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Home , Diriyah, House of Saud, Ikhwan, Middle East Eye, Mohammed Bin Salman, Najd

REPORT 09.19.19 and Religious Authority and Reform in

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., Fellow, Center for the Annelle R. Sheline, Ph.D., Zwan Postdoctoral Fellow, Baker Institute and Boniuk Institute for Religious Tolerance

In the eyes of some sections of the foreign interests that successive Saudi rulers have policy commentariat and many of his followed in a pragmatic and gradualist international supporters, Crown approach to socio-political development. Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) is Such policies enjoyed a measure of a religious reformer working to degrade success in cushioning the impact of rapid the influence of powerful forces in Saudi economic modernization and guiding the Arabia that have pushed in a more kingdom through periods of great internal conservative direction over the past strain. Section three examines instances 40 years, both within and beyond the of religious pushback through the growth kingdom. However, perceptions of MBS of the in the 1990s. The as a religious reformer rest on flawed meteoric rise of Mohammed bin Salman readings of the history of the relationship and the emergence of his “1979” narrative between the reigning Al Saud family and about “moderating” Islam is examined in Perceptions of MBS as the Wahhabi clerical establishment. The section four, while sections five and six history of the modern Saudi state has make the case that MBS is not in fact a a religious reformer shown that at key junctures where it could religious reformer but instead has pursued rest on flawed readings have acted otherwise, the leadership within changes more symbolic than substantive. of the history of the the has made decisions that This report ends by contending that, like relationship between maintained their political supremacy over his predecessors, MBS is using religion and against any contestation from religious as a tool of political control, despite the reigning Al Saud elites or individual clerics. If MBS seeks to attempts by some supporters to claim he family and the Wahhabi substantially reform the religious sphere, is reforming . clerical establishment. he would need to target the kingdom’s most powerful religious institutions, such as the Council of Senior Scholars. This has HISTORICAL CONTEXT yet to happen. This report analyzes the relationship The contemporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, between political and religious authority in ruled since 1932 by Abd al-Aziz Al Saud Saudi Arabia. An opening section explores and his sons, is the third iteration of a Saudi the nature of the political-religious pact state in the . The first Saudi that has positioned political authority state, known as the Emirate of , took above that of religion as the ultimate shape in 1744 when Prince Mohammed bin source of domestic power. A second Saud of Diriyah joined with Mohammed Ibn section details the careful mixture of Abd al-Wahhab, an Islamic scholar from consensus and balancing of competing Lower (corresponding to today’s ), BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 09.19.19

