The Internal Dynamics of Terrorist Cells: a Social Network

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST

CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF

TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN

CONTEXT

STUART KOSCHADE

Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours)

Centre for Social Change Research

Queensland University of Technology

Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy qualification

2007

i KEYWORDS: terrorism, terrorist cells, terrorism studies, social network analysis, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Ustashi, Ustasha, Aum Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e- Taiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, history of terrorism, Australia, destabilisation techniques, betweenness, critical node, counter-terrorism, Willie Brigitte, Faheem Khalid Lodhi, Shoko Asahara, Imam Samudra, Muklas, Bali bombing, Islamic extremism.

ABSTRACT: The rise of the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement, which was mobilised by the al-Qaeda attacks of and responses to September 11, 2001, heralds a new period in the history of terrorism. The increased frequency and intensity of this type of terrorism affects every nation in the world, not least Australia. Rising to meet the challenges posed by terrorism is the field of terrorism studies, the field which aims at understanding, explaining, and countering terrorism. Despite the importance of the field, it has been beleaguered with criticisms since its inception as a response to the rise of international terrorism. These criticisms specifically aim at the field’s lack of objectivity, abstraction, levels of research, and levels of analysis. These criticisms were the impetus behind the adoption of the methodology of this thesis, which offers the distinct ability to understand, explain, and forecast the way in which terrorists interact within covert cells.

Through social network analysis, this thesis examines four terrorist cells that have operated in or against Australia. These cells are from the groups Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community) and operated between 1963 and 2003. Essentially, this methodology attempts to discover, map, and analyse the interaction within the cells during the covert stage of their respective operations. Following this, the results are analysed through the traditional social network analysis frameworks to discover the internal dynamics of the cell and identify the critical nodes (leaders) within the cells. Destabilisation techniques are subsequently employed, targeting these critical nodes to establish the most effective disruption techniques from a counter-terrorism point of view.

The major findings of this thesis are: (1) that cells with a focus on efficiency rather than covertness were more successful in completing their objectives (contrary to popular belief); and (2) betweenness centrality (control over the flow of communication) is a critical factor in identifying leaders within terrorist cells. The analysis also offered significant insight into how a Jemaah Islamiyah cell might operate effectively in Australia, as well as the importance of local contacts to terrorist operations and the significance of international counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Firstly I would like to thank my family for their support – Mum, Dad, Michael, and Fiona - without you this project would have been all the more difficult. Equally vital has been the support from my principal supervisor Dr. John Synott, whose guidance has been fundamental in the completion of this thesis. Additionally my associate supervisors Dr. Ian Wells and Dr Jean-Louis Durand have also been essential, their advice and guidance has been invaluable.

To my most excellent band of brothers, my friends, thank you for your support in an endeavour that could surely threaten to send the sanest of people around the bend: Nigel Lee, Grant Gilmore, Ross Marks, Elliot Wren, Stewart Forsyth, Jolon Knight, Jonas Howard, Chris O’Hallaren, Dave Hartley, Robert Hueston, Steven York, Matthew Wren, and Shannon Boyd. Similar sentiments go to the Grange Thistle Football Club.

I must also thank many staff at QUT for their support: Professor Clive Bean, Associate Professor Gavin Kendall, Dr. Ken Parker, Dr Paul Harrison, Dr Mark Brough, Dr Barbara Hanna, Waveney Croft, Gail Stringfellow, Chanel Hopkinson, Kerry Pert, Margaret Miles, Eve Teague, and Christie Anne Williams.

My sincerest thanks also go out to the following: Noni Kenny, Chad Whelan, Luke Howie, Sally Hose, Mark Branagan, Martin Chulov, Jeff Penrose, Chantal Enter, Liz Jackson, Flt Lt Ian Tindall, Dr Carl Ungerer, Lucia Falzon, Ian Shaw, the Research Network for a Secure Australia, the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre and Athol Yates, Chris Flaherty, John McDonald, Dave Lawson, Jane Doutre, Anna King, Danelle Dobson, Jonathan Farley, and Kathleen Carley.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP xiii TERMS, PHRASES & LANGUAGE xiv

CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION 1 1. TERRORISM 2 2. ORIENTATION OF THESIS 4 3. SUMMARY OF THESIS 5 3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 5 3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 6 3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 7 3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS 8 4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 9

CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 11 1. A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 14 1.1 ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC – C1 AD 15 1.2 ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1-C13 16 1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY 18 1.3 LEFT-WING & REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: CIRCA 1790 – 1910 19 1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT 19 1.3.2 RUSSIAN TERRORISM 21 1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM 22 1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM 23 1.3.5 PERIOD SUMMARY 24 1.4 RIGHT-WING & POST WWI TERRORISM: CIRCA 1917 – 1960 24 1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD 25 1.4.2 ZIONISM 25 1.4.3 THE USTASHA 26 1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 27 1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 28 1.4.6 PERIOD SUMMARY 29 1.5 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 – TODAY 30 1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS 31 1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s) 31 1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 32 1.5.2 NEW GROUPS 33 1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS 33 1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS 35 1.5.2.3 COMMUNIST GROUPS 36 1.5.2.4 HEZBOLLAH 38 1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 39 1.5.2.6 AUM SHINRIKYO 40 1.5.2.7 AL-QAEDA 41 1.6 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 45 1.6.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 46 1.6.2 CHECHEN REBELS 48 1.6.3 THE AL-QAEDA MOVEMENT 48 1.6.4 THE WAR IN IRAQ – CONSEQUENCES 49 2. TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA 51

iv 2.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 52 2.2 EARLY TERRORISM 53 2.3 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 53 2.3.1 USTASHI GROUPS 53 2.3.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORISM 57 2.3.3 THE HILTON BOMBING 58 2.3.4 THE JCAG 58 2.3.5 AUM SHINRIKYO 59 2.4 DOMESTIC TERRORISM 60 2.5 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62 2.5.1 PRE 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62 2.5.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH MANTIQI 4 & JACK ROCHE 62 2.5.1.2 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES 64 2.5.2 POST 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 65 2.5.2.1 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 65 2.5.2.2 MALLAH & THOMAS 66 2.5.2.3 THREATS TO AUSTRALIA 67 2.5.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM RAIDS – NOVEMBER 2005 67 3. SUMMARY 68

CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 71 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 72 1.1 EARLY LITERATURE 73 1.1.1 EARLY 1970S – POLITICAL SCIENCE RESPONSES 73 1.1.2 MID 1970S – INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 74 1.1.3 1980S – ‘BOOM PERIOD’ 78 1.1.3.1 SCHMID & JONGMAN’S APPRAISAL 79 1.2 CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM STUDIES 80 1.2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 81 1.2.1.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM 82 1.2.1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM 82 1.2.2 TERRORISTS 83 1.2.2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 84 1.2.2.2 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 84 1.2.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES 86 1.2.2.4 POLITICAL SCIENCE 87 1.2.3 TERRORIST TACTICS 88 1.2.3.1 TARGET SELECTION 88 1.2.3.2 WMD & CBRN 89 1.2.3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS 90 1.2.3.4 CYBER-TERRORISM 92 1.2.3.5 GENERAL TACTICS 93 1.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM 94 1.2.4.1 NATIONAL 94 1.2.4.2 INTERNATIONAL 95 1.2.4.3 NON-STATE 96 1.2.4.4 GENERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES 97 1.3 AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE 98 1.3.1 USTASHI LITERATURE 98 1.3.2 THE HILTON BOMBING & ANANDA MARGA 100 1.3.3 TERRORISM IN EARNEST 101 1.3.3.1 POST 2001 RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA 107 2. ISSUES WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES 110 2.1 CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF TERRORISM STUDIES 111 2.1.1 OBJECTIVITY 111 2.1.2 ABSTRACTION 112 2.1.3 LEVELS OF RESEARCH 112 2.1.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 113

v 3. POST 2001 ANALYTICAL RESEARCH IN TERRORISM 113 STUDIES 4. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS 118

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 121 1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 122 1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 122 1.1.1 SOCIOMETRIC ANALYSIS 123 1.1.2 HARVARD APPROACH 126 1.1.3 MANCHESTER APPROACH 127 1.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS – COVERT NETWORKS 127 1.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS & TERRORISM STUDIES 130 1.3.1 VALDIS KREBS 131 1.3.2 FURTHER TERRORISM RESEARCH 136 2. IMPLEMENTATION 136 2.1 THESIS OBJECTIVES 137 2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 138 3. METHODOLOGY 139 3.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 140 3.1.1 THE CASE STUDY 140 3.1.2 DATA COLLECTION & SOURCES 141 3.1.2.1 GOVERNMENT SOURCES 142 3.1.2.2 NGO & MEDIA SOURCES 142 3.1.2.3 INTERVIEWS 144 3.1.3 NEGATING CRITICISMS – CASE STUDIES 145 3.2 RELATIONAL DATA 146 3.2.1 INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA 147 3.2.1.1 MATRICES 148 3.2.1.2 GRAPHS 150 3.3 NETWORK ANALYSIS 152 3.3.1 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES 152 3.3.1.1 SIZE 153 3.3.1.2 DENSITY 153 3.3.1.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION 154 3.3.1.4 AVERAGE COMMUNICATION SPEED 155 3.3.1.5 CLUSTERS 156 3.3.1.6 NETWORK FORMATION 157 3.3.2 NODE LEVEL MEASURES 158 3.3.2.1 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY 159 3.3.2.2 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY 160 3.3.2.3 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 161 3.3.2.4 CLIQUE COUNT 162 3.4 DESTABILISATION TECHNIQUES 163 4. ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE 166

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO 169 1. THE CROATIAN REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERHOOD 170 2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: OPERATION KANGAROO 172 2.1 AREA COMMAND FOUR 173 2.2 THE TROIKA 175 2.3 ACTION KANGAROO 176 2.3.1 THE NINE 176 2.3.2 RECRUITMENT & TRAINING 177 2.3.2.1 TRAINING IN AUSTRALIA 177 2.3.2.2 CAMP IN AUSTRALIA 178 2.3.2.3 TRAINING IN EUROPE 179

vi 2.3.3 INSERTION INTO THE SFRY 180 2.3.3.1 TOLIC/OBLAK/STOJIC TROIKA 181 2.3.3.2 FUMIC/PERKOVIC/ZDRILIC TROIKA 182 2.3.3.3 PODRUG/TAPSANJI/LEKO TROIKA 182 2.3.3.4 GEZA PASTI 182 2.3.4 TRIALS 183 3. RELATIONAL DATA 184 4. ANALYSIS 189 5. DESTABILISATION 192 6. SUMMARY 194

CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO 197 1. AUM SHINRIKYO 198 2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: BANJAWARN CELL 201 2.1 MAIN GROUP ARRIVES 203 2.2 OPERATION BEGINS 204 2.3 OPERATION ENDS 206 3. RELATIONAL DATA 208 4. ANALYSIS 212 5. DESTABILISATION 215 6. SUMMARY 220

CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 221 1. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 222 2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2003 SYDNEY CELL 224 2.1 WILLIE VIRGILE BRIGITTE 224 2.2 FAHEEM KHALID LODHI: THE QUARTERMASTER 228 2.3 RECRUITING 228 2.4 PREPARATIONS 230 2.5 OPERATION UNDERWAY 231 2.5.1 TARGET SELECTION 233 2.5.2 MELANIE BROWN 234 2.5.3 CHEMICALS 235 2.6 CELL FAILS 235 3. RELATIONAL DATA 236 4. ANALYSIS 241 5. DESTABILISATION 244 6. SUMMARY 247

CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 249 1. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 250 2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2002 BALI OPERATION 252 2.1 TENGGULUN 252 2.2 OPERATION BEGINS 254 2.3 SOLO MEETING 256 2.4 TEAM LIMA 257 2.5 PREPARATIONS: BUILDING THE BOMB 259 2.6 BALI: CELL ESTABLISHMENT 262 2.7 IMPLEMENTATION 264 3. RELATIONAL DATA 265 4. ANALYSIS 270 5. DESTABILISATION 274 6. SUMMARY 278 CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS 279

vii 1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CELLS 280 1.1 CONTEXTUAL OBSERVATIONS 280 1.2 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES 281 1.3 NODE LEVEL MEASURES 283 2. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA: A MODEL FOR INSIGHT 286 3. DESTABILISATION DISCUSSION 287 3.1 CRITICAL NODES 288 3.2 ALL-CHANNEL NETWORKS 289 3.3 DESTABILISATION APPLICATIONS 290 3.3.1 HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO 290 3.3.2 AUM SHINRIKYO 291 3.3.3 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 291 3.3.4 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 293 4. SUMMARY 294

CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION 295 1. REVIEW 296 2. MAJOR FINDINGS 297 2.1 EFFICIENCY OVER COVERTNESS 297 2.1.1 APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 298 2.2 BETWEENNESS AS CRITICAL 298 2.2.1 APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 298 2.3 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA 299 2.3.1 APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 299 3. FURTHER APPLICATIONS 300 3.1 LOCAL CONTACTS 300 3.2 INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 301 4. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 301 4.1 TERRORISM STUDIES 302 4.1.1 SUBDUING THE CRITICISMS 302 4.1.2 FURTHER RESEARCH 303 4.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TOOL 304 4.2.1 FURTHER RESEARCH 306 5. TERRORISM STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 306

ENDNOTES 309 REFERENCE LIST 355

viii LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGY FIGURES FIGURE 1: SEPTEMBER 11 AL-QAEDA GRAPH 131 FIGURE 2: KREBS’ LINE NETWORK 132 FIGURE 3: GRAPH: EXAMPLE ADJACENCY MATRIX 150 FIGURE 4: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 151 FIGURE 5: CLUSTER GRAPH 157 FIGURE 6: NETWORK FORMATIONS 157 FIGURE 7: ORA EXAMPLE GRAPH 164 FIGURE 8: B REMOVED 165

TABLES TABLE 1: BINARY ADJACENCY MATRIX: MEMBER BY MEMBER 148 TABLE 2: ADJACENCY MATRIX: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA 150 TABLE 3: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CENTRALITY 159 TABLE 4: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS 161 TABLE 5: DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS 162 TABLE 6: CLIQUE COUNT 162

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO FIGURES FIGURE 1: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO GRAPH – ACTION 188 KANGAROO FIGURE 2: ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH 193 FIGURE 3: TOLIC REMOVAL 193 FIGURE 4: TAPSANJI REMOVAL 194 FIGURE 5: ZDRILIC REMOVAL 194

TABLES TABLE 1: HRB BINARY RELATIONS 186 TABLE 2: HRB INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 187 TABLE 3: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 189 TABLE 4: ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 189 TABLE 5: BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 189 TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES 190 TABLE 7: CLIQUE COUNT 190

CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO FIGURES FIGURE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO GRAPH – BANJAWARN OPERATION 211 FIGURE 2: ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH 216 FIGURE 3: TOYODA REMOVAL 217 FIGURE 4: HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF AUM SHINRIKYO – BANJAWARN 219 OPERATION

TABLES TABLE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO BINARY RELATIONS 210 TABLE 2: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 212 TABLE 3: ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 212 TABLE 4: CLOSENESS & BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 213 TABLE 5: CLIQUE COUNT 213

CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA FIGURES FIGURE 1: LASHKA-E-TAIBA GRAPH – SYDNEY CELL 2003 240 FIGURE 2: ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH 244 FIGURE 3: LODHI REMOVAL 245

ix FIGURE 4: SAJID REMOVAL 246

TABLES TABLE 1: LET BINARY RELATIONS 238 TABLE 2: LET INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 239 TABLE 3: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 241 TABLE 4: ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 241 TABLE 5: BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 241 TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES 242 TABLE 7: CLIQUE COUNT 242

CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH FIGURES FIGURE 1: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH GRAPH – BALI OPERATION 2002 269 FIGURE 2: ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH 277 FIGURE 3: SAMUDRA REMOVAL 278 FIGURE 4: IDRIS REMOVAL 278 FIGURE 5: MUKLAS REMOVAL 279

TABLES TABLE 1: JI BINARY RELATIONS 267 TABLE 2: JI INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED 268 TABLE 3: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA 270 TABLE 4: ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 270 TABLE 5: BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) 270 TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES 271 TABLE 7: CLIQUE COUNT 272

CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS TABLES TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE NETWORK LEVEL RESULTS 282 TABLE 2: CRITICAL NODE CENTRALITY RESULTS 284 TABLE 3: RANKED BETWEENNESS LEVELS FOR HRB, LET, & JI 285

x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation. ACT: Australian Capital Territory. AFP: Australian Federal Police. AK-47: Automat Kalashnikov – Model 47. ASALA: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. BO: Boevaya Organisasia, Battle Organisation. CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (Weapons). CHOGM: Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. CIA: Central Intelligence Agency. CI-CE-CT: Counter-Intelligence – Counter-Espionage – Counter-Terrorism. CIRA: Continuity Irish Republican Army. CMF: Citizen Military Forces. DST: La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, Directorat for Territorial Surveillance. EPR: Ejercito Popular Revolucionario, Popular Revolutionary Army. EU: European Union. ETA: Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom. FIS: Front Islamique du Salut, Islamic Salvation Front. FLN: Front de Liberation Nationale, National Liberation Front. GIA: Groupe Islamique Arme, Armed Islamic Group. GPO: General Post Office. GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, Salafist Group to Call and Combat. HAMAS: Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia, Islamic Resistance Movement. HIRO: Hrvatska Ilegalan Revolucionarna Organizacija Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Brotherhood. HRB: Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. HOP: Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret, Croatian Liberation Movement. HM: Hrvatska Maldež, Croatian Youth. HNO: Hrvatski Narodni Otpor, Croatian National Resistance. IMRO: Inner-Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation. INTERFET: International Force East Timor. IRA: Irish Republican Army. ISI: Inter-Services Agency. IYM: Islamic Youth Movement. JCAG: Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide. JI: Jemaah Islamiyah, Islamic Community. JRA: Japanese Red Army. JTJ: Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Monotheism and Holy War Movement. KGB: Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee of State Security. LET: Lashkar-e-Taiba, Army of the Pure/Righteous. MAK: Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab, Afghan Services Bureau. MDI: Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad. MI5: Military Intelligence section 5. MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front. NAA: National Archives of Australia. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

xi NATP: National Anti-Terrorism Plan. NGO: Non-Government Organisation. NMO: Irgun Zvai Leumi, National Military Organisation. NV: Narodnaya Volya, People’s Will. NSW: New South Wales. OAS: Organisation de l’Armee Secrete, Secret Army Organisation. OIW: Offensive Information Warfare. ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command. PFLP-SC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Command. PFLP-SOG: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Operations Group. PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army. PLF: Palestinian Liberation Front. PLA: Peoples’ Liberation Army. PLO: Palestine Liberation Organisation. PSCC: Protective Services Coordination Centre. RAA: Royal Australian Army. RAF: Rote Armee Fraktion, Red Army Faction. RB: Brigade Rosse, Red Brigades. RB-CCCP: Red Brigades for the Construction of a Combatant Communist Party. RB-UCC: Red Brigades – Union of Combatant Communists. RIRA: Real Irish Republican Army. SASR: Special Air Service Regiment. SFRY: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. SHUMS: Saveza Hrvatske Ujedinjene Mladeži Svijeta, Croatian United Youth of the World. SMS: Short Message Service. TNT: Trinitrotoluene. UDBA: Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti/Sigurnosti/Varnosti, State Security Administration. UHREC: (QUT) University Human Research Ethics Committee. UK: United Kingdom. UN: United Nations. UNHj: United Croats of West Germany. UNSW: University of New South Wales. US: United States (of America). USS: United States Ship. UTM: University of Technology Malaysia. WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction.

xii STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or referenced except where due reference is made.

Signature:

Date:

xiii TERMS, PHRASES, CONVENTIONS, AND LANGUAGE

Throughout this thesis the use of acronyms will be employed. At the beginning of each chapter the individual acronyms will be reintroduced as used throughout the thesis to increase comprehensibility. The acronyms employed will be those most commonly used within the terrorism studies literature. For example, Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation) will be referred to as the NMO, while Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community) will be referred to as JI. The list of acronyms on pages xi-xii will further assist in their comprehensibility. Commonly used acronyms and abbreviations such as PhD, AM, PM, Dr, will not be included in this list.

This thesis has in a majority of places used the conventional English spelling of Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Croatian, and Indonesian names and places. For example Abu Bakar Bas’yir will be referred to as Abu Bakar Bashir.

On their introduction within the text, non-English words will be presented in italics followed by their English translation. From that point onwards the word will be referred to in normal font. For example Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) would subsequently be referred to as Aum Shinrikyo.

The popular Western names of individuals within this thesis will be used, for example the Jemaah Islamiyah member Ali Ghufron will be referred to as Muklas. When individuals such as Muklas are introduced, or when there is ambiguity over an individual’s identity, the name by which they will be referred to throughout the thesis will be given followed by the individual’s real name or nom de guerre.

Additionally, quotations (unless presented as a blocked quote) will use double inverted commas to indicate text taken verbatim from another source, while single inverted commas will be used for the introduction of concepts.

Finally, unless otherwise indicated, all monies referred to are represented as Australian Dollars.

xiv

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

This chapter, as the introduction to the thesis, will outline its orientation. This discussion will establish the significance of the phenomenon of terrorism within a global context, as well as its significance within an Australian context. The chapter will then discuss the research objectives and questions of the thesis, followed by a summary of the subsequent nine chapters, to firmly establish the course of the thesis, discussing: i. Chapter II: The Phenomenon of Terrorism – this chapter focuses on the establishment of the principal concepts of the thesis, terrorism and terrorism in Australia; ii. Chapter III: The Field of Terrorism Studies – this chapter is essentially the literature review, which examines the field of terrorism studies and the objectives of the project; iii. Chapter IV: Social Network Analysis: A Methodology – this chapter outlines the methodology of the thesis and examines social network analysis, the research questions, and the orientation of the thesis. iv. Chapters V-X: Data, Analysis, and Conclusions – a brief outline of the substance and progression of these chapters will be discussed. This chapter will conclude by discussing the potential significance of the project.

1. TERRORISM

While the first incidents of terrorism can be traced to the Fourth Century BC, terrorism has been a significant international issue since the emergence of ‘International Terrorism’ from the late 1960s. International terrorism was a revolutionary phase within the phenomenon’s history. This period witnessed infamous events such as the Black September group’s hostage-taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games (in which 11 of the athletes, a police officer, and five of the terrorists were killed) and the Japanese Red Army’s machine gun and grenade attack at the Lod Airport in Israel in 1972, resulting in the deaths of 26 people. The period of international terrorism saw the rise of many terrorist groups championing many different political and religious causes. In the thirty years between 1968 and 1996 there were 6 956 incidents of international terrorism around the world resulting

in 7 049 fatalities.1 These figures illustrate the formidable force that was posed by the many groups that constituted international terrorism.

The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism from the late 1990s culminated in the al- Qaeda attacks against New York and Washington in September 2001. This single operation resulted in 2 986 deaths and signalled a new phase within the history of terrorism. 21st Century Islamic extremism, headed by the Islamic extremist group al- Qaeda (The Base), has since continued its campaign of terrorism with attacks and attempted attacks all over Europe, Asia, America, and the Middle East. To illustrate the increase in the frequency and intensity of 21st Century Islamic extremism over international terrorism, in the ten years between 1996 and 2006, there have been 1 354 incidents of terrorism resulting in 7 249 fatalities.2 i While no successful attacks have yet to take place on Australian soil, there have been significant attempts on and scares to Australia’s internal security.

In a White Paper released by the Australian Government on July 15, 2004, entitled Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, the specific threats to Australia’s security were outlined. The White Paper discusses the reasons that Australia has become a target for Islamic extremism, citing multiple statements by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri between 2001 and 2003. These statements include references to Australia as a target due to its alignment with the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), as well as its military deployment to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The bombing of nightclubs on the Indonesian island of Bali in 2002 (and later in 2005), which specifically targeted Australians and other Westerners, solidified Australia’s position as a target for Islamic extremists. Since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 2001, the Australian Government has spent around $6.2 billion on counter-terrorism measures (a figure which excludes deployment and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq).ii The budgets of Australia’s intelligence agencies have been increased by significant margins, some as much as almost 300%. The organisation of Australia’s high level counter-terrorism

i These figures do not include ‘domestic’ terrorist events that may otherwise be included in figures of 21st Century Islamic extremism. This note particularly applies to terrorism in areas such as Indonesia and Iraq. ii Current as August at 2005.

committees and arrangements have also been rearranged to maximise efficiency and national coordination.3

Australia has been targeted by Islamic extremists prior to 2001, as Chapter II will demonstrate, but it has also been the training ground, testing facility, and the site of international conflicts for terrorist groups motivated by the many varying facets of both religion and politics. As yet, many of these groups, cells, and events have not been examined within the media or academia at any great level of detail, much less so examined within the academic field of terrorism studies to understand how these groups have operated.

2. ORIENTATION OF THESIS The objectives of this thesis have been synthesised from a review of the terrorism studies literature in Chapter III. This literature review examines the development of the terrorism studies field from the 1970s, outlining the developing methodological and analytical criticisms that remain unresolved today. This review also determines that there is almost no research on terrorist groups that have operated in or targeted Australia. As such, the objectives of this thesis are: i. To describe, understand, and explain the organisation and communication of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia; ii. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of terrorism studies; and iii. To employ a method of analysis that can contribute to a predictive capability within terrorism studies.

In order to meet these objectives, the thesis’s research questions are posed in Chapter IV. These research questions are: i. How have terrorist cells in Australia operated? ii. How might a Jemaah Islamiyah cell operate in Australia? iii. What are the most effective methods of destabilising these cells? Guided by these research questions, this thesis will attempt to examine the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous, LET), and Jemaah

Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) cells that operated in or against Australia in the thirty years between 1963 and 2003, through social network analysis. From the insight into the JI cell that is examined, the thesis attempts to offer insight into how the group might operate in Australia, hoping to contribute (on some level) towards a predictive capacity within the field. The thesis will also use theoretical destabilisation techniques that have been employed previously within the social network analysis field to attempt to generate the most effective counter-terrorism techniques for use against these cells for further counter-terrorism applications.

3. SUMMARY OF THESIS

This section of the chapter will outline the direction and course of the thesis through an in-depth review of the following three chapters, briefly discussing the major concepts and theories involved throughout the thesis. These subsequent chapters aim to instil firstly, a comprehension of the phenomenon of terrorism, secondly how terrorism is studied and understood, and finally to lay a firm base for the thesis through the definitive establishment of the major concepts, methodology, and orientation of the project. The data, analysis, and conclusion chapters will also be briefly discussed for a more intimate conception of how the thesis is structured and aims to achieve its objectives.

3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM Chapter II establishes the definition and conceptual framework of terrorism that the thesis will be using. A vital component of establishing this conceptual framework is the adoption of a definition of terrorism.iii Chapter II avoids an extensive debate on what many believe is the Achilles’ heel of terrorism studies so as to not consume time on such a complex and controversial topic. This discussion does, however, firmly establish the contextual and definitional basis of terrorism that will be employed throughout this thesis, specifically, terrorism in Australia.

Following this definitional establishment, the chapter moves on to examine the development of terrorism through six succinct phases. These phases map a selected history of terrorism from below, beginning with ancient terror through tactics such as iii A valid, reliable, and generally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist and is a pressing dilemma within the field of terrorism studies.

regicide and tyrannicide, to the development of terrorist groups, to terror from the left, terror from the right, international terrorism, and the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism. This section offers a detailed snapshot of the groups that facilitated the development of terrorism since the Fourth Century BC, through to the events leading to the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism and an assessment of this type of terrorism today.

The chapter then takes the same approach to examine the history of terrorism in Australia, which unlike the coverage of the overall history of the phenomenon, is a reasonably advanced and comprehensive history due to the limited and intermittent nature of terrorism in Australia.

The purpose of the chapter is to firmly establish the phases, modus operandi, and development of the two major concepts of this thesis. These concepts are terrorism and terrorism in Australia, which will be definitively discussed and defined through historical examples to instil a comprehensive understanding of these concepts.

3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES The aim of Chapter III is to understand how terrorism is studied within the academic field of terrorism studies. This chapter will examine the development of the field of terrorism studies and where the field is currently positioned. This examination begins in the early 1970s following the response of political science to the rise of international terrorism, and examines the literature from other disciplines that challenged political science’s dominance in the field in the mid-1970s. The review then follows the rapid growth of the field through the 1980s, highlighting the criticisms that emerged in this period.

The chapter moves to a review of the contemporary literature and examines a range of articles from the two major terrorism studies journals, Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,iv classifying the various foci of research within the field. The review then examines terrorism research that focuses on terrorism in Australia, demonstrating that there is a disproportionately small body of iv Andrew Silke (in 2001) argued that these two journals, as the core journals of the field, provide a reasonably balanced representation of research in the field.

academic research on terrorist organisations and groups that have operated in Australia. The review establishes that in recent years the field in Australia has been expanding, but there remains no research that aims to better understand and analyse terrorist cells, groups, and organisations that have operated in Australia.

The next section of Chapter III revisits the criticisms of terrorism of the 1980s, proposing that they remain contemporary criticisms of the field. Following the establishment of these criticisms, a quantity of post-2001 literature is reviewed and it is discovered that despite a significant rise in the quantity of studies within the field, there are significant criticisms within the field such as to warrant new conceptualisations and methodological approaches. It is through these criticisms that the thesis’s research objectives are established

Chapter III will conclude by noting that there is a methodology that facilitates the description, understanding, and explanation of the way in which terrorist cells operate, communicate, and are organised, through a firmly grounded analytical approach, and hence facilitate fulfilling the objectives. This method also has been utilised for past studies that attempt to provide predictive insight. This method is Social Network Analysis.

3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS Social network analysis is a framework for the analysis of the interaction and communication of a group of individuals. The method provides an ability to mathematically map the interaction between the individuals of a network and can determine different significant criteria of the network and its dynamics such as density, degree of connexion,v and size.4 Additionally, the method determines the individual measures of each of the network’s members through criteria such as: amount of activity within; ability to control the interaction and communication within, and; ability to access the rest of the network. It will be made clear within this chapter that the adoption of social network analysis satisfies the objectives of the project, some of the criticisms of terrorism studies, and has potential applications within the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields.

v Connexion is a technical term within social network analysis and will be used throughout.

Chapter IV of this thesis comprehensively outlines the development of the social network analysis methodology from its psychological, mathematical, and sociological structural functionalist roots of the early 1920s to its applications in the analysis of covert networks today. This examination extends to the applications of the method to terrorism studies, many of which revolve around the work of Valdis Krebs5 and Kathleen Carley.6 This section finds that while integration between the two fields exists, there has been very little application of social network analysis to terrorist cells, and no such studies on cells that have operated in Australia. Following these assertions, the chapter moves to outline the research questions. The chapter then thoroughly establishes the methodology of the thesis, discussing in specific detail the social network analysis methodology adopted to fulfil the research objectives and answer the research questions. The chapter concludes by outlining how each of the subsequent data chapters will examine the four terrorist cells.

3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS Following the establishment of the thesis’ methodology in Chapter IV, Chapters V through VIII each examine one of the four cells. These chapters begin with a background on the terrorist group that the cell is from. This is followed by the contextual background of the cell, extensively detailing the operation and the interaction within the cell. From this background, the relational data is synthesised and presented in adjacency matrices. From these tables, the cell is mathematically graphed to more clearly demonstrate the relationships and interaction within the cell.

This data is then employed within a social network analysis, providing scores on the different network and nodal level measures of the methodology. These results are discussed to determine their meaning and significance, including the leaders within the cell and the level of covertness or efficiency of the cell. The results and conclusions of this analysis are applied to the theoretical destabilisation techniques that attempt to effectively disrupt the cell through the removal of critical links or individuals.

Following the completion of the data chapters, Chapter IX provides a comparative analysis of the results and the destabilisation techniques of each of the cells. The final

chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis through a review of the data, results, and analysis, to put forth the major findings, further applications, contribution to knowledge, and an evaluation of the directions of terrorism studies in the 21st Century.

4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH This thesis aims to contribute specific applications to the fields of terrorism studies, social network analysis, counter-terrorism, and intelligence through its findings. As mentioned earlier, the application of this methodology to terrorist cells in Australia provides research into two specific areas in which little or no such literature exists. The application of social network analysis to examine a variety of terrorist cells offers the opportunity for comparative analysis of these cells.

Because the project’s objectives have been synthesised from the criticisms of the field, the thesis specifically attempts to address those criticisms. The generation of a methodology that can provide a framework for objective and applied research may potentially provide an example of a methodology that has a high degree of reliability in its application within terrorism studies and constitute a foundation for further research. The potential applications and generation of avenues for further research are significant, building on the appropriate application of the methodology.

The application of any methodology in an attempt to understand aspects of the operation of terrorist cells and to allow insight into and possible prediction of these cells has significant potential implications for the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields. Specifically, the method allows the identification of the leaders within networks and the determination and comprehension of the internal dynamics of the cell. Additionally, the theoretical examination of the most effective methods to destabilise such cells has similar potential significance for the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields.

In this introductory chapter, the orientation and direction of the thesis were established, as well as some insight into the major concepts of the thesis in addition to the direction of the data, analysis, and conclusion chapters. The next chapter provides

an understanding of terrorism from below, particularly a definitive comprehension of two of the central concepts of the thesis: terrorism and terrorism in Australia.

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF

TERRORISM

CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, an overwhelming majority of the literature focusing on terrorism begins with definitional discussions of the phenomenon of terrorism in order to establish the context or framework of the ensuing research and analysis. This thesis will emulate this trend within this chapter, although this context will be established through a selective examination of the history of the phenomenon of terrorism. It is contended that the construction of a descriptive, contextually rich history of terrorism is infinitely more useful to establish a context for the basis of a thesis (particularly due to the definitional dilemmas within the field – to be discussed below). This chapter aims to categorically construct a selected history of terrorism in order to establish a clear context for the central concepts of the thesis, firstly the phenomenon of terrorism, and secondly, terrorism in Australia. Additionally, this history will situate each of the four groups examined within this thesis in their historical contexts. The establishment and construction of this history is critical in the establishment of these concepts and provides an essential understanding of, and insight into, the development of the phenomenon, the major trends and stages, and the current state of terrorism today: the period of Islamic extremism.

Terrorism (in its varying forms) is an age-old phenomenon that has been employed all over the world for many different purposes through many different motivations. The concept of terrorism has been known by other names, and indeed, has implied other meanings. Terrorism is a concept that is constantly evolving and as such is a concept that escapes definition. The complex phenomenon of terrorism has been employed by people of different races, religions, ideologies, and periods, resulting in the constant changing of the phenomenon itself. Terrorism is specifically different in every event, hence the difficulty in defining it. According to Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “One writer, Walter Laqueur, simply threw up his hands, arguing that terrorism had appeared in so many different forms and under so many different circumstances that a comprehensive definition was impossible”.1

Since the rise of international terrorism on the world stage, academics, politicians, and law-makers have struggled to define the phenomenon for the above reasons. There is yet to be a single generally agreed upon definition. Schmid and Jongman discuss the blurring between the major concepts and boundaries of terrorism and list them as: i. Assassination; v. Crime; ii. Guerrilla warfare; vi. Insanity; and iii. Revolutionary violence; vii. Political violence.2 iv. Warfare; While all of these concepts are intrinsically linked to the diverse phenomenon of terrorism, the principle arguments are based around where the borders between these concepts and terrorism lie. In addition to the conceptual discrepancies, definitions can be based on the motivation of the terrorist act, the objective or goal of the act, and the target of the act.

