Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Tracking Terrorist Financing By Michael E Gray

1 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Introduction

As the war on terror has entered it seventh year, efforts to dismantle terrorist financial networks remains an essential part of the strategy. More than 140 millions dollars in terrorist assets have been frozen. Some 1,600 bank accounts have been seized world wide. Terrorist groups have become increasingly adapted to eluding detection through the use of cash, shell companies and money laundering operations. Charities donations and informal money transfer centers (hawals) are strongly embedded in the Islamic culture have made it extremely difficult in tracking down terrorist financial links. Another fact to be considered by law enforcement is that terrorist operations can be accomplished at a relatively low cost. A good example of this is the 2005 London train bombing cost $2,000, the 2004 Madrid mass transit bombing was $10,000-$15,000, the 2002 Bali nigh club bombing was $50,0001 and the 9/11 World Trade Center attack was $400,000-$500,0002 What methods are used to fiancé these operations? Charities. At once time they were the main source of operating capital along with donations from wealthy individuals according to the CFR 2002 Task Force Report. The 2004 report does state that Saudi Arabia has taken some steps to rectify this. In the Islamic culture there are numerous charities out there and we can not monitor all of them3. Illegal Activities. A good source of income comes from the drug trade.4 Illicit Drug Trade Terrorist groups are currently interacting with transnational organized crime syndicates, especially narcotics cartels. Peruvian Shining Path and Colombian FARC guerrillas have provided mercenary security support for narcotics production and trafficking lines in South America, and there is strong evidence that the Palestinian PFLP-GC has been using infrastructure in Lebanon to support drug trafficking. In return, these terrorist groups receive enormous amounts of money, more so than in “traditional”fund-raising operations such as kidnapping and bank robbery— operations that are far riskier than supporting narcotics trafficking.

1 United Nation Report on terrorism 2 911 commission report pages 169-172 3 Roberts O Collins Alms for Jihad 4 Loretta Napoleoni expert on terrorist financing

2 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Furthermore, this interaction offers smuggling routes long established and tested by crime syndicates for drug and arms running, potentially providing terrorists with logistical infrastructure to clandestinely move people, arms and materiel5. Currently, however, the objectives and methods of terrorist groups remain significantly different that those of transnational organized crime syndicates. Terrorist groups generally seek an overthrow of the status quo, using spectacular operations that seek to attract the attention of the world. Transnational criminal organizations derive their power through a low profile, working within the existing structure, seeking not to attract the attention of “legitimate”powers. However, criminal syndicates do work for money, and there is no clear reason, given the right price, that such syndicates would not lend their logistical, communications, and transportation infrastructures to support terrorist operations. This holds two important implications for US counter-terrorism strategy. Firstly, if terrorist groups increasingly interact with organized crime syndicates, they may evolve organizationally, to adapt to such interaction. Such an organizational evolution would require a re- thinking of infiltration and targeting strategies as terrorist organizations come to resemble more closely, for example, the narcotics cartels in South America. Secondly, there is a trend of increasing lethality of terrorist attacks. The logical end of this trend is, of course, terrorist use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. If terrorist interaction with transnational crime syndicates is successful enough— especially with narcotics traffickers— the infrastructures of these interactions might be robust enough to provide terrorists with real opportunities for WMD proliferation, including the introduction of a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. The implications of such an infrastructure are obvious. Just how much of a group's financing comes from drugs varies widely, Mr. Thompson6 said. "With the Islamic fundamentalists, it is maybe 25 to 30 per cent. It's probably the single biggest money earner." The drugs trafficked by Islamic terrorists include marijuana from Lebanon, but more commonly they distribute heroin. Afghanistan is one

5 Neal A Pollard Director Terrorism Research Center Terrorism and Organized crime Report 2004 6 John Thompson DEA spokes person

3 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac of the largest growers of opium poppies, the source of heroin, 86% of the world’s opium is grown here. Even Osama bin Laden7 may have his hands in the drug trade. According to a Russian report, Bin Laden has bankrolled Chechen gunmen in Dagestan with funds generated from heroin trafficking. The importance of illegal drugs to the financing of terrorism raises an obvious question. If illegal drugs are the single largest source of funding for terrorism, can you hurt terrorism by legalizing drugs? "Probably," John Thompson said. "In fact I think you could hurt it considerably." Drug policy activists have long argued that by banning drugs and putting them into the black market, Western nations have fuelled mayhem. "We have to look at the ways that our drug policies are enriching terrorist organizations just the way that they're enriching organized crime," said Eugene Oscapella8, an Ottawa lawyer and a founding member of the Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy. So far, that reconsideration hasn't happened. The G8 and the United Nations have discussed the problem of terrorist financing over the past several years, but they have never discussed drug prohibition in that light. The G8 went so far as to explicitly refuse to talk about drug legalization. This is typical for the UN Instead; they have focused on fundraising among expatriate communities and other, lesser sources of financing. British Prime Minister Tony Blair9 insisted that in striking back at terrorism, the West would have to cut off the money that pays for terrorist atrocities. There's little question that the drive against terrorism will be sweeping, taking in all the "roots and branches," including financing. But Mr. Thompson doesn't expect world governments to seriously consider whether they might cut off much of the money flowing into terrorist hands by abolishing drug prohibition. In some countries this there main source of revenue. "This is a sacred cow. It's going to be hard to kill." Refer to charts in appendix for details.

7 Russian Intelligence Report on drug trafficking 8 Founder of Foundation for Drug Policy in Canada 9 UK Prime Minister

4 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Coupon and Welfare fraud is another way that these groups are financed. Coupon redemption fraud has been a favorite financing target by terror cells and their sympathizers operating within the United States. Since 1986, terror operatives working within the U.S. have used Coupon Redemption as a method of financing operations here and abroad. This is well documented in various indictments and investigations over the years.

US vs Adam Bahhur10

In 1988 in South Florida, a $186 million dollar coupon fraud investigation was revealed. During an undercover sting operation by industry and law enforcement that was captured on video tape, the ring leader, Adnan Bahhur, pounded his chest to the undercover operatives and claimed that his uncle is George Habash, the leader of the PLFP (Palestine Liberation Front), the military arm of the PLO. Habash was a close associate of Saddam Hussein, the Dictator of Iraq.

When Bahhur was arrested, he recanted his claim to a relationship with Habash and his association with the PLFP. Where did the $186 million go? At the time of his arrest, many of his associates and co-conspirators, grocery store owners from across America, most Middle-Eastern men, came to Hollywood, Florida to reap additional financial gains from the coupon fraud scheme. The U.S. Postal Inspector and Broward County Sheriff’s Office conducted a raid that was captured on video.

This was the first indication of a national network of coupon fraudsters with alleged ties to terrorist operations. Years later, in 2003, Bahhur continued his criminal enterprise in other cities in the Midwest. He was convicted of various crimes in Tennessee and spent some time in the Federal lockup. He’s back out on American streets living and doing business in South Florida, today.

10 Trial Transcript, Indictment and newspaper accounts

5 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac AYOUB / WORLD TRADE CENTER

From 1989 through 1996 in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, another coupon fraudster, the “King of Coupons”, Radwan Ayoub, generated more than $100 million from his coupon fraud enterprise. His network stretched across America, from the Northeast, into the South, the Midwest and Texas. His claim to fame is that his coupon fraud operations used a specific storefront in Brooklyn, New York, “Hamada Video”, this was the main operations building for the 1993 bombers of the World Trade Center. This location was used by Ayoub to ship all of his fraudulent coupons after the packages were received from cutting houses throughout the Northeast. The “Hamada Video”storefront was the main meeting place for the planners of the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. That bombing killed six people and injured more than one thousand. Sheik Rachman11 and his co-conspirators in the bombing, including red head, Mahmud Abouhalima, chief planner of the bombing, often met at this location. Mahmud Abouhalima was the manager of Hamada Video. The storefront and basement was used to gather supplies for preparation of the bombing, according to the owner of the building. Abouhalima lived on the third floor of the building. The Sheik, Abouhalima and others in the bombing conspiracy were supported by coupon fraud. They are currently serving 200 plus years in U.S. Federal Penitentiary12.

11 The Blind Sheik also involved in the Sadat assination 12 Trial transcript Indictment newspaper articles

6 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac US vs ZEIN ISA

In St. Louis, Zein Isa was running the Abu-Nidal13 terror cell from his home and business, a grocery storefront. Isa and his associates, a network of Middle-Eastern grocery store owners, ran a mill of coupon fraud activities, stolen goods, adulteration of baby formula and trafficking in stolen treasury notes.

He became famous, while trying to remain under the radar of the U.S. government, when he murdered his daughter, Palestina, while his wife (not the girl’s mother), held her down. She was stabbed numerous times. Her murder screams were captured on a Federal bug, but the response was too late to save her life. At the time, a task force of Federal law enforcement agents, the U.S. Postal Inspector’s Office and the Secret Service and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division, in addition to state police and local law enforcement were investigating Isa and his terror network. They failed to act on the network. With the murder of Isa’s daughter and his subsequent arrest, the task force disbanded. Isa’s network of coupon fraud redemption associates stretched across America into Mexico. His organization was closely associated with Saddam Hussein, the Iraq dictator. Isa died while serving a life sentence in the Federal Penitentiary. The three coupon fraud networks described above used the coupon clearinghouses to defraud hundreds of American Corporations out of hundreds of millions of dollars over period of more than ten years.

The activities of those who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, murdered a daughter to protect secrets and paid millions for funding operations are all suspected of supporting terror cells within the United States and the Middle East.

13 Designated Terrorist Organization

7 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING SERVICES

Now in 2007 International Outsourcing Services, Inc. (IOS), which has become one of the largest coupon clearinghouse operations in the United States.

IOS clears coupons for many businesses run by Middle-Eastern owners or operators. Many are not associated with terror operations but allow their businesses or names to be used by those who are terror- connected. Many of them had never submitted coupons to a coupon clearinghouse for redemption. An investigation of more than 300 stores associated with the IOS coupon fraud scheme found storefronts that did not sell grocery goods and stores which did not even exist.

Abdel Rahim Jebara, the leader of the IOS coupon fraud scheme, has residences in South Florida, New York and Ramallah, in the Palestinian territory of Israel. He sent a portion of his coupon fraud profits to Ramallah to support family members and his associates, who were recorded on tape proclaiming a “jihad in Ohio”.

IOS, with operations in El Paso, Texas; Bloomfield, Illinois; Memphis, Tennessee and Mexico is similar to the former clearinghouse locations of Seven Oaks and CRI during the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s. The Seven Oaks clearinghouse contributed funding to the Radwan Ayoub network, with more than $100 million going to financing operations for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Some of the names and locations cited in the IOS indictments and the February 2003 indictments which led to the IOS criminal investigation were found to be involved in coupon fraud operations throughout the 1990’s. This was well-documented and evidence was provided to Federal law enforcement agencies in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, but no action was taken.

8 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac In the IOS indictments some of the participants have the same names, faces, addresses and networks as those implicated in the early 1990’s. CRIMETALKAMERICA.COM finds that some of the same grocery storefronts, with the same addresses, were listed as suspect stores in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, submitting an excessive volume of coupons for redemption during those periods.

Named in the 2003 Abdel Rahim Jebra14 indictment which led to the 2007 IOS indictment is Robert McDonald15, an employee of International Data, Inc. (IDI). In 1989 McDonald was listed as a person of interest in the Northeast coupon fraud investigation. He had a relationship with the Seven Oaks clearinghouse of El Paso, Texas. An internal investigation by Seven Oaks and the Neilsen Clearinghouse (NCH) found that McDonald had a relationship with two of the employees of Seven Oaks who were receiving financial reward for their inside information from the “King of Coupons”, Radwan Ayoub, the supplier of financing to the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The coupon fraud continued on for some 17 years, involving some new players and some old ones… a similar fraud by networks and individuals with ties to Middle East terror operations.

It is obvious that the leaders of IOS benefited from the fraud schemes. Officers and shareholders of IOS financially benefited as a result of the increased coupon redemption billings, an estimated $250 million (filed in an affidavit for forfeiture and seizure by the U.S. government).

These profits are at the expense of our American security. IOS management padded their pockets along with the coupon fraud network and terror operations.

Will the U.S. Government, through the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the IRS Criminal Division and the FBI recover the profits from this international coupon fraud and/or from the individual executives and fraudsters involved? This is unknown.

…

14 Indictment 15 The inside man

9 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac What about the 300+ stores that were part of this fraud scheme? Who will explore these store operations and their financial benefits from the coupon fraud? Will we bring them to justice? These are questions that are still unanswered. It was reported that some $40 million in additional fraudulent coupon submissions were stopped from processing. After IOS, subsidiary International Data, Inc. (IDI) discovered that the FBI was investigating. It is reported that employees destroyed documents, altered account information and changed financial statements. It’s also alleged that many employees were instructed to do so by IDI/IOS management. This information was obtained from conducting interviews of the employees. It is known that Zein Isa met with a shadowy subject identified as Mohamad Atta16 in Mexico, after traveling throughout South America during the 1990’s. Isa met with other terror operatives in South America and Mexico, and some within the United States. The intelligence community could not identify whether this Mohamad Atta was the same person who orchestrated the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks, and it was automatically dismissed as “no relationship”. It is easy to dismiss outright without merit or confirmation.

The indifference shown during the 1980’s and 1990’s by Federal and local law enforcement to coupon fraud and its connection to terrorism has changed since September 11, 2001. In 2007, coupon fraud and its association to terror operations are now recognized as a major crime. Combating terror funding from within the United States, the FBI and the U.S. Postal Inspector’s Office concentrated on this coupon fraud.

The welfare fraud link Corner groceries the ones tagged with graffiti and plastered with advertisements like "Chorizo $2.89" and "Eggs 89¢ a dozen”dot neighborhoods through out the country. But some of these stores aren't making their money on sausage and eggs.

More and more of these tiny pantries claim to sell millions in merchandise a year through the food-stamp program. Federal investigators are after dozens of them for ringing up phony sales and

16 Unable to confirm this meeting and determine if this the same person from 9/11

10 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac illegally handing customers cash and pocketing a sizable cut all courtesy of U.S. taxpayers.

These frauds put money in the hands of the poor to buy drugs and are helping to fund terrorism. Phyllis Fong17, the watchdog for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, says anti terrorism investigators across the country are focused on some of these crooked grocers, who authorities say reap a staggering amount of cash.

In recent years, federal prosecutors have charged store owners and employees with ripping off at least $16 million from the food- stamp program, court records show.

This electronic food-stamp program -- called Link -- was launched in 1997 to combat rampant fraud in the paper food- stamp program. The stamps were often used illegally, as black- market currency, to buy drugs. But cheaters quickly found a way to steal from the new, electronic food-stamp system, too.

The latest scam works like this:

A welfare recipient goes to a store with a Link card credited by the government with a dollar amount for groceries -- say, $100. The store clerk swipes the card through a government computer and takes credit for $100 in phony food sales. Then, the clerk hands $70 to the welfare recipient, keeping the rest as profit.

Typically, a Link participant receives $200 to $500 a month on his or her card, depending on household size. The program does not allow a participant to use a Link card to get cash.

Such Link fraud is being rooted out by the USDA -- the administrator of the program -- along with the U.S. attorney's office,

17 Inspector General USDA

11 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service and the local Police Departments.

Ringing up charges

Investigators have stepped up surveillance of the small groceries in the Link program, looking for huge spikes in electronic food-stamp redemptions and tracking them on computers.

"We recognize how serious a problem," said James Barz18, an assistant U.S. attorney who prosecutes Link cases. "With the aggressive work of the USDA and Secret Service and the Internal Revenue Service, they have made great strides in shutting off the flow of money to stores that would engage in illegal activity."

Tom Moriarty19, special investigator with the U.S. attorney's office, said about $120 million in Link benefits are redeemed monthly in the state of Illinois alone.

Federal authorities have served a flurry of search warrants on stores and kicked and removed many of them out of the Link program. Those stores did $27 million in sales in the year before they were barred from the program. Criminal investigations of those stores are under way and prosecutions are expected.

"It's like using a high-priced ATM machine. "When was the last time you went to a 7-Eleven, and the person in front of you bought $150 worth of groceries?" For every $100 redeemed in the scams, $70 typically goes back to the Link cardholder. "If the question is, 'Has a portion of taxpayer money gone to pay for drugs?' the answer is yes,"

Amar Abu Siessi is among the latest store owners charged. After a mix-up with his bail , Abu Siessi was accidentally let out of a federal lockup. Now, he's a fugitive. Abu Siessi, a Jordanian, is accused of running a scam dating to the late 1990s, making millions from a half dozen small grocery stores he's owned.

18 US Attorney working on the food stamp fraud case 19 US Attorneys Investigator

12 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac He's charged in two separate Link-fraud cases. In one, Abu Siessi's corner store at 3000 W. Addison in Chicago Ill. didn't have scanners to ring up food quickly, shopping carts or a large inventory. Yet the store claimed to do hundreds of dollars in sales a minute, court records show.

One figure jumped out at investigators: From May through October 2000, Abu Siessi's store redeemed $383,000 in Link-card benefits -- 82 percent of what other stores in the same neighborhood redeemed.

Federal prosecutors said Abu Siessi using the AKA’S -- Khaled Beh and Khaled Al Mara Beh -- to set up bank accounts to which he'd funnel the money he stole from the Link program.

They said he paid off an inspector to lie about the size of his business. The inspector worked for "Greet America20," which was under contract by USDA to evaluate stores applying for authorization to participate in Link. The inspector was caught taking bribes from store owners. After she was arrested, the inspector worked undercover and implicated Abu Siessi. The inspector still could face criminal charges.

Terrorists are getting a piece of this fraudulent operation

Abu Siessi's lawyer, Joseph Di Natale, said his client actually was the victim, scammed by family members. They lent him money to open grocery stores, made money off his Link sales and then fled the country, Di Natale said. He said Abu Siessi's uncle sometimes sent his nephew to lunch, and then rang up hundreds of thousands of dollars in Link sales without his knowledge. Very unlikely story.

Di Natale21, who has represented about a dozen of the Link- fraud defendants, acknowledged that some of the money sent overseas might end up in the hands of terrorists. But it's not

20 Company under contract with USDA to investigate applicants for the program 21 Di Natale attorney for many of the grocery stores investigated for violating the rules of the program

13 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac necessarily because store owners agree with terrorists' ideology, Di Natale said. In some countries, a ruling group might demand a cut of money wired overseas, sort of like paying "juice" on a mob loan. "If the money goes to the other side, the terrorist is getting a piece of it."

Most of the store owners he dealt with had used their ill-gotten money for legal investments, Di Natale said. They bought used car lots, strip malls, big homes, pricey cars and sometimes paid off mistresses, he said. Banks often caught the fraud after noticing a huge spike in deposits,

Like lining up for Concert tickets

Blue Bird Food Market on the Southwest Side of Chicago is another store targeted by the government. The bodega sits on the corner of 24th and Hamlin in Little Village. Federal investigators suspect most of the money the store earned last year was from welfare fraud.

Blue Bird22 representatives are accused of paying an inspector to exaggerate the grocery's inventory to qualify for the food-stamp program, court records show.

Blue Bird allegedly redeemed $139,000 in benefits over the last five months of 2005 -- 20 times the monthly sales estimate the store gave the government to get into the program, according to a federal affidavit for a warrant to seize money from a bank account Blue Bird held.

No criminal charges have been brought against the store or the owner as of yet. Prosecutors would not comment because the investigation is ongoing. The owner would not comment.

Poor people often line up outside such stores like a crowd camping out for Concert tickets, officials stated. During one investigation in 2002, federal agents counted about 80 Link users standing outside one South Side of Chicago grocery R & F Foods near the Englewood police station to get cash.

22 Corruption of a inspector

14 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac It was late on July 31 and they were waiting for the state to credit their cards with benefits after midnight -- the first day of the month.

Federal agents watched the cardholders "yelling, jostling and shoving in line" outside the store in the 6000 block of South Racine Chicago.

A store employee came outside to say everyone would be let in one at a time, according to a federal agent's affidavit to back up fraud charges brought against the store's owner, Anwar Haddad23.

When the store opened, agents saw people going inside and leaving without groceries, except for an occasional soda or bag of chips.

Later that day, an informant wearing a hidden recorder presented his Link card, which had $360 in benefits on it. He received $180 in cash and Haddad took the remaining $180 by making eight phony food sales, prosecutors said.

Haddad was sentenced to 51 months in prison for fraud and ordered to repay $801,000 to the government.

Food-stamp benefits can be legally used only to buy "food or food products for human consumption, plus seeds and plants for use in home gardens to produce food24," according to the USDA.

But over and over, federal authorities have watched food-stamp recipients, who find out about crooked stores through word of mouth, use illegal cash from their Link cards to feed their drug habits, not their families.

The fraud is especially insidious because the family members of Link cardholders often wind up having to stand in line at food pantries for handouts because the Link benefits have been squandered on drugs.

23 Grocery Store owner sentenced to prison for violating the food stamp program 24 No alcohol

15 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

In a detention hearing for Munthir Hamad, who faces charges related to food-stamp fraud, prosecutors alleged that he sent thousands of dollars a month to his girlfriend in Palestine.

Experts stress such money transfers can simply involve a shopkeeper feathering the nest for retirement in his native country. But investigators are looking at the possibility that some of the fraud is financing terrorists.

Tracking terror

Chicago Police officers go through a five-day training session on terrorism and have been taught that Link fraud is one of the ways terrorists are suspected of raising money, along with sales of counterfeit cigarettes and baby formula. This training should be given to Police agencies throughout the continental United States.

One law enforcement source stated at least 25 percent of the Chicago food-stamp fraud cases he has reviewed showed bank transfers to overseas accounts. This is excellent it shows that the agencies are cooperating with each other for the common goal in stopping terrorist financing.

"They have investigated a number of food stamp trafficking cases involving the transfer of monies overseas," said Phyllis Fong25, the USDA's inspector general, in testimony before Congress.

Nationally, her office was responsible for 116 convictions, 115 indictments and $16.2 million in money recovered in 2005 in connection to Link fraud across the country.

25 USDA Inspector General

16 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac She gave Congress an estimate of $395 million in food- stamp fraud nationally, or 2.5 cents for every dollar issued, between 1999 and 2002 -- the latest figures.

The USDA has worked with joint terrorism task forces across the country and in Operation Green Quest26, which tracks overseas money transfers to terrorists, Fong said. In testimony before Congress in 2003, Fong said her office was working on active Link-fraud investigations with many of the 44 terrorism task forces across the country. In one case, $1 million was transferred overseas and two of the retailers fled the United States, Fong said.

Though prosecutors in have made no direct links from food stamp fraud to aiding terrorism, Hatem Fariz27 is charged with both.

Fariz, grocery owner, has been charged with ripping off $1.6 million from the Link program at his store T & T Foods in the 2700 block of West North Avenue Chicago Ill. between May 1999 and December 2000. He is expected to plead guilty to that charge, his lawyer has indicated. Fariz also is accused of helping terrorists in a federal case in Florida.

Prosecutors have not publicly linked his suspected welfare scam in Chicago to his alleged funding of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad28. The group is on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations. Fariz faces a retrial on a conspiracy charge in the Tampa, Fla., case after a jury there deadlocked on the same charge last year. The jury acquitted him on 25 other counts.

26 Green Quest no longer in service 27 Hatem Fariz grocery store owner 28 Terrorist Organization as per US Department of State

17 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Food-stamp fugitives

As authorities keep searching for stores scamming the program, they're also hunting for at least five other fugitives besides Abu Siessi who are charged with food-stamp fraud.

Investigators believe Fouad Al Awawada, Ismael Hussein, Saleh Suliman Mashal, Raafat Ezaldin and Mohamad Aburkbeh have fled overseas.

Al Awawada, for instance, was sentenced in 2004 to 70 months in prison for stealing $801,000 from the food-stamp program at his store, Sam's Super Save 99 at 5419 S. Ashland. A federal judge let Al Awawada attend his daughter's wedding before he was supposed to surrender to prison. He never returned.

"We think they're in Jordan," deputy U.S. marshal Rich Walenda29 said of Al Awawada, Mashal and Hussein.

Counterfeit Good Sales Police Seized Counterfeit Merchandise Los Angeles: Police along with investigative consultants and the Fashion District Security shut down a major counterfeiting operation in downtown Los Angeles. During a two-day raid, authorities seized $18.4 million worth of counterfeit designer brand merchandise from two downtown locations. On May 23, 2006, police raided a swap meet located at 500 South Los Angeles Street and found fake Tiffany jewelry worth about $6.4 million and arrested two adults. On May 24, 2006, police also raided and seized 12 million worth of counterfeit handbags, clothes, sunglasses, shoes and wallets etc. from the Fashion District Santee Alley between 12th Street and Olympic Boulevard.

29 US Marshall Service spokes person

18 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Most of the designer brand products were: Tiffany, Louis Vuitton, Prada, Coach, Bebe, Oakley and Gucci.

30 Authorities have been investigating the operation for several months and wanted to combat the rampant illegal counterfeit that has grown rapidly in the downtown area. Knockoff Dealers Could Have Designs on Terror

30 Recovered goods from various raids

19 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

A Senate panel is told that some traffickers of high-end counterfeits have ties to Hezbollah.

They said that suspected Hezbollah operatives in the U.S. and other groups accused of terrorist activity were raising as much as $30 million a year in America through the sale of counterfeit merchandise and other criminal enterprises, and sending unknown but substantial sums back home.

Hezbollah has not commented on its U.S. fundraising activities, but says it generates money for legitimate charitable activities.

U.S. and other law enforcement officials assert that some of the money has been used to fund terrorist attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere.

"There are mounting indicators of the involvement of terrorist groups and their supporters" in counterfeiting, said Stedman, who supervises the criminal investigation section of the L.A. County Sheriff's Department's emergency operations bureau. "We have encountered suspects who have shown great affinity for Hezbollah and its leadership," Stedman told the committee.

He said the evidence of suspected terrorist organizations raising money through counterfeiting was largely anecdotal. It is based on the activity of special squads of investigators who have conducted searches in Los Angeles County that produced 125 arrests, $16 million in seized merchandise and another $3.5 million in cash.

Among those involved, Stedman and other authorities say, are members of Russian, Eurasian, Asian and Lebanese organized crime cells and, more recently, traditional street gang members.

"The profits are enormous, with minimal criminal exposure," Stedman said. "In the parlance of one suspect: 'It's better than the dope business ? no one's going to prison for DVDs.' "

20 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Stedman and other witnesses at Wednesday's hearing said that they could not identify the tattooed merchant or other suspects because of ongoing investigations.