to create a -religious entity aimed Saud control. An early example occurred in at ridding Islam in the Arabian Peninsula the 1920s during a conflict with the of heretical practices and deviations. Abd (Brotherhood) movement. Abd al-Aziz al-Wahhab was the author of Kitab al-Tawhid undertook a campaign to settle the (the Book of Monotheism), which aimed to and turn them into a fierce fighting force take Islam back to its pure and unadulterated that greatly assisted the conquest of the roots, thereby forming a core component of and al-Ahsa provinces. However, the . Mohammed bin Saud when the Bedouin Ikhwan rebelled against and his descendants expanded the Saudi Abd al-Aziz’s moderation of religious policy state well beyond its Najdi heartland and at its in the new territories, they were crushed height, the first Saudi state covered a in battle by the forces of the nascent Saudi extending from in the south to Aleppo state in 1929-30.3 When the agenda of and in the west and in religious conservatives conflicted with modern-day to the north.1 the centralization of control, Abd al-Aziz The first Saudi state collapsed in 1818 demonstrated that the would after a series of British attacks on Saudi not be constrained by the “dynamic alliance.” territory and a final Egyptian assault on Fifty years later, the seizure of the Diriyah. It was quickly replaced by a second Grand in by a group of Saudi state, the Emirate of Najd, which lasted religious militants led by Juhayman until 1891, when Abd al-Rahman Al Saud al-Utaybi represented “in many ways the was defeated by the rival al-Rashid sequel to the Ikhwan revolt of 1929” in of Ha’il and forced to flee with his family, the struggle over the speed and direction 4 Abd al-Aziz Al Saud which included the young Abd al-Aziz. After of Saudi modernization. Al-Utaybi’s finding refuge in and regrouping, Abd father had fought with the Ikhwan at the and his successors al-Aziz Al Saud reconquered Riyadh in 1902 Battle of Sabala in 1929 that ended with have, in key moments, and began the process of unifying through their defeat by Abd al-Aziz’s forces. His mobilized religion both conquest the remainder of Najd (1912) and son became radicalized while studying in as an instrument of the adjoining provinces of al-Ahsa (1922), in the 1970s and being exposed to the Hejaz (1925), and Asir (1930). In 1932, the modernist lifestyle in Riyadh and other power and as a source Abd al-Aziz proclaimed the merger of the major Saudi cities. Juyahman recruited of legitimacy. Najd, Hejaz, and Asir into the Kingdom of similarly disaffected Bedouin from humble Saudi Arabia, leaving him in control of the backgrounds who were cut out of (and majority of the Arabian Peninsula north of rejected) what they saw as the oil-fueled Yemen, with the exception of the British- transformation of Saudi Arabian society. protected emirates of Kuwait, , , After taking control of the Grand Mosque, the , and the Trucial States (today the militants released a list of their grievances ) on the shoreline of the with “Western” innovations, including .2 television and women’s education. They Many observers of Saudi Arabia attach made personal attacks on the freewheeling significance to the “dynastic alliance” made activities of senior Al Saud .5 by Mohammed bin Saud and Mohammed Ibn On this occasion, the Al Saud responded Abd al-Wahhab in 1744 and see as its legacy very differently to the direct challenge to a separation of responsibilities, whereby the the religious and political basis of their Al Saud exercise political leadership while legitimacy than after 1930, when Abd al-Aziz the descendants of al-Wahhab (primarily had (militarily defeated and) marginalized the al- family) monopolize religious the religiously conservative Ikhwan. posts. However, the reality is more complex After executing Juhayman and the other as Abd al-Aziz Al Saud and his successors perpetrators, the royal family then proceeded have, in key moments, mobilized religion to implement many of the rebels’ demands. both as an instrument of power and as They did this through measures that a source of legitimacy, each time using refocused the role of religion in Saudi society. a strategy of co-optation that kept final Measures taken included an increase in responsibility for policy firmly within Al funding for religious universities, expansion of 2 MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND REFORM IN SAUDI ARABIA