The disparity surrounding the defining of such a prevalent and universal phenomenon has led academics such as Jay Shafritz, Earl Gibbons, and Gregory Scott to deduce that “it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon”.3 Any definition of terrorism is dependent on a single variable: the subjective nature of the defining party. For the purpose of this project, which aims to examine terrorist cells that have operated in or against Australia, it will employ the following definition from the Australian Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003: [A] Terrorist act means an action or threat of action where: (a) the action falls within subsection (2) and does not fall within subjection (3); and (b) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause; and (c) the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of: (i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory, or foreign country; or (ii) intimidating the public or a section of the public. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) causes serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or (b) causes serious damage to property; or (c) causes a person’s death; or (d) endangers a person’s life, other than the life of the person taking the action; or (e) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or (f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system including, but not limited to: (i) an information system; or

(ii) a telecommunications system; or (iii) a financial system; or (iv) a system used for the delivery of essential government services; or (v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; or (vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system. (3) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) is advocacy, protest, dissent, or industrial action; and (b) is not intended: (i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or (ii) to cause a person’s death; or (iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the person taking the action; or (iv) to create serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public.4

Clearly this is not a historical or even an academic definition. However, for the purposes of examining terrorism in Australia, the definition is appropriate. The adoption of this definition assists in setting the context, terrorism in Australia, for this thesis.

While the genealogy of terrorism dates back to before Christ, what follows will be an overview of significant terrorist groups and events that have led to the development of the phenomenon of ‘terrorism from below’, as this is the form of terrorism to be examined within the scope of this project. As such, this history will exclude forms of terrorism such as ‘terrorism from above’ (or state terror), mainstream political violence, and forms of warfare. Although some of the groups and campaigns detailed below may not conform to traditional or contemporary definitions of terrorism from below, their inclusion indicates the importance of the particular movement or event to a comprehensive history of the development of ‘bottom up’ terrorism. The aim of this chapter is not to determine the causes and sources of terrorism, but to establish and descriptively examine the development of terrorism from below, the phenomenon itself, and where it stands today, through the events and groups that have shaped it.i

1. A HISTORY OF TERRORISM As mentioned previously, the history of terrorism to follow examines only terrorism from below and will examine only a small number of the terrorist groups that have operated over the past 2000 years. This will be a small snapshot of an extensive and i As such, this chapter will provide a background into many of the groups discussed throughout the thesis.

exhaustive history of the phenomenon, to establish a context for the research project, and by no means intends to be a comprehensive treatment of the history of terrorism.ii This context is necessary to establish the development of the phenomenon and an understanding of the vital events leading up to the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism. The history to be presented below has been arranged in six chronological phases of terrorism: 1. Ancient Terror & Assassination: C4 BC – C1AD; 2. Origins of Terrorism: C1 – C17 AD; 3. Left Wing and Revolutionary Terrorism: Circa 1790-1910; 4. Right Wing and Post WWI Terrorism: Circa 1916-1960;iii 5. International Terrorism: Circa 1960-Today, and; 6. 21st Century Islamic Extremism. Again, this examination of the development of terrorism limits its scope to terrorism from below, as that is the specific theme of the project.

1.1. ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC – C1 AD While Walter Laqueur in 1977 claimed that “terrorism is a new, unprecedented phenomenon [and]…[f]or this reason, its antecedents (if any) are of little interest”,5 Grant Wardlaw in 1982 emphasised that “[t]he history of terrorism is a full-scale investigation in its own right…it is important that some of the landmarks should be pointed out in order to view current groups in perspective”.6 Following the logic of Wardlaw, this chapter contends that these ancient incidents and events are vital to any comprehension of the development of terrorism, and so the ancient precedents will be briefly discussed.

This history of the antecedents of terrorism begins with Aristotle and his work in the promotion of tyrannicide around the mid-Third Century BC. Aristotle claimed that there: are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies – hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for living in

ii The author acknowledges that many significant groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have not been treated in detail within this history. iii There was a revision to left-wing terror towards the end of this period.

luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to strike – the angry are more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not listen to reason. And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted.7

Essentially, Aristotle was promoting assassinations against tyrants. Assassination is the earliest form of terrorism from below.

One of the most notable instances of ancient tyrannicide was the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BC. Although he did not play a role in the assassination, Ciceroiv justified Caesar’s death: There can be no such thing as a fellowship with tyrants, nothing but bitter feud is possible…For, as we amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to circulate, because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who, under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast, should be severed from the common body of humanity.8

Assassinations justified through tyrannicide and regicidev became commonplace from the times of Aristotle. Examples of such assassinations include: i. Philip II of Macedon, in 336 BC; ii. Nero, Emperor of Rome, in 68; iii. Henry III, King of France, in 1589; iv. Henry IV, King of France, in 1610; v. Peter III, Tsar of Russia, in 1762, and; vi. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States (US), in 1865.9 Following the assassination of US President Abraham Lincoln, his assassin, John Wilkes Booth jumped onto the theatre stage screaming “sic semper tyrannis (thus always to tyrants)”.10

1.2. ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1 – C13 It is in this second period (60 – 1400) that the origins of terrorism can clearly be distinguished, as recognised groups of motivated and unified individuals began to undertake terrorist agenda and operations. The earliest significant case of a terrorist group can be traced to the Sicarii, a collection of highly organised religious men of

iv Roman philosopher and politician (106 – 43 BC) v The killing of a king.

the lower ranks active in the Zealot campaign against Roman rule in Palestine between circa 60-70. According to Laqueur, the Sicarii were known for their use of unorthodox tactics, such as attacking their enemies by daylight, or on holidays, with a concealed short sword called a sica (from which the group’s name was derived). The Sicarii destroyed the house of Ananias, the palaces of the Herodian dynasts, public archives, granaries, and sabotaged the water supply of Jerusalem.11 vi The Sicarii were eventually defeated after the siege of Masada, where 960 of the group committed suicide rather than be taken by the Romans.12 vii

From around 1094-1273, a group known as the Assassins, an offshoot of the Ismailis, a sect of Muslim Shiites, undertook a terrorist campaign against the Seljuqs. Based in Persia, the Assassins expanded to operate in Iraq and Syria, where the Fidaiin (fighters) disguised themselves as strangers or Christians and operated against orthodox Muslims and Christians in secrecy.13 The Assassins killed caliphs, prefects, government officials, and even Conrad of Montferrat, the Crusader King of Jerusalem. Like the Sicarii, the Fidaiin also used small-bladed weapons to dispatch their targets. The Assassins were eventually quelled by the Mongols in the 13th Century.14

In India from the 13th Century until the mid-19th Century, a group known as the Thuggee or Thugs, who followed the Hindu goddess Kaliviii (the goddess of death), undertook a campaign of strangulations along India’s remote roads and highways.15 The Thuggee operated in groups of between ten and fifty men, and used advanced tactics to scout, approach, and subdue their largely random victims. Andrew Sinclair details their method of dispatch, which was most often strangulation, the bodies of their victims mutilated both to satisfy the cult’s religious demands and to erase the victim’s identity.16 Membership of the group was through birthright, and the group was often protected by local rulers, who shared in the spoils of the cult. The Thuggee were eventually subjugated through the loss of support of the local rulers and

vi The significance of the sabotage of Jerusalem’s water supply lies in the suggestion that it is perhaps the first instance of a terrorist group attempting to use large scale bio-terrorism. vii While the sicarii are an example of resistance against foreign rule, similar to the resistance movement in Europe during Nazi occupation, they are cited for their use of these tactics, which is important in the development of terrorism. viii There was also a significant number of Muslims in the group.

population through the expansion of British colonial rule into these formerly isolated areas.17

In the first attempted terrorist attack in Britain, in 1605, Catholic extremist Guy Fawkes and co-conspirators planned to blow up Westminster Palace in London on the opening of Parliament, killing King James I and his government. The group planned to then install the Catholic Pope as the head of England. This motivation stems from King Henry VIII’s separation from the Roman Catholic Church after he was denied an annulment of his first marriage and formed the Church of England. Fawkes’ plot involved detonating large amounts of gunpowder in the cellar of the British Parliament, and as a result the operation is now commonly referred to as the ‘Gunpowder Plot’. The mission failed when a letter one of Fawkes’ co-conspirators sent to his brother-in-law, warning him to stay away from the proceedings, found its way to the King. Fawkes was captured guarding the gunpowder in the cellar, and he and his gang were eventually drawn and quartered in front of an enthusiastic crowd at Westminster.18 This example is significant as the operation shows a modus operandi far beyond its time, through the use of (and scale of) explosives, and the consequential innocent casualties the attack would have caused.

1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY The terrorism of this period was characterised by the assassination tactic. While assassinations were performed long before the Sicarii (as was established through an examination of ancient terrorism), and this tactic is not confined to terrorism but is also a feature of mainstream political violence, the organisation and underground methods of the Sicarii, the Ismali assassins, the Thuggee and the gunpowder plot make them significant groups within a history of the development of terrorism. Interestingly, the Sicarii attempts to sabotage the water supply of Jerusalem exhibit characteristics of biological terrorism, a tactic of terrorism far beyond their time. Furthermore, the Ismali assassins, the Thuggee (to a degree), and Fawkes, seem to be the first large scale examples of religious extremism within terrorism. The principal motivations for the adoption of terrorism as a tactic in this period were resistance to foreign rule and religious motivation - two motivational themes that persist through the entire history of terrorism.

1.3. LEFT WING & REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: CIRCA 1790 - 1910 The rise of left wing terrorism coincided with the ascendancy of the philosophical traditions of anarchy and communism throughout Europe. Because many of Europe’s governments were embedded in monarchs and theocracies,ix these philosophies were transformed into powerful tools of violent revolution.

1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT The Anarchist movement initially developed through the writings of William Goodwin in 1793 and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in 1840. These writings principally concerned the possession of property as theft, and the promotion of extreme minimalist government.19 Bruce Hoffman maintains that the physical applications of Anarchist philosophy to the concept of revolution were implemented through the work of Carlo Pisacane, who had discarded his birthright as the Duke of San Giovanni in Italy to fight for the Anarchist cause.20 Pisacane was the pioneer of what would eventually become known as the ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ doctrine through the writings of Paul Brousse. Essentially, this doctrine promoted decisive action on an individual level to inspire further action by others.21 Pisacane wrote “[t]he propaganda of the idea is a chimera…Ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they are free”.22

These early works on Anarchism provided a base for German radical democrat Karl Heinzen, in 1848, to establish what terrorism expert Walter Laqueur articulates as the “first full-fledged doctrine of modern terrorism; most elements of latter-day terrorist thought can be found in the writings of this forgotten German”.23 Heinzen justifies terrorism on a large scale in his essay Der Mod (Murder) of 1848: If you have to blow up half a continent and pour out a sea of blood in order to destroy the party of the barbarians, have no scruples or conscience. He is no true republican who would not gladly pay with his life for the satisfaction of exterminating a million barbarians.24

In his 1849 Die Evolution (The Evolution) essay, Heinzen goes further to state: We must call a spade a spade. The truth must out, whether it seems amiable or terrible, whether it is dressed in the white of peace or the red of war. Let us be frank and honest, let us tear away the veil and spell out in plain speech what the lesson is

ix Such as Russia, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.

which is now being illustrated everyday before our eyes in the form of actions and threats, blood and torture, cannons and gallows by both princes and freedom- fighters…to wit, that murder is the principle agent of historical progress.25

Such statements provided an impetus for Anarchist terrorists and philosophers to partake in and advance a violent Anarchist doctrine.

These ideas were transformed again by Mikhail Bakunin in his Principles of the Revolution published in 1869, which had built on the work of Pisacane. These principles called for the destruction of state, military, and religious institutions and structures, as well as the murder of individuals who submitted to the dominance of these institutions. In 1886, French Anarchist Paul Brousse coined the phrase ‘propaganda of the deed’ (discussed previously), which encompassed the work of Pisacane, Bakunin and other Anarchists of the time, and (as mentioned previously) became the driving doctrine behind the Anarchist terrorist movement.26

In 1881 the Anarchist International organisation was formed in London and championed violent anarchist doctrine. This period of the early 1880s saw the Anarchist movement gain momentum. In 1884, in the September 13 edition of the London newspaper Freiheit (Freedom), John Most offered advice to budding Anarchists: “What is the purpose of anarchists’ threats – an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth – if they are not followed up by action?”.27 The Anarchist International, as well as the Freiheit newspaper were resolute supporters of terrorism.

Such propaganda added fuel to the fire of the Anarchist movement for the remainder of the 19th Century and ensured a spate of attacks throughout France in particular, including the assassination of French President Sadi Carnot. Many accounts of the anarchist movement, including that of Grant Wardlaw, claim that the individuals were no more than common criminals who only used the propaganda of the deed doctrine as a superficial justification for violence.28 The significance of the anarchist movement is that it was not confined to one country. The Anarchist movement was a formidable movement outside central Europe, in areas such as Mediterranean Europe, and throughout Latin America.29

1.3.2 RUSSIAN TERRORISM In Imperial Russia under Tsar Alexander II in January of 1878, the Russian revolutionary movement Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will, NV) undertook a terrorist campaign against Tsarist authorities after one of the group’s members, Kovalski, attempted to resist arrest. The incident occurred during the movement’s resistance to Tsarist economic, cultural, military, and educational reforms in Imperial Russia. NV’s campaign included the shooting of the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, the assassination of the head of the Tsarist political police, and several attempts on the life of Tsar Alexander II. The Tsar had been sentenced to death by the revolutionary tribunal of the NV,30 and was eventually assassinated in 1881 by a team of NV bomb throwers.31 Morozov, one of the group’s leading theorists, believed that “terrorism was a cost effective form of struggle which would overthrow the Tsarist tyranny”.32 The group believed that the use of terrorism would incur fewer civilian casualties than a mass uprising.33

According to terrorism expert Paul Wilkinson, after strict regulations enforced upon NV members by the Tsar allowing summary arrests and sentencing, combined with increased pressure by Alexander III’s secret police, and the deep infiltration by informers within the group, NV was forced out of St. Petersburg and then forced to southern Russia. The group’s funding from St. Petersburg eventually dwindled, bringing about the demise of the group.34

The members of NV that remained were absorbed into the Social Revolutionaries in the late 1890s.35 In 1902, the Social Revolutionary Party sponsored and gave autonomy to its fighting organisation, the Boevaya Organisasia (Battle Organisation, BO).36 In that year, the BO assassinated the minister of the interior. The group continued this campaign between 1903 and 1910, assassinating hundreds of state officials, including the Grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich. Paul Wilkinson writes that following the defeat of NV, the Tsar’s secret police had become more sophisticated and efficient, its efforts focused against the BO. A double agent of the secret police, Azev, rose to command the BO and created division with their parent organisation, the Social Revolutionary Party. Eventually the BO dictated to the Social Revolutionaries. After Azev was discovered and executed, the BO never recovered, with the assassination numbers decreasing to close to zero by 1910.37

Following the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Russia in 1917, the Communists vied for a world revolution as inspired by the philosophy of Karl Marx. In 1920, Karl Katusky, in his book, Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the National History of the Revolution, wrote: “It is, in fact, a widely spread idea that terrorism belongs to the very essence of revolution, and that whoever wants a revolution must somehow come to terms with terrorism”.38

1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM Throughout the late 19th Century, the government of Ottoman Turkey increased its policy of persecution of the Armenian population, imposing high taxes and restrictions of civil liberties.x In the periods preceding and following the outbreak of the First World War in 1915, the Ottoman government labelled the Armenians a national security threat, and began distributing propaganda material illustrating that threat.39 In this year, hundreds of Armenian leaders were arrested and executed. The entire population of the Armenians in Turkey was ordered to be deported to the Syrian Desert. Andrew Sinclair contextualises these circumstances by detailing that Armenians within the Ottoman Army were murdered, and concentration camps and death factories were constructed.40 The estimated death toll of the Armenian Genocide perpetrated by the Turks stands at about 1.5 million.41 However, despite being one of the worst genocidal actions in modern history, it remains unrecognised as genocide by both the Turkish and US governments.

In 1921, the leader of the Ottoman government, Mehmed Talaat Pasha, was assassinated by an Armenian student in Berlin, for his part in the Genocide.42 The following year, Ahmed Djemal Pasha, high ranking government official and Minister for Marine, was also assassinated by Armenian nationalists.43 Armenian terrorism continued sporadically until the 1990s, through groups such as the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). These two groups and their campaigns will be discussed in detail later in the chapter when examining ‘International Terrorism’.

x The Armenian Revolution Federation launched an unsuccessful revolt in 1896 in response to a lack of reforms by the Ottoman government.

Like Armenia, by the late 19th Century Macedonia had been under Ottoman rule for five hundred years. Throughout this period, the Ottoman state persecuted and forced the Christian population to convert to Islam.xi With the promised reforms of 1895 by the Ottoman government not taking place, the Inner-Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) launched a terrorist campaign against the Ottoman Government in the hope of achieving an independent Macedonia.44 The IMRO were heavily influenced by socialist doctrines and were linked to the anarchist Macedonian Secret Revolutionary Committee. Despite an apparent leftist position, the IMRO were financially supported by the Italian Fascists,45 and attained technical and tactical assistance from Armenian revolutionary groups.46 The group undertook a series of bombings leading up to the unsuccessful Ilinden uprising of 1903. The IMRO continued its struggle until the mid-1930s when it was suppressed by the Bulgarian government (where the group was based) following their support of high profile Ustashi assassinations.47

1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM One of the most significant terrorist movements to be formed in the early 20th Century was the Irish Republican Army (IRA), effectively created in 1916 through the merging of two rebel groups opposed to British rule in Ireland: the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizens Army. These groups (supported by Germany) embarked on and promoted a popular rebellion against the British in Ireland. This uprising, known as the Easter Rising, began on April 24 when the groups seized strategic locations within the city of Dublin. Thomas Hennessey details that there was little public support for the uprising, which was quelled on April 29. Fifteen leaders of the rebellion were executed the following month.48 The Easter Rising marked a significant turning point in the history of Irish independence, distinguishing a division between the terrorist tactics of the republicans and the political strategies of the nationalists.

By 1919 the republican rebels were officially known as the IRA and commenced guerrilla style attacks on police and military targets, as well as violence directed against the Protestant population. Between 1919 and 1921, during the fight for independence, the IRA commenced a terrorist campaign consisting of ambushes and

xi Often these measures extended to forced circumcision, which the Ottoman state had also applied to the Armenian population.

raids against British and Loyalist targets. The IRA sustained 752 deaths in this period, while inflicting around 600 on the Crown forces.49 The introduction of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 divided the island of Ireland into two jurisdictions with their own parliaments, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.50 In July of 1921, a truce was signed between the IRA and the Crown forces.51 While a majority of the IRA joined the new national army of the Irish Free State, a number of the members remained and initiated a civil war against the Irish Free State between 1922 and 1923.52 As will be discussed later in this chapter, terrorism committed by Irish Republicans did not end here but continued into, and was transformed by, the period of international terrorism.

1.3.5 PERIOD SUMMARY The left-wing and revolutionary period of terrorism is perhaps the most influential in the history of the phenomenon, inspired and motivated through the rise of new political ideologies of liberalism, communism, and anarchism. The most significant aspect of this period of terrorism was the introduction of the bomb as a weapon of assassination. Small-scale indiscriminate terrorism began during this period with bombings by the Anarchist movement. The organisation and cell structure of the groups in this period developed significantly, with formal military organisation and more structured formation. As in the previous period, this form of terrorism was predominantly limited to small scale murder and assassination. Significantly, the anarchist campaign of the late 19th Century spanned over all of Europe and through South America. This was the first campaign that spanned such a distance. Unlike terrorism in the previous period, which was characterised by religious motivation, the motivations of the above groups were revolutionary or separatist. Like the religious motivations behind terrorism, the politically stimulated separatism and revolutionary motivations are two that have continued throughout the phenomenon’s history. The left-wing and revolutionary period of terrorism instilled the phenomenon as a successful form of political opposition.

1.4. RIGHT WING & POST WWI TERRORISM: CIRCA 1917 – 1960 Following the end of World War I, there was a significant decrease in terrorism from the left side of the political spectrum, countered by the emergence and rise to significance of right wing terrorism. Towards the end of this period, particularly after

the defeat of fascism in 1945, there was a resurgence of left wing terrorism. By the 1960s, the era was shared equally by both types of groups.

1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD According to terrorism expert Walter Laqueur, the Iron Guard was founded in 1927 as a fascist, anti-parliamentary, anti-Communist, anti-Semitic group in Romania by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, and was reportedly financed by the Polish Government.53 The group, originally known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, was established as a military organisation operating through the use of terrorist tactics. The Iron Guard was banned by Romanian Premier Ion Duca in 1933 and was forced to operate as the ‘All for the Fatherland Party’. In retaliation, within days the group assassinated Duca. In 1938 Codreanu was killed while imprisoned by the Romanian government. The following year a new government was installed with Armand Calinescu as Prime Minister. Several months later he was assassinated in retaliation for Codreanu’s death.54 Subsequently, the Iron Guard assisted in the installation of Marshall Ion Antonescu, and formed the ‘National Legionary State’ in 1940. Ioanid Radu maintains that through this partnership, the Iron Guard and Antonescu massacred Jews, murdered former government ministers, and undertook a campaign of political assassinations, which included the assassination of ex-Premier Nicolae Iorga in 1940. The Iron Guard attempted a coup against Antonescu in 1941, but this was successfully suppressed, forcing the group into exile once again. The Iron Guard vanished from Romanian politics with the collapse of the Axis powers at the end of World War II in Europe.55

1.4.2 ZIONISM The Zionist movement for a Jewish homeland in Palestine gained both significance and pace in 1917, following British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour’s declaration of support for the establishment of a Jewish state. This resulted in a mass immigration of Jews from around the world to Palestine. Leading up to World War II, this movement gained pace and as a consequence, Arabs in Palestine rioted and declared their opposition to further Jewish settlement in Palestine.56 As a response to Arab attacks on Jews in Palestine, in 1936 the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation, NMO) was as an ultra-nationalist, right-leaning movement with a disciplined, military structure. The political objective of the group was the creation of a Jewish

independent state within its biblically defined boundaries. Irgun undertook bombing campaigns against the Arabs and the British in Palestine. When the group attempted to halt all operations against the British on the outbreak of World War Two, a splinter group, the ‘Stern Gang’, separated from the NMO and continued attacks against British targets. The group operated in cells of three members with only vertical connections to the upper echelons of the group. The Sternists were responsible for the assassination of the British Minister of State for the Near East, Lord Moyne, in 1944. In 1944 Menachem Begin, who would become Prime Minister of Israel in 1977, became the leader of the NMO and resumed hostilities against the British.57

The NMO continued its operations against the British and the Arabs through the 1940s using the tactics of an underground army, such as ambushes and raids. The Irgun terrorists targeted buildings within Palestine, the bombings of which resulted in numerous civilian casualties. The most renowned attack by the NMO was on the British Headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 22, 1946, where 91 people were killed.58 The NMO continued attacks against the Arabs, and attacked attempts by the British to intervene.59 When the British Mandate in Palestine expired on March 14, 1948, Israel proclaimed itself an independent state and was quickly recognised by the US, the Soviet Union, and many other independent nations. The NMO dissolved following the attainment of independence and many members joined the newly established Israeli Defence Forces, fighting in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War which followed the proclamation of the Jewish state.60

1.4.3 THE USTASHA The Ustasha (insurgent) were a fascist Croatian separatist terrorist group that operated within and outside Yugoslavia post-World War I. In 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia banned all nationalist parties and as a result, the Croatian Party of Rights founded the Ustashi movement. The group undertook guerrilla warfare operations within Yugoslavia and assassinated Yugoslav officials abroad. The Ustasha received support from the Hungarian and Italian governments and cooperated with the Macedonian IMRO until the IMRO’s defeat in 1930.61 In 1934 the group assassinated the Yugoslav King Alexander and the French foreign minister Barthou. The Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelic, was held responsible for the killings. In April 1941, Hitler and

Mussolini invaded Yugoslavia, installing the Ustasha leader, Pavelic, as Fuhrer of independent Croatia.

Pavelic’s regime was as barbaric as (if not worse than) the Nazi regime that installed it.62 The Ustashi government massacred around 330 000 Serbs, Jews, Muslims, and Gypsies, and also deported thousands of people to Nazi concentration camps.63 The Ustashi Government was opposed by the Tito-led National Liberation Army (Yugoslav partisans). Following the liberation of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany, many of the Ustasha forces fled to areas such as Spain, Latin America, the US, Canada, and Australia.64 In many of these countries, the Ustasha began creating terrorist organisations aimed at the destruction of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (formed after the allies’ liberation of Pavlec’s Croatia) and the liberation or reinstallation of Croatia. The Ustashi groups that operated in Australia and their activities will be discussed later in the chapter when examining terrorism in Australia.

1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD In Egypt, 1928, Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in order to revive the Islamist movement. Following the empire’s collapse, the caliphatexii system of government was forbidden. Al-Banna, previously a school teacher, taught Islam as a religion but also as a comprehensive way of life based on the principles of Wahhabism.xiii Over the following twenty years the Brotherhood gained a strong constituency and an increasing influence. Through this powerful influence, the Muslim Brotherhood developed a political party, the anti- Egyptian ‘Party of the Muslim Brotherhood’. The Brotherhood began establishing military training camps through its close ties to individuals within the government, particularly Anwar al-Sadat. The individuals who trained in these camps became the Armed Battalions of the Muslim Brotherhood.65 The group sided with the Palestinians in the 1948 war against Israel and began terrorist operations inside Egypt. In 1948 the Brotherhood was responsible for the assassination of Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, the Prime Minister of Egypt.66 Following this assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood was

xii The system in which the Caliph rules over all Muslims, essentially translating to ‘Successor of the Prophet (Muhammad)’. xiii Wahhabism is a fundamentalist movement within the strand of Sunni Islam.

outlawed by the Egyptian Government and in 1949, the organisation’s founder, al- Banna, was assassinated by an Egyptian Government agent.67 xiv

Toward the end of this period of terrorism, there was a resurgence of left-wing terrorism, signifying a strong swing from the right-wing groups of this period. Among these was the 26th of July Movement in Cuba during the late 1950s. Campaigns such as this led to the anonymous phrase “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” after their actions were labelled as terrorism. These events (among others) are responsible for the blurring between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, when political actors with vested interests defined these campaigns as terrorism.xv Defining groups or movements as terrorist organisations has allowed the demonisation and delegitimisation of the causes and struggles of various groups.

1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM The socialist Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) engaged the French colonialist government in Algeria in 1954 through a terrorist campaign with the aim of an independent Algeria. The FLN executed indiscriminate attacks by bombing heavily populated civilian areas such as buses, shops, markets, and stations.68 The FLN’s resistance developed into the 1954 war of independence, where the FLN employed guerrilla tactics against the French. The FLN claimed that its aim was “the restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles”.69 The FLN’s socialist ideological leaning separates the group from the other organisations of this period. However, the prominence and longevity of this group justifies its inclusion in this period/categorisation of terrorism. Throughout the conflict, the FLN engaged in the attacking and killing of civilians, including the massacre of 123 civilians in the town of Philippeville, in 1955. The French response to civilians suspected of supporting the FLN was brutal, and usually resulted in a village being subjected to aerial bombardment or artillery strikes. The FLN was also engaged in a conflict with rival groups vying for power in Algeria. These groups, such as the Mouvement National

xiv It is significant to note that the Egyptian Brotherhood is the first ‘modern’ Islamic extremist group, from which many other similar organisations branched and splintered. xv Again we see that the definition is dependent on the defining party.

Algerien (National Algerian Movement), engaged in terrorist attacks against each other, and the civilians on either side.70

By 1958, the French had suppressed the FLN’s military campaign, and the group reverted to acts of terrorism both in France and Algeria. In 1961, the French government opened a dialogue with the FLN and established a cease fire the following year. During these talks and the consequent referendum for reforms, the Organisation de l’Armee Secrete (Secret Army Organisation, OAS), a right-wing group opposed to Algerian independence, launched a terrorist campaign to disrupt the cease fire. The OAS’s campaign was the worst of the war, with attacks against both the FLN and the French government. The OAS was responsible for an average of 120 bombings per day over the month of March, 1962, with targets such as schools and hospitals. The campaign of the OAS was unsuccessful, with the cease fire enduring, and the French conceding power over Algeria to the FLN in late September, 1962.71

1.4.6 PERIOD SUMMARY As in the previous periods, assassination remained the primary method of terrorism. Large-scale indiscriminate bombings were the innovation of this period. Groups such as the NMO, the FLN, and the OAS targeted innocent individuals for the purpose of a greater emotional and psychological impact on their enemies, the public, and the media. Such large-scale attacks against civilians proved relatively successful during this period, with the NMO and the FLN accomplishing their goals. Right-wing and post-World War I terrorism established the use of military tactics through their organisational arrangements and the establishing of what became known as ‘terrorist cells’, increasing the sophistication of cells in the previous period. This organisation of independent covert groups of terrorists became the most effective method of conducting terrorist operations, a method of operating that continues successfully today. While such organisation could be found in Irish groups of the previous period, the modus operandi adopted by different groups with different motivations, from different areas of the world, denotes a significant development in terrorism. We can also identify the beginnings of modern Islamic extremism through the formation and development of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the frequency of terrorism the media attention it received in the right-wing and post-World War I period was not as momentous as the next two periods, the development of terrorism in this forty year

period was among the most significant in terrorism’s history, firmly establishing the phenomenon for the rise of International Terrorism.

1.5. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 – TODAY The terrorist groups and events that arose from the late 1960s to the early 1970s characterised a significantly new period of terrorism, in that traditional conflicts began to transcend national borders. In August of 1969, two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a Trans-World Airline flight to Tel Aviv, Israel. The aircraft was then directed to Syria, where the passengers were released and the plane destroyed.72 On September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian members of the Black Septemberxvi organisation entered the Olympic village in Munich and made an assault on the building in which the Israeli athletes were staying. The group demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in Israeli prisons. The terrorists were allowed to travel to an airport where a trap set by German authorities was implemented. Five of the terrorists were killed and three arrested, while all nine of the hostages were grenaded by the terrorists. In the single month of September 1974, the Japanese Red Army attacked the French embassy in The Hague, a man wearing a South Vietnamese Army jacket blew up a commercial airliner in midair killing all on board, and the IRA killed two judges in Belfast.73 These events, along with the rise and actions of many other groups, and the shift in tactics by existing groups, gave rise to the concept of ‘International Terrorism’.

The characterising feature of this period (and the impetus behind the name) is that terrorism began to transcend international borders: conflicts that were previously confined to one nation, spilled over to the rest of the world. This is evident through the above paragraph, Palestinian terrorists in Syria and Germany, and Japanese terrorists in Holland. In addition, the terrorism of this period concentrated on mass casualty attacks under the spotlight of the mass media hence creating a global dilemma that thrust the phenomenon of terrorism into the international spotlight. Many of these groups were sponsored by foreign governments whose interests

xvi Also known as the Abu Nidal Organisation, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, and the Fatah Revolutionary Council.

coincided with those of the terrorists.xvii The advent of international terrorism is, according to Wardlaw, “a consequence of technological change. The most obvious relevant developments [were] in the fields of transport, communications (particularly as applied to news gathering and distribution), and weaponry”.74 This technological change and its effect on terrorism is evident as we follow the different periods of terrorism, from assassinations by blade, to shootings, to bombings, and then to mass casualty bombings. Two of the most significant factors of international terrorism were firstly, its effects on existing groups, and secondly the rise of new groups.xviii

1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS The prevalence of international terrorism is demonstrated through groups that have continued their struggles or campaigns into the international terrorism period. Traditional methods and areas of operations changed, such as mass casualty bombings and skyjacking within the borders of other countries, with operations even extending to countries with no relevance to the groups’ political aims and motives.xix

1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s) The IRA continued the campaign of violence and terrorism in the United Kingdom (UK) as discussed earlier. In late 1969, at a meeting of the IRA, a Provisional Army Council (Provisional IRA, PIRA) was established. By 1970 the council had splintered from the group and had begun the reorientation from a defensive strategy to a retaliatory position.75 On October 31, 1971, the PIRA campaign began in mainland Britain with the bombing of a (closed) restaurant atop the London Post Office Tower, achieving only structural damage. This was followed four months later by the bombing of a public house frequented by British soldiers in Aldershot, which resulted in seven deaths and 19 injured. In March of 1973, two bombs were detonated, the first outside the Old Bailey in London, and the other at a Protestant Loyalist event in a Glasgow Hall. According to Terrence Taylor, more than sixty PIRA bombings were

xvii Syria, Iran, the United States, and the United Kingdom have all had alleged links to terrorist organisations through the period of international terrorism. xviii It is important to acknowledge the significance of domestic terrorism during this period, particularly the 1995 Oklahoma bombing which killed 168 people. In order to focus on the internationalisation of terrorism of this period, domestic terrorism will not be discussed. xix The only example of this type of terrorism previously is Anarchist terrorism in the mid to late 1800s throughout Europe and Latin America.

carried out in Great Britain between August and December 1973. The PIRA campaign in Great Britain in 1973 left 15 dead and 109 injured.76

It is important to note the response from the Protestant community in Northern Ireland, through the creation of groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Protestant Force, and the Ulster Defence Association.77 xx These Protestant paramilitary groups were created in the mid 1960s to early 1970s to oppose civil rights for Catholics and to combat members of the IRA, Sinn Fein Provisionals (the PIRA’s political party), and the general Catholic community.78

According to the United States Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, the PIRA continued its campaign against Crown officials, civilians, police, and military targets until the cease-fire in 1997.79 This ceasefire led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998, in which all IRA members within Northern Ireland were to end the paramilitary campaign and disarm by May 2000.80 Splinter groups such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA) continued terrorist campaigns through the PIRA’s cease-fire with the Crown. The groups’ goals consisted of uniting Ireland and disrupting the Northern Ireland peace process,81 a campaign that was largely successful and continued the violence by the Loyalist paramilitaries and the various IRA groups.82 On July 28, 2005, the IRA’s leadership ordered the stand down of arms in the Republican campaign and the participation in a peaceful democratic approach for unity and independence in Ireland.83

1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD Despite being banned in 1948 following the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to operate and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Nasser in 1954. However, the Brotherhood successfully murdered Nasser’s successor and former ally of the Brotherhood, Anwar al-Sadat in 1981.84 Through the evolution of international terrorism, the Brotherhood has expanded to have branches in over 70 countries, despite being pursued by the Egyptian, Arab, and Western Governments.85

xx It is alleged that the UK supported some of these Protestant groups.

A significant effect that international terrorism had on the Muslim Brotherhood was the establishment of Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS) in 1987 as an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the group’s goal is the establishment of a Palestinian state in place of Israel. The group is firmly based in the Gaza Strip, receives aid from Iran, and has sought to achieve its goals through both terrorism and conventional political processes.86

1.5.2 NEW GROUPS The initial phase of international terrorism also saw the rise of many new groups from all over the world, comprising different motivations, tactics, behaviours, and beliefs. However, as in the instance of HAMAS and the examples of the IRAs, the splintering of groups is a significant feature of international terrorism, as we will see through the development of Palestinian terrorist organisations. Although this was seen to a degree in the NMO, the extent to which it occurred in the period of international terrorism was unparalleled by previous periods.

