Interpretation of the Rise of the Crown Prince

Home , Al Maktoum, King Saud University, Mohammed Bin Salman, Muhammad bin Nayef

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory BereketDaireleri Teorisi bağlamındaaçıklamayı hedefl Madkhali Salafism, Egypt, geopolitics Barakah CircleTheory explain Riyadh’sr Beytülmakdis,Kudüs, BAE, Medhali Selefilik, Mısır, jeopolitik KELİMELER: ANAHTAR KEYWORDS promoting Muhammad binSalman. foreign policy in recent years, especially under the rule of the Crown Prince A ouu nmi i rl yaatdr B çlşa Rydı sn dönemde son Riyad’ın çalışma, Batı politikayı, Bu dış izlediği oynamaktadır. dış rol Suudi bir önemli bağlamda, boyutu Bu sonucudur. konum bir politikasının dengelerinin ve güç bölgesel ölçüde uluslararası büyük çıkması, ortaya Riyad’ın olarak adımlar. merkezi güç dönük bir etmeye bölgesel teşvik Selefiliği Medhali ölçeğinde Doğu tesi işbirliği yakın daha normalleştirme ile Mısır da ve BAE ilişkileri daha girişimleri, müttefiklerinin siyasi bölgedeki İsrail’le ve şeytanlaştırılması/ötekileştirilmesi, İran’ın artması, bağımlılığın ABD’ye an dönemin yeni izlemeye Bu politika başladı. dış bir iddialı ve aktif yıllarda son ardından,gelmesinin ÖZ: plays politics. In thisrespect, powernew centre significantly relieson regionaland international power the its regional allies as BSTRACT: :

didate an an SuudiArabistan, özellikle VeliahtPrens Muhammed Bin Selman’ıngöreve establish MUHAMMAD SALMAN BIN AND SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY

a increasing dependence on the US INTERPRETATION THE OF RISE THE OF CROWN PRINCE

Veliaht Prens Muhammed Bin Selman ve Suudi Dış Politikası , Middle East Studies, Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBU), Turkey, (ASBU), Ankara of University Sciences Social Studies, East , Middle crucial role in examining of of : Beytülmakdis Bereket Daireleri Saudi ArabiaSaudi has begun to pursue an active and ambitious ment Saudi Arabia, Muhammadbin Salman, Islamicjerusalem, UAE, . Madkhali Salafism in the Middle East. Riyadh’semergen

ACCORDING TO THE CIRCLE BARAKAH THEORY ; greater ;

ecentpolicy foreign movescontext within the theof of of nn eilneid Ot Dğ systnn jeopolitik siyasetinin Doğu Orta belirlenmesinde unun Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies as as closer coo the geopolitical dimension of a non The main main The

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peration withthe UAE and Egypt; parameters thisof new era may stated be the .

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165 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 166 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) Abd al Abd Barakah Circle Theory is new a geopolitical theory founded and developed by THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY geopolitical framework. Salman the Saudi and policy, foreign according toBarakah the Circle Theory as a Eastern conflicts, focusing on the rise o regionalthe developments. This triesarticle to analyse and interpret the Middle while ignored examining generally is dimension of geopolitical analysis However, pol of terms in region the of post the once again on the focus of the international community. In particular, analysis of politics the in Middle ElEast. El Iraq, (Hijaz), Saudi Arabia Egypt, Libya, involves third circles should be liberated, then they would lead the liberation of alone, v) in orderto liberate Palestinian people does not have adequate capacity to save Muslim peoples, iii) the security of Egypt and Syria is interdependent, iv) is the powercentre of the Arab of which al of which urban settlement, but regiona includes which several villages, towns, cities, and The The INTRODUCTION ‘surrounded with central role to Islam historical Syria ( Maqdis SAUDI ARABIASAUDI homelands (particularly Madinah Yemen)and (David, In 2018). addition, towards the Arabian Peninsula and describe the land as one of the oldest Jewish re historical and these two cities have close connections with Islamicjerusalem in terms of reflects the power politics of the region the of politics power the reflects core ofcore regarding significanta position accordin Syriaand within the powerpolitics equations of region, the the country still has Although theory does not give a central role to Saudi Arabia compared to Egypt Saudi Arabia Mehmet AkifKOÇ - Awaisi (2007: 23 (2007: Awaisi “ The f The The holiest cities of Islam, Makkah and Madinah are part of Saudi Arabia and Middle East Middle - .

Fattah Bayt al - 2011 Arab Uprisings era attracts increasing attention to re due irst circle,irst Bayt al Bayt - Aqsa Mosque is the centre. (Hijaz) W - E

Maqdis l - - Bilad Maqdis ” ITHIN THE C ligious understanding. Israeli scholars reveal theirinterest Awaisi, professor of international relations, based on power on based relations, international of professor Awaisi, Barakah’ - , as one of the most controversial and conflicting regions, is is regions, and conflicting controversial the most of one , as es the summaris main27) predictions of his theory as; i) Egypt is located in the second thirdand circles of Barakah Circles. Bayt al Bayt icjerusalem which is praised in Qur’an by its feature of ’ al .

- geography. In theory, three circles surrounding Sham), Eastern Egypt and Cyprus. T 1

- and he determines the Maqdis or or Maqdis Bayt al Bayt itical, economic, cultural and security parameters. ONTEXT THEOF BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY g to theory and primarily affects the developments - Awaisi (2007: 23 (2007: Awaisi

world, ii) Turkey is the powercentre of East - Maqdis

Islamicjerusalem is not acity oranother .

f the Crown Muhammadbin Prince the f The s The , initially th initially , - 24; Abu 24; w econd econd circle mainly consists of estern Iran along with Turkey. mosque mosque e peoples of second and second of peoples e - Munshar, 2013) gives a gives 2013) Munshar,

as the the as al Bayt al he t he - Aqsa Mosque Aqsa ‘core of the the of ‘core hird circle -

