sign in sign up
<<
Home , Mohammed Bin Salman, NEOM, Salman (myth), The National (Abu Dhabi)

COMMENTARYIT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF

It’s a Family Affair: Religion, Geopolitics and the Rise of Mohammed bin Salman

SIMON MABON*

ABSTRACT Over the past year, the Kingdom of has expe- rienced a period of rapid transformation under the direction of a new Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, the son of the cur- rent King. Domestically, Bin Salman has overseen political reform in the upper echelons of the al-Saud ruling family, whilst embark- ing on a more pro-actively anti-Iranian foreign policy. This article looks at the actions of the new crown prince to explore the impact of Bin Salman’s influence on both the Kingdom and the more broadly.

Introduction crown prince, the 32 year old Mo- hammed bin Salman, essentially the n November 4, 2017, the Leb- power behind the throne. Known by anese Prime Minister, Saad ‘Saudi watchers’ as MbS, the son of OHariri resigned from office King Salman was appointed to the of- whilst in , blaming Iranian fice of crown prince in June 2017 and manipulation of events. A day later, a wasted little time in seeking to trans- number of prominent members of the form the Kingdom’s fortunes. The al-Saud royal family were arrested, office of crown prince is not with- along with around 200 leading mem- out challenges, as four of the last five bers of the country’s business elite. crown princes of Saudi Arabia have On November 6, the Saudis claim failed to become King. Yet few expect that a missile was launched from Ye- such a fate to befall MbS as a conse- men and intercepted near the Riyadh quence of the moves made to secure airport. Over 3 days, the severity of his position. * Lancaster the challenges facing Saudi Arabia in University, UK the coming years became visible for Such problems of succession and in- Insight all to see. In charge of responding to deed power struggles within the up- Vol. 20 / No. 2 / the challenges is the Kingdom’s new per echelons of the al-Saud are not 2018, pp. 51-66

DOI: 10.25253/99.2018202.04 2018 Sprıng 51 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

emergence of Saudi Arabia and the Unable to draw upon mechanisms through which Ibn Saud was able to establish the third –and memories of shared history current– Saudi-led state across the or to cultivate narratives of . We then turn to a collective identity that would consideration of Bin Salman, looking at his background and political his- ensure political unity and tory before considering the domes- cohesion Ibn Saud was forced tic challenges facing Saudi Arabia and finishing with an exploration of to find alternative ways to the geopolitical environment within ensure the survival of his which the Kingdom operates. political project The Family as State

new. Take, for instance, the struggles The third –and current– Saudi state between Saad and Faysal over who was established by Ibn Saud in 1932, was to rule the Kingdom and the when he united the 4 pieces of the factionalism within the ruling fam- Arabian jigsaw. With the provision of ily that shaped political life since the weapons and subsidies from the Brit- death of Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rah- ish, Ibn Saud was able to both create man al-Saud –known by most as Ibn an expansionist political project and Saud. Yet the case of MbS is perhaps consolidate his position when faced of more importance than the struggle with restless tribal dynamics, seen in between Saad and Faysal as it is the the Ikhwan rebellion and later mani- first instance of a move beyond the festations of such tensions such as the sons of Ibn Saud, to a different gener- seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. ation of rulers of the Saudi Kingdom. Yet as Madawi al-Rasheed suggests, This move brings a number of prom- this political project was not neces- inent princes into competition, as the sarily reflective of indigenous desires sons of previous Kings –and their or aspirations. Rather, she suggests sons– also have legitimate claims for that the establishment of Saudi Ara- the throne. bia was “a state imposed on people without a historical memory of unity To understand the emergence of or national heritage.”1 Yet this only Mohammed bin Salman as crown secured the territorial borders of the prince –and to consider the trajec- new state and in the years that fol- tory of Saudi Arabia more broadly– lowed, Ibn Saud embarked on the we must consider the Kingdom’s his- process of building a nation to reside torical past whilst placing its present within its borders. into socio-economic and geopoliti- cal context. As such, this article be- Unable to draw upon memories of gins by offering a brief outline of the shared history or to cultivate narra-

