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9/11 FBI Report 2004 02(Feb) mmmm M a a , aaaaH a aaa iiui H Q x 1 $2 K! F R L 5&#39; ,-1,i-:l}§§1_-"EX-L"?;ZI?£I>i;2;i@a?;-1Y,I=: Law Enfarcament Sensitive Summary of Penttbom Investigation Q , Prepared by Penttbom Team Roam 1B-999 February 29, 2004 Law Enforcement Sansitive H ¢ sauna-3844 ~ MISC1ama;j¥a%%W,aWaaaia{avaa-1? aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa iv Law Enforcement Sensitive PENTTBOM CASE SUMMARY 0212912904 The fulinwingis a "Law En.n&#39;c_en1c11t_Sensitivrz"ofznaicriais versirm relevant E13 thc PEN ITBDMinvestig;ati0n_. Recipientsshould forwardadditional pertinentinflurmatiun the-:ta PENTFBGM InvestigativeTeam at FBI Headquarters {Room{B599} 02~32¢$~9060!. This documentmay begiven toother LawEnfomement Agencieswhu havea legitimate need inmow. The ccmtents 0fthis documsntmay nothe reproducedfor pubiicazionw Fiald Divisicmsshould heaware thatany analyticalproducts created.containizzg information relatingTQ the19 Hijackers,associates, orevents sf9E1 M11must beappreved byshe PENTTBOM InvestigativeTeam. 1 Law Enforcement Sensitive MISC. REQ. #§4& 900003845 v Law Enforcement Sensitive nzmr-1&4 I. In; mducun II. Ea Pt! Wj_g,ned &#39;in_Yes!iga§ian_T__;1 , , , , , V , _ Diets, , , , , , , , ,Y A. Travei of Non-Pilat Hijackers to Aighanistan B. Training in Afghanistan for tha Pilots i". Hamburg Piints ii. Hanjaur C. Ghtaining US Visas by the Pikrts i. Al~$lmhhi ii. Jarrah iii Atta iv. Binalshihh v. A!-»HZazmi vi. Hanjour D, Flight Training Research and Appiicaons Arrival in the US by the Hijacker Leadership i. Aldviihdhar and Al-H:1zmi ii. Hanjour iii. Atta and Ai»SheI1hi iv. Jarrah 2 vLaw Enfnrcement Sensitive MISC, mg. #4:; 066003846 "yr Law Enforcement Sensitive F. Initial Financing G. Flight Training L Al-Hazmi anti Al-Mihdhar ii. Hanjour iii. Atta and Al-Shehébi iv. J arrah H. Gbtaiming US Visas by "Musciti" Hijackcrs I. Internatiunai Travei by Hijackers i. Germany Meeting - Attzn and Binaishihh ii. .»r-kl-Shehhi Travais to Morecco and Egypt iii. Binalshibh Travals tn Afghanistan: iv. J arralfs Overseas Trips J, Seiectied Domestic Travei by Hamburg Pilats i. Aria, A!-Shehhi and Jarrah Travel to Gexmgia and Virginia ii. Atta, A!-Shelahi and Jarrah Return to Florida K. Arrival ofkernaining Hijackers and Seeemd Wave of Financing i. Eatam AI-Suqami and Waleed Al»Shehri ii. Majed Moqed and Ahmed Aihiamdi iii. Hanna AL-Ghamdi, Ahmed Al--Nami am! Muhaud A!~Shehri. iv. Ahmed Akaznawi and WailA1~Shehri 3 Law Enforcement Sensitive 92 1 misc. RE-Q. #¢4 OOGGGBB47 Law Enforcement Sensitive v. Faye: Banihammad and Saeed ,Al~Gh amdi vi. Abdulaziz Al-Omani and Salsm Aléazmi vii. Khalid Al-Mihdhar L. Test Flights Taken by the Hijackers i. All-Shemai ii. Jarmh iii, Atsa iv. Waleed Al»Shehri v. Hanjaur and AI-Hammi M. All-Hazmfs Meetings with Atta. and Hanjour &#39; i. Alia Passibly Meets with AI-Hazmi in June 2031 ii. Al-Hazmi 211113 Hanjaur after Apparent Meeting with Atta in June 2001 iii. Atta Possibly Meets with Ahazmi in Early Jaxly 2001 N. Hijacker activities during July and Augamt Mill} i. Atta Travels to Spain Again ii; Atta Meets" with Al-»I1azmiin Lats: July 2301 iii. Atta Meets with Al-Haz-mi in lilarly August 2001 iv. Atta