the remit and size of the religious police, and American forces would leave the kingdom further support for pan-Islamic organizations after the war.7 and causes, such as the anti-Soviet campaign Aware of the need to reinforce such a in Afghanistan. In addition, the emergence momentous decision to station American of post-revolutionary and the decline in troops in the Muslim holy land, the Saudi oil prices in the early-1980s challenged the government asked the Council of Senior Saudi regime’s leadership of the Scholars to legitimate the move through and its ability to provide for the economic a fatwa. Initially, the Council, led by Abd welfare of its citizens. Faced with multiple al-Aziz bin Baz, the senior religious authority threats to its political and religious legitimacy, in the kingdom, refused to support the the regime responded by slowing down the government’s position, but after pressure process of liberalization and granting more the Council issued a fatwa on August 13, The House of Saud 6 8 political space for Islamist activism. 1990, endorsing the king’s decision. By alternatively repressed so doing, the government alienated a significant portion of the Salafi establishment. and responded to DOMESTIC BALANCING ACT Some members coalesced into the Sahwa9 criticism from the most (“Awakening”) movement of religious- The episodes of domestic unrest described conservative aspects political activism, while others turned to of society. above illustrate how the House of Saud more radical critics of Saudi policy such as alternatively repressed and responded , whose offer of the use of to criticism from the most conservative his Arab fighting force based in Afghanistan aspects of society. Following 1979, to repel Saddam Hussein had been rejected challenges posed to the religious legitimacy by the Saudi government in August 1990. of the Al Saud, and concerns about the Whether expressed through the Sahwa or possibility of further unrest, lent an air al-Qaeda,10 the decision to rely on U.S.-led of excessive caution to Saudi policy military support unleashed forces of domestic formulation, but decisions also reflected the opposition that coursed through Saudi society lessons drawn by the Al Saud from these for the remainder of the 1990s.11 examples of internal contestation, as well Religious elites became less harmonized as from the prolonged split within the royal upon the emergence of a new generation family between King Saud and of religious scholars led by bin Baz, the Faisal between 1958 and 1964. Policies Grand of Saudi Arabia until his death in traditionally had to be weighed to assess 1999. The most important religious family in their effect on the balance of familial power Saudi Arabia has been the al-Sheikh family, within the Al Saud, particularly in terms of direct descendants of Mohammed Ibn Abd appointments to senior positions, and to al-Wahhab. The al-Sheikh reaffirmed their evaluate how they would be received by key ancestor’s historic alliance with Mohammed elements of Saudi society. This balance of bin Saud in 1744 by aligning themselves interests resulted in an element of fluidity in with Abd al-Aziz Al Saud following the the constant process of decision-making as recapture of Riyadh in 1902. Al-Sheikh princely assessments of the policy landscape family members became the backbone of shifted over time and in response to events. the religious establishment of (legal The delicate balancing act facing Saudi scholars) and the mutawaeen (religious leaders (exacerbated by their reluctance police) until the death of Mohammed bin to be rushed into critical decisions) was Ibrahim al-Sheikh, the supreme scholarly demonstrated by the August 7, 1990, authority in Saudi Arabia, in 1969. Afterward invitation by King Fahd to host American- King Faisal reorganized the religious led military forces preparing to oust the establishment, eroding the al-Sheikh’s invading Iraqi army from Kuwait. Following influence. This trend was only partially a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense reversed after the appointment of Abdul- Dick Cheney, King Fahd made the decision aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh as Grand Mufti of to invite foreign troops on the promise that Saudi Arabia in 1999.12

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RISE OF THE SAHWA MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN AND THE “1979” NARRATIVE The emergence of Sahwa dissent in the late 1980s and 1990s illustrated rising religious Since his father, King Salman, appointed activism in the kingdom. Clerics such as him defense minister in January Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali built 2015, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) upon King Fahd’s deeply unpopular decision has accumulated power to a degree to host U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to accuse unprecedented in modern Saudi history, the regime of hypocrisy. In 1994, al-Awda first as Deputy Crown Prince from April and more than 100 other Sahwa activists 2015 and later as Crown Prince from June were imprisoned amid a regime crackdown.13 2017. MBS leveraged his father’s backing Following his release from prison, al-Awda and the passing of the old guard of senior and other religious figures reinvented Al Saud figures to cement his control over themselves as Islamist intellectuals. They defense, economic, and oil policy through built a substantial public following, initially the creation of a Presidency of State by distributing as many as 200,000 cassette Security and a Committee of Economic and recordings of individual sermons.14 Development Affairs, and a restructuring of The rise of social media posed significant ’s governing arrangements. new dilemmas for the Saudi leadership. This concentration of power has struck With millions of followers on , many observers of Saudi Arabia as a decisive al-Awda possessed a vast audience with shift away from the informal system of whom he could communicate directly, checks and balances that previously had bypassing attempts at state control or prevented any one leader from exercising censure. al-Awda took advantage of this truly autocratic control. That equilibrium new platform when he released an open had evolved more by accident than by Mohammed bin Salman letter to King Abdullah in March 2013 that design due to the embedded strength of the has accumulated criticized the regime’s response to the institutional fiefdoms whose interests had power to a degree Arab Spring upheaval and warned the to be balanced before any major decision government that it could face the “spark of could be made. Upon the deaths of the older unprecedented in violence” if it did not address concerns over generation, there were far fewer constraints modern Saudi history. political detainees, poor public services, and on the 34-year-old crown prince as he perceived government corruption. al-Awda charted his path toward power.17 released the open letter on Twitter through A major difference that separates MBS a series of tweets, each designed to carry a from the previous generation of leaders, self-contained message that maximized its all sons of the founder, Abd al-Aziz, is that impact through onward sharing.15 MBS has no personal experience with the Whereas in the 1990s, the Saudi momentous events of the 1970s and that government responded to the challenge era’s backlash against social and economic posed by the Sahwa by arresting and change. MBS instead has suggested imprisoning dozens of Sahwa leaders and repeatedly that Saudi Arabia changed for their followers, including al-Awda himself, the worse in 1979. He portrayed that year the majority were released by 1999 and kept as a pivotal one in which Islam became a lower public profile thereafter.(new: fn 116) politicized through the rise of Ayatollah The fact that al-Awda (and others) returned Khomeini in Iran and the fundamentalist to activism in such a direct manner in 2013, takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In coupled with the politically unstable regional a March 2018 interview, MBS context following the Arab Spring, meant explained to journalist Nora O’Donnell that, that after 2015 Mohammed bin Salman was before 1979, less inclined to open any space to groups in We [] were living a very normal Saudi society that might conceivably pose a life like the rest of the Gulf countries. political—more than religious—threat as he Women were driving cars. There were consolidated power. movie theaters in Saudi Arabia. Women 4 MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND REFORM IN SAUDI ARABIA