52 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

tives of collective identity that would serious challenges to the political rule ensure political unity and cohesion of the al-Saud, with greater claims in the manner outlined by Benedict to tribal legitimacy than the ruling Anderson, Ibn Saud was forced to tribe.8 find alternative ways to ensure the survival of his political project. One To circumvent such challenges, al- such technique was that of intertribal Saud drew upon the religious alli- marriage, where it is alleged that the ance with , which helped new ruler married into 30 different the construction and consolidation tribal families, immediately cultivat- of a Saudi nationality, in spite of the ing a large support base whilst also myriad challenges. Religion thus creating a large royal family, which served a prominent role in the fab- continues to pose political problems ric of the state, with the al-Saud de- to this day.2 This helped to secure a riving Islamic legitimacy from being large tribal support base that has been the ‘protectors of the two holy places’ retained through the use of tribal and espousing support for Islamic norms and customs within the polit- norms. Yet the use of Islamic rheto- ical structures of the modern Saudi ric to engender legitimacy serves as state. Such moves were not without a ‘double-edged sword’ whenever the consequence, resulting in the emer- norm is violated, leaving the ruling gence of an estimated 10,000 princes. regime open to criticism.9 Amidst The structure of succession in Saudi increased Westernization, tensions Arabia is patriarchal, yet passed from between tradition and modernity, old Ibn Saud to his eldest son, to the next and young, public and private, such eldest and so forth.3 King Salman, allegations10 became more prom- however, is one of the last remaining inent. The fusion of the tribe with sons of Ibn Saud,4 resulting in a move state was undertaken as a prominent to the next generation of Saudi rulers. tool of control within the formative At this point, an estimated 80 princes stages of the Kingdom, wherein dis- have a claim to the throne,5 revealing sent against the al-Saud was framed the extent of the political challenge as dissent against the state. With this facing MbS.6 in mind, forms of political dissent against the ruling elite were pushed Integral to the formation of Saudi to the margins and framed as being claims to legitimacy stem from the simultaneously against the state and fusion of the al-Saud family with the against God. Wahhabi ulama, drawing upon his- toric relationship between the two groups and providing the new Saudi The Rise of MbS and Challenges state with a degree of legitimacy not to the Kingdom found in their tribal lineage partic- ularly evident given the plethora of Previously occupying the office of tribal groups across the Arabian Pen- Minister of Defense –itself a promi- insula.7 Such tribal groupings posed nent portfolio in the Kingdom– MbS

2018 Sprıng 53 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

Amirs of cities, opinion leaders and religious men pledge allegiance to Mohammed bin Selman, while he sits between two religious leaders, after his father, King Salman, declared him as crown prince. BANDAR ALGALOUD / AA Photo

built his reputation through a bold appointed as special advisor to the foreign policy agenda designed to governor of Riyadh –his father– and restrict Iranian influence across the after Salman took the throne in 2015, region. There is little doubt that the Bin Salman was appointed defense crown prince is reform-minded, minister on January 23, 2015. On seeking to move the Kingdom away June 21, 2017 MbS was appointed to from its reliance upon the dual pillars the office of crown prince. of oil and Wahhabi faith. In doing so, however, he risks creating serious Described simultaneously as a re- schisms at the very heart of the Saudi former, hardliner, revolutionary, re- social contract. To understand such actionary, Machiavellian, a ‘prince desires, we must briefly consider the of chaos,’ and ‘a new Abdul Aziz’ it journey that MbS took to get to the is fair to say that there are a range office of crown prince. of different views of MbS and his political activities across Saudi Ara- Born in the summer of 1985 to Prin- bia.12 Supporters have framed him cess Fahda bint Fala bin Sultan al-Ha- as a hard-working, business-minded thleen, MbS received his education in leader keen to challenge corruption Riyadh before studying Law at King with a desire to modernize whilst Saud University. After graduating he avoiding the trappings of royalty. In began his career in the private sec- contrast, critics view him as pow- tor before becoming more involved er-hungry, a ‘young up-start,’ and in governmental work, taking a keen someone unaware of the dangers of interest in youth and business devel- reforming too much too fast.13 Such opment programs.11 In 2009, he was views are hardly surprising given the

54 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

speed of reform across the Kingdom since MbS was appointed as crown For some, the series of arrests prince. was seen as a positive move There is a general agreement that for the Saudi economy the Kingdom faces serious eco- and for the Kingdom as a nomic challenges stemming from the construction of the Saudi econ- whole. Yet for others, it was omy, dominated by the public sector a rampant display of power where bloated bureaucracies employ a large percentage of the workforce. from a crown prince wishing Indeed, the public sector has long to secure his position within been used as a mechanism to stave the al-Saud off domestic dissent as seen in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Although Saudi Arabia avoided large-scale protests seen by Demonstrating an awareness of the a number of other states across the deeper socio-economic concerns Middle East, King Abdullah offered within Saudi Arabia, stemming from a welfare package worth around $130 a number of concerns about the lon- billion that included a number of new gevity of oil supplies,17 an increas- jobs in the Ministry of Interior, infra- ingly large youth boom and high structural improvements and a rise in levels of public sector employment, the minimum wage.14 The economic MbS set out a vision to facilitate a package was supported by a number transformation to a ‘post-oil’ world, of token political reforms including referred to as Vision 2030. Central to allowing women to stand and vote in this vision was the idea of NEOM, the municipal elections.15 first carbon neutral city in the world, straddling Saudi Arabia, and Such challenges have been exacer- , designed to be the city of the bated by the rapid drop in oil prices, future. Requiring serious economic which hit the Saudi coffers dramati- investment, it was designed to be at cally, quickly wiping out a sizeable the forefront of the Kingdom’s eco- portion of the Kingdom’s capital re- nomic and social innovations, al- serves. The ability to placate domestic though the relationship with poorer unrest through vast economic hand- parts of the Saudi population is yet to outs appears unsustainable. Amidst be fully explored. NEOM also pos- such challenges, dissent across the sesses territorial innovation, strad- Kingdom is rapidly growing, leading dling Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian to calls for political reform, an end to borders. corruption and demands for a writ- ten constitution, particularly from The following statement reveals a Shia groups based in the Eastern great deal about relations between Province.16 Saudi Arabia and its neighbors:

