‡”™‹–Š–Š‡ƒ„•‡ ‡‘ˆƒ’”‘‘— ‡†anti-Semi- –‹•ȋ‡š ‡’–ƒ‘‰–Š‡Š‹–‡—••‹ƒ•Ȍǡ–Š‡”‡™ƒ•‹–Š‡–”‡ƒ–›’‘”– no political authority able or empowered to enforce uniformity and conformity, and thus variations and differences could be maintained and perpetuated. The three Jewish groups, Baghdadi, Russian, and Central European, maintained separate synagogues. The earliest were those of the Sephar- di ‡™•Ǣ‡–ŠŽ™ƒ•‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͺͺ͹ƒ†‹–••’Ž‹–‡”‰”‘—’ǡShe’erit •”ƒ‡Žǡ‹ͳͻͲͲǤŠ‡‹”‹‹–‹ƒŽŽ›–‡’‘”ƒ”›’”ƒ›‡”Š‘—•‡•™‡”‡Žƒ–‡””‡- placed by two splendid structures: Š‡Žƒ Š‡Ž‹ͳͻʹͲǡϐ‹ƒ ‡†„›‹” ƒ ‘„Ž‹ƒ•ƒ••‘‘ȋͳͺͶ͵Ȃͳͻͳ͸Ȍǡƒ†‡–ŠŠƒ”‘‹ͳͻʹ͹ǡϐ‹ƒ ‡† by Silas Aaron Hardoon.ͶͲ By the early years of the twentieth centu- ry, enough Russian Jews had arrived in Shanghai to feel the need of a congregation of their own. They did not build a synagogue, but used the premises of the Sephardi She’erit Israel synagogue. Ohel Moshe (Oi- Š‡Ž‘‹•Š‡Ȍǡƒ•‹–™ƒ• ƒŽŽ‡†ǡ‘˜‡†–‘‹–•‘™„—‹Ž†‹‰‹ͳͻʹ͹ǡƒ†‹ ͳͻͶͳǡ–Š‡‡™Synagogue was constructed in the French Concession.Ͷͳ The approximately twenty thousand Central European refugees fully ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†–Š‡ ‘’Ž‡š‹–›‘ˆ‘†‡”Judaism, now transplanted into the treaty port context. Aside from the Central European and Polish secu- larists, the refugees represented the entire spectrum of Reform, Liber- al, and ultra-Orthodox Jewry. Due to their diversity and their sojourner status, building a •›ƒ‰‘‰—‡™ƒ•‘—–‘ˆ–Š‡“—‡•–‹‘Ǣˆ‘”•‡”˜‹ ‡•‘ festivals and the high holy days they used various premises, while for

ͶͲ Silas ƒ”†‘‘ȋͳͺͷͳȂͳͻ͵ͳȌ™ƒ•ƒ ‘Ž‘”ˆ—ŽShanghai personality who, perhaps in- ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›Š‹•—”ƒ•‹ƒ™‹ˆ‡ǡ’Žƒ›‡†ƒ ‘•‹†‡”ƒ„Ž‡”‘Ž‡‹Š‹‡•‡ƒˆˆƒ‹”•Ǥ ‘”ƒ ƒ‡ †‘–ƒŽ„‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›ǡ•‡‡—ͳͻͺ͵Ǥ Ͷͳ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’Ǥ͸ͲȂ͸ͳǤ ͹ͺ Irene Eber the ultra-Orthodox rabbis and their students Beth Aharon was made available. During the nearly one hundred years of Jewish populations in Shanghai, rabbis, who were responsible for the communities’ spiritual ƒ†‡˜‡”›†ƒ›Ž‹˜‡•ǡ™‡”‡‘ˆ–‡Šƒ”†–‘ϐ‹†Ǥ„˜‹‘—•Ž›ǡ–Š‡›™‘—Ž†Šƒ˜‡ to speak the language of their congregants and they would have had to come from abroad in order to have received rabbinic training. For the ƒ‰Š†ƒ†‹•ǡϐ‹†‹‰ƒrabbi presented special problems because, in ad- dition to familiarity with Sephardi liturgy and customs, he had to be an English speaker in order to represent the status-conscious community in the International Settlement.Ͷʹ The Baghdadis eventually compro- ‹•‡†‘–Š‡ϐ‹”•–”‡“—‹”‡‡–‹’”‡ˆ‡”‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‡‰Ž‹•ŠŽƒ‰—ƒ‰‡ requirement. The Russian community was more fortunate. Rabbi Meir •Š‡ƒœ‹ȋͳͺͻͳǦͳͻͷͶȌǡƒˆ–‡”•‡”˜‹‰‹Vladivostok, came to Shanghai ‹ͳͻʹ͸ǡ”‡ƒ‹‹‰–Š‡—••‹ƒ ‘‰”‡‰ƒ–‹‘ǯ•Ž‡ƒ†‡”ˆ‘”–Š‡‡š––™‡- ty-one years.Ͷ͵ More research is needed to better understand the reli- gious diversity of the Central European refugees. Rabbis were certainly among them, but customs often differed within what may be broadly described as Reform Judaism,ͶͶ and splinter groups tended to develop. Except for the staunchest of secularists, the Jews celebrated the major festivals and observed the high holy days. Practices varied, de- pending on cultural background and religious fervor. Simhat Torah, for example, the conclusion of the yearly cycle of Torah reading, was cele- brated as joyously with song and dance by the Hasidim of the Mir Yeshi- va as if they had never left their homes.Ͷͷ Whereas the ultra-Orthodox continued to maintain strict Sabbath observance, most of the Jewish population did not, which was a constant irritant to the Orthodox community. Many of the Sephardi businessmen, who had been strictly ‘„•‡”˜ƒ–ƒ–‘‡–‹‡ǡŠƒ†‰”‘™Žƒš„›–Š‡ͳͻ͵Ͳ•Ǥ—••‹ƒ•ǡ‘•–‘ˆ whom were merchants and storekeepers, did not close for the Sabbath. Neither did the Central European refugees desist from trying to make a living.

Ͷʹ‡›‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’Ǥ͵͸͵Ǥ‡›‡”†‹• —••‡•–Š‹•ƒ†‘–Š‡”“—‡•–‹‘•‹ ‰”‡ƒ–‡” †‡–ƒ‹Ž ‡Ž•‡™Š‡”‡ȋ‡›‡”ʹͲͲ͵ȌǤ Ͷ͵ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’Ǥ͸Ͳǡ͹ͻȂͺͲǤ ͶͶ Reform congregations, for example, might or might not have separate seating for men and women, head covering for men, a choir, an organ, and the like. The general term “reform” does not adequately describe these differences. Ͷͷ ‡”–•ƒͳͻͻͻǡ’Ǥʹ͹Ǥ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͹ͻ

Kashruthȋ”‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘• ‘ ‡”‹‰†‹‡–ƒ”›Žƒ™•Ȍ™ƒ•ƒ‹–ƒ‹‡†Ž‘- gest by the Sephardi Jews, even after other observances had been aban- doned. This included ritual slaughter, abstaining from forbidden foods Ž‹‡•Š‡ŽŽϐ‹•Š‘”’‘”ǡƒ†‡‡’‹‰‡ƒ–ƒ†‹Ž•–”‹ –Ž›•‡’ƒ”ƒ–‡Ǥ‘–Š the Russian and the Central European communities were more lax. Yet, in the shelters (HeimeȌǡ™Š‡”‡ƒ›‘ˆ–Š‡†‡•–‹–—–‡”‡ˆ—‰‡‡•Ž‹˜‡† upon arrival, kosher kitchen facilities were maintained, and the organi- zations responsible for refugee welfare made every effort to adhere to dietary laws.Ͷ͸ It is not clear how the problem of matzoth (unleavened „”‡ƒ†Ȍ†—”‹‰–Š‡ƒ••‘˜‡”™‡‡™ƒ•Šƒ†Ž‡†ǡ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›†—”‹‰–Š‡ three years of war when wheat shortages developed. The ultra-Ortho- dox group would have been especially affected, as rituals concerning –Š‡ ‰”‹†‹‰ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ϐŽ‘—” ‹ ƒ††‹–‹‘ –‘ –Š‡ ƒ‡” ‘ˆ ’”‡’ƒ”‹‰ –Š‡ dough and baking had to be strictly observed.

Community Organizations

”‹‘”–‘–Š‡Žƒ”‰‡—„‡”‘ˆ”‡ˆ—‰‡‡•ƒ””‹˜‹‰‹ͳͻ͵ͺǡ„‘–Š–Š‡Bagh- dadi and Russian communities had each established institutions and ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ƒŽ •–”— –—”‡• †‡ƒŽ‹‰ ™‹–Š ϐ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽ •—’’‘”–ǡ ™‡Žˆƒ”‡ǡ charity, burial, and other communal matters. These were, however, not •—ˆϐ‹ ‹‡––‘ƒƒ‰‡–Š‡ƒ••‹˜‡ƒ‹†‡ˆˆ‘”––Šƒ–™ƒ•”‡“—‹”‡†–‘Š‡Ž’ settle the refugees. Some form of cooperation between the two estab- lished communities was necessary and both rose to the challenge, with the Sephardi community taking the lead, perhaps because they felt the pressure of the British more keenly than did the Russians. Even before ever larger shiploads of refugees landed in Shanghai, the Shanghai Mu- nicipal Council had indicated that it could not be responsible for the ‡™•ǯƒ‹–‡ƒ ‡Ǣ–Š‡„—”†‡™‘—Ž†Šƒ˜‡–‘„‡•Š‘—Ž†‡”‡†„›Ž‘ ƒŽ Jewry.Ͷ͹ As a result, several new organizations for relief purposes were established. Here I shall discuss one community organization and two aid organizations only: burial societies, because of their importance in communal life, and two organizations responsible for refugees’ aid, the Committee for the Assistance of European Jewish Refugees in Shanghai ȋ Ȍƒ† Ǥ Ͷͺ

Ͷ͸”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’ǤͶͳͲǤ Ͷ͹ ͳͻ͵ͺȀͳͻ͵ͻǤ Ͷͺ HICEM stands for HIAS ICA-Emigdirect. The organization was supported by the ‡”‹ ƒ ‡™‹•Š ‘‹–‹•–”‹„—–‹‘‘‹––‡‡ȋ Ȍǡ–Š‡Hebrew Sheltering and ͺͲ Irene Eber

The ritual preparation of the corpse and burial have an important place in Jewish observances, and burial societies occupy a central posi- tion in all Jewish communities. In Shanghai, the Sephardi burial society (Hevra KadishaȌ™ƒ•‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͺ͸ʹǡ’”‘„ƒ„Ž›ƒ–ƒ„‘—––Š‡•ƒ‡ –‹‡ƒ•–Š‡ˆ‘—†‹‰‘ˆ‹–•ϐ‹”•–cemetery on Mohawk Road (now Huang- pu 哳ค ‘ƒ†ȌǤŠ‡—••‹ƒ ‘—‹–›‘”‰ƒ‹œ‡†‹–•„—”‹ƒŽ•‘ ‹‡–›‹ ͳͻʹʹǡŠƒ˜‹‰‹–‡””‡†‹–•dead in the Sephardi cemetery in a separate section until they acquired their own cemetery on Baikal Road (now ‡‹‹‰‘ƒ†ȌǤŠ‡”‡ˆ—‰‡‡•‹‹–‹ƒŽŽ›—•‡†„‘–Š–Š‡Ashkenazi burial society and ‡‡–‡”›ǡ—–‹Žϐ‹ƒŽŽ›–Š‡›ǡ–‘‘ǡ‘”‰ƒ‹œ‡†–Š‡‹”‘™„—”‹ƒŽ •‘ ‹‡–›‹ͳͻͶͲƒ†ƒ “—‹”‡†Žƒ†ˆ‘”–Š‡‹”cemetery on Columbia Road. Due to the high mortality rate among the refugees, a fourth cemetery ȋ‘‘‹–‘ƒ†Ȍ™ƒ•ƒ††‡†‹ͳͻͶͳǤͶͻ In life as well as in death the three communities maintained their separateness. Unfortunately, the four ‡‡–‡”‹‡•™‡”‡‘˜‡†„‡–™‡‡ͳͻͷ͹ƒ†ͳͻͷͻ–‘‹‰’— 䶂⎖ County, in the environs of Shanghai, and have since disappeared.ͷͲ The Committee for the Assistance of European Jewish Refugees was ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹–Š‡ˆƒŽŽ‘ˆͳͻ͵ͺƒ•ƒƒƒŽ‰ƒƒ–‹‘‘ˆ’”‡˜‹‘—• ”‡Ž‹‡ˆ committees and brought together Baghdadis, Russians, and refugees.ͷͳ Prominent businessmen active in Shanghai commerce assumed a ma- jor role, raising funds both locally and abroad. It is to the credit of men like ‹ Š‡ŽŽ‡’‡‡Žƒȋ Ǥͳͺ͹͹ȂǫȌƒ†ŽŽ‹• ƒ›‹ȋͳͺͻͶȂͳͻ͹͹Ȍ™Š‘ǡ without experience in social welfare, nonetheless saw to it that the ref- ugees were given shelter and were fed. The standing of these men in

‹‰”ƒ–‹†‘ ‹‡–›ȋ Ȍǡƒ†–Š‡‘†‘Ǧ„ƒ•‡†Jewish Colonization Associ- ƒ–‹‘ȋ ȌǤŠ‡ „—”‡ƒ—™ƒ•Ž‘ ƒ–‡†‹ ƒ”„‹—–‹Ž‡’–‡„‡”ͳͻ͵ͻǡ™Š‡ it moved to Shanghai. The CAEJR was supported by the JDC and by funds raised in Shanghai. Ͷͻ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’ǤͶʹͷǤ –ŠƒƒŽ’ŠǤ ‹”• Šˆ‘”ƒ‹‰ƒ˜ƒ‹Žƒ„Ž‡–‘‡ƒŽ‹•–‘ˆ “Central European Jewish Refugees who Died in Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͳͻͶͲȂͳͻͶͷǤdzŠ‡Ž‹•–ǡ ϐ‹”•–’—„Ž‹•Š‡†‹–Š‡‡™‘”—ϔ„ƒ—ǡ’”‹Žͳʹǡͳͻǡʹ͸ǡƒ†ƒ›͵ǡͳͻͶ͸ǡ ‘•‹•–• ‘ˆͳǡͶ͵͵ƒ‡•Ǥ –Šƒ –ƒƒ”‹˜›ˆ‘”Š‹•’”‡Ž‹‹ƒ”›‡šƒ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Ž‹•–ǡ which shows that nearly twice as many men died than women in Shanghai and that infant mortality was comparatively higher than that of older children. The higher ƒŽ‡‘”–ƒŽ‹–›”‡ϐŽ‡ –•ǡ‘†‘—„–ǡ–Š‡Žƒ”‰‡”—„‡”‘ˆJewish men in Shanghai. A more detailed analysis of the list should reveal further useful data. ͷͲ ͳͻͷͺǡͳͻ͸ͲǤ  —Ž›ͳͻͷͺǡ–Š‡ ‡™‹•Š ‘—‹–›™ƒ•‘–‹ϐ‹‡†„›–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ƒ—–Š‘”‹–‹‡•–Šƒ–ͶǡͲͲͲ‰”ƒ˜‡•™‡”‡–‘„‡‘˜‡†Ǥ› ƒ—ƒ”›͸ǡͳͻ͸Ͳ–Š”‡‡cemeter- ies had been moved. About current efforts to recover some of the gravestones, see ƒ”Ǧ ƒŽʹͲͲʹǤ ͷͳ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’Ǥͻ͵Ȃͻ͸Ǥ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͺͳ the business community enabled them, furthermore, to maintain con- tacts with the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Japanese authorities on behalf of the refugees.ͷʹ The committee ceased to function after the start of the ƒ ‹ϐ‹ ƒ”ǡ™Š‡”‹–‹•Š’ƒ••’‘”–Š‘Ž†‡”•ǡŽ‹‡Ellis Hay- im, were interned by the ƒ’ƒ‡•‡ǤŠ—•ǡ‹ ‡„”—ƒ”›ͳͻͶ͵ǡ™Š‡–Š‡ Japanese authorities ordered the relocation of stateless refugees to the “designated area,” or ghetto, in Hongkou, they also ordered the Rus- sian communal association to assume the care of the refugees. The new committee was known as the Shanghai Ashkenazi Collaborating Relief Association, or SACRA.ͷ͵ Š‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‡ǡ—†‡”–Š‡†‹”‡ –‹‘‘ˆMeyer ‹”ƒȋͳͺͻͳȂͳͻͷͷȌǡ engaged in an unprecedented rescue operation that was just short of heroic. First in Harbin and then in Shanghaiˆ”‘‡’–‡„‡”ͳͻ͵ͻ—–‹Ž ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͶͳǡ™Š‡–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‡™ƒ• Ž‘•‡†„›–Š‡Japanese, Birman disseminated information about China and helped move refugees in and out of Shanghai. He wrote thousands of letters to relief agencies throughout the world, trying to help locate and relocate refugees. De- •’‹–‡ Ž‹‹–‡† ˆ—†•ǡ Š‹• ‘ˆϐ‹ ‡ ’ƒ‹† ˆ‡‡• ˆ‘” „‘”†‡” ”‘••‹‰• ƒ† ˆ‘” documents required by the Shanghai Municipal Police, ship passage for visa holders, and the like. Birman tirelessly explored every avenue, fol- lowed every lead, both of how to bring Jews to the safe haven of Shang- haiƒ†ǡƒ•–Š‡ Ž‘—†•‘ˆ™ƒ”‰ƒ–Š‡”‡†ǡŠ‘™–‘ϐ‹†‘–Š‡” ‘—–”‹‡•‘ˆ refuge once routes from Shanghai increasingly closed down.ͷͶ

Educational Institutions and Publishing

Schools for the young developed but slowly and in accordance with the needs and growth of the three communities. In the early years of the Baghdadi community, Jewish education for boys was taken care of at home. They were instructed in prayers and Bible by their fathers or the

ͷʹ Š‹• •‘‡–‹‡• „ƒ ϐ‹”‡†Ǥ ‘” ‡šƒ’Ž‡ǡ ‹ ͳͻͶͲ Inuzuka Koreshige ⣜ຊᜏ䟽 ȋͳͺͻͲȂͳͻ͸ͷȌ†‡ƒ†‡†–Šƒ–Ellis Hayim write a letter stating how grateful the Jews were for the way the ƒ’ƒ‡•‡–”‡ƒ–‡†–Š‡Ǥ ƒ›‹”‡ˆ—•‡†ȋͳͻͶͲȌǤ ͷ͵ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’ǤͷʹͳȂͷʹʹǤ ͷͶ Ž–ƒȀ„‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͷͳȂͺ͸ǤBirman’s letters often reveal the desperation that must have been felt in Shanghai as war seemed inevitable. For example, on Novem- „‡”͸ǡͳͻͶͳǡBirman wrote that Shanghai is cut off from most countries, and one ™‡‡Žƒ–‡”ǡ‘‘˜‡„‡”ͳ͵ǡͳͻͶͳǡ–Šƒ–DzŠ‡•‹–—ƒ–‹‘‹•‰”‘™‹‰•–‡ƒ†‹Ž›™‘”•‡ǡ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹‹•‘™ƒŽ•‘ —–‘ˆˆˆ”‘‡–”ƒŽƒ†‘—–Š‡”‹ ƒdzȋ ͳͻͶͳƒȌǤ ͺʹ Irene Eber community’s teacher (melamedȌǡ‡••‡–‹ƒŽŽ›ƒ’”‹˜ƒ–‡–—–‘”™Š‘–ƒ—‰Š– –Š‡„‘›•‹–Š‡‹”Š‘‡•Ǥ—–„›ͳͻͲʹǡƒHebrew school (Talmud TorahȌ for boys was established on the premises of the She’erit Israel syna- gogue. In time, this religious school developed into the Shanghai Jew- ish School with a British-based curriculum and instruction in English. Those who could afford it preferred, however, to send their children to ”‹–‹•Š’—„Ž‹ • Š‘‘Ž•ǡ•‘–Šƒ–‘Ž›’—’‹Ž•ˆ”‘Ž‡••ƒˆϐŽ—‡–Baghdadi families attended the Shanghai Jewish School.ͷͷ Some Russian parents, particularly those who wanted their children educated in the British style, also sent their children to this school. Whereas socially the par- ents of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews remained distant, some of the younger generation interacted at least during school hours. Despite the fact that few of the Central European refugees brought families with school age children and large families were quite the exception,ͷ͸ more school facilities were nevertheless required due to –Š‡ ‹ϐŽ—šǤ ‹” ‘”ƒ ‡ ƒ†‘‘”‹‡ ȋͳͻͲʹȂͳͻͻͷȌǡ ™‡ŽŽ ‘™ ˆ‘” Šƒ˜‹‰ endowed a number of educational institutions in China, Asia, and the ‹††Ž‡ƒ•–ǡ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͻ͵͹–Š‡Šƒ‰Šƒ‹Jewish Youth Association (better known as the ƒ†‘‘”‹‡ Š‘‘ŽȌǤ •–”— –‹‘™ƒ•ƒŽ•‘‹‰Ž‹•Š and the curriculum included Hebrew, Bible studies, as well as Chinese. The nominal fee charged attracted children from less well-off fami- lies.ͷ͹ As in the Shanghai Jewish School, the younger generation here too had an opportunity to interact. The ”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ˆ‘”‡Šƒ„‹Ž‹–ƒ–‹‘–Š”‘—‰Š”ƒ‹‹‰ȋȌ˜‘ ƒ- –‹‘ƒŽ• Š‘‘Žˆ—Žϐ‹ŽŽ‡†ƒ˜‹–ƒŽˆ— –‹‘ˆ‘”‘Ž†‡”–‡‡ƒ‰‡”•ƒ† ƒ†—Ž–• ˆ”‘ͳͻͶͳ‘ǡ„›’”‘˜‹†‹‰–”ƒ‹‹‰‹˜ƒ”‹‘—••‹ŽŽ•ƒ†–”ƒ†‡•Ǥ‹‰- ‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›ǡ—••‹ƒ• ‘‘’‡”ƒ–‡†™‹–ŠSephardi Jews to make this voca- tional school a success.ͷͺ William Deman, a refugee from Vienna, estab- lished on his own initiative a business school that offered training in ‘ˆϐ‹ ‡•‹ŽŽ•ƒ†Žƒ‰—ƒ‰‡•ǤŠ‡ ”‡‰‰ Š‘‘Ž‘ˆ—•‹‡••ȋŽƒ–‡” ”‡‰‰ ‘ŽŽ‡‰‡ȌƒŽ•‘‘’‡”ƒ–‡†ˆ”‘ͳͻͶͳ‘Ǥͷͻ Finally, the Asia Seminar should be also mentioned. Creatively organized by W.Y. Tonn, who had pursued

ͷͷ ‡›‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’’Ǥ͵͸ͷȂ͵͸͸Ǥ ͷ͸ Large intact families were mostly found among the ultra-Orthodox from Poland. For example, according to Birman, in a group of ten rabbis only three were without ˆƒ‹Ž‹‡•ǤŠ‡‘–Š‡”•Šƒ†ˆ‘—”‘”ϐ‹˜‡ Š‹Ž†”‡ȋ ͳͻͶͳ„ȌǤ ͷ͹ ‡›‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’Ǥ͵͸ͻǢ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͻͲȂ͵ͻͳǤ ͷͺ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͻͷȂ͵ͻ͸Ǥ ͷͻ ͳͻͺͺǡ’’ǤͳʹͶȂͳʹ͸Ǥ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͺ͵

Chinese studies in Berlin, the Seminar offered instruction in languages as diverse as Hebrew, Urdu, Sanskrit, Chinese and ƒ’ƒ‡•‡ˆ”‘ͳͻͶ͵ on. Its lecture series on Chinese thought and art added an intellectual dimension to the otherwise drab Hongkou existence.͸Ͳ The rabbis and their students were part of the refugee community, yet they lived their lives separately from the others, as indeed they had done earlier in ۄ‡ǡ™Š‡”‡–Š‡›Šƒ†ϐ‹”•–Žƒ†‡†ƒˆ–‡”Ž‡ƒ˜‹‰‹–Š- uania, and still earlier, in Poland. Once they were settled, the yeshiva students, under the guidance of their rabbis, resumed rigorous study schedules. The distance that separated their way of life from that of the secular Jews did not prevent, however, a number of refugee teenage boys from joining them, and in the Mir Yeshiva they were apparently accepted by both teachers and students. It may have been the strict- ly regulated life of prayer and study that attracted the youngsters, or perhaps it was the better quality food available among the ultra-Ortho- dox.͸ͳŠ‡”‡‹•‘†‡›‹‰ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Šƒ––Š‡›‡•Š‹˜ƒ•–—†‡–•ǯ—ϐŽƒ‰- ging devotion to study as well as their maintenance of ritual purity in daily life was exemplary. Study in the yeshiva is the study of texts. Concerned about the scar- city of Talmudic books for their students, the rabbis decided to repro- †— ‡–Š‡„‘‘•–Š‡›Šƒ†„›Ž‹–Š‘‰”ƒ’Š›ǤŠ‡›•— ‡‡†‡†‹ϐ‹†‹‰ƒ Chinese printer, and over time most of the titles of the Talmud were reprinted,͸ʹ an accomplishment that was hailed as a “historic event” in the Yiddish press.͸͵ Aside from this undertaking, a considerable number of Jewish news- ’ƒ’‡”•ƒ†Œ‘—”ƒŽ•ϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‡†‹Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡprinting in German, Yid- dish, and Russian. Although some of the weeklies or monthlies were short-lived, publishing only a few issues before they folded, as a com- munication effort within each community this publishing activity was a remarkable feat. Here I will mention only some of the papers. The Jü- †‹• Š‡•ƒ Š”‹ Š–‡„Žƒ––and ‡‡‹†‡„Žƒ––†‡”Œò†‹• Š‡ ‡‡‹†‡ad-

͸Ͳ ͳͻͺͺǡ’’ǤͳͷͶȂͳͷͷǤ ͸ͳ ‘„‹ƒ•ͳͻͻͻǡ’Ǥ͹ͻǤ ͸ʹ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’ǤͶ͵ͶǤ ‘”†‹‰–‘”ƒœŽ‡”ǡ‡ƒ”Ž›ͳͲͲ–‹–Ž‡•™‡”‡”‡’”‹–‡†Ǥ- ‘–Š‡”Ž‹•–‡–‹‘•ͳͲͶ–‹–Ž‡•ȋŽ„‘‹ͳͻͻͻȂʹͲͲͲǡ’’Ǥ͹ͶȂͺ͸ȌǤKontras (Kontras ͳͻ͸ͲȂͳͻ͸ͳȌ•–ƒ–‡•–Šƒ–„‡–™‡‡ͳͻͶͳƒ†ͳͻͶʹǡ–Š‡‹”‡•Š‹˜ƒ’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ͷ͸‘” ͷͺ–‹–Ž‡•‘ˆͳͲͲȂͳͷͲ ‘’‹‡•‡ƒ ŠǤŠ‡–‹–Ž‡•‹ Ž—†‡†’”ƒ›‡”„‘‘•ƒ† ‘’Ž‡–‡ Bibles with commentaries (Mikra’ot gedolotȌǤ ͸͵ ULͳͻͶʹǤ ͺͶ Irene Eber dressed the religiously observant German refugee population. For sec- ular German speakers there was the Shanghai Jewish Chronicle, which Šƒ†–Š‡Ž‘‰‡•–”—ƒ‘‰–Š‡˜ƒ”‹‘—•’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•Ǣ‹‡ ‡Ž„‡‘•– was intended for the more intellectually inclined reader.͸Ͷ Russian readers read Nasha Zhizn ȋ—” ‹ˆ‡Ȍǡ ™Š‹ Š ‹ Ž—†‡† ƒ Yiddish page, later re- placed by an English page. The religious party, Agudat Yisrael, published two Yiddish papers, ‹‹††‹•Š‡Š–‹‡ˆ—˜ƒ›–‹œ”ƒŠ (The Jewish ‘‹ ‡ˆ”‘–Š‡ ƒ”ƒ•–Ȍƒ† Dos Vort ȋŠ‡‘”†ȌǤƒ•–„—–‘–Ž‡ƒ•– was the English language monthly, Israel’s Messenger, which served al- most exclusively the ‡’Šƒ”†‹ ‘—‹–›ƒ†™ƒ•–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‘”‰ƒ‘ˆ the Shanghai Zionist Association. More research is necessary to do full justice to this impressive publishing activity, of which the above is only the barest outline.͸ͷ Nevertheless, from it we can safely conclude that the intellectual level of the three Jewish communities was remarkably high, consisting not only of readers but boasting also a considerable number of writers, whose contributions were featured in the papers. The exodus from China after World War II was gradual, lasting well ‹–‘–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•Ǥˆ‡™Baghdadis, like members of the Kadoorie fami- ly, who had been pillars of the Shanghai community, resettled in Hong ‘‰ǡ‡˜‡–—ƒŽŽ›ϐ‹†‹‰–Š‡‹”Žƒ•–”‡•–‹‰’Žƒ ‡‹–Š‡Hong Kong Jew- ish cemetery.͸͸ Undoubtedly, many Baghdadis might have considered remaining in Shanghai after the end of war, yet the treaty port days were clearly over and Shanghai would never be the same. Nor would they ever again be able to lead the kind of Jewish lives that they and their forbears had created in the treaty port. The Sephardi-Shanghai past was transformed into a time and place remembered. Some of the Central European refugees returned to their countries of origin, but most opted for America or Israel, as did the majority of the Russian community, while others made their homes in Australia. The Judaism they had brought with them from Germany, Austria, or Russia had not essentially changed in Shanghai. Wherever they went thereaf-

͸Ͷ ‘”‘”‡ƒ„‘—––Š‡’ƒ’‡”ƒ†‹–•‡†‹–‘”ǡ•‡‡”‡‹••Ž‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͷͳͳȂͷʹͶǤ ͸ͷ Š‡ —’—„Ž‹•Š‡† Dz‹ ‹††‹•Š‡ ”‡••‡ ‹ Š‹‡ǡ ͳͻ͵͹ȂͳͻͶ͹ǡdz ’”‡’ƒ”‡† „› Asher Rozenboim and held by the •–‹–—–‡ˆ‘” ‡™‹•Š‡•‡ƒ” Š” Š‹˜‡ȋ Ȁ‹†‹•Š‡” ‹••‡•Šƒˆ–Ž‹Š‡” •–‹–—–ȌǡŽ‹•–•Ͷ͸Jewish publications in all of China. Unfortu- nately, only single issues of most of these papers are available. Some have disap- peared altogether. ͸͸ This is an unusually beautiful and interesting cemetery with its many styles of gravestones and varieties of inscriptions, representing the different cultural backgrounds of ‘‰‘‰ ‡™”›Ǥ„‡”Ȁ •‹ƒʹͲͲ͵ȋ‹ ‡„”‡™ȌǤ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͺͷ ter, they would again be part of Jewish communities and congregations similarly observant or secular. Shanghai seems to have been no more than a passing episode of hardship in the lives of the ultra-Orthodox and ›‡•Š‹˜‘–Š, and they continued a life of study and prayer in their new environment, whether in Israel or the diaspora. The erstwhile Shanghai-landers, as some like to refer to themselves, remember their China days with great fondness. If some had felt regrets over years lost,͸͹ such feelings vanished in time and are not perpetuated by the younger generation. In the last two decades, reunions have tak- en place and tours undertaken to Shanghai to revisit the homes where they once lived and where they were children or teenagers. Memories ƒ”‡‡’–ƒŽ‹˜‡ȋ‘”—†‡”‰‘ Šƒ‰‡Ȍ‹†‘ —‡–ƒ”‹‡•ƒ„‘—–Šƒ‰Šƒ‹- landers– in particular the refugees among them – and in memoirs about their Jewish-Shanghai past.

Judaism in China Today

Except for Hong Kong and an incipient Shanghai community, today there are no organized Jewish communities with synagogues and Jew- ish institutions in China. Those individuals who identify themselves as Jewish in Kaifeng today are not Jewish in accordance with halakha. They are the descendants of Jews. Can we say that by following the reintro- duced religious practices they are now “Jewishdzǫ͸ͺ But perhaps whether Kaifeng Jews are, or are not, halakhically Jews does not matter to those who are interested in the revitalization of Kaifeng Judaism. Anson Layt- ner, for example, speaks of “reviving Jewish culture,” and Len Hew, a descendant of the Zhao family, wants to revive the community. I would question the term “revival,” however, for it is surely not Qing dynasty Kaifeng Judaism that they wish to see revived. Nor is it obvious what is meant by “Jewish culture,” and where to draw the line between culture and observing religious commandments (mitzvothȌǤ‡ŽŽ‡ƒ‹‰ǡ‘ doubt, as these efforts at revival are, they raise a number of questions, including those of faith and belief.

͸͹ ‡‹ͳͻͶͷǡ’’Ǥʹ͹Ȃ͵ͲǤ ͸ͺ Š‹•ƒ†‘–Š‡”’”‘„Ž‡•ƒ”‡ƒŽ•‘”ƒ‹•‡†‹ƒͳͻͻͺ†‘ —‡–ƒ”›Dz‹›ƒ‹Kai- feng,” in which a group of young Western Jews questions the many complex as- pects of Jewish identity. ͺ͸ Irene Eber

Today Jews from Western countries and Israel work in China – about ͳͷͲƒ”‡•ƒ‹†–‘”‡•‹†‡‹Beijing – as transient businessmen and profes- sionals. The largest number is in Shanghai, estimated at three hundred, ƒ†‹ʹͲͲʹ–Š‡Šƒ‰Šƒ‹Jewish Community Center was inaugurated.͸ͻ But these Jews are only temporarily in China, remaining there for lon- ger or shorter periods of time. They do not have synagogues, although services take place in Beijing and at several locations in Shanghai. The Ohel Rachel synagogue is not used for daily prayer. Matters are different in Hong Kong. A small but vital Jewish commu- nity was reconstituted after ‘”Ž†ƒ” –Šƒ–Šƒ•ϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‡†‡˜‡”•‹ ‡ and has, in fact, grown larger than it was between the wars. Consisting of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, this community represents the entire spectrum of Judaism, from orthodox observance of the Habad move- ment to Reform Judaism. The Jewish Club, donated by Sir Eli Kadoorie ȋͳͺ͸͹ȂͳͻͶͶȌ‹ͳͻͲͻ–‘–Š‡ ‘—‹–›ǡ‹•‘™–Š‡ ‡™‹•ŠCommunity Center, and Ohel Leah, the synagogue built by Sir ƒ ‘„ƒ••‘‘‹ͳͻͲʹǡ is still in use. Even though a large number of Hong Kong’s Jews live there only temporarily, its nearly three thousand Jews are an interesting mix of descendants of old Sephardi families, Australians, South Africans, Americans, Israelis, and British, and their common language is English. Thus in this small corner of China, —†ƒ‹• ‘–‹—‡•–‘ϐŽ‘—”‹•Šǡ‘–‘ˆ Chinese Jews but of Jews in China, many of whom, nonetheless, consider China their home.

References

„”ƒŠƒʹͲͲͳȂ‡†›„”ƒŠƒǡDz ‹•–‘”›‹–Š‡ƒ‹‰ǣ ‹”•–Š‹‡•‡‡• ‡†ƒ– from Kaifeng Set to Study in Israel.” Points Eastͳ͸ǤʹȋʹͲͲͳȌͳǡ’Ǥ͸Ǥ Ž„‘‹ͳͻͻͻȂʹͲͲͲȂ˜‹•Šƒ‹Ž„‘‹ǡ”ƒ„„‹ǡDzǯˆ—•‡‹ŠƒŠƒ‹˜ǯǮŠ‡ǯ‡”‹–Š Šƒ’Ž‹–ƒǯdz ȋŠƒ‰Šƒ‹—„Ž‹•Š‹‰ƒ†Dz •”ƒ‡Žǯ•‡ƒ–dzȌǤƒǯƒ›ƒȋͳͻͻͻȂʹͲͲͲȌǡ’’Ǥ͹ͶȂͺ͸Ǥ Ž–ƒȀ„‡”ʹͲͲͲȂ˜”ƒŠƒŽ–ƒƒ† ”‡‡„‡”ǡDz Ž‹‰Š––‘Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͳͻ͵ͺȂͳͻͶͲǣ The Larger Setting.” Yad Vashem StudiesʹͺȋʹͲͲͲȌǡ’’ǤͷͳȂͺ͸Ǥ ‡”‰‡”Ȁ Š™ƒ„ͳͻͳ͵ȂP. Berger and M. Schwab, Le plus ancien manuscrit hebreau. Journal Asiatique ʹ‡”Ǥ ȋͳͻͳ͵Ȍǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ͻȂͳ͹ͷǤ ‹ ‡”•Ȁ ‡”‹‘–ʹͲͲͲȂ‘„‡”–‹ ‡”•ƒ†Š”‹•–‹ƒ ‡”‹‘–ǡDz –”‘†— –‹‘Ǥdz ǣNew ”‘–‹‡”•ǡ ’‡”‹ƒŽ‹•ǯ•‡™‘—‹–‹‡•‹ƒ•–•‹ƒǡͷ;ͺ͸ǦͷͿͻ͹. Manchester-New ‘”ǣƒ Š‡•–‡”‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͶȂͷǤ ƒ”Ǧ ƒŽʹͲͲʹȂ˜‹”ƒ”Ǧ ƒŽǡDzŠƒ‰Šƒ‹‰”‡‡•–‘–‘’ ‡™‹•Š ”ƒ˜‡•–‘‡ƒŽ‡ǤdzJewish

͸ͻ  ʹͲͲʹǡͳǤ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͺ͹

ChronicleȋʹͲͲͲȌǤ  ͳͻͶͳƒȂ‡–”ƒŽ” Š‹˜‡ˆ‘”–Š‡ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡ ‡™‹•Š‡‘’Ž‡ǡDzͳͲͳǤ‹”ƒ Ž‡––‡”–‘‘Ž‹•Š‡Ž‹‡ˆ‘‹––‡‡Ǥdz‡Ž„‘—”‡ǡ͸‘˜‡„‡”ͳͻͶͳƒ†ͳ͵‘˜‡„‡” ͳͻͶͳǤ  ͳͻͶͳ„Ȃ †ǤǡDzͳͲͳǤ‹”ƒŽ‡––‡”–‘ dzʹ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͶͳǤ ‘Š‡ͳͻͻͲȂ›”‘Ǥ‘Š‡ǡDz‹‡ƒ‰‡”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘‹‘”–ŠŠ‹ƒǤdzThe Journal of Asian StudiesͶͻǣ͵ȋͳͻͻͲȌǡ’’ǤͷͲͻȂͷ͵ͶǤ  ʹͲͲʹǡ—ŽŽ‡–‹ ‰—†‘–•‡‹‹͵͹ʹȋʹͲͲʹȌͳǤ „‡”ͳͻͻͻȂ ”‡‡„‡”ǡDzŠ‡ –‡”‹ƒ„Ž‡‡”—‡•–‹‘Ǥdz ǣ‹„Ž‡‹‘†‡”Š‹ƒǡ –Š‡‹–‡”ƒ”›ƒ† –‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ ’ƒ –, ed. I. Eber, S.K. Wan, K. Walf, with R. Malek. ƒ–—‰—•–‹ǣ‘—‡–ƒ‡”‹ ƒǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ͷȂͳ͸ͳǤ „‡”Ȁ •‹ƒʹͲͲ͵Ȃ ”‡‡„‡”ƒ††”‹ƒ •‹ƒǡDz ‘ —•ˆ‘”‡‡„‡”‹‰ǣŠ‡ ‡™‹•Š Cemetery in Hong Kong.” Pe’amimͻͺȂͻͻȋʹͲͲͶȌǡ’’͵͵͵Ȃ͵ͷͲȋ‹ ‡„”‡™ȌǤ EJͳͻ͹ͳȀͳͲȂ › Ž‘’‡†‹ƒ —†ƒ‹ ƒ‘ŽǤͳͲǤ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡ǣ‡–‡”ǡͳͻ͹ͳǤ ‡‹ͳͻͶͷȂ‘‹ ‡‹ǡDzŽ‹†˜‡‰Šƒ‰Šƒ‹‡”‰Š‡––‘dzȋ‘‰ƒ„‘—–Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ Š‡––‘ȌǤ Unzer Vortǡƒ‡ŽŠ‡ˆ–ȋͳͻͶͷȌǡ’’Ǥʹ͹Ȃ͵ͲǤ Š‘•ŠͳͻͻʹȂAmitav Ghosh, In an Antique Land. Delhi: Ravi Dayal. ‡‰ͳͻͻͻȂ ‡‰Š›‡‹ƒ‰ǡ‹–‹‡•‘ˆ”‹•–‘ ”ƒ–•ƒ†—”‡ƒ— ”ƒ–•ǣŠ‡‡˜‡Ž‘’‡– ‘ˆ‡†‹‡˜ƒŽŠ‹‡•‡‹–›• ƒ’‡•. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press and Singa- ’‘”‡‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͻǤ ‡”–•ƒͳͻͻͻȂ‘•‡ˆ ‡”–•ƒǡMirer Yeshiva in Golesȋ‹”‡•Š‹˜ƒ‹š‹Ž‡ȌǤ- Š‡”•–ǣƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹††‹•Š‘‘‡–‡”ͳͻͻͻǤȋ‡’”‹–‘ˆͳͻͷͲǤȌ ‘‹‰ͳͻͻʹȂ‹Ž› ‘‹‰ǡ”‡ƒ–‹‰Š‹‡•‡–Š‹ ‹–›ǡ—„‡‹‡‘’Ž‡‹Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ͷ;ͻͶǦ ͷͿ;ͶǤ‡™ ƒ˜‡Ǧ‘†‘ǣƒŽ‡‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻʹǤ  Ȃ ‘‹– ‹•–”‹„—–‹‘ ‘‹––‡‡ǡ Dz  ͵͵ȂͶͶǡ ϐ‹Ž‡ Ͷͺ͹Ǥdz ‡––‡” ˆ”‘ Ǥ†‡Ž‡˜‹ Šǡ ”‡•‹†‡–ǡ‡”‹ ƒ ƒ”ƒ•–‡”‘ ‹‡–›ǡ  ǤǡǤǤ–‘ ‰—†‘–•‡‹‹ǡ‡Ž˜‹˜ǡʹ͹  –‘„‡” ͳͻͷͺ ƒ† Ǥ Ǥ —†ƒŽ‡˜‹ Šǡ Šƒ‹”ƒǡ ‘— ‹Ž ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‡™‹•Š ‘—‹–›ǡ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡ–‘ ‡”‹Žˆ‡„‡‹ǡ ǡ ‡‡˜ƒǡ͸ ƒ—ƒ”›ͳͻ͸ͲǤ ”ƒœŽ‡”ͳͻ͹͸Ȃƒ˜‹†”ƒœŽ‡”ǡ ƒ’ƒ‡•‡ǡƒœ‹•ƒ† ‡™•ǡŠ‡ ‡™‹•Š‡ˆ—‰‡‡‘—- ‹–›‘ˆŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͷͿ͹;ǦͷͿͺͻ. New York: Yeshiva University Press. ”‡‹••Ž‡”ʹͲͲͲȂ ”ƒ­‘‹•‡”‡‹••Ž‡”, “Ein Journalist im Exil in Shanghai: Adolph J. Storfer und die ‡Ž„‡‘•–Ǥdz ǣƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͷͳͳȂͷʹͶǤ Kontrasͳͻ͸ͲȂͳͻ͸ͳǡ“ǯˆ—•‡‹Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ȋŠƒ‰Šƒ‹”‹–‹‰ȌǤ” Kontras Hasefer Hatorani ȋƒ’ŠŽ‡–•‘• ”‹’–—”ƒŽŽ‹–‡”ƒ–—”‡Ȍǡ‘Ǥͻȋͳͻ͸ͲȂͳͻ͸ͳȌǡ’ǤͷʹȂͷ͵Ǥ ƒ›–‡”ͳͻͺʹȂ•‘ƒ›–‡”ǡDz‡†‹• ‘˜‡”‹‰‡ƒ–•‘ˆ ‡™•‹Š‹ƒǤdzHeritage ͳ͸ȋͳͻͺʹȌǤ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻ͹ʹȂ‘ƒŽ†Ǥ‡•Ž‹‡ǡŠ‡—”˜‹˜ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ‡™•ǡŠ‡ ‡™‹•Š‘—‹–› of Kaifeng. ‡‹†‡ǣǤ Ǥ”‹ŽŽǡͳͻ͹ʹǤ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻͺͶȂ †ǤǡŠ‡Š‹‡•‡Ǧ ‡„”‡™‡‘”‹ƒŽ‘‘‘ˆ–Š‡ ‡™‹•Š‘—‹–›‘ˆǯƒ‹- fengǤ‡Ž ‘‡ǣƒ„‡””ƒ‘ŽŽ‡‰‡‘ˆ†˜ƒ ‡††— ƒ–‹‘ǡͳͻͺͶǤ ƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͲȂ‘ƒƒŽ‡ǡ‡†Ǥǡ ‡™•‹Š‹ƒǡ ”‘ƒ‹ˆ‡‰ǤǤǤ–‘Šƒ‰Šƒ‹. Sankt Au- ‰—•–‹ǣ‘—‡–ƒ‡”‹ ƒ •–‹–—–‡ǡʹͲͲͲǤ ͺͺ Irene Eber

‡›‡”ʹͲͲͲȂƒ‹•‹‡‡›‡”ǡDzŠ‡‡’Šƒ”†‹ ‡™‹•Š‘—‹–›‹Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ƒ†–Š‡ —‡•–‹‘‘ˆ †‡–‹–›Ǥdz ǣƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͲǡ’’Ǥ͵ͶͷȂ͵͹͵Ǥ ‡›‡”ʹͲͲ͵Ȃ †Ǥǡ ”‘–Š‡‹˜‡”•‘ˆƒ„›Ž‘–‘–Š‡Šƒ‰’‘‘ǣ‡–—”›‘ˆ‡’Šƒ”†‹ Jewish Life in ShanghaiǤ‡™‘”ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••‘ˆ‡”‹ ƒǡʹͲͲ͵Ǥ ƒ”–‹ͳͺ͸͸ȂǤǤǤƒ”–‹ǡDzˆˆƒ‹”•‹Š‹ƒǤdzThe New York Timesǡʹͻ—‰—•–ͳͺ͸͸ǡ ’ǤʹǤ ‡—•‡”ͳͻͺͶȂ ƒ ‘„‡—•‡”ǡ”ƒ•ǤǡŠ‡ƒŽ—†‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ†‘ˆ •”ƒ‡Žǡ”‡Ž‹‹ƒ”› Translation and ExplanationǤ‘ŽǤʹ͸ǣQidushin. Chicago-London: The University of Š‹ ƒ‰‘”‡••ǡͳͻͺͶǤ ˜‡”›‡”ͳͻ͹͸ Ȃ ƒ‹‡Ž ˜‡”›‡”ǡ ‘Ž—††Š‹•–‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ǣ‹••‡–‹‰‡ –•‹ƒ–‡ Traditional ChinaǤƒ„”‹†‰‡ǣ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻ͹͸Ǥ ‘ŽŽƒͳͻͺͲȂ‹ Šƒ‡Ž‘ŽŽƒǡƒ†ƒ”‹•ǡ ‡™•ǡƒ†‹••‹‘ƒ”‹‡•. Philadelphia: The Jew- ‹•Š—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ ‹‡–›‘ˆ‡”‹ ƒǡͳͻͺͲǤ ͳͻͶͲȂ—„Ž‹ ‡ ‘”†ˆϐ‹ ‡ǡDz Ȁ͵͹ͳȀʹͶ͸ͺͶǡ†‹•’ƒ– Š‘Ǥͷ͸͹Ǥdz‡––‡”ˆ”‘Ǥ Ǥ ‡‘”‰‡ǡ‘•—Ž ‡‡”ƒŽ–‘ ‘”‡‹‰ˆϐ‹ ‡ǡͷ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͻͶͲǤ ƒ„‹‘™‹–œȀ ”‘••ƒͳͻ͸ͷȂ‘—‹• Ǥƒ„‹‘™‹–œƒ†Š‹Ž‹’ ”‘••ƒǡ”ƒ•ǤǡThe ‘†‡‘ˆƒ‹‘‹†‡•‘‘ ‹˜‡ǡŠ‡‘‘‘ˆ ‘Ž‹‡••. New Haven-London: Yale Uni- ˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻ͸ͷǤ Š‹„ƒͳͻͺ͵ȂŠ‹„ƒ‘•Š‹‘„—ǡDz—‰ ‘”‡‹‰”ƒ†‡ǣ –• ‘’‡ƒ†”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘Ǥdz ǣ Š‹ƒ‘‰“—ƒŽ•ǡŠ‡‹††Ž‡‹‰†‘ƒ† –•‡‹‰Š„‘”•ǡͷͶ–Š–‘ͷͺ–Š‡–—”‹‡•ǡ ‡†Ǥ‘””‹•‘••ƒ„‹Ǥ‡”‡Ž‡›Ǧ‘•‰‡Ž‡•ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒŽ‹ˆ‘”‹ƒ”‡••ǡͳͻͺ͵Ǥ’’Ǥ ͺͻȂͳͳͷǤ ‘„‹ƒ•ͳͻͻͻȂ‹‰—†‘„‹ƒ•ǡ–”ƒ‰‡ ƒ˜‡ǡ ‡™‹•ŠŠ‹Ž†Š‘‘†‹ƒ”–‹‡Šƒ‰Šƒ‹, ”„ƒƒǦŠ‹ ƒ‰‘ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ ŽŽ‹‘‹•”‡••ǡͳͻͻͻǤ UL ͳͻͶʹ Ȃ ‹†’ƒ• „‡Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ ȋ”‹–‡† ‹ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹Ȍǡ œ‡” ‡„ͷͶǡͳͷƒ›ͳͻͶʹǤ (œ‡”‡„was the Yiddish page in the Russian weekly Nasha ZhiznȌǤ ƒ‰ͳͻͺͶȂƒ‰‹•ŠƒǡDzŠ‡‡• ‡†ƒ–•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‹ˆ‡‰ ‡™•Ǥdz ǣJews in Old Chi- ƒǣ–—†‹‡•„›Š‹‡•‡ Š‘Žƒ”•, tr. and ed. Sidney Shapiro. New York: Hyppocrene ‘‘•ǡͳͻͺͶǡ’’Ǥͳ͸͹Ȃͳͺ͹Ǥ ‡‹ͳͻͻͲȂ‡––›‡ŠǦǯ‹‡‹ǡŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡ”— ‹„Ž‡‘ˆ‘†‡”Š‹ƒǤ Oxford-New York: šˆ‘”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͲǤ ‡”„Ž‘™•›ͳͻͻͶȂǤ Ǥ˜‹‡”„Ž‘™•›ǡ‘–‡‘–Š‡ ‡™‹•Š‘—‹–›‹ƒ‹ˆ‡‰ – A Liturgical Perspective. In: Gnosisforschung und Religionsgeschichte - Festschrift ˆò”—”–—†‘Ž’Šœ—ͼͻǤ ‡„—”–•–ƒ‰, ed. H. Preissler and H. Seiwert. Marburg, ͳͻͻͶǡ’’Ǥͷͺ͹ȂͷͻͷǤ Š‹–‡ͳͻ͸͸Ȁ Ȃ‹ŽŽ‹ƒǤŠ‹–‡ǡChinese Jews: A Compilation of Matters Relating to –Š‡ ‡™•‘ˆǯƒ‹ˆ‡‰ —Ǥƒ”– Ǥ‘”‘–‘ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‘”‘–‘”‡••ǡͳͻ͸͸Ǥ ”‡ͳͻͺʹȂŠ”‹•–‘’Š‡””‡ǡDz ‹‡– ‡™•‘ˆŠ‹ƒǣŠ‡ƒ•–”ƒ ‡‹• ƒ†‹‰ǤdzThe New York Timesǡͳͺƒ›ͳͻͺʹǤ ˆ‘›Š’ƒ”‰‘‹Žƒ‹ ‹Š‡‰ ᗀ䩴ᡀ, Hatong Waizhuan ૸਼ཆۣȋ‘ˆϐ —Š—ͳͻͺ͵Ȃ— ƒ”†‘‘ȌǤŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǣ—š‹‰Œ‹ Š—„‡ǡͳͻͺ͵Ǥ ͳͻ͵ͺȀͳͻ͵ͻȂƒ†ƒ•Š‡” Š‹˜‡•ǡͲ͹ͺȀͺͷǡDzŠƒ‰Šƒ‹—‹ ‹’ƒŽ” Š‹˜‡•dzǡ ƒ„Ž‡ Chinese Jews and ‡™•‹Š‹ƒ ͺͻ

ˆ”‘Š‹Ž‹’•ǡ‡ ”‡–ƒ”›ȏŠƒ‰Šƒ‹—‹ ‹’ƒŽȐ‘— ‹Ž–‘ ‡”ƒ ‡™‹•Š‹†‘- ‹––‡‡ǡ Ǧ ǡ ‹‰”ƒ–‹‘ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ǡ  ǡ ʹ͵ ‡ ‡„‡” ͳͻ͵ͺǡ ƒ† Ž‡––‡” ˆ”‘–Š‡Šƒ‰Šƒ‹—‹ ‹’ƒŽ‘— ‹Ž–‘‡„‡”•‘ˆ‘— ‹Žǡͳʹ’”‹Žͳͻ͵ͻǤ YVAͳͻͺͺȂ †ǤǡͲ͹ͺȀͷ͸, “William Deman, Tagebuchblätter eines Heimatvertriebe- nen, ein verlorenes Jahrzehnt.”  Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ͳͻ͵ͻȂͳͻͶͻǤ

Sin and Penance in Fujian Christianity in Late Ming Times

Erik Zürcher

he choice of the subject needs a few words of explanation: why sin and penance, why Fujian 福建, and why the late Ming? Firstly, T sin and is an elliptic formula used for the sake of brevity. It actually refers to the theme “ penance” as it figures in the title of this paper

Christianity.the whole complex When goingof “guilt through – sin –the remorse impressive – confession corpus of – contempoabsolution- – penance”, as experienced, expressed and practiced in early Chinese- ten by Jesuit missionaries, Chinese converts, sympathizers and oppo- rary source materials – more than 200 seventeenth-century texts writ the Christian awareness of sin, the ritual of confession and the sacra- nents – one is struck by the central role played by that theme. Of course orthodox Roman Catholic doctrine as it was propagated by the western mentmissionaries. of absolution But here belonged we rather to the are “foreign concerned input”: with they the formedreceiving part end: of the way in which that complex was received by Christian literati and functioned in a Chinese context. Secondly, there are good reasons to focus upon Fujian. During the last decades of the Ming, Fujian, and especially its coastal zone, was Jesuit mission. This mainly was due to the effort deployed by one remarkable man,one of the the Italian most flourishingmissionary andGiulio most Aleni promising (Ai Rulüe theaters 艾儒略 of the after his arrival in Under the protection of some im- portant sponsors he established himself1 in the provincial, 1582–1649) capital Fu- zhou 福州, and fromFuzhou there he in started1625. his campaign, traveling to almost every part of the province. Within ten years Christian communities had

For Giulio 1Menegon Zürcher . Aleni see Pfister 1932, 126–137; Dehergne 1973; Lipiello/​Malek 1997; 1994; Goodrich 1976; Pan 1994; Lin 1992; 1990 Religion in China

Max Deeg/Bernhard Scheid (eds.), , pp. 91–112. ͻʹ Erik Zürcher been established under local lower gentry leadership in the major cit- ies, with Fuzhou and Quanzhou ⋹ᐎ as the main centers. In the perspective chosen for this paper – the contextualization of the Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven as an exotic marginal religion in the Chinese milieu – Fujian is especially important because of the amount and quality of the Chinese source materials that have been preserved, not only Aleni’s own large output of Chinese texts, but also works writ- ten by Chinese converts, some of which are truly unique in nature.ʹ Thirdly, the rather limited time span covered (the quarter century between Ž‡‹ǯ•ƒ””‹˜ƒŽ‹ͳ͸ʹͷƒ† ƒǤͳ͸ͷͲȌ‹•‹’‘•‡†„›–Š‡–”ƒ‰‹  course of events. The terrible devastations wrought by the Qing con- “—‡•–‹–Š‡›‡ƒ”•ͳ͸Ͷ͹Ȃͳ͸Ͷͺƒ†ǡ•‘‡™Šƒ–Žƒ–‡”ǡ–Š‡ˆ‘” ‡††‡’‘’—- lation of the coastal zone dealt a blow from which the Jesuit mission in Fujian never recovered.

The Chinese Context

In introducing the subject, let me not stay too long on the high, oxy- gen-poor summits of generalization. The feeling of guilt, in the sense of the painful awareness of having willfully transgressed the norms of moral conduct, of course forms part of human experience, at least in all major civilizations. In the religious sphere the concept of sin, in the sense of a deliberate violation of rules that are imposed by higher be- ings or that form part of a cosmic order, is present in all major religions, ƒ•‹•–Š‡—”‰‡–‘‡Ž‹‹ƒ–‡‹–ȋ‘”‡• ƒ’‡ˆ”‘‹–• ‘•‡“—‡ ‡•Ȍ„›•‘‡ ‹†‘ˆ‘”ƒŽ’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘Ǥ In China self-examination and self-accusation have a long history, both within and outside the religious sphere, and much has been writ- ten about it ever since Wolfram Eberhard, in his pioneering study Guilt ƒ†‹‹”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽŠ‹ƒǡshowed the importance of interiorized guilt

ʹ Special mention may be made of the eight-juan ᐫ Kouduo richao ਓ䩨ᰕᢴ (Diary of ƒ‹Ž›†‘‹–‹‘•Ȍǡƒ ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ‘–‡•‘ˆ ‘˜‡”•ƒ–‹‘•Š‡Ž†„›Aleni and some other ‹••‹‘ƒ”‹‡•™‹–ŠŠ‹‡•‡• Š‘Žƒ”•‹–Š‡›‡ƒ”•ͳ͸͵ͲȂͳ͸ͶͲǡ ‘’‹Ž‡†„›Li Jiubiao ᵾҍ⁉Ǣ‹š‹—›‹Œ‹ƒ थ㝙а䪁ȋ‹””‘”ˆ‘”‡ŽˆǦ—Ž–‹˜ƒ–‹‘Ȍǡ ‘’‹Ž‡†„› Li Jiubiao’s brother Li Jiugong ᵾҍ࣏, containing, inter alia, a number of Chinese Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹”ƒ Ž‡–ƒŽ‡•ǢShensi lu ᝾ᙍ䤴ȋ‡ ‘”†‘ˆ‡†‹–ƒ–‹‘•Ȍ„›Li Jiugong ȋ’‘•–Š—‘—•Ž›’—„Ž‹•Š‡†„›Š‹••‘ǡ ƒǤͳ͸ͺͲȌǡƒ†Xichao chongzheng ji ⟉ᵍጷ ↓䳶ȋ”–Š‘†‘š›š–‘ŽŽ‡†‹–Š‹• Ž‘”‹‘—•”ƒȌǡƒ ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ’‘‡•’”‡•‡–‡†–‘ Aleni by Chinese scholars. Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͻ͵ in Chinese culture. Other landmarks are the studies by Wu Pei-yi on self-examination and ‘ˆ‡••‹‘Ǣ„›Cynthia Brokaw on the so-called ‡†‰‡”•‘ˆ‡”‹–ƒ†‡‡”‹–Ǣ„›Sakai ƒ†ƒ‘‘‘”ƒŽ‹–›„‘‘•Ǣƒ†ǡ on the Buddhist side, by Yü Chün-fang, and by Kuo Li-ying in her work on confession and remorse in Chinese Buddhism.͵ Thanks to their ef- forts we can discern the contours of the Chinese indigenous landscape in which the Christian practices took place. In the Confucian tradition, and especially in Neo-Confucianism, self-investigation (xingshen ⴱ䓛Ȍǡ–Š‡ ”‹–‹ ƒŽ‘”ƒŽƒ••‡••‡–‘ˆ‘‡ǯ• ‘™–Š‘—‰Š–•ǡ™‘”†•ƒ†ƒ –‹‘•ƒ•ƒϐ‹”•–•–‡’‹–Š‡’”‘ ‡••‘ˆ•‡ŽˆǦ‹- provement, had always played a very important role. The examination of conscience was focused on the observance of social virtues and on the elimination of egoistic impulses that stand in the way of their reali- zation, but it always had a metaphysical dimension as well, for the Con- ˆ— ‹ƒ˜‹”–—‡•”‡ϐŽ‡ ––Š‡“—ƒŽ‹–‹‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘•‘•‹–•‡ŽˆǤ‡ƒ”‡Ž‹˜‹‰‹ ƒ‘”ƒŽ—‹˜‡”•‡Ǣ„›”‡ƒŽ‹œ‹‰–Š‡‹„‘”‰‘‘†‡••‘ˆ‘—”ƒ–—”‡™‡ conform to the intention of Heaven. In Neo-Confucianism, the practice of self-investigation had also given rise to a type of spiritual exercise with religious overtones called jingzuo 䶌඀, “quiet-sitting”, no doubt —†‡”–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆChan Buddhism. Jingzuo introspection was prac- ticed in the early morning or at the end of the day, in a secluded room, sometimes for a considerable time. It was an exercise on mental puri- ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†–Š‡ ‘–‡’Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–”ƒ•‰”‡••‹‘• ‘‹––‡†‘†‘—„– formed part of it, but there is no evidence that feelings of acute remorse and penance played a dominating role in it. However, as Wu Pei-yi has shown, this rather optimistic self-image of the Confucian practicant underwent a remarkable change in the latter ŠƒŽˆ‘ˆ–Š‡•‹š–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›Ǥ‘—‰ŠŽ›„‡–™‡‡ͳͷ͹Ͳƒ†ͳ͸͹Ͳ™‡ϐ‹† in certain Confucian circles what Wu Pei-yi calls “a deep awareness of the human proclivity to evil, an urgent need to counter this proclivity, a readiness for self-disclosure, and a deep anguish over one’s own wrong- doings.” This wave of zisong 㠚䁏, “self-indictment”, no doubt bore the stamp of the Zeitgeist of the late Ming, a period of social unrest, political turmoil, and, in some circles, libertarianism and conspicuous spending. It may well have been one reaction to the evils of the time, an intro- spective counterpart of Confucian moral crusades like the Donglin ᶡ ᷇ movement. On the other hand, it also may have been stimulated by

͵ „‡”Šƒ”†ͳͻ͸͹Ǣ—ͳͻ͹ͻǢ”‘ƒ™ͳͻͺ͹ƒ†ͳͻͻͳǢƒƒ‹ͳͻ͸ͲǢòͳͻͺͳǢ—‘ͳͻͻͶǤ ͻͶ Erik Zürcher contemporary Buddhist or Buddho-Daoist practices of confession and self-investigation. It goes without saying that it is highly relevant to our subject, for two reasons: the coincidence in time, and the fact that it took place in the milieu of Confucian scholars, the primary target group of the Jesuit mission. But it also should be noted that in a strictly Confu- cian sphere, penitence is not coupled with the idea of divine retribution: ideally self-cultivation is supposed to be undertaken for its own sake, and not as a means to acquire gong ࣏ , “merit”, or fu ⾿ , “good fortune”. In Buddhist and Daoist penitence, the accumulation of merit and the quest for good fortune play a central role, as does the belief in a univer- sal law of retribution supervised or mediated by divine powers. There can be no doubt that the origin of lay penitential rites must be sought in monastic Buddhism. Since very early times the monks of a local parish meetings during which all ƒŠ†ƒڍ‘’— were obliged to hold fortnightly the monastic rules were recited one by one. The rules are arranged in categories in descending order, from the most serious faults warrant- ing permanent expulsion to minor transgressions that merely deserve to be criticized, or just to be noted. The confessional element lies in the fact that transgressors are supposed to report their fault when the rel- evant rule has been recited, and that the presiding monks can decide to impose a ’‡ƒ ‡ǤŠ‹•”‡ —””‹‰’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘”‹–‡ƒŽ™ƒ›•Šƒ•„‡‡ considered indispensable for maintaining the “purity” (qingjing ␵䶌Ȍ of the Buddhist order, without which it cannot function. In ƒŠ¢›¢ƒBuddhism, the increased participation of lay believers, both men and women, in religious life stimulated the development of collective penitential rituals (chanhui ᠪᛄȌ‹™Š‹ Š„‘–Š Ž‡”‰›ƒ† laity took part. Like other ƒŠ¢›¢ƒ”‹–—ƒŽ•ǡ–Š‡›•‡”˜‡†ƒ†‘—„Ž‡’—”- pose. On the one hand, the confession of sins and the declaration of re- ‘”•‡ƒ”‡ƒ –•‘ˆ‘”ƒŽ’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘–Šƒ–‰‡‡”ƒ–‡‡”‹–ȋgongȌˆ‘”–Š‡ individual believer, resulting in improving his or her karmic destiny. On the other hand, the ƒŠ¢›¢ƒ„‡Ž‹‡ˆ‹–Š‡’‘••‹„‹Ž‹–›‘ˆDz–”ƒ•ˆ‡””‹‰dz the merit thus gained to other persons (or at least of sharing it with –Š‡Ȍ•–‹—Žƒ–‡†–Š‡‹”’‘’—Žƒ”‹–›ǡ„‡ ƒ—•‡•— Š”‹–‡• ‘—Ž†„‡—•‡†–‘ improve the lot of, for instance, deceased parents. Chanhui meetings also have an important devotional aspect, for the force of karma (which ‹•‹’‡”•‘ƒŽƒ†‹‡š‘”ƒ„Ž‡Ȍ‹•‘–†‹”‡ –Ž›‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›–Š‡’ƒ”–‹ - ipant, but through the mediation of benevolent superhuman powers ȋ‘†Š‹•ƒ––˜ƒ• ‘” —††Šƒ•Ȍ –‘ ™Š‘ –Š‡ ’‡‹–‡–• ƒ’’‡ƒŽ ˆ‘” ‡” › and forgiveness. In all this the role of the priests is essential: the priests Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͻͷ perform the ceremonial, they recite the confessional texts on behalf of the participants, and they transfer the merit to others. Their expert li- turgical knowledge and their state of ascetic purity give them access to the divine powers. The latter are not only prayed to, but “invited”, and are believed actually to be present during the ceremonial. An important further step was made by the popularization of the •‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡†‘†Š‹•ƒ––˜ƒ˜‘™ǡƒ’”ƒ –‹ ‡–Šƒ–’”‘„ƒ„Ž›†ƒ–‡•ˆ”‘–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–Š century A.D., and that in the course of time has become a standard el- ement in Chinese Buddhist life. During this ritual, the candidate indi- vidually makes the vow to follow the Bodhisattva career before three •‡‹‘”‘•Ǣƒ––Š‡•ƒ‡–‹‡—††Šƒ•ƒ†‘†Š‹•ƒ––˜ƒ•ƒ”‡ ƒŽŽ‡†–‘ witness. Since the Bodhisattva ordination is impossible without moral ’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡŠ‡‘”•Š‡Šƒ•–‘’”ƒ –‹ ‡’‡‹–‡ ‡ƒ†confession regard- ing all the forty-eight forgivable sins listed in the formulary, with utter sincerity and devotion, six times per day, before the images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Absolution – in the sense of a guaranteed remission of sins – is not conferred by a monk but by the divine powers them- •‡Ž˜‡•Ǣ‹––ƒ‡•–Š‡ˆ‘”‘ˆ•‘‡‹†‘ˆ•—’‡”ƒ–—”ƒŽDz•‹‰dzȋxiang ⴨Ȍ revealed to the practicant in a vision or in a dream. If after a full year the sign does not appear, the practicant’s karmic burden is too heavy, and the initiation has to be postponed till the next life. In this ritual, the act of penitence and the quest for forgiveness have become individual- ized, but the form of the confessional always is stereotyped and gener- alized. The practicant seeks redemption from sins of a certain category ȋ‡Ǥ‰Ǥ˜‘ ƒŽ•‹•Ž‹‡Ž›‹‰ǡ•Žƒ†‡”ƒ†„ƒ „‹–‹‰Ȍ‡˜‡” ‘‹––‡†‹–Š‡ ‘—”•‡‘ˆ‹—‡”ƒ„Ž‡Ž‹˜‡•ƒ†‹–Š‡’”‡•‡–Ž‹ˆ‡ǢŠ‡‘”•Š‡’”‘‹•‡• ‘––‘ ‘‹––Š‡ƒ‰ƒ‹ǡƒ†ƒ••ˆ‘”ˆ‘”‰‹˜‡‡••Ǥ‘•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ sinful deeds actually committed are mentioned. In fact, in the Buddhist per- spective it would make no sense to do so, because the vast majority of sins committed are supposed to date from former lives and cannot be remembered by the penitent. In religious Daoism, ‘ˆ‡••‹‘ •–ƒ”–‡† ƒ• ƒ ƒ‰‹ ƒŽ ’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ method associated with healing, the patient meditating on his sins and the Daoist master acting as an intermediary asking the divine powers to remove the pollution. However, already in early medieval times this was supplanted by chanhui rituals closely patterned after Buddhist examples. The belief in rebirth and karmic retribution became incor- porated into Daoism, the main difference being that the ultimate aim pursued by the believer is not Buddhahood but becoming an Immortal. ͻ͸ Erik Zürcher

On the other hand, the belief in “divine controllers” (deities reporting ƒŽŽ–”ƒ•‰”‡••‹‘•–‘–Š‡Š‹‰Š‡”‡ Š‡Ž‘•‘ˆ–Š‡Š‡ƒ˜‡Ž›„—”‡ƒ— ”ƒ ›Ȍ and the idea that there those acts were carefully recorded appear to be of Daoist origin and to have been taken over by Buddhism. Š‡Žƒ––‡”„‡Ž‹‡ˆ‹–Š‡”‡ ‘”†‹‰ƒ†Dz“—ƒ–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘dz‘ˆsin even- tually became the doctrinal basis of a type of moralistic book-keeping known as Gongguo ge ࣏䙾Ṭ, “Ledgers of Merit and Demerit”. The oldest surviving example is a Daoist text of the twelfth century, but the genre and the practice based on it only became wide-spread in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when many Gongguo ge were published, also of Buddhist or Buddho-Confucian inspiration. In those later ledgers, the supernatural element (divine beings shortening or lengthening one’s life •’ƒ‘–Š‡„ƒ•‹•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ ‘—–ƒ†‡—’‘ˆ‡”‹–ƒ††‡‡”‹–’‘‹–•Ȍ is less prominent, although the system always presupposes some kind of divine or karmic retribution. The emphasis is on daily practice: each one of the positive and negative acts listed is worth a certain number of “merits” (gongȌ‘”Dz†‡‡”‹–•dzȋguoȌǡƒ†–Š‹•‡ƒ„Ž‡•–Š‡—•‡”–‘‡‡’ track of his moral development and to improve his karmic situation. The importance of the Gongguo ge for the present subject lies in the fact that here, unlike in the Buddhist penitentials, the user renders account ‘ˆ•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ –”ƒ•‰”‡••‹‘•–Šƒ–ƒ”‡”‡ ‘”†‡†‘‡„›‘‡ƒ†•Š‘”–Ž›ƒˆ- ter the event. It also marks a further stage of individualization: by using the ledger one controls the process of merit accumulation and thereby „‡ ‘‡•ƒ•–‡”‘ˆ‘‡ǯ•‘™ˆƒ–‡ǤŠ‡•›•–‡™ƒ•™‹†‡Ž›ƒ ‡’–‡†Ǣ‘ the other hand it occasionally was criticized by orthodox Confucians because of its “vulgar” emphasis on reward and punishment, and, as we shall see, also by Christians, albeit for other reasons. After this brief survey of contemporary types of moral self-examina- tion and confession let us turn to the main subject. How did Christian ideas concerning sin, remorse and release, and their ritual expression in ‘ˆ‡••‹‘ƒ†ƒ„•‘Ž—–‹‘ǡϐ‹–‹–‘–Š‹•Š‹‡•‡ ‘–‡š–ǫ There can be no doubt that to non-believers much of it seemed strange, but at the same time it was not so totally different from Chi- nese practice as to be quite unintelligible. The Christian practice of con- templating one’s own sinful deeds formed part of a program of medi- tative exercises (called xingxiu ⴱ㝙, “investigation and cultivation”, a ‘ˆ— ‹ƒ–‡”Ȍ–Šƒ–™ƒ•”‡‹‹• ‡–‘ˆConfucian jingzuo, “quiet-sit- ting”. Christian texts contained detailed lists of categorized sins to be used as a moral guide, almost like Gongguo ge. Like Buddhist and Daoist Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͻ͹ believers, Christian penitents appealed to a supernatural power, with a priest acting as an intermediary. Sincere remorse followed by expi- ation was considered a means to accumulate “merit” and to improve one’s lot in the hereafter. Especially to Confucian scholars with Bud- dhist inclinations (as there were many in seventeenth-century —Œ‹ƒȌ all this must have sounded somewhat familiar. But on the other hand the Christian complex showed a number of features that set it apart and †‡ϐ‹‡†‹–•—‹“—‡‡••‹–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ‘–‡š–Ǥ ™Šƒ–ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™• •ŠƒŽŽ–”› to identify some of the most salient distinctive features of the Christian practice of gaojie ੺䀓ȋŽ‹–ǤDz‹†‹ –‡–ƒ†”‡‹••‹‘dzȌǤ

“Confucian Monotheism”

Š”‹•–‹ƒ•Šƒ†–Š‡‹”‘™†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘‘ˆsin (zui 㖚Ȍǡ‘‡–Šƒ–™ƒ•‹‡š- tricably bound up with their belief in a single God, the Lord of Heaven, †‡ϐ‹‡†ƒ•–Š‡ ”‡ƒ– ƒ–Š‡”Ǧƒ†Ǧ‘–Š‡”ƒ†–Š‡ ”‡ƒ–—Ž‡”‘ˆ–Š‡—‹- verse. He is both ren ӱ, “benevolent”, and ›‹ 㗙, “righteous”. Being be- nevolent, he loves every human being, even the most obstinate sinner, who like all other human beings has been endowed with the freedom to choose between good and evil so that he can mend his ways. But, being righteous, the Lord of Heaven also is the stern and impartial judge of souls. He knows whatever we think, say or do, and, in addition, he has written evidence, for all our good deeds are recorded by angels, and all our transgressions by devils.Ͷ Since he is both the supreme Parent and the supreme Ruler, every sinful deed must be considered an act of rebellion: the sinner is both „—š‹ƒ‘нᆍǡ“—ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽdzǡƒ†„—œŠ‘‰ нᘐ, “disloyal” – the two most heinous crimes in the traditional Confucian scale of delicts. Since the Lord of Heaven is compassionate, sins can be forgiven if they are duly regretted, confessed and expiated, but only during the present life on earth. After death the situation has become frozen: good ‹•‰‘‘†ƒ†„ƒ†‹•„ƒ†Ǣ–Š‡”‡‹•‘‹††Ž‡™ƒ›Ǥͷ As Aleni tells a criti- cal Fujian scholar: compare it with your examination system. As long as you are composing your essay you can make any correction and im- provement you like, but once you have handed it in, the Chief Examiner

Ͷ ͸Ǥͳͳƒȋ†‡˜‹Ž•Ȍƒ†ͳͳ„ȋƒ‰‡Ž•ȌǤ ͷ The point is already made by Matteo ‹ ‹‹͸Ǥͳͳƒȋ ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’Ǥͷͷ͵ȌǢƒ- ƒ•Š‹”‡Ȁ —ͳͻͺͷǡ’͵͵͵ǤˆǤƒŽ•‘͵Ǥʹ͹ƒȂ„Ǣ’Ǥʹͷ„ǡƒ†͵ǤͶͳƒǤ ͻͺ Erik Zürcher is inexorable: even the slightest mistake will lead to rejection and dis- grace.͸ Even having the slightest doubt about God’s righteousness is an act of rebellion: Aleni takes one of his disciples to task because he, as a ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ•‘ǡ ƒ‘–‹ƒ‰‹‡–Šƒ–Š‡™‘—Ž†‡Œ‘›„Ž‹••‹Š‡ƒ˜‡™Š‹Ž‡Š‹• parents are tortured in hell.͹ And when another critic remarks that the amount of sin one has committed always is limited, and that therefore the unlimited eternal punishment in hell is disproportionate, he is told that in view of God’s supreme majesty even the slightest transgression is a major offence.ͺ We can understand why outsiders considered Chris- tianity to be very ›ƒ ೤, “severe”!ͻ

The Priest as a Mediator

Between the ‘”†‘ˆ ‡ƒ˜‡ƒ†–Š‡„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•–ƒ†•–Š‡ϐ‹‰—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡ priest as a mediator and as a ritual expert. He is a foreigner, for till the very end of the seventeenth century no Chinese priests were ordained. In Fujian Christianity, the role of the ‡•—‹–•ƒ•„‡ƒ”‡”•‘ˆ‡™• ‹‡–‹ϐ‹  knowledge was of secondary importance. Since the making of astro- nomical observations was an imperial prerogative there was no ob- servatory where they could exhibit their skills, and the Fujian gentry showed surprisingly little interest in those matters. To them the for- ‡‹‰ƒ•–‡”™ƒ•ǡϐ‹”•–ƒ†ˆ‘”‡‘•–ǡƒduode 䩨ᗧ (short for saze’erduo- de ᫂◔⡮䩨ᗧ = sacerdoteǡDz’”‹‡•–dzȌ‘”shenfu ⾎⡦, “spiritual father”. In several ways that role was rather familiar in the Chinese context, in spite of its exotic trappings. During rituals the priest’s sacral status (al- ”‡ƒ†›‹’Ž‹‡†„›Š‹• ‡Ž‹„ƒ–ƒ”‹ƒ’—”‹–›Ȍ™ƒ•‡Šƒ ‡†„›Š‹•Ž‹–—”‰‹ ƒŽ vestments and his use of unintelligible Latin mantras. Even the mys- tery of the Eucharist may have reminded outsiders of the way in which in Chinese cults, a deity or an ancestral spirit is “invited” to descend and to be present at the ritual.