In another case, Stedman said, he came across small Hezbollah flags displayed in one suspect's bedroom during a search of a residence for counterfeit goods.

"Next to the flags was a photograph of Hassan Nasrallah," Stedman said, referring to the Hezbollah leader. The United States considers Hezbollah ? a powerful Shiite political party and militia based in Lebanon ? to be a terrorist group. But throughout much of the Middle East, it is seen as a reputable organization with a history of fighting Israeli aggression.

During another search in 2004, Stedman said, detectives found a photo album that pictured dozens of attendees at a fundraising event for the Holy Land Foundation, which has been shut down by the Treasury Department over its alleged support of Hamas, another political entity that the United States considers to be a terrorist group.

In another case, U.S. Customs officers stopped a Lebanon-bound suspect at Los Angeles International Airport and found she was carrying more than $230,000 in cash, Stedman said. Authorities later learned the woman owned a chain of cigarette shops, and seized more than 1,000 cartons of bootleg cigarettes, an additional $70,000 in cash, and wire transfers to banks throughout the world, Stedman said.

Cigarette Smuggling Operation In one high-profile case, Mohamad and Chawki Hammoud were convicted in June 2002 of funding the activities of Hezbollah from the proceeds of a sophisticated interstate cigarette-smuggling ring based in Charlotte, N.C. Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee chairwoman31, called on consumers to avoid buying counterfeit items ? even if there was only indirect evidence that terrorists were benefiting from the illicit trade.

31 Sen. Susan Collins Chairwoman of the Homeland Security Commission

21 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

But she said an investigation by her committee staff showed that terrorist groups had become increasingly involved in counterfeiting as authorities cracked down on charities and wire transfers and dried up other sources of funding.

"Each time one avenue is closed down, another one is exploited by ever-resourceful terrorist groups," Collins said. "And counterfeiting, because it is extremely lucrative and easy to get into, is the mechanism that terrorist groups have discovered and are exploiting." Smugglers with ties to terrorist groups are acquiring millions of dollars from illegal cigarette sales and funneling the cash to organizations such as al Qaeda and Hezbollah, federal law enforcement officials say, prompting a nationwide crackdown on black market tobacco (refer to link charts in appendix). The lucrative trafficking of cigarettes, known as cigarette 32diversion, is a simple scheme but difficult to stop, law enforcement officials say. The traffickers purchase a large volume of cigarettes in states where the tax is low, such as Virginia and North Carolina, transport them up Interstate 95 to states such as Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey and then sell them at a discount without paying the higher cigarette taxes in those states. With huge profits -- and low penalties for arrest and conviction -- illicit cigarette trafficking now has begun to rival drug trafficking as a funding choice for terrorist groups, said William Billingslea, an ATF senior intelligence analyst who has studied the issue extensively. Although black market cigarette sales have been around for decades, the link to suspected terrorist groups is a new and growing phenomenon. "The schemes provide terrorists millions of dollars which can be used to purchase firearms and explosives to use against the United States and others," said ATF Director Carl J. Truscott, who was appointed to head the agency two months ago after 22 years in the Secret Service.

32 ATF Report on Cigarette Smuggling

22 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Several major cases of illicit cigarette trafficking with terrorist links have involved the purchase of cigarettes in Virginia and are currently under investigation, federal law enforcement sources said, adding that there are other cases nationally with links between the traffickers and Hamas, Hezbollah and al Qaeda. "The money is so lucrative," Billingslea said. In New York City, for example, where the combined state and city tax on cigarettes is $3 a pack, a carton can sell for about $75. The trafficker can buy a carton for about $20 in Virginia, where the tax is 2.5 cents a pack, and then sell it to a mom-and-pop store in New York at a profit of about $40 a carton, ATF officials said. A smuggler can make about $2 million on a single truckload of cigarettes. A truckload contains 800 cases, or 48,000 cartons.

"People go shopping for a bargain," Billingslea said. "Why pay $75 for a carton of cigarettes when I know someone down the street who will sell me a carton for $15 less out of the back of a car?" The first large-scale cigarette trafficking case tied to terrorism was prosecuted in North Carolina in 2002. A federal jury in Charlotte convicted Mohamad Hammoud33, 28, of violating a ban on providing material support to terrorist groups by funneling profits from a multimillion-dollar cigarette-smuggling operation to Hezbollah. The jury also found Hammoud, whom prosecutors described as the leader of a terrorist cell, and his brother guilty of cigarette smuggling, racketeering and money laundering. The two men, natives of Lebanon, were accused of smuggling at least $7.9 million worth of cigarettes out of North Carolina and selling them in Michigan. Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years in prison. Prosecutors were able to prove that profits from the venture were funneled to high-ranking Hezbollah leaders. And Hammoud was caught on wiretaps speaking on the telephone with Hezbollah's military commander in Lebanon, Sheik Abbas Harake, according to trial testimony. In another case in September, Hassan Moussa Makki,34 41, a key player in a multimillion-dollar interstate cigarette smuggling ring, pleaded guilty in Michigan to providing material support for terrorism and

33 Trial transcripts ATF Report Indictment and newspaper coverage 34 Link Chart

23 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac participating in a racketeering conspiracy. Prosecutors said he also funneled money to Hezbollah. Makki, a native of Lebanon, was one of 12 people indicted last year in the scheme to buy low-tax cigarettes in North Carolina and sell them in Michigan. He was sentenced to 57 months in prison. Law enforcement sources said the terrorist links are established in these and other ongoing investigations through wiretaps and background intelligence investigations and by running the traffickers' names and those of their associates through CIA, FBI and Homeland Security databases. When a terrorist tie is suspected, the cigarette-trafficking probe becomes a joint investigation with one of 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country. The task forces, run by the FBI, are composed of federal, state and local law enforcement officials. Paul J. McNulty35, the U.S. attorney in Alexandria, last year charged 10 people with possession and distribution of contraband cigarettes, wire fraud and money laundering as part of a scheme to smuggle more than $2 million in cigarettes bought in Virginia to New York. A man whose name came up in that investigation was arrested in Detroit carrying hundreds of thousands of dollars in wire transfer receipts showing payments to people associated with Hezbollah.

In an interview, McNulty declined to comment on terrorist links in that case. But he said the ATF and other law enforcement agencies are taking cigarette smuggling "more seriously than ever." "We are pursuing cases such as cigarette smuggling because of the possibility that proceeds from that crime could end up in the hands of terrorists," McNulty said. He added that the Charlotte case made law enforcement officials more attentive to cigarette smuggling as a key source of financial support for terrorists. "There are other sources, but this is the one that has gotten the attention of law enforcement," McNulty said. Cigarette trafficking36 is difficult to stop, partly because tobacco is a legal commodity. Smuggling cigarettes becomes a federal crime only when more than 60,000 cigarettes, or 300 cartons, are purchased to

35 Paul J McNulty US Attorney Michigan 36 Link Chart

24 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac avoid payment of state tax, said Jerry Bowerman37, chief of the ATF alcohol and tobacco enforcement branch. McNulty said catching the suspects is extremely labor-intensive. In his case, he said, New York tax authorities placed advertisements in various newspapers and magazines in the New York City area offering Virginia cigarettes for sale. The ads for A&A Tobacco Wholesale listed a Virginia telephone number to place orders. A Virginia post office box was set up as a billing address. Incoming calls were switched to and recorded by an agent with the New York office of tax enforcement.

An undercover storefront location was established for A&A Tobacco Wholesale by law enforcement personnel in King George County in Virginia, where investigators from the New York tax office posed as employees and filled the cigarette orders.

When prospective cigarette purchasers telephoned the advertised number and placed orders, they were told that the cigarettes being sold would bear counterfeit joint New York State and New York City tax stamps.

DA Some cigarette bootleggers sent profits to Middle East

Despite the shock value of the dozens of plastics bags filled with cash that were piled on a table at a Hauppauge press conference, Suffolk District Attorney Thomas Spota said most of the tens of millions of dollars made by a group of illegal cigarette bootleggers arrested today was "disturbingly absent."

Joined by other county, state and federal agents who took part in the nine-month sting in which 50,000 cartons of untaxed cigarettes were seized, Spota38 said all of the nine men arrested had ties to other nations and some are suspected of sending their profits to middle eastern countries. The case has been forwarded to federal anti-terrorism authorities.

37 ATF Enforcement Chief 38 District Attorney Suffolk County NY

25 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The men bought cheap cigarettes from Indian reservations, Chinese counterfeiters and undercover agents and sold them at more than 100-percent markup to New York City merchants for resale. Spota said the scheme cost New York taxpayers tens of millions of dollars in revenue each year.

Spota's spokesman, Robert Clifford39, said the intensive investigation began in December and was led by the district attorney's office with assistance from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the state Office of Tax Enforcement, the state Organized Crime Task Force and Suffolk County police.

During that time, investigators used surveillance technology to monitor the transport of about 50,000 cigarette cartons purchased from the Poospatuck40 reservation in Mastic and the Shinnecock reservation in Southampton to various stores in New York City, Clifford said.

"Vans full of smokes" were seized in the operation, Clifford said, and the cigarettes were sold tax-free to merchants for resale. Possessing or transporting untaxed cigarettes for the intention of sale is a felony. Counterfeit tax-stamp embossers used to imprint phony state tax stamps on the cigarette packages were also seized. The defendants will be arraigned in First District Court in Central Islip today. The Jenkins Act prohibits the illegal sale of cigarettes and is listed below for your review JENKINS ACT (1) The term “person”includes corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. (2) The term “cigarette”means any roll for smoking made wholly or in part of tobacco, irrespective of size or shape and whether or not such tobacco is flavored, adulterated, or mixed with any other ingredient, the wrapper or cover of which is made of paper or any other substance or material except tobacco.

39 Spokesman Suffolk County District Attorney Office 40 Indian Reservation New York State

26 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac (3) The term “distributor licensed by or located in such State”means— (A) in the case of any State which by State statute or regulation authorizes the distribution of cigarettes at wholesale or retail, any person so authorized, or (B) in the case of any other State, any person located in such State who distributes cigarettes at wholesale or retail; but such term in no case includes a person who acquires cigarettes for purposes other than resale. (4) The term “use”, in addition to its ordinary meaning, means the consumption, storage, handling, or disposal of cigarettes. (5) The term “tobacco tax administrator”means the State official duly authorized to administer the cigarette tax law of a State. (6) The term “State”includes the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (7) The term “transfers for profit”means any transfer for profit or other disposition for profit, including any transfer or disposition by an agent to his principal in connection with which the agent receives anything of value.

376. Reports to State tobacco tax administrator (a) Contents Any person who sells or transfers for profit cigarettes in interstate commerce, whereby such cigarettes are shipped into a State taxing the sale or use of cigarettes, to other than a distributor licensed by or located in such State, or who advertises or offers cigarettes for such a sale or transfer and shipment, shall— (1) first file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State into which such shipment is made or in which such advertisement or offer is disseminated a statement setting forth his name and trade name (if any), and the address of his principal place of business and of any other place of business; and (2) not later than the 10th day of each calendar month, file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State into which such shipment is made, a memorandum or a copy of the invoice covering each and every shipment of cigarettes made during the previous calendar month into such State; the memorandum or invoice in each case to include the name and address of the person to whom the shipment was made, the brand, and the quantity thereof. (b) Presumptive evidence The fact that any person ships or delivers for shipment any cigarettes shall, if such shipment is into a State in which such person has filed a statement with the tobacco tax administrator under subsection (a)(1) of this section, be presumptive evidence

27 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac (1) that such cigarettes were sold, or transferred for profit, by such person, and (2) that such sale or transfer was to other than a distributor licensed by or located in such State. 377. Penalties Whoever violates any provision of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.

378. Jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter.

Identify Theft and False ID’s helps fund terrorism The use of stolen identities by terrorists is undoubtedly on the rise. Terrorist organizations utilize the proceeds of this crime to fund their activities and disguise the identities of their operatives. According to Judith Collins41 from the Michigan State University Identity Theft Crime and Research Lab, “All acts of terrorism enacted against the United States have been facilitated with the use of a fake or stolen Identity.” Collins indicates that 5 percent of all identity thieves are connected to terrorism and 2 percent, specifically to al-Qaida. In fact, the a-Qaida terrorist involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks had opened 14 bank accounts using several different names, all of which were fake or stolen.

Experts caution that this problem is not going away anytime soon and that the use of identity theft as a catalyst for terrorist funding and operations will rise significantly. How Terrorists Use a Stolen Identity: Terrorists are using stolen identities in the following ways: •To avoid watch lists. Several "watch lists" have been established in order to "red flag" certain individuals that are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Once "flagged," authorities then take appropriate action such as surveillance, detention etc. These watch lists are based on an individual's

41 Judith Collins University of Michigan Identify Theft Crime and Research Lab

28 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac identity. If the individual assumes another identity, they can avoid being "flagged" to authorities. •To obscure their whereabouts. An al-Qaida42 training manual stipulates that a terrorist be given a set of 5 different identities when they depart from the terror training camp. Specific instructions are given as to how to use these identities to conceal and obscure travel. By using multiple identities through the course of their travels, it is much more difficult for authorities to investigate and track their whereabouts and activities. •To fund terrorist activities. Identity theft can be a very lucrative crime. It is becoming more and more common for terrorist organizations to have specific operatives that perpetuate identity theft for the purposes of credit card and bank fraud. The proceeds from such activities are then funneled through the terrorist organization to support operational costs and particular terrorist activities. •To gain unauthorized access. Terrorists impersonate an individual or role to gain access to entry points such as airline gates, border crossings, or other facilities. Once access is gained, they then can travel freely, gather information on targets, security measures, and more to plan their terror activities.

A fugitive suspected of selling false identification papers to two Sept. 11 hijackers was arrested at Kennedy International Airport after stepping off an overnight flight from Cairo, the authorities said.

The man, Mohamed el-Atriss, 45, was seized by United States Customs officers on a fugitive warrant the Passaic County sheriff's office issued. The warrant charged Mr. Atriss, a native of Egypt, with running a fake-document mill that sold false identification papers and driver's licenses in Paterson and Elizabeth, N.J. Refer to the link charts in the appendix

What Can Be Done To Prevent It.: Preventing terrorist from using identity theft to fund and aid their terror activities is an impossible proposition, but there is much work that can be done to do a better job in hindering their success.

42 Training Manual used by Al-Qeada for there operatives

29 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Although there are too many efforts underway to list, the following are some interesting points: •Stop exporting identities to other countries. According to Judith Collins from the Michigan State University Identity Theft Crime and Research Lab, "The first step should be to reconsider the trend of exporting white-collar jobs to other countries. These jobs would not exist but for the fact that they require the processing of personal identification information." It appears as though Collins believes that as jobs are exported overseas that there is an increased likelihood that as a result, personal information is likely to end up in the wrong hands. Many of these countries that such work is being exported to, do not have appropriate information handling standards in place. "If a car is manufactured in another country, it is to meet the same standards universally," Collins explained. "We need information security standards internationally." •Fight money laundering. This continues to be focus of law enforcement. Complex money laundering software that tracks terrorist financing schemes by reviewing transactional and reference data from various databases is being used. •National driver's licenses and birth records. Many believe that a centralized management system of driver's licenses and birth records would result in the ability to share information across multiple law enforcement agencies, therefore increasing detection and investigation capabilities.

Hawalas alternative remittance system

The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering

This paper presents a description of the hawala (also referred to as hundi) alternative remittance system. Hawala is an ancient system originating in South Asia; today it is used around the world to conduct legitimate remittances. Like any other remittance system, hawala can, and does, play a role in money laundering. In addition to serving as a 'tutorial' on hawala transaction, this paper will also discuss the way in which hawala is used to facilitate money laundering.

30 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac What is hawala?

Hawala (1) is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the world. It is but one of several such systems; another well known example is the 'chop', 'chit' or 'flying money' system indigenous to China, and also, used around the world. These systems are often referred to as 'underground banking'; this term is not always correct, as they often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often heavily and effectively advertised.

The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking or even the 'chop' system, hawala makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers (2).

How does hawala work?

Hawala works by transferring money without actually moving it. In fact 'money transfer without money movement' is a definition of hawala that was used, successfully, in a hawala money laundering case.

An effective way to understand hawala is by examining a single hawala transfer. In this scenario, which will be used throughout this paper, Abdul is a Pakistani living in New York and driving a taxi. He entered the country on a tourist visa, which has long since expired. From his job as a taxi driver, he has saved $5,000 that he wants to send to his brother, Mohammad, who is living in Karachi (3).

Even though Abdul is familiar with the hawala system, his first stop is a major bank. At the bank, he learns several things:

The bank would prefer that he open an account before doing business with them;

31 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The bank will sell him Pakistani rupees (Rs) at the official rate (4) of 31 to the dollar; and

The bank will charge $25 to issue a bank draft.

This will allow Abdul to send Mohammad Rs 154,225. Delivery would be extra; an overnight courier service (surface mail is not always that reliable, especially if it contains something valuable) can cost as much as $40 to Pakistan and take as much as a week to arrive. Abdul believes he can get a better deal through hawala, and talks to Iqbal, a fellow taxi driver who is also a part-time hawaladar.

Iqbal offers Abdul the following terms:

A 5% 'commission' for handling the transaction;

35, instead of 31, rupees for a dollar; and

Delivery is included.

This arrangement will allow Abdul to send Mohammad Rs 166,250. As we will see, the delivery associated with a hawala transaction is faster and more reliable than in bank transactions. He is about to make arrangements to do business with Iqbal when he sees the following advertisement (5) in a local 'Indo-Pak'

32 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac newspaper (such advertisements are very common):

MUSIC BAZAAR AND TRAVEL SERVICES AGENCY

Cheap tickets to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Dubai Great rupee deals (service to India and Pakistan) Large movie rental selection Video conversions Latest Bollywood hits on CD and cassette Prepaid international calling cards Pager and cellular activations (trade-ins welcome) Conveniently located in Jackson Heights

(718) 555-1111 ask for Nizam or Yasmeen (718) 555-2222 [fax] (718) 555-2121 [pager]

Abdul calls the number, and speaks with Yasmeen. She offers him the following deal:

A fee of 1 rupee for each dollar transferred;

37 rupees for a dollar; and

Delivery is included.

Under these terms (6), Abdul can send Mohammad Rs 180,000. He decides to do business with Yasmeen.

The hawala transaction proceeds as follows:

Abdul gives the $5,000 to Yasmeen;

Yasmeen contacts Ghulam in Karachi, and gives him the details;

Ghulam arranges to have Rs 180,000 delivered to Mohammad.

33 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac This diagram summarizes the transaction:

Even though this is a simple example, it contains the elements of a hawala transaction. First, there is trust between Abdul and Yasmeen. Yasmeen did not give him a receipt, and her recordkeeping, such as it may be, is designed to keep track of how much money she owes Ghulam, instead of recording individual remittances she has made. There are several possible relationships she can have with Ghulam (these will be discussed later); in any case she trusts him to make the payment to Mohammad. This delivery almost always takes place within a day of the initial payment (a consideration here is time differences), arid the payment is almost always made in person. Finally, in some scenarios, he trusts her to repay him the equivalent of either $5,000 or Rs 180,000.

Connections are of equal importance. Yasmeen has to be connected to Ghulam in Karachi to arrange this payment. As her advertisement indicates, she also offers service to India, so she either knows, or has access to, someone who can arrange payment there. Hawala networks tend to be fairly loose, communication usually takes place by phone or fax (but email is becoming more and more common). To complete this discussion, there are two related issues to be addressed. The first is the relationship between Yasmeen and Ghulam, and the second is how Ghulam 'recovers' the money that he paid to Mohammad on Abdul's behalf.

As was stated above, hawala works through connections. These connections allow for the establishment of a network for conducting the hawala transactions. In this transaction, Yasmeen and Ghulam are part of the

34 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac same network. There are several possible ways in which this network could have been constructed.

The first possibility is that Yasmeen and Ghulam are business partners (or that they just do business together on a regular basis). For them, transferring money is not only another business in which they are engaged but a part of their normal business dealings with one another. Another possibility is that, for whatever reason, Ghulam owes Yasmeen money. Since many countries make it difficult to move money out of the country, Ghulam is repaying his debt to Yasmeen by paying her hawala customers; even though this is a very 'informal' relationship, it is quite typical for hawala. A third (and by no means the final) possibility is that Yasmeen has a 'rupee surplus' and Ghulam is assisting her in disposing of it.

In the last two cases, Ghulam does not need to recover any money; he is either repaying an existing debt to Yasmeen, or he is handling money that Yasmeen has entrusted to him, but is unable to move out of the country. In the first case, where Yasmeen and Ghulam are partners, a more formal means of balancing accounts is needed.

One very likely business partner scenario is an import/export business. Yasmeen might import CDs and cassettes of Indian and Pakistani music and 22 carat gold (7) jewelry from Ghulam, and export telecommunications devices to Ghulam. In the context of such a business, invoices can be manipulated to 'conceal' the movement of money.

If Yasmeen needs to pay Ghulam the Rs 180,000 that he has given to Mohammad, she can do it by 'under invoicing' a shipment to him. She could, for example, send him $20,000 worth of telecommunications devices, but only invoice him for $15,000. Ghulam pays Yasmeen $15,000 against this invoice. The 'extra' value of goods, in this case $5,000 (the equivalent of Rs 180,000) is the money that she owes him.

In order to move money the other way (in this case, from Pakistan to New York)',over invoicing' can be used. For this example, it is assumed that Ghulam owes Yasmeen $5,000. She could buy $10,000 of telecommunications devices, and send it to Ghulam with an invoice for $15,000. Ghulam would pay her $15,000; this covers the $10,000 for the telecommunications devices as well as the other $5,000.

35 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Since many hawala transactions (legitimate and illegitimate) are conducted in the context of import/export businesses, the manipulation of invoices, as discussed above, is a very common means of settling accounts after the transactions have been made.

Why would anyone bother with hawala?

When compared to a 'traditional' means of remitting money, such as obtaining a check or ordering a wire transfer, hawala seems cumbersome and risky. In this section, we will examine the motivations for using the hawala system.

The primary reason is cost effectiveness. As was shown in this example, Abdul was able to obtain nearly Rs 30,000 more (averaging exchange rates, this is about US$ 880), a significant savings by using the hawala system. Some of the reasons for this cost effectiveness, namely low overhead, exchange rate speculation and integration with existing business activities, will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

The second reason is efficiency. A hawala remittance takes place in, at most, one or two days. This can be contrasted with the week or so required for an international wire transfer involving at least one correspondent bank (as well as delays due to holidays, weekends and time differences) or about the same amount of time required to send a bank draft from North America to South Asia via a courier service (surface mail is not a reliable option where the contents are valuable, and it can also take several weeks to arrive).

The third reason is reliability. Complex international transactions, which might involve the client's local bank, its correspondent bank, the main office of a foreign bank and a branch office of the recipient's foreign bank, have the potential to be problematic. In at least once instance reported to the authors, money for a large commercial transaction (money being sent from the United States to South Asia) was lost 'in transit' for several weeks while trying to conduct such a transaction. When the bank located the money, it

36 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac was returned to the customer. He enlisted the services of a local hawaladar, who was able to complete the transaction in less than a day.

The fourth reason is the lack of bureaucracy. Abdul is living and working in the United States on an expired student visa; he does not have a social security number (and since he deals almost exclusively in cash, he really does not need one). It would be difficult, if not impossible for him to open a bank account as he does not have adequate identification. In addition, he does not completely trust banks and would prefer not to use them if at all possible. Iqbal and Yasmeen do not operate in a 'bureaucratic' framework, making them a preferable alternative to the bank.

The fifth reason is the lack of a paper trail. Even though Abdul earned the money that he sent to Mohammad legally, he would prefer to remain anonymous (this is a much more important consideration in illicit hawala transactions). Since it is rare for hawaladars to keep records of individual transactions, it is unlikely that Abdul's remittance will ever be identified as part of the business dealings between Yasmeen, Ghulam and their associates.

The sixth reason is tax evasion. In South Asia, the 'black' or parallel economy is 30%-50% of the 'white' or documented economy. Money remitted through official channels might invite scrutiny from tax authorities - hawala provides a scrutiny-free remittance channel.

Why does hawala work?

In brief, hawala 'works' - or competes effectively with other remittance mechanisms - because of its cost effectiveness. A secondary consideration is that hawala is often related or even integral to existing business dealings.

One reason for hawala's cost effectiveness is low overhead. A business like Yasmeen's 'Music Bazaar and Travel Services Agency' operates out of a rented storefront as opposed to a bank building (which has expensive vaults and alarm systems), and may even share space with another business (e.g. a sari or gold shop), further reducing rental expenses. Yasmeen's employees are paid less than bank officers, and they probably do

37 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac not have insurance or access to a retirement plan. Some hawaladars operate with even less, using a table in a tea shop as an office and having little more than a cellular phone and notebook as overhead expenses.

The second reason is exchange rate speculation. In India, for example, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 8(2) (8) states that '(e)xcept with the previous general or special percussion of the Reserve Bank, no person, whether an authorized dealer or a moneychanger or otherwise, shall enter into any transaction which provides for the conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency at rates of exchange other than the rates for time being authorized by the Reserve Bank'. Since hawala dealers do not, in many if not most cases comply with such regulations, their transactions may be illegal (a more detailed discussion of the legality of hawala follows).

Depending on one's perspective (and possibly jurisdiction), hawaladars are either engaging in foreign exchange speculation or black market currency dealing. In any case, they exploit naturally occurring fluctuations in the demand for different currencies. This enables them to turn a profit from hawala transactions (which, in addition to being remittances, almost always have a foreign exchange component), and they are also able to offer their customers rates that are better than those offered by banks (most banks will only transact at authorized rates of exchange).

The rates cited in this paper (35 Rs/$ for Iqbal, 37 Rs/$ for Yasmeen and the official rate of 31 Rs/$ as cited by the bank) reflect a difference of 12-19% over the official rate. These may actually be a little high. A U.S. hawaladar (9) involved in the laundering of drug proceeds as well as legitimate remittances told one of the authors of this paper that he could still make a profit on an exchange rate margin as small as 2%, making him much more competitive than a bank.

In addition, since many hawaladars are also involved in businesses where money transfers are necessary, providing remittance services fits well into these businesses' existing activities. Monies from remittances and business transfers are processed through the same bank accounts, and few, if any, additional operational costs are incurred by a business that offers hawala remittance services.

38 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Finally, an important component of hawala is trust. Hawala dealers are almost always honest in their dealings with customers and fellow hawaladars. Breaches of trust are extremely rare. It is worth noting that one of the meanings attached to the word hawala is 'trust'!

