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JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

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JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment S E C RE T / / NOFORNI I 2O3II2O8 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION,GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR 8 December2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthern Command. 3511 NW glst Avenue. Miami,FL33172 SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee Ammar al-Baluchi.ISN: USSPK- 010018DP(S) JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment l. (S/NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Ammar al-Baluchi o Aliases and CurrentlTrue Name: Mustafa al-Baluchi. Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali. MohammadAli. Amanullah.Habib. Jammv o Place of Birth: al-Ahmadi. Kuwait (KU) o Date of Birth: 29 August 1977 o Citrzenship: Kuwait o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9PK-01001SDP 7 (U//FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. 3. (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis a seniormember and planner of al-Qaidaas well as the nephew of al-Qaida military leaderKhalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM). Under KSM's direction,detainee helped plan and facilitateal-Qaida operations and personnel, CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON: E.O.12958, AS AMENDED,SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20311208 S E C RE T // NOFORNI I 2O3II2O8 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk Source: the New York Times S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9PK-01001SDP(S) including the travel of 9ll1 hijackersto the United States(US). He is affiliated with numerousother senior leadersof al-Qaida including Usama Bin Laden (UBL), Jemaah Islamiya (JI)r leaderRiduan bin Isomuddin aka (Hambali), Sayf al-Adl, Walid bin Attash aka (Khallad), Shaykh Said al-Masri, Hamza Zubayr and others. Detaineehelped facilitate the travel and finances for at least 13 of the 9/11 hijackers as they left the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the US. He was also involved in numerousplots targeting the US and other western assets,and acted as a liaison for messagesand money for KSM and Indonesianal- Qaida leaders.2He is also responsiblefor arranging the evacuationof al-Qaida fighters and families fleeingAfghanistan (AF). IADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.I JTF-GTMO has determined this detaineeto be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interestsand allies. o A MEDIUM threatfrom a detentionperspective. o Of HIGH intelligencevalue. 4. (S/NF) Detainee'sAccount of Events: The following sectionis based on a consolidation of several accountsfrom various significant individuals in order to assemblea feasible timeline. a. (S/NF) Prior History: In 1985or 1986,detainee left Kuwait to attendthe Umrah (minor hajj) in SaudiArabia (SA). In 1988,detainee, his immediatefamily and other relatives moved to Iran (IR) while his father stayedto continue working in the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Hajj. In 1993,while attendingboarding school inZahedan,IR, Ramzi Yousef s' family contacteddetainee to let him know that Ramzi would be staying inZahedan for eye surgery. From 1996 to 1998, detaineetraveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), where he acquiredhis Microsoft certification online from the US, but took the required classesat the Universal Computer Institute in Karachi. He also attendedcomputer classesin Karachi at PetromanElectronics Institute and at a unidentified third school. It was during this time that he becameinterested in attendingjihad training. In August 1998, after graduating from school, his father directed him to find employrnentin the UAE.* ' Analyst Note: JemaahIslamiya is a Tier I target. Tier I targetsare defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstratedthe intention and the capability to attack US personsor interests. '. TD-314t61768-03 3 Analyst Note: Ramzi Yousef is the 1993 World Trade Center bomber. ' TD-314/52606-05, Analyst Note: Within this document there seemsto be an error on the datesfor his arrival in the UAE. It was originally statedas 5 June 1998; however, later in the document it is labeled as 5 August 1998. 