worked everywhere. We were just lifestyles were financed by the government’s normal people developing like any oil wealth. MBS reduced subsidies on water other country in the world until the and and implemented a 5% value events of 1979.18 added tax. These policies are not popular, Part of the threat posed by older Saudi but they signal his commitment to reducing critics (such as ) to MBS the public burden on the Saudi state and 22 and his narrative of returning Saudi Arabia eventually diversifying the economy. to a “moderate” form of Islam is that they Other high profile initiatives were delayed, were able to draw upon firsthand experience such as the Aramco initial public offering, of Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and 1970s to but may go forward eventually. On social argue that there was no clean “before-and- reform, MBS permitted cinemas to open, and after” dividing line. As Khashoggi noted in allowed women to drive and to leave Saudi March 2018 at the Project on Middle East Arabia without the permission of a male Democracy in Washington, D.C., Saudi guardian. Nevertheless, the government Islam was far from “moderate” before maintains a somewhat ambiguous position 1979.19 Indeed, in the early 1960s, then- on further reforms: in May 2019, a dry night Crown Prince Faisal threatened first to send club opened in but quickly shut in the army to disperse clerics opposing down, while a law to uphold public decency the first schools for girls. Faisal later was passed by the Council but has yet authorized police to open fire on religious to be implemented. MBS must try to balance MBS must try to balance some citizens’ demands for social change demonstrators protesting the introduction some citizens’ demands of television to Saudi Arabia. The latter with others’ concerns that the kingdom incident, in 1966, proved to be fateful for is losing its identity. But while the scope for social change with Faisal, as one of those killed in the protest at and results are mixed, MBS has certainly others’ concerns that the television station was a young member changed aspects of Saudi Arabia’s economic the kingdom is losing and social status quo. of the royal family, Khaled bin Musa’id Al its identity. Saud. Nine years later, Khaled’s younger Yet in the religious arena, Mohammed brother, Faisal bin Musa’id, assassinated bin Salman’s stated intention to implement his uncle, King Faisal, in revenge for his reform has not been followed by significant brother’s death.20 changes in policy. Prominent American The royal family responded to the media figures portrayed MBS as the first traumas of the late 1970s by becoming more Saudi royal to stand up to the religious tactically conservative. Under King Fahd, establishment and challenge the long- rulers assumed the title of Custodian of the standing partnership between the House Two Holy . Fahd also facilitated the of Saud and Wahhabi clerics, citing a flow to Afghanistan of individuals such as wave of arrests of prominent clerics in Osama bin Laden, who sought a platform September 2017 and since. However, the for the militant expression of religious Saudi government has largely ignored clerics beliefs. But the imprisonment of the Sahwa that represent the core of the religious leaders in the 1990s showed that the Al Saud establishment, instead pursuing individuals maintained the upper hand in the political who have a history of criticizing government relationship and was willing and able to rein policies, such as Salman al-Awda and other in clerics when required.21 figures from the Sahwa movement. Evidence that MBS is not challenging the Saudi religious establishment is his alliance A RELIGIOUS REFORMER? with its most prominent institution, the Council of Senior Scholars. The president Mohammed bin Salman has promised of the Council is Abdul-aziz Ibn Abdullah economic, social, and religious reform. al-Sheikh, a member of the influential family In the economic realm, he has (indeed) of clerics descended from Mohammed Ibn implemented policies that retract parts Abd al-Wahhab. One esteemed member of of the rentier bargain whereby subsidized the council is Shaikh Saleh bin Mohammed