Travels to Las Vegas, NV, with Al-I-lazmi and H:m§uur v.. Hijackers Purchase Knives vi. Hijackers Continue Gym Training and Check Flights 4 Law Enforcement Sensitive mac. REQ. #-aa 6¬100038-48 """ "I Law Enfnrcement Sensitive 92 G. Finai Preparations _ i. Jarrah Travabi to Maryland ii. Atta and Akiiazmi Search fur Flights fur @1110} iii. Purchase 01&#39; P1s1neL Tickeis far 9&#39;21 H91 iv. Return of Excess Ikxuds to Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi l P. Final Movement of Hijaekers- Leading Up to September 11, 2001 i. American Airlines Flight 11 Hijackers ii. United Airlines Flight 93 Hijackers iii. United Airlines Flight 175 Hijackers iv. American Airlines Flight &#39;7? Hijmzikars Q. The Events of September 11, .2681 I &#39; i. American Airlines Fiight 11 Hijackers United Aiflinées Flight V175 Hi_iackers~ v iii. American Airlines Flight 77 Hiiackers iv. United Airlines Flight §3 Ii&#39;ijacker.s R. Other Subjects i. AH Abdul Mi aka Ammar Al.-»Bal.uchi aka Isam Mansom" ii. Briustafa Ahmed A!-Haws-awi. I iii Ramzi Bjnalshibk iv. Zacarias Mnussaoui 5 i Law Enforcement Sensitive i _ M-15¢ REQ {M4 990333849 ,--_ __ _-_-_-»_ ___________ _ _?___-_-_--__ _ _ ::::_~_~:_~:_ 777 &#39; &#39;7&#39; &#39; Law Enfnrcemcmt Sensitiw: Fl vi. Khalid Shaikh Mohamed {KSM! vii. Said Baha§i viii, Zlakariya Essabar ix. Mnshabvab Ahamlan. x. Mounir El~&#39;Motassadeq xi. Abdeighani Mzaudi Hi. Qlgggg i. Funding af the Hijackers ii. Returning funds by the Hijackers iii. Movement of funds ta Mouss-aoui IV. Praiect Bgggiggk V. §££!;mheri1_li ij a §k§§?,Q am1:1onali!;ies 6 Law Enforcement Sensitive misc. REQ. #44. @Q,@9°335@ Law E»nf0rc:ement Sensitive L Intratliwtion LES!Th: termrist. attacksagainst th United States{US} on 9:1 lit}! , werethe cuitninatiun sfaver a.decade ofrheteric, planning,coordiliatioti antitmnrist actionby USAMA BIN LAIIFEN URL! andthe Al Qaeda organizationagainst theUS andits allies.URL andA1. Qaedii considerthemselves involvedin a "Hwy War" against theUS, The FBI, with its titsmestic anti irntcismatitmalcountertsrrorism. partners,has conductedinternational ternerisminvestigations targeting UEL, A1 Qaetiaand assnciatedterrorist gmups.a,t1dindivitiuals forsevarai ytrars. {LES} In $95, UBL isaued therst sfia series §Jf_f?UWi3Sthat deciaredjihad an theUS, Bash successivefatwaescalated, in tune and scale,the hoiywar to be madt: againstthe US.The iastfatwct, issuttdin 2.198, denianiicdthat Muslims worldwidc kill Aniericazns, bathmilitary and civiiitut, whereverthey ccsuidbe found. Ti1l&#39;¬E5~Hii3I1ih8i8Kl,in 5198, UB1. reiterated» this edictat a press conference, The US Embassiesin. Nairabi,Kenya, andDar asSaiasmt, Tanzania,were bombed onSW93. The Embassy Bumbingstrial trzireg 5&#39;tg_{§§;g.__llBL,tit! in New er York pmvictsd therst public pmof that URL was cnnnccttidt0 acts nfterrorism tlgitlithe US, LES! in the couxse ofthe Embassy"Bombings tria1,.itwasproved that Al Qaeda existed. Through evidenceand witnessstatements, includingstatements byants nfthe faundingmembers tifril Qascia, it was shown that A1 Qaeda was zm.extrems1y organizedgroup whiehusad sophisticatsd, tschriciiogyand equipment.It was aisu madeciear that A1.Q:1eiia stsught the tiestructitm reftin: US, Ne-n~pub1ic infmmatiaiideveloped in other investigations indicatesthat UBL can be cormectedto numerous acts of terrorism andplzmntzd actscit terrmismagainst the US. LES! The PENTTBDM investigation indicatesthat the W1. it./01.attzic-ks wart:also attributable to UBL. §33Pii9I!