2018 Sprıng 55 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

The sovereign laws will be within the same time, MbS was Head of the framework of the Saudi law, like de- Royal Court and Defense Minister, fense, national security, counter ter- pushing for the Kingdom to accept rorism and similar threats. Foreign economic reforms that would include policy. [sic] These things will be re- budget cuts, reductions in salaries, tained at the Saudi government lev- and general implementation of aus- els. But commercial rules and others terity measures following the drop will be under NEOM itself. They will in oil prices that resulted in serious be given the right to regulate all of depletion of Saudi Arabia’s currency these details in a way that serves the reserves. The anger that many felt was purposes of objectives of NEOM.18 palpable. Writing in Open Democ- racy, Alain Gabon referred to MbS as This suggests that the security of the region’s “biggest threat to peace, NEOM will be run in line with Saudi stability and hope for democratiza- Arabia’s defense and security policy, tion.” Gabon later revealed collusion yet beyond this the new development between MbS and the former owner will be autonomous, demonstrat- of the to avoid paying around ing the dominance of Saudi Arabia 84 million euros in tax. across the area. In addition to such economic innovation, MbS also Yet such reforms face challenges not sought to open the Kingdom’s bor- only from those opposed to change ders to tourism. In a similar vein, he but also from the seemingly endemic also lifted a 35-year ban on cinemas corruption across the Kingdom. and began to work towards creat- Within a year of accepting the role of ing different forms of entertainment crown prince, MbS ordered a series across the Kingdom. of arrests designed as a crackdown on corruption that resulted in 11 The Saudi Kingdom is often described well-known princes being detained – as a patrimonial regime, where net- including the Kingdom’s richest man, works of patronage exert influence Prince Waleed bin Talal– along with across bureaucratic and institutional around 200 prominent businessmen landscapes. When coupled with the and ex-ministers.20 A video that was tribal history of the state, it is easy to shared on social media revealed the see how such a fabric is created and prince saying: “ assure you anyone maintained as a mechanism of con- involved in corruption will not be trol. Such conditions mean that those spared, whether he is a prince or a who exert power often have huge fi- minister or anyone.” Although well nancial resources and MbS is no dif- received by some,21 as a number of ferent. In the summer of 2015, Bin analysts are quick to point out, the Salman purchased the luxury yacht crown prince has not declared his the Serene for around $500 million19 family’s own financial records, nor less than a year after he purchased has he explained the 1.1 trillion ri- another yacht now known as Pega- yals (an estimated $250 billion) that sus VII for a paltry $120 million. At has allegedly gone missing under his

56 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

father’s rule.22 The threat posed by en- demic corruption was described by The Kingdom’s recent foreign one Saudi official as policy can be understood at every level, and there are hun- by considering two close dreds of billions of riyals that are friendships: the first with lost from economy every year […] The point here was Mohammed bin Zayed, the de mainly to shock the system, to send facto ruler and crown prince of a message that this will not be tol- erated anymore and that nobody is the , and immune.23 the second with U.S. President, For some, the series of arrests was seen as a positive move for the Saudi economy and for the Kingdom as a whole. Yet for others, it was a ram- try, and reigned in the powers of the pant display of power from a crown religious police.”25 In interviews of prince wishing to secure his position my own, a number of Saudis spoke of within the al-Saud. In an interview efforts to develop a tourism industry for a BBC series on the House of based on the restoration of a num- Saud, Madawi al-Rasheed, a staunch ber of UNESCO recognized heritage critic of the ruling described sites, including the development of the crackdown as a “theatrical per- luxury hotels across the region.26 Yet formance,” as much for external au- such moves may prove controversial, diences as for domestic actors as the challenging the very foundations of crown prince consolidates power. In the Saudi state by opening the ‘Land addition, more than 20 influential of the Two Holy Places’ up to people clerics and intellectuals were arrested of all faiths and, perhaps more im- on suspicion of espionage and having portantly, stressing the importance of links with the pre-Islamic history. and, by extension, .24 The crown prince announced a de- As Robert Mason recounts, such sire to move the Kingdom towards events were just the beginning: a ‘more tolerant’ form of , de- “Sheikh Saud Al-Mojeb, the attor- claring an intention to crack down ney general, stated that the deten- on members of the ulama who op- tions were “merely the start of a vital posed his reform agenda. This was process to root out corruption,” he supported by anti-terror legislation sought to float 5 percent of the Saudi designed to fulfill the crown prince’s Aramco shares (dubbed the biggest agenda of destroying extremist ide- IPO in history), allowed women to ologies through regulation of myr- drive, tolerated the reopening of cin- iad forms of expression.27 The need emas, has plans for a tourism indus- to eradicate such groups and prevent

2018 Sprıng 57 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

Saudi Arabia took on a counter-revo- The two states have conflicting lutionary role to prevent increases in Iranian power across the region. With views of the construction of the appointment of MbS as the crown regional security, with Saudi prince, this pro-active foreign policy Arabia reliant upon the U.S. has increased. The Kingdom’s recent foreign policy can be understood as a military guarantor, whilst by considering two close friend- holding that its history ships: the first with Mohammed bin Zayed,28 the de facto ruler and crown and power leave it uniquely prince of the United Arab Emirates, qualified to ensure control and the second with U.S. President, Donald Trump.