Is hawala legal?

Since hawala is a remittance system, this question really addresses regulations governing remittance services (10) and the circumstances of the remittance. The assumption here, of course, is that these remittances are like Abdul's, and 'legitimate'; the illicit use of hawala in money laundering is discussed in the next section of this paper.

Even though hawala is illegal from a regulatory standpoint in some U.S. jurisdictions, hawaladars advertise their services widely in a variety of media (ethnic newspapers have been the traditional place to find them, now some are using the Internet). Enforcement of these regulations is difficult with respect to hawala. The advertisements are often printed in foreign languages, and wording like 'sweet rupee deals' does not necessarily suggest remittance services. Moreover, businesses like Yasmeen's do not conduct remittances as their primary activity.

In South Asia, the situation is more complicated. Many South Asian nations (such as India and Pakistan) have laws that prohibit speculation in the local currency, prohibit foreign exchange transactions at anything other than the official rate of exchange, and impose strict licensing requirements on money remitters and foreign exchange dealers. In addition, there are regulations governing inbound and outbound remittances.

A detailed discussion of these regulations is beyond the scope and intent of this paper. It is, however, possible to state 'hawala is illegal in India and Pakistan' with nearly complete accuracy.

The important point for our purposes is that the existence of these regulations is another reason hawala is still used. Many people in these countries have money that they would like to move to another country due to concerns about stability, to pay for education or medical treatment. Hawala provides a ready means of doing this, and its use as a facilitator of 'capital

39 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac flight' on both large and small scales is very common. The existence of these laws also explains, in part, the prevalence of invoice manipulation as part of hawala schemes.

Another aspect of these regulations is the use of the United Arab Emirates, specifically Dubai, for hawala transactions. There are two main reasons for this. The first is the large population of expatriate workers from India and Pakistan; they use hawala to send money home. The second is Dubai's large gold market, which is the source of much of the gold sent (licitly and illicitly) to India and Pakistan. Dubai, unlike many other South Asian nations, allows essentially unregulated financial dealings. Because of this, many South Asian businessmen maintain offices in Dubai, and money is often wired there to circumvent regulations elsewhere. In addition, Dubai offers a neutral meeting place for Indian and Pakistani businessmen, as tension between these countries makes travel between them difficult if not impossible.

This paper should not, however, be considered a condemnation of the economic policies of India or Pakistan, both of which have taken concrete steps to combat money laundering. The efficiency and cost effectiveness of hawala make it an attractive means of remitting money under almost any regulatory regime.

How is hawala used to launder money?

Up to this point, no distinction has been made between hawala transactions where the source of the money is legitimate (e.g. Abdul's remittance to his brother) and where the source, and intent, of the transactions is illegitimate. Following Indian and Pakistani usage, the term 'white hawala' is used to refer to legitimate transactions, such as Abdul's. The term 'black hawala' refers to illegitimate transactions, specifically hawala money laundering (11).

This distinction is valuable for money laundering enforcement. Many 'white' hawala transactions are essentially remittances, and, while illegal under Indian and Pakistani law, are not illegal in other jurisdictions. `Black' hawala transactions, however, are almost always associated with some

40 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac serious offense (e.g. narcotics trafficking, fraud), that is illegal in most jurisdictions.

Money laundering consists of three phases: placement, layering and integration. Since hawala is a remittance system, it can be used at any phase.

In placement, money derived from criminal activities is introduced into the financial system. In many money laundering schemes, the biggest 'problem' here is handling cash. Some jurisdictions, such as the United States, require reporting by financial institutions of cash transactions over a certain amount (in the U.S. it is US$ 10,000) (12), and attempting to circumvent such reporting requirements by making smaller transactions is an offense.

Hawala can provide an effective means of placement. In the example, Abdul gave Yasmeen US$ 5,000 in cash. Since she also operates a business (and also performs remittance services for others), she will make periodic bank deposits consisting of cash and checks. She will justify these deposits to bank officials as the proceeds of her legitimate business. Even though she might prefer it if reports were not filed, she will not object to this as it would arouse suspicion at the bank (and her business provides more than adequate justification). She may also use some of the cash received to meet business expenses, reducing her need to deposit that cash into her bank account.

In the layering stage, the money launderer manipulates the illicit funds to make them appear as though they were derived from a legitimate source. A component of many layering schemes has been seen to be the transfer of money from one account to another. Even though this is done as carefully as possible, when it is done through the 'traditional' banking system it presents two problems to the money launderer. First, there is the possibility that a transaction could be considered to be suspicious and reported as such. Related to this is the paper trail created by these transactions. If any portion of the laundering network is examined, the related paper trails could lead a diligent investigator directly to the source of the criminal proceeds and unravel the money laundering network.

Hawala transfers leave a sparse or confusing paper trail if any. Even when invoice manipulation is used, the mixture of legal goods and illegal money, confusion about `valid' prices and a possibly complex international

41 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac shipping network create a trail much more complicated than a simple wire transfer.

The authors of this paper has investigated hawala money laundering, and have found that even 'basic' hawala transfers can be difficult to trace and tie to the original, criminal source of money. There is no reason, however, why hawala transfers could not be 'layered' to make following the money even more difficult. This could be done by using hawala brokers in several countries, and by distributing the transfers over time.

In the final stage of money laundering, integration, the launderer invests in other assets, uses the funds to enjoy his ill-gotten gains or to continue to invest in additional illegal activities. The same characteristics of hawala that make it a potential tool for the layering of money also make it ideal for the integration of money. This is when money seems to become legitimate, and, as we have seen, hawala techniques are capable of transforming money into almost any form, offering many possibilities for establishing an appearance of legitimacy.

Given hawala's close ties to business activities, there is no reason why money cannot be 'reinvested' in a legitimate (or legitimate appearing) business. Yasmeen could very easily arrange for the transfer of money from the United States to Pakistan, and then back to the United States, apparently as part of an investment in a business there.

What are some indicators of hawala?

As has been shown in this paper, hawala is actually quite simple; much of the complexity associated with and ascribed to hawala money laundering comes from the nearly infinite number of variations that are encountered in hawala transactions.

This complexity of variation makes it nearly impossible to lay out a straightforward guide to recognizing hawala money laundering as part of a criminal undertaking. It is, however, possible to provide a few indicators that may be useful.

42 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

One of the most consistent and valid indicators of hawala activity in investigations conducted in the United States is seen in bank accounts. A 'hawala' bank account almost always shows significant deposit activity, usually in the forms of cash and checks, which are often from one or more ethnic communities (e.g. Afghan, Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, Somali) associated with the hawaladar. These checks may be made out to the primary account holder, or some secondary entity (often outside the United States) somehow associated with the account. These checks may also have some sort of notation, consisting of a name (presumably of the person to whom the money is remitted to) or something supposedly indicating what was 'bought' with the money. In one case, many checks were seen with the word 'bangle' written on them; this was done apparently in order to make it appear as though the checks, which were almost all for even dollar amounts, had been written to purchase jewelry.

These accounts will also almost always show outgoing transfers (usually by wire) to a major financial center known to be involved in hawala. Three of the most common locations are Great Britain, Switzerland, and, as discussed previously, Dubai. Given the flexible and casual nature of the hawala business, hawala accounts will not always be seen to balance. The following diagram summarizes 'hawala account' behavior:

As has been discussed, certain businesses are also more likely than others to be involved in hawala. Once again, it is not possible to give an exhaustive list, but the following is a starting point:

43 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Import/Export Travel and Related Services Jewelry (gold, precious stones) Foreign Exchange Rugs/Carpets Used Cars Car Rentals (usually non-chain or franchise) Telephones/Pagers

Laws in India, Pakistan and other countries make it difficult to convert foreign currency (or foreign currency instruments, such as travelers' checks). Criminal activities in these countries may often involve foreign currency (especially dollars), which pose something of a problem. A 'solution' that has been seen to this problem is the shipment of these negotiable instruments from South Asia to the United States. Even though such shipments may violate both courier policies and U.S. law, the money launderers accept these risks rather than try to attempting to place these instruments into their local economies.

44 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Marriage Fraud

. Marriage and visa fraud potentially threaten the national security of the United States. Terrorism is an additional type of threat associated with these crimes. The U.S. visa is one of the most coveted items in the world, and foreign nationals have acquired visas fraudulently to enter the United States with the intent to harm people. Americans who marry strangers from countries known to harbor terrorists make the United States more vulnerable to terrorism, plain and simple.

These crimes affect the American economy as well. These foreign nationals who enter the country illegally via marriage fraud or any other type of fraud are defrauding the United States of immigration benefits to which they are not entitled. These crimes violate the legal immigration process. They also threaten the integrity of the system for others who abide by U.S. immigration laws.

Marriage fraud also threatens Americans who are lured into committing this crime through monetary gain. Frequently, the scheme will require the American to live with a stranger who is now his or her new “spouse.” We have seen instances where the foreign spouse has gained access to bank accounts and other personal information and left the American in financial trouble.

We have also seen cases of human trafficking related to marriage fraud. Foreign women have become involved in mail-order bride scams to escape their lives in their native country. Instead of living the life of comfort they were promised, many are subjected to physical violence or prostitution once they reach the United States. These women are bound to a life of abuse because they know if

45 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac they lose the sponsorship of their spouse, they will be deported and will never again be eligible for a U.S. visa.

Marriage fraud is a serious crime. Participants may think their single fraudulent marriage will not be discovered, but by committing this crime, they face prosecution along with the larger ring. In previously prosecuted marriage fraud cases, individuals were sentenced up to 5 years in prison and fined as much as $250,000 for involvement in the scheme.

In closing, I want to reemphasize the seriousness of these crimes. They threaten our national, economic, and personal security. No one wins, and the consequences are far greater than the potential gains. Diplomatic Security is firmly committed to working with our law enforcement partners in the United States and around the world to fight marriage and visa fraud, and bring those who commit these crimes to justice. Thank you.

California Man Pleads Guilty to Marriage Fraud Charges

Kevin J. O'Connor, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, announced that CHAN CHAMPA, age 29, of Modesto, California, pleaded guilty today to federal conspiracy charges relating to a marriage fraud scheme in which United States citizens residing in Connecticut and California were paid to travel to Cambodia and marry Cambodian nationals so that the Cambodians could obtain immigrant visas, permitting them to enter and live in the United States. United States Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez accepted CHAMPA's plea of guilty this afternoon in Hartford federal court.

46 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac CHAMPA and Tin Iv, of Stockton, California, previously were named in an indictment that charges that from approximately March 2001 through approximately March 2003, Iv, CHAMPA and others conspired to defraud the United States by arranging and facilitating fraudulent marriages between Cambodian nationals and U.S. citizens, which were undertaken to evade U.S. immigration laws, and to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful functions of the U.S. Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now known as the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services).

In the course of the court proceeding today, CHAMPA admitted that he assisted Iv in arranging for U.S. citizens to travel from the United States to Cambodia. In particular, CHAMPA admitted that he referred several U.S. citizens who wished to enter into fraudulent marriages to Iv. CHAMPA also admitted that he assisted the U.S. citizens working with Iv in obtaining passports; accompanied them when they traveled to Cambodia; and assisted Iv in instructing the U.S. citizens concerning the scheme. CHAMPA admitted that he assisted Iv in some fashion with respect to at least six other individuals who entered into fraudulent marriages in Cambodia. Once in Cambodia, the U.S. citizens participated in marriage ceremonies with Cambodian nationals who were strangers to them in exchange for cash payments from Iv, which were usually in the amount of $7,000. CHAMPA admitted that Iv usually paid part of the $7,000 to the U.S. citizens while they were in Cambodia to marry the foreign nationals; the remainder was to be paid to the U.S. citizens once their spouses obtained visas and/or arrived in the United States. CHAMPA admitted that Iv paid him for each U.S. citizen CHAMPA directed to Iv and who entered into a sham marriage.

47 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac CHAMPA will face a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment and a fine up to $250,000 when he is sentenced by Chief United States District Judge Robert N. Chatigny on May 13, 2004.

Iv pleaded guilty to conspiracy and marriage fraud charges before Magistrate Judge Martinez on February 12, 2004. He is scheduled to be sentenced on April 30, 2004. Sourasay Sikhounmeuang and Christina Dixon, both residents of Torrington, Connecticut, previously pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy and/or marriage fraud charges in connection with Iv and CHAMPA's marriage fraud scheme and await sentencing, as well.

"This prosecution demonstrates that federal law enforcement authorities are determined to prosecute schemes that are intended to evade our nation's immigration laws, "U.S. Attorney O'Connor stated. "Citizens of other countries who wish to immigrate to the United States must do so in accordance with the law and will not be permitted to gain an unfair advantage over others by engaging in marriage fraud. Those individuals who seek to profit by brokering fraudulent marriages between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals will be punished."

This case is being investigated by the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, has provided assistance in the investigation, as has the Torrington and Stockton (CA) Police Departments. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Jonathan Biran.

Mortgage Fraud

48 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The fraud usually begins when a seller is approached by a buyer with an offer too good to be true: the purchase of the home at a price well above list price (in some cases, hundreds of thousands of dollars). The catch is that the money over and above the list price is to be returned to the buyer by the seller at the time of closing. The incentive for the seller is that they receive their initial asking price, and in many mortgage fraud cases, the fraud ring tries to target homes that have been on the market for more than a year and where the seller will be eager to accept the buyer's unusual arrangements.

The next phase of the fraud almost always involves an insider at the mortgage company who will agree to a loan at the inflated value of the home (the list price plus whatever amount is to be returned to the buyer). In some instances, a phony construction company is established by the buyer on an associate to justify on paper the additional amount of the loan. Once the loan is approved, the deal goes to closing where the seller takes the equivalent of the list price and the buyer walks away with their share of the transaction. In a number of cases, no one ever occupies the home nor is a mortgage payment ever made.

Assyrian International News Agency Mortgage Fraud Funding Jihad?

A man arrested in December at the Kansas City airport with $70,000 in his bulging pockets while trying to board a Southwest Airlines flight claiming the money was

49 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac actually Muslim prayer books, a San Francisco mortgage company executive who went on the run from the FBI in November, seven people arrested in September in Salt Lake City with ties to al-Qaeda, and a co-defendant in the Sami al-Arian/Palestinian Islamic Jihad trial all have one thing in common -- the growing trend of terrorist associations with mortgage fraud rings in the US.

Financial experts say that mortgage fraud has become the fastest growing type of white-collar crime, and terrorist organizations have been quick to jump on the trend. But what concerns federal authorities is how regularly mortgage fraud is showing up in terrorism investigations.

In the past year, several high-profile mortgage fraud arrests have been tied to federal terrorism investigations, most notably a ring busted up in Salt Lake City that is alleged to have direct ties to the late al- Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Federal agents have been trying to track the hundreds of thousands of dollars illegally obtained by Sharif Omar and his associates in the mortgage fraud ring. At least $40,000 was transferred to an account in Jordan. From there, federal officials believe that money went to Sharif's brother, Shawqi Omar, who was seized in a raid by US forces in Iraq in October 2004 and is accused of working for al-Zarqawi's terrorist network in Baghdad. Shawqi Omar is still in US military custody.

The Salt Lake City case is not the first time that the FBI has seen the nexus between mortgage fraud and terrorism investigations:

50 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

· Tarik Hamdi was charged last year for immigration and mortgage-loan fraud as part of an investigation into the role of an Islamic charity, the International Institute for Islamic Thought of Herndon, Virginia, that Hamdi worked for and was being investigated for ties to terrorist financing. According to an August 2005 Washington Post article, Hamdi was personally responsible for delivering a satellite phone battery to al- Qaeda operatives for Osama bin Laden's personal device, which was used to coordinate the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hamdi was also responsible for facilitating an interview with bin Laden for ABC News in May 1998. · Last year a Dearborn, MI man pled guilty to mortgage fraud in a plea deal with federal authorities to prevent being charged additionally with terrorist activities. At the time of his arrest, federal authorities found books, posters and recruitment videos for the Hezbollah terrorist organization inside the home of Nemr Ali Rahal. According to the Detroit News, a picture was also recovered of Rahal tearing up an American flag. Rahal had fraudulently obtained more than $500,000 by falsifying information on a mortgage application. Customs officials had also stopped Rahal and his son the previous year for having military-grade explosive residue on their passports as they reentered the US from Canada. · In another Dearborn-area case, two men, Mohammed Krayem and Mahmoud Youssef Kourani were accused in 2004 of transferring more than $200,000 obtained through real estate fraud and cigarette smuggling to Kourani's brother, Haider Kourani, the Hezbollah chief of military security for southern Lebanon. The money was to be used for purchasing military equipment from

51 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac the United Nations Protection Force for use in attacks against Israel. · One of the co-defendants in the Sami al-Arian terrorism trial, Sameeh Taha Hammoudeh, pled guilty to three counts of tax evasion, immigration and mortgage fraud - - the only crimes that Hammoudeh was convicted of after his acquittal on terrorism charges (Al-Arian later pled guilty to several terrorism charges and admitted his role in supporting Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Had prosecutors not secured Hammoudeh's plea agreement, there would not have been any basis to deport him back to Palestine. Even though he faced up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine for these crimes, a US federal judge sentenced Hammoudeh to time served, five years probation, and waived all fines except $300. · In June 2005, two Dearborn-area men, Ahmad and Musa Jebril, were convicted of mortgage fraud charges after defrauding six banks for $250,000 and dozens of people of up to $400,000. The Jebrils were active supporters of Hamas, and federal authorities said that Ahmad Jebril was training a cell of local men to wage jihad against the US. Both Musa and Ahmad Jebril had been thrown out of their local mosque, where Musa had been an imam, for their radical activities. A local Muslim writer has described in an article for Beliefnet the climate of fear that the two men created in the Islamic community by their jihadist preaching and activities. The indictment also noted that immediately following the November 1995 car bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which killed four Americans, the Jebrils faxed a statement in support of the attacks to CNN. Subsequent to their conviction of mortgage fraud, the Jebrils and one of their associates were additionally charged by the

52 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac federal government with trying to bribe a juror during their fraud trial.

But these various rings have not limited their activities to mortgage fraud and supporting terrorism: in one case it led to murder. In yet another case out of the Detroit/Dearborn- area, Bashar Farraj and Samer Fawaz were convicted in June 2005 in the murder of one of their associates involved in their mortgage fraud scheme. The body of the victim, Raed Al-Farah, was never recovered, but his blood was found in the office used by the two men and in Farraj's 2002 Trailblazer. He had been lured to the office under the pretense of discussing a federal investigation into their mortgage fraud scheme, at which point he was struck on the head and killed to "tie up loose ends".

With the difficultly of gathering sufficient evidence to conduct a case sufficient to convict on terrorism charges, federal authorities have not hesitated to look at the illegal means by which these individuals have financed their plans for jihad against the US.

It is the ease by which jihadists and their supporters can raise hundreds of thousands of dollars in a short period of time that makes mortgage fraud so attractive compared to the high-risk world of drug distribution, or the low returns from other known petty crimes that have previously been used to finance Islamic terrorism, such as smuggling cigarettes or baby formula.

In just one case currently under investigation by the FBI and Homeland Security officials in Columbus, Ohio, the value of the transactions being looked at is more than $11 million. This case typifies the ease with which large amounts of case can be had, and serves as a textbook example of how mortgage fraud rings operate.

53 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The fraud usually begins when a seller is approached by a buyer with an offer too good to be true: the purchase of the home at a price well above list price (in some cases, hundreds of thousands of dollars). The catch is that the money over and above the list price is to be returned to the buyer by the seller at the time of closing. The incentive for the seller is that they receive their initial asking price, and in many mortgage fraud cases, the fraud ring tries to target homes that have been on the market for more than a year and where the seller will be eager to accept the buyer's unusual arrangements.

The next phase of the fraud almost always involves an insider at the mortgage company who will agree to a loan at the inflated value of the home (the list price plus whatever amount is to be returned to the buyer). In some instances, a phony construction company is established by the buyer on an associate to justify on paper the additional amount of the loan. Once the loan is approved, the deal goes to closing where the seller takes the equivalent of the list price and the buyer walks away with their share of the transaction. In a number of cases, no one ever occupies the home nor is a mortgage payment ever made.

The Columbus case demonstrates the flexibility and ease with which the fraudulent transactions are accomplished. According to an article in the Columbus Dispatch, one buyer, Mohamed A. Mohamed targeted homes in the inner city, where in one case a mortgage was obtained for $160,000 on a home that county officials had only appraised for $34,000. That mortgage was eventually foreclosed and Mohamed lost his mortgage brokers license, but he still maintains a real estate agent license and has been involved in other transactions in that capacity.

54 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Conversely, a series of purchases made by Hany Rezk Ibrahim and his wife involve several of the highest priced residential real estate transactions made in the Columbus area in the past year, with the Ibrahims walking away with approximately $250,000 in each transaction. In one case, the pair bought a home for $1.3 million that had sold for $540,000 the year before. Just prior to going on his real estate purchasing spree, Hany Ibrahim incorporated a home improvement company, listing an address at a local condominium complex as the corporate address.

All of these cases give evidence to why terrorists have latched onto mortgage fraud: the ease and the high profitability, compared to other criminal activity that carries greater risk and less of a return. Committing fraud in just one transaction can raise hundreds of thousands for jihad, where it might take a cigarette smuggling ring months or even years to make as much.

Fortunately, the mortgage industry, which has already taken action in response to the rapid rise of mortgage fraud, is becoming more aware of the involvement of terrorist organizations in some cases. Last October, experts from the mortgage lending industry gathered together with law enforcement and banking regulatory officials at a conference sponsored by the Appraisal Foundation. One expert, Connie Wilson of Interthinx, one of the leading mortgage fraud prevention firms, briefed attendees on how Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and even the Taliban, had established mortgage fraud rings in the US.

On the downside, however, this trend creates yet another area that law enforcement and homeland security must monitor, as the enemies of the United States grow bolder and attempt to fund their operations against our country

55 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac through organized crime and fraud, essentially forcing Americans to pay for the demise of our own society. In the final analysis, the only way to reverse this trend of mortgage fraud financing jihad is for citizens to be aware of the threat and also be willing to withstand the financial incentives and refuse involvement in the schemes. In many respects, our own safety is contingent upon our own vigilance.

56 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Islamic banking

Islamic banking refers to a system of banking or banking activity that is consistent with Islamic law (Sharia) principles and guided by Islamic economics. In particular, Islamic law prohibits usury, the collection and payment of interest, also commonly called riba in Islamic discourse. In addition, Islamic law prohibits investing in businesses that are considered unlawful, or haraam (such as businesses that sell alcohol or pork, or businesses that produce media such as gossip columns or pornography, which are contrary to Islamic values). In the late 20th century, a number of Islamic banks were created, to cater to this particular banking market.

History of Islamic banking Classical Islamic banking

• During the Islamic Golden Age, early forms of proto-capitalism and free markets were present in the Caliphate,[1] where an early market economy and early form of merchant capitalism was developed between the 8th-12th centuries, which some refer to as "Islamic capitalism".[2] A vigorous monetary economy was created on the basis of the expanding levels of circulation of a stable high-value currency (the dinar) and the integration of monetary areas that were previously independent. • A number of innovative concepts and techniques were introduced in early Islamic banking, including contracts, bills of exchange, long-distance international trade, the first forms of partnership (mufawada) such as limited partnerships (mudaraba), and the earliest forms of credit, debt, profit, loss, capital (al-mal), capital accumulation (nama al-mal),[3] circulating capital, capital expenditure, revenue, cheques, promissory notes,[4] trusts (see Waqf), startup companies,[5] savings accounts, transactional accounts, pawning, loaning, exchange rates, bankers, money changers, ledgers, deposits, assignments, the double-entry bookkeeping system,[6] and lawsuits.[7] Organizational enterprises similar to corporations independent from the state also existed in the medieval Islamic world, while the agency institution was also introduced.[8][9] Many of these early capitalist concepts were adopted and

57 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac further advanced in medieval Europe from the 13th century onwards. • The common view of riba (usury) among classical jurists of Islamic law and economics during the Islamic Golden Age was that it is only riba and therefore unlawful to apply interest to money exnatura sua— exclusively gold and silver currencies— but that it is not riba and is therefore acceptable to apply interest to fiat money— currencies made up of other materials such as paper or base metals— to an extent.[10] The definition of riba in classical Islamic jurisprudence was "surplus value without counterpart." When "currencies of base metal were first introduced in the Islamic world, no jurist ever thought that paying a debt in a higher number of units of this fiat money was riba" as they were concerned with the real value of money (determined by weight only) rather than the numerical value. For example, it was acceptable for a loan of 1000 gold dinars to be be paid back as 1050 dinars of equal aggregate weight (i.e., the value in terms of weight had to be same because all makes of coins did not carry exactly similar weight). The rationale behind riba according to classical Islamic jurists was "to ensure equivalency in real value" and that the "numerical value was immaterial (or it was not of any concern at that time)."