1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in 1964 as a nationalist group intent on the creation of an independent Palestine. Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the PLO began an international terrorist campaign in the early 1970s.87 This conflict sparked the rise of several splinter groups such as the PFLP in 1967 and the Black September group in 1974, which subsequently perpetrated the attack on the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics.88

In addition to the attack in Munich, the Black September organisation was responsible for almost 900 deaths or injuries throughout 20 countries. The group’s major offensives include attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985, which resulted in 20 deaths, the 1986 attack on the Neve Shalom synagogue in Turkey which killed 22, and the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, which resulted in 22 civilian deaths and over 150 injuries.89 According to Clive Williams, the group was also responsible for the 1988 attack on the City of Poros cruise ship, which killed 20 and wounded 98, and the assassination of a Jordanian diplomat to Lebanon in 1994.90

As outlined in the US Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 report, the PFLP was founded in 1967 as a Marxist-Leninist umbrella group of the PLO, carrying out numerous terrorist attacks against Israeli and moderate Arab targets during the 1970s and 80s. In October 2001, the PFLP assassinated the Israeli Tourism Minister in retaliation for the death of the PFLP’s Secretary General at the hands of rockets fired from an Israeli helicopter.91 The significance of the PFLP lies not only in the group itself, but in the movements that splintered from it (and the PLO). In 1968 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) split from the PFLP, when members craved a greater concentration on terrorism, and less on politics. The group carried out numerous attacks throughout Europe and the Middle East, concentrating on cross-border attacks against Israel. The group is now significantly involved in operations in Lebanon.92

The PFLP also spawned the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Operations Group (PFLP-SOG). The PFLP-SOG was largely unsuccessful and did not create much of an impact on an international scale; however, two groups splintered from this organisation: the 15 May Organisation, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Command (PFLP – SC).93

The 15 May Organisation broke away from the PFLP - SOG in 1979, and based its headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. The group claimed responsibility for the 1980 bombing of a hotel in Lebanon, the bombing of Israel’s El Al offices in Rome and Istanbul in 1981, and the bombing of the Israeli embassies in Athens and Vienna in the same year. In 1982, the group attempted to bomb a Pan Am aircraft in Brazil, and detonated a bomb on another Pan Am flight from Japan to Hawaii.94 The PFLP-SC formed in the same year and claimed credit for several bombings in Europe, including an attack in 1985 on a restaurant in Torrejon,xxi Spain, where eighteen people were killed.95

In the late 1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) split from the PFLP-GC. This group was known for aerial attacks against Israel and the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro. On October 7, 1985, four PLF members took control of

xxi There was a US Air Force base in Torrejon.

the ship off the coast of Egypt, demanding the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. The hijackers executed American Leon Klinghoffer to demonstrate their resolve. After being refused permission to dock in Syria, the hijackers negotiated their safe passage to Tunisia via an Egyptian passenger aircraft. The aircraft was intercepted by US Navy fighters and forced to land in Italy, where the hijackers were arrested.96 Palestinian groups continue to operate today, but are confined to operations against Israel as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada.xxii The Palestinian May 15 Organisation’s operations in Australia will be discussed later in an examination of terrorism in Australia.

1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS In the late 1970s, the JCAG launched an international campaign against Turkey for retribution for the genocide of the Armenian population in Turkey during the First World War, and for an independent Armenian nation. As detailed by James Crown, in 1979, the son of the Turkish Ambassador to the Netherlands was murdered, followed by the 1980 assassination of the Turkish Consul-General to Australia. Two years later the group claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General in Los Angeles.97

In conjunction with the JCAG’s campaign, the ASALA which formed in 1975 bombed several US airline offices throughout Europe during the early 1980s. This campaign included the bombing of the Ankara International Airport in Turkey, killing 11 people.98 ASALA continued airport bombings with the attack on a counter of a Turkish airline in Paris in 1983, which left eight dead.99 During this period, the group claimed responsibility for a minimum of 140 assassinations of Turkish diplomats and officials.100 The JCAG’s operation in Australia will be discussed below in the examination of terrorism in Australia.

xxii The al-Aqsa Intifada is the second wave of the Palestinian uprising against Israel which began in September 2000.

1.5.2.3 COMMUNIST GROUPS The reversion to left-wing terrorism at the end of the post World War One period of terrorism provided the impetus for the left-wing groups that characterised the period of international terrorism.xxiii In 1968 the Baader-Meinhof Group was founded by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. The goal of the group was, through the use of terrorism, to destroy Western capitalism, and bring about the worldwide communist revolution. The group cooperated with several other left-wing Middle Eastern terrorist organisations.101 The general ideology of the group was a fusion of Marxism and Maoism. From the group’s inception and transformation to the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, RAF), until the early 1990s, the RAF undertook bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and robberies. The group went about achieving its goals through the attempted assassination of the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Belgium in 1979, the bombing of NATO Air Force headquarters in Ramstein in 1981, the rocket attack on the Air Force base in Rhein- Main in 1985, the automatic machine gun assault on the US embassy in Bonn in 1991, and later that year the assassination of the German Trust Agency Director.102 The RAF dissolved in 1998 claiming in a media release: “Almost 28 years ago, on May 14, 1970, the RAF arose in a campaign of liberation. Today we end this project. The urban guerrilla in the shape of the RAF is now history”.103 Jeremy Varon claims that the RAF marked the emergence of a new type of terrorist, the white middle-class youth, far from the stereotypical disenchanted Palestinian or Catholic dissident.104 The effects of the group were extensive: They…became a potent symbol of both the extremes to which New Left rebellion had gone and the profound social and political divisions their societies experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. As both a cause and a symptom of broad-based crises of legitimacy, their violence constituted an important episode in the histor[y] of their nation…of the developed West as a whole, and of global conflict.105

The RAF maintained close ties with leftist groups throughout Europe, one such group was the Italian Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades, RB),106 created in 1969 by Renato Curico, with the goal of destroying the Italian government as well as capitalist organisations. The group operated from a Marxist-Leninist ideological stance and a military formation composed of ‘columns’ and ‘brigades’, beginning their campaign

xxiii Although the Palestinian groups were left-wing, their movement was significant in its own right.

with a string of fire bombings and kidnappings. The group was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of one of Italy’s longest serving (former) Prime Ministers, Aldo Moro in 1979.107 Following the murder of Moro, the RB toned down their operations to ambushes and assassinations of capitalist business executives and government employees.108 Throughout this period, new leftist groups emerged to join the conflict such as Autonomia Operaia (Workers’ Autonomy), Prima Linea (Front Line), Lotta Continua (Fight On), and Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power).109

In 1981, the RB kidnapped US General Dozier, who was among the highest ranking US officers in Italy. Dozier was later rescued by Italian authorities.110 In 1984, the RB split into the Red Brigades for the Construction of a Combatant Communist Party (RB-CCCP) and the Red Brigades – Union of Combatant Communists (RB-UCC).111 The US Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 maintains that despite the demise of the Red Brigades following the mass arrests after the kidnapping of Dozier and the split of the group, the RB-UCC and RB-CCCP have continued to undertake sporadic small-scale attacks against targets such as Italian police and political advisors.112 The arrests that took place following the assassination of Leamon Hunt (the US Chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Group) in 1984 crippled the group, however sporadic attacks have continued to take place. The RB were described by Xavier Raufer as “by far Europe’s principal armed communist organisation”.113

The Japanese Red Army (JRA)xxiv formed in the early 1970s, and was led by Fusako Shigenobu until her arrest in 2000. According to the US Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 report, the goal of the JRA was to depose the Japanese government and install a communist alternative. As with the previous Marxist groups, the JRA were reliant on finances and training from the PFLP and other Palestinian groups.114 The group was responsible for the 1972 machine-gun and grenade-attack at Lod Airport in Israel, killing 26; several hijackings throughout the 1970s; and the storming of the French Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands, in which the ambassador and ten others were taken hostage. This situation was resolved after the JRA negotiated the release of member Yatuka Furuya, US$300 000, and the use of an aircraft. The 1972 attack in

xxiv Also known as the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade.

Israel saw the first suicide bombings in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict conducted by Japanese. Rather than be captured, the members of the operation killed themselves with grenades.115

In August of 1975, the JRA took the US consul and the Swedish charge d’affaires to Malaysia, along with 50 other hostages after assaulting a building containing the two embassies. In compliance with their demands, five members of the JRA were released from prison. The JRA launched mortar attacks against Japanese, Canadian, US, and British embassies in the mid 1980s, as well as bombing a US military recreational club in Italy, which killed five. The JRA also launched a bombing campaign against multinational corporations and in one such attack on Mitsubishi headquarters, eight people were killed. Shortly after these attacks, the JRA was no longer active in Japan, and was completely reliant on groups in the Middle East for support and finance.116 The group disbanded in 2001, endeavouring to pursue its goals through legitimate political processes.117

1.5.2.4 HEZBOLLAH Hezbollah (Party of God) is an Islamic Shiah group which was formed in 1982 as a reaction to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel. The goals of Hezbollah are the liberation of Palestine, the defeat of Israel, and the establishment of a Lebanese Islamic State, governed by Shariah law.xxv As with many other Middle Eastern groups, like the PLO, Hezbollah participates in the political processes of Lebanon. The group was behind the 1983 bombing of the US Embassy and the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. These attacks killed 63 and 241 respectively. A second attack simultaneous with the US Marine barracks bombing occurred on a French paratrooper barracks, killing 58. Hezbollah has also been responsible for numerous hijackings, kidnappings, and bombings against US and Israeli targets.118 The attacks on the US Marine barracks and the French paratrooper barracks were conducted by suicide bombers who drove the trucks, laden with Trinitrotoluene (TNT), as close as possible to the targets, and then detonated their payload, killing themselves in the process.119

xxv Islamic law, under which all aspects of society are governed through the Koran and Islam.

The method of suicide bombing has become extremely prevalent among Palestinian groups in the al-Aqsa Intifada that began in September 2000. The method is widely thought to have been perfected by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a domesticxxvi terrorist organisation struggling for independence within Sri Lanka since 1975.120 The popularity of this method increased further following its use within Islamic extremism, as will be shown in the following pages.

1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM After the October 1988 riots in Algeria, the government set about creating constitutional reforms. One of these was the separation of the FLN from the government. The reforms also allowed for the right to form political parties. In 1989, the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) was formed and ran in the 1990 municipal elections. Detailed by Peter St John, the FIS received 54 percent of the popular vote, while the FLN received only 28 percent. Similar results occurred in the 1991 national democratic elections, which was promptly followed by an iron fist response by the military, who installed their own High Council of State, effectively stealing the democratic FIS victory.121

In April 1992, the FIS detonated a bomb in the Algiers International Airport, killing nine. Between 1993 and 1995, the Groupe Islamique Arme (Armed Islamic Group, GIA), which was against democracy and democratic processes, but shared the aim of an Islamic state in Algeria, amalgamated with the FIS. In their joint operations the groups executed almost 50 journalists (both international and domestic) within Algeria.122 In August 1993, the FIS kidnapped three French Consular officials, who were later released, carrying the message ‘Foreigners leave the country. We give you one month’. Between the deadline and December, 23 foreigners had been executed.123 These tactics were effectively used to keep foreigners out of Algeria. In 1994, on the third anniversary of the election win that should have seen the FIS gain power, the GIA hijacked an Air France commercial jet bound for Algiers. Three passengers were executed before the aircraft was assaulted by the French Special Forces after landing in Marseilles.124 According to the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FIS’s armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in 2000, and a large number of

xxvi With the exception of attacks in India.

militants from other groups surrendered under a national reconciliation amnesty program.125

1.5.2.6 AUM SHINRIKYO Another group that developed in this period was the Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth). Aum was established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, and was approved as an official religious entity under Japanese law in 1989.xxvii The ultimate goal of the group was to take over Japan, followed by the world. Known as a ‘Doomsday’ or ‘Armageddon’ groupxxviii within modern terrorism studies literature, Aum believed that the US planned to initiate World War III with Japan, an action which would result in Armageddon.126

In 1992, under the subterfuge of one of the cult’s companies, Aum attempted to secure a sample of the Ebola virus from a medical mission to Zaire. The operation was eventually unsuccessful. Between 1993 and 1994, Aum attempted to extract uranium from a purchased farm ranch in Western Australia. Throughout the early 1990s, the group was held responsible for various chemical attacks (including anthrax) in Japan, resulting in hundreds of injuries.127

As detailed by Mark Juergensmeyer, at 7:45am, on March 20, 1995, five of Aum’s scientists from the cult’s Ministry of Science and Technology boarded trains that were set to converge on Kasumigaseki station underneath Japan’s principal government buildings. Before the trains converged on their target, the five Aum members pierced plastic bags of Sarin concealed in newspaper with the pointed end of their umbrellas. The members quickly exited the trains before the fumes of the deadly nerve agent filled the carriages. The nerve agent’s effects were severe, the Tokyo commuters’ symptoms including convulsions, vomiting, oral bleeding, loss of bowel control, and loss of consciousness, and the agent’s lethal effects focusing on the brain, lungs, heart, stomach, and nerves. The attack killed 12 commuters and injured 5 500.128

xxvii These laws were implemented into Japanese law at the urging of the US after World War II to prevent the persecution of such religious organisations, as was the practice before 1945. xxviii A group that believes in an impending Armageddon and usually sets about bringing about such an event through violent means.

Following the arrests in relation to the Tokyo attacks, the group changed its name (to Aleph) and publicly abandoned its terrorist ambitions following the Tokyo subway attacks and the consequent arrests and response from the Japanese Government. This group and its activities in Australia will be expanded on below.

1.5.2.7 AL-QAEDA In 1979, the Soviet Army, under the orders of General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Illyich Brezhnev, invaded Afghanistan to consolidate communist control over the politically volatile capital of Kabul, and to reinforce the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The anti-communist groups that were challenging the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and causing the initial instability, became the principal resistance against the Soviet invasion. Neamatollah Nojumi writes that these groups comprised political-militant organisations such as the Hezb-e-Islami (The Islamic Party), Jamaiat-e-Islami of Afghanistan (The Islamic Society of Afghanistan), Afghan Melat (Social Democratic Party of Afghanistan), and Ikhwanis (The Brethren).129 The members of this resistance became known as the Mujahideen (Strugglers),xxix who partook in the jihad (struggle)xxx against the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan. Jihad (more specifically) translates to “Struggle in the defence of Islam”,130 and the resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen as such by the ummah (Islamic Community).131

Until 1984, the mujahideen consisted of Afghans from the country’s various provinces, with only several hundred Arabs assisting in the jihad against the Soviets. Between 1984 and 1986, the numbers of Arab mujahideen increased significantly,132 this also saw members from Southeast Asian Islamic movements such as Darul Islam (House of Islam) participate in the jihad from 1985.133 The International Crisis Group asserts that the international mujahideen recruits were instructed on explosives, land mines, weapons, topography, and infantry and urban warfare tactics in training camps established around Afghanistan.134 According to Rohan Gunaratna, in 1984, Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam and his student Osama bin Laden established the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al- Arab (Afghan Services Bureau, MAK). MAK served as an office for the jihad against

xxix It is often translated as ‘Holy Warrior’, however, this meaning is not always explicit. xxx Implies a holy struggle, contemporarily the meaning implies a violent struggle.

the Soviets; housing, training, and financing Muslims to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The MAK offices were established throughout 35 countries (including 30 offices in the US) and distributed propaganda acting as recruiting centres for the jihad.135 Azzam issued a clear fatwa xxxi for jihad in Afghanistan entitled Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman that declared that the killing of kuffar (unbelievers) was an obligation of all Muslims.136 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade notes that around 25 000 Muslims from all over the world rallied to Afghanistan to join the local resistance against the Soviets.137

In addition to the international recruits flocking to assist in the jihad in Afghanistan, the mujahideen were supported by the Pakistani Intelligence, the Inter-Services Agency (ISI), which funnelled the mujahideen funds that were provided by the US and Saudi Arabian governments. US military aid escalated in the same manner as international recruits; in 1980 the US Government provided US$30 million and in 1985 provided US$250 million in assistance.138 In addition to these funds, again distributed through the ISI, the American Government began distributing Surface-to- Air Stinger Missiles to the mujahideen in Afghanistan.139

The Islamic resistance to the invasion was fought over treacherous terrain against one of the world’s two superpowers, and after 22 000 casualties and 75 000 injured, the Soviet Army pulled out of Afghanistan into neighbouring Uzbekistan in early 1989. The mujahideen had defeated one of the world’s two superpowers; however the Soviet invasion was brutal: the Soviets killed over a million people, and displaced over five million.140

Azzam wrote in his book Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Man’s Most Important Duty: The duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan, jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again: before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, southern Yemen, Tashkent, and Andalusia.141

This statement signalled the concept of the ‘global jihad’. These goals would culminate in the reestablishment of the rule of the Islamic caliphs.

xxxi Essentially a religious decree.

The jihad in Afghanistan saw the formation of many new terrorist organisations such as Harakat Ul-Mujahideen (Movement of the Holy Warriors)xxxii and Lashkar-e- Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET).142 The most significant movement to emerge from the Soviet jihad was al-Qaeda, which was to be transformed from MAK. During the Soviet withdrawal, Azzam and bin Laden were in the process of changing MAK into an Islamic strike force, although the pair disagreed significantly on the role of this new organisation. Bin Laden continued to train mujahideen in camps around Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. After Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb in 1989,xxxiii bin Laden effectively merged MAK into al-Qaeda. Borrowing from the ideology of Azzam, bin Laden set the specific goals of the removal of US military forces from Saudi Arabia and the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments throughout the Middle East governed by Shariah law (re-establishing the rule of the caliphs). These goals advanced al-Qaeda’s fundamental ideology which is based on a fusion of the religious and political dimensions of Salifism and Wahhabism, from within the Sunni sect of Islam, creating al-Qaeda’s distinct political ideology.143

In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda focused on training and funding jihads in Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt.144 In 1993 al- Qaeda had involvement in the first World Trade Centre bombing, which killed six and injured over 1 000. The group also planned the elaborate but failed 1994 Oplan Bojinka (Operation Explosion), which involved the assassination of Pope John Paul II, and US President Clinton, as well as the destruction of 11 US airliners and the CIA in Langley.145

On June 25, 1996, a bomb consisting of approximately 4 000 pounds of explosives attached to a fuel truck driven by an Islamic extremist exploded outside the Khobar Towers military complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, which housed US Air Force personnel. Nineteen US servicemen were killed and 372 were injured.146 The inquiry into al-Qaeda’s most devastating operation, The 9/11 Commission Report, which was to come five years later, noted that al-Qaeda is likely to have assisted the Saudi Hezbollah guerrillas in the attacks.147 The Khobar Towers operation saw the adoption

xxxii Now known as Jamiat Ul-Ansar. xxxiii No responsibility was claimed for the assassination, however Gunaratna (2002) maintains that bin Laden condoned the attack.

of suicide bombing within this strand of international terrorism. Jason Burke asserts that while suicide operations were not an innovation of Islamic extremism, and were first employed by the JRA (which in turn took the concept to Hezbollah), the combination of suicide operations with the notion of martyrdom created a significantly effective modus operandi. In Islam, one who dies in a legitimate jihad is called a shahid (witness/martyr)148 and is honoured with a place in Jannah (paradise) with 72 Houri (fair women of paradise). In the second chapter of the al-Qaeda manual, ‘Necessary Qualifications and Characteristics for the Organisation’s Member’, qualification four reads: “Sacrifice: He [the member] has to be willing to do the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of majestic Allah on earth”.149

In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa entitled ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’. This fatwa essentially listed the crimes of the US and Israel, calling for all Muslims to fight against these ‘occupying’ forces and drive them out of the Middle-East. The fatwa praised the attack on the Khobar Towers complex.150 When addressing his Muslim Brothers, bin Laden states: Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy --your enemy and their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one’s own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam.151

This fatwa was followed by another in February of 1998. The ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement’ claimed: For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples.152

In response, the fatwa instructs that “to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim...this is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah”. 153

Six months after the release of this fatwa, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked by al-Qaeda suicide bombers. On August 7 1998, at approximately 10:30am, a Nissan truck carrying a several hundred pound explosive device comprising TNT and aluminium nitrate exploded outside the US embassy in Nairobi killing 213 and injuring over 4 000. Nine minutes later, a truck packed with between 400 and 500 packets of TNT combined with oxygen-acetylene cylinders, exploded outside the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, killing 11.154

On October 12 2000, a zodiac,xxxiv driven by an al-Qaeda member, filled with over 500 pounds of explosives rammed the destroyer United States Ship (USS) Cole in the port of Aden, in Yemen. The resulting explosion killed 17 US servicemen and injured 39. The explosion created a hole 60 by 40 feet in the hull, causing US$250 million in damage to the destroyer.155

The emergence and development of al-Qaeda on the world scene of international terrorism during the late 20th Century was considerable in pace. In the decade between the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the bombing of the USS Cole, al-Qaeda was involved in numerous operations against US civilian and military targets. Al-Qaeda’s development in this period is shadowed by the events of 2001, which set in motion events that would see the end of the international terrorism period, and greet the period of 21st Century Islamic extremism, led by its foundation – al-Qaeda.

1.6. 21st CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM On September 11, 2001, 19 members of al-Qaeda hijacked 4 commercial airliners. The first, American Airlines Flight 11, crashed into the north tower of the New York World Trade Centre at 8:45am. The second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Centre at approximately 9:05am. American Airlines Flight 77, the third hijacked aircraft, smashed into America’s military headquarters, the Pentagon, at 9:39am. At 9:59am, the south tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed. Eleven minutes later, the final hijacked aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed into a deserted area of Stoney Creek, Pennsylvania,

xxxiv A type of small boat.

after passengers attempted to take over the plane en route to Washington DC. At 10:28am, the north tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed. Each of the hijacked aircraft was carrying approximately 60 000 pounds of jet fuel, and travelling at around 300 miles per hour. Almost 3 000 people died in these attacks,156 which mobilised the Salafist movement into action not only in the Middle East, but all over the world.

1.6.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs’ white paper on transnational terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) formed within the Darul Islam separatist movement that emerged in Indonesia during the 1950s. The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state and the movement was responsible for several uprisings during the 1950s and 60s in Indonesia. While Darul Islam was suppressed and forced to operate underground during the mid 1960s, several armed militant organisations formed from the group in the mid-to-late 1980s. One of these groups was JI.

The goal of JI is the creation of a pan-Islamic state that includes most of Southeast Asia, which (like al-Qaeda’s vision) restores the rule of the caliphs.157 JI established radical Islamic boarding schools and expanded their influence into Malaysia and throughout South East Asia. The group’s leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, began sending recruits to mujahideen training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1980s. It is during this period that the links were formed between JI and al-Qaeda. During the late 1990s, JI began establishing similar camps in the Philippines,158 in which al-Qaeda recruits would train with members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The links forged during the Afghanistan conflict provided ideological backing, military training, funding, and expertise for JI and other South East Asian groups such as the MILF.159 The links between al-Qaeda and JI were most strongly demonstrated in the relationship between JI’s number two, Hambali, and al-Qaeda’s military chief (and planner of the 2001 attacks), Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.160 These links have been essential to the success of operations in South East Asia by JI.

As detailed in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s East Timor in Transition, 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge states, on August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor successfully voted for their country’s independence in a United Nations (UN) sponsored and supervised ballot. Following the ballot, pro- integration militia backed by members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces) began a campaign of widespread violence against civilians, journalists, and UN officials. Following the lack of response by the Indonesian government, the UN passed UN Security Council Resolution 1264 allowing an Australian-led International Force [in] East Timor (INTERFET) to restore order in the country.161 The INTERFET arrived in Dili on the morning of 20 September 1999, led by nine Australian warships. The two Australian infantry battalions (including Australia’s elite Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) forces) deployed to East Timor secured the sea and air ports around the capital and INTERFET quickly consolidated control of the newly independent country.162 According to Sally Neighbour, the Australian-led operation was seen by JI leaders Sungkar and Bashir as a direct assault on Islam, equal to that of the US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. This turn of events solidified Australia as an enemy of Islam in the eyes of JI.163 xxxv

On Christmas Eve of 2000, eleven teams of JI operatives planted 38 devices in churches and in the homes of priests throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The devices detonated between 8:30pm and 10:30pm killing 19 people and injuring 120,164 signifying the beginning of the rise and rise of JI as a force of Islamic extremism within Southeast Asia.

JI was responsible for the bombing of night clubs in Bali on October 12, 2002, which left over 200 people dead, including 88 Australians. The group is also responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, which killed 17 and injured 100,165 and the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, on September 9, 2004, which killed ten and injured over a hundred.166 The most recent attack targeted the tourist destination of Bali for the second time on October 1, 2005, killing 23 and injuring 129.167 The JI cell that conducted the 2002 Bali bombings will be the subject of a social network analysis in this project.

xxxv Bin laden and his deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri have also cited Australia’s involvement in East Timor as a source for conflict.

1.6.2 CHECHEN REBELS Separatist Islamic Chechen rebels have undertaken numerous attacks against Russia, such as the December 2003 train bombing which killed 42,168 the February 2004 subway bombing which killed 39 and injured more than 130,169 and the taking of over 700 hostages in a Moscow theatre in October 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 129 hostages and 41 of the terrorists. Chechen rebels have been supported and trained by al-Qaeda.170

On September 1, 2004, approximately 30 armed Chechen Islamic extremists took over School Number One in the town of Beslan, North Ossetetia, Russia. The terrorists covered the gymnasium, in which they held a majority of the hostages, with explosive devices. Following unsuccessful negotiations between the Russian forces and the rebels, an agreement was reached that allowed medical workers to enter the gymnasium to retrieve the bodies of the hostages already killed. During this retrieval, an explosive was detonated (the cause of which remains a matter of debate), and both the terrorists and the Russian forces opened fire. The school children who attempted to flee were caught in the middle. The ensuing fire fight and collapse of the gymnasium resulted in the deaths of 344 civilians.171

1.6.3 THE AL-QAEDA MOVEMENT Since the rise to significance of al-Qaeda through the attacks in 2001, scores of Islamic extremist groups, which were previously unknown or considered minor groups, such as JI, have risen to join the al-Qaeda-led campaign against Western nations. In April of 2002, in Tunisia, an al-Qaeda bomber detonated a truck carrying natural gas outside a historic Jewish synagogue, which killed 21 people.172 On May 12, 2003, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, four expatriate housing complexes were attacked by suicide bombers in explosive-filled vehicles. 25 bystanders were killed in the attacks, which were later attributed to al-Qaeda.173 Later that month, twelve al-Qaeda- linked suicide bombers attacked Spanish and Jewish sites in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 33 people.174 In November, two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey were bombed, killing 23 people. Just days later, the British Consulate, and the British owned HSBC bank were attacked by suicide bombers, killing a further 27 people. Joint responsibility was claimed between al-Qaeda and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front.175

1.6.4 THE WAR IN IRAQ – CONSEQUENCES On March 20, 2003, a coalition led by the US, but consisting of forces from the UK, Poland, and Australia, invaded Iraq. The invasion was justified as anticipatory self- defence in light of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that the coalition claimed Iraq possessed.176 A secondary justification for the invasion was based on tentative links between the Saddam Hussein-led Iraqi Government and al-Qaeda. On May 1, following a successful initial campaign, US President George Bush announced the conclusion of major combat operations.177 In the months following this announcement, it appeared clear that the insurgency in Iraq, led by foreign terrorists, threatened to plunge the newly liberated Iraq into a guerrilla form of civil war.

The terrorist campaign in occupied Iraq directed against US soldiers, security forces and civilian contractors, has claimed thousands of lives. On August 19, 2003, a truck laden with explosives detonated outside the Canal Hotel where the UN had based their headquarters in Iraq. 22 people died, including the highest ranking UN envoy in the country, Brazilian Vieira de Mello. Over 150 people were injured.178 Similar attacks against institutions committed to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, civilians, and US forces within Iraq have been claimed by and attributed to groups such as the Holders of the Black Banner,179 the 1920 Revolution Brigade,180 the Army of Ansar al-Sunna,181 the al-Qaeda Organisation for Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers,182 the al- Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula,183 and the European Branch of Al- Qaeda (also known as Al-Tawhid).184

Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a veteran of the Soviet jihad, was the leader of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War Movement, JTJ) that formed in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. JTJ renamed itself Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and later that year al-Zarqawi swore his allegiance to Osama bin Laden.185 Al- Zarqawi and his group led the Sunni mujahideen in Iraq, coordinating many of the above attacks and groups,xxxvi and developing a folk hero status similar to that of bin Laden in Afghanistan. In addition to the resistance in Iraq, al-Zarqawi had been

xxxvi A distinction must be made between the different groups that constitute the insurgency, that is, that there are political anti-occupation groups, jihadi groups, and groups that espouse a mixture of both ideologies. The major difference between these groups is the targets of attacks; the jihadis are responsible for a significant majority of attacks against civilians, while the liberation groups concentrate attacks solely against US and occupation forces.

coordinating preparations for large scale attacks in Europe, signifying the emergence of a new amir (commander)xxxvii-like leader within the global jihadist movement.186 Al-Zarqawi was killed by a US air-strike on June 7, 2006.187 Despite the loss of the movement’s leader, al-Qaeda in Iraq and what has become known as ‘Zarqawism’, the indiscriminate and specifically savage terrorism that aims to divide any Sunni and Shiite unity within Iraq, threatens to continue.188

A fatwa concerning Iraq was released on November 5, 2004, by the Saudi Sheikhs Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, and Ali bin Awad al-Qarni entitled An Open Address to the Struggling Iraqi People, declaring jihad in Iraq is the responsibility of every able person.189 The resistance in Iraq increasingly resembles the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Saudis are joining the mujahideen,190 new terrorist groups are emerging, training camps are being established, mujahideen are flocking to fight, and Islamic extremist groups from all over the Middle East are participating together in the jihad in Iraq. Any withdrawal of US forces will surely be heralded by Islamic groups as a victory over the world’s sole superpower. The resistance has not been confined to Iraq, and the latest attacks on Western nations have been justified through their involvement in the invasion of Iraq in addition to existing complaints of Western imperialism.

On March 11, 2004, ten explosive devices were detonated on four trains during peak hour in Madrid, Spain. The explosions killed 190 people, and injured over 1 400.191 An Islamic brigade claiming to be an arm of al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks in a video taped message from al-Qaeda’s military chief in Europe, in which he said: “We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly 2.5 years after the attacks on New York and Washington…More blood will flow if the injustices [in Iraq] do not stop”.192

Islamic extremists carried through with al-Qaeda’s threat on July 7, 2005, when suicide bombers detonated explosive devices carried in backpacks on three London Underground trains within 50 seconds of each other at 8.50am and one on a double- decker bus at 9.47am. The bombings killed 56 people and injured over 700. Within

xxxvii An Islamic term for an individual of high importance, title, or nobility.

hours a statement was released by The Secret Organisation Group of al-Qaeda in Europe. This statement declared: Nations of Islam and Arab nations: Rejoice, for it is time to take revenge against the British Zionist crusader government in retaliation for the massacres Britain is committing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The heroic Mujahideen [holy warriors] have carried out a blessed raid [ghazwxxxviii] in London. Britain is now burning with fear, terror and panic in its northern, southern, eastern, and western quarters.

We have repeatedly warned the British government and people. We have fulfilled our promise and carried out our blessed military raid in Britain after our Mujahideen exerted strenuous efforts over a long period of time to ensure the success of the raid.

We continue to warn the governments of Denmark and Italy and all the crusader governments that they will be punished in the same way if they do not withdraw their troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. He who warns is excused. 193 xxxix

It is clear that al-Qaeda is no longer simply a terrorist group; it is a movement, an ideology, and as its name implies, a foundation for 21st Century Islamic extremism.

Thus far, this chapter has examined the origins, phases, and development of the phenomenon of terrorism and the motivations and modus operandi of these groups all over the world, establishing 21st Century Islamic extremism as the major form of terrorism at present. While traditional groups within the period of international terrorism such as the RIRA and PIRA have continued their campaigns, they are vastly overshadowed by the enormity and frequency of events and groups of Islamic extremism. The next section of the chapter will examine how the phenomenon of terrorism has developed in Australia.

2. TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA The previous section of the chapter has shown the evolution of terrorism from a form of political violence to a defined and succinct tactic in its own right. This section of the chapter aims to construct a history of terrorism in Australia, in the context of the development of the phenomenon world-wide. This procedure is necessary to set the context for any examination or analysis of terrorism in Australia (the central concept of this thesis). Australia experienced only two small scale sporadic instances of

xxxviii An attack for the purposes of conquest. xxxix The last sentence is a rebuttal to Muslims who condemn Islamic terrorism, indicating that through the Koran, if a warning is given, the resulting violence is excused.

terrorism before the advent of international terrorism in the 1960s. Through the advancements of technology and the influence of globalisation, conflicts originating in other areas of the world were brought to Australia, a country whose borders were previously significantly isolated from the phenomenon of terrorism. The period between the 1960s and the 1980s was the height of Australia’s experience with terrorism. In this period, groups such as the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), the Palestinian May 15 Organisation, the JCAG, and Ananda Marga (Path of Bliss) operated within Australia’s borders. The affluence of international terrorism during this period gave impetus to a number of domestic terrorist organisations that operated against various arms of the Australian Government and major corporations in Australia. The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism appears to be creating another period of heightened terrorist activity within Australia.

2.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE Australia has a significant history of political violence, albeit a rather low-scale and sporadic one. In the early 1790s, military staff stationed on Norfolk Island rioted against the authority of the Governor of the island.194 In 1804, 300 Irish convicts armed themselves and marched on Sydney. This revolutionary attempt was quickly quelled by colonial forces. In 1808, the Governor of New South Wales (NSW), William Bligh, was overthrown by a group of dissident military officers over attempts to control the sale and purchase of rum. In 1921 a minor state legislative candidate was assassinated in South Australia.195 The Eureka Stockade of 1854 resulted in the deaths of 30 miners and five troopers. The early 20th Century saw significant violence from trade unions and workers parties, including attempted derailments of trains and bombings.196 While some of these events may resemble the cases of terrorism from below discussed in the previous section, and may also fit the definition of terrorism adopted for this project, these cases have historically been considered acts of political violence and industrial action, not commonly regarded as terrorism. Traditional acts of political violence through protest and industrial action will not be included in this history of terrorism as the focus on the significant instances of terrorism from below is significantly more beneficial to examining a history of terrorism in Australia.

2.2 EARLY TERRORISM The first instance of terrorism in Australia was in 1868, when Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh, was picnicking at Clontarf Beach in Sydney and was shot in the back by Irishman James O’Farrell. O’Farrell was an Irish nationalist with alleged links to the Fenian Brotherhood (the Irish Republican Brotherhood).197 xl The Fenian Brotherhood embarked on a struggle to bring about an Irish republic in the mid 1800s, and normally operated in cells of ten men adopting the guerrilla warfare style modus operandi used in the American Civil War, through the returning Irish-Americans involved in the conflict.198

The next significant terrorist incident occurred in 1915 when two Afghans partaking in jihad, Mullah Abdullah and Muhammad Gul, opened fire on a picnic train outside Broken Hill, killing four Australians. The organisation responsible, headed by the Sultan of Ottoman Turkey, claimed the attack and the jihad was in retaliation to Australia’s military operations against Islam. The two extremists were killed in their exploit.199 This was the last significant terrorist event in Australia until the 1960s.