Whilst Bin Zayed certainly exerts a the financial support for them is thus great deal of influence, the most pow- a central part of MbS’ modernization erful friend of MbS is in Washington. strategy, essential not only to ensure The first official trip made by Presi- domestic stability, but also the con- dent Trump was to Riyadh, demon- tinued support of foreign allies. Be- strating not only the importance of yond the borders of the Kingdom, U.S.-Saudi relations –which had been MbS established an anti-terrorism rocky during the Obama presidency– coalition, comprised of Sunni states, but also the personal relationship be- designed to vanquish terrorism from tween Trump and MbS. Closing the the region and to secure state sover- triangle was a strong relationship be- eignty. Domestically the move was tween Bin Zayed and Trump, which largely well received by young Saudis, saw the two visit Riyadh in the Spring many of whom were encouraged by of 2017, an event organized by the the efforts of the young prince. –not the State Depart- ment– in a breach of the diplomatic protocol.29 The Prince and Regional Dynamics This triumvirate reveals the impor- tance of personalities and individu- Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has long als within the contemporary Middle been driven by a desire to restrict East. Whilst the Obama presidency Shia influence across the region, for was met with a trepidation across the regional and domestic calculations. region, Trump’s ‘interactional’ presi- In doing so, the Kingdom is able to dency was well received by the likes restrict Iranian influence whilst pre- of Bin Zayed and MbS who were able venting the empowerment of Shia to strike up good relationships with groups within Saudi Arabia. In the someone who understood the im- aftermath of the Arab Uprisings this portance of the personal nature of policy became more prominent as regional politics.

58 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

During the Future Investment Initiative In a book written by a Trump re- ances in Abu Dhabi and Washington conference gime insider, it was reported that the providing logistical and diplomatic held in Riyadh, President remarked that “We’ve put support in a number of arenas. Un- MbS pledged a moderate Islam our man on top,” after King Salman’s der MbS, Saudi foreign policy can be and an open decision to replace Mohammed bin understood through analysis of two Saudi Arabia. 30 Nayef as crown prince. The decision strands of thought: (i) to reduce Ira- FAYEZ NURELDINE / prompted vocal support from the nian influence across the Middle East AFP / Getty Images Trump Administration for the father and Islamic world, and (ii) to secure and son team. On one occasion, he Saudi Arabia’s position as hegemonic tweeted “I have great confidence in actor within the GCC. King Salman and the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly To many in Riyadh and across the what they are doing…”31 demonstrat- Arab part of the Gulf, Iran has long ing support for the Kingdom’s an- been seen as the bête noir of Middle ti-corruption drive. Such friendships Eastern affairs. Since the revolution have proved essential for Riyadh to of 1979 and the establishment of the construct its foreign policy, with alli- Islamic Republic, competition to de-

2018 Sprıng 59 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

rive legitimacy from Islam has been In Lebanon, the rivalry is largely an arena of existential importance for played out through the use of prox- Saudi Arabia. After the U.S.-led inva- ies, such as the March 8 and March sion of in 2003 and the removal of 14 alliances and the construction of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party networks of economic interest that from power, Iran and Saudi Arabia predominantly –although not ex- have become increasingly involved clusively– revolve around sectarian in a geopolitical struggle to shape interests.35 Perhaps the most obvi- the nature of the region, harnessing ous example of the influence of MbS sectarian divisions for geopolitical on the Lebanese arena concerns the purposes as a means of exerting in- treatment of the Lebanese Prime fluence in Iraq and Lebanon.32 Insta- Minister, . Hariri, a long bility stemming from the Arab Up- time Saudi ally was summoned to the risings escalated tensions in Bahrain, royal palace at 8:30 AM on the second and , providing scope for morning of a trip to the Kingdom that Riyadh and Tehran to compete for re- was designed as a means of counter- gional hegemony. The two states have ing Iranian influence. Upon his ar- conflicting views of the construction rival at the palace, Hariri was stripped of regional security, with Saudi Ara- of his cell phone and given a pre-writ- bia reliant upon the U.S. as a military ten speech to announce his resig- guarantor, whilst Iran holding that its nation, before being placed under history and power leave it uniquely house arrest. Although the motives qualified to ensure control; indeed, behind such action remain unclear, it Iran is calling for a Regional Dialogue is largely accepted that the speech was Forum to shape security calculations written as a consequence of Riyadh’s across the . increasing concerns at Hariri’s inabil- ity to stand up to Hezbollah and, by Anti-Iranian sentiment increased un- extension, Iran.36 Yet after a spate of der MbS as he sought to prevent fur- diplomatic efforts, Hariri was allowed ther Iranian influence across the re- to return to Beirut, whereupon his gion amidst suggestions of the estab- resignation was rescinded and his lishment of an “Iranian land bridge” popularity –along with that of Hez- from Tehran to the Mediterranean bollah– has increased. Established in Sea.33 Containment efforts particu- 1982 with Iranian support, Hezbollah larly played out in Lebanon and Ye- (Party of God) serves as an integral men, although it should be stressed part of Iranian foreign policy across that competition continued in Iraq the Levant, providing scope to counter and Syria, whilst Bahrain was largely threats from , but also with the closed off to Iranian activity.34 Whilst ability to shape events in neighboring Lebanon and Yemen are two very dif- states.37 Understanding the impor- ferent arenas of competition between tance of Hezbollah to Tehran helps to Saudi Arabia and Iran, in both cases understand the importance of Syria, Saudi foreign policy has struggled to which serves as a means of providing achieve its goals. support to Hezbollah. Of course, the