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al-Luhaydan, who in 2008 appeared to to prayer. al-Arefe was jailed by the Saudi assert that the owners of satellite television regime in 2014 for criticizing the train line stations could be executed for contributing connecting Muslim holy sites in Mecca but to public immorality.23 An outside observer has avoided critiquing the government might assume that a would-be religious since then. The regime moved to curtail his reformer would require that the council influence, suspending his Twitter account members adopt a more progressive stance, on December 28, 2018, and banning him but no member of the Council of Senior from preaching. At the time of writing, he Scholars has been disciplined or required continues to Tweet using his non- to address controversial rulings. Instead, Twitter profiles, and videos posted on the council has obliged MBS with religious Twitter showed him leading prayers. Another edicts that support his policy decisions: deeply conservative cleric is Abdurahman they issued a fatwa against Qatar following al-Barrak, who in 2010 called for the death the Saudi-led boycott, as well as against penalty for those supporting gender mixing. after the Canadian government Al-Barrak has also avoided imprisonment, granted citizenship to the family of dissident despite the government’s alleged effort Saudi blogger , who remains to target controversial clerics. Issuing a imprisoned as of September 2019. Observers conservative or even intolerant ruling is of Saudi Arabia might take the Supreme tolerated. Instead, those imprisoned are Council’s willingness to reverse its fatwa often individuals that have criticized the against women driving as an indication that government. Several imprisoned clerics MBS is pressuring the institution to adopt were among the 2011 petitioners seeking a Many clerics outside a more progressive stance. However, the constitutional monarchy, a representative the official religious religious establishment has consistently parliament, and protections for minorities. establishment have demonstrated that it will offer a religious MBS has benefited from a lack of justification for the decisions made by the knowledge in the Western media about the altered their tone in House of Saud, making the fatwa reversal views of influential Saudi clerics. Those who order to ensure they do unsurprising. Meanwhile, MBS has refrained use their positions of religious authority not risk imprisonment. from censuring even the most controversial to support the House of Saud face few members of the Council of Senior Scholars, barriers to reinforcing a deeply conservative reinforcing the long-standing partnership form of Islam, whereas those who seek between the religious establishment and the greater freedom of expression or political royals, while demonstrating the inequality of representation may find themselves the the relationship. target of state repression. Many clerics outside the official religious establishment have altered their tone in order to ensure they do not risk SYMBOLISM, NOT SUBSTANCE imprisonment. In May 2019, A’id al-Qarni, a prominent figure associated with the American commentators may view MBS’ Sahwa movement, apologized to Saudi decision to allow women to drive and apply society for the Sahwa. He expressed his for government documents like passports support for MBS’ plan to moderate Islam without a male guardian as an indication and condemned Qatar. Another well- that he is in the process of reforming Saudi known cleric is Mohamed al-Arefe, whose Islam. However, this policy is consistent controversial stances, such as calling for with other actions he has undertaken, in , earned him tens of millions which tend to focus on symbolic rather than of Twitter followers and a ban on travel substantive changes. MBS wishes to attract to the . Since the wave of international investment, but he needs to arrests in 2017, al-Arefe’s Twitter account change Saudi Arabia’s image, especially has focused on uncontroversial topics, such after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi as the specificities of ritual washing prior inside the Saudi Consulate in in October 2018. Therefore, he is interested