- shaping shaping Bayt al

Maqdis

homelands (particularly Madinah Yemen)and (David, In 2018). addition, towards the Arabian Peninsula and describe the land as one of the oldest Jewish re historical and these two cities have close connections with Islamicjerusalem in terms of regarding significanta position accordin Syriaand within the powerpolitics equations of region, the the country still has Although theory does not give a central role to Saudi Arabia compared to Egypt Saudi Arabia ARABIASAUDI Maqdis third circles should be liberated, then they would lead the liberation of alone, v) in orderto liberate Palestinian people does not have adequate capacity to save Muslim peoples, iii) the security of Egypt and Syria is interdependent, iv) is the powercentre of the Arab El Iraq, (Hijaz), Saudi Arabia Egypt, Libya, involves historical Syria ( al of which urban settlement, but regiona includes which several villages, towns, cities, and region the of politics power the reflects ofcore ‘surrounded with central role to Islam politics the in Middle ElEast. al Abd Barakah Circle Theory is new a geopolitical theory founded and developed by THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY geopolitical framework. Salman the Saudi and policy, foreign according toBarakah the Circle Theory as a Eastern conflicts, focusing on the rise o regionalthe developments. This triesarticle to analyse and interpret the Middle while ignored examining generally is dimension of geopolitical analysis However, pol of terms in region the of post the once again on the focus of the international community. In particular, analysis of The INTRODUCTION - Awaisi (2007: 23 (2007: Awaisi “ The holiest cities of Islam, Makkah and Madinah are part of Saudi Arabia and f The Middle East Middle - .

Fattah Bayt al - 2011 Arab Uprisings era attracts increasing attention to re due irst circle,irst Bayt al Bayt - Aqsa Mosque is the centre. (Hijaz) W - E

Maqdis l - Bilad - Maqdis ” ITHIN THE ligious understanding. Israeli scholars reveal theirinterest Awaisi, professor of international relations, based on power on based relations, international of professor Awaisi, Barakah’ - , as one of the most controversial and conflicting regions, is is regions, and conflicting controversial the most of one , as 27) summaris 27) is located in the second thirdand circles of Barakah Circles. Bayt al Bayt icjerusalem which is praised in Qur’an by its feature of ’ al .

geography. - In theory, three circles surrounding Sham), Eastern Egypt and Cyprus. T 1

- and he determines the Maqdis or or Maqdis C Bayt al Bayt g to theory and primarily affects the developments ONTEXT THEOF BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY itical, economic, cultural and security parameters. - Awaisi (2007: 23 (2007: Awaisi es the main predictions of his theory as; i) Egypt

world, ii) Turkey is the powercentre of East - Maqdis

Islamicjerusalem is not acity oranother .

as the the as al Bayt al he t he - Aqsa Mosque Aqsa ‘core of the the of ‘core hird circle -

- shaping shaping Bayt al

Maqdis

of founder, Abdul the extremely unusual and is still confusing. Transferof royal powerfrom the sons insystem orderto pave the way for a young inexperiencedand prince was position, does not astonish anyone. Howeve into consideration, fighting for recently; on the otherhand, news o news extraordinary and ambitious move was labelled as ‘palace coup’ by international prince in favourof his son in June 2017 and placed him under house arrest. This second turning point, King Salman replaced Muhammad bin Nay Abdul grandfather. In 20 Princess Fahda bint Falah is from Ajman the tribe, whoseis leader the princess' ‘powercentre’ of Saudi the palace: was He born on August 1985. His31, mother, Salman and increases securityand policies recent in years and theircoordinated steps with Israel foreign in Dhabi Abu and Riyadh of cooperation close Additionally, orientation. al geopolitics of context in analysed be also era and harsh stance against the freedom movements of Arab peoples should duringforces the Cold period.War prefer to participate in the hot conflicts and wars bet leaders have a unique and steady relationship with the United States and did not grants substantial role to Riyadh regional in dynamics. On other the hand, Saudi 23 POLICY FOREIGN CASE THE STUDY: RISE PRINCEOF MUHAMMAD BIN SALMANAND SAUDI Barakah Circle Theory. geopolitics. All these parameters make Saudi Arabia a gripping case forstudy the the modern history of Saudi Arabia when 91 additional risks and discomfort to Saudi internal dynamics (Tisdall, geographical proximitygeographical of Saudi Arabia to Ibn Saud Ibn surprising decision made Muhammad bin Salman the first of grandsons the of Muhammad bin Salman as deputy crown prince and defence minister. This coronat the Following Salman was appointed as crown prince when his brother Aziz passed away and his brotherSalman rd

of of When dissociated and fragmented structure of the Muhammad bin Salman’s profile does not reveal much detail about new Riyadh’s conservative foreign and security policy in post -

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory Aziz utlets (Addiction and intrigue, 2018; Saudi prince, 2018). January 2015January be will evaluated as a turningsignificant point in ,

the founder of the kingdom, to move on to the line of the Al Saud, and togetherthey had three children. He received his the the

importance of Saudi Arabia in in Arabia Saudi of importance

transformation of of transformation 08, bin Salman married Princess Sarah bint Mashhoorbin

- Aziz Aziz ion, King Salman immediately appointed his son A l the the

the the Saud, to grandsons his created troubles has

throne, especially the to crown access prince extremely rapid rising of Muhammad bin the the t he he whole political formation attaches r, r, bin Abdul bin

region region year the the the the

ong with its foreign policyong foreign with its overthrow of the whole royal royal whole the of overthrow old King Abdullah bin Abdul Abdullah King old of of context of Middle East - Bayt al Bayt Aziz replaced him. KingAziz replaced ween Arabs and Israeli House of Saud Saud of House , Nayef, - 2011 Arab2011 Uprisings

- Maqdis

succession. As a

2017)