2.3 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM The lack of terrorism in Australia before the 1960s and the comparative abundance of terrorism in Australia after the 1960s gives authority to the concept and influence of international terrorism, as conflicts originating within nations outside Australia’s borders had transgressed to terrorist campaigns and operations within Australia between the mid 1960s and the mid 1980s. This period experienced scores of small to medium scale terrorist incidents and activities. The most prolific of the groups that operated in Australia during this period would have to be the various Ustashi movements.xli

2.3.1 USTASHI GROUPS As discussed in the Right-Wing and Post World War I period of terrorism, following the fall of the fascist Ustashi government in the Independent State of Croatia in 1945, the victorious forces led by Tito installed the SFRY. Members of the hierarchy of the

xl There is debate among Australian historians as to whether O’Farrell had Fenian links or was simply a mentally unstable alcoholic motivated by his Irish heritage. xli The ‘Ustasha’ is used as a general term encompassing all fascist groups involved with the Croatian liberation movement.

former fascist government, pursued by the socialists for their brutal war crimes against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies, escaped and migrated to Spain, Canada, and Australia. Aided by a strong Croatian Diaspora in Australia, the former Ustashi members established the Australian section of the Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret (Croatian Liberation Movement, HOP) following its establishment by Pavelic in 1956 while exiled in Argentina. As reported by the Commonwealth Police, the most violent of the Croatian independence groups was the HRB, which was established on June 9, 1961,200 by Jure Maric, Ilija Tolic, Josip Oblak, Geza Pasti, and Drazden Tapsanji following their dissatisfaction with the HOP’s lack of militancy and revolutionary action.201 xlii The Australian branch of the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National Resistance, HNO) was based in Melbourne and was linked to the HNO headquarters in Spain, as well as to other arms of the Ustashi movement around the world. The Australian branch was led by Srecko Blaz Rover.202 Rover was heavily involved in the Ustashi movement; in 1967 Rover constructed a bomb disguised as an expensive- looking pen, which seriously injured a young Yugoslav at a Yugoslav National Day Ball.203

The Australian branch of Ujedinjen Hrvati Njemacki (UHNj, United Croats of West Germany) was formed around June 1971 in Sydney, and led by Jakov Suljack. In October of 1972, Suljack was arrested and charged with another count of assault and possession of an unlicensed pistol.204 Suljack’s commitment to the liberation of Croatia was clear: in the 1971 November – December edition of the ‘Croatian Call’, he stated: “It is our duty to support the Croatian liberation struggle…for without a bloody shirt there will be no independent state of Croatia”.205 The meetings for the Australian branch of the UHNj were held at the Irish National Association’s Ulster room in Sydney.206

From the early 1960s, the Ustashi groups began conducting military training in Australia, many run by the HOP, and attended by members of the other organisations. Perhaps the most significant of these camps was run by the HOP in 1963 near Wodonga in Victoria.207 In close proximity to this camp, the Australian Citizen Military Forces (CMF) were undertaking manoeuvres using their standard armament

xlii A much more detailed account of the development of the HOP and HRB in Australia will be given in Chapter V.

in addition to armoured vehicles. The CMF were approached by HOP members who were in turn given a demonstration of the equipment and weapons. Photos of HOP members holding CMF weapons and sitting on armoured vehicles were subsequently published in the HOP magazine, Spremnost.208 This camp was attended by members of the HRB.209 In early July 1963, two HRB members who were at the Wodonga camp, along with seven other Australian residents, illegally entered the SFRY through Italy for the purpose of waging a terrorist campaign against the Yugoslav government. The nine individuals were caught and sentenced to severe prison terms by the SFRY Government ranging from six to fourteen years.210 The incursion cell of this operation, known as Action Kangaroo, will be the focus of a social network analysis in this project (to be discussed in further detail in Chapters IV and V).

From their formation, these groups also engaged in a violent campaign against Yugoslav officials, interests, and individuals within Australia. Various small scale incidents of political violence appeared in the early to mid 1960s against Yugoslav institutions such as the premises of the Consulate-General and the Yugoslav Settlers Association. By 1966, the violence had escalated to death threats, stabbings, and attempted murders. In the mid to late 1960s, the Ustashi activities in Australia had advanced into the realm of terrorism. On September 17, 1966, a parcel bomb exploded prematurely in a parcel chute in the General Post Office (GPO) in Melbourne. The parcel was addressed to Marijan Jurjevic, a Yugoslav that had set out to publicise the Ustashi group’s activities since the early 1960s.211 Between January 1967 and November 1971, seven separate bombings were carried out against the: i. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Double Bay; ii. Yugoslav National Day ball; iii. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney; iv. Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra; v. Yugoslav Consulate-General in Melbourne, vi. a Serbian Orthodox Church; and vii. a Yugoslav travel agency in Sydney.212 These operations, in addition to the 1963 incursion into Yugoslavia, posed serious questions as to the level of the Australian Federal Government’s response to anti- Communist terrorism. The inability of authorities to act also exposed organisational

and collaborative weaknesses between state and federal authorities. The change in government in 1972 levelled severe measures against the Croatian groups. 213

The HOP military training continued into the 1970s, when the Ustashi groups had to constantly increase and revise their security measures.214 By this stage, the HOP had established the Saveza Hrvatske Ujedinjene Mladezi Svijeta (Croatian United Youth of the World, SHUMS) and the Hrvatska Maldez (Croatian Youth) movements, and were training with automatic weapons and high-powered explosives in remote areas of Victoria and South Australia.215 SHUMS was led by Srecko Blaz Rover, who had earlier also led the HOP (in 1963) and HNO.216 The Secretary of SHUMS was Zdenko Marincic, who arrived in Australia in early 1970. In 1972, Marincic he flew to Frankfurt, West Germany, without any form of permit or visa, and was subsequently refused entry. Marincic returned to Australia and was arrested after concealing a rifle in his luggage, as well as four silencers concealed in a toy koala.217

On April 6, 1972, simultaneous bombings were executed against the Australia and New Zealand Bank’s Migrant Advisory Centre in Melbourne, and the residence of pro-Yugoslavian figure, Jurjevic.218 As stated in a report by the Attorney-General’s Department, on September 16, two explosive devices were detonated, the first at the Adria Travel Agency, in George Street, Sydney. The second device, also on George Street, was detonated inside the General Trade and Tourist Agency. Sixteen people were injured in the second explosion, two of whom were injured critically.219 A third explosive device was removed from the Adria Travel Agency.220

In 1972, the HRB become known as the Hrvatska Ilegalan Revolucionarna Organizacija (Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation, HIRO). In June 1972, six Australian citizens and three others who had previously lived in Australia entered Yugoslavia through Austria as part of a larger group of Croatian terrorists, in the HRB’s second Australian-launched incursion into Communist Yugoslavia.221 All but one of the Australian insurgents were either killed or tried and executed by SFRY security forces.222

In 1974, an inquiry was established by the Whitlam Government under Justice Hope, leading to a much sharper focus on accountability within Australia’s security agencies. This in turn led to a much harsher response from agencies such as ASIO, and the decline of groups such as the HIRO.223 The Croatian independence movements discussed above show that the activities undertaken by the more violent groups such as the HRB, the HIRO, and the UHNj, resulted in these movements constituting the longest and most sustained terrorist campaign in Australia’s history.

2.3.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORISM According to Simon Reeve, the Munich operation undertaken by the Palestinian group Black September in 1972 “thrust the Palestinian cause into the world spotlight, set the tone for decades of conflict in the Middle East, and launched a new era of international terrorism”.224 Australia became part of this new era of terrorism on September 23, 1972, when two envelopes containing explosives concealed within cardboard containers were discovered at the Sydney GPO. These envelopes were addressed to personnel at the Israeli Consulate in Woollahra, NSW. Two days later, three similar envelopes were discovered at the GPO in Canberra, addressed to personnel at the Israeli Embassy.225 Sir Alan Hulme, the Postmaster-General, stated that the letter bombs were posted from Amsterdam on September 18, and were disposed of by the NSW Police and the Department of Army Disposal Squad.226 The bombs were attributed to Arab groups by Attorney-General Ivor Greenwood in a 1972 cabinet submission released the same month entitled ‘Terrorism in Australia’.227 Palestinian terrorism was revived in Australia in 1982 through the Palestinian May 15 Organisation, and through Australia-based Palestinian groups.

In 1982 a new group emerged in Australia: the Palestinian May 15 Organisation. Two members of the organisation flew into the country and using established networks, bombed the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Jewish Hakoah club at Bondi, both on December 23. No one was killed in the incidents.228 Palestinian terrorism extended into Australia again in 1996, when Mohammad Hassanein, who had ties to extremist groups in Egypt, travelled to Australia on a false passport, was arrested and deported. His arrival coincided with a major Jewish Congress and it was suspected that he would have led or assisted in attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets with established cells in the country.229

2.3.3 THE HILTON BOMBING The second most fatal terrorist attack in Australian history took place in the early hours of February 13, 1978. As detailed by Jenny Hocking, at approximately 1:40am a bomb that was planted in a rubbish bin outside the Sydney Hilton exploded inside a garbage truck immediately after the bin had been collected. The leaders and delegates from the nations of the Commonwealth were staying in the Hilton for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). The resulting explosion (which intensified inside the garbage truck) killed the two garbage-collectors and a police officer guarding the entrance to the Hilton.230

The CHOGM representatives were to have met in Bowral for a luxury retreat the following day. Nearly two thousand troops from the Royal Australian Army (RAA) were deployed in Bowral in addition to Kiowa helicopters which patrolled the skies over the small town.231 Following the ‘Siege at Bowral’, as it became known, authorities made the wrongful arrest of Tim Anderson, Ross Dunn, and Paul Alister, who were all members of the religious organisation Ananda Marga. Ananda Marga was created in 1955 by Prabhat Rainjain Sarkar in India, as a spiritual social movement, which expanded rapidly, reaching two million members by 1975. In 1971, Sarkar was arrested, and Ananda Marga was outlawed four years later. Sarkar was sentenced to life in prison in 1976 for conspiracy, abetment, and murder. Sarkar’s followers claimed that the charges were fabricated.232 The leader was eventually released in 1978 following a change of government the previous year. From 1977 to 1979, Ananda Marga undertook terrorist attacks against diplomatic targets and airlines and airports around the world.233 While there are conspiracy theories regarding the motivation and responsibility for Australia’s second most fatal terrorist attack, the responsible party remains a mystery.

2.3.4 THE JCAG The development of Armenian terrorism has been discussed previously, but in 1980, the JCAG brought their campaign of anti-Ottoman/Turkish terrorism to Australia. Authorities believe that the group used a similar method of operations to that of the Palestinian May 15 Organisation, when two members of the group from overseas flew into the country and prepared for the operation with local support. On December 17, two Armenians assassinated the Turkish Consul, Sarik Arijak and his bodyguard,

Engin Sever, at Dover Heights in Sydney. The terrorists used an automatic pistol fired from a motorbike. According to Clive Williams, the two assassins are suspected to have left the country following the completion of the operation and have never been located.234

In 1986, two members of the JCAG residing in Sydney attempted to detonate a car bomb in the basement car park of the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne. One of the bombers, Hagop Levonian, was killed in the attack when the bomb detonated prematurely. The other member, Levon Demirian, was arrested through information from the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and served ten years in prison.235 The JCAG’s operations in Australia ceased around the same time that the group ceased its international terrorism operations.

2.3.5 AUM SHINRIKYO Aum Shinrikyo (discussed previously) was a Japanese religious cult formed by Chizuo Matsumoto in 1986.236 The group’s religious doctrine espoused a combination of Tibetan Buddhism, Hinduism, and yoga.237 Documented in an investigation by the United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the group believed in a range of apocalyptic scenarios, the most popular of which was that in 1997 a war would break out between the US and Japan, leading to a world war and consequent Armageddon. The group planned for the war and set about its instigation by undertaking military training and manufacturing conventional, chemical, and biological weapons.238

This group provides perhaps the most threatening incident in Australia’s history of international terrorism. In April of 1993, two members of the group arrived in Australia and began inspecting properties in Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia. The group eventually purchased the Banjawarn property in Western Australia, about 600 kilometres northwest of Perth, through companies created and owned by the group. On this property, the 20 strong group carried out experiments with the nerve agent Sarin, testing it on the sheep on the station, and also made

attempts to extract uranium.xliii Approximately six months later, Aum used Sarin in attacks in the city of Matsumoto, killing seven, and the Tokyo subway which killed twelve and injured over 5 500.239

Following the subway attacks, a majority of the group’s hierarchy including Matsumoto, were arrested and many have been sentenced to death. The group was not outlawed by the Japanese Government and has changed its name to Aleph.240

2.4 DOMESTIC TERRORISM Domestic terrorism is essentially the use of terrorism by an internal group against the state, citizens, institutions, and structures within that state; for example the Russian, anti-Ottoman, and Muslim Brotherhood campaigns discussed above are examples of domestic terrorist movements. Domestic terrorism is specifically different from acts of Islamic extremism inside Australia due to Islamic extremism’s global campaign against Western governments. Australia has had very few instances of domestic terrorism and the following domestic terrorist events meet the definition given in the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003. The inclusion of domestic terrorist events which follows is necessary to a history of terrorism in Australia, in order to contrast the significance of the effects of international terrorism on Australia.

The events discussed in this section occurred after the rise of international terrorism in Australia. In the 1972 Terrorism in Australia submission to cabinet referred to previously, Senator Greenwood detailed the domestic groups that were then active in Australia. At the top of the list were the Palestine-Australian Solidarity Committee, based in Melbourne, and the Australian-Palestine Solidarity Committee, based in Sydney. The report continued and cited the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), an anti- US, anti-Vietnam War, and anti-National Service group responsible for attacks against corporations such as Honeywell and General Electric, and attacks against the Department of Labour and National Service. The report also mentioned the National Socialist Party for their bombings of structures owned by Leftist interests in Melbourne.241 Excluding the last example, most of the Australian domestic terrorist

xliii The Aum cell that operated in Australia in 1993 will be examined through social network analysis as a part of this thesis.

groups were left-wing, mirroring the trend within international terrorism during this period.

The Greenwood submission outlined numerous attacks which were undertaken against the US Consulate-Generals in both Sydney and Melbourne, Australian premises of US corporations, and Australian military and Department of Labour and National Service institutions between 1970 and 1972. In 1970, the US Consulate- Generals in Sydney and Melbourne were attacked with a Molotov cocktail, a home- made bomb, and when butyric acid was dispensed into the air conditioning system. Over the following three years, American corporations such as Honeywell, General Electric, Keep Bros and Woods, and the Du Pont Corporationxliv were attacked with shotguns, petrol bombs, and other incendiary devices. Only one of these attacks was publicly claimed by the PLA. The PLA also later claimed responsibility for the gelignite bombing of the Torrens River Pump House which caused extensive damage. This period also saw several attacks against the Department of Labour and National Service, through firearm attacks and letter bombs, and also the bombings of Australian Defence Force bases, depots, armouries, guardrooms, training depots, and cadet facilities.242 No deaths resulted from these attacks.

The next domestic terrorist movements to appear were the anti-nuclear and environmentalist movements. The following incidents were more a case of violent action by social movements rather than attacks by terrorist organisations. Several ‘eco-terrorism’ incidents occurred in reaction to the nuclear research conducted by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, and the research centre at Lucas Heights, as well as the attempted construction of the Franklin Dam. In 1977, a fire broke out at the Australian Atomic Energy Commission at Mascot, New South Wales. This was followed by the defusing of an explosive device consisting of gelignite and ammonium nitrate at the Lucas Heights Research Establishment in Sydney, in 1983. Both of these incidents were blamed on anti-nuclear groups.243 Also in 1983, at the height of the Franklin Dam protests, the hijacking of a Trans-Australian Airlines aircraft was unsuccessfully attempted.244

xliv This attack was unsuccessful and the petrol bomb ignited a solicitor’s office below the Du Pont Corporation’s offices.

Right-wing racist groups were another form of domestic terrorism which emerged in its most violent form during the 1980s. While a majority of the activities that right- wing groups undertake would generally be classified as political violence, the Australian National Movement’s (founded in 1984) bombing of Chinese businesses in Perth would transcend the boundaries of political violence.245 While this and other right-wing groups, such as National Action and Confederate Action Party, have at times walked the fine line between political violence and terrorism, their existence and activities deserve mention.

As has been established, Australia has enjoyed a history of extremely low scale, zero casualty domestic terrorism. This remains the case today; there are no significant domestic terrorist groups within Australia.

2.5 21st CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORISM The previous examination of the development of 21st Century Islamic extremism contested that Islamic extremism is the most significant terrorist threat the world faces today. In the same fashion that saw international terrorism reach Australia’s borders, Islamic extremism has also threatened Australia’s internal security.

2.5.1 PRE 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM Just as the emergence of al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism in the late 1990s was felt by the US and other areas of the world, preceding their rise to infamy and the War on Terror in 2001, Islamic extremist operations were also directed towards and within Australia.

2.5.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH: MANTIQI 4 & JACK ROCHE Mantiqi 4 (of four: the JI structure will be discussed in Chapter VIII) was the division of JI whose area of operations covered the geographic regions of Australia, West Papua, and the Maldives. Mantiqi 4 was established in Australia around the early 1990s. The leader of Mantiqi 4 was the high ranking Abdul Rahim Ayub. Ayub lived in Sydney and had previously hosted visits from JI leaders Abdullah Sunkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. While Mantiqi 4 was dwarfed by the other three divisions of JI, Ayub maintained absolute secrecy and slowly recruited members into JI, while engaging the division’s main purpose of fund-raising. Ayub and his group began associating with

the Lakemba-based Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) and their publication the Nida’ul Islam (The Call of Islam), facilitating a strong relationship between the two groups.246 In 1997 Abdul Rahim’s twin brother Abdul Rahman Ayub, a veteran of the Afghanistan conflict and high ranking al-Qaeda member (Abdul Rahman wrote sections of the al-Qaeda manual), joined his brother in Sydney.247

In mid-1998 following a violent conflict with members of the mosque they attended at Dee Why, the Ayub twins moved to Perth in Western Australia and continued recruiting and fundraising activities, while the rest of Mantiqi 4 moved into Lakemba. Following the move of the Ayub brothers, Mantiqi 4 began jihadi training, including treks through the Blue Mountains, and extended to military style combat drills and exercise. The Perth group used an associate’s property for paintball skirmishes, used for both physical and combat training. Mantiqi 4 also began send recruits to train in camps in Mindanao with members of al-Qaeda and the MILF.248

In 2000, Mantiqi 4 recruit Jack Roche, a British expatriate, was sent to Indonesia to meet with JI’s operational leader Hambali. On their meeting, Hambali informed Roche that he wanted to set up an operational cell in Australia, suggesting the Sydney Olympics as a possible target.xlv Roche was sent to Afghanistan via Pakistan for training. In Pakistan he met with al-Qaeda operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to discuss potential operations in Australia. Roche then made his way to a training camp in Afghanistan where he had a fleeting meeting with Osama bin Laden and took a ten day course on explosives, basic espionage methods, and counter- measures.249

According to Sally Neighbour, after returning to Australia Roche began attempts to recruit cell members (as instructed by Hambali and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) and conducted surveillance on the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Israeli Embassy in Canberra. Roche was not tight-lipped about his budding operation, causing discontent within the local Islamic community and significant amounts of animosity from the Ayub twins who had been left out of the operation. Following dissent from the Ayub twins and a meeting between Roche and Abu Bakar Bashir (in which Bashir initially

xlv This target was later seen not to advance the causes of JI.

instructed Roche to continue with the operation), the operation was eventually put to rest when Bashir called Roche and instructed him to cease all activities.250 Roche was arrested in November 2002 and received a nine year sentence after being convicted of conspiring to blow up the Israeli Embassy in June 2004.251

While this chapter is concerned with the history of terrorism in Australia, it is important to note JI’s continued attacks against Western interests in Southeast Asia, which since 2002 have killed 93 Australians, as detailed previously.

2.5.1.2 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES There were several other significant terrorist threats in the lead-up to the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. The first was the discovery by New Zealand police of a terrorist cell in Auckland. In this operation police uncovered what appeared to be a virtual command centre complete with maps of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor. The plans surfaced after a raid on what was a suspected Afghan crime syndicate. Media sources speculated that the group was tied to Osama bin Laden.252 xlvi

The second event in the lead-up to the Sydney Games was the discovery of an alleged al-Qaeda training camp in bushland near Braidwood, New South Wales. The camp was discovered by police after residents reported hearing automatic gunfire from the area. The 138 hectare site was a known camping area for the IYM and the camp is known to have been accessed by al-Qaeda members. Evidence of bomb-making, a small arsenal of Automat Kalashnikov 1947 model (AK-47) assault rifles, and target ranges were found at the site by police.253

Around the same period (late 1990s) al-Qaeda had established money-raising support cells in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide.254 The IYM’s leader, Bilal Khazal, was alleged by a CIA report in 2002 to be al-Qaeda’s chief organiser in Australia, substantiated by his travel to Afghanistan in 1998, where the report claims he met with Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri,255 and the warrant issued by Lebanon for his involvement in a string of bombings and a failed assassination

xlvi It is necessary to emphasise that these speculations were made before the World Trade Centre attacks in 2001, and the ‘hype’ surrounding al-Qaeda after these events.

attempt against the US Ambassador to Lebanon.256 A second training camp was discovered by ASIO near Melbourne in 2002.257

As is evident from these examples, Islamic extremism posed a threat to Australia prior to September 11, 2001, and the Bali bombings in the following year.

2.5.2 POST 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM There have been numerous threats to Australia’s internal security since the World Trade Centre attacks of 2001. Perhaps the most potentially threatening was the LET cell centring on Frenchman Willie Brigitte.

2.5.2.1 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA The LET-trained Willie Virgille Brigitte flew into Australia on May 16, 2003,258 and after meeting with Australian LET contacts, quickly immersed himself within the Islamic communities in the Sydney suburb of Lakemba.259 Brigitte’s principal contact in Australia, the Pakistani-born Faheem Khalid Lodhi, arranged Brigitte’s mobile phone (registered in a false name) and accommodation in Lakemba. These two individuals formed the nucleus of the cell, with medical student Izhar Ul-Haque and Abdul Rakib Hasan among those on the periphery of the operation.260 The operation consisted of eight individuals, with the orders originating in Pakistan from ‘Sajid’, a mid to senior-ranking Pakistani within LET, under whom most of the individuals had trained.261

This cell aimed to detonate an explosive device attempting to destroy one or more of the following targets: i. the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor; ii. the SASR headquarters at Perth’s Swanbourne barracks; iii. the Garden Island Navy Base; iv. the Holsworthy Army barracks in Sydney; and v. the national power grid.262 The cell had done reconnaissance work around the Lucas Heights nuclear facility, and Lodhi had procured aerial photographs of various military installations.263 Around September 2003, the group were awaiting the arrival of an explosives expert, believed to be Abou Salah, the man who trained Willie Brigitte in explosives in Pakistan. This

cell member was supposed to have travelled into Australia disguised as a Georgian rugby supporter for the 2003 Rugby World Cup, but had difficulties in obtaining an Australian visa.264

On October 9, 2003, Willie Brigitte was arrested for visa violations and taken to the Villawood detention centre, following communications from the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, DST) in Paris who had tracked Brigitte to Australia.265 Izhar Ul-Haque was arrested on April 15, 2004,266 and Lodhi was arrested a week later on April 22.267 On August 23, 2006, Lodhi received a sentence of 20 years for his involvement in the plot.268 In March 2007, Brigitte was convicted by a French court of associating with a terrorist group, receiving a nine year sentence.269 This cell will be examined through social network analysis as part of this project.

2.5.2.2 MALLAH & THOMAS In early December 2003, Zekky Mallah, an Australian born Lebanese man was arrested in his home and charged with planning a terrorist act which was to involve killing members of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and ASIO. Mallah was also attempting to become Australia’s first suicide bomber, seeking permission from the radical Sheik Abdul Salam Zoud.270

Joseph Terrence Thomas was charged by the Australian Government of training in the al-Farooq al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan during March of 2001, where he met with Osama bin Laden on more than one occasion.271 In Afghanistan, Thomas fought against the Northern Alliance and assisted in obtaining passports for al-Qaeda members. When Thomas attempted to return to Australia in January of 2003, he was arrested by Pakistani authorities and eventually returned to Australia in June. After 17 months of freedom back in Australia, Thomas was arrested again, this time by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and charged with providing support to al-Qaeda.272 Thomas was acquitted of providing resources for a terrorist attack, but convicted of receiving funds from a terrorist organisation. This conviction was later overturned; however, Thomas was placed on a control order restricting his movements and contacts.

In July, 2005, Australian security sources revealed that ASIO had compiled a list of over 100 al-Qaeda (and affiliated groups) trained individuals who at that time resided in Australia,273 presenting a clear picture of the threat that 21st Century Islamic extremism poses to Australia.

2.5.2.3 THREATS TO AUSTRALIA In August 2005, an Australian man (identified as such only through accent and believed to be Matthew Stewart) dressed in Arab clothing and armed with an AK-47, appeared in a video released by al-Qaeda.274 In this video, the man, citing Western involvement in Iraq, stated: It is time for us to be equals…As you kill us, you’ll be killed. As you bomb us, you will be bombed…The honourable sons of Islam will not just let you kill our families in Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir and the Balkans, Indonesia, the Caucasus and elsewhere.275

This threat was followed by another shortly after to mark the fourth anniversary of the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. The man in this tape was American al-Qaeda member Adam Yahiye Gadahn, who asserted: Yesterday, London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne, Allah willing. And this time, don’t count on us demonstrating restraint or compassion…We love peace, but when the enemy violates that peace or prevents us from achieving it, then we love nothing more than the heat of battle, the echo of explosion and the slitting of the throats of the infidels.276

In addition to such threats, Australian institutions overseas, such as the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, have received threats from Islamic extremist organisations, along with other nations involved in the war in Iraq.277

2.5.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM RAIDS – NOVEMBER 2005 Between the late hours of November 7 and the early hours of November 8, 2005, Australian security and counter-terrorism authorities launched Operation Pendennis, a series of raids on suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne.278 Eight Sydney men and 10 Melbourne men were arrested and charged with offences ranging from “Conspiring to manufacture explosives in preparation for a terrorist attack” 279 to “Being a member of a terrorist organisation”.280 In preparation for an attack, the Melbourne cell had allegedly conducted surveillance of Flinders Street Station, the

Melbourne Stock Exchange, and the Casselden Place high-rise which houses many Commonwealth departments. The group also conducted paramilitary training in remote areas of Victoria.281

These assorted events, threats, and incidents indicate that Australia has had a considerable history of terrorism that has, to a degree, developed in unison with the stages of the phenomenon globally. While Australia had next to no terrorist events before the 1960s, international terrorism brought groups from all over the world who conducted operations aimed at specific sections of Australian society, but not at Australia or its government. The incidents of domestic terrorism differed in this regard, but by definition, domestic terrorism aims at conducting violence (or threats of violence) against the government or people of their nation. The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism has dramatically changed general perceptions of terrorism in Australia. For the first time, Australians and the Australian Government are the targets of terrorism, and not simply the innocent bystanders in conflicts that have transgressed to Australia. Although no genuine damage has occurred on Australian soil as a result of Islamic extremism, the comparative quantity of events over the last few years compared to the thirty-odd years of international terrorism experienced by Australia demonstrates that Islamic extremism poses a clear and substantial threat now and into the future.

3. SUMMARY This chapter has examined the phases, groups, modus operandi, and development of the phenomenon of terrorism from ancient terror, to the formation of organised and unified groups through the Sicarii, the Assassins, and the Thuggee, and followed it through its development into a tool of revolution, separatism, anti-colonialism, and religious extremism. Through the descriptive summaries of the selected groups that have used terrorism as a tool to achieve their ends, the chapter has also presented the development (largely driven through the advance of technology) of the different tactics: from assassination, to bombings, to mass casualty bombings, to biological terrorism, to suicide bombings. As has been established, Islamic extremism is the major form of terrorism in the early 21st Century.

The goals of the groups that make up the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement differ markedly from those that defined international terrorism throughout the late 1960s to 1980s. The organisation and sheer volume of the Islamic extremist groups resembles the development of Palestinian terrorism. However, the goals of the two strands of terrorism are markedly different. The goals of the Palestinian groups are nationalistic and have been largely limited to or involved the destruction of Israel, the liberation of Palestine, and in some cases, the instalment of Shariah law in selected countries. These groups have also focused attacks against US interests in the Middle East. 21st Century Islamic extremism builds on the Palestinian goals by seeking the full withdrawal of US forces from the Middle East, and the establishment of a global Islamic government operating under Shariah law, re-establishing the rule of the caliphs. Often, Islamic extremism does not distinguish between Christians and less- pious Muslims through its doctrines and its attacks. The global nature of the Salafi movement is significant in itself, with attacks and operations taking place in every corner of the globe. It is markedly clear that Islamic extremism and the Salafist ‘global jihad’ herald a new period in the history of terrorism and are not simply a new facet of international terrorism. Regardless, Islamic extremism poses a clear, significant, and immediate threat, not just to Western governments but to governments all over the world.

This chapter has examined the development of terrorism as a phenomenon, establishing clearly the concept of terrorism from below, and examined terrorism in Australia, and established a context for the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter has clarified the contemporary situation which both the world and Australia face. This examination has identified the key issues in the development of terrorism and the concepts critical to a further understanding of terrorism and terrorism in Australia. Additionally, this chapter has located a contextual basis and location in history for the four groups to be examined within this thesis. While this chapter has undertaken the pivotal role of understanding terrorism, its progression, and its current state, the following chapter aims to examine how the phenomenon has been studied within academia.

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF

TERRORISM STUDIES

CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES

The previous chapter has discussed both the development of the global phenomenon of terrorism and the development of terrorism in Australia, establishing a context and the major concepts of the thesis. This chapter will examine the development of the field of ‘Terrorism Studies’, which is the interdisciplinary academic field that examines all facets of the phenomenon of terrorism. This examination will explore the founding and evolution of the field, the nature of its contemporary interdisciplinary frameworks and the current foci of the field. The chapter will then move to discuss the historical and contemporary criticisms and weaknesses within the field. This discussion will lead to the development of this project’s primary objectives.

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD During the 1960s, there existed very few studies or research examining terrorism.1 Following the rise of international terrorism,i an initial response of applying general political violence theory was generated within the political science field. At the head of this approach was Ted Gurr, who in 1970 applied traditional theories of political violence to terrorism, most notably relative deprivation theory.2 ii Gurr and his fellow scholars attempted to understand exactly what terrorism is, and were frequently undermined by non-academic counter-terrorism and intelligence professionals. The formal meta-theoretical approaches from political science began to falter when they came under increasing criticism from wider academia, and consequently, were publicly labelled inept.

By the mid-1970s, many academics had abandoned the strictly political science approach and widened the field’s scope through sociological, communicative, and psychological theories aiming at explanatory research in relation to terrorism.3 Following this expansion, the field began to witness a relatively sharp increase in the amount of research and dissertations on terrorism. After the faltering of terrorism studies as a sub-field of political science purely based around the study of political violence, perspectives were offered through other disciplines such as psychology,

i The development of which was discussed in the previous chapter. ii The tension that arises from inconsistency between individuals’ value expectations and reality, consequently resulting in violence.

sociology, international relations, criminology, psychiatry, anthropology, and law, thus creating a multidisciplinary sub-field based within political science.4

1.1 EARLY LITERATURE 1.1.1 EARLY 1970s - POLITICAL SCIENCE RESPONSES Paul Wilkinson’s Political Terrorism of 1974 was among the earliest literature within the field and was the benchmark text for the field throughout the 1970s.5 As a review of the early literature of terrorism studies indicates, the initial focus of the literature was on the definitional problematic surrounding terrorism.iii In approaching this, Wilkinson attempted to distinguish political terror from general terror, then to define political terrorism, and finally, to distinguish both political terror and terrorism as independent forms of political violence.6 Wilkinson emphasised the importance of the study of terrorism in that period, and the general neglect of terrorism studies and research, specifically the insignificant foundation-based research undertaken prior to the early 1970s.7

Wilkinson then moved to a typology of the major varieties of political terrorism through their definitions, historical origins, attributes, and sub-types. From these categories he identified three typologies: revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and repressive terrorism.8 From there, Wilkinson, using a series of case studies, focused the study on the revolutionary and sub-revolutionary forms of terrorism.

Revolutionary and sub-revolutionary terrorism were closely examined through their varying forms. These six types were: the righteous assassin, terror against indigenous autocracy, liberation from foreign rule, resistance against totalitarianism, terror against liberal democracies, and international and sub-revolutionary terrorism. Wilkinson cited examples for each of these forms of terrorism throughout history, ranging from terrorism in ancient Japan and Rome to the contemporary Irish Republican Army (IRA).9

iii As discussed in the previous chapter, this remains a significant problem within the field today.

Wilkinson then shifted his focus to assess the state of the field of terrorism studies in its preliminary stages, in the face of mounting criticism of the pure political science approach, asserting that: …there is as yet no adequate and generally accepted scientific theory of political violence or of terrorism. Much of the most valuable insight yielded by modern analysis of political violence belongs to a far older tradition of statecraft and political wisdom, a tradition which it is most foolish to despise.10

This assessment of the state of terrorism studies is echoed over nearly three decades by academics and researchers within the field, as reviews of contemporary literature will demonstrate.

In 1975, Lester Sobel edited a piece of literature that comprised historical summaries of various terrorist activities and events in differing areas of the world in order to provide a history of terrorism from the late 1960s through to the 1970s. These reviews provided comprehensive reports of terrorist conflicts, kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and all manner of terrorist activities and issues, from the Middle East, Canada, Ireland, and West Germany. These summaries offered explanations of the origins, tactics, successes, and methods of these groups. Sobel’s piece concluded by examining the international action taken to counter terrorism. This examination included United Nations (UN) discussions of terrorism, the international responses to skyjacking, and pilot strikes as a response to the lack of action being taken against the terrorist tactic. While Sobel offered valuable and current information and insight into terrorist groups around the globe (elements which are essential for understanding terrorism), the accounts were descriptive only and offered little analysis or insight into the directions of the field.11 This work, while offering an important descriptive review and extending the literature within terrorism studies, did not contribute to what Wilkinson would have termed an “accepted scientific theory of political violence or terrorism”.12

1.1.2 MID 1970s - INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES Similar to the work of Sobel, International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander, provided alternate perspectives on international terrorism in 1976.13 This work reviewed terrorism activities in Canada, the United States (US), Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Soviet Union, Africa,

Britain, South Asia, the Middle East, and included a perspective from the UN. While these chapters focused on different areas of the world, the approaches also varied. For example, Robert Freedman examined Soviet policy towards international terrorism (including the sponsoring of Palestinian groups). This provided specific analytical elements that were lacking in Sobel’s effort of the previous year.14 Another example of this analysis is provided through Edward Weisband and Damir Roguly’s examination of Palestinian terrorism and the motivations and struggle for legitimacy of the groups.15 While Sobel’s offering to the field provided a much more comprehensive review of terrorist events around the world, the works within Alexander’s collaborative piece provided a level of in-depth analysis into the phenomenon and hence, appear to have made a stronger contribution to the development of the field.

In 1976 Fredrick Hacker offered to terrorism studies a psychiatric perspective.16 As is discernable from the title Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time, Hacker acknowledged three types of terrorists: the crazies, the criminals, and the crusaders. Hacker addressed state terrorism and terrorism from below through these three perspectives. He then moved to explore the motivations of the three classifications of terrorists, which were examined through the varying goals and beliefs of the different terrorists. These motivations were relatively abstract, and resembled behavioural generalisations rather than actual motivations behind terrorism. These speculations were applied to the reviews and biographies of different organisations. Hacker then applied his experience of psychology to the methods of conversion and programming utilised by terrorist groups to indoctrinate their members. Finally, as with the earlier literature, Hacker concluded with an application of his findings to counter-terrorism strategies and responses.17 This piece of literature was among the first to offer a credible alternative to the political science approach to terrorism studies.