Modern Islamic banking

• The first modern experiment with Islamic banking was undertaken in Egypt under cover without projecting an Islamic image— for fear of being seen as a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism that was anathema to the political regime. The pioneering effort, led by Ahmad El Najjar, took the form of a savings bank based on profit-sharing in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr in 1963. This experiment lasted until 1967 (Ready 1981), by which time there were nine such banks in the country

58 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Principles

• Islamic banking has the same purpose as conventional banking except that it operates in accordance with the rules of Shariah, known as Fiqh al-Muamalat (Islamic rules on transactions). The basic principle of Islamic banking is the sharing of profit and loss and the prohibition of riba (usury). Amongst the common Islamic concepts used in Islamic banking are profit sharing (Mudharabah), safekeeping (Wadiah), joint venture (Musharakah), cost plus (Murabahah), and leasing (Ijarah). • In an Islamic mortgage transaction, instead of loaning the buyer money to purchase the item, a bank might buy the item itself from the seller, and re-sell it to the buyer at a profit, while allowing the buyer to pay the bank in installments. However, the fact that it is profit cannot be made explicit and therefore there are no additional penalties for late payment. In order to protect itself against default, the bank asks for strict collateral. The goods or land is registered to the name of the buyer from the start of the transaction. This arrangement is called Murabaha. Another approach is EIjara wa EIqtina, which is similar to real- estate leasing. Islamic banks handle loans for vehicles in a similar way (selling the vehicle at a higher-than-market price to the debtor and then retaining ownership of the vehicle until the loan is paid). • There are several other approaches used in business deals. Islamic banks lend their money to companies by issuing floating rate interest loans. The floating rate of interest is pegged to the company's individual rate of return. Thus the bank's profit on the loan is equal to a certain percentage of the company's profits. Once the principal amount of the loan is repaid, the profit-sharing arrangement is concluded. This practice is called Musharaka. Further, Mudaraba is venture capital funding of an entrepreneur who provides labor while financing is provided by the bank so that both profit and risk are shared. Such participatory arrangements between capital and labor reflect the Islamic view that the borrower must not bear all the risk/cost of a failure, resulting in a balanced distribution of income and not allowing lender to monopolize the economy. • And finally, Islamic banking is restricted to Islamically acceptable deals, which exclude those involving alcohol, pork,

59 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac gambling, etc. Thus ethical investing is the only acceptable form of investment, and moral purchasing is encouraged. Islamic banking is an example of full-reserve banking, with banks achieving a 100% reserve ratio.[2] However, in practice, this is not always the case.[3] • Islamic banks have grown recently in the Muslim world but are a very small share of the global banking system. Micro-lending institutions founded by Muslims, notably Grameen Bank, use conventional lending practices and are popular in some Muslim nations, especially Bangladesh, but some do not consider them true Islamic banking. However, Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank and microfinance banking, and other supporters of microfinance, argue that the lack of collateral or excessive interest in micro-lending is consistent with the Islamic prohibition of usury

Shariah Advisory Council/Consultant

• Islamic banks and banking institutions that offer Islamic banking products and services (IBS banks) are required to establish Shariah advisory committees/consultants to advise them and to ensure that the operations and activities of the bank comply with Shariah principles. • In Malaysia, the National Shariah Advisory Council, which additionally set up at Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), advises BNM on the Shariah aspects of the operations of these institutions and on their products and services

60 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Investments through principles

• Bai' al-Inah (Sale and Buy Back Agreement) • The financier sells an asset to the customer on a deferred- payment basis, and then the asset is immediately repurchased by the financier for cash at a discount. The buying back agreement allows the bank to assume ownership over the asset in order to protect against default without explicitly charging interest in the event of late payments or insolvency. • Bai' Bithaman Ajil (Deferred Payment Sale) • This concept refers to the sale of goods on a deferred payment basis at a price, which includes a profit margin agreed to by both parties. This is similar to Murabahah, except that the debtor makes only a single installment on the maturity date of the loan. By the application of a discount rate, an Islamic bank can collect the market rate of interest. • Bai muajjal (Credit Sale) • Literally bai muajjal means a credit sale. Technically, it is a financing technique adopted by Islamic banks that takes the form of murabaha muajjal. It is a contract in which the bank earns a profit margin on the purchase price and allows the buyer to pay the price of the commodity at a future date in a lump sum or in installments. It has to expressly mention cost of the commodity and the margin of profit is mutually agreed. The price fixed for the commodity in such a transaction can be the same as the spot price or higher or lower than the spot price. • Bai salam • Bai salam means a contract in which advance payment is made for goods to be delivered later on. The seller undertakes to supply some specific goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange of an advance price fully paid at the time of contract. It is necessary that the quality of the commodity intended to be purchased is fully specified leaving no ambiguity leading to dispute. The objects of this sale are goods and cannot be gold, silver, or currencies. Barring this, Bai Salam covers almost everything that is capable of being definitely described as to quantity, quality, and workmanship.

61 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Basic Features And Conditions Of Salam

• First of all, it is necessary for the validity of Salam that the buyer pays the price in full to the seller at the time of effecting the sale. It is necessary because in the absence of full payment by the buyer, it will be tantamount to sale of a debt against a debt, which is prohibited, as the basic wisdom behind the permissibility of salam is to fulfill the instant needs of the seller. If the price is not paid to him in full, the basic purpose of the transaction will be defeated. Therefore, all the Muslim jurists are unanimous on the point that full payment of the price is necessary in Salam. However, Imam Malik is of the view that the seller may give a concession of two or three days to the buyers, but this concession should not form part of the agreement. • Salam can be effected in those commodities only the quality and quantity of which can be specified exactly. The things whose quality or quantity is not determined by specification cannot be sold through the contract of salam. For example, precious stones cannot be sold on the basis of salam, because every piece of precious stones is normally different from the other either in its quality or in its size or weight and their exact specification is not generally possible. • Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity or on a product of a particular field or farm. For example, if the seller undertakes to supply the wheat of a particular field, or the fruit of a particular tree, the salam will not be valid, because there is a possibility that the crop of that particular field or the fruit of that tree is destroyed before delivery, and, given such possibility, the delivery remains uncertain. The same rule is applicable to every commodity the supply of which is not certain. • It is necessary that the quality of the commodity (intended to be purchased through salam) is fully specified leaving no ambiguity which may lead to a dispute. All the possible details in this respect must be expressly mentioned. • It is also necessary that the quantity of the commodity is agreed upon in unequivocal terms. If the commodity is quantified in weights according to the usage of its traders, its weight must be determined, and if it is quantified through measures, its exact

62 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac measure should be known. What is normally weighed cannot be quantified in measures and vice versa. • The exact date and place of delivery must be specified in the contract. • Salam cannot be effected in respect of things which must be delivered at spot. For example, if gold is purchased in exchange of silver, it is necessary, according to Shari‘ah, that the delivery of both be simultaneous. Here, salam cannot work. Similarly, if wheat is bartered for barley, the simultaneous delivery of both is necessary for the validity of sale. Therefore the contract of salam in this case is not allowed. • Hibah (Gift) • This is a token given voluntarily by a creditor to a debtor in return for a loan. Hibah usually arises in practice when Islamic banks involuntarily pay their customers interest on savings account balances. • Ijarah • Ijarah means lease, rent or wage. Generally, Ijarah concept means selling benefit or use or service for a fixed price or wage. Under this concept, the Bank makes available to the customer the use of service of assets / equipments such as plant, office automation, motor vehicle for a fixed period and price.

63 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Advantages of Ijarah

• The following are the advantage of Ijarah to lessee: • Ijarah conserves capital as it may provide 100% financing. • Ijarah enables the Lessee to have the use of the equipment on payment of the first rental. This is important since it is the use (and not ownership) of the equipment that generates income. • Ijarah arrangements are flexible because the terms and rental provision may be tailored to suit the needs of the Lessee. Therefore, it aids corporate planning and budgeting • Ijarah is not borrowing and is therefore not required to be disclosed as a liability in the Balance Sheet of the Lessee. Being an "off-balance-sheet" financing, it is not included in the computation of gearing ratios imposed by bankers. The borrowing capacity of the Lessee is therefore not impaired when leasing is resorted to as a mean of financing. • All payments of rentals are treated as payment of operating expenses and are therefore, fully tax-deductible. Leasing therefore offers tax-advantages to profit making concerns. • There are many types of equipment, which becomes obsolete before the end of its actual economic life. This is particularly true in high technology equipment like computers. Thus the risk is passed onto the Lessor who will undoubtedly charge a premium into the lease rate to compensate for the risk. A Lessee may be willing to pay the said premium as an insurance against obsolescence. • If the equipment use is for a relatively short period of time, it may be more profitable to lease than to buy. • If the equipment is for short duration and the equipment has a very poor second hand value (resale value), leasing would be the best method for acquisition.

64 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Ijarah Thumma Al Bai' (Hire Purchase)

• These are variations on a theme of purchase and lease back transactions. There are two contracts involved in this concept. The first contract, an Ijarah contract (leasing/renting), and the second contract, a Bai contract (purchase) are undertaken one after the other. For example, in a car financing facility, a customer enters into the first contract and leases the car from the owner (bank) at an agreed rental over a specific period. When the lease period expires, the second contract comes into effect, which enables the customer to purchase the car at an agreed price. • In effect, the bank sells the product to the debtor, at an above market-price profit margin, in return for agreeing to receive the payment over a period of time; the profit margin on the lease is equivalent to interest earned at a fixed rate of return. • This type of transaction is particularly reminiscent of contractum trinius, a complicated legal trick used by European bankers and merchants during the Middle Ages, which involved combining three individually legal contracts in order to produce a transaction of an interest bearing loan (something that the Church made illegal). The combiniation of different contracts is also prohibited according to Shariah.

Ijarah-Wal-Iqtina

• A contract under which an Islamic bank provides equipment, building, or other assets to the client against an agreed rental together with a unilateral undertaking by the bank or the client that at the end of the lease period, the ownership in the asset would be transferred to the lessee. The undertaking or the promise does not become an integral part of the lease contract to make it conditional. The rentals as well as the purchase price are fixed in such manner that the bank gets back its principal sum along with profit over the period of lease.

65 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Mudarabah (Profit Sharing)

• Mudarabah is an arrangement or agreement between the bank, or a capital provider, and an entrepreneur, whereby the entrepreneur can mobilize the funds of the former for its business activity. The entrepreneur provides expertise, labor and management. Profits made are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur according to predetermined ratio. In case of loss, the bank loses the capital, while the entrepreneur loses his provision of labor. It is this financial risk, according to the Shariah, that justifies the bank's claim to part of the profit.[13] The profit-sharing continues until the loan is repaid. The bank is compensated for the time value of its money in the form of a floating rate that is pegged to the debtor's profits.[

Murabahah (Cost Plus)

• This concept refers to the sale of goods at a price, which includes a profit margin agreed to by both parties. The purchase and selling price, other costs, and the profit margin must be clearly stated at the time of the sale agreement. The bank is compensated for the time value of its money in the form of the profit margin. This is a fixed-income loan for the purchase of a real asset (such as real estate or a vehicle), with a fixed rate of profit determined by the profit margin. The bank is not compensated for the time value of money outside of the contracted term (i.e., the bank cannot charge additional profit on late payments); however, the asset remains as a mortgage with the bank until the Murabaha is paid in full. • This type of transaction is similar to rent-to-own arrangements for furniture or appliances that are very common in North American stores.

66 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Musawamah

• Musawamah is a general and regular kind of sale in which price of the commodity to be traded is bargained between seller and the buyer without any reference to the price paid or cost incurred by the former. Thus, it is different from Murabaha in respect of pricing formula. Unlike Murabaha, however, the seller in Musawamah is not obliged to reveal his cost. Both the parties negotiate on the price. All other conditions relevant to Murabaha are valid for Musawamah as well. Musawamah can be used where the seller is not in a position to ascertain precisely the costs of commodities that he is offering to sell. musawah.

Joint Venture

• Musharakah is a relationship between two parties, both of whom contribute capital to a business, and divide the net profit and loss pro rata. This is often used in investment projects, letters of credit, and the purchase or real estate or property. In the case of real estate or property, the bank assess an imputed rent and will share it as agreed in advance.[13] All providers of capital are entitled to participate in management, but not necessarily required to do so. The profit is distributed among the partners in pre-agreed ratios, while the loss is borne by each partner strictly in proportion to respective capital contributions. This concept is distinct from fixed-income investing (i.e. issuance of loans).[

67 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Qard Hassan (Good Loan)

• This is a loan extended on a goodwill basis, and the debtor is only required to repay the amount borrowed. However, the debtor may, at his or her discretion, pay an extra amount beyond the principal amount of the loan (without promising it) as a token of appreciation to the creditor. In the case that the debtor does not pay an extra amount to the creditor, this transaction is a true interest-free loan. Some Muslims consider this to be the only type of loan that does not violate the prohibition on riba, since it is the one type of loan that truly does not compensate the creditor for the time value of money

Sukuk (Islamic Bonds)

• Sukuk is the Arabic name for a financial certificate but can be seen as an Islamic equivalent of bond. However, fixed-income, interest-bearing bonds are not permissible in Islam. Hence, Sukuk are securities that comply with the Islamic law and its investment principles, which prohibit the charging or paying of interest. Financial assets that comply with the Islamic law can be classified in accordance with their tradability and non- tradability in the secondary markets. • Conservative estimates suggest that over US$500 billion of assets are managed according to Islamic investment principles. Such principles form part of Shariah, which is often understood to be Islamic law, but it is actually broader than this in that it also encompasses the general body of spiritual and moral obligations and duties in Islam.

68 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Takaful (Islamic Insurance)

• Takaful is an alternative form of cover that a Muslim can avail himself against the risk of loss due to misfortunes. Takaful is based on the idea that what is uncertain with respect to an individual may cease to be uncertain with respect to a very large number of similar individuals. Insurance by combining the risks of many people enables each individual to enjoy the advantage provided by the law of large numbers. • In modern business, one of the ways to reduce the risk of loss due to misfortunes is through insurance which spreads the risk among many people. The concept of insurance where resources are pooled to help the needy does not contradict Shariah. However, conventional insurance involves the elements of uncertainty (Al-gharar) in the contract of insurance, gambling (Al-maisir) as the consequences of the presence of uncertainty and interest (Al-riba) in the investment activities of the conventional insurance companies that contravene the rules of Shariah. It is generally accepted by Muslim jurists that the operation of conventional insurance does not conform to the rules and requirements of Shariah.

Wadiah (Safekeeping)

• In Wadiah, a bank is deemed as a keeper and trustee of funds. A person deposits funds in the bank and the bank guarantees refund of the entire amount of the deposit, or any part of the outstanding amount, when the depositor demands it. The depositor, at the bank's discretion, may be rewarded with a hibah (gift) as a form of appreciation for the use of funds by the bank. In this case, the bank compensates depositors for the time-value of their money (i.e. pays interest) but refers to it as a gift because it does not officially guarantee payment of the gift.

Wakalah (Agency)

This occurs when a person appoints a representative to undertake transactions on his/her behalf, similar to a power of attorney

69 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Islamic Equity Funds

• Islamic investment equity funds market is one of the fastest- growing sectors within the Islamic financial system. Currently, there are approximately 100 Islamic equity funds worldwide. The total assets managed through these funds currently exceed US$5 billion and is growing by 12–15% per annum. With the continuous interest in the Islamic financial system, there are positive signs that more funds will be launched. Some Western majors have just joined the fray or are thinking of launching similar Islamic equity products. • Despite these successes, this market has seen a record of poor marketing as emphasis is on products and not on addressing the needs of investors. Over the last few years, quite a number of funds have closed down. Most of the funds tend to target high net worth individuals and corporate institutions, with minimum investments ranging from US$50,000 to as high as US$1 million. Target markets for Islamic funds vary, some cater for their local markets, e.g., Malaysia and Gulf-based investment funds. Others clearly target the Middle East and Gulf regions, neglecting local markets and have been accused of failing to serve Muslim communities. • Since the launch of Islamic equity funds in the early 1990s, there has been the establishment of credible equity benchmarks by Dow Jones Islamic market index and the FTSE Global Islamic Index Series. The Web site failaka.com monitors the performance of Islamic equity funds and provide a comprehensive list of the Islamic funds worldwide.

70 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Islamic laws on trading

• The Qur'an prohibits gambling (games of chance involving money). The hadith, in addition to prohibiting gambling (games of chance), also prohibits bayu al-gharar (trading in risk, where the Arabic word gharar is taken to mean "risk"). • The Hanafi madhab (legal school) in Islam defines gharar as "that whose consequences are hidden." The Shafi legal school defined gharar as "that whose nature and consequences are hidden" or "that which admits two possibilities, with the less desirable one being more likely." The Hanbali school defined it as "that whose consequences are unknown" or "that which is undeliverable, whether it exists or not." Ibn Hazm of the Zahiri school wrote "Gharar is where the buyer does not know what he bought, or the seller does not know what he sold.”The modern scholar of Islam, Professor Mustafa Al-Zarqa, wrote that "Gharar is the sale of probable items whose existence or characteristics are not certain, due to the risky nature that makes the trade similar to gambling." There are a number of hadith who forbid trading in gharar, often giving specific examples of gharhar transactions (e.g., selling the birds in the sky or the fish in the water, the catch of the diver, an unborn calf in its mother’s womb etc.). Jurists have sought many complete definitions of the term. They also came up with the concept of yasir (minor risk); a financial transaction with a minor risk is deemed to be halal (permissible) while trading in non- minor risk (bayu al-ghasar) is deemed to be haram. [ • What gharar is, exactly, was never fully decided upon by the Muslim jurists. This was mainly due to the complication of having to decide what is and is not a minor risk. Derivatives instruments (such as stock options) have only become common relatively recently. Some Islamic banks do provide brokerage services for stock trading and perhaps even for derivatives trading.

71 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Microfinance

Microfinance is a key concern for Muslims states and recently Islamic banks also. Islamic microfinance tools can enhance security of tenure and contribute to transformation of lives of the poor

Controversy

• Islamabad, Pakistan, June 16, 2004: Members of leading Islamist political party in Pakistan, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) party, staged a protest walkout from the National Assembly of Pakistan against what they termed derogatory remarks by a minority member on interest banking: • Taking part in the budget debate, M.P. Bhindara, a minority MNA [Member of the National Assembly]...referred to a decree by an Al-Azhar University's scholar that bank interest was not un-Islamic. He said without interest the country could not get foreign loans and could not achieve the desired progress. A pandemonium broke out in the house over his remarks as a number of MMA members...rose from their seats in protest and tried to respond to Mr Bhindara's observations. However, they were not allowed to speak on a point of order that led to their walkout.... Later, the opposition members were persuaded by a team of ministers...to return to the house...the government team accepted the right of the MMA to respond to the minority member's remarks.... Sahibzada Fazal Karim said the Council of Islamic ideology had decreed that interest in all its forms was haram in an Islamic society. Hence, he said, no member had the right to negate this settled issue • Islamic banks do compensate and charge for the time value of money, thus paying and receiving what is known in economics as interest. Such people compare Islamic banking to contractum trinius— a legal trick devised by European bankers and merchants during the Middle Ages, designed to facilitate the borrowing of money at a fixed rate of interest (something that the Church fiercely opposed) through combining three different contractual agreements that in and of themselves were not prohibited by the Church. While Islamic law prohibits the collection of interest, it does allow a seller to resell an item at a

72 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac higher price than it was bought for, as long as there are clearly two transactions. • Islamic Banks (such as Islami Bank) in Bangladesh have added their own variation to Islamic Banking. They charge a fixed fee, what they termed as a 'markup'. This markup is a constant amount decided by the bank which is added to the loan but is not dependent on the success of the business. It serves as an acceptable loophole to collecting interest. Also these banks will take part in profit-sharing but will not take part in any losses. Their success have been in convincing people of their religious mandate but at the same time have exploited every nuance of the mandate. • These arguments and criticism are exactly the same as those used at the time of Muhammad. The Qur'an addresses this issue in simple terms, saying that usury (Riba)is forbidden by Allah, while trade has been permitted by him: • "Those who devour usury will not stand except as stand one whom the Evil one by his touch Hath driven to madness. That is because they say: "Trade is like usury," but Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those who after receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat (The offence) are companions of the Fire: They will abide therein (for ever)." (Surah Baqarah 2:275) -

73 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix A Drug Trafficking

DRUG MONEY FUND TERRORIST GROUPS

Canada 1

Link TERRORIST GROUPS HEZBOLLAH ALQAEDA

DEA BROKE OPERATION Dealer AND BELIEVE THAT MANY LEGAL SMUGGLED IMMIGRANTS OR VISITORS USE PSEUDOEPHEDRINE CREDIT AND IDENITY THEFTS ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN ILLEGAL CIGARETTE SALES CREATION OF DIVERTED CHARITABLE FUNDS METHAMPHETAMINE CASH SMUGGLING STREET NAME ICE TO ENRICH ANTI-AMERICAN Middle East Link TERRORIST GROUPS Transaction

Link

Transaction Transaction

USA Cash 2 PAKISTAN YEMEN DETROIT & CHICAGO JORDAN LEBANON CLEVELAND PHOENIX AND SEVERAL CITIES IN CALIFORNIA

74 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix B Sale of False ID’s FALSE IDS

MEKKI HAMED Link Link Link SUDANESE PILOT CHARLOTTE NC NASSER AHMED AMERI Arrest LITTLE ROCK ARK. 10-16-02 MAKING FALSE ID Arrest ILLEGAL ALIEN IMMIGRATION FRAUD POESSION AMMUNITION 12-18-02 CONVICTED ORDERED DEPORTED BIN LADEN ALQAEDA NETWORK Link

EL-ATRISS Owner NATURALIZED US CITIZEN 18 FAKE ID DAILY SOLD PHONY ID $800 A PIECE = $14,000 DAILY Link

Link Link PROVIDER OF INTER LICENSE Employee SOLD PHONY ID KHALID ALMIHDHAR ID CARDS NOTARY PUBLIC FAX FLIGHT 77 CRASHED INTO PENTAGON PASSPORT SERVICES SAUDI NATIONAL MONEY TRANSFER CLARA ORTUBIA RESIDENCES BUSINESS LOCATED 28 Link Employee SAN-DIEGO NEW YORK PATTERSON AND ELIZABETH NJ Arrest MAKING FALSE IDS LICENSE PLATES AUTO TITLE CERTIFICATES Employee Link

YANELIS FABIAN 32

ABDUL AZIZ ALOMARI SAUDI NATIONAL FLIGHT 11 CRASHED INTO W TC RESIDENCE VALERIA POLLERO FLORIDA 30

75 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix C Cigarette Smuggling ALQAEDA DETROIT

Arrest NORTH CAROLINA Link CHARGED MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST CONSIDERED TO BE EXPERT IN AIRPORT SECURITY OPERATIONS FALSE IDS TELEPHONE CALLING CARD FRAUD

Associate ABDELLA Associate LEADER SALAFIYYA CELL LINKS TO ALQAEDA

KARIM KOUBRITI YOUSSEF HMIMSSA 23 MOROCCO 21 Associate Associate Link

Link Link

Link Link

AHMED HANNAN CREDIT CARD THEFT FAROUK ALI-HAIMOUD 33 MOROCCO ILLEGAL CIGARETTE SALES 21 ALGERIA DIVERTED CHARITABLE FUNDS AND CASH TO TERROR GROUPS

76 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix D MARKETS DISQUALIFIED FROM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

BUFFALO NY SMS MARKET & DELICATESSEN 865 BROADWAY UNITED SUPERMARKET BUFFALO NY 1114 BROADWAY BUFFALO NY DISQUALIFIED FROM DISQUALIFIED FROM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

DISQUALIFIED FROM SHORT STOP DELI FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 1069 BROADWAY DISQUALIFIED FROM BUFFALO NY FOOD STAMP PROGRAM US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SYCAMORE VARIETY STORE DISQUALIFIED FROM 977 SYCAMORE ST FOOD STAMP PROGRAM BUFFALO NY

HEND MARKET DISQUALIFIED FROM DISQUALIFIED FROM 1172 BROADWAY FOOD STAMP PROGRAM BUFFALO NY FOOD STAMP PROGRAM DISQUALIFIED FROM DISQUALIFIED FROM DISQUALIFIED FROM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

NIAGARA MARKET SUPER 3 FOODS 835-837 NIAGARA ST 149 WILLIAMS ST BUFFALO NY BUFFALO NY

HUDSON MINI MARKET M&S FOOD MARKET 110 HUDSON ST 927 BROADWAY N&M DELICATESSEN BUFFALO NY BUFFALO NY 221 HUDSON ST BUFFALO NY

77 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix E

RELATED GRAPHIC43 FOOD STAMPS AND COUPON FRAUD

43 Chicago Sun Times graft for the food stamp program link program

78 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix F: Origins of hawala, hundi and other related words

This section provides linguistic background on some Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati and Farsi (Persian) words associated with hawala.

The words hawala and hundi are both used, correctly and interchangeably, to describe the alternative remittance system discussed in this paper. Since there is only one system, the usage 'the hawala and hundi systems' is incorrect. Either name can be used, or one can say 'the hawala or hundi system'.

The word hawala comes from the Arabic root h-w-l , which has the basic meanings 'change' and 'transform'. The word 'hawala' is defined as a bill of exchange or a promissory note. It is also used in the expression hawala safar , traveler's check.

When the word came into Hindi (13) and Urdu (14) it retained these meanings, but it also gained the additional meanings 'trust' and 'reference' which reflect the manner in which the system operates. Furthermore, in popular usage',hawala' is often used to refer to any sort of financial crime, particularly money laundering or fraud.

A hawala operator is a hawaladar

The word hundi comes from the Sanskrit root meaning 'collect'. In India, one of its most common meanings is for the collection box found in a Hindu temple. In addition to this, it also has the same meanings as hawala: bill of exchange, promissory note, trust, reference and the alternative remittance system.

A hundi operator is a hundiwala , which also means banker or foreign exchange dealer.

Both terms are used; there appears to be some slight geographic preference for the term hundi in northern Pakistan, particularly around Lahore. Hawala, on the other hand, seems to be used almost exclusively in Indian journalism. In Iran, the term havala (also spelled as in Urdu) is used, this is the same as the word 'hawala' due to a difference in pronunciation of the letter (w in Urdu, v in Farsi).

79 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac A Hindi word which is of interest for historical reasons (see Appendix B) is potedar , which means 'treasurer' or 'paymaster' and comes from the word pot , which means 'assessment'.

The Arabic root s-r-f has, among other meanings',pay' and 'disburse'. The Arabic word for bank, masrif , comes from this root. It is also the basis for the Farsi words saraf , which means a 'money changer' or 'money remitter (hawala dealer)' and sarafi , which is the name for the business.

80 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix G: The history of hawala

Hawala predates 'traditional' or 'western' banking (the first 'western bank' in India was the Bank of Hindustan, established in Calcutta around 1770) (15). Prior to this, the operations of sarafs and potedars (see appendix A), who were primarily moneychangers (and essentially the predecessors of the hawaladars discussed in this paper) were a fundamental component of the commercial and financial infrastructures.

Contrary to some accounts, hawala did not begin during the Vietnam War. It was, however, during the Vietnam War that many Americans were exposed to hawala through the operations of Indian merchants in Saigon. Americans often took advantage of their hawala service to remit money.

Today, hawala and 'traditional' banking exist as parallel, but intertwined, economic systems in India and Pakistan.

81 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix H: Another hawala pricing scheme

In this scenario, Abdul wants to send 100,000 rupees to his brother Mohammad. This differs from the previous scenario in that he wants to send a fixed amount in rupees, rather than dollars.

The Bank

The bank gives the official exchange rate for rupees (for the purposes of this paper, that is assumed to be 31 Rs/$) and charges $25 for the exchange. The cost of the 100,000 rupees would be $3,125; adding the $25 fee brings the total cost of this transaction to $3,150.

The Hawaladars (Iqbal and Yasmeen)

Iqbal offers his usual rates: 35 rupees for a dollar and five percent commission. The rupees will cost Abdul $2,857, Iqbal's fee is $142, for a total of $2,999.

Yasmeen also offers her typical terms: 37 rupees for a dollar and a fee of one rupee for each dollar remitted. The rupees will cost Abdul $2,702 and Yasmeen's fee is $73. At $2,775, Yasmeen still has the best deal in town!