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in improving Saudi Arabia’s international they deem in violation of Islamic law, reputation without fundamentally altering such powers have now been shifted to the the structures that maintain control by ordinary police.25 Where MBS has truncated the House of Saud. He demonstrated this the power of the religious establishment, it by arresting several female activists that is to consolidate power into the central state pushed for the right to drive: although and specifically, to boost his own control. he implemented their demands, some of A trio of Arab and Islamic summits held them remain imprisoned, as evidence that in Mecca in late May 2019 demonstrate that public displays of activism will be met with despite social reforms, the Al Saud feel they retaliation, even if the official position aligns can continue to leverage the religious soft with that of the demonstrators. power of the holy city to signal their role Gender equality is one of the areas as political leaders. It remains to be seen where Saudi Arabia’s reputation is especially whether Muslim allies will continue to follow poor, and the prohibition against female Saudi Arabia’s lead. drivers was publicly visible. The Saudi state Some might argue that the lack of has gradually stripped away aspects of the meaningful religious reform is not due to guardianship system that previously had a lack of commitment on the part of the imposed more legal restrictions on women’s crown prince but is instead due to the rights than any other government in the deeply conservative nature of Wahhabi world, with measures that allow Saudi Islam. However, this view attributes women to acquire passports and travel causality to the religion, rather than focusing abroad without the permission of a male on the actors responsible for deploying relative, register births, marriages, and the religion, namely the Saudi state. Wahhabism, like any divorces, and act as guardian to children Wahhabism, like any religious tradition, religious tradition, is who are minors.24 Other aspects of the is not unchangeable and can be made to not unchangeable and guardianship system remain in place, serve different agendas. Furthermore, can be made to serve however, and implementation of the latest similar to Islamic law or shariah, which is changes has not been even across the board, silent or inconclusive on many aspects of different agendas. with women taking to Twitter to complain life, the writings of Ibn Abd that they could not order passports via the al-Wahhab are insufficient to provide a government’s online portal. conclusive structure for government.26 The imprisonment of wealthy individuals If an influential leader wished to deploy in the Ritz-Carlton in November 2017 a more “moderate” form of Wahhabism, represents a similar policy that earned he or she could do so. Analysis of Ibn Abd widespread media attention without causing al-Wahhab’s writings has demonstrated fundamental changes. By targeting high ways in which the 18th century cleric profile citizens, even members of his own expressed views that would appear less family, MBS assuaged the feelings of Saudi radical than other interpretations. For citizens who have watched in frustration as example, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab prioritized the top tier of Saudi society has benefited the preservation of life and the family unit, from decades of corruption and nepotism. even of those considered enemies. Other The Ritz-Carlton affair was intended to interpretations, such as those of the appeal to young Saudis that see MBS as school, assert that individuals who had responsive to the wishes of his fellow attacked the Muslim community lost all Millennials, but also served to consolidate rights, whereas Ibn Abd al-Wahhab argued the Crown Prince’s power. that the marital bonds must be preserved, Curtailing the “religious police” even for attackers.27 Like all religious also constitutes a largely superficial traditions, Wahhabism can be interpreted to change. While the religious police, or the serve different agendas. mutawaeen, are no longer permitted to roam the streets and malls to punish those

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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ENDNOTES

Using religion as a tool of political control 1. Pascal Menoret, The Saudi Enigma: A is consistent with past practice in Saudi History (: Zed Books, 2005), 48-49. Arabia. It does not appear that MBS is about 2. Michael Herb, All in the Family: to tamper with an approach that has formed Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in a key basis for the projection of domestic the Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany, NY: stability and regional influence for decades. State University of New York Press, 1999), 87. As MBS has expanded and consolidated 3. Guido Steinberg, “The Wahhabi Ulama power within Saudi Arabia, he has shown and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present,” himself willing to take on domestic rivals, in Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political using coercive power more aggressively Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, eds. Paul than have past Saudi leaders. Reports that Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst & the public prosecutor is seeking the death Co, 2005), 21-23. penalty in the trial of Salman al-Awda 4. Andrew Hammond, The Islamic and Awad al-Qarni, two former Sahwa Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia leaders, as well as TV personality Ali (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 72-74. al-Omari, illustrate the change. al-Awda 5. Ibid. faces trial for his public criticisms of the 6. Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Saudi monarchy and for stirring public Arabia: Violence and Pan- Since discord.28 The cleric’s silencing is less a 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University factor of a religious crackdown than part of Press, 2010), 24. a broader suppression of critical voices that 7. Rachel Bronson, “Understanding also claimed the life of Jamal Khashoggi in U.S.-Saudi Relations,” in Saudi Arabia in the October 2018. Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign If he retains his position, MBS may Affairs, eds. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman yet evolve into a religious reformer. (London: Hurst & Co., 2005), 385-86. However, his behavior to date appears to 8. Hammond, Islamic Utopia, 76. demonstrate that he is motivated primarily 9. Madawi al-Rasheed, “Divine Politics by considerations of the consolidation of Reconsidered: Saudi Islamists on Peaceful power. The quest for political authority in Revolution,” LSE Middle East Center Paper advance of becoming king has led MBS to Series 07 (2015): 8. take on clerical opponents, such as al-Awda, 10. Thomas Hegghammer, “Islamist who represent an alternative political Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi future, rather than their theological views or Arabia,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 practices. Unless and until MBS makes any (2008): 701. substantive move to the contrary, he will 11. Steinberg, “Wahhabi Ulama,” 30-31. remain a political practitioner rather than a 12. Sarah Yizraeli, Politics and Society religious reformer. in Saudi Arabia: The Crucial Years of Development, 1960-1982 (London: Hurst & Co., 2012), 194-95. 13. The crackdown aimed to stifle emergence of a domestic opposition movement. See Hegghammer, “Islamist Violence,” 704. 14. Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2011), 143.