͸ ͵ǤͳͶƒǤXiong Shiqi ➺цᰇ has elaborated the examination metaphor in a „ƒ‹- hua pamphlet entitled ‡†ƒ‹Œ‹‰›—ㆆᙐ䆖௫ (A Warning Allegory to Urge On the †‘Ž‡–Ȍǡ™‹–Šƒ’”‡ˆƒ ‡„›Yang Tingyun ὺᔧ㆐ȋͳͷͷ͹Ȃͳ͸ʹ͹Ȍ†ƒ–‡†ͳ͸ʹ͹Ǣ”‡’”Ǥ‹  ˜‘ŽǤͳǡ’’ǤͳͶͳȂͳͶ͸Ǥ ͹ ͵Ǥ͵ƒǤ ͺ ͷǤͳʹ„Ȃͳ͵ƒǣ–Š‹•ƒ›„‡ ‘’ƒ”‡†™‹–Šƒ‹‰ƒ‹’‘Ž‹–‡”‡ƒ”Ǥ ˆƒ†‡ to a commoner it is of no consequence, but if made to the ruler the result may be fatal. The same argument in Diego de ƒ–‘Œƒǯ•ȋͳͷ͹ͳȂͳ͸ͳͺȌʹǤͳ͵ƒƒ†‹ Francesco ƒ„‹ƒ•‹ǯ•ȋͳͷͺʹȂͳ͸ͶͻȌʹǤʹͲ„ȋ ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’ǤͳʹͷʹǤȌ ͻ ͺǤͳ„Ǣ ˆǤƒŽ•‘‹ ‹—‰‘‰‹ʹǤͳͷƒǤ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͻͻ

However, the role played by the Christian priest in the rite of con- fession and absolution does not appear to have any counterpart in tra- ditional Chinese religion. In Buddhist penitential rites, the priest acts as a messenger reciting the confessional formulas and transferring the merit to other beings, but there is no question of his having the divine and exclusive authority to remit sins. The uniqueness of the Christian sacrament is stressed by Aleni: although other doctrines may “exhort people by good words”, only our doctrine knows absolution, and only Christians can receive it.ͳͲ The power attributed to the Christian priest required some expla- nation. In an interesting pamphlet entitled Lingxi ‰ƒ‘Œ‹‡›ƒ‘‰—‹么⍇੺ 䀓㾱㾿, “Essentials of Baptism and Confession”, Zhang Geng ᕥ䌑, the leader of the Christian community in Quanzhou, answered some of the questions that had arisen, apparently even among believers. One of the questions is: “If I feel sincere remorse and the Lord of Heaven forgives ‡ǡ™Š›—•––Š‡”‡„‡ƒ’”‹‡•–ǫdz‘–Š‡”‹•ǣDzŠ‡’”‹‡•–‹•‘—”„”‘–Š- ‡”Ǣ™Š›–Š‡—•–Š‡•‹–•‘ƒŒ‡•–‹ ƒŽŽ›‹ˆ”‘–‘ˆ–Š‡‘”†ȏǯ•ƒŽ–ƒ”Ȑ and listen to our confession, while we are kneeling down – is that not ƒ””‘‰ƒ ‡ǫdz Š‹•”‡’Ž›Zhang Geng draws an interesting parallel (bor- rowed from MenciusȌǣ—”‹‰confession the priest’s position is com- parable to that of the shi, the boy-medium who in the ancient ancestral ritual impersonated the soul of the †‡ƒ†ǢŠ‡™ƒ•ƒ›‘—‰„‘›ǡ„—–‹ that situation even elder relatives would kneel down and honor him.ͳͳ Elsewhere Yang Tingyun and Aleni give the dogmatically correct ex- planation: the priest is authorized to confer absolution, for it is the Lord of Heaven himself who has entrusted the remission of sins to Saint Pe- ter and hence, through apostolic succession, to the Pope, who again has conferred it upon all priests.ͳʹ

Confession and Moral Self-Improvement

Confession only is effective if preceded by careful self-investigation that leads to a clear awareness of one’s faults and to the inner feeling

ͳͲ ͵Ǥ͹ƒǤ ͳͳ ʹƒȂ͵ƒǤ ͳʹ ’Ǥ͸ʹ„ȋ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’Ǥ͵͸ͶȌǤˆǤŽ‡‹‹ ͵ǤͳƒǦʹ„ǣ ‘†Šƒ•†‡Ž‡‰ƒ–‡†–Š‡ care of spiritual life to the ‘’‡ƒ†–Š‡Žƒ––‡”ǯ•Dz‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ• Šƒ”‰‡†™‹–Š”‡Ž‹‰‹‘dzǡ just as he has entrusted the administration of worldly affairs to the ruler and his •‡‹‘”‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•Ǥ ͳͲͲ Erik Zürcher of tonghui Ⰻᛄ, “bitter remorse”. The texts contain some guidelines for the methodical contemplation of one’s own moral conduct. They appear –‘„‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›–Š‡Jesuit Spiritual Exercises, but they also show •‘‡ƒˆϐ‹‹–›™‹–ŠConfucian self-cultivation and jingzuo. The practice forms part of the daily observances that every believer is supposed to perform. At dawn the practicant meditates and asks for God’s help to spend the day without committing any sins. At the end of each day he carefully reviews all his acts of thought, speech and body, whatever evil he may have done, and whatever good he may have failed to do. In the case of minor transgressions he thinks about a way to amend them, and the more serious ones are stored in his memory awaiting confession. Utmost care must be taken not to forget any sinful act, for no merit is gained by incomplete confession. It is therefore advisable to note them down in writing. At the end of each month or each fortnight all the ma- jor faults are inventoried, and if a priest is available an appointment must be made.ͳ͵ The daily and monthly inventorying and recording of sins is useless if it is not accompanied by an intense feeling of guilt and remorse. Remorse can be inspired by fear, but it is better to follow the ‡šƒ’Ž‡‘ˆƒϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ•‘™Š‘•‹’Ž› ƒ‘–„‡ƒ”–Š‡–Š‘—‰Š–‘ˆŠƒ˜‹‰ neglected his parents, even if they do not reprimand him.ͳͶ All this sounds very methodical and programmatic. In fact, the Christian community leader Li Jiugong treats confession-and-absolu- tion (gaojieȌƒ•ƒ‡–Š‘†‘ˆ’”‘‰”‡••‹˜‡•’‹”‹–—ƒŽ’—”‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡƒŽ‘•– ‹ƒ‡ Šƒ‹ ƒŽ™ƒ›Ǥ ‹”•–‘‡ ‘ˆ‡••‡•–Š‡‘•–‰”‹‡˜‘—••‹•Ǣƒˆ–‡” these have been forgiven one turns to the lighter ones. In this way one progresses until one is free from sin. As an additional exercise, it is ad- visable to remember the more serious sins one has committed and to confess once again.ͳͷ Confession should be made as frequently as possible, but actually only believers living in or near the few larger cities were able to do so. The others had to wait for the rare occasions when a priest visited their communities, and at best they would meet a missionary once a year. In the meantime, as Fan Zhong 㤳ѝ remarks in his ”‹‡ˆ –”‘†— –‹‘–‘ –Š‡ ‘Ž›‘ –”‹‡(Š‡‰Œ‹ƒ‘š‹ƒ‘›‹㚆ᮉሿᕅǡͳ͸͵͵Ȍǡ‘‡—•–’”ƒ –‹ ‡ Dz•‡ŽˆǦƒ —•ƒ–‹‘dzƒ†ϐ‹”Ž›†‡ ‹†‡‘––‘sin again.ͳ͸

ͳ͵  ͳǤʹ͹„ȂʹͻƒǢ ˆǤƒŽ•‘͵Ǥͷ„ƒ†ͶǤʹͶƒǢ͵ǤͶʹƒǡƒ†’Ǥͷ͸„Ǥ ͳͶ ͵Ǥʹʹ„Ȃʹ͵ƒǤ ͳͷͳǤͻƒȂͳͲƒǤ ͳ͸ ’’Ǥͺ„ȂͻƒǤ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͲͳ

Of course any suggestion that the Christian confession resembles the Buddhist chanhui is to be rejected. Yang Tingyun (an erstwhile devout lay —††Š‹•–ǡ Š‡ ‡ ™‡ŽŽ ‹ˆ‘”‡† ƒ„‘—– •— Š ‡”‡‘‹ƒŽ•Ȍ ”‡ƒ”• that the Buddhist ceremonial is no more than an outward routinized ritual, not based on genuine self-examination. He also aptly observes that in chanhui, sins are listed in only very general terms, and that no ‡–‹‘‹•ƒ†‡‘ˆƒ›•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ sinful acts committed by the believers: “When chanhui has been completed, they still do not know what their confession has been about.”ͳ͹

Š‡Žƒ••‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‹•

Occasionally, mention is made in Christian texts of the use of Gongguo ge, “Ledgers of Merit and Demerit.” In an interesting conversation with a member of a Daoist association, Ž‡‹ƒ‰”‡‡•–Šƒ–‹’”‹ ‹’Ž‡”‡ϐŽ‡ - tion about one’s own sins is always commendable, but he adds that it remains ineffective as long as the practicant does not realize against whom he is sinning.ͳͺ Li Jiugong criticizes the system because in the Ledgers both merits and demerits are listed. The inclusion of merito- rious deeds leads to self-complacency. Christians only note down their transgressions: “That is the method to achieve saintliness (zuo sheng zhi fang ֌㚆ѻᯩȌǤdzͳͻ In one respect, however, the Gongguo ge system does bear some re- semblance to the Christian method: in both cases a great number of acts (in the Š”‹•–‹ƒ ƒ•‡‘Ž›‡‰ƒ–‹˜‡‘‡•Ȍƒ”‡ˆ‘”—Žƒ–‡†ǡ ƒ–‡‰‘- rized and methodically listed. An extensive survey of •‹ˆ—Žƒ –•ȋʹͲͳ items, many more than found in any Gongguo geȌ‹•‹ Ž—†‡†‹Aleni’s Di zui zheng gui ⓼㖚↓㾿ȋDz‘””‡ –—Ž‡•ˆ‘”–Š‡Ž‹‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‹•dzȌǡ arranged according to the Ten Commandments and the Seven Cardi- nal Sins. In the introductory section, Aleni explains how this part of the book must be used. Since it is essential that the penitent be clearly aware of any fault he may have committed, including the persons in- volved and the circumstances, the list is presented as an aid “carefully to be consulted item by item”. Minor transgressions are also listed, for “the mirror is only wiped clean if even the smallest specks of dust are

ͳ͹ ʹǤͳͻƒȂ„ǤˆǤƒŽ•‘͹ǤͳͻƒȂ„ǣBuddhist penitence is a sheer fraud. ͳͺͶǤͳʹƒȂ„Ǥ ͳͻ͵ǤͳͳƒǤ ͳͲʹ Erik Zürcher removed.”ʹͲ –ƒŽ•‘‹••‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ––Šƒ–Ž‡‹ published a shortened ver- sion of this work in one juan that consists of the list with only a few additional paragraphs. This Dizui zheng gui lüe ⓼㖚↓㾿⮕ was proba- bly intended to be diffused on a wider scale than the original four-juan version, as a simple guide to confession.ʹͳ ‹–•‰‡‡”ƒŽƒ””ƒ‰‡‡–ƒ† Žƒ••‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡŽ‡‹ǯ• inventory fol- lows the European model. However, since it had to be used by Chinese converts, its content has been thoroughly adapted to the Chinese en- vironment. Especially in sections dealing with religious activities and mantic techniques and with social relations (notably the prohibition of ‘ —„‹ƒ‰‡Ȍ–Š‡ƒ†ƒ’–ƒ–‹‘‹•‘„˜‹‘—•Ǥˆ ‘—”•‡–Š‡–‡š–‹•‘”ƒ–‹˜‡ ƒ†’”‡• ”‹’–‹˜‡ǡƒ†–Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡ ƒ‘–„‡–ƒ‡ˆƒ‹–Šˆ—ŽŽ›–‘”‡ϐŽ‡ –ƒ - tual behavior, but as a “typology of sin” it is indicative of the formal value system that was current among Christian devotees. In what fol- lows, special attention will be paid to two categories of offences: cases of superstitious behavior, and sins related to family life and other hier- archical social relations.

Sins Relating to Superstition

True to the principles of the monopolistic Mediterranean type of reli- gion that the Jesuits propagated, virtually all beliefs and practices of Chinese religious life were declared anathema and presented as the work of the devil. Certain Confucian rituals were deemed acceptable, „—– ‘Ž› ‹ ƒ Dz’—”‹ϐ‹‡†dz ˆ‘”ǡ •–”‹’’‡† ‘ˆ ƒŽŽ •—’‡”•–‹–‹‘—• ‡Ž‡‡–•Ǥ By doing so they naturally sided with the most orthodox and purist wing of Confucianism. Since medieval times there had been concerned scholars fulminating against Buddhist superstition and ƒ‘‹•–ƒ‰‹ Ǣ some Neo-Confucians rejected “vulgar” practices like geomancy and the burning of counterfeit paper money, and excluded Buddhist priests

ʹͲ ʹǤͻƒǤ Yang Tingyun’s Christian biography by Ding Zhilin it is expressly said that Yang used Aleni’s DZZG as a guideline for self-investigation and confes- •‹‘Ǣ ˆǤ’Ǥͺ„ȋ ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’Ǥʹ͵ʹȌǤ ʹͳ Aleni’s DZZGL has been included in the collection Tongku jing ji Ⰻ㤖㏃䒏 (“Scriptur- ƒŽ‡š–•‡Žƒ–‹‰–‘‹‰‘”‘—•„•‡”˜ƒ ‡dzȌǡ ‘’Ž‹‡†„›João Fróis (Fu Ruowang Կ㤕ᵋǡͳͷͻͳȂͳ͸͵ͺȌǢ‹–‹•”‡’”‘†— ‡†‹˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’ǤͳͳͻͷȂͳʹ͹ʹǤ Šƒ˜‡‘– been able to consult another compendium entitled —‹œ—‹›ƒ‘œŠ‹ ᛄ㖚㾱ᤷ (“The ••‡–‹ƒŽ‡ƒ‹‰‘ˆ‡’‡–ƒ ‡dzdzȌǤ –ƒ†ƒ‡”–ʹͲͲͳǡ’Ǥ͸ʹͶǡ‹–‹••ƒ‹†–‘„‡„› Lazzaro Cattaneo (Guo Jujing 䜝ት䶌ǡͳͷ͸ͲȂͳ͸ͶͲȌǡDz‡†‹–‡†„›Ž‡‹‹–Š‡ͳ͸͵Ͳ•Ǥdz Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͲ͵ from their funerary rituals. But in general even purists accepted the ex- istence of such practices as belonging to the way of life of the unenlight- ened masses, and they did not want to eradicate them. Moreover, since in the ‘ˆ— ‹ƒ–”ƒ†‹–‹‘–Š‡’‡”•‘‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‡˜‹Ž‹•—‘™ǡ–Š‡› never would regard them as being inspired by any Prince of Darkness. But that vision was very much alive among Christians. Both the Jesu- its and their converts were convinced that the forces of evil preferably used false doctrines, magic arts and supernatural phenomena as means to delude mankind. In his Shen gui zhengji ⾎公↓㌰ (“Correct Descrip- –‹‘‘ˆ‰‡Ž•ƒ†‡‘•dzǡ ƒǤͳ͸͵ͲȌ Alfonso Vagnone (Gao Yizhi 儈 аᘇǡͳͷ͸ͺȂͳ͸ͶͲȌ’”‡•‡–•ƒ‹–‡”‡•–‹‰Ž‹•–‘ˆ•ƒ–ƒ‹ •—’‡”ƒ–—”ƒŽ phenomena, such as voices heard in the air, automatic script, images coming to life and uttering prophesies, and telekinesis. Possession by a demon can manifest itself by glossolalia (an uneducated person sud- †‡Ž›„‡‹‰ƒ„Ž‡–‘•’‡ƒˆ‘”‡‹‰Žƒ‰—ƒ‰‡•ƒ†–‘“—‘–‡†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‡š–•Ȍǡ clairvoyance, thought-reading, and enormous physical strength.ʹʹ For- swearing pagan beliefs and rituals was a prerequisite for becoming a Christian. The act was ritualized: before baptism the neophyte had to forsake all his former superstitions, to remove and destroy (by burning ‘”„—”›‹‰ȌƒŽŽ–Š‡Dz†‡‘‹ dz‹ƒ‰‡•Š‡’‘••‡••‡†ǡƒ†–‘„—”ƒŽŽŠ‹• non-Christian religious texts and talismans.ʹ͵ The ostentatious break with the past could not escape public attention, for it also meant that ‘˜‡”–•”‡‘˜‡†–Š‡’”‘–‡ –‹˜‡‹ƒ‰‡•ȋDz†‘‘”‰‘†•dzȌ–Šƒ–Šƒ††‡ ‘- rated the entrance of their homes and replaced them by the emblem of Christ. In Christian sources, much attention is paid to the description and condemnation of popular religious beliefs and customs. More than thir- ty of these are listed by Inácio da Costa (Guo Najue 䜝㌽⡥ǡͳ͸Ͳ͵Ȃͳ͸͸͸Ȍ ˆ‘‹†ƒ–‹‰—Ž‰ƒ”—’‡”•–‹–‹‘•dzȌ —Žin his Zhuo sumi pian ⠝؇䘧ㇷȋDz ƒǤͳ͸ͶʹǤ Ž‡‹ǯ• Di zui zheng gui the emphasis naturally is on their prohibition: they are listed as “sinful” (›‘— zui ᴹ㖚Ȍ—†‡”–Š‡ ‹”•– Commandment, i.e. as acts of rebellion against God himself. They com- prise three categories of offences:

ʹʹ Shen gui zhengjiǡͶŒǤǢƒ—• ”‹’–‹—Œ‹ƒŠ—‹‹„”ƒ”›ǡŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ȋ‘†‡”–”ƒ• ”‹’–ȌǤ ˆǤƒŽ•‘ʹǤ͵ͳƒǣƒŽŽ’ƒ‰ƒ”‹–—ƒŽ•ƒ”‡‹•’‹”‡†„›–Š‡devil. ʹ͵ ’Ǥ͹ƒǤˆǤƒŽ•‘͸Ǥͳ„Ǧʹƒǣ„‡ˆ‘”‡baptism Christians are held to remove all idols from the altar in their house chapels (jiatang ᇦาȌǤ ͳͲͶ Erik Zürcher

Ȉ Firstly, all mantic techniques such as fortune-telling by drawing di- vination lots and by using the planchette, geomancy, the election of Ž— ›†ƒ›•ǡ’Š›•‹‘‰‘›ƒ†ƒ•–”‘Ž‘‰›ǡƒ”‡“—ƒŽ‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ•sinful. Ȉ Secondly, also sinful is any kind of contact with Buddhism or Dao- ism. It is a long list that includes visiting temples and reciting scrip- –—”‡•ƒ†ƒ–”ƒ•Ǣƒ‹‰˜‘™•ǢŠ‘Ž†‹‰jiao 䟞”‹–—ƒŽ•Ǣ ‘–”‹„- uting money to the restoration and decoration of temples and to –Š‡ƒ‹‰‘ˆ‹†‘Ž•Ǣ ‘’›‹‰ƒ†’‘••‡••‹‰’ƒ‰ƒ• ”‹’–—”‡•Ǣ‘– destroying one’s pagan texts and idols before baptism but selling them or giving them away, and any personal “contaminating” con- tact with Buddhist monks, Daoist priests and magicians. Ȉ Thirdly, it is a sin to believe in pagan faith-healing and prophetic †”‡ƒ•Ǣ–‘ƒ• ”‹„‡•—’‡”ƒ–—”ƒŽ’‘™‡”•–‘Š‡”„•ǡ–”‡‡•ƒ†ƒ‹- ƒŽ•Ǣ–‘™”‹–‡ƒ‘‹•– Šƒ”•Ǣ–‘’”‘‘— ‡•’‡ŽŽ•Ǣƒ†–‘Œ‘‹„”‘–Š- erhoods sealed with blood.ʹͶ We never shall know to what extent these prohibitions were heeded by the mass of believers. The very fact that they are listed suggests that at least some Christians engaged in such ungodly activities. But in any case we may conclude that really conscientious believers were obliged to renounce virtually the whole body of traditional religion and reli- gious lore, and by doing so could not but marginalize themselves as a group.

Sins Relating to Social Life

Many sins pertaining to family life and other hierarchical social rela- tions are appended to the Fourth and the Sixth Commandment (“Hon- ‘”–Š›ˆƒ–Š‡”ƒ†–Š›‘–Š‡”dzƒ†DzŠ‘—•ŠƒŽ–‘– ‘‹–ƒ†—Ž–‡”›dzȌǤ The Commandments are used as headings covering a number of anal- ogous offences, as also was done in western confessionals. Thus, sinful conduct mentioned under the Fourth Commandment is not restricted to the relation between children and parents, but is extended to cov- er relations between other juniors and seniors within and outside the family: teacher and pupils, master and servants, and husband and wife. Only a few of these sins are explicitly related to Christianity, notably committing sacrilegious acts in serving one’s parents and failing to

ʹͶ  ͳǤͳͲ„Ȃͳͳ„Ǣƒ•‘‡™Šƒ–Ž‡•• ‘’”‡Š‡•‹˜‡Ž‹•–‹•’”‘˜‹†‡†‹ ’’Ǥ ͷ„Ȃ͸ƒȋ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’ǤͳʹͲ͸ȂͳʹͲ͹ȌǤ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͲͷ provide religious instruction to one’s relatives. Apart from these, the list reads like a survey of traditional Confucian morality expressed in prohibitions. This is not amazing, for both the Jesuits (before the Rites Contro- ˜‡”•›Ȍƒ†–Š‡‹”‡†— ƒ–‡† ‘˜‡”–•ƒŽ™ƒ›• Žƒ‹‡†–Šƒ––Š‡‹”†‘ –”‹‡ represented what is zheng ↓ (“normative, correct, ‘”–Š‘†‘šdzȌǡ‹’Ž›- ing that it fully conformed to Confucian values and, indeed, could con- tribute to their realization. Expectably, the most grievous sin in this category is lack of ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ’‹‡–›Ǥ ˆ‡”‹‘”•sin by not submitting to their •—’‡”‹‘”•Ǣ’—’‹Ž•„›†‹•‘„‡›‹‰–Š‡‹”–‡ƒ Š‡”•Ǣ•—„Œ‡ –•„›–”‡•’ƒ••‹‰ the laws of the authorities (guanfu ᇈᓌȌǢ–Š‡™‹ˆ‡„›‘–•‡”˜‹‰Š‡” husband. On the other hand, the master of the house commits a sin if he maltreats his slaves and servants, and the husband if he does not provide his wife with her daily necessities.ʹͷ Social inequality is natural and intended by God – and if there were no poor, how would the rich be ƒ„Ž‡–‘‰ƒ‹‡”‹–„› Šƒ”‹–›ǫʹ͸ The only very important exception is the absolute prohibition of polygamy, i.e. the taking of a concubine. In the list of sins, concubinage ranks higher than sodomy, enjoying pornography and visiting prosti- tutes. It is to be condemned even if no son is born from regular mar- riage.ʹ͹ On this point no compromise was possible: cases are known of very distinguished prospective converts being refused baptism until they had sent away their concubine, and if after baptism a member of the congregation yielded to social pressure and took a concubine he risked being excommunicated.ʹͺ The condemnation of concubinage was

ʹͷ  ͳǤͳͶ„Ȃͳ͸ƒƒ†ͳͺƒȂ„Ǣ ’’Ǥͺ„ȂͳͲƒƒ†ͳʹ„Ȃͳ͵ƒȋ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’Ǥ ͳʹͳʹȂͳʹͳͷƒ†’’ǤͳʹʹͲȂͳʹʹͳȌǤ ʹ͸ ͳǤͳͶ„Ǧͳ͸ƒƒ†ͶǤͶƒȂͷ„Ǥ ʹ͹ ʹǤʹͺƒȂʹͻ„Ǣ ˆǤƒŽ•‘–Š‡‹–‡”‡•–‹‰ƒ”‰—‡–„”‘—‰Š–ˆ‘”™ƒ”†„›Aleni: if, as sometimes happens, childlessness is due to the husband’s physical condition, ™‘—Ž†–Š‡Š‹•™‹ˆ‡„‡ƒŽŽ‘™‡†–‘–ƒ‡ƒ•‡ ‘†Š—•„ƒ†ǫȋʹǤʹͺ„ȌǤ ʹͺ A well-documented case of the latter is that of Wang Zheng, the well-known tech- nologist and “pillar of the faith” in Xi’an, who for some time was excommunicated because he, at an advanced age, had taken a concubine under heavy family pres- sure. He was readmitted only after having sent her away and having made a writ- ten statement of remorse – a curious document that has survived. It is appended to the collection of edifying tales presented orally by Adam Schall (Tang Ruowang ⒟㤕ᵋǡ ͳͷͻʹȂͳ͸͸͸Ȍ ƒ† ‘–‡† †‘™ ƒ† ‡†‹–‡† „› Wang Zheng ⦻ᗥ, entitled Š‘‰›‹–ƒ‰”‹Œ‹•—‹„‹ ጷаาᰕ䁈䳘ㅶ (Daily Record of Miscellanea Made at the Š‘‰›‹Š—” ŠȌǡ‹ǯƒǡͳ͸͵ͺǢ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’Ǥͺ͵͵Ȃͺ͵͹Ǥ ͳͲ͸ Erik Zürcher a Christian innovation that raised serious problems and controversies. ‘ƒ›‘—–•‹†‡”•‹–•‡‡‡†–‘ ‘ϐ‹”–Š‡‹‘”ƒŽƒ–—”‡‘ˆ–Šƒ–”‡- ligion, because it violated the ‘ˆ— ‹ƒ”—Ž‡–Šƒ–ƒϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ•‘—•–—•‡ any means to secure male offspring.

The Ritual

The actual ritual of penitence, confession and absolution closely follows the European model. The believer is expected to make confession at least once a year, in the church, in front of the altar, where the priest is seated. He is supposed to have prepared himself by self-investiga- tion and remorse, “as if facing a stern judge”. He approaches the priest, –ƒ‡•‘ˆˆŠ‹• ƒ’ȋ‹Š‹‡•‡‡›‡•ƒ˜‡”›Š—‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‰‰‡•–—”‡Ȍƒ†‡‡Ž• †‘™ǢŠ‡‘™–‘™•ƒ†”‡ ‹–‡•–Š‡Dz ”‹’–—”‡‘ˆ‘ˆ‡••‹‘dzȋHuizui jing ᛄ㖚㏃ǡ–Š‡‘ϐ‹–‡‘”ȌǤˆ–‡”Šƒ˜‹‰†‡• ”‹„‡†–Š‡•‹• ‘‹––‡†•‹ ‡ his last confession, he recites the formulaic profession of remorse, and asks forgiveness. The priest then comments upon the nature and gravi- ty of the sins confessed, and confers absolution. In case of serious faults he imposes a penance. The penitent puts on his cap, thanks the priest and leaves.ʹͻ Unlike the Buddhist chanhui, the Christian confession was individ- —ƒŽǡ’‡”•‘ƒŽƒ†Š‹‰ŠŽ› ‘ϐ‹†‡–‹ƒŽǤŠ‡’‡‹–‡–™ƒ•Š‡Ž†–‘”‡’‘”– about his sinful deeds and inclinations, and even to disclose his most secret feelings and temptations, giving details as to time, place, fre- quency, circumstances, and persons involved. Especially in the Chinese context, this created a psychological barrier of shame and humiliation. In his tract about baptism and confession mentioned above, Zhang Geng refers to the hesitation felt by many believers: “It is disgraceful and shameful to confess your own sins!”, and: “It is disgraceful that con- fession is so direct and complete!”͵Ͳ Elsewhere Aleni, answering some questions that evidently were inspired by feelings of shame, has to dis- appoint his interlocutor: no, sinful deeds have to be confessed one by ‘‡ǡƒ†‘–•—ƒ”‹œ‡†‹‰‡‡”ƒŽ–‡”•Ǣ‘ǡconfession must be oral

ʹͻ  ͵ǤʹƒȂʹʹƒǤ‡‡†Ž‡••–‘•ƒ›–Šƒ–ƒŽŽ–Š‹•”‡ˆ‡”•–‘ ‘ˆ‡••‹‘•ƒ†‡„›ƒŽ‡ believers. For female penitents there must have been special procedures, for the missionaries had to be extremely cautious in having any contact – let alone this ‹†‘ˆ ‘ϐ‹†‡–‹ƒŽˆƒ ‡Ǧ–‘Ǧˆƒ ‡ ‘˜‡”•ƒ–‹‘Ȃ™‹–Š™‘‡Ǥ ͵Ͳ  ’’Ǥ͵„ȂͶƒǤ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͲ͹ and cannot be made in writing.͵ͳ ƒ•‡ –‹‘•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›ƒ‡†Dz‡ Ashamed of Sinning, not of Confessing”, he tells a story illustrating that it is the devil himself who inspires such shame in order to prevent the sinner from being saved.͵ʹ

Penance

The last stage of the procedure is that of penance: the task of expiation imposed by the ‘ˆ‡••‘”ǡ„‘–Šˆ‘”–Š‡„‡‡ϐ‹–‘ˆ–Š‡’‡‹–‡–ȋˆ‘”‡š- ’‹ƒ–‹‘‹•ƒ‡ƒ•–‘‰ƒ‹‡”‹–Ȍƒ†ƒ•ƒ ‘’‡•ƒ–‹‘ˆ‘”–Š‡Šƒ” done to others. The content varies according to the type of sin. Acts of impiety towards God are compensated by religious observances like ’”ƒ›‡”ƒ†”‡ ‹–‹‰–‡š–•ǡŠƒ”‹ϐŽ‹ –‡†—’‘‘–Š‡”•ǡ„› Šƒ”‹–›ǤŠ‡ third category, to which much attention is paid, serves to expiate sinful †‡‡†•”‡•—Ž–‹‰ˆ”‘–Š‡™‡ƒ‡••‘ˆ–Š‡ϐŽ‡•ŠǤ – ‘•‹•–•‘ˆƒ –•‘ˆ self-‘”–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ȋku 㤖Ȍ•— Šƒ••Š‘”–‡”‘”Ž‘‰‡”’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆƒ• ‡•‹• (including rigorous fasting and sexual ƒ„•–‹‡ ‡Ȍƒ†•‡ŽˆǦcastigation. Self-‘”–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡ‡˜‡‹‡š–”‡‡ˆ‘”•ǡ™ƒ•„›‘‡ƒ•—- known in traditional China. Self-mutilation (notably feeding one’s ail- ‹‰’ƒ”‡–™‹–Š‘‡ǯ•‘™ϐŽ‡•ŠȌƒ†˜‡”›”‹‰‘”‘—•‘—”‹‰’”ƒ –‹ ‡• were considered laudable expressions of ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ’‹‡–›ǤPilgrims occasion- ally indulged in at least a show of self-laceration. Burning scars in the top of the skull formed a regular part of —††Š‹•–‘”†‹ƒ–‹‘Ǣƒ› —††Š‹•–‘••ƒ ”‹ϐ‹ ‡†ϐ‹‰‡”•„›„—”‹‰ǡƒ†‘•’—„Ž‹ Ž›–‘”- turing themselves while collecting alms were a common sight in Chi- nese cities. Christian ascesis had its own peculiar forms and its own inner motivation, but as a phenomenon it was not unfamiliar. Chinese Christians had their role models near at hand. The exem- plary lives of saints (a genre of pious literature that was very popu- lar in Š”‹•–‹ƒ ‹” Ž‡•Ȍƒ„‘—†‡†™‹–Š•–‘”‹‡•‘ˆ‡š–”‡‡ascetics and self-torture. In addition, some Jesuits themselves could show the way, for self-‘”–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘™ƒ•‡š–‡•‹˜‡Ž›’”ƒ –‹ ‡†‹–Š‡’‡”‹‘†‹—”‘’‡ǡ as well as by some missionaries in China. In fact, Aleni himself is said to have done so, chastising himself with a whip every night, “in order

͵ͳ  ͵Ǥ͹ƒȂͳͲ„Ǥ ͵ʹ  ’’Ǥ͵Ͷ„Ȃ͵ͷ„ȋ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’Ǥͳʹ͸ͶȂͳʹ͸͸ȌǤ ͳͲͺ Erik Zürcher to appease the Lord’s anger.”͵͵ Especially in Fujian, zealous converts are said to have indulged in long and bloody disciplines, “carrying iron chains” to such an extent that Aleni had to restrain them.͵Ͷ He had to do the same with Zhang Shi ᕥ䆈 (Zhang Geng’s eldest son, baptized Dz‹ Šƒ‡ŽdzȌǡ™Š‡–Š‡›‘—‰œ‡ƒŽ‘–ƒ†‡ƒ˜‘™–‘ Šƒ•–‹•‡Š‹•„‘†›™‹–Š a thousand lashes during the forty days of Lent.͵ͷ Flagellation and rig- orous fasting appear to have been the most common types of bodily penance, but reference is also made to other practices such as sleeping ‹ƒ—’”‹‰Š–’‘•‹–‹‘‘”‘–Š‡ϐŽ‘‘”ǡƒ†™‡ƒ”‹‰ƒŠ‘”•‡Šƒ‹”•Š‹”–ƒ† a girdle made of coarse rope or metal.͵͸ Of course we must not assume that the majority of believers went –‘•— Š‡š–”‡‡•Ǣ‹‘•– ƒ•‡•penance was no doubt routinized and •—’‡”ϐ‹ ‹ƒŽǤ—–‡˜‡‹ˆ†”ƒ ‘‹ ‡–Š‘†•‘ˆ Šƒ•–‹•‹‰–Š‡ϐŽ‡•Š™‡”‡ ‘Ž› ‘ϐ‹‡†–‘ƒ•ƒŽŽ‹‘”‹–›ǡ–Š‡›—•–Šƒ˜‡”‡‹ˆ‘” ‡†–Š‡‰‡‡”- al opinion that Christianity was very “severe”.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have made an attempt to treat one essential element of the doctrine of the Lord of Heaven in its Chinese context and to iden- tify points of convergence and of difference. Late Ming Christianity in —Œ‹ƒ™ƒ•‘–ƒƒŽ‹‡„‘†›ǣƒ•ƒ‘–‹•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘”‹–›”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǡ it formed part of the varied religious landscape of the region. It was practiced by small groups that held distinctive and sometimes even dissenting ideas centered on the belief in the Lord of Heaven, the divine autocrat and controller of human fate in life and death. All the other beliefs and rituals current in this Christian subculture bore the stamp of a very strong monotheistic creed that had no counterpart in the tra- ditional Chinese world-view. The Christian complex of sin, confession and penance shows many points of convergence with contemporary traditional trends, ideas and practices, as noted above. In a general way it also conformed to the gen- ‡”ƒŽ–”‡†–‘™ƒ”†•‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽ‹œƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†‹– ‡”–ƒ‹Ž›•Š‘™‡†ƒˆϐ‹‹–›

͵͵ As related by Li Sixuan ᵾఓ⦴ in his biography of Ž‡‹ǡ ’Ǥ͹ƒǢ ˆǤò” Š‡” ͳͻͻ͹ǡ’’ǤͺͷȂͳʹͺǡ‡•’Ǥ’ǤͳͳͶǤ ͵Ͷ ˆǤϐ‹•–‡”ͳͻ͵ʹǡ’Ǥͳ͵ʹǤ ͵ͷ ’Ǥ͵„Ǥ ͵͸ ’ǤͻƒǢ ’ǤͻƒȂ„Ǥ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͲͻ with the Confucian puritanical reaction to real or supposed moral de- cay, laxity and libertarianism. On the other hand, the complex is illustrative of an alternative, id- iosyncratic faith and life-style, the deviant character of which was still enhanced by its non-Chinese origin, by the presence of western priests, and by the fact that the latter derived their power to remit sins from a ˆ‘”‡‹‰•ƒ ”ƒŽƒ—–Š‘”‹–›ǣƒ•Šƒ†‘™›ϐ‹‰—”‡ ƒŽŽ‡†Dz–Š‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘˜‡”- eign” (jiaowang ᮉ⦻ or jiaohuang ᮉⲷ, the ‘’‡ȌǤ ƒ††‹–‹‘ǡƒ‘‰ outsiders, Christian rigorousness and the many obligations that seri- ‘—•„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•™‡”‡ ‘’‡ŽŽ‡†–‘ˆ—Žϐ‹ŽŽ appear to have been a source of amazement and ridicule: “They laugh at us and say that our religion makes us suffer.”͵͹ Aleni counters this complaint by pointing out to his disciple that outsiders do not know about the heavenly reward that is in store for devout Christians. Believers have to exert themselves con- stantly, like scholars who are preparing themselves for examinations or Ž‹‡’‡ƒ•ƒ–•™Š‘™‘”–Š‡‹”ϐ‹‡Ž†•–‹ŽŽ–Š‡‹”Šƒ†•ƒ†ˆ‡‡–Šƒ˜‡‰”‘™ callous. The burden of being a practicing member of a Christian con- gregation may be illustrated by a passage from the Meditations (Shensi luȌǡ‹™Š‹ ŠŽ‡‹ǯ•erstwhile disciple Li Jiugong exhorts his brethren –‘•–ƒ†ϐ‹”ǣ It often happens that those who just have become followers of the Teaching of Heaven are jeered at and ridiculed ... But if we are afraid of being laughed at by others for doing good, must we then refrain from †‘‹‰‹–ǡŒ—•––‘ƒ˜‘‹†”‹†‹ —Ž‡ǫ ˆ™‡†‘–Šƒ–ǡ™‡—•––—”‹™ƒ”†ƒ† criticize ourselves. The Scripture says that metal is tested by a blazing ϐ‹”‡ǡ ƒ† –Šƒ– ˜‹”–—‡ ‹• –‡•–‡† –Š”‘—‰Š Šƒ”†•Š‹’Ǥ ˆ ›‘— ƒ‘–•–ƒ† one jeer, you may be sure that your religious fortitude is too weak. You rather should use that ridicule as an incentive, like a horse that runs faster when it sees the whip.͵ͺ

͵͹͸ǤͳͷƒǤ ͵ͺ͵ǤͳƒȂʹƒǢ ˆǤƒŽ•‘͸Ǥͳͷ„Ȃͳ͸ƒǤ ͳͳͲ Erik Zürcher

References

Chinese References DKW – Da kewen ㆄᇒ୿ǡ„›Š—‘‰›—ƒȋ†Ǥ Ǥͳ͸͸ͲȌǢ Ǥͳ͸͵ͳǤƒ–‡•‡˜‡–‡‡–Š ‡- –—”›’”‹–‡†‡†‹–‹‘ǡ‹„Ž‹‘–Š°“—‡ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡†‡ ”ƒ ‡ǡ‘—”ƒ–͹Ͳ͵͸Ǥ DYP – ƒ‹›‹’‹ƒԓ⯁ㇷǡ„›ƒ‰‹‰›—ȋͳͷ͸ʹȂͳ͸ʹ͹ȌǡͳͻʹͳǤ‡’”Ǥ‹–Š‡ ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘ Tianzhu jiao dongchuon wenxianǡƒ‹„‡‹ͳͻ͸ͷǡ’’ǤͶ͹ͳȂ͸͵ʹǤ DZZG – Di zui zhenggui⓼㖚↓㾿, by Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe 㢮݂⮕ǡͳͷͺʹȂͳ͸ͶͻȌǢ„‡- ˆ‘”‡ͳ͸ʹ͹Ǥ”‹–‡†‡†Ǥ”‡’”‘†Ǥ‹Ǥ–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ƒ†Ǥ—†‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡChinese Christian ‡š–•ˆ”‘–Š‡‘ƒ” Š‹˜‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‘ ‹‡–›‘ˆ ‡•—•ȋͳʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ʹͲͲʹȌǡ˜‘ŽǤ ǡ ’’Ǥ͵͵͹ȂͷͺͲǤ DZZGL – Dizui zhenggui lüe ⓼㖚↓㾿⮕ǡ„› ‹—Ž‹‘Ž‡‹ȋ‹—Žò‡ǡͳͷͺʹȂͳ͸ͶͻȌǤ ǣ Ǥ ”‘‹•ȋ ——‘™ƒ‰ǡͳͷͻͳȂͳ͸͵ͺȌǡTongku jingji Ⰻ㤖㏃䒏, repr. in , Vol III, pp. ͳͳͻͷȂͳʹ͹ʹǤ KDR – Kouduo richao ਓ䩨ᰕᢴ, comp. by Li Jiubiao ᵾҍ⁉ǡ Ǥͳ͸Ͷ͸Ǣ”‡’”Ǥ‹Ǥ–ƒ†ƒ‡”– ƒ†Ǥ—†‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‹‡•‡Š”‹•–‹ƒ‡š–•ˆ”‘–Š‡‘ƒ” Š‹˜‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‘ ‹‡–› of Jesusȋͳʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ʹͲͲʹȌǡ‘ŽǤ Ǥ LXGJ – ‹‰š‹‰ƒ‘Œ‹‡›ƒ‘‰—‹么⍇੺䀓㾱㾿, by Zhang Geng ᕥ䌑, ms. Bibliothèque Natio- ƒŽ‡†‡ ”ƒ ‡ǡ‘—”ƒ–͹ʹͶͻǤ -‘‹–ƒ‡—“°LXYJ – ‹š‹—›‹Œ‹ƒथ؞а䪁, by Li Jingong ᵾҍ࣏ǡͳ͸Ͷ͵Ǣ’”‹–‡†‡†Ǥ‹„Ž‹‘–Š ƒŽ‡†‡ ”ƒ ‡ǡ‘—”ƒ–͸ͺ͹͹Ȃ͸ͺ͹ͺǤ LYLS – ‹‰›ƒŽ‹•Šƒ‘䵸傇㹑प, by F. Sambasi (Bi Fangji ⮒ᯩ☏ǡͳͷͺʹȂͳ͸ͶͻȌǡͳ͸ʹͶǤ Reprod. in TXCH ǡ’’Ǥͳͳʹ͹Ȃͳʹ͸ͺǤ PZYQ – ƒ‰œ‹›‹“—ƒ嗀ᆀ䚪䂞, by Diego de Pantoja (Pang Diwo 嗀䘚ᡁǡͳͷ͹ͳȂͳ͸ͳͺȌǡ ’‘•–ŠǤ‡†Ǥ Ǥͳ͸͵ͲǤ‡’”‘†Ǥ‹Ǥ–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ƒ†Ǥ—†‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡChinese Christian ‡š–•ˆ”‘–Š‡‘ƒ” Š‹˜‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‘ ‹‡–›‘ˆ ‡•—•ȋͳʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ʹͲͲʹȌǡ‘ŽǤ ǡ ’’ǤͳȂʹͷʹǤ ǤŽ‡‹Ȍǡ„›‹‹š—ƒᵾ ˆ‘›Š’ƒ”‰‘‹„SJAX – Siji Ai xiensheng xingshu ᙍ৺㢮ݸ⭏㹼䘠ȋ ఓ⦴ǡ Ǥͳ͸ͷͲǡ••Ǥ‹„Ž‹‘–Š°“—‡ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡†‡ ”ƒ ‡ǡ‘—”ƒ–ͳͲͳ͸ƒ†ͳͲͳ͹Ǥ SJXY – Š‡‰Œ‹ƒ‘š‹ƒ‘›‹ 㚆ᮉሿᕅ, by Fan Zhong, ms. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ‘—”ƒ–͹ͲͷͺǤ SSL – Shensi lu ᝾ᙍ䤴, by Li Jiugong ᵾҍ࣏ǡȋ’‘•–Ǥ‡†ǤȌ Ǥͳ͸͹ͲǤ”‹–‡†‡†Ǥ”‡’”‘†Ǥ‹Ǥ –ƒ†ƒ‡”–ƒ†Ǥ—†‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡChinese Christian Texts from the Roman Archives of –Š‡‘ ‹‡–›‘ˆ ‡•—•ȋͳʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ʹͲͲʹȌǡ‘ŽǤ ǡ’’ǤͳͳͻȂʹ͵ͺǤ TSMB – ‹ƒ Š‹ ‹‰„‹ƒ ཙ䟻᰾䗘, by Yang Tingyun ὺᔧ㆐ ȋͳͷ͸ʹȂͳ͸ʹ͹ȌǢ „‡ˆ‘”‡ ͳ͸ʹͳǢϐ‹”•–’”‹–‡†‡†Ǥȋ —œŠ‘—ͳ͸ͶͷȌ”‡’”‘†Ǥ‹ ǡ’’Ǥʹ͵ͳȂͶͳ͹Ǥ TXCH – Tianxue chuhan ཙᆨࡍവ, comp. by Li Zhizao ᵾѻ㰫ͳ͸ʹ͸ǡ”‡’”‘†Ǥ‹Zhongguo shixue congshu ѝ഻ਢᆨ਒ᴨ‘Ǥʹ͵ǡ͸˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ͳͻ͸ͷǤ TZSY – ‹ƒœŠ—•Š‹›‹ཙѫሖ㗙, by Matteo Ricci (Li Madou ࡙⪚ヷǡͳͷͷʹȂͳ͸ͳͲȌǡ‡‹Œ‹‰ ͳ͸ͲͳǤ‡’”‘†Ǥ‹  ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͷͳȂ͸͵͸Ǥ ‹‡„‹ƒŠ—ƒ™‡š‹ƒ•ƒ„‹ƒཙѫᮉᶡۣ᮷⦫йㇷǡ͸˜‘Ž•Ǥǡ ‰‘†WXSB – Tianzhu-jiao ͳͻ͹ʹǤ Sin and Penance in Fujian Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡• ͳͳͳ

‹‡„‹ƒ Š—ƒ ™‡š‹ƒ š—„‹ƒ ཙѫᮉᶡۣ᮷⦫㒼㐘ǡ ͵ ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡ ‰‘† ‘ƒ‹Œ—Š•ƒ‹ WXXB – ͳͻ͸͸Ǥ XJH – N. Standeart, A. Dudink, Huang Yilong and Zhu Pingyi, Xujiahui cangshulou Ming Qing Tianzhu-jiao wenxian ᗀᇦय़㯿ᴨ⁃᰾␵ཙѫᮉ᮷⦫ǡͷ˜‘Ž•Ǥǡƒ‹„‡‹ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ Šƒ‘š‹‰•Š‹Œ‹ὺ⏷ൂݸ⭏䎵ᙗһ䒏 (biography of Yang ‰‡Š•ƒ‹šƒ—›‹‰ƒ YQY – Tingyun ὺᔧ㆐ǡ ͳͷ͸ʹȂͳ͸ʹ͹Ȍǡ „› ‹‰ Š‹Ž‹ бᘇ哏 and Giulio Aleni (Ai Rulüe, ͳͷͺʹȂͳ͸ͶͻȌǤ‡’”‘†Ǥ‹XJH˜‘ŽǤ ǡ’’Ǥʹͳ͹Ȃʹ͵ͺǤ References in European Languages ”‘ƒ™ͳͻͺ͹Ȃ›–Š‹ƒ”‘ƒ™ǡDzòƒ —ƒ‰ȋͳͷͷ͵Ȃͳ͸Ͳ͸Ȍƒ†–Š‡‡†‰‡”•‘ˆ‡”‹– and Demerit.” HJASͶ͹ȋͳͻͺ͹Ȍǡ’’Ǥͳ͵͹Ȃͳͻ͸Ǥ ”‘ƒ™ͳͻͻͳȂ †ǤǡThe Ledgers of Merit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late Ming ChinaǤ”‹ ‡–‘ǡͳͻͻͳǤ ‡Š‡”‰‡ ͳͻ͹͵ Ȃ ‘•‡’Š ‡Š‡”‰‡ǡ ±’‡”–‘‹”‡†‡•Œ±•—‹–‡•†‡Š‹‡†‡ͷͻͻ͸ͷ;ͶͶ. ‘‡ǡͳͻ͹͵Ǥ „‡”Šƒ”†ͳͻ͸͹Ȃ‘Žˆ”ƒ„‡”Šƒ”†ǡGuilt and Sin in Traditional China. Berkeley and ‘•‰‡Ž‡•ǡͳͻ͸͹Ǥ ‘‘†”‹ Šͳͻ͹͸ȂǤƒ””‹‰–‘ ‘‘†”‹ ŠǡDz ‹—Ž‹‘Ž‡‹Ǥdz ǣǤǤ ‘‘†”‹ Šƒ†Šƒ‘›- ing Fang, ‹ –‹‘ƒ”›‘ˆ‹‰‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›Ǥ‡™‘”Ȁ‘†‘ǡͳͻ͹͸Ǥ —‘ͳͻͻͶȂ—‘‹Ǧ›‹‰ǡ‘ˆ‡••‹‘‡– ‘–”‹–‹‘†ƒ•Ž‡„‘—††Š‹•‡ Š‹‘‹•†—‡ƒ—‡ siècleǤƒ”‹•ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ƒ ƒ•Š‹”‡Ȁ —ͳͻͺͷȂ‘—‰Žƒ•ƒ ƒ•Š‹”‡ƒ†‡–‡” ——‘Ǧ Š‡ȋ–”ƒ•ǤȌǡ Matteo Ric- ‹Ǥ ǤǣŠ‡”—‡‡ƒ‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡‘”†‘ˆ ‡ƒ˜‡ȋǯ‹‡Ǧ Š—•Š‹ŠǦ‹ȌǤ–Ǥ‘—‹•ǡͳͻͺͷǤ ‹ͳͻͻʹȂ‹ ‹•Š—‹᷇䠁≤, “Ai Rulüe yu Mingmo Fujian shehui” 㢮݂⮕㠷᰾ᵛ⾿ᔪ⽮ ᴳ. In: ƒ‹Œ‹ƒ‘•Š‹›ƒŒ‹— ⎧Ӕਢ⹄ウͳͻͻʹǤʹǡ’’Ǥͷ͸Ȃ͸͸Ǥ ‹’‹‡ŽŽ‘ȀƒŽ‡ͳͻͻ͹Ȃ‹œ‹ƒƒ‹’‹‡ŽŽ‘ƒ†‘ƒƒŽ‡ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‘Scholar from the West’: ‹—Ž‹‘Ž‡‹Ǥ Ǥȋͷͻ;͸ȂͷͼͺͿȌƒ†–Š‡‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡‡–™‡‡Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ƒ†Š‹ƒ (Mon- —‡–ƒ‡”‹ ƒ‘‘‰”ƒ’Š‡”‹‡•˜‘ŽǤͶʹȌǤ‡––‡–ƒŽǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ‡‡‰‘ͳͻͻͶȂ—‰‡‹‘‡‡‰‘ǡ ‘Ž‘ ‹‡Ž‘ǣ ‹—Ž‹‘ Ž‡‹ ȋͷͻ;͸ȂͷͼͺͿȌǤ Brescia, ͳͻͻͶǤ —ƒ›‡•—Š—‹•Š‹‹—Žò‡㾯ֶ —”‘‰‹‡‰Œ—ƒ█匣၏, ‹Žƒ‹‘‰œ‹ǣ ƒͳͻͻͶȂƒ ᆄᆀü᰾ᵛޕ㨟㙦ぼᴳ༛㢮݂⮕ȋǤǤ–Š‡•‹•ǡ•‹‰Š—ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ȌǤƒ‹’‡‹ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ϐ‹•–‡”ͳͻ͵ʹȂ‘—‹•ϐ‹•–‡”ǡ‘–‹ ‡•„‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹“—‡•‡–„‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹“—‡••—”Ž‡•Œ±•—‹–‡•†‡ l’ancienne mission de ChineǤŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͳͻ͵ʹǤ ƒƒ‹ͳͻ͸ͲȂƒƒ‹ƒ†ƒ‘䞂Ӆᘐཛ, Šó‰‘—œ‡•Š‘‘‡›óѝ഻ழᴨȃ⹄ウ, Tokyo, ͳͻ͸ͲǤ –ƒ†ƒ‡”–ʹͲͲͳȂ‹ ‘Žƒ•–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ƒ†„‘‘‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹Š‹ƒǡ ˜‘ŽǤͳǤ ‡‹†‡ǡʹͲͲͳǤ —ͳͻ͹ͻȂ—‡‹Ǧ›‹ǡDz‡ŽˆǦšƒ‹ƒ–‹‘ƒ†‘ˆ‡••‹‘‘ˆ‹•‹”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽŠ‹ƒǤdz Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (HJASȌ͵ͻȋͳͻ͹ͻȌǡ’’ǤͷȂ͵ͺǤ òͳͻͺͳȂòŠòǦˆƒ‰ǡŠ‡‡‡™ƒŽ‘ˆ—††Š‹•‹Š‹ƒǣŠ—ǦŠ—‰ƒ†–Š‡ƒ–‡‹‰ ›–Š‡•‹•Ǥ‡™‘”ǡͳͻͺͳǤ ͳͳʹ Erik Zürcher

ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻͲȂ”‹ò” Š‡”ǡDzŠ‡ ‡•—‹–‹••‹‘‹ƒ–‡‹‰‹‡•ǣ‡˜‡Ž•‘ˆ‡- •’‘•‡Ǥdz ǤǤ‡”‡‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡDevelopment and Decline of Fukien Province in the ͷͽ–Šƒ†ͷ;–Š‡–—”‹‡•Ǥ‡‹†‡ǡͳͻͻͲǡ’’ǤͶͳ͹ȂͶͷͺǤ ò” Š‡” ͳͻͻ͹ Ȃ †Ǥǡ Dz ‹—Ž‹‘ Ž‡‹ǯ• Š‹‡•‡ ‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›Ǥdz ǣ ‹’‹‡ŽŽ‘ȀƒŽ‡ ͳͻͻ͹ǡ ’’Ǥ ͺͷȂͳʹ͹Ǥ Christendom and its Manifestations in China Today

Roman Malek, S.V.D.

Preliminaries

hristendom,ͳ or – according to today’s Chinese terminology – Ji- du-zongjiao สⶓᇇᮉ, i.e., the Religion of Jesus Christ, has tried Cseveral times to gain a foothold in China in order to settle there institutionally in the form of different Christian Churches and de- ‘‹ƒ–‹‘•Ǥ ‹ ‡ –Š‡ ϐ‹”•– ‡ ‘—–‡” ‘ˆ –Š‡ Eastern Syrian Church (‡•–‘”‹ƒ‹•Ȍ ™‹–Š Š‹ƒ ‹ –Š‡ •‡˜‡–Š century, Christendom has had various manifestations, and we might actually speak of different “Christendoms” in the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo ѝഭȌǤŠ‹•‹•‡˜‹- denced by the fact that the four missionary attempts (the Nestorian in the seventh century, the Franciscan in the thirteenth century, the Jesuit in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and the Protestant, Cath- olic, and ”–Š‘†‘šƒ––‡’–•‹–Š‡‹‡–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›Ȍʹ were carried out quite independently from one another, as well as by the terms at- tributed to the historical forms of Christendom in the course of Chinese history: Jingjiao ᲟᮉȂ–Š‡Dz‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȁ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‘ˆ‹‰Š–dzˆ‘”Nestorian- ism, i.e., the ƒ•–‡”›”‹ƒŠ—” ŠǢ Tianzhu-jiao ཙѫᮉ – the “Teach-

ͳ Here, I use the term Christendom intentionally as it seems to better embrace all the Christian phenomena, e.g., the Christian civilization rather than an institutional Dz Š—” Š‡†dz”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ‘–‘Ž›Ȍ‹Š‹ƒǤChristendom “stands for a polity as well as religion, for a nation as well as for a people. Christendom in this sense was an ‹†‡ƒŽ™Š‹ Š‹•’‹”‡†ƒ††‹‰‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ› ‡–—”‹‡•‘ˆŠ‹•–‘”›ƒ†™Š‹ ŠŠƒ•‘–›‡– ƒŽ–‘‰‡–Š‡”Ž‘•–‹–•’‘™‡”‘˜‡”–Š‡‹†•‘ˆ‡dzǤȋ”“—Šƒ”–ͳͻͲͺǡ’Ǥ͸ͻͻȌ ʹ ‘”–Š‡Š‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡•‡ƒ––‡’–•ǡ•‡‡‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›ƒ–‘—”‡––‡ƒ†–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ʹͲͲͳǤ There are, of course, numerous studies on the history of each of the forms and aspects of Š”‹•–‡†‘‹Š‹ƒǤ ‘”ƒ„‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›ǡ•‡‡–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ʹͲͲͳǤ

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’Ǥͳͳ͵ȂͳͶͳǤ ͳͳͶ Roman Malek

‹‰Ȁ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Lord of Heaven” (‹ƒœŠ—‹•Ȍǡ͵ also called jiujiao ᰗ ᮉȋ–Š‡DzŽ†‡ƒ Š‹‰dzȌˆ‘”ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ ‹•ǢJidu-jiao สⶓᮉ or Yesu-jiao 㙦 こᮉ ȋ–Š‡Dz‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȁ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‘ˆ ‡•—•Š”‹•–dzȌ ƒŽŽ‡†ƒŽ•‘ xinjiao ᯠᮉ ȋ–Š‡Dz‡™‡ƒ Š‹‰dzȌˆ‘””‘–‡•–ƒ–‹•Ǣ Dongzheng-jiao ь↓ᮉ (the Dz”–Š‘†‘šƒ•–‡”‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȁ‡Ž‹‰‹‘dzȌˆ‘”–Š‡Orthodox Church. Since the times of the Jesuits, Christianity was also called “Western teach- ‹‰Ȁ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘dzȋxixue 㾯ᆖȌǤ ‘ —‡– ͷͿ (“The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious —‡•–‹‘ †—”‹‰ —” ‘—–”›ǯ• ‘ ‹ƒŽ‹•– ‡”‹‘†dzȌ ‘ˆ –Š‡ Communist ƒ”–›‘ˆŠ‹ƒˆ”‘–Š‡›‡ƒ”ͳͻͺʹǡ™Š‹ Š‹••–‹ŽŽ‡ˆˆ‡ –‹˜‡–‘†ƒ›ǡŽ‹•–• ϐ‹˜‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›Ǧ”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡† ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘• ‹ Š‹ƒǣ Buddhism (Fojiao ֋ᮉȌǡ Daoism (Daojiao 䚃ᮉȌǡIslam (Yisilan-jiao ԺᯟޠᮉȌǡCatholicism (Tian- œŠ—ǦŒ‹ƒ‘Ȍǡƒ†Protestantism ( ‹†—ǦŒ‹ƒ‘ȌǤͶ Thus, Christendom in China today, from the point of view of religious policy, is not regarded as one ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǡ„—–’‘••‡••‡•–™‘‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†ȋorthodox, zheng ↓Ȍ manifestations: Catholicism, exclusively represented by the Catholic Patriotic Association (Zhongguo Tianzhu-jiao Aiguohui ѝഭཙѫᮉ⡡ഭ ՊȌǡƒ†Protestantism, represented by the Protestant Patriotic Three- Self-Movement (Zhongguo Jidu-jiao Aiguo Sanzi Yundong ѝഭสⶓᮉ⡡ ഭй㠚䘀ࣘȌǤŠ‡—••‹ƒǦOrthodox Church (‘‰œŠ‡‰ǦŒ‹ƒ‘Ȍ‹•‘–‘ˆ- ϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†ƒ•ƒ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǣ”ƒ–Š‡”ǡ–Š‡„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•‘ˆ–Š‹•Š—” Šƒ”‡ ascribed to minorities (shaoshu minzu ቁᮠ≁᯿, especially, the Russian ‹‘”‹–›‹Š‹ƒȌǤͷ It might be remarked here that also in traditional China, the imperial state had the prerogative to determine – according –‘ƒ› ”‹–‡”‹ƒ™Šƒ–•‘‡˜‡”Ȃ™Š‹ Š–‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȁ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋjiao ᮉȌ™ƒ•–‘ „‡ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ•Dz‘”–Š‘†‘šǡdz‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†„›–Š‡•–ƒ–‡ǡƒ† ™Š‹ Š™ƒ•–‘„‡”‡‰ƒ”†‡†ƒ•ƒDz‡˜‹Ž–‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȁ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ȁ —Ž–dzȋxiejiao 䛚 ᮉȌǤ͸ In contrast to the political point of view, the Zongjiao cidian ᇇᮉ䇽ި (‹ –‹‘ƒ”›‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•Ȍǡ’—„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͻͺͳ‹Shanghai, characterizes Š”‹•–‡†‘ȋ–Š‡Dz‡Ž‹‰‹‘‘ˆŠ”‹•–ǡdz ‹†—ǦŒ‹ƒ‘Ȍ”ƒ–Š‡”‘”‡ƒ —”ƒ–‡Ž› ƒ•ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™•ȋ’Ǥͻ͵͸ˆǤȌǣ Jidu-jiao ȋ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ ‘ˆ Š”‹•–Ȍǣ ‘‘ ‡š’”‡••‹‘ ˆ‘” ƒŽŽ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• groups which recognize Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of the world. The

͵ Erik Zürcher describes the Christianity of the Ming and Qing periods as “‹ƒœŠ—‹•Ǥdz‡‡ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻͶǡ’ǤͷͲǤ Ͷ‡‡ƒ ‹•ǡ’’ǤͺȂʹ͸Ǥ ͷ For the ”–Š‘†‘šŠ—” Š‹Š‹ƒ–‘†ƒ›ǡ•‡‡‘œ†‹ƒ‡˜ͳͻͻͻƒƒ†ͳͻͻͻ„Ǥ ͸ ‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡƒŽ‡ͳͻͺͻǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳͳͷ

Christian religion comprises the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the “new” religion (xinjiao, ”‘–‡•–ƒ–‹•Ȍƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•ƒ—„‡”‘ˆ•ƒŽŽ‡”‰”‘—’•Ǥ The Christian religion, Buddhism, and Islam together are called the three big world religions. Š”‹•–‡†‘†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡†‹–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ‡–—”› in Palestine and slowly spread within the whole Roman Empire. It be- lieves that Shangdi кᑍ (the Supreme Ruler on High, i.e., the Protes- –ƒ–ƒ‡ˆ‘” ‘†Ȍ‘”Tianzhu ཙѫ (the Lord of Heaven, i.e., the Cath- ‘Ž‹ ƒ‡ˆ‘” ‘†ȌŠƒ• ”‡ƒ–‡†ƒ††‹”‡ –•–Š‡™‘”Ž†Ǣ‹–ƒ••—‡•–Šƒ– mankind has sinned beginning with its progenitor and that it suffers miserably in sin and may only be redeemed through faith in God and his son Jesus Christ. It regards the collection of the books (taken over from the ‡™‹•Š”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ȍ‘ˆ–Š‡Ž†ƒ†–Š‡‡™‡•–ƒ‡–ƒ•–Š‡ ‘Ž› Scripture. In general, Christendom in China – in which manifestation whatsoev- er – may be characterized as a “marginal” “foreign religion” (›ƒ‰Œ‹ƒ‘ ⌻ᮉȌǤ͹ Until today, Christians form a very small minority of approxi- mately only two percent of the Chinese population, and exercise – seen from the socio-cultural point of view – only a small amount of regional ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡Ǥ ”‘–Š‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǧ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ’‘‹–‘ˆ˜‹‡™ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Š‡Chris- tian Churches form units which, due to various reasons, are being sup- pressed or at least controlled – as was also the case in traditional China. In contrast to —††Š‹•ǡ™Š‹ Š‹–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ‡–—”›ǤǤƒŽ•‘ ƒ‡–‘ China as a “foreign religion” but was able to strike roots in Chinese cul- ture, Christendom has never become regarded as a “Chinese religion.” Generally speaking, in China, Christendom was and is seen as “Western Christendom,” a “Western religion.” This refers to the Christian reality in all its manifestations. Historiography shows that the various manifestations of Christen- dom in China were closely connected with the various changes that took ’Žƒ ‡‹Š‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›ǤŽ›‹–Š‡Žƒ•–ͳͷͲ›‡ƒ”•ȋ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡƒˆ–‡”–Š‡Opium Wars and the ƒ‹’‹‰‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ȌŠƒ•Christendom unfolded many fac- ‡•ƒ†’Žƒ›‡††‹ˆˆ‡”‡–”‘Ž‡•‹Š‹ƒǤ ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ‹–™ƒ•ϐ‹”•–Ȃ ‘- sciously or not – an important factor in modernization. It then became more and more marginalized, criticized, fought, and eliminated from social life. Despite this, it has surprisingly become a spiritual force and has again been a factor in the process of modernization in today’s Chi-

͹ Regarding the question of “marginality” of Christendom in China, which cannot be ‡š’Ž‘”‡†Š‡”‡‹‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Žǡ•‡‡‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻ͵ƒǡͳͻͻ͵„ƒ†ͳͻͻ͹Ǥ‹–Š regard to the category “foreign religion” within the Chinese context, see, among ‘–Š‡”•ǡ‡‹™‡”–ͳͻͺ͹Ǥ ͳͳ͸ Roman Malek na. On one hand, these alternating roles mirror the changes that have –ƒ‡’Žƒ ‡™‹–Š‹Š‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›Ǣ‘–Š‡‘–Š‡”Šƒ†ǡ–Š‡›ƒŽ•‘”‡ϐŽ‡ – changes in Chinese Christendom.ͺ In addition, since the last missionary encounter between Christi- anity and China at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, within Chinese and Christian traditions important events have occurred. Such events include the May Fourth Movement ‘ˆͳͻͳͻǡ–Š‡ƒ†‘’–‹‘‘ˆ‡•–‡”ƒ”š‹•‹–Š‡ͳͻʹͲ•ǡ–Š‡Dz‹„‡”ƒ- –‹‘dz‘ˆͳͻͶͻǡ–Š‡‡ —‡‹ ƒŽ‘˜‡‡–ǡ–Š‡‡ ‘†Vatican Council ‹–Š‡ͳͻ͸Ͳ•ǡ–Š‡—Ž–—”ƒŽ‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘ȋͳͻ͸͸Ȃͳͻ͹͸Ȍǡ–Š‡†‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡‘ˆ”‡- ligions, efforts towards in-culturation and contextualization, China’s opening to the West, modernization endeavors, as well as many others. A general understanding of Christian history and ideas has started to grow within Chinese society, helped by research and publications on Christendom being carried out in China itself. A totally new, changed situation has developed which poses the question of religion (zongjiao wentiᇇᮉ䰞仈Ȍƒ†Christendom in China in a new way. After both the Chinese and the Christian traditions have been sifted through a sieve of criticism and changes, they no longer seem to radically exclude one another. Among other reasons, this has lead to the fact that also out- side the Churches, more and more people are becoming interested in Christendom from a historical, philosophical, artistic, or ethical point of view. Outside of the Chinese state and party structures, a constant decrease in negative attitudes towards Christendom can be observed. At the same time, it seems to gradually lose its character as a “Western religion” and become (as —††Š‹•†‹†Ȍǡ™Š‹Ž‡•–‹ŽŽDzˆ‘”‡‹‰ǡdzƒ‹Ǧ —Ž- turated („‡†‹Š—ƒᵜൠॆ , „‡•‡Š—ƒᵜ㢢ॆȌ–”ƒ†‹–‹‘Ȃƒ••‘‡Š‹‡•‡ experts in religious studies have remarked.ͻ Due to quite strong local roots and, at the same time, the isolation of the Catholic communities from their “non-Christian” environment, Catholicism in some regions in China is regarded not only as a religion (zongjiao ᇇᮉȌǡ„—–ƒŽ•‘ƒ•ƒ ethnic group (minzu ≁᯿ȌǤͳͲ

ͺˆǤ ƒ‘ʹͲͲͲƒ†ʹͲͲʹǤ ͻ‡‡ǡ‡Ǥ‰Ǥǡ‹‡ͳͻͻͷǡ’’ǤͳȂͷǤ ͳͲ See the remarks of the sociologist ‹ Šƒ”† ƒ†•‡ǡ ȋƒ†•‡ ͳͻͻͺǡ ‡•’Ǥ ’Ǥ ͷ͵Ȍǣ “Rural Catholicism is less a chosen faith than an ascribed status. … A Chinese rural Catholic community is formed by bonds that for most practical purposes cannot be broken unless one leaves the countryside. … Chinese Catholicism … is a kind of ‡–Š‹ ‹–›ǤdzˆǤƒŽ•‘ƒ†•‡ʹͲͲͳǡ’’Ǥʹ͵͵ȂʹͶͻǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳͳ͹

In this new context, Christendom in China has unfolded various and rather independent manifestations. In China today, we can dis- tinguish in principle two main manifestations of Š”‹•–‡†‘ǣ ȋͳȌ –Š‡ Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡ ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹œ‡† Š”‹•–‡†‘ ƒ†ǡ ȋʹȌ –Š‡ Dz‘Ǧ Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡdz‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ‘Ǧ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹œ‡†Christendom. ȋͳȌŠ‡Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹œ‡†ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‘ˆChristendom in China include the Catholic and the Protestant Churches in their three ‹†‡’‡†‡–ˆ‘”•ǣȋƒȌ–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†„›–Š‡–ƒ–‡Ǣȋ„Ȍ –Š‡—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽCatholic Underground Church and the Protestant House Š—” Š‡•‘–”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†„›–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ‘˜‡”‡–Ǣƒ†ȋ Ȍ˜ƒ”‹‘—• forms of new religiosity, the so-called “Christian sects or groups” which also belong to these institutionalized manifestations of Christendom. Due to the reasons mentioned above, the Russian-Orthodox Church is not considered here. Anthony Lam from the Holy Spirit Study Center in Hong Kong proposes the following categorization of the Christian Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍ ‰”‘—’• ȋ™‹–Š •’‡ ‹ƒŽ ”‡‰ƒ”† –‘ –Š‡ ƒ–Š‘Ž‹  Š—” ŠȌǣȋƒȌ Underground extremists who refuse to cooperate with any govern- ‡–Ǧ•ƒ –‹‘‡†•›•–‡Ǣȋ„Ȍ—†‡”‰”‘—†•‡ –‘”•”‡‰‹•–‡”‡†™‹–Š–Š‡ ‰‘˜‡”‡–Ǣȋ Ȍ’‡Š—” Š•‡ –‘”•”‡‰‹•–‡”‡†™‹–Š–Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–Ǣ ȋ†Ȍ’‡Š—” Š•‡ –‘”•”‡‰‹•–‡”‡†™‹–Š„‘–Š–Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–ƒ†–Š‡ Patriotic Association.ͳͳ ȋʹȌ  Ž—†‡†‹–Š‡Dz‘ǦŠ—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡdz‘Ǧ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹œ‡†ƒ‹ˆ‡•- tations of Š”‹•–‡†‘‹Š‹ƒƒ”‡ǡ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›ǡȋƒȌ–Š‡•‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡†—Ž- tural Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‘”–Š‡—Ž–—”ƒŽŠ”‹•–‹ƒ•ǡƒ†ǡƒ•™‡ŽŽǡȋ„ȌChristen- dom as an subject of academic research, i.e., as an academic discipline at universities, academies, and institutes. Here, Christendom can in a positive sense become a subject of academic research and teaching, but also an object of (not only ƒ”š‹•–Ȍ ”‹–‹ ‹•Ǥ According to Chinese academics, these main manifestations of Christendom might be subsumed under two other categories, namely, that of “folk Christianity” or “popular Christianity” of the majority of believers, and that of “elite Christianity,” which also includes “cultural Christians.”ͳʹDz ‘Žȋ”—”ƒŽȌChristianity” has especially developed in the countryside and often takes on fundamentalist or syncretistic traits.ͳ͵

ͳͳƒʹͲͲͲǡ‡•’Ǥ’ǤʹͳǤ ͳʹ‡‡Š—‘ͳͻͻͺǢŠ—‘ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳ͵ For the rural manifestations of Christendom in China, see, among others: “A Study ‘ˆ–Š‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ƒ‹–Š‘ˆ ‹•Š‹‰‡‘’Ž‡‹‹‰’—‘—–›ǡdz‹ƒ ‹•ͳͻͺͻǡ’’Ǥ ʹ͹ʹȂʹͺ͵Ǣ‹–œ‹‰‡”ͳͻͻ͸Ǣ‹ƒ‰ͳͻͻͻǢ™‡‡–‡ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳͳͺ Roman Malek

“Elite Christianity” has mainly developed among intellectuals and is —†‡”•–‘‘†ƒ•ƒ™‡Ž–ƒ• Šƒ——‰ǡƒ•›•–‡‘ˆ˜ƒŽ—‡•ȋ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡƒ‹†‡‘ȏ–Š‡‘Ȑ Ž‘‰›Ȍƒ†‘–ƒ•ƒŠ—” Šȋ‡†Ȍˆ‘”‘ˆChristianity. From the above remarks it is apparent that when speaking about “Christendom” this contribution neither exclusively nor primarily re- fers to the Christian Churches and the theology of the Christian Church, but rather is examining the Christian religion or teaching with its nu- merous historical and ideological facets. A quite different level is presented by Christendom as an object of the government’s religious political control, for which analysts often use the category ‘”–Š‘†‘š›ȀŠ‡–‡”‘†‘š›ȋzheng/xie ↓Ȁ䛚ȌǤͳͶ According to this scheme, three types of religiosity in China can be distinguished: ȋͳȌ‘”–Š‘†‘š‘”Ž‡‰ƒŽ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ•Ȍ‘”–‡ƒ Š‹‰ȋ‹–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽŠ‹ƒȂƒ† practically until today – represented exclusively by Confucianism or –Š‡ —””‡–Ž›†‘‹ƒ–‹‰–ƒ–‡†‘ –”‹‡ȌǢȋʹȌ—‘”–Š‘†‘š„—–Ž‡‰ƒŽ”‡- Ž‹‰‹‘•ȋ‹–Š‡Š‹ƒǡ–Š‡ϐ‹˜‡Dz”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ǡdz‹ Ž—†‹‰Ca- tholicism and ”‘–‡•–ƒ–‹•ȌǢ ȋ͵Ȍ heterodox and illegal religions (all unregistered “sects” and groups, new religious movements, and Under- ground or ‘—•‡Š—” Š‡•ȌǤ This contribution tries, phenomenologically, to sketch the main manifestations of Š”‹•–‡†‘‹Š‹ƒ–‘†ƒ›ȋŠ‹ƒȌǡ‡Ǥ‰Ǥǡ‘ˆCa- tholicism and ”‘–‡•–ƒ–‹•‹–Š‡‹”‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ†—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽˆ‘”•ǡ–Š‡ new Christian religiosity (the so-called Š”‹•–‹ƒ•‡ –•Ȍƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•–Š‡ so-called Cultural Christianity and Christianity as an object of criticism and research. Excluded here are the manifestations of Christianity in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

The Church(ed), Institutional Manifestations of Christendom in China

Š‡Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‘ˆChristendom in China include the Catholic and ”‘–‡•–ƒ–Š—” Š‡•‹–Š‡‹”–Š”‡‡ˆ‘”•ǣȋƒȌ –Š‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ Š—” Š‡• ”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡† „› –Š‡ Š‹‡•‡ ‘˜‡”‡–ǡ •‘‡- –‹‡•‡””‘‡‘—•Ž› ƒŽŽ‡†Dzƒ–”‹‘–‹ dz‘”Dzƒ–‹‘ƒŽdzǢȋ„Ȍ–Š‡—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽǡDz‹Ž- legal” Underground or House Churches not recognized by the Chinese ‘˜‡”‡–Ǣȋ Ȍ˜ƒ”‹‘—•ˆ‘”•‘ˆ‡™”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‹–›ǡ–Š‡•‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡†Chris-

ͳͶ ‡‡ƒ‰ͳͻ͸ͳǢƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͳǢò” Š‡”ͳͻͻ͹ǡ‡•’Ǥ’’Ǥ͸ͳͷȂ͸ʹʹǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳͳͻ tian sects, which must also be included in institutionally-structured Christendom. ȋƒȌŠ‡ˆϔ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‡•ǡ‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†„›–Š‡ ‘˜‡”‡– ƒ Š‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†ƒ†”‡‰‹•–‡”‡†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹–Š‡Š‹ƒ—•– be represented by a Patriotic Association. In this way, Christendom in Š‹ƒ–‘†ƒ›‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›‘Ž›‡š‹•–•™‹–Š‹–Š‡ˆ”ƒ‡™‘”‘ˆ–Š‡ ƒ–”‹- otic Associations, i.e., the Patriotic Association of the Chinese Catholic Church and the Protestant Patriotic Three-Self-Movement. All manifes- tations of Š”‹•–‡†‘–Šƒ–ƒ”‡‘–‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‡†ƒ†ƒ”‡‘– registered with these Patriotic organizations are considered illegal (feifa 䶎⌅Ȍ‘”heretical (xie 䛚Ȍǡƒ†ƒ”‡’‡”•‡ —–‡†Ǣ–Š‡› ƒ‘Ž›‡š- ercise their activities in the so-called Underground. Š‡ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘•ȋDzƒ••‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•dzȌ‘ˆ–Š‡Š—” Š‡•ǡ ™Š‹ Š™‡”‡ˆ‘—†‡†‹–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•ǡƒ”‡„ƒ•‡†‘–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ŽˆǦ”‹- ‹’Ž‡• ȋ‘” —–‘‘‹‡•Ȍ ˆ‘”—Žƒ–‡† ƒŽ”‡ƒ†› ‹ –Š‡ ͳͻ͵Ͳ• „› Š‹‡•‡ –Š‡‘Ž‘‰‹ƒ•ǣͳǤ‡ŽˆǦ•—’’‘”–ȋœ‹›ƒ‰㠚ޫȌǡ‹Ǥ‡ǤǡŠƒ˜‹‰ϐ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽ‹†‡’‡- †‡ ‡ƒ†‘–ƒ ‡’–‹‰ˆ‘”‡‹‰ƒ‹†ǢʹǤ‡ŽˆǦ’”‘’ƒ‰ƒ–‹‘ȋzichuan 㠚ՐȌǡ i.e., propagating the Gospel solely with the help of local Chinese person- ‡ŽǢ͵Ǥ‡ŽˆǦƒƒ‰‡‡–ȋzizhi㠚⋫Ȍǡ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡƒ†‹‹•–‡”‹‰–Š‡Š—” Š‹ Š‹ƒ‹†‡’‡†‡–Ž›ǡ™‹–Š‘—–ˆ‘”‡‹‰‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡Ǥͳͷ Patriotism (aiguo ⡡ ഭȌ‹•–Š‡ϐ‹”•– ‘†‹–‹‘ˆ‘”’‘•‹–‹˜‡–”‡ƒ–‡–‘ˆ–Š‡Christian Church- es by the Communist state. This means at least outward consent with the current ruling orthodoxy (i.e., the leadership of the CCP and the role ‘ˆ–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ŽˆǦ”‹ ‹’Ž‡•ȌǤŠ‡•–ƒ–—–‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘• formulate these principles explicitly.ͳ͸ The subordination of the Chris- tian Churches under the Patriotic Associations, and of the Associations under the leadership of the Party through “cooperation” with the State Council’s Bureau for Religious Affairs, until today remains a fundamen- –ƒŽ ‘†‹–‹‘ˆ‘”–Š‡’—„Ž‹ ȋ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽȌƒ –‹˜‹–›‘ˆ–Š‡Christian Churches.