82 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix I: Hawala bookkeeping

'Hawala bookkeeping' emphasizes keeping track of how much money is owed to whom. The following sample chart is based on records analyzed by one of the authors of this paper during a recent investigation (16), and is representative of the records that might be encountered during a hawala investigation (note that these charts are usually handwritten, and it is not uncommon for English and another language to be used):

16/6/98 Vinod 100000 37.6 2659.57 F-1202 16/6/98 Ashish 250000 39.25 6369.42 F-1203 16/6/98 Nitin Bhai 350000 42.3 8274.23 B-8146 17/6/98 DK 50000 38.75 1290.32 F-1204 17/6/98 Suresh Kumar 300000 39.25 7643.31 B-8147 17/6/98 Anil 200000 40.1 4987.53 S-5428 17/6/98 Vinod 150000 39.75 3773.58 F-1205 18/6/98 Manoj 300000 41.25 7272.72 B-8148 18/6/98 Vinod Bhai 350000 42.2 8293.83 L-2160 18/6/98 Ganesh Trading 200000 38 5263.15 19/6/98 Suresh Kumar 175000 39.5 4430.37 B-8149

The first column indicates the date of the transaction. The second column is the name of the hawala broker to whom the debt is owed; it is very common to use partial names (e.g. 'Vinod') or codes (e.g. 'DK' ). The third column is the amount of the debt. This chart reflects a tendency to do business in multiples of 100,000; so it would not be uncommon to see things like '1.5' for 150,000. The third column indicates the dollar/rupee exchange rate in effect for the transaction. The fourth column is the value of the transaction in dollars. The fifth column reflects the way in which the payment was made. Notations such as 'F-1202' usually represent a bank ('F' might be 'First Bank'; 'B' and 'L' would represent other banks) and the check number. The notation for Ganesh Trading is '52 t' in Hindi. This represents 52 tolas (17) of gold, possibly paid to a local goldsmith or jeweler instead of remitting the money via a bank.

83 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix J: Hawala cases

This section provides brief descriptions of cases where hawala or hawala-like techniques were used to launder proceeds derived from various predicate offenses. If the case has been adjudicated, identifying information is provided. In others, the investigation was ongoing at the time of writing, so particulars are not provided and certain details of the case may be designated as hypothetical.

Narcotics Trafficking (1)

In mid-1997, several people were convicted of conspiracy to launder as well as laundering the proceeds of the sale of Pakistani heroin and opium (18). This case involved a legitimate foreign exchange business, Frankfurt-based MGM Marwex Geldwechsel, its U.S. branch, MGM Marwex International and a hawala network spanning several countries.

Narcotics Trafficking (2)

Several Pakistani and Afghan nationals allegedly importing heroin into a major U.S. metropolitan area are suspected of collaborating with a bank officer to launder the proceeds of the sale of the heroin. This bank officer is believed to open accounts without following appropriate 'know your customer' procedures and also assists the traffickers with the management of these accounts, which are used for hawala-like transfers. Large numbers of checks have been processed through these accounts, and money has then been wired to Dubai and other places. It is also believed that other traffickers have availed themselves of this money laundering scheme. In addition, this bank officer may be handling the receipt of shipments of negotiable instruments from a south Asian country on behalf of suspected criminals in that country. These shipments may represent part of a money laundering scheme as well as potential violations of U.S. laws regarding the import of currency and the source country's laws regarding the export and possession of currency.

84 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Narcotics Trafficking (3)

In 1985, British courts convicted a Mr. Choraria (19) of 'being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition of importation of a Class A controlled drug, namely heroin'. Choraria was described as the 'banker who knowingly enabled payment for heroin imported into this country illegally to be transferred to India from whence the heroin had been sent'.

Choraria operated two legitimate businesses, an import/export financing firm (confirming house) and a remittance business (it is possible that at least part of this remittance business was hawala-based). In this case, Mr. Choraria brokered the transfer of funds between parties in Karachi and Mumbai as part of heroin smuggling.

This case has two somewhat humorous aspects: hawala had to be explained at length during the trial by Mr. Choraria's nephew, as the system was not known to Choraria's bankers. In addition, some of the British criminals involved in the case did not seem to understand how the money was being transferred.

Narcotics Trafficking (4)

The investigation of a Delhi-based hashish trafficking organization revealed that the traffickers had established several false corporate identities. Under the cover of these identities, machinery was shipped to Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia. Hashish was concealed in this machinery. Hawala was used to repatriate the proceeds of the hashish sales back to the Indian traffickers.

85 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Terrorism (1)

The investigation into the assassination of an important Indian politician revealed that the assassins were, in fact, terrorists. These terrorists used hawala to transfer the proceeds of the sale of narcotics to arms dealers for the purchase of military hardware.

Terrorism (2)

The series of bomb blasts in a major Indian city in 1993 was financed through hawala. The investigation revealed that the funds supporting these bombings (specifically funds used to buy explosives and to pay the bombers) were handled by hawala operators in the United Kingdom, Dubai and India.

Terrorism 3 Indictment 9/21/07

OPERATION CASH OUT CHARGES 45 DEFENDANTS IN INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND BRIBERY SCHEMES

Investigation by ICE, FBI, and IRS, along with State, Local and International Agencies, Results in Four Indictments Seeking Forfeiture of Over $5 Million

Baltimore, Maryland - A federal grand jury has indicted 39 individuals and one business on charges arising from money laundering, conspiracy to bribe a public official, operating unlicensed money transmitting businesses and failing to file currency transaction reports, announced United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein. One defendant is also charged with one count of concealment of terrorist financing. The four indictments seek a total of $5,148,000 in criminal forfeitures and ownership interest in two convenience stores located in Snow Hill, Maryland. Five additional defendants have been arrested and charged by criminal complaint with bribery and one other with money laundering.

86 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

United States Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein said, “Operation Cash-Out was a wide-ranging undercover investigation that yielded evidence of four separate criminal schemes involving at least 46 defendants in the United States, Spain, Canada and Belgium. Three of the indictments involve money laundering hawala schemes exposed through an undercover investigation in which a cooperating witness pretended to operate a business engaged in criminal activity. The indictments allege that the hawala money-transmitting businesses laundered millions of dollars that they believed were the proceeds of illegal activities such as drug dealing, by accepting the money in the United States and returning it in other countries. One of the defendants, Saifullah Ranjha, is alleged to have laundered money that he believed was to be used by al Qaeda, a foreign terrorist organization. The fourth indictment alleges a scheme in which many defendants conspired to bribe public officials with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to illegally obtain green cards and the Maryland Comptroller’s Office to receive abatement of taxes owed to the state.”

“Today's arrests are the culmination of a four year undercover operation that spanned the globe and could not have been successful without the cooperation of both domestic and international law enforcement agencies." said James A. Dinkins, Special Agent in Charge, of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Baltimore. "Illicit money transmittal businesses, coupled with individuals seeking to exploit our immigration system, can pose significant threats to our national security and public safety.”

Special Agent in Charge William D. Chase, of the Baltimore Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated, “This investigation, led by local, state, federal and international law enforcement agencies, demonstrates the value of global cooperation in our efforts to defeat criminals and their use of the international finance system to launder their ill gotten gains. Our national security and that of our international partners, hinges upon our commitment to seek out and punish those who would exploit our financial and immigration systems for their own criminal goals. We all consider today a success story for law enforcement and international cooperation.”

87 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Francis L. Turner, Special Agent in Charge, IRS, Criminal Investigation stated, "Money laundering is a global threat, fuel for criminals to conduct their criminal affairs and is used to manipulate and erode our financial systems."

U.S. v. Saifullah Ranjha et al., MJG- 07-0239

According to the 31-count second superseding indictment returned in U.S. v. Saifullah Ranjha et al., Saifullah Ranjha operated Hamza, Inc., a money remitting business in Washington, D.C. From October 2003 to the present, Ranjha, Hamza, Inc. and five other defendants allegedly conspired to launder over $2.208 million received from a cooperating witness working with ICE and FBI agents. The money was purported to be the proceeds of drug trafficking, terrorist financing and trafficking in contraband cigarettes. Saifullah Ranjha, his brother Imdad Ranjha, and Muhammad Saqi obtained the money from the witness in Laurel, Maryland or at the Hamza, Inc. office in Washington, D.C.

The defendants allegedly used an informal money transfer system known as a “hawala”which does not rely upon conventional banking systems and regulations, but involves giving the money to an individual in the United States, who in turn, arranges for the equivalent amount of money, minus commissions, to be paid back outside of the United States to an individual or financial account, as designated by the person seeking to have the money transferred. The defendants allegedly arranged for a network of persons or businesses to transfer the money into the cooperating witness’s foreign bank accounts or to be delivered outside the United States, after taking out their commission of 5% or more. Saifullah Ranjha relied primarily on Mazhar Chughtai in Canada to arrange for the bank deposits. Ranjha provided the witness with coded contact information for Saqi and Parvez Sandhu who resided in Spain, and other Ranjha associates in Canada, England, Spain, Pakistan and Australia, in order for the witness to meet with them abroad and receive the monies.

Count two of the indictment alleges that from February 2004 to the present, Saifullah Ranjha concealed the source and ownership of the funds he received from the witness that Ranjha believed were destined for al Qaeda, a foreign terrorist organization.

88 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Saifullah Ranjha is also charged with failing to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) that would have reflected receipt from the witness of over $2,208,000 in amounts ranging from $13,000 to $300,000. The indictment seeks the forfeiture of $2,208,000.

All of the defendants face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for conspiracy to launder money; and all of the individual defendants face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for one or more counts of money laundering (Saifullah Ranjha - 14 counts; Chughtai - eight counts; Muhammad - three counts; Imdad Ranjha, Saqi, and Sandu - one count each). Saifullah Ranjha faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for concealment of terrorist financing; and a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison on each of 14 counts for failure to file CTRs. Both Ranjha brothers face a maximum sentence of five years in prison for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business in Maryland.

U.S. v. Gujjar, et al., MJG-07-0227

According to the 15 count superseding indictment returned in U.S. v. Gujjar, et al., from March 2005 to the present, Mohammad Gujjar conspired with 24 other defendants to pay bribes to an individual they believed to be a public official of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to obtain “green cards”for themselves and their associates. The defendants met with the cooperating witness in Snow Hill, Baltimore, Ocean City, and Salisbury, Maryland; New Jersey; Wisconsin and New York to provide bribes totaling $495,000 ranging in payments from $5,000 to $60,000.

Count two of the indictment charges Gujjar, his brother Mohammad Ijaz, and four other defendants with a Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy for their agreement, from January 2005 to the present, to: pay $495,000 to an individual they believed to be an immigration official to illegally issue green cards for them and their associates; provide $450,000 in bribes to an individual they believed to be a corrupt official of the Maryland Comptroller’s Office to induce that official to release over $1.8 million in Maryland sales and use tax assessments levied against convenience store businesses associated with the defendants; and to

89 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac launder money. There in fact were no corrupt immigration and state officials.

The indictment seeks forfeiture of at least $945,000 and the defendants’ ownership interests in two convenience store businesses located in Snow Hill, Maryland.

All of the defendants face a maximum sentence of five years in prison for conspiracy to bribe public officials. 22 defendants face a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison for bribery of public officials. Gujjar, Ijaz, Javed Iqbal (I), Saeed Ahmed, Mohammad Akhtar and Mohammad Asif face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for the racketeering conspiracy.

U.S. v. Rehman, et al., MJG-07-0418

According to the two count superseding indictment returned in U.S. v. Rehman, et al., Abdul Rehman conspired with seven other defendants, from May 2006 to the present, to launder $1,475,000 received from a cooperating witness who represented that the monies were proceeds of illegal drug trafficking and international smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes. On a number of occasions the cooperating witness gave the money to an associate of the defendants in Harford County and Baltimore, Maryland; New York; Spain and Australia for hand-to-hand delivery, minus 5% to 7% in commissions, to the witness or a designee in Spain, Australia and elsewhere. The defendants used the hawala method to arrange for the transfer of the money.

Count one of the indictment charges eight persons with conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business.

The indictment seeks the forfeiture of $1,475,000.

Five of the defendants face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for conspiracy to launder money. All of the defendants face a maximum sentence of five years in prison for conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business.

90 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac U.S. v. Ahsan and Rehman, MJG-07-0397

According to the 12-count superseding indictment returned in U.S. v. Ahsan and Rehman, Mohammad Ahsan owned and operated a money remitting business in Washington, D.C. known as Pak Exchange Services. From November 2004 to March 22, 2007, Abdul Rehman, who is also charged in the indictment described above, allegedly conspired with Ahsan to launder $520,000 provided by the cooperating witness who represented that the monies were the proceeds of illegal drug trafficking. The witness gave the money to Ahsan at his residence in Laurel. Similar to the Ranjha money laundering scheme described above in the Ranjha case, Ahsan used the “hawala”method to arrange for the equivalent amount of monies, minus commissions, to be deposited into the witness’s designated foreign bank account, or to be delivered by Rehman and others to the witness or a designee in Canada, England, Spain, Pakistan and the Netherlands. Both men are also charged with money laundering.

Count two charges Ahsan with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business from July 2005 to March 22, 2007. Ahsan is also charged failing to file CTRs that would have reflected receipt from the witness of $520,000, in amounts ranging from $20,000 to $200,000. The indictment seeks the forfeiture of $520,000.

Ahsan and Rehman face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison conspiracy to launder money. Ahsan faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for each of five counts of money laundering and Rehman faces the same penalties for one count of money laundering. Ahsan faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison on each of five counts for failure to file CTRs; and a maximum sentence of five years in prison for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business outside of the District of Columbia, as he is alleged to be licensed to conduct business only within the District of Columbia.

91 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac An indictment and criminal complaint are not a finding of guilt. An individual charged by indictment or criminal complaint is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty at some later criminal proceedings.

United States Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein thanked U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation and the Maryland Office of the Comptroller - Enforcement Division for their investigative work. Mr. Rosenstein also recognized the Drug Enforcement Administration; Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; Maryland State Police; Ocean City Police Department; Maryland Natural Resources Police; Howard County and Baltimore City Police Departments; the Torrence City and San Bernardino County Police Departments, California; the Wicomico, Worcester, and Somerset County Sheriffs Offices; and the Maryland National Guard for their assistance.

In addition, U.S. Attorney Rosenstein thanked our international partners, the London Metropolitan Police; Spanish National Police; Australian Federal Police; Dutch National Police; Belgium Federal Police and Royal Canadian Mounted Police for their help. The U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Eastern District of New York, the District of New Jersey and Washington, D.C. also provided assistance in this case.

Mr. Rosenstein commended Assistant United States Attorney Christine Manuelian, who is the lead prosecutor on the case, with assistance from Assistant United States Attorneys Philip S. Jackson and Stephanie Gallagher, and Assistant United States Attorney Harvey E. Eisenberg, Chief of National Security, who supervised this case.

92 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Alien Smuggling

A worldwide alien smuggling network is suspected of using hawala banking techniques to move money between North America and South Asia to pay the alien smuggling 'fee' and additional payments (e.g. for lawyers) are also made.

93 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Welfare Fraud

Certain immigrants from a particular country are accused of committing large scale welfare fraud in two major U.S. cities. An employee of a car rental agency deposits large numbers of checks into a personal checking account, and then wires money to a variety of locations, including Dubai (this is documented by Suspicious Activity Reports filed by the bank where the account is held). Since it is known that there are many immigrants from this country working in Dubai, it is suspected that hawala is then being used to remit money (which probably includes proceeds derived from welfare fraud) from Dubai back to this country, which has a poorly developed banking system, via couriers. This is the sanitized text from one of the Suspicious Activity Reports associated with this case:

SUSPECT ONE MAKES FREQUENT LARGE CASH DEPOSITS INTO HIS CHECKING ACCOUNT AND IN A FEW DAYS HE WIRES IT OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAS BEEN SEEN WITH SUSPECT TWO. THIS ACTIVITY SEEMS UNUSUAL FOR HIS OCCUPATION.

Insider Trading

A citizen of a South Asian country, who was an investment banker in a major U.S. financial center is accused of giving 'tips' to various friends and relatives. After some illegal trades took place, the banker resigned and apparently fled the United States for his homeland. At the same time, several of his associates also traveled to this same country as well as several European financial centers. An analysis of seized bank records indicates that money was wired to persons apparently of the same nationality in at least one of these financial centers. It is possible that these wire transfers were the first part of hawala-like transfers of the proceeds from the illicit trades to the investment banker's home country.

94 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Customs and Tax Violations (1)

A Pakistani living in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area was doing hawala transfers for other expatriates. Large cash transactions at the bank used by some of the defendants were brought to the attention of customs and tax authorities. Their subsequent investigation uncovered a scheme in which surgical instruments manufactured in Pakistan were being imported at inflated prices (over-invoicing) to facilitate the transfer of money from the United States to Pakistan, in apparent violation of Pakistani law. Convictions were obtained for customs violations, making false statements and tax fraud (20).

Customs and Tax Violations (2)

An individual representing himself as being in the gold business in a large U.S. city, specifically as a 'gold broker', is suspected of various customs and tax violations as well as money laundering. This individual has made very large cash deposits at several banks, and at least one bank has closed this individual's account because of these deposits. This individual's bank account was examined in conjunction with a tax investigation. This individual claims to supply various gold shops with gold bullion, and also that he sells gold coins and jewelry to individuals. Interviews with owners of these businesses and alleged clients indicate that this is not the case. It is believed that this individual is acting as a bank for various individuals and businesses, assisting them in evading the payment of taxes.

95 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Gambling

Hawala has been used not only as an alternative remittance system but as an alternative banking system in a South Asian gambling operation. Currency control laws made it nearly impossible for citizens of one country to take money to gamble in another, and there are similar problems with bringing gambling winnings back into the country. The gambling operators have engaged hawaladars to accept money 'on deposit' from gamblers, and pay winnings through them as well. This is something of a testimony to the reliability of hawala. During a conversation with one of the authors of this paper, one of the principals in this gambling operation reported that this had been going on for nearly twenty years without any significant difficulties.

96 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix K: Glossary

This glossary contains certain terms used in this paper as well as others that the reader may encounter while researching hawala and related topics. Where appropriate, Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu spellings are given. 'Hawala', 'hundi ' and other words closely connected to money movement are discussed in detail in Appendix F.

Confirming house: in the import/export business, a confirming house acts on behalf of the buyer by dealing directly with the exporter to complete the contract. There is no overseas credit risk or financial burden for the exporter because the confirming house provides short term credit to the overseas buyer, who pays a commission for this service.

crore : 10,000,000 [ten million]; part of the South Asian numbering system, frequently used when discussing money. A crore is 100 lakhs. A billion is often referred to as 100 crore. The South Asian numbering system is based on three units: thousands, lakhs (100,000) and crores. For this reason, 'two crore' will be heard instead of 'twenty million'. The placement of commas reflects the number of crores; 2,00,00,000 would be written instead of 20,000,000 (the first is 'two crores' the second is 'twenty million').

Integration: the third and final stage of money laundering In this stage, the launderer invests in other assets, uses the funds to enjoy a luxurious lifestyle or reinvests his profits into criminal activities.

khokha (also spelled koka; khokhu in Gujarati): The literal meaning of this word is 'something hollow', 'bag' or 'paid bill'; it is used colloquially to refer to 10,000,000 [ten million] rupees. When speaking of money, this word is often used interchangeably with crore.

lakh (also spelled lack or lac): 100,000 [one hundred thousand]; part of the South Asian numbering system, frequently used when discussing money. The term 'hundred thousand' is rarely used; instead; 'five lakhs' will be heard instead of 'five hundred thousand'. The placement of commas reflects the number of lakhs; 5,00,000 would be written instead of 500,000 (the first is 'five lakhs' the second is 'five hundred thousand').

97 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac layering: the second stage of money laundering. In this stage, the money launderer manipulates the illicit funds to make them appear as though they were derived from a legitimate source.

Man (also maund): approximately 40 kg.

Money laundering: the process of converting the proceeds of a criminal activity into funds with an apparently legal source. Money laundering may be further divided into three sub processes or stages: placement, layering and integration.

Numerals: for reference, here are the forms of the numerals as written in Hindi, Gujarati, Punjabi, Bengali, Urdu, Arabic and Persian (Farsi/Dari) (21):

peti : The literal meaning of this word is 'box', 'suitcase' or 'belt'; it is used colloquially to refer to 100,000 rupees. When speaking of money, this word is often used interchangeably with lakh.

Placement: the first stage of money laundering. In this stage, the money launderer disposes of the proceeds of a criminal activity (which are often in the form of cash).

ser (also seer): approximately 1 kg, 1/40th of a man.

tola (tolo in Gujarati): approximately 11.7 grams (the weight of a silver rupee); this is a common unit used in the precious metals and

98 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac jewelry businesses in India, Pakistan and Persian Gulf. One twelfth of a tola is a masha

99 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix L: Bibliography

Cajori, Florian (1993 reprint of the 1928/9 original) A History of Mathematical Notations, Mineola, New York: Dover.

Chohan, Ali Hassan (1995) Practical Dictionary, English to English & Urdu; Urdu to Urdu & English, Lahore: Oriental Book Society.

Cowan, J. M. [editor] (1976) Arabic-English Dictionary, The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modem Written Arabic, Ithaca, New York: Spoken Language Services.

Gala, L.R., Shah, B. L, and Gokani, L. B. (1998) Gala's Desk Dictionary: English-English-Gujarati & Gujarati-Gujarati-English, Ahmadabad and Bombay: Gala/Navneet Publications (I) Limited.

Gonzalez, Patricia (1997) 'Ex-Corona Man Guilty of Laundering Drug Money; 68-year-old Aided International `Kingpin'' The Press-Enterprise (Riverside, California), July 4, 1997.

Gupta, Suraj B. (1992) Black Income in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Jost, Patrick (1997) 'Black Hawala, Financial Crimes and the World Drug Trade' in Jayasuriya, D.C., Nayak R. K. and Wells, A. (editors) Global Drugs Law: Selected Papers Presented at the Indian Law Institute/UNDCP International Conference on Global Drugs Law, New Delhi, 28 February-3 March 1997. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. This paper is also available from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Office of Communications, 2070 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 200, Vienna, VA 22182 USA.

Kapoor, Sanjay (1996) Bad Money, Bad Politics: The Untold Hawala Story. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications (Alka Paperbacks).

Maharaja, Jagadguru Swami Sri Bharati Krsna Tirthaji (1997) Vedic Mathematics. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Malhotra, Angelina (1995) 'India's Underground Bankers' Asia, Inc. Online/Asia, Inc. August 1995.

100 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac McGregor, RS. (1993) The Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Menninger, Karl (1992 reprint of the original 1969 translation by Paul Broneer) Number Words and Number Symbols: A Cultural History of Numbers [Zahlwort and Ziffer: Eine Kulturgeschichte der Zahlen] Mineola, New York: Dover Publications.

Pathak, R. C. [compiler] (1995) Bhargava's Standard Illustrated Dictionary HindiEnglish. Varanasi: Bhargava Book Depot.

Puliani, Ravi and Puliani, Mahesh (1997) Bharat's Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 with Rules, Including the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992 with 1993 Rules & Other Allied Acts and Rules. Delhi: Bharat Law House.

Quereshi, Bashir Ahman [compiler] (1992) Standard Twentieth Century Dictionary Urdu into English. Delhi: Educational Publishing House.

Sandhu, Harjit Singh (1998) 'Hawala-A Good Old Vehicle for the Movement of Bad Money' Laundering News (Sydney, Australia) 2:1998.

Tannan, M. L. (1996) Tannan's Banking Law and Practice in India. New Delhi: India Law House.

Thakur, Sushila (1990) Two Decades of Indian Banking: The Service Sector Scenario. Delhi: Chanakya Publications.

Tharoor, Shashi (1997) India: From Midnight to the Millennium. New York: Harper Perennial.

Tripathi, Dwijendra and Misra, Prithi (1985) Towards a New Frontier: History of the Bank of Baroda. New Delhi: Manohar.

U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] (1993) Money Laundering in Southwest Asia. Washington, DC: Department of Justice, DEA Publication DEA-930001.

U.S. Library of Congress (1996) India: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

101 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac U.S. Library of Congress (1995a) Pakistan: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Library of Congress (1995b) Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Zdanowicz, John S., Welch, William W., and Pak, Simon J. (1995) 'Capital Flight From India to the United States Through Abnormal Pricing in International Trade' Finance India, Vol. X, No. 3, September 1995.

End Notes

(1) The terms hawala and hundi refer to the same system and may be used interchangeably. Refer to Appendix A for background on the origins and meanings of these words. (2) The term 'hawala operator' is also very popular; see Tharoor (1997). (3) This scenario would be just as valid if the money were being sent to India, or from one of several South Asian nations to the United States; note that hawala is also frequently used to move money out of South Asia. Appendix C has another scenario, showing another aspect of hawala pricing schemes. (4) The rates of exchange for various South Asian currencies fluctuate widely; a consistent, but possibly not current, rate of exchange is used throughout this paper. (5) This is a fictitious advertisement; it does, however, combine the elements of 'hawala ads' seen by the authors. (6) This pricing scheme was encountered in the case U.S. v. Ismail, which is discussed in Appendix D of this paper. (7) The gold trade is very much a part of hawala; hawaladars may also be involved in the buying, selling and delivery of gold. (8) Puhani et. al. (1971:20); the FERA is one piece of current Indian legislation used to address money laundering; it will eventually be replaced by comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation and a revised foreign exchange act called the FEMA (Foreign Exchange Management Act).

102 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac His 'legitimate' business consists primarily of exchanges between the U.S. and Iran [dollars and rials]. Hawala is also very common in Iran, (9) where it is referred to as 'havala'. The difference in profit margins may, in part, be accounted for by the difference in markets for Iranian rials and Indian and Pakistani rupees. (10) Under Section 1960 of Title 18 of the U.S. Criminal Code',whoever conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of a business, knowing the business is an illegal money transmitting business shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both'; this reinforces individual states' efforts to license money remittance businesses, but there is no overall mechanism for regulating these businesses. Under proposed regulations requiring registration of money transmitters, it would be a criminal offense to engage in hawala without being registered with the U.S. Department of the Treasury. (11) See Jost (1997) for a detailed discussion of 'black hawala'. (12) In other jurisdictions, large cash transactions are often considered at least cause to alert a bank or other financial institution to the possibility that the transaction should be reported as 'suspicious' under applicable regulations. (13) In Gujarati, it is , hawalo; Gujarati information is included in this paper as the language has figured prominently in several significant hawala cases. (14) Hindi is one of the national languages of India; Urdu the national language of Pakistan. They are Indo-European languages; their origins are Sanskrit, the liturgical language of Hinduism and the Persian of the Mughals, the Islamic rulers of India. In addition, there are many Arabic words in these languages, reflecting the influence of Mughal culture. Today, the spoken languages are nearly identical, leading some to claim that they are dialects of the same language. Hindi is written in the Devanagari script, borrowed from Sanskrit, and tends to favor Sanskrit for the creation of new words. Urdu follows Mughal tradition; it is written in a slightly modified version of the Arabic script, and favors Arabic and Persian as sources of new words. (15) Tripati and Misra (1985:6). (16) The names and transactions in this example are fictitious.