60 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

extent to which Iran wields influence over Hezbollah is contested, partic- The complexity of the ularly after the 2006 war with Israel, allegedly undertaken without a ‘green situation in Yemen resulted light’ from Tehran.38 in fluid alliances around –yet not defined by– religious In Yemen, the Kingdom’s military ex- cursion was designed to prevent the identities, where long- emergence of what was seen to be an standing rivals sometimes Iranian ‘client state’ on the southern border of Saudi Arabia. Whilst De- found themselves working fense Minister, MbS launched Op- towards the same goals across eration Decisive Storm, designed short periods of time to crush Houthi rebels who were perceived to be receiving military support from Iran. U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks rejected graphic organization of Yemen has this claim in the mid-2000s, yet such resulted in devastating loss of life and assertions have become generally ac- damage to the infrastructure of the cepted in the international commu- state. With it has brought allegations nity. Saudi allegations are also shared of war crimes against Saudi Arabia.41 by analysts in Yemen, who date Ira- Although this military action was nian penetration of Yemen back to initially supported by the U.S., as ci- around 2007 –some 30 years after vilian deaths surge, the pressure to Saudi intervention– yet there is a curtail military action has increased. great deal of suspicion that in spite of Yet, prior to peace talks beginning, Iranian penetration, it is Saudi Arabia many expect Saudi Arabia to meet its that will be left to facilitate the even- military targets and change ‘facts on tual rebuilding process.39 Drawing on the ground’ to strengthen their nego- the close friendship with Bin Zayed, tiating position;42 for the time being, MbS was able to call on Emirati sup- Riyadh struggles to exert its desired port for Saudi military action, along level of impact. with Egypt, Bahrain, and Qatar, al- though Doha’s expulsion from the In addition to Iranian belligerence, Saudi-led coalition reflected escalat- the second dimension of Saudi for- ing tensions between the two.40 eign policy concerned Qatar, which was framed as a sponsor of terror- The complexity of the situation in ism, a supporter of Islamist groups Yemen resulted in fluid alliances and framed as guilty of an apparent around –yet not defined by– religious rapprochement with Iran beyond the identities, where long-standing rivals existence of the shared South Pars gas sometimes found themselves work- field. Events in Syria in the previous ing towards the same goals across years had caused trepidation stem- short periods of time. Yet the demo- ming from Doha’s efforts to coordi-

2018 Sprıng 61 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

Crown Prince MbS, announces his economic reform plan known as Vision 2030 with a press conference. FAYEZ NURELDINE / AFP / Getty Images

nate the anti-Assad campaign and form. Support for the Brotherhood desire to channel funding through in Egypt after the toppling of Hosni its networks.43 Though ultimately un- Mubarak was a source of great con- successful, the attempt to circumvent, cern for many in Saudi Arabia and or perhaps challenge, Saudi leader- the UAE, whose views of the Ikhwan ship across the region was a cause of were shaped by political concerns. concern to many in Riyadh. Moreover, the international cover- age of events in Egypt –in a positive A secondary area of concern was the light– and across the region more continued support to Islamist groups critically, by the Qatari owned Al Ja- across the region, such as the Mus- zeera served as a mouthpiece for Do- lim Brotherhood and Hamas, who ha’s foreign policy.45 are viewed with suspicion by Saudi Arabia and the UAE since the Gulf On June 5, 2017, ambassadors from War and, particularly after the Arab Saudi Arabia and its allies Bahrain, Uprisings.44 Doha had been home UAE and Egypt were withdrawn from to Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Qatar and their citizens were ordered Hamas, for a number of years and to leave the country. In addition, the Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an influential countries gave Qatari citizens 14 days Egyptian theologian was also based to return home. Land and sea bor- there. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the ders were closed and Saudi and Emi- Brotherhood was seen as a threat to rati flights to Doha were canceled. the stability and legitimacy of closed Similar events had occurred in 2014, political systems and demand for re- where ambassadors were once more