ͳͷ For the Patriotic Association and Three-Self-Movement, see “La vraie nature de l’Association Patriotique des catholiques chinois,” in: ‰Ž‹•‡• †ǯ•‹‡Ǥ Dossiers et documentsͳͻͻͶȀͶǡ’’ǤͳȂ͵ͷǢƒŽ‡ȀŽƒ–‡ͳͻͺ͹Ǣ‹ ‡”‹ͳͻͺͺǢƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͲǢƒŽ‡ ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ‘”ƒ ”‹–‹ ƒŽƒƒŽ›•‹•‘ˆ–Š‡•‡’”‹ ‹’Ž‡•ǡ•‡‡Šƒ‰ͳͻͻͻǤ ͳ͸ See, for example, the statutes of the Catholic Patriotic Association in: China heute ͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͻȂͶͳǢDz‡—‡ƒ–œ—‰‡†‡”ƒ–Š‘Ž‹• Š‡ ”‡‹‡‹†‡”Š‹ƒǡdz‹ǣ China heuteͳͻͻʹǡ’’Ǥͳ͸ʹȂͳ͸ͶǢDz‘•–‹–—–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Catholic Patriotic ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ȋͳͻͻ͹Ȍǡdz‹ǣŠ‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳ͵ȋͳͻͻͺȌͳǡ’’Ǥ͸ͲȂ͸͸Ǥ ͳʹͲ Roman Malek

Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‡•ǡƒ•ƒ”—Ž‡ǡˆ‘ŽŽ‘™–Š‡”‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ”–› and Government and do not accept “interference” from abroad, even though today there are broad contacts with Churches outside of China. The administration of the Church follows the policy of independence and autonomy. On the Catholic side, this autonomy is especially em- phasized by the fact that the Patriotic Association elects and ordains its own bishops. These are, in most cases, recognized by the Holy See despite the non-existent diplomatic relations between Beijing and the Vatican. These independent ordinations cause an incomplete communio between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Universal Church. In the ’ƒ•–ǡ–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Šǡ†—‡–‘–Š‡’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ’”‡••—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡Communist Party, expressed a certain hostility towards Rome and the Pope. Later, however, this attitude became more and more moderate. Today, even –Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽCatholic Church publicly recognizes that the Primate of the Pope is part of the Catholic faith. ‘ƒŽƒ”‰‡‡š–‡–ǡ–Š‡‹–‡”ƒŽ•‹–—ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Š—” Šȋ‡†Ȍƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ- tions of Christendom is known. It is, however, much more complicated –Šƒ™‡ ƒ‰Ž‡ƒ‹‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ”‡’‘”–•‘”–Šƒ‹• ‘‘Ž›–Š‘—‰Š–Ǥ‘ characterize the present situation of the Churches in China comprehen- sively, we may name four aspects which more or less represent today’s •‹–—ƒ–‹‘ǣȋͳȌŠ‡ ‘’Ž‡š‹–›‘ˆ–Š‡‡ Ž‡•‹ƒ•–‹ ƒŽ•‹–—ƒ–‹‘ȋ†‡’‡†‹‰ on the ‘ˆ‡••‹‘ǡ†‡‘‹ƒ–‹‘ǡ’Žƒ ‡ƒ†Ȁ‘”ǡ‡Ǥ‰Ǥǡ–Š‡†‹‘ ‡•‡Ȍƒ†–Š‡ increasing non-transparency with regard to the so-called Underground Church or the Protestant House Churches. They show a simultaneous development of extensive “gray areas” between the Underground and –Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” ŠǢͳ͹ ȋʹȌ ƒ ˜‡”› ‹–‡•‹˜‡ ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ȋ•ƒ ”ƒ‡–ƒŽȌ Ž‹ˆ‡ and innumerable activities that are not proportional to the personnel ƒ†–Š‡ϐ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽ’‘••‹„‹Ž‹–‹‡•‘ˆ–Š‡Š—” Š‡•Ǣȋ͵Ȍ•–‹ŽŽǦ‡š‹•–‹‰‡‡†• ‹„‘–Š–Š‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽƒ†ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽƒ––‡”•ǢȋͶȌƒ†”ƒƒ–‹ ‹””‡ ‘ ‹Žƒ„‹Ž‹- ty among all the groups within the Christian Churches.ͳͺ Through many decades – taking Protestant Christians as one exam- ple – the Patriotic Three-Self-Movement was the only legal organization

ͳ͹ Jean Charbonnier remarks in his article “The ‘Underground’ Church” that “quite a number of analyses carried out in recent years all agree as to the existence of an intermediate group – actually comprising a majority – that is neither underground nor patriotic. These members of the faithful practice their religion openly, and ”‡ˆ—•‡–‘”‡Œ‡ ––Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”‹–›‘ˆ–Š‡’‘’‡ǤdzȋŠƒ”„‘‹‡”ͳͻͻ͵ǡ’Ǥͷ͵ǤȌ ͳͺ ‘”†‡–ƒ‹Ž•ǡ•‡‡ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷƒǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳʹͳ of Chinese Protestantism.ͳͻ This organizational standardization had socio-political and historical reasons. In the meantime, however, Chi- nese Protestantism has developed a nearly inestimable organizational variety.ʹͲ In the meantime, the so-called post-denominational situation (the building-up of only one united “Church of Jesus Christ” under the leadership of the Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ŽˆǦ‘˜‡‡–Ȍǡ™Š‹ Šƒ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ• was imposed on the Church, seems no longer to exist. The social conditions in China today (especially, poverty in the coun- –”›•‹†‡ȌŠƒ•Ž‡†–‘•’‡ ‹ϐ‹  Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ •”‡‰ƒ”†‹‰–Š‡‡„‡”•Š‹’ structure of the Protestant (and also ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ ȌŠ—” Š‡•‹–Š‡ ‘—- tryside: Among their members are many old people, many women, and many illiterate persons. This situation has improved somewhat over the last decade, but, all in all, these characteristics are still valid.ʹͳ It is understandable that Christians in the countryside attach more impor- tance to ritual activities than Church dogmas. It is also understandable that due to their living conditions they do not care much about theol- ogy, and that their main focus is on their real interests. Many Chris- tians, for example, regard the difference between being Christian and non-Christian as being the most important distinctive feature. This fundamentalism results in the fact that in the Chinese villages there is a sectarian thinking and a strong tendency towards a kind of “Christian folk religion.” –Š‡ ‹–‹‡•ǡ–Š‡Š—” Šȋ‡†ȌChristendom has developed differently from the countryside. As more and more intellectuals and young peo- ple come to the Churches, the structure of Christendom in the cities Šƒ• Šƒ‰‡†•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›ǡ™Š‹ Š™‹–Š‘—–ƒ›†‘—„–Šƒ•Šƒ†’‘•‹–‹˜‡‡ˆ- fects on the marginalized situation of Chinese Christendom as a whole. On the other hand, however, the rising number of intellectuals among Christians leads to increasing demands towards the Churches.ʹʹ At the

ͳͻ ‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡ —–‡”ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵ǡ‡•’Ǥ’’Ǥ͹ʹȂͺͲǤ ʹͲ For the institutions of the Protestant Church in China, see —–‡”ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵, pp. ͷ͵Ȃ͸ͷǡƒ†‹ ‡”‹ͳͻͺͺǡ‡•’Ǥ’’ǤͳͶ͸Ȃͳͷ͵Ǥ ʹͳ ‘”•–ƒ–‹•–‹ ƒŽ†ƒ–ƒ‘–Š‡Š”‹•–‹ƒ•‹–Š‡ ‘—–”›•‹†‡ǡ•‡‡ǡˆ‘”‡šƒ’Ž‡ǣ ‡Ȁ‹— ͳͻͺͻǢ‹ͳͻͻͶǢ—‘ʹͲͲͳǢŠƒ‘ʹͲͲͳǤ ʹʹ According to Sun Li (Shijie zongjiao wenhuaͳͻͻͷǡ’’ǤʹͲȂʹͶȌǡ‹ͳͻͻͲǡ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡ ‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲͲǡͲͲͲ”‘–‡•–ƒ–Š”‹•–‹ƒ•ƒ†ʹ͵ Š—” Š‡•‹Shanghai. Among the Š”‹•–‹ƒ•ǡʹ͹Ψ™‡”‡„‡–™‡‡ͳͺƒ†ͶͲ›‡ƒ”•‘ˆƒ‰‡ǡʹ͸Ψ„‡–™‡‡Ͷͳƒ†ͷͻǡ ƒ†Ͷ͹Ψ‘˜‡”͸ͲǤ –Š‡ ‘–‡š–‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹•–‘”›ƒˆ–‡”ͳͻͶͻǡ–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”–Š‡ƒƒŽ›œ‡• –Š‡‘–‹˜ƒ–‹‘•ƒ† ‘–‡–•‘ˆ–Š‡ˆƒ‹–Š‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‰‡‰”‘—’ͳͺ–‘ͶͲǡƒ†”‡ˆ‡”•–‘ the fact that recently there are many educated Christians (›‘—™‡Š—ƒ†‡Œ‹†—- ͳʹʹ Roman Malek moment, the Churches in the Chinese cities still come up against many limiting factors, and the contradiction between the spiritual needs of the believers and the lack of Church service is very noticeable. It can „‡•ƒ‹†ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Šƒ–•‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•–Š‡Š—” Šȋ‡†ȌChristendom in Š‹ƒŠƒ• Šƒ‰‡†•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›Ǥˆ–‡”–Š‡Cultural Revolution, Church life was allowed again and the Churches initiated various activities. They increased their contacts with foreign Churches and broadened the range of these contacts. The Chinese Churches have become active ‹–Š‡ϐ‹‡Ž†‘ˆ‡‡”‰‡ ›ƒ‹†ƒ†‘–Š‡”•‘ ‹ƒŽ•‡”˜‹ ‡•ǡƒ•–Š‡‡šƒ’Ž‡• of the Protestant Amity Foundation in Nanjing and the Catholic Beifang Jinde ेᯩ䘋ᗧ in Shijiazhuang show.ʹ͵ ‡–™‡‡ͳͻͺͲƒ†ͳͻͻͲǡ–Š‡—„‡”‘ˆ”‘–‡•–ƒ–•‡ƒ”Ž›†‘—„Ž‡†ǡ ˆ”‘ƒ„‘—––Š”‡‡–‘‘”‡–Šƒϐ‹˜‡‹ŽŽ‹‘ǤŠ‡‰‡‡”ƒŽ‹ƒ†‡“—ƒ ›‘ˆ Š‹‡•‡•–ƒ–‹•–‹ •ƒ†˜ƒ”›‹‰†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘•‘ˆProtestant “Christians” (registered, not registered, baptized, sympathizers, followers of Chris- –‹ƒ• ‰”‘—’•ǡ ‡– ǤȌǡ Š‘™‡˜‡”ǡ ‹’‡†‡ •–ƒ–‹•–‹ ƒŽ †ƒ–ƒǤ  —’—„Ž‹•Š‡† ”‡’‘”–‘ˆ–Š‡—”‡ƒ—ˆ‘”–ƒ–‹•–‹ •‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹ƒ ‘—–•͸͵‹ŽŽ‹‘ Protestants. A report in the ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•ƒ‹Ž› (‡‹”‹„ƒ‘Ӫ≁ᰕᣕȌ’—„- Ž‹•Š‡†‹ʹͲͲͳ‡•–‹ƒ–‡•–Šƒ––Š‡”‡ƒ”‡͸͹‹ŽŽ‹‘Dz‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽdz”‘–‡•–ƒ–• organized in “House Churches.”ʹͶ ȋ„Ȍ ‘ˆϔ‹ ‹ƒŽǡ Underground or ‘—•‡ Š—” Š‡•ǡ ‘– ‡ ‘‰‹œ‡† „› –Š‡ Chinese Government The somewhat vague terms “Underground” or “House Church” refer to Churches that, due to the political situation, perform their activities Žƒ†‡•–‹‡Ž›‘”Ȃˆ”‘–Š‡˜‹‡™’‘‹–‘ˆ–Š‡–ƒ–‡Ȃ‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽŽ›ǡ‘–‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ- ly. Three conditions, according to Anthony Lam, “must be present for an underground phenomenon to take effect. Firstly, the government must ˆ‘”„‹†‹–•‡š‹•–‡ ‡Ǣ•‡ ‘†Ž›ǡ‹–—•–„‡‘”‰ƒ‹•‡†ƒ†ƒ –‹˜‡™‹–Š‹ƒ

tuȌ‹–Š‹•‰”‘—’ǡ–Š‹•–‘ƒ‰”‡ƒ–‡š–‡– Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹œ‹‰–Š‡‹ƒ‰‡‘ˆChristianity in Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǤˆǤƒŽ•‘—ͳͻͻ͵Ǥ—™”‹–‡•ȋ’ǤͳͷȌǣDzŽ–Š‘—‰Š–Š‡—„‡”‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ• in ‡‹Œ‹‰‹•–‘‘•ƒŽŽ–‘”‡ϐŽ‡ ––Š‡™Š‘Ž‡•‹–—ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡Christian believers in mainland China, they are better educated and they represent the major tendencies in the development of Christianity on the mainland.” ʹ͵ For ‹–› ‘—†ƒ–‹‘ǡ•‡‡Š›–‡ͳͻͺͺǡ’’ǤͶʹͲȂͶʹʹǡ‹–›‡™•Ž‡––‡” (ƒŒ‹‰Ȍǡ and ‹–›‡™•‡”˜‹ ‡ ( ‘‰‘‰ȌǤFor Beifang Jinde, see “‡‹ˆƒ‰Œ‹†‡: Erste katholische sozial-karitative Einrichtung.” In: China heute  ȋʹͲͲͳȌǡ ’’Ǥ ͳͳˆǤ ʹͶ ‘”–Š‡“—‡•–‹‘‘ˆ•–ƒ–‹•–‹ •‘Š”‹•–‹ƒ•‹Š‹ƒǡ•‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡ —–‡”Ȁ Šƒ ͳͻͻ͵ǡ ‡•’Ǥ ’’Ǥ ͸͸Ȃ͹ͳ ȋDz‡’‘”–‹‰ •–ƒ–‹•–‹ •dzȌǢ Dz ‘™ ƒ› Š”‹•–‹ƒ• ƒ”‡ –Š‡”‡‹Š‹ƒǫdz ǣŠ‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͲȋͳͻͻͷȌʹǡ’’ǤͳͷȂͳͺǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳʹ͵

‰‹˜‡•‘ ‹‡–›Ǣƒ†–Š‹”†Ž›ǡ‹–••–”— –—”‡—•–”—’ƒ”ƒŽŽ‡Ž–‘–Š‡‘‡–Šƒ– has authorised government approval.”ʹͷ In China, this unique ecclesiasti- cal phenomenon is not new: it did not develop only after the Communist –ƒ‡‘˜‡”‹ͳͻͶͻǡ„—–ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›‹–Š‡ͳͺ–Š ‡–—”›Ǥˆ–‡”–Š‡‹’‡”‹ƒŽ„ƒ on Catholic missionaries, clandestine communities existed, as the exam- ple of the life and work of the Austrian Bishop of Nanjing, Gottfried F.X. ƒ‹„‡ Š‘˜‡Ǥ Ǥȋͳ͹Ͳ͹Ȃͳ͹ͺ͹Ȍǡ‹ŽŽ—•–”ƒ–‡•ǡʹ͸ and as the research of Rob- ‡”–Ǥ–‡ƒ˜‡”‹ϐ‹‡•Ǥʹ͹ Within Chinese ”‘–‡•–ƒ–‹•ǡ –Š‡”‡ ƒ”‡ †‹•–‹ –‹‘• „‡–™‡‡ ȋƒȌ –Š‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ Š—” Š ‘ˆ –Š‡ Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ŽˆǦ‘˜‡‡–ǡ ȋ„Ȍ ‡‡–‹‰ ’Žƒ ‡• „‡Ž‘‰‹‰–‘–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡Žˆǡȋ Ȍ–Š‡ŠƒŽˆǦ‹†‡’‡†‡–Š—” Š‡•‹–Š‡ ‘—–”›•‹†‡ǡƒ†ȋ†Ȍ–Š‡•‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡†House Churches:ʹͺ ȋƒȌŠ‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‘ˆ–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡Žˆƒ†‹–•‡‡–‹‰’Žƒ ‡•ƒ”‡Ž‡- gal, registered, and public religious meeting sites. They are distinct ‹–Šƒ––Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‘ˆ–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡ŽˆŠƒ•‹–•‘™ Š—” Š„—‹Ž- dings, especially in the cities, and – usually – full-time ministers. ȋ„Ȍ •ƒŽŽ‡” ‹–‹‡•ǡ•ƒŽŽƒ”‡––‘™•ǡ‘”‹–Š‡‘—–•‹”–•‘ˆ ‹–‹‡• –Š‡”‡ƒ”‡ƒŽ•‘Š”‡‡Ǧ‡Žˆ‡‡–‹‰’Žƒ ‡•ǤŠ‡•‡ƒ”‡ϐ‹š‡†ƒ†”‡- gistered meeting places, but, they are not required to be church buildings. They seldom have ministers who receive a regular form- ation.ʹͻ ȋ Ȍ‹–Š”‡‰ƒ”†–‘–Š‡ŠƒŽˆǦ‹†‡’‡†‡–Š—” Š‡•‹–Š‡ ‘—–”›•‹†‡ǡ most often these have been founded by lay people and are in remote rural areas. Some of them are not registered with the government and their relationship with the Three-Self-Movement is also quite ‘’Ž‹ ƒ–‡†Ǥ‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡Š—” Š‡•ƒ ‡’–ϐ‹ƒ ‹ƒŽŠ‡Ž’ˆ”‘–Š‡ Three-Self-Movement, even though they do not belong to the Three- Self. Others refuse any contact with the Three-Self. The most obvi- ous common characteristic of such groups is a “charismatic leader” at the top.

ʹͷ ‡‡ƒͳͻͻͻǤ‡‰ƒ”†‹‰–Š‡”‘„Ž‡ƒ–‹ of the Underground Church, see further Šƒ”„‘‹‡” ͳͻͻ͵ǡ ’’Ǥ ͷʹȂ͹ͲǢ Dz‡––‡”ƒ ’ƒ•–‘”ƒŽ‡ †‡ŽŽƒ ‘ˆ‡”‡œƒ ‡’‹• ‘’ƒŽ‡ ƒ––‘Ž‹ ƒȋ‘—ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‡Ȍƒ‹ˆ‡†‡Ž‹†‡ŽŽƒ‹ƒǡdz‹ǣAsia Newsͳͻͻͷǡ‘Ǥ͵ǡ’’ǤʹͺȂ͵ͳǤ ʹ͸ ‘”Š‹• Žƒ†‡•–‹‡‹–‹‡”ƒ–Ž‹ˆ‡ƒ†™‘”ǡ•‡‡”ƒŠŽͳͻ͸ͶǢƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͲǤ ʹ͹‡‡–‡ƒͳͻͻ͸ƒ†ͳͻͺ͹Ǥ ʹͺ For these divisions of the ”‘–‡•–ƒ– Š—” Š ‹ Š‹ƒǡ •‡‡ —–‡”ȀŠƒ ͳͻͻ͵ǡ passim. ʹͻ For ”‘–‡•–ƒ–‡‡–‹‰’Žƒ ‡•ǡ•‡‡‹‰ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ͳʹͶ Roman Malek

ȋ†Ȍ House Churches have developed due to many different reasons. ‘‡ƒ”‡–Š‡”‡•—Ž–‘ˆ˜‡”›•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽƒ††‡‘‹ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ traditions, others are the result of having dissociated themselves from the Three-Self for political or even simply practical reasons. The term “House Churches” includes all Christian communities in China other than those which are under direct jurisdiction of the Three-Self and Christian Council (the so-called Lianhui 㚄Պ, i.e., the ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ”‘–‡•–ƒ–Š—” ŠȌǤŠ‡›ˆ‘” ‘—‹–‹‡•–Š”‘—‰Š’‡”- sonal networks and are characterized, among other things, by lay preachers and the spiritual-emotional character of their services.͵Ͳ They are, as Zhong Min and Chan Kim-Kwong have observed, “vi- brant in faith, evangelistic in outreaching, fundamentalistic in doc- trine, pious in devotion, informal in liturgy, spontaneous in devel- ‘’‡–ƒ†ϐŽ‡š‹„Ž‡‹•–”— –—”‡Ǥdz͵ͳ The Chinese authorities, likewise, do not make a blanket judgment of the †‡”‰”‘—†‰”‘—’•ǡ„—–†‹•–‹‰—‹•Š„‡–™‡‡ϐ‹˜‡†‹ˆˆ‡”‡–Dz—- †‡”‰”‘—†ˆ‘” ‡•ǣdzȋͳȌ–Š‘•‡‰”‘—’•–Šƒ–•—’’‘”––Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–ƒ† the Patriotic Associations, but have not been recognized by the govern- ‡–ǢȋʹȌ–Š‘•‡–Šƒ–†‘‘–™ƒ––‘„‡Ž‘‰–‘ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘•ǡ whose activities, however, are not opposed to the country’s laws and ”‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘•‘”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•Ǣȋ͵Ȍ–Š‘•‡™Š‘†‹••‘ ‹ƒ–‡–Š‡•‡Ž˜‡•ˆ”‘–Š‡ Patriotic Associations, not out of political reasons, but due to religious ƒ†Dz•‡ –ƒ”‹ƒdz–Š‹‹‰ƒ††‹ˆˆ‡”‡ ‡•ǢȋͶȌ–Š‘•‡™Š‘†‘‘–™ƒ––‘ join the Patriotic Associations, because they have suffered under the “extreme Leftists” in the past and their wounds have not yet healed, or „‡ ƒ—•‡–Š‡‹”’‡”•‡ —–‘”••–‹ŽŽŠ‘Ž†‘ˆϐ‹ ‡•™‹–Š‹–Š‡ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ••‘ ‹- ƒ–‹‘•ǢȋͷȌƒ•ƒŽŽ‹‘”‹–›‘ˆ–”—Ž›DzŠ‘•–‹Ž‡‡Ž‡‡–•dz–Šƒ–—•‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ –‘ ƒ””›‘—–Dz‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽƒ† ”‹‹ƒŽdzƒ –‹˜‹–‹‡•ǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•–ˆ‘—”‰”‘—’•Ȃƒ - cording to Party documents – are different from the last with regard to their situation and nature. Although they should be understood as groups of believers who are not subject to the leadership of the Patriot- ic Associations and are not registered within religious venues approved by the State, they cannot be treated as hostile or opposition groups.͵ʹ

͵Ͳ For a characterization of the Protestant groups, see —–‡”ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵ǡ‡•’Ǥ’’Ǥ ͺͳȂͺͺǤ ͵ͳŠ‘‰ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵ǡ’ǤʹͷͳǤ ͵ʹ See “Bewertung und Analyse der gegenwärtigen religiösen Situation Chinas,” in: China heute  ȋͳͻͻ͵Ȍǡ’’ǤͳʹȂͳͻȋ–”ƒ•ŽǤˆ”‘Dangdai œ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘›ƒŒ‹— ⮦ԓᇇᮉ⹄ ウͳͻͻͳȀͳȌǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳʹͷ

The Catholic Underground Church can be considered as a case in point for the “underground force” that quite representatively illustrates unof- ϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‘ˆChristendom in China today. The division within the ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Š‹Š‹ƒ„‡‰ƒ‹ͳͻͷ͹ǡ™Š‡–Š‡Patriotic Associa- tion of the Chinese Catholic Church came into being, which in the same ›‡ƒ”„”‘—‰Š–ƒ„‘—––Š‡ϐ‹”•–‡’‹• ‘’ƒŽ ‘•‡ ”ƒ–‹‘•™‹–Š‘—––Š‡ ƒ’- proval of the Holy See. A small group of bishops, priests, and lay people emerged who joined the ƒ–”‹‘–‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘Ǣƒ––Š‡•ƒ‡–‹‡ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ an opposition to the Association and the new Communist state arose.͵͵ Following the —Ž–—”ƒŽ‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘ȋͳͻ͸͸Ȃͳͻ͹͸Ȍƒ†–Š‡•‘Ǧ ƒŽŽ‡†‘’‡‹‰ of China, the gap between the two groups within the Catholic Church not only became more clearly visible, but deepened more and more. Decisive for this development was, among others, the document of the Propaganda Fideˆ”‘ͳͻ͹ͺȋ ƒ —Ž–ƒ–‡•‡–’”‹˜‹Ž‡‰‹ƒ•ƒ ‡”†‘–‹„—•ϔ‹†‡Ž‹„—•“—‡‹–‡””‹- –‘”‹‘‹ƒ”—†‡‰‡–‹„—• ‘ ‡••ƒŠ‹•’‡”†—”ƒ–‹„—• ‹” —•–ƒ–‹‹•Ȍǡƒ•‹– ƒŽŽ‘™‡†–Š‡•ƒŽŽ—„‡”‘ˆŽ‡‰‹–‹ƒ–‡ȋDzŽ‘›ƒŽ–‘‘‡dzȌ„‹•Š‘’•™Š‘ had not joined the Patriotic Association to perform ordinations of bish- ‘’•ƒ†’”‹‡•–•™‹–Š‘—–’”‹‘”ˆ‘”ƒŽƒ’’”‘˜ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘Ž›‡‡Ǣ‹–ƒŽŽ‘™‡† the priests who did not belong to the Patriotic Association to administer the sacraments in all of China.͵Ͷ These privileges contributed to the fact that the group “loyal to Rome” became more active than before the Cul- tural Revolution. It remained, however, unrecognized by the government. ––Š‡•ƒ‡–‹‡ǡ–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š™ƒ•‡™Ž›ˆ‘”‡†™‹–Š–Š‡Š‡Ž’‘ˆ –Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–ǤŠ‹•ƒ†‡–Š‡ ‘–”ƒ•–•–‹ŽŽ‘”‡‘„˜‹‘—•ƒ† ‘ϐŽ‹ –• ‹‡˜‹–ƒ„Ž‡Ǥ —”–Š‡”‘”‡ǡ‹ͳͻͺͻƒ‹†‡’‡†‡–—†‡”‰”‘—†‹•Š‘’•ǯ Conference was founded. The activities of the Underground Church in China are not completely clandestine. As its bishops, priests and nuns do not have governmental permission to work, they cannot exercise their ministry publicly. The characteristic of the Underground Church, therefore, is its illegality with regard to the State and not an “existence in catacombs.” The bishops and priests, as well as their activities, are regarded as illegal according –‘–Š‡–ƒ–‡ǯ•Žƒ™Ǣƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š‡Š—” Š ƒ‘Žƒ™ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Š‡› are legitimate, as they keep the full communion with the Pope. In the beginning of the division, the loyalty to the Pope (the so-called loyalty

͵͵ For the history of the ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Šƒˆ–‡”–Š‡Dz‹„‡”ƒ–‹‘dz‘ˆͳͻͶͻǡ•‡‡ǤƒŽ‡ǡ Dz‡”‡—ƒ—ϐ„ƒ—†‡”ƒ–Š‘Ž‹• Š‡‹” Š‡‹†‡”‘Ž•”‡’—„Ž‹Š‹ƒǡdz‹ƒŽ‡Ȁ Žƒ–‡ͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’Ǥʹ͹Ȃ͸ͺǢ‘‰ͳͻͻ͵Ǥ ͵Ͷ For the text of the Facultatesǡ•‡‡Šƒͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’ǤͶ͵ͺȂͶͶʹǤ ͳʹ͸ Roman Malek

–‘‘‡Ȍ™ƒ•–Š‡ƒ‹ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ ‘ˆ–Š‡Underground Church. ‘†ƒ›ǡ Š‘™‡˜‡”ǡ ƒˆ–‡” –Š‡ ƒŒ‘”‹–› ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ „‹•Š‘’• Šƒ˜‡„‡‡ recognized by the Pope and the name of the Pope may be mentioned publicly, not only in prayers, “loyalty to Rome” is no longer a criterion of differentiation. Since, however, a formal connection with the Pope and the Holy See, which does not recognize the PR China, is not possible and any activity in this direction is interpreted as being hostile to the State, the Underground Church remains clandestine. The existence of the Underground Church is today, therefore, rather due to restrictive religious policies and the non-recognition of the PR China (and the recognition of the Republic of China in ƒ‹™ƒȌ„›–Š‡Vatican.͵ͷ Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ†—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‡•Šƒ˜‡’ƒ”ƒŽŽ‡Ž•–”— –—”‡•ǡ‡ƒ- ing that the ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ †‹‘ ‡•ƒ„‹•Š‘’ǯ••‡‡•–Šƒ–™‡”‡•‡–—’‹ͳͻͶ͸ are often occupied twice.͵͸ Both parts of the Catholic Church have their own Bishops’ Conference. Neither is, however, recognized by the Holy See. Both groups exist without direct connection to the Pope. The Cath- olic Underground Church in China, claims to be the only true Catholic Church in China. Due to these and other reasons, the gap as well as the irreconcilability between the two groups within the Catholic Church in China is growing. Thus, the reconciliation of the two groups remains of urgent concern to the Chinese Church as well as to the Universal Church.͵͹  ‘”†‹‰ –‘ ‰‘˜‡”‡– •–ƒ–‹•–‹ •ǡ –Š‡”‡ ƒ”‡ ‘”‡ –Šƒ ϐ‹˜‡ ‹Ž- Ž‹‘ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ •ǡ‘˜‡”ͷǡͲͲͲ Š—” Š„—‹Ž†‹‰•ǡ‘”‡–ŠƒʹǡͲͲͲ Šƒ’‡Ž•ǡ ͹Ͳ„‹•Š‘’•ǡƒ†‡ƒ”Ž›ʹǡͲͲͲ’”‹‡•–•‹–Š‡Š‹ƒǤ‹ ‡–Š‡‘’‡‹‰ of China, especially, after the so-called ‘ —‡–ͷͿ‘ˆͳͻͺʹǡ–™‡–› –Š‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽ•‡‹ƒ”‹‡•ȋ™‹–Š‘”‡–ŠƒͳǡͲͲͲ•‡‹ƒ”‹ƒ•Ȍƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ• numerous convents have been opened. Non-governmental estimates, Š‘™‡˜‡”ǡƒ‹–ƒ‹–Šƒ––Š‡”‡ƒ”‡ƒ’’”‘š‹ƒ–‡Ž›ͳͲ–‘ͳͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘ƒ–Š- olics in China, with the Underground Church becoming stronger. The Catholic †‡”‰”‘—† ‹ Š‹ƒ Šƒ• ƒ’’”‘š‹ƒ–‡Ž› ͸Ͳ Dz Žƒ†‡•–‹‡dz

͵ͷ ‘” ‘–Š‡” ƒ—•‡• ‘ˆ Žƒ†‡•–‹‹–›ǡ •‡‡ Šƒ”„‘‹‡” ͳͻͻ͵ǡ ‡•’Ǥ’’ǤͷͷȂͷ͹ȋDz‘ —†‡”•–ƒ†–Š‡ ƒ—•‡•‘ˆ Žƒ†‡•–‹‹–›ǡ™‡—•–”‡ˆ‡”–‘‹–•Š‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ‰‡‡•‹•dzȌǤ ͵͸ With regard to the Catholic hierarchical structure of the Church in China today, see ƒʹͲͲͲǡ‡•’Ǥ’’ǤͳͻˆǤƒ†ʹͳˆǤƒ•’‡ƒ•‹–Š‹• ‘–‡š–ƒ„‘—––Š‡Dz†—’Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ of authority.” ͵͹ ‘”–Š‡•‡“—‡•–‹‘•ǡ•‡‡ƒ‰ͳͻͻ͵Ǣ ‡›†”‹ šͳͻͻ͵Ǣ‘ǤͳͻͻʹǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳʹ͹

„‹•Š‘’•ǡ‘”‡–ŠƒͳǡͲͲͲ’”‹‡•–•ǡ‘˜‡”ͳǡͲͲͲ—•ǡƒ†‘•–’”‘„ƒ„Ž›ͷ –‘͹‹ŽŽ‹‘„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•Ǥ͵ͺ ȌChristian Groups and Sects ƒ††‹–‹‘–‘–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ†—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‘ˆChristendom in China in the last decades, innumerable Christian groups and sects have been revived or have newly arisen.͵ͻ They constitute the third institutional manifestation of Christendom in China. Within this con- stantly growing “new Christian religiosity,” which, as yet, has remained both little explored and noticed (except by the controlling authorities of –Š‡Š‹ƒȌǡ™‡ ƒ†‹•–‹‰—‹•Š†‹˜‡”•‡ ‘–‡–•ƒ†ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•Ǥ More detailed material exists about sixteen of such groups or “sects.”ͶͲ They bear curious names, and include: for example, the “Shouters” or “Yellers” (Huhanpai બ஺⍮Ȍǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻ͸͹ǡ™‹–Š ƒǤʹͲͲǡͲͲͲ‡- bers in the Provinces of He’nan, Fujian, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hebei, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, ‡‹Ž‘‰Œ‹ƒ‰ǢDzThe Established King” (Beiliwang 㻛・ ⦻Ȍǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ ƒǤͳͻͺ͹‹Š—‹ǡ™‹–Š‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲͲǡͲͲͲ‡„‡”• in Anhui, Hunan, —ƒ‰†‘‰ǢͶͳ “The Teaching of the Supreme Deity” (Zhushenjiao ѫ⾎ᮉȌǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻͻ͵‹Š—‹ǡ™‹–Š‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲǡͲͲͲ ‡„‡”• ‹ ʹʹ ”‘˜‹ ‡•Ǣ DzThe Eastern Lightning” (Dongfang Shan- dianjiao ьᯩ䰚⭥ᮉȌǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻͻͲ‹Zhengzhou ( ‡ǯƒȌǡ™‹–Šƒ unknown number of members in He’nan, Shandong, Shanxi, Heilong- Œ‹ƒ‰ǢDzThe Way of Resurrection” (Fuhuodao ༽⍫䚃Ȍǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻͻͲ in ‡ǯƒǡ™‹–Š–‘†ƒ›‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲǡͲͲͲ‡„‡”•‹‘”‡–ŠƒʹͲ ‘—–‹‡•ƒ†–‘™•Ȁ ‹–‹‡•‹–Š‡”‘˜‹ ‡•‘ˆHe’nan and Š—‹ǢDzThe Teaching of Reincarnation” (Chongshengpai 䟽⭏⍮Ȍǡˆ‘—†‡†‹ͳͻ͸ͺ in He’nan, with, it is said, three million followers in He’nan, Shaanxi, Šƒš‹ǡ —„‡‹ǡƒ†‘–Š‡”’”‘˜‹ ‡•ǢDzŠ‡‘—‹–›‘ˆDisciples” or “Disciples Sect” (Mentuhui 䰘ᗂՊȌǡˆ‘—†‡†ƒ”‘—†ͳͻͺͻ‹Shaanxi, ™‹–Š‘”‡–ŠƒͷͲͲǡͲͲͲ‡„‡”•ǤͶʹ

͵ͺ There is no exact statistical data on the Catholic Church in China, but see, for instance, “ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ •–ƒ–‹•–‹ •ͳͻͻ͸ǡdz‹ǣŠ‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳʹȋͳͻͻ͹Ȍͳǡ’Ǥ͵͵ǡDz ‘™ ƒ›ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ •ƒ”‡–Š‡”‡‹Š‹ƒǫdz‹ǣ‹„‹†Ǥǡ‘Ǥ͵ǡ’’ǤͶͺˆǤ‡‡ƒŽ•‘–Š‡•–ƒ–‹•–‹ •‹ China heuteȋʹͲͲͳȌǡ’’ǤͳͺˆǤǢ‹„‹†Ǥǡ ȋʹͲͲʹȌǡ’’ǤʹͳˆǤ ͵ͻ ‘”–Š‡•‡ƒ†‘–Š‡”†‡–ƒ‹Ž•ǡ•‡‡ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷ„. ͶͲ ‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡ—’ˆ‡”ʹͲͲͳǡpassimǢ—ͳͻͻͻǤ Ͷͳ ‡‡—‘ͳͻͻͺǤ Ͷʹ‡‡—ͳͻͻͺǤ ͳʹͺ Roman Malek

In present-day China, these groups enjoy a growing number of fol- lowers. They are characterized by charismatic leaders,Ͷ͵ complex and ϐŽ‡š‹„Ž‡‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•–‡ƒ Š‹‰•–Šƒ–†‡ƒŽ™‹–Š•ƒŽ˜ƒ–‹‘ƒ† redemption. They take up the indigenous forms of Protestantism that ƒ”‘•‡‹–Š‡ͳͻʹͲ•ƒ†ͳͻ͵Ͳ•—†‡”–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆƒ‡•–‡” Šƒ”- ismatic renewal and Pentecostal movements. Such a consciously con- structed connection with former Christian groups serves as a legiti- mization to attract new members. In a certain sense, they also stand in the tradition of the Chinese folk religious sects and represent not only a major challenge for the Chinese State, but also for institutionalized Š—” Šȋ‡†ȌChristendom.ͶͶ Most groups are based solely in the countryside. Data about mem- bership and geographical distribution are only “guesstimates.” Mem- „‡”•Š‹’ϐ‹‰—”‡•˜ƒ”›ˆ”‘ƒ–Š‘—•ƒ†–‘•‡˜‡”ƒŽŠ—†”‡†–Š‘—•ƒ†ǡ‘” even “several ten thousands.” Ye Xiaowen ਦሿ᮷, former Director of the National Bureau of Religious Affairs, quotes the Ministry for Pub- Ž‹ ‡ —”‹–›ǡ™Š‹ Š‡–‹‘•ͳͷ‰”‘—’•™‹–Šƒ„‘—–ͷͲͲǡͲͲͲˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•ǤͶͷ According to estimates from Hong Kong (Associated Pressǡ ͻ ‡ ‡- „‡”ͳͻͻͻȌǡ–‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡Christian groups have altogether three million members. The geographical extension of these groups seems enormous. Usu- ally, they are spread out over several provinces. The “Teaching of the Supreme Deity” and the “Community of Disciples” have the largest –”ƒ•Ǧ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ•’Š‡”‡‘ˆƒ –‹˜‹–›‹Š‹ƒǤŠ‡ϐ‹”•–™ƒ•‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ –‘™•‘” ‹–‹‡•ƒ†‹ ‘—–‹‡•‘ˆʹʹ”‘˜‹ ‡•ƒ†Šƒ•ˆ‘”—Žƒ–‡†ƒ clear strategy for development that is reminiscent of the guerilla tactics of the Communist Party during its formative period: from the villages to the cities, from the peasants to the Party cadres, intellectuals, and other high strata of society. Its members are supposed to get acquaint- ed with management law, cadres, and similar political affairs.

Ͷ͵  ‘”†‹‰–‘—’ˆ‡”ȋʹͲͲͳȌǡ„‹‘‰”ƒ’Š‹ ƒŽ†ƒ–ƒ‘–Š‡ˆ‘—†‡”•‘”Ž‡ƒ†‡”•‘ˆ‰”‘—’• inspired by Christianity is rare. The data presented in most cases emphasizes a poor or peasant background and minimal or hardly-existent education. The writ- ings of the communities present the life of their leaders in a very mystical and glo- ”‹ϐ‹‡†Ž‹‰Š–Ǥ –‹•”‡ƒ”ƒ„Ž‡–Šƒ–‘•–‘ˆ–Š‡ˆ‘—†‡”•Šƒ˜‡ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›Ž‹˜‡†‹ƒChris- –‹ƒ ‘–‡š–Ǥ ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›ˆƒ‹Ž›‡„‡”•‘”ˆ”‹‡†•ǡ–Š‡›ƒŽ•‘„‡ ƒ‡‡„‡”• of Protestant, mostly unregistered, House Churches. ͶͶ For Š”‹•–‹ƒ ƒ† ‘–Š‡” Dz•‡ –•ǡdz •‡‡ ƒ””‡ŽŽȀ‡””› ͳͻͺʹǢ ‡‰ ͳͻͻ͸Ǣ ƒ„‡”– ͳͻͻͺǢ‹ƒ‰ͳͻͻͻǤ Ͷͷ ‡‡‡ͳͻͻͻǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳʹͻ

Š‡‡„‡”•Š‹’•–”— –—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡‰”‘—’•”‡ϐŽ‡ –•–Š‡™Š‘Ž‡”ƒ‰‡ of a clan or a village: children, juveniles, adults, and the elderly. The percentage of young women with a middle-school degree is relatively high. Students and young people also form a large group.Ͷ͸ Party cadres being members of these groups inspired by Christianity, in contrast to the Falungong ⌅䖞࣏, does not seem to be a problem of regional or na- tional scope.Ͷ͹ Protestant communities, especially the “House Churches,” often serve as recruiting centers for new members of these groups. The main reason for much of the attraction is, above all, a lack of knowledge about the Christian doctrine. Apart from spiritual promises, some groups also offer material incentives to potential members. The members, however, are required to offer material property to the leader as a “gift” or “sac- ”‹ϐ‹ ‡dzǡ–Š—•‹˜‡•–‹‰‹–‘‘‡ǯ•‘™•ƒŽ˜ƒ–‹‘ƒ†‡–‡”ƒŽŽ‹ˆ‡Ǥ The Christian groups are characterized by a hierarchical, na- –‹‘Ǧ™‹†‡‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ƒŽ•–”— –—”‡ǡ™‹–Šϐ‹š‡† ‘’‡–‡ ‡•ǡ”‹‰Š–•ǡ and duties. The leader of a community possesses absolute authority. Besides a complex organizational structure, norms for behavior, dis- ciplinary measures and sanctions are important elements of these groups. In order to strengthen the internal organization, the “Commu- nity of Disciples,” e.g., has a very exclusive marriage policy: Members of the group may only practice intermarriage. With the help of a ban on newspapers and other reading materials as well as a ban on television, the connection to the outside world is supposed to be cut, and the loy- alty towards the group assured. To what extent these groups exercise

Ͷ͸ In —ƒ’”‘˜‹ ‡ǡƒ„‘—–ͻͷΨ‘ˆ–Š‡‡„‡”•‘ˆ–Š‡DzTeaching of the Supreme ‡‹–›dzƒ”‡›‘—‰’‡‘’Ž‡Ǣ‘”‡–Šƒ͸ͲΨ‘ˆ–Š‡Šƒ˜‡Šƒ†ƒ–Ž‡ƒ•–ƒ‹††Ž‡• Š‘‘Ž education. There are hardly any statistics on the socio-economical background of the members. Furthermore, we cannot assume that the descriptions we have access to have selected representative cases. Daniel L. Overmyer’s statement on Buddhist folk religion in traditional China is also valid for today’s situation: “The fact that the membership of many groups consisted primarily of peasants †‘‡•ǯ–”‡ƒŽŽ›’”‘˜‡ƒ›–Š‹‰ǡ„‡ ƒ—•‡ˆ”‘͹Ͳ–‘ͺͲ’‡” ‡–‘ˆ–Š‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‹–- self were peasants” (Overmyer ͳͻ͹͸ǡ’ǤͳͺȌǤ Ͷ͹ According to an investigation about the membership structure of the “Community of Disciples” in one county in ‹ Š—ƒ”‘˜‹ ‡ǡƒ„‘—–ͷΨ‘ˆ‹–•‡„‡”•™‡”‡ ƒ”–›‡„‡”•Ǥ —”–Š‡”‘”‡ǡ‹•‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡˜‹ŽŽƒ‰‡•ǡˆ‘”‡”ƒ”–›‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•Œ‘‹‡† the “Community.” In one county in Šƒƒš‹ ”‘˜‹ ‡ǡ ‹ ͳͻͻͷ ƒ„‘—– ͳͲͲ ƒ”–› ‡„‡”•ƒ†ͺͲ”‡’”‡•‡–ƒ–‹˜‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡•ǯ‘‰”‡••‘ˆ–Šƒ–’”‘˜‹ ‡™‡”‡ members of the local “Community of Disciples.” ͳ͵Ͳ Roman Malek

’•› Š‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽ’”‡••—”‡ȋDz„”ƒ‹™ƒ•Š‹‰dzȌ‘–Š‡‡„‡”•ǡ ƒ‘Ž›„‡ circumstantially evidenced. A central characteristic of the Christian groups is the phenomenon of spiritual healing: Illness is regarded as an expression of somebody’s being possessed by an evil spirit or demon, or as a result of sinful behav- ior. Regular medical treatment and, especially, Western medicine are rejected.Ͷͺ Prophesies regarding the “Last Judgement” in connection with redemption form another aspect of the teachings. The teachings of the known groups always include salvation and apocalyptic ideas. Besides a widely branched organizational network, many groups practice a community life in their headquarters. Many activities take place during the night. One main activity during the assemblies is “glos- solalia,” described by the groups themselves mostly as “communication with God” or “the revelation of God.” The spreading of the teaching, i.e., the recruitment of new follow- ers, is one of the main activities of all communities. Most of the groups make use of various publications – brochures, books, and other media – in order to spread their teaching, e.g., at train stations, in trains, or in villages, etc. There is not much known about the number of copies of the distributed materials. Some groups organize special classes, in which members are prepared for missionary work. They often use business activities in order to be able to do their missionary work in a concealed way: hairdressing salons, car repair shops, restaurants, and wushu- schools are regarded as discreet and unsuspicious meeting points. To what extent the groups are really motivated by the aim of reaching po- litical power is not clear. All the groups mentioned here refer to the Bible and to Christian ideas, which have developed in China under the inclusion of folk reli- gious traditions. There is always a latent syncretism present. The exis- tence of the groups is well known, but their organizational structures ƒ†–‡ƒ Š‹‰•ƒ”‡‘Ž›’ƒ”–Ž›‘™ǤŠ‡”‡ˆ‘”‡ǡƒ–›’‘Ž‘‰›‘” Žƒ••‹ϐ‹- ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡•‡‰”‘—’•‹•†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–ǤŠ‡ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‹•–‹ •Dz•—„˜‡”•‹˜‡dzƒ† “Š‡–‡”‘†‘šdzƒ”‡’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘•ƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š‡–ƒ–‡ǯ• ”‡Ž‹- gious policy and not analytical categories, and therefore not helpful.Ͷͻ The challenge of the above-mentioned Christian groups for the Chi- nese Government and also for the Churches is very strong. Moreover,

Ͷͺ ‘”–Š‹•’Š‡‘‡‘ƒ‘‰Š‹‡•‡Š”‹•–‹ƒ•ǡ•‡‡¡Š”‹• ŠǦ„Žƒ—ͳͻͻͻǤ Ͷͻ‡‰ƒ”†‹‰–Š‡ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‡™”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘˜‡‡–•ǡ•‡‡ƒ”‡”ͳͻͺ͹Ǥ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳ͵ͳ the emergence and growth of interest in religion in the last decades ȋ•‹ ‡ ƒǤͳͻͺͲȌ‹†‹ ƒ–‡•ƒ‰”‘™‹‰†‡•‹”‡ˆ‘”•’‹”‹–—ƒŽǦ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—••—’- ’‘”–Ǥ Š‹• ‡‡† ‹• ƒŽ•‘ ˜‹•‹„Ž‡ ™‹–Š –Š‡ ‘ǦŠ—” Šȋ‡†Ȍ ‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ manifestations of Christendom in China.

The Non-Church(ed), Non-Institutional Manifestations of Chris- tendom in China: “Elite Christianity”

ȋƒȌDz—Ž–—”ƒŽŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›dz The phenomenon of the “cultural Christians” (wenhua jidutu ᮷ॆสⶓ ᗂȌ ‘” Dzcultural Christianity” (jidu zongjiao wenhua สⶓᇇᮉ᮷ॆȌ ‹• ”‡‰ƒ”†‡†ƒ•–Š‡‘•–†‹•–‹ –‹˜‡ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡‘ǦŠ—” Šȋ‡†Ȍǡ non-institutional Christendom.ͷͲ ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ –•ͳͺǡʹͶȂʹͺǡ–Š‡Dzcultur- al Christians” are also described as “Apollos” or “Nicodems” of China. The “cultural Christians” are intellectuals who, mainly through the •–—†›‘ˆ‡•–‡” —Ž–—”‡ƒ†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ǡŠƒ˜‡†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡†ƒ ‡”–ƒ‹ƒˆϐ‹- ity for the Christian faith or theology. However, they opt to stay outside of the Churches, which, according to their opinion do not possess a gen- uinely theological power, as they either follow the State too closely or – as with the Underground – seem to be too “sectarian”. Therefore, they ƒ”‡ȋƒ†”‡ƒ‹Ȍ‘Ǧ„ƒ’–‹œ‡†ƒ†Dz‘ǦŠ—” Š‡†ǤdzŠ‡›ƒ”‡Dzcultural Š”‹•–‹ƒ•ǡdzƒ†–Š‡‹”‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘–Š‡‹–‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ Ž‹ƒ–‡‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹- nese society seems to be more distinct than that of the Churches. It is a phenomenon that moves the relationship between Chinese culture and Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ȋƒ†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹‰‡‡”ƒŽȌ‹–‘ƒ–‘–ƒŽŽ›‡™’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡Ǥ For these “cultural Christians” Christianity is – if it is permitted to •ƒ›•‘ȂƒDz‹†‡‘ȋ–Š‡‘ȌŽ‘‰›dz–Šƒ–†‘‡•‘–‡ ‡••ƒ”‹Ž›Ž‡ƒ†–‘baptism and a life according to the faith. Only with reservations, the writings of these Christians may be described as theological (in the sense of the Š—” ŠȌǤ’”‘‹‡–ƒ ƒ†‡‹ ǡLiu Xiaofeng ࡈሿᷛ, who also belongs to the “cultural Christians,” says that they only accept and defend Chris- tianity as a cultural conception, as a weltanschauung. Insofar, they are not “true Christians,” because somebody “who accepts the Christian

ͷͲ This term goes back to the Anglican Bishop K.H. Ting (Ding Guangxun бݹ䇝Ȍ who, when answering the question whether persons like the painter Ding Fang, the writer Sun Xiaoling, or the philosopher He Guanghu are Christians, described them as “cultural Christians” and said that this was a cultural “expression of being a Christian.” ͳ͵ʹ Roman Malek creed only as a cultural conception indeed cannot be called a Christian. ȏǥȐŽ›ƒ•ƒŽŽ’‡” ‡–ƒ‰‡‘ˆ–Š‡‹–‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ•‹–‡”‡•–‡†‹Christian- ity have also made a decision to profess this existential experience.”ͷͳ Liu Xiaofeng continues that in China perhaps we cannot help but distin- guish between Christians outside of the denominations and the mem- bers of the Christian Churches. Here, he refers to the interpretational models of Ernst Troeltsch, Jürgen Moltmann, and the controversies that Dietrich Bonhoeffer triggered off with his idea of “religionsloses Chris- tentum.”ͷʹ This interest in Christendom outside of the Churches, especially, among intellectuals, is, without any doubt, a theological challenge for the Chinese Churches. This new understanding of Christendom, opines the historian of religion, Zhuo Xinping, gains its force not so much from inside the Chinese Church with all its traditional attachments, but above all from a totally new generation, namely, that of the experts in religious science, philosophers, theologians, writers, poets, artists, and other scholars who are very much interested in Christian culture and try to use it in order to reshape and preserve the traditional Chinese culture. They regard the Š”‹•–‹ƒ —Ž–—”‡ƒ•‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–†‡- ˜‡Ž‘’‡–ƒŽ–‡†‡ ‹‡•‹™‘”Ž†Š‹•–‘”›Ǣ–Š‡› ‘•‹†‡”‹–ƒ•–”‘‰‹- pulse for their own thinking, with its two extremes, the Confucian and the Daoist or Buddhist ‡„‡•ƒ• Šƒ——‰. They see the cultural value of Christendom not only in the Occident, but also for China. This, con- cludes Zhuo Xinping, is meant by the so-called cultural understanding of religion in general and Christendom in particular.ͷ͵ The “cultural Christians” see their main task in enriching the Chris- tian coloring of Chinese culture and fostering the spread of the Chris- tian spirit of culture, the humanities, and education. In the PR China, there are a large number of books, journals, articles, and conferences

ͷͳ ‹—ͳͻͻ͵ǡ’Ǥ͵Ǥ ͷʹ ‹—ͳͻͻ͵ǡ’Ǥ͵ˆǤSimilar objectives are also known from Christian Europe, e.g., with the “Protestantenverein” and the “Cultural Protestantism” (KulturprotestantismusȌǤ The “Protestantenverein” was aiming at the reconciliation of religion and culture, and postulated Protestantism as the moral foundation of culture and state. Thus Christianity did not realize itself within the Churches, but in the transformation into a Christian world. The idea was to form the Protestant culture, to establish Protestantism as cultural factor or as a cultural force. In this context, however, later on, an accelerated decline of denominational Christianity into a cultural Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›™ƒ•†‹ƒ‰‘•‡†Ǥ‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡ ”ƒˆͳͻͻʹǤ ͷ͵ˆǤŠ—‘ͳͻͻͺǡ’Ǥͳͻ͹ˆǤǢ—ʹͲͲͲǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳ͵͵ on philosophy, theology, and the history of ChristianityͷͶ that verify the hypothesis that this “cultural Christianity” has in the meantime become a cultural “force” within Chinese society, especially through its close connection with academic research on Christendom in the PR Š‹ƒǡ™Š‹ Šǡ‹›‘’‹‹‘ǡ‹•–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–Š‹’‘”–ƒ–ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹- nese Christendom. ȋ„ȌŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ƒ•ƒ„Œ‡ –‘ˆ ƒ†‡‹ ‡•‡ƒ” Š Research on Christendom in China during the last two decades has ex- ’‡”‹‡ ‡†•‘‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ– Šƒ‰‡•ǡ‘ˆ–‡†‡• ”‹„‡†ƒ•ƒ Šƒ‰‡‘ˆ’ƒ”- adigms.ͷͷ A very special aspect of this change of paradigms is the aca- demic and non-Church research on Christendom by Chinese scholars in the PR China, as well as the presence of Christianity as an academic dis- cipline at universities, academies of science as well as their institutes. Since I have described this academic manifestation of Christendom in detail elsewhere, I will limit myself here to some remarks only.ͷ͸ First of all, we have to emphasize the fact (or, as some put it: the ’Š‡‘‡‘Ȍ –Šƒ– —‡”‘—• ‹–‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ• ‹ –Š‡  Š‹ƒ Ȃ ’Š‹Ž‘•‘- phers, historians, scholars of literary and religious studies and other disciplines – study Christian thinking and expect from it a stimulation of Chinese spiritual life and a moral-spiritual counterbalance to the ma- terialism that is spreading everywhere in China. They are interested in a modern, “enlightened” Christendom. They do research on the his- tory of Š”‹•–‡†‘‹Š‹ƒƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•‹–Š‡‡•–Ǣ–Š‡›†‡˜‘–‡–Š‡- selves “theoretically” to the many aspects of Christian thought. Similar to the time of the May Fourth Movement – as has been explained by Liu Xiaofengͷ͹ – in China today we have once again a “competition of ideas.” Socialism and Communism in China, however, have fundamen- tally changed the relationship between the Chinese and Christian cul- –—”‡•ǣŠ‡ˆ‘”‡”–‡•‹‘•„‡–™‡‡–Š‡ˆ‘”‡‹‰ȋ‡•–‡”ȌChristianity and the indigenous tradition of the orthodox Confucianism have turned into tensions between Christianity and the new orthodoxy, namely, ƒ”š‹•Ǧ‘—‹•ȋƒŽ•‘•–‡‹‰ˆ”‘–Š‡‡•–Ȍǡ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ‹–‘ƒDz‹- ternal” or “domestic” tension between cultural ideas from the West on Chinese soil.

ͷͶ‡‡ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷ Ǥ ͷͷ ‹ ‘Žƒ•–ƒ†ƒ‡”–‰‹˜‡•ƒ†‡–ƒ‹Ž‡†•—”˜‡›‘ˆ–Š‹•–‘’‹ Ǥ‡‡–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ͷ͸‡‡ǡƒ‘‰‘–Š‡”•ǡƒŽ‡ʹͲͲʹǤ ͷ͹‹—ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ͳ͵Ͷ Roman Malek

Here it is, of course, not possible to present the whole spectrum of the current research on Christianity in the PR China in detail. I once again refer to other publications,ͷͺ and limit myself to some interpreta- tions proposed by Liu Xiaofeng. The academic research on Christendom, according to Liu Xiaofeng, is a “cultural-theoretical type of Christian thought” that does not consid- er and transmit the denominational dogmatics, but simply a “Christian science” (“Christentumswissenschaft dzȌǤ –Š‹•™ƒ›ǡ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ„›–Š‡‹ ‘”’‘- ration of this “Christentumswissenschaft” into the universities and insti- tutes, Christendom becomes a “structural element” of Chinese culture. This means that today’s cultural system of the PR China enables the blending of Š”‹•–‹ƒƒ†Š‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š–ȋ‹Ǥ‡ǡƒ•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ Dz‹- culturation” of Š”‹•–‡†‘ȌǤ ”‘–Š‡˜‹‡™’‘‹–‘ˆ —Ž–—”ƒŽƒ–Š”‘- pology this also means that the academic research on Christendom will eventually become Chinese Christian thought. Liu Xiaofeng is further- more convinced that alone due to the modernization of China, Chris- tendom as a “cultural good” has already penetrated Chinese culture. The relation between Chinese culture and Christendom as a “foreign religion,” therefore, is no longer a dialogue between cultures, but an existential dialogue: “The development of Chinese Christendom, from a ˆ‘”‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡‘—–•‹†‡–‘ƒˆ‘”‘ˆ‹–ǯ•‘™ǡ†‘‡•‘–‘Ž›ǥ change the traditional relationship between Chinese culture and Chris- tendom, but also the direction of the future development of Chinese culture itself,” says Liu.ͷͻ The traditional division within Christendom, too, which was imported by the missionaries into China and harmed the development of Christendom in China, has nothing to do with China itself. According to Liu, the phenomenon of “cultural Christianity” is ec- umenical and corresponds to the universality of Christendom.͸Ͳ Following Ernst Troeltsch, who in his Soziallehren saw Christendom holding a threefold social shape – as Church, sect, and mystics – Liu Xiaofeng divides the various manifestations of Chinese Christendom into similar types. According to his typology, the Catholic and Prot- ‡•–ƒ–‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ—” Š‡•ƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•–Š‡Protestant movements that are independent from the West may be regarded as the “Churches” of pres- ent-day China. “Their attitude towards society, government, and nation as well as their tendency to be connected with the State power, clearly

ͷͺ ˆǤƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͻǤ ͷͻ‹—ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’ǤͶǤ ͸Ͳ‹—ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳ͵ͷ demonstrate these characteristics.”͸ͳŠ‡—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‰”‘—’•ǡ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽ- ly the Protestant “House Churches,” may be regarded as “sects” due to their structure as well their nature. However, the Catholic Under- ground Church is, according to Liu, an exception. The “cultural Christi- anity” and Christendom as an academic discipline (Christentumswissen- schaftȌǡƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘Liu Xiaofeng, due to their nature and form, belong to Troeltsch’s type of “mystics.” He stresses three characteristic points ‘ˆ–Š‡•‡Dz›•–‹ •dzǣȋͳȌ–Š‡†‡ϐ‹‹–‡‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽ Šƒ”ƒ –‡”‘ˆˆƒ‹–Šƒ†–Š‡ †‹•–ƒ ‡–‘‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽˆ‘”•ǢȋʹȌ–Š‡‡’Šƒ•‹•‘–Š‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ †‹- mensions and meaning of Š”‹•–‡†‘Ǣȋ͵Ȍ–Š‡•’‘–ƒ‡‘—•–‡†‡ › –‘™ƒ”†•ƒƒ ƒ†‡‹ ƒ†”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘•‹–›ǡ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ–‘™ƒ”†•ƒDz–Š‡‘Ž‘- gy,”͸ʹ™Š‹ Š –‡”Dz‹†‡‘ȋ–Š‡‘ȌŽ‘‰›ǡdz‹ ‘–”ƒ•––‘–Š‡–Š‡‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆ–Š‡ Churches. The Churches in China today do not recognize the “cultural Christi- anity,” the “sects” reject it. The “cultural Christians,” on the other hand, regard the form of faith of the “sects” incomprehensible. Liu Xiaofeng believes that the lack of a Chinese “systematic theology” has serious negative effects on Chinese Christendom. If, however, “cultural Christi- anity” in China really gains a foothold and is able to foster the develop- ment of a “systematic theology” and a Christian philosophy (Liu speaks ƒ„‘—– ƒ Dz —Ž–—”ƒŽ –Š‡‘Ž‘‰›dzȌǡ ‹– ‘—Ž† „‡ ’ƒ–ŠǦ„”‡ƒ‹‰ ˆ‘” –Š‡™Š‘Ž‡ Chinese Christendom, formally as well as with regard to the doctrine.͸͵ The question, however, remains unanswered: Will the non-Church and non-institutional Christendom in China spread more vividly than the Church Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ǫ‹ŽŽ–Š‡Dzcultural Christianity” become a dom- inant future manifestation of Chinese Š”‹•–‡†‘ǫ

Concluding Remarks

Even though Chinese Christendom in all its manifestations still is re- garded as a “marginal” “foreign religion,” today, it seems to lose its Western character and has become a growing – howsoever character- ized – sinicized socio-cultural force.͸Ͷ In China, today, there is a dis-

͸ͳ‹—ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’Ǥ͸Ǥ ͸ʹ‹—ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’Ǥ͹Ǥ ͸͵‹—ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ͸Ͷ Wu Xinming writes in this context: “Although Christianity cannot yet compete with Buddhism in the matter of sinicisation, contemporary scholars have already begun to use the expression ‘Chinese Christianity’ instead of ‘western Christianity ͳ͵͸ Roman Malek course on a “religious culture” (zongjiao wenhua ᇇᮉ᮷ॆȌǡ‘–Š‡Dz”‡- ligious spirit of the culture” (wenhua zongjiao jingshen ᮷ॆᇇᮉ㋮⾎Ȍǡ and, in this context, also on a “Christian culture” (jidu-jiao wenhua or jidu zongjiao wenhua สⶓᇇᮉ᮷ॆȌƒ•‹‹–‡‰”ƒŽ’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ socio-cultural life.͸ͷ‹ ‡ͳͻͻͷǡ–Š‡Œ‘—”ƒŽShijie zongjiao wenhua ц⭼ ᇇᮉ᮷ॆ has been published in this spirit. The present spiritual situation in China is often compared to the sit- uation around the ƒ› ‘—”–Š‘˜‡‡–‹ͳͻͳͻǤ•‹–Š‡May Fourth Movement, the credibility of the ‘ˆ— ‹ƒ–”ƒ†‹–‹‘„‡‰ƒ–‘ˆƒŽ–‡”Ǣƒ– present, the credibility of the Marxist-Communist ideals is swaying. According to Liu Xiaofeng, the discrediting of the given ideology, i.e., ˆ‘‰‹Ž‡†‘‡”ƒ•†ƒ‡†the “crisis of faith” (š‹›ƒ‰ weiji ؑԠডᵪȌ the cultural ideas, values, and ideals. Through the politics of “Opening to the West,” an assimilation of various Western ideas and a search ˆ‘”ƒ‡™ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‘”‹‡–ƒ–‹‘Šƒ•„‡‰—ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›‹–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•Ǥ—‡–‘ this search, various, even contrasting, tendencies of thought have de- veloped and at the moment, none of them is prevailing. The Christian orientation, though small, still is – as Liu Xiaofeng says – a conspicuous and amazing sound in the “cacophony of the cultural rearrangement.” The revival of religiosity in China today, including the diverse man- ifestations of Christendom, evidences that what is called religion or re- ligiosity is truly alive and propagating itself – despite the restrictive religious policy and despite the Marxist predictions about the death of religion. In China, certain manifestations of Christendom will surely die out. Other manifestations of Christendom, however, show that they ƒ”‡ƒ„Ž‡–‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡–Š‡Ž‹ˆ‡‘ˆ–Š‡’‡‘’Ž‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›Ǥ The theologian and philosopher of religion Reinhold ‹‡„—Š”ȋͳͺͻʹȂ ͳͻ͹ͳȌ‘ ‡†‡• ”‹„‡†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ•–Š‡Dz ‹–ƒ†‡Ž‘ˆŠ‘’‡Ǥdz͸͸ This description also applies to the role of the resurrecting religiosity being played out

in China’ to describe the Christianity which has grown up in China during the past hundred years, just as for many scholars became accustomed to using ‘Chinese Buddhism’ to describe ‘the development of Indian Buddhism in China.’ Of course, by comparison with the long history of Chinese civilisation, the history of Christianity during the period of China‘s development is, after all, very short.” ȋ—ʹͲͲͲǡ’Ǥͳ͵ǤȌ ͸ͷ‡‡Šƒ‰Ǧ—„‹ͳͻͻ͵ǡ’Ǥ͵ͷǢ‡‡„ʹͲͲͲǤIn this context, D.L. Overmyer’s remark is interesting, namely, that the Chinese scholars often use the term wenhua instead of zongjiao or š‹›ƒ‰‹‘”†‡”–‘ƒ˜‘‹†’‘••‹„Ž‡†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–‹‡•™‹–Š–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”‹–‹‡• (see ˜‡”›‡”ʹͲͲͳǡ’ǤͳͲͺǡǤͻȌǤ ͸͸ ‹‡„—Š”ͳͻ͵ʹǡ ’’Ǥ͸ͲȂ͸ʹǤ Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳ͵͹ at least in some segments of today’s Chinese society – including various manifestations of Christendom – in the PR China today. Christendom in China, thus, has become a phenomenon with an open future, but – in the words of Wu Xinming – it has “the ability to bring into play the con- tribution it should make to the way in which Chinese culture engages with other world cultures, for the further enrichment and development of Chinese culture itself.”͸͹

References

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͸͹ —ʹͲͲͲǡ’Ǥͳ͵Ǥ ͳ͵ͺ Roman Malek

‡Ȁ‹—ͳͻͺͻȂ ‡ —›‹‰ƒ†‹—Š—š‹ƒǡDz ‹‡Ž†–—†›‘ˆ‘‡Š‘‡ ƒ‡ Christians in Lai’an County, Anhui Province.” In: D. MacInnis, Religion in China To- †ƒ›Ǥ‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†”ƒ –‹ ‡Ǥƒ”›‘ŽŽǡǣ”„‹•‘‘•ͳͻͺͻǡ’’Ǥ͵Ͷ͵Ȃ͵ͶͺǤ ‡›†”‹ šͳͻͻ͵Ȃ Ǥ ‡›†”‹ šǡDzŠ‡‡‡†ˆ‘”‡ ‘ ‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‘Ǥdz ǣǤƒ‰ƒ† ǤǦǤ‹- ‡•–ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‡ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Š‹‘†‡”Š‹ƒǤ‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡•ͳͻͻ͵Ǥ Maryknoll, NY: ”„‹•‘‘•ǡ’’ǤͳͻͻȂʹͲͺǤ —–‡”ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵ȂAllan Hunter and Chan Kim-Kwong, Protestantism in Contempo- ”ƒ”›Š‹ƒǡƒ„”‹†‰‡ǣƒ„”‹†‰‡‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͵Ǥ ”ƒŠŽͳͻ͸ͶȂ ‘•‡’Š”ƒŠŽǡŠ‹ƒ ‹••‹‘• ‹ ”‹•‹•ǣ ‹•Š‘’ ƒ‹„‡ Š‘˜‡ ƒ† ‹• ‹‡•ͷͽ͹;Ȃͷͽ;ͽǤ Rome: Gregorian University Press ͳͻ͸Ͷ. —’ˆ‡”ʹͲͲͳȂǤ—’ˆ‡”ǡ“‘Geheimgesellschaften’ in der VR China: Christlich inspirier- –‡ǡ•’‹”‹–—‡ŽŽǦ”‡Ž‹‰‹Ú•‡ ”—’’‹‡”—‰‡•‡‹–ͳͻ͹ͺǤdz Š‹ƒƒŽ›•‹•ȋ”‹‡”Ȍǡ –‘„‡” ʹͲͲͳǡ‘ǤͺǤ ƒͳͻͻͻȂ–Š‘›ƒǡDzŠ‹ƒǯ•†‡”‰”‘—†‘˜‡‡–•ǣ‡ƒ‹‰ƒ†‡•‘Ž—- tion.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌͳǡ’ǤͷǢ’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ƒŽ•‘‹Tripod ȋͳͻͻͻȌǡ‘Ǥ ͳͳͲǡ’’ǤͷȂͳͺǤ ƒʹͲͲͲȂIdǤǡDzŠ‡ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Š‹Š‹ƒǣ‘ϐŽ‹ –‹‰––‹–—†‡•ǤdzŠ‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”- nalǡͳͷȋ—‰—•–Ǧ‡ ‡„‡”ʹͲͲͲȌʹȀ͵ǡ’’ǤͳͻȂʹ͵Ǥ ƒ„‡”–ͳͻͻͺȂ‘›ƒ„‡”–ǡDz‘†‡”‡ –•ƒ†—Ž–•‹Š‹ƒǤdzŠ‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽ, ͳ͵ȋ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͻͺȌǡ’’Ǥ͸ȂͻǤ ƒ–‘—”‡––‡ͳͻʹͻȂ‡‡–Š ‘––ƒ–‘—”‡––‡ǡ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹••‹‘•‹Š‹ƒǤ New York: Macmillan, ͳͻʹͻ. ‡‡„ʹͲͲͲȂ‡‘‡‡„ǡDzƒ‰ —‹Ž‹ƒ† ‹•‹‡™‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ—Ž–—”‡ǤdzInter-Religio ͵ͺȋʹͲͲͲȌǡ’’Ǥͷ͹Ȃ͸͵Ǥ ‹ͳͻͻͶȂ‹‹ƒ‰ǡDz‡•‡ƒ” Š‡•‹–‘–Š‡”‡•‡–‹” —•–ƒ ‡•‘ˆ”‘–‡•–ƒ–Š”‹•–‹- anity in China – A Sociological Analysis of Christianity in the Nanyang District of Henen Provicne.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͻȋͳͻͻͶȌʹǡ’’ǤͶȂͳͳǤ ‹ƒ‰ͳͻͻͻȂ‹ƒ‰ ‹ƒŽ—ǡDz—”ƒŽŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ƒ†Š‹‡•‡ ‘Ž‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǤdzŠ‹ƒ–—†› JournalͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌʹǡ’’ǤʹʹȂ͵ͶǤ ‹–œ‹‰‡”ͳͻͻ͸ȂŠƒ”Ž‡•Ǥ‹–œ‹‰‡”ǡDz—”ƒŽ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ†‹ŽŽƒ‰‡ ”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ ‹ North China: The Catholic Challenge in the Late Nineteenth Century.” In: Daniel H. ƒ›•ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹Š‹ƒǤ ”‘–Š‡‹‰Š–‡‡–Š‡–—”›–‘–Š‡”‡•‡–. Stan- ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’’ǤͶͳȂͷʹǤ ‹—ͳͻͻ͵Ȃ‹—‹ƒ‘ˆ‡‰ǡDzǮ—Ž–—”‡ŽŽ‡Š”‹•–‡ǯ‹†‡”‘Ž•”‡’—„Ž‹Š‹ƒǤ‡‘„ƒ Š- tungen zu einer gegenwärtigen Bewegung.” minima sinicaͳͻͻ͵ȀʹǤ ‹—ͳͻͻ͸ȂId., “Die akademische Erforschung des Christentums im kulturellen System des Kommunismus.” China heuteȋͳͻͻ͸Ȍǡ’’Ǥͳ͹ͺȂͳͺ͵Ǥ —ͳͻͻͺȂ——ˆ‡‰ǡDz‡’‘”–‘ƒ ˜‡•–‹‰ƒ–‹‘‹–‘–Š‡ ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽ”‰ƒ‹•ƒ–‹‘ǡ–Š‡ ‘Disciples Sect’.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳ͵ȋͳͻͻͺȌ͵ǡ’’ǤͻȂͳ͸Ǥ —‘ͳͻͻͺȂ—‘‡‹Š‘‰ǡDzŠ‡ ƒ –•„‘—––Š‡ –‹˜‹–‹‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‡–‡”‘†‘š‡ –ǮŠ‡ Established King’.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳ͵ȋͳͻͻͺȌ͵ǡ’’Ǥͳ͹ȂʹͳǤ —‘ʹͲͲͳȂId., “An Investigation into the State of Religion in Shanghai Farming Villag- Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳ͵ͻ

es.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳ͸ȋʹͲͲͳȌʹǡ’’ǤʹͳȂ͵ʹǤ ƒ ‹•ͳͻͺͻȂ‘ƒŽ†ƒ ‹•ǡ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ›Ǥ‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†”ƒ –‹ ‡Ǥ Mary- ‘ŽŽǡǣ”„‹•‘‘•ǡͳͻͺͻǤ ƒ†•‡ͳͻͻͺȂ‹ Šƒ”†ƒ†•‡ǡŠ‹ƒǯ•ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ •Ǥ”ƒ‰‡†›ƒ† ‘’‡‹ƒ‡”‰‹‰ ‹˜‹Ž‘ ‹‡–›Ǥ‡”‡Ž‡›ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒŽ‹ˆ‘”‹ƒ”‡••ǡͳͻͻͺǤ ƒ†•‡ʹͲͲͳȂId., “Beyond Orthodoxy: Catholicism as Chinese Folk Religion.” In: Ste- ’Š‡ŠƒŽŽ‡› ”ǤȂ‹ƒ‘š‹—ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‹ƒƒ†Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›Ǥ—”†‡‡†ƒ•–ǡ ‘’‡ˆ—Ž FutureǤ”‘ǡȂ‘†‘ǣŠƒ”’‡ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͺͻȂ‘ƒƒŽ‡ǡDz‡”–”ƒ†‹–‹‘‡ŽŽ‡ Š‹‡•‹• Š‡–ƒƒ–—††‹‡‡Ž‹‰‹‘ȋ‡ȌǤdz ǣǤƒŽ‡ƒ†Ǥ”ƒ™†œ‹ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ™‹• Š‡—–‘‘‹‡—†Ž‡Š—‰Ǥ‹‡”‘„- Ž‡ƒ–‹†‡”ƒ–Š‘Ž‹• Š‡‹” Š‡‹Š‹ƒǡ–Š‡‘Ž‘‰‹• Š—†‰‡• Š‹ Š–Ž‹ Š‰‡•‡Š‡Ǥ St. Augustin–Nettetal: –‡›Ž‡”‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͺͻǡ’’Ǥ͵ͳȂͷ͵Ǥ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͲȂ †ǤǡDz‹‡Žˆ¡Ž–‹‰‡ƒ–Š‘Ž‹œ‹–¡–Ǥ‘–‹œ‡ò„‡”†‹‡ƒ–Š‘Ž‹• Š‡‹” Š‡‹†‡” Volksrepublik China.” ZMRͳͻͻͲȀͶǡ’’Ǥʹ͹ͷȂʹͻ͹Ǥ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷƒȂ †ǤǡDz‹‡‹” Š‡‹Š‹ƒ—†—•‡”‡‹••‹‘ƒ”‹• Š‡‡”ƒ–™‘”–—‰Ǥ Bemerkungen und Vorschläge.” Ordenskorrespondenz͵͸ȋͳͻͻͷȌͳǡ’’Ǥ͵ͳȂͶ͹Ǥ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷ„ȂIdǤǡDzŠ‹ƒ‹Ǯ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ϐ‹‡„‡”ǯǫ‡‡”—‰‡œ—‡‹‡Š¡‘‡Ǥdz Stimmen der ZeitͳͻͻͷȀͳʹǡ’’ǤͺͲͺȂͺʹʹǤ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͷ ȂId., “L’Etude du christianisme et de la théologie en Chine aujourd’hui par des intellectuels non baptisés.” ‰Ž‹•‡•†ǯ•‹‡Ǥ‘••‹‡”•‡–†‘ —‡–•ȋͳͻͻͷȌ‘Ǥ ͻǡ’’ǤͳȂ͸Ǥ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻ͸ȂIdǤȋ‡†ǤȌǡDz ƒŽŽ„‡‹•’‹‡ŽdzŠ‹ƒǤY—‡‹• Š‡‡‹–”¡‰‡œ—‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǡŠ‡‘Ž‘‰‹‡ —†‹” Š‡‹ Š‹‡•‹• Š‡‘–‡š–Ǥ S–Ǥ—‰—•–‹Ȃ‡––‡–ƒŽǣ–‡›Ž‡”‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ƒŽ‡ͳͻͻͻȂIdǤǡDzƒ”—‹–‡”‡••‹‡”‡•‹ Š‘†‡”‡Š‹‡•‡ˆò”†ƒ•Š”‹•–‡–—ǫdz ǣ ‘Šƒ‡•ڕ‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‡Š” ‹‡Ž™ƒ‰‡Ǥ’—”‡•— Š‡‹ ‡•‡ŽŽ• Šƒˆ–ǡ—Ž–—”ǡ KircheǤ ”‡‹„—”‰‹Ǥ”Ǥǣ ‡”†‡”ǡͳͻͻͻǡ’’ǤʹͲ͸ȂʹͳͳǤ ƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͲȂIdǤ ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ‘––ˆ”‹‡† ˜‘ ƒ‹„‡ Š‘˜‡   ȋͷͽͶͽȂͷͽ;ͽȌǤ ‡” ‹• Š‘ˆ ˜‘ ƒŒ‹‰—†•‡‹‡”‹‡ˆ‡ƒ—•Š‹ƒ‹– ƒ•‹‹Ž‡•‡‹‡”‡‹•‡„‡• Š”‡‹„—‰. Transkri- „‹‡”–—†„‡ƒ”„‡‹–‡–˜‘Ǥ—ŠŽȋͳͻͶͳȂͳͻͻ͹Ȍ—†Ǥ ”‡‹Š‡””˜‘Ž˜‡”ˆ‡Ž†–ǦŽ unter Mitwirkung von G. Zeilinger. Sankt Augustin–Nettetal: Inst. Monumenta ‡”‹ ƒǡʹͲͲͲǤ ƒŽ‡ʹͲͲͳȂId., “Herausgeforderte Orthodoxie: Der chinesische Staat und die neue Religiosität.” Religion – Staat – GesellschaftʹȋʹͲͲͳȌͳȀʹǡ’’ǤʹͶ͵Ȃʹ͸ͻǤ ƒŽ‡ʹͲͲʹȂId., “Notizen zur Erforschung des Christentums in der Volksrepublik Š‹ƒǤdz ǣ Ǥ˜‡”•ǡǤƒŽ‡ǡǤ‘Žˆȋ‡†ǤȌǡChristentum und Kirche in der Volksre- ’—„Ž‹Š‹ƒǤò Š‡ǣ‘‘• ‘ǡʹͲͲʹǡ’’ǤͶͳȂ͸͸Ǥ ƒŽ‡ȀŽƒ–‡ȂǤƒŽ‡ƒ†ǤŽƒ–‡ȋ‡†ǤȌǡChinas Katholiken suchen neue Wege. Freiburg ‹Ǥ”Ǥǣ ‡”†‡”ǡͳͻͺ͹Ǥ ‹‡„—Š”ͳͻ͵ʹȂ‡‹Š‘Ž†‹‡„—Š”ǡ‘”ƒŽƒƒ† ‘”ƒŽ‘ ‹‡–›Ǥ–—†›‹–Š‹ •ƒ† PoliticsǤ‡™‘”ͳͻ͵ʹȋʹͳͻ͸ͲȌǤ ˜‡”›‡”ͳͻ͹͸Ȃƒ‹‡ŽǤ˜‡”›‡”ǡ ‘Ž—††Š‹•–‡Ž‹‰‹‘Ǥ‹••‡–‹‰‡ –•‹ƒ–‡ Traditional China, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ͳͶͲ Roman Malek

