The Violent Power Struggle in Syria WP Scenarios and Policy Options for the International Community

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Co m ments 501962–2012

Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen S

The violence in Syria continues to escalate. Propaganda-serving reforms devoid of For a different perspective substance and credibility, like the constitutional amendments of February 2012, have on this issue see: SWP Comments No. 11 done nothing to de-escalate the situation. A return to the status quo ante appears just (March 2012) of Markus Kaim: as implausible as a negotiated settlement. There is now an acute danger of full-blown »Crisis in Syria: Possibilities and Limits of civil war with the fighting between regime and insurgents spilling over into sectarian Military Intervention« bloodshed. Although pressure is growing for the international community to intervene militarily, the foremost goal must be to avoid an uncontrolled escalation of violence and to press for humanitarian organisations to be granted access.

The violence in Syria has dramatically them from entering resistance strongholds, increased since the failure of the Arab thus fulfilling a certain protective function League observer mission at the end of for the protests but at the same time pro- January, with Syrian armed forces increas- voking more violence on the part of the ingly deploying artillery to shell residential regime. The Free Syrian Army is poorly areas where insurgents are hiding. In equipped, has attracted criminal elements March three districts of the central Syrian and is fragmented into local groups. In city of Homs that had been under siege and spite of the Syrian National Council’s bombardment for weeks were invaded by efforts to establish control over rebel forces, ground troops and the rebels driven out – with a military bureau opening in early with large-scale destruction and devastat- March 2012, they are to date neither under ing consequences for the civilian popula- civilian control nor do they follow a central tion. command. Altogether the Free Syrian Army Although the army has suffered increas- does not currently present a serious chal- ing desertions from the lower ranks, the lenge to the army and security forces. top leadership and most of the still fear- Religiously motivated violence is on the some and effective security apparatus rise in mixed residential areas, especially remain loyal to the regime. The rebels of between Sunnis and Alawites. At the same the so-called Free Syrian Army carry out time, anti-regime protests continue to grow attacks on the state security forces, regular even in areas hitherto regarded as loyal, army and intelligence services and prevent especially the two commercial centres

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is head of the Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 9 Heiko Wimmen is an Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division March 2012

Damascus and Aleppo. While there is no into a spectrum of ideological currents and hard data on the mood within the popu- is incapable of acting unitedly. The Syrian lation, observation of internet forums National Council, which the Friends of the indicates that many Syrians who had long Syrian People group recognised as a legiti- remained neutral are now openly taking a mate representative of the Syrian opposi- stance against the regime. tion at its meeting on 24 February, is riven The constitutional amendments pre- by internal tensions and only enjoys the sented in a referendum on 26 February support of part of the Syrian population. 2012 must be seen in the first place as The greatest obstacle to joint action by the evidence that the willingness to introduce different opposition alliances turns out to reforms asserted by representatives of the be their differences over the question of regime is utterly lacking in credibility. foreign intervention, which many Syrians Although the amendments abolish the categorically reject. This controversy pro- leading role of the Baath Party in state and duces fundamental differences about the society and introduce a multi-party system way forward whose resolution, in contrast – with parliamentary elections to be held to many other questions, cannot be post- within three months – power still remains poned to the time after Assad. concentrated in the hands of the president, while the other constitutional organs amount to little more than window-dress- Scenarios ing. As such, the new constitution formally After a year of increasingly violent power cements the monopolisation of state and struggle a return to the status quo ante politics that the Assad family has long appears just as unrealistic as a transition asserted in reality. The provision restricting negotiated between regime and opposition. the president to two seven-year terms only The regime plainly still believes it holds a comes into force after the end of Bashar position of strength. At the same time, the al-Assad’s current term in 2014 and would entanglement of most of the power elite in thus permit him to remain in office until corruption, violence and massive human 2028. rights violations make it virtually unthink- In the meantime, the economic sanc- able that any significant section of this tions imposed by the United States, the group would survive a system change un- European Union, Turkey and most Arab scathed. Thus, the implications for all states are beginning to bite, especially the higher-ranking officers and civil servants European sanctions against the Syrian oil of abandoning the absolute monopoly of industry. The population is hit by shortages power militate strongly against this of petrol, heating oil and butane gas, while happening. extended electricity blackouts now occur Four future scenarios emerge. In the on a daily basis even in the capital. Since regime survival scenario, continuing the beginning of the crisis the black market repression gradually wears down the popu- exchange rate of the Syrian currency has lar uprising, with the regime surviving but fallen by about 50 percent against the US largely isolated internationally and a dollar. Imported goods like wheat are run- population sinking into abject poverty ning low, leading to bread shortages, and because of the sanctions. Representatives of prices for local staples such as milk prod- the protest movement suffer vicious repres- ucts are rising noticeably. But there is still sion, while whatever is left of the opposi- no sign of the posited political effects of tion radicalises, possibly towards Islamist the sanctions. Top leaders have not extremism, and continues the struggle by changed their stance, nor has the business means of terrorism. elite turned its back on the regime. Implosion. Increasing desertions, inter- The Syrian opposition remains divided nal sectarian tensions and a lack of re-