62 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

withdrawn, only to return in time for the 35th summit Meeting of the GCC Rapid change away from in Qatar in early December.46 In an effort to normalize relations, a list conservative values of Islam, of demands was issued by the Sau- tribe and tradition could prove di-led bloc, demanding a heavy price deeply unsettling for Saudi for resetting relations, including the closure of ,47 albeit coming Arabia from an actor that sought to breach the other’s sovereignty. economic investment, and agree- In response, those visiting Doha in ments over food supplies52 highlight- the summer of 2017 would see the ing the realignment of actors across face of Emir Tamim looking down the Sunni world, distinct from Ri- over the city, from the sides of multi- yadh and, in turn, creating a number story buildings, to the back windows of challenges that could emerge in the of taxis, as a newfound Qatari nation- coming years. alist sentiment emerged in response to perceived Saudi aggression. Yet such action was not taken alone. In- Be Wary of the Winds of Change stead, on his visit to Riyadh in the spring of 2017, it is suggested that There is little doubt that Saudi Ara- Trump gave Riyadh the green light to bia is at a point of existential trans- act against Qatar, 48 later tweeting that formation. Facing serious economic “During my recent trip to the Middle crises, growing calls for political re- East I stated that there can no lon- form and seemingly endemic corrup- ger be funding of Radical Ideology. tion, MbS faces a number of serious Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!”49 domestic challenges. Yet, his moves Trump later tweeted: “So good to see are increasingly popular across the the Saudi Arabia visit with the King Kingdom as a growing number of and 50 countries already paying off. Saudis support his reform efforts. They said they would take a hard line Perhaps the most important aspect of on funding…50 …extremism, and all recent events is speed. Whilst MbS is reference was pointing to Qatar. Per- in his early 30s and speed is not seen haps this will be the beginning of the as an obstacle, the social fabric of the end to the horror of terrorism!”51 Saudi state is far more conservative and characterized by bureaucratic It is hardly surprising that the block- and theological inertia. Rapid change ade of Qatar went some way to alter- away from conservative values of Is- ing the construction of regional secu- lam, tribe and tradition could prove rity, as ties between Turkey and Qatar deeply unsettling for Saudi Arabia. became much stronger. Within this How the crown prince deals with relationship, a number of areas were these domestic challenges will be re- strengthened, including military ties, vealing, particularly if –as expected–

2018 Sprıng 63 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

he is appointed King in the not too 8. For more on this see, Madawi al-Rasheed and Loulouwa al-Rasheed, “The Politics of Encapsu- distant future. lation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 Yet, it is in the realm of foreign policy (1996). that the bigger concerns are revealed. 9. Al-Rasheed and al-Rasheed, “The Politics of The continuation of conflict in Yemen Encapsulation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition”; al-Rasheed, A History of with a catastrophic impact on the Saudi Arabia, p. 144. country will have serious repercus- 10. Joseph Kostiner, “State, Islam and Opposition sions, in perceptions of the Kingdom in Saudi Arabia, The Post Desert Storm Phase,” if nothing else. Whilst previous fail- Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, ures to address regional challenges, No. 2 (1997), retrieved from, http://meria.idc.ac.il/ such as the Yemen conflict, have JOURNAL/1997/ issue2/jv1n2a8.html. cost prominent princes key political 11. “Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Sal- man,” Al Jazeera, (December, 14, 2017), retrieved portfolios, it is hardly likely that MbS from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea- will be removed from the post. Af- tures/2017/06/profile-saudi-crown-prince-mo­ - ter all, after the spate of arrests that hammed-bin-salman-170621130040539.html. decimated the upper echelons of the 12. See, Marko Langer, “Saudi Arabia’s Moham- al-Saud, there are few people left to med bin Salman: Reformer and Hard-liner,” Deutsche Welle, (November 5, 2017), retrieved challenge him. from http://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabias-mo- hammed-bin-salman-reformer-and-hard-lin- er/a-40714307; David Hearst, “Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Prince of Chaos,” Huffing- Endnotes ton Post, (November 15, 2017), retrieved from 1. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mo- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) hammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabias-prince-of- p. 3. chaos_us_594acf7ee4b092ed90588b3c; Patrick Cockburn, “Mohammed bin Salman’s Ill-advised 2. Darryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Ventures Have Weakened Saudi Arabia’s Position Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform, (Lon- in the World,” , (December 15, don: C. Hurst & Co., 2003), p. 68. It is also believed 2017), retrieved from http://www.independent. that Ibn Saud had 45 legitimate sons. The number co.uk/voices/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-ara- of daughters was not counted. See also: Harry St. bia-patrick-cockburn-qatar-lebanon-a8112426. J. Philby, The Heart of Arabia, (: Constable html; and Hussein Ibish, “The Saudi Crown and Company, 1922). Prince Is Gambling Everything on Three Major 3. The Basic Law of Governance, Royal Embassy Experiments,” , (November 7, 2017), of Saudi Arabia, retrieved from http://www. retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/ saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/ international/archive/2017/11/the-saudi-crown- laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx prince-is-risking-everything-on-three-major-ex- periments/545240/. 4. Along with Muqrin, a former crown prince, and Ahmad. 13. Mark Mazzetti and Ben Hubbard, “Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition,” 5. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guard- New York Times, (October 15, 2016), retrieved ing the Desert Kingdom, (Oxford: Westview Press, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/ 1997), p. 26. world/rise-of-saudi-prince-shatters-decades-of- 6. Donald Trump, , 11:03 PM, (Novem- royal-tradition.html. ber 7, 2017) retrieved from, https://twitter.com/ 14. Steffen Hertg, “The Cost of the Counter Rev- realDonaldTrump/status/927672843504177152. olution in the GCC,” Foreign Policy, (May 31, 7. Joseph Nevo, “Religion and National Identity in 2011), retrieved from http://mideast.foreign Saudi Arabia,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 policy.com/posts/2011/05/31/the_costs_ (1998), p. 34. of_counter_revolution_in_the_gcc.