@§ii£¥§§§i2£1£LQLQZQQLQ I . L-ES} TheFBI PENTTBOMinvestigation hasinvttlved altDivisions sfthe FBI, including FBI}-IQand LegatOfces aroundthe world.The Fnlimviiigis a suzninaqv"of the results ofthe invastigatitmas cf2i"29fO4. Theseresults area and axenut intendedto pruvide all of the detaiis ofthe invastigaticm. Theinvestigationi intothe attacksis continuing. "these resultswill he updated periodicallyand will be provictedto the eld. t<tttP~ Qiléilk-,,I:!3Y§Jli§JI1:?iiQll?Ilii§§i!5I" _ tn 3§§E.I1§l!5§$;@l¥_ _ LES! On.ii:27!.99, Mtthand.Ai»Sh::h;ri wasissued Saudipasspart #8982062.He tmveied fmm SaudiArab-ia to Qatar on 12f1S:&#39;*99. Tr Law Enforcement Sensitive MISC. REQ.tit 9@w@3351 Law Enforcement Sensitive LES! Un4r24!GU,_ AhmedAhduilab AhmedA1-Nami departedSauiii Arabia to theUnited Arab Emirates. LES! On6J5.?@0, AbdulzizAi-QT1&#39;iI&#39;i issued Saudi waspasspart #C165i1iin Buraidah, Saudi Arabia,expiring on625.105, >117/1fi}U,@~&#39;&i~i}B13$ideparwd SaudiArabia tnBahrain and retumeci tnSaudi Arabiathe saunaday from&h»:: UAE.Cm }&#39;f81&#39;DG,AI.-O,m.ari usedhis ATM card, iinked. tohis bankaccoum maintainedat the A1-Rahji. Bankingand InvesmwntCorporation AL Jardah branch},six Limesto makeA&#39;{M withclrawalsmm. HSBC, Shahceh Complex,Karachi, Pakistan. LES! According to gxassportsxamps, Satan:AlSuqami AA11! enteredMalaysia an 7f12ii.}i! andiieparted Malaysiafor Istanbul,Turiiay, on9~f23f¬-0. Hnwevezr,.inve;stigation has 1¢veaIedtha Turkishpassport st§1mps~tube false. §.i._1l£§i!1_i!L2»iL|__éf3.2l!i!_!l.i§_Té!!1!..fmj_tl&#39;:§.BQ!l§§ §,_i.l5_£;_g;;burg Films LES! Invesgafiiellhas revealedthe Hamburgpiloics forths 9311:131 Qperationentred Afghanistanin late Fail of 1999. Thepiiotsi who residedin Hamburg, Gerrnany, namelyAtta, AL Shehhi, Ian-ahand Binaishibh,tmveled taAfghmiistan utiiizing the route Hamburg,Gcnnany, to Istanbul, Turkey, to Karachi. Pak.istan. {LES} QniG.f23.»9§ againand on11.312/&#39;99,. AttaMohmnsd submitted an applicationvia the Internetto NationaiVisa Sewica.This numpanyimlps individualsappiy furthe USgreen card lottery fin: a $50 fats. LES! 21 11125199-. ZiadIarrah depariedHamlmrg, Geninany,to Karashi,Pakistan, via istanbui, Turkey, on Turkish Airlines ight 1.662. andTurkish Airiincs ight I656. Jsmah returned toHamburg, Gemzany,on U3U00. {LE3} Fourdays later,on 11/29399,Mohaméci Attadeparted Hamburg,Gennany, to Karachi, Pakistan,via istanhui,Turkey, onTuridsh Airlinesight 1662and TurkighAjigg. flight 1056..Iilitialiy, on 1U2.5f9§, Atia using thename Elmnir!-p921rcha.seda me way ticket,with cash, fromHamburg ta Karachi via Istanbul. Hedid notuse thisticket. He exchanged thisticket on 12122399and madean additionalpayment withhis DresdnerBank Visacard far anew ruund trip ticket. Atta returnedtn Hzmlburg,Gemaany, an2f25!&#39;00. 4 {LES} On12_f6;99, RamziBinaishihh departedHamburg, Gennany,to Kaxachi, Pakistan, 8 Law TElni&#39;orce»mentSensitive Miac. REQ. #44 3399&#39;33952
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