died 2012. in e f as crown crown as f

and Israel Israel and . terms of of terms

is taken taken is -

167 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 168 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) US and utili and US close circle thank American media outlets, Prince was benevolently adopted by Trump and his Obama administration hisand fluctuated image to some Congress members and constructed reputation in Western media. Except promise to inject funds into the US economy are the main factors be investment in lobbyists in Washington, public relations companies and his costThe of Prince’s image intra contributed to form legitimis a and business circles, even before his appointment crownas prince, has chairma secretary numberof firms before he became involved in governmental work. He served as graduated second in his class. Aftergraduation, bin Salman established a students. He obtained a law degree from King Saud primary education in Riyadh, where he was ranked among the kingdom's top ten social changesocial are all under Prince Mohammed’s control” of crown the prince as, goals in the Middle East (Al East Middle the in goals thisreflect perception. particularly varioushis visits to the US, Europe and the Middle Eastern countries de his internal politics, palace as the monarch, Crown Prince emerges as the real orchestrator of Kingdom. As result, a although his 83 grant him the final decision economic in and commercial policies of the addition, Prince’s duties on economicsphere, especially huge oil ind financial support. President Trump’s busin theand ISIS ideology, in particularthrough the Saudi Wahhabism approach and destructive activities of Salafi/Jihadi networks in context of attacks, 9/11 al side refrain from mentioning th and leadership among Saudi y a non Foundation, MiSK the established also He development. for Society Albir the for trustees of board Prince Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 2018a). of the Saudi cabinet as a part governorof at time, Riyadh the continuedand to the serve experts commission years in 2007. In 2009, he became special adviserto his fa political journey when he served an adviseras to Council the of for Ministers two through various business incubation programmes. Prince embarked on his Mehmet AkifKOÇ - Muhammad bi Muhammad - al Muhammad Saudi political elites and a new influe - facto position, bin Salman is considered as the ‘real King’ outside, n of the board for the King Abdul King the for board the of n - general of Riyadh the Competitive Council, special adviserto the s ation of Saudi petro Saudi of ation economicmanagement and foreign s to his generous promises to increase Saudi investments in the the in investments Saudi increase to promises generous his to s n Salman’s close relations with the US leaders, policy makers Yahya, aSaudi political analyst, d

“currently, foreign policy, defence matters, and issues of - profit organisation that works on cultivating learning - Rasheed, 2018: 235 2018: Rasheed, - making activities is not known but yet; serious - timeconsultant until March2013 (Profile: Crown e e role played by Saudi Arabia in proliferation of ing basis both for his growing role within the within role bothforhis growing ing basis outh and developsouth and start - dollars in parallel with the US foreign policy - years old fatherKing Salman sits in Saudi

- Azizmember Foundation,the of and ntial actor in Middle Eastern politics. ess - - 237). oriented visit and his speech in speech his and oriented visit for for

However, Trump and the US the and Trump However, - security orientation. Due to escribes the increasing role role increasing the escribes a short a period theend at of

University, where he University, - ups the in country

(Tisdall, 2017). In ther, who was was who ther, ustry, also hind his - Qaeda Qaeda

financial support. President Trump’s busin theand ISIS ideology, in particularthrough the Saudi Wahhabism approach and destructive activities of Salafi/Jihadi networks in context of attacks, 9/11 al side refrain from mentioning th (Al East Middle the in goals utili and US close circle thank American media outlets, Prince was benevolently adopted by Trump and his Obama administration hisand fluctuated image to some Congress members and constructed reputation in Western media. Except promise to inject funds into the US economy are the main factors be investment in lobbyists in Washington, public relations companies and his costThe of Prince’s image intra contributed to form legitimis a and business circles, even before his appointment crownas prince, has thisreflect perception. particularly varioushis visits to the US, Europe and the Middle Eastern countries de his internal politics, palace as the monarch, Crown Prince emerges as the real orchestrator of Kingdom. As result, a although his 83 grant him the final decision economic in and commercial policies of the addition, Prince’s duties on economicsphere, especially huge oil ind changesocial are all under Prince Mohammed’s control” of crown the prince as, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 2018a). of the Saudi cabinet as a part governorof at time, Riyadh the continuedand to the serve experts commission years in 2007. In 2009, he became special adviserto his fa political journey when he served an adviseras to Council the of for Ministers two through various business incubation programmes. Prince embarked on his and leadership among Saudi y a non Foundation, MiSK the established also He development. for Society Albir the for trustees of board chairma secretary numberof firms before he became involved in governmental work. He served as graduated second in his class. Aftergraduation, bin Salman established a students. He obtained a law degree from King Saud primary education in Riyadh, where he was ranked among the kingdom's top ten - Muhammad bi Muhammad al Muhammad Saudi political elites and a new influe - facto position, bin Salman is considered as the ‘real King’ outside, n of the board for the King Abdul King the for board the of n - general of Riyadh the Competitive Council, special adviserto the s ation of Saudi petro Saudi of ation economicmanagement and foreign s to his generous promises to increase Saudi investments in the the in investments Saudi increase to promises generous his to s - n Salman’s close relations with the US leaders, policy makers Yahya, aSaudi political analyst, d

- Azizmember Foundation,the of and ntial actor in Middle Eastern politics. ess - - 237). oriented visit and his speech in speech his and oriented visit for for

However, Trump and the US the and Trump However, - security orientation. Due to escribes the increasing role role increasing the escribes a short a period theend at of

University, where he University, - ups the in country

(Tisdall, 2017). In ther, who was was who ther, ustry, also hind his - Qaeda Qaeda

2018: 235 2018: pillars (Al the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has bee The US US The Saudi Arabia:and US the Riyadh, in May 2017, clearly reflect that type of symbiotic relationship between this st strategy in parallel with the US interests. King Faisal was the only exception of politics of US sinceof the World the War end the II and lowsupported price oil in role key a played has Arabia Saudi Israel. and oil communism, War: Cold the Middle East that,argues three issues drove the US’s great powerpolitics Hudson (2016: 357 aftermath of establishme the the military campaign organis the unconditional US support to Aviv. Tel In addition, Riyadh nevercontribut makers to secure those existential interests. Forinstance, SAMA (Saudi Arabia the the USSaudi and Arabia (Ismael and P emanating from the Arab nationalism also fuelled close cooperation between antagonist to Iranian influence. On the other hand, a shared threat perception Israeli extension reveal, anycase, in regional Saudi explicitly policy is tied to American Arab world. As the modern history of the US (Ka calculations and policy moves are designed to strengthen dynastical interests external and internal politics of 5) 4) 3) 2) 1) rim, 2017: 72 According to my analysis, Saudi foreign policy, under The securi

billion Saudi billion Saudi Arabia. This landmark agreement includes the announcement of a $110 billion in our two countriesand We signed historic agreementswith the Kingdom that will invest almost $400 operations. (President Trump’sSpeech, 2017). agreement will help the Saudi military to take a greater role in security friends to get a gooddeal from our great American defense

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory ance who oil led embargo the during the 1973 Arab Promoting Madkhali Salafism (including Gulf) Further Further political Islam political Increasing dependence on the United States in security and regional politics Palestinian peopl Palestinian Rapprochement and normalisation policy towards Israel and abandoning (UA Emirates United the Arab with cooperation Close F actor - - 250) Rasheed, 2017: 143 2017: Rasheed,

: in

demon ty and sustainability of Al - 73). Huge income of oil exports are also used by Saudi policy policy Saudi by used also are exports oil of income Huge –73). funded defense purchase purchase defense funded S – audi audi 358), while discussing the roots of the US involvement in the in involvement US of roots the the –358), discussing while designs, with Saudi Arabia playing the role of a chief regional .