64 Insight Turkey IT’S A FAMILY AFFAIR: RELIGION, GEOPOLITICS AND THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

15. Caryle Murphy, “GCC to Set Up $20bn Bailout ule=RelatedCoverage®ion=Marginalia&pg- Fund for Bahrain and Oman,” The National, (March type=article. 11, 2011), retrieved from http://www.thenational. 24. “Saudi Arabia ‘Arrests Clerics in Crackdown on ae/news/world/middle-east/gcc-to-set-up-20bn- Dissent,’” BBC News, (September 13, 2017), re- bail- out-fund-for-bahrain-and-oman. trieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 16. See, for example, the work of Toby Matthiesen, middle-east-41260543. The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism, 25. Robert Mason, “Winds of Change in Riyadh,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); The Cairo Review, (November 13, 2017), re- Madawi al-Rasheed, Muted Modernists: The Strug- trieved from https://www.thecairoreview.com/ gle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia, (London: tahrir-forum/winds-of-change-in-riyadh/. Hurst, 2015) and Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Gener- 26. See, “Why Exhibit at the Hotel Show Saudi Ara­ ation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, bia,” The Hotel Show Saudi Arabia, retrieved from 2006). https://www.thehotelshowsaudiarabia.com/ exhibitor/why-exhibit-at-the-hotel-show-saudi- 17. Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureau- arabia/. crats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 27. Sam Meredith, “Saudi Arabia Promises a Re- turn to ‘Moderate Islam,’” CNBC, (October 25, 18. Vivian Nereime and Alaa Shahine, “Saudi Ara- 2017), retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/ bia Crown Prince Details Plans for New City: Tran- 2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-promises-a-return-to- script,” Bloomberg Politics, (October 26, 2017), re- moderate-islam.html. trieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-10-26/saudi-arabia-crown-prince- 28. Declan Walsh, “Qatar Goes Its Own Way and details-plans-for-new-city-transcript. Pays for It,” , (January 22, 2017), retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/ 19. Amando Flavio, “Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince 2018/01/22/world/middleeast/qatar-sau- Buys a $550 Million Yacht Despite Implementing di-emir-boycott.html. Financial Austerity,” ANONHQ.com, (October 20, 2016), retrieved from http://anonhq.com/saudi- 29. Eliza Mackintosh, “How Trump’s First Foreign arabias-crown-prince-buys-550-million-yacht-in- Trip Compares with Past Presidents,” CNN, (May stantly-despite-implementing-austerity/. 20, 2017), retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/ 2017/05/19/world/donald-trump-first-foreign- 20. Krishnadev Calamur, “Saudi Arabia’s Very presidential-trips/index.html. Public, Very Risky Palace Intrigue,” The Atlantic, (November 5, 2017), retrieved from https://www. 30. Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/ White House, (London: Little Brown, 2018). saudi-arrests/545015/. 31. Donald Trump, Twitter 11:03 PM, (November 7, 21. Thomas L. Friedman, “Saudi Arabia’s Arab 2017). Spring, at Last,” The New York Times, (November 32. See, Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: 23, 2017), retrieved from https://www.nytimes. Power and Rivalry in the Middle East, (London: I.B. com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-ar- Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2015). ab-spring.html. 33. Martin Chulov, “Amid Syrian Chaos, Iran’s 22. Ali Waked, “Saudi Economist Publishes Contro- Game Plan Emerges: A Path to the Mediterra- versial Study Claiming $293 Billion Disappeared nean,” , (October 6, 2016), retrieved From State Budget,” Breitbart, (November 12, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ 2016), retrieved from http://www.breitbart.com/ oct/08/iran-iraq-syria-isis-land-corridor. jerusalem/2016/11/12/saudi-economist-publish- 34. Simon Mabon, “The End of the Battle of Bah- es-controversial-study-claiming-250bn-disap- rain” Middle East Journal, (Forthcoming). peared-state-budget/. 35. See, post rebuilding in Dahiya, 2016. 23. Ben Hubbard and David D. Kirkpatrick, “The Upstart Saudi Prince Who’s Throwing Caution 36. Anne Barnard and Maria Abi-Habib, “Why to the Winds,” The New York Times, (November Saad Hariri Had that Strange Sojourn in Saudi 14, 2017), retrieved from https://www.nytimes. Arabia,” The New York Times, (December 24, 2017), com/2017/11/14/world/middleeast/saudi-ara- retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ bia-mohammed-bin-salman.html?action=- 12/24/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-saad-hari- click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&mod- ri-mohammed-bin-salman-lebanon.html.