Until the late 1970s, only singular approaches from a small number of disciplines had been offered within the field, with no attempt to unite the disciplines into an interdisciplinary framework. In 1977, the first step was taken towards this goal. The book Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Yonah Alexander and

Seymour Finger presented the perspectives of terrorism as provided through the fields of history, political science, law, the media, psychology, and the social sciences.18

The historical perspectives dealt with the general overview of terrorism, the definitional dilemmas of the phenomenon, and the origins of international terrorism.19 Robert Friedlander assessed the principal dilemma with terrorism studies since its infancy: Disagreement within the world community regarding the nature of the threat presented and the failure to agree upon effective remedial action results in part from confusion over both the origins and the composition of international terrorism. It has become commonplace to assert that a precise definition is lacking and that a working model has yet to be developed.20

The political science perspectives offered frameworks for understanding political violence movements through a conceptual approach,21 terrorism as a military weapon,22 and deterrence within the US’s policies on terrorism.23 The legal perspectives addressed terrorism within international law (and its implications)24 and extradition and prosecution processes.25 The media perspectives that were put forth examined terrorism’s relationship with the media26 and the comparative distinctions between these relationships in the US27 and the Middle East media spheres.28 These approaches were valuable contributions to the multidisciplinary approaches within terrorism studies.29

One of the more remarkable perspectives presented in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives was the statistical approach presented by Edward Mickolus, which made an attempt at predicting terrorist activity.30 This approach took into account the “type of attack…the location, the identity and nationality of the victims, the targets and demands of the terrorists, the types and extent of demands made, and the outcomes (damage, casualties, governmental responses)”.31 Mickolus claimed that while a statistical approach could offer close to predictability (when used by capable analysts), …we must remember that statistical analysis alone cannot answer everything. All disciplines and methods of analysis are useful, including contributions from international law, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, police, intelligence, political science, as well as statistics and mathematics.32

The psychological approach was presented again by Joseph Margolin who, from the outset, was critical of previous psychological behavioural approaches, describing them as “narrow, parochial, and [using] highly questionable effort to apply conventional psychiatric methods”.33 Again, the state of terrorism studies was assessed: “No area in the study of terrorism is receiving adequate attention today”. 34 As with Mickolus, Margolin endorsed a multidisciplinary approach which incorporated the assertions, opportunities, and limits of other disciplines. The study assessed the various methods within psychology and psychiatry and the appropriateness of their application to the study of terrorism. In particular, Margolin noted the need for interdisciplinary approaches to terrorism studies.

Walter Laqueur, a professor of political science and sociology, provided a political sociological approach to terrorism studies in 1977 through his book Terrorism.35 As with a majority of the literature of this period in the field, Laqueur began by defining terrorism through a historical review of terrorism and its associated facets of political violence.36 His focus then shifted to a study of the structure of various terrorist groups around the world examining the finance, intelligence, arms, tactics, the media, and counter-terrorism strategies associated with these groups. After examining the motivations of terrorists, including the frustration-aggression hypothesis,iv Laqueur claimed that “the results of the application of political science to the study of internal conflict, far from proving anything, have been quite negative, no truly scientific (that is predictive or explanatory) theories have emerged”.37 Laqueur provided three reasons for this: firstly, “a quantitative index cannot possibly reflect deprivation which defies ‘objective’ measurement”; 38 secondly, that research was unhistorical and ignored the fact that theories cannot be applied to all groups; and thirdly, analysis has been one-dimensional and assumed democracies to be the norm, ignoring modern dictatorships.39 Laqueur went further to claim that “fiction holds more promise for the understanding of the terrorist phenomenon than political science”.40 Here, Laqueur characterises the dissent against the pure political science approach that characterised this period of terrorism studies.

iv The frustration-aggression hypothesis is essentially the theory in which frustration increases the likelihood of aggression.

1.1.3 1980s - ‘BOOM PERIOD’ Following the development of the sub-field of terrorism studies in the 1970s, the 1980s saw a dramatic rise in the amount of research and literature on terrorism.41 This period was described by Gordon as the ‘take off’ years within the field.42 This period saw the launch of the two core journals of the field, with Studies in Conflict & Terrorism in 1977, and Terrorism and Political Violence issuing its first volume in 1989.

In 1982, Grant Wardlaw offered the field an approach from criminology in the book Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures. 43 Again, the opening discussion dealt with the definitional problems of terrorism, promptly followed by a historical summary of various forms of political violence and terrorism. The most significant aspects of this study were the author’s conflict resolution approaches, which he maintained could be achieved through policy change,44 a totalitarian state (which he argued is not appropriate), adequate support for counter-terrorism personnel, and adopting a policy of not meeting any political demands made by terrorists.45 The majority of the study dealt with counter-terrorism models and hostage negotiations and strategies. Wardlaw closed by acknowledging the contributions and validity of the behavioural sciences and encouraged these disciplines to increase their participation in the field.

In the literature reviewed from 1974 to 1982, the period in which the field of terrorism studies began to flourish in light of the rise of international terrorism, approaches were offered from political science, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, law, history, mathematics (statistical analysis), and criminology. Each study offered differing approaches and perspectives to the study of terrorism. Gordon asserted that terrorism studies was, and remained, “a multidisciplinary field, with political science the core discipline to which the subject is attached”.46

The first distinction of the terrorism studies literature from the 1970s to the mid 1980s is that the definition of terrorism and its associated concepts were problematic in that there was not a single or universal definition of terrorism. Instead, it seems that there were many definitions which were applied by the various approaches. The second distinction was that a significant portion of the literature applied its findings to

counter-terrorism strategies and relevant policy. The final and most significant generalisation was the demand for a comprehensive and interdisciplinary framework for the study of terrorism.

1.1.3.1 SCHMID & JONGMAN’S APPRAISAL In 1988, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman released Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature; this book essentially became the Bible for terrorism research.47 The book was written as an assessment of the field of terrorism research, examining: terrorism and related concepts; theories; data and data bases on state and non-state terrorism, and; the literature of terrorism. This piece of literature also contained an extensive bibliography of political terrorism, and a ‘World Directory of Terrorist and other Organisations Associated with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence, and Protest’.

The first chapter examined the definition of terrorism through interviews with the field’s leading researchers whose definitions of terrorism differed dramatically. The authors examined the issue in fine detail, addressing conceptual concerns from symbolic violence, narrow and broad definitions, the concept of one definition of terrorism or many definitions for the varying forms, terrorism as a method of combat, terrorism without terror, the communication function, and additional conceptual problems with the definition.48 Jongman and Schmid then moved to examine the numerous typologies of terrorism. The authors presented the definitional issue as a grave dilemma within the field.

The next chapter examined the theories of terrorism, with a wide scope, including theories of political violence, common wisdom, terrorism from above, terrorist theories of terrorism, psychological theory, communication theory, and sociological theory. Jongman and Schmid made it obvious through their analysis of responses from leading researchers that the state of theory development within the field was poor, and focused more on policy than scientific advancement.49 The researchers “pleaded for interdisciplinary approaches or comparative studies, both contemporary and historical, as a means to advance the state of thinking”.50

The final chapterv assessed the literature of terrorism, through an analysis of both macro-studies, which focused on historical and political/sociological studies, and micro-studies, which in turn focused on preventative, medical, psychology, strategy, and countermeasure research.51 Again, this section of the field was severely criticised. Jongman and Schmid cited the lack of substantive research within the field, describing the bulk of the literature as: …impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often pretentious, venturing far- reaching generalisations on the basis of episodal evidence. The subject matter is not one which invites dispassion, and the sense of moral outrage and resulting eagerness to condemn has often hindered authors from a deeper understanding of terrorism...There are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the literature is not research based in any rigorous sense; instead, it is too often narrative, condemnatory, and prescriptive.52

Jongman and Schmid sum their assessment of the field through a question posed to the leading researchers: “Where do you see the elements of cumulativeness and maturation in the literature on terrorism?”.53 The responses ranged from “virtually nowhere” to “nowhere as yet”. 54

1.2 CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM STUDIES The contemporary study of terrorism remains a multidisciplinary area of study and has developed significantly into a recognised field that encompasses any study of terrorism and its associated effects, concepts, theories, and counter-measures. As mentioned previously, terrorism studies has two core academic journals, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Terrorism and Political Violence, which encompass the works that epitomise the field. These journals lead the field in publishing studies from the varying disciplines examining the phenomenon of terrorism. The field has continued the strong tradition of interdisciplinary approaches called for by the early works of the 1970s. Terrorism studies is based in political science because terrorism is a social phenomenon and must therefore be examined through the social sciences. Terrorism affects many aspects of society and human experience, and can therefore be examined by all of the areas it affects; hence its interdisciplinary nature. As a result of this interdisciplinary nature and the rapid development of the field, the literature and the research relating to terrorism are available through multiple sources ranging from v The chapter on data and data bases on state and non-state terrorism will be overlooked as this chapter’s relevance is insignificant.

law journals and local periodicals, science and technology journals, general interest journals, economic, business and management journals, and traffic and shipping journals,55 in addition to the core terrorism journals. The growth and interdisciplinary nature of the field after the 1980s is evidenced through the fact that research on terrorism can be sought through a diverse variety of databases such as the Aerospace, Engineering Index, MEDLINE (DIALOG), INSPEC, and UNCOVER databases.56

Due to the breadth of the terrorism studies research area, there are many foci within the field. The following section of the chapter will briefly outline the main foci of the field synthesised from a study by Avishag Gordon, which examined the academic study of terrorism after 2001.57 To demonstrate the foci and the areas of study within each focus, contemporary terrorism research is examined through the articles of the two chief terrorism studies journals mentioned previously. In an examination of the levels of data and analysis within terrorism studies, Andrew Silke claimed that these two journals “can be regarded as providing a reasonably balanced impression of research activity in the field”58 and as such will be used in this examination. The articles examined were published between 1998 and 2006 (with one from 1991). This analysis does not intend to be an exhaustive and definitive map of the field, but rather a guide to the areas of focus and research within terrorism studies. The analysis of the contemporary literature within the major journals indicates that terrorism studies research can be divided into four major foci: i. The Phenomenon of Terrorism iii. Terrorist Tactics ii. Terrorists iv. Counter-Terrorism There is research that lies outside these areas, however, its focus will usually be within the general categorisation of one of these areas. Each of these areas is interdependent and each focus has been developed such that its separation and independent understanding is necessary for insight into the total framework of terrorism studies.

1.2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM The first focus of the literature aims to examine the phenomenon of terrorism. The scope of the focus is broad, ranging from treating issues such as the definitional dilemmas regarding the phenomenon to treating and categorising the concepts that concern the field. The literature below gives examples of examinations of concepts

and definitions associated with the phenomenon and the different typologies of terrorism.

1.2.1.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM The first article within this area, by Alex Schmid, investigates the location of terrorism in relation to the concepts and contexts of crime, warfare, politics, propaganda, and religion.59 Schmid asserts that if a framework of terrorism is employed using a single context, incidents lying within the other contexts are inevitably ignored. The author examines the situation of terrorism within each of these contexts, with each providing useful understanding and insight into different forms of terrorism. Schmid sums by suggesting that a unilateral approach would possibly result in misunderstanding “the full nature and scope of the terrorist motivations and modes of operation. All relevant aspects need to be properly considered to understand terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.60

In an attempt to determine why a universally agreed upon definition of terrorism has eluded the field, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler employ an empirical analysis of the definitions used within the major terrorism journals.61 Weinberg et al. base their study on Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 research with the same focus, measuring 22 definitional elements used in definitions of terrorism ranging from violence, to intimidation, to publicity, and to fear. From the 55 articles examined, Weinberg et al. determined through the most popular definitional elements that the consensus definition is: “Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role”.62 The authors concede that this definition is too general to be operable, and leaves out many important concepts. As a result, the authors state that unless the field is willing to concede that terrorism as a very broad and wide-ranging concept, it may benefit from finding an alternative governing concept.

1.2.1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM In an examination of the nature of religious terrorism, Mark Sedgwick analyses the political roots in the objectives of religious terrorist groups.63 Sedgwick uses al-Qaeda as the subject of his analysis, examining the goals and strategy behind the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Through this analysis, Sedgwick

finds that al-Qaeda’s strategy is comparable to the anarchist propaganda of the deed doctrine (discussed in the previous chapter), aiming to mobilise its Islamic constituency. The article finds that while al-Qaeda is clearly a group espousing religious terrorism, its objectives are as political as those of any other group. Sedgwick notes that a terrorist group with political goals can be responded to through political measures, just as any other variety of terrorism.

In another article examining the religious variant of terrorism, Ayla Schbley attempts to define the religious terrorism typology.64 Schbley begins this attempt by rewording the definition of terrorism, moving away from traditional political approaches (which were subjective) and advocating a concise, apolitical, criminal definition. In an attempt to define a religious terrorist, which was not completely possible within the article, Schbley uses psychometric measures synthesised from data collected from 356 terrorists (341 surveys and 15 interviews). From the results of this survey and an anthological study of taped self-immolations of 15 terrorists and 918 zealots, the author presents a 32 point profile of a religious terrorist. To demonstrate, the first two points of the profile are: 1. Shi’a religious terrorism is a method of forcefully communicating a perceived divine message/command. 2. Shi’a religious terrorism is performed by elements with strong ethno- religious identity.65

While Schbley acknowledges that this profile is based on Lebanese Shiite religious terrorism, the profile may also be applicable to Sunni groups. Schbley sums by introducing the typology of International Islamic Terrorism, of which the above profile examines a certain strand (despite its applicability to other areas) and advocates further theory-building within the International Islamic Terrorism typology.

1.2.2 TERRORISTS The examination of terrorists and terrorist organisations is an immense area of the field and is perhaps the focus which best demonstrates the field’s interdisciplinary nature. Studies in this focus examine terrorism from perspectives such as anthropology, sociology, political science, international relations, psychology, and psychiatry.

1.2.2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES Zachary Abuza’s article provides a historical review of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and their operations in the Southern Philippines from 1978 to 2005.66 Abuza begins his examination by focusing on the peace talks that have been taking place between the MILF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, facilitated by the US. Abuza then moves to discuss the possibility of factionalism within the MILF, leading into an assessment of the current military strength and capacity of the group, with estimates as low as 12 000 and as high as 100 000. The author then discusses the links between the MILF and other terrorist organisations such as Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) and the Abu-Sayyaf Group. Abuza concludes his article with an assessment of the state of the MILF, stating that the group have clearly demonstrated a level of competence on the battlefield that indicates that they will not be defeated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but inversely can never achieve victory through armed struggle.

Another example of a qualitative descriptive review is provided by Mark Wrighte’s profile of the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Army, EPR) in Mexico.67 This profile examines the historical origins, tactics, splinter groups, and terrorist activity of the EPR, followed by a comparison to the Zapatista National Revolutionary Army. These examples and the focus itself are vital within the literature and the field. Descriptive historical reviews provide a contextual background and the basis of understanding for any analysis from any discipline. The importance of this area is proven when examining the literature within the other areas. Each study must begin with at least some level of qualitative review focus, to establish a contextual background for the study.

1.2.2.2 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES In an article espousing a sociological approach, Fernando Reinares examines an empirical assessment of the evolving social and demographic profiles of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, ETA) terrorist group.68 Reinares analyses an extensive range of characteristics of over 600 ETA members. Through this analysis, the article finds that a large majority of members who joined ETA were male, recruited between their late teens and early twenties and were born in and resided in urban areas. The largest distribution of members was from the working

class and almost half were born in the Guipuzcoa province of Basque country. Reinares also found that the distribution of ETA members’ sociological characteristics was consistent with the profiles of other Western secular terrorist organisations that developed from the late 1960s. The final finding of the article was that an inversion of the ETA members’ profile had taken place between 1970 and 1995. The average recruitment age of the group lowered in the mid-1980s and recruits originated from urban and metropolitan backgrounds with a low proportion of euskeravi speakers. The working class base of the group’s recruitment also changed to students below the university level.

The second example of a sociological perspective is presented by Anwar Alam and provides a sociological examination of al-Jama’a al-Islammiya’s (Islamic Group) rise and operations in Egypt in order to establish a historical and cultural context of Islamic terrorism.69 Alam begins the article by discussing the development of al- Jama’a and their shift towards terrorist operations in the early to mid-1990s. The author then notes that the large majority of the group members were of a Sai’di vii background.

The article conducts an examination of the social influences and clashes within and between the northern and southern regions of Egypt. Alam maintains the argument that al-Jama’a rose in Egypt through political, social, and economic factors that affected its local context, and as such “al-Jama’a signifies a socio-political movement to fight for social equality, justice, and dignity as well as to have a legitimate share in the power arrangement of local and provincial administration”.70 Alam sums by illustrating that the case of al-Jama’a and the differences in origins and motivations from other Egyptian groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jihad, demonstrate that within Islamic terrorism, different groups are aligned with different agendas and are motivated by varying causes.

vi The language spoken by the Basque people. vii Sai’di refers to southern Egypt, also known as Upper Egypt.

1.2.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES The behavioural foci area of the literature offers multidisciplinary perspectives on terrorist and terrorist group behaviour, with a majority of the literature being produced by the psychological, sociological, and anthropological disciplines. The first example of this is provided by Jacob Rabbie, whose article presents a ‘Behavioural Interaction Model’ with the aim of providing a framework for the socio-psychological study of terrorism.71 Rabbie briefly engages in the debate of defining terrorism, noting that for the purpose of his article terrorism is considered a form of psychological warfare employing violence. The article then introduces the behavioural interaction model and the two major foci of the model. The first is the environment, which consists of three components: physical environment; internal and external social environment; and the structure of interdependence between the subjects/organisations. The second focus of the model is the psychological orientation, which had the following components: cognitive, emotional, and normative orientations; action tendencies, intentions, and behaviour; and evaluation of goals and achievement. Rabbie concludes that the model is in a preliminary stage and currently only provides useful only as a descriptive mechanism; the model was created with the intention of providing some coherence to terrorism studies. The article finishes with the hope that this framework can stimulate further research on the behaviour of terrorists through the socio-psychological approach.

Another piece of literature within this focus is provided by Max Taylor and John Horgan72 in their examination of the behavioural bases between Islamic extremism and violence and how it is possible to understand ideological and religious control of an individual’s behaviour. The central contention of this piece is an attempt to explain the behaviour of Islamic terrorists through the nature of the Islamic state and anti- Western sentiment, following an examination of the bases of Islamic fundamentalism. Taylor and Horgan examine the processes of fundamentalism through psychological and behavioural approaches, finding that “the processes of fundamentalism are not beyond analysis, nor do they fall outside the conceptual structures already available to psychology”.73 The authors state that the comprehension of the concepts examined in the study will assist in better policy-making and benefit the conceptualisation of fundamentalism within psychological approaches to terrorism. The article concludes

by noting the significance of research that aims at understanding fundamentalist behaviour, encouraging empirical research in the area.

1.2.2.4 POLITICAL SCIENCE As the review of the early terrorism studies literature demonstrated, the field has always been based within political science and the various approaches that the discipline espouses. This remains the case in the contemporary literature as the following articles establish. While many of the other articles within this review originate within and champion a political science approach, this section specifically examines literature that uses political science as an approach to examining terrorists and terrorist groups.

The first example of this approach, provided by Magnus Ranstorp,74 was an examination of the Osama bin Laden’s fatwa released on February 22, 1998, as well as the ‘Declaration of War’, which was released in 1996. Ranstorp maintains that these two documents provide an insight into what he calls the ‘bin Laden phenomenon’.viii The article provides comprehensive analysis and insight into bin- Laden’s ideology and his fatwa. The first insight is that the issue of the fatwa is a means of undertaking psychological warfare against the enemies of Islam. Ranstorp’s analysis also concludes that the fatwa illustrates bin Laden’s significant and comprehensive knowledge of the political, geographical, and operational environments on local, regional, and global issues and contexts. The fatwa is also the first demonstration of bin Laden’s alliance with other radical Islamic groups. Ranstorp notes bin Laden’s lack of Islamic scholarship, specifically noting that the fatwa is not binding to Muslims. Ranstorp continues and notes the inclusion of Sheikh Mir Hamzah as a signatory, which provides religious authority and broader approval for the fatwa. The article also establishes the clear appeal for application of the fatwa through jihad, supported through the Koran and Islamic history and the mobilisation of the Islamic masses. Ranstorp sums by assessing that bin Laden’s fatwa is nothing new or revolutionary, but represents many broad consciences within the Middle East and the Islamic community. As such, the ideology can be seen as novel when

viii This is especially insightful, as the article was published in 1998.

examining these two documents, as it represents an “unfolding ethnopolitical and religious [force] in the Middle East”.75

James Piazza, in his article, examines the hypothesis that terrorism is caused by poverty, inequality, and low economic conditions.76 Piazza firstly examines the incidence of terrorism versus the average gross domestic product per capita within various countries as initial evidence that the previously mentioned factors were not determinants of terrorism. The study then employs regression analysis models to examine terrorist operations and attacks in 96 countries between 1986 and 2002. Piazza’s results negated the popular theory that terrorism was caused by poverty and low economic development, also invalidating the similarly popular relative deprivation theory. The study instead found factors such as “population, ethno- religious diversity, increased state repression and most significantly, the structure of party politics…to be significant predictors of terrorism”.77 Piazza concludes by suggesting that social cleavage theory is a more appropriate model with which to examine the causes and predictors of terrorism, with the paradigmatic cases of this approach being India, Israel, and Columbia.

1.2.3 TERRORIST TACTICS The third focus area of the field to be treated is the terrorist tactics focus. This focus essentially examines the modus operandi of all manner of terrorist organisations. These examinations include the weapons used, target selection, methods of communication and interaction, overall long-term strategy, area of operations, and goals. The literature used to demonstrate the nature of this focus examines the different types of research examining terrorist tactics, including target selection, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons (CBRN), suicide attacks, cyber-terrorism, and general reviews of tactics.

1.2.3.1 TARGET SELECTION The first example of an article examining the target selection methods of terrorists and terrorist organisations is provided by C.J.M. Drake.78 Drake begins his article by discussing the factors involved in the target selection of terrorists, noting that ideology is a fundamental process within this selection. Despite the centrality of ideology

within this process, Drake notes that no single factor can explain terrorists’ target selection. Drake defines ideology as “the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives – however ill-defined or tenuous – by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims”.79 The article moves to discuss exactly how ideology influences the target selection of terrorists, focusing on how an ideology identifies and dehumanises enemies of the group and assigns guilt to particular institutions and individuals, establishing what are called ‘legitimate targets’. Drake provides specific examples of this process, citing the Symbionese Liberation Army, Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Red Brigades (RB), Red Army Faction (RAF), and (Irish) Loyalist terrorists. Following comparative analysis of the targets selected by groups of different ideologies, Drake finds that ideological differences lead to differences in target selection of the differing groups. The article concludes by stating that the target selection of terrorists is crucially affected by ideology.

In a second example of research focusing on the target selection of terrorist groups, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Daphna Canetti-Nisim examine the social profiles of suicide bombers and their victims during the second intifada in Israel and the Occupied Territories.80 The authors firstly examine what a suicide bomber is, and then evaluate the Palestinians’ use of the tactic, noting the success of its use within the second intifada. Following this, Weinberg et al. establish that the profile of a suicide bomber (contrary to popular belief) is an older, more experienced member within the organisation. The focus shifts to the victims of suicide bombings, the authors noting that as the intent of the tactic is to kill as many Jews as possible, the targets are public transport facilities and vehicles, shopping centres, and popular restaurants. As a result of the selection of these targets, people at the lower end of the socio-economic scale and students comprised the highest proportion of casualties.

1.2.3.2 WMD & CBRN The study of WMD and CBRN, and their use, or potential use, in the hands of terrorists is an area of the field that has gained increased attention in recent years.ix Robert Bunker’s study, Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism,81 attempts to provide a conceptual framework for the understanding of weapons of mass

ix As the review of post-September 11 analytical work (below) will demonstrate.

disruption.x Bunker begins by examining the traditional definition and conceptual frameworks of WMD and CBRN in light of emerging forms of weapons such as information warfare, electronic warfare, directed energy weapons, and advanced non- lethal weapons. After establishing a conceptual framework for weapons of mass disruption through concepts such as weapon morphology and effects, weapon threshold, and destruction and disruption, Bunker presents the following as examples of weapons of mass disruption: i. Radio Frequency Weaponry ii. Isotropic Radiators iii. Non-Lethal Chemical Agents iv. Radiological Devices (Genetic Altercation) v. Liquid Metal Embrittlement vi. Computer Viruses vii. Non-Lethal Biological Viruses.82

Another example of the research into WMD is provided by Daniel Gressang,83 who looks at the potential use of WMD by terrorists by firstly examining previous arguments and works on the subject. In doing so, Gressang draws on the behavioural foci, ideological analysis focus, and the understandings of the different types of terrorists (provided through descriptive reviews). Gressang went further to look at the intended message behind the use of WMD. Again, these two studies differ in their specific aims within the WMD and CBRN focus but are equally important: while Bunker looked at the differing types of WMD and other weapons intended for the same purpose, Gressang assessed the potential use of those weapons through the applications of understandings within other fields and areas of focus. Because the use of a CBRN or WMD by a terrorist group is arguably the single greatest threat posed by the phenomenon, this area of focus is vital to the field.

1.2.3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS In examining the tactic of suicide bombing employed by Palestinians during the second intifada, Assaf Moghadam presents a two-stage model which explores the factors and procedures behind the tactic.84 The article examines suicide attacks

x As opposed to Weapons of Mass Destruction.

conducted by Palestinians against Israel that occurred between September 2000 and June 2002 through a two-phase model. The first phase, the motivational phase, examines why an individual is motivated to become a suicide bomber through aspects such as religious motives, personal motives, nationalist motives, economic motives, and through sociological aspects. The second phase, the organisational phase, examines areas such as organisational goals and motives, the different Palestinian groups that employ suicide tactics, and the recruitment, training, indoctrination, planning, execution, weapon procurement, division of labour and compartmentalisation, and target selection of those groups. Moghadam finds that a large majority of individuals who choose to become suicide bombers are motivated by multiple factors. Moghadam concludes his article with the counter-terrorism applications of his research, stating that the Israeli targeting of organisational structures to prevent terrorism will have short-term effects on these groups, but they need to adopt a long-term strategy of reducing the incentives and motivations for individuals to participate in suicide terrorism.

Andrew Silke’s article examining the suicide tactic offers a historical review of the tactic of such attacks in an attempt to offer advantages and insight into current endeavours to understand and counter suicide terrorism.85 Silke begins by examining suicide as a political weapon, citing Cato’s suicide as a message of defiance to Caesar in 44BC and the use of setsujoku (suicide to avoid disgrace) and kanshi (suicide to protest) by Japanese samurai.

The article’s treatment of suicide as a political statement moves to look at the suffragette movement in Britain in the early 1900s, the RAF members who committed suicide in Stammheim prison in West Germany, and the hunger strike of imprisoned members of the IRA in 1981. The focus of the article then shifts to examine suicide in acts of violence, citing Samson’s suicide, King Leonidas of Sparta’s last stand at the hands of Xerxes’ invading army in 481BC, Hussein ibn Ali’s (Muhammad’s grandson) fatal stand against Yazid’s troops, and the defenders of the Alamo in 1836. Finally, Silke conducts a review of and then compares the kamikaze pilots of World War II with Islamic extremist suicide bombers, drawing parallels in relation to the rejection of calling the event ‘suicide’, and instead labelling their bodies as weapons for use in a righteous act against their enemies. Silke concludes his article by

establishing that historical reviews of suicide as an instrument of war and politics offers many objective insights into the tactic employed by Islamic extremists in the present day. This assessment is made on the basis that objectivity and dispassion regarding Islamic extremism are difficult due to the contemporary and recent nature of such events.

1.2.3.4 CYBER-TERRORISM Gabriel Wiemann, in the article ‘Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears’, assesses the threat of the tactic of cyber-terrorism.86 As defined by Weimann, cyber-terrorism is “the use of computer network tools to harm or shut down critical infrastructure”.87 Weimann’s article attempts to assess the present and potential threat that the tactic actually poses. Weimann examines the increasing alarm (propagated by politicians and the media) over the tactic and distinguishes cyber-terrorism from hackers. The article concludes that conventional tactics currently used by terrorists pose the significantly greater threat. However, he warns against the complacency that resulted in the September 11 attacks. Weimann proposes the possibility of a large scale conventional attack combined with a cyber-terrorism attack on communications infrastructure, the result of which would be potentially catastrophic. The evidence suggests that while terrorist groups are extensively using the internet in their current operations, they have yet to resort to cyber-terrorism. The threat may be exaggerated and manipulated in some spheres, but its threat and existence cannot be denied or ignored.

In another example of an examination of the cyber-terrorism tactic, Michael Knights and Lorenzo Valeri88 examine ‘Offensive Information Warfare’ (OIW)xi and its use by terrorists to attack symbolic and critical infrastructure targets. OIW is described by the authors as the “set of activities carried out by individuals and/or groups with specific political and strategic objectives, aimed at the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the data collected, stored and transferred inside information systems connected to the internet”.89 The study outlines the rationale behind OIW, then examines the formulation of terrorists’ operational style (including target selection) and examines the likely terrorist uses and methods of OIW, particularly against the xi Which they refer to as a component of Arquilla & Ronfeldt’s ‘Netwar’, to be discussed in the following chapter.

critical infrastructure of a nation. The study goes further to examine the effects and implications of OIW on the trust “that underpins the commercial and financial operations of wide-area networks”.90 The article ends by evaluating the threat of the tactic and examining the counter-measures available against the tactic, including those that have already been implemented.

1.2.3.5 GENERAL TACTICS Peter John’s91 study of the process of ‘skyjacking’ discusses the processes and instances of the tactic and addresses the responses adopted by various governments. John describes the effects of this tactic: Airport property or even the plane itself may be blown up. Human lives may be threatened or taken. Backed by periodic torture or even killings, threats may be used to extort money, or to obtain the release of prisoners, the publication of manifestos, or safe conduct to another country far away from the scene of the crime.92

John examines the history of the tactic throughout the world, followed by an in-depth case study of the crash of the Pan Am 103 (the Lockerbie disaster). The case study examines the various theories behind the publicly unsolved disaster. These theories include the Libyan intelligence agents’ involvement; the Iranian Government’s revenge for the US Navy’s shooting down of Iran Air flight 655; the possible ‘blowback’ from US interference in the Lebanese drug trade; and the assassination of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hostage negotiation team. John then progresses to discuss the warnings that were given and the intelligence failures that contributed to the disaster as well as the flaws within the aviation industry’s security measures. John sums up his article by evaluating the threat of skyjacking and aerial terrorism, discussing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East as a result of US foreign policy.

Another example of the study of a terrorist tactic, although a relatively new one, is Joseph Foxell’s examination of the ‘Agro-Terrorism’ tactic.93 Foxell succinctly defines agro-terrorism as “attacks on a society’s agricultural infrastructure”,94 and his article attempts to examine the increasing threat of this tactic. The article examines Imperial Germany’s use of bio-agricultural warfare in World War I, when German agents infected American horses and livestock bound for British and French armies with anthrax and glanders. Foxell discusses the US vulnerabilities to agro-terrorism

and the potential economic impact of such an attack. The methods of a potential agroterrorism attack are then discussed, examining the contamination of crops or livestock, contamination of animal feed, scenarios with adulterated seeds, and the contamination of municipal water supplies. The motivations of the use of the tactic are discussed in relation to newer forms of terrorism where the destruction of the society is the goal. Like the examination of cyber-terrorism by Weimann, Foxell’s concludes that we must be prepared for the event of agro-terrorism, despite the lower likelihood of such an event happening.

1.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM As demonstrated in the review of the early literature within the field, counter- terrorism research has always been a prevalent focus within terrorism studies. The approaches that are most common to this stream of terrorism studies are legal studies, political science, policing, and intelligence. Most literature within the field will employ elements of counter-terrorism to the findings and applications of their research. This section concerns the specific counter-terrorism focus itself and the literature to follow will specifically focus on counter-terrorism strategies and applications.

1.2.4.1 NATIONAL In an examination of national counter-terrorism measures, Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp discuss the limits of liberal democracy in combating terrorism,95 with specific reference to Israel. The article assesses whether a ‘criminal justice model’ or a ‘war model’ is more appropriate to the pursuance of counter-terrorism strategies. Using the example of Israel, the article outlines the war model approach adopted by Israel shortly after its inception in 1948, and its move to the criminal justice approach by the 1970s. The authors outline the ‘expanded criminal justice model’, which was previously a grey area between the two aforementioned models.

Bradley Bamford provides another example of an article examining national counter- terrorism in his analysis of the counter-terrorism arrangements of the United Kingdom (UK) in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.96 It must be acknowledged that this article was published in 2004, before the bombings in London on July 7, 2005. Bamford’s article begins with an assessment of the threat of terrorism to the UK,

noting its extensive experience with terrorism through the Northern Ireland troubles. This assessment notes the previous Islamic extremist plots to attack the London Underground in 2002, Heathrow airport in 2003, and the Ricin plot, also in 2003. The author examines the threats posed by al-Qaeda, North African extremists, and other Islamic extremists devoted to the cause. Bamford then examines the UK’s response to the September 11 attacks and the threat currently posed by such groups. This examination covers the counter-terrorist agencies such as Military Intelligence section 5 (MI5) and the Special Branches within the local police forces, discussing their counter-terrorism roles.

The article then shifts to examine the role of intelligence in the UK’s counter- terrorism efforts, discussing the difficulties of gathering intelligence on al-Qaeda prior to 2001. Bamford then examines the increased intelligence cooperation between states since 2001, as well as the proactive legal and financial approaches, target hardening, emergency planning, interagency cooperation, and military deployment. Bamford concludes by acknowledging that the fact that there has not been an attack on the UK since 2001 is either an indication that the counter-terrorism measures are working, or that terrorists have not made a concerted effort to attack. In sum, Bamford says it is unrealistic to expect total security.

1.2.4.2 INTERNATIONAL The counter-terrorism focus is examined on an international scale by Oldrich Bures in an article examining counter-terrorism policy implemented by the EU following the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks.97 Bures begins this exploration with an analysis of the roots of the EU’s current counter-terrorism policy, beginning with the policies of the European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s. This analysis traces the development of the policy to 2001, which leads to an examination of the response to the al-Qaeda attacks of the same year, particularly the adoption of the Plan of Action (the European policy to combat terrorism). This analysis examines the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing in the form of Europol, the establishment and expansion of Eurojust, the introduction of a universal definition of terrorism, and the freezing of assets belonging to identified and presumed terrorists. Bures then moves to examine the counter-terrorism arrangements in light of the al-Qaeda attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which saw the revision

and enhancement of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies. Bures concludes his article by suggesting that the EU will have difficulty in implementing the political agreements that are required to establish more effective counter-terrorism policy. In this suggestion, Bures cites the multitude of cultural, legal, and political changes required, and the policymaker’s failure to address the causes of terrorism.

In another article examining international counter-terrorism measures, Nora Bensahel examines the various coalitions against terror, arguing that a single ‘coalition against terror’ is misleading.98 Bensahel claims that the notion of a ‘coalition of coalitions’ is a more appropriate term. The first coalition outlined by the article is the military coalition, whose role it is to track down and eliminate terrorist leaders and bases, demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom. The second is the financial coalition, which attempts to trace and seize the financial networks of terrorist organisations consisting of national and international agencies. The next coalition concerns international law enforcement efforts which are required for the apprehension of the modern international terrorist. The fourth is the intelligence coalition which aims to reduce terrorist capabilities and to provide warning of impending attacks. The final coalition is the reconstruction coalition which aims at reconstructing unstable areas where terrorist organisations can increase their support and recruitment bases. Bensahel then examines the scope, costs (of both formation and maintenance), the utility of Non-Government Organisations (NGO), sub-state, and private actors, and preventive versus reactive policy in relation to the different coalitions. The author sums by saying that successful counter-terrorism policy must employ all of the coalitions and that the strategy adopted will determine the importance of each coalition.

1.2.4.3 NON-STATE An example of an article examining a non-state approach to counter-terrorism is provided by Jayantha Dhanapala in the analysis of the UN’s response to the September 11 attacks.99 Dhanapala traces the development of UN policy following the 2001 attacks, specifically the speedy adoption of Resolution 1373 and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The author discusses the importance of the UN to maintaining human rights in the campaign against terrorism, a principle function of the UN. Dhanapala also examines the actions of the General

Assembly and the Secretariat, which condemned the attacks and (through a policy working group) aimed to dissuade aggrieved movements from adopting terrorism, denying them the means to undertake terrorism, and to cooperate internationally against terrorism. Dhanapala makes a final recommendation that a commission on terrorism should be established within the Economic and Social Council of the UN to provide an annual meeting within the international community to discuss specific issues related to terrorism and the appropriate responses.