; is

F ation e / Islamicjerusalem cause; Islamicjerusalem / e oreign

ofIran andits allies/partners acrosstheMiddle East - 158; Korany, 2016: 79 nt of of nt P ed by other Arab states against Israel in the the in Israel against states Arab other by ed olic

create many thousands of jobs in America and and America in jobs of thousands many create Riyadh; all the other regional 4 y

Israel in Islamic world and fight against non against fight and world Islamic in erry,2014: 11 – andwe will be sure to ourhelp Saudi

in 1948 in and harshlythe by criticis ed Saud dynasty plays a central role in role central a plays dynasty Saud

- Saudi Arabia relations clearly – –101; Kinzer, 2011; Al 12) n constructedn on five main .

E)and Egypt - Israeli warto protest the the companies. This ambitious rule of of rule ambitious / international international / ;

- Rasheed, Rasheed, and by by –and during during - Salafi Salafi ed ed ;

169 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 170 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) Saudi Saudi argues, the US will remain amajortrading partnerand security guarantorof the context of existing political and economic conditions, as Lippman (2011: 49) instruments utilis the the Tehran (Perthes, 2018: 95 Iranian airspace and imports, upgraded its relationship with both Ankara and strengthened its cooperation with Turkey and became more dependent on 2013. However, Qatarhas not accepted the 13 Brother Muslim the of support Egypt also joined the Saudi the Turkish military base and halting joint military cooperation inside Qatar. ‘terrorist organis of the allegations on are the closest allies of Riyadh among the GCC states. 2017 Qatarcrisis is based July 2017 decisionthe with to Qatar,links cut and generally and the UAE Bahrain have been states’ threat perceptions emanating from the 1979Revolution of ThereIran. foundedwas 1981in under the leadership of following Riyadh Gulf the Arab own stability and security interests. To end, the this Gulf Cooperation Council with otherGulf monarchies instrumentalised and the Gulf toregion As a powerful Gulf kingdom, Saudi Arabia has always been in close cooperation of the Riyadh Emergence strengthen injected UAE togetherbetween 25 41.5 billionand dollars 2014 in p for financing oil, cash, i.e. of aid, types different 2013, Egypt received $12 billion from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in form of namely Palestine, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia etc. In the aftermath of the coup in addition reaffir March 2015, the same GCC countries, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, approximately $2 la Mercad, 2017). As stated above with the statement of President Trump, the the Trump, huge armssales President of statement the with above stated As 2017). Mercad, la investmentstotal in the US economy are currently evaluated at $800 billion (de Americanthe short and long term Accordinassets. geographical distribution of Saudi investments reveals a traditional density on Egyptian economy and reinEgyptian economyand relationship, funds established by ut by established funds Monetary Authority) and Public Investment Fund (PIF) are two sovereign we Mehmet AkifKOÇ d Increasing ties between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt alsocan in be seen emonis Arabia, med theirintention to assist the Egyptian president, each promising an al $4 billion in investments billion $4 al fluctuations the in relationship Saudi withGCC countries, other like e ation of of ation

l which - e Sisi’s government and recover economic weakness of Egypt. In Egypt. of weakness economic recover and government Sisi’s l - Sisi needed the financial support of monarchies to revive support ofto revive monarchies financial the needed Sisi ations’; one of the requests from Qatar was also about closing ed by Riyadh to sustain the same profits. In this respect, within

deal

remainsvulnerable, surroundedtroublesomeby neighbours trillion only between the years 2009 and 2016. the the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi towards Doha’s rela ilis

- between the US and Saudi Arabia are Abu Dhabi Abu – Muslim Brother Muslim ing the enormous oil revenues which was calculated a 104; Aras and Akpınar, 2017: 6 force his positionthe against Muslimforce his Brother - UAE axis in in axis UAE s

whichwas toppled by Abd al

- deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt. In this Cairo Cairo s Axis th a nd affiliatednd networks the in region, e

boycott ofdue to Qatar Doha’s terms rojects. Saudi Arabia and the g tog some calculations, Saudi

imposed by this axis and axis this by imposed – 7) .

- Fattah tionship with

safeguard its its safeguard also similar also - e 2015 to2015 s l ; while while ; - 5 Sisi in

alth The The t .

Egyptian economy and reinEgyptian economyand relationship, addition reaffir March 2015, the same GCC countries, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, strengthen injected UAE togetherbetween 25 41.5 billionand dollars 2014 in p for financing oil, cash, i.e. of aid, types different 2013, Egypt received $12 billion from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in form of namely Palestine, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia etc. In the aftermath of the coup in the Tehran (Perthes, 2018: 95 Iranian airspace and imports, upgraded its relationship with both Ankara and strengthened its cooperation with Turkey and became more dependent on 2013. However, Qatarhas not accepted the 13 Brother Muslim the of support Egypt also joined the Saudi the Turkish military base and halting joint military cooperation inside Qatar. ‘terrorist organis of the allegations on are the closest allies of Riyadh among the GCC states. 2017 Qatarcrisis is based July 2017 decisionthe with to Qatar,links cut and generally and the UAE Bahrain have been states’ threat perceptions emanating from the 1979Revolution of ThereIran. foundedwas 1981in under the leadership of following Riyadh Gulf the Arab own stability and security interests. To end, the this Gulf Cooperation Council with otherGulf monarchies instrumentalised and the Gulf toregion As a powerful Gulf kingdom, Saudi Arabia has always been in close cooperation of the Riyadh Emergence Saudi argues, the US will remain amajortrading partnerand security guarantorof the context of existing political and economic conditions, as Lippman (2011: 49) instruments utilis the Trump, huge armssales President of statement the with above stated As 2017). Mercad, la investmentstotal in the US economy are currently evaluated at $800 billion (de Americanthe short and long term Accordinassets. geographical distribution of Saudi investments reveals a traditional density on approximately $2 ut by established funds Monetary Authority) and Public Investment Fund (PIF) are two sovereign we d Increasing ties between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt alsocan in be seen emonis Arabia, med theirintention to assist the Egyptian president, each promising an al $4 billion in investments billion $4 al fluctuations the in relationship Saudi withGCC countries, other like e ation of of ation

deal

remainsvulnerable, surroundedtroublesomeby neighbours trillion only between the years 2009 and 2016. the the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi towards Doha’s rela ilis

whichwas toppled by Abd al

- deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt. In this Cairo Cairo s Axis th a nd affiliatednd networks the in region, e

boycott ofdue to Qatar Doha’s terms rojects. Saudi Arabia and the g tog some calculations, Saudi

imposed by this axis and axis this by imposed – 7) .