˜‡”›‡”ʹͲͲͳȂId., “From ‘Feudal Superstition’ to ‘Popular Beliefs’: New Directions in Mainland Chinese Studies of Chinese Popular Religion.” ƒŠ‹‡”•†ǯš–”²‡Ǧ•‹‡ ͳʹȋʹͲͲͳȌǡ’’ǤͳͲ͵Ȃͳʹ͸. ‘œ†‹ƒ‡˜ͳͻͻͻƒ – Dionisy Pozdniaev, “The Chinese Orthodox Church on the Path to Autonomy.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌͳǡ’’ǤͳͷȂʹͳǤ ‘œ†‹ƒ‡˜ͳͻͻͻ„ – Id., “The Orthodox Church in China: Its Problems and Prospects.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌͳǡ’’ǤʹͳȂʹʹǤ ‡‹™‡”–ͳͻͺ͹ȂHubert Seiwert, “Hochkultur und fremde Religion. Buddhismus und ƒ–Š‘Ž‹œ‹•—•‹Š‹ƒǤdz ǣǤ›‡ƒ†Ǥ–‡‰›‡”Š‘ˆȋ‡†ǤȌǡReligion in fremder —Ž–—”Ǥ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒŽ•‹†‡”Š‡‹–‹—”‘’ƒ—†•‹‡Ǥ Saarbrücken–Scheidt: Dadder, ͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’ǤͷͷȂ͹ͷǤ –ƒ†ƒ‡”–ͳͻͻ͹Ȃ‹ ‘Žƒ•–ƒ†ƒ‡”–ǡDz‡™”‡†•‹–Š‡ ‹•–‘”‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹- ty in China.” Catholic Historical Review ͺ͵ȋͳͻͻ͹Ȍǡ’’Ǥͷ͹͵Ȃ͸ͳ͵Ǥ –ƒ†ƒ‡”–ʹͲͲͳȂIdǤȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ƒ†„‘‘‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›‹Š‹ƒ (Handbuch der Orientali- •–‹ͳͷǤͳȌǤ‡‹†‡ǣ”‹ŽŽǡʹͲͲͳǤ ™‡‡–‡ ʹͲͲͳ Ȃ Žƒ ‹ Šƒ”† ™‡‡–‡ǡ Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–› ‹ —”ƒŽ Š‹ƒǤ ‘ϔŽ‹ – ƒ†  - ‘‘†ƒ–‹‘‹ ‹ƒ‰š‹”‘˜‹ ‡ǡͷ;ͼͶȂͷͿͶͶ. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese –—†‹‡•ǡ‹˜Ǥ‘ˆ‹ Š‹‰ƒǡʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ‰ͳͻͻ͵ȂǤƒ‰ǡDzŠ‡Š—” Š‹–‘–Š‡ͳͻͻͲ•Ǥdz ǣǤƒ‰ƒ† ǤǦǤ‹‡•–ȋ‡†ǤȌǡThe ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Š‹‘†‡”Š‹ƒǤ‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡•Ǥƒ”›‘ŽŽǡǣ”„‹•‘‘•ǡͳͻͻ͵ǡ ’’ǤʹͺȂͶʹǤ ‘‰ͳͻͻ͵Ȃ Ǥ‘‰ǡDzŠ‡Š—” Šˆ”‘ͳͻͶͻ–‘ͳͻͻͲǤdz ǣǤƒ‰ƒ† ǤǦǤ‹‡•–ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ Š‡ƒ–Š‘Ž‹ Š—” Š‹‘†‡”Š‹ƒǤ‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡•Ǥ Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, ͳͻͻ͵ǡ’’Ǥ͹Ȃʹ͹Ǥ ”“—Šƒ”–ͳͻͲͺȂ Ǥ”“—Šƒ”–ǡDzŠ”‹•–‡†‘Ǥdz ǣŠ‡ ƒ–Š‘Ž‹   › Ž‘’‡†‹ƒ, vol. III. ‡™‘”ǣ‘„‡”–’’Ž‡–‘ǡͳͻͲͺǤ ¡Š”‹• ŠǦ„Žƒ—ͳͻͻͻȂŽƒ—†‹ƒ¡Š”‹• ŠǦ„Žƒ—ǡDz ‡ƒŽ‹‰”ƒ›‡”•ƒ† ‡ƒŽ‹‰‡•–‹- monies in Mainland Chinese Churches: An Attempt at Intercultural Understand- ing.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌʹǡ’’ǤͷȂʹͳǤ ‹ ‡”‹ͳͻͺͺ– Philip Lauri Wickeri, ‡‡‹‰–Š‡‘‘ ”‘—†Ǥ”‘–‡•–ƒ–Š”‹•–‹ƒ- ‹–›ǡ–Š‡Š”‡‡Ǧ‡Žˆ‘˜‡‡–ǡƒ†Š‹ƒǯ•‹–‡† ”‘–Ǥ Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, ͳͻͺͺǤ WhyteͳͻͺͺȂ‘„Š›–‡ǡϔ‹‹•Š‡† ‘—–‡”ǤŠ‹ƒƒ†Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›. London: Fount ƒ’‡”„ƒ •ǡͳͻͺͺǤ —ͳͻͻ͵Ȃ—‹ǡDzŠ‡ ƒ‹–Šƒ†‹ˆ‡‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ•‹‡‹Œ‹‰Ȃ –‡”˜‹‡™•ƒ†‡ϐŽ‡ - tions.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͺȋͳͻͻ͵Ȍ͵ǡ’’ǤͺȂͳ͸Ǥ —ʹͲͲͲȂ—‹‹‰ǡDzŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›ƒ†Š‹‡•‡—Ž–—”‡‹–Š‡ʹͳ•– ‡–—”›Ǥ  Study from the Viewpoint of Academic Research.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͷȋʹͲͲͲȌ ʹȀ͵ǡ’’Ǥ͸Ȃͳ͵Ǥ ‹ͳͻͻͷȂ‹‡ᐼ᮷, “Zongjiao wenhua zai dangjin Zhonguo de weizhi” ᇇᮉ᮷ॆ൘ᖃ ӺѝഭⲴս㖞. Shijie zongjiao wenhuaц⭼ᇇᮉ᮷ॆͳͻͻͷȀͳǤ ƒ‰ͳͻ͸ͳȂŠǯ‹‰Ǧǯ—ƒ‰ǡ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹Š‹‡•‡‘ ‹‡–›Ǥ–—†›‘ˆ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”›‘- ‹ƒŽ — –‹‘•‘ˆ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ†‘‡‘ˆŠ‡‹” ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ ƒ –‘”•Ǥ Berkeley – Los Ange- Š”‹•–‡†‘ƒ†‹–•ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹ƒ‘†ƒ› ͳͶͳ

Ž‡•ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒŽ‹ˆ‘”‹ƒ”‡••ͳͻ͸ͳǤ ‡ͳͻͻͻ– Ye Xiaowen 㩹ሿ᮷, “Xiejiao wenti de xianzhuang, chengyin ji duice” 䛚ᮉ୿ 乼Ⲵ⨮⣰ǃᡀഐ৺ሽㆆ (The present situation, causes for their development, and ‘—–‡”‡ƒ•—”‡•”‡‰ƒ”†‹‰–Š‡“—‡•–‹‘‘ˆŠ‡”‡•‹‡•ȌǤ ǣ ƒŽ—‰‘‰›—š‹‡Œ‹ƒ‘ ⌅䕚 ࣏㠷䛚ᮉȏ ƒŽ—‰‘‰ƒ†Š‡”‡•‹‡•Ȑǡ‡†ǤŠ‡ ‘‰š‹‰ƒ†ƒ‹Š‡Œ‹‰Ǥ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘‡Š—ƒŠ—„ƒ•Š‡ǡͳͻͻͻǡ’’Ǥͳ͸ͲȂͳ͹ͳǤ ‹‰ͳͻͻ͸Ȃ‹‰ ‹‡ǡDzŠ‡ ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ”‹•–‹ƒ ‘‡‡‡–‹‰•ƒ†—”’’”‘ƒ Š–‘ Them.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳͳȋͳͻͻ͸Ȍͳǡ’’ǤͳͲȂͳ͸Ǥ —ͳͻͻͻȂYu Tao, “Introduce More Theory into Religious Studies. Conference on ‘The Problem of Contemporary Religious Cults’ held in Shanghai.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽ ͳͶȋͳͻͻͻȌͳǡͳʹȂͳͷȋ–”ƒ•ŽǤˆ”‘ƒ‰†ƒ‹œ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘›ƒŒ‹— ⮦ԓᇇᮉ⹄ウͳͻͻ͹ȀͶȌǤ Šƒ‰Ǧ—„‹ ͳͻͻ͵ Ȃ —‹œ‹ Šƒ‰Ǧ—„‹ǡ ‹‡ ƒ† ‘––‡•Ǥ ‹ ‡•’”¡ Š ‹– ‹— Xiaofeng. minima sinicaͳͻͻ͵Ȁʹ Šƒ‘ʹͲͲͳȂZhao Wen, “An Investigation into the Situation of Catholicism in the Tan Domicile.” Š‹ƒ–—†› ‘—”ƒŽͳ͸ȋʹͲͲͳȌʹǡ͵ʹȂͶ͵Ǥ Š‘‰ȀŠƒͳͻͻ͵ȂZhong Min and Chan Kim-kwong, “The ‘Apostolic Church’: A Case –—†›‘ˆƒ ‘—•‡Š—” Š‹—”ƒŽŠ‹ƒǤdz ǣǤ‡—‰Ȃ ǤǤ‘—‰ȋ‡†ǤȌǡChristian- ‹–›‹Š‹ƒǤ ‘—†ƒ–‹‘•ˆ‘”‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡Ǥ Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, Univ. of ‘‰‘‰ǡͳͻͻ͵Ǥ Š—‘ͳͻͻͺȂŠ—‘‹’‹‰, “Die Bedeutung des Christentums für Chinas Modernisie- rung.” IǣǤ ¡é„ƒ—‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ”‹•–‡–—‹‡‹ Š†‡”‹––‡Ǥ–—‡ŽŽ‡Š‡•‡—† ‡š–‡ƒ—•Š‹ƒǤ ƒ„—”‰ǣǡͳͻͻͺǡ’’Ǥ͹ͺȂͺ͸Ǥ Š—‘ʹͲͲͳȂId., “Discussion on ‘Cultural Christians’ in China.” In: S. Uhalley Jr. – Xia- ‘š‹—ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‹ƒƒ†Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›Ǥ—”†‡‡†ƒ•–ǡ ‘’‡ˆ—Ž —–—”‡. Armonk, NY– ‘†‘ǣŠƒ”’‡ǡʹͲͲͳǡ’’Ǥʹͺ͵Ȃ͵ͲͲǤ ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻ͵ƒ – Erik Zürcher, “A Complement to Confucianism: Christianity and Or- thodoxy in Late Imperial China.” In: Chun-Chieh Huƒ‰ƒ†”‹ò” Š‡”ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ ‘”•ƒ†–Š‡–ƒ–‡‹Š‹ƒǤ‡‹†‡ǣ”‹ŽŽǡͳͻͻ͵ǡ’’Ǥ͹ͳȂͻʹǤ ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻ͵„ – Id., “Jesuit Accommodation.” In: Chun-Chieh Huang and Erik Zürcher ȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‘”•ƒ†–Š‡–ƒ–‡‹Š‹ƒǤ‡‹†‡ǣ”‹ŽŽǡͳͻͻ͵Ǥ ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻͶȂId., “Jesuit Accommodation and the Chinese Cultural Imperative.” In: ǤǤ—‰‡ŽŽ‘ȋ‡†ǤȌǡŠ‡Š‹‡•‡‹–‡•‘–”‘˜‡”•›Ǥ –• ‹•–‘”›ƒ†‡ƒ‹‰Ǥ Sankt —‰—•–‹Ȃ‡––‡–ƒŽǣ–‡›Ž‡”‡”Žƒ‰ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ò” Š‡”ͳͻͻ͹ȂId., “Confucian and Christian Religiosity in Late Ming China.” The Cath- olic Historical Reviewͺ͵ȋͳͻͻ͹ȌͶǡ’’Ǥ͸ͳͶȂ͸ͷ͵Ǥ

Unity in Diversity The Islamic Revival Movement in China Today

Wang Jianping

ntil recently, China’s Muslim tradition received relatively lit- tle systematic study. However, some recent scholarly works in English have begun to address the history and present state of U ͳ Muslims and Islam in China. In his book Muslim Chinese, Dru Gladney ȋ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͳȌ‘ˆˆ‡”‡†‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–‡š–‡•‹˜‡”‡’‘”–•‘Hui എ Mus- lims in post-Mao China – the largest Muslim ethnic minority group in China – and a general portrait of China's Muslim peoples. But since it appeared, only a few works have dealt with the Islamic revival move- ‡––Šƒ–Šƒ•‘ —””‡†‹Š‹ƒ†—”‹‰–Š‡ͳͻͻͲ•Ǥʹ In China, scholarly recognition of the importance and diversity of China’s Islamic heritage has also been slowly growing. According to statistics from the Islam- ic Association of China, at the end of the twentieth century China had a —•Ž‹ ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ ‘”‡ –Šƒ ʹͲ ‹ŽŽ‹‘͵ǡ͵ͷǡͲͲͲmosquesͶ and Ͷ͸ǡͲͲͲ akhond ȋ‡”•‹ƒǣ Ǯ–‡ƒ Š‡”ǡ Ž‡”‰›ƒǯȌ ‘” Ž‡”‹ • ™‘”‹‰ ˆ‘” —•Ž‹ ‘—‹–‹‡•ǡ ʹͲǡͲͲͲ khalifas (Arabic for ‘successors of the Prophet Muhammad’ – the religious students studying in madaris, plu- ral of madrasaᔇŽ‹‰‹‘—•• Š‘‘Ž•Ȍͷ and there are at least a thousand local •Žƒ‹ ƒ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘•ȋ‹ Ž—†‹‰Ͷʹʹƒ––Š‡ ‘—–›Ž‡˜‡ŽȌǡ™Š‹ Š ‘-

ͳ ‘” –Š‡ ‘•– ”‡’”‡•‡–ƒ–‹˜‡ ™‘”•ǡ •‡‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ ͳͻͻͶ ƒ† ͳͻͺͳǡ ‡•Ž‹‡ ͳͻͺͳ ƒ† ͳͻͺ͸ǡ‹ŽŽ•„—”›ͳͻ͹͵ǡ‹’ƒͳͻͻ͹ǡ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͷƒ† Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͳǤ ʹ ‡‡‹ŽŽ‘ͳͻͻ͸ƒ†ͳͻͻͻǡ—†‡Ž•‘ͳͻͻͺƒ†ͳͻͻͻǡ ‹ŽŽ‡––‡ʹͲͲͲǡ ƒ• Š‘ȀŠ—‹ ʹͲͲͲǤ•ˆ‘”Š‹‡•‡• Š‘Žƒ”Ž›™‘”•ǡ†—‡–‘–Š‡•‡•‹–‹˜‹–›‘ˆ–Š‡–‘’‹ ‹Š‹ƒǡ the author has not seen any special books on Islamic studies that have been pub- lished regarding the current situation. ͵ ˆǤ—ʹͲͲʹǤ Ͷ This statistic of the number of mosques in China is apparently an underestimate.  ‘”†‹‰–‘ƒϐ‹‰—”‡‰‹˜‡„›ƒ—•Ž‹• Š‘Žƒ”‹ƒ—‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ǡ–Š‡ ‘•“—‡•‹Š‹ƒ—„‡”‘”‡–ŠƒͶͲǡͲͲͲǢ•‡‡ˆǤͳ͹Ǥ ͷ ˆǤƒͳͻͻͻǤ

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌǡReligion in Chinaǡ’’ǤͳͶ͵Ȃͳͺ͸Ǥ ͳͶͶ Wang Jianping ordinate Islamic affairs with government authorities under the control of the Communist Party.͸ This paper will discuss the current state of Islam and Muslim com- munities in China based on extensive reading of periodicals published by many Islamic organizations and communities, interviews with Mus- Ž‹•ˆ”‘ƒ›™ƒŽ•‘ˆŽ‹ˆ‡ǡƒ†ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›–Š‡†‹”‡ –‘„•‡”˜ƒ–‹‘•ƒ†‡ during visits to many Muslim communities in different parts of China over the last decade. It will also build on other studies of contempo- rary Muslim China that have appeared in Chinese and English in recent years.

The Muslim Community in China

Any examination of Islam in China must not overlook the basic orga- nization of the Muslim community – its grassroots organizations, and the basic components of Islamic social life in China. Here a fundamental issue is the ‘exceptional’ character of Islam compared to other Chinese religious traditions. A fundamental difference between Islam and the Buddhist and Daoist religions that have traditionally dominated Chi- nese society is that Islam is an organized religion and Muslims live in a community based on Islamic law (•Šƒ”‹ಃƒȌǤ –Š‡” –Šƒ ‘ƒ•–‡”‹‡• and temples in which monks live in secluded settings only occasionally open to others, Chinese Buddhism and Daoism generally have no ex- clusive religious communities. Historically, the only exceptions to this rule were a few sects which arose at certain times in Chinese history. Chinese religions are not ‘organized religions’. In China, as elsewhere, Christianity has been a religion centered on church communities. But generally Christian churches have focused on spiritual activities, and have stayed removed from the economic, social and cultural activities that Muslim communities have encompassed. Thus, no other religion in China combines spiritual faith with mundane matters as intimately as Islam. Another striking difference between Islam and other religions in China is that the Islamic faith is closely related to ‡–Š‹ ‹–›ǢMuslims ‹Š‹ƒƒ”‡‡ƒ”Ž›ƒŽŽ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡†„›–Š‡Š‹‡•‡‰‘˜‡”‡–ƒ•„‡Ž‘‰- ing to one of several ethnic minority groups. Chinese followers of Bud- dhism, Daoism and Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›Šƒ˜‡‘•— Š•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ƒŽŽ›‡–Š‹ Ž‹•

͸ ˆǤ—ʹͲͲͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͶͷ and national social status. But, as will be explained in greater detail below, China’s Muslims belong to ethnic minority groups, principally Hui and Uighur (Weiwuer-zu 㔤੮ቄ᯿ȌǤ The typical Muslim community centers on a mosque, and its mem- bers enjoy a shared religious commitment as well as economic and so- cial-cultural activities. In Arabic, such a community is called a Œƒƒಃƒ. In this community all adult male members have equal rights and re- sponsibilities to participate in communal affairs. Consensus over de- cisions concerning the mosque is arrived at by a board of management headed by a director and several elders. They also take care of routine affairs such as ‘•“—‡ƒ‹–‡ƒ ‡ǡϐ‹ƒ ‡•ǡ‡†— ƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†‹‹•–”ƒ- tion, and daily activities that directly tie the mosque to Muslim life and public affairs.͹ In China the majority of Muslims, except for members of several —ϐ‹ orders, follow the traditional Sunni custom in which each Œƒƒಃƒ is a “—‹–‡‹†‡’‡†‡–„‘†›ƒ†–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡‘•–”‘‰ ”‘••Ǧƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‹‘•„‡- tween communities. There is no central leadership of these communi- ties, although there are strong spiritual and cultural bonds between them and there is also a widespread Islamic fraternal sentiment. Each Œƒƒಃƒ is more autonomous than, say, a Han ≹ Chinese village or neigh- borhood, and other Muslim communities cannot interfere in its affairs or restrain its autonomy. The Œƒƒಃƒ has two parts: a mosque administration board, which is made up of members of the community and a madrasaȋ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•• Š‘‘ŽȌ composed of the people mainly coming from outside the community, such as akhondsͺ (or ‹ƒ•Ȍƒ†khalifas.ͻ Most Muslim communities in China have customary regulations that stipulate that a cleric, such as an imam, should be invited from another Muslim community to supervise the religious affairs and religious school of the host community. The essential requirements of the imamƒ”‡ǣϐ‹”•–ǡŠ‡—•–„‡‘™Ž‡†‰‡- able in the Arabic Quran and •Žƒ‹ –Š‡‘Ž‘‰›Ǣƒ†•‡ ‘†ǡŠ‡—•–„‡ a virtuous, upright person willing to dedicate himself to Islam and his community. The qualities considered necessary for the selection of the

͹ ˆǤ—‘ʹͲͲʹǤ ͺ Akhond refers to religious clerics who staff mosques and madarisǢimams or Ak- honds of madrasa teaching are the chief clerics of mosques. ͻ Concerning the structure of Muslim communities in China, even in history we can observe these parallel divisions among the Hui communities in Yunnan Ӂই. Cf. ƒ‰ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ͳͶ͸ Wang Jianping director and elderly members into the mosque management board are: ƒ•‡•‡‘ˆ”‡•’‘•‹„‹Ž‹–›ƒ†Œ—•–‹ ‡ǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•”‡ƒ†‹‡••ˆ‘”•‡ŽϐŽ‡•• engagement for their community. Usually, the term for members of the Mosque administration and the imam is three years, but their tenure can be extended for another term or longer if the community chooses.ͳͲ The Muslim community is thus centered on the mosque where the akhond and other clergy reside and preach. The mosque is a commu- nal center providing religious services and instruction, as well as im- portant social, cultural, economic and public welfare functions. Thus, Muslims regard the mosque as the soul of their community. In China, mosques have often come to be more active and effective units of com- munity than the villages and urban neighborhood committees that dominate the grassroots Han social fabric. Indeed, as grassroots secular power in China has eroded since the ͳͻͺͲ•„‡ ƒ—•‡‘ˆ ‘””—’–‹‘ƒ† ‘‡” ‹ƒŽ”‡ˆ‘”•ǡmosque-based communities of Muslim society have actually strengthened their role in communal affairs. Today almost all the important affairs in rural Chi- na such as family planning, education, village elections, social security, and anti-drug campaigns, cannot take place without at least the tacit support of the akhond or imam. In Muslim communities the akhond is ‘ˆ–‡‘”‡‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽ–ŠƒŽ‘ ƒŽ’ƒ”–›‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•ǡƒ†„‡ˆ‘”‡ƒ‹’‘”–- ƒ––ƒ•‹•—†‡”–ƒ‡ǡ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•—•– ‘•—Ž–™‹–Š–Š‡akhond. In many ƒ•‡•ǡ–Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡–‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•ƒ›ƒ•–Š‡imam to deliver a speech after the Œ—ಃƒȋ–Š‡ ”‹†ƒ›’”ƒ›‡”•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘‰”‡‰ƒ–‹‘Ȍ–‘ ‘—‹ ƒ–‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ’‘Ž‹ ‹‡•ƒ†”‡•—Ž–‹‰‡ƒ•—”‡•–‘–Š‡ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•Ǥ In Muslim communities the akhond‹•–Š‡‘•–’”‘‹‡–’—„Ž‹ ϐ‹‰- —”‡ǡƒ†Š‹•˜‹‡™• ƒ‡š‡”–ƒ’‘™‡”ˆ—Ž‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘‘”†‹ƒ”›‡„‡”• of the community. In not a few cases the director of mosque adminis- tration board is also a village cadre, thus combining the religious and secular administrative roles. If the director of the mosque board is not ƒ˜‹ŽŽƒ‰‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽǡŠ‹•ƒ—–Š‘”‹–›ƒ›‡˜‡”–Š‡Ž‡••‡š ‡‡†–Š‡’‘™‡”‘ˆŽ‘- ƒŽ’ƒ”–›ƒ†‰‘˜‡”‡–‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•™Š‘•‡„—”‡ƒ— ”ƒ–‹ •–ƒ–—•’”‡˜‡–• them from enjoying the same authority in the community. This is one

ͳͲ This part in general has been summarized by the author after visits to various Muslim communities in China. Other Muslim scholars in Islamic periodicals such as Kaituo ᔰᤃ(PioneerȌǡ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹—Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウ (Journal of Islamic —Ž–—”‡Ȍǡ and Musilin tongxun ぶᯟ᷇䙊䇟 (—•Ž‹‡™•Ž‡––‡”Ȍǡ‡– ǤŠƒ˜‡ƒŽ•‘†‹•- cussed this issue. ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͶ͹ important reason the state has been losing authority among the Mus- lim believers in heavily Islamic parts of China. After decades of restrictions and even harsh repression, the Chi- nese government began to adopt a more pragmatic policy towards re- Ž‹‰‹‘‹–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǡƒ†–Š‹•‡™–‘Ž‡”ƒ ‡‹‰‹–‡†ƒ”‡˜‹˜ƒŽ‘ˆIslam. Now growing numbers of Muslims attend mosques to pray and attend religious services. Mosques in regions with a strong Islamic tradition such as Xinjiang ᯠ⮶, Gansu ⭈㚳, Ningxia ᆱ༿, Yunnan Ӂই, Hebei ⋣ े, He’nan ⋣ই and Shaanxi 䲅㾯ǡƒ”‡‘ˆ–‡ˆ—ŽŽ–‘‘˜‡”ϐŽ‘™‹‰†—”‹‰ the Friday jum’a prayers. Many pious Chinese —•Ž‹•’”ƒ›ϐ‹˜‡–‹‡• a day, and in Muslim dominant areas an Islamic ceremony can attract more than ten thousand believers to pray and listen to the ™ƒಃœ (Arabic: ƒ•‡”‘†‡Ž‹˜‡”‡†„›ƒ‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽimamȌǤͳͳ The mosque black board always has posted the long list of the names of the Muslims who pay zakatȋ”ƒ„‹ ǡƒŽ•Ȍ‘” ‘–”‹„—–‡‘‡›‘”‘–Š‡”‹–‡•ˆ‘””‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• purposes. In urban mosques it is also not unusual to see Uighur Muslims pray- ing side by side with Hui Muslims – a sign that Islamic fraternal feelings can cross ethnic boundaries.ͳʹ It is also not uncommon to see Muslim women in heavily Muslim areas such as Kashgar (Kashi ரӰȌǡHotan (Hetian ઼⭠Ȍ, Lanzhou ޠᐎ, Linxia Ѥ༿, Weizhou 世ᐎ and Xi’an 㾯ᆹ wearing the headscarves and modest dress many followers believe the Holy Quran stipulates. During Ramadan, the fasting month of the Is- lamic calendar, many Muslims now abstain from food and drink during the daytime. Even in communities with weaker religious traditions, Muslims often observe basic Islamic customs such as refusing to eat pork and other foods proscribed by Quranic dietary law, observing Muslim prac- tices in weddings, funerals and burial services, observing the ritual of

ͳͳ ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ‹ͳͻͺͳ‹Shadian ⋉⭨, a Hui community in Yunnan, the celebration of the Birthday of the Prophet —Šƒƒ†™ƒ•ƒ––‡†‡†„›ͷͲǡͲͲͲ—•Ž‹•Ǣ–Š‡ annual •Žƒ‹ ˆ‡•–‹˜ƒŽŠƒ•ˆ‘”–Š‡Žƒ•–†‡ ƒ†‡—•—ƒŽŽ›„‡‡ ‡Ž‡„”ƒ–‡†„›ͳͲǡͲͲͲ —•Ž‹•ȋƒ‰Ȁƒͳͻͻ͸ȌǤ–Š‡”„‹‰Muslim communities in Northwest China can also have such large gatherings for religious festivals, i.e., the Id-Kan Mosque in Kashgara and the Hui communities in Linxia of Gansu. ͳʹ In Beijing on Xinjiang Street ᯠ⮶ᶁ many Uighur businessmen have opened restau- rants and shops for commercial activities for people going to the Jingshifang 䭖Ӱ ൺ and the Haidian ⎧⏰ Mosques for religious services. ͳͶͺ Wang Jianping giving Arabic names to new-born children, and following Islamic ritual in the slaughter of livestock. Although the distance between China and Saudi Arabia is consid- erable, and most Chinese Muslims are poor, the number of followers applying to perform the hajj – the pilgrimage to Mecca that each Mus- lim has to perform at least once – has been growing steadily since –Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•Ǥ •’‹–‡‘ˆƒƒ—ƒŽ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ“—‘–ƒ‘ˆʹͲͲͲhajjis in recent years,ͳ͵ the actual number of Chinese Muslims making the pilgrimage ‡˜‡”››‡ƒ”ƒ›„‡‘”‡–Šƒ͸ͲͲͲǢƒ›‰‘–‘Saudi Arabia on other pretexts such as visiting relatives and doing business. To sum up, with the revival of Islamic consciousness and religious traditions in China, most Chinese Muslims can now freely practice the basic requirements of Islam, and the number of Muslims determined to strictly follow all ‘Five Pillars’ of the Islamic faith is growing quickly.

The Diversity of China’s Muslim Communities

Although Islamic traditions have revived strongly in China since the ͳͻͺͲ•ǡ Š‹ƒǯ• —•Ž‹ communities are very diverse in terms of geo- graphical location, ethnicity, languages, cultural features, and even their various doctrinal schools and religious practices. ͳȌ First, the Muslim population in China is distributed widely but un- ‡˜‡Ž›Ǥ ŽŽ ‘ˆ Š‹ƒǯ• ͵ʹ ’”‘˜‹ ‡•ǡ ƒ—–‘‘‘—• ”‡‰‹‘•ǡ ƒ† —‹ ‹- palities have Muslim’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘•Ǥ—–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•‡ƒ”Ž›ʹǡͶͲͲ ‘—–‹‡•ǡ ‘”‡–Šƒʹǡ͵ͲͲŠƒ˜‡Muslims.ͳͶ However, the geographic concentra- tion of the Muslim population in China is also highly uneven: more than two thirds of China’s Muslims live in the country’s northwest, partic- ularly in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu ᯠ⮶㔤੮ቄ㠚⋫४Ȍǡ Gansu Province, the Ningxia Hui Autono- mous Region (Ningxia Hui Zizhiqu ᆱ༿എ᯿㠚⋫४Ȍǡƒ†Qinghai 䶂⎧ Province. The other third of the Muslim population is largely concen- trated in predominantly Muslim areas in a number of other provinc- es: He’nan, Hebei, Yunnan, Shandong ኡь, and Anhui ᆹᗭ.ͳͷ Although

ͳ͵ The number of hajjis who performed a pilgrimage to ‡ ƒ‹ʹͲͲͲ™ƒ•ʹʹͲͲǡƒ† ‹ʹͲͲʹƒ„‘—–ʹͲͲͲǡ ‹–‡†ˆ”‘›‹–‡”˜‹‡™™‹–Šƒ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ––Š‡Islamic Associ- ation of China ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉॿՊǡ ‡„ǤͺǡʹͲͲʹǢŽ•‘ ˆǤƒ‘‰‰—ƒ‰ʹͲͲʹǤ ͳͶ ˆǤŠƒ‰‹ƒŽ—ͳͻͻͳǤ ͳͷ ‡‡ƒ’ʹƒ†ƒ’͵‹ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳǡ’ǤššǦšš‹Ǥ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͶͻ most of China’s regions outside the northwest have very small Muslim ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘•ǡ–Š‡•‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘•–‡†–‘Ž‹˜‡‹†‡•‡ ‘ ‡–”ƒ–‹‘•Ǣ they dominate certain urban neighborhoods or villages, often close to historically strategic geographic sites such as rivers, canals or commu- nication hubs. This remarkable feature of Muslims’ residential patterns is a product of history: many Muslims moved into central inland and -coastal China during the Yuan ݳ, Ming ᰾ and Qing ␵ Dynasties, serv ing as militia in imperial armies, and they were stationed in strategic encampments from which ‘Hui’ Muslim communities evolved. ʹȌ The Muslim population in China is also ethnically very diverse. There are ten ethnic minority groups in China that are classed as Mus- ,lim peoples. They are the Hui, Uighur, Kazakh (Hasake-zu ૸㩘ݻ᯿Ȍ -Kyrgyz (Keerkezi-zu ḟቄݻᆌ᯿ȌǡDongxiang-su ьґ᯿, Uzbeks (Wu zibieke-zu Ѽᆌ࡛ݻ᯿Ȍǡ Tatars (Tataer-zu ຄຄቄ᯿Ȍ, Tajik (Tajike-zu ᆹ᯿ . The؍ ຄਹݻ᯿ȌǡSalar (Sala-zu ᫂᣹᯿Ȍǡƒ†Bonan (Bao’an-zu largest group is the Hui – mainly Chinese-speaking Muslims who are distinguished from Han Chinese largely by their religion alone – who —„‡”‘˜‡”ͳͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘ƒ†ƒ‡—’ƒŽ‹––Ž‡‘”‡–ŠƒƒŠƒŽˆ‘ˆ–Š‡ Muslim population in China. The next largest group of Muslims is the Uighur people, who number eight million according to the latest census statistics.ͳ͸ The Uighur are followed by the ƒœƒŠ’‡‘’Ž‡ǡ™‹–Šƒ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆͳǤͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǣ–Š‡ ‘‰š‹ƒ‰ǡ™‹–Šƒ”‘—†ͷͲͲǡͲͲͲǢƒ†–Š‡›”‰›œ™‹–ŠʹͲͲǡͲͲͲǤŠ‡ ƒŽƒ”Šƒ˜‡ƒ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆͳͲͲǡͲͲͲǡƒ†–Š‡Tajik, Uzbeks and Bao’an Šƒ˜‡ ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘• „‡–™‡‡ ͳ͵ǡͲͲͲ ƒ† ͶͲǡͲͲͲǤ Š‡ •ƒŽŽ‡•– —•Ž‹ ethnic group is the ƒ–ƒ”•ǡ™‹–Šƒ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆƒ”‘—†͸ǡͲͲͲǤͳ͹ Linguistically, the majority of Hui speak Mandarin Chinese as well as the various Chinese dialects also spoken by local ƒŠ‹‡•‡Ǣƒ•ƒŽŽ number of Hui also speak Mongol, Thai, Bai and Tibetan thanks to a long history of association and intermarriage with these other ethnic groups. Several thousand Hui Muslims live on Hainan ⎧ই, a large is- land province in the South China Sea, and they speak a Vietnamese-Ma-

ͳ͸ Š‡ ‡•—•‘ˆͳͻͻͲ‰ƒ˜‡–Š‡‹‰Š—”’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ƒ•͹ǡʹͳͶǡͶ͵ͳǤŠ‡ ‡•—•‘ˆʹͲͲͳ has not given any broken down statistics concerning the Muslim population in Chi- ƒǤŠ‡ϐ‹‰—”‡‘ˆ‡‹‰Š–‹ŽŽ‹‘‹•”ƒ–Š‡”ƒ˜‡”›”‡•‡”˜‡†‡•–‹ƒ–‡‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”Ǥ ͳ͹ ŽŽϐ‹‰—”‡•ƒ”‡‰‹˜‡‹”‡ˆ‡”‡ ‡–‘–Š‡ ‡•—•‘ˆͳͻͻͲƒ†Œ—•–‡†„›–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”ƒ - cording to the natural growth of these Muslim peoples. Cf. ‡‹Œ‹‰‡˜‹‡™ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥ͵ ȋƒŒ‘”ƒ–ƒ‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻͻͲ‡•—•Ȍƒ†’Ǥ͵Ͳȋ‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•–Š‹ ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹- –‹‡•ȌǤ ͳͷͲ Wang Jianping lay language inherited from ancestors who came from Southeast Asia. The Uighur, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Salar and Tatars each speak their own distinctive languages, all belonging to the Turkic-Altai language family. The Dongxiang and the Bao’an speak a mixed Turkic-Mongol Žƒ‰—ƒ‰‡ƒŽ•‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›ƒ†ƒ”‹Š‹‡•‡Ǥ ‹ƒŽŽ›ǡ–Š‡Tajik speak an eastern Iranian language. ͵Ȍ Although they share a common faith, Muslims in China belong to very diverse cultural traditions. The Hui have been more open to Han Chinese culture than other Muslim groups. The forefathers of the Hui came from Central Asia, Persia, Arabia and western Asia. But after many generations of intermarriage with Han Chinese and other ethnic groups, and encouraged by assimilation policies imposed by imperial governments, most Hui look like Han Chinese. In many ways they have absorbed Han Chinese culture and customs in language, dress, and so- cial habits – with the exception of Muslim practices concerning diet, birth, marriages and funerals. The Turkic-Altai speaking Muslim peoples generally resemble their Central Asian counterparts in cultural traditions and customs. The Ka- zakhs and Kyrgyz retain a nomadic tribal life with traces of pre-Islamic culture, including some shamanistic elements. Historically, the Uighur, Uzbeks and Tatars were mostly sedentary peoples who lived in set- –Ž‡‡–•ƒ”‘—†‘ƒ•‡•Ǣ–Š‡›ƒ‹ˆ‡•–ƒ•–”‘‰ˆƒ”‹‰ƒ† ‘‡”- cial traditions. The Dongxiang, Salar and Bao’an lead a life of farming, –”ƒ†‹‰ ƒ† Š‡”†‹‰ǡ ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‰ –Š‡‹” †‡ƒ†‹‰ •—””‘—†‹‰•ǣ ‰‡‘- graphically isolated areas with mixed economic activities. The moun- tain-dwelling ƒŒ‹•ǯŽ‹ˆ‡•–›Ž‡”‡ϐŽ‡ –•–Š‡‹”–‹‡•–‘Iranian culture and is similar to their ethnic counterparts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.ͳͺ ͶȌ Islam in China is to some extent divided by the same doctrinal di- visions and divergent religious practices to be found in the rest of the Muslim world. The majority of Muslims in China adhere to the ƒƒϐ‹ School ૸ѳᯀᆖ⍮, the one of the four ƒ†ŠŠƒ„s, or theological-juris- tic schools, in Sunni Islam. But among Chinese Muslims there are divi- sions between —ϐ‹mysticism and non-—ϐ‹•–”‡ƒ•‘ˆ •ŽƒǢ„‡–™‡‡ the Ikhwani Schoolͳͻ and the traditional Qadim (Gedimu Ṭ䘚ⴞ, from

ͳͺ ‹”‡‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͶǡ’’ǤͻͳȂͳ͵ͷǤ ͳͻ Ikhwani (Yihewani Ժ䎛⬖ቬǡ”ƒ„‹ ˆ‘”Ǯ„”‘–Š‡”Š‘‘†ǯȌǡ‘”‹‰‹ƒ–‹‰ˆ”‘–Š‡ƒŠ- habit (ƒŠƒ„‹ ⬖૸∄Ȍ‘˜‡‡–‹”ƒ„‹ƒƒ†‹–”‘†— ‡†‹–‘Š‹ƒ‹–Š‡Žƒ–‡ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͷͳ

”ƒ„ǤDz‘Ž†dzȌ Š‘‘Žǡ™Š‹ Š‹•‘”‡–‘Ž‡”ƒ–‘ˆ‹†‹‰‡‘—• —Ž–—”‡•Ǣƒ† between the Sunni and Š‹᪂ƒ‰”‘—’•Ǥ –‹••ƒˆ‡–‘•ƒ›ͻͻΨ‘ˆMuslims in China are adherents of Sunni Is- lam. But at least of one third of the Sunni Muslims in China are follow- ers of various —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ǤŠ‡”‡ƒ”‡ˆ‘—”ƒŒ‘”—ϐ‹‘”†‡”•’”‡•‡–‹ China: Jahriyya (Zhehelinye ଢ䎛᷇㙦Ȍ, Š—ϐ‹››ƒȋ —ˆ‡‹›‡㱾䶎㙦Ȍ, Qa- diriyya (Gadelinye ాᗧ᷇㙦Ȍƒ†Kubrawiyya (Kuburenye ᓃнᗽ㙦Ȍ. There are also some smaller orders such as Shaddhliyya (Shazilinye ⋉ ᆌ᷇㙦Ȍ, Suhrawadiyya (Suhelawadiye 㣿䎛᣹⬖ᓅ㙦ȌǡChistiyya (Qie- sidiye ࠷ᯟᓅ㙦Ȍ and Qalandariyya (Gelandaiye Ṭޠዡ㙦ȌǤŠ‡Žƒ”‰‡•– group among the main four —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‹•–Š‡Š—ϐ‹››ƒǡ™‹–ŠʹǤͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘ followers. But it is sub-divided into many sub-orders and schools. The Jahriyya also is divided into several groups with a total membership of ͳǤͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘ǤŠ‡Qadiriyya has a membership of about half a million. The smallest —ϐ‹‘”†‡”‹•–Š‡Kubrawiyya, whose adherents mainly belong to the Dongxiang ethnic group in ƒ•—”‘˜‹ ‡ǤŠ‡•‡ϐ‹‰—”‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ —ϐ‹ˆ‡ŽŽ‘™•‘Ž›‹ Ž—†‡–Š‘•‡‘ˆ–Š‡Hui, Dongxiang, Salar and Bao’an Muslim peoples. As for the statistics of the —ϐ‹‡„‡”•Š‹’ƒ‘‰–Š‡ Turkic —•Ž‹•‹Š‹ƒǡ–Š‡”‡•‡”˜‡†ϐ‹‰—”‡’”‘„ƒ„Ž›‹•ƒ”‘—†‘”‡ than one million. Non-—ϐ‹„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•ƒ”‡ƒŽ•‘†‹˜‹†‡†‹–‘•‡˜‡”ƒŽ‰”‘—’•ǤŠ‡Žƒ”‰‡•– group is the Qadim, the traditional group which has accommodated lo- cal cultures in its faith. At a conservative estimate, the Qadim or the traditional Sunni group has at least ten millions followers in commu- ‹–‹‡•–Š”‘—‰Š‘—–Š‹ƒȋ‹ Ž—†‹‰–Š‡ϐ‹‰—”‡•„‘–Š–Š‡Hui and other —”‹ ‰”‘—’•ȌǤ ʹͲ The Š™ƒ‹‘˜‡‡–Šƒ•ƒ–Ž‡ƒ•–ʹ‹ŽŽ‹‘‡„‡”• ‹Š‹ƒǤ –•’Ž‹–‹–‘–™‘‰”‘—’•‹–Š‡ͳͻ͵Ͳ•ǣ–Š‡ƒ‹•–”‡ƒIkhwani and the ƒŽƒϐ‹››ƒȋƒ‹Žƒˆ‡‹›‡䎋᣹㨢㙦Ȍǡ™Š‘•‡‡„‡”•˜‡‡”ƒ–‡ϐ‹”•– three generations after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. There are several major differences between the Ikhwani and the Qadim or the traditional Sunni group. One of them is that the Ikhwani oppose to ritual tomb pilgrimages, veneration of the dead and celebra- tion of the Maulid (the Prophet —Šƒƒ†ǯ•„‹”–Š†ƒ›ȌǡƒŽŽ‘ˆ™Š‹ Šƒ”‡ practiced by the Qadim. The Ikhwani group regards these practices

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, later on they developed into a distinguished group differing from the Wahhabiyya. ʹͲŠ‡ϐ‹‰—”‡•‘ˆ–Š‡Qadim and the Ikhwani groups are based on the tables provided by Ma Tong 傜䙊’s work with my estimation data including other Muslim peoples ‹Š‹ƒǤ‡‡ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’’Ǥ͵ͷʹȂ͵ͷ͵Ǥ ͳͷʹ Wang Jianping as Chinese or indigenous acculturations and deviations from the righ- teous path of Islam. China’s founding Š™ƒ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•™‡”‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡† by the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia they encountered during their hajj there, and they came back to China vowing to expunge alien Chinese practices from Muslim communities and restore Islam in China to the true way of Allah. The Ikhwani group is also opposed to all forms of —ϐ‹•ǤŠ‡•Ž‘‰ƒ–Š‡›’‘’—Žƒ”‹œ‡†‹–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž›ʹͲ–Š ‡–—”›™ƒ•ǡ “Down with menhuan 䰘ᇖ (Chinese for —ϐ‹•Ȍƒ††‡•–”‘›–Š‡“—„„ƒ (Arabic, referring to the tombs of the —ϐ‹•ƒ‹–•ȌdzǤʹͳ Nowadays, ‘purist’ Chinese Muslims who wish to practice a more ‘orthodox’ Islam often belong to Ikhwani communities. Unlike the term Wahhabi, the Ikhwani School of the Hui Muslims does not have negative connotations of po- liticization and radicalism, and in fact Ikhwani groups are tolerated by the Chinese government. The major differences between —ϐ‹ƒ†–Š‡‘Ǧ—ϐ‹‰”‘—’•ƒ”‡–Š‡ following: First, a —ϐ‹‘”†‡”Šƒ•ƒ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•Ž‡ƒ†‡”™Š‘ƒ’’‘‹–•Š‹• ”‡’”‡•‡–ƒ–‹˜‡•–‘•—’‡”˜‹•‡Š‹• ‘—‹–‹‡•Ǣ‘Ǧ—ϐ‹‰”‘—’•Šƒ˜‡‘ such central leadership, and no hierarchical structure that spans local communities.ʹʹ Second, the leaders of —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ƒ†•—„‘”†‡”•—•—ƒŽŽ› pass their power onto designated successors, in most cases chosen from their own kin or disciples. By contrast, non-—ϐ‹‰”‘—’• Š‘‘•‡–Š‡‹” ‹ƒ•–Š”‘—‰Š ‘—‹–› ‘•‡•—•ǤŠ‹”†ǡ—ϐ‹•’”ƒ –‹ ‡ƒ‹†‘ˆ mysticism (tariqa, Arabic for ‘the way toward ŽŽƒŠǯȌƒŽ‹‡–‘‘Ǧ—ϐ‹ Islam. In their rituals they emphasize dhikr (chanting accompanied by „‘†›‘˜‡‡–•Ȍƒ†‡†‹–ƒ–‹‘Ǥ‘Ǧ—ϐ‹‰”‘—’•ƒ”‡†‡˜‘–‡†–‘ˆ—Ž- ϐ‹ŽŽ‹‰–Š‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘„Ž‹‰ƒ–‹‘••ƒ –‹‘‡†„›–Š‡Quran and the Sun- na, and they reject the ritualistic and meditative practices of the —ϐ‹Ǥ Fourth, —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ƒ”‡ ‡–‡”‡†‘ƒ“—„„ƒ, or tomb (mazar, Arabic, re- fers to the tomb of a —ϐ‹•ƒ‹–ƒ‘‰–Š‡Turkic Muslim ‘—‹–‹‡•Ȍ complexes holding the graves of the orders’ founding saints, and —ϐ‹ disciples believe in karama – miracles accomplished by saints (wali ⬖ 䟼Ȍǡ‘”„›—ϐ‹ƒ•–‡”•ǤŠ‡”‡ˆ‘”‡ǡ–Š‡›”‡‰ƒ”†pilgrimages to tombs as

ʹͳ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’Ǥͳ͵͵Ǥ ʹʹ This is only considered relatively, not absolutely since in the special time and spe- cial circumstance, i.e., in the time of the Muslim insurrection against the oppres- sion of Chinese imperial authorities, the non-—ϐ‹‰”‘—’••— Šƒ•Qadim Muslims could formulate a central leadership or a prominent Muslim leader who led all —•Ž‹•ϐ‹‰Š–‹‰ƒ‰ƒ‹•––Š‡‘ǦMuslim rulers. The most remarkable example is Du Wenxiu ᶌ᮷⿰ȋͳͺʹ͵Ȃͳͺ͹ʹȌƒ†Ma Dexin 傜ᗧᯠȋͳ͹ͻͶȂͳͺ͹ͶȌ‹–Š‡—ƒ- nese —•Ž‹”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ȋͳͻth ‡–—”›ȌǤ‡‡ƒ‹Š‘—›‹ͳͻͷ͵Ǥ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͷ͵ their most important rituals, even more important than the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some —ϐ‹‰”‘—’•‡˜‡†‡‡–Š‡‹”—ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•–‘Šƒ˜‡†‹˜‹‡ natures equivalent to the Prophet Muhammad or even Allah. However, the non-—ϐ‹‰”‘—’•ǡ’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”Ž›–Š‡Ikhwani, reject these practices as ƒ„‡””ƒ–‹‘•Ǣ–Š‡›”‡‰ƒ”†tomb venerating as a heresy. There are also many other divisions that differentiate China’s Mus- lim communities. More than half of China’s Tajik Muslims in China fol- low •ƒ‹᪂‹ŽŠ‹᪂‹•ǡ‘”Seventh Imam sect in the Š‹᪂ƒˆƒ‹–ŠǤŠ‡›”‡- gard the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader, and pay annual tribute to his representatives from abroad. Many Uighurs in Yarkand (Yeerqiang ਦቄ㖼, today Shache 㦾䖖Ȍ ‹ •‘—–Š‡” Xinjiang are followers of the Twelfth Imam Š‹᪂ƒǡ‘”–Š‡ƒŒ‘”‹–›Š‹᪂‹‰”‘—’‹–Š‡Islamic world. In addition, a small number of Hui in Xinjiang and Gansu follow Twelfth ƒŠ‹᪂‹•Ǥʹ͵ ͷȌChinese Muslims display a wide range of day-to-day religious prac- tices. The sedentary Hui, Uighur and Uzbek Muslims pray regularly in mosques, and pious —•Ž‹•‡˜‡’”ƒ›ϐ‹˜‡–‹‡•ƒ†ƒ›ǤŠ‡‘ƒ†‹  Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muslims pray possibly one or two times a day in their tents. Fasting during Ramadan is widespread among Muslims in Northwest China, but Hui who live in coastal China often observe only a few days’ fasting or do not fast at all. The Turkic Muslims of western China celebrate the †ƒŽǦ—”„ƒȋƒ›‘ˆƒ ”‹ϐ‹ ‡Ȍƒ•–Š‡„‹‰‰‡•–Islam- ic festival. But the Hui mark the end of Ramadan as the most important Islamic festival. Many Hui communities in southwest China even treat Maulid, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, as the biggest Islamic festival. While the Hui have adopted many Chinese customs and cultural habits, the Turkic and Tajik Muslims retain the traditions of Turkic and Iranian Islam, including some pre-Islamic elements drawn from sha- manism, Manichaeism, Buddhism and star-worship.ʹͶ In the cities and towns Muslims often drink alcohol, but in regions with strong Islamic traditions drinking is regarded as a grave violation of Islamic law. In

ʹ͵ On the Shi’a among the Hui in Xin jiang, I got the information from my trip to the ”‡‰‹‘‹ʹͲͲͲǢXinjiang Hui surnamed Yu ⿩, now doing trade in Beijing, claims himself to be a Shi’a and assures me that there is a small group of Shi’a among the Hui in Yili Ժ⢱ of North Xin jiang. On the Shi’a Hui in Gansu, I got the information from my colleague Prof. Feng Jinyuan ߟӺⓀ™Š‘•ƒ™–Š‡‹Š‹•ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹–Š‡ ͳͻͺͲ•Ǥ ʹͶ Šƒ‘”—ʹͲͲͲǤ ͳͷͶ Wang Jianping western China many Muslims take it as a religious duty to send their children to study the Arabic Quran and Islam in madaris, but full-scale madrasa education in the eastern part of China is considerably rare. Many Muslims in central and eastern China understand being Muslim to ‡ƒƒ˜‘‹†‹‰’‘”‡ƒ–ƒ†Ž‹––Ž‡‘”‡Ǣ„—–ˆ‘”ƒ›‡–Š‹ ƒŽŽ› Turkic Muslims in China’s west Islam is a whole way of life, and they must follow the Quran and Sunna in their entirety. Among the —ϐ‹ groups the different orders sometimes clash each other just for a small variety in the tone of chanting the Quranic text, the method of medita- tion or in some ritual formation.ʹͷ

The Impetus to Unity Among China’s Muslim Communities

Although the many factors described above offer a picture of tremen- dous diversity in Islam in China, there is also clearly a trend towards greater unity among these Muslim communities, particularly over the past two decades of economic reform. There are several factors encour- aging greater unity among China’s Muslim communities. ǤUmma‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–› The sentiment of umma (Arabic, ‘Muslim ƒ–‹‘Š‘‘† ‘” ˆ”ƒ–‡”‹–›ǯȌ links otherwise disparate Muslim communities together as they all strive to survive in a non-Muslim society. If one visits a mosque in Shanghai, China’s largest commercial and industrial city where many Uighur businesspeople travel to do business, one often sees Uighur Muslims praying alongside Hui Muslims. The Uighurs do not have their own mosque, and so the two communities pray together. In many other big cities, such as Beijing, Guangzhou ᒯᐎ, Xi’an, Lanzhou and Shenzhen ␡ൣ, it is common for Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds to pray together. The same applies to Hui travelers in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰Ǣ‹ˆ–Š‡› ƒ‘– ϐ‹†ƒmosque for Hui Muslims, they attend a Uighur mosque to pray. In madaris in Beijing and elsewhere throughout China, Uighur khalifa sit beside Hui khalifa in the same classroom studying the Quran and other Islamic subjects. Some —ϐ‹‘”†‡”••— Šƒ•Lingming Tang ⚥᰾า and some sub-orders of Š—ϐ‹››ƒ ƒŽ•‘ Šƒ˜‡ –”ƒ•Ǧ‡–Š‹  ‡„‡”•Š‹’Ǥ •

ʹͷ ƒ‘‰Šƒ•”‡ ‘”†‡†ƒ› ƒ•‡•‘ˆ•— Š Žƒ•Š‡•ƒ†‡˜‡•ƒ‰—‹ƒ”› ‘ϐŽ‹ –• among the different —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‘”•—„‘”†‡”•‹Š‹ƒǯ•Š‹•–‘”›ȋƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ȌǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͷͷ regional mobility grows, this kind of cross-ethnic religious mixing is also growing. Occasionally, this trans-ethnic religious sentiment has also given ”‹•‡ –‘ –”ƒ•Ǧ‡–Š‹  ’”‘–‡•–•Ǥ  ͳͻͺͻ Muslims in Beijing, Shanghai, Lanzhou, Kunming ᰶ᰾, Urumqi (Wulumuqi Ѽ励ᵘ喀ȌǡXi’an and Xin- ing 㾯ᆱ protested against a Chinese book Sexual Customs which had passages insulting to Islam. The public rallies brought together Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Dongxiang, and Salar Muslims with Hui Muslims. Un- der great pressure, the Chinese authorities banned the book and put the two Chinese authors under house arrest.ʹ͸ Such umma•‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–›‹•ƒŽ•‘”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹mosque building and main- tenance and Islamic education. When a local community builds or reno- vates a mosque, funds for the task are collected not only from the com- munity itself, but also from other communities and individual Muslims even in far distant regions. Likewise, funding for madrasa schools and Islamic festivals often comes from a wide variety of sources. When a local Muslim community celebrates major Islamic holidays such as the Id al-Qurban, the end of the Ramadan, and the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, representatives from other Muslim communities are in- vited to participate in the festival and may travel thousands of kilome- ters to attend.ʹ͹ ǤŠƒ”‡† ƒ‹–Š The various Muslim ethnic groups and different Islamic schools de- scribed above share the same basic religious beliefs and practices, and this in itself helps to encourage unity between communities. Any Mus- lim – Uighur, Uzbek, Tajik, Dongxiang, or Hui – certainly believes in the same Quran, the Prophet Muhammad and probably hopes to master Ar- ƒ„‹ ǢƒŽŽ’‹‘—•Muslims follow the same essential Five Pillars of Islam: reciting the Islamic credo in Arabic, praying, giving alms, fasting, and, if possible, making a pilgrimage to Mecca. The social cement that this shared faith generates is seen, for example, in social events that bring different groups together. In annual competitions of Quranic chanting

ʹ͸ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͳǢ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ͳͻͻ͸„ȋŠ‡  ‹†‡–‘ˆ‘‘‘ˆSexual Cus- toms‹Š‹ƒȌǤ ʹ͹ Many pieces of the monument stones in various mosques have the inscription texts display this point, and the author himself has clearly seen the inter-links of Muslim communities concerning building mosque and Islamic festival celebration in his many trips to the —•Ž‹ ‘—‹–‹‡•‹Š‹ƒǤ‡‡—Ȁ‡‹ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳͷ͸ Wang Jianping organized by the Islamic Association of China or by local Islamic asso- ciations, Uighur Muslims and Muslims from other ethnic groups join with Hui Muslims in reciting the Arabic —”ƒ™‹–ŠƒŽŽ–Š‡ϐŽ—‡ ›ƒ† ‡Ž‘†›–Š‡› ƒ—•–‡”Ǣ–Š‹••‹ŽŽ‹• ‘•‹†‡”‡†ƒ‰”‡ƒ–˜‹”–—‡„›ƒŽŽ Muslims in China. The basic creed of Islam that Muslims subscribe to is generally the •ƒ‡ ƒ ”‘•• ‘—‹–‹‡•ǡ ™‹–Š •‘‡ ˜ƒ”‹ƒ–‹‘• ”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‰ Ž‘ ƒŽ —Ž- tural adjustments. In encountering a non-Islamic environment with a strong ƒŠ‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ǡŠ‹‡•‡Muslims tend to focus on their own communities, and they prefer to mix with other followers of Islam rather than assimilating into Han Chinese culture. Muslims ev- erywhere across China uphold the same dietary customs and dine at halal (according to •Žƒ‹ ”‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘•Ȍ”‡•–ƒ—”ƒ–•‘” ƒˆ‡–‡”‹ƒ•ǤŠ‡› also often pepper their conversation with some Arabic or Persian vo- cabulary, although they may speak Mandarin Chinese or Chinese dia- lects, especially if they are Hui.ʹͺ —•Ž‹•ƒ™ƒ›ˆ”‘Š‘‡‘ˆ–‡ϐ‹† it easier to socialize with other Muslims and receive hospitality from locals Muslims. When Chinese Muslims meet other Muslims, they often greet each other with dostȋ‡”•‹ƒǡǮˆ”‹‡†ǯȌ‘”salamȋ”ƒ„‹ ǡ’‡ƒ ‡ȌǤ The way of Islamic way of life is thus deeply rooted in habits and tradi- tions that transcend communal boundaries. Ǥ”‘••”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–› Chinese Muslims have developed strong sympathies for the injustices they perceive other Muslims suffering in a predominantly non-Muslim society, and they have proven willing to aid other Muslim communities. There have been cases of Chinese Muslims acting in concert to resist or ’”‘–‡•–Š‘•–‹Ž‹–›ˆ”‘™‹†‡”•‘ ‹‡–›Ǥ Žƒ–‡ʹͲͲͲ–Š‡DzYangxin Incident” occurred in which Hui Muslims in Yangxin 䱣ؑ, Shandong, fought with Han Chinese after Muslim bans on eating pork were mocked and vio- lated. Hui from Mengcun ᆏᶁ Hebei Province, traveled to Yangxin to show their solidarity with their fellow Muslims brothers. When the Hui protestors from Mengcun marched into Yangxin their way was blocked by armed police. The local government mishandled the incident and six Hui Muslim ‹˜‹Ž‹ƒ•™‡”‡‹ŽŽ‡†‹–Š‡‡•—‹‰‰—ϐ‹”‡Ǥʹͻ After word of this tragedy spread across China, many Muslim communities in Hebei, Shandong, He’nan, Tianjin and even Beijing mobilized and held protests

ʹͺ ‡‡ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳƒǤ ʹͻ ƒ‘ƒ‘—ƒʹͲͲʹǡ’ǤͷͲǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͷ͹ demanding the government redress this injustice and pay compensa- tion for the deaths.͵Ͳ Muslims in other regions donated money to the families of those who died or were injured. The central government, fearing wider instability, moved very swiftly to assuage Muslim anger and dismissed local leaders in Yangxin, including the chief of the police force. The government also met all the demands raised by the Hui pro- testers.͵ͳ ‡ƒ”Ž›ʹͲͲͳƒ—ϐ‹•—„‘”†‡”ȋ–Š‡ƒŽƒ”‡Š—ƒȌ‹Guanghe Coun- ty ᒯ⋣৯, ƒ•—”‘˜‹ ‡ǡ„”‘‡‘—–‹‹–‡”ƒŽϐ‹‰Š–‹‰ƒˆ–‡”‹–•ƒ•- ter passed away and there was a dispute over who was his rightful •— ‡••‘”ǤŠ‡ϐ‹‰Š–‹‰ ‘•––™‘Ž‹˜‡•ǡƒ†Ž‘ ƒŽƒ—–Š‘”‹–‹‡•‘”†‡”‡†–Š‡ temporary closure of the suborder’s mosque. The —ϐ‹„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•–Š‡ had no place to pray, and other neighboring Muslim communities invit- ed the —ϐ‹„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”•–‘’”ƒ›‹–Š‡‹”mosques, although they belonged to different —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ƒ††‹ˆˆ‡”‡–‡–Š‹ ‰”‘—’•Ǥ͵ʹ It is not unusual for a Uighur Muslim to seek shelter in a Hui mosque or community if traveling in central and eastern China. The traveler may even receive a few days’ free accommodation from his co-believers despite different cultural backgrounds and customs. The sentiment of the umma can therefore act as a unifying force transcending barriers between different communities, groups and schools. Indeed, throughout China’s history many Muslim uprisings against imperial governments contained different Muslim groups: Hui, Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar, Dongxiang, and others.͵͵ Ǥ—•Ž‹‡–™‘”• In the wake of China’s economic reforms, overlapping trade, communi- cations and cultural networks have been emerging in Chinese Muslim

͵Ͳ The author is aware of this through interviews he held with the participants from these provinces at a conference held in ‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ‘˜‡„‡”ʹͲͲͳǤ ͵ͳ ‡ˆ‡”–‘–Š‡‹Š—ƒ‡™•‰‡ ›ǯ•”‡’‘”–ƒ––Š‡„‡‰‹‹‰‘ˆʹͲͲͳǢ ‘ϐ‹”‡†„› the author’s interviews with the Hui Muslims from North China during a confer- ence held by Islamic Association of China (Zhongguo Yisilan-jiao Xiehui ѝഭԺᯟޠ ᮉॿՊ , ‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ‘˜‡„‡”ͻȂͳʹǡʹͲͲͳǤ ͵ʹ ƒ•‡†‘–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”ǯ•’‡”•‘ƒŽ‘„•‡”˜ƒ–‹‘•‹Š‹•ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹Guanghe of Gansu, ƒ—ƒ”›͵ͲǡʹͲͲͳǤ ͵͵ For example, the Muslim uprisings in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹–Š‡ͳͺthƒ†–Š‡ͳͻth centuries, the Muslim uprisings in Northwest China and in —ƒ‹–Š‡ͳͻth century. See Tan ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͶͺȂ͸ͶǢ ‹ͳͻͺͻǡ’ǤͶ͵Ǣ ƒ‘‡›—ƒͳͻͻͺǤ ͳͷͺ Wang Jianping society. Š‡‰”‘™‹‰‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡‡–™‘”•‹Š‹ƒ‹•†‡• ”‹„‡† in the following six scenes: ͳȌ The Muslim economic network in China: After China opened its door –‘ƒƒ”‡–‡ ‘‘›‹–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǡ’”‹˜ƒ–‡‡–‡”’”‹•‡†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡†”ƒ’‹†- ly, and Muslims have taken advantage of liberalizing economic policies to set up their own business. Many Muslim-owned restaurants, work- shops, shops, hotels, and companies have mushroomed across the coun- try. According to recent statistics, in Beijing alone there are at least two thousand Muslim-owned enterprises such as restaurants, cafeteria, butchers, hotel, kindergartens, and other private businesses.͵Ͷ In many areas of China markets for halal beef and mutton and other Muslim foodstuffs, leather, handicrafts, and herbs have absolutely be- come dominated by Muslims. Many of these private Muslim enterprises ‘–”‹„—–‡’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡‹”’”‘ϐ‹–•–‘mosques and Islamic schools. Their donations have already given rise to informal Islamic charity founda- tions serving Islamic welfare and public welfare. Some Muslim busi- nessmen have founded business syndicates with many branches span- ning many regions. Sha Pengcheng ⋉呿〻, a Hui Muslim entrepreneur who owns a traditional Hui medical company in Xi’an and exports med- icine to many countries in Middle East, Southeast Asia and European ƒ†‡”‹ ƒ ‘—–”‹‡•™‘–Š‡ʹͲͲͲ ‘‘‹ ‹‘‡‡””‹œ‡•’‘- sored by Omar Foundation in Los Angeles.͵ͷ Many Chinese Muslims also use their connections with their friends in Islamic countries to do in- ternational business linking up with international Islamic foundations. ʹȌ A regional network of transportation, communication and commer- cial links fostering economic and trade cooperation among Muslim communities: Even in imperial China, Muslims were famed for their far-reaching transport and commerce networks, such as the Silk Road, the Spice Road and trans-Asiatic caravan trade. For Muslims in China, as elsewhere, the early career of Muhammad as a trader set an example of combining commerce and piety. Traditionally, Chinese Muslims trad- ed in porcelain, silk, textiles, minerals, tea, jade and other commodities. Muslims also developed special secret signs and practices to protect

͵Ͷ ‡‰ʹͲͲͳǡ’Ǥ͵ʹǢ‡‰ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’Ǥͳͺ͵Ǣ ‰ƒ‹‡†–Š‹•ϐ‹‰—”‡ƒŽ•‘ˆ”‘›‹–‡”˜‹‡™ with the Deputy Secretary in General of Islamic Association of Beijing (Beijing Yi- silanjiao Xiehui ेӜԺᯟޠᮉॿՊȌ‹ —‡‘ˆʹͲͲʹǤ ͵ͷ News reported by Zhongguo musilinʹͲͲͳȀʹǡ’ǤͶͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͷͻ their trade, and they formed trade guilds to regulate trade and trans- portation. Today, China’s Muslims, especially the Hui and the Uighur peoples, have inherited a traditional proclivity for trade and commerce.͵͸ In western China, particularly in mountainous regions such as Yunnan, Gansu and Guizhou 䍥ᐎ where communications are backward, Mus- lims still dominate the modern ‘caravan’ trade of today. In these and other regions, Muslim owners of motor vehicles have developed re- gional networks carry passengers and goods. The trading traditions of China’s Muslim communities, and their wider religious networks, have „‡‡‰‹˜‡‡™Ž‹ˆ‡ƒ†‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‹–Š‡™ƒ‡‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•‡ ‘‘‹ ”‡- ˆ‘”•ǡƒ†–Š‹•‡™‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‹•ƒŽ•‘”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹•–”‡‰–Š‡‡† ‘–ƒ –• between Muslims across the country. ͵Ȍ A network of production and distribution of Islamic goods to meet the demand of believers in China: Muslims in China have also developed their own networks to make and distribute daily goods used by Muslims everywhere. Muslims make and sell halal foods for residents and trav- elers. Many mosques have shops to distribute special religious items such as soap, white caps, cloth to wrap corpses, prayer badges, jewel- ry, headscarves, prayer carpets, porcelain, incense and incense-burner, and Islamic booklets and publications. The commercial links created by the circulation of these Islamic goods made by Chinese Muslims have formed an Islamic economy that to a considerable degree independent of the Han Chinese economy and commercial distribution networks. ͶȌ The creation of Islamic websites: With the spread of the Internet, Islamic communities throughout China have also taken to using high technology to communicate. Two dozen or so Islamic websites have been set up by the Muslims in China since the last few years.͵͹ Most of them are devoted to spreading the doctrine of Islam and instructing Muslim people in their faith, and there are also a few Muslim-oriented commercial and academic websites run by Muslims. Islamic religious websites are usually operated by Hui Muslim teachers and students in madaris. Much of the content explains the basic tenets of Islam and pro- motes Islamic culture. The websites also report news from the rest of the Islamic ™‘”Ž†ƒ†‘ˆˆ‡” ‘‡–ƒ”‹‡•‘ —””‡–—•Ž‹ƒˆˆƒ‹”•Ǣ for example, the reaction of the Muslim world to the ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳter-

͵͸ For •Žƒ‹ ‡ ‘‘›ǡ•‡‡ƒ‹ͳͻͻʹǤ ͵͹ ƒȀ —ʹͲͲʹǡ’ǤʹͶǤ ͳ͸Ͳ Wang Jianping rorist attacks and the bombing in Afghanistan afterward.͵ͺ Quite a few articles criticize the spread of materialism in contemporary Chinese society, and discuss how Muslims should protect their faith in an atmo- sphere of spiritual crisis. Many young Muslims also socialize in special Muslim internet ‘chat rooms,’ and these rooms have also acted as a bridge for forming friend- •Š‹’•„‡–™‡‡–Š‡Ǥ ‘”‹•–ƒ ‡ǡ ’”‹ŽʹͲͲʹƒ–”ƒˆϐ‹ ƒ ‹†‡–‹ŽŽ‡† three Hui Muslim students from the Zhaotong Madrasa (Zhaotong Jing- xuexiao ᱝ䙊㓿ᆖṑȌ in —ƒ†—”‹‰ƒ•’”‹‰˜ƒ ƒ–‹‘‘—–‹‰Ǣƒˆ–‡” news of the tragedy was posted on Internet, many Muslims from across China sent messages of condolence to Zhaotong Madrasa, and also sent donations to the families of the deceased and the school.͵ͻ Many web- sites have opened discussion forums on topics such as how to be a true Muslim, attitudes towards the Chinese language, how to maintain faith in a non-Muslim social environment, and whether Muslims are allowed to sell drugs to others. These Islamic websites have become another channel for reviving and spreading Islamic tradition and culture in China. ͷȌA network of Islamic publications: In contemporary China a network has evolved to produce and distribute Muslim newspapers, magazines and books, as well as cassettes, videocassettes and CDs diskette of Is- lamic materials.ͶͲ Many Muslim entrepreneurs, driven by religious pi- ety, have opened Islamic bookshops, publishers, cultural centers and libraries to spread Islamic knowledge and strengthen ethnic-religious identity. Hundreds, even thousands, of Islamic shops distribute Islamic books, magazines and audio-visual materials throughout China. They sell material such as recordings of —”ƒ‹ ”‡ ‹–ƒ–‹‘•Ǣ”ƒ„‹ •‡”‘• (™ƒಃœȌ †‡Ž‹˜‡”‡† „› ˆƒ‘—• Ž‡”‹ •Ǣ •‡”‘• †‡Ž‹˜‡”‡† †—”‹‰ ”‹†ƒ› prayers by notable imams or Khatib (Š—–„ƒȌǢƒ†ϐ‹Ž•ƒ††‘ —‡- taries on the history and traditions of Islam, as well as on current af- fairs such as the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the Afghanistan War. Muslim printing houses in many places, especially in northwest Chi- na, have published tens of thousands copies of Islamic books including

͵ͺ Šƒ‰Š‡‰œŠ‹ʹͲͲʹǤ ͵ͻ —•‹Ž‹–‘‰š—ǡ —‡ʹͲͲʹǡ’’ǤͳͳȂͳʹǤ ͶͲ Many Islamic publications such as Kaituo, Musilin tongxun, Gansu musilin ⭈㚳ぶᯟ ᷇ (Muslims in ƒ•—Ȍƒ†A min 䱯᭿ ȋ‡ƒ ‡ȌŠƒ˜‡–Š‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽ ‘Ž—ˆ‘”Dzƒ†˜‡”- tisement” to sell the Islamic books, cassettes and videocassettes with the Islamic contents. ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͸ͳ the Arabic Quran, the hadith, the works of the •Šƒ”‹ಃƒ, the tafsir (com- mentaries of the Holy —”ƒȌǡkalamȋ–Š‡‘Ž‘‰‹ ƒŽǦ†‘‰ƒ–‹ †‹• ‘—”•‡•Ȍǡ works on —ϐ‹•ǡ •Žƒ‹ history, and instructional handbooks on Is- lam. These Islamic bookshops, centers and associations have created an informal system to distribute ideas and information to all Muslim communities nationwide, thus binding together scattered communities into an consciously Islamic. ͸Ȍ A network of Islamic education has developed which spans differ- ent Chinese Muslim communities. China’s Muslims communities are so widely dispersed and so religiously diverse it is impossible for any one community to maintain a system of religious education relying only on its own funding, teachers and students. Muslim communities in China usually like to invite an akhond from outside to take charge of madrasa schooling. On the other hand, a community with a strong Islamic tradi- tion regards it as a duty to send its knowledgeable, pious akhond to do religious work in other communities, even remote ones, to revive and spread Islam. It is not uncommon nowadays, for example, for an imam from Xin- jiang to travel to Guangzhou in South China to act as an imam of a mosque there and give religious instruction in the madrasa. When a fa- mous akhond opened a course on the Arabic Quran, •Šƒ”‹ಃƒ and hadith in a madrasa in Yunnan, many students came from distant places such as Guizhou, Sichuan ഋᐍ, Gansu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang 唁嗉⊏, Hainan and He’nan to study under his guidance. The local community also regarded it as a duty and honor to accommodate these students from other com- munities. When they graduate, these madrasa students will probably accept positions as imams in their home or other communities. Often larger communities with strong Islamic traditions estab- lish big madrasa, and invite prominent Islamic scholars to recruit and teach Muslim students. There are also heavily Muslim areas with many mosques and madaris boasting famous Islamic teachers who attract Žƒ”‰‡ ‰”‘—’• ‘ˆ •–—†‡–•Ǣ –Š‡•‡ ƒ”‡ƒ• Šƒ˜‡ †‡˜‡Ž‘’‡† ”‡’—–ƒ–‹‘• ƒ• China’s “Little Meccas” (xiao maijia ሿ哖࣐Ȍǡƒ†–Š‡‹”‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡”ƒ†‹- ates out to other Muslim communities throughout their home regions. Currently, they can be found in Xinjiang (at Kashgar, Hotan, Yarkand, Turfan, Aksu, and ‹Ž‹ȌǢ ƒ•— (Linxia, Guanghe and ƒœŠ‘—ȌǢ Ning- xia (Weizhou, Yinchuan 䬦ᐍ, and Tongxin ਼ᗳȌǢYunnan (Shadian ⋉ ⭨, Kunming, Weishan ᏽኡ, Najiaying 㓣ᇦ㩕, and Dali བྷ⨶ȌǢShaanxi (‹ǯƒȌǢShanxi ኡ㾯 (Changzhi 䮯⋫ȌǢ He’nan (Zhengzhou 䜁ᐎ, Sang- ͳ͸ʹ Wang Jianping po ẁඑ, Baizhai ⲭመ, and Gadangdian ⯉ⱙᓇȌǢƒ†Hebei (Cangzhou ⋗ᐎȌǤͶͳ They are widely considered by Chinese Muslims to be central places of Islam in China. These “Little Meccas” act as regional hubs in a loose nationwide network of Islamic education.Ͷʹ They could poten- tially play a central role in uniting scattered communities at a regional level, becoming regional headquarters for guiding Muslim interaction with the majority Han Chinese society and the Chinese state.