1.2.4.4 GENERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES Patrick O’Neil examines the complexity involved in the implementation of a biometric system for the purpose of countering terrorism.100 This examination contends that the enterprise of the modern terrorist aims to subvert complex systems in order to create mass destruction and disorder. O’Neil builds on this assertion to claim that the establishment of a complex counter-terrorism system, such as a biometric national identity card, would merely create another target for terrorists to attack. The article examines the development of the biometric debate in recent years through risk and organisational theory, in an attempt to determine whether biometrics would “make people safer”. 101

Another example of a general counter-terrorism focus is offered by David Veness.102 From the outset, Veness offers seven propositions of the worlds of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It is important to note that this article was published in September 2001, just prior to the September 11 attacks. Veness’ propositions can be synthesised as: i. Low intensity and high impact conflict complemented by variation and complexity are the key features of terrorism; ii. Newer, more diffuse forms of terrorism are complementing the old challenges posed by terrorism; iii. The traditional geographical basis of terrorism is transforming, with a particular emphasis on South East Asia; iv. Terrorism and crime are collaborating on more fronts; v. Newer tactics such as cyber-terrorism and the use of WMD deserve serious but rational examination; and that vi. Counter-terrorism methods must be flexible, innovative, and continuous.103

Veness considers the evolution of terrorism and the various strategies to be adopted to combat this evolution, placing importance on intelligence, forensic science, and the cohesion and flexibility of counter-terrorism elements, while following the development of terrorism and counter-terrorism simultaneously.104

1.3 AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE The terrorism studies field in Australia has developed in stark contrast to the field in the rest of the world. Although Australia has yielded many influential terrorism researchers, such as Grant Wardlaw,xii the research concerning terrorism in Australia is sparse at best, with modest academic qualitative literature and little quantitative research or substantive analysis into the phenomenon in Australia. The history of terrorism in Australia, presented in the previous chapter, indicates that while Australia does not have a very extensive history of terrorism, there have been significant events and groups worthy of academic analysis (both qualitative and quantitative). The following paragraphs review the qualitative literature concerning terrorism in Australia. While some of the following literature may not be considered within the academic field of terrorism studies, their inclusion in such a review is vital, firstly due to the limited literature on the subject, and secondly, to ensure a comprehensive coverage of that literature. The development of the Australian literature responded to terrorist events in Australia, the principle two events being the Ustashi movements and the Hilton bombing.

1.3.1 USTASHI LITERATURE Most of the early literature on terrorism in Australia is limited to subjective descriptive reviews of the Ustashi movements in Australia. In a piece of literature released by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundationxiii in 1972,105 the organisation attempted to raise awareness of Ustashi groups in Australia. The short book detailed the crimes of the Ustasha government in the former fascist Croatia and the political debate within Australian political circles as to the validity of reports of Ustashi groups in Australia. The author examined literature detailing the history, tactics, vows, and goals of such organisations, as well as their ties to organisations such as the Croatian Soccer Club in Sydney. The Ustashi’s activities in Australia were then detailed, xii Currently the National Manager of Intelligence for the Australian Federal Police. xiii An organisation that aims at the achievement of peace, human rights, and social justice.

ranging from their bombings in Sydney and Canberra, to their training camps, and their insurgent cells sent into Yugoslavia. The booklet sums by saying: The Ustasha is a fascist organisation; it is a weapon in the hands of Australian and foreign reaction; its activities in Australia should be exposed and stopped; and those who aid and abet and cover up their criminal activities should be pushed from office.106

Also in 1972, Dave Davies released a publication entitled The Ustasha in Australia,107 for the Communist Party of Australia. Like the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Davies attempted to expose Ustashi activities (particularly the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National Resistance, HNO), Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret (Croatian Liberation Movement, HOP), and Hrvatska Maldez (Croatian Youth, HM)) in Australia. The publication was similar to the previous piece, detailing a history of the fascist Ustashi Government during the Second World War, then moving to discussions of the various Ustashi movements in Australia and their relations to organisations such as various Roman Catholic identities within the Croatian community, the Croatian Soccer Club, and several politicians. Davies also detailed the work and threats on the life of Marijan Jurjevic who, as has been seen (in the previous chapter), was a central figure in the movement to expose the Ustashi movement in Australia. Davies closed with a strong message: “Democratic forces in Australia cannot be complaisant about fascism in Australia…decisive action, including united organisation against all those concerned with democratic rights must be organised to stamp out these criminal groups in Australia”.108

As is discernable from its title, Trial by Slander: A Background into the Independent State of Croatia and an Account of the Anti-Croatian Campaign in Australia, Les Shaw’s 1973 offering was (like the left-wing Davies publication) far from objective.109 The piece was separated into two sections, the first on the development, installation, and fall of Fascist Croatia, and the second on what the author called “[t]he alleged terror in Australia”. 110 In this section, the author essentially set about a character assassination of anti-Ustashi campaigner Marijan Jurjevic, and other such anti-Ustashi campaigners. Shaw attempted to cast doubt on the validity of Croats’ responsibility for the bombings in Australia, even suggesting that Jurjevic blew up his own apartment in order to spark further investigation into Ustashi groups.

On the other side of the coin, Marijan Jurjevic presents his 1973 Ustasha Under the Southern Cross.111 Like the work of Shaw, this piece was divided into two sections, a background on the Ustasha and the independent state of Croatia, and the Ustasha’s activities in Australia. In this latter section, Jurjevic began by examining the military training undertaken by Ustashi groups in Australia, principally the HOP and the HPA, citing articles and photos from the HOP’s Spremnost magazine talking of the ‘liberation’ of Croatia.xiv This led the author to detail the 1963 and 1972 Ustashi incursions into Yugoslavia. From here, Jurjevic set about discussing the main players in the movement, their various associations (including religious and government ties), and the support of the Australian community. The author detailed the intimidation tactics used by the movements, some of which he experienced, including the bombing of his home, his bashing resulting in two broken ribs, a parcel bomb exploding before reaching his residence, and death threats (of which he received an average of ten per year). The purpose of Jurjevic’s work was to alert the wider public to the Ustashi threat. His work closes with “Only public awareness can destroy [extremist fascism] forever”.112

1.3.2 THE HILTON BOMBING & ANANDA MARGA There are several pieces of literature concerning the Hilton bombing in Sydney, which was for a period attributed to the religious group Ananda Marga. The following works were written by those who were falsely imprisoned and accused of the Hilton bombing and other terrorist activities. While the following books cannot be considered academic research or within the academic field of terrorism studies (like the previous research), its existence does add some weight to the research on terrorism in Australia.xv Paul Alister’s 1997 Bombs, Bliss, and Baba: The Spiritual Autobiography Behind the Hilton Bombing Frame-Up,113 was essentially his autobiography, focusing on his involvement with Ananda Marga, his false imprisonment, and the court proceedings involving the Hilton bombing and other terrorism charges. Similarly, Tim Anderson’s 1985 Free Alister, Dunn, and Anderson: The Ananda Marga Conspiracy Case,114 discussed the persecution and imprisonment of the three Ananda Marga members. xiv One such article included a photo of HOP members on an Australian Defence Force tank (discussed in the previous chapter). xv Especially when considering the lack of literature regarding the event, in addition to the lack of academic research regarding terrorism in Australia.

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1.3.3 TERRORISM IN EARNEST It seems that the first scholarly piece of literature on terrorism in Australia was published in the Australian Readers Digest, by Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology William Clifford in 1981.115 Clifford’s article, ‘Terrorism: Australia’s Quiet War’, began by claiming that for the first time in Australia, Australians must fear terrorism.116 The article began within an examination of the history of terrorism and political violence in Australia, reiterating the fact that a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)xvi was to be held in Melbourne within days of the article’s publication. Clifford discussed the threats of terrorism within Australia, briefly diagnosing the nation’s civil liberties, city sizes, modes of transport, and multiculturalism as conducive to terrorist operations in liberal democracies, citing that in contrast, authoritative communist nations are not troubled by terrorism.117

Clifford then moved to weigh the risks of terrorism against the amount of liberty we are to surrender in order to be safe. In this line, Clifford made reference to two major incidents. The first was the counter-terrorism proposals by the government that followed the Hilton bombing, as well as the establishment of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) following this event. The second reference was an incident in April 1979, when Domenico Speranza took a woman hostage at Sydney airport, held a knife to her throat and attempted to detonate an explosive device.118

The subsequent discussion found that Australia’s principal security risk was that of international terrorism, and that the organisation responsible for countering this threat was the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).119 The author used the (then) upcoming 1981 CHOGM as a hypothetical example of a terrorist scenario, detailing the National Anti-Terrorism Plan (NATP) directed through the Protective Services Coordination Centre (PSCC), specifying the coordination between the AFP and various state police forces, ASIO, the Australian Bomb Data Centre, and Immigration in the event of such a scenario.120

xvi It was during a CHOGM that three individuals were killed by a terrorist bomb at the Sydney Hilton in 1978.

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Clifford’s article finished by examining the changes that terrorism has instilled in contemporary life, particularly concerning security within the executive business world (with regard to kidnapping) and security within and around embassies in Australia, arguing that a liberal society is the best defence against terror.121 This article was the first to provide a significant overview of terrorism in Australia, and the first to examine the subject and its future in earnest.xvii

Following from his influential 1982 effort, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Grant Wardlaw released an article entitled ‘Terrorism and Public Disorder: The Australian Context’, in The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s.122 This article began by discussing the sensationalisation of terrorism in Australia through the media and questioning the validity of the imminent threat of terrorism propagated by the media and Australian Government.123 Wardlaw progressed to detail a history of public disorder in Australia and the government responses to and actions against such public disorder.124 The article shifted to a discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Australia, displaying scepticism when examining the frequency and severity of terrorist events in Australia, specifying the development of Australia’s counter-terrorism responses such as the PSCC, the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence, and ASIO, detailing the roles of each organisation under the NATP.125 Wardlaw examined the conditions and circumstances under which the Defence Force can be deployed within Australia to assist in policing, as was executed following the Hilton bombing in 1978.xviii The dissection of Australia’s counter- terrorism policy continued, assessing Australia’s response to a hypothetical hijacking, again detailing the appropriate measures such as the AFP, the Anti-Hijack Committees, and the Crisis Policy Centre.126

Wardlaw concluded by stating that Australia’s counter-terrorism measures adequately meet the terrorist threat to Australia. However, while Australia’s responses to specific (isolated) instances of terrorism have been appropriate, the responses to public disorder have been over-authoritarian. The author warned against such a response to

xvii Incidentally, Crown (1986) (to be discussed below) cited Clifford’s (1981) article as the only real attempt at examining terrorism in Australia. xviii This will be discussed in further detail when examining Hocking (1993).

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either form of political violence in the future.127 In this piece, Wardlaw focused his knowledge and experience on terrorism (and public disorder) in an Australian context, to provide a small but valuable contribution to the literature on terrorism in Australia.

Australia: The Terrorist Connection, by James Crown,128 published in 1986, was the third piece included in the sparse Australian literature that can be considered within the academic field of terrorism studies, and, like Clifford in 1981,129 examined Australia’s position within the 1980s world of international terrorism. Crown began with two hypothetical terrorist incidents, the first, a hijacking of an aircraft bound for Melbourne Airport, and the second, a kidnapping of a wealthy businessman, proposing Australia’s ill-preparedness for such events.130 This assertion was in direct contention with that of Wardlaw’s of the same year.131

These hypothetical scenarios were followed by an account of terrorism in Australia, leading into the most likely sources of a terrorist attack in Australia, which ranged from Australia’s relationship with the US, to Australian criminal organisations and their assorted links with terrorist groups. Crown also examined major terrorism issues ranging form the Hilton bombing to Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi’sxix involvement in international terrorism. 132

Crown examined the new world of international terrorism, its effects on previously isolated nations like Australia, and considered the volatility of the political situations of Australia’s neighbours, particularly in Southeast Asia.xx Crown offered another fictional scenario, regarding an Australian pro-Indonesian position on East Timor, and the retaliation by East Timorese groups.xxi The focus then shifted to New Caledonia and the right-wing pro-independence Forces Caledoniennes Libres (Caledonian Liberation Force) organisation and left-wing Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front. Crown considered the implications of these groups for Australia and for Australians in New Caledonia.133

xix Leader of the Libya since 1969. xx As this book was written in the mid-1980s, the threat of communism was still considered significant. xxi This threat was demonstrated in 1998 when bomb threats were made on three Australian airliners bound for Denpasar by the East Timor Liberation Front.

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The book concluded by offering an assessment of Australia’s security from terrorism, and set about offering significant policy recommendations for protective and security agencies. These recommendations ranged from the protection of arms and explosives, to intelligence, and the identification and protection of likely terrorist targets. The most academically significant aspect of this piece of literature, however, was presented in the postscript: For Australia, far too little has been written about the terrorist threat and the potential for politically motivated violence this country faces.…In order to document the facts I have quoted throughout this book I have turned to the only source of record available on the Australian scene – newspapers, magazines, and the recollections of individuals involved and the journalists who reported these incidents.134

It is clear that the study of terrorism in Australia during this period was almost non- existent, despite Crown presenting a clear cause for (at least some) alarm for Australia regarding terrorism and terrorism research. Crown’s assessment had little impact, as the next serious offering within the field came five years later.

The article ‘Terror Australis’, written by Malcolm MacKenzie-Orr in 1991,135 presented a short and succinct history of terrorism in Australia (confined to three events) in contrast to Australia’s “sophisticated, centrally coordinated organisation for counter-terrorism and protective security”.136 MacKenzie-Orr listed the reasons that Australia could be considered safe from international terrorism: its commitment to civil rights, liberties, and multiculturalism; its even-handed foreign policy; its sparse population and; its remoteness from conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and South America. The author then moved to outline the risks associated with international terrorism in Australia, and the reasons for Australia’s high counter-terrorism preparedness. These were: Australia’s growing ethnic population among which over fifty percent of immigrants are from Asian and Middle Eastern nations with domestic conflicts; Australia’s involvement in Operation Desert Storm; Australia’s perceived weakness in light of increased security measures throughout Europe and the US, and; domestic conflicts within nations in Australia’s region, in nations such as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Vanuatu, and Fiji.137 This article offered some insight into the threat of terrorism to Australia, despite an insubstantial examination of terrorism’s history in Australia. Despite the limited length of the article, value was found in its assessment of the existing risks of international terrorism in Australia.

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In 1992, Therese Taylor published her article ‘Australian Terrorism: Traditions of Violence and the Family Court Bombings’,138 in the Australian Journal of Law and Society, examining the 1984 campaign of bombings against judges of the Family Court and their families. Taylor compared this campaign of political violence against Australia’s conventional history of terrorism, citing the bombing of the Hakoah Club, the Hilton bombing, and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) assassination of the Turkish Consul-General to Australia and his bodyguard.139 She then discussed the motivations of the Family Court bombings through an analysis of the Australian Family Law Act and the flaws within the legislation that led to such a violent response. The article examined the way in which these bombings incited wide-spread criticism, particularly within the media, against the Family Court and not against the perpetrators of the violence.140 Taylor argues that this was the basis of Australia’s only completely successful ‘terrorist’ campaign, due to the fact that “[t]he perpetrators were not apprehended, the security services were unable to halt the campaign, and the target was delegitimated”.141 This article provided an in-depth analysis of the Family Court bombings and a shift from the study of main-stream terrorism, adding to the academic literature on terrorism in Australia.

Crown’s 1986 call for terrorism research was met convincingly by Jenny Hocking 142 in her 1993 book Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State. Hocking hails from a legal background and attempted to examine the development of Australian internal security arrangements and legislation through a history of terrorism and other such national security threats. As in all academic literature on terrorism before her, Hocking began with a detailed and comprehensive definition of terrorism, and examined its place within social and political spheres as an ideological construct.143 Hocking then moved briefly to state that political motivation is the defining feature of terrorism, before shifting to distinguish between terrorism from above and terrorism from below, and terrorism from political violence.144 The author then examined the theoretical approaches to terrorism and terrorism studies which, she claimed “were marred by simplistic and evaluative approaches and by a common failure to recognise the essentially political nature of the use of the term ‘terrorism’ – and consequentially of these theories themselves”.145 Hocking’s criticisms continued, aiming at descriptive reviews within terrorism

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studies. Hocking then examined the development of the counter-terrorism theories and the ‘security state’, drawing on the work of Hirsh and Jurgen Habermas.146

Following this establishment of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the security state as central concepts of the study, Hocking examined the history of Australia’s internal security arrangements from the 1907 establishment of the Australian Intelligence Corps and its disbandment following the outbreak of the First World War, when Military Intelligence took over the internal security responsibilities. The groups under the watchful eye of these organisations were pacifist and left-wing groups.147 Hocking offers an account of the development of the Counter-Espionage Bureau, the Defence Security Bureau, the Commonwealth Investigation Service, and finally ASIO.148

Hocking’s analysis of ASIO followed the organisation’s creation through its charter and constitutional basis, through to its counter-subversion and counter-espionage orientation, and its relationships with various Federal Governments.149 The author’s focus then shifted to the Hilton bombing in 1978 and the constitutional basis for the deployment of Australian Defence Force personnel. Hocking then examined the creation of a distinction between ‘terrorism’ and ‘domestic violence’ within the Australian political arena.150 This examination led the author to an assessment of the history of terrorism in Australia since 1963, including Ananda Marga, Croatian separatists, the JCAG, the Family Court bombings and other isolated instances of political violence.151 xxii

Following this detailed assessment, Hocking discussed the focus of internal security arrangements reverting to counter-subversion in the wake of the Hilton bombing. The response to the bombing of the Hilton was a renewal of large-scale surveillance by intelligence and law enforcement agencies and included the introduction of the ASIO Act 1979. This legislation radically changed the organisation and powers of ASIO. Hocking examined the act and its implications for civil liberties. These changes included the redefinition of ‘security’, ‘terrorism’, ‘politically motivated violence’, and ‘subversion’. The changes gave ASIO powers to enter premises and remove records (providing warrants are issued), powers to intercept communications, and a

xxii As distinct from terrorist incidents.

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reduced accountability for the organisation.152 Hocking concluded with an assessment of Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements, ranging from law enforcement agencies, to the PSCC, the NATP. Hocking closed this conclusion by prompting the Federal and New South Wales (NSW) governments to investigate alleged security and military involvement in the bombing of the Hilton, because “[w]ithout such an inquiry public speculation will remain that the much-vaunted single act of terrorism in this country was in fact perpetrated by the very organisations established to protect us from it”.153 Hocking’s 1993 publication provided the most comprehensive piece of literature on terrorism in Australia, clearly surpassing all previous efforts (and many future ones).

1.3.3.1 POST 2001 RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA Following the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks in the US, Clive Williams authored the newspaper article ‘Terror Trails on the Home Front’ which provided an extremely brief yet relatively comprehensive coverage of Australia’s history of terrorism.154 Williams summed up by posing the possibility of Islamic extremist cells in Australia in light of the 2001 attacks, discussing the incidence of illegal immigrants in Australia and the opportunity for the introduction of a national identity card.155 Williams followed this article with further research on terrorism in Australia, to be discussed shortly.

In 2004 Hocking followed her 1993 work with her book Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter- Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy.156 This publication essentially expanded on her past work in light of the events of September 11 and the 2002 Bali bombings, and the consequential legislative changes made to Australia’s internal security arrangements. Hocking began in the same manner as in her previous effort, examining the definition of terrorism and its associated concepts, and moving to the history and development of ASIO and Australia’s internal security arrangements. The new offering differed when addressing the ‘Second Wave’ of counter-terrorism, which developed as a consequence of the September 11 attacks and the Bali bombings by al- Qaeda and JI respectively.157 Hocking cited the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee and the billions of dollars in increased budgets for counter-terrorism and border security funding, and noted that the post-September 2001 changes to internal security arrangements were the most dramatic since the

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establishment of ASIO in 1949.158 Hocking examined the legislation behind these changes, such as the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 and the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, the latter of which she compares to the controversial and ultimately unsuccessful Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950.159

The author progressed to examine the development of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, in light of executive detention, detention in the absence of suspicion, the detention of children, the removal of the right to remain silent, the denial of legal representation, and the possibility of torture without accountability.160 These legislative changes, Hocking stated, “test the boundaries of the constitutionally structured and politically practiced relationship between law and politics”.161 Hocking contended that such changes challenge the basis and validity of democracy and closed by stating that: [i]f we consider that acts of extreme political violence, labelled ‘terrorism’, may reflect a local but systemic failure in participatory democratic practice, then the narrowing of acceptable discourse and legitimate political activity may well be one of the precipitating factors of terrorist activity. If so, then what is needed as part of the struggle against terrorism are not further constraints on effective political participation, but a more inclusive politics; not less democracy, but more.162

Hocking’s follow up improves and updates her previous work in light of the rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism and its effects on Australian legislation.

In late 2006, Martin Chulov released Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism from Within and Without.163 This book detailed an extensive history of Islamic extremism in Australia that began before the 2000 Sydney Olympics, detailing the major plots, arrests, and events that have occurred since. Chulov provides a strong (pseudonyms aside) historical account of pre-2000 Islamic extremist training in Australia, accounts of Mamdouh Habib, Jack Thomas, Zak Mallah, and David Hicks, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) cell centring around Willie Brigitte and Faheem Khalid Lodhi, as well as the operations of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). This piece of literature provides a strong historical context for terrorism studies in Australia and offers an important platform for analytical approaches within the field.

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Apart from the three pieces of literature above, little literature has been produced in the first six years of this century that assists in either a qualitative or quantitative understanding of terrorism in Australia. Despite the lack of literature aiming to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in Australia, there has been a significant amount of research literature from the counter-terrorism focus of terrorism studies. This body of literature includes research such as that of Aldo Borgu who in 2004 examined a framework for regional cooperation by governments to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta in the same year.164 In this vein, threat assessments are also popular (as the Australian literature on international terrorism demonstrated). An example of such an assessment is Carl Ungerer and Dallas Rogers’ evaluation of the threat of agroterrorism to Australia in the international Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal.165 A large portion of the contemporary literature examines Australia’s legislative responses that have developed since 2001, such as Clive Williams’ 2002 ‘Australian Security Policy, Post 11 September’,166 Jenny Hocking’s 2003 ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia’s New Security Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control’,167 and Christopher Michaelsen’s 2005 ‘Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?’.168 While research such as this is of immense value to the field, next to no research has explored terrorist operations in Australia and no research exists on gaining a more comprehensive understanding of how these groups have operated. Such an endeavour would surely provide significant insight into the understanding of international terrorism, 21st Century Islamic extremism, and the development of counter-terrorism policy and applications.

This section of the chapter has established that while there is a noteworthy amount of Australian research into terrorism, little research is being undertaken to understand the phenomenon in Australia. The review indicates that an overwhelming majority of the works have been situated within the counter-terrorism focus. While each of the foci of the field are important, very little of the previous literature focused on terrorists or terrorist organisations in Australia and attempted to either qualitatively or quantitatively understand or explain terrorism in Australia. An even smaller number employed methodologies that attempted to facilitate analytical techniques that would assist in research, or would advance the field through understanding, explaining or

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predicting terrorism in Australia. As we have seen through the early literature and will continue to see within the criticisms of the contemporary literature, this criticism cannot be confined to the literature on terrorism in Australia, but is a significant issue within the field as a whole.

2. ISSUES WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES As we have seen, terrorism research has developed significantly since the 1970s. However, as Gordon states, the “field is still not yet established as a mature or stable discipline in [academia]”.169 This failure has been attributed to many elements, the earliest of which was the lack of researchers and trainees within terrorism studies, the lack of co-ordination of the terrorism studies literature, and the “absence of an academic organisation that would identify terrorism and co-ordinate funding for the new studies on terrorism”.170 These issues were first identified in the early 1980s.171 Preceding this failure, during the late 1960s and early 1970s was the failure of the political science sub-field to contribute to government policy making on terrorism.172 These failures were seen as preventing the terrorism research sub-field from becoming a speciality, consequentially resulting in the delay of the evolution of terrorism studies as an independent discipline.

Merari attributes the failures within terrorism studies to the numerous autonomous approaches to and forms of terrorism, the lack of interest from the social sciences, the lack of government and academic collaboration, and the clandestine nature of terrorist organisations.173 During the rapid growth of terrorism research in the 1980s, the field was subject to many sub-specialities, which again resulted in the uncoordinated state of the literature.174 As asserted in the review of the early literature of the field, Andrew Silke claims that one of the greatest dilemmas within terrorism research is an agreed upon universal definition of terrorism, this, and the consequential conceptual framework, he regards as the ‘holy grail’ of the field.175 James Poland concurs, stating that the definitional dilemma is the most confounding problem within the field. 176 E.F. Gibbons, Gregory Scott, and Jay Shafritz, go as far as to say “it is unlikely that any definition [italics in original] will ever be agreed upon”.177

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As the review of the contemporary literature within terrorism studies demonstrates, the research area has developed into a speciality and a field of its own, stopping short of becoming a discipline in its own right. Many of the issues that have been discussed above have continued to plague terrorism studies. The following will examine the criticisms of the field today, drawing on the initial criticisms above, and those made by Schmid and Jongman in 1988.

2.1 CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF TERRORISM STUDIES xxiii In 2001, Andrew Silke published an article entitled ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’.178 This article drew from the 1988 work of Schmid and Jongman and attempted to examine the state of the contemporary field in light of Schmid and Jongman’s criticisms of 1988. This article, along with similar research, indicates that terrorism studies continues to suffer from long term methodological and analytical issues. These problems can be separated into four broad criticisms: Objectivity, Abstraction, Research, and Analysis.

2.1.1 OBJECTIVITY The first of these criticisms is that research into terrorism studies is not objective.179 180 Essentially, these criticisms attack the field’s value-neutrality as a school within the social sciences. Take a statement from Andrew Silke for example: “researchers have traditionally not been overly concerned with remaining objective and neutral in how they view the subject and its perpetrators”.181 xxiv The achievement of objectivity is vital to any scientific form of inquiry. While it is admittedly difficult to remain objective in the study of terrorism (particularly post-event), objectivity is a necessary component within the field, and must be achieved for successful research.xxv

xxiii It must be noted that a large majority of the contemporary criticisms of terrorism studies were made prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the consequential expansion in the works within the field. xxiv We have seen this extensively in the Australian literature. xxv Objectivity in this regard is an issue that concerns many academic research areas, for example research focusing on domestic violence, sexual assault, rape, and murder.

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2.1.2 ABSTRACTION The second criticism is that terrorism research no longer deals with terrorists, or that research is too abstracted from the phenomenon which is to be studied. For instance, Bruce Hoffman argues that “too often terrorism research is conducted in a vacuum, divorced from the reality of the subject”.182 Similar claims are made by Brannan et al.: …terrorism studies has remained profoundly unaware of the internal dynamics and human characteristics of its subject; this is one of the reasons why some other branches of the social sciences regard terrorism studies as shallow and devoid of intellectual credibility.183

The authors articulate that “[m]any researchers remain profoundly isolated from their research subjects, a state of affairs that seriously diminishes the ability to understand the phenomenon under study or to offer relevant advice on appropriate responses to it”.184

2.1.3 LEVELS OF RESEARCH The third criticism entails that works in terrorism studies are not based in empirical research. This claim focuses on the field’s lack of research based in empirical and primary data. Schmid and Jongman, in 1988, asserted that “as much as eighty percent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense”,185 a figure more recently established by Silke.186 In the same year as Schmid and Jongman, Gurr observed that “[w]ith a few clusters of exceptions there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism”.187 Three years later, Merari claimed that even this was an understatement and that only a small proportion of the terrorism literature is based on primary resources.188

In an attempt to provide a stronger framework for terrorism studies, Brannan et al., after pointing out that “terrorism studies has remained profoundly distant from its research subject”,189 claimed that primary sources were the missing essence of research within terrorism studies. They claim that the greatest of primary sources is the terrorist and encouraged interviews with terrorists in order to gain this primary research. It must be noted that Brannan et al. were writing prior to September 11, 2001. Since these attacks, the rise of world-wide 21st Century Islamic extremism and the ‘War on Terror’, members of terrorist organisations, particularly al-Qaeda, have become profoundly more reclusive than before the attacks in New York and

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Washington. Even before these attacks, al-Qaeda was an enigmatic organisation, making interviews near impossible at best.xxvi However, their point remains valid. This third criticism essentially entails a complaisant reliance on secondary and tertiary documents and research, and no generation of primary documents or data within terrorism studies. 190 191

2.1.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS The final criticism to be found within the terrorism studies literature cites the levels of analysis within the field. A majority of the research in terrorism studies has been qualitative research complemented by an inadequate quantity of explanatory or predictive studies. The rationale behind this dilemma is the neglect of established and experimental forms of analysis. Silke cites that quantitative analysis is not applied enough in terrorism studies; specifically, he suggests statistical analysis methodologies. Furthermore, only around three percent of the research within the field uses inferential forms of analysis. 192 Brannan et al. sum the situation: “The prevailing laissez-faire approach to methodology must be consigned to the past if the aim of terrorism studies is genuinely to seek understanding”.193

3. POST 2001 ANALYTICAL RESEARCH IN TERRORISM STUDIES Since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, and the advent of 21st Century Islamic extremism, the field of terrorism studies has experienced another ‘take off’ period similar to the 1980s, through the rapid growth and development of the field. Terrorism studies is becoming less confined to academia. Institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the Research and Development Corporation provide large amounts of research to the field, with specific policy implications and applications. Research in the field has increased dramatically, assisted by the millions of dollars poured into research and development by Western governments as a response to the September 11 attacks. The bulk of this literature concentrates on WMD and CBRN prevention, and responses and extensive work within the counter- terrorism focus.

xxvi Several interviews have taken place with Osama bin Laden. See work by Peter Bergen (2002). Interviews have also taken place with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi bin al-Shibh through the al-Jazeera media network.

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Since 2001, a significant amount of research on terrorists and terrorist groups has been undertaken, that essentially constructs a history of and general assertions about the state, capabilities, and modus operandi of 21st Century Islamic extremist groups. The most influential and accurate of these are supplied by Peter Bergen, in Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden194 and The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader,195 and Jason Burke, author of Al- Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam.196 Similar literature includes that of Rohan Gunaratna,197 Jane Corbin,198 and Sally Neighbour.199 Neighbour’s examination of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) is the pinnacle study of this group. This area of literature serves as a foundation for further analytical research and understanding of these groups and 21st Century Islamic extremism.

The inflation in the amount of research within the field has also increased the amount of concrete analytical studies called for by Jongman, Schmid and Silke, and the improvement of terrorism studies research in relation to the criticisms outlined above. This was demonstrated by the research examined in the Contemporary Terrorism Studies section of this chapter in the articles by Rienares, Weinberg et al., Piazza, and Moghadam who applied substantive forms of analysis within their research.

Abdelaziz Testas in his 2004 article ‘Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis’,200 empirically attempts to quantify the factors behind Islamic extremism in 37 different Muslim counties by building on the previous work of Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova in 2003.201 This endeavour directly meets the criticisms of the levels of analysis of terrorism studies through its use of high levels of empirical analysis. Testas employs a ‘Poisson Regression Model’ in which the count variable is the average number of terrorist attacks per year and measures explanatory values, educational attainment, and economic conditions. This research builds on Krueger and Maleckova by examining additional variables such as political repression and civil war.202

Testas found that education and civil war were positive determinants of terrorism, and furthermore, that political repression initially decreased terrorism, but over time eventually increased it. The income variable was found to be a negative determinant, but this finding was considered weak unless examined within the context of civil war.

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The author concluded the article by calling for further empirical research into the area to focus the method and analysis on specific countries and cases, and to further examine the educational variable within the approach.203 In this article, Testas provided an empirically-driven research project using a quantitative methodology that aimed at achieving understanding and explanation to provide a platform for further research in this approach.

In a different analytical approach published in the same year, Caron Gentry examined the relationship between new social movement theory and terrorism.204 The article examined the roles of leadership, membership, personal ideology, and gender within social movement theory, and examined new social movements' abilities to develop into a terrorist group. Gentry introduced New Social Movement Theory as capable of answering the criticisms inherent in both terrorism studies and international relations through its ability to examine the internal dynamics of terrorist organisations and to do so on the micro, macro, and meso levels. The author asserted that “new social movement theory provides a theoretical framework for terrorism studies to develop a more thorough and less biased way of studying those who engage in political violence”.205 The article examined the development of the left-wing US terrorist group the Weather Underground Organisationxxvii from its parent organisation, the Students for a Democratic Society, through new social movement theory, specifically focusing on the female members of the group. Like Testas, Gentry’s article provided a new analytical approach to terrorism studies that further contributed to the development of analytical approaches within the field.206

In Laurita Denny, Jerrold Post, and Ehud Sprinzak’s 2003 study ‘The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists’,207 the trio seem intent on meeting Brannan et al.’s recommendations for quelling the levels of research criticism through the use of the terrorist as a source of primary data. Denny et al.’s methodology involved the use of semi-structured interviews with incarcerated members from religious extremist groups such as Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah (HAMAS), Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, as well as secular members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Fatah, and the Democratic xxvii The Weather Underground Organisation (also known as Weatherman) operated between 1969 and 1975 in the US against the US Government.

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Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The project was undertaken through the behavioural focus, aiming to attain an understanding of the psychology and decision making-processes, as well as in relation to WMD.

The respondents within their project were examined on factors such as: family background and early life; socialisation and recruitment; decision-making and the structure of their organisation; views on armed attacks; justification for suicide bombings; attitudes towards casualties and WMD; and sense of remorse.208 Following an examination of the results, Denny et al., contrast the generalisations of these individuals with those of the September 11 al-Qaeda members. This study provides a methodology that specifically answers the criticisms of methodologies within the field over the past two decades. Despite this, the study concludes with no recommendations for counter-terrorism or policy initiatives and applications.

Jessica Stern has also responded to the criticisms of terrorism studies in her book, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, 209 in which she interviews terrorists, both incarcerated and at large, from groups such as the ‘Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord’, HAMAS, Laskar Jihad, the Temple Mount Faithful, LET, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and anti-abortion groups, to name a few. This research is presented in two parts: ‘Grievances that Rise to Holy War’ and, ‘Holy War Organisations’. Although not conducting any interviews with al- Qaeda members,xxviii Stern gives an excellent assessment of the groups through almost every facet possible, from the groups’ relations with nation-states, to weapon acquisition, funding, mission planning and procedures. Stern goes on to make her conclusions regarding religious terrorism, and the application of her findings to US policy. This study shows clear purpose, using substantially tangible and concrete methodology and theory, satisfying the criticisms of the field.

Continuing the terrorism studies tradition of multidisciplinary approaches, David Lester, Mark Lindsay, and Bijou Yang attempted to use psychological profiling in an analysis of suicide bombers, contributing to the behavioural foci of terrorism studies in 2004.210 To begin, the authors examine previous attempts at profiles on suicide xxviii Stern did conduct interviews with family members of some members and attended court hearings for members.

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bombers, ranging from sociodemographic approaches to psychodynamic speculations, yielding two assertions from this literature: 1. That suicide bombers are not characterised by the risk factors associated with suicide; and 2. That psychological profiles are impossible.211 Lester et al. argue that these assertions are false, or at least premature.

The authors established that no academic study has collected extensive biographical data on suicide bombers, noting that if detailed biographical information were collected on suicide bombers, evidence might be discovered that indicated a high frequency of the suicide risk factors (which are traditionally discovered through biographical data).212 The authors also suggest that typologies might be possible for particular suicide bombers, illustrated by the case of Timothy McVeigh.xxix Lester et al. pointed to the significance of an individual’s childhood, specifically when the individual reaches maturity accepting certain beliefs and views of leaders that result in such violence. The authors sum up by claiming that only when these detailed biographies become available will academics be able to gain some understanding of the psychodynamics and typologies of the suicide bomber.213 These assessments by Lester et al., again point to a lack of primary research within terrorism studies.