- Fattah tionship with

safeguard its its safeguard also similar also - e 2015 to2015 s l ; while while ; - 5 Sisi in

alth The The t .

The conflictThe overPalestine is normalis and Issue Palestine Arab regimes is a crucial pillar of their alliance powerthe politics and future of the region and acting to preserve the autocratic of Arabia Saudi and Muhammad bin Zayed of the UAE, ambitiously try to shape became a theatre where an alliance of ‘young sheikhs’, Muhammad bin Sa 2018: 437Piazza, national interests orperception of security threats from Yemen (Byman, 2018; ‘payment’ of GCC’s the abovementioned financial Arab states against Israel during the Cold War Palestine issue, they also did not join military the campaigns byled nationalist Egypt) Egypt) Egypt’s participationEgypt’s the in Saudi humanitarian disasterand became an extreme fiasco forRiyadh and its allies. Nasser (Korany and Dessouki,2010: 50 personal prestige and regional influence and also to blame the otherArab states conf land in 1948 as a blatant case of injustice made to all Arabs (and Muslims). The modern history. Arab states and peoples viewed the separation of Palestinian background in Israel war, Iranian 40 politically financially,and tookand steps to peace lead initiatives (Lippman, 2011: frame a pro pursued Egypt, with along Dhabi, initiatives of Saudi leaders until recent years. instance,For Riyadh and Abu evaluationthis does not reflect the realities and ignores some important except prestige or national influence among the Arabs. On the otherhand, the Palestine issue to mobilis advances of Iran the Storm) to Yemeni 2015 back March in President Mansour toHadi and stop the coalition led Saudi Arabiaby launched military a intervention (Operation Decisive Muslim Riyadh alliesits neededand e profoundly shape t story’ for the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and reveals his ambitions to MoroccoJordan, and Sudan. The intervention designed was initially ‘success a as GCCall countries (except Oman) and Egypt along – 41; Mansfield, 2013: 320 2013: Mansfield, 41; lict wasals Although are some there circ Yemen is another work and undertheir strong alliance with the US, also supported Intifada

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory , ion of for 6 Brother

SaddamHussein, Hafez and

‘sell

ing King Faisal King the the s’ opolitically utilis

- ideology in the region ideology the 2018: region 425 in (Piazza,

438). out’ the Palestinian people and surrender

factorand Shi’a question heavily affected and, to certain a international are he region; however, quickly - backed Houthi(

As Lucas (2017:31 field field 7

ation with Is 322, 350). However, starting from 2006 Hizbullah 2006 from starting However, 350). –322, in 1970s,in Saudi leaders gener e their peoples and and peoples e their of of l - considered Sisi to prevent defeat and the spread of -

cooperation for the the for cooperation ed by some nationalist Arab leaders to gain 51). The Arab leaders, such as les who blame Saudi Arabia (and the UAEand - n led campaign may also be read as the al a Zaidi - Assad Assad rael concerning - Palestinian policy within a pragmatic - - 33) states, the Gulf and Middle East East Middle and Gulf the states, 33) Shiite) forces. The coalition in coalition The forces. Shiite)

the longestthe protractedconflictin . .

were the the it it

nationalist figures who use who figures nationalist the Arab support instead of own its Arab world to gain personal personal gain to world Arab transformed to a full a to transformed side the participation of Saudi - 426). ing - - ally stayed in the in stayed ally UAE Israeliconflict and

to Israeli politics, - Egypt axis. A axis. Egypt Gamal with thewith cludes cludes Abdel Abdel - scale scale lman lman the the d -

171 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 172 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) emerged primaryas a determinant parallelin with the of Saudi the rise my enemymy is friend’my Riya existence of the Jewish state. Recently, the trend of rapprochement between pragmaticrelationship. Beyond rhetoric, Riyadh never challenged the very bilateral held secretin was and usually through the since but US, 2006direct the war foreign policy added a new dimension to existing geopolitical risks and and power risks geopolitical dimension a to policy existing added new foreign the US security umbrella, yet following the powerpolitics context; until the 1979 Iranian Revolution both states were under Saudi statements in his Mar also Riyadh setting than ever before. Mutually shared threat perceptions of Tel Aviv and Israel have greaterstrategic depth and are takin nature ofthe post the making, the in decades been has Israel and states Gulf the between ties informal axis. AccordingEgypt to Ulrichs negativeand non issue underthe rule of Muhammad bin Salman significantly transformed into a (Fattah and Korany, 2010: 373 dominatedextent, Saudi foreign policy regarding Israel and regional its activities The recent US initiative to settle the problem in favour of Israel, so normalis political environment and security perceptions of tw basis regular with an increasing (Podeh, frequency 2018). Under the existing Israel and the US on the Palestine issu Arabia, Saudi among coordination close of reflection another is deal’, century’s Fight against Iranian circumstances, also accelerated this ‘overt but unofficial’ cooperation. theseIn new key role in rapprochement with Israel, Trump’s accession to the US Presid Mehmet AkifKOÇ dh is and Tel Aviv successfula example of realist the axiom of The history of Saudi of history The As a second phase in post in phase a second As Must Must negotiatingtable―or they shou about time that the Palestiniansaccept the It’s offers given. was and it agree offers the to all come to rejected the and again, and again opportunities Iran… There are much more urgent andmore important issues to deal with, such as The Palestinian issue is not at the top of the Saudi government’s agenda sidelined within The Saudi the Crownsidelined Prince’s policy priorities. foreign - Iranian relations were mostly evaluated within a geopolitical rivalry and - Abu Dhabi regarding Iran and Shiite factor thein Middle East plays the ation of Saudi of ation connectionswereestablished and security Make Peace or Shut Up, 2018)