103 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac (17) The amount owed is $5263.15; assume a price for 22K gold of US$ 8.64/g and 11.7 grams/tola (see Appendix F for more information on South Asian weights, measures and numerals). (18) Gonzalez (1997) (19) R v. Choraria Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 27 March 1985. (20) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISMAEL, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAKEEL AHMAD, a/k/a Javed Iqbal, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff Appellee, v. MIAN TAUQIR AHMED, a/k/a Tauqir Ahmed, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOB BASHER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 95-5299, No. 95-5324, No. 95- 5325, No. 95-5326. 97 F.3d 50; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25229; 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (21) 'Western' numerals (1, 2, 3, etc.) can be referred to as 'Hindu-Arabic' numerals. These numerals, including the important sign for zero, apparently originated in South Asia (Cajori 1993: 45-70; Menninger 393-445; Maharaja 1977:xlii) and were adopted by the Arabs, and ultimately made their way to Europe. Note that the 'Hindi' numerals are actually the original Devanagari (Sanskrit) numerals, and are also used for Nepali.

104 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix J Indictment Mini-Marts Funding Middle East Terrorism

FOURTEEN AREA PEOPLE INDICTED ON FEDERAL RACKETEERING CHARGES INVOLVING CONSPIRACY TO TRANSFER CASH AND CHECKS TO THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Fourteen members of a criminal enterprise operating out of five St. Louis- area convenience stores have been indicted on federal racketeering and multiple related charges. As far back as 2000, the conspiracy has involved bank fraud, receipt of stolen property, conducting an unlicensed money transmitting business, purchasing contraband cigarettes for resale, evading reporting requirement on exporting monetary instruments, wire fraud and transporting monetary instruments and funds to avoid reporting requirements.

"The indictment alleges that after generating money through these illegal activities, the members of this organization utilized couriers, who traveled from the United States to the Palestinian territories carrying cash, jewelry, cashier's checks and endorsed and unendorsed personal and business account checks

This case illustrates the importance of law enforcement partnerships, intelligence sharing and cooperation we see every day in St. Louis through the work of our task forces. As a result of today's law enforcement actions, the activities of criminal elements in our community have been disrupted. According to the indictment, the Hamed Organization is a criminal enterprise that operates primarily in the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County. Members and associates of the enterprise, many who are related to each other, raise and collect money through legal and illegal means for themselves and to transfer money to entities in the Palestinian territories. The enterprise owns and operates convenience stores that they utilize to receive and sell stolen goods, such as infant formula, computers, Global Positioning System devices and cigarettes. The enterprise allegedly buys the stolen property at rates significantly below fair market retail value and sells the items through the convenience stores at a large profit.

105 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Additionally, as alleged in the indictment, the enterprise transferred real estate and businesses amongst its members as a means to generate cash from fraudulently obtained bank loans. They obtained the bank loans by falsifying citizenship status, total assets, misrepresentations of debt and asset ownership.

They operated out of the following area convenience stores: •Regal Food I, 4201 McRee Avenue, St. Louis •Regal Food II, 3852 Virginia Avenue, St. Louis •Ferguson Market, 9101 West Florissant Avenue, Ferguson •Prince Market, 9826 St. Charles Rock Road, St. Louis •St. Louis Supermarket, 4331 Natural Bridge Avenue, Individuals indicted: •Bassam Hisham Hamed, Florissant, MO, chief executive of the enterprise •Ghandi Hisham Hamed, Florissant, MO, leader of the enterprise and brother of Bassam Hamed •Ayoub Hisham Hamed, Hazelwood, MO, brother of Bassam Hamed •Said Jarabaa, Florissant, MO, leader of the enterprise •Suhail Jarabaa, Florissant, MO, brother of Said Jarabaa •Mohammed Badwan, Florissant, MO, brother of Mazen •Mazen Badwan, Florissant, MO, brother of Mohammed •Abdelkarim Badwan, Florissant, MO, father of Mohammed and Mazen •Nael Abdeljabbar, Florissant, MO •Mahmoud Ghannam, Hazelwood, MO •Mahir Mohammad, St. Louis, MO •Nayef Lutfeyyah, Florissant, MO •Rayqa Jarabaa, Palestine •Shahrazad Ramadan, St. Louis, MO

106 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Charges and maximum penalties: •RICO Conspiracy, 20 years prison and/or fines up to $250,000 or twice the gross profits/proceeds •Bank fraud, 30 years prison and/or files up to $1,000,000 •Transporting monetary instruments to avoid reporting requirement, 20 years prison and/or fines up to $500,000 or twice value of funds •Conspiracy to structure in order to avoid reporting requirements, five years prison and/or fines up to $250,000 •Conspiracy to receive stolen goods, five years prison and/or fines up to $250,000 •Receiving contraband cigarettes, five years prison and/or fines up to $250,000

Stolen Baby Formula

Date Location Formula Formula Price Remarks Powder Liquid 10/14/05 Regal 1 5 5 $150 10/17/05 Regal 2 11 10 $340 10/17/05 Regal 1 19 6 $480 10/21/05 Regal 2 19 11 $482 10/21/05 Regal 1 `6 5 $180 11/8/05 Regal 2 9 4 $300 1/17/06 Regal 1 8 5 $220 1/17/06 Regal 2 9 4 $212 1/31/06 Regal 1 21 11 $550 1/31/06 Regal 2 20 11 $500

107 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

2/7/06 Regal 1 27 11 $595 2/15/06 Regal 1 29 8 $675 2/17/06 Regal 2 21 $405 2/23/06 Regal 1 27 13 $680 3/1/06 Regal 1 10 $300 3/10/05 Regal 20 $300 3/23/06 Regal 2 37 15 $700 4/3/06 Regal 2 22 5 $370 4/11/06 Regal 2 8 21 $300 4/19/06 Regal 2 21 12 $400 6/29/06 Regal 1 68 $680 6/30/06 Regal 2 46 7/28/05 Regal 1 24 $288 8/31/06 Regal 2 28 22 $650 9/26/06 Regal 1 36 $360 9/29/06 Regal 2 70 8 $840 11/28/06 Regal 2 20 $520 1/28/07 Regal 2 8 $140

108 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Cigarette Smuggling

Date Location Price Remarks 1/28/08 St Louis $500 1,750 Cartons Supermarket 4/23/08 Ferguson $2,000 2,400 Cartons supermarket

Stolen Property

Date Location Description Price Remarks 12/23/05 Regal 2 Toshiba $200 Satellite Laptop Computer 2/15/06 Mohammad Diapers Badwan 3/1/06 Regal 2 Toshiba $300 Satellite Laptop Computer 3/29/06 Regal 2 Toshiba $125 Satellite Laptop Computer 4/17/06 Ghandi 4 Desk Top Requested Hamed Computers Purchase of GPS Flat these items Screen TVs Cameras Laptop computers 9/9/06 McDonalds Magellan $150 4420 S Road master Broadway 360 GPS 9/26/06 Ayoub Stolen GPS Request Hamed and Items

109 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Computers 11/28/06 Ghandi Compaq $590 Hamed Presario Regal 2 Laptop and A Tom Tom 60 910 GPS 12/20/06 Regal 2 Compaq $520 Presario Laptop Emachines Desktop and 2 Garmin Street Pilots GPS 1/12/07 Regal 2 Toshiba $200 laptop computer 1/30/07 Regal 2 Toshiba $200 Satellite laptop computer

Money Transfers

Date Individual Amount From To Remarks 11/7/06 Bassam $42,634.01 St Louis Beiten Proceeds Hamed Missouri Palestine of illegal acts 9/8/06 $36,610.20 St Louis Beiten Proceeds Missouri Palestine of illegal acts 1/8/08 Said $38,873.64 St Louis Beiten Proceeds Jarabaa Missouri Palestine of illegal acts

110 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Overt Acts

Date Individual Amount From To Remarks 2/28/05 Ferguson $20,000 Commerce Palestine Proceeds Market Bank Investment of illegal St Louis Bank in acts Missouri Palestine 3/11/05 Bassam $6,000 Commerce Ramallah Proceeds Hamed Bank Palestine of illegal St Louis Union acts Missouri Bank 3/17/05 Ghandi $6,000 Commerce Ramallah Proceeds Hamed Bank Palestine of illegal St Louis Union acts Missouri Bank 7/27/05 Ferguson $15,000 US Bank Israel Proceeds Market Bank of illegal acts 3/3/06 Basam $6,000 Commerce Palestine Proceeds Hamed Bank Investment of illegal St Louis Bank in acts Missouri Palestine 9/8/06 Rayoa $36,610.20 US Banks Amman Checkbook Jarabaa $5,946.10 Jordan and blank checks 1/16/07 Thabit $5,000 US Bank Amman Proceeds Hamed & $5,000 Chicago Jordan of illegal Mother Iza $7,000 Ill acts Darhamed 1/8/08 Shahrazad $38,873.64 St Louis Jerusalem Proceeds Ramadan Missouri Israel of illegal acts 6/8/08 Suhail $9,820 Chicago Ill Amman Proceeds Jarabaa Jordan of illegal acts 6/8/08 Shahira $10,000 Chicago Ill Amman Proceeds Jarabaa Jordan of illegal acts

111 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

112 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Criminal Activity that Financed Terrorist Plots

Organization Plot Financing Remarks Activity Al-Qeada 1999 LA Airport Lived on Welfare Millennium and Theft for 4 Bombing yrs Ahmed Ressam In Canada Al-Qeada 2002 Bali Jewelry store Bombing robberies Al-Qeada Credit Card fraud Moroccan Waiter Scanning device stolen credit card worn on his belt information Al-Qeada Counterfeit currency Philippines Al-Qeada 2005 London Credit card fraud transit bombing Al-Qeada 2004 Madrid Drug sales train bombing Al-Qeada Iraq Oil smuggling kidnapping political corruption NGOs diverting funds Hizballah USA Baby Formula 20-40 million Hamound Theft Food annually brothers NC stamp fraud Haj Hasan Hilu Welfare fraud Laqis Canada Credit card fraud T shirt sales Cigarette Smuggling Banking Scams False documents

113 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Alien smuggling through South America Hizballah South America Baby Formula tri Border Region Theft Food stamp fraud Welfare fraud Credit card fraud T shirt sales Cigarette Smuggling Banking Scams False documents Alien smuggling through South America Shake Downs Hizballah Venezuela Travel Alien Smuggling Agencies Hizballah Sierra Leone Blood Diamonds Liberia Congo Hizballah USA Jordan Drug Sales Yemen Lebanon Hizballah West Bank Hizballah 3 million controls Western annually 2000- Unions for 2004 money transfers Hamas USA Midwest Drug Sales Meth Cigarette and counterfeit tax stamps Hamas USA Counterfeit DVD and other articles sales Baby Formula Food stamp fraud coupon fraud welfare fraud food stamp fraud

114 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac T shirt sales credit card fraud visa fraud alien smuggling mortgage fraud

115 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix K Abbreviations used in Terrorist Investigations.

AAD Interior and Security Ministry Sudan ABIM Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia ADF Allied Democratic Forces AKK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sudan APU Movement of Islamic Unity ARC Advice and Reformation Committee ASG Abu Sayyaf Group BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International BIC Benevolence International Corporation BIF Benevolence International Foundation BN Barisan National BNPP Barisan National Pembebasan Patani BRN Barisan Revolusi National CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear WMDs DEHCQ Darul Ebsan Orphanage and Hifsul Quran Center DHF Darul Hijra Foundation DIAS Daw’l Imam Al-Shafee FH Front Hizbullah FIS Islamic Liberation Front Algeria GIGN Groupe d’Intervention Gendarmerie National French Anti- Terrorist Force GRF Global Relief Foundation GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat HCI Human Concern International HEZB HEZB-ul-Mujahidin HNI HIZB-I-NEHZAT-I-Islami Branch of IRP HT HEZB-UT-TEHRIR HUA Harkat-ul-Ansar HUJI Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami HUM Harkat-ul-Mujahidin IA Indian Airlines ICS Islami Chatra Shibir IDCP Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines IDGI Islamic Dawah and Guidance International IED Improvised Explosive Device IFM Islamic Front of Malaysia IIC International Islamic Conference

116 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac IIEP International Islamic Efforts of the Philippines IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization IMT Islamic Movement of Tajikistan IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IOC Islamic Observation Center IPC Islamic Presentation Committee IRIC International Relief and Information Center IRP Islamic Renaissance Party China ISCAG Islamic Studies Call and Guidance ISD International Security Department of Singapore ISI Inter Service Intelligence Pakistan Security Services ITFI IT Forensic Investigation IWCF Islamic World Committee Foundation IWWWM Islamic World Wisdom Worldwide Mission JEEMA Justice Forum Uganda JEM Jayash-e-Muhammad Army of Muhammad JI Jemaah Islamiyyah KIMM Kongress Indian Muslim Malaysia KMM Malaysian Mujahidin Group LBI Islamic Benevolence Committee LET Lashkar-e-Toiba LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MAK Afghan Service Bureau Front MASYUMI Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MIRA Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia MIYM Muslim Islamic Youth Movement MNF Multi- National Force US Led MNLF Moro National Liberation Front MWL Muslim World League NCB National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia NIF National Islamic Front Sudan NU Nahdlatul Ulena OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control US OPM/SANG Saudi Arabian National Guard OSALA Oromo- Somali-Afar Liberation Alliance PAI Pakistan Awami Itehad PAL Philippine Airlines PAS Parti Islam Se Malaysia

117 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac PDF Militia People Defense Force PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PIA Pakistan International Airlines PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PPP Development Unity Party PULO Pattani United Liberation Organization RAW Research and Analysis Wing India Foreign Intelligence Service SBG Saudi Bin laden Group SPLA Sudan’s People Liberation Army SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan Army of the Prophet’s Companion TMSA Thai Muslim Students Association TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Moammadi TWRA Third World Relief Agency UMFF Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom Fighters USIS United States Information Service Center UTO United Tajik Opposition YMAT Young Association of Thailand

118 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix L Glossary of Foreign and Islamic Terms

Baya Formal oath of loyalty Bidah Innovation considered non Islamic corruption diluting the word of God Dar al-Harb Land of conflict Dar al-Islam Land of Islam Dar al-Kufr Land of Infidels Dar al-Suhl Land of Treaty Dawa Call to Islam Fard Ayn Individual Obligation Fard Kifaya Collective Obligation Fitna Temptation or trial discord within the Muslim community Hadith Stories recording the words and deeds of the Prophet by people who knew him Hijra Exile withdrawal Jahiliyya The state of barbarism and ignorance that prevailed in the Arabic Peninsula before Muhammad’s revelations jihad adj. Jihad Striving Jihad Bis Sayf Striving through the sword violent revolt Kufr Infidel Maghreb North African Islamic Land Mantiqi Region Indonesian Mujahed Pl. Mujahedin Jihad Fighter Salaf Ancient one companion of the Prophet Shahada Profession of Faith also Martyrdom Shahid Witness martyr Sharia Strict Quranic Law Shura Council Takfr Excommunicated a lapsed Muslim form the Arabic root Kufr for Impiety Tawhid Unity of God Umma Muslim Community Wakalah Branches Indonesian Zakat Charity The word means purification and growth Each Muslim calculates there zakat individually Hajji The annual pilgrimage to Mecca

119 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Bin Son of Bint Daughter of Umm Mother of Abu or Abi Father of Al-Rashid Rightly guided prominent Wahabi Saudi Arabia - Usama bin Laden is a Wahabi Muslim Mahadi - Sudan; Libya; Algeria Hanafi Pakistan Hanbali Pakistan

Shi’a Muslims Shi’a Muslims or Shiites are followers of Mohammad's cousin/son-in-law Ali.

Sunni Muslims Sunni Muslims follow the teachings of Abu Bakr, who died in 634.

Al Awlani the leader Al Jare Currier; Infantryman Al Kannas Sniper/killer with one shot Al Mukabir Communications/Intelligence Al Hakeem Medic/doctor Jamaat E Tableigh the group that reforms” Jamaat Dawa the group that calls someone to their cause Jamaat Eghatha the group that assists and rescues Lashkar E Taibe specific to Pakistan - similar to above Bayaat allegiance to Barakat Blessings Barakate reference to UBL at Gitmo Ahl El Beit The Core, trace their descent to Mohammed

120 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sahaba The trusted company, lesser that Ahl El Beit Al Ansar The supporters, mostly Sunni, non-Arabs Al-Fadl Prominent Abd Allah Servant of God Abd al-Aziz Servant of the almighty Abd al-Rahman Servant of the merciful Amat Allah Female servant of god Muhamed al-Hallaj Muhamed the dresser of cotton Mughirah al-Jufi Mughirah of the tribe of Jufi Yaqub al-Dimashqui Yaqub of Damascus Modern Jihad Holy War Original Jihad Inner Struggle Masjid Mosque Malay Indonesia Language Pashto Afghanistan Language Urdu/Punjabi Pakistan Language Kaafir non-Muslim Zaaniyah Adulteress zina, fornication In some parts of the Muslim world, virgins who have been raped are considered to have fornicated Ummah in trust for Allah Murabaha Murabaha is most commonly used for short-term trade financing and involves the sale of an asset for a price which includes a stated mark up of the original purchase price. Mudaraba This form of financing involves the establishment of a joint venture between a passive investor or "sleeping partner" and

121 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac a manager or "working partner" Musharaka. This is a variation on the joint venture format described above and involves a partnership typically formed for the purpose of investment in a specifically identified project. Ijara. Ijara is analogous to equipment leasing transactions as we know them. It involves the lease for a fixed term of goods selected by the lessee. Salam We would describe this investment as a forward sale contract involving the current payment for assets to be delivered in the future Istisna This vehicle is, in essence, a build-to-suit contract in which the investor agrees to design and construct an asset pursuant to the purchaser's specifications Sukuk Al-Ijara Liquidity is injected into Islamic finance transactions through the use of lease participation trust certificates. Al-Wadih These accounts are non-interest bearing, but guarantee return of capital. Mudaraba. These deposits are made for the purpose of investment of the funds by the bank. Master Lease Since leases involve the payment of rent (i.e, a payment for the right to use and occupy a facility), not the payment of interest (i.e., payment for the use of money), they are often utilized in structuring Islamic investment in U.S. real estate assets. Purchase of Cost plus financing arrangements, often For-Sale Lots. with an obligation to complete certain improvements, are often employed in

122 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac connection with the development and sale of finished lots for residential construction. Joint Venture. Joint ventures can take many forms and can be used as a vehicle for acquiring existing properties or for development of new real estate assets. Riba- Usury - or interest):

123 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Appendix M Names of Terrorist and there Group Affiliations

Central Staff of Al-Qaeda Name AKA’s DOB and place of Birth Osama Bin Laden Abu Abdullah 1957 Saudi Arabia Ayman Al-Zawahiri Abdel Muiz Dr Nur 1951 Egypt Ali Amin Ali Al- Abu Ubaydah Al- Egypt Rashidi Barshiri Shubhi Mohammed Abu Hafs Al-Mastri 1957 Egypt Abu Sittah Mohd Atef Sheikh Omar Abdel Blind Sheikh 1938 Egypt Rahman Mohammed Shawqi 1955 Egypt Al-Islambuli Zain Al-Abidin Mohd Abu Zubaydah 1971 Saudi Arabia Hussein Mohammed Ibrahim Sayf Al-Adl Al-Madani 1945 Egypt Makkawi Mustafa Ahmed 1968 Saudi Arabia Al-Hawsawi Rifai Ahmed Tafa Abu Yasir 1954 Egypt Talat Fuad Qasim 1956 Egypt Osama Rushdi 1960 Egypt Mustafa Ahmed Hassan 1957 Egypt Hamza Khalid Sheikh KSM 1965 Kuwait Mohammed Khalid Abdel Rahman 1962 Kuwait Al-Fawwaz Ahmed Fadl Al- Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi 1966 Jordan Kalaylah Mohammed Al- 1954 Egypt Zawahiri Omar Mahmoud Abu Qatada 1960 Jordan Othman Mamdouh Mahmud Abu Hajer Al-Iraqi 1958 Iraq Salim

124 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Hamid Al-Fakhiri Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi 1971 Libya Ahmad Hussein Mustafa 1962 Egypt Ujayzah Jamal Ahmed Mohd 1963 Sudan Al-Fadl Osama Siddiq Ali 1966 Egypt Ayyub Muntasir Wadih El-Hage Abu Abdullah Al- 1960 Lebanon Lubnani Said Al-Sayyid Salamah 1963 Egypt Khalid Ahmed Said Khadr Abu Abdurrahman 1948 Egypt Al-Kanadi Yasir Tawfq Al-Sirri Abu Ammar 1962 Egypt Sulayman Abu 1965 Kuwait Mustafa Kame Abu Hamza Al-Masri 1958 Egypt Tharwat Salah Shitahih 1960 Egypt Adil Mohd Abd Al- Abd Al-Bari 1959 Egypt Majid Abdl Al-Aziz Musa 1955 Egypt Al-Jamal Core Arab Cluster Waleed Mohd Tawfiq Khallad Yemen Bin Attash Mahmud Abouhalima 1959 Egypt Ali Abdel Saud Mohd Ali Mohammed Jeff 1952 Egypt Mustafa Khalid Al-Syyid Ali Shiekh Adam 1964 Egypt Abu Al-Dahab Abdoul Basit Mahmoud Ramzi Yousef 1968 Kuwait Abdul Karim Abdul Hakim Murad 1968 Kuwait Wali Khan Amin Shah Osama 1967 Afghanistan Abdoul Shakur 1972 Pakistan Abdoul Aziz Fahd 1970 Saudi Arabia Nasser Rayid Hajir 1970 Saudi Arabia Muslih Shamrani 1970 Saudi Arabia

125 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Khaled Ahmed Said 1970 Saudi Arabia I Houssaine Kherchtou Abu Said Maghrebi 1964 Morocco Mohammed Sadeek Abu Yasser 1965 Saudi Arabia Odeh Abdallah Mohammed Haroun Fazul 1973 Comoros Fazul Khlafan Khamis 1973 Tanzania Mohamed Ahmed Omar Sheikh 1973 England Mohamadou Ould Slahi 1970 Mauritania Abdal Rahim Al-Nashiri Abu Bilal Al-Makki 1966 Saudi Arabia Mohamed Heidar 1861 Syria Zammar Mohamed Rashid 1977 England Daoud Al-Owhali Mamoun Darkazanli Abu Llyas 1958 Syria Mohammad Bin Nasser 1946 Indonesia Belfas Mounir Al-Motassadeq 1974 Morocco Abdelghani Mzoudi 1974 Morocco Said Bahaj 1975 Germany Mohamed El-Amir Abu Abdul Rahman 1968 Egypt Awad El-Sayed Atta Al-Masri Ramzi Mohd Abdullah 1972 Yemen Bin Al-Shibh Ziad Amir Jarrah Abu Tareq Al-Lubnani 1975 Lebanon Marwan Al-Shehi Abu Qaqaa Al-Qatari 1978 UAE Zakarya Essabar 1977 Morocco Hani Hanjour Orwah Al-Taifi 1972 Saudi Arabia Nawaf Al-Hazmi Rabia Al-Makki !975 Saudi Arabia Khalid Al-Midar Sinan 1974 Saudi Arabia Saleem Al-Hazmi Bilal Al-Makki 1979 Saudi Arabia Majed Mishan Al-Harbi Majed Moqed Al- 1979 Saudi Arabia Ahnaf Wail Mohd Al-Shehri Abu Mosaeb Al- 1975 Saudi Arabia Janoubi Waleed Mohd Al-Shehri Abu Salman 1980 Saudi Arabia Hamza Al-Ghandi Julabeeh Al-Ghandi 1981 Saudi Arabia Ahmed Ibrahim Al- Ikrimah Al-Ghandi 1980 Saudi Arabia

126 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ghandi Ahmed Ibrahim Ibn Jarrah Al-Ghandi 1981 Saudi Arabia Al-Haznawi Al-Ghandi Abdul Aziz Al-Omari Abu I Abas Al-Janoubi 1978 UAE Satam Mohd Al-Suqami Azmi 1976 Saudi Arabia Fayez Ahmad Al-Shehri Abu Ahmed Al-Emarati 1977 Saudi Arabia Bani Hamr Muhammad Al-Shehri Omar Al-Azdi Mohand 1977 Saudi Arabia Al-Shehri Saeed Al-Ghandi Moataz 1980 Saudi Arabia Ahmed Al-Nami Abu Hashen 1980 Saudi Arabia Zuher Hilal 1976 Saudi Arabia Mohammed Al-Thaiti Jose Padilla Abdulla Al-Muhajir 1970 USA Adnan Gulshair Mohd Jafar Al Tayer 1975 Saudi Arabia El Shakri Jamah Kamal Derwish Ahmed Hijazi 1973 USA Mohammad Mansur Sammy 1982 Kuwait Jabarah Abdul Rahman Mansur 1980 Kuwait Jabarah Shadi Abdullah 1977 Jordan Omar Kahn Sharif 1978 England Asif Hanif 1981 Pakistan Jamal Ahmed Mohd Abu Abed Al Rahman Yemen Al Badavi Al Badawi Fahid Al Quso Abu Hathayfah Al Yemen Adani Khaled Mohammed 1974 Saudi Arabia Jehani Abdallah Khadr 1980 Canada Abdel Rahman Khadr 1982 Bahrain Omar Khadr Ali Abdal Said Al Abu Bakr Al Azdi 1974 Saudi Arabia Faqasi Al Ghamdi Othman Hadi Makbould 1966 Saudi Arabia Al Mardi Al Omari Muhammad Othman 1972 Saudi Arabia