These works, while limited in quantity, demonstrate a positive shift towards new methods and frameworks of analysis within contemporary research, providing primary data, new insight, and new direction within the field. Despite the field of terrorism studies’ dramatic expansion and rise to significance (particularly post 2001), as well as the increase in the amount of substantive analytical studies, a majority of the methodological and analytical problems that have compromised the field for the last two decades still exist. Silke states that “[t]he ultimate aim for any research field is to progress from one level of understanding to the next, until a significant number of studies can be conducted at explanatory level”.214

While many of the major criticisms of terrorism studies continue to surface in a significant number of contemporary studies, there is an significant movement to build upon the existing strong qualitative and descriptive bases of terrorism studies with

xxix The individual behind the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in April, 1995.

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analytical research that focuses on not only the expansion of knowledge within the field, but also on the understanding and explanation of the phenomenon and its concepts. Movement in this area will continue to see criticisms of the field diminish and the calls for a terrorism studies discipline strengthen. Since the second renaissance period of the field, this strengthening has increased ten-fold, with specific university courses and schools being established that focus on the study of terrorism.

4. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS As we have seen, terrorism studies has matured from a sub-field of political science through the 1970s, into a multidisciplinary field, and continued to develop through the 1980s and 1990s, stopping short of attaining the status of an independent discipline. We have seen that since the second ‘boom’ period of terrorism studies (post 2001) there has been significant progress and growth in important areas of terrorism studies. Despite this, the field continues to suffer from long-term problems, sharply compounded by the contemporary criticisms of terrorism studies’ objectivity, abstraction, levels of research, and levels of analysis. Silke sums up the situation rather concisely in stating: [i]t seems relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a state and that after over 30 years of enquiry, the field shows little evidence that it is capable of making the leap to consistently producing research of genuine explanatory and predictive value.215

Furthermore, we have seen that relatively little research exists on terrorism in Australia. Through this review of the literature and the identification of the major gaps and problems within the field, three clear objectives can be established. These are: 1. To attempt to describe, understand, and explain the organisation and communication of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia. 2. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of terrorism studies. 3. To employ a method of analysis that may contribute to a predictive capability to terrorism studies.

While the many approaches to terrorism studies are invaluable and contribute greatly towards a complete and comprehensive field, there is one comprehensive analytical

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approach that shows promise in providing new insight into the organisation and communication of terrorist cells, and which may effectively contribute to an explanatory and predictive capability within terrorism studies. This approach is Social Network Analysis. The following chapter will examine the development and applications of social network analysis to the study of covert and terrorist organisations. This discussion will lead to a review of the thesis objectives and introduce the research questions of the project. Following the establishment of social network analysis as the principal analytical framework of this project, the methodology will be proposed in detail.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS

CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

There is an area within the social sciences which aims to examine and understand how groups of individuals operate and consequentially, how they behave. This area is social network analysis, a methodological form of analysis that fuses mathematics, anthropology, psychology, and sociology.1 i This chapter will examine the historical development of the social network analysis field and its applications to covert and terrorist networks. From there, the chapter will review the thesis objectives and re- introduce the research questions. The project’s methodology will then be outlined in detail. The chapter will conclude by assessing the methodology in relation to the thesis objectives of the project and discuss the analysis chapters to come.

1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS A ‘Social Network’ can be defined as “a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them”.2 Therefore, social network analysis is “a mathematical method for ‘connecting the dots’…[and] allows us to map and measure complex, sometimes covert, human groups and organisations”.3 The method focuses on uncovering the patterning of people’s interactions.4 Correctly interpreting these networks assists “in predicting behaviour and decision-making within the network”.5 Furthermore, the “ability to understand and predict behaviour of members in a social network allows the analyst to evaluate specific courses of action that will influence the members of a social network in a desirable manner”.6 Steven Aftergood, of the Federation of American Scientists, claims that social network analysis “provides a useful way of structuring knowledge and framing further research. Ideally it can also enhance an analyst’s predictive capability”.7

1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD Social network analysis developed from the early 1920s through three major approaches: i. the Sociometric Analysis approach; ii. the Harvard approach; and iii. the Manchester approach. 8

i Note the interdisciplinary nature similar to terrorism studies.

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The sociometric analysis approach was the original approach of the field, developing from the 1920s, and was followed by the research of Harvard structuralists in the 1930s. The Manchester approach built on the research and developments of both schools of thought from the 1950s, with all three methods advancing the theoretical, empirical, and mathematical elements within social network analysis.9

1.1.1 SOCIOMETRIC ANALYSIS The first of the field’s approaches was the sociometric analysis approach, which originally developed through psychology. This approach was very much the more technical approach of the three, providing advances through the application of graph theory.10 The earliest foundations of this approach lie in the educational and developmental psychology of the 1920s. The research of John Almack11 in 1922 and Beth Wellman12 in 1926 focused on the choices among pairs of school children, and recorded the interaction of the pairs combined with intelligence quotas and other psychological data. In 1927 Eugeine Chevaleva-Janovskaja designed the field’s first structural study of group interaction and again, this research was based on young school children, examining (among other things) the impact of age on group formation.13 Between 1928 and 1933, Helen Bott,14 Ruth Hubbard,15 and Elizabeth Hagman16 also conducted research into the interpersonal connections and interactions between young children. While these studies were far removed from social network analysis in its contemporary form, they formed the basis for the structural and interpersonal research into networks within psychology.

One of the most important and earliest antecedents of the strands that developed into social network analysis originated in psychology through ‘Gestalt’ theory and the work of Wolfgang Kohler, through his research on the psychology of primates in 1925.17 Gestalt theory concerned the networks and organised patterns that structure the perceptions and thoughts within the mind. This theory was eventually integrated into the structural analysis of society through Jacob Moreno in Who Shall Survive?: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interactions, published in 1934. Moreno began his revolutionary work by examining the theories leading to the formation of the ‘psychological planning of society’, originating through the varying approaches of Henri-Louis Bergson,18 Sigmund Freud,19 Hippolyte Bernheim,20Auguste Comte,21

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Karl Marx,22 and Francis Galton.23 Moreno defined the methods of his proposed approach to the psychological planning of society as: 1. Socionomy: …a science which is concerned with the psychological properties of populations and with the communal problems which these properties produce. Its principal concern is with the intricate interrelations of various groups and their activities and the way in which these activities affect the welfare of the community;24

2. Sociometry: the “part of socionomy which deals with the mathematical study of psychological properties of populations, the experimental technique of and the results obtained by application of quantitative methods”,25 and; 3. Sociometric Test: “An instrument to measure the amount of organisation shown by social groups”.26

Moreno conducted such experiments through various educational facilities in the United States (US). After detailing the methodology of his experiments,27 he presented his tabulated results. From these tables, Moreno attempted to represent the formal configurations of social relationships, and the value of such relationships through the subjects’ psychological processes via the application of Gestalt theory. Through this application and the structural work within psychology before him, Moreno invented the ‘Sociogram’, a visualisation of a network in which individuals were represented as ‘nodes’ and the relationship between these nodes as ‘lines’ or ‘links’.28 In his analysis, Moreno compared the sociograms of different school children of different ages, discovering three succinct divisions of psychological development. These were defined as the ‘Pre-Socialised Period’, the ‘First Socialised Period’, and the ‘Second Socialised Period’. Moreno then examined these cleavages in groups and the concept of age within group development.29 Moreno extended his experiment in this piece of literature to examine the organisation of groups within cottage families and work shops such as a steam laundry, applying similar forms of analysis to those experiments. The 1934 work of Moreno revolutionised the study of societal structure, not only within psychology, but also within sociology and anthropology, as will be demonstrated subsequently.

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Moreno continued his work, focusing on the relationship between psychology and ‘social configurations’, through the founding of the Sociometry journal in 1937. In an article in the first volume of the journal, Moreno discussed the state and development of the sociometry field which he claimed was a relatively new field that had developed gradually since the First World War. Moreno claimed that sociometry “aims to determine objectively the basic structures of human society”.30 ii Moreno outlined the significance of the science in stating that “it is essential to know the actual structure of human society at a given moment”.31 The article discussed sociometry and its relations to and within the social sciences, and the types of sociometric procedures within the field. Moreno outlined the four approaches to sociometry: (1) the research procedure, aiming to study the organisation of groups; (2) the diagnostic procedure, aiming to classify the positions of individuals in groups and the position of groups in the community; (3) therapeutic and political procedure, aiming to aid individuals or groups to better adjustment; and finally, (4) the complete sociometric picture, in which all these steps are synthetically united and transformed into a single operation.32

The article then proceeded to discuss the research and presentation of data within sociometry, as well as the major concepts within the field.

Building on the revolutionary work of Moreno, the mathematical integration of sociometry began through the work of Kurt Lewin in 1951, when he began analysing social space through techniques such as topology and set theory.33 ‘Graph Theory’, in its contemporary from, was developed by Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary in 1956. The two built on the methods of Moreno, developing a framework in which they claimed that graph theory allowed for the mathematical analysis of the sociogram.34 Graph theory is defined as consisting of “a body of mathematical axioms and formulae which describe the properties of the patterns formed by lines”.35 The development of social network analysis through graph theory allowed a set of criteria to be developed to portray the formal properties of networks, as well as representing networks through graphs (as opposed to sociograms).36 iii Cartwright and Harary endeavoured to advance the network graphs further, allotting the lines values such as

ii Note the early focus on objectivity in relation to the previous chapter’s criticisms of the lack of objectivity within terrorism studies. iii The principle difference between a ‘sociogram’ and a ‘graph’ is that a graph is considered a precise mathematical object and as such is a mathematical representation of a network.

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positive and negative to represent the nature of the relationship (signed graph), numerical values to indicate the strength of the relationships (valued graph), and also arrows to indicate the direction of the exchange or the relationship (directed graph).37

1.1.2 HARVARD APPROACH The Harvard approach was based on the same fundamental concepts as the sociometric approach, that is, those that evolved through developmental psychology. Unlike the sociometric analysis approach, however, the Harvard approach developed along with ‘Structural Functionalism’ within sociology and anthropology. The Harvard approach developed through the 1920s and focused on the patterns of interpersonal connection and the formation of ‘Cliques’.38 A clique was then defined as “an intimate non-kin group, membership in which may vary in numbers from two to thirty or more people”.39 More recently a clique has been defined by Wasserman and Faust as (simply) a group involving a minimum of three nodes.40

The Harvard approach developed in unison with the psychological approach in a non- technical fashion by anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, considered among the most influential contributors to modern anthropology and structural functionalism, during the 1920s and 1930s. Radcliffe-Brown applied structural functional theory to studies of tribal groups in the Andaman Islands41 as well as Australian Aborigines.42 This research aimed to look beyond family and kinship relations, and examine friendship and other such associations. Radcliffe-Brown examined these relations by discussing the ‘web’ of society. Following this work, a number of academics from the sociology and anthropology disciplines adopted Radcliffe-Brown’s concepts of the fabric and web of societies. This work was taken up principally by Harrison White and fellow Harvard University anthropologists.43

By the 1960s, the Harvard academics had instituted a clear and developed social network analysis methodology. In 1963, Harrison White employed matrix algebra in the simplification of the classification of kinship relations.44 In 1969, John Boyd examined the mathematical applications to group theory in relation to class and kinship,45 three years later, Francois Lorraine and Harrison White examined the structural equivalence of individuals within social networks.46 The Harvard school of thought was responsible for the foundations of a coherent framework of social

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network analysis through the work of White and his students that emigrated to the departments of different institutions all over the world.47

1.1.3 MANCHESTER APPROACH The third approach in the development of social network analysis is the Manchester approach, which was cultivated by academics of the University of Manchester. The approach combined the previous two to investigate the structure of interpersonal and community relations within tribal societies.48 In the 1950s, the Department of Anthropology at Manchester University began examining conflict within tribal groups and societies. These academics examined the ‘density’ and ‘texture’ of these societies, initiating an abundance of technical and applicational work through the 1960s and 1970s. The most important of these works were heavily influenced by the work of Radcliffe-Brown and were led by John Barnes’ 1954 work in which he applied significant analytical thoroughness to the previous concepts of social network analysis.49 Elizabeth Bott followed in 1957, with a network examination of urban families and the roles and relationships within them,50 and later came Clyde Mitchell’s applications to urban social networks in 1969.51 This strand of social network analysis also included Jeremy Boissevain and his study Hal-Farrug: A Village in Malta in 1969.52 Boissevain and Mitchell later jointly authored Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction in 1973.53

The contemporary field of social network analysis, the culmination of these three approaches, has developed into a strong but relatively small area of study, headed by the International Network for Social Network Analysis, the Journal of Social Structure and the Connections periodicals. The works within this field originate from psychology, anthropology, sociology, and mathematics, and concern the many fields and facets of human. The area of social network analysis that concerns this thesis is the research examining covert networks.

1.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS – COVERT NETWORKS There has been an abundance of social network analyses into crime and criminal networks, largely stimulated by Sparrow’s 1991 work on the application of network analysis techniques to intelligence analysis. This work focused on the identification of network vulnerabilities within the different types and forms of criminal networks.

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Sparrow began his article by asserting that intelligence agencies have remained largely unsophisticated in their use of analytical concepts and frameworks, stating that social network analysis has much to offer intelligence agencies in this area.54 The author established that despite these important applications, there was little research overlapping the two fields. Sparrow exhibited three contentions regarding the importance of integration between the two areas of research: i. the pertinent application of social network analysis to intelligence analysis; ii. the significant opportunity within the field for adapting network analysis to the intelligence field, and; iii. the profound benefits of such collaboration to both fields.55 The article then outlined some of the current methods of analysis within the intelligence community, examining the characteristics of criminal networks through network analysis. Sparrow identified three major difficulties in examining covert networks through social network analysis. The first was ‘Incompleteness’, which acknowledges that all data on covert organisations will inevitably be incomplete. The second was ‘Fuzzy Boundaries’. This concern addressed the ambiguous boundaries of covert networks. Individuals may be a part of many different networks, or only on the periphery of the network in question. The final problem within the study of covert networks was that such networks are ‘Dynamic’, meaning that they are never static, and that the relationships and contacts are constantly changing.56 Sparrow then examined the relevant concepts and applications of social network analysis to criminal networks.57 This article outlined the specific significance and applications of social network analysis to the academic study of criminal networks and the intelligence field, setting the foundations for the social network analysis of covert networks.

Subsequent to Sparrow, Wayne Baker and Robert Faulkner’s study of illegal networks within the heavy electrical equipment industry examined the organisation of price fixing conspiracies and these networks. Following an analysis of the networks, the authors found that the individuals involved in these activities operated in networks that traded concealment for efficiency.iv Baker and Faulkner’s methodology

iv Further measures of concealment/secrecy and efficiency of networks with regard to density will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

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specifically aimed to close the perceived gap between the theory and technique of social network analysis.58

Peter Klerks’ work on various criminal organisations observed the developing and contrasting approaches to examining criminal networks, noting that the “network mode of organisation between people and functional entities has proven to be far better adapted to modern modes of collaboration, trading and communication than the traditional hierarchical structures”.59 He then examined three phases of network analysis within intelligence analysis. The first involved the use of hand-drawn charts and maps using different coloured pins. The second phase employed computer software such as i2’s Analyst’s Notebook and Netmap produced by Active Analysis. Klerks identified the third phase with an intense focus on the “content of the contacts, on the social context, and on the interpretation of such information”.60 v Klerks’ article essentially indicated the important and necessary role that social network analysis (or third phase intelligence network analysis) has to play in the intelligence and law enforcement fields.

Social network analysis has also been employed in military and intelligence applications such as Robert Deckro and Richard Renfro’s analysis of the Iranian Government in 2001. In this study, sponsored by the National Security Agency, and conducted through the (US) National Air Intelligence Centre, the authors attempted to develop a social network analysis of the Iranian government to determine their specific decision making processes and the influential individuals within the Iranian Government. Through this methodology, Deckro and Renfro discovered the individuals within the Iranian government who wielded the most influence in the decision making processes of the various bodies of government. In this way, they identified which individuals could be pressured or targeted to alter the decisions of the Iranian Government in favour of US interests.61 These results allow for predictions of the likely actions of the Iranian Government and how these decisions would be made. Such research has obvious and profound applications to the political, military, and intelligence spheres.

v The computer software to be employed in the third phase intelligence analysis of this project will be discussed in the methodology section of this chapter.

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1.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS & TERRORISM STUDIES Despite the previously discussed literature on covert networks, very little literature existed that examined terrorist networks through social network analysis before September 11, 2001. Following this event and the consequential resources poured into terrorism research, the social network analysis and terrorism research area began to form. Arquilla and Ronfeldt were among the first to take up the challenge. Arquilla and Rondfeldt in a 2001 book entitled Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, synthesised previous work, the sum of which introduced and developed the concept of netwarvi and its applications to terrorism, crime, and militancy. This book outlines the previous work and its development through the various areas of netwar. The authors examined the development of social network analysis, outlining the theory behind the practice. They assessed that “the field of network analysis, writ large, has been dominated by social network analysis, but organisational network analysis can be even more helpful for understanding the nature of netwar”.62 They then shaped a framework of ‘Organisational Network Analysis’. This framework comprises five levels: the organisational level, the narrative level, the doctrinal level, the technological level, and the social level.63 The organisational network analysis framework differs from social network analysis in that it does not employ the use of robust empirical methods and mathematics to measure the values of the network, but rather focuses on criteria such as the strategies and methods employed, and the information systems used in the network. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s work provided an important framework for the analysis of the networks of terrorist cells and groups. Despite the important research and attempted development of the network analysis area, this study did not actually apply their theoretical approaches to real historical terrorist networks using any form of sociometric, organisational analysis, or graph theory.

vi Netwar as a concept concerns conflict through which nonstate actors are organised within networks rather than hierarchies.

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1.3.1 VALDIS KREBS FIGURE 1: SEPTEMBER 11 AL-QAEDA GRAPH 64

The first significant social network analysis of terrorism, which applied graph theory and network and sociogramatical analysis,vii is Valdis Krebs’ 2002 analysis of the September 11 al-Qaeda cell (Figure 1). This study began with its focus on the two al- Qaeda members Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar who were photographed at a meeting of known and suspected terrorists in Malaysia in early 2000 by America’s

vii All essential elements of social network analysis.

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Krebs then mapped the relationships between the hijackers on each of the aircraft, and mapped the co-conspirators of the cell using media sources, shown in Figure 1. This graph shows the complexity and intensity of the overall network responsible for the September 11 operation. While Krebs did not outline his theoretical foundations or provide a contextual background, he followed conventional social network analysis methods in his graph, such as using differing thicknesses in the ties between nodes to signify the strengths of the relationships.

FIGURE 2: KREBS’ LINE NETWORK

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Krebs then provided an analysis of his research, using conventional social network analysis criteria such as ‘Degrees of Connexion’, ‘Centrality’, ‘Betweenness’, and ‘Closeness’.viii The use of this analysis illustrated that cell member Mohamed Atta was the leader of the network. Figure 2 demonstrates that Krebs also used density and shape in the analysis of just the hijackers to discover a low density ‘line’ or ‘snake’ networkix which signified that the network was set up to minimise damage if a node was compromised.x Krebs argued that this formation traded efficiency for secrecy. In this study, Krebs offered the most profound social network analysis to date of a terrorist organisation.65

The significance of Krebs’ work is verified by the research of Phillip Vos Fellman and Roxanna Wright who used Krebs’ analysis of the September 11 cell when demonstrating the effectiveness and utility of social network analysis in the study of terrorism. Vos Fellman and Wright began their paper by asserting the non- randomness of terrorism: “Randomness and determinism are the poles that define the extremes in any assignment of causality. Of course reality is somewhere in between”.66 The authors go on to press that “terrorist behaviour falls somewhere in between the purely chaotic and the fully deterministic realms”.67 The paper addresses the possibility of predicting terrorism in a purely chaotic system, and acknowledges the impossibility of total predictivity within such a system. Vos Fellman and Wright assert that: …the application of the most recent advances in science is most likely to bear fruit in the fight against terrorism not at the level of state leadership, and not at the level of mapping and predicting the behaviour of each individual terrorist, but rather at an intermediate or organisational level.68

This level is characterised as the ‘mid-range’ level.

The paper then cited Krebs’ social network analysis of the al-Qaeda September 11 cell as the pinnacle study of terrorism at the mid-range and proceeded to a review of the methodology and the analysis. The authors argued that social network analysis offers very strong insights into the behaviour of terrorist networks and that previous studies

viii These criteria will be discussed in detail below. ix Different types of network formations will also be discussed below. x Zacharias Moussaoui (a member of the al-Qaeda 9/11 network) was arrested while using flight simulators in the US. Despite this compromise, no damage was sustained by the cell in the lead up to the operation. Another pilot was used, and the mission was carried out without any further disruption.

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have treated terrorist networks as an unstructured concept. Furthermore, they argued that Krebs’ use of social network analysis uncovers the dynamics of learning and adaptation within such a network. From this discussion, the authors noted the importance of social network analysis in the study of terrorism by saying that it “contributes to counter-terrorism…the ability to map the invisible dynamics inside a terrorist community”.69

Vos Fellman and Wright then discussed further measures of networks, social cohesion and adhesion, and their effects on the development and dynamics of networks, using arguments from James Moody and Douglas White, and Frank Harary and White’s discussions of social cohesion and embeddedness. The article examined issues of cohesion and adhesion as well as embeddedness, solidarity, and the robustness of networks. Vos Fellman and Wright claimed that a “group is adhesive to the extent that the social relations of its members are resistant to the group being pulled apart, and a group is cohesive to the extent that the multiple social relations of its members pull together”.70 They inferred that “measurable differences in cohesiveness should have predictive consequences”,71 and that “in terms of counter-terrorism, this is a clear, predictive model which can be utilised for the optimisation of effort and resources”.72

Jonathan Farley further emphasises the significance of social network theory’s application to terrorism studies by applying order theoryxi to social network analysis in an attempt to mathematically analyse the extent to which a terrorist cell has been broken. This application resulted in graphs representing ‘ordered sets’, which essentially represented a ranked sociogram (or network). Farley also drew on the work of Krebs in these applications. The incorporation of order theory was undertaken due to Farley’s assumption that: “A graph inadequately represents a terrorist cell…because it fails to capture the fact that, in any cell, there will most likely be a hierarchy – leaders and followers – with orders passed down from leaders to followers”.73 The study continues by examining the results of the removal of individuals within a terrorist cell; this is achieved through the calculation of the probability that a terrorist cell has been disrupted.74

xi Essentially a hierarchical approach, examining ordered rank.

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Carley, Reminga, and Kamneva debate the proposition of hierarchical examinations of covert and terrorist cells, by stating that such networks: …have network structures that are distinct from those in typical hierarchical organisations. Their structure is distinct from the organisations that most people in western culture are used to dealing with. In particular, they tend to be more cellular and distributed. As such, most people do not have an intuitive understanding of how they work and instead seek to think of them as hierarchies. However, analysis reveals that trying to destabilise a cellular distributed network using tactics designed for hierarchies is likely to be ineffective.75

As Farley discusses, traditional forms of destabilising hierarchical networks aim at cutting the lines of command and communication between the leaders and the foot soldiers within networks, for example, the arrest of the head of a cell. Such measures may produce confusion and a loss of cohesion and effectiveness.76 While these methods remove the leadership from a cell, a majority of the cell may remain in place to undertake an operation. The methodology of this thesis will examine the terrorist cells as dynamic networks. Disruption techniques for cellular and distributed networks (dynamic as oppose to hierarchical networks) will be discussed below in greater detail.

Farley concluded his article by suggesting that terrorism is not an academic subject, citing scepticism as the general response in the search for new tools in the war on terror.xii However, he articulates that academic methods must aim at the assistance of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the fight against terror.77 Farley’s work provides a significant piece of research within the field, with some substantive applications of his study to counter-terrorism fields, and further exploration into the applications of social network analysis to terrorism studies. While this article offered significant analysis of Kreb’s study of the al-Qaeda cell responsible for the attacks on New York and Washington, a majority of Farley’s analysis aimed at the breaking of theoretical cells, but like the previous attempts, did not apply his theory by mapping real terrorist cells through order or graph theory.

xii Farley strongly pushes the ‘abstruse’ field of mathematics as a source of this scepticism.

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1.3.2 FURTHER TERRORISM RESEARCH In 2004, Marc Sageman released Understanding Terror Networks,78 which examined the rise and development of 21st Century Islamic extremism through the revival of the Salafist movement. While Sageman did not conduct a social network analysis of this movement, he provided a succinct contextual examination of the Salafist movement, examining the ties that bind members together, such as friendship, kinship, worship, and discipleship, emphasising the importance of social bonds.79 This work resembled what Arquilla and Ronfeldt called an organisational network analysis, in its analysis of the new technology that defines the links between nodes, such as the internet, and its discussion of the organisational design.80 In this book, Sageman provided an important way of understanding how the Salafist jihad network operates.

Since Krebs’ social network analysis of the al-Qaeda September 11 cell, there have been several other analyses of terrorist networks. Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat, Reminga, and Kamneva in 2003 examined an al-Qaeda network that undertook an embassy bombing in Tunisia and examined destabilisation techniques of this network.81 In a 2005 study, Carley mapped the communication and interaction within a 2002 al-Qaeda network, through dynamic network analysis.82 In the same year, Carley, Diesner, Reminga, and Tsvetovat also examined a terrorist network in the Middle-East through dynamic network analysis.83 Despite these works, there still exists little literature in which substantive historical terrorist cells have been mapped and examined through either social network or other forms of network analysis. None has been undertaken of terrorist cells that have operated in Australia.

2. IMPLEMENTATION It has been established that there remains a significant amount of research to be undertaken combining the terrorism studies and social network analysis fields. Despite the potentially profound significance of sociogramatical and social network analysis to terrorism studies, there has been only a handful of substantive studies that have employed such analysis of real terrorist groups and cells. In light of Silke’s assessment of terrorism studies cited in the previous chapter, social network analysis

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is a powerful tool capable of providing predictive and explanatory value to the field.xiii

2.1 THESIS OBJECTIVES This thesis has employed a social network analysis of historical terrorist groups in Australia. The adoption of a social network analysis framework as the methodology of this project meets the first two objectives outlined in the previous chapter: 1. To describe, understand, and explain the organisation and communication of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia. 2. To attempt to provide a methodology that satisfies the criticisms of terrorism studies. The first objective is met through the distinct ability of social network analysis to map and measure the organisation, interaction, and communication of groups of individuals. The second objective will be met through the methodology and methods of data collection used within this project. These methods will aim at the objective collection, presentation, and analysis of the data, the analysis of the internal dynamics of the terrorist cell, the generation of primary data, and a strong method of analysis.

The third objective of the thesis is: 3. To employ a method of analysis that can contribute to a predictive capability within terrorism studies. This objective is met through the use of the social network methodology. Social network analysis provides the “ability to understand and predict behaviour of members in a social network [and] allows the analyst to evaluate specific courses of action that will influence the members of a social network in a desirable manner”.84 It is hoped that the adoption of this methodology as the framework for analysis in the project will contribute towards a predictive and explanatory ability within terrorism studies, as well as achieve an intimate understanding of the organisation and communication of terrorist groups that have operated in Australia.

xiii The significance of such research is evidenced by the amount of further research drawn from Krebs’ (2002) study.

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2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS The first research question provides a direct response to the first research objective and aims to contribute to the literature on terrorism in Australia. The first research question is: A. How have terrorist cells in Australia operated? In response to this question, three terrorist cells that have operated in Australia have been selected for analysis. These groups were selected due to their significance within the history of terrorism in Australia and following preliminary research as to the feasibility of the collection of appropriate levels of data. The groups selected were: the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB) cell that launched an incursion into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1963; the Aum Shinrikyo cell operating in Western Australia in 1993; and the Lashka-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET) cell operational in Sydney in 2003. An accurate assessment of this question through social network analysis will provide a useful explanatory evaluation of the operation and communication of these groups, the strengths and weaknesses of these methods of operating and interacting, how to counter groups that are operating in a similar fashion, and how these (or similar) groups may operate in the future.

In order to utilise the predictive capability of social network analysis and to further satisfy the criticisms of terrorism studies discussed in the previous chapter, a second question is posed that aims to offer insight into how Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) would potentially operate in Australia through the following question: B. How might a JI cell operate in Australia? This inquiry will conduct a social network analysis of the 2002 JI Bali cell. The resolution of this question will attempt to provide insights into and projections of the organisation, communication, and operation of what is arguably Australia’s most pertinent terrorist threat.xiv C. What are the most effective methods of destabilising these cells? This question aims to provide specific counter-terrorism applications by establishing the most effective methods of destabilising the cells that were graphed in answering

xiv As evidenced by the Bali, Marriott, and Jakarta Embassy bombings.

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the previous two research questions. The destabilisation techniques to be employed will be covered in the methodology section of this chapter.

What follows will outline the specific methodology of this project, including the specific social network analysis frameworks to be used and the methods of presenting and collecting the necessary data required for the response to the above research questions.

3. METHODOLOGY This doctoral project employs a social network analysis methodology. The methodology of this project required three interdependent stages. The first was the ‘Contextual Background’, in which the context and physical environment of the cell’s operation are examined. From this contextual background, the second stage, the ‘Relational Data’ stage, was undertaken. Relational data can be defined as “the contacts, ties, and connections, the group attachments and meetings, which relate one agent to another”.85 This stage of the methodology aims to record the relational data that can be synthesised from the contextual background. Once the contextual background and relational data stages were complete, the ‘Network Analysis’ stage was commenced. The network analysis stage uses the recorded relational data to measure the different network criteria of the individuals and the overall network. Through these stages, the project employed both qualitative and quantitative approaches. While Scott acknowledges that it is “possible to undertake quantitative and statistical counts of relations, network analysis consists of a body of qualitative measures of network structure”.86 Despite the qualitative measures of network structure, the empirical nature of social network analysis requires both qualitative and quantitative strategies. This will be clearly demonstrated throughout this section of this chapter. A retroductive approach was adopted as the project aimed to uncover the mechanisms that form and sustain terrorist cells that have been operational in Australia between the 1960s and today.

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3.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND The first step in any attempt to analyse a social network is to construct a contextual background. This project provided a contextual background behind the four terrorist cells and the individuals within these networksxv in order to understand the physical environment of the network. This background was constructed through a case study approach, with the data being collated through ethnographic interviews, and primary, secondary, and tertiary documentary research.

3.1.1 THE CASE STUDY The case study is among the oldest of methodological traditions within qualitative research, used in disciplines ranging from anatomy, to biochemistry, psychiatry, and sociology.87 Specifically, the case study was employed most influentially within the Chicago sociological tradition throughout the 1920s. According to Yin, the “case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”.88 The significance of the method is documented by Bromley who states that the “case study or situation analysis is the bed-rock of scientific investigation”.89 The purpose of conducting this case study was descriptive, to provide the contextual background of the networks to be examined, and as Yin agrees, this is one of the method’s primary functions.90

The contextual backgrounds within this project have detailed the data on the group/organisation, the cell, and the individual, to allow a complete understanding of the context in which the cell is based and is operating. As will be discussed regarding the data collection below, the contextual background must be objective, and there can be no assumptions in relation to the data or the relationships between individuals. As has been discussed, the examination of covert networks can lead to incomplete or insufficient data. Where educated assumptions are absolutely necessary and feasible, the evidence supporting such an assumption is presented. All data has been correlated to attempt to ensure the absolute authority and objectivity of both the data and the data sources.

xv The term ‘network/s’ in this project implies the cell, and not wider terrorist networks, as designated by the term within broader terrorism studies literature.

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Despite the significance and prevalent use of the case study method, there are three major criticisms, particularly when contrasted with quantitative methodologies. Such issues are necessary to contend with to meet the second objective of the project. These criticisms are: i. The possibility of casual research and biased results.91 ii. That case studies are not useful in generalisation and comparison.92 iii. That case studies are arduous and time consuming.93 The first criticism echoes criticisms of terrorism studies and their lack of objectivity. The solution to this criticism is dependent on the data sources used in the research and the methods employed, which will be discussed subsequently. The following two criticisms will also be discussed later in this chapter.

3.1.2 DATA COLLECTION & SOURCES Inherent in the examination and analysis of data concerning covert groups and their actions is the difficulty associated with the collection of such data. By its very nature, the data concerning the groups that have been examined was difficult to procure for several reasons: 1. A wealth of the data is classified by government agencies; 2. Government agencies often do not themselves have the data required to form an inclusive assessment of the group or operation under investigation. These issues presented problems with regard to the LET cell which involved individuals who have been charged with terrorism-related offences but not convicted. Additionally, the data collection of the LET cell discovered individuals within the cell who have not been publicly identified or charged with any offence related to these activities. The legal ramifications of this discovery are discussed below.

The HRB cell posed a different dilemma in that while many government documents on the group have been declassified, the data on the group that the government had collected was incomplete and not comprehensive. Before discussing the data collection methods that have been employed in this doctoral project, Sparrow’s discussion of the difficulty in examining covert networks must be revisited.94 Any examination of a terrorist or covert organisation will inevitably be incomplete, particularly within academia where the data collection methods are far less comprehensive and far-reaching than those of national and international intelligence

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agencies. Despite the best efforts of the researcher in this project, the data and the networks will inevitably be incomplete in some areas.

The contextual background data collected in this project was achieved through documentary research and interviews. The principal form of data collection in this project was through ‘open source’xvi documentary research, and hence, through social artefacts. Primary data was employed as much as possible.

3.1.2.1 GOVERNMENT SOURCES These primary sources were retrieved through the National Archives of Australia (NAA) which included declassified archives from various government departments and agencies including seized diaries, letters, and pamphlets of the terrorist cells in question. While some of these sources had already been declassified, applications for access had to be made and the archives examined for declassification through the NAA. This was the first type of government data source employed.

The project also employed reports and media releases published by the Australian government regarding the cells in question. Examples of these are the Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia,95 by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Institute of Criminology in 2004, and the US government, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, by the Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1995.96 Previously classified reports from the AFP concerning Aum Shinrikyo were acquired through section 15 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. These reports detailed the individuals, activities, and interaction which occurred during the relevant period in Western Australia.

3.1.2.2 NGO & MEDIA SOURCES Reports by Non-Government Organisations (NGO) such as the International Crisis Group, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, and the South Asia Analysis Group were also used in the

xvi With the exception of the documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

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documentary research for the project. Media sources were the final form of documentary data utilised by the project. These sources were especially significant in the process, in respect to both availability and non-availability of data, particularly those regarding the information detailed in the Brigitte Dossier released by French Intelligence to select Australian media sources following their interrogation of the LET-trained terror suspect, Willie Virgile Brigitte. These media outlets included the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) television’s Four Corners programme, Channel Nine’s Sunday programme, and News Limited newspapers. This dossier detailed Brigitte’s history, training, and activities in Australia. A majority of the media sources used were based on information such as court hearings and reports, and statements made by Australian intelligence and government authorities and officials. Attempts were made to acquire the Brigitte Dossier from la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) in Paris, which declined as the matter was before the courts. The media outlets that were given the dossier also were approached, including Liz Jackson of the ABC program Four Corners and Ben English of the Herald Sun, but these individuals were unable to distribute the document. Many of these media sources were also based on data uncovered during the court proceedings of individuals involved in the cell.

The Counter Intelligence, Counter Espionage, Counter Terrorism (CI-CE-CT) websitexvii has been used as a data source for the contextual background of the LET cell. This is an Australian website aimed at Australian intelligence professionals and discusses varied topics associated with the concepts encapsulated in the site’s name. The CI-CE-CT mission statement is: Australia has never had, and does not have a serious dedicated and professional counter-intelligence capability. A country without a CI capability cannot be regarded as a serious player in regional and international affairs or a reliable alliance member.97

The website presents an editorial titled ‘Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network in Australia’. This editorial presents a chronology of the LET-trained Brigitte’s activities in Australia, some of which are presented in what appear to be diary entries.xviii It is

xvii http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/ xviii Brigitte tended to carry documents with him.