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UAE ency ency - Arab nationalism the1960 Arab of 1950s and Utilisation of the Madkhali Salafism Israel is also another measure against Iran (Koç, 2019: 112) aforementioned, the rapprochement policy of Saudi Arabia and the UAEwith Nasser and Baathist rulers of Syria and Iraq was on the top of Saudi Arabia’s limit Iranian influence (Al influence Iranian limit ‘Iranfor the nuclearsigning deal’ also reflect Riyadh’s strong determination to of Shiite Bahraini opposition, and continuous criticism of Obama administration stance to harshl political the and military gains in Tehran’s Moreover, region. firm Saudi Arabia’s are the recent steps of the Saudi leadership in orderto prevent the spread of po prestigiousand Hariri family; establishing ties with powerful Iraqi cleric and 2015; Riyadh’s efforts to balance Tehran in Lebanon through Sunni community Trump declared Saudi Arabia’s role hand, other the On opposition. the against force military of use its following intoback the Arab League from which Assad government was expelled as viewed says work in Syria embassy 'continuing', 2018b). These kinds of moves are became the first Arab to years bilateral trade resumed; first commercial flight from seven in to Syria Tunisia internal war the in weight their to revive order in Syria towards policies their transforming regionLevant the the following of Assasurvival 78 2017: (Umar, afailure in resulted actors along with the existential threat emanating from the ISIS, armed struggle pol to diverging due However, Iran’s influence in the Levant and its strategic link to Lebanese Hizbullah. backed Syrian armed rebels aiming to downfall Assad wouldwhich threaten through Shiite communitiesits al / close proxies Iraq and Bashar ally has gained more room formanoeuvre particularly in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and entity since the US invasion in 2003. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisi with Iraqi relations tense which isgovernment pro perceived as Saudi leaders did not back Hizbullah in its war against Israel in 2006 and has Lebanon has been an important threat forRiyadh in 1980s an competition with Saudi Arabia. Increasing influence of Tehran particularly in the Jordanthe re to readiness opening its Damascus embassy in the last week of 2018; Bahrain als litical leaderMuqtada litical al Muhammad bin Salman’s unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen since In post

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory ok off in December 2018; also Sudanese President Omar al Omar President Sudanese also 2018; December in off ok an an - - Syria bordercrossing officially re - 2011 era following the proliferation of Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia Arabia Saudi uprisings, Arab of proliferation the following era 2011 weary country. To this end, the UAE led the GCC countries in re indicatorof some Arab countries’ preparation to Syria welcome - activate embassy its day after a the decision. UAE’s Moreover, y repress its own repress its y Shiite community, active support in repression state state - Sadr who strongly opposes Iranian influence in Iraq - R leaderto visit Syria since the warbegan (Bahrain asheed, 2017;asheed, Legrenzi and Gause, 2016). As itical strategies of regional and international international and regional of strategies itical

–

financing 79). Underenormous Iranianinfluence in s leds by

the reconstruction of Syria. d, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi aims at - opened in October 2018andOctoberopened in the the Egyptian Egyptian .

d 1990s; as a result, result, a as 1990s; d president - Iranian political political Iranian o declared its its declared o - Assad ngs, Iran Iran ngs, -

. Bashir Bashir Abdel Abdel

173 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 174 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) through the Muslim Brother the Muslim through diminished nationalist threat forRiyadh. However, the rise of the political Islam death Nasser, then security threats agenda. Fall of Arab nationalism accession of the of accession constituted newa threat to Gulf the monarchies. The Arab uprisings and the Mehmet AkifKOÇ support to e to support measures in containing the rising Islamist groups. Riya LibyaTunisia, Palestineand 2000s) alarmed (in the leaders Saudi to take ( Theory derived and to dimension assertive prince of the UAE, Muhammad bin Zayed, have also added a new ambition and Salman tocrown prince the position and close relationshis with the crown considering the alliance of two young sheikhs, ascension of Muhammad bin inrole the geopolitical framework of the Middle East and of beyond significant foreign borders Riyadh has policy its and region influential Syria, has a secondary role in context of the Barakah Circle Theory. However, the Ma non as opposition of form any regards and ruler the to obedience named after the Saudi cleric Sheikh Rabi political and security elites: to legitimis to Islam (Lacroix,2017: 51 militias are two most remarkable examples in Saudi struggle to limit political Haftar in his fight against the local moderate Islamist government fractions and the Crown Prince the with membershiphis alleged As indicatedAs in introductory part, Saudi Arabia, BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY even to the point of accusing them of being non INTERPRETATION OF Tunisia, wellas as Libya (Salah Ali, 2017; Olidort, 2015: substantially instrumentalised by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Egypt and internationally recogni Saudi remarkable influence overLibyan politics and society and byutilised Egypt and Khashoggi dkhalis harshly criticis 1) In thisIn context, new a phenomenon was instrumental

- UAEbacked Genera campaignYemen in and harsh stance againstIran were the initialsignsthe of of His to the the urgent Middle East. design military approach geopolitics 2015 surprised the all regional in prince ambitious) extremely (but inexperienced young and of rise a The

that e : murder, 2018;Wittes, 2018)

conclu l the the - Sisi who toppled who Sisi

Muslim Muslim murderof the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashogg ded the the

– the Saudi foreign foreign Saudi the within the theoretical framework s THE THE 53; Al 53; e the Muslim Brother ed Tripolied government.The MadkhaliSalafis are Brother overthrowi

l Haftarto counterlocal Islamist forces and the Madkhali Salafism Madkhali the SAUDI FOREIGN SAUDI POLICY ACCORDING TOTHE - s Rasheed 2018: 242 2018: Rasheed

the the and affiliated groups within the Arab s

to government positions particularly in Egypt,

and international actors and signalled a new Muslim Muslim ng .

of Saddam Hussein by the U policy. policy. a l - Brother Madkhali who advocates absolute absolute advocates who Madkhali s , or any other Islamic movements Following the analyses, it can be can it analyses, the Following 244). Most Most –244). when when ,