2018 Sprıng 65 COMMENTARY SIMON MABON

37. See, James Worrall, Simon Mabon and Gordon 43. Christopher Philips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stom- Club, Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance to Govern- achs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria,” ment, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015). For in-depth Middle East Policy, Vol. 24, No.1 (Spring 2017), pp. discussion about the relationship between Iran 36-47. and Hezbollah see chapters 5 and 6. 44. Stéphane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim 38. Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Brotherhood Predicament,” in The Qatar Crisis, Rivalry in the Middle East. (Washington D.C.: The Project on Middle East Political Science, 2017), retrieved from https:// 39. Interview with analysts based in Yemen, 2018. pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ 40. Many in Oman have been critical of the “Ye- POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf#page=52. men adventure,” including Sultan Qaboos, who are concerned about the destabilizing impact of 45. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar: The Gulf’s the conflict upon the region, alongside the cata- Problem Child,” The Atlantic, (June 5, 2017), strophic humanitarian consequences. Oman has retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/ been free of violence since the Dhofar Rebellion international/archive/2017/06/qatar-gcc-saudi- and has explicitly stated its vision as a nation of arabia-yemen-bahrain/529227/. peace. See, Giorgio Cafiero and Theodore Karasik, 46. Phillip Walter Wellman, “3 Gulf States With- “Yemen War and Qatar Crisis Challenge Oman’s draw Ambassadors from Qatar,” VOANews, (March Neutrality,” Middle East Institute, (July 6, 2017), 5, 2014), retrieved from https://www.voanews. retrieved from http://www.mei.edu/content/ com/a/saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-withdraw-am- article/oman-s-high-stakes-yemen. bassadors-from-qatar/1864426.html. 41. See amongst others, Lynn Maalouf, “Yemen: 47. Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi, “Qatar May Have to The Forgotten War,” Amnesty International, re- Pay Heavy Price to Restore Links to Gulf Neigh- trieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/lat- bours,” Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi, (June 5, 2017) re- est/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/; trieved from http://sultanalqassemi.com/articles/ Rasha Mohamed, and Rawan Shaif, “Saudi Ara- qatar-may-have-to-pay-heavy-price-to-restore- bia Is Committing War Crimes in Yemen,” Foreign links-to-gulf-neighbours/. Policy, (March 25, 2016), retrieved from http:// 48. Juan Cole, “Trump Engineered Saudi Soft foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/25/civilian-casual- Coup, Attack on Qatar, to Save Self,” Juan Cole, ties-war-crimes-saudi-arabia-yemen-war/; Nicho- (January 7, 2017), retrieved from https://www. las Kristof, “The Photos the U.S. and Saudi Arabia juancole.com/2018/01/trump-engineered-at- Don’t Want You to See,” The New York Times, (Au- tack.html. gust 29, 2017), retrieved from https://www.ny- times.com/interactive/2017/08/31/opinion/col- 49. Donald Trump, Twitter, 3:06 PM, June 6, 2017, umnists/yemen--cholera.html; and Steph- retrieved from https://twitter.com/realDonald anie Nebehay, “Yemen: UN Agrees to Investigate Trump/status/872062159789985792. Alleged War Crimes amid Conflict between Saudi 50. Donald Trump, Twitter, 4:36 PM, June 6, 2017, Arabia-led Coalition and Rebels,” Independent, retrieved from https://twitter.com/realDonald (September 29, 2017), retrieved rom http://www. Trump/status/872084870620520448. independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ yemen-saudi-arabia-war-crimes-un-investiga- 51. Donald Trump, Twitter, 4:44 PM, June 6, 2017, tion-houthi-rebels-latest-a7974541.html. retrieved from https://twitter.com/realDonald Trump/status/872086906804240384. 42. “Caution Gives Way to Increasingly Assertive Policies in Saudi Arabia, but to What End?” 52. “Turkey and Qatar: Behind the Strategic Alli- Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, ance,” Al Jazeera, (February 1, 2018), retrieved from (November 26, 2017), retrieved from http:// http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/tur- jmepp.hkspublications.org/2016/11/25/saudi- key-qatar-strategic-alliance-171024133518768. arabia-assertive-foreign-policy/. html.

66 Insight Turkey