2 S E C RE T //NOFORNI I 2O3II2O8 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk Source: the New York Times s E c RE T //NOFORN I I 20311208 JTF-GTMO-CDR SLIBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9PK-010018DP(S) b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detaineestated that he was "self-recruited,"for jihad having been inspired by the martyrdom of KSM's brother Asim and by hearing Ramzi Yousef speakabout jihad in kan.5 Detaineebecame more interestedin joining thejihad after he left Iran in 1996 through his exposureto Arab culture and ideology in Pakistanand the UAE.6 While in Pakistan,detainee expressed interest in obtaining militant training from the camps in Afghanistan but could not fit the training around his studies. He felt he would not be very successfulwith the training so instead,he offeredhis servicesto his uncle,KSM, who usedhim to facilitatethe activitiesof the 9/11 hijackers.T c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: At the end of 1999,KSM requesteddetainee to transfer funds to 9l11 hijacker, Nawaf al-Hazmi, in the US. From 1999 to their ultimate missionin 2001, detaineehelped facilitate 13 of the 9/11 hijackers'travel, obtainingvisas, setting up bank accounts,and providing for their lodging in the UAE prior to leaving for the US. During 2000, detaineealso met and facilitated Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi aka (Zahir), an al-Qaidafinancial manager, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh,originally intendedtobe aglIl hijacker,but he was not able to obtain a US entry visa.o After detainee'scompany closed their businessin the UAE, detainee'sUAE visa was revokedand he traveledto Pakistanand "looking then on to Afghanistan for training." After the fall of the Taliban in November 2001,detainee assisted KSM in organizingthe movementof al-Qaidaoperatives and their familiesto safehouses in Pakistan. Lr December2001, detaineearranged e-mail accounts and travel arrangementsfor shoebombers Richard Reid and Issa al-Britani'aka (Dhiren Barot) aka (Abu Issaal-Hindi) aka (Sajid Badat).r0In late December200I, detaineeplanned an operationto attack a military basein Quetta,PK." In January 2002, various senior al- "dirty Qaida leadersbegan to arrive in Karachi. From March to April 2002, bombers" Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed arrived in Karachi and detaineescheduled their travel and set up communicationswith them. From May to June2002, detainee andHamzaZubayr beganplotting to carry out simultaneousattacks in Karachi againstthe US Consulate, westernresidences, and westernersat the local airport. On 11 September2002, raids were conductedon the housesof HamzaZubaw and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the DefenseArea of t to-:t+/sst33-os uto4rutruzltos 7ro-z rur sze06-05, TD-3 I 4/55 I 33-05 t tr-3 t+lszooo-os n NEWS WIRE - AP - 09-AUG -2004, AnalystNote: This article sourcedKU-O10010 as statingthat KU-010010 sentIssa al-Britani to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,in late 1999or early 2000 to meet with ID-O10019. This is also when, in January2000, the leadersmet at the home of Yazid Sufaat to plan the 9ll1 attacks and the USS Cole attack. On 16 January 2002, a US federal grand jury indicted Richard Reid on nine counts, including use of a weapon of mass destruction and attemptedmurder. toto-3r4/o82or-04 rr Analyst note: This operation did not come to fruition. ) S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 Downloaded from The Rendition Project www.therenditionproject.org.uk Source: the New York Times S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9PK-010018DP(S) Karachi; Zvbayr was killed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured. After the raids, plans for further operationsstopped until October 2002. Detainee's activities centeredon the developmentof the plot of simultaneousattacks in Karachi, PK, from October until his capturein April 2003.'" 5. (S/NF) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) On 30 April2003 in Karachi,the PakistaniIntelligence Bureau and a team of Pakistani rangerscaptured detainee along with senior terrorist planner Walid bin Attash and '' four other suspectedal-Qaida members. According to reporting,local authoritiesalso seized150 kg of high explosivesand detonatorsduring the raid.ra b. (S) Property Held: o (S//NF) A pink perfumeb.ottle filled with atraceamount (less than % oz.) of '' potassiumcyanide poison lNot held by JTF-GTMO) c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September2006 d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detaineewas transferredto JTF- GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities againstthe United States. 6. (S/NF) DetaineeThreat: a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGH risk, ashe is likely to posea threat to the US, its interestsand allies. b. (S//NF) Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis a seniormember and planner of al-Qaidawho facilitatedthe travel and funding of 13 of the 9/11 hijackers. Detainee participated in attack planning againstUS and western targetsand is affiliated with significant senior al-Qaida and JI personnel. Detaineefacilitated the transfer of funds from al-Qaidato JI for operationalpurposes, assisted in the creationof al-Qaidamedia
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