. The. neo following the 1967 warand - s religious. The group has a has group The religious. 4

t –7; Kekilli, 2017: 171 in Egypt and and Egypt in o the Muslim Brother Muslim o the comparedtoEgypt and of Bayt al dh’s unconventional

the Barakah Circles Barakahthe recently, ised theby Saudi - takfiri groupwas takfiri - Maq - religious also also dis attempts attempts S forces S forces – . While While . Khalifa Khalifa 172) World World . The The . i

. by by

Theory derived and to dimension assertive prince of the UAE, Muhammad bin Zayed, have also added a new ambition and Salman tocrown prince the position and close relationshis with the crown considering the alliance of two young sheikhs, ascension of Muhammad bin inrole the geopolitical framework of the Middle East and of beyond significant foreign borders Riyadh has policy its and region influential Syria, has a secondary role in context of the Barakah Circle Theory. However, the indicatedAs in introductory part, Saudi Arabia, BARAKAH CIRCLE THEORY INTERPRETATION OF Tunisia, wellas as Libya (Salah Ali, 2017; Olidort, 2015: substantially instrumentalised by the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Egypt and internationally recogni Saudi remarkable influence overLibyan politics and society and byutilised Egypt and even to the point of accusing them of being non Ma non as opposition of form any regards and ruler the to obedience named after the Saudi cleric Sheikh Rabi political and security elites: ( Crown Prince the with membershiphis alleged legitimis to Islam (Lacroix,2017: 51 militias are two most remarkable examples in Saudi struggle to limit political Haftar in his fight against the local moderate Islamist government fractions and e to support measures in containing the rising Islamist groups. Riya LibyaTunisia, Palestineand 2000s) alarmed (in the leaders Saudi to take the of accession constituted newa threat to Gulf the monarchies. The Arab uprisings and the Brother the Muslim through diminished nationalist threat forRiyadh. However, the rise of the political Islam death Nasser, then security threats agenda. Fall of Arab nationalism Khashoggi dkhalis harshly criticis 1) In thisIn context, new a phenomenon was instrumental

that e : murder, 2018;Wittes, 2018)

conclu l the the - Sisi who toppled who Sisi

Muslim Muslim murderof the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashogg ded the the – the Saudi foreign foreign Saudi the within the theoretical framework s THE THE 53; Al 53; e the Muslim Brother ed Tripolied government.The MadkhaliSalafis are Brother overthrowi

l Haftarto counterlocal Islamist forces and the Madkhali Salafism Madkhali the SAUDI FOREIGN SAUDI POLICY ACCORDING TOTHE - s Rasheed 2018: 242 2018: Rasheed

the the s and affiliated groups within the Arab

to government positions particularly in Egypt,

and international actors and signalled a new Muslim ng .

. The. neo following the 1967 warand - s religious. The group has a has group The religious. 4

t – in Egypt and and Egypt in o the Muslim Brother Muslim o the 7; Kekilli, 2017: 171 comparedtoEgypt and of Bayt al dh’s unconventional

the Barakah Circles Barakahthe recently, - ised theby Saudi takfiri groupwas takfiri - Maq - religious also also dis attempts attempts S forces S forces – . While While . Khalifa Khalifa 172) World World . The The . i

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6) 5) 4) 3) 2)

Interpretation of the rise of MBS and Saudi Foreign Policy according to the Barakah Circle Theory of Israel people, repression over and Syria, harshly critici and North Africa foreign poli foreign Arab states to obey Riyadh’s ambitions. One of the main goals of Saudi the other and region enforce vacuum the in political to the fill tries Arabia Saudi has revealed, crisis Qatar 2017 the As geopolitics. of regional terms Riyadh’s ongoing disputes with Turkey and Qatar also ha Palestinian people Palestinian crossing also worsenthe economic and humanitarianconditions ofthe Palestinian groups and prevent Egypt to help Gaza through the Rafah border the deepen to further steps Riyadh’s prevailing Riyadh adopted and Turkey people and people Normalis independently movingor joinarival axis an alliance with the to form great has exerted axis new Moreover, effort anyone. surprise not of new actors (namely Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) to claim leadership does of the Arab Arab the of the Arab within position primary and leadership regional towards UAE) the with (along claims Riyadh’s is era new the of consequences important ofmost the One constrain the local Islamist opposition Islamist local the constrain started the normali the started backing policy of Islamist armed rebels against the Assad government and Ghannoushi, the Madkhali Salafists etc. Also in Syria, Saudis abandoned the the orLibya, Islamic secular Tu Saudi local political is of pro empowerment states further in trend rising aforementioned The affiliate Arab Uprisings era; after the fall of the local Islamists in Egypt, the similar / The overthrowing of the Brothers Muslim overthrowing The as the Camp David agreement and Israeli loudly; but at later at but a loudly; first axis. Atthis early phase, the s the of cohesion the strengthen and move astrategic as emerge Israel with ‘Overt but unofficial’ nor (Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Washington and Cairo) Brother Muslim the Salman under era. Thenew Trump US politics, Donald

Madkhali Salafism etc. can also be viewed as the Riyadh - US axis’ strategic moves to damage todamage Ankara moves strategic US axis’ ’s macro strategy. The rise of of rise e The strategy. ’s macro d locald networks inTunisia, Libya,Syria andPalestine also weakened. ation with Israel also requires the abandoning of the Palestinian World

Israel. cutbetween this point, also Saudi At theIsrael. move Egypt link

cy is to limit the Turkish the tolimit cy is from from the cause of the cause World, . While Egypt, as the geopolitical and histori and the geopolitical as Egypt, While . a resolute policy to leave alone the Palestinians against the against Palestinians the toleave alone policy resolute a form . The Khashoggimurder, normalis

s s has been weakened during during weakened been has the weakened Egypt in order to prevent it it from to prevent order in Egypt the weakened

stage, ationprocess with secular/Baathist Damascusregime and religious figures, such e as such figures, religious and in Egypt also established the fourth pillar of the new axis axis the of new pillar the fourth established also in Egypt ing Muslim

an allianceto Bayt al Bayt s mali

ing Iran and its partners, partners, its and Iran ing most probably most

s ation efforts of Saudi and Emirati leadership

Br - Maqdis. As the Crown Prince clearly states, states, clearly Prince Crown As the Maqdis. other - Qatari partnership in the Gulf region, Syria nisian groups opposing en groups nisian . ides do not declare the normalis the declare not do ides l