The Features of the Islamic Revival Movement in China

Ǥ‘•“—‡• The Islamic revival in China over recent decades is vividly displayed in the building of many new mosques, in both Arabic style with domes and Chinese style with pagodas, and the restoration and enlargement of many existing mosques.Ͷ͵ These mosques play a fundamental role in the religious, social and cultural life of —•Ž‹•Ǣ–Š‡› ƒ‘–Ž‹˜‡ƒ’”‘’- er Islamic life without a mosque led by an akhond. Among —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ǡ many mazar complexes, mosques and spiritual residences have been rebuilt since the government took a more tolerant attitude towards ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘‹–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǤͶͶ Over the last decade I have visited and photo- graphed many mosques and mazars throughout China: the deserts and oases of South ‹Œ‹ƒ‰ǢŽƒ”‰‡‘†‡”mosques with big domes and tall minarets newly built in Yunnan, Gansu, Shanghai and ‹‰š‹ƒǢ–”ƒ†‹- tional Chinese temple-style mosques in Shaanxi, Jiangsu ⊏㣿, Beijing and ‹ƒŒ‹Ǣƒ†ƒ›•ƒŽŽmosques in the northern Chinese country- side of Hebei and He’nan. A mosque is an architectural complex with many religious, social and cultural functions.Ͷͷ As China is so remote from Mecca and Medina, the centers of the Islamic world, and as many Muslim communities – particularly the Hui – are surrounded by non-Muslim majorities, Chi- nese mosques are widely regarded by Muslims as a particularly sacred

Ͷͳ On this central place in ‡„‡‹ǡ•‡‡—‹“‹‰ͳͻͻͻǡ˜‘ŽǤʹǤ Ͷʹ Concerning the theory of “Little Mecca” in studies of Islam of China, refer to the ƒ—–Š‘”ǯ•†‘ –‘”‹ƒŽ†‹••‡”–ƒ–‹‘ȋƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ͳͻͻ͸ƒȌǡ’’ǤͳͷͺȂͳ͸ͲǤ Ͷ͵ ‡‡— ‹ƒ™‡‹ͳͻͻͷƒ†ͳͻͻͺǤ ͶͶ ‡‡ƒ™—–ʹͲͲͳǡ–Š‡Žƒ–‡•–„‘‘‘mazar, published by Dawut Rahila, a female Uighur scholar in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰Ǣ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ™—–ʹͲͲʹǡ’ǤͶͶǤ Ͷͷ ‘”‘”‡•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ǡ•‡‡ ‡‰ͳͻͻʹǡ’’Ǥ͵ͲȂ͵Ͷƒ†ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ͳͻͻ͸ƒǡ ’’Ǥͳ͵ͲȂͳ͵͵Ǥ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͸͵ sites that play a central role in community life. A mosque complex of- ten has walls to keep out non-Muslim intruders.Ͷ͸ It usually consists of a prayer hall, rooms for ritual ablution, a religious school, a khalifa’s dormitory, an akhond’s residence, a maitaȋ”ƒ„‹ ˆ‘”Ǯ ‘”’•‡ǯȌ”‘‘ where the deceased are kept, a meeting room, a courtyard or garden, a kitchen, storerooms, and a shop that sells religious books and items, a minaret and historic relics such as tomb stones and memorials. In some areas mosques include special prayer halls for women. Given mosques’ central importance, over recent years many Chinese Muslim commu- nities build large, elegant mosques, and even small, poor villages can „‘ƒ•–“—‹–‡‰”ƒ†‘‡•Ǥ‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǡƒ› ‘—‹–‹‡•Šƒ˜‡„—‹Ž– mosques in the Arabic architectural style with large domes, tall mina- rets, and crescent symbols. The mosque is usually a complex that functions not only as a reli- gious site but also as a site for education, cultural activities, social and economic exchanges, and even martial arts training. Now we turn to the ‘•–•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‘ˆ–Š‘•‡ˆ— –‹‘•ˆ‘”–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ revival movement in China: education and publications, both closely linked with mosques. Ǥ •Žƒ‹ Education Islamic scholars in China have argued that in every mosque the madra- sa, or religious school (jingxuexiao 㓿ᆖṑȌǡ•Š‘—Ž†„‡ƒ––Š‡ ‡–‡”‘ˆ the mosque’s life.Ͷ͹–ƒ ‘•‡”˜ƒ–‹˜‡‡•–‹ƒ–‡ǡ–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡ƒ„‘—–ͶͲǡͲͲͲ mosques in China, and at least half of them have a madrasa or madra- sa-style religious school in which the children learn the teachings of Islam learning and pious young Muslims are trained to be clerics. China ƒ›–Š—•Šƒ˜‡ƒ„‘—–ʹͲǡͲͲͲ •Žƒ‹ schools or Quranic study centers of varying sizes and status. Local estimates also suggest that these schools ƒ”‡—‡”‘—•Ǣˆ‘”‡šƒ’Ž‡ǡLinxia Prefecture, Gansu, has a reputation of being a “Little ‡ ƒǡdzƒ†‹–Šƒ†‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲǡͲͲͲmadrasa students studying at various Islamic • Š‘‘Ž•‹ͳͻͻ͹ǤͶͺ For China as a whole, at a ‘•‡”˜ƒ–‹˜‡‡•–‹ƒ–‡–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡’”‘„ƒ„Ž›‘”‡–ŠƒʹͲͲǡͲͲͲ•–—†‡–• studying in madaris.

Ͷ͸ Not only a few mosques put a wooden board on the gate of the prayer hall writ- ten in Chinese: No non-Muslim is allowed to enter the hall. I observed this kind of „‘ƒ”†‹›ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹Yunnan, Gansu, Hebei and Beijing. Ͷ͹ ƒ‰ƒ‹™‡ʹͲͲͲǡ’ǤʹͲǤ Ͷͺ Šƒ‰Š‹Š—ƒͳͻͻ͹ǡ’ǤͳͻǤ ͳ͸Ͷ Wang Jianping

Islamic ‡†— ƒ–‹‘‹Š‹ƒ ƒ„‡†‹˜‹†‡†‹–‘–Š”‡‡•‡ –‘”•ǣ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ madaris, private madaris–‘Ž‡”ƒ–‡†„›Ž‘ ƒŽƒ—–Š‘”‹–‹‡•ǡƒ†ϐ‹ƒŽŽ›ǡƒ† most widespread, community-run general instruction in Islam.Ͷͻ Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris are sponsored and administrated by the Islam- ic Association of China, a semi-government body in charge of Islamic affairs, and by provincial-level Islamic Associations. The aim of the ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris is to train imams or akhonds to serve important Mus- lim communities or work as intermediaries between the government ƒ† ‘—‹–‹‡•Ǥ–’”‡•‡–ǡ–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡‘”‡–Šƒ–‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris across the country: Urumqi, ‹Œ‹ƒ‰Ǣ ƒœŠ‘—ǡ ƒ•—Ǣ Yinchuan, ‹‰š‹ƒǢZhengzhou, He’nan Province, where more than one million Hui —•Ž‹•Ž‹˜‡ǢShenyang ⊸䱣, Liaoning 䗭ᆱǢKunming, —ƒǢXining, ‹‰Šƒ‹ǢShijiazhuang ⸣ᇦᒴ, ‡„‡‹Ǣƒ†ƒƒ–‹‘ƒŽmadrasa and a mu- nicipal madrasa in Beijing.ͷͲ Some regions and municipalities have also opened the training classes for akhondǢ–Š‡•‡ ƒ„‡ˆ‘—†‹Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tian- jin, Huhehot (Huhehaote બ઼⎙⢩Ȍǡƒ†‘–Š‡”ƒ”‡ƒ•Ǥ ‘”†‹‰–‘ͳͻͻͻ •–ƒ–‹•–‹ •ǡ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡ʹͲǡͲͲͲ—•Ž‹•–—†‡–•studying in these various ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris and training classes.ͷͳŠ‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris have regu- lar curricula. Besides the Quran and hadith and other Islamic subjects, they have introduced modern Arabic as well as Marxist philosophy, Chinese history, Chinese language, computer training and English. The graduates are granted a diploma equivalent to a college degree. —––Š‡—„‡”‘ˆ•–—†‡–•‰”ƒ†—ƒ–‹‰ˆ”‘‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽmadaris is far less than the demand for graduates from Muslim communities across China. The authorities have allowed Muslim communities to collect funds and open their own madaris, but these schools must be registered with, and supervised by, government religious affairs departments. (As this author observed during a trip to Linxia there are also unregistered madaris or —”ƒ‹  Žƒ••‡•ȌǤ Against this background, thousands of private madaris, large and small, have mushroomed all over China. Some prominent private madaris can recruit several hundred students and boast impressive ‘†‡”„—‹Ž†‹‰•ƒ†•’‘”–•‰”‘—†•ˆƒ”Žƒ”‰‡”–Šƒƒ›‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ

Ͷͻ ‘”‘”‡†‡–ƒ‹Ž‡†‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ǡ•‡‡ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳǤ ͷͲ ƒ•‡† ‘ –Š‡ ƒ—–Š‘”ǯ• ‹–‡”˜‹‡™ ™‹–Š ƒ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ ™Š‘ ™‘”• ƒ– China Madrasa (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao Jingxueyuan ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉ㓿ᆖ䲒Ȍ‹‡‹Œ‹‰ǡƒ›ǡʹͲͲͲǤ ͷͳ ƒͳͻͻͻǡ’’Ǥͳ͹ȂͳͺǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͸ͷ madaris. For example, the Linxia Arabic School in Gansu Province has even established a women’s college as well as a men’s one, and both have several hundred students from all over China who come to study Islam and Arabic. Other prominent private madaris include the Tongxin Madrasa, the Nanguan Mosque Madrasa (Nanguan Quingzhensi Jing- xuexiao ইޣ␵ⵏሪ㓿ᆖṑȌǡƒ†–Š‡Weizhou Madrasa in ‹‰š‹ƒǢ–Š‡ Xiguan 㾯ޣ Mosque Madrasa and Boshuxiang ᷿ṁᐧMosque Madra- sa in ƒœŠ‘—Ǣ–Š‡Guanghe ƒ†”ƒ•ƒ‹ ƒ•—Ǣ the Najiaying Madrasa (Najiaying Yisilan Wenhua Xueyuan 㓣ᇦ㩕Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆᆖ䲒Ȍ, Dali Arabic School (Dali Alaboyu Xuexiao བྷ⨶䱯᣹՟䈝ᆖṑȌ, Kaiyuan ᔰ䘌 Arabic School, and Huihuideng എ䖹ⲫ Madrasa in —ƒǢ–Š‡ ƒ†ƒ‰†‹ƒ⯉ ⱙᓇ Arabic School, Zhoukou Amin ઘਓ䱯᭿ Arabic School, and Baizhai ⲭመ Arabic School in ‡ǯƒǢƒ†–Š‡Šƒ‰œŠ‹”ƒ„‹ ‘ŽŽ‡‰‡ȋŠƒ‰- zhi Alaboyu Xueyuan 䮯⋫䱯᣹՟䈝ᆖ䲒Ȍ in Shanxi, Daqi བྷ⽱ Mosque Madrasa and Xinhua ᯠॾ Mosque Madrasa in Linxia, Gansu. After more than ten years’ operation, many of these large-scale pri- vate madaris have a stable body of students and teachers, and are well equipped with computers and photocopiers. Some of them even have their own libraries containing thousands of Arabic books from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and other Islamic countries.ͷʹ Certainly, most private madaris in China are very small, with only several students (khalifa•Ȍƒ†ƒakhond (or imamȌ™Š‘–‡ƒ Š‡•–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ doctrine in the courtyard of a mosque. The textbooks and curricula of these private madaris vary greatly depending on their locations and the religious traditions of the akhonds who run them. Some use modern Arabic textbooks and new teaching ‡–Š‘†•Ǣ‘–Š‡”•—•‡‘Ž†ˆƒ•Š‹‘‡†”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•–‡š–„‘‘•ƒ†ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™–Š‡ traditional madrasa schooling methods that have been passed on by akhonds for many generations.ͷ͵ Most graduates students of private madaris work as clerics in their hometown mosques. But many students choose other occupations, although they usually remain faithful Mus- lims and play some core role in the affairs of their communities. The last type of madrasa-style Islamic education is the general Is- lamic education offered by many communities. For instance, there are —”ƒ‹ • Š‘‘Ž•ƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘mosques which offer classes during the

ͷʹ Based on the author’s personal observation in Linxia and Lanzhou of Gansu Prov- ‹ ‡ǡ ƒ—ƒ”›ʹͲͲͳǤ ͷ͵ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳ͸͸ Wang Jianping winter and summer school vacations. There are also occasional classes taught by akhond for kindergarten children, adults or university stu- dents. These schools, classes and short-term programs do not aim to train the clerics but rather provide their students with basic knowledge of Islam: to teach them how to perform ritual ablution, how to pray, how to recite the core passages of the Quran.ͷͶ The impact of these shorter –‡ƒ Š‹‰’”‘‰”ƒ••Š‘—Ž†‘–„‡—†‡”‡•–‹ƒ–‡†Ǣ–Š‡›Š‡Ž’–‘”‡ƒˆϐ‹” the Muslim identity of many participants, and some Muslim clerics have pointed out in articles how participants can experience a spiritual re- birth.ͷͷ All the funds for private madaris and the primary Islamic educa- tion come from alms donated by Muslim believers. The results of this privately-supported network of Islamic education are striking: even in cosmopolitan cities like Beijing, Tianjin and Šƒ‰Šƒ‹‘‡ ƒϐ‹† many children studying the Quranic phases and basic Islam teachings at mosque schools during the summer vacation. Ǥ •Žƒ‹ —„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘• With the resurgence of Islamic consciousness and the strengthening of Muslim identity, and also the growing role of the mass media in Chinese society, Chinese Muslims in China are increasingly publishing their own newspapers, magazines and periodicals to spread their ideas. Lin Song ᷇ᶮ, a professor of Quranic studies at the Central Univer- sity of Nationalities (Zhongyang Minzu Daxue ѝཞ≁᯿བྷᆖȌ‹‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ Šƒ•‡•–‹ƒ–‡†–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡‘”‡–Šƒϐ‹ˆ–› •Žƒ‹ periodicals sponsored and published by Muslims in different parts of China.ͷ͸ Many of them Šƒ˜‡„‡ ‘‡‘”‡‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽ™‹–Š–Š‡”‹•‡‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ nationalism and religious ideology among China’s Muslim communities, particularly Hui communities. These periodicals are entirely supported by dona- tions collected from believers nationwide, and many editors of these periodicals are volunteers. Most editors and contributors are the Hui Muslim intellectuals, students and clerics. A few titles, such as Kaituo ȋ‹‘‡‡”ȌǡGansu musilin (—•Ž‹•‹ ƒ•—Ȍǡ Musilin tongxun (Muslim ‡™•Ž‡––‡”Ȍǡ or ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— (Journal of Islamic —Ž–—”‡ȌǡŠƒ˜‡

ͷͶ ƒ™—†ʹͲͲͲǢ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘—•ƒͳͻͻͳ. ͷͷ ƒ‹‰Ž‹ƒͳͻͻ͹ǡ’Ǥͷ͵Ǥ ͷ͸ Personal interview with Prof. Lin Song ᷇ᶮǡ—‰—•–ͳʹǡʹͲͲͳ‹Beijing. For a more detailed introduction to these periodicals published by different Muslim organiza- –‹‘•ƒ† ‘—‹–‹‡•‹Š‹ƒǡ•‡‡ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͸͹

’”‹–”—•‘ˆ‘”‡–ŠƒͳͲǡͲͲͲˆ‘”‡˜‡”›‹••—‡ǡƒ†–Š‡‹”†‹•–”‹„—–‹‘ covers all China. The longest surviving such magazine is more than –™‡–››‡ƒ”•‘Ž†ǡƒ†ƒ›Šƒ˜‡’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ˆ‘”‘”‡–Šƒϐ‹˜‡›‡ƒ”•Ǥ Mostly subscribers receive them for free. The contents of these magazines are very rich. These periodicals ad- dress subjects such as Islamic education, Islamic history, and Islamic ’Š‹Ž‘•‘’Š›ǡƒ†ƒŽ•‘ ƒ””›–”ƒ•Žƒ–‹‘•ˆ”‘”ƒ„‹ ’—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•Ǣ–Š‡‹” columns cover Quranic studies, ™ƒಃœȋ•‡”‘•Ȍƒ†hadith, discussions of Islamic doctrine such as kalamȋ–Š‡‘Ž‘‰›Ȍƒ†•Šƒ”‹ಃƒ law, Quranic commentaries on community news, and news reports from the Islamic world. They also address controversies in China’s Muslim societies. For instance, Muslim intellectuals and clerics have debated crucial issues such as Islamic education reform, how Islam should adapt to the mod- ‡”™‘”Ž†ǡŠ‘™–‘ ‘„ƒ––Š‡Ǯ†‡ ƒ†‡–ǯŠ‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡•‹ Hui communities, and how to revive Islamic tradition. Increasingly, these magazines have also begun to address sensitive political issues. A recent issue of Amin 䱯᭿, a magazine published by a madrasa in Zhoukou ઘਓ, He’nan Province, strongly criticized the aggressive policies adopted by Ariel Sharon against Palestinians and criticized American foreign policy in the Middle East. The magazine ex- pressed the solidarity of He’nan's Hui Muslims with the Palestinian peo- ple, supporting their struggle against Israeli occupation.ͷ͹ A magazine published by Tianmu ཙぶ Hui community in Tianjin even appealed to the Islamic Association of China to organize a Muslim Volunteer Army to go to Palestine and stand by side the Palestinian people against Isra- el as it killed the Palestinian youths in the occupied land.ͷͺ These Islamic magazines and newspapers have helped to foster the growth of Islam nationalism in China, and sometimes voiced a radical- ly Islamic response to the West and secular Chinese society. Thus the emergence of these Islamic periodicals has not only helped to link up networks of Muslim communities throughout China, it has also given ˜‘‹ ‡–‘ƒ•’‹”ƒ–‹‘•ˆ‘”ƒ•–”‘‰ǡ—‹ϐ‹‡† •Žƒ‹ identity.

ͷ͹ See A minǡ‹–‡” ••—‡ǡʹͲͲͳ™‹–Šƒƒ”–‹ Ž‡‡š–”ƒ –‡†ˆ”‘ƒ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‡™•’ƒ’‡”Ǥ Not only Amin but also other Islamic periodicals in China have similar articles or express the same views, as for instance, Shanghai musilin к⎧ぶᯟ᷇ (Muslims in Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ȌǡKaituo, Gansu musilin, or Musilin tongxun. ͷͺ “Qingyuan shu” 䈧ᝯҖȋDz’’‡ƒŽ‹‰ƒŽŽdzȌǡTianmu musilin ཙぶぶᯟ᷇ͳͶǡƒ›ʹͲǡ ʹͲͲʹǡ’Ǥ͵Ǥ ͳ͸ͺ Wang Jianping

Ǥ •Žƒ‹ Movements ͹ȌThe new push of the Ikhwani movement: The Wahhabi school of Is- lamic ”‡˜‹˜ƒŽϐ‹”•–‡‡”‰‡†‹Š‹ƒƒ––Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻ–Š ‡–—”›Ǥͷͻ It became the Š™ƒ‹‘˜‡‡–ˆ”‘–Š‡ͳͻʹͲ•–‘–Š‡ͳͻͶͲ•ǡ™Š‡ it spread across China and converted many Qadim communities into Ikhwani ones. The Ikhwani movement was encouraged by Hui Muslim warlords such as Ma Hongbin 傜呯ᇮǡȋͳͺͺͶȂͳͻ͸ͲȌǡMa Hongkui 傜呯 䙥ȋͳͺͻʹȂͳͻ͹ͲȌǡMa Buqing 傜↕䶂ȋͳͻͲͳȂͳͻ͹͹Ȍǡƒ†Ma Bufang 傜↕ 㣣ȋͳͻͲ͵–ͳͻͶͷȌǡ and it developed rapidly in northwest China. Ikhwani doctrine even became the dominant stream of Islam in the northwest during that period.͸Ͳ Š™ƒ‹‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‰”ƒ†—ƒŽŽ›ˆƒ†‡†ƒ™ƒ›ƒˆ–‡”ͳͻͶͻǡ™Š‡Islam as ƒ™Š‘Ž‡™ƒ•‹–‡•‡Ž›”‡•–”‹ –‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡Žƒ–‡ͳͻͷͲ•–‘–Š‡Žƒ–‡ͳͻ͹Ͳ•Ǥ —–ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǡ™Š‡ •Žƒ‹ religious activities were allowed to resume, the Ikhwani movement again developed momentum. Ikhwani activists have sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca, study in Arabic coun- tries by Chinese Muslim youths, and missionary work in China by cler- gy from Arabic countries. Many Ikhwani activists advocate purifying the Islamic way of life among the Muslim communities ‹ Š‹ƒǢ –Š‡› ‘’Žƒ‹ –Šƒ– Qad- ‹ ‘—‹–‹‡•Šƒ˜‡ƒ„•‘”„‡†–‘‘ƒ›Š‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡• which diverge from the orthodox path, and they have demanded the ‡”ƒ†‹ ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡•‡ƒŽ‹‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡•Ǥ •’‹”‡†„›ƒˆƒ‹–Š‹–Š‡’”‹•–‹‡ Islam of Mecca founded by the Prophet Muhammad, Chinese Ikhwani activists have also torn down traditional temple-like mosques and re- placed them with Arabic-style architecture.͸ͳ Š‡›Šƒ˜‡‘’’‘•‡†Š‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡•‹™‡††‹‰•ǡˆ—‡”- als and other rituals. They demand women wear headscarves in public, and even ask young girls attending public schools or college to wear headscarves. They have also admonished Muslims to abstain from any alcohol and opposed young students indulging in pop music, movies, mixed dancing, and unhealthy television programs. Some extremists

ͷͻ ƒ‘‰ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͻͷȂͳͲ͹Ǥ ͸Ͳ ‹ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’’Ǥ͸ʹȂ͸ͷǤ ͸ͳ The author personally observed in his trips to Yunnan and Gansu that many his- torical Chinese style mosques were demolished by Hui Muslims, particularly the Ikhwani groups, and were rebuilt with the mosques in Arabic architectural style on the same sites. ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͸ͻ have even destroyed the decorations on mosques structure and Islamic historical relics.͸ʹ Among the ethnically Turkic peoples of the Xinjiang Uighur Auton- omous Region the Š™ƒ‹ ȋ‘ˆ–‡ „› Š‹‡•‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ• ƒŽŽ‡† ƒ• –Š‡ Wahhabiyya, however, the local Uighurs who are the members of this group entitled themselves with the —‹ –”ƒ†‹–‹‘Ǣ ƒ• ˆ‘” –Š‘•‡ Ui- ghurs who oppose this group labeling them as the ƒŠŠƒ„‹››ƒȌ‘˜‡- ment has been intertwined with a nationalist campaign for an indepen- dent Eastern Turkistan. There it has vocally condemned —ϐ‹›•–‹ ƒŽ practices and pro-Beijing tendencies in social and political life, and it has also attacked the implementation of family plan programs among Turkic Muslims. Some Ikhwani followers even advocate a fundamen- talist theory of jihadȋŠ‘Ž›™ƒ”Ȍǣ‹ŽŽ‹‰‘”‡š’‡ŽŽ‹‰Ǯ‹ϐ‹†‡Ž•ǯȋHan Chi- ‡•‡Ȍ ˆ”‘ –Š‡‹” Žƒ†Ǥ͸͵ The Xinjiang government fears that a strong Ikhwani presence in southern Xinjiang could spark instability and ˆ—‡Ž–Š‡•‡’ƒ”ƒ–‹•–‘˜‡‡––Š‡”‡Ǣƒˆ‡™›‡ƒ”•ƒ‰‘‹–‹••—‡†ƒ„ƒ‘ Wahhbiyya organizations and disbanded any Wahhabiyya communi- ties, dismissing their clergymen, even jailing them in the ‘Strike-Hard’ campaign against national separatism. The central government of Chi- ƒ‡–”—•–‡†–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽIslamic Association of China to issue a new sermon (™ƒಃœȌ ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘†‡˜‘–‡†–‘†‡‘— ‹‰nationalist separatism among Uighur clergymen.͸Ͷ The Xinjiang Chinese government has also organized training classes to instruct Uighur imams and akhonds in the theories of Marxism and Mao Zedong on religion, and to instruct them in combating religious extremism and separatism. ͺȌ Revival of Islam among Qadim communties: Although most Chinese Qadim communities (in the Uighur areas, they are entitled as “the tra- ditional —‹‰”‘—’dzȌƒ”‡‘–ƒ•”ƒ†‹ ƒŽƒ†’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽƒ•–Š‡Ikhwani (or the Wahhabiyya labeled by the government in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰Ȍ‘˜‡‡–ǡ

͸ʹ Many Ikhwani communities even have prohibited their religious students to watch TV or read Chinese literature in Linxia of Gansu where the Ikhwani movement is •–”‘‰Ǣ–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”ǯ•’‡”•‘ƒŽ‘„•‡”˜ƒ–‹‘™Š‡˜‹•‹–‹‰–Šƒ–ƒ”‡ƒ†—”‹‰ ƒ—ƒ”› ƒ† ‡„”—ƒ”›ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ͸͵ See ‹ƒ–ƒ‰†‡›ƒ‘•Š‹ ཙาⲴ䫕ॉ (Š‡‡›–‘–Š‡ƒ”ƒ†‹•‡ȌǡƒŠƒ†Ǧ ‘’‹‡†Uighur text circulated among the ‹‰Š—”—†‡”‰”‘—†ǡͳͻͻͻǤ ͸Ͷ ʹͲͲǡͲͲͲ ‘’‹‡•‘ˆƒwa’z speech collection in Uighur language have been printed and distributed to Uighur clerics in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹ʹͲͲͳǡƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘Šƒ•ƒŽǦ‹ ༿ᵘ㾯б, the deputy Chairman of the Islamic Association of China (personal in- terview, ‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ‘˜‡„‡”ǡʹͲͲͳȌǢ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘Š‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘ ‹ƒ‘™—Š‹†ƒ‘ ‡‹›—ƒŠ—‹ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳ͹Ͳ Wang Jianping they have also experienced a revival of •Žƒ•‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǤŠ‡ƒ- ifestations of this re-Islamization include the following: ƒȌRenewed enthusiasm for Quranic study among Muslims: Before the ͳͻͺͲ•ǡ‘Ž›ͳͲΨ‘ˆ–Š‡‹‰Š—”Muslims could know how to chant the Quranic version in Arabic or Uighur language, however, there are ͻͲ؏‘”‡‹‰Š—”are able to recite or are studying the Quran at present.͸ͷ Among the Hui and other Muslim peoples, many commu- nities have opened part-time classes to study the Quran taught by community akhonds.͸͸ „ȌSending Islamic missionary teams from religious centers, large ma- daris, communities with strong Islamic traditions to distant villages and communities: The Linxia Arabic School has sent several groups of the missionary teams made up of madrasa teachers and students across northwest China, they have also journeyed a thousand kilo- meters to Yunnan in southwest China for Islamic missionary work. The teachers and students spread Islamic teaching among the Hui communities in these regions and promoting renewed Islamic con- • ‹‘—•‡••ǡƒŽŽ‹–Š‡Š‘’‡‘ˆ ”‡ƒ–‹‰ƒ—‹ϐ‹‡† ‘—‹–›‘ˆ„‡Ž‹‡- vers (ummaȌƒ ”‘••Š‹ƒǤ͸͹ ȌAnti-drug and anti-alcohol campaigns launched by religious activists among the Muslim communities: In Xi’an and in Tianjin the Muslim communities ‘”‰ƒ‹œ‡†ƒƒ–‹ǦƒŽ ‘Š‘Ž ƒ’ƒ‹‰‹–Š‡ͳͻͻͲ•ƒ† ‹ʹͲͲͳǤ͸ͺ They campaigned for local Islamic restaurants and shops to stop selling any alcohol, and urged Hui Muslims to give up alcohol and censure those who broke Islamic law. Many Muslim communi- ties in Gansu, Ningxia and Yunnan have launched strong campaigns –‘ϐ‹‰Š–†”—‰–”ƒˆϐ‹ ‹‰ƒ†Š‡”‘‹—•‡ǡ™Š‹ Š–Š‡› ‘†‡‡†ƒ• haramȋ”ƒ„‹ ǣǮ’”‘Š‹„‹–‡†„› •Žƒ‹ Žƒ™ǯȌǤ Muslims in these com- —‹–‹‡•†‡‘— ‡††”—‰–”ƒˆϐ‹ ‹‰„›–”ƒ†‡”•ˆ”‘—•Ž‹ ‘- munities describing it as a disgrace for Muslims to engage in such crimes.͸ͻ

͸ͷ Cited from Khahna ঑૸㓣, an Uighur scholar (now residing at Cambridge, Massa- Š—•‡––•‹–Š‡‹–‡†–ƒ–‡•Ȍǡƒ––Š‡ ‘ˆ‡”‡ ‡‘ˆ‹˜‹Ž‹œƒ–‹‘‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡„‡–™‡‡ Confucianism and Islam, ƒŒ‹‰ǡŠ‹ƒǡ—‰—•–ͺȂͳͳǡʹͲͲʹǤ ͸͸ ƒ‹—ŽƒʹͲͲͲǤ ͸͹‹„—Žƒš‹ʹͲͲͳǤ ͸ͺ ‹ŽŽ‡––‡ʹͲͲͲǡ’’Ǥͳ͸͹Ȃͳ͹ͺǢ ƒ‘ƒ‘—ƒʹͲͲʹǡ’’ǤͳͲͲȂͳͲ͵Ǥ ͸ͻ „†—ͳͻͻͻǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͹ͳ

†ȌA resurgence of Muslim identity among young people: Confronted with widespread Han prejudice against religious believers as back- ward and ignorant, many Muslim young people are proud of their identity as Muslims.͹Ͳ Many young Muslim girls wear headscarves and modest Islamic clothes in public, sometimes enduring contemp- tuous glances from non-Muslims. Many Muslims ϐ‹† ”‡•‘Ž˜‡ ƒ† assurance in their faith when confronted with a Chinese society ƒˆϐŽ‹ –‡†ǡƒ•–Š‡›•‡‡‹–ǡ„›ƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ‹•ǡ ‘””—’–‹‘ƒ†‹‘”ƒŽ‹–›Ǥ Their faith teaches them that at the end of the world God will judge all people and punish evil and reward good, and also that Islam will certainly defeat materialism and shaitanȋ”ƒ„‹ ǡǮ•ƒ–ƒǯȌ‹ƒϐ‹ƒŽ battle.͹ͳ ͻȌ The revival movement among —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ǣ‹‡Ikhwani and Qadim groups in China, various Chinese —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•Šƒ˜‡ƒŽ•‘‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡†ƒ revival movement during the past decade. This —ϐ‹”‡ƒ‹••ƒ ‡‹•”‡- ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹•‡˜‡”ƒŽ–”‡†•ǣ ƒȌA more coherent organizational structure has emerged among var- ious —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ǡ–Š—•‡Šƒ ‹‰–Š‡„‹†•„‡–™‡‡—ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•ƒ† disciples. Many orders have built strong, fortress-style monasteries (“—„„ƒȌ ™Š‹ Š ˆ‘” •‡‹Ǧƒ—–‘‘‘—• •‘ ‹‘Ǧ‡ ‘‘‹  „‘†‹‡•Ǥ ‘” instance, the Lingming Tang, a —ϐ‹•—„‘”†‡”—†‡”–Š‡Qadiriyya Order in ƒœŠ‘—ǡŠƒ•ƒ‡„‡”•Š‹’‘ˆʹͲͲǡͲͲͲǤ –•‡„‡”••’‡– ‘”‡–Šƒ–‡›‡ƒ”ƒ†ͳͲͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘—ƒȋƒ„‘—–ͳͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘—”‘‹ ʹͲͲͷȌ–‘„—‹Ž†ƒŠ—‰‡Š‡ƒ†“—ƒ”–‡”• ‘’Ž‡šǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•ƒŠ‹‰Š™ƒ›ǡ‹”- rigation works, ponds, power lines, a cattle farm, vegetable gardens, and small workshops.͹ʹ The Lingming Tang has several branch-mon- asteries in other parts of China, and their leaders are nominated by the suborder’s leader Wang Shoutian ⊚ሯཙ. Shaykh Wang regu- larly travels to his —ϐ‹ ‘—‹–‹‡•–‘ ‘ŽŽ‡ –ƒŽ•ƒ†ƒ†‹‹•–‡” communal affairs. He has several akhonds devoted to madrasa edu- ƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†ƒƒ‰‡”•‹ Šƒ”‰‡‘ˆϐ‹ƒ ‡ǡ„—•‹‡••ƒ†–”ƒ•’‘”–Ǥ Many —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•”‡•‡„Ž‡–Š‡Lingming Tang in having a hierar- chical organization: a leader, his representatives in different areas, other subordinates in scattered communities, disciples who imple-

͹Ͳ ‘‰ʹͲͲͲǤ ͹ͳ Ž‹ʹͲͲͲǤ ͹ʹ ‡”•‘ƒŽ‘„•‡”˜ƒ–‹‘•†—”‹‰›ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”ƒ–‹‰‹‰ƒ‰ǡƒœŠ‘—ǡ ƒǤʹ͵–‘ ‡„ǤͳǡʹͲͲͳǤ ͳ͹ʹ Wang Jianping

ment the leader’s religious instructions, and staff who work for the ‘”†‡”‹˜ƒ”‹‘—•ϐ‹‡Ž†•Ǥ „ȌProminent •Šƒ›Šs or —ϐ‹walis exercise absolute power over their followers. In communist society the Party once wielded absolute po- wer. In the wake of the religious revival of the past two decades, however, in —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•–Š‡’‘™‡”‘ˆ–Š‡’ƒ”–›Šƒ•‰‹˜‡™ƒ›–‘ the •Šƒ›Š or murshidȋ”ƒ„‹ ǣ‰—‹†‡ȌǤmuridȋ”ƒ„‹ ǣˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”Ȍ‘” disciple of a —ϐ‹ƒ•–‡”—•–™Š‘ŽŽ›•—„‹–Š‹•‡Žˆ–‘Š‹•ƒ•–‡”Ǣ must absolutely obey the •Šƒ›. So a —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡” ƒ‘„‹Ž‹œ‡Š‹•ˆ‘Ž- lowers – often a large force – thanks to the closed boundaries of —ϐ‹ organization. ȌForming tight social and religious networks: Many —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•Šƒ˜‡ developed networks of followers that span counties, regions and provinces. The Jahriyya, Š—ϐ‹››ƒƒ†Qadiriyya have communities that spread throughout most parts of China. Through centralized leadership, these —ϐ‹‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•Šƒ˜‡‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†ƒ™‹†‡Ž› ƒ•– net of organizational, communications and economic networks. Be- cause of their mystic nature and sometimes clandestine ways, other groups – even non-—ϐ‹ —•Ž‹• Ȃ ϐ‹† ‹– ‹’‘••‹„Ž‡ –‘ ’‡‡–”ƒ–‡ their networks. The experiences of repression in imperial times and persecution in recent decades have led —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•–‘–—”‹™ƒ”†• for protection and support. This makes some —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•Š‹‰ŠŽ›•—- spect in the eyes of government authorities. In recent years there have been clashes between local authorities and —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•Ǥ †ȌŽƒ”‰‡†• ‘’‡ƒ† ƒ’ƒ ‹–›ǣ‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•ƒ›—ϐ‹‘”†‡”•Šƒ˜‡ organized large scale activities, including tomb (mazarȌ˜‡‡”ƒ–‹‘ by —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‹Xinjiang and amal (Arabic: charitable deeds, espe- cially in the memory of deceased —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Ȍ•‡”˜‹ ‡„›—ϐ‹‘”†‡”• in Hui and Dongxiang Muslim communities. –Š‡Žƒ–‡ͳͻͺͲ•ǡˆ‘” example, at the Odam Mazar in the southern part of Kashgar, Xin- jiang, an annual mazar˜‡‡”ƒ–‹‘ ‡”‡‘›ƒ––”ƒ –‡†ͳͲͲǡͲͲͲ–‘ ʹͲͲǡͲͲͲ‡–Š‹ —ϐ‹•ƒ†‘–Š‡”—•Ž‹•of Uighur and other ethnici- ties.͹͵ Such mazar veneration activities usually last several days and have become a most prominent event in Uighur society. Amal ser- vices among the —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‘ˆ —‹communities have also expanded

͹͵ Š‹•”‡•‡”˜‡†ϐ‹‰—”‡‹•„ƒ•‡†‘›‹˜‡•–‹‰ƒ–‹‘‹ƒ”ƒ†ȋŠƒ Š‡ȌǡXinjiang ‹—‰—•–‘ˆʹͲͲͳǤ ‘”†‹‰–‘ƒ‰Š‘—Ž‹ͳͻͺ͵ǡYarkand had a population of ͶͲͲǡͲͲͲǡ ͻͲΨ ‘ˆ ™Š‹ Š ’ƒ”–‹ ‹’ƒ–‡† ‹ ˜‡‡”ƒ–‹‘ –‘ ƒ„‘—– –™‡–› ’”‘‹‡– mazar•Ǣ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ™—–ʹͲͲʹǡ’ǤͶͶǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͹͵

in scope and importance. In ‹š‹ƒƒ„‘—–ʹͲͲǡͲͲͲ—•Ž‹•ǡ most of –Š‡–Š‡—ϐ‹•ǡƒ––‡†‡†–Š‡ˆ—‡”ƒŽ•‡”˜‹ ‡‘ˆYang Shijun ᶘ༛傿, the —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”‘ˆ–Š‡Qadiriyya order.͹Ͷ The Jahriyya order has also held large-scale amal for its deceased —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Ǣ–Š‡› ƒ„‡Žƒ”‰‡ ”ƒŽŽ‹‡•ƒ––”ƒ –‹‰‘”‡–Šƒ–‡‘”ƒŠ—†”‡†–Š‘—•ƒ†—ϐ‹•ˆ”‘ different parts of China.

The External Relations of Muslim Communities in China

Ǥ‡Žƒ–‹‘•™‹–ŠHan Chinese Muslims ƒ‡—’‘Ž›ʹΨ‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†Han Chinese make —’‘”‡–Šƒͻ͵ΨǤ ƒ‘Ǧ—•Ž‹ƒŒ‘”‹–›society, China’s Muslims —•—ƒŽŽ›‡‡’ƒŽ‘™’”‘ϐ‹Ž‡ǤŠ‡”‡ƒ”‡•‡˜‡”ƒŽˆƒ –‘”•–Šƒ–ƒ ‘—–ˆ‘” their seeming invisibility. One is that Islam, as a religion with non-local ‘”‹‰‹•ǡ‹•‘–’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‹•–”‡ƒ —Ž–—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‘ ‹ƒŽ‹•–•–ƒ–‡Ǣƒ- other is that most Muslims live in marginalized regions, especially in northwest China, where deserts, barren hills, and mountains dominate the landscape, and economic resources are limited. Although Chinese Muslims have tended towards caution in dealing with the Han majority, they have also enjoyed some advantages in es- tablishing a foothold in society. In particular, Muslim communities have –‘•‘‡†‡‰”‡‡„‡‡ϐ‹–‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡ˆƒ˜‘”ƒ„Ž‡‡–Š‹ ‹‘”‹–›’‘Ž‹ ‹‡• implemented by the Communist Party. The national minority policies ‹–”‘†— ‡†„›Š‹‡•‡‰‘˜‡”‡–‹–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•™‡”‡‘†‡Ž‡†‘Sta- lin’s policies in the Soviet Union. Under them, Muslim peoples in China have enjoyed the several advantages: ƒȌDisproportionately high representation in political bodies such as People’s Congress and Political Consultative Committee, Communist Party Congress and organizations, the United Frontier Department (Tongzhanbu 㔏ᡈ䜘Ȍ, and government organs such as the State Bureau of Religious Affairs (Guojia Zongjiao Shiwuju ഭᇦᇇᮉһ࣑ ተȌ and State National Minorities Committee (Guojia Shaoshuminzu Weiyuanhui ഭᇦቁᮠ≁᯿ငઈՊȌ. This “special status” is particu- Žƒ”Ž›”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹•›•–‡‘ˆƒ—–‘‘‘—•”‡‰‹‘•ǡ’”‡ˆ‡ –—”‡•ǡƒ†

͹Ͷ Zhongguo musilin”‡’‘”–•–Š‹•‡˜‡–ǡƒŽ•‘ ‘ϐ‹”‡†„››ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹ ‡„”—ƒ”› ʹͲͲͳǤ ͳ͹Ͷ Wang Jianping

counties that grants some self-governance to Muslim and other mi- norities.͹ͷ „ȌTo a lesser or greater degree, most Muslims in China are enjoying a loose restriction in the family-planning program that nearly all Han Chinese must abide by: one family and one child. Urban Muslim families, and other ethnic minority families, can usually have two children, and rural Muslim families can have three children. (Nor- mally, an urban Han Chinese family can only have one child is al- lowed, and a rural Han Chinese family can have two children if the ϐ‹”•–‹•ƒˆ‡ƒŽ‡ǤȌ ȌEthnic minority groups can send their children to schools, colleges and universities with considerably lower entrance scores than Han Chinese students. †ȌIn government departments, institutions and the state-owned enterprises, Muslims and other ethnic minorities enjoy more favora- ble treatment than their Han Chinese counterparts in the allocation of living allowances, job promotions and housing. ‡ȌIn civil legal disputes and even crime cases, if a case involves two dif- ferent ethnicities, often the party who is an ethnic minority receives favorable consideration.͹͸ˆ ‘—”•‡ǡ–Š‹•‹•‘–ƒ„•‘Ž—–‡Ǣƒ•‹ƒ› countries, China’s ethnic minorities also suffer racial and religious discrimination. And unfortunately, the preferential policies granted to minority nationalities have also generated backlashes. They have reinforced the ethnic identity of Muslim peoples and also provoked antagonism against Muslim and other minorities. After the ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳǡʹͲͲͳterrorist attacks on the World Trade Cen- ter in New York and the Pentagon, as in other countries in Europe and North America, many Muslims in China felt tremendous pressure and suspicion from the mass media that often gave the misleading impres-

͹ͷ In the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for example, the Hui only occupy one third of Ningxia’s population. The regional governor, however, should be a Hui and the main posts of the government usually are taken by Hui cadres. This is also similar to Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolian etc regions and prefectures. ͹͸ Many Han Chinese in Xin jiang complain that they are actually discriminated by the Žƒ™‹–Š‡ ‹˜‹Ž ƒ•‡••— Šƒ•–”ƒˆϐ‹ ƒ ‹†‡–ǡ‡ ‘‘‹ †‹•’—–‡ƒ†‘–Š‡”•‹ˆ–Š‡› have arguments with the ethnic minority groups. This is one of the main reasons for them wanting to emigrate back to Inland China. I personally encountered not a few complains from Han Chinese during my traveling in south Xin jiang in the •—‡”‘ˆʹͲͲͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͹ͷ sion that Islam is equivalent to fundamentalism, terrorism and extrem- ism.͹͹ Many Muslims, including young people and clerics, complained in interviews and conversation that they felt discriminated against by the press and television. Many Muslims became fearful their relations with Han Chinese could be seriously damaged by negative media coverage. In this hostile atmosphere of ignorance and misunderstanding, which to some extent predated ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳǡƒ›—•Ž‹•in China have begun to turn to their religious traditions for consolation.͹ͺ Some of them have become more isolated and radical. This is especially true of Uighur Muslims,ƒ†‹•”‡ϐŽ‡ –‡†‹–Š‡‹”ƒ––‹–—†‡•–‘™ƒ”†•‘Ǧ—•- lims and Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics. Many of them refuse to discuss their views about these issues.͹ͻ Ǥ‡Žƒ–‹‘•™‹–Š–Š‡–ƒ–‡ Chinese Muslims have a complex relationship with their government, controlled by professed atheists who disavow all religions. Many Mus- lims take a pragmatic approach towards the Communist Party-run gov- ‡”‡–Ǣ–Š‡›„‡Ž‹‡˜‡–Š‡Š‹‡•‡‰‘˜‡”‡–‹•ƒ•‘’‘™‡”ˆ—Ž–Š‡› must accommodate its demands and strive to survive under it while also enjoying the government’s preferential minorities program. The relationship between Muslim peoples and the state is often a bargain- ing process, or game of cat and mouse, that has evolved over recent de- cades. China’s Muslims ƒ”‡ ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ› Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡† ƒ• ‡–Š‹  minorities and therefore enjoy some privileges in political, economic and cultural sta- –—•ǡ•‘–‘•‘‡‡š–‡––Š‡›„‡‡ϐ‹–ˆ”‘–Š‡•–ƒ–—•“—‘Ǥ‘”‡‘˜‡”ǡ—•- lim communities are organized in combining religious activities with economic, social, cultural and educational functions. The Chinese gov- ernment has sought to use these two factors to contain nationalist-reli- gious ferment in Muslim communities and restrain radical Islam. It has

͹͹ For instance, an article published by the —›ƒ 㗔䀰ȋDz‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‘‹ ‡dzȌƒ‰ƒœ‹‡ recently labeled Islam as backward, anti-reform and anti-modernity. The tone of this paper was so offensive that the Islamic Association of China appealed to the ‡–”ƒŽ‰‘˜‡”‡–ƒ†”‡“—‡•–‡†ˆ‘”ƒˆ‘”ƒŽƒ’‘Ž‘‰›„›–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”ȋŠ‘—ʹͲͲʹȌǤ ͹ͺ ƒ‹œ—ʹͲͲͲǤ ͹ͻ ‘–ƒˆ‡™–‹‡•†‹†–Š‡ƒ—–Š‘”Šƒ˜‡•— Š‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡•‹Š‹•ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”‹Xinjiang, particularly when talking to ‹‰Š—”‹–‡ŽŽ‡ –—ƒŽ•ƒ†‰‘˜‡”‡–ƒŽ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•ǤŽ› some young college students and grassroots level cadres in the Uighur society ex- pressed their feelings and opinions more freely. ͳ͹͸ Wang Jianping also made great efforts to implement constitutional and legal goals to assimilate ethnic minorities, including Muslim peoples, into a harmo- nious national family committed to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Guided by this two-pronged strategy of containment and absorp- tion, the Chinese government has unhesitatingly cracked down on any ethnic separatist movements and religious extremist activities, but has also taken a lenient attitude towards the law-abiding social, econom- ic and cultural activities of Muslim peoples. Taking advantage of these policies, most Muslims, particularly Hui Muslims, have been generally “Chinese law-abiding” while also exercising their legal rights and po- Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ –‘ ƒ••‡”–• –Š‡‹” ”‹‰Š–• ƒ† ‘„–ƒ‹ „‡––‡” –”‡ƒ–‡–Ǥ Thus, when incidents involving the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims occur, such as the pork contamination riot described above, Muslims communities throughout the region affected mobilize to protect their rights and demand compensation or concessions from Non-Muslims and the local government. Usually, in the wake of the inci- dent it is the ƒŠ‹‡•‡™Š‘ƒ‡ ‘ ‡••‹‘•—†‡”‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽƒ”„‹–”ƒ- tion, and the Muslims press forward towards their goals. Muslim communities have adopted these tactics to protect their of- ϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›Ǧ‡†‘”•‡† ”‹‰Š–•ǡ „—– –Š‡‹” ‡ˆˆ‘”–• Šƒ˜‡ –Š‡ ’ƒ”ƒ†‘š‹ ƒŽ ‡ˆˆ‡ – of encouraging growing of nationalism, strengthening ethnic identity boundaries, and fuelling Islamic sentiment. Communities can deploy these forces in confrontations with non-Muslims and the government. The state, in turn, fears potentially larger challenges from Muslim groups and generally attempts to devise solutions that minimize na- tionalism and Islamism while appeasing Muslim elites. This often in- volves a combination of state supervision and ‘soft’ incentives in the form of special treatment and status. China’s Muslim elites have proven skilled at exploiting their rela- tionship with the state. They can bargain with the government by ap- pealing to the potential force of the Muslim communities under their authority, thus pressuring local Chinese authorities to provide better treatment for themselves and their peoples. Here the lessons of Chinese Š‹•–‘”›Šƒ˜‡ ‘•‹†‡”ƒ„Ž‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡Ǣ‹–Š‡’ƒ•–ǡ™Š‡–Š‡ ‡–”ƒŽ‰‘˜- ernment was weak, China’s Muslim elites developed into semi-indepen- dent forces or warlords dominating large tracts of territory.ͺͲ

ͺͲ ‡‡—ʹͲͲͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͹͹

In modern times China has still not overcome the cycle of control and resistance that results from these contending state, elite and popular ˆ‘” ‡•ǡ™‹–Š’‡”‹‘†•‘ˆȋ—•—•–ƒ‹ƒ„Ž‡Ȍ ‘–”‘Žƒ†”‡’”‡••‹‘‰‹˜‹‰ way to disorder and instability. The Chinese government thinks that its implementing the preferential minorities program could strengthen its central power and better control the minorities’ inhabited frontier land. Eventually, it does not expect that its policy to appease the Mus- lim minority peoples only stimulate their nationalism and religious •‡–‹‡–ǤŠ‡‹ϐŽ‡š‹„‹Ž‹–›–Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ‡–”ƒŽ‰‘˜‡”‡–ǯ•’‘Ž‹ ‹‡• toward ethnic minorities and Muslim believers cannot remain stable in the long term. They are short-sighted and full of pitfalls, and in the future may give way to riots and chaos. Ǥ‡Žƒ–‹‘•™‹–Š–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ ‘”Ž† Within the framework of umma all Muslims are brothers and sisters. These fraternal ties transcend national borders, ethnicity, language and social status. Even in the past, before modern transportation by ship and plane made the Middle East much more accessible to Chinese Muslims, many of them made the hajj journey to Mecca by traversing the Euro-Asian continent or taking a sea route across the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.ͺͳ Returning from the hajj, Chinese Muslims also brought back Islamic texts for their home communities, and so their access to the Islamic tradition was constantly refreshed. Today, China has re-opened its doors to the rest of the world, and as a leading developing country it wants to develop friendly relations with Muslim countries ƒ†‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•‹•‹ƒƒ†ˆ”‹ ƒǡ‹ Ž—†- ing the League of Arab States, the Muslim World League, and the Islam- ic Summit Organization. The Chinese government cannot easily afford to damage links with these countries and international bodies, and this ƒ‡•‹–†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž–ˆ‘”–Š‡‰‘˜‡”‡––‘•–‹ϐŽ‡–Š‡–‹‡•„‡–™‡‡Š‹‡•‡ Muslims and their fellow believers in the Islamic world. Compared with the past Chinese Muslims now have more advan- tages for fostering relations with Muslim countries. First, there are strengthened economic ties. Many Chinese Muslim entrepreneurs do business in western, central, and southeastern Asia and African coun- tries, and much of their business is, of course, done with fellow believ-

ͺͳ ƒ‡š‹ͳͻͺͺǡ’’ǤͷͷȂ͸͵Ǥ ͳ͹ͺ Wang Jianping ers. Chinese Muslims even do business with the Muslims in European and North American countries. Beside this economic relationship, many Muslims – irrespective of whether they are Hui, Uighur and another ethnic group – participate in the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. More and more young Chinese Muslim students are studying Arabic and Islam in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, the Gulf States, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Cen- tral Asian republics and other Islamic countries. Every year, the Islamic Association of China sends scholars and learned men to attend religious conferences and symposia, competitions in Arabic Quranic recitation and Arabic calligraphy, and other religiously-oriented activities with Muslims abroad. The Chinese government, represented by Islamic As- sociation of China, also maintains regular contacts with international Islamic organizations. These economic, cultural and scholarly contacts with Muslims abroad also allow for a great deal of informal interaction. They make it possible for many Chinese Muslims to bring back materials such as reli- gious literature, cassettes and videos, and to spread information about China’s Muslim communities to Muslims abroad. These exchanges have also exposed Chinese Muslims to new ideas about Islam from abroad, including Islamic fundamentalism and radical political Islam. In this way, the seeds have been sown in China for the spread of many of the ideas that have galvanized other Muslim populations in recent decades. Chinese government is, however, highly vigilant against religious ‡š–”‡‹•ˆ”‘ƒ„”‘ƒ†Ǥ ͳͻͻ͸Š‹ƒ‡š’‡ŽŽ‡†ƒIranian diplomat for improper conduct in spreading revolutionary Islamic ideas among Muslim communities in Northwest China.ͺʹ In quite a few cases Islamic missionaries from Pakistan have been expelled for disseminating Is- lamic fundamentalism in China.ͺ͵ In Xinjiang the —•–‘‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•ƒ† border guard posts are particularly watchful for possible entry of rad- ical Islamic materials from the Central Asian republics. Local author- ‹–‹‡•–Š‡”‡Šƒ˜‡ ‘ϐ‹• ƒ–‡†ƒ††‡•–”‘›‡†Žƒ”‰‡—„‡”•‘ˆ„‘‘•ǡ cassettes, and videos promoting dangerous religiously-inspired ideol-

ͺʹ The author heard these news at the Second International Conference of Iranology in ‡‹Œ‹‰ǡ –‘„‡”ͳͻͻͺǤ ͺ͵ —ʹͲͲʹǡ’’ǤͳͶȂͳ͸ǢƒŽ•‘•‡‡”‡’‘”–•‹Hong Kong based newspapers, such as the South China Morning Post and the Far Eastern Economic Reviewǡ„‡–™‡‡ʹͲͲͲƒ† ʹͲͲͳ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳ͹ͻ ogies and advocating national separatism among Uighur communities in southern Xinjiang. ͺͶ

Conclusion

Muslim society is quite different from other parts of Chinese society in its beliefs, ways of life, cultural traditions and social organization. It is miraculous that China’s Muslim communities have preserved their own identity and avoided assimilation or destruction by the authoritarian Š‹‡•‡•–ƒ–‡Ǥ –™‘†‡ ƒ†‡•‘ˆ”‡•—”‰‡ ‡•‹ ‡–Š‡ͳͻͺͲ•–Š‡—•Ž‹ peoples of China have developed their own semi-independent economy, production and market structures, social and cultural networks, edu- cation system, press and mass media. This Islamic revival has gained impetus from China’s progress to- wards modernity and globalization: as China has developed a market economy and become more integrated in international commerce and affairs, Chinese Muslim communities have accumulated more resources to organize and assert themselves. China is constantly vigilant against any internal or external challenges to Marxist ideology and the social- ist regime, and the state has been on the offensive against religious fundamentalism and the radical Islamic movement, but Muslim society has evolved a strong fabric of religious tradition and social exclusivity, and over time China’s Muslim communities have increasingly departed from mainstream Chinese society and culture. These communities have, to varying degrees, resisted the general consequences of modernization. While the communal structure of the majority Han Chinese has been drastically eroded by commercialism, materialism and individualism, the communal ties of Muslims have steadily strengthened over last two decades, particularly with the Is- lamic revival movement and the spread of Islamic education. After en- try into WTO, China will become an increasingly unbalanced, contra- †‹ –‹‘Ǧϐ‹ŽŽ‡†•‘ ‹‡–›Ȃƒ‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰Ž›Ž‹„‡”ƒŽƒ”‡–‡ ‘‘›—†‡”ƒ Marxist socialist regime. In these circumstances, the state will certain- Ž›ϐ‹†‹–‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰Ž›†‹ˆϐ‹ —Ž––‘†‡ƒŽ™‹–ŠIslam, especially spreading radicalism and nationalism, merely by offering economic and social privileges on the one hand, and threatening to apply force and coer-

ͺͶ See Turkistan Newsletter, an Internet website information based in Netherlands ‡†‹–‡†„›ƒ–‘ǡƒ›ʹͶǡʹͲͲʹǤ ͳͺͲ Wang Jianping cion for suppressing the national separatism and religious extremism on the other hand. China’s authorities feel growing uncertainty about the increasing ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ƒ†‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘‘ˆ—•Ž‹•‘ ‹‡–›‹China. During the past decade the Islamic revival movement in China has developed particular momentum in two regions: in Turkic Muslim society it has expressed itself through a ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•–‹†‡’‡†‡ ‡‘˜‡‡–Ǣ‹ —‹—•Ž‹so- ciety it has expressed itself through confrontations with majority Han Š‹‡•‡‘˜‡”‹ ‹†‡–•‘ˆ’‘” ‘–ƒ‹ƒ–‹‘‘””‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•†‡ϐ‹Ž‡‡–Ǥ The revival of Islam and Muslim society in China may potentially pose a serious challenge to China during the country’s historic transi- tion. If China were to fail to renovate its political apparatus, which gives so much power to a highly centralized government, it will experience increasingly tense relations with its Muslim peoples. A †‹”‡ – ‘ϐŽ‹ – with religious ethnic minorities would cost China precious resources and damage its modernization program, as well as risk its denuncia- tion by Western countries and the Islamic world. However, if the central government makes too many concessions to Muslim communities, its capacity to control these communities will erode. Whether the revival of Islam truly becomes a major source of instability in China will de- pend on whether the next generation of leaders of the Communist Party can navigate between these two possibilities.

References

„†—ͳͻͻͻȂ„†—ƒ ‹“‹‰䱯ᐳᶌg傜ਹᒶ, “Yan” ✏… ȋ‘‹‰ǤǤǤȌǤHuigui എᖂ (“Re- –—”–‘ȏŽŽƒŠȐdzǡ’‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‹œŠƒ‹”ƒ„‹  Š‘‘Ž‘ˆ ‡ǯƒ⋣ইⲭመ䱯᣹՟ 䈝ᆖṑȌͳǡʹͻ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͻͻǡ’ǤʹǤ -ͲͲͲȂŽ‹ƒ„ƒ䱯䟼ᐤᐤ, “Tiaozhan yu shiming” ᥁ᡈо֯ભ (Challenge and Misʹ‹Ž •‹‘ȌǤManla ┑᣹ (“Maullah, religious student”, periodical of the Xiangjiang Village New Mosque in Linxia Ѥ༿俉ॐᒴ␵ⵏᯠሪȌʹͷǡͳ’”‹ŽʹͲͲͲǡ’ǤͶǤ A min – A min 䱯᭿ȋ”ƒ„‹ ǣDz’‡ƒ ‡dzȌǡƒ‰ƒœ‹‡ˆ‘—†‡†‹ƒ” Š‘ˆͳͻͻ͹ǡ‡†Ǥƒ—- gan 傜⏖ᒢ the headmaster of the Amin Arabic School of Zhoukou City, He’nan Province ⋣ইⴱઘਓᐲ䱯᭿䱯᣹՟䈝ᆖṑ,ͳͻͻ͹ȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂ͵ͶȌǤ ƒ‹ͳͻͷ͵Ȃƒ‹Š‘—›‹ⲭሯᖍȋ‡†ǤȌǡ —‹‹“‹›‹ എ≁䎧ѹȋ’”‹•‹‰•‘ˆ–Š‡ —‹ȌǤŠƒ‰- hai: Shenzhou Guoguang Press ⾎ᐎഭݹࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͷ͵ǡͶ˜‘Ž•Ǥ ‡‹Œ‹‰‡˜‹‡™ͳͻͻͲȂ‡‹Œ‹‰‡˜‹‡™͵͵ǤͷʹȋʹͶȂ͵Ͳ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͻͲȌǤ ƒ™—†ʹͲͲͲȂƒ™—†䗮੮, “Qingzhen xiaoxue shidai” ␵ⵏሿᆖᰦԓ (The Time of Is- Žƒ‹ ”‹ƒ”› Š‘‘ŽȌǤMusilin tongxun ぶᯟ᷇䙊䇟ǡͳ –‘„‡”ʹͲͲͲǡ’ǤͳǤ ͲͲͳȂƒŠ‹Žƒƒ™—–✝׍᣹g䗮੮ᨀ, ‡‹™—‡”œ—ƒœŠƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— 㔤੮ቄʹ–—™ƒ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͺͳ

᯿哫᡾᮷ॆ⹄ウȋ–—†‹‡•‘ƒœƒ”—Ž–—”‡‹–Š‡‹‰Š—”‡‘’Ž‡ȌǤ”—“‹ǣ‹Œ‹ƒ‰ University Press ᯠ⮶བྷᆖࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ™—–ʹͲͲʹȂ †Ǥǡ‡‹™—‡”œ—ƒœŠƒ Šƒ‘„ƒ‹›—‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘ 㔤੮ቄ᯿哫᡾ᵍᤌоԺᯟޠ ᮉ (Mazar‡˜‡”‹‰ƒ‘‰–Š‡‹‰Š—”•ƒ†‹–•‡Žƒ–‹‘™‹–Š •ŽƒȌǤShijie zongjiao ›ƒŒ‹— ц⭼ᇇᮉ⹄ウȋ ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ‘”Ž†‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•–—†‹‡•ȌʹͲͲʹȀʹǤ ‹ŽŽ‘ͳͻͻ͸Ȃ‹ Šƒ‡Ž‹ŽŽ‘ǡChina’s Muslims. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ‹ŽŽ‘ͳͻͻͻȂ †ǤǡŠ‹ƒǯ•—•Ž‹ —‹‘—‹–›ǣ‹‰”ƒ–‹‘ǡ‡––Ž‡‡–ƒ†‡ –•. Lon- †‘ǣ—”œ‘ǡͳͻͻͻǤ ‡‰ͳͻͻʹȂ ‡‰ ‹›—ƒߟӺⓀ, Yisilanjiao zai Zhongguo Ժᯟޠᮉ൘ѝഭ (Islam in Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒ䬦ᐍ: Ningxia People’s Publication House ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻʹǤ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͷȂ ‘•‡’Š Ž‡– Š‡”ǡStudies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia (ed. Beatrice ǤƒœȌǤŽ†‡”•Š‘–ǣƒ”‹‘”—ǡͳͻͻͷǤ Gansu musilin – Gansu musilin ⭈㚳ぶᯟ᷇ȋ—•Ž‹•‹ ƒ•—Ȍǡ“—ƒ”–‡”Ž›ƒ‰ƒœ‹‡ǡ‡†Ǥ Ma Zhenggang 傜↓㓢ǡƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ ƒ•—⭈㚳ⴱԺᯟޠ ᮉॿՊ, Lanzhou ޠᐎǡͳͻͻͳȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂͶ͵ȌǤ ƒ‘ ‡›—ƒ ͳͻͻͺ Ȃ ƒ‘ ‡›—ƒ 儈᮷䘌, ‹‰‘ š‹„‡‹ —‹‹ œŠ‹ ˆƒ “‹‰ ›—- dong ␵ᵛ㾯ेഎ≁ѻ৽␵䘀 (The Anti-Manchu Movement Launched by the Hui in ‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒƒ–ƒ–‡‹‰›ƒ•–›ȌǤ‹ Š—ƒ䬦ᐍ: Ningxia People’s Publica- tion House ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͺ. ƒ‘ƒ‘—ƒʹͲͲʹȂ ƒ‘ƒ‘—ƒ儈㘰ᇭ, ‹Ž‹‰†‡†—„ƒ‹Ǧ™‘•Š‹ —‹Š—‹ ᗳ⚥Ⲵ⤜ⲭ— ᡁᱟഎഎȋ‘‘Ž‘‰—‡‹‹†ǣ ƒƒ —‹Š—‹ȌǤ‹ƒŒ‹ཙ⍕: Association of Liter- ature and Arts in Beichen District of Tianjin ཙ⍕े䗠४᮷ᆖ㢪ᵟ⭼㚄ਸՊǡʹͲͲʹǤ ‹ŽŽ‡––‡ʹͲͲͲȂMaris Boyd Gillette, ‡–™‡‡‡ ƒƒ†‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ‘†‡”‹œƒ–‹‘ƒ†‘- •—’–‹‘ƒ‘‰”„ƒŠ‹‡•‡—•Ž‹•Ǥ–ƒˆ‘”†ǣ–ƒˆ‘”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡʹͲͲͲǤ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͳȂ”— Žƒ†‡›ǡ—•Ž‹Š‹‡•‡ǣ–Š‹ ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•‹–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„- licǤƒ„”‹†‰‡ǡƒ••Ǥǣ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻͳǤ Gongzuo tongxun – Gongzuo tongxun ᐕ֌䙊䇟ȋ‘”‹‰—ŽŽ‡–‹Ȍǡ‡†ǤŠ‡ •Žƒ‹ —Ž- tural Association in Xi’an 㾯ᆹᐲԺᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウՊ, Xi’an. —‹œ—›ƒŒ‹—Ȃ —‹œ—›ƒŒ‹—എ᯿⹄ウȋ‡•‡ƒ” Š‘–Š‡ —‹–Š‹ ‹–›Ȍǡ“—ƒ”–‡”Ž›Œ‘—”- nal, ed. Yang Huaizhong ᶘᘰѝ. Ningxia Academy of Social Sciences ᆱ༿⽮Պ、ᆖ 䲒, Yinchuan 䬦ᐍͳͻͻͲȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂͶ͹ȌǤ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ͳͻͺͲȂƒ’Šƒ‡Ž •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǡ—•Ž‹•‹Š‹ƒǡƒ–—†›‹—Ž–—”ƒŽ‘ˆ”‘–ƒ–‹‘. Lon- †‘ǣ—”œ‘ǡͳͻͺͲǤ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ͳͻͻͶȂ †ǤǡIslam in Š‹ƒǡƒ”‹–‹ ƒŽ‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š›. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood ”‡••ǡͳͻͻͶǤ ƒ• Š‘ȀŠ—‹ʹͲͲͲȂƒ”‹ƒ ƒ• Š‘ƒ†Š—‹ ‹‰Œ—ǡŠ‡ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‘‡ǯ•‘•“—‡• in Chinese IslamǤ‹ Š‘†ǣ—”œ‘”‡••ǡʹͲͲͲǤ ‹ͳͻͺͻȂ ‹Š—”‘‰䠁ṁ㦓, “Chuanfang Village, one Shared Suffering” ᐍᯩመ—ᛓ 䳮ѻᶁ. In: Shadian Huizu shiliao ⋉⭨എ᯿ਢᯉ (Historical Materials of the Hui in Šƒ†‹ƒȌǡ‡†ǤŠ‡”‹–‹‰ ”‘—’‘ˆDz ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽƒ–‡”‹ƒŽ•‘ˆ–Š‡ —‹‹Šƒ†‹ƒdzlj⋉ ⭨എ᯿ਢᯉNJ㕆߉㓴. Kaiyuan: Kaiyuan Printing Factory ᔰ䘌ঠࡧলǡͳͻͺͻ. ͳͺʹ Wang Jianping

Kaituo – Kaituo ᔰᤃȋDz‹‘‡‡”dzǢ”ƒ„‹ ǡAl-FathȌǡ •Žƒ‹ ƒ‰ƒœ‹‡ǡ‡†Ǥ ƒ ƒ‹ Šƒ‘ 丙⎧▞ǡƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘Š‡‡–‡”‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ —Ž–—”ƒŽ–—†‹‡•ǡ •–‹–—–‡‘ˆ‘ ‹ƒŽ- thropology and Studies in Folklore, Northwestern College of Ethnology 㾯े≁᯿ᆖ ᮷ॆ⹄ウѝᗳ. Lanzhou,ͳͻͻʹȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂͶͲȌǤޠ䲒⽮ՊӪ㊫ᆖg≁؇ᆖ⹄ウᡰԺᯟ ƒ‹ͳͻͻʹȂƒ‹—Ž‹䎆ᆈ⨶, Zhongguo Huizu shehui jingji ѝഭഎ᯿⽮Պ㓿⍾ (The Econ- ‘›‘ˆ–Š‡ —‹‘ ‹‡–›‹Š‹ƒȌǡ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ ‘—•‡ᆱ ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻʹǤ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻͺͳȂ‘ƒŽ†ƒ‹‡Ž‡•Ž‹‡ǡ •Žƒ‹ ‹–‡”ƒ–—”‡‹Š‹‡•‡ǡƒ–‡‹‰ƒ†ƒ”Ž› Šǯ‹‰ǣ ‘‘•ǡ —–Š‘”• ƒ† ••‘ ‹ƒ–‡•. Canberra: Canberra College of Advanced †— ƒ–‹‘ǡͳͻͺͳǤ ‡•Ž‹‡ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ †Ǥǡ •Žƒ‹”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽŠ‹ƒǣŠ‘”– ‹•–‘”›–‘ͷ;ͶͶ. Canberra: Can- „‡””ƒ‘ŽŽ‡‰‡‘ˆ†˜ƒ ‡††— ƒ–‹‘ǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ‹’ƒͳͻͻ͹Ȃ ‘ƒ–Šƒ‹’ƒǡ ƒ‹Ž‹ƒ”–”ƒ‰‡”•ǣ—•Ž‹ ‹•–‘”›‹Š‹ƒ. Seattle: ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒ•Š‹‰–‘”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ —ʹͲͲʹȂ—Š‹’‹‰੅ᘇᒣ, “Bajisitan yu Yisilan-jiao” ᐤสᯟඖоԺᯟޠᮉ (Pakistan ƒ† •ŽƒȌǤYafei zongheng ӊ䶎㓥⁚ (“Asia and Africa Review”, quarterly maga- zine, ed. Shi Min ਢ᭿, Beijing: Institute of Asian and African Development, Center of Development Studies, State Council of China ഭ࣑䲒ਁኅ⹄ウѝᗳӊ䶎ਁኅ⹄ウ ᡰȌ͵ȋʹͲͲʹȌǡ’’ǤͳͶȂͳ͸Ǥ ƒ‡š‹ͳͻͺͺȂƒ‡š‹傜ᗧᯠ (Ma Fuchu 傜༽ࡍȌǡChaojin tuji ᵍ䀀䙄䇠 (“Records on the Pilgrimage to Mecca.” An Arabic manuscript translated into Chinese by Ma Anli 傜ᆹ⽬ƒ†’—„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͺ͸ͳȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ ‘—•‡ ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡ”‡’”‹–ͳͻͺͺǤ ƒ‹œ—ʹͲͲͲȂƒ‹œ—傜ѭ䚥, “Dengta” ⚟ຄȋ‹‰Š–Š‘—•‡ȌǤYisilan wenzhai Ժᯟޠ ᮷᪈ȋDz •Žƒ‹ ‹‰‡•–dzǢ’‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽǡ‡†Ǥ‹ƒš‹ —‹‘—‹–›‘ˆ‹‰›—ƒ‘™ǡ Yanshan County of Yunnan Ӂই⹊ኡ৯ᒣ䘌㺇⭠ᗳᶁȌʹͲȋ͹ —Ž›ʹͲͲͲȌǡ’ǤͶǤ ƒ‹‰Ž‹ƒ‰ͳͻͻ͹Ȃƒ‹‰Ž‹ƒ‰傜᰾㢟, “Dui jingtang jiaoyu de pingjia” ሩ㓿าᮉ 㛢Ⲵ䇴ԧȋ˜ƒŽ—ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ†”ƒ•ƒ†— ƒ–‹‘ȌǤGongzuo tongxunͳͻͻ͹ȀͶǡ’Ǥͷ͵Ǥ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵Ȃƒ‘‰傜䙊, Š‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘’ƒ‹›—‡Š—ƒœŠ‹†—•Š‹Ž—‡ѝഭ Ժᯟޠᮉ⍮о䰘ᇖࡦᓖਢ⮕ (A Brief History of Islamic Sects and the Menhuan Sys- –‡‹Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ ‘—•‡ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͺ͵. ȋ‡’”‹–ʹͲͲͲǤȌ ƒ‹—ŽƒʹͲͲͲȂƒ‹—Žƒ傜⿰ޠ, “Guanxin haizi jiushi guanxin women de weilai” ޣ ᗳᆙᆀቡᱟޣᗳᡁԜⲴᵚᶕ (Taking Care of the Children is Taking Care of Our Fu- –—”‡ȌǤMusilin funu ぶᯟ᷇ྷྣ (“Muslim Women”, periodical, ed. The Linxia Arabic School for Women Ѥ༿ѝ䱯ྣṑȌ —‡Ȃ —Ž›ʹͲͲͲǡ’ǤͶǤ ‘‰‰—ƒ‰傜≨ݹ, “Yinggai yi zenyang de fangshi yingjieƒͲͲʹȂʹ‰ƒ—‰‰‘ƒ haji” ᓄ䈕ԕᘾṧⲴᯩᔿ䗾᧕૸ਹ (How to welcome the hajjisȌǤMusilin tongxun, July ʹͲͲʹǡ’Ǥ͵Ǥ —ʹͲͲͳȂ—ƒぶ傜, “Xidaotang de jiaoyu moshi jiqi dui Musilin de jiaoyu qishi” 㾯䚃าⲴᮉ㛢⁑ᔿ৺ަሩぶᯟ᷇Ⲵᮉ⽪ (the Educational Model of the Hall of the ‡•–‡”ƒ–Šƒ†‹–•‡†— ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹ŽŽ—•–”ƒ–‹‘ˆ‘”—•Ž‹•ȌǤ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— ȋ‹ǯƒȌʹͲͲͳǡ’’ǤʹͲȂʹͳǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͺ͵