SWP Comments 9 March 2012

sources cause the progressive disintegration community will come under growing pres- of the armed forces. The regime resorts sure to intervene militarily, even without a increasingly to paramilitary forces which Security Council mandate. The justification operate more and more outside its control. would be to treat the situation as genocide In expectation of imminent collapse of the or as an immediate threat to regional regime, loyalty erodes within the state stability or to the territorial integrity of apparatus and the middle layers, especially, neighbouring Turkey. jump ship. The inner circle finally recog- Implosion currently appears the most nises the hopelessness of its situation and probable of the outlined scenarios. Grow- chooses exile. ing numbers of high-ranking officials are If that sequence of events was accompa- apparently leaving Syria and signs are nied by a split in the armed forces and growing that an increasing proportion of security apparatus it could easily lead to a those whose support for the regime was massive escalation of armed clashes and the largely rooted in fear for national stability scenario of full-blown civil war. This would are rethinking their position. However, the in all likelihood be fought along sectarian process might drag on for quite some time lines as most of the troops are Sunni where- and the regime’s behaviour to date gives as military leaders are overwhelmingly grounds to fear that its response to increas- Alawi. Only the elite units commanded by ing isolation will be to inflict even harsher the president’s brother (Fourth Division repression and whip up communal resent- and Republican Guard) are made up almost ments among the Alawi community. entirely of Alawites. Growing numbers of Sunni Syrians already This escalating scenario also contains hold their Alawi compatriots collectively the danger of war by proxy where actors responsible for the crimes of the regime, with regional ambitions (Iran, Saudi Arabia, while the government systematically Qatar) each lend logistical and financial widens the rift by sowing fear with stra- support to their preferred Syrian faction. tegically placed propaganda. If the state Saudi Arabia and Qatar are already pressing were to collapse there is therefore a danger for military equipment to be supplied to of retribution that could initiate an un- the rebels. The conflict could also spill over controllable spiral of sectarian violence. to neighbouring countries, for example with tribes living along the Iraq/Syria border becoming tangled up in the fight- Options for the International ing. Confrontations could also escalate in Community Lebanon between supporters of Hezbollah, Implosion would also be the preferred which is allied with the Syrian regime, and scenario as long as an outbreak of uncon- Sunnis who mostly support the Syrian trolled violence can be prevented. Given opposition. Refugee movements would have that such a development is best promoted repercussions on neighbouring states, by broad sections of the population, as well especially Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. as civil servants and officials, coming to the Military intervention. So far the inter- conclusion that Assad’s days in power are national community has been cautious numbered, the decisive pressure point is where military intervention is concerned. tightening the international isolation of This is by no means only because of the the Syrian regime. Alongside ramping up negative stance of Russia and China, but and strict reinforcement of existing sanc- stems above all from worries about becom- tions, a change of position by Russia would ing dragged into a long civil war and send the right message. For that to happen possibly a regional conflict. If, however, the conflict needs to be taken out of the fighting escalates and the humanitarian current Cold War mould – Moscow stand- crisis comes to head, the international ing against the West – to seek solutions

SWP Comments 9 March 2012

jointly with Russia as well as with the Arab On the other hand, humanitarian or- League. ganisations currently reject out of hand Prevent further escalation of violence. the idea of individual states establishing In order to minimise transitional violence so-called humanitarian corridors or pro- after a regime collapse, a post-Assad leader- tection zones. Without a Security Council ship will have to assert control as quickly as mandate this would lack legitimation and possible over the security apparatus, the without a major military intervention with paramilitaries and the insurgents. In order ground forces it would be impossible to to prepare for this, international support impose such areas against the will of the for the Syrian opposition should concen- regime. The involved states would become trate on concrete planning to enhance its warring parties. capabilities for the day after Assad, in- Nonetheless, there is a danger of the cluding the preparation of a coordinated humanitarian situation assuming such security strategy that also addresses ques- catastrophic proportions that neighbouring

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und tions of transitional justice. states, like NATO member Turkey, and thus Politik, 2012 In contrast, supplying arms to the Free ultimately the alliance as a whole, would All rights reserved Syrian Army would be highly inadvisable. come under immense moral pressure to

These Comments reflect Europeans should firmly oppose the put an end to the killing. NATO should solely the authors’ views. clamour for such a course of action and therefore work with Turkey, the states of

SWP convince their Arab partners not to go the Arab League and humanitarian organi- Stiftung Wissenschaft und down this path. Further militarisation of sations to urgently prepare contingency Politik German Institute for the uprising would do little to change the plans for such an eventuality. At that point International and military balance of power, but it would of time it will be crucial not only to have Security Affairs further increase the toll among the civilian the military means ready, but also agree- Ludwigkirchplatz 34 population. Also, a growing volume and ment about the concrete steps and strategic 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 firepower of weapons in circulation would goals of intervention. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 worsen the prospects of quickly stabilising www.swp-berlin.org the security situation after the fall of the [email protected] regime. ISSN 1861-1761 Approaches that instrumentalise human-

Translation by Meredith Dale itarian aid and support for the opposition for the sake of geostrategic goals (for exam- (English version of SWP-Aktuell 12/2012) ple in connection with the nuclear conflict with Iran) must be rejected out of hand. As well as undermining declared humanitarian principles, such an approach cyni- cally sacrifices the liberty-seeking Syrian population on the altar of geopolitics. Improve the humanitarian situation. International organisations already assess the situation as a humanitarian crisis and are preparing to care for large numbers of refugees across the border in neighbouring Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. These efforts will increasingly need international support. Europe should strongly support the efforts of UN and Arab League envoy Kofi Annan to exert pressure for humanitarian organisations to be granted access to the worst-affected regions and cities.

SWP Comments 9 March 2012