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Jordanian peace treaty peace Jordanian affiliatedgroups and ,

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was a turning point point post was ain turning Bayt al the past past the - Doha alliance ,

ation process with Israel with process ation e declared officially, declared e such also coincided withbin l - Sisi in Egypt, Haftar in in Haftar Egypt, in Sisi - Maqdis sidelining decades, emergence emergence decades, - ve significance in in ve significance Abu Dhabi Abu cal power centre power cal

. or liberating it liberating or the the

Nahda and Palestinian Palestinian promoting - Egypt ation ation - 2011

to . - -

175 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 176 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) lose ground lose

pro politicalcurrent economicand orientation of Saudi the leadership its and pro alliance with the real power Theory, Saudi Arabia, as seconda thirdand circle region, is expected to form an reflects this situa Salman bin Muhammad Prince Crown under policy foreign aggressive Arabia’s Saudi study, case article’s This bases. power geopolitical traditional of weakness Syria and Turkey) to liberate the t analysing the regional developments. One of crucial the derived aspects from withinof theregion the context which geopolitical ignored is whilegenerally Relations The Barakah Circle Theory is developed by a CONCLUSION Mehmet AkifKOÇ he theory is - Israel moves;Israel the in short to middleterm, positive expectations from Riyadh from the region region the from .

the the

emergence of artificial, or unnatural, powercentres underthe tion. the On otherhand, according to the Barakah Circle and aims at explaining the controversial power politics power the controversial at explaining and aims cent re Ba s of the the of s yt al yt - Maqdis “ Middle Eastern Middle Muslim . However, while analysing the the analysing while However, .

Professor ”

geopolitics (Egypt, (Egypt, geopolitics of of International International - US, US, ground lose pro politicalcurrent economicand orientation of Saudi the leadership its and pro Syria and Turkey) to liberate the alliance with the real power Theory, Saudi Arabia, as seconda thirdand circle region, is expected to form an reflects this situa Salman bin Muhammad Prince Crown under policy foreign aggressive Arabia’s Saudi study, case article’s This bases. power geopolitical traditional of weakness t analysing the regional developments. One of crucial the derived aspects from withinof theregion the context which geopolitical ignored is whilegenerally Relations The Barakah Circle Theory is developed by a CONCLUSION he theory is - Israel moves;Israel the in short to middleterm, positive expectations from Riyadh from the region region the from .

the the

Professor ”

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179 Beytülmakdis Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, 19 (2) 180 Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies, 2019, 19 (2) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ENDNOTES Mehmet AkifKOÇ

Albani, Abd al Abd Albani, scholars with whom this strand is most closelyassociated areMuhammad Nasir influential most The based. are they which in country Muslim any of the ruler to obedience Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi religious religious Wahhabi Arabia’s Saudi nationalism during the 1950s and1950s during 1960s. the nationalism 1952 the led Nasser 1970. Haram Mosque [at Makkah] al Makkah] [at Mosque Haram 09.pdf http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB20 Papers/Issues/2017/12/14/pp121417gcc East/2018/0117/Libya at: available 2018, 17, January Monitor, Science Christian the Madkhalis?”, the are Who opportunity: as crisis “Libya Luck (2018). Taylor https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2 bid of “purified” is Islam until least at discourse, their within frames political supporting t al Rabee’ al- sub a as evaluated is Salafism Madkhali Radicalization. The George Washington University Washington George The Radicalization. see; Alexander Meleagrou networks Islamist and groups Salafi other with relations their and Madkhalis on information al Sheikh whom Qutb, Brotherhood Muslim the of critical especially are Madkhalis evils. other and King Faisal King Faisal the by published datarelevant the by calculations using author’s own arebased this figures on These Abdul For King Abdul King GamalNasser Abdel surrounded Barakah, Barakah, surrounded a for journey night by did worshipper,Who Muhammad, He His take to “Glory assassinated by his nephew 1975 in his by assassinated - Madkhali (as a result they are also often referred to as “Madkhalis”) and present present and as “Madkhalis”) often to referred arealso result they Madkhali(as a a detailed detailed a - Aziz al Aziz

Madkhali. The “propagandist” section of the Quietist Salafis follows Sheikh Rabee’ Rabee’ Sheikh follows Salafis the Quietist of section “propagandist” The Madkhali. Al - Aziz Aziz he Saudi regime as an article of faith. Quietists reject political involvement or or involvement political reject Quietists faith. of article an as regime Saudi he

- Saud Sau - map of Islamicjerusalem, seeEl Az d iz bin Baz, Muhammad ibn al ibn Muhammad Baz, bin iz Al

was born in Riyadh in 1906. He is th is 1906. He born in Riyadh in was

(1875

was the second president of Egypt, serving from 1954 until his death in death his 1954 until from Egypt, serving of president second the was crisis Saud. He is famous with his leading role of oil embargo in 1970s, 1970s, Saud. He with hisembargo famous of in role leading is oil Al - - ladhi Barakna Hawlahu Barakna ladhi - Madkhali describes as a “supermarket of heresies.” Madkhali of For a further “supermarket describes as 1953), the founder and first king of Saudi Arabia. Saudi of king first and founder the 1953), - OPEC as

overthrow of themonarchy and knownas the symbol of Arab - - opportunity Hitchens (2018). Salafism in America: Salafism (2018). Hitchens

Aqsa Aqsa establishment. They also call for believers to show absolute absolute show to believers for call also They establishment. and and

- to economic

- - Mosque [at Islamicjerusalem], which we have with with have we which [at Islamicjerusalem], Mosque IMF Who category of Quietist Salafis who usually align with with align usually who Salafis Quietist of category . - - are Awaisi (2007a). Awaisi 191/f/Salafism%20in%20America.pdf ...”. - - Uthaymeen, Muhammad Aman al Aman Muhammad Uthaymeen, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy outlook - https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle - the

Program on Extremism (also available at: at: available (also Extremism on Program (Qur’an, 17:1) - Madkhalis ethird son of th - and - policy

- cha e Kingdom's founder, founder, Kingdom's e

llenges History, Evolution, Evolution, History,

ideologue Sayyid Sayyid ideologue ʻ a (innovation) (innovation) a ;

); ); - - Jami, and and Jami, ud

from - Din al Din

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