ͳͻͻͳ Ȃ —•ƒ ぶ㩘, “Shi Yixie jingxiuban zai qianjin” ᐲԺॿ㓿ᆖ䘋؞⨝൘ࡽ䘋 ƒ•— ȋ”‘‰”‡••‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ†”ƒ•ƒ”ƒ‹‹‰Žƒ••‘ˆ–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ȌǤ Shanghai musilin tongxun к⎧ぶᯟ᷇䙊䇟Ͷǡ‡ ‡„‡”ͳͻͻͳǡ’’Ǥͳ͵ȂͳͶǤ Musilin tongxun – Musilin tongxun ぶᯟ᷇䙊䇟ȋDz—•Ž‹‡™•Ž‡––‡”dzȌǡ‘–ŠŽ›‡™•- paper, ed. The Lanzhou Muslim Association Committee for Cultural and Educa- ᐎ, Lanzhou.ͳͻͻͻȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂ͵ͺȌǤޠ䘋Պ׳ᐎぶᯟ᷇᮷ॆᮉ㛢ޠ tional Promotion ƒȀ —ʹͲͲʹȂƒ‹‰“—ƒ█᰾ᵳ and Hu Zhiming 㜑ᘇ᭿, “Zongjiao wangzhan de xianzhuang he guanli duice” ᇇᮉ㖁ㄉⲴ⧠⣦઼㇑⨶ሩㆆ (The Current Situation of ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‡„•‹–‡•ƒ†–Š‡‡ƒ•—”‡•–‘—’‡”˜‹•‡–Š‡ȌǤ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘›—•Š‹Œ‹‡ ᇇᮉо ц⭼ (“Religion and the World”, monthly journal, ed. The Center of Religious Stud- ies, State Bureau of Religious Affairs ഭᇦᇇᮉһ࣑ተᇇᮉ⹄ウѝᗳ, BeijingȌʹͲͲʹȀ ͸ǡ’ǤʹͶǤ ‡‰ͳͻͻ͸Ȃ‡‰‹ƒᖝᒤ,‡‹Œ‹‰†‡ —‹œ—›—‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘•Š‹Ž‹ƒ‘Š—‹„‹ƒेӜⲴഎ᯿ оԺᯟޠᮉਢᯉ≷㕆ȋƒ–ƒ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘–Š‡ —‹ƒ† •Žƒ‹‡‹Œ‹‰ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‡ ˆϐ‹ ‡‘ˆ ƒœ‡––‡‡”ƒ† ‹•–‘”›ǡ‡‹Œ‹‰‘‹––‡‡ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•ेӜᐲ≁ငਢ ᘇ࣎ޜᇔ and the Islamic Association of Beijing ेӜᐲԺᯟޠᮉॿՊ. ‡‰ʹͲͲͳȂ †Ǥǡ‡‹Œ‹‰ —‹œ—™‡Œ‹ ेӜഎ᯿᮷䳶 (Collected Papers on the Hui Nation- ƒŽ‹–›‹‡‹Œ‹‰ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ेӜǡʹͲͲͳǤ ‹ŽŽ•„—”›ͳͻ͹͵Ȃƒ”„ƒ”ƒ‹ŽŽ•„—”›ǡ‘Š‡•‹‘ƒ†Ž‡ƒ˜ƒ‰‡‹Š‹‡•‡—•Ž‹‹‘”‹–› ȋ–Š”‘’‘Ž‘‰›ȌǤ’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ŠǤ†‹••‡”–ƒ–‹‘ǡ‘Ž—„‹ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ǡͳͻ͹͵Ǥ ‹ͳͻͻ͸Ȃ‹‹‰†‡⽱᰾ᗧ, Long Ahong 㙻䱯䀷 (Blind akhondȌǤ‹š‹ƒǣŠ‡‹‰†‡ Mosque in Linxia City of Gansu Province ⭈㚳ⴱѤ༿ᐲ᰾ᗧ␵ⵏሪǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ —†‡Ž•‘ͳͻͻ͹Ȃ —•–‹ ‘—†‡Ž•‘ǡƒ•‹• †‡–‹–‹‡•ǣ›‰Š—”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•ƒŽ‘‰Š‹ƒǯ• Silk RoadǤ‡™‘”ǣ‘Ž—„‹ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ —†‡Ž•‘ͳͻͻͻȂ †ǤǡDzŠ‹ƒǤdz ǣ •Žƒ—–•‹†‡–Š‡”ƒ„‘”Ž†, ed. David Westerlund ƒ† ‰˜ƒ”˜ƒ„‡”‰Ǥ‹ Š‘†ǣ—”œ‘”‡••ǡͳͻͻͻǡ’’ǤͳͻͲȂʹͳͳǤ Shanghai musilin – Shanghai musilin к⎧ぶᯟ᷇ ȋDzŠƒ‰Šƒ‹ —•Ž‹•dzȌǡ “—ƒ”–‡”Ž› magazine, ed. Imam Bai Runsheng ⲭ⏖⭏ǡƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ Shanghai к⎧ᐲԺᯟޠᮉॿՊ, Shanghai.ͳͻͺ͵ȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂ͹ͶȌǤ —‘ʹͲͲʹȂ—‘ŠƒŠ‘‰㍒ঐ呯, “Tigao zhemati de wenhua suzhi” ᨀ儈㘵哫ᨀⲴ᮷ॆ ㍐䍘 (Raise the Cultural Level of jama'atȌǤGansu musilinʹͲͲʹȀʹǡ’ǤʹͷǤ ƒʹͲͲͲȂƒ—–‹‡䉝੤䫱ǡDzͳͻ•Š‹Œ‹͸Ͳ‹ƒ†ƒ‹†‡‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹•‹ŽƒǦŒ‹ƒ‘dz ͳͻц㓚͸Ͳ ᒤԓⲴᯠ⮶Ժᯟޠᮉ ȋ •Žƒ‹‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹–Š‡ͳͺ͸Ͳ•ȌǤ ǣZhongguo Xinjiang duqi Yisilanjiao shi ѝഭᯠ⮶ൠ४Ժᯟޠᮉਢ (A History of Islam in the Xin jiang Region of Š‹ƒȌ˜‘ŽǤʹǡ‡†ǤŠ‡”‹–‹‰ ”‘—’‘ˆDz ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ •Žƒ‹–Š‡‹Œ‹ƒ‰‡‰‹‘‘ˆ China” ljѝഭᯠ⮶ൠ४ԺᯟޠᮉਢNJ㕆߉㓴. Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publication ᯠ⮶Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͲǤ Tianmu musilin – Tianmu musilin jianxun ཙぶぶᯟ᷇ㆰ䇟ȋDz‹ƒ——•Ž‹—ŽŽ‡–‹dzȌǡ periodical, ed. The Northern Mosque of Tianmu Community ཙぶ␵ⵏेሪ, Beichen District of Tianjin. ‹ƒ–ƒ‰†‡›ƒ‘•Š‹Ȃ‹ƒ–ƒ‰†‡›ƒ‘•Š‹ཙาⲴ䫕ॉ (Š‡‡›–‘–Š‡ƒ”ƒ†‹•‡ȌǤ‹- ghur hand-copied manuscript circulated among the Uighur underground organi- zations, translated into Chinese by Bao Wenan ᇍ᮷ᆹ, Institute of Religious Stud- ͳͺͶ Wang Jianping

ies ᇇᮉ⹄ウᡰ, Xin jiang Academy of Social Sciences ᯠ⮶⽮Պ、ᆖ䲒ǡ”—“‹ǡͳͻͻͻǤ ‘‰ʹͲͲͲȂ‘‰‹ƒ‘’‹‰ㄕሿᒣ, ‘‡œ‡›ƒ‰Œ‹‹ƒ—•Š‡‰ ᡁԜᘾṧ㓚ᘥぶ൓ ȋ ‘™†‘™‡‡‡”ƒ–‡–Š‡”‘’Š‡–—Šƒƒ†ǫȌǤ‹›—‡ ᯠᴸ (“Crescent moon”, periodical, ed. The Muslim Cultural Training Center of Pingliang in Gansu ⭈㚳ᒣ ߹ᐲぶᯟ᷇᮷ॆษ䇝ѝᗳȌ͵ʹǡͳͷ —‡ʹͲͲͲǡ’’ǤͳȂ͵Ǥ ƒͳͻͻͻȂƒƒ‘„‹ᇋ㘰ᇮǡDz‹ƒ†—‹ʹͳ•Š‹Œ‹†‡Š‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒǦŒ‹ƒ‘dz 䶒ሩʹͳц 㓚ⲴѝഭԺᯟޠᮉȋ ƒ ‡–Š‡ʹͳ•–‡–—”›ǣ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒȌǤZhongguo musilin ͳͻͻͻȀ ͳǡ’’Ǥͳ͹ȂͳͺǤ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ͳͻͻ͸ƒȂƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰⦻ᔪᒣ, ‘ ‘”†ƒ†‘ϔŽ‹ –ǣŠ‡ —‹‘—‹- –‹‡•‘ˆ—ƒ‘ ‹‡–›‹ƒ ‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡Ǥ Unpublished dissertation, Univer- •‹–›‘ˆ—†ǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ͳͻͻ͸„Ȃ †ǤǡDzŠ‡  ‹†‡–‘ˆ‘‘‘ˆ‡š—ƒŽ—•–‘• in China.” Themeno ȋƒŒ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ ‘’ƒ”ƒ–‹˜‡”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—••–—†‹‡•‘ˆ„‘‹˜‡”•‹–›ǡ ‹Žƒ†Ȍǡ‡ ‡„‡” ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳƒȂ †Ǥǡ Ž‘••ƒ”›‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡ •Žƒ‹ ‡”•. London: Curzon Press, ʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳ„Ȃ †ǤǡŠ—–ƒŠ‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘›—ˆ—š‹‰›—†‘‰ ࡍ᧒ѝഭ Ժᯟޠᮉ㛢༽ޤ䘀ࣘ (An Elementary Probe to the Revival of Islamic Education in Š‹ƒȌǡ—’—„Ž‹•Š‡†ƒ—• ”‹’–ǡ—‰—•–ʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ‰ ‹ƒ’‹‰ʹͲͲͳ Ȃ †ǤǡDzƒ‰†ƒ‹Š‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒǦŒ‹ƒ‘™‡Š—ƒƒ™—†‡š‹ƒ“‹ yu fazhan” ᖃԓѝഭԺᯟޠᮉ᮷ॆ࠺⢙Ⲵᦰ䎧оਁኅ (Rising and Development of •Žƒ‹ —Ž–—”ƒŽ‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽ•‹‘–‡’‘”ƒ”›Š‹ƒȌǤƒ’‡””‡ƒ†ƒ––Š‡Š‘‰‰—‘ Yisilan-jiao Yanjiu Lunwen-ji ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉ⹄ウ䇪᮷䳶 (Symposium of Islamic Stud- ‹‡•‹Š‹ƒȌǡ•’‘•‘”‡†„›–Š‡ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒѝഭԺᯟޠᮉॿՊ, Bei- jing ेӜǡ‘˜‡„‡”ͻȂͳͳǡʹͲͲͳǤ ƒ‰ƒ‹™‡ʹͲͲͲȂƒ‰ƒ‹™‡⦻ѳ᮷, “Guanyu jingtang jiaoyu de sikao” ޣҾ㓿 าᮉ㛢Ⲵᙍ㘳ȋ‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‘•‘ƒ†”ƒ•ƒ†— ƒ–‹‘ȌǤ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— Ժᯟޠ᮷ ॆ⹄ウȋ ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ —Ž–—”‡ȌʹȋʹͲͲͲȌǤ ͳͻͺ͵Ȃƒ‰Š‘—Ž‹⦻ᆸ⽬, “Xinjiang Yichanpai yanjiu” ᯠ⮶׍⾵⍮⹄ウ‹Ž—‘Š‰ƒ ȋ–—†‹‡•‘–Š‡ •Šƒ ”‘—’•‹‹Œ‹ƒ‰ȌǤ‹Œ‹ƒ‰•Š‡Š—‹‡š—‡›ƒŒ‹— ᯠ⮶⽮Պ、 ᆖ⹄ウȋDz‡•‡ƒ” Š‘‹Œ‹ƒ‰‘ ‹ƒŽ ‹‡ ‡•dzǡ”—“‹Ȍͳͻͺ͵Ȁ͵Ǥ ƒ‰Ȁƒͳͻͻ͸Ȃƒ‰‹Š—ƒ⦻ᆀॾ and Ma Shaomei 傜㓽㖾ȋ‡†ǤȌǡShadian de zuotian jintian ⋉⭨Ⲵ᱘ཙgӺཙȋŠƒ†‹ƒǣƒ•–ƒ†”‡•‡–ȌǤ—‹‰ǣ—ƒ–Š‹ ƒŽ Publication Ӂই≁᯿ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻ͸Ǥ — ‹ƒ™‡‹ͳͻͻͷȂ— ‹ƒ™‡‹੤ᔪՏȋ‡†ǤȌǡZhongguo qingzhensi zonglan ѝഭ␵ⵏሪ㔬 㿸ȋŠ‡ ‡‡”ƒŽ—”˜‡›‘ˆ‘•“—‡•‹Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ- tion House ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͷǤ — ‹ƒ™‡‹ͳͻͻͺȂ †ǤǡŠ‘‰‰—‘“‹‰œŠ‡•‹œ‘‰Žƒš—„‹ƒ ѝഭ␵ⵏሪ㔬㿸㔝㕆 (A Se- “—‡Ž–‘–Š‡ ‡‡”ƒŽ—”˜‡›‘ˆ‘•“—‡•‹Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹- cation House ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͺǤ —‹“‹‰ͳͻͻͻȂ—‹“‹‰੤х␵ȋ‡†ǤȌǡCangzhou Huizu ⋗ᐎഎ᯿ (Hui Nationality ‹ƒ‰œŠ‘—Ȍǡʹ˜‘Ž•Ǥ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ‡–”ƒŽ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•”‡••ѝཞ≁᯿བྷ ᆖࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͻǤ ‹–›‹‹˜‡”•‹–›ͳͺͷ

‹”‡‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͶȂ‹”‡—”„ƒ㾯ӱgᓃ ቄ ⨝ , Madali Khan 傜䗮࣋⊇, and Duan Shiyu -⸣㗭, Zhongguo Tajike ѝഭຄਹݻȋŠ‡ƒŒ‹‹Š‹ƒȌǤ”—“‹ǣ‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹˜‡”⇥ sity Press ᯠ⮶བྷᆖࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͶǤ —ʹͲͲͳȂ—‹ƒŽ‘‰䇨ᇚ䲶, Š—ƒŒ—ˆƒŒ‹–—ƒ›—š‹„‡‹—•‹Ž‹•Š‡Š—‹䈨傜ߋ䰰䳶ഒ о㾯ेぶᯟ᷇⽮Պ (The Ma Warlord Groups and the Muslim Society in Northwest- ‡”Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ ‘—•‡ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ‹„—Žƒš‹ʹͲͲͳȂ‹„—Žƒš‹Ժঌ᣹ ⅓  ȋ „”ƒŠ‹ȌǡDzŠ‘‰Ǧ—š‹ƒ‘ǡ›‹‰‡„‹š—ˆƒœŠƒ†‡ yaolan” ѝ䱯ྣṑ˖ањᗵ享ਁኅⲴ᩷㈞ (Chinese-Arabic School for Women: A Cra- †Ž‡ˆ”‘™Š‹ Šƒ„›—•– ”‘™ȌǤMusilin tongxunȋ’”‹ŽʹͲͲͳȌǡ’ǤͷǤ ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— – ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウ (Islamic Cultural Stud- ‹‡•Ȍǡ’‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽ‡†‹–‡†„› — ‡‰›‹‰ਔࠔ㤡ǡƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘‡–‡”‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ —Ž–—”- al Studies, He’nan Academy of Social Sciences ⋣ইⴱ⽮Պ、ᆖ䲒Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウѝ ᗳǡŠ‡‰œŠ‘—ǡͳͻͻͶȂʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂͳͲȌǤ ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹—ȋ‹ǯƒȌȂ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹—Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウ (Islamic Cultur- ƒŽ–—†‹‡•ȌǤ“—ƒ”–‡”Ž›’‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽ‡†‹–‡†„›Š—Š‘‰Ž‹ᵡጷ⽬ǡƒˆϐ‹Ž‹ƒ–‡†–‘–Š‡ Xi’an Association of Islamic Cultural Studies 㾯ᆹᐲԺᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウՊ, Xi’anͳͻͻͶȂ ʹͲͲʹȋ‘ǤͳȂ͵ͲȌǤ —ʹͲͲʹȂ—Š‡‰—‹։ᥟ䍥, “Yisilan-jiao yu ‘teshu fuza xing’” ԺᯟޠᮉоĀ⢩↺༽ᵲ ᙗāȋ •Žƒƒ†‹–•Dz’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ‘’Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘dzȌǤŠ‘‰Œ‹ƒ‘›—‹œ— ᇇᮉо≁᯿ (“Re- ligion and Ethnicity”, ed. Mu Zhongjian ⢏䫏䢤, Central University of Nationalities, Institute of Religious Studies ѝཞ≁᯿བྷᆖᇇᮉ⹄ウᡰ, Beijing: Religious Cultural Publication House ᇇᮉ᮷ॆࠪ⡸⽮ȌͳȋʹͲͲʹȌǡ’’ǤͶͲȂͶͳǤ —Ȁ‡‹ʹͲͲͳȂ—Š‡‰—‹։ᥟ䍥 and Lei Xiaojing 䴧ᲃ䶉ȋ‡†ǤȌǡZhongguo Huizu jinshi lu ѝഭഎ᯿䠁⸣ᖅȋ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡‘—‡– • ”‹’–‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡ —‹‹Š‹ƒȌǤ Yinchuan 䬦ᐍ: Ningxia People’s Publication House ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͳǤ Šƒ‰Š‡‰œŠ‹ʹͲͲʹȂŠƒ‰Š‡‰œŠ‹ᕐ᢯ᘇ, “Xiaobao” ሿᣕȋŠ‘”–‘–‹ ‡ȌǤHuizu ›ƒŒ‹— എ᯿⹄ウ (‡•‡ƒ” Š‘–Š‡ —‹–Š‹ ‹–›ȌʹͲͲʹȀ͵ȋƒ” ŠʹͷǡʹͲͲʹȌǡ’’ǤͳͺȂ ͳͻǤ Šƒ‰‹ƒŽ—‡–ƒŽǤͳͻͻͳȂŠƒ‰‹ƒŽ—ᕐཙ䐟, Song Chuansheng ᆻՐॷ and Ma Zhen- gliang 傜↓Ӟ, Zhongguo musilin renkou ѝഭぶᯟ᷇Ӫਓ (Muslim Population in Chi- ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•—„Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘ ‘—•‡ᆱ༿Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡͳͻͻͳǤ Šƒ‰Š‹Š—ƒͳͻͻ͹ȂŠƒ‰Š‹Š—ƒᕐᘇॾ, “Zhongguo Yisilan jingtang jiaoyu de huigu yu fazhan” ѝഭԺᯟޠ㓿าᮉ㛢Ⲵഎ亮оኅᵋ (Review and Prospect for Madrasa †— ƒ–‹‘‹Š‹ƒȌǤGongzuo tongxunͷȋͳͻͻ͹Ȍǡ’ǤͳͻǤ Šƒ‘”—ʹͲͲͲȂŠƒ‘”—䎥ᚙ݂, “Fulu: Xinjiang Yisilan-jiao jingji, jiaofa, jiaoyu ᮉ㓿⍾ǃᮉ⌅ǃᮉ㛢ࡦᓖ৺ぶᯟ᷇ⲴҐ؇ޠzhidu ji Musilin de xisu” 䱴ᖅ˖ᯠ⮶Ժᯟ (Appendix: Islamic Economy, Law, Educational System and the Customs of Mus- Ž‹•‹‹Œ‹ƒ‰ȌǤ ǣZhongguo Xinjiang diqu Yisilanjiao shi ѝഭᯠ⮶ൠ४Ժᯟޠᮉਢ ȋ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ •Žƒ‹–Š‡‹Œ‹ƒ‰‡‰‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒȌǡ˜‘ŽǤʹǡ‡†ǤŠ‡”‹–‹‰ ”‘—’ of “A History of Islam in the Xinjiang Region of China”ljѝഭᯠ⮶ൠ४ԺᯟޠᮉਢNJ 㕆߉㓴, Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publication ᯠ⮶Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͲǡ’’Ǥ͵ͻͳȂͶͳͳǤ Zhongguo musilin ѝഭぶᯟ᷇ȋ—•Ž‹•‹Š‹ƒȌǡ„‹Ǧ‘–ŠŽ›ƒ‰ƒœ‹‡ǡ‡†ǤƒŠ‘‰- jie 傜ᘐᶠ, Islamic Association of China ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉॿՊ, Beijing. Š‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒǦŒ‹ƒ‘ ‹ƒ‘™—Š‹†ƒ‘‡‹›—ƒŠ—‹ʹͲͲͳ – Zhongguo Yisilan-jiao Jiaowu ͳͺ͸ Wang Jianping

Zhidao Weiyuanhui ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉᮉ࣑ᤷሬငઈՊ (Committee of Religious Affairs —‹†ƒ ‡‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ ˆˆƒ‹”•‘ˆŠ‹ƒȌȋ‡†ǤȌǡ‹„‹ƒ™‘‡”œ‹›ƒŒ‹ƒ‰Œ‹ ᯠ㕆গቄީ ╄䇢䳶ȋ‡™Ž›†‹–‡†‘ŽŽ‡ –‹‘‘ˆ’‡‡ Š‡•„›ƒ᪂œȌǡ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•—Ž–—”ƒŽ Publication House ᇇᮉ᮷ॆࠪ⡸⽮ǡʹͲͲͳǤ ‘—‰—ƒ‰ઘᴹݹ, “Chuantong zongjiao de xiandai yiyi” Ր㔏ᇇᮉⲴ—‘ŠͲͲʹǡȂʹ—‘Š ⧠ԓ᜿ѹȋŠ‡‘†‡”‡ƒ‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ȌǤ—›ƒ 㗔䀰 (“Peo- ple’s Voice”, magazine published by the Political Consultation Committee of China ѝഭ᭯⋫ॿ୶Պ䇞ǡ‡‹Œ‹‰ȌʹͲͲʹȀʹǡ’’Ǥ͵͸Ȃ͵ͻǤ Islam in China  ‘‘†ƒ–‹‘‘”‡’ƒ”ƒ–‹‘ǫ

Dru C. Gladney

China’s Muslims face their second millennium under Chinese rule. Many of the challenges they confront remain the same as they have for the last ͳǡͶͲͲ›‡ƒ”•‘ˆ ‘–‹—‘—•‹–‡”ƒ –‹‘™‹–ŠŠ‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›ǡ„—–ƒ› are new as a result of China’s transformed and increasingly globalized •‘ ‹‡–›ǡƒ†‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›–Š‡™ƒ–‡”•Š‡†‡˜‡–•‘ˆ–Š‡ͻȀͳͳterrorist at- tacks and the subsequent “war on terrorism.” Muslims in China live as minority communities amid a sea of people who, in their view, are largely pork-eating, polytheist, secularist, and ƒϔ‹”ȋŠ‡ƒ–Š‡ȌǤ‡˜‡”- theless, many of their small and isolated communities have survived in rather inhospitable circumstances for over a millennium. Though small ‹’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘’‡” ‡–ƒ‰‡ȋƒ„‘—–ʹΨ‹Š‹ƒǡͳΨ‹Japan, and less than ͳΨ‹‘”‡ƒȌǡ–Š‡‹”—„‡”•ƒ”‡‡˜‡”–Š‡Ž‡••Žƒ”‰‡‹ ‘’ƒ”‹•‘™‹–Š other Muslim states. For example, there are more Muslims in China than in Malaysia, and more than in every Middle Eastern Muslim nation except Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. East Asia is also increasingly depending on mainly Muslim nations for energy and cheap labor, thus raising the importance of its Muslim diasporic communities for international and domestic relations. Japan has a rather small resident Muslim communi- –›ǡ‡•–‹ƒ–‡†–‘„‡Ž‡••–ŠƒͳͲǡͲͲͲǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ”‡ ‡–™ƒ˜‡•‘ˆ‹††Ž‡ Eastern and South Asian migrant laborers to Japan’s large industrial cities suggest that the total Muslim population in Japan could be near- ing the one million mark. Though these communities are temporary in terms of residency, they have as strong an impact on Japan’s rather insular society as the Turkish and Kurdish populations in the Scandina- ˜‹ƒŠ‡ƒ”–Žƒ†•ȋ™Š‹ Š‘™Šƒ˜‡•—”’ƒ••‡†ͳͲ’‡” ‡–ȌǤ•‹’ƒͳ in- sightfully noted, these long-term Muslim communities have often been

ͳ ‹’ƒͳͻͻ͹ǡ’ǤʹǤ

ƒš‡‡‰Ȁ‡”Šƒ”† Š‡‹†ȋ‡†•ǤȌ, Religion in Chinaǡ’’Ǥͳͺ͹ȂʹʹͺǤ ͳͺͺ Dru C. Gladney the “familiar strangers” found in small enclaves throughout Asia. And if Kosovo and Bosnia are to serve as lessons, failure to accommodate Mus- lim minorities can lead to national dismemberment and international intervention. Indeed, China’s primary objection to NATO involvement in Kosovo centered on its fear that this might encourage the aiding and abetting of separatists, with independence groups in Xinjiang ᯠ⮶, Ti- bet, and perhaps Taiwan, clearly a major Chinese concern. This paper will seek to examine Muslim minority identity in Asia ™‹–Š•’‡ ‹ϐ‹ ”‡ˆ‡”‡ ‡–‘Š‹ƒǡ‘–‘Ž›„‡ ƒ—•‡‹–‹•™Š‡”‡–Š‹•ƒ—- thor has conducted most of his research, but also because with the larg- est Muslim minority in East Asia, China’s Muslims are clearly the most threatened in terms of self-preservation and Islamic identity. However, it is hoped that lessons gleaned from the Chinese case might be useful for other Muslim communities in East Asia, and perhaps elsewhere in Asia as well. Most relevant is the thesis put forth that successful Muslim accommodation to minority status in Asia can be seen to be a measure of the extent to which Muslim groups allow the reconciliation of the dictates of Islamic culture to their host culture, be it Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or other. This goes against the opposite view that can be found in the writings of some analysts of Islam in China, such as Raphael Is- raeli and Michael Dillon, that Islam in the region is inherently rebellious and that Muslims as minorities are always problematic to the security of a non-Muslim state.ʹ

Islam in China

•Žƒ‹Š‹ƒŠƒ•’”‹ƒ”‹Ž›„‡‡’”‘’ƒ‰ƒ–‡†‘˜‡”–Š‡Žƒ•–ͳǡ͵ͲͲ›‡ƒ”• among the people now known as “Hui” എ, but many of the issues con- fronting them are relevant to the Turkic and Indo-European Muslims on China’s Inner Asian frontier. “Hui teaching” (Huijiao എᮉȌ™ƒ•–Š‡ term once used in Chinese to indicate “Islam” in general, and proba- bly derives from an early Chinese rendering of the term for the mod- ern ‹‰Š—”’‡‘’Ž‡Ǥ ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š‡”‡ƒ•‘ƒ„Ž›ƒ —”ƒ–‡ͳͻͻͲƒ–‹‘ƒŽ census of China, the total —•Ž‹’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‹•ͳ͹Ǥ͸‹ŽŽ‹‘ǡ‹ Ž—†‹‰ǣ —‹ȋͺǡ͸Ͳʹǡͻ͹ͺȌǢ‹‰Š—”ȋ͹ǡʹͳͶǡͶ͵ͳȌǢƒœƒŠȋͳǡͳͳͳǡ͹ͳͺȌǢDongxiang ь ґȋ͵͹͵ǡͺ͹ʹȌǢ ›”‰›œ ȋͳͶͳǡͷͶͻȌǢ ƒŽƒ” ȋͺ͹ǡ͸ͻ͹ȌǢ ƒŒ‹ ȋ͵͵ǡͷ͵ͺȌǢ Uzbek ȋͳͶǡͷͲʹȌǢ‘ƒȋͳʹǡʹͳʹȌǢƒ†ƒ–ƒ”ȋͶǡͺ͹͵ȌǤŠ‡Hui speak mainly Si-

ʹ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ͳͻ͹ͺǢ‹ŽŽ‘ͳͻͻ͹Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͺͻ no-‹„‡–ƒ Žƒ‰—ƒ‰‡•Ǣ —”‹ ǦŽƒ‰—ƒ‰‡ •’‡ƒ‡”• ‹ Ž—†‡ –Š‡ Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and ƒ–ƒ”Ǣ ‘„‹‡†—”‹ ǦMongolian speak- -–ƒ”–‡ ‘ ᆹȌǡ؍ ers include the Dongxiang, Salar, and Bonan (Bao’an ed in Gansu’s ⭈㚳 mountainous Hexi ⋣㾯 ‘””‹†‘”Ǣƒ†–Š‡Tajik speak a variety of Indo-Persian dialects. It is important to note, however, that –Š‡Š‹‡•‡ ‡•—•”‡‰‹•–‡”‡†’‡‘’Ž‡„›ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–›ǡ‘–”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•ƒˆϐ‹Ž- iation, so the actual number of Muslims is still unknown, and that all ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ϐ‹‰—”‡•ƒ”‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›’‘Ž‹–‹ •‹–Š‡‹”—•‡ƒ†‹–‡”’”‡- tation. While the Hui have been labeled the “Chinese-speaking Muslims”, “Chinese Muslims”, and most recently, as “Sino-Muslims”,͵ this is mis- leading since by law all Muslims living in China are “Chinese” by cit- izenship, and many Hui speak many of the non-Chinese languages where they live, such as the Tibetan, Mongolian, Thai, and Hainan⎧ই —•Ž‹•ǡ™Š‘ƒ”‡ƒŽ•‘ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡†„›–Š‡•–ƒ–‡ƒ•Hui. Yet most Hui are closer to the Han Chinese than the other Muslim nationalities in terms of demographic proximity and cultural accommodation, adapting many of their Islamic practices to Han ways of life, which has often become the source for many of the criticisms of Muslim reformers. In the past, this was not as great a problem for the Turkish and Indo-European Muslim groups, as they were traditionally more isolated from the Han and their identities not as threatened, though this has begun to change in the last forty years. As a result of state-sponsored nationality identi- ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ ƒ’ƒ‹‰•‘˜‡”–Š‡ ‘—”•‡‘ˆ–Š‡Žƒ•––Š‹”–››‡ƒ”•ǡ–Š‡•‡‰”‘—’• have begun to think of themselves more as ethnic nationalities, some- thing more than just “Muslims”. The —‹ƒ”‡—‹“—‡ƒ‘‰–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–›Ǧϐ‹˜‡ ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•‹Š‹ƒ‹–Šƒ––Š‡›ƒ”‡–Š‡‘Ž›ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–›ˆ‘” whom religion ( •ŽƒȌ‹•–Š‡‘Ž›—‹ˆ›‹‰ ƒ–‡‰‘”›‘ˆ‹†‡–‹–›ǡ‡˜‡ though many members of the Hui nationality may not practice Islam. Resulting from a succession of Islamic reform movements that •™‡’–ƒ ”‘••Š‹ƒ‘˜‡”–Š‡Žƒ•–͸ͲͲ›‡ƒ”•ǡ‘‡ϐ‹†•ƒ‘‰–Š‡Mus- lims in China today a wide spectrum of Islamic belief. Archaeological discoveries of large collections of Islamic artifacts and epigraphy on the southeast coast suggest that the earliest Muslim communities in Chi- na were descended from Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim ‡” Šƒ–•ǡ‹Ž‹–‹ƒǡƒ†‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•™Š‘•‡––Ž‡†ϐ‹”•–ƒŽ‘‰Š‹ƒǯ•

͵ ‘”–Š‡†‡„ƒ–‡‘˜‡”–Š‡†‡ϐ‹‹–‹‘‘ˆHui and reference to them as “Sino-Muslims”, •‡‡‹’ƒͳͻͻ͹ǡ’Ǥšš‹˜Ǥ ͳͻͲ Dru C. Gladney southeast coast from the seventh to tenth centuries, and then in larg- er migrations to the north from Central Asia under the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, gradually intermar- rying with the local Chinese populations, and raising their children as Muslims. Practicing Sunni, ƒƒϐ‹Islam, residing in independent small communities clustered around a central mosque, these communities were characterized by relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and urban enclaves that related with each other via trading networks and recognition of belonging to the wider Islamic umma, headed by an ahong 䱯䀷 (also written 䱯⍚, or aheng 䱯㺑, from the Persian, akhond α’”‡ƒ Š‡”Ȍ™Š‘™ƒ•‹˜‹–‡†–‘–‡ƒ Š‘ƒ‘”‡‘”Ž‡••–‡’‘”ƒ”›„ƒ•‹•Ǥ —ϐ‹•„‡‰ƒ–‘ƒ‡ƒ•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽ‹’ƒ –‹Š‹ƒ’”‘’‡”‹–Š‡ late seventeenth century, arriving mainly along the Central Asian trade routes with saintly •Šƒ›Šs, both Chinese and foreign, who brought new teachings from the pilgrimage cities. These charismatic teachers and tradesmen established widespread networks and brotherhood associations, including most prominently the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiri- yya, and Kubrawiyya. The hierarchical organization of these —ϐ‹‡–- works helped in the mobilization of large numbers of Hui during eco- nomic and political crises in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, assisting widespread Muslim-led rebellions and resistance movements against late Ming and Qing imperial rule in YunnanӁই, Shanxiኡ㾯, Gansu, and ‹Œ‹ƒ‰ǤŠ‡ͳͻͳʹnationalist revolution allowed further autonomy in Muslim concentrated regions of the northwest, and wide areas came under virtual Muslim warlord control, leading to frequent intra-Muslim and —•Ž‹Ǧ ƒ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•—–‹Ž–Š‡‡˜‡–—ƒŽ ‘—‹•– victory led to the reassertion of central control. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Wahhabi-inspired reform movements, known as the Yiheiwani ׍唁⬖ቬ (also written Ժ唁⬖ቬ, or Yihewani Ժ䎛⬖ቬ, from the Arabic Ikhwan = brethren, viz. Ikhwan al-Muslimin = —•Ž‹„”‘–Š‡”•Ȍǡ”‘•‡–‘’‘’—Žƒ”‹–›—†‡”nationalist and warlord sponsorship, and were noted for their critical stance toward tradition- alist Islam as too acculturated to Chinese practices, and —ϐ‹•ƒ•–‘‘ attached to saint and tomb veneration. These movements of •Žƒ‹ϐŽ—- enced all —•Ž‹ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•‹Š‹ƒ–‘†ƒ›ǢŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ–Š‡›ˆ‘—†–Š‡‹” most political expression among the Hui who were faced with the task of accommodating each new Islamic movement with Chinese culture. Among the northwestern Muslim communities, especially the Uighur, their more recent integration into Chinese society as a result of Mongo- •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻͳ lian and Manchu expansion into Central Asian has forced them to reach social and political accommodations that have challenged their identi- ty. In terms of integration, the Uighur as a people represent perhaps the least integrated into Chinese society, while the Hui are at the other end of the spectrum, due to several historical and social factors that I will discuss below.

Uighur Indigeneity and the Challenge to Chinese Sovereignty

 ͳͻͻ͹ǡ „‘„• ‡š’Ž‘†‡† ‹ ƒ ‹–› ’ƒ” ‹ ‡‹Œ‹‰ ‘ ͳ͵ ƒ› ȋ‹ŽŽ‹‰ ‘‡Ȍƒ†‘–™‘„—•‡•‘͹ƒ” Šȋ‹ŽŽ‹‰–™‘Ȍǡƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•‹–Š‡‘”–Š- western border city of Urumqi (Wulumuqi Ѽ励ᵘ喀Ȍǡ–Š‡ ƒ’‹–ƒŽ‘ˆXin- jiang ‹‰Š—”—–‘‘‘—•‡‰‹‘ǡ‘ʹͷ ‡„”—ƒ”›ȋ‹ŽŽ‹‰‹‡Ȍǡ™‹–Š ‘˜‡”–Š‹”–›‘–Š‡”„‘„‹‰•‹ͳͻͻ͸ǡ•‹š‹Tibet alone. Most of these are thought to have been related to demands by Muslim and Tibetan sep- aratists. Eight members of the Uighur Muslim minority were executed ‘ʹͻƒ›ͳͻͻ͹ˆ‘”ƒŽŽ‡‰‡†„‘„‹‰•‹‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒǡ™‹–ŠŠ—- dreds arrested on suspicion of taking part in ethnic riots and engaging in separatist activities. Though sporadically reported since the early ͳͻͺͲ•ǡ•— Š‹ ‹†‡–•Šƒ˜‡„‡‡‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰Ž› ‘‘•‹ ‡ͳͻͻ͹ƒ† are documented in a recent scathing report of Chinese government pol- icy in the region by Amnesty International.Ͷ A very recent report in the Wall Street Journal‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ””‡•–‘ͳͳ—‰—•–ͳͻͻͻ‘ˆRebiya Kadeer, a well-known Uighur business woman, during a visit by the United States Congressional Research Service delegation to the region, indicates Chi- na’s random arrests have not diminished since the report, nor is China concerned with Western criticism.ͷ As we consider the interaction of Uighur Muslims with Chinese so- ciety, we must examine three interrelated aspects of regional history, economy, and politics. First, Chinese histories notwithstanding, every ‹‰Š—”ϐ‹”Ž›„‡Ž‹‡˜‡•–Šƒ–Š‹•ƒ ‡•–‘”•™‡”‡–Š‡‹†‹‰‡‘—•’‡‘’Ž‡ of the Tarim basin, which did not become known in Chinese as Xinjiang ȋDz‡™†‘‹‹‘dzȌ—–‹Ž–Š‡‡‹‰Š–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›Ǥ‡˜‡”–Š‡Ž‡••ǡ Šƒ˜‡ƒ”- gued elsewhere that the constructed “ethnogenesis” of the Uighur, the current national identity of the people today known as the Uighur, is a rather recent phenomenon related to Great Game rivalries, Sino-So-

Ͷ  ͳͻͻͻǤ ͷ WSJͳͻͻͻǤ ͳͻʹ Dru C. Gladney viet geopolitical maneuverings, and Chinese nation-building.͸ While a collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uighur” existed ˆ”‘„‡ˆ‘”‡–Š‡‡‹‰Š–Š ‡–—”›ǡ–Š‹•‹†‡–‹–›™ƒ•Ž‘•–ˆ”‘–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡–Š to twentieth centuries. It was not until the fall of the Turkish Khanate ȋͷͷʹ–͹ͶͶǤǤȌ–‘ƒ’‡‘’Ž‡”‡’‘”–‡†„›–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Š‹•–‘”‹ƒ•ƒ•Huihe എ㓕 or Huihu എ咈 –Šƒ–™‡ϐ‹†–Š‡„‡‰‹‹‰•‘ˆ–Š‡Uighur Empire. At this time the Uighur were but one collection of nine nomadic tribes, who, initially in confederation with other Basmil and Karlukh nomads, defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dominated the federa- tion under the leadership of ‘Ž‹‡‹Ž‡‹͹ͶʹǤ Gradual sedentarization of the Uighur, and their defeat of the Turk- ‹•ŠŠƒƒ–‡ǡ‘ —””‡†’”‡ ‹•‡Ž›ƒ•–”ƒ†‡™‹–Š–Š‡—‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ‰ state became especially lucrative. Sedentarization and interaction with the Chinese state was accompanied by socio-religious change: the tra- ditional shamanistic Turkic-speaking Uighur came increasingly un- †‡”–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ‡”•‹ƒManichaeism, Buddhism, and eventually, Nestorian Christianity. Extensive trade and military alliances along the old Silk Road with the Chinese state developed to the extent that the Ui- ghur gradually adopted cultural, dress and even agricultural practices of the Chinese. Conquest of the Uighur capital of Karabalghasun in Mon- golia by the nomadic ›”‰›œ‹ͺͶͲǡ™‹–Š‘—–”‡• —‡ˆ”‘–Š‡ƒ‰™Š‘ may have become by then intimidated by the wealthy Uighur empire, led to further sedentarization and crystallization of Uighur identity. One branch that ended up in what is now Turfan took advantage of the unique socioecology of the glacier-fed oases surrounding the Taklam- akan and were able to preserve their merchant and limited agrarian practices, gradually establishing Khocho or Gaochang 儈᰼, the great Uighur city-state based in —”ˆƒˆ‘”ˆ‘—” ‡–—”‹‡•ȋͺͷͲ–ͳʹͷͲȌǤ The Islamicization of the Uighur from the tenth to as late as the sev- enteenth centuries, while displacing their Buddhist religion, did little to bridge these oases-based loyalties. From that time on, the people of “Uighuristan” centered in Turfan who resisted Islamic conversion until the seventeenth century were the last to be known as Uighur. The oth- ers were known only by their oasis or by the generic term of “Turki.” With the arrival of Islam, the ethnonym “Uighur” fades from the histor- ‹ ƒŽ”‡ ‘”†Ǥ –™ƒ•‘–—–‹Žͳ͹͸Ͳ–Šƒ––Š‡Manchu Qing dynasty exerted full and formal control over the region, establishing it as their “new do-

͸ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͲǡ’Ǥ͵Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻ͵ minions” (‹Œ‹ƒ‰Ȍǡƒƒ†‹‹•–”ƒ–‹‘–Šƒ–Žƒ•–‡†„ƒ”‡Ž›‘‡Š—†”‡† years when it fell to the ƒ—„‡‰”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ȋͳͺ͸Ͷ–ͳͺ͹͹Ȍƒ†‡š’ƒ†- ‹‰—••‹ƒ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡Ǥ͹ The end of the Qing dynasty and the rise of Great Game rivalries between China, Russia, and Britain saw the region torn by competing loyalties and marked by two short-lived and drastically different attempts at independence: the short-lived proclamations of an “East Turkestan Republic” in ƒ•Š‰ƒ”‹ͳͻ͵͵ƒ†ƒ‘–Š‡”‹Yining Ժᆱ ȋ Š—ŽŒ‡Ȍ ‹ ͳͻͶͶǤ ͺ As Andrew Forbes has noted, these rebellions and attempts at self-rule did little to bridge competing political, reli- gious, and regional differences within the Turkic people who became known as the ‹‰Š—”‹ͳͻ͵Ͷ—†‡”•— ‡••‹˜‡Š‹‡•‡—‘‹–ƒ‰ഭ ≁ފ (Ȍ™ƒ”Ž‘”†ƒ†‹‹•–”ƒ–‹‘•Ǥͻ Justin Rudelson’sͳͲ recent work suggests there is persistent regional diversity along three, and perhaps four macro-regions: the northwestern Zungaria plateau, the southern Tarim basin, the southwest Pamir region, and the eastern Kumul-Tur- fan-Hami corridor. The recognition of the ‹‰Š—”ƒ•ƒ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŠ‹‡•‡ “nationality” (minzu ≁᯿Ȍ‹–Š‡ͳͻ͵Ͳ•‹Xinjiang under a ‘˜‹‡–Ǧ‹ϐŽ—- enced policy of nationality recognition contributed to the widespread acceptance today of continuity with the ancient Uighur kingdom and –Š‡‹”‡˜‡–—ƒŽDz‡–Š‘‰‡‡•‹•dzƒ•ƒ„‘ƒϐ‹†‡ nationality. The “nationali- ty” policy under the ‹†‡–‹ϐ‹‡†ϐ‹˜‡’‡‘’Ž‡•‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡ™‹–Š–Š‡ ƒ in the majority. This policy was continued under the Communists, they ‡˜‡–—ƒŽŽ›”‡ ‘‰‹œ‹‰ϐ‹ˆ–›Ǧ•‹šƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•ǡ™‹–Š–Š‡ ƒ‘ —’›‹‰ƒ ͻͳ’‡” ‡–ƒŒ‘”‹–›‹ͳͻͻͲǤ The “peaceful liberation” by the Chinese Communists of Xinjian g in ͳͻͶͻǡƒ†‹–••—„•‡“—‡–‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡–‘ˆ–Š‡Xinjiang Uighur Autono- ‘—•‡‰‹‘‘ͳ –‘„‡”ͳͻͷͷǡ’‡”’‡–—ƒ–‡†–Š‡ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•–’‘Ž‹ ›‘ˆ recognizing the Uighur as a minority nationality under Chinese rule.ͳͳ This nationality designation not only masks tremendous regional and linguistic diversity, it also includes groups such as the Loplyk and Dolans that have very little to do with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims who became known as the Uighur. At the same time, contemporary Ui- ghur separatists look back to the brief periods of independent self-rule under Yakub Beg and the Eastern Turkestan Republics, in addition to

͹ For the best treatment of the ƒ—„‡‰”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ǡ•‡‡‹ͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ͺ ‡•‘ͳͻͻͲǤ ͻ ‘”„‡•ͳͻͺ͸ǡ’ǤʹͻǤ ͳͲ—†‡Ž•‘ͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ͳͳ ŠƒŠ‹†‹ͳͻͺͶǡ’ǤʹͶͶǤ ͳͻͶ Dru C. Gladney the earlier glories of the Uighur kingdoms in Turfan and Karabalghasun, as evidence of their rightful claims to the region. Contemporary Uighur separatist organizations based in Istanbul, Ankara, Almaty, Munich, Amsterdam, Melbourne, and Washington, D.C., may differ on their po- litical goals and strategies for the region, but they all share a common vision of a unilineal Uighur claim on the region, disrupted by Chinese and Soviet intervention. The independence of the former Soviet Central •‹ƒ‡’—„Ž‹ •‹ͳͻͻͳŠƒ•†‘‡— Š–‘‡ ‘—”ƒ‰‡–Š‡•‡Uighur or- ganizations in their hopes for an independent “Turkestan”, despite the fact the new, mainly Muslim Central Asian governments have all signed ’”‘–‘ ‘Ž•™‹–ŠŠ‹ƒ‹–Š‡•’”‹‰‘ˆͳͻͻ͸–Šƒ––Š‡›™‘—Ž†‘–Šƒ”„‘” or support separatist groups. Within the region, though many portray the Uighur as united around separatist or Islamist causes, Uighur continue to be divided from within „›”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—• ‘ϐŽ‹ –•ǡ‹–Š‹• ƒ•‡ ‘’‡–‹‰—ϐ‹ƒ†‘Ǧ—ϐ‹ˆƒ –‹‘•ǡ –‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽŽ‘›ƒŽ–‹‡•ȋ™Š‡–Š‡”–Š‡›„‡‘ƒ•‡•‘”’Žƒ ‡•‘ˆ‘”‹‰‹ȌǡŽ‹‰—‹•- tic discrepancies, commoner-elite alienation, and competing political loyalties. These divided loyalties where evidenced by the attack in May ͳͻͻ͸‘–Š‡imam of the Idgah Mosque in Kashgar by other Uighurs, as well as the assassination of at least six ‹‰Š—”‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•‹‡’–‡„‡” ͳͻͻ͸Ǥ –‹•ƒŽ•‘‹’‘”–ƒ––‘‘–‡–Šƒ–Islam was only one of several unifying markers for Uighur identity, depending on those with whom they were in cooperation at the time. For example, to the Hui Muslim Chinese, the Uighur distinguish themselves as the legitimate autoch- thonous minority, since both share a belief in Sunni Islam. In contrast to the nomadic Muslim peoples (Kazakh or ›”‰›œȌǡUighur stress their attachment to the land and oasis of origin. In opposition to the Han Chi- nese, the Uighur will generally emphasize their long history in the re- gion. This suggests that Islamic fundamentalist groups such as that of Taliban in Afghanistan (often glossed as “ƒŠŠƒ„‹››ƒdz‹–Š‡”‡‰‹‘Ȍ will have only limited appeal among the Uighur. It is this contested un- †‡”•–ƒ†‹‰‘ˆŠ‹•–‘”›–Šƒ– ‘–‹—‡•–‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡— Š‘ˆ–Š‡ —””‡– debate over separatist and Chinese claims to the region. Amnesty International has claimed that the round-ups of so-called terrorists and separatists have led to hurried public trials and immedi- ate, summary executions of possibly thousands of locals. One Amnesty International estimate suggested that in a country known for its fre- quent executions, ‹Œ‹ƒ‰Šƒ†–Š‡Š‹‰Š‡•–—„‡”ǡƒ˜‡”ƒ‰‹‰ͳǤͺ’‡” week, most of them Uighur. Troop movements to the area, related to the •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻͷ nationwide campaign against crime known as “Strike Hard” launched ‹ ͳͻͻͺ –Šƒ– ‹ Ž—†‡• –Š‡ ƒŽŽ –‘ ‡”‡ – ƒ Dz‰”‡ƒ– ™ƒŽŽ ‘ˆ •–‡‡Ždzƒ‰ƒ‹•– separatists in Xinjiang, have reportedly been the largest since the sup- pression of the large –‘‹•—””‡ –‹‘‹’”‹ŽͳͻͻͲȋ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–ƒŒ‘” uprising in Xinjiang that took place in the Southern Tarim region near Baren Township, which initiated a series of unrelated and sporadic pro- –‡•–•ȌǤŽŽ‡‰‡†‹ —”•‹‘•‘ˆƒŽ‹„ƒϐ‹‰Š–‡”•–Š”‘—‰Š–Š‡ƒŠƒ ‘”- ridor into China where Xinjiang shares a narrow border with Afghani- stan have led to the area being swamped with Chinese security forces and large military exercises, beginning at least one month prior to the ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳth attack. These military exercises suggest that there was growing government concern about these border areas even before the ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳth attack. Recently, under US and Chinese pressure, Paki- stan returned one Uighur activist to China, apprehended among hun- dreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of suspected Uighur separatists in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbeki- stan. International campaigns for Uighur rights and possible indepen- dence have become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially on the internet. Repeated public appeals have been made to Abdula- hat Abdurixit, the Uighur People’s Government Chairman of Xinj iang in Urumqi. Notably, the elected chair of the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (Ȍ„ƒ•‡†‹Š‡ ƒ‰—‡‹•ƒUighur, Erkin Alptekin, son of the separatist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who is buried in Istanbul where there is a park dedicated to his memory. Supporting primarily an audience of approximately one million expatriate Uighurs (yet few Uighurs in Central Asia and China have access to these inter- ‡–•‹–‡•Ȍ–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡ƒ–Ž‡ƒ•––™‡–›Ǧϐ‹˜‡‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•ƒ† web sites working for the independence of “Eastern Turkestan” based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, D.C. and New ‘”Ǥ‹ ‡‡’–‡„‡”ͳͳth, each of these organizations has disclaimed any support for violence or terrorism, pressing for a peaceful resolution ‘ˆ‘Ǧ‰‘‹‰ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•‹–Š‡”‡‰‹‘ǤŠ‡‰”‘™‹‰‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆDz ›„‡”Ǧsep- aratism” and international popularization of the Uighur cause concerns Chinese authorities, who hope to convince the world that the Uighurs do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat. Š‡•‡ ‘†’”‡••‹‰‹••—‡‹•‡ ‘‘‹ Ǥ‹ ‡ͳͻͻͳǡŠ‹ƒŠƒ•„‡‡ ƒ‡–‘‹Ž‹’‘”–‡”Ǥ –ƒŽ•‘Šƒ•ʹͲ‹ŽŽ‹‘ Muslims. Mishandling of its Muslim problems will alienate trading partners in the Middle East, who ͳͻ͸ Dru C. Gladney are primarily —•Ž‹•ǤŽ”‡ƒ†›ǡƒˆ–‡”ƒ‡–Š‹ ”‹‘–‘ͷ ‡„”—ƒ”›ͳͻͻ͹ in the northwestern Xinjiang city of Yining, which left at least nine Ui- ghur Muslims dead and several hundreds arrested, the Saudi Arabian ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ‡™•’ƒ’‡”ƒŽǦ‹Žƒ†™ƒ”‡†Š‹ƒƒ„‘—––Š‡Dz•—ˆˆ‡”‹‰‘ˆȏ‹–•Ȑ Muslims whose human rights are violated”. Turkey’s Defense Minister —”Šƒƒ›ƒ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ› ‘†‡‡†Š‹ƒǯ•Šƒ†Ž‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡‹••—‡ǡƒ† China responded by telling Turkey to not interfere in China’s internal affairs. Muslim nations on China’s borders, including the new Central Asian states, Pakistan, and ˆ‰Šƒ‹•–ƒǡ–Š‘—‰Š‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽŽ›—•—’’‘”–‹˜‡ of Uighur separatists, may be increasingly critical of harsh treatment ‡š–‡†‡†–‘ˆ‡ŽŽ‘™—”‹ ƒ†Ȁ‘”Muslim co-religionists in China. Unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region may lead to a de- cline in outside oil investment and revenues, that are already operating at a loss. Recently, Exxon reported that its two wells came up dry in China’s supposedly oil-rich Tarim basin of southern Xinjiang, with the ‡–‹”‡”‡‰‹‘›‹‡Ž†‹‰‘Ž›͵Ǥͳͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘‡–”‹ –‘•‘ˆ ”—†‡‘‹Žǡ— Š Ž‡••–ŠƒŠ‹ƒǯ•‘˜‡”ƒŽŽ‘—–’—–‘ˆͳͷ͸‹ŽŽ‹‘–‘•ǤŠ‡‘”Ž†ƒ Ž‘ƒ•‘˜‡”̈́͵„‹ŽŽ‹‘ƒ›‡ƒ”–‘Š‹ƒǡ‹˜‡•–‹‰‘˜‡”̈́͹ͺͲǤͷ‹ŽŽ‹‘ ‹ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡’”‘Œ‡ –•‹–Š‡Xinjiang Region alone, with some of that mon- ey allegedly going to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps ȋȌ–Šƒ–Š—ƒ”‹‰Š–•ƒ –‹˜‹•–Harry Wu has claimed employs pris- on (laogaiࣣ᭩Ȍ Žƒ„‘”Ǥ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‘’ƒ‹‡• ƒ† ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•ǡ from the World Bank to Exxon may not wish to subject its employees and investors to social and political upheavals. Most China-Central Asia trade is between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan (‹Œ‹ƒ‰̵•Žƒ”‰‡•––”ƒ†‹‰’ƒ”–‡”„›ˆƒ”ȌǤ ”‘ͳͻͻͲ–‘ͳͻͻʹǡKazakh- •–ƒ̵•‹’‘”–•ˆ”‘Š‹ƒ”‘•‡ˆ”‘Œ—•–—†‡”Ͷ’‡” ‡––‘ͶͶ’‡”- cent of its total. About half of China-Kazakh trade is on a barter basis. Š”‘—‰ŠͳͻͻͷǡŠ‹ƒ™ƒ•ƒœƒŠ•–ƒ̵•ϐ‹ˆ–ŠŽƒ”‰‡•––”ƒ†‡’ƒ”–‡”ǡ„‡- hind —••‹ƒǡ ‘ŽŽƒ†ǡ ‡”ƒ›ǡƒ†™‹–œ‡”Žƒ†Ǥ›ʹͲͲͲǡŠ‹ƒ™ƒ• only eclipsed by Russia in trade with ƒœƒŠ•–ƒǤ›ʹͲͲͳǡKazakh ex- ’‘”–•–‘Š‹ƒ”‡ƒ Š‡†̈́ͳ„‹ŽŽ‹‘ǡƒ†‘ —’‹‡•͹͹’‡” ‡–‘ˆƒŽŽ‡- –”ƒŽ•‹ƒǦŠ‹ƒ–”ƒ†‡Ǥ ʹͲͲʹǡŠ‹ƒ‹’‘”–‡†‡ƒ”Ž›ͳͻǡ͸ͲͲ„ƒ””‡Ž• per day of crude oil from ƒœƒŠ•–ƒ„›”ƒ‹Žǡ”‡’”‡•‡–‹‰ͳǤͶ’‡” ‡– of its total imports. Just as Kazakhstan seeks other outlets for its oil be- sides Russia, China seeks other import sources besides a few countries ‹–Š‡‹††Ž‡ƒ•–ǡ™Š‡”‡ƒ‹•–Š‡•‘—” ‡‘ˆ͹Ͳ’‡” ‡–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ• ‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‘‹ŽǤ  —‡ʹͲͲ͵ǡHu Jintao 㜑䭖⏋ signaled the importance of the relationship by making Kazakhstan his third foreign trip as the •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻ͹

‡™”‡•‹†‡–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǤ –‡”‡•–‹‰Ž›ǡƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡‘˜‡”ͳǤ͵‹Ž- lion Kazakhs in northwestern Xinjiang, there has been no separatist incidents among the Kazakhs or efforts to unite with Kazakhstan, de- •’‹–‡–Š‡ˆƒ ––Šƒ–‹ͳͻ͸ʹƒœƒŠ•‘—–—„‡”‡†–Š‡Uighur when a Žƒ”‰‡’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘ϐŽ‡†–‘–Š‡†—”‹‰–Š‡‹‘ǦSoviet split. China’s trade with Kyrgyzstan has also increased rapidly, though pales in comparison to Kazakhstan and œ„‡‹•–ƒǤŠ”‘—‰Šͳͻͻͷǡ›”- gyzstan was Xinjiang’s third largest trading partner, after Kazakhstan and Hong Kong, but it has declined in recent years. Nevertheless, the strategic importance of the Kyrgyz-China relationship has increased due to China’s concerns over the development of US and Russian air- bases near Bishkek, in Manas and Kant. The SCO anti-–‡””‘”‹•‘ˆϐ‹ ‡ is headquartered in Bishkek, and the Kyrgyz ambassador to China, Mu- ”ƒ–„‡ ƒƒŽ‹‡˜ǡ™Š‘•’‡ƒ•ϐŽ—‡–Š‹‡•‡ǡŠƒ•™‘”‡†Šƒ”†–‘„—‹Ž† a close relationship.  • ‡ƒ”Ž› ƒ• ͳͻͻʹǡ Š‹ƒ ”ƒ‡† ƒ• Uzbekistan’s leading non-CIS trading partner. Since then, bilateral trade has increased by as much as ͳʹ͹’‡” ‡–’‡”›‡ƒ”ǡƒ‹‰Uzbekistan China’s second largest Central Asian trading partner. Despite the fact that Uzbekistan does not share a border with China and they were the last country invited to join the SCO, this may be one of the most promising economic relationships de- ˜‡Ž‘’‹‰‹‡–”ƒŽ•‹ƒǤŠ‡Žƒ”‰‡ƒ†”‡Žƒ–‹˜‡Ž›ƒˆϐŽ—‡–Uzbek pop- ulation will eagerly purchase Chinese goods once remaining border restrictions are relaxed and better transportation is built. In addition, China’s œ„‡•ǡ–Š‘—‰Š—„‡”‹‰‘Ž›ͳͶǡͲͲͲǡƒ”‡‡š–”‡‡Ž›ƒˆϐŽ—‡– and well-educated. They have begun to play an important role in build- ing cross-border ties. Bilateral trade with ƒŒ‹‹•–ƒ‹ ”‡ƒ•‡†‡ƒ”Ž›‹‡ˆ‘Ž†ˆ”‘ͳͻͻʹ –‘ͳͻͻͷǤ ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ™‹–Š— Š‘ˆTajikistan still embroiled in the Afghan ‘ϐŽ‹ –ǡ ƒ† –Š‡ ‘—–”› •—ˆˆ‡”‹‰ ˆ”‘ ƒ †‡–‡”‹‘”ƒ–‹‰ •–ƒ†ƒ”† ‘ˆ Ž‹˜‹‰ǡ–”ƒ†‡†”‘’’‡†„›ŠƒŽˆ‹ͳͻͻ͸ǤŠ‘—‰Š‹˜‡•–‡–Šƒ•‹- creased due to the Afghan war, its “gas-n-go” military relationship with the country may be transitory. China is clearly the only major country ‹–Š‡”‡‰‹‘–Šƒ–‹•’‘‹•‡†–‘„”‹‰•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹˜‡•–‡–ǡ’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”- ly with Tajikistan’s vast water and mineral resources. Trade between China and Turkmenistan has also risen rapidly. Due to its “positive neu- trality” policy, Turkmenistan is not a member of the SCO, though ener- gy trade with China will grow considerably in the near future. China is expected to eventually import Turkmen gas to satisfy the growing ͳͻͺ Dru C. Gladney energy requirements in the northwest corner of the country. The sale ‘ˆƒ–—”ƒŽ‰ƒ•ƒ ‘—–•ˆ‘”͸ͲǤ͵’‡” ‡–‘ˆ–Š‡–‘–ƒŽ˜‘Ž—‡‘ˆ—”‡ ‡š’‘”–•ǤŠ‡ƒ„‹–‹‘—•ͺǡͲͲͲ”ƒ•Ǧ•‹ƒTurkmenistan-China-Ja- pan gas pipeline suggests that China’s ties to the country will increase dramatically in the next decade. This Turkmenistan-China-Japan nat- ural gas pipeline, part of the envisaged “Energy Silk Route” which ™‘—Ž† ‘‡ –‡–”ƒŽ•‹ƒǯ•”‹ Š‰ƒ•ϐ‹‡Ž†•™‹–Š‘”–Š‡ƒ•–•‹ƒ—•‡”•ǡ demonstrates the potential for cooperation among countries. But it also highlights the growing importance of international companies – in this ƒ•‡‹–•—„‹•Š‹ƒ†šš‘Ȃ‹ϐ‹ƒ ‹‰ƒ†‹ϐŽ—‡ ‹‰–Š‡ ‘—”•‡ of oil and gas development in the region. With a potential price tag of ̈́ʹʹǤ͸„‹ŽŽ‹‘ǡ–Š‹•’‹’‡Ž‹‡Ȃƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•ƒ›•ƒŽŽ‡”ƒ†Ž‡•• ‘•–Ž› ones – would not be possible without foreign participation. Hence, the “new Great Game” between China and Central Asia involves many more players than the largely three-way Great Game of the nineteenth centu- ry. Yet these new international corporate forces do not supersede local ethnic ties and connections that extend back for centuries. While the increasing trade between Central Asia and China is note- ™‘”–Š›ǡ‹–”‡ϐŽ‡ –•Š‹ƒ̵•”ƒ’‹†Ž›‰”‘™‹‰–”ƒ†‡™‹–Š–Š‡‡–‹”‡™‘”Ž†ǣ –”ƒ†‡™‹–Š‡–”ƒŽ•‹ƒ‹ ”‡ƒ•‡†„›ʹͷ’‡” ‡–ˆ”‘ͳͻͻʹ–‘ͳͻͻͶǡƒ† „›͵ͷ’‡” ‡–ˆ”‘ͳͻͻͷ–ʹͲͲͲǢ†—”‹‰–Š‡•ƒ‡’‡”‹‘†–‘–ƒŽŠ‹‡•‡ –”ƒ†‡‹ ”‡ƒ•‡†ƒŽ‘•––™‹ ‡ƒ•ˆƒ•–Ǥ ˆƒ –ǡ†—”‹‰ͳͻͻͷǡ‘Ž›ͲǤʹͺ’‡”- ‡–‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•̈́ʹͺͲǤͺ„‹ŽŽ‹‘‘˜‡”•‡ƒ•–”ƒ†‡‹˜‘Ž˜‡†–Š‡ϐ‹˜‡‡–”ƒŽ Asian republics, about the same as with Austria or Denmark.ͳʹ Despite the small trade values China is clearly a giant in the region, investing ‡ƒ”Ž›̈́ͳ„‹ŽŽ‹‘Žƒ•–›‡ƒ”ǡƒ†‹–™‹ŽŽ ‘–‹—‡–‘’Žƒ›ƒƒŒ‘””‘Ž‡ in Central Asia’s foreign economic relations. For example, China’s two- way trade with ƒœƒŠ•–ƒ‹•‰”‡ƒ–‡”–Šƒ—”‡›ǯ•–”ƒ†‡™‹–ŠƒŽŽϐ‹˜‡ Central Asian republics. This is so even though predominantly Muslim Central Asia is of a much higher priority for Turkey than for China. It is clear that Uighur separatism or Muslim complaints regarding Chinese policy will have important consequences for China’s economic development of the region. Tourists and foreign businessmen will cer- tainly avoid areas with ethnic strife and terrorist activities. China will continue to use its economic leverage with its Central Asian neighbors and Russia to prevent such disruptions.

ͳʹ ‡‡‘”‹ƒȀ‹‰†‘”–œȀ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻ͹Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ͳͻͻ

The third aspect is political. China’s international relations with its bordering nations and internal regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet have become increasingly important not only for the economic reasons dis- cussed above, but also for China’s desire to participate in international ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘••— Šƒ•–Š‡‘”Ž†”ƒ†‡”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ƒ†•‹ƒǦƒ ‹ϐ‹  Economic Council. Though Tibet is no longer of any real strategic or substantial economic value to China, it is politically important to Chi- na’s current leadership to indicate that they will not submit to foreign pressure and withdraw its iron hand from Tibet. Uighurs have begun to work closely with Tibetans internationally to put political pressure on Š‹ƒ‹‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽˆ‘”ƒǤ ƒ‹–‡”˜‹‡™Š‡Ž†‹ •–ƒ„—Ž‘͹’”‹Ž ͳͻͻ͹„›–Š‹•ƒ—–Š‘”™‹–ŠAhmet Türköz, vice-director of the Eastern Turkestan Foundation that works for an independent Uighur homeland, Š‡‘–‡†–Šƒ–•‹ ‡ͳͻͺͳǡ‡‡–‹‰•Šƒ†„‡‡–ƒ‹‰’Žƒ ‡„‡–™‡‡–Š‡ Dalai Lama and Uighur leaders, initiated by the deceased Uighur na- tionalist Isa Yusuf Alptekin. These international fora cannot force Chi- na to change its policy, any more than the annual debate in the U.S. over the renewal of China’s Most-Favored Nation status can. Nevertheless, –Š‡› ‘–‹—‡–‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡Š‹ƒǯ•ƒ„‹Ž‹–›–‘ ‘‘’‡”ƒ–‡‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽŽ›Ǥ As a result, China has sought to respond rapidly, and often militarily, to domestic ethnic affairs that might have international implications. •Š‹ƒŠƒ•‰‘‡–Š”‘—‰Š–Š‡’”‘ ‡•••‹ ‡ͳͻͻ͹‘ˆ”‡‹–‡‰”ƒ–‹‰ Hong Kong, harboring the hope of eventually reuniting with Taiwan, residents of Hong Kong and Taiwan will be watching how China deals with other problems of national integration. During the Dalai Lama’s ƒ” Šͳͻͻͺ˜‹•‹––‘Taiwan, he again renounced Tibet’s independence, calling for China to consider Tibet under the same “two systems, one country” policy as Hong Kong, yet the People’s Daily continued to call him a “separatist”. Taiwan will certainly be watching how well Hong Kong is integrated into China as a “Special Administrative Region” with a true separate system of government, as opposed to Tibet and Xin- jiang, which as so-called “Autonomous Regions” have very little actual autonomy from decision-makers in Beijing. China’s handling of ethnic and integrationist issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong will have a direct „‡ƒ”‹‰‘‹–•’‘••‹„Ž‡”‡—‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘™‹–ŠTaiwan. ƒ††‹–‹‘ǡ‘—–•‹†‡‘ˆ–Š‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽminorities, China possesses tre- mendous ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity. Intolerance toward difference in Xinjiang might be extended to limiting cultural pluralism in Guangdongᒯьǡ™Š‡”‡ƒ–Ž‡ƒ•–ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡†‹ƒŽ‡ –•‘ˆƒ–‘‡•‡ƒ”‡ ʹͲͲ Dru C. Gladney spoken and folk religious practice is rampant. Memories are strong of the repressions of the —Ž–—”ƒŽ‡˜‘Ž—–‹‘ȋͳͻ͸͸Ȃͳͻ͹͸Ȍǡ™Š‡ƒŽŽˆ‘”• of diversity, political or cultural, were severely curtailed. If rising Chi- nese nationalism entails reducing ethnic and cultural difference, then anyone who is regarded as “other” in China will suffer, not just the Ui- ghurs.

Hui Muslims and Islamic Accommodation to Chinese Society

As a result of the history of Islamic reform movements that have swept across China, the Hui continue to subscribe to a wide spectrum of Is- lamic belief. The variety of religious orders within Hui Islam represent a long history of reforms and Islamic movements that resulted from interaction with the Islamic world. The late Joseph Fletcherͳ͵ was the ϐ‹”•––‘•—‰‰‡•––Šƒ––Š‡ƒ–—”‡‘ˆŠ‹ƒǯ•’”‡•‡–Ǧ†ƒ›Islamic commu- ‹–‹‡•ƒ†‘”†‡”• ƒ„‡–”ƒ ‡†–‘•— ‡••‹˜‡Dz–‹†‡•dz‘ˆ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ƒ† individuals who entered China during critical periods of exchange with –Š‡‘—–•‹†‡™‘”Ž†Ǥ‹‡ƒ•™‡ŽŽ‹‰ƒ†‡„„‹‰–‹†‡ǡ–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‡•‡ movements grew or diminished with the interaction of China’s Muslims and the •Žƒ‹ ™‘”Ž†ǤŠ‹•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡™ƒ•‘–„ƒ•‡†‘’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘‹- grations as much as gradual and profound exchange between the two regions. While this study does not begin to address Islam’s complex history in China, an introduction to the context of Islamic reforms is necessary for an understanding of the rise of fundamentalism in China. Each of these tides can be considered successive reform movements in that they all seek to transform Islam in China, accommodating Chinese culture with Islamic requirements, in reference to textual and discur- sive standards in the Middle East as discovered by Muslims from China on the hajj or preached by peripatetic Middle Eastern representatives of these movements in China. What many of the Muslims in China did not recognize, however, was that just as Islam in China had shifted over time on the periphery, so had the so-called “center” in the Middle East. The somewhat quixotic quest of these Muslims at the distant edge of •Žƒ‹ ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ˆ‘”–Š‡ˆ—†ƒ‡–ƒŽ•‘ˆ–Š‡‹”ˆƒ‹–Šǡƒ†–Š‡†‹ƒŽ‡ –‹  interaction between periphery and center, engendered the rise of a se- ries of reformist tides that washed across the China Islamic hinterland. This is parallel to similar reform movements among all Muslims in Asia

ͳ͵ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͺͺǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͲͳ that are on its periphery in relation to the Meccan heartlands. Just as Muslims in the Middle East “peripheralize” those in the wider diaspora as not “truly —•Ž‹•dzȋ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›–Š‘•‡‘– ‘˜‡”•ƒ–‹”ƒ„‹ ȌǡMus- lims in Asia often homogenize all Middle Eastern Muslims as Arabs and —‹ǤŠ‹•”‡ϐŽ‡ –•ƒ‹†‘ˆDz‘”‹‡–ƒŽorientalism”, a rather facetious term I employed in an earlier articleͳͶ, to describe the process whereby Muslims and minorities exoticize their own communities for purposes ‘ˆ’”‹†‡ƒ†•‘‡–‹‡•’”‘ϐ‹–Ǥ

The First Tide: Gedimu Traditional Chinese Islam

The earliest Muslim communities were descended from the Arab, Per- sian, Central Asian, and Mongolian Muslim ‡” Šƒ–•ǡ‹Ž‹–‹ƒƒ†‘ˆϐ‹- cials who settled along China’s southeast coast and in the northwest in large and small numbers from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries. Generally residing in independent small communities clustered around a central mosque, they became known as the Gedimu Ṭ䘚ⴞ(from the Arabic qadimǡDz‘Ž†dzȌǤ ‘”–Š‡•‡ ‘—‹–‹‡•ǡ‹–™ƒ•Sunni, ƒƒϐ‹Islam that became so standard that few Hui with whom I spoke in the north- ™‡•–Šƒ†‡˜‡Š‡ƒ”†‘ˆŠ‹ǯ‹•ǡ‡˜‡–Š‘—‰Š–Š‡ ”ƒȀIraq war was at ‹–•Š‡‹‰Š–†—”‹‰›ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”ƒ†‹–Š‡†ƒ‹Ž›‡™•Ǥ These “old” Islamic communities established an early Hui pattern of zealously preserving and protecting their identity as enclaves en- sconced in the dominant Han society. Each village was centered upon a single mosque headed by an ahong who was invited to teach on a more or less temporary basis. These ahongs generally moved on an average of every three years from one mosque to another. A council of senior local elders and ahongs were responsible for the affairs of each village and the inviting of the itinerant imam. Late nineteenth century and ear- ly twentieth century travelers noted the maintenance of these isolated communities. “I know of no strictly farming village where there is an ‡“—ƒŽ‹š–—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡–™‘‰”‘—’•ȏ ƒƒ† —‹ȐǢdz˜ƒŽŽͳͷ observed, “in every case the village is predominantly one or the other. In some in- stances, the population is composed almost entirely of one group, with only a few hangers-on of the other.” He goes on to suggest that due to different cultural, ritual, and dietary preferences that sometimes led to

ͳͶ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͶƒǡ’’Ǥͳͳ͵–ͳͳͶǤ ͳͷ˜ƒŽŽͳͻ͵ͻǡ’ǤͳͻǤ ʹͲʹ Dru C. Gladney

‘’‡ ‘ϐŽ‹ –ǡ–Š‡ ‘—‹–‹‡•’”‡ˆ‡””‡†’Š›•‹ ƒŽ•‡’ƒ”ƒ–‹‘Ǥ‘–Š‡” frequent northwest traveler noted:  •‘‡ †‹•–”‹ –• –Š”‘—‰Š‘—– –Š‡ ’”‘˜‹ ‡ ȏGansu] the Moslems are found in such numbers as to outnumber the Chinese in the proporti- on of seven to one. Again, in other districts it is possible to travel for days without coming across one Moslem family, and in such districts ‹–™‘—Ž†„‡‡š––‘‹’‘••‹„Ž‡ˆ‘”ƒ‘•Ž‡ˆƒ‹Ž›–‘•‡––Ž‡ǤǤǤǤ‘ϐ‹† Chinese and Moslems living harmoniously intermingled is but on the rarest occasion.ͳ͸ This islation was mitigated somewhat during the collectivizati on cam- ’ƒ‹‰•‹–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•ǡ™Š‡ ƒƒ†Hui villages were often adminis- tered as clusters by a single commune. They have also been brought closer together through national telecommunications and transpor- tation networks established by the state, including such umbrella or- ganizations as the Chinese •Žƒ‹ ”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ǡ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹ͳͻͷͷǡ which seeks to coordinate religious affairs among all Muslim groups. With the recent dismantling of the commune in many areas, however, these homogeneous Hui communities are once again becoming more segregated. While these disparate communities among the Gedimu were generally linked only by trade and a sense of a common religious heritage, an attachment to the basic Islamic beliefs as handed down to them by their ancestors, it was the entry of the —ϐ‹„”‘–Š‡”Š‘‘†•‹–‘ China that eventually began to link many of these isolated communities together through extensive socio-religious networks.

The Second Tide: —ϐ‹‘—‹–‹‡•ƒ†ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡–™‘”•

—ϐ‹•†‹†‘–„‡‰‹–‘ƒ‡ƒ•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽ‹’ƒ –‹Š‹ƒ—–‹Ž–Š‡ late seventeenth century, during the “second tide” of Islam’s entrance into China. Like —ϐ‹ ‡–‡”•–Šƒ–’”‘Ž‹ˆ‡”ƒ–‡†ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡–Š‹”–‡‡–Š ‡- tury in other countries,ͳ͹ many of these —ϐ‹‘˜‡‡–•‹Š‹ƒ†‡- veloped socio-economic and religio-political institutions built around the schools established by descendants of early —ϐ‹•ƒ‹–Ž›Ž‡ƒ†‡”•ǤŠ‡ institutions became known in Chinese as the menhuan䰘ᇖ, the “lead- ing” or “saintly” descent groups.

ͳ͸†”‡™ͳͻʹͳǡ’ǤͳͲǤ ͳ͹”‹‹‰Šƒͳͻ͹ͳǡ’ǤͳͲǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͲ͵

The important contribution that —ϐ‹•ƒ†‡–‘”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ- tion in China was that the leaders of mosques throughout their order owed their allegiance to their •Šƒ›Š, the founder of the order who ap- pointed them. These designated followers were loyal to the leader of their order and remained in the community for long periods of time, unlike the Gedimu ahongs who were generally itinerant, not well con- nected to the community, and less imbued with appointed authority. Gedimu ‘•“—‡‡Ž†‡”•™‡”‡Ž‘›ƒŽ–‘–Š‡‹”˜‹ŽŽƒ‰‡ϐ‹”•–ǡƒ† ‘‡ –- ed only by trade to other communities. While it is beyond this paper to delineate the history and distribution of these —ϐ‹menhuan, Joseph Fletcher’s cogent introductory discussion of their development is worth citing: Over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries a considerable number of these “saintly lineages” came into being in northwest China, most of them within the Naqshbandi “path”. Typically, each saint’s tomb had a shrine, or “—„„ƒ (Chinese ‰‘‰„ƒ‹ or ‰‘‰„‡‹ ᤡेȌǡƒ†–Š‡ƒ‹•Š”‹‡•„‡ ƒ‡ ‡–‡”•‘ˆ†‡˜‘–‹‘ƒŽ activity. The “saintly lineages” obtained contributions from their fol- lowers and amassed substantial amounts of property. The growth in the number and importance of the menhuan represented an important change, because they gradually replaced the “old” ( ‡†‹—Ȍ’ƒ––‡”„› linking together the menhuan adherents all over the northwest. The widening compass of social integration that resulted made it easier for the “saintly lineages” and other leaders to harness the Muslims’ politi- cal and economic potential, facilitating the rise of Muslim warlordism in that region in the twentieth cen tury.ͳͺ Many —ϐ‹”‡ˆ‘”••’”‡ƒ†–Š”‘—‰Š‘—–‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒ†—”‹‰–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž› decades of the Qing dynasty (mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth ‡–—”‹‡•ȌǤ  ”‡ƒ•‡† –”ƒ˜‡Ž ƒ† ‘—‹ ƒ–‹‘ „‡–™‡‡ Muslims, both east and west, during what Fletcher terms the “general orthodox ”‡˜‹˜ƒŽdz‘ˆ–Š‡‡‹‰Š–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›ǡŠƒ†‰”‡ƒ–‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘Muslims from West Africa to Indonesia, and not least of all, on China’s Hui Muslims.ͳͻ Exposure to these new ideas led to a reformulation of traditional Islam- ic concepts that rendered them more meaningful and practical for the Hui Muslims of that time. While it is socio-economic organization that was perhaps —ϐ‹•ǯ•‘•–Žƒ•–‹‰ ‘–”‹„—–‹‘–‘Islam in China, the ‘”‹‰‹ƒŽ ‘–‡•–„‡–™‡‡—ϐ‹•ƒ†‘Ǧ—ϐ‹•™ƒ•‘˜‡”— Š‘”‡’”ƒ -

ͳͺ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͺͺǡ’ǤͳͷǤ ͳͻ ‡‡‘ŽŽͳͻͺʹǡ’’Ǥ͵͵–ͺ͸Ǥ ʹͲͶ Dru C. Gladney

–‹ ƒŽ–—”ˆǤ—ϐ‹• ”‹–‹ ‹œ‡†–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽMuslims as being too materialistic, bound to their mosques, criticized the burning of incense to ancestors, ƒ†–Š‡‹”Žƒ ‘ˆ’”‘ϐ‹ ‹‡ ›‹–Š‡‘”‹‰‹ƒŽ–‡š–•ǤŠ‡› ‘†‡‡†–Š‡ ‘Ǧ—ϐ‹•ˆ‘”–Š‡‹”—•‡‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡‹™‘”•Š‹’ǡƒ†‘”‹‰–Š‡‹”mosques with Quranic quotations and hadith‘ ‘Ž‘”ˆ—Ž„ƒ‡”•ƒ†ϐŽƒ‰•ǤŠ‡› condemned the Muslims for wearing traditional Chinese white funeral dress and sullying Islam with many other Chinese cultural practices, ƒŽŽ‹‰ˆ‘”ƒ’—”‹ϐ‹‡†”‡–—”–‘–Š‡ƒ• ‡–‹ ‹†‡ƒŽ•‘ˆ–Š‡Prophet and his —ϐ‹ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•ǤŠ‡›ƒŽ•‘‘ˆˆ‡”‡†ƒ‘”‡‹‡†‹ƒ–‡‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡‘ˆIs- Žƒ–Š”‘—‰Š–Š‡”‹–—ƒŽ•‘ˆ”‡‡„”ƒ ‡ƒ†‡†‹–ƒ–‹‘ǡƒ†–Š‡‡ˆϐ‹- cacy of the saint, instead of the daunting memorization and recitation of Quranic texts. While theirs was a reformist movement, it was less textual than experiential, revealing the power of Allah and his saints to transform one’s life through miracles, healings, and other transfor- mative acts. —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•™‡”‡‰”ƒ†—ƒŽŽ›‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹œ‡†‹–‘•— Šˆ‘”•ƒ•–Š‡ menhuanǤŽ›ˆ‘—”‘”†‡”•ƒ‹–ƒ‹•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ƒ‘‰–Š‡ Hui today, as Claude PickensʹͲ, a Protestant missionary in northwest Š‹ƒǡ ϐ‹”•– †‹• ‘˜‡”‡† ƒ• –Š‡ ˆ‘—” menhuan of China: the Qadiriyya, Š—ϐ‹››ƒǡ Jahriyya, and Kubrawiyya. While these are the four main menhuan, they are subdivided into a myriad of smaller branch solidar- ities, divided along ideological, political, geographical and historical lines. A detailed history of these divisions and alliances would reveal the tensions and new meanings created by Hui communities as they attempted to reconcile perceived disparities between the indigenous practice of Islam in China with the Islamic ideals as represented by returned hajji or itinerant foreign preachers who maintained, in their eyes, more “orthodox” interpretations of Islam. It is unfortunate, but perhaps quite natural that Western scholar- ship has prolonged the confusion of early Chinese writers over the rise of —ϐ‹•ƒ†Žƒ–‡”Islamic orders in China. As each Islamic reformer ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†ƒ‡™ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰‹Š‹ƒǡ‘ˆ–‡‹ ‘ϐŽ‹ –™‹–Š‘–Š‡”‘Ž†- er Islamic orders, these “new” arrivals replaced or converted the “old” traditional •Žƒ‹  ‘—‹–‹‡•ǤŠ‹‡•‡‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•†—”‹‰–Š‡‹‰ƒ† the Qing naturally referred to these communities with their new teach- ings as xinjiao ᯠᮉ (lit., “new religion” or “teaching”, not “new sect” ƒ•‹–Šƒ•„‡‡‡””‘‡‘—•Ž›–”ƒ•Žƒ–‡†ȌǤ•‡ƒ Š‡™ƒ””‹˜ƒŽ”‡’Žƒ ‡†

ʹͲ ‹ ‡•ͳͻͶʹǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͲͷ the older, they became known as the “new”, or even “new new” teach- ings (xinxinjiao ᯠᯠᮉȌǡƒ•‹–Š‡ ƒ•‡‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ””‹˜ƒŽ‘ˆ–Š‡Ikhwan in China. Traditional Islam among the Hui generally was referred to as laojiao㘱ᮉǡ–Š‡‘Ž†–‡ƒ Š‹‰ȋ•Ȍǡƒ†‡˜‡•‘‡‘”†‡”•–Šƒ–™‡”‡‡™ at one time, when others arrived were gradually classed as old, laoji- ao, which is the case with the Š—ϐ‹››ƒǡƒ‡ƒ”Ž›Naqshbandiyya —ϐ‹ ‘”†‡”ǡ™Š‹ Š‹–•‡Žˆ‹•‘™ Žƒ••‹ϐ‹‡†ƒ•ƒDz‘Ž†–‡ƒ Š‹‰dzȋ•‡‡„‡Ž‘™ȌǤ – was often the case that those who regarded themselves as maintain- ing the established traditional beliefs of Islam in China represented the reformers as “new”, and thus, suspect, whereas they saw themselves as “old”, or more true to their traditions. The reformers, on the other hand, generally thought of themselves as the more orthodox, based on their more informed, sometimes esoteric, interpretations of Islam due to their recent contact with movements in the Muslim heartlands. They thus resented the title of “new teachings”, or the even more derisive “new new teachings”, calling themselves by the more exact names of their orders, Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Wahhabi, Ikhwan, etc., but the names “new teaching” or “new sect” stuck as it was applied by their critics who supported the state. Even the name Gedimu, depicting the “older” Islamic communities in China, is a not-so-subtle jibe at the other Islamic orders as being newer, and thus removed from the traditional fundamentals of Islam in China. These designations became important politically as well as theolog- ically in that during the mid-nineteenth century northwest rebellions, some of which were led by —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•ǡ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡•–ƒ–‡’”‘• ”‹„‡† all of those movements that had become known as “new teachings” in order to root out the more rebellious Hui communities. This is pre- cisely the rationale whereby all Buddhist sectarian movements were proscribed under the general rubric of the “White Lotus” rebellion in China, although recent scholarship has revealed that only a few Bud- dhist movements fell under the shadow of that stem.ʹͳ Unfortunately, Chinese and Western scholars perpetuated these designations and un- til recently there were no accurate descriptions of Hui Islamic orders in China.ʹʹŠ‡’‘•–Ǧͳͻ͹ͻ‘’‡‹‰‘ˆŠ‹ƒ–‘–Š‡‡•–Šƒ•ƒŽŽ‘™‡†–Š‡ appearance of Chinese publications on these groups as well as Western

ʹͳ ƒ””‡ŽŽȀ‡””›ͳͻͺʹǡ’’Ǥʹͺ͵–͵ͲͷǢƒ“—‹ͳͻ͹͸Ǥ ʹʹ ‡‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ͳͻ͹ͺǡ’’ǤͳͷͷȂͳͺͲǤ ʹͲ͸ Dru C. Gladney

ϐ‹‡Ž†™‘”ˆ‘”–Š‡ϐ‹”•––‹‡ǡ‰‹˜‹‰—•ƒ„‡––‡”‰Ž‹’•‡‹–‘–Š‡‹”‘”‹‰‹• and socio-religious complexity.