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15. Angus McDowall, “Saudi Cleric Issues AUTHORS Rare Warning in Call for Reform,” , March 16, 2013. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., is a Baker 16. Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Islamists Institute fellow for the Middle East. Working and the Arab Spring,” LSE Kuwait Program across the disciplines of political science, Paper No. 36, May 2014, 2. international relations and international 17. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The political economy, his research examines Future Has Arrived for Mohammed bin the changing position of Persian Gulf states Salman,” , November 9, 2017. in the global order, as well as the emergence 18. “Saudi Arabia’s Heir to the Throne of longer-term, nonmilitary challenges to Talks to 60 Minutes,” CBS News, March 19, regional security. 2018. 19. “Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Annelle R. Sheline, Ph.D., is the Zwan Arabia: A Deeper Look,” Project on Middle Postdoctoral Fellow, jointly appointed by East Democracy, Washington, D.C., March the Baker Institute’s Center for the Middle 21, 2018. East and the Boniuk Institute for Religious 20. Yizraeli, Politics and Society in Saudi Tolerance. Her research focuses on religious Arabia, 77-78. authority in the Middle East, specifically 21. David Pearce, “What Next in Saudi the intersection of religious and national Arabia after Khashoggi?,” November identities in the Arab monarchies. 30, 2018, https://daviddpearce.com/ blog/139594/what-next-in-saudi-arabia- after-khashoggi#/. 22. Jim Krane, Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf (New York: Press, 2019). See more Baker Institute Reports at: 23. Christopher Boucek, “Saudi www.bakerinstitute.org/baker-reports Fatwa Restrictions and the State-Clerical Relationship,” Sada: Middle East Analysis, This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who Carnegie Endowment for International participated in a Baker Institute project. Peace, October 27, 2010. Wherever feasible, this research is 24. Stephen Kalin, “Cleared for Takeoff: reviewed by outside experts before it is Saudi Women Start Exercising Their Newest released. However, the views expressed Right,” Reuters, August 22, 2019. herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily 25. Nathan Brown, “Saudi Arabia is represent the views of Rice University’s Moving to Rein in Its Religious Police. Sort Baker Institute for Public Policy. Of,” , August 16, 2017. 26. Madawi al-Rasheed, “Mecca © 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute Summits: Saudi Arabia is Using Holy Sites to for Public Policy Score Political Goals,” , May This material may be quoted or 30, 2019. reproduced without prior permission, 27. Stephane Lacroix, Awakening provided appropriate credit is given to Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in the author and Rice University’s Baker Contemporary Saudi Arabia, trans. George Institute for Public Policy. Holoch (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Cite as: Press, 2011), 4. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian and Annelle 28. Natana Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: R. Sheline. 2019. Mohammed bin From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad Salman and Religious Authority and (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Reform in Saudi Arabia. Issue brief 208-209. no. 09.19.19. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

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