2019

DiplomaticCrisis–InvasionPlans?–TensionsEscalate–Al-Jazeera,the ‘Go-To’TelevisonChannel–SoaringDefenceExpenditure–QatarLeaves OPEC –NolongertheWorld’sLargest LNG Exporter

For Qatar to find itself, in 2017, involved in a surprisingly bitter feud with four of its neighbours and allies was a geo-political surprise. For that feud to drag on into its third year was, for many neutral observers, beyond belief. Relations be- tween Qatar and its close neighbour Bahrain might occasionally have been oc- casionally bad-tempered; but no more than that. And relations with Dubai, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) commercial centre, had always been viewed as close rather than antagonistic. Since independence, in many respects Qatar had become considered one of the most open and advanced of the Arab na- tions. It had, invested a substantial amount of resources into attracting re- nowned university institutions and opening world-class museums, designed by great architects such as IM Pei or Jean Nouvel. Considered by many to be the re- gion’s most successful Arabic television network with a wide-ranging Eng- lish-language service, the Al-Jazeera broadcaster had its headquarters in Doha, the emirate’s capital city. The current emir, the UK educated Tamim al-Thani (aged 37), had assumed power in a peaceful transition in 2013. He had sur- rounded himself with a new breed of competent (if inexperienced) young man- agers who after only four years in power faced the gravest diplomatic crisis in the short history of their small country. To pick a squabble with one neighbour (the UAE) might be seen as unfortunate, with two (including near neighbour Bahrain) as careless. But to do so with four, including the regional heavy- weightsEgyptandSaudiArabia,smackedofincompetence.

TransatlanticRipples At the time, in mid-2018, no direct links between the blockade of Qatar and the ‘resignation’ of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, were obvious. However, it later emerged that the countries lobbying hardest for Tillerson’s removal from his post had been Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which were frustrated by Tillerson’s attempts to mediate and end the blockade of Qatar. One report in the New York Times even suggested that the UAE ambassador to Washington was aware that Tillerson would be forced out three months before he was fired inMarch2018.

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The US based The Intercept newsletter reported on a Tillerson intervention in the summer of 2017, reportedly to stop a Saudi-led, UAE-backed plan to in- vade Qatar. The reports came from State Department and US intelligence sources. In the days and weeks following the imposition of the Qatar blockade Mr Tillerson had urged Saudi Arabian officials not to take military action against Qatar. US State Department and press accounts had described Tillerson’s moves as part of an effort to reduce tensions in the Gulf, rather than as an attempt by Tillerson to avert a Saudi Arabian or UAE-led military opera- tion. According to The Intercept Secretary of State Tillerson had urged Saudi King Salman, the then Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir not to attack Qatar or otherwise escalate hostil- ities. Mr Tillerson also asked the (then) Defence Secretary Jim Mattis to call his counterparts in Saudi Arabia to explain the dangers of such an invasion. The US had an important vested interest: the Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar’s cap- ital city, is the forward headquarters of US Central Commandand home to some 10,000Americantroops. Reportedly, the pressure from Tillerson caused Mohammed bin Salman, who was, and is, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, to back down, concerned that the invasion would damage Saudi Arabia’s long-term relationship with the US. But Tillerson’s intervention did not go down well with Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince and effective ruler of Abu Dhabi. Later that June, Mo- hammed bin Salman would be named crown prince, leapfrogging over his cousin to become next in line for the throne after his elderly father. His ascen- sionsignalledhisgrowinginfluenceoverthekingdom’saffairs. Allegedly, according to US intelligence sources, Qatari intelligence agents working inside Saudi Arabia had discovered the invasion plan in the early sum- mer of 2017. Tillerson had acted after the Qatari government notified him and the US embassy in Doha. Months later, intelligence reporting by the US and UK apparentlyconfirmedtheexistenceoftheplan. The invasion plan, as devised by the Saudi and UAE Crown Princes was to in- volve Saudi ground troops crossing the land border into Qatar, and, with mili- tary support from the UAE and advancing past the US air base, Saudi forces were toseizeDoha. The Intercept quoted Robert Malley, President and CEO of Crisis Group and a former Middle East adviser to President Barack Obama, as saying that since the summer of 2017, Qatari officials had consistently told him that their country had been threatened with invasion. ‘There is little doubt that senior Qatari offi- cials with whom I spoke were convinced – or at least acted as if they were con- vinced – that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been planning a military attack on