The Qadiriyya

Š‹Ž‡–Š‡”‡‹••‘‡†‹•’—–‡ƒ‘‰–Š‡—ϐ‹•–Š‡•‡Ž˜‡•ƒ•–‘™Š‹ Š order was the earliest to enter China proper, as there had been regu- lar contacts on an individual basis with the —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‘ˆ‡–”ƒŽ•‹ƒ that had already begun to proliferate in Xinjiang in the early part of –Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›ǡ‹–‹•‰‡‡”ƒŽŽ›ƒ‰”‡‡†–Šƒ–‘‡‘ˆ–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž‹‡•––‘ „‡‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†ϐ‹”Ž›‘Š‹‡•‡•‘‹Ž™ƒ•–Š‡ƒ†‹”‹tariqa (“path”, or •Žƒ‹ Dz‘”†‡”dzȌǤŠ‡ˆ‘—†‡”‘ˆ–Š‡Qadiriyya menhuan in China is Qi Jingyi ⽱䶉аȋ ‹ŽƒŽƒ†Ǧ‹ǡͳ͸ͷ͸–ͳ͹ͳͻȌǤ‘™ƒ‘‰–Š‡Hui as Qi Daozu ⽱䚃⾆ȋ ”ƒ†ƒ•–‡”‹ȌǡŠ‡™ƒ•„—”‹‡†‹Linxia’s Ѥ༿“great tomb” (†ƒ‰‘‰„‡‹བྷᤡेȌ•Š”‹‡ ‘’Ž‡šǡ™Š‹ Š„‡ ƒ‡–Š‡ ‡–‡” of Qadiriyya —ϐ‹•‹Š‹ƒǤʹ͵ One of the reasons that Grand Master ‹ ‘–‹—‡•–‘„‡‰”‡ƒ–Ž›”‡˜‡”‡†ƒ‘‰ƒŽŽ—ϐ‹•‹Š‹ƒ‹•–Šƒ––Š‡ tradition suggests he received his early training under two of the most famous Central Asian —ϐ‹–‡ƒ Š‡”•ǡKhoja Afaq and Khoja Abd Alla. Qi Jingyi supposedly met with the revered Naqshbandi leader Khoja Afaq ȋ•‡‡ „‡Ž‘™Ȍ ‹ Xining 㾯ᆱ‹ͳ͸͹ʹǡ™Š‡”‡ƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘Qadiriyya re- cords the master sent the sixteen year old acolyte home, saying “I am not your teacher (›—‡”ˆ‡‹•Š‹ ։ቄ䶎ᐸȌǡ›ƒ ‹‡––‡ƒ Š‹‰‹•‘– to be passed on to you, your teacher has already crossed the Eastern Sea and arrived in the Eastern Land. You must therefore return home quickly, and you will become a famous teacher in the land.”ʹͶ Qadiriyya followers today feel that their saint received the blessing of the great Naqshbandi Khoja Afaq, while their order was formally founded by his second teacher, Khoja Abd Alla, a twenty-ninth generation descendant of Muhammad.ʹͷ Chinese —ϐ‹”‡ ‘”†••–ƒ–‡–Šƒ–Š‡‡–‡”‡†Š‹ƒ‹ ͳ͸͹Ͷƒ†’”‡ƒ Š‡†‹Guangdong, Guangxi ᒯь, Yunnan, Guizhou 䍥ᐎ and Linxia, Gansu, before his eventual death in —‹œŠ‘—‹ͳ͸ͺͻǤŠ‹Ž‡ Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani is the reputed founder of the Qadiri tariqa, it is ‘–•—”’”‹•‹‰–‘ϐ‹†–Šƒ–Abd Alla perhaps studied in Medina under the renowned Kurdish mystic, Ibrahim b. ƒ•ƒƒŽǦ—”ƒ‹ȋͳ͸ͳ͸–ͳ͸ͻͲȌǡ

ʹ͵ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’ǤͷͲ͹ȂͷͲͺǤ ʹͶ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’Ǥ͵͵ͲǤ ʹͷ ”‹‹‰Šƒͳͻ͹ͳǡ’’ǤͶͲ–Ͷ Ͷ Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͲ͹ who was initiated into both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri tariqas, as well as several other —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ȋ•‡‡„‡Ž‘™ȌǤ The appeal of Qadiriyya —ϐ‹•ƒ•ƒ”‡‡™ƒŽ‘˜‡‡–ƒ‘‰–Š‡ Hui is related to its combining ascetic mysticism with a non-institu- tionalized form of worship that centers around the tomb complex of deceased saints rather than the mosque.ʹ͸ The early Qadiriyya advo- cated long-term isolated meditation, poverty, and vows of celibacy. The head of the order did not marry and eschewed family life, a radical de- parture from other Islamic traditions in China. Qadiriyya —ϐ‹ ‘–‹- ue to attend the Gedimu mosques in the local communities in which they live, gathering at the tombs for holidays and individual worship. Qi Jingyi was known for his emphasis upon ascetic withdrawal from so- ciety, poverty and self-cultivation, which involves meditation, fasting, prayer, and other contemplative practices. Formalized Islamic ritual ƒ•”‡’”‡•‡–‡†„›–Š‡Dzϐ‹˜‡’‹ŽŽƒ”•dzȋfasting, pilgrimage, prayer, alms- giving, and recitation of the shahadahȌ™ƒ•†‡‡’Šƒ•‹œ‡†„›Qi Jingyi in favor of private meditation. Qadiriyya maintain: “Those who know themselves clearly will know Allah” and “The Saints help us to know ‘—”•‡Ž˜‡•ϐ‹”•–„‡ˆ‘”‡‘™‹‰Allah”. Union with the divine is accom- plished through meditation and self-cultivation, rather than formalized public ritual. “The moment of thinking about Allah”, they maintain, “is superior to worshiping him for a thousand years”. —ϐ‹ mysticism in China combines many of the similar themes of the Daoist tradition, and draws heavily on its metaphysical vocabulary.ʹ͹ A Chinese inscription above the entrance to a Qadiriyya branch tomb complex in Beishan Hui ेኡՊcemetery, Linxia, reads: “The Dao is Unceasing” (ti dao wu she 億䚃❑㠽ȌǤŠ”‘—‰Š”‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•–‡”‹‘Ž‘‰› familiar to the Hui in China, Confucian moral tenets, Daoist mystical concepts, and Buddhist folk rituals infused with new Islamic content pervade Qadiriyya —ϐ‹•Ǥʹͺ Although the Qadiriyya menhuan has al-

ʹ͸ ‘”„‡•ȋͳͻͺ͸ǡ’Ǥ͹ͷȌ”‡‰ƒ”†•–Š‡’‘’—Žƒ”‹–›‘ˆ–‘„•ƒ‘‰–Š‡Hui as “probably due to isolation from the Islamic mainstream.” On the other hand, Joseph Trip- pner argued that these “grave-worshiping cults” give evidence of the pervasive ‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆŠ‹ǯ‹•ƒ‘‰–Š‡ —‹ȋ”‹’’‡”ͳͻ͸ͳǡ’ǤͳͶͷȌǤŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡Ž›ǡ •—‰‰‡•– that the tombs reveal a wide variety of Hui religious meaning, serving as import- ant charters that link different Hui communities to their foreign Muslim heritage ȋ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͺ͹ǡ’’ǤͷͲͳȂͷͳ͹ȌǤ ʹ͹ ‡‡ œ—–•—ͳͻͺ͵Ǥ ʹͺ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’’Ǥ͵ʹͺȂ͵ͷͶǤ ʹͲͺ Dru C. Gladney

™ƒ›•„‡‡Ž‡••‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽ–Šƒ‘–Š‡”—ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‹Š‹ƒ†—‡–‘‹–•”‡- jection of “worldly” political involvement, it set the stage for many —ϐ‹ orders to follow. By stressing the intimate experience of Allah through the power of his appointed •Šƒ›Š, —ϐ‹•‹Š‹ƒ„‡ ƒ‡ƒˆ‘” ‡ˆ‘” ”‡‡™ƒŽƒ†–”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‡š‡’Ž‹ϐ‹‡†„›ƒ”‡–—”–‘–Š‡’—”‡ƒ• ‡–‹  ideals of Islam, as well as initiating a new sociopolitical Islamic order. At once reformist and transformative, it initiated a new tide of reform that swept across China.

The Naqshbandiyya

The Naqshbandi tariqa became most rooted in Chinese soil through the establishment of two menhuan, the Š—ϐ‹››ƒ ƒ† Jahriyya, that ™‡”‡–‘‡š‡” ‹•‡–”‡‡†‘—•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘–Š‡Š‹•–‘”›‘ˆIslam in Chi- na and the northwest. As Joseph Fletcher argued, “the history of the Naqshbandiyya is the history of Islam” from eighteenth to nineteenth century China. Fletcher goes on to explain that the reform movement emphasized “...a shar’ist orthopraxy, political activism, propagation of the religion, and a strong —‹‘”‹‡–ƒ–‹‘ȏ™Š‹ ŠȐ ƒ‡–‘ƒ”–Š‡ ƒ“•Š„ƒ†‹››ƒ‹ƒ™ƒ›–Šƒ–’”‘˜‡††‡ϐ‹‹–‹˜‡‹–Š‡›•–‹ ƒŽ’ƒ–Šǯ• subsequent history. ... Two other general characteristics of popular mysticism, namely the veneration of saints (misleadingly called ‘saint worship’ by non-—•Ž‹™”‹–‡”•Ȍƒ†–Š‡•‡‡‹‰‘ˆ‹•’‹”ƒ–‹‘„›˜‹•- iting and meditating at the saints’ tombs (misleadingly referred to as ‘–‘„™‘”•Š‹’ǯȌǡ™‡”‡ƒŽ•‘’”‘‹‡–ˆ‡ƒ–—”‡•‘ˆ–Š‡Altishahr Naqsh- bandiyya.”ʹͻ Founded by ƒŠƒǯƒ†Ǧ‹ƒ“•Š„ƒ†ȋ†Ǥͳ͵ͺͻȌǡ™Š‘Ž‹˜‡†‹”ƒ•‘š- ania, the Naqshbandiyya order gradually spread east across the trade ”‘—–‡•ǡƒ†„›–Š‡‹††Ž‡‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹ˆ–‡‡–Š ‡–—”›‰ƒ‹‡†ƒ• ‡†ƒ ‡ over other Central Asian —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‹–Š‡‘ƒ•‹• ‹–‹‡•‘ˆAltishahr, the area surrounding the Tarim river basin in what is now southern Xin- jiang. The Naqshbandi order that gained the most prominence in the Tarim basin and played an important role in later eighteenth and nine- teenth century politics in Xinjiang was the Makhdumzada, established by ƒŠ†—Ǧ‹ǯœƒȋƒŽ•‘‘™ƒ•Šƒ†ƒ•ƒ‹ǡͳͶ͸ͳ–ͳͷͶʹȌǤ –™ƒ• his great-grandson Š‘Œƒˆƒ“ȋ†Ǥͳ͸ͻͶȌǡ‘™‹–Š‡Š‹‡•‡•‘—” ‡• as Hidayat Allah, who was the saint most responsible for establishing

ʹͻ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͶǡ’ǤͳͳǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͲͻ the Naqshbandiyya among the Hui in northwest China.͵Ͳ Khoja Afaq ȋŠ™ƒŒƒǦ›‹ˆƒ“ǡͳ͸ʹ͸Ȃͳ͸ͻͶǡDz–Š‡ƒ•–‡”‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘”‹œ‘•dzȌˆ‘—†‡†–Š‡ Afaqiyya in ‹Œ‹ƒ‰ǡƒ†ˆ”‘ͳ͸͹ͳȂͳ͸͹ʹ˜‹•‹–‡†Gansu, where his fa- ther Muhammad Yusuf had previously visited and preached, reportedly converting a few Hui and a substantial number of the Salars to Naqsh- bandi —ϐ‹•Ǥ—”‹‰–Š‹•‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽ–‘—”ǡKhoja Afaq visited the north- west cities of Xining, LintaoѤ⍞ and Hezhou⋣ᐎ (now Linxia, Chi- na’s “Little ‡ ƒdzȌǡ’”‡ƒ Š‹‰–‘ —‹ǡSalar, and Northeastern Tibetan Muslims. Two of these early Hui Gansu Muslims became his disciples and went to Central Asia and the pilgrimage cities to become further trained in the order. When they returned to China, they established the two most important Naqshbandi brotherhoods among the Hui in the northwest, the Š—ϐ‹››ƒƒ†–Š‡Jahriyya. Throughout its history, the Naqshbandiyya has stressed an ac- tive participation in worldly affairs.͵ͳ Their •Šƒ›Šs worked wonders, chanted the powerful mathnawi texts of the Turkish mystic Jalal ad- ‹ —‹ ȋ†Ǥ ͳʹ͹͵Ȍǡ ƒ† ƒ†˜‘ ƒ–‡† • ”‹’–—”ƒŽ ”‡ˆ‘”•Ǥ Š‡› ‡’Šƒ- sized both self-cultivation and formal ritual, both withdrawal from and involvement in society. Unlike the Qadiriyya, their leaders enjoyed families and the material wealth accrued from the donations of their followers. They also became committed to political involvement and social change based on the principles of Islam. Some of the Naqshbandi- yya orders in China, advocated, I argue, more of a “transforma tionist” perspective, in which they sought to change the social order in accord with their own visions of propriety and morality. This inevitably led to ‘ϐŽ‹ –•™‹–ŠŠ‹‡•‡”—Ž‡ƒ†Ž‘ ƒŽ‰‘˜‡”‡–•ǡ ƒ—•‹‰•‘‡‘”- ders of the Naqshbandiyya, especially the Jahriyya, to be singled out for suppression and persecution. By contrast, the Š—ϐ‹››ƒ–‡†‡†–‘•‡‡ ‘”‡ ‘ˆ‘”‹•–•‘Ž—–‹‘•–‘Ž‘ ƒŽ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•ǡ•–”‡••‹‰’‡”•‘ƒŽ‹–‡”- nal reform over political change. The different stance that the Naqsh- bandiyya orders took in China with regard to the state and Chinese cul- –—”‡”‡ϐŽ‡ –•–Š‡‹”†‹ƒŽ‡ –‹ ƒŽ‹–‡”ƒ –‹‘™‹–ŠŽ‘ ƒŽ‹–‡”’”‡–ƒ–‹‘•‘ˆ identity and changing sociopolitical realities in the northwest: Under one —ϐ‹–”ƒ†‹–‹‘–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡–™‘‘˜‡‡–•ƒ†–™‘‹–‡”’”‡–ƒ–‹‘• of fundamental reform. A brief introduction to these two movements is necessary for our understanding of the later challenges to the move-

͵Ͳ ‡‡”‹’’‡”ͳͻ͸ͳǡ’’ǤͳͶʹ–ͳ͹ͳǤ ͵ͳ Š‹‡Žͳͻ͹ͷǡ’Ǥ͵͸͹Ǥ ʹͳͲ Dru C. Gladney ments by the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of accommodating their interpretations of Islam to a changing Chinese political culture.

The Naqshbandi Š—ϐ‹››ƒ

—”‹‰Š‹•ͳ͸͹ʹ˜‹•‹––‘Hezhou, Khoja Afaq played an important role in the life of a certain Ma Laichi 傜ᶕ䘏ȋͳ͸͹͵Ȃͳ͹ͷ͵ȌǡƒHezhou Hui of extraordinary talent who went on to found one of the earliest and most ‹ϐŽ—‡–‹ƒŽNaqshbandiyya orders in China, the Š—ϐ‹››ƒmenhuan. Ac- cording to —ϐ‹–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ǡMa Laichi was born to a childless couple after they received Khoja Afaq’s blessing, and was later raised and trained by one of his disciples, Ma Tai Baba 傜ཚ⡨⡨ ȋDz ”‡ƒ– ƒ–Š‡”dzȌǡ™Š‘Žƒ–‡” gave him his daughter in marriage and passed on to him the leadership of the mystical path that he had received from Khoja Afaq. ͵ʹ ”‘ͳ͹ʹͺ– ͳ͹͵ͶǡMa Laichi went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, Yemen and Bukhara where he studied several —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ǡƒ†„‡ ƒ‡’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”Ž›‹ϐŽ—- enced by Mawlana Makhdum, a man of uncertain origin who Fletcher hypothesizes may have been Indian. When he returned from his pil- grimage, Ma Laichi established the most powerful of the Š—ϐ‹››ƒmen- huan, the Huasi 㣡ሪȋDzϐŽ‘™‡”›‘•“—‡dzȌ„”ƒ Šǡ’”‘’ƒ‰ƒ–‹‰–Š‡‘”†‡” for thirty-two years among the Hui and Salar in Gansu and Qinghai 䶂 ⎧, before his death. The menhuan is still quite active and centered in Linxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, at the tomb of Ma Laichi, which ™ƒ•”‡•–‘”‡†‹ͳͻͺ͸Ǥ Originating in an earlier Central Asian and Yemeni Naqshbandi Su- ϐ‹•ǡ–Š‡Š—ϐ‹››ƒ‘”†‡”™ƒ•’‡”‡ƒ–‡†™‹–Šƒ‡’Šƒ•‹•‘ƒ‘”‡ passive participation in society, the veneration of saints, the seeking of inspiration at tombs and the silent dhikr (“remembrance”, properly khu- ϔ‹››ƒ, the “silent” ones͵͵ȌǤŠ‡”‡ƒ”‡‘™‘˜‡”–™‡–›•—„Ǧ„”ƒ Šmen- huan throughout China, with mosques in Yunnan, Xinjiang, and Beijing. Most Š—ϐ‹››ƒ‘”†‡”•ƒ”‡ ‘ ‡–”ƒ–‡†‹Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia ᆱ ༿, and Xinjiang with several of the original Š—ϐ‹››ƒ’”ƒ –‹ ‡•‹•‘‡ outlying areas such as northern Ningxia beginning to lose their distinc- tiveness over time.

͵ʹ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’’Ǥʹʹ͵–ʹͶ͹Ǥ ͵͵ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻ͹ͺǡ͵ͺǢ Š‹‡Žͳͻ͹ͷǡͳ͹ʹǡ͵͸͸Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳͳ

The Naqshbandi Jahriyya

The second Naqshbandi tariqa, the Jahriyya order, was founded in Chi- na under the dynamic leadership of Ma Mingxin 傜᰾ᗳ ȋͳ͹ͳͻȂͳ͹ͺͳȌǤ One of the most fascinating detective stories in historical discovery is the tracing of Ma Mingxin’s spiritual lineage to Mizjaja, a village on the outskirts of Zabid in Northern Yemen, by Joseph Fletcher.͵Ͷ While Š‹‡•‡ —ϐ‹• Šƒ˜‡ ‘™ ˆ‘” ‰‡‡”ƒ–‹‘• –Šƒ– –Š‡‹” •ƒ‹– Ma Ming- xin studied in the Middle East, it was never clear whom he received his “New Teaching” from or where he studied. Middle Eastern —ϐ‹ƒ - counts recorded the presence of Chinese Muslims studying in certain —ϐ‹ƒ”‡ƒ•ǡ„—–‘Ž›Fletcher was able to put the two together. This was an important discovery, as Ma Mingxin’s —ϐ‹’”ƒ –‹ ‡™ƒ•–Š‘—‰Š––‘„‡ novel, even Š‡–‡”‘†‘šǡƒ†–Š‡•—„Œ‡ –‘ˆƒ› ‘ϐŽ‹ –•‹‘”–Š™‡•– China. This controversy is mainly over Ma Mingxin’s use of the jahr in remembrance (“vocal dhikr”, from whence comes the name ƒŠ”‹›Ǧ ›ƒǡ–Š‡Dz˜‘ ƒŽdz‘‡•Ȍǡ™Š‹ ŠŠ‡‘’‡Ž›ƒ†˜‘ ƒ–‡†‹‘’’‘•‹–‹‘–‘–Š‡ Š—ϐ‹››ƒǯ••‹Ž‡–”‡‡„”ƒ ‡ǡ–Š‡‘”‡•–ƒ†ƒ”†Naqshbandi prac- tice. After an extensive search through arcane —ϐ‹†‘ —‡–•‹”- ƒ„‹ ǡ‡”•‹ƒǡ—”‹•Šƒ†Š‹‡•‡ǡƒ†ƒϐ‹ƒŽ’‡”•‘ƒŽ–”‹’–‘Yemen, Fletcher discovered that the name of the anonymous —ϐ‹•ƒ‹–—†‡” whom Chinese Muslim records indicate Ma Mingxin was a Naqshbandi —ϐ‹™ƒ•ƒœǦƒ›„Ǥ—Šƒƒ†„†ƒŽǦƒ“‹ƒŽǦ‹œŒƒŒ‹ȋͳ͸Ͷ͵ȀͶȂͳ͹ʹͷȌǡ whose family home was in Mizjaja, the Zabid. Chinese —ϐ‹”‡ ‘”†•‘Ž› indicate that Ma Mingxin studied in Yemen in a —ϐ‹‘”†‡”‘™ƒ•–Š‡ Shazilinye, whose •Šƒ›Š was Muhammad Bulu Seni, but did not know the full ancestry and origins of the order. Most Jahriyya only say: “The root of our order is Arabia, the branches and leaves are in China.”͵ͷ This †‹• ‘˜‡”›‹•‡š–”‡‡Ž›•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹–Š‡Š‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‹†‡ƒ•ǡƒ•‹–‹•‘™ that az-Zayn had studied in Medina under the famous Kurdish mystic, Ibrahim b. ƒ•ƒƒŽǦ—”ƒ‹ȋͳ͸ͳ͸Ȃͳ͸ͻͲȌǡ™Š‘ƒŽ•‘ƒ†˜‘ ƒ–‡†–Š‡—•‡‘ˆ vocal formulae in the remembrance of Allah (ƒŽǦŒƒŠ”„‹Ǧǯ†ŠǦdhikrȌǤŽǦ—- rani’s students were at the forefront of Islamic reform and revolution- ary movements throughout the Islamic world. Under al-Kurani’s student’s direction, it is not surprising that Ma ‹‰š‹”‡–—”‡†–‘Š‹ƒǡ‹ͳ͹ͶͶƒˆ–‡”•‹š–‡‡›‡ƒ”•‘ˆ•–—†›‹Ye- men and the Arabian Peninsula, with more activist and radical reforms

͵Ͷ ‡‡ ‘”†ͳͻ͹Ͷǡ’’Ǥͳͷ͵Ȃͳͷͷƒ† Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻ͹ͷǤ ͵ͷ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’Ǥ͵͸ͷǤ ʹͳʹ Dru C. Gladney on his mind. While advocating the use of the vocal dhikr, he general- ly opposed the heavy emphasis upon the veneration of Islamic saints which had become popular in China. He also disputed the timing of the breaking of the fast at the beginning of the Ramadan feast with the Š—ϐ‹››ƒǣŠ‡ƒ‹–ƒ‹‡†‹–™ƒ•–‘„‡ƒˆ–‡”–Š‡’”ƒ›‡”ǡ™Š‡”‡ƒ•–Š‡Khu- ϐ‹››ƒƒŽŽ‘™‡†ˆ‘”ˆ‡ƒ•–‹‰„‡ˆ‘”‡‰‘‹‰–‘–Š‡mosque for prayer. This †‹•’—–‡Ž‡†–‘„Ž‘‘†› ‘ϐŽ‹ –•™‡ŽŽ‹–‘–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž›–™‡–‹‡–Š ‡–—”›Ǥ •–Š‡†‹•’—–‡•‰”‡™™‘”•‡ƒ† ‘ϐŽ‹ –•‡”—’–‡†ǡ‹‰–”‘‘’•ǡˆ”‡•Š from the conquest of ‹Œ‹ƒ‰‹ͳ͹ͷͻǡ†‹†‘–™‹•Š–‘Šƒ˜‡ƒ›‘”‡ trouble among Muslims in Gansu. They arrested ƒ‹‰š‹‹ͳ͹ͺͳ and executed him as his followers attempted to free him. Three years later they crushed another uprising lead by a Jahriyya —ϐ‹ǡTian Wu ⭠ ӄ. From this point on, the Qing sought to limit the spread of the move- ments, outlawing many of the so-called “New Teachings”, primarily the Jahriyya. The great Northwest Hui ”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ȋͳͺ͸ʹȂͳͺ͹͸Ȍ™ƒ•Ž‡†„› Ma Hualong傜ॆ嗉, another Jahriyya —ϐ‹ murshidȋ•’‹”‹–—ƒŽŽ‡ƒ†‡”Ȍ ƒ†ϐ‹ˆ–Š‰‡‡”ƒ–‹‘†‡• ‡†ƒ–‘ˆMa Mingxin. His rebellion was re- sponsible for cutting the Qing state off from the northwest, making way ˆ‘”–Š‡‰”‡ƒ–ͳͺ͸ͶȂͳͺ͹͹Uighur-led rebellion in Xinjiang under Yakub ‡‰Ǥ ͳͺ͹ͳMa Hualong was captured and executed, supposedly with his entire family. His body is entombed in Dongta ьຄTownship, Jin- ji 䠁〟, just east of the Yellow River in Ningxia, while his head is re- ported to have been buried in Xuanhuagang ᇓॆ዇, a Jahriyya center, north of Zhangjiachuan ᕐᇦᐍ in south Gansu. There is also evidence that suggests Du Wenxiuᶌ᮷⿰ȋͳͺʹ͵Ȃͳͺ͹ʹȌǡŽ‡ƒ†‡”‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ–Šƒ› Hui Muslim rebellion in —ƒȋͳͺͷͷȂͳͺ͹͵Ȍǡ™ƒ•ƒŽ•‘‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„› Jahriyya. Following the failure of these uprisings, the Jahriyya became — Š‘”‡•‡ ”‡–‹˜‡ƒ††‹•’‡”•‡†ǡŽ‡ƒ†‹‰–‘–Š‡‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡–‘ˆϐ‹˜‡ main Jahriyya branch orders, all named after their ritual and historical centers: Shagou ⋉⋏, Beishanेኡ, Xindianziᯠᓇᆀ, Banqiaoᶯẕ, and Nanchuanইᐍ.

The Kubrawiyya

ˆ‹‘”‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‹Š‹ƒ‹•–Š‡ˆ‘—”–Šƒ‹—ϐ‹‘”†‡”ǡ–Š‡Kubra- wiyya. ͵͸ An Arab, —Š‹ƒ†Ǧ‹ǡ‹••ƒ‹†–‘Šƒ˜‡ϐ‹”•–‹–”‘†— ‡†–Š‡‘”†‡”

͵͸ For the origins of the —„”ƒ™‹››ƒǡ•‡‡”‹‹‰Šƒͳͻ͹ͳǡ’’Ǥͷͷ–ͷͺǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳ͵

–‘Š‹ƒ‹–Š‡ͳ͸ͲͲ•Ǥ͵͹ He taught in He’nan, Qinghai, Gansu, and died in the Dawantou བྷ⒮ཤ, Dongxiangьґ prefecture, Gansu province. Presently, many of the Dongxiang Muslim minority concentrated in that area are members of the Kubrawiyya menhuan.

—ϐ‹‡–™‘”•ƒ†Islamic Resurgence

The importance and extensiveness of these —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•ˆ‘”—‹–‹‰†‹•- parate Hui communities across China cannot be underestimated. Gell- ner’s suggestion that “—ϐ‹•’”‘˜‹†‡•ƒ–Š‡‘”›ǡ–‡”‹‘Ž‘‰›ǡƒ†–‡ Š- nique of leadership...”͵ͺ seems applicable to understanding the rapid proliferation of various orders during the turmoil of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when China was faced with widespread do- mestic social unrest and the advancing encroachment of Western im- perialist powers. Unlike the isolated “patchwork” Gedimu communi- ties that had been the norm until that time, —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•’”‘˜‹†‡†–Š‡ leadership and organization that could help Hui survive politically and economically.͵ͻ—”‹‰–Š‡ˆ”ƒ‰‡–‡†‡’—„Ž‹ ƒ’‡”‹‘†ȋͳͻͳͳȂͳͻͶͻȌǡ extensive —ϐ‹‡–™‘”•’”‘˜‡†Š‡Ž’ˆ—Ž–‘•‘‡ —‹warlords in the northwest and disruptive to others. ––Š‡ͳͻͺͷ ‘‡‘”ƒ–‹‘ ‡”‡‘›ȋermaili ቄ哖࣋Ȍ‘ˆ–Š‡†‡ƒ–Š of the Jahriyya order’s founder, ƒ ‹‰š‹ǡ ‘˜‡” ʹͲǡͲͲͲ ƒ†Š‡”‡–• gathered for three days at the site of his original tomb outside Lanzhou. The local municipality had intended originally to refrain from partici- pation in the ceremony, but owing to the unexpected number of partic- ipants, the city eventually supplied sanitation facilities and food. The Provincial Islamic Society subsequently agreed to allow Ma Mingxin’s tomb to be rebuilt. Two months earlier, a similar ermaili was held in remembrance of Ma Hualong, the Jahriyya rebellion leader. A crowd of ‘˜‡”ͳͲǡͲͲͲˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•ˆ”‘ƒ•ˆƒ”ƒ™ƒ›ƒ•Urumqi, Kunming ᰶ᰾ and Harbin arrived at his grave in Lingwu ⚥↖ County, Dongta Township, †‡‘•–”ƒ–‹‰–Š‡‡š–‡•‹˜‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‹•‘”†‡”ƒ†–Š‡‹’‘”–ƒ– focus the —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”ǯ•tomb provides for galvanizing collective action.

͵͹ Ma Tong suggests the —„”ƒ™‹››ƒƒ›Šƒ˜‡ ‘‡–‘Š‹ƒƒ•‡ƒ”Ž›ƒ•ͳ͵͹ͲǤ‡‡ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵ǡ’’ǤͶͷͳȂͶͷͷǤ ͵ͺ ‡ŽŽ‡”ͳͻͺͳǡ’ǤͳͲ͵Ǥ ͵ͻ‡‡‹’ƒͳͻͺͶǤ ʹͳͶ Dru C. Gladney

Membership in various •Žƒ‹ ‘”†‡”•‘ˆ–‡•‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–Ž›‹ϐŽ—‡ - es social interaction, especially among the —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•™Š‘•‘‡–‹‡• distinguish themselves by dress. Unlike the rounded white hat worn by most Hui men, —ϐ‹ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‡”•‘ˆ–‡™‡ƒ”ƒ•‹šǦ ‘”‡”‡†Šƒ–ǡ•‘‡–‹‡• black. Many Jahriyya Hui shave the sides of their beards to commem- orate their founder, Ma Mingxin, whose beard is said to have been shorn „›‹‰•‘Ž†‹‡”•„‡ˆ‘”‡Š‹•‡š‡ —–‹‘‹ͳ͹ͺͳǤŠ‹Ž‡–Š‡•‡ƒ”‡”•ƒ”‡ almost universally unnoticed by the Han majority – for whom a Hui is a Hui – in the marketplace northwest Hui can easily identify members of the various orders that divide them internally. The exclusivity of —ϐ‹ orders in China illustrates the importance of the question of identity and authority for —ϐ‹ —‹ǤHui can enter these orders through ritual vow or by birth, but seldom maintain allegiance to two menhuan at once. This is unlike —ϐ‹‘”†‡”•‹‘–Š‡”’ƒ”–•‘ˆ–Š‡™‘”Ž†–Šƒ––‡† to be less exclusive and allow simultaneous membership in several or- ders.ͶͲ Š‹ƒǡ‡„‡”•Š‹’‹–Š‡•‡‘”†‡”•‹•‡š Ž—•‹˜‡Ǣ Šƒ‰‹‰–‘ƒ new order is tantamount to a conversion experience for Chinese Mus- lims, perhaps the only one they will ever have, since most Muslims in China entered Islam by birth or marriage.

The Third Tide: Scripturalist Concerns and Modernist Reforms

The third tide in Chinese Islam began at the end of the Qing dynasty, a period of accelerated exchange between China and the outside world, when many Muslims began traveling to and returning from the Middle East. In the early decades of the twentieth century, China was exposed to many new foreign ideas and in the face of Japanese and Western im- perialist encroachment sought a Chinese approach to governance. In- tellectual and organizational activity by Chinese Muslims during this period was also intense. Increased contact with the Middle East led Chinese Muslims to reevaluate their traditional notions of Islam. Pick- ‡•”‡ ‘”†•–Šƒ–ˆ”‘ͳͻʹ͵–‘ͳͻ͵Ͷ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡ͺ͵Ͷ‘™ —‹Muslims who made the hajj, or pilgrimage, to Mecca.Ͷͳ ͳͻ͵͹ǡƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘‘‡ ‘„•‡”˜‡”ǡ‘˜‡”ͳ͹Ͳ —‹pilgrims boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound for Mecca.Ͷʹ ›ͳͻ͵ͻǡƒ–Ž‡ƒ•––Š‹”–›Ǧ–Š”‡‡ —‹Muslims had studied at

ͶͲ”‹‹‰Šƒͳͻ͹ͳǡ’ǤͳͳǤ Ͷͳ ‹ ‡•ͳͻ͵͹ǡ’’Ǥʹ͵ͳȂʹ͵ͷǤ Ͷʹ ‘›‘—•ͳͻͶͶǡ’Ǥͳʹ͹Ǥ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳͷ

Cairo’s prestigious al-Azhar University. While these numbers are not •‹‰‹ϐ‹ ƒ–™Š‡ ‘’ƒ”‡†™‹–Š’‹Ž‰”‹•‘–Š‡hajj from other South- east Asian —•Ž‹ƒ”‡ƒ•ǡ–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡ƒ†’”‡•–‹‰‡ƒ––ƒ Š‡†–‘–Š‡•‡ returning Hui hajji was profound, particularly in isolated communities. “In this respect,” Fletcher observed, “the more secluded and remote a Muslim community was from the main centers of Islamic cultural life in the Middle East, the more susceptible it was to those centers’ most recent trends.”Ͷ͵ •ƒ”‡•—Ž–‘ˆ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ‡˜‡–•ƒ†–Š‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆˆ‘”‡‹‰Muslim ideas, numerous new Hui ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘•‡‡”‰‡†Ǥ ͳͻͳʹǡ‘‡›‡ƒ”ƒˆ- ter Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan ᆛѝኡ,ͳͺ͸͸ȂͳͻʹͷȌ™ƒ•‹ƒ—‰—”ƒ–‡† provisional president of the Chinese Republic in NanjingইӜ, the Chi- nese Muslim Federation was also formed in that city. This was followed by the establishment of other Hui Muslim associations: the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association (‡‹Œ‹‰ǡͳͻͳʹȌǡ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Mus- lim Educational Association (Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ǡͳͻʹͷȌǡ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Muslim As- •‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ȋͳͻʹͷȌǡ–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Muslim Young Students Association (Nan- Œ‹‰ǡͳͻ͵ͳȌǡ–Š‡‘ ‹‡–›ˆ‘”–Š‡”‘‘–‹‘‘ˆ†— ƒ–‹‘‘‰Muslims (ƒŒ‹‰ǡͳͻ͵ͳȌǡƒ†–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Muslim General Association (Jinan⍾ ইǡͳͻ͵ͶȌǤ The —•Ž‹’‡”‹‘†‹ ƒŽ’”‡••ϐŽ‘—”‹•Š‡†ƒ•‡˜‡”„‡ˆ‘”‡ǤŽ–Š‘—‰Š Löwenthal reports that circulation was low, there were over one hun- dred known Muslim periodicals produced before the out-break of the Sino- ƒ’ƒ‡•‡ƒ”‹ͳͻ͵͹ǤͶͶ Thirty journals were published between ͳͻͳͳƒ†ͳͻ͵͹‹Beijing alone, prompting one author to suggest that while Chinese Islam’s traditional religious center was still Linxia (He- œŠ‘—Ȍǡ‹–• —Ž–—”ƒŽ ‡–‡”Šƒ†•Š‹ˆ–‡†–‘Beijing. Ͷͷ This took place when many Hui intellectuals traveled to Japan, the Middle East and the West. Caught up in the ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•–ˆ‡”˜‘”‘ˆ–Š‡ϐ‹”•–ŠƒŽˆ‘ˆ–Š‹• ‡–—”›ǡ–Š‡› published magazines and founded organizations, questioning their identity as never before in a process that one Hui historian, Ma Shou- qian傜ሯॳ, has recently termed “The New Awakening of the Hui at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries”.Ͷ͸ As many of these Hui hajji returned from their pilgrimages to the Middle East,

Ͷ͵ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͶǡ’Ǥ͹Ǥ ͶͶ ڙ‡–ŠƒŽͳͻͶͲǡ’’ǤʹͳͳȂʹͷͲǤ Ͷͷ ‘›‘—•ͳͻͶͶǡ’Ǥʹ͹Ǥ Ͷ͸ƒŠ‘—“‹ƒͳͻͺͻǤ ʹͳ͸ Dru C. Gladney they initiated several reforms, engaging themselves once again in the contested space between Islamic ideals and Chinese culture.

The Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood

ϐŽ—‡ ‡† „› Wahhabi ideals in the Arabian Peninsula, returning Hui reformers introduced the Ikhwan Muslim Brotherhood to China – a religious movement in tune, in some cases, with China’s national- ist concerns, and in others, with warlord politics. While the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the Islamic world has been depicted as an- ti-modernist and fundamentalist, this is not true of the movement in China. “There a fundamentalist, revivalist impulse among returned ’‹Ž‰”‹•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„›Wahhabi notions” Lipman suggests, “was trans- formed into a nationalist, modernist, anti-—ϐ‹•‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–›‰”‘—’™Š‹ Š advocated not only Muslim unity but Chinese national strength and consciousness.” Ͷ͹ The beginnings of the Ikhwan movement in China can be traced to Ma Wanfu 傜з⾿ ȋͳͺͶͻȂͳͻ͵ͶȌǡ™Š‘”‡–—”‡†ˆ”‘–Š‡hajj‹ͳͺͻʹ to teach in the Linxia, Dongxiang area. Eventually known as the Yihei- wani, the initial reformers were primarily concerned with religious scripturalist orthodoxy – so much so that they are still known as the “venerate the scriptures faction” (zunjing paiሺ㓿⍮ȌǤ‡‡‹‰’‡”- haps to replace “Islamic theater” with scripture,Ͷͺ they proscribed the veneration of saints, their tombs and shrines, and sought to stem the ‰”‘™‹‰‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘ˆ™‡ŽŽǦ‘™‹†‹˜‹†—ƒŽahongs and —ϐ‹menhuan Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Ǥ†˜‘ ƒ–‹‰ƒ’—”‹ϐ‹‡†ǡDz‘ǦŠ‹‡•‡dzIslam, they criticized such cultural accretions as the wearing of white mourning dress (daixiaoᡤ ᆍȌƒ†–Š‡†‡ ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆmosques with Chinese or Arabic texts. At one point, Ma Wanfu even proposed the exclusive use of Arabic and Persian instead of Chinese in all education. Following strict Wahhabi practice, Yiheiwani mosques are distinguished by their almost complete lack of adornment on the inside, with white walls and no inscriptions, as well as a preference for Arabian-style mosque architecture. This con- trasts sharply with other more Chinese-style mosques in China, typical of the “old” Gedimu, whose architecture resemble Confucian temples in their sweeping roofs and symmetrical courtyards (with the Huajue

Ͷ͹ ‹’ƒͳͻͺ͸ǡ’ǤʹͳǤ Ͷͺ Š‡’Š”ƒ•‡‹•ˆ”‘ƒ–‘ͳͻͺͶǡ’’Ǥ͵͵ͶȂ͵͵ͷǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳ͹

ॆ㿹 Great Mosque in Xi’an 㾯ᆹƒ•–Š‡„‡•–‡šƒ’Ž‡ȌǤŠ‡Yiheiwani also proscribed the adornment of their mosques with Quranic texts and banners, whether in Arabic or Chinese, whereas this is the most striking marker of —ϐ‹mosques and worship centers in the northwest, whose walls are often layered with calligraphy and unique Hui-style art. Many Muslims supported the earliest communist call for equity, au- tonomy, freedom of religion and recognized nationality status, and were active in the early establishment of the People’s Republic, but became disenchanted by growing critiques of religious practice during several ”ƒ†‹ ƒŽ’‡”‹‘†•‹–Š‡„‡‰‹‹‰‹ͳͻͷ͹Ǥ—”‹‰–Š‡Cultural Rev- ‘Ž—–‹‘ȋͳͻ͸͸Ȃͳͻ͹͸ȌǡMuslims became the focus for both anti-religious and anti-ethnic nationalism critiques, leading to widespread persecu- tions, ‘•“—‡Ǧ Ž‘•‹‰•ǡ ƒ† ƒ– Ž‡ƒ•– ‘‡ Žƒ”‰‡ ƒ••ƒ ”‡ ‘ˆ ͳǡͲͲͲ —‹ ˆ‘ŽŽ‘™‹‰ƒͳͻ͹ͷ—’”‹•‹‰‹Yunnan province. Since Deng Xiaoping’s 䛃ሿᒣ ’‘•–Ǧͳͻ͹ͺ”‡ˆ‘”•ǡMuslims have sought to take advantage of liberalized economic and religious policies, while keeping a watchful eye on the ever-swinging pendulum of Chinese radical politics. There are now more ‘•“—‡•‘’‡‹Š‹ƒ–Šƒ–Š‡”‡™‡”‡’”‹‘”–‘ͳͻͶͻǡ and Muslims travel freely on the hajj to Mecca, as well as engaging in cross-border trade with co-religionists in Central Asia, the Middle East, and increasingly, Southeast Asia. It should be noted here that increas- ing Muslim activism in China does not necessarily entail increasing re- ligious conservatism, or the rise of a “Wahhabi”-inspired Muslim tide of fundamentalism. Indeed, like the term xinjiaoȋ‡™‡ƒ Š‹‰Ȍ™Š‹ Š was a euphemism in the last century to refer to any new Islamic teach- ing that made its way into China, the term Wahhabi today in China, es- pecially in Xinjiang, is often merely a general term to refer to Muslims who are more conservative, and not necessarily organized into any school or sect. Increasing Muslim political activism on a national scale and rapid state response indicates the growing importance Beijing places upon —•Ž‹Ǧ”‡Žƒ–‡†‹••—‡•Ǥ ͳͻͺ͸ Uighurs in Xinjiang marched through the streets of Urumqi protesting against a wide range of issues, includ- ing the environmental degradation of the Zungharian plain, nuclear testing in the Taklamakan, increased Han immigration to Xinjia ng, and ethnic insults at Xinjiang University. Muslims throughout China pro- tested the publication of a Chinese book, ‡š—ƒŽ—•–‘•ǡ‹ƒ›ͳͻͺͻǡ ƒ†ƒ Š‹Ž†”‡ǯ•„‘‘‹ –‘„‡”ͳͻͻ͵–Šƒ–’‘”–”ƒ›‡†Muslims, partic- ularly their restriction against pork (which Mao once called “China’s ʹͳͺ Dru C. Gladney

‰”‡ƒ–‡•–ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ–”‡ƒ•—”‡dzȌǡ‹ƒ†‡”‘‰ƒ–‘”›ˆƒ•Š‹‘Ǥ ‡ƒ Š ƒ•‡ǡ–Š‡ government quickly responded, meeting most of the Muslim’s demands, condemning the publications, arresting the authors, and closing down the printing houses.Ͷͻ Islamic factional struggles continue to divide China’s Muslims inter- nally, especially as increased travel to the Middle East prompts criti- cism of Muslim practice at home and exposes China’s Muslims to new, often politically radical, •Žƒ‹ ‹†‡ƒŽ•Ǥ  ‡„”—ƒ”›ͳͻͻͶǡˆ‘—”Naqsh- bandi —ϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‡”•™‡”‡•‡–‡ ‡†–‘Ž‘‰Ǧ–‡”‹’”‹•‘‡–•ˆ‘”–Š‡‹” support of internal factional disputes in the southern Ningxia Region, that had led to at least sixty deaths on both sides and People’s Libera- –‹‘”›‹–‡”˜‡–‹‘Ǥ•‘–‡†ƒ„‘˜‡ǡ–Š”‘—‰Š‘—––Š‡ͳͻͻͲ•–Š‡”‡ was increasing Uighur activism in Xinjiang, declining substantially in the early part of the new millennium, and the government’s Strike Hard campaign has curtailed any organized Uighur efforts. Beijing has responded with increased military presence, particular- ly in Kashgar and Urumqi, as well as diplomatic efforts in the Central Asian states and Turkey to discourage foreign support for separatist movements. It is important to note that in general Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities are not necessarily sympathetic to any of these separatist actions among the Uighur, and it is not yet clear how much support even among the Uighur there is for violent acts, especial- Ž›–Š‡ͳͻͻ͸ƒ––‡’––‘ƒ••ƒ••‹ƒ–‡ƒDz ‘ŽŽƒ„‘”ƒ–‹‰dzimam in Kashgar. At the same time, cross-border trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia Šƒ•‰”‘™–”‡‡†‘—•Ž›ǡ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›†—‡–‘–Š‡”‡‘’‡‹‰‹ͳͻͻͳ‘ˆ–Š‡ Eurasian Railroad, linking Urumqi and Alma Ata with markets in China and Eastern Europe. Overland travel between Xinjiang and Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kygyzstan, and Kazakhstan has also increased dramatical- ly with the relaxation of travel restrictions based on Deng Xiaoping’s prioritization of trade over security interests in the area. The govern- ment’s policy of seeking to buy support through stimulating the local economy seems to be working at the present, as income levels in Xin- jiang are often far higher than those across the border, yet increased Han migration to participate in the region’s lucrative oil and mining industries continues to exacerbate ethnic tension. Muslim areas in northern and central China, however, continue to be left behind as Chi-

Ͷͻ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͶ„ǡ’Ǥʹ͸ͺǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹͳͻ na’s rapid economic growth expands unevenly, enriching the southern coastal areas far beyond the interior. While further restricting Islamic freedoms in the border regions, at the same time the state has become more keenly aware of the im- portance foreign Muslim governments place on China’s treatment of its Muslim minorities as a factor in China’s lucrative trade and military agreements. The establishment of full diplomatic ties with Saudi Ara- „‹ƒ ‹ ͳͻͻͳ ƒ† ‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰ ‹Ž‹–ƒ”› ƒ† –‡ Š‹ ƒŽ –”ƒ†‡ ™‹–Š ‹††Ž‡ Eastern Muslim states enhances the economic and political salience of China’s treatment of its internal Muslim minority population. The increased trans-nationalism of China’s Muslims will be an important factor in their ethnic expression as well as practiced accommodation to Chinese culture and state authority.

Internal Conversion

While these various Chinese Islamic associations are as confusing to the non-initiate as the numerous schools of Buddhist thought in China, what is striking about them is their exclusivity of membership. Unlike Middle Eastern or Central Asian Islamic orders, where one might belong to two or even three brotherhoods at once, the Hui belong to only one. Among the Hui, one is generally born into one’s Islamic order, or con- verts dramatically to another. In fact, this is the only instance of con- version I encountered among my sojourn among the Hui. I never met a Han who had converted to Islam in China without having been married to a Hui or adopted into a Hui family, though I heard of a few isolated in- stances. Fletcher records the conversion of twenty-eight Tibetan tribes as well as their “Living Buddha” by Ma Laichi in Xunhuaᗚॆ, Qinghai in the mid-eighteenth century.ͷͲˆ–‡”–Š‡ͳ͹ͺͶMa Mingxin uprising, the Qing government forbade non-Muslims from converting to Islam, ƒ†–Š‹•ƒ›Šƒ˜‡Šƒ†•‘‡‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡‘–Š‡ˆ‡™ ƒ ‘˜‡”•‹‘•”‡- corded in history. This goes against the common assumption that Islam in China was spread through proselytization and conversion. Islamic preachers in China, including Ma Laichi, Ma Mingxin, Qi Jingyi, and Ma Qixi 傜੟㾯, spent most of their time trying to convert other Muslims. Islam in China for the most part has grown biologically through birth and intermarriage.

ͷͲ ‡‡ƒŽ•‘”‹’’‡”ͳͻ͸ͳǡ’’ǤͳͷͶȂͳͷͷǤ ʹʹͲ Dru C. Gladney

Hui Islamic Orders and Chinese Culture

Š‡–‡•‹‘•ƒ† ‘ϐŽ‹ –•–Šƒ–Ž‡†–‘–Š‡”‹•‡ƒ††‹˜‹•‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡—ϐ‹ menhuan in northwest China, and subsequent non-—ϐ‹”‡ˆ‘”•ǡƒ”‡‹- possible to enumerate in their complexity. They give evidence, howev- er, of the ongoing struggles that continue to make Islam meaningful to Hui Muslims. These tensions between Islamic ideals and social realities are often left unresolved. Their very dynamism derives from the ques- tions they raise and the doubts they engender among people struggling with traditional meanings in the midst of changing social contexts. The questions of purity and legitimacy become paramount when the Hui are faced with radical internal socioeconomic and political change, and exposed to different interpretations of Islam from the outside Muslim ™‘”Ž†ǤŠ‡•‡ ‘ϐŽ‹ –•ƒ†”‡ˆ‘”•”‡ϐŽ‡ –ƒ‘‰‘‹‰†‡„ƒ–‡‹Š‹ƒ over Islamic orthodoxy, revealing an important disjunction between “scripturalist” and “mystical” interpretations. In a similar fashion, the study of Southeast Asian Islam has often centered on the contradiction and compromise between the native cul- ture of the indigenous Muslims and the •Šƒ”‹ಃƒ of orthodox Islam, the mystical and scriptural, the real and the ideal.ͷͳ The supposed accom- modation of orthodox Islamic tenets to local cultural practices has led scholars to dismiss or explain such compromise as syncretism, assimi- lation and “•‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘dzǡƒ•Šƒ•„‡‡†‡• ”‹„‡†ƒ‘‰–Š‡ —‹ǤAn alter- native approach, and one perhaps more in tune with the interests of Hui themselves, sees this incongruence as the basis for on-going dialectical –‡•‹‘•–Šƒ–Šƒ˜‡‘ˆ–‡Ž‡†–‘”‡ˆ‘”‘˜‡‡–•ƒ† ‘ϐŽ‹ –•™‹–Š‹ Muslim communities.ͷʹ Following Max Weber,ͷ͵ one can see the wide variety of •Žƒ‹ ‡š’”‡••‹‘ƒ•”‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‰’”‘ ‡••‡•‘ˆŽ‘ ƒŽ™‘”Ž† ‘- struction and programs for social conduct whereby a major religious tradition becomes meaningful to an indigenous society.  –Š‡ ‘’‡–‹–‹‘ ˆ‘” • ƒ” ‡ ”‡•‘—” ‡•ǡ –Š‡•‡ ‘ϐŽ‹ –• ƒ”‡ ƒŽ•‘ prompted by and expressed in economic concerns, such as we saw above in the defeat of the Xidaotang 㾯䚃า by the Š—ϐ‹››ƒMa An- liang 傜ᆹ㢟ȋͳͺͷͷȂͳͻͳͻȌȂ Ž‡ƒ”Ž›ƒ ƒ•‡‘ˆ ‘˜‡–‹‰Š‹•Muslim broth- er’s wealth. Fletcher notes that one of the criticisms of the Š—ϐ‹››ƒ was that their recitation of the Ming sha le ᰾⋉ं took less time than

ͷͳ Š‹•†‹•–‹ –‹‘™ƒ•‘•–ˆ—ŽŽ›ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ–‡†„›‹ŽŽ‹ƒ‘ˆˆȋ‘ˆˆͳͻͺͷǡ’’ǤͺȂͳͲȌǤ ͷʹ ‡‡‹ ‡Žƒͳͻ͹͸ǡ’’ǤͳͲȂͳ͵Ǥ ͷ͵ ‡„‡”ͳͻ͹ͺǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹʹͳ the normal Quranic suras by non-—ϐ‹ Ž‡”‰›ǡƒ†–Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡–Š‡‹”imams were cheaper to hire at ritual ceremonies. He suggests that this assist- ed their rise in popularity and provoked criticism by the Gedimu reli- gious leaders.ͷͶ The ‹Š‡‹™ƒ‹ ”‹–‹ ‹œ‡†„‘–Š–Š‡ ‡†‹—•ƒ†—ϐ‹•ˆ‘” ‘Ž›’‡”ˆ‘”‹‰”‹–—ƒŽ•‹„‡Ž‹‡˜‡”ǯ•Š‘‡•ˆ‘”’”‘ϐ‹–ǡƒ†ƒ†˜‘ ƒ–‡† –Š‡’”ƒ –‹ ‡ǡDz ˆ›‘—”‡ ‹–‡ǡ†‘‘–‡ƒ–Ǣ‹ˆ›‘—‡ƒ–ǡ†‘‘–”‡ ‹–‡dzȋnian Œ‹‰„— Š‹ǡ Š‹„›‹ƒŒ‹‰ᘥ㓿нਲ਼ǃਲ਼нᘥ㓿ȌǤŠ‡Š‹‡•‡•–ƒ–‡Šƒ• generally found economic reasons for criticizing certain Islamic orders among the Hui. —”‹‰–Š‡ƒ†‡ˆ‘” ƒ’ƒ‹‰•‘ˆ–Š‡ͳͻͷͲ•ǡ™Š‹ Š appropriate mosque and waqf ( •Žƒ‹ ‡†‘™‡–ȌŠ‘Ž†‹‰•ǡ–Š‡›‡– with great resistance from the —ϐ‹menhuan, which had accumulated ƒ‰”‡ƒ–†‡ƒŽ†—‡–‘–Š‡‹”Š‹‡”ƒ” Š‹ ƒŽ ‡–”ƒŽ‹œ‡†Ž‡ƒ†‡”•Š‹’Ǥ ƒͳͻͷͺ document criticizing Ma Zhenwu傜ᥟ↖, the Jahriyya —ϐ‹•Šƒ›Š, the following accusations are quite revealing: According to these representatives, Ma Chen-wu instituted many “A- mai-lis,” or festival days to commemorate the dead ancestors to which the A-hungs must be invited to chant the scriptures and be treated with big feasts, thereby squeezing money out of the living for the dead. For example, he has kept a record of the days of birth and death of all the family members of this followers and has seen to it that religious ser- vices be held on such days. These include “Grandmother’s Day,” “Wife’s ƒ›ǡdzDz—–ǯ•ƒ›ǡdzƒ†‘–Š‡”•ǡ•‹š–›Ǧϐ‹˜‡‘ˆ•— ŠDzǦƒ‹ǦŽ‹•dz‹ƒ›‡ƒ”Ǥ On the average, one of such “A-mai-lis” is held every six or seven days, among which are seven occasions of big festival.... All the A-hungs of the Islamic mosques have been appointed by Ma Chen-wu. Through the appointment of A-hungs he has squeezed a big sum of money.... Ma has ”‡‰—Žƒ”Ž›ǡ‹–Š‡ƒ‡‘ˆ”‡’ƒ‹”‹‰–Š‡Dz—‰Ǧ’‡‹•dzȏ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ–‘„•Ȑǡ•“—‡‡- zed the Hui people for money.ͷͷ Š‡ –‡•‹‘• ƒ”‹•‹‰ ˆ”‘ –Š‡ ‘ϐŽ‹ – ‘ˆ Š‹‡•‡ —Ž–—”ƒŽ ’”ƒ –‹ ‡• and Islamic ideals have led to the rise and powerful appeal of Islamic movements among Hui Muslims. I explored one way of looking at this tension between cultural practice and Islamic ideals in an earlier work ȋ ‹‰—”‡ͳȌǤͷ͸

ͷͶ Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͶǡ’ǤʹͳǤ ͷͷ —‘–‡†‹ƒ ‹•ͳͻ͹ʹǡ’’Ǥͳ͹ͳȂͳ͹ʹǤ ͷ͸ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻ͸ǡ’Ǥ͹ͷǤŠ‹•‹–‡”’”‡–‹˜‡• Š‡‡‹•‹ϐŽ—‡ ‡†„› Ǥ‹ Šƒ”†Niebuhr‘s (‹‡„—Š”ͳͻͷͳȌƒƒŽ›•‹•‘ˆChristian social ethics. ʹʹʹ Dru C. Gladney

‹‰—”‡ͷ

Islam and Chinese Culture: A Range of Alternatives More Distinction Less Distinction

In China there were many attempts to reconcile Chinese culture with •ŽƒǡŽ‡ƒ†‹‰–‘ƒ”ƒ‰‡‘ˆƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡•ȋ•‡‡ ‹‰—”‡ʹȌǤ–‘‡‡š–”‡‡ there are those who reject any integration of Islam with Chinese cul- ture, such as Ma Wanfu’s return to an Arabicized “pure” Islam. Con- versely, at the other extreme, there are those leaders of the Gedimu, such as Hu Dengzhou㜑ⲫᐎ, who accepted more of an integration with traditional Chinese society. Likewise, Ma Qixi’s Xidaotang stressed the complete compatibility of Chinese and Islamic culture, the importance of Chinese Islamic Confucian texts, the harmony of the two systems, and the reading of the Quran in Chinese. ‹‰—”‡͸

Hui Islam and Chinese Culture: A Range of Alternatives Hu Dengzhou Hu Ma Yinghaun Hu Songshan Hu Zhang Hairu Ma Songting Ma Hualong Ma Mingxin Ma Wanfu Ma Debao Ma Laichi More Distinction Less Distinction Ma Qixi Qi Jinyi Liu shi Liu

Sepa- Dualist Transfor- Reformist Synthesis ratist mationist

Early Qadiriyya, Jahriyya Yiheiwani Gedimu, Yiheiwani, Kubra- Š—ϐ‹››ƒ Xidaotang ƒŽƒϐ‹››ƒ wiyya •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹʹ͵

„‡–™‡‡ǡ‘‡ϐ‹†•˜ƒ”‹‘—•ƒ––‡’–•ƒ– Šƒ‰‹‰Š‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›–‘ Dzϐ‹–dzƒ Muslim world, through transformationist or militant Islam, as illustrated by the largely Naqshbandiyya-led nineteenth-century Hui uprisings. The Jahriyya sought to implement an alternative vision of the world in their society, and this posed a threat to the Qing, as well as other Hui Muslims, earning them the label of “heterodox” (xiejiao䛚ᮉȌ and persecution by the Chinese state. By contrast, other Hui reformers have attempted throughout history to make •ŽƒDzϐ‹–dzŠ‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–›ǡ such as Liu Zhi’s ࡈᲪmonumental effort to demonstrate the Confucian morality of Islam. The Qadiriyya alternative represents resol ution of this tension through ascetic withdrawal from the world. Qi Jingyi ad- vocated an inner mystical journey where the dualism of Islam and the Chinese world is absolved through grasping the oneness of Allah found inside every believer. These various approaches in Chinese Islam rep- resent sociohistorical attempts to deal with the relationship of relating the world religion of Islam with the local Chinese realm. Figure 3

Muslim Minorities and Chinese Culture Less Distinction More Distinction

‹‰Š—”ǫ Kazakh, Salar, Dongxiang, —‹ǫ Kyrgyz, Tatar Bonan Uzbek

Another way to examine this range of alternatives is to generalize about the —•Ž‹ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‹‡•–Š‡•‡Ž˜‡•ȋ ‹‰—”‡͵ȌǤ –Š‹•• Š‡‡ǡ–Š‡Ui- ghur can be seen to be much more resistant to accepting integration into Chinese society than other Muslims groups, in that they are the only Muslim minority in China expressing strong desires for a separate •–ƒ–‡ȋ‹‰Š—”‹•–ƒȌȂƒŽ–Š‘—‰Š‹–‹•‘–ƒ–ƒŽŽ Ž‡ƒ”–Šƒ–ƒŽŽUighur desire independence. At the other extreme, it could be argued that of all the Muslim minorities the Hui are the most integrated into Chinese soci- ety and culture. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage in that they often have greater access to power and resources within Chinese ʹʹͶ Dru C. Gladney society, but at the same time risk either the loss of their identity or the rejection of other Muslim groups in China as being too assimilated into Chinese society to the detriment of Islam. In between there are a range of Muslim nationalities who are closer to the Uighur in terms of resist- ing Chinese culture and maintaining a distinct language and identity (Uzbeks, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and ƒŒ‹•Ȍƒ†–Š‘•‡™Š‘ƒ”‡— Š Ž‘•‡” to the Hui in terms of accommodation to Chinese culture (Dongxiang, ‘ƒȌǤŠ‹Ž‡— Š‘ˆ–Š‹•‹•†—‡–‘Š‹•–‘”‹ ƒŽ‹–‡”ƒ –‹‘ƒ†Ž‘ ƒŽ‡ǡ‹– can be a heuristic way of examining the challenges faced by each Mus- lim minority in their daily expression of identity and Islam in Chinese society. Here it must be clearly noted, however, that there are many ex- ceptions to this overly generalized pattern, e.g., Uighur (such as Party ‘ˆϐ‹ ‹ƒŽ•ƒ†•‡ —Žƒ”‹•–•Ȍ™Š‘ƒ”‡“—‹–‡‹–‡‰”ƒ–‡†‹–‘Š‹‡•‡•‘ ‹‡–› and Hui (such as religious ‹ƒ•ƒ†”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘—•›‘—–Š•Ȍ™Š‘Ž‹˜‡–Š‡‹” lives in strident resistance to Chinese culture.

The Fourth Tide: Ethnic Nationalism in an Age of Globalization

China is not immune from the new tide of ethnic nationalism and “pri- mordial politics” sweeping Europe, Africa and Asia in the post-Cold War period. Much of this is clearly due to a response to globalization in terms of localization: increasing nationalism arising from the or- ganization of the world into nation-states. No longer content to sit on the sidelines, the nations within these states are playing a greater role in the public sphere, which Jürgen ƒ„‡”ƒ••—‰‰‡•–•‹•–Š‡†‡ϐ‹‹‰ characteristic of civil society in the modern nation-state.ͷ͹ In most of these nationalist movements, religion, culture, and racialization play a ’”‹˜‹Ž‡‰‡†”‘Ž‡‹†‡ϐ‹‹‰–Š‡„‘—†ƒ”‹‡•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ–‹‘Ǥ Š‹ƒǡƒ† perhaps much of Muslim Asia, Islam will continue to play an important ”‘Ž‡‹†‡ϐ‹‹‰–Š‡ƒ–‹‘ǡ‡•’‡ ‹ƒŽŽ›‹ ‘—–”‹‡•™Š‡”‡ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–›‹• †‡ϐ‹‡†„›ƒ‹š‘ˆ”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ†ethnicity (i.e., China, Malaysia, Indone- •‹ƒǡŠ‹Ž‹’’‹‡•ȌǤˆ‘—”–Š–‹†‡‘ˆMuslim activism in China cannot but be nationalistic, but a nationalism that may often transcend the bound- aries of the contemporary nation-state via mass communications, in- creased travel, and the internet. The three previous “tides” of Islam in China, according to Fletcher, were precipitated by China’s opening to the outside world. A new tide

ͷ͹ ƒ„‡”ƒ•ͳͻͺͻǤ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒ ʹʹͷ is now washing across China’s terrain. No matter what conservative leaders in the government might wish, China’s Muslim politics have reached a new stage of openness. If China wants to participate in the international political sphere of the nation-states, this is unavoidable. With the opening to the West in recent years, travel to and from the •Žƒ‹ Š‡ƒ”–Žƒ†•Šƒ•†”ƒƒ–‹ ƒŽŽ›‹ ”‡ƒ•‡†‹Š‹ƒǤ ͳͻͺͶǡ‘˜‡” ͳǡͶͲͲMuslims left China to go on the hajj. This number increased to ‘˜‡”ʹǡͲͲͲ‹ͳͻͺ͹ǡ”‡’”‡•‡–‹‰ƒ”‡–—”–‘’”‡ǦͳͻͶͻŽ‡˜‡Ž•Ǥ‡˜‡”ƒŽ Hui students are presently enrolled in Islamic and Arabic studies at the ƒŽǦœŠƒ”‹˜‡”•‹–›‹‰›’–Ǥ ‡’–‡„‡”ͳͻͺ͹ǡ ˜‹•‹–‡†–Š‡Š‘‡‘ˆ a Hui elder in Xi’an who had just returned from the hajj. He was es- corted home from the airport in a procession of over a hundred taxis, all owned and operated privately by Hui. ‹•–”‹’™ƒ•ϐ‹ƒ ‡†„›Ž‘- cal Hui, ™Š‘–—”‡†‘˜‡”ͳͲǡͲͲͲ›—ƒȋ–‡›‡ƒ”•™ƒ‰‡•ˆ‘”ƒƒ˜‡”ƒ‰‡ northwest Hui ˆƒ”‡”Ȍ–‘–Š‡Š‹‡•‡Islamic Society in Beijing. The Islamic Society arranged his travel to Pakistan, where his visa was arranged at the Saudi Embassy (at the time of his trip China had no formal diplomatic relations with ƒ—†‹”ƒ„‹ƒȌǡƒ†•—’’Ž‹‡†Š‹™‹–Š ̈́ͺͲˆ‘”—•‡‘–Š‡–”‹’ǡ•‹ ‡–Š‡Ž‘ ƒŽ —””‡ ›™ƒ•‘ ‘˜‡”–‹„Ž‡Ǥ Upon his return he traveled throughout the northwest, preaching and lecturing about his pilgrimage experiences and the need to reform Is- ŽƒƒŽ‘‰‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡”Ž‹‡•Ǥ ‡–Š‹ƒ‰ƒ‹‹‘˜‡„‡”ͳͻͻͺƒ† he had since returned three times on the hajj and engaged in frequent business-related travel to the Middle East. His trips to the Middle East were often sponsored by local and national government organizations. Encouraged by the Chinese state, relations between Muslims in Chi- na and the Middle East are becoming stronger and more frequent, part- ly from a desire to establish trading partners for arms, commodities, and currency exchanges, and partly by China’s traditional view of itself as a leader of the Third World. Delegations of foreign Muslims regularly travel to prominent Islamic sites in China, in a kind of state-sponsored religious tourism, and donations are encouraged. While the state hopes that private Islamic investment will assist economic development, the vast majority of grants by visiting foreign Muslims have been donat- ed to the rebuilding of Islamic mosques, schools, and hospitals. As Hui in China are further exposed to Islamic internationalism, and as they return from studies and pilgrimages abroad, traditional Hui identities will once again be reshaped and called into question, giving rise to a fourth tide of Islam in China. Global Islam is thus localized into Hui Is- ʹʹ͸ Dru C. Gladney

Žƒǡϐ‹†‹‰‹–•‡š’”‡••‹‘ƒ•ƒ”ƒ‰‡‘ˆƒ ‘‘†ƒ–‹‘•„‡–™‡‡Š‹- nese-ness and —•Ž‹Ǧ‡••ƒ•†‡ϐ‹‡†‹‡ƒ ŠŽ‘ ƒŽ ‘—‹–›Ǥ These accommodations of China’s Muslims are not unlike those made on a daily basis among other Muslim minorities in Asia. The only difference may be the increasingly post-modern contraction of time and space: accommodations that took over a millennia in China are now being required of Muslim diasporic communities in a matter of hours or days. For Hui in China, Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers in Tokyo and Seoul, and the other wider diaspora, Muslims may be becoming in- creasingly “unfamiliar” strangers. This does not bode well for the fu- ture integration of Muslims into the Chinese leviathan.