127 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Al Shehri Turki Mishal Dandani 1974 Saudi Arabia South East Asia Group South East Asia South East Asia Group Group Abu Bakar Baasyir Ustaz Abu Somad 1938 Indonesia Abdullah Sangkar 1937 Indonesia Riduan Isamuddin Encep Nurjaman 1964 Indonesia Hambali Ali Ghufron bin Mukhlas 1960 Indonesia Nurhasym Fikiruddin Muqti Mohammed Iqbal Abu 1959 Indonesia Jibril Abduragak Abubakur Abu Sayyaf 1961 Philippines Janjalani Omar Faruq 1971 Kuwait Yassin Syawal Indonesia Fathar Rahman Al 1971 Indonesia Ghozi Abdoul Aziz Iman Samudra 1970 Indonesia Enjang Bastaman Jahir Indonesia Amrozi Bin Nurhasym 1962 Indonesia Ali Imron Bin 1972 Indonesia Nurhasym Yazid Sufaat 19654 Malaysia Agus Dwikarna 1964 Indonesia Jack Thomas Jihad Thomas 1974 Australia Hashim Bin Abbas 1961 Singapore Mohammad Nazir Bin 1969 Malaysia Abbas Faiz Bin Abu Bakar 1962 Malaysia Bafaba Jafaar Bin Mistooki 1961 Singapore Saifulla Yumos Muklis 1972 Philippines Maghreb Arab Group Maghreb Arab Group Maghreb Arab Group Abdilah Ziyad Rachid 1958 Morocco Mohamed Zinedine Said 1959 Morocco Stephane Ait Iddir Said 1973 France Radouane Hammadi 1973 France Tarek Falah 1974 France

128 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Khader Abu Hoshar 1865 Jordan Rachid Ramda 1970 Algeria Ali Touchent Terek 1957 Algeria Safe Bourada 1970 France Khaled Kelkal 1971 Algeria Karim Koussa 1972 France Nasserdine Simani 1971 France Boualem Bensaid Banabas Mehdi 1967 Algeria Smain Ait Ali Belkacem 1969 Algeria Fateh Kamel 1960 Algeria Christophe Caze Walid 1969 France Lionel Dumont Abou Hamza 1971 France Rachid Soumdi 1971 France Omar Zemmiri 1966 France Hocine Bendaoui 1977 France Mouloud Bouguelane 1970 France Karim Said Atmani 1966 Morocco Abdellah Ouzghar 1964 Morocco Amar Makhlulif Doctor Abu Doha 1966 Algeria Haydar Raeed Hijazi Abu Ahmed Al Amriki 1969 USA Ahmed Rassam 1967 Algeria Mustafa Labsi 1969 Algeria Abiderraouf Hannachi 1950 Tunisia Mohammed Bensakhria Meliani 1968 Algeria Aeurobui Beandli 1975 Algeria Lamine Maroni 1971 Algeria Fouhad Sabour 1965 France Abdel Qader Mahmoud 1962 Egypt Es Sayed Essid Sami Ben Saber Omar the 1968 Tunisia Khermais Traveler Tarek Maaroufi 1965 Tunisia Imad Eddin Barakat Abu Dahdah 1960 Syria Yarkas Habib Zacarias Sahrawi 1968 France Moussaoui Djamel Beghal 1965 Algeria Kamel Daoudi 1974 Algeria

129 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Richard Colvin Reid Abdoul Rauff 1973 England Nizar Trabelsi 1970 Tunisia David Courtailler 1976 France Jerome Courtailler 1974 France Herve Djamel Loiseau 1975 France Nizar Ben Mohd Nasr Sayf Al Islam Ettounsi 1978 Tunisia Nawar Mohamed Rafiki Abu Hafs 1974 Morocco Mohamed Damir 1972 Morocco Mehdi Damir 1980 Morocco Mohamed Al Omari 1979 Morocco Richard Pierre Antoine Abu Ahderrahmane 1972 France Robert Lhaji Mohamed Hassouna 1981 Morocco Mohamed Al Mehini 1978 Morocco CIA Zapped 8 Qaeda Lieutenants Since July 2008

Khalid Habib a veteran combat leader and operations chief Rashid Rauf mastermind of the 2006 British airliner plot

Abu Khabab Al Qaeda’s most al-Masri, seasoned explosives expert and trainer Abdallah Azzam, top aide to Sheikh Sa’id al-Masri

Abu al-Hassan led cross-border al-Rimi operations against

130 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac coalition forces in Afghanistan

Abu Sulaiman a senior external al-Jaziri operations planner and facilitator

Abu Jihad al-Masri a senior operational planner and propagandist

Usama al-Kini chief of Pakistan operations and the planner of last year’s Marriott attack in Pakistan and the bombing of Benazir Bhutto’s motorcade United Kingdom Operatives Mathew Monks Mohammed Naveed Bhatti Junade Feroze Zia Ul Haq Qaisar Shaffi Nadeen Tarmohammed Omar Abdul Rehman Abdul Aziz Jalil Dhren Barot Italy Operatives

131 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Djamel Lounci Cell Leader Othman Deramch Abon Housef Algeria Farid Alba Ali Achour Algeria L-Habi Bendeka Al-Hadi-Hadi Algeria Yakine Ahmad Yacine Diannabs Algeria Nacer Moustafa Algeria Yousef Abbes Giseppe Algeria Fetri Ben Assen Tunisia Haddad Abd Al Wakab Ab Forjani Mouloud Algeria Al Hafiz Mourad Rabah Diroma Ali EL-Heit Mohamed Kamel Ali Diroma Abderahmane Morocco Kifane Ansar Al Islam Logistical Base Cell False Documents Tuscany Region Italy Imam Mohamed Arrested 2003 Extradited to Morocco Rafik Casablanca bombing Imam Maamari Rashid Lombardi Region Salafist Group Logistical Base Italy Preaching and False Documents Combat Arms Chemical Materials Habib Ben Ahmed President Fund Raiser Loubiri Executive Board SCAR Chabaane Ben Provides false Mohamed Trabelsi IDs To illegal Aliens Kamel Darraji Provides false

132 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac IDs To illegal Aliens Mohamed El Provides false Mahfoudi IDs To illegal Aliens Mohamed Ben Provides false Mohamed IDs To illegal Abdelhedi Aliens Imed Ben Bechir Provides false Jammali IDs To illegal Aliens Netherlands Bombing Plot Hassan O A Samir E Abdelaziz Pakistan Arrest 12-19-02 Dr Javed Ahmed USA Umar Karar Son of Dr Ahmed USA Khyzer Ali Son of Dr Ahmed USA Naveed Khwaja Brother of Dr Canada Ahmed Currently convicted Canada Germany Ishan Gamaoui Cell Phone Bomb Tunisia Al Qeada Arrested trigger maker Spain Madrid Bombing Rabei Osman Mohammed the 3-11-04 Ahmed Egyptian Planner Madrid Bombing Samir Mahdjoub Recruiter Ansar Algeria Al Islam Mohamed Daki Morocco Abderrazak Recruiter Iraq In Jail Italy Suicide Bombers Yahia Payjmi In Jail Italy

133 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Cise Maxamed In Jail Italy Cabdullaah Elayashi Radi In Jail Italy Amer Aziz Abdalrahman Alarnaot Abujauer Mohamed Maherhalak Jose Emilo Suarez Spouse Brother Arrest 6-9-04 in law supplied explosives Mohamed Chaoui Abdulak Al Magrebi Vinny Kohly Morocco Allekema Lamari Cell Leader Abu Dujan Al Al Qeada Afgani Spokesman Europe Suresh Kumar Morocco Mohamed Bakali Morocco Boutaliha Jamal Zougam Morocco Said Chedadi Imad Eddin Abu Dahdah Al Qeada cell Barakat Leader Europe Smal Letrech Djamel Merabet Abu Anas Ahmed Mohamed Magid Mchmacha Mourat Yala Ali Omar Jelloul

134 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac MOST WANTED

Jamal Mohammad al-Badawi Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : July 22, 1960 or October 23, 1960 or October 23, 1963 Place of Birth : Al-Shargian, Makiras, Yemen Height : Approximately 5'5" (165 cm) Weight : Approximately 175 lbs (79 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Black Sex : Male Complexion : Olive Aliases : Jamal Muhsin al-Tali, Abu Abdul Rahman al- Badawi, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Adani, Jamal Mohammad Ahmad Ali al-Badawi, Jamal Mohammad Ahmad

135 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The individual listed above is wanted in connection with the October 12, 2000, bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. This attack resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder and conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals and U.S. military personnel; conspiracy to use and using weapons of mass destruction, damaging and destroying government properties and defense facilities; and providing material support to terrorist organizations.

Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso Up to $5 Million Reward

136 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Date of Birth : November 12, 1974 Place of Birth : Aden, Yemen Height : Approximately 5'6" (168 cm) Weight : Approximately 150 lbs (68 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Black Complexion : Olive Sex : Male Aliases : Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Awlaqi, Fahd al-Quso, Abu Huthaifah, Abu Huthaifah al-Yemeni, Abu Huthaifah al- Adani, Abu al-Bara Citizenship : Saudi Arabian

The individual listed above is wanted in connection with the October 12, 2000, bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen. This attack resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder and conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals and U.S. military personnel; conspiracy to use and using weapons of mass destruction, damaging and destroying government properties and defense facilities; and providing material support to terrorist organizations.

137 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Umar Patek Up to $1 Million Reward

Date of Birth : 1970 Height : 5'3" (166 cm) Weight : 130 - 135 lbs (60 kg) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Complexion : Brown Aliases : Umar Kecil, Umar (Arab), Pa'tek, Pak Taek, Abu Syekh, Zacky

Patek, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah, is believed to have served as the assistant for the field coordinator of the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which killed 202 people, including seven U.S. citizens. Patek is a 35-year-old Javanese Arabic man.

138 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Usama bin Ladin Up to $25 Million Reward

Date of Birth : 1957 Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : 6'4" - 6'6"(193 - 198 cm) Weight : 160 lbs (71 kg) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown Complexion : Olive Sex : Male Nationality : Saudi Arabian Characteristics : Full beard, mustache; walks with cane. Status : Fugitive Aliases : Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin, Shaykh Usama bin Ladin, the Prince, the Emir, Abu Abdallah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, the Director

Usama bin Ladin is wanted in connection with the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and for the August 7, 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

139 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; and attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

140 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Saif al-Adel Up to $5 Million Reward

Place of Birth : Egypt Hair : Dark Eyes : Dark Sex : Male Citizenship : Egyptian Aliases : Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim al-Madani

Saif al-Adel is believed to be affiliated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and is believed to be a high-ranking member of the al-Qa'ida organization. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

141 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

Adnan G. el Shukrijumah Up to $5 Million Reward

142 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Date of Birth : August 4, 1975 Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : 5'3" - 5'7" (160 - 170 cm) Build : Medium to Heavy Hair : Black Eyes : Black Complexion : Olive Sex : Male Characteristics : El Shukrijumah occasionally wears a beard. El Shukrijumah carries a Guyanese passport, but may attempt to enter the U.S. with a Saudi, Canadian, or Trinidadian passport. Aliases : Adnan G. el Shukri Jumah; Abu Arif; Ja'far al- Tayar; Jaffar al-Tayyar; Jafar Tayar; Jaafar al-Tayyar

Adnan G. el Shukrijumah is wanted in connection with possible threats against the United States.

On March 26, 2003 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a Material Witness Warrant for his arrest.

El Shukrijumah may be involved with al-Qa'ida terrorist activities and, if so, poses a serious threat to U.S. citizens and interests worldwide.

143 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ayman al-Zawahiri Up to $25 Million Reward

Date of Birth : June 19, 1951 Place of Birth : Egypt Hair : Brown/Black Eyes : Dark Sex : Male Nationality : Egyptian Aliases : Abu Muhammad, Abu Fatima, Muhammad Ibrahim, Abu Abdallah, Abu al-Mu'iz, The Doctor, The Teacher, Nur, Ustaz, Abu Mohammed, Abu Mohammed Nur al-Deen, Abdel Muaz, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri

Ayman al-Zawahiri is a physician and the founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This organization opposes the secular Egyptian Government and seeks its overthrow through violent means. Al-Zawahiri is believed to now serve as an advisor and doctor to Usama bin Ladin. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

144 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; and attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Approximately 1963 Place of Birth : Egypt Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Build : Medium Hair : Dark Eyes : Dark

145 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sex : Male Citizenship : Egyptian Status : Fugitive Aliases : Abu Mohamed al-Masri, Saleh, Abu Mariam

Abdullah may wear a mustache and has a scar on the right side of his lower lip. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; attack on a federal facility resulting in death; conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

146 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Approximately 1965 Place of Birth : Egypt Height : Approximately 5'6" to 5'8" (168-173 cm) Build : Medium Hair : Dark Eyes : Dark Sex : Male Citizenship : Egyptian Aliases : Shuaib, Abu Islam al-Surir, Ahmed Ahmed, Ahmed The Egyptian, Ahmed Hemed, Hamed Ali, Ahmed Shieb, Abu Islam, Ahmed Mohammed Ali, Ahmed Hamed, Ahmed Mohammed Abdurehman, Abu Khadiijah, Abu Fatima, Ahmad al-Masri

Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali may have formal training in agriculture and may have worked in this field. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

147 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

Anas al-Liby Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : March 30, 1964 or May 15, 1964 Place of Birth : Tripoli, Libya Height : 5'10" - 6'2" (178 - 188 cm) Build : Medium Hair : Dark Eyes : Dark Sex : Male Characteristics : Scar on left side of face. Usually wears a full beard.

148 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Citizenship : Libyan Languages : Arabic, English Aliases : Anas al-Sabai, Anas al-Libi, Nazih al-Raghie, Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Raghie

Anas al-Liby has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy national defense utilities of the United States.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

149 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Abderraouf Ben Habib Jdey Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : May 30, 1965 Place of Birth : Grombalia, Tunisia Height : 6'0" (183 cm) Weight : 210 lbs (95 kg) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown

150 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sex : Male Characteristics : Scar on forehead Aliases : Farouq Al-Tunisi, Abd Al-Rauf Bin Al-Habib Bin Yousef Al-Jiddi, Abderraouf Dey, A. Raouf Jdey, Abdal Ra'Of Bin Muhammed Bin Yousef Al-Jadi, Abderraouf Ben Habib Jeday

Abderraouf Jdey, also known as Farouq al-Tunisi, has an extensive history of extremist affiliations. He has been closely linked with al-Qa'ida operatives and involved in plans for conducting hijacking/terrorist operations. Jdey is an associate of Tunisian terror suspect Faker Boussora, and the two may have traveled together in the past.

Jdey left his native Tunisia in 1991 and immigrated to Montreal, Canada, becoming a Canadian citizen in 1995. While in Canada, Jdey studied biology at the University of Montreal and attended the Assunna Mosque in Montreal.

Jdey departed Canada in 1999 and received combat training and experience in Afghanistan through 2000. He engaged in fighting against the Afghan Northern Alliance and authored a suicide letter stating his intention to become a martyr for jihad. During this time, Jdey also appeared in a well-known martyrdom video that was later found in an al-Qa'ida leader's house in 2001.

Following a return to the Montreal area in 2001 in which Jdey consorted with extremists on methods of joining the jihad, Jdey left Canada. Authorities remain concerned that Jdey may attempt to return to Canada or the United States to plan or participate in a terrorist attack.

151 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Faker Ben Abdelaziz Boussora Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : March 22, 1964 Place of Birth : Tunisia Height : 5'7" (170 cm) Weight : 165 lbs (75 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Dark Sex : Male Characteristics : Boussora has protruding ears and is believed to have a serious pituitary gland illness. Aliases : Abu Yusif al-Tunisi, Abdulaziz, Fakeroun, Fakerrou, Fakir

Faker Boussora, also known as Abu Yusif al-Tunisi, is a Tunisian national with extensive connections to radical Islamic extremism. He is an al-Qa'ida trained operative with declared intentions of becoming a suicide martyr. Boussora is an associate of Tunisian terror suspect Abderraouf Jdey, and the two may have traveled together in the past.

Boussora left his native Tunisia in 1988 to reside in France. He departed France in 1991 and immigrated to Montreal,

152 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Canada, traveling back and forth from Canada to Tunisia frequently during the 1990's. Boussora gained Canadian citizenship in 1999 and while in Canada attended the Assunna Mosque in Montreal.

Boussora departed Canada in 1999 and may have made more than one trip to Afghanistan during the 1999-2000 timeframe. He received training from al-Qa'ida while in Afghanistan, and subsequently returned to Canada.

Authorities remain concerned that Boussora may attempt to return to Canada or the United States to plan or participate in a terrorist attack. He may suffer from a serious illness and be in extremely poor health, resulting in weight loss and altered physical appearance.

Adam Yahiye Gadahn Up to $1 Million Reward

153 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Date of Birth : September 1, 1978 Place of Birth : United States Citizenship : American Height : 5'11" (180 cm) Weight : 210 lbs (95 kg) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown/Hazel Sex : Male Complexion : Light Build : Medium Languages : Arabic, English Scars and Marks : Gadahn has scars on his chest and right forearm. Aliases : Azzam al Amriki, Azzam the American, Abu Suhayb al Amriki, Abu Suhail al Amriki, Abu Suhayb, Yihya Majadin Adams, Adam Pearlman, Yayah

Adam Yahiye Gadahn was indicted in the Central District of California for treason and material support to al-Qa'ida. The

154 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac charges are related to Gadahn's alleged involvement in a number of terrorist activities, including providing aid and comfort to al-Qa'ida and services for al-Qa'ida.

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : August 5, 1972 or December 5, 1974 or February 5, 1974 or August 2, 1972 Place of Birth : Comoros Islands

155 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Nationality : Coastal African, Comoros Island Height : 5'3" - 5'5" (160 - 165 cm) Weight : 120 - 140 lbs (54 - 64 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Complexion : Dark Birth Name : Abdullah Muhammad Ali Fadil Husayn Mullah Ati Languages : English, French, Swahili, Arabic, Comoran Aliases : Abdallah Fazul, Abdalla Fazul, Abdallah Mohammed Fazul, Fazul Abdilahi Mohammed, Fazul Adballah, Fazul Abdalla, Fazul Mohammed, Haroon, Harun, Haroon Fazul, Harun Fazul, Fadil Abdallah Muhamad, Fadhil Haroun, Abu Seif Al Sudani, Abu Aisha, Abu Luqman, Fadel Abdallah Mohammed Ali, Fouad Mohammed, Abu Al Fazul al-Qamari

Fazul Mohammed likes to wear baseball caps, tends to dress casually, and is very good with computers. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; and attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for

156 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : February 19, 1976 Place of Birth : Mombasa, Kenya Height : 5'6" - 5'8" (168 - 173 cm) Weight : 180 - 190 lbs (82 - 86 kg) Build : Medium Hair : Black, curly Eyes : Brown Sex : Male

157 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Nationality : Kenyan Languages : Swahili, Arabic, English Aliases : Fahid Mohammed Ally, Fahid Mohammed Ali Musalaam, Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam, Fahid Muhamad Ali Salem, Mohammed Ally Msalam, Usama al-Kini, Fahad Ally Msalam

Fahid Msalam sometimes wears a light beard or moustache and has, in the past, worked as a clothing vendor. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; and attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

158 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : April 9, 1969 or April 9, 1960 Place of Birth : Kenya Height : 5'8" - 6'0" (173 - 183 cm) Weight : 175 lbs (79 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Nationality : Kenyan Characteristics : Swedan sometimes wears a light beard or moustache. Aliases : Sheikh Ahmad Salem Suweidan, Sheikh Ahmed Salem Swedan, Sheikh Swedan, Sheikh Bahamadi, Ahmed Ally, Bahamad, Sheik Bahamad, Ahmed the Tall

159 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan has, in the past, managed a trucking business in Kenya. He has been indicted for his alleged role in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Murder of U.S. nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States; and attack on a federal facility resulting in death.

Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, Saif al- Adel, Anas al-Liby, Ahmed Mohamed Hamed Ali, and others already in custody are believed to be responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya on August 7, 1998. The embassy bombings killed 224 civilians and wounded over 5,000 others. These terrorists are believed to be members of al-Qa’ida, an international terrorist network headed by Usama bin Ladin.

160 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Ali Atwa Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Approximately 1960 Place of Birth : Lebanon Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Build : Medium Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Lebanese Aliases : Ammar Mansour Bouslim, Hassan Rostom Salim

The above terrorist is believed to be a member of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah.

On June 14, 1985, terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens, Greece to its destination of Rome, Italy. After flying to multiple sites, the plane landed in Beirut, Lebanon, where the hijackers shot and killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and dumped his body on the airport tarmac.

The above terrorist was indicted for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985 hijacking of a commercial

161 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac airliner. This hijacking resulted in the assault of multiple passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault passengers and crew; air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interference with flight crew; placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing destructive device aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury; and aiding and abetting.

Hasan Izz-al-Din Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : 1963 Place of Birth : Lebanon Height : 5'9" to 5'11" (175 - 180 cm) Build : Slender Hair : Black Eyes : Black

162 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sex : Male Citizenship : Lebanese Aliases : Ahmed Garbaya, Samir Salwwan, Sa-id

The above terrorist is believed to be a member of the terrorist organization Lebanese Hizballah.

On June 14, 1985, terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens, Greece to its destination of Rome, Italy. After flying to multiple sites, the plane landed in Beirut, Lebanon, where the hijackers shot and killed U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and dumped his body on the airport tarmac.

The above terrorist was indicted for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985 hijacking of a commercial airliner. This hijacking resulted in the assault of multiple passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault passengers and crew; air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interference with flight crew; placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing destructive device aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury; and aiding and abetting.

163 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Abdul Rahman Yasin Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : April 10, 1960 Place of Birth : Bloomington, Indiana Height : Approximately 5'10" (178 cm) Weight : Approximately 180 lbs (82 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Complexion : Olive Sex : Male Citizenship : American Characteristics : Possible chemical burn on right thigh. Epileptic; takes medication for condition. Aliases : Abdul Rahman Said Yasin, Aboud Yasin, Abdul Rahman S. Taha, Abdul Rahman S. Taher

Abdul Rahman Yasin directly assisted terrorist mastermind Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in carrying out the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City. Yousef and Yasin drove a van full of explosives into the basement of the World Trade Center, killing six people and wounding

164 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac over a thousand. Yasin fled the United States immediately after the bombing to avoid arrest.

After the bombing, law enforcement officials obtained evidence which led to the indictment and arrest of several suspected terrorists involved in the bombing, including Yasin.

Yasin was born in the United States, moved to Iraq during the 1960s, and returned to the U.S. in the fall of 1992. He possesses a U.S. passport.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Damage by means of fire or an explosive; damage by means of fire or an explosive to U.S. property; transport in interstate commerce an explosive; destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities; conspiracy to commit offense or defraud the U.S.; aiding and abetting; penalty of death or life imprisonment when death results; assault of a federal officer in the line of duty; and commission of a crime of violence through the use of a deadly weapon or device.

Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil Up to $5 Million Reward

165 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Date of Birth : June 26, 1967 Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : 5'4" (163 cm) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Saudi Arabian Aliases : Abu Omran

On June 25, 1996, members of Saudi Hizballah carried out a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the time, the complex was used to house U.S. military personnel. The terrorists drove a tanker filled with plastic explosives into the parking lot and detonated it, all but destroying the nearest building. The attack killed 19 U.S. servicemen and one Saudi citizen, and wounded 372 others of many different nationalities.

The individual listed above was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder

166 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac of federal employees; and attempted murder of federal employees.

Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed al-Nasser Up to $5 Million Reward

Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Saudi Arabian

On June 25, 1996, members of Saudi Hizballah carried out a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the time, the complex was used to house U.S. military personnel. The terrorists drove a tanker filled with plastic explosives into the parking lot and detonated it, all but destroying the nearest building. The attack killed 19 U.S. servicemen and one Saudi citizen, and wounded 372 others of many different nationalities.

The individual listed above was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the

167 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; and attempted murder of federal employees.

Ibrahim Salih Mohammed al-Yacoub Up to $5 Million Reward

168 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Date of Birth : October 16, 1966 Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : Approximately 5'4" (162 - 163 cm) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Saudi Arabian Remarks : Al-Yacoub has a receding hairline and may wear a beard.

On June 25, 1996, members of Saudi Hizballah carried out a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the time, the complex was used to house U.S. military personnel. The terrorists drove a tanker filled with plastic explosives into the parking lot and detonated it, all but destroying the nearest building. The attack killed 19 U.S. servicemen and one Saudi citizen, and wounded 372 others of many different nationalities.

The individual listed above was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; and attempted murder of federal employees.

169 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ali Saed bin Ali el-Hoorie Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : July 10 or July 11, 1965 Place of Birth : Saudi Arabia Height : 5'2" (157 - 158 cm) Hair : Black Eyes : Black Sex : Male Characteristics : El-Hoorie has a mole on his face. Citizenship : Saudi Arabian Aliases : Ali Saed bin Ali al-Houri

On June 25, 1996, members of Saudi Hizballah carried out a terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers housing complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the time, the complex was used to house U.S. military personnel. The terrorists drove a tanker filled with plastic explosives into the parking lot and detonated it, all but destroying the nearest building. The attack killed 19 U.S. servicemen and one Saudi citizen, and wounded 372 others of many different nationalities.

The individual listed above was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the

170 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to murder U.S. employees; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; conspiracy to destroy property of the U.S.; conspiracy to attack national defense utilities; bombing resulting in death; use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. nationals; murder while using destructive device during a crime of violence; murder of federal employees; and attempted murder of federal employees.

Jaber A. Elbaneh Up to $5 Million Reward

171 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Date of Birth : September 9, 1966 Place of Birth : Yemen Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Occupations : Salesman, Taxi Driver Aliases : Jaber A. Elbanelt, Jaben A. Elbanelt, Jabor Elbaneh, Abu Jubaer, Jubaer Elbaneh, Jubair

Jaber A. Elbaneh is wanted in connection with a federal criminal complaint unsealed on May 21, 2003, in the Western District of New York, Buffalo, New York. He is charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to provide material support, specifically to al-Qa'ida.

Elbaneh is believed to have fled the United States and is still thought to be outside the country.

Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : April 18, 1966 Place of Birth : Bani Suwayf, Egypt Eyes : Dark Sex : Male

172 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Aliases : Abd al-Aziz al-Masri, Hasan ‘Umar Ibrahim Ali Saleem Abu Salsbil, Abu Salsabil Hassan Omar, Hasan ‘Umar Zizo

Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri is an al-Qa'ida member and an explosives and chemical weapons expert. He is a member of the al-Qa'ida Shura council and is a close associate of al-Qa'ida leaders Saif al-Adel and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Prior to joining al-Qa'ida, al-Bakri was a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad terrorist group, under the direction of Ayman al-Zawahiri. He served as an instructor in al- Qa'ida's camps in Afghanistan, providing terrorist recruits with training in the use of explosives and chemical weapons. Al-Bakri also unsuccessfully attempted to hijack a Pakistani Air passenger flight in December 2000. It is likely that he continues to train al-Qa'ida terrorists and other extremists.

Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : April 29, 1953 Place of Birth : Egypt

173 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Sex : Male Aliases : Abu Khabab al-Masri

Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar is an explosives and poisons expert working on behalf of al-Qa'ida.

Umar operated a terrorist training camp in Derunta, Afghanistan, where he provided hundreds of Mujahidin with hands-on training in the use of poisons and explosives. Since 1999, he has distributed training manuals that contain instructions for making chemical and biological weapons. Some of these training manuals were recovered by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

It is likely that Umar continues to train al-Qa'ida terrorists and other extremists.

Dulmatin Up to $10 Million Reward

174 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Age : mid to late 30s Height : 5'7" - 5'8" (172 cm) Weight : 155 lbs (70 kg) Hair : Brown Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Complexion : Brown Aliases : Amar Usman, Joko Pitoyo, Joko Pitono, Abdul Matin, Pitono, Muktarmar, Djoko, Noval

On October 12, 2002, a suicide bomber entered the Sari Nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, and detonated a bomb in his backpack. Fifteen seconds later, those fleeing the club were met with another attack when a powerful car bomb was detonated across the street at Paddy’s Irish Bar. The final death toll was 202, including seven Americans. These victims were citizens of more than 20 different countries, primarily young tourists on vacation. Hundreds of others suffered severe burns and other injuries. Several members of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group have been convicted in relation to this attack.

Dulmatin is believed to be one of the masterminds responsible for planning these attacks, which comprise the deadliest act of terrorism in Indonesian history. He is an electronics specialist with training in al-Qa'ida camps in

175 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Afghanistan, and is a senior figure in the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization.

Isnilon Hapilon Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Approximately 1966 Place of Birth : Possibly Lantawan, Basilan Height : Approximately 5'5" to 5'7" (165 cm) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Complexion : Tan Characteristics : Skinny; may have chin hair and slight mustache. Aliases : Abubakar Hapilon, Amah Hi Omar, Abu Omar, Abubakar, Bakkal Personality : Likable by peers; proud and confident in his abilities.

Isnilon Hapilon is a senior leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a foreign terrorist organization operating in the southern Philippines. The group and its leadership are integrated with the worldwide network of Islamic terrorists, including Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qa’ida.

176 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Hapilon was involved in the 2001 Dos Palmas incident in which 20 individuals were kidnapped, including three Americans.

On May 27, 2001, the ASG kidnapped three American citizens from the Dos Palmas Resort on Palawan in the Philippines. The three Americans were identified as Guillermo Sobero and Martin and Gracia Burnham, an American missionary couple. On June 11, 2001, the ASG spokesman, Abu Sabaya, claimed he had had Guillermo Sobero executed as a "birthday present" for Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On October 7, 2001, a human skull was recovered from Basilan Island, which was found to be that of Guillermo Sobero. In June 2002, Martin Burnham died in the crossfire between the Filipino soldiers and the ASG; Gracia Burnham was injured, but was rescued and repatriated to the United States.

Hapilon was indicted in the District of Columbia for his alleged involvement in terrorist acts against U.S. nationals and other foreign nationals in and around the Republic of the Philippines.

177 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Abu Jihad al Masri Up to $1 Million Reward

Nationality : Egyptian Eyes : Brown Hair : Black Aliases : Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim Comments : Abu Jihad al-Masri is balding and has curly hair.

Abu Jihad al-Masri operates out of Iran and is in charge of al-Qa'ida media and propaganda. He may also be the Chief of External Operations for al-Qa'ida.

178 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ramadan Abdullah Mohammad Shallah Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : January 1, 1958 Place of Birth : Sajaya, Gaza Strip Build : 6'1" (185 cm) Weight : 225 lbs (102 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Brown Sex : Male Complexion : Light Height : Medium Nationality : Palestinian Languages : Arabic, English Aliases : Ramadan Shallah, Rashad, Mohamad el-Fatih, Mahmoud, Radwan, al-Shaer, Abu Abdullah, Ramadan Abdullah

179 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Ramadan Abdullah Mohammad Shallah is wanted for conspiracy to conduct the affairs of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a specially designated terrorist organization, through a pattern of racketeering activities such as bombings, murder, extortions and money laundering.

Shallah was one of the original founding members of the PIJ and since 1995 has been the secretary-general and leader of the organization, which is headquartered in Damascus, Syria.

Shallah was listed as a “Specially Designated Terrorist” under United States law on November 27, 1995 and was indicted in a 53-count indictment in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, in 2003.

Mohammed Ali Hamadei Up to $5 Million Reward

180 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Weight : 150 lbs (68 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Dark Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Lebanese Languages : Arabic, German Aliases : Mohammod Ali Hamadei, Ali Hamadi, Castro Remarks : Hamadei has a mole on his right cheek below his eye. He is believed to be a member of the terrorist organization, Lebanese Hizballah.

Mohammed Ali Hamadei was indicted for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847. This hijacking resulted in the assault of various passengers and crew members, and the murder of Petty Officer Robert D. Stethem, United States Navy.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Aircraft piracy in the Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States; unlawful placing of a destructive device on an aircraft; hostage taking; murder; assault on a passenger; and conspiracy.

181 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Mohammed Ali Hamadei Up to $5 Million Reward

Height : 5'8" (173 cm) Weight : 150 lbs (68 kg) Hair : Black Eyes : Dark Brown Sex : Male Citizenship : Lebanese Languages : Arabic, German Aliases : Mohammod Ali Hamadei, Ali Hamadi, Castro Remarks : Hamadei has a mole on his right cheek below his eye. He is believed to be a member of the terrorist organization, Lebanese Hizballah.

Mohammed Ali Hamadei was indicted for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847. This hijacking resulted in the assault of

182 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac various passengers and crew members, and the murder of Petty Officer Robert D. Stethem, United States Navy.

The individual listed above has been indicted on the following charges:

Aircraft piracy in the Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States; unlawful placing of a destructive device on an aircraft; hostage taking; murder; assault on a passenger; and conspiracy.

Zulkifli bin Hir Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : 1966 Place of Birth : Muar, Johor Sex : Male Citizenship : Malaysian Aliases : Zulkifli, Zulkifli Hir, Zulkifli Abdul Hir, Musa Abdul Hir, Musa, Marwan

Zulkifli bin Hir is a Malaysian citizen born in 1966 in Muar, Johor. An engineer trained in the United States, he is believed to be the head of the Kumpulun Mujahidin

183 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Malaysia (KMM) terrorist organization and a member of Jemaah Islamiyah's central command. Since August 2003, he has been present in the Philippines, where he is believed to have conducted bomb-making training for the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Zulkarnaen

Date of Birth : 1963 Place of Birth : Central Java, Jakarta Sex : Male Build : Thin Aliases : Aris Sumarsono, Zulkarnaen, Daud

Zulkarnaen, whose real name is Aris Sumarsono, is called Daud by fellow militants. U.S. and Indonesian officials stated that Zulkarnaen became operations chief for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) after the arrest of his alleged

184 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac predecessor Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, in Thailand. Zulkarnaen is described by those who know him as a small man of few words.

Zulkarnaen has been identified as possibly the highest ranking leader of the Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. He is believed to head the elite squad that helped carry out the suicide bombing at Jakarta's Marriott Hotel that killed 12 people in 2003 and helped to prepare the bombs that killed 202 people in Bali in 2002.

Zulkarnaen is one of al-Qa’ida’s point men in Southeast Asia and is one of the few people in Indonesia who have direct contact with Usama bin Ladin's terror network. Zulkarnaen earned a degree in biology from an Indonesian university, and in the 1980s he was among the first Indonesian militants to go to Afghanistan for training to become an expert in sabotage. Zulkarnaen now leads a squad of militants called Laskar Khos, or ‘special force,’ whose members were recruited from some 300 Indonesians who trained in Afghanistan and the Philippines.

Zulkarnaen was a protégé of Abdullah Sungkar, founder of JI and the Islamic boarding school al-Mukmin where Zulkarnaen and other senior militants studied. In the mid- 1980s, Sungkar sent a small group of Indonesians to Afghanistan to train in a camp led by Mujahidin commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Before Sungkar's death in 1999, Zulkarnaen was often seen by his mentor's side, helping to organize conferences and arrange the agenda of the elder radical.

Zulkarnaen is believed to have helped organize fighting in the Maluku islands in the 1990s, and organized a meeting

185 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac among militants who trained in Afghanistan at different times, enabling them to join forces.

Noordin Mohammad Top

Date of Birth : August 11, 1968 Place of Birth : Johor, Malaysia Sex : Male Nationality : Malaysian Aliases : Noordin Muh Top, Noordin Mat Top, Noordin Din Moch Top

Noordin Mohammad Top is one of the most dangerous members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). He is believed to be a top recruiter, strategist, and fundraiser for JI.

Despite being one of the top targets of regional security forces, Noordin has repeatedly escaped their grasp. A Malaysian national, he and Dr. Azahari bin Husin were the masterminds behind several suicide attacks in Indonesia, including the Bali bombings in October of 2005 that injured several Americans. Noordin is also suspected of having orchestrated several other terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the October 12, 2002 Bali attack, which killed 202

186 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac people and injured 209; the August 5, 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia; and the September 9, 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, which killed several individuals and wounded over 140 others.

Noordin has been the leading proponent of targeting Western interests in Indonesia. In addition to the two Bali and two Jakarta attacks, Noordin has ordered his operatives to conduct reconnaissance on a large foreign- owned power plant southeast of Surabaya. In January 2006, he announced the formation of a new organization, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad, although it is still unclear whether this is a distinctly independent organization from JI.

Noordin has been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department and the UN Security Council as a terrorist financier. He remains one of the most important JI figures at large. He is a charismatic leader and a recruiter, and has proven to be innovative and single-minded in his desire to implement the al-Qa’ida line and target Western interests.

187 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Qari Mohammad Zafar Up to $5 Million Reward

Qari Mohammad Zafar is wanted for questioning in connection with the March 2, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.

The attack killed three Pakistani citizens and David Foy, a U.S. diplomat. Zafar is suspected of being a key figure involved with this attack.

188 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Mullah Omar Up to $10 Million Reward

Height : Tall Hair : Black Sex : Male Nationality : Afghan Characteristics : Shrapnel wound to the right eye

Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qai'da network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks.

Although Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime from power, Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies.

189 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Abu Yahya al-Libi Up to $1 Million Reward

Date of Birth : January 1, 1963 Place of Birth : Libya Weight : 195 Height : 5´8" Hair : Black Eyes : Black Complexion : Medium Sex : Male Nationality : Libyan Characteristics : Black Beard Status : Fugitive Aliases : Mohammad Hassan Abu Bakar, Abu Yahya Sheikh Yahya, Al-Libbi, Abu Yahya Yunis al Sahrawi, Hasan Qa'id, Yunis, Muhammad Hassan Qayed

190 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan citizen, is an Islamic scholar who was captured by authorities in 2002 and imprisoned at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. Al-Libi escaped in July 2005, and has since appeared in a number of propaganda videos, using his religious training to influence people and legitimize the actions of al-Qa´ida.

Al-Libi is a key motivator in the global jihadi movement and his messages convey a clear threat to U.S. persons or property worldwide. Al-Libi is believed to be in hiding in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Sirajuddin Haqqani Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Circa 1973 Place of Birth : Weight : 150 Height : 5’7” Hair : Black Eyes : Complexion : Light, with wrinkles Sex : Male Nationality : Afghan Pashtun Characteristics : Status : Fugitive Aliases : Siraj Haqqani, Khalifa

191 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Sirajuddin Haqqani, a senior leader of the Haqqani terrorist network founded by his father Jalaladin Haqqani, maintains close ties to al-Qa’ida. During an interview with an American news organization, Haqqani admitted planning the January 14, 2008 attack against the Serena Hotel in Kabul that killed six people, including American citizen Thor David Hesla.

Haqqani also admitted to having planned the April 2008 assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He has coordinated and participated in cross-border attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is believed to be located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Baitullah Mehsud Up to $5 Million Reward

Date of Birth : Circa 1972 Place of Birth : Weight : 175 Height : 5´2" Hair : Black Eyes : Black

192 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Complexion : Medium Sex : Male Nationality : Pakistani Characteristics : Black Beard Status : Fugitive Aliases : Khalifa

Baitullah Mehsud is a key al-Qa’ida facilitator in the tribal areas of South Waziristan in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities believe that the January 2007 suicide attack against the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was staged by militants loyal to Mehsud. Press reports also have linked Mehsud to the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the deaths of other innocent civilians.

In addition, Mehsud has stated his intention to attack the United States. He has conducted cross-border attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and poses a clear threat to American persons and interests in the region.

193 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Abdul Basit Usman Up to $1 Million Reward

Abdul Basit Usman, a Filipino citizen, is a bomb-making expert with links to the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organizations operating in the southern Philippines. Because of these associations, U.S. authorities consider Basit to be a threat to U.S. and Filipino citizens and interests. Basit is believed to have orchestrated several bombings that have killed, injured, and maimed many innocent civilians. Basit is believed to be hiding in central Mindanao.

Basit has been indicted in the Philippines for his role in multiple bombing incidents since 2003, and the Government of the Philippines has issued a warrant for his arrest.

194 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Radullan Sahiron Up to $1 Million Reward

Radullan Sahiron is a senior leader of the Philippines- based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The group split from the much larger Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, replaced him as the nominal leader of the group. In September 2006, Khadaffy Janjalani was killed in a gun battle with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Radullan Sahiron is assumed to be the new ASG leader.

Many innocent men, women and children have died and or have been seriously injured as a result of Sahiron's actions. Sahiron played a role in the May 2001 Dos Palmas kidnapping of three U.S. citizens, including Martin and Gracia Burnham, and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including U.S. citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered.

Sahiron is believed to be hiding in southern Mindanao where he continues to plot terror schemes that impact many communities. Because of his leadership position within the ASG, whose terrorist attacks have resulted in the

195 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac deaths of U.S. and Filipino citizens, U.S. authorities consider Sahiron to be a threat to U.S. and Filipino citizens and interests.

Sahiron lost his right hand fighting security forces in the 1970s. He is fluent in Arabic and Tausug.

196 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Khair Mundos Up to $500,000 Reward

Khair Mundos is a key leader and financier of the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group.

Mundos’s May 2004 arrest on the first-ever money laundering charges against terrorists grew out of an investigation initiated by the USG in coordination with Philippine officials. While in police custody, Mundos confessed to having arranged the transfer of funds from al- Qa’ida to Abu Sayyaf Group leader Khadaffy Janjalani to be used in bombings and other criminal acts throughout Mindanao. In February 2007, Mundos escaped from a Kidapawan Provincial Jail. Because of his leadership position in the Abu Sayyaf Group, whose terrorist attacks have resulted in the deaths of U.S. and Filipino citizens, U.S. authorities consider Mundos to be a threat to U.S. and Filipino citizens and interests.

Mundos is believed to be hiding in southern Mindanao.

197 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Americans Aligned with Foreign Terrorist Organizations

At least 25 American citizens - both born and naturalized--have been charged with serious federal terrorism violations since the beginning of 2009, according to information compiled by federal officials. Here are some from that list, including Times Square Bombing suspect Faisal Shahzad

198 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Bryant Neal Vinas

A native-born citizen and Long Island, N.Y., resident, Vinas was captured in Pakistan in 2008 and charged with providing material support to Al Qaeda regarding New York subways and Long Island Rail Road trains, and to receiving training from the group. He pleaded guilty in January 2009

David Williams, Onta Williams, and James Cromitie

The three men from Newburgh, N.Y., were indicted on June 2, 2009, and charged with a plot to plant explosives near a synagogue in the

199 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Bronx and to shoot down military aircraft at a National Guard base in Newburgh using Stinger missiles. The three pleaded not guilty and will go to trial this June. At left, Onta Williams (left), David Williams (second from left), and Cromitie (right) with a lawyer in a courtroom sketch from May 21, 2009; at right, Cromitie is led from a New York federal building the same day

Laguerre Payen

Payen, an alleged fourth conspirator in the Bronx synagogue plot, was also arrested and indicted in June 2009 for conspiring to bomb the synagogue and shoot down military aircraft. He is shown (right) in a White Plains, N.Y., courthouse on May 21; having pleaded not guilty, he will also go on trial this June

200 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

David Headley

Headley was indicted in December 2009 for participating in the deadly 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, India, and plotting to attack a Danish newspaper. A native U.S. citizen, he pleaded guilty to all charges in March (left). At right, a police officer in New Delhi holds up a page of Headley’s passport.

201 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac The Boyds

Dylan (left), Daniel Patrick (center), and Zakaria (right) Boyd, members of a North Carolina family and natural-born citizens, were indicted in June 2009 in a plot to provide material support to terrorists and to kill abroad. Daniel, the father of Dylan and Zakaria, was named as the ringleader of the plot, and in September 2009 was charged additionally with plotting to kill military personnel at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Va. The men and several alleged co- conspirators are currently in jail awaiting trial, scheduled for September.

202 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Anes Subasic

Subasic, a naturalized citizen and North Carolina resident, was also charged in the North Carolina plot. Like the Boyds, he was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and to kill abroad. His trial is also set for September.

203 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Yaghi

Hassan (left) and Yaghi were also arrested in the North Carolina plot and charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and to kill abroad. They are set to stand trial in September.

204 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Michael Finton

Finton, also known as Talib Islam, who was born in the U.S. and lived in Decatur, Ill., was arrested in September 2009 after allegedly trying to blow up a truck he believed to be filled with explosives outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Ill. The arrest came after a sting operation involving FBI officials posing as Al Qaeda members contacted Finton. In October 2009, he was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted murder of federal employees. He received a mental evaluation in January to determine whether he was competent to stand trial.

205 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Tarek Mehanna

The U.S.-born Mehanna, 27, was living with his parents in Sudbury, Mass., when he was arrested in October 2009 for allegedly plotting terror attacks in U.S. malls and against U.S. military figures in Iraq. He was indicted on Nov. 5, 2009, for conspiring and providing material support to terrorists and conspiracy to kill abroad, adding to charges from earlier that year of lying to the FBI in a terrorism investigation. He pleaded not guilty.

206 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Zarein Ahmedzay

A naturalized U.S. citizen from Afghanistan, Ahmedzay (center) was charged in New York for teaming up with Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi in a Qaeda plot to bomb the New York subway system the previous September. Ahmedzay pleaded guilty to all charges on April 23, 2010. He is scheduled to be sentenced in June.

207 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Adis Medunjanin

Joining Ahmedzay and Zazi in the subway bombing case, Medunjanin (right), a naturalized U.S. citizen from Bosnia, was also indicted in New York in February on charges that he flew to Pakistan to receive military training from Al Qaeda. Unlike his counterparts, Medunjanin has pleaded not guilty and indicated through his lawyer (left) that he plans to go to trial.

208 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Colleen LaRose

A U.S. citizen from Michigan living in Pennsylvania, 46-year-old LaRose, a.k.a. “Jihad Jane,”has been charged with plotting to murder a Swedish cartoonist and recruit others for violent jihad; she pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial, but her lawyer has held out the possibility of a plea deal.

209 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Raja Khan

Originally from Pakistan, naturalized citizen and Chicago cabbie Khan, 56, was charged in March with providing material support to terrorists for allegedly attempting to send money to a Pakistani terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda. He pleaded not guilty in April.

210 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Jamie Paulin-Ramirez

The Colorado-born Ramirez, 31, dubbed “Jihad Jamie”by the press, was charged in Pennsylvania in April with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. She was allegedly recruited by LaRose to join the plot to kill a Swedish cartoonist, and is also awaiting trial. Like LaRose, she submitted a not-guilty plea, but has indicated through her lawyers that a plea deal is possible.

211 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Wesam El-Hanafi and Sabirhan Hasanoff

Hanafi (left), a U.S.-born citizen from Brooklyn, and Hasanoff (right), a dual U.S. and Australian citizen, were arrested in April and charged with conspiracy to provide material support, computer advice, and assistance to Al Qaeda. Hasanoff entered a not-guilty plea on May 17; he was denied bail. El-Hanafi is set to appear in federal court later this week.

212 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Khalid Ouazzani

Naturalized U.S. citizen Khalid Ouazzani, a Kansas City auto parts dealer originally from Morocco, pleaded guilty on May 19, 2010 to conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda and to bank fraud and money laundering. He personally provided more than $23,000 to Al Qaeda.

213 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Eljvir Duka Serdar Tatar Mohamad Shnewer

Fort Dix Plot

214 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Anwar al-Awlaki is an influential preacher who has had links with two of the 9/11 terrorists, as well as the Fort Hood killer, Nidal Hasan. Awlaki comes from an influential tribe in Yemen.

215 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Major Nidal Malik Hasan

Russell Defreitas, 63 years old at the time of his arrest, is a United States citizen originally from Guyana.3 Defreitas lived in New York for 30 years but kept a home in Guyana.4 Defreitas worked at JFK Airport as a “trainee supervisor”for the cargo company Evergreen Eagle until he was laid off in 2001.5 After he was laid off, he collected welfare and held odd jobs, such as selling incense on the street.

216 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Kareem Ibrahim, 62 years old at the time of his arrest, is a Trinidadian citizen. Ibrahim , who was born “Winston Kingston”, converted to Islam when he was 21.7 Ibrahim once held a position in the Trinidadian political party, Congress of the People,8 and had also worked as a musician in a steel drum band that toured in the United States in the 1970s.9 He had not done any air travel since 1979 because he suffered from extreme claustrophobia.10 Ibrahim worked in accounting jobs until he retired in Kareem Ibrahim 200511 and served as an imam for two Shia congregations in Trinidad.12 He also sold Islamic books in a Trinidad market.13 He is the father of five14 and lived with his granddaughter and her husband.15 Ibrahim and co-conspirator Abdul Kadir had known each other for twenty years.16 Prior to his extradition to the United States, Ibrahim was hospitalized in Trinidad for an alleged nervous breakdown.

217 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Abdul Kadir 55 years old at the time of his arrest, was a former mayor of Linden (Guyana’s second largest city) and a former Member of Parliament, representing the People’s National Congress Reform. He converted to Islam in 1972. Kadir graduated from the University of Guyana in 1975, with a technical diploma in civil engineering. Kadir spent a year in Venezuela between 1977 and 1978. He then went on to receive a BSc in Civil Engineering from the University of the West Indies in 1981.

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad

In an armed attack outside the Army-Navy Career Center which handles recruiting, in Little Rock, AR killed one soldier wounded another. Muhammad, an American citizen who is a convert to Islam and previously known as Carlos Bledsoe, already had been under investigation by the FBI at the time of the shootings. He had traveled to Yemen, received indoctrination from

218 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac radical clerics, according to a watch group, and possessed a false Somali passport.

Paul and Nadia Rockwood

Samir Khan (r.) could be brought up on terrorism charges very soon if a grand jury decides he is

Mr. Khan, who was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in Queens, is an unlikely foot soldier in what Al Qaeda calls the “Islamic jihadi media.”He has grown up in middle-class America and wrestles with

219 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac his worried parents about his religious fervor. Yet he is stubborn. “I will do my best to speak the truth, and even if it annoys the disbelievers, the truth must be preached,”Mr. Khan said in an interview.

JOHN WALKER LINDH. Captured Nov. 25, 2001. Washington, D.C.,- born Lindh, was captured as an enemy combatant during the United States' 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. He became interested in Islam after seeing the Spike Lee film Malcolm X and converted in 1997. Lindh is now serving a 20-year prison sentence. Pictured here is Lindh on the attendance register of the madrassa (Islamic school) Arabia Hassani Kalan Surani Bannu, in Pakistan in 2002.

220 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

NAJIBULLAH ZAZI. Arrested Sept. 16, 2009. While born in Afghanistan, Zazi moved with his family to New York City in 1999 and became a legal resident. Court documents allege that in 2008 he traveled to Afghanistan to join the Taliban, though he was recruited by Al Qaeda. He returned to the US in January 1999, moved to Denver, and before the end of the year was convicted for plotting to blow up New York’s subways with homemade bombs. He pled guilty to conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiring to commit murder, and providing support to a terrorist organization. In this Sept. 25 photo, Zazi, center, is escorted off an NYPD helicopter. He faces a possible life sentence.

221 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

OMAR HAMMAMI. At large. Alabama-born Omar Hammami was profiled in a recent New York Times feature, “The Jihadist Next Door.”Raised Christian in a Bible-Belt town, the son to a Syrian father and American mother was gradually drawn into fundamentalist Islam and in 2007 joined Somalia’s Al Qaeda-backed insurgent group Al Shabaab. He is identified by peers as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, "the American." He is said to be a rising star and major recruiter, as in this March 31, 2009, image from a recruiting video released by the jihadist forums.

222 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN. At large. Born in 1960 in Bloomington, Ind., Yasin is wanted for his alleged participation in the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center, which resulted in six deaths. One of only two Americans on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists, the US is offering up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest. He is pictured in this 2001 poster.

Beltway sniper John Allen Muhammad

223 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Lee Boyd Malvo

In this artist's drawing Wesam El-Hanafi, left, and Sabirhan Hasanoff are seen during their initial appearance on terrorism related charges at U.S. One is a computer engineer, the other an accountant A federal indictment charged them with trying to modernize an Al Qaeda cell in Yemen

224 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac

Lloyd R. WOODSON, 43, having a last known address in Reston, Fairfax County, Virginia was arrested early Monday after police responded to a “suspicious person”call to a Quick Chek convenience store located on Route 28 in Somerset County, New Jersey. The caller to the police stated that a Black male, dressed in military fatigues, was acting suspicious at approximately 3:55 a.m. When police arrived and began to interview WOODSON, he ran from the officers, who found him hiding in the brush in a nearby trailer park. During a search of WOODSON, police found him wearing a bullet proof vest and was carrying a weapon modified to shoot .50 caliber ammunition under his coat.

Carlos Eduardo Almonte, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa

225 Ch F-X ang PD e

w Click to buy NOW! w m o w c .d k. ocu-trac Dominican-Americans in the New York City area expressed feelings of outrage and surprise that 24-year-old Carlos Eduardo Almonte, a naturalized American citizen born in the Dominican Republic, was arrested while allegedly on his way to join terrorist group Al Shabaab

They hoped to soon arrive in Africa to wage holy war against American troops.

Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte on charges of trying to kill, maim and kidnap as part of an Islamist group linked to al Qaeda.

226