References

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Ž‡– Š‡”ͳͻͻͶȂ ‘•‡’Š Ž‡– Š‡”ǡDzŠ‡ƒ“•Š„ƒ†‹››ƒ‹‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒdzǤ ǣStudies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia  Ǥ‡ƒ–”‹ ‡ ‘”„‡•ƒœȋ‡†ǤȌǤŽ†‡”•Š‘–ǣ•Š‰ƒ–‡ —„Ž‹•Š‹‰ͳͻͻͶǡ’’ǤͳȂͶ͸Ǥ ‘”„‡• ͳͻͺ͸ Ȃ †”‡™ Ǥ Ǥ ‘”„‡•ǡ Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. ƒ„”‹†‰‡ǣƒ„”‹†‰‡‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ‘”†ͳͻ͹ͶȂ ‘•‡’Š ‘”†ǡDz‘‡Š‹‡•‡—•Ž‹•‘ˆ–Š‡ͳ͹–Šƒ†ͳͺ–Š ‡–—”‹‡•Ǥdz Asian Affairsȋ‡™‡”‹‡•ȌͷǤʹȋͳͻ͹ͶȌǡ’’ǤͳͶͶȂͳͷ͸Ǥ ‡ŽŽ‡”ͳͻͺͳ – Ernest Gellner, —•Ž‹‘ ‹‡–›. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ͳͻͺͳ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͺ͹Ȃ”—Ǥ Žƒ†‡›ǡDz—•Ž‹‘„•ƒ†–Š‹  ‘ŽŽ‘”‡ǣŠƒ”–‡”•ˆ‘” —‹ Identity.” The Journal of Asian Studies Ͷ͸Ǥ͵ȋͳͻͺ͹Ȍǡ’’ǤͶͻͷȂͷ͵ʹǤ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͲȂ †ǤǡDzŠ‡–Š‘‰‡‡•‹•‘ˆ–Š‡‹‰Š—”ǤdzCentral Asian StudiesͻǤͳȋͳͻͻͲȌǡ ’’ǤͳȂʹͺǤ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͶƒȂ †ǤǡDz‡’”‡•‡–‹‰ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–›‹Š‹ƒǣ‡ϐ‹‰—”‹‰ƒŒ‘”‹–›Ȁ‹‘”‹- ty Identities.” The Journal of Asian Studies ͷ͵ǤͳȋͳͻͻͶȌǡ’’ǤͻʹȂͳʹ͵Ǥ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻͶ„Ȃ †ǤǡDzƒŽƒ—•Š†‹‡‹Š‹ƒǣ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ǡ–Š‹ ‹–›ǡƒ†–ƒ–‡‡ϐ‹‹- tion in the People‘s Republic.” In:•‹ƒ‹•‹‘•‘ˆ—–Š‘”‹–›ǣ‡Ž‹‰‹‘ƒ†–Š‡‘†- ern States of East and Southeast Asia. Helen Hardacre, Laurel Kendall, and Charles ‡›‡•ȋ‡†•ǤȌǤ ‘‘Ž—Ž—ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ ƒ™ƒ‹‹”‡••ǡͳͻͻͶǡ’’ǤʹͷͷȂʹ͹ͺǤ Žƒ†‡›ͳͻͻ͸Ȃ †Ǥǡ—•Ž‹Š‹‡•‡ǣ–Š‹ ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•‹–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡Ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹ . Cam- „”‹†‰‡ǣ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͸ȋͳst‡†‹–‹‘ǡͳͻͻͳȌǤ ƒ„‡”ƒ•ͳͻͺͻȂ ò”‰‡ ƒ„‡”ƒ•ǡŠ‡–”— –—”ƒŽ”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡—„Ž‹ ’Š‡”‡. ”ǤŠ‘ƒ•—”‰‡”ƒ† ”‡†‡”‹ ƒ™”‡ ‡Ǥƒ„”‹†‰‡ǣ ”‡••ͳͻͺͻȋͳ•–‡†‹- –‹‘ǡͳͻ͸ʹȌǤ ƒ””‡ŽŽȀ‡””›ͳͻͺʹȂ–‡˜ƒ ƒ””‡ŽŽƒ†Ž‹œƒ„‡–Š‡””›ǡDz –”‘†— –‹‘Ǥdz ǣ›- ’‘•‹—ǣ› ”‡–‹ ‡ –•‹Š‹‡•‡‘ ‹‡–›. eds. Stevan Harrell and Elizabeth Perry. Modern ChinaͺȋͳͻͺʹȌǡ’’Ǥʹͺ͵Ȃʹ͵ͲǤ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ͳͻ͹ͺȂƒ’Šƒ‡Ž •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǡ—•Ž‹•‹Š‹ƒǤ‘†‘Ƭ–Žƒ–‹  ‹‰ŠŽƒ†•ǣ—”œ‘ Ƭ —ƒ‹–‹‡•”‡••ǡͳͻ͹ͺǤ œ—–•—ͳͻͺ͵Ȃ‘•Š‹Š‹‘ œ—–•—ǡ—ϔ‹•ƒ†ƒ‘‹•. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer- •‹–›‘ˆƒŽ‹ˆ‘”‹ƒ”‡••ǡͳͻͺ͵Ǥ ‹ͳͻͺ͸Ȃ‹ ‘Ǧ†‘‰ǡŠ‡—•Ž‹‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ•Š‰ƒ”‹”ƒ–‡‹Š‹‡•‡‡- –”ƒŽ•‹ƒǡͷ;ͼͺ–ͷ;ͽͽǤŠǤǤ‹••‡”–ƒ–‹‘ǡ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‹˜‡”•‹–›ǡͳͻͺ͸Ǥ ‹’ƒͳͻͺͶȂ ‘ƒ–Šƒ‹’ƒǡDzƒ– Š™‘”‘ ‹‡–›ǡ‡–™‘”‘ ‹‡–›ǣ–—†›‘ˆ Sino-Muslim Communities.” In: Islam in Asia. ed. Raphael Israeli and Anthony H. ‘Š•Ǥ‘ŽǤʹǤ‘—Ž†‡”ǣ‡•–˜‹‡™”‡••ǡͳͻͺͶǡ’’ǤʹͶ͸Ȃʹ͹ͶǤ ‹’ƒͳͻͺ͸Ȃ †ǤǡDzŠ‡Š‹”†ƒ˜‡ǣ•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡–ƒ†”ƒ•ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ–Š‡—•- lim Brotherhood in Modern China.” Paper presented at the China Colloquium of –Š‡ ‡”›Ǥ ƒ •‘ Š‘‘Ž‘ˆ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ–—†‹‡•ǡ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǡʹͲ ‡„”—ƒ”›ͳͻͺ͸ǡʹͳ’ƒ‰‡•Ǥ ‹’ƒͳͻͻ͹Ȃ †Ǥǡ ƒ‹Ž‹ƒ”–”ƒ‰‡”•ǣ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ—•Ž‹•‹‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒ. Seattle: ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒ•Š‹‰–‘”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ʹʹͺ Dru C. Gladney

ڙ‡–ŠƒŽͳͻͶͲȂ—†‘Žˆڙ‡–ŠƒŽǡDzŠ‡‘Šƒ‡†ƒ”‡••‹Š‹ƒǤdz ǣThe Reli- gious Periodical Press in ChinaǤ‡‹‰ǣ›‘†ƒŽ‘‹––‡‡‘Š‹ƒǡͳͻͶͲǤ ƒ‘‰ͳͻͺ͵Ȃƒ‘‰ǡŠ‘‰‰—‘‹•‹ŽƒŒ‹ƒ‘’ƒ‹›—‡Š—ƒœŠ‹†—•Š‹Ž—‡ ѝഭԺᯟ ޠᮉ⍮о䰘ᇖࡦᓖਢ⮕ (A history of Muslim factions and the menhuan system in Š‹ƒȌǤ‹ Š—ƒǣ‹‰š‹ƒ‡‘’Ž‡Ǯ•—„Ž‹•Š‹‰‘ ‹‡–›ǡͳͻͺ͵ȋͳ•–‡†‹–‹‘ǡͳͻͺͳȌǤ ƒŠ‘—“‹ƒͳͻͺͻȂƒŠ‘—“‹ƒǡDzŠ‡ —‹‡‘’Ž‡Ǯ•‡™™ƒ‡‹‰ƒ––Š‡†‘ˆ–Š‡ ͳͻ–Š‡–—”›ƒ†‡‰‹‹‰‘ˆ–Š‡ʹͲ–Š‡–—”›Ǥdzƒ’‡”’”‡•‡–‡†ƒ––Š‡ ‘ˆ‡”- ence Š‡‡‰ƒ ›‘ˆ •Žƒ‹Š‹ƒǣ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ›’‘•‹—‹‡‘”›‘ˆ ‘•‡’Š Ǥ Ž‡– Š‡”Ǥ ƒ”˜ƒ”†‹˜‡”•‹–›ǡͳͶȂͳ͸’”‹ŽͳͻͺͻǤ ƒ ‹•ͳͻ͹ʹȂ‘ƒŽ†Ǥƒ ‹•ǡ‡Ž‹‰‹‘—•‘Ž‹ ›ƒ†”ƒ –‹ ‡‹‘—‹•–Š‹ƒ. ‡™‘”ǣƒ ‹ŽŽƒ‘’ƒ›ǡͳͻ͹ʹǤ ƒ“—‹ͳͻ͹͸Ȃ—•ƒƒ“—‹ǡ‹ŽŽ‡ƒ”‹ƒ‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘‹Š‹ƒǣŠ‡‹‰Š–”‹‰”ƒ•’”‹•- ‹‰‘ˆͷ;ͷ͹Ǥ‡™ ƒ˜‡ǣƒŽ‡‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻ͹͸Ǥ ‹‡„—Š”ͳͻͷͳȂ Ǥ‹ Šƒ”†‹‡„—Š”ǡChrist and Culture. New York: Harper and Row, ͳͻͷͳǤ ‹ ‡•ͳͻ͵͹ȂŽƒ—†‡Ǥ‹ ‡•ǡDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‡‘ˆŠ‹‡•‡‘•Ž‡•ǤdzThe Chinese Recorder͸ͺȋͳͻ͵͹Ȍǡ’’ǤͶͳͶȂͶͳ͹Ǥ ‹ ‡• ͳͻͶʹ Ȃ Claude L. Pickens, “The Four Men Huans.” Friends of Moslems ͳ͸Ǥͳ ȋͳͻͶʹȌǡ’’ǤͳȂʹͲǤ ‘ˆˆͳͻͺͷȂ‹ŽŽ‹ƒ‘ˆˆǡDz •Žƒ„• —”‡†ǫ‘‡‡ϐŽ‡ –‹‘•‘–—†‹‡•‘ˆ •Žƒƒ† Society in Asia.” L‘Islam en IndonesieͳǤʹͻȋͳͻͺͷȌǡ’’Ǥ͹Ȃ͵Ͷ —†‡Ž•‘ͳͻͻ͹Ȃ —•–‹ ‘—†‡Ž•‘ǡOasis identities: Uighur nationalism along China’s Silk RoadǤ‡™‘”ǣ‘Ž—„‹ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡͳͻͻ͹Ǥ ŠƒŠ‹†‹ͳͻͺͶȂ—”ŠƒŠƒŠ‹†‹ǡXinjiang Wushi nianȋ‹Œ‹ƒ‰ǣ ‹ˆ›‡ƒ”•ȌǤ‡‹Œ‹‰ǣ ‡•Š‹‹Ž‹ƒ‘Š—„ƒ•Š‡ǡͳͻͺͶǤ  Š‹‡Žͳͻ͹ͷȂ‡ƒ”‹‡ Š‹‡Žǡ›•–‹ ƒŽ‹‡•‹‘•‘ˆ •Žƒ. Chapel Hill: Uni- ˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‘”–Šƒ”‘Ž‹ƒ”‡••ǡͳͻ͹ͷǤ ”‹‹‰Šƒͳͻ͹ͳȂ Ǥ’‡ ‡””‹‹‰ŠƒǡŠ‡—ϔ‹‘”†‡”•‹ •Žƒ. Oxford: Claren- †‘”‡••ǡͳͻ͹ͳǤ ”‹’’‡”ͳͻ͸ͳȂJoseph Trippner, •Žƒ‹• Š‡ ”—’’‡—† ”¡„‡”—Ž–‹‘”†™‡•–Š‹ƒ. ȋ—•Ž‹‰”‘—’•ƒ†‰”ƒ˜‡Ǧ —Ž–•‹‘”–Š™‡•–Š‹ƒȌǤDie Welt des Islams͹ȋͳͻ͸ͳȌǡ ’’ǤͳͶʹȂͳ͹ͳǤ ‘ŽŽͳͻͺʹȂJohn Obert Voll, •Žƒǡ ‘–‹—‹–›ƒ† Šƒ‰‡‹–Š‡‘†‡”™‘”Ž†. Boulder, ‘Ž‘Ǥǣ‡•–˜‹‡™”‡••Ǣ••‡šǡ‰Žƒ†ǣ‘‰ƒǡͳͻͺʹǤ  ͳͻͻͻȂWall Street Journal, Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Noted Businesswoman in ”ƒ †‘™‹—•Ž‹‡‰‹‘dzǡͳͺ—‰—•–ͳͻͻͻǤ ‡„‡”ͳͻ͹ͺȂƒš‡„‡”ǡ ‘‘›ƒ†‘ ‹‡–›Ǥʹ‘Ž•Ǥ‡”‡Ž‡›ǣ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆƒŽ‹ˆ‘”- ‹ƒ”‡••ǡͳͻ͹ͺǤ Index

A B „†ƒŽǦƒ†‹”ƒŽǦ ‹Žƒ‹ʹͲ͸ ƒ‰Š†ƒ†‹•͸ͷǡ͹ͷȂͺͶ „†—ŽƒŠƒ–„†—”‹š‹–ͳͻͷ ƒŠƒǯƒ†Ǧ‹ƒ“•Š„ƒ†ʹͲͺ „”ƒŠƒ͹ʹǡ͹͵ǡ͹Ͷ Baiyunguan ⲭ䴢㿰ʹͲǡʹ͹ ƒ„•–‹‡ ‡͸ͺǡͳͲ͹ „ƒ’–‹•ͺǡͳͲ͵ǡͳͲͶǡͳͲͷǡͳͲ͸ǡͳ͵ͳ †ƒ͹ʹǡ͹͵ ‡ Š‡”–ǡ ‡‹œ͵ͺ ˆ‰Šƒ‹•–ƒͳͷͲǡͳͷͻǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͹ͷǡͳͻͶȂͳͻ͹ Beifang Jinde ेᯩ䘋ᗧͳʹʹ ‰ƒŠƒͳͷ͵ ‡‹Œ‹‰ʹǡʹͲǡʹ͹ǡͷʹǡͷͶǡ͸ͺǡͺ͸ǡͳʹͲǡͳʹʹǡ ‰—†ƒ–‹•”ƒ‡ŽͺͶ ͳͶ͹ǡͳͶͻǡͳͷ͵Ȃͳͷͺǡͳ͸ʹȂͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͺǡ ahong 䱯䀷 (see also akhondȌͳͻͲǡʹͲͳǡ ͳͻͳǡͳͻͻǡʹͳͲǡʹͳͷȂʹͳͺǡʹʹͷ ʹͲ͵ǡʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͳ Beiliwang 㻛・⦻ͳʹ͹ aiguo ⡡ഭͳͳͻ „‡†‹Š—ƒ ᵜൠॆͳͳ͸ Ai Tian 㢮⭠͸ͺ „‡•‡Š—ƒ ᵜ㢢ॆͳͳ͸ akhondͺǡͳͶ͵ǡͳͶͷǡͳͶ͸ǡͳ͸ͳȂͳ͹ͳǡͳͻͲ ‡–ŠŠƒ”‘͹͹ǡ͹ͺ Aksu (Akesu 䱯ݻ㣿Ȍͳ͸ͳ ‡–ŠŽ͹͹ –‘‹•—””‡ –‹‘ͳͻͷ „‹ƒ‹ƒ 㐘ᒤ͵ͷ Ž‡‹ǡ ‹—Ž‹‘ͻͳǡͻʹǡͻ͹ȂͳͲͻ ‹„Ž‡͵ʹǡ͹ͶǡͺͳȂͺ͵ǡͳ͵Ͳ ŽŽƒŠͳͷͳǡͳͷʹǡʹͲͶǡʹͲ͹ǡʹͲͺǡʹͳͳǡʹʹ͵ ‹ ‡”•ǡ‘„‡”–͹͸ Žƒ–ƒʹͳͺ ‹”ƒǡ‡›‡”ͺͳǡͺʹ ƒŽ•„‘™ŽͶʹȂͶ͸ „‹–—”‡ ᖬ൏Ӫ͵ͻ Ž’–‡‹ǡ”‹ͳͻͷ ‘†›‹›—Ž†— Š‘•†ƒ‰ Š‘••”ƒ„ƒŒ‹ Ž’–‡‹ǡ •ƒ—•—ˆͳͻͷǡͳͻͻ Ž–ƒ”„›—‰„ƒǯ‹”‹’ƒ‡„–Š‡”•- Ž–‹•ŠƒŠ”ƒ“•Š„ƒ†‹››ƒʹͲͺ ‰‘’‘ǡ‡„•‰‘ȋŽ—‡ƒŽ•Ȍ͵͵ ᆹȌͳͶͻȂͳͷͳǡͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡ؍ amalͳ͹ʹǡͳ͹͵ Bonan (Bao’an American Jewish Joint Distribution Com- ʹʹ͵ǡʹʹͶ ‹––‡‡͹ͻ ‘Š‘‡ˆˆ‡”ǡ‹‡–”‹ Šͳ͵ʹ Amin 䱯᭿ͳ͸ͷǡͳ͸͹ ”‘ƒ™ǡ›–Š‹ƒͻ͵ ‹–› ‘—†ƒ–‹‘ͳʹʹ —††Šƒͷǡ͵ͶȂͶ͸ǡͷͷǡʹͳͻ ‡•–› –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽͳͻͳǡͳͻͶ „—††Šƒ’¢–”ƒͶʹ ƒ ‡•–‘”͹Ͳ —††Š‹•͵Ȃ͸ǡͳͷǡͳͻȂʹͳǡʹͻȂͶ͹ǡͷʹȂͷͷǡ Anhui ᆹᗭͳʹ͹ǡͳͶͺ ͷͺǡ͹ͳǡͻ͵ȂͳͲ͹ǡͳͳͶȂͳͳ͸ǡͳʹͻǡͳ͵ʹǡ –‹ǦŠ”‹•–‹ƒ‘˜‡‡–ͷʹ ͳ͵ͷǡͳ͵͸ǡͳͶͶǡͳͷ͵ǡͳͻʹǡʹͲͷǡʹͲ͹ǡ –‹Ǧ‡Ž‹‰‹‘‘˜‡‡–ͷʹ ʹͳͻ ƒ–‹Ǧ‡‹–‹•͹͹ —Šƒ”ƒʹͳͲ ƒ’‘ ”›’ŠƒͶͶ —•–‘͵͵ arhat͵ͺ „—š‹ƒ‘ нᆍͻ͹ ƒ• ‡–‹•ͳͲ͹ „—œŠ‘‰ нᘐͻ͹ •Š‡ƒœ‹͸ͷǡ͹͹ǡͺͲǡͺʹǡͺ͸ 䑍ƒȋ›—Ǧ™ƒ‰䱯㛢⦻ȌͶʹ Index

230C confession 6, 13, 91–96, 99–102, 106– Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 108, 120 Caesarcakravartin 32 Confucianism 3, 4, 6, 14, 19–21, 52–55, Candragarbhasūtra 54 71, 93–97, 100–106, 109, 118, 132, 42 Confucius133, (Kongzi 136, 170, 孔子 207, 216, 222, 223 36 Neo-Confucianism 93, 102 cardinal virtues 72 ) 35, 55 Cassiodorus 32 cultural Christianity 117, 131–135 castigation 107 Cultural Revolution 58, 116, 122, 125, Catholicism 6, 7, 91, 113–127, 134, 135 200, 217 Catholic Underground Church 117, 125, CuracaoD 75 Ce dai jing126, yu 135 策怠警喻 Cattaneo, Lazzaro 102 98 dagoba Chancelibacy 禪 207 da Costa, Inácio 103 Chang’anCeylon 39, 長安 43, 44, 45 Dao 道 43 chanhui 懺悔20, 30, 93, 121–124 DaodejingDalai Lama 道德經 199 66 dao fa ziran 4, 13, 道法自然 16–19, 23–25, 55, 56, 207 94, 95, 101, 106 4, 13, 14, 16, 19, 23 Chan Kim-Kwong 124 23 ChineseChavannes, Catholic Édouard Patriotic 3 Association Daoism 3, 4, 6, 13–26, 36, 52–55, 58, 71, China Madrasa 164 Daojiao94–96, 道教 101–104, 114, 132, 144, Chinese Protestant Patriotic Three-Self- daoren 145,道人 207 114, 117–120, 125 Dao­xuan 道宣 (see also Daoism) 55 Chistiyya (Qiesidiye 切斯底耶 16, 42 ChongshengpaiMovement 重生派 114, 119–123 41 Chongyi tang riji suibi 崇一堂日記隨筆) 151 Darel 38 Chos-’byung 127 Dawut Rahila 162 105 Deman, William 82 (History of the Dharma) 33 Deng Xiaoping 9, 217, 218 Christendom 7, 8, 10, 113–137 Devānaṃ Piyatissa 43 Christianity 3, 6–8, 29–32, 52–58, 65, 68, dhikrdevil 74, 102, 103, 107 91–109, 113–136, 144, 145, 192, DiDharmaratna 帝 37 Chunqiu221 春秋 dianji 點記152, 210–212 Christianization 33 14, 72 Chu-sanzang-jiji 34, 出三藏記集 37, 41 Die Gelbe Post 38 Church of Jesus Christ 121 diaspora 6, 74, 85, 201, 226 44, 46 Ding Guangxun 84 丁光训 Committeecircumcision for 68, the 71 Assistance of European DiDillon, Yiddishe Michael Shtime 188 fun vaytn Mizrakh clash of civilizations 5, 62 Dizui zheng gui 滌罪正規 131 Dizui zheng gui lüe 滌罪正規略 84 Jewish Refugees 79, 80 Document 19 101, 103 Communist Party of China (CPC) 5, 7, 8, 102 Community51, 52, of 57–59,Disciples 63, (see 114, also 120, Men 128,- Dongfang Shan (1982)­dian­-jiao 58, 东方闪电教 114, 126 144, 173, 175, 180 DonglinDomenge, 東林 Jean 68 Dongxiang 东乡 127 tuhui) 127, 128, 129 movement 93 concubinage 102, 105 149–151, 155, 157, 172,  †‡šʹ͵ͳ

ͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡʹͳ͵ǡʹͳ͸ǡʹʹ͵ǡʹʹͶ ‘Ǧ•Š‘—Ǧ•Š‹„‘ǦŽ—Œ‹ ֋ਇ⸣㕭䤴䁈Ͷ͸ Dongzheng-jiao ь↓ᮉͳͳͶ ”׋•ǡ ‘ ‘ͳͲʹ dostͳͷ͸ fu ⾿ͻͶ Dos VortͺͶ Fuhuodao ༽⍫䚃ͳʹ͹ —‡‘ˆŠ‘—͵ͷ Fujian ⾿ᔪ͸ǡͻͳǡͻʹǡͻ͹ǡͻͺǡͳͲͺǡͳʹ͹ Dunhuang ᮖ❼͸͸ ˆ—†ƒ‡–ƒŽ‹•ͳͳ͹ǡͳʹͳǡͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹Ͷǡͳ͹ͺǡ duode 䩨ᗧͻͺ ͳ͹ͻǡͳͻͶǡʹͲͲǡʹͳ͸ǡʹͳ͹ —”–ǡ —„‡”–͵ͺǡͶͲ Fuzhou ⾿ᐎͻͳǡͻʹ Du Weiming ᶌ㏝᰾͵ Du Wenxiu ᶌ᮷⿰ͳͷʹǡʹͳʹ G E ƒ†Š¢”ƒ͵ͺǡͶʹǡͶͶ Gansu ⭈㚳ͳͶ͹Ȃͳͷ͵ǡͳͷ͹Ȃͳ͹ͲǡͳͺͻǡͳͻͲǡ Eastern Lightning (see also Dongfang ʹͲʹǡʹͲ͸ǡʹͲͻȂʹͳ͵ Šƒ†‹ƒŒ‹ƒ‘Ȍͳʹ͹ Gansu musilin ⭈㚳ぶᯟ᷇ͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸͸ǡͳ͸͹ Eastern Syrian Church (see also Nestorian- Gan Zhongke ⭈ᘐਟͳͷ ‹•Ȍͳͳ͵ gaojie ੺䀓ͻ͹ǡͻͻǡͳͲͲ 亟ۣ (see⌅ܗǡ‘Žˆ”ƒͻʹ Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan 儈†”ƒŠ”‡„ ‹‰Š– ‘”–ƒŽ•ʹͳ also Foguo-jiȌ͵ͺ ͺǡͶͶǡͶ͸͵ۣܗErjiao-lun Ҽᮉ䄆Ͷͳ Gaoseng-zhuan 儈 ermaili ቄ哖࣋ʹͳ͵ Gedimu Ṭ䘚ⴞȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ†‹ȌͻǡͳͷͲǡ ‡• Šƒ–‘Ž‘‰›͵ʹǡͶͳȂͶͷ ʹͲͳȂʹͲ͹ǡʹͳ͵ǡʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͳǡʹʹʹ •–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡†‹‰ȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘‡‹Ž‹™ƒ‰Ȍͳʹ͹ Ge Hong 㪋⍚ͳͻ ‡–Š‹ ‹–›ͻǡͳͲǡͳͳ͸ǡͳͶͶǡͳͶͺǡͳ͹͹ǡʹʹͶ ‡‡‹†‡„Žƒ––†‡”Œò†‹• Š‡ ‡‡‹†‡ͺ͵ —•‡„‹‘•‘ˆƒ‡•ƒ”‡ƒ͵ʹ ‰Š‡––‘ͺͳ œ”ƒ͹͵ ‹‘ƒ Š‹‘†ƒ ‹‘”‡͵ʹ gong ࣏ͻͶǡͻ͸ F Gongguo ge ࣏䙾Ṭͻ͸ǡͳͲͳ ‘œƒ‹ǡ ‡ƒǦƒ—Ž͹ͳ Falungong ⌅䕚࣏ͳǡͳʹͻ ‰”ƒ˜‡͸ͻǡ͹ͲǡͺͲǡͺͶǡͳͷͳǡͳͷʹǡͳ͸͵ǡͳ͹ʹǡ Fan Zhong 㤳ѝͳͲͲ ͳͻͲǡʹͲ͵ǡʹͲ͸ȂʹͳͲǡʹͳ͵ ˆƒ•–‹‰ͳͲ͹ǡͳͲͺǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͷ͵ǡͳͷͷǡʹͲ͹ guanfu ᇈᓌͳͲͷ Faxian ⌅亟͵ͺȂͶ͸ Guangdong ᒯьͳʹ͹ǡͳͻͻǡʹͲ͸ ƒ›—ƒǦœŠ—Ž‹ ⌅㤁⨐᷇Ͷͷ Guanghe ᒯ⋣ͳͷ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸ͷ Fei Changfang 䋫䮧ᡯ͵͹ǡͶͲ Guang-hongming-ji ᔓᕈ᰾䁈Ͷͳ feifa 䶎⌅ͳͳͻ Guangzhou ᔓᐎ͸͸ǡ͸ͺǡͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸Ͷ Feng Jinyuan ߟӺⓀͳͷ͵ Guizhou 䍥ᐎͳͷͻǡͳ͸ͳǡʹͲ͸ Fengshui 付≤ͳǡͳȂͳʹ Guojia Shaoshuminzu Weiyuanhui ഭᇦቁ ϐ‹Ž‹ƒŽ’‹‡–›ʹͲǡ͹ʹǡͻ͹ǡͳͲͷǡͳͲ͹ ᮠ≁᯿ငઈՊͳ͹͵ ϐŽƒ‰‡ŽŽƒ–‹‘ͳͲͺ Guojia Zongjiao Shiwuju ഭᇦᇇᮉһ࣑ተ Ž‡– Š‡”ǡ ‘•‡’ŠͳͶ͵ǡʹͲͲǡʹͲ͵ǡʹͲͺȂʹͳͳǡ ͳ͹͵ ʹͳͷǡʹͳͻȂʹʹͳǡʹʹͶ œŠ‘—†’ƒŽ͵͵ ‘„‘ǦŒ‹‰ ֋㕭㏃Ͷͷ Foguo-ji ֋഻䁈͵ͺ H Fojiao ֋ᮉȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘—††Š‹•ȌͷͷǡͳͳͶ ˆ‘Ž”‡Ž‹‰‹‘ͳͷǡ͹ͳǡͳʹͳǡͳʹͻ ƒ„ƒ†‘˜‡‡–ͺ͸ Fo-miedu-hou-guanlian-zangsong-jing ֋⓵ ƒ„‡”ƒ•ǡ ò”‰‡ʹʹͶ ᓖᖼἪ↋㪜䘱㏃ͶͶ hadithͳ͸ͲȂͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸͹ǡʹͲͶ ʹ͵ʹ Index

Haidian Mosque (Haidian Qingzhensi ⎧⏰ Huainanzi ␞ইᆀʹ͵ ␵ⵏሪȌͳͶ͹ Huajue ॆ㿹 ”‡ƒ–‘•“—‡ʹͳ͸ Hainan ⎧ইͳͶͻǡͳ͸ͳǡͳͺͻ Huangdi ⲷᑍ͵ͷ hajj͵ͲǡͳͶͺǡͳͷͳǡͳ͹͹ǡʹͲͲǡʹͲͶǡʹͳͶȂʹͳ͹ǡ Huasi 㣡ሪʹͳͲ ʹʹͷ Huayan 㨟೤͵Ͳ hajjiʹͲͶǡʹͳͷ Hu Dengzhou 㜑ⲫᐎʹʹʹ halakhic͹Ͷǡͺͷ Huhanpai બ஺⍮ͳʹ͹ halalͳͷ͸Ȃͳͷͻ Huhehot (Huhehaote બ઼⎙⢩Ȍͳ͸Ͷ ƒƒϐ‹ Š‘‘ŽͳͷͲǡͳͻͲǡʹͲͳ Hui എͺǡͻǡͳͲ͸ǡͳͶ͵ȂͳͺͲǡͳͺͺȂͳͻͳǡͳͻͶǡ ƒŠ‹‡•‡ͳͶͷǡͳͶͻǡͳͷͲǡͳͷ͸ǡͳͷͻǡͳ͸ʹǡ ʹͲͲȂʹʹ͸ ͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͲȂͳ͹͸ǡͳ͹ͻǡͳͺͲǡͳͺͻǡͳͻͶǡ Huihe എ㓕ͳͻʹ ʹͲͳǡʹͳͶ Huihu എ咈ͳͻʹ Han Mingdi ╒᰾ᑍ͵͸ǡ͵͹ǡ͵ͻ Huijiao എᮉͳͺͺ Han Shundi ╒丶ᑍͳ͵ Huijiao ភⲾͶͶ Han Wudi ╒↖ᑍͳͶǡͳͷ Huizui jing ᛄ㖚㏃ͳͲ͸ haphtarah͹ͳ —‹œ—‹›ƒ‘œŠ‹ ᛄ㖚㾱ᤷͳͲʹ haramͳ͹Ͳ Hu Jintao 㜑䭖⏋ͳͻ͸ Harbin (Haerbin ૸⡮☡Ȍ͸ͷǡ͹ͷǡͺͲǡͺͳǡ —ƒͳʹ͹ǡͳʹͻ ʹͳ͵ —–‹‰–‘ǡƒ—‡Žͷ ƒ”†‘‘ǡ‹Žƒ•ƒ”‘͹͹ —Š‹ȋ —Š‹ŠȌ㜑ሖ͵Ͳ Šƒ”‘›ͳͷȂͳ͹ǡʹ͵ǡͷ͸ǡ͸ͳǡʹʹʹ ƒ•ƒƒŽǦ—”ƒ‹ʹͲ͸ǡʹͳͳ I ƒ•‹†‹͹ͺ ƒ›‹ǡŽŽ‹•ͺͲǡͺͳ I Ching (see also YijingȌͳ͹ Š‡ƒ†• ƒ”˜‡•ͳͶ͹ǡͳͷͻǡͳ͸ͺǡͳ͹ͳ †ƒŽǦ—”„ƒͳͷ͵ǡͳͷͷ Hebei ⋣ेͳʹ͹ǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͶͺǡͳͷ͸ǡͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸Ͷ †‰ƒŠ‘•“—‡ͳͻͶ ‡„”‡™͸ͷǡ͸ͺǡ͹Ͷǡ͹ͻǡͺʹȂͺͶ †Ǧƒ‘•“—‡ͳͶ͹ Heilongjiang 唁嗉⊏ͳʹ͹ǡͳ͸ͳ Ikhwani (Yihewani Ժ䎛⬖ቬȌͻǡͳͷͲȂͳͷʹǡ ‡‹•”‹‰Žƒ͵ʹ ͳ͸͹Ȃͳ͹ͳǡͳͻͲǡʹͲͷǡʹͳ͸ Heming 古匤ͳ͵ǡͳͶ Ž›Üа❦͵͵ He’nan ⋣ই͹Ͷǡͳʹ͹ǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͶͺǡͳͷ͸ǡ imamͳͶͷȂͳͶ͹ǡͳͷʹǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸ͷǡ ͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸͹ǡʹͳ͵ ͳ͸ͻǡͳͻͶǡʹʹͳǡʹʹͶ ‡‰Š›‡‹ƒ‰͸͹ ‡˜‡–Š ƒͳͷ͵ ‡”‹‘–ǡŠ”‹•–‹ƒ͹͸ ™‡Žˆ–Š ƒͳͷ͵ heqi ઼≓ͳ͸ ƒƒŽ‹‡˜ǡ—”ƒ–„‡ͳͻ͹ Š‡”‡•›ͳͳͻǡͳͷʹ †‹ƒ͵ǡͷǡʹͻǡ͵Ͳǡ͵͵ȂͶ͹ǡ͸͸ǡ͹͵ǡ͹ͷǡͳ͵͸ǡ ‡”‘†‘–͵ʹ ͳ͹͹ǡʹͳͲ Š‡–‡”‘†‘š›ͳͳͺǡͳ͵Ͳǡʹͳͳǡʹʹ͵ ‹†‹ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘͵Ͳ ‡˜”ƒƒ†‹•ŠƒͺͲ †—•͵ͺȂͶͲ ‡™ǡ‡ͺͷ ‡”‘‰‘Ž‹ƒͳʹ͹ǡͳ͹Ͷ Hezhou ⋣ᐎʹͲͻǡʹͳͲǡʹͳͷ •–‹–—–‡ˆ‘” ‡™‹•Š‡•‡ƒ” ŠͺͶ ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘–Š•͵ʹ Inuzuka Koreshige ⣜ຊᜏ䟽ͺͳ ‘‰‘‰͸ǡ͸͵ǡͺͶȂͺ͸ǡͳͳ͹ǡͳͳͺǡͳʹʹǡ ”ƒͳͷͲǡͳͷ͵ǡͳ͹ͺ ͳʹͺǡͳ͹ͺǡͳͻ͹ǡͳͻͻ ”ƒ“͸ͷǡ͹ͷǡͳ͸ͲǡʹͲͳ Hongkou 㲩ਓ͹ͷǡͺͳǡͺ͵ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒͳͶ͵ǡͳͶͺǡ Hongming-ji ᕈ᰾䁈͵Ͷ ͳͷͷǡͳͷ͹ǡͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸͹ǡͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͷǡͳ͹ͺ Hotan (Hetian ઼⭠ȌͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳ •Žƒ‹•͵ͳǡͳ͹͸ǡͳͻͶ ‘—•‡Š—” Š‡•ͳͳ͹ȂͳʹͶǡͳʹͺǡͳʹͻǡͳ͵ͷ •Žƒȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘‹•‹ŽƒǦŒ‹ƒ‘Ȍ͵ǡͺȂͳͲǡ͵ͳǡ  †‡šʹ͵͵

ͳͳͶǡͳͳͷǡͳͶ͵ȂͳͺͲǡͳͺ͹ȂͳͻͶǡ K ʹͲͲȂʹʹͷ •”ƒ‡Ž͹Ͳǡ͹ͶǡͺͶȂͺ͸ ƒ†‡‡”ǡ‡„‹›ƒͳͻͳ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǡƒ’Šƒ‡Žͳͺͺ ƒ†‘‘”‹‡ǡŽ‹ͺ͸ •”ƒ‡Žǯ•‡••‡‰‡”ͺͶ ƒ†‘‘”‹‡ˆƒ‹Ž›ͺͶ ƒ†‘‘”‹‡ǡ ‘”ƒ ‡ͺʹ J ƒϔ‹”ͳͺ͹ Kaifeng 䮻ሱ͸ǡ͸ͷǡ͸ͻȂ͹ͷǡͺͷ Jahriyya (Zhehelinye ଢ䎛᷇㙦Ȍͳͷͳǡͳ͹ʹǡ Kaituo ᔰᤃȋ‹‘‡‡”ȌͳͶ͸ǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸͸ǡͳ͸͹ ͳ͹͵ǡʹͲͶǡʹͲͺȂʹͳͶǡʹʹͳȂʹʹ͵ kalamͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸͹ ƒŽƒŽƒ†Ǧ‹—‹ʹͲͻ kalpa͵Ͷ ŒƒƒಃƒͺǡͳͶͷ Kang Youwei ᓧᴹѪͷ͵ ƒ„—†˜Ä’ƒ͵ͶǡͶ͵ ƒ–ǡ ƒ—‡Ž͵Ͳ ƒ’ƒʹͻǡ͵͵ǡ͵Ͷǡͷͷǡ͹ͶȂ͹͸ǡͺͳǡͺ͵ǡͳͺ͹ǡ ƒ’‹Žƒ˜ƒ•–—͵͹ ͳͺͺǡͳͻͺǡʹͳͶǡʹͳͷ ƒ”ƒ„ƒŽ‰Šƒ•—ͳͻʹǡͳͻͶ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡͸ͷǡ͹Ͷ ƒ”ƒ‘”—͵ͺ ‡•—‹–‘”†‡”͵ǡ͸ǡͷ͵ǡ͸ͺǡ͹ͳǡͻͳȂͻͶǡ karamaͳͷʹ ͻͺȂͳͲ͹ǡͳͳ͵ǡͳͳͶ karmaͻͶȂͻ͸ 胕󖔃͵͸”ƒ†ٿ—’ƒٿ—”ƒ Ͳǡ͵ʹǡͳͳ͵Ȃͳͳͷǡͳʹͳ͵–•‹”Š•—•‡ ‡™•͸ǡ͵ʹǡ͸ͷȂͺ͸ǡͳͳͷ Kashgar (Kashi ரӰȌͶͶǡͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͹ʹǡ Jiang Shen 㭓ըʹͶ ͳͻ͵ǡͳͻͶǡʹͳͺ Jiangsu ⊏㣿͹͸ǡͳ͸ʹ ƒ•Š”—–Š͹ͻ Jiangxi ⊏㾯ͳͶǡͳͻ ¢ä›ƒ’ƒ¢–ƒᒣ‰ƒ͵͹ Jiang Zemin ⊏⌭≁͸ͳǡ͸ʹ Kazakh (Hasake ૸㩘ݻȌͺǡͳͶͻǡͳͷ͵ǡͳͷͷǡ jiao ᮉͷͷǡ͹ͲǡͳͳͶ ͳͷ͹ǡͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡͳͻͶǡͳͻ͸ǡʹͳͺǡʹʹ͵ǡ jiao 䟞ͳͲͶ ʹʹͶ jiaohuang ᮉⲷͳͲͻ ƒœƒŠ•–ƒͳͻͷȂͳͻͺǡʹͳͺ Jiaojing-jiao ᮉ㏃ᮉ͹ͳ khalifaͳͷͶǡͳ͸͵ jiaowang ᮉ⦻ͳͲͻ Khocho (Gaochang 儈ୡȌͳͻʹ jiatang ᇦาͳͲ͵ Š‘Œƒ„†ŽŽƒʹͲ͸ jide ぽᗧʹʹ Š‘Œƒˆƒ“ȋŠ™ƒŒƒǦ›‹ˆƒ“Ǣ ‹†ƒ›ƒ– Jidu-jiao สⶓᮉȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘Š”‹•–‹ƒ‹–›Ȍ ŽŽƒŠȌʹͲ͸ȂʹͳͲ ͳͳͶǡͳ͵͸ Š‘–ƒ͵ͺǡͶ͵ Jidu-zongjiao สⶓᇇᮉͳͳ͵ Š—ϐ‹››ƒȋ —ˆ‡‹›‡㱾䶎㙦ȌͳͷͳǡͳͷͶǡͳ͹ʹǡ jihadͳ͸ͻ ʹͲͶǡʹͲͷǡʹͲͺȂʹͳʹǡʹʹͲǡʹʹʹ jing ㋮ͳͺǡʹͲ Kim Pu-sik 䠁ᇼ䔮͵͵ Jingjiao Ჟᮉͳͳ͵ ۄ‡͹ͷǡͺ͵ Jingshifang Mosque (Jingshifang Qingshen- Kojiki ਔһ䁈͵͵ si 䭖Ӱൺ␵ⵏሪȌͳͶ͹ ‘Ž‹‡‹Ž‡ͳͻʹ jingzuo 䶌඀ͻ͵ǡͻ͸ǡͳͲͲ Kongzi ᆄᆀ͵ͷ jinren 䠁Ӫ͵͹ ‘”‡ƒʹͻǡ͵͵ǡ͵Ͷǡͳͺ͹ǡͳͺͺ jiujiao ᰗᮉͳͳͶ ‘•Š‡”͹ͳ —†ƒ‹•͵ǡ͸͹ǡ͹ʹȂ͹ͺǡͺͶȂͺ͸ Kouduo richao ਓ䩨ᰕᢴͻʹ ‡ˆ‘” —†ƒ‹•͹ͺǡͺ͸ ku 㤖ͳͲ͹ ò†‹• Š‡•ƒ Š”‹ Š–‡„Žƒ––ͺ͵ Kubrawiyya (Kuburenye ᓃнᗽ㙦Ȍͳͷͳǡ Œ—ಃƒͳͶ͸ǡͳͶ͹ ͳͻͲǡʹͲͶǡʹͳʹǡʹͳ͵ǡʹʹʹ Jurchen (Ruzhen ྣⵏȌ͸͸ —«ƒͶ͵ —¢”ƒŒÄ˜ƒͶͳǡͶͶ ʹ͵Ͷ Index

Kunming ᰶ᰾ͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸Ͷǡʹͳ͵ Ž‘›ƒŽ–›ͻ͹ —‘‹Ǧ›‹‰ͻ͵ Lü Dongbin ੲ⍎䌃ʹͳ Kuomintang ഭ≁ފȋȌͳͻ͵ —䋐ƒ‰ƒ”ƒ͵͸ M Kyrgyz (Keerkezi ḟቄݻᆌȌͺǡͳͶͻȂͳͷ͹ǡ ͳͺͺȂͳͻͶǡͳͻ͹ǡʹͳͺǡʹʹ͵ǡʹʹͶ Ma Anliang 傜ᆹ㢟ʹʹͲ Ma Bufang 傜↕㣣ͳ͸ͺ L Ma Buqing 傜↕䶂ͳ͸ͺ ƒ ƒ—ͳͳͺ ƒ‹„‡ Š‘˜‡ǡ ‘––ˆ”‹‡†ͳʹ͵ Ma Debao 傜ᗧᇍʹʹʹ ƒǡ–Š‘›ͳͳ͹ǡͳʹʹ Ma Dexin 傜ᗧᯠͳͷʹǡͳ͹͹ lanmao huihui 㯽ᑭഎഎ͹ͳ madrasa (jingxuexiao 㓿ᆖṑȌͺǡͳͶ͵ǡͳͶͷǡ Lanzhou ޠᐎͳͶ͹ǡͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸ͷǡ ͳͷ͵ȂͳͷͷǡͳͷͻȂͳ͹ͳ ͳ͹ͳǡʹͳ͵ ƒ†•‡ǡ‹ Šƒ”†ͳͳ͸ laojiao 㘱ᮉʹͲͷ ƒŠ¢¢›¢•ó–”ƒ͵͸ Laozi 㘱ᆀͳ͵ǡͳͶǡͳ͹ǡͶǡʹ͵ǡ͵ͷǡ͵͸ ƒŠ¢¢ƒͶͶ 󖔃͵͹•ƒٿ¢˜”‹‹”ƒ’¢Šƒ Laozi-huahu-jing 㘱ᆀॆ㜑㏃͵͸ ͵Ͷƒ•ٽƒ˜¢Šƒ ǡ•‘ͺͷ”‡–›ƒ ‡‹ͷͻǡ͸͵ ƒŠ¢›¢ƒͻͶ ‡‹‹•ͷ͹ ƒŠ‹†ƒͶ͵ ‡•Ž‹‡ǡ‘ƒŽ†͹ͳ Ma Hongbin 傜呯ᇮͳ͸ͺ Liang Qichao ằ੟䎵ͷ͵ Ma Hongkui 傜呯䙥ͳ͸ͺ Lianhuamian-jing 㬞㨟䶒㏃Ͷͷ Ma Hualong 傜ॆ嗉ʹͳʹǡʹͳ͵ǡʹʹʹ Lianhui 㚄ՊͳʹͶ ƒ‹‘‹†‡•͹Ͷ Liaoning 䗭ᆱͳ͸Ͷ maitaͳ͸͵ ‹†ƒ‹Ǧ•ƒ„ƒ‘ǦŒ‹ ↧ԓйሦ䁈͵͹ȂͶʹ ƒ‹–”‡›ƒͷǡ͵Ͷǡ͵ͺȂͶ͸ Li Hongzhi ᵾ⍚ᘇͳ ƒŠ†—Ǧ‹ǯœƒȋŠƒ†ƒ•ƒ‹ȌʹͲͺ Lihuo-lun ⨶ᜁ䄆͵Ͷǡ͵ͷ ƒŠ†—œƒ†ƒʹͲͺ Li Jiubiao ᵾҍ⁉ͻʹ Ma Laichi 傜ᶕ䘏ʹͳͲǡʹͳͻǡʹʹʹ Li Jiugong ᵾҍ࣏ͻʹǡͻͺȂͳͲͳǡͳͲͻ Ma Mingxin 傜᰾ᗳʹͳͳȂʹͳͶǡʹͳͻǡʹʹʹ Lingming Tang ⚥᰾าͳͷͶǡͳ͹ͳ ƒ Š—ͳͻͲǡͳͻʹ ‹‰š‹‰ƒ‘Œ‹‡›ƒ‘‰—‹ 么⍇੺䀓㾱㾿ͻͻ mandate of Heaven (see tianmingȌ Lin Song ᷇ᶮͳ͸͸ ƒ‹ Šƒ‡‹•ͳͷ͵ǡͳͻʹ Lintao Ѥ⍞ʹͲͻ ƒ‘‡†‘‰ͳ͸ͻ Linxia Ѥ༿ͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸ͷǡͳ͸ͺȂͳ͹ʹǡ Ma Qixi 傜੟㾯ʹͳͻǡʹʹʹ ʹͲ͸ ȂʹͳͲǡʹͳͷǡʹͳ͸ ƒ””‹ƒ‰‡ͳͲͷǡͳʹͻǡʹͳͲǡʹͳͶ Li Sixuan ᵾఓ⦴ͳͲͺ ƒ”–‹ǡǤǤǤ͸ͺǡ͹͵ Ž‹–‡”ƒ–‹ͷ͵ǡͻͳ ƒ”š‹•ͷ͹ǡͷͻȂ͸͵ǡͳͳ͸ǡͳͳ͹ǡͳ͵͵ǡͳ͵͸ǡ Li Tieguai ᵾ䩥ᤀʹͳ ͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͻ ‹––Ž‡‡ ƒͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸͵ǡʹͲͻ mathnawiʹͲͻ Liu Xiaofeng ࡈሿᷛͳ͵ͳȂͳ͵͸ matzoth͹ͻ Liu Zhi ࡈᲪʹʹ͵ ƒ—Ž‹†ͳͷͳǡͳͷ͵ ‹˜‹—•͵ʹ Ma Wanfu 傜з⾿ʹͳ͸ǡʹʹʹ ‹š‹—›‹Œ‹ƒ थ㝙а䪁ͻʹ ƒ› ‘—”–Š‘˜‡‡–ͷʹǡͳͳ͸ǡͳ͵͵ǡͳ͵͸ Li Zicheng ᵾ㠚ᡀ͸ͺ mazarͳͷʹǡͳ͸ʹǡͳ͹ʹ Longhu Mountain (Lunghu-shan 嗉㱾ኡȌ Ma Zhenwu 傜ᥟ↖ʹʹͳ ͳͶǡͳͻǡʹͲ ‡ ƒͳͶͺǡͳͷʹǡͳͷͷǡͳ͸ʹǡͳ͸͵ǡͳ͸ͺǡͳ͹͹ǡ ‘”†‘ˆ ‡ƒ˜‡ͻʹǡͻ͹ȂͻͻǡͳͲͺǡͳͳͶǡͳͳͷ ʹͲͳǡʹͲͻǡʹͳͲǡʹͳͶǡʹͳ͹  †‡šʹ͵ͷ

‡†‹ƒͳ͸ʹǡʹͲ͸ǡʹͳͳ N melamedͺʹ ‡ ‹—•ͻͻ ¢‰ƒͶ͵ Mengcun ᆏᶁͳͷ͸ ƒŠƒ¢‰ƒͶ͵ menhuan 䰘ᇖͳͷʹǡʹͲʹȂʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͲǡʹʹͳ ƒŒ‹‰ͳʹʹǡͳʹ͵ǡͳ͹Ͳǡʹͳͷ Mentuhui 䰘ᗂՊͳʹ͹ ƒ“•Š„ƒ†‹››ƒͻǡͳͻͲǡʹͲ͵Ȃʹͳͳǡʹͳͺǡʹʹ͵ ‡” Šƒ–•͸ǡ͸͸ǡ͸͹ǡͳͺͻǡʹͲͳ ƒ”‡†”ƒ›ƒäƒ•Ͷͷ Mile ᕼंȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ‹–”‡›ƒȌͷǡ͵Ͷ ƒ•ŠƒŠ‹œͺͶ Mingdao xu ᰾䚃ᒿ͹ʹ ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•ͻǡͳ͸͸Ȃͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͷȂͳͺͲǡͳͻͲǡ ͺ ͳͻͻǡʹͲͲǡʹͳͷȂʹͳͻǡʹʹͶ͵ۣܗMingseng-zhuan ᰾ minjian zongjiao ≁䯃ᇇᮉ͵ ‡‘‘ˆ— ‹ƒ‹•͵ ‹‘”‹–›ͺǡ͸ͷǡͳͳͶǡͳ͹͵Ȃͳ͹͹ǡͳͺͲǡͳͺͺǡ ‡•–‘”‹ƒ‹•ȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ ‹‰Œ‹ƒ‘Ȍͳͳ͵ǡͳͻʹ ͳͻͻǡʹͲͳǡʹͳͺǡʹͳͻǡʹʹ͵ǡʹʹ͸ ‡™—Ž–—”‡‘˜‡‡–ͷʹ ‹›ƒ͹ͳ ‹‡„—Š”ǡ‡‹Š‘Ž†ͳ͵͸ǡʹʹͳ ‹”‡•Š‹˜ƒ͹ͺǡͺ͵ Nihongi ᰕᵜ䁈͵͵ ‹••‹‘ƒ”‹‡•͵ǡ͸ǡ͵͹ǡ͹ʹǡͻͳǡͻʹǡͳͲͲǡͳͲ͸ǡ Ningbo ሗ⌒͸ͷǡ͸ͺ ͳͲ͹ǡͳͳ͵ǡͳͳ͸ǡͳʹ͵ǡͳ͵Ͳǡͳ͵Ͷǡͳ͸ͺǡ Ningxia ሗ༿͸ͷǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͶͺǡͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸ͷǡͳ͹Ͳǡ ͳ͹Ͳǡͳ͹ͺǡʹͲͶ ͳ͹͵ǡʹͳͲǡʹͳʹǡʹͳͺ ͸ȂͶͷ͵ƒٿ¢˜”‹ mitzvothͺͷ ‹œŒƒŒƒʹͳͳ ‘ƒŠ͹ʹ ‘†‡”‹œƒ–‹‘ͷͳǡͷʹǡͳͳͷǡͳͳ͸ǡͳ͵Ͷǡͳ͹ͻǡ ͳͺͲ O mofa ᵛ⌅͵͸ǡͶͳǡͶʹ †ƒƒœƒ”ͳ͹ʹ mohel͹ͳ Š‡Ž‡ƒŠͺ͸ ‘‰‘Ž͸͹ǡͳͶͻǡͳ͹ͶǡͳͺͻǡͳͻͲǡʹͲͳ Š‡Ž‘•Š‡͹͹ ‘‰‘Ž‹ƒͳʹ͹ǡͳͻʹ Š‡Žƒ Š‡Ž͹͹ǡͺ͸ ‘‘‰ƒ›͸ͻ Ž†‡•–ƒ‡–͵ʹ ‘‘–Š‡‹•͹ʹ ‘’‹—ˆ‘”–Š‡ƒ••‡•͸͵ ‘”–‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ͳͲ͹ ’‹—ƒ”ͷʹǡ͸ͷǡͳͳͷ ‘•‡•͹ʹǡ͹͵ Organization for Rehabilitation through ‘•Ž‡•ȋ•‡‡—•Ž‹•Ȍ ”ƒ‹‹‰ͺʹ mosque (quingzhensi ␵ⵏሪȌͻǡͳͶ͵ȂͳͶ͹ǡ ‘”‹‡–ƒŽ‹•ʹͲͳ ͳͷ͵Ȃͳ͸ͺǡͳͻͲǡʹͲͳȂʹͲͶǡʹͲ͹ǡʹͳͲǡ ”–Š‘†‘šŠ”‹•–‹ƒŠ—” Šͳͳ͵ǡͳͳͶǡͳͳ͹ ʹͳʹǡʹͳ͸ǡʹͳ͹ǡʹʹͳǡʹʹͷ ”–Š‘†‘š —†ƒ‹•͹ͺǡͺ͸ Mouzi ⢏ᆀ͵ͷ —Ž–”ƒǦ”–Š‘†‘š͹ͷȂ͹ͻǡͺʹǡͺ͵ǡͺͷ —Šƒƒ†͵ͲǡͳͶ͵ǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͷͳȂͳͷͷǡͳͷͺǡ ‘”–Š‘†‘š›͹ǡͻǡ͵Ͷǡͺ͸ǡͻͳǡͻ͸ǡͳͲʹǡͳͲͷǡ ͳ͸ͺǡʹͲͶǡʹͲ͸ ͳͳͶǡͳͳͺǡͳͳͻǡͳ͵͵ǡͳͷʹǡͳ͸ͺǡ —Šƒƒ†„†ƒŽǦƒ“‹ƒŽǦ‹œŒƒŒ‹ʹͳͳ ʹͲ͵ȂʹͲͷǡʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͲ —Š‹ƒ†Ǧ‹ʹͳʹ ˜‡”›‡”ǡƒ‹‡Žʹǡ͵ǡ͹ͳǡͳʹͻǡͳ͵͸ muridͳ͹ʹ murshidͳ͹ʹǡʹͳʹ Musilin tongxun ぶᯟ᷇䙊䇟 (Muslim P ‡™•Ž‡––‡”ȌͳͶ͸ǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸͸ǡͳ͸͹ ƒ ‹ϐ‹ ƒ”ͺͳ —•Ž‹ͺȂͳͲǡ͸ͷǡ͸ͺǡ͹ͳǡͳͶ͵Ȃʹʹ͸ ƒ‹•–ƒ͵ͺǡͳ͸ͷǡͳ͹ͺǡͳͻͷǡͳͻ͸ǡʹͳͺǡʹʹͷ —•Ž‹”‘–Š‡”Š‘‘†ͻǡʹͳͲǡʹͳ͸ ƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒͳ͸͹ —–‹Žƒ–‹‘ͳͲ͹ Pan Gu ⴈਔ͹͵ ›•–‹ ‹•ͳͷͲǡͳͷʹǡʹͲ͹ǡʹͲͺ ƒ–‘Œƒǡ‹‡‰‘†‡ͻͺ Index

Pan236 Yue 潘岳 parinirvāṇa (see also nirvāṇa 63 ReligionsfieberRamadan 147, 153, 155, 212 ) 5, 36, 38 religionslosesrelics 43, 44, Christentum163, 168 Pelliot, Paul 3 1 penance 6, 91–94, 106–108 ren 仁 132 Pentecostal movement 128 Remusat, Abel 3 Persia 44, 66, 67, 150 72, 97 Pickens, Claude 204, 214 Ricci, Matteo 53, 68, 97 pilgrimage 8, 9, 21, 38, 45, 107, 148, 151, Rites Controversy 3, 53, 105 152, 155, 168, 177, 190, 207–210, Rosh Hodesh 71 214, 215, 225 Ruiying-benqi-jingRozenboim, Asher 瑞應本起經 84 Pollak, Michael 73, 74 Rudelson,Rujiao 儒教 Justin 193 Polybios of Megalopolis 32 ru-shi-dao san-jiao 儒释道三教 46 polygamy 69 (see also Confucianism) 55 Pope 99, 109, 120, 125, 126 55 Propaganda Fide 125 RussiaS 84, 193, 196, 198 prophecy 34, 43, 71, 130 prostitution 105 Protestantism 7, 68, 72, 113–124, 128, saddharma (zhengfa 129, 132–135, 204 Sabbath 71, 78 Purim 71 ) 39 Puruṣapura (Peshawar) 42, 44 Sāgara 43 Q Saint Peter 99 Sakai Tadao 93 赛拉菲耶 salamŚākyamuni 33–39 QadiriyyaQadim (see (Gadelinye also Gedimu) 嘎德林耶 9, 150–152, SalarSalafiyya (Sala (Sailafeiye 撒拉 ) 151, 222 168–171 156 Qalandariyya (Gelandaiye 格兰岱耶) 9, 151, ) 149, 150, 151, 撒拉门155, 157, qi 氣 171–173, 190, 204–209, 223 188,宦 189, 209, 210, 223 Qigong 氣功 ) 151 Salar Sufi Order (Sala Menhuan Qi Jingyi 16, 祁静一18, 20 ) 157 Qinghai 青海 1, 22 Samguk-sagiSallustus 32 三國史記 qingjing 清靜 206, 207, 219, 223 Samguk-yusaSambiasi, Francesco 三國遺事 98 Qin Shihuangdi 148, 秦始皇帝 164, 210, 213, 219 33 qixing 七姓 94 33 Quan­zhen-dao 全真道 37 sanjiaoSaṃyuktāgama heyi 三教合一 44 Quanzhou 泉州 69 sanqingSaṅghayaśas 三清 45 qubba 4, 19–21 4 92, 99 15 152, 171, 203 Sanskrit 83 Quran 8, 145, 147, 152–155, 160–167, saze’erduodeSassoon, Jacob 撒澤爾鐸德 Elias 77, 86 R 170, 178, 204, 216, 221, 222 Saudi Arabia 148, 151, 165, 178, 219, 225 98 selikhotSchall, Adam 105 SengyouSchmidt-Glintzer, 僧祐 Helwig 36 rabbi 74, 75, 78, 82, 83 66 Rabbi Meir Ashkenazi 78 44, 45 rabbinic 71, 75, 78 separatism 9, 169, 178, 179, 195, 198 radicalism 152, 179 Sephardim 65, 69, 75–86  †‡šʹ͵͹

Sexual CustomsͳͷͶǡͳͷͷǡʹͳ͹ shouji ᦸ䁈͵Ͷ Shaanxi 䲅㾯ͳʹ͹ǡͳʹͻǡͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸ʹ Shouters (Huhanpai બ஺⍮Ȍͳʹ͹ Shaddhliyya (Shazilinye ⋉ᆌ᷇㙦Ȍͳͷͳ Shujing ᴨ㏃͵Ͷ Shadian ⋉⭨ͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳ Š—ǡ’‡”‘”‘ˆ ƒȋ ƒŠ—†‹Ȍͳ͵ shahadahʹͲ͹ Shun 㡌͵ͷ shaitanͳ͹ͳ Sichuan ഋᐍͳʹͻǡͳ͸ͳ Shale ⋉ंȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ•Š‰ƒ”ȌͶͶ ‹Ž‘ƒ†ͳͷͺǡͳͻʹ •Šƒƒ‹•ͳ͵ǡͳͶǡͳͷͲǡͳͷ͵ǡͳͻʹ Sima Qian ਨ俜䚧ͶͲǡͶͳ Shandong ኡьͳʹ͹ǡͳͶͺǡͳͷ͸ •‹͸ǡͻͳǡͻʹǡͻͷȂͳͲͺǡͳͳͷǡͳ͵Ͳ Shangdi кᑍ͹ʹǡͳͳͷ ‡˜‡ƒ”†‹ƒŽ‹•ͳͲͳ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ʹǡ͸ǡͷʹǡ͸ͷǡ͸͸ǡ͹ͷȂͺ͸ǡͳͲ͵ǡͳͳͶǡ •‹‹ϐ‹ ƒ–‹‘ȋ‘”•‹‹ ‹œƒ–‹‘ȌͶȂͻǡʹͻǡ͵Ͳǡ ͳʹͳǡͳʹʹǡͳͷͶǡͳ͸ʹȂͳ͸͹ǡʹͳͶǡʹͳͷ ͹ʹǡ͹͵ǡͳ͵ͷǡʹʹͲ Shanghai Ashkenazi Collaborating Relief ‹‘Ǧ—•Ž‹•ͳͺͻ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘ͺͳ Sishier-zhang-jing ഋॱҼㄐ㏃͵͹ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹‘‘’‡”ƒ–‹‘”‰ƒ‹•ƒ–‹‘ȋȌ ‘””‹–—”Ž—•‘͵ʹ ͳͻ͹ •‘ ‹ƒŽ‹•ͷͺ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ ‡™‹•ŠŠ”‘‹ Ž‡ͺͶ •‘†‘›ͳͲͷ Šƒ‰Šƒ‹ ‡™‹•Š Š‘‘Žͺʹ •‘–‡”‹‘Ž‘‰›Ͷǡ͸ǡ͵ʹǡ͵Ͷǡ͵͸ǡͶͳȂͶͷ Shanxi ኡ㾯ͳʹ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸ͷǡͳͻͲ •‘—Žͳ͹ǡͻͻǡͳͶ͸ shaoshu minzu ቁᮠ≁᯿ͳͳͶ ‘˜‹‡–‹‘ͳ͹͵ǡͳͻͳȂͳͻͶǡͳͻ͹ •Šƒ”‹ಃƒͳͶͶǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸͹ǡʹʹͲ ’‡‡Žƒǡ‹ Š‡ŽŽ‡ͺͲ ͹ǡ͵ͺǡͶͶ͵ƒٿͳ͹ͳǡͳ͹ʹǡͳͻͲǡʹͲ͵ǡʹͲͺȂʹͳͳǡʹʹͳ 䔃ƒŠ›ƒŠ• ͵Ͷƒ”‡ٿƒ¢ͳͳ ä”ʹ‡›‹Ž‹œƒŠ Š‡ǯ‡”‹– •”ƒ‡Ž͹͹ǡͺʹ c”ăᒣ¢ͶʹǡͶͷ She Moteng ᭍᪙偠ȋ¢ä›ƒ’ƒ¢–ƒᒣ‰ƒȌ͵͹ –ƒŽ‹ͳ͹͵ shen ⾎ͳͺ •–ƒ”Ǧ™‘”•Š‹’ͳͷ͵ shenfu ⾎⡦ͻͺ State Bureau of Religious Affairs (Guojia Š‡‰Œ‹ƒ‘š‹ƒ‘›‹ 㚆ᮉሿᕅͳͲͲ Zongjiao Shiwuju ഭᇦᇇᮉһ࣑ shengren 㚆Ӫͳ͸ ተȌͳ͹͵ Shen gui zhengji ⾎公↓㌰ͳͲ͵ –ƒ–‡ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹‘”‹–‹‡•‘‹––‡‡ͳ͹͵ shenren ⾎Ӫͳ͸ —ϐ‹•ͻǡͳͶͷǡͳͷͲȂͳͷͶǡͳͷ͹ǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸ʹǡ Shensi lu ᝾ᙍ䤴ͻʹǡͳͲͻ ͳ͸ͻȂͳ͹͵ǡͳͻͲǡͳͻͶǡʹͲʹȂʹͳͺǡʹʹͲǡ shenxian ⾎ԉͳͶȂʹͳ ʹʹͳ Shenyang ⊸䱣ͳ͸Ͷ Suhrawadiyya (Suhelawadiye 㣿䎛᣹⬖ᓅ Shenzhen ␡ൣͳͷͶ 㙦Ȍͳͷͳ Š‹᪂ƒ •ŽƒͳͷͲǡͳͷ͵ —ƒƒͶ͵ •ƒ‹᪂‹ŽŠ‹᪂‹•ͳͷ͵ —‹ͳʹͳ ™‡Žˆ–Š ƒŠ‹᪂ƒͳͷ͵ —‹ •Žƒȋ—ƒȌͳͶͷǡͳͷͲȂͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͻǡ Shi Daoan 䟻䚃ᆹȋ͸–Š ǤȌͶͳ ͳͻͲǡͳͻͶǡʹͲͳǡʹͲͺ Shi Daoan 䟻䚃ᆹȋ͵ͳʹȂ͵ͺͷȌͶͷǡͶ͸ Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan ᆛѝኡȌʹͳͷ Shiji ਢ䁈͵Ͷ •›ƒ‰‘‰—‡͸ǡ͸͸ǡȂ͸ͺǡ͹͹ǡͺʹǡͺͷǡͺ͸ Shijiazhuang ⸣ᇦᒴͳʹʹǡͳ͸Ͷ •› Š”‡–‹•͹ǡͻǡʹͻ Shijie zongjiao wenhua ц⭼ᇇᮉ᮷ॆͳʹͳǡ ͳ͵͸ T Š‹‡‹͹Ͷ Shilifang ᇔ࡙䱢͵͹ ƒ ‹–—•͵ʹ Š‹Š‘‰›—͹Ͷ tafsirͳ͸Ͳ shokhet͹ͳ Taipingjing ཚᒣ㏃ͳͷȂͳ͹ ʹ͵ͺ Index

ƒ‹’‹‰‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ͳͳͷ —”‹•ŠŠƒƒ–‡ͳͻʹ Taiqiquan ཚᾥᤣͳ —”‡‹•–ƒͳͻ͹ǡͳͻͺ ƒ‹™ƒͳǡʹǡͳͶǡʹͲǡͳͳͺǡͳʹ͸ǡͳͺͺǡͳͻͻ ò”ÚœǡŠ‡–ͳͻͻ Tajik (Tajike ຄਹݻȌͳͶͻǡͳͷͲǡͳͷ͵ǡͳͷͷǡ —ᒲ‹–ƒŠ‡ƒ˜‡͵͹ǡ͵ͺǡͶ͵ǡͶͷǡͶ͸ ͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡʹʹͶ ƒŒ‹‹•–ƒͳͷͲǡͳͻ͹ǡʹͳͺ U ƒŽ‹„ƒͳͻͶǡͳͻͷ ƒŽ—†͹ͳȂ͹Ͷǡͺʹǡͺ͵ Uighur (Weiwuer 㔤੮ቄȌͺǡͻǡͳͶͷȂͳͷͺǡ Tao Hongjing 䲦ᕈᲟͳͷ ͳ͸ʹǡͳ͸ͻȂͳ͹ͺǡͳͺͺȂʹͲͲǡʹͳʹǡʹͳ͹ǡ tariqaͳͷʹǡʹͲ͸ǡʹͲͺǡʹͳͳ ʹͳͺǡʹʹ͵ǡʹʹͶ Tatar (Tataer ຄຄቄȌͳͶͻǡͳͷͲǡͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡ ummaͺǡͳͷͶȂͳͷ͹ǡͳ͹Ͳǡͳ͹͹ǡͳͻͲ ʹʹ͵ †‡”‰”‘—†Š—” Š‡•͹ǡͳͳ͹Ȃͳʹ͸ǡͳ͵ͳǡ ƒ›ƒǡ—”Šƒͳͻ͸ ͳ͵ͷ Teaching of Reincarnation (see also United Frontier Department (Tongzhanbu Š‘‰•Š‡‰’ƒ‹Ȍͳʹ͹ 㔏ᡈ䜘Ȍͳ͹͵ Teaching of the Supreme Deity (see also Unrepresented Nations and People’s Orga- Š—•Š‡Œ‹ƒ‘Ȍͳʹ͹ǡͳʹͺǡͳʹͻ ‹œƒ–‹‘ȋȌͳͻͷ –‡Ž‡‘Ž‘‰›ͶͲǡͶͳ ’ƒ–‹••ƒͶ͵ǡͶͶ ͻͶƒŠ†ƒڍ‘’— ͳͲͳȂͳͲͶ•–‡†ƒ‘‡ –‡””‘”‹•ͻǡ͵Ͳǡͳͷͻǡͳ͹Ͷǡͳ͹ͷǡͳͺ͹ǡͳͻͳǡ ”†—ͺ͵ ͳͻͷȂͳͻͺ Urumqi (Wulumuqi Ѽ励ᵘ喀ȌͳͷͶǡͳ͸Ͷǡ Š‘”͵͵ ͳͻͳǡͳͻͷǡʹͳ͵ǡʹͳ͹ǡʹͳͺ ͶͶǡͶͷƒڍÄٿڍ— ʹ͵•‡†‹†›—Š Tian ཙͷͷǡ͹ʹ Uzbek (Wuzibieke Ѽᆌ࡛ݻȌͳͶͻȂͳͷͷǡ Tianjin ཙ⍕͸ͷǡͳͷ͸ǡͳ͸ʹȂͳ͸͹ǡͳ͹Ͳ ͳͺͺǡͳͺͻǡͳͻ͹ǡʹʹ͵ǡʹʹͶ tianming ཙભͶͲ œ„‡‹•–ƒͳͻͷǡͳͻ͹ Tianmu ཙぶͳ͸͹ Tianshi-dao ཙᑛ䚃ͳͻ V Tian Wu ⭠ӄʹͳʹ ƒ‰‘‡ǡŽˆ‘•‘ͳͲ͵ Tianzhu ཙㄪȋ †‹ƒȌ͵͹ǡͶʹǡͶ͵ǡ͸͸ǡ͹͵ǡ ƒ‹ä¢ŽÄͶʹ ͳͳͷ ƒ–‹ ƒͳͳ͸ǡͳʹͲǡͳʹ͸ ‹ƒœŠ—‹•ͳͳͶ ‹ƒ›ƒͶͷ Tianzhu-jiao ཙѫᮉͳͳ͵ǡͳͳͶ ‹ ‡–†‡‡ƒ—˜ƒ‹•͵ʹ Tiaojin-jiao ᥁ㅻᮉ͹ͳ Žƒ†‹˜‘•–‘͹ͺ Ͷ͵ƒپƒ”ƒ¢›˜ ǡ͵͵ǡ͵ͶǡͳͶͻǡͳ͹ͶǡͳͺͺȂͳͻͳǡͳͻͻǡ͵–‡„‹ ʹͲͻǡʹͳͻ tonghui ⰋᛄͳͲͲ W Tongku jing ji Ⰻ㤖㏃䒏ͳͲʹ Tongzhanbu 㔏ᡈ䜘ͳ͹͵ ƒŠŠƒ„‹ͻǡͳͷͳǡͳͷʹǡͳ͸͹ǡͳͻͲǡʹͲͷǡʹͳ͸ǡ ‘ǡǤǤͺʹ ʹͳ͹ ‘”ƒŠ͸ǡ͸ͺǡ͹ͳǡ͹ͺǡͺʹ ƒŠŠƒ„‹››ƒͳͷͲǡͳ͸ͻǡͳͻͶ triratna͵ͻ wali ⬖䟼ͳͷʹǡͳ͹ʹ ”‘‡Ž–• Šǡ”•–ͳ͵ʹȂͳ͵ͷ Wang Chongyang ⦻䟽䲭ͳͻǡʹͳ Tuoli 䱰↧͵ͺ Wang Shoutian ⊚ሯཙͳ͹ͳ Turfan (Tulufan ੀ励⮚Ȍͳ͸ͳǡͳͻʹȂͳͻͶ ƒ‰‹•Šƒ͹Ͳ —”‹ ǦŽ–ƒ‹ͳͶͻǡͳͷͲ Wang Zheng ⦻ᗥͳͲͷ —”‹ —•Ž‹•ͳͷͳȂͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ͻǡͳͺͺǡ ƒ›‘ˆ‡•—””‡ –‹‘ȋ —Š—‘†ƒ‘Ȍͳʹ͹ ͳͻ͵ ™ƒಃœͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸Ͳǡͳ͸͹ǡͳ͸ͻ  †‡šʹ͵ͻ

‡„‡”ǡƒšͻǡʹʹͲ Xuanzang ⦴ྈͶͶ ‡‹ǡ‡––›͹͸ Xunhua ᗚॆʹͳͻ Wei Boyang 兿՟䲭ͳ͹ Weishu 兿ᴨ͵͹ǡͶͶ Y Weiwuer-zu 㔤੮ቄ᯿ȋ•‡‡‹‰Š—”Ȍ Weizhou 世ᐎͳͶ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸ͷ ƒ—„‡‰ͳͻ͵ǡʹͳʹ wenhua jidutu ᮷ॆสⶓᗂͳ͵ͳ ƒ—„‡‰”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ͳͻ͵ wenhua zongjiao jingshen ᮷ॆᇇᮉ㋮⾎ ›ƒ ೤ͻͺ ͳ͵͸ ›ƒ‰Œ‹ƒ‘ ⌻ᮉͳͳͷ White Cloud Monastery (see also Baiyun- ›ƒ‰“‹ 䲭≓ͳ͸ ‰—ƒȌʹͲ Yang Shijun ᶘ༛傿ͳ͹ʹ Š‹–‡‘–—•”‡„‡ŽŽ‹‘ʹͲͷ Yang Tingyun ὺᔧ㆐ͻͺȂͳͲʹ ͺͶǡͺ͸ Yangxin 䱣ؑͳͷ͸ǡͳͷ͹ ”ƒ†Ž”‘ —ȋ’‡”‘”ǡ•‡‡ ƒ—†‹Ȍ ƒ‰š‹  ‹†‡–ͳͷ͸ —ǡ ƒ””›ͳͻ͸ Yangzhou ᨊᐎ͸ͷ —ǡ‡‹Ǧ›‹ͻ͵ Yangzi ᨊᆀ (Changjiang 䮧⊏Ȍ͸͸ wuwei ❑⡢Ͷǡʹ͵ Yao ๟͵ͷ —ǡ‹‹‰ͳ͵ͷǡͳ͵͹ Yarkand (Yeerqiang ਦቄ㖼Ȍͳͷ͵ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͹ʹ ‡ŽŽ‘™’‡”‘”ȋ —ƒ‰†‹Ȍͳ͹ǡ͵ͷ X ‡ŽŽ‘™‹˜‡”ʹʹǡ͸ͺǡʹͳʹ ‡‡͸͹ǡʹͳͲǡʹͳͳ ‡‘’Š‘͵ʹ ›‡•Š‹˜‘–Š͹Ͷǡͺͷ Xi’an 㾯ᆹͳͲͷǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͷͶǡͳͷͺǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͹Ͳǡ Yesu-jiao 㙦こᮉͳͳͶ ʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͷ Ye Xiaowen ਦሿ᮷ͳʹͺ xiang ⴨ͻͷ ›‹ 㗙͹ʹǡͻ͹ ͸ǡ͵͹ǡͶʹ Yiciluoye а䌌′ᾝȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ •”ƒ‡ŽȌ͹Ͳ͵⌅ۿ xiangfa xianren ԉӪͳͷȂͳͻ ‹††‹•Š͹ͷǡ͹͸ǡͺ͵ǡͺͶ ʹʹʹxianren 䌒Ӫͳ͸ Yiheiwani ׍唁⬖ቬͳͻͲǡʹͳ͸ǡʹʹͳǡ xiao ᆍͳ͹ǡ͹ʹ Yijing ᱃㏃ (I ChingȌͷͷ Xiaojing ᆍ㏃ʹͲ Yili Ժ⢱ͳͷ͵ǡͳ͸ͳ Xichao chongzheng ji ⟉ᵍጷ↓䳶ͻʹ ›‹ and ›ƒ‰ͳ͵ǡͳͷ Xidaotang 㾯䚃าʹʹͲǡʹʹʹ Yining Ժᆱͳͻ͵ǡͳͻ͸ Xie Fuya 䅍ᢦ䳵ͷ͸ ›‹“‹ 䲠≓ͳ͸ xiejiao 䛚ᮉͳͳͶǡʹʹ͵ Yisilan-jiao Ժᯟޠᮉȋ•‡‡ƒŽ•‘ •ŽƒȌͳͳͶ xingshen ⴱ䓛ͻ͵ ‹•‹Žƒ™‡Š—ƒ›ƒŒ‹— Ժᯟޠ᮷ॆ⹄ウ xingxiu ⴱ㝙ͻ͸ ȋ ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ •Žƒ‹ —Ž–—”‡ȌͳͶ͸ǡ Xining 㾯ᆱͳͷͶǡͳ͸ͶǡʹͲ͸ǡʹͲͻ ͳ͸͸ Xinjiang ᯠ⮶ͺǡͻǡͳͶ͹ǡͳͶͺǡͳͷ͵Ȃͳͷ͹ǡ Yongzheng 䳽↓͸ͺ ͳ͸ͳȂͳ͸Ͷǡͳ͸ͻǡͳ͹ʹȂͳ͹ͻǡͳͺͺȂͳͻͻǡ ›‘—–ƒ‹Š‘—›‹ ⥦ཚᖼ㼄͹Ͷ›‘—™‡Š—ƒ†‡ ʹͲ͸Ȃʹͳʹǡʹͳ͹ǡʹͳͺ jidutuͳʹͳ xinjiao ᯠᮉͳͳͶǡͳͳͷǡʹͲͶǡʹͳ͹ ›—ƒ“‹ ݳ≓ͳ͸ Xinjing ᗳ㏃ʹͲ òǡŠòǦˆƒ‰ͻ͵ xinxinjiao ᯠᯠᮉʹͲͷ Yu Ji Ҿਹͳͷǡͳ͸ Ԡডᵪͳ͵͸ Yunnan ӁইͳͶͷȂͳͶͺǡͳͷ͹Ȃͳ͹ͲǡͳͻͲǡʹͲ͸ǡؑ ‹Œ‹‡™‰ƒ›‹š Xiong Shiqi ➺цᰇͻͺ ʹͳͲǡʹͳʹǡʹͳ͹ xixue 㾯ᆖͳͳͶ Xiyu 㾯ฏ͵ Xuanhuagang ᇓॆ዇ʹͳʹ ʹͶͲ Index

Z ॿՊȋ •Žƒ‹ ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ‹ƒȌ ͳͷ͹ Za-ahan-jing 䴌䱯ਜ਼㏃ͶͶ Š‘‰‹ͳʹͶ zakatͳͶ͹ Š‘‰›‘‰ ѝᓨͷͷ Zhang Enbo ᕥᚙⓕʹͲ Zhou Huanwang ઘẃ⦻Ͷͳ Zhang Geng ᕥ䌑ͻͻǡͳͲ͸ǡͳͲͺ Zhou Muwang ઘぶ⦻͵ͺ zhangjiao 䮧ᮉ͸ͺ Zhou Pingwang ઘᒣ⦻͵ͻȂͶͳ Zhang Ling ᕥ䲥ͳ͵ǡͳͷ Zhou Wenwang ઘ᮷⦻ͶͲ Zhang Shi ᕥ䆈ͳͲͺ Zhou Wuwang ઘ↖⦻ͶͲ Zhang Tianshi ᕥཙᑛͳͻ Zhou Xiangwang ઘ㽴⦻Ͷͳ Šƒ‘ȋˆƒ‹Ž›Ȍ͸͸ Š‘—›‹ ƒ–‘‰“‹ ઘ᱃৳਼ཱྀͳ͹ǡͳͻ Zhaotong Madrasa (Zhaotong ᱝ䙊ͳ͸Ͳ Zhou Zhaowang ઘᱝ⦻͵ͺ Zhao Yingdou 䏉᱐ᯇ͹ʹ Zhou Zhuangwang ઘ㦺⦻͵͹ǡͶͳ Š‡Œ‹ƒ‰ͳʹ͹ Zhuangzi 㦺ᆀͶǡͳ͵ǡͳͶ ͵zhengfa ↓⌅͵͸ǡ͵ͻǡͶʹ Zhuo sumi pian ⠝؇䘧ㇷͳͲ Zhengyi-pai ↓а⍮ǤͶǡͳͻȂʹͳ Zhushenjiao ѫ⾎ᮉͳʹ͹ Zhengzhou 䜁ᐎͳʹ͹ǡͳ͸ͳǡͳ͸Ͷ Zhu Xi ᵡ⟩ͳͺ Š‡Ž‹‰›‡™‡‹–— ⵏ䵸ᾝսെͳͷ ziran 㠚❦Ͷǡʹ͵ zhenren ⵏӪͳ͸ǡʹͷ zisong 㠚䁏ͻ͵ Zhimeng Ც⥋ͶͶ zongjiao ᇇᮉͳǡ͵ǡͷͷǡͷ͸ǡͳͳ͸ǡͳʹͳǡͳʹͶǡ Zhi Qian ᭟䅉Ͷ͸ ͳ͵͸ zhong ᘐ͹ʹ zongjiao-re ᇇᮉ⟡ (see also ‡Ž‹‰‹‘•ϔ‹‡- Zhongguo Jidujiao Aiguo Sanzi Yundong ѝ „‡”Ȍͳ ഭสⶓᮉ⡡ഭй㠚䘀ࣘͳͳͶ Zongli-zhongjing-mulu ㏌⨶⵮㏃ⴞ䤴Ͷ͸ Zhongguo Tianzhujiao Aiguohui ѝഭཙѫ zui 㖚ͻ͹ǡͳͲ͵ǡͳͲ͸ ᮉ⡡ഭՊͳͳͶ zuo sheng zhi fang ֌㚆ѻᯩͳͲͳ Zhongguo Yisilan-jiao Xiehui ѝഭԺᯟޠᮉ