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quite possible, although unconfirmed, that these entries are from the Brigitte Dossier discussed previously. Martin Chulov, arguably the country’s open source expert on Brigitte and the LET cell, indicated that the documents seemed to be genuine. xix

3.1.2.3 INTERVIEWS The third form of data collection was through interviews. The first category of interviews was intended to be ethnographic-orientated interviews with former members of the HRB such as Kremsimir Perkovic, Victor Kuper, Jure Gojevic, and Jure Maric. The undertaking of such interviews aimed specifically at responding to Brannan and colleagues that interviews with the specific subjects of the investigation were the greatest of primary resources. The interviews conducted attempted to fill gaps in the data and confirm the data collected.xx Following the approval of the interviews by the UHREC, letters were sent to each of the intended interviewees at addresses identified through the White Pages telephone directory. Those that were contacted were living at the same addresses as during the period examined within the contextual background. These letters included a cover page detailing the project, a consent information package regarding the interviews within the project, and the return details for their responses as to their intentions to participate. Regrettably no interviews were conducted as a majority of the individuals were not able to be contacted. The very few who were contacted declined to be interviewed.

The second form of interview was a more general investigative interview with members of the media and individuals who were formerly in charge of the investigations into terrorist groups. These interviews often took the form of open- ended discussions, taking place over the telephone, regarding the different cells examined within the project. Again, as with the attempted ethnographic interviews, these interviews aimed at the generation and confirmation of data regarding these cells. The individuals interviewed in this process were Martin Chulov (The

xix It is important to note that the data from this source was not used as relational data in the analysis of the LET cell. xx These interviews were to be conducted as semi-structured interviews and (in some cases) unstructured interviews. The interviews sought Level 3 (Full) Application for Approval to Undertake Research Involving Human Participants, from the (Queensland University of Technology) University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC). This application treated confidentiality as the highest priority (in addition to the researcher’s personal safety), both to protect interviewees and encourage them to participate.

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Australian) and Liz Jackson (formerly Four Corners) within the media sphere, and Jeff Penrose (formerly of the Australian Federal Police) who was in charge of the investigation into Aum Shinrikyo’s activities in Australia between 1993 and 1994.

During the process of these interviews, some portions of the collected data presented ethical dilemmas. There were individuals who were identified as part of terrorist cells who previously had not been identified in the public arena and had not been charged by authorities in relation to any acts of or association with terrorism. To resolve this issue, the interview process was halted and consultation with the Research Ethics Officer was sought. An application for Level 2 (Expedited) Application for Approval to Undertake Research Involving Human Participants was lodged and approved, with the legal issues involving sensitive data forming the impetus of the application. The Committee agreed to the use of pseudonyms and the appropriate ‘camouflaging’ of facts that would otherwise allow the identification of such an individual. These measures were implemented so as to not compromise the interactional details of the individual or the rest of the network.

The data collected and employed within the contextual background of this project was verified through alternative sources in order to increase its reliability. The case studies themselves serve as a background to a social network analysis, and hence, bias is not applicable in this context. The data collected within this thesis is current as of January 2007.xxi

3.1.3 NEGATING CRITICISMS – CASE STUDIES The proposed methodology met the first criticism of case studies and the objectivity criticism of terrorism studies through the method of data collection and selection of data sources. The second criticism of the case study methodology suggests that the method is not useful in generalisation and comparison.98 Because this methodology will not compare the case studies themselves, but only the results of the social networks analysis of the relational data, this criticism is negated. The final criticism of this method is that case studies are arduous and time consuming.99 The case studies in this project were specifically focused on the cell in question and the interaction within

xxi This disclaimer particularly relates to the LET cell, as the cases currently remain before the courts.

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that specific cell, to provide a contextual representation of the data used for the analysis, providing a more focused approach. Robert Yin agrees that the final criticism is negated through such a managed and focused method.100 The use of the qualitative case study as the basis for analysis in this project illustrates its importance and utility within both terrorism studies and intelligence analysis.

3.2 RELATIONAL DATA The next stage undertaken in this social network analysis concerned the storage and classification of the relational data collected through the above processes and data sources. According to Scott, there are three principal types of data in research: Attribute Data; Relational Data, and; Ideational Data. Scott maintains that the data appropriate to social network analysis is relational data.101 Relational data consists of the contacts, ties, and connections of the individuals within a network. These “relations are not the properties of the agents, but the systems of the agents [therefore,]…the methods appropriate to relational data are those of network analysis”.102

In the collection and collation of the relational data of covert networks, it is important to acknowledge (again) Sparrow’s problems regarding covert networks: 1. Incompleteness; 2. Fuzzy Boundaries; and 3. Dynamic Networks.103 The incompleteness of the data is acknowledged as a weakness of this projectxxii and is inextricably tied to the reliance on open source data and the limited resources available to the researcher. Sparrow’s fuzzy boundaries dilemma within covert networks refers to the difficulty in deciding which individuals to include within the network. For this project, the individuals who have been included in the relational data (and analysis) stage were those who were directly involved through interaction with or direct involvement in the operation once the cell had gone into the ‘covert’ stage of its operation.xxiii This timeframe began when the cell finalised its intended modus operandi and consequentially established itself covertly to undertake its objectives. This timeframe ceased at the final implementation of the operation, or at the stage the cell was disrupted by authorities. This measure focuses the analysis on

xxii As it would be in any examination of covert networks. xxiii The use of the word ‘covert’ to describe the commencement of the cell’s operation must be distinguished from the use of ‘structural covertness’ as a characteristic of a network.

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how the group operates when it is in its purely covert stage, towards the completion of the operation, in order to evaluate the best destabilisation methods and counter- terrorism applications for when the cell is at its most dangerous. This is also the most likely stage at which a terrorist group will enter or begin operating in Australia. This interval will be defined and specified in the analysis sections of the specific chapters on each of the terrorist cells.

The dynamic aspect of covert networks concerns the relationships and interactions between the individuals within a network over time. In a dynamic network, these interactions and individuals are not static but mobile, and the interactions between the individuals have been measured and scored within this timeframe. The values attributed to these interactions will be addressed through the introduction of ‘Interactional Criteria’ and measures.

3.2.1 INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA Interactional criteria are essentially the criteria measuring the strengths of the linkages between the individuals within a network.104 These criteria serve as measures for describing the existence, importance, and type of relationship between individuals.

There are many stages of terrorist operations that include recruitment, radicalisation/indoctrination, planning, and operational stages. This project is concerned with constructing and analysing the cell during the operational period. It must be noted at this point, and it is a contention of this project, that when a group of individuals undertakes covert behaviour, normal (and previously existing) ties such as family, religious, racial, and ideological ties between the members of a terrorist cell become dormant. This period will be referred to as the ‘Covert Stage’ of the operation. The only ties that bind the individuals during this period are the interactions that concern the operation (or act of terrorism) within this period.

Adapted from Boissevain’s work, the interactional criteria adopted for this project are: ‘Transactional Content’ and ‘Frequency and Duration of Interaction’.105 The transactional content measure concerns the exchanges between the actors, which define that relationship.106 The transactional content measure was used in addition to the frequency and duration of interaction to define the strengths of the relationships

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within the network. The frequency and duration of contact criterion is largely self explanatory, as the criterion serves to qualify the transactional content measure by indicating the frequency and duration of the links between individuals. This project will be an interaction or operation based network analysis (as opposed to a ‘Trust’ network).

The transactional content measure incorporates both personal and non-personal interaction and discussions (meetings), communication via email, telephone, letter, internet chat room, or any other means, and through transactions of any type involving items such as money, data, weapons, or explosives. This measure determines the inclusion of individuals within a network (if this interaction is related to or is in aid of the terrorist operation of the individual cell). The frequency and duration of contact criterion serves to measure the strength of the interaction between different nodes within a network. Once the interactions between individuals can be measured, these interactions need to be stored in adjacency matrices.

3.2.1.1 MATRICES Scott claims that “all social research data, once collected must be held in some kind of data matrix”.107 This is especially essential when storing and organising relational data. This project used data matrices to store the relational research data synthesised from the contextual background on each of the cells under investigation. The relational data for this project has been presented in ‘Adjacency: Member by Member’ matrices, such as the matrix in Table 1. The matrix in Table 1 represents a fictional or example network in which A, B, and C are connected, and D and B are connected. These connections indicate the binary relationships between the group members, that is, simply whether a relationship exists or not.

TABLE 1. BINARY ADJACENCY MATRIX: MEMBER BY MEMBER. Member A Member B Member C Member D Member A 1 1 0 Member B 1 1 1 Member C 1 1 0 Member D 0 1 0

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Because the covert networks examined are mobile and communicate or exchange on numerous occasions, a weighted value is assigned to each interaction between the individuals of a network. This project employed a codification of the interactional data where numerical values were assigned to the different levels of interaction, constituting a static weighted representation of a dynamic relationship: 0. No Contact A score of zero indicates that there was no interaction between the nodes within the period under examination. 1. Low Level Contact A low contact level indicates that there is a very low level of contact between individuals, confined to limited interaction such as a single email, text message, a telephone/satellite-phone call, a brief conversation in an internet chat room, or a financial transaction. 2. Moderate Level Contact A score of two indicates a moderate level of contact between individuals, representing a relationship which may consist of multiple interactions through email, telephone, internet, multiple financial transactions, or an extremely limited amount of personal interaction. 3. Medium Level Contact The medium level contact represents interaction such as a limited personal interaction or meeting or cumulative amounts of moderate and low level interaction. 4. High Level Contact The high level contact indicates interaction such as an extended meeting or cumulative interaction of a medium, moderate, or low level contact. A score of four between individuals using low level methods of contact would have required a very considerable amount of such interaction. 5. Maximum Level Contact Five is the maximum weighted representation of a dynamic relationship and may represent interaction such as individuals who reside together or meet frequently.

Table 2 shows the same adjacency matrix represented in Table 1, but uses the interactional criteria as static representations of dynamic relationships. The static interaction scores in Table 2 indicate: Member D and Member B have a maximum level contact relationship; Member A and Member C have a medium level contact

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relationship; Member B and Member A have a low level contact relationship; and finally Member C and Member B have also have a low level relationship. No other relationships exist within the network.

TABLE 2. ADJACENCY MATRIX: INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA. Member A Member B Member C Member D Member A 1 3 0 Member B 1 1 5 Member C 3 1 0 Member D 0 5 0

3.2.1.2 GRAPHS As discussed above, covert networks are cellular and distributed, as opposed to hierarchical. As such, the mapping of the terrorist cells should be through social network analysis.xxiv Similarly, it is important to note that this methodology does not involve dynamic network analysis, due to the small size of the networks that have been examined.xxv This project employed the sociometric analysis approach of social network analysis. The development of the sociogram and graph theory within social network analysis was discussed previously. A sociograph or graph (as they will be termed throughout this methodology and project) is a visual representation of a network developed through graph theory with the actors represented by nodes, and their relationships represented by links or lines.

FIGURE 3. GRAPH: EXAMPLE ADJACENCY MATRIX.

xxiv As opposed to order theory or hierarchical network analysis. xxv As discussed previously, dynamic network analysis is used for moderate to large scale networks.

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Figure 3 shows a graph constructed from the binary adjacency matrix in Table 1. The graphs in this project have been constructed through the social network analysis software UCInet version 6.85 made by Analytic Technologies, specifically by the network analysts Stephen Borgatti, Martin Everett, and Linton Freeman.108 The UCInet program is one of the most widely used network analysis programs in the field due to the program being inexpensive, user-friendly, having many powerful features, and being constantly updated.109 The program allows the direct graphing from an adjacency matrix input. Figure 3 demonstrates more clearly the relationships between members A, B, C, and D in Table 1. Figure 4 shows the same graph, but using the data from Table 2. This graph more clearly demonstrates the links between the nodes represented in Table 2; it is clear that B and D have extremely high levels of interaction, which may be a result of the two living together or the pair having extremely high levels of telephone conversations. Nodes A and C have lower levels of interaction but still significantly more than A and B, and C and B. The interaction between A and C may be a result of a brief meeting or numerous financial transactions and email conversations, while the weaker relationships between A and B, and B and C, may represent text messages, emails, or financial transactions.

FIGURE 4. INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED.

These interactional criteria were used in the construction of the graphs in this project, as the formal measures of the relations between the actors within the terrorist cells were considered imperative in a complete analysis of the network and a comparative analysis of the cells. For example, an actor with multiple strong links indicates an important (and perhaps necessary) part of a network.

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NETWORK ANALYSIS The frameworks for analysis for this project (to be presented) were based on the mathematical applications within social network analysis of leading theorists within the field such as Beauchamp,110 Sabidussi,111 Boissevain,112 Freeman113, Carley,114 Wasserman and Faust.115 The framework also employed elements of Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s netwar and organisational network theory.116 The analysis of the data accumulated from the previous two stages was examined through ten mathematical criteria designed to measure the properties of the network and the individuals within the network. These criteria entail ten measures, which are: ‘Size’; ‘Density’; ‘Degree of Connexion’; ‘Average Communication Speed’; ‘Actor Level Degree Centrality’; ‘Actor Level Closeness Centrality’; ‘Actor Level Betweenness Centrality’; ‘Clique Count’, and; ‘Clusters’. ‘Network Formations’ will also be examined within this analysis. These criteria are widely used and held as the analysis criteria by social network analysts and theorists in general.117 While ascribed static analogue weightings (interactional criteria) have been used in the project and the mapping of the networks (due to its usefulness in the contextual analysis of links and relationships within a network, as well as for further analysis), all of the equations will treat the network links as binary. The ten criteria can be separated into two categories: network level measures and node level measures.

3.3.1 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES The network level measures calculate the criteria of the overall network in relation to every member within that network. The network level measures employed within this methodology were: i. Size; ii. Density; iii. Degree of Connexion; iv. Average Communication Speed; v. Clusters; and vi. Network Formation.

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3.3.1.1 SIZE Size can be defined generally as the number of nodes within a network or data set. Boissevain describes the size measure as the “most important structural criterion of a…network…this is because the other criteria are calculated as a proportion of the total possible or actual links in the network”.118 If we use the example network in Figures 3 and 4, the size of this network is four. This measure was limited in this project through the network being confined to actors within the terrorist cell or those involved with terrorist activities in association with the cell during the specific period being examined. This strict procedure for the inclusion of members in the network aims to limit the fuzzy boundaries of covert networks discussed by Sparrow. These limitations of size allowed for the analysis of the cell itself and did not extend to the group’s wider terrorist networks.xxvi

3.3.1.2 DENSITY Density is described as the “the average proportion of lines incident with nodes in the graph”,119 or “the extent to which links that could possibly exist among persons do in fact exist”.120 The use of density can indicate how structurally covert a cell is. For example, Krebs’ analysis shows that the September 11 cell had a low density, implying that the removal of a nodexxvii would not compromise the rest of the network. The result of the density equation is standardised as a percentage. A network with a density of 100 percent indicates that every possible link within the network is in fact linked, while a density of zero percent indicates that the minimum possible links (zero) exist between the nodes in the network. As discussed previously, density indicates whether the cell in question has a focus on, or has been established to provide, either structural covertness or efficiency. Networks with low density have low efficiency but high structural covertness, while networks of high density have high efficiency but low structural covertness. Density is measured by the Wasserman and Faust equation:121

D = L g(g-1) / 2

xxvi Such measures also ensure that the focus and length criticisms of case studies are abided by. xxvii Such as Moussaoui.

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In this equation: D is density; L is the total number of lines present; and g is the total number of nodes within the network. To apply this equation to the example in Tables 1-2 and Figures 3-4, the total number of lines in the network is four, and the total number of nodes in the network is four. The successful completion of this equation informs us that the density of the network in question is 66.67 percent dense. A density score of 66.67 percent indicates that a network has a reasonably high density, indicating lower levels of structural covertness, but higher levels of efficiency.

4 0.6666’ = 4(4-1) / 2

The result of the density equation is represented as a percentage of the total possible density of the network, referred to as a standardised percentage. Many of the equations to follow will be represented as standardised percentages, the widespread application of which was devised by Beauchamp in 1965.122

3.3.1.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION The third measure of the network level criteria was the degree of connexion criterion. This criterion allows the measure of the average number of relations each member has with other members of the network.123 The degree of connexion can qualify the results of density equations in evaluating the structural covertness of a network by determining the average number of relations each member of the network has. Generally (but dependent on the size of the network), the higher the degree of connexion, the lower the structural covertness. The degree of connexion measure is useful in comparative analysis between networks. The degree of connexion (d) is presented by Boissevain in the following equation:124

d = 2L g

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To again apply this equation to the example network, the total number of lines present is four, and the total number of nodes present is 4. Using Boissevain’s degree of connexion equation, the average number of relations per node is two, represented in the following equation: 2 x 4 2 = 4

A score of two represents a high degree of connexion within the network, as the highest possible score could have been three (due to the total number of nodes being four). The high degree of connexion score supports the reasonably high density score of the network calculated in the previous equation.

3.3.1.4 AVERAGE COMMUNICATION SPEED The average communication speed is calculated through the average shortest path between each node in the network. This measure further assists the density and degree of connexion measures in determining the effectiveness of the communication within the cell. This measure is very useful in attempting to destabilise larger networks when comparing the reduction in information flow and speed. The equation used for the calculation of the average communication speed, as proposed by Carley, is:125

-1 ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟ Average Speed = ⎜ ∑dG (i, j)⎟ / D ⎝ (i, j)∈D ⎠

126 Geodesic distance (dG) is defined as the “shortest path between two nodes” within a mathematically defined plane. In this equation, dG (i, j) is the geodesic distance between the i and j within a square network. Essentially, in Carley’s equation dG (i, j) represents the geodesic distance between every node and every other node within the network. Additionally, D represents the total number of geodesic distances between dG (i, j), or the total possible relationships within the network. This equation calculates the average geodesic distance between nodes i and j. In order to better evaluate the average speed of the network, the result is standardised into a percentage,

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a number between 0 and 1, to allow a more precise comparative analysis between networks.

To use the example network again, the sum of the geodesic distances between node pairs i and j, where such a path exists, is 16, and the total number of geodesic distances within the network is 12. If dG (i, j) is divided by D, we are left with a result of 1.333’, which is the average number of geodesic distances between the nodes of the network. When this result is inversed to a standardised percentage to allow comparative analysis between networks, the result is a value of 0.75 (as represented in the equation below). Thus, the average communication speed of the example network is 0.75. As a percentage, this result indicates that the average speed of communication within the network in question is 75 percent of the fastest possible average speed. As such a high average speed of communication, this result further supports the network’s leaning towards efficiency already established through the density and degree of connexion equations. 16 -1

0.75 = 12

3.3.1.5 CLUSTERS The next network criterion is the clusters measure. A cluster is “an area of relatively high density”.127 For example, if we take the example network in question, and extend the size of the dataset to 11 (Figure 5), we can see that A, B, C, and E form a cluster. This collection of nodes is an area of high density relative to the rest of the network, and hence a cluster. The nodes G, H, I, and J in Figure 4 also form a cluster. These clusters are important to recognise and identify as they indicate closer and tighter (and hence significantly more efficient) groups within networks.

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FIGURE 5. CLUSTER GRAPH

3.3.1.6 NETWORK FORMATION Social networks represented in graphs can take on very different formations and structures, depending on the network. The analysis of these formations was the final stage of the network level analysis. Arquilla and Rondfeldt outline the development of this analytical sub-approach, in their study of covert networks through the research of social network analysts, social psychologists, and organisational psychologists. This research led to the assumption that networks, when examined through sociometric and graph theory, tended to form categorical formations.128 Arquilla and Rondfeldt discuss these three types of formations: the ‘Chain’ or ‘Line’ network; the ‘Hub’ or ‘Star’ network; and the ‘all-channel’ network.

FIGURE 6. NETWORK FORMATIONS

(i) Chain (ii) Star (iii) All-channel

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The network in Figure 6 (i) is a line or chain network. In a line network, all information must travel through the preceding node before arriving at its target, therefore, there can be no shortcuts when attempting to exchange information. If two people who wish to communicate are at opposite ends of the network, the information must travel to every node in between the two individuals. When discussing the line formation with regards to terrorism or other covert organisations, this formation has a focus on secrecy, and is therefore less efficient. Also, the removal of a single node would theoretically stop all communication within the network.

Figure 6 (ii) shows a hub or star formation. This formation demonstrates a network centralised around a ‘hub’ or central figure, with all communication within the network passing through this hub. This individual has the highest centrality (to be discussed) within the group, which usually denotes the leader, or at least, the most important individual from a counter-terrorism perspective. The removal of the centralised individual will theoretically render the network inoperable. This formation is essentially a trade-off between secrecy and efficiency.

The final formation, the all-channel formation, in Figure 6 (iii), is an extremely efficient network in which every member can communicate with every other member. All-channel networks have a density of 100 percent and trade all secrecy for maximum efficiency. These categorical network formations and the inferences that can be drawn from them were used in the analysis of the networks examined in this project.

3.3.2 NODE LEVEL MEASURES The nodal level measures in this methodology aim to calculate the criteria of each individual within the network against the rest of the network. These nodal level measures are: i. Actor Level Degree Centrality; ii. Actor Level Closeness Centrality; iii. Actor Level Betweenness Centrality; and iv. Clique Count.

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3.3.2.1 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY Actor level degree centrality is the first node level measure of the employed social network analysis methodological criteria and is the level at which a node is accessible to the persons in the network. Essentially, this measures the individual’s activity within the network. Centrality is affected not only by the size of a network, but by the formation and shape of the network.129 This measure assists the analyst in identifying the leaders within networks. This does not imply that they necessarily hold the power in the relationships or indeed the network, but an individual’s centrality indicates a critical importance within the network. The equation for the calculation of centrality is presented by Wasserman and Faust as:130

CD(ni) = di(ni)

In this equation: CD(ni) is the Degree of Actor Level Centrality Index for node ‘i’; xxviii di(ni) is the degree of node ‘i’. The higher the value of CD(ni), the more central that individual is. In order to compare the different centrality indexes, the result of this equation, CD(ni), is standardised to a percentage or proportion, C’D(ni). The equation for the standardised degree of actor level centrality index, again presented by Wasserman and Faust, is:131

di(ni) C’D(ni) = g-1

Applying this equation to the example network, the following results indicate the degree and standardised degree of centrality for each individual.

TABLE 3. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CENTRALITY

Members CD(ni)C’D(ni) A 2 66.667 B 3 100 C 2 66.667 D 1 33.333

xxviii This ‘degree’ simply equates to the number of links the individual node possesses.

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As Table 3 demonstrates, B has the highest degree and is hence the most central node within the network, with D the least central. These results indicate that B is the most accessible individual with the highest level of activity within the network and that a majority of the information and communication within the network goes through B. The results also demonstrate that C and A have the same degree of centrality, which is relatively high. A and C are twice as central as D, who is the least central (and therefore most isolated) node within the network.

3.3.2.2 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY Like actor degree centrality, actor level closeness centrality is a criterion applied to the individuals within a network, and describes how close an actor is to others in the network, or the ability of actors within a network to access others.132 The equation for closeness is presented below and was developed by Sabidussi in 1966 when examining centrality indexes of graphs.133

−1 ⎡ g ⎤ CC (n i ) = ⎢∑d(n i ,n j )⎥ ⎣ j=1 ⎦

In this equation, CC (ni) is the ‘Actor Level Closeness Centrality Index’, g is the total number of actors within a network, and d(ni, nj) represents the geodesic distance between node ‘i’ and node ‘j’. Essentially, this equation attempts to establish the sum of the geodesic distances between the node in question (i) and every other node (j).

The result of this equation, CC (ni), is then multiplied by (g-1), to give a standardised 134 result as a percentage, C’C (ni). This equation is represented by Beauchamp as:

C’C(ni) = CC(ni) x (g-1)

If we apply this equation to the example network again, Table 4 shows the standardised actor level closeness centrality index (C’C (ni)) results. These results indicate that B has the greatest ability to access the rest of the network. It is important to note that Sabidussi’s equation is used only in closed networks and this methodology will be applied only to small scale terrorist cells, all of which will be closed networks.

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TABLE 4. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS

Members C’C (ni)

A 4 0.75 B 3 1.00 C 4 0.75 D 5 0.6

3.3.2.3 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY The betweenness structural criterion is another measure of an individual’s activity/ability within a network, measuring the ability to control the flow of information within a network.135 The equation for the calculation for betweenness, developed by Freeman in 1977,136 is:

g jk (ni ) CB (ni ) = ∑ j

In this equation CB(ni) is the ‘Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index’ for node ‘i’, gjk is the number of geodesics linking nodes ‘j’ and ‘k’, and gjk(ni) is the number of geodesics linking the two actors that include the node ‘i’. This equation calculates the probability that node ‘i’ will be between an interaction between the other nodes within the network. Once again, CB(ni) is standardised to a percentage, C’B(ni), (‘Standardised Actor Level Betweenness Centrality Index’) by:

C’B(ni) = CB(ni)/[(g-1)(g-2)/2]

Table 5 shows the standardised actor level betweenness centrality index as applied to the example matrix. These results indicate that B has the highest betweenness value at 66.667, meaning that B controls 66.667% of the interaction within the cell and hence has the greatest control over the communication. This is clearly demonstrated when examining B’s position in Figures 3 and 4.

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TABLE 5. DEGREE OF ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS

Members C’B(ni) A 0.000 B 66.667 C 0.000 D 0.000

3.3.2.4 CLIQUE COUNT The clique count measure calculates the number of distinct cliques to which each node in the network belongs. Generally, an individual who is involved in a high number of cliques can facilitate the collaboration of the separate cliques (to work together), thus illustrating a critical importance to the network.137 Table 6 shows the clique count for the example network. If looking at Figure 2, we can see that A, B, and C, form a distinct clique, while D is isolated from this section of the network. Hence A, B, and C receive a score of one for their clique count, while D receives a score of zero. This result means that A, B, and C form the central clique of this network and that D lies to the outer of the network. This measure is better employed against larger networks in which individuals are involved in multiple cliques, which greatly increases their influence. It is also important to note which cliques these nodes are connected to, as within covert operations different cliques usually have different operational tasks.

TABLE 6. CLIQUE COUNT CLIQUE COUNT A 1 B 1 C 1 D 0

All of the equations in the data chapters will be calculated through the UCInet program or the ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser Version 1.5.5 program developed by Kathleen Carley.138 The Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program will

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specifically be used in representing the theoretical destabilisation processes applied to the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells.

3.4 DESTABILISATION TECHNIQUES In their paper, Destabilising Networks, Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt139 propose three indicators of destabilisation of a network. These indicators propose that a network has been destabilised when: i. “The rate of information flow through the network has been seriously reduced, possibly to zero”.140 ii. “The network, as a decision-making body, can no longer reach consensus, or takes much longer to do so”.141 iii. “The network as an organisation, is less effective; [for example] its accuracy at doing tasks or interpreting information has been impaired”.142 These indicators will be employed when attempting theoretically to destabilise the networks of the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells.

Counter-terrorism techniques traditionally aim at neutralising members of terrorist networks either through capture or death. The removal of a node from a network can make a cell less able to adapt, reduce its performance, reduce its ability to communicate, or have little effect at all.143 The node level criteria outlined earlier allow the identification of the most important and well-connected individuals within a network, through their high centrality scores. These nodes are known as the ‘critical’ nodes within a network.144 The removal or isolation of these nodes ensures that this removal has maximised the damage to the network’s ability to adapt, its performance, and its ability to communicate. However, simply identifying the leaders or the critical individuals within the cell and neutralising or isolating them can have the adverse effect of increasing the network’s activity, or creating multiple smaller cells with multiple leaders.145 There are many other consequences of disruption techniques that can occur over periods of time, a majority of which are mainly associated with large networks covered by the dynamic network analysis literature. As this project examines small-scale cells as opposed to large-scale networks, theoretical disruption techniques aimed at immediate and maximum disruption will be employed.

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In endeavouring to effectively destabilise the networks examined in this project, the analysis has employed the program ORA: Organisational Risk Analyser Version 1.5.5.146 The ORA program will be used to determine the immediate effects of attempts to disrupt the cell through the breaking of linkages, the removal of nodes, and the resulting reduction in capacity of that cell. As well as the removal of critical nodes, the disruption techniques can also attempt to separate the major components of the network. For example, these techniques can isolate the bombing team from the command team, or the bomb makers from the suicide bombers (if the network structure allows for such isolation). Figure 7 shows the example network again through the ORA program. As the nodal measures employed throughout this chapter have demonstrated, node B of the example network is critical. Node B has the highest amount of activity within the network, the greatest ability to access others, and the greatest control over the flow of information in the network. In an attempt to reduce the information flow, decision-making, and effectiveness, and to isolate components of the network, B will be targeted in this destabilisation attempt. Figure 8 shows the result of the removal of B.

FIGURE 7: ORA EXAMPLE GRAPH

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Figure 8 shows that the removal of the node identified as the most important within the network completely isolates and reduces the information flow between D and the rest of the network, hence reducing the decision-making capacity and the effectiveness of the network.

FIGURE 8: B REMOVED

Through these destabilisation techniques, this methodology has employed specific counter-terrorism applications that can effectively reduce the rate of information flow, separate the leaders and isolate major sections of the network, and reduce the effectiveness of the overall cell for each of the four terrorist cells examined within this project. It is important to note that these techniques aim at theoretical and immediate destabilisation only, and therefore it is impossible within the scope of this project to determine the likelihood of connections being re-established by members of the network. For example, in Figure 8, A or C may have the ability to reform the connection with D, as this methodology only maps interaction that occurs during the covert phase of the operation. In this case, pre-existing ties that are not mapped may provide the means to re-establish the connection. Likewise, a member of the

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organisation not previously involved in the operation may take up the role of B, reforming the network to its original state.

4. ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE This chapter has reviewed the history and development of social network analysis, discussed the lack of social network analysis research within terrorism studies, and has presented the methodology employed in this project, from the data collection stage to the frameworks of analysis.

To sum up, in this dissertation the methodology has applied social network analysis to each of the four terrorist cells, aiming to provide an understanding of the organisation and communication of the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells. Once the identification of the interactional, network, and nodal structural measures of the cells are established this allows for the identification of the critical nodes. These nodes represent vulnerabilities within different types of cells and allow the formulation of effective and efficient destabilisation techniques for the theoretical neutralisation of these cells.

From the understanding gained regarding these cells and the use of the appropriate destabilisation methods, this project will attempt to provide applications to Australia’s counter-terrorism procedures and policy. The applications specifically relate to any vulnerabilities discovered within the different types of cells and any further directions that can be engaged to appropriately counter these cells which Australia’s current security arrangements may not properly defend against. This includes discovering which types of cells are more dangerous and effective than others. The fourth cell, JI, will be examined to provide insight into the cells of one of Australia’s greatest terrorist threats.xxix This examination will allow the assessment of the likely networking modus operandi of JI operations in Australia or future operations against Australian targets internationally. Through the review of the method, this chapter has established that the method can be employed to assist “in predicting behaviour and decision-making within…network[s]”,147 can endow the researcher with the “ability to understand and predict behaviour of members in a social network [and allow] the

xxix At least within Southeast Asia.

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analyst to evaluate specific courses of action that will influence the members of a social network in a desirable manner”.148 As was established in the previous chapter, such abilities are sorely needed within terrorism studies.

While the previous two chapters aimed specifically at understanding the phenomenon of terrorism and how it is studied, this chapter introduced the social network methodology as a response to the criticisms of terrorism studies and examined the development of this methodology and its applications to covert networks. This was followed by the presentation of the methodology of the thesis. The proposed methodology has specifically been designed to meet the objectives of the thesis. The following chapters will apply this methodology through a social network analysis of the HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, LET, and JI cells. Following this, the project will provide an analysis of these results and the conclusions, implications, and applications of this project.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

This chapter is the first of four analysis chapters, with each chapter conducting a social network analysis of one of four selected terrorist cells through the methodology outlined in the previous chapter. Each analysis chapter will begin with an overview of the terrorist organisation with which the cell is affiliated and then examine the contextual background of the cell itself. The chapter will then move to an examination of the relational data synthesised from the contextual background and subsequently the analysis of these results through social network analysis. The final stage of the chapter will examine the possible methods for the theoretical destabilisation of the cell. This construction of the contextual background of the 1963 operation by the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB) offers the most detailed account of the incident within academic literature.

1. THE CROATIAN REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERHOOD As discussed briefly in Chapter II, the Ustasha was a Croatian separatist movement which aimed at independence from Serbian control following the establishment of Croatia within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Serbian King Alexander from 1929.1 After increasingly Draconian measures were imposed on the Croats within the Kingdom (including the dispossession of all political rights), Dr. Ante Pavelic led revolutionary activities against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.i In 1929, shortly after becoming the leader of the separatist movement, Pavelic was forced into exile where he pledged his allegiance to the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO).2 Bolstered by support from fascist Italy, the Ustasha movement assassinated Yugoslav officials both within the Kingdom and internationally. In 1934, Croats assassinated King Alexander and the French Foreign Minster Barthou.3

On April 8, 1941, before the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, the Ustasha and members of the Croatian Peasants Party led an invasion into Yugoslavia in a revolt against Serbian rule of Croatia. After two days the Croatian forces had consolidated control of Yugoslavia. The Croat Colonel, Slanko Kvaternik, declared the independence of Croatia on behalf of the exiled Ustasha leader Pavelic.4 Following the arrival of the

i The name of the Kingdom changed following the dissolution of Croat rights.

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Axis forces and the return of the Ustasha leader, Hitler installed Pavelic as Fuhrer of Croatia. Pavelic’s regime proceeded to massacre 330 000 Jews, Muslims, Serbs, and Gypsies within Croatia, and exported thousands to Nazi concentration camps. 5

A widespread anti-Fascist campaign began in July of 1941 to oust the Ustashi and German forces from Yugoslavia. This campaign was led by Joseph Broz Tito who commanded the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and Partisan Detachments. The initial success enjoyed by Tito was countered by the Germans in Fall Weiss (Plan White) and Operation Schwarz (Operation Black). Both of these operations inflicted heavy casualties upon the Partisans, but they were able to escape both German offensives and continue their operations. By 1945, with the support of the Red Army and the Royal Air Force Balkan Air Force,ii the Partisans consolidated control of Belgrade.6

Following the fall of the Ustasha regime, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was established and Tito installed as the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the war, subsequent to the fall of fascist Croatia and the end of World War II, mass emigration took place. According to a report by the Australian Prime Minister’s Department in 1967, in the period between October 1945 and August 1967, approximately 68 000 Yugoslavs entered Australia. This estimate includes all ethnic groups from the state of Yugoslavia, the major groups being Serbs and Croats. This figure does not include ‘stateless persons’, who at the time would have included a large number of Croatian émigrés. The Australian Government estimated that during this period approximately 30 000 of the 68 000 émigrés were Croatian.7

The Ustashi movement in Australia was established through the creation of the Australian section of the Hrvatski Oslobodilacki Pokret (Croatian Liberation Movement, HOP). The HOP was established in 1956 following Ante Pavelic’s fall from power in 1945 and his consequent exile to Argentina. The HOP doctrine and ideology is based on the original Ustashi principles set out by Pavelic in 1933.iii In Australia, the HOP was the leading body of the Croatian movements and was ii The Balkan Air Force established as a part of the British Royal Air Force. iii Which essentially outlined the sanctity, sovereignty, and superiority of the Croatian Nation.

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supported by groups such as the Australian Croatian Association in Melbourne.8 The headquarters of the HOP was in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where Pavelic was exiled,9 and the HOP had 25 branches around the world including Canada, the United States (US), Europe, and Australia. The Australian branch had up to 5 000 members by 1964.10

The HOP in Australia was a purely political movement, the aim of which was the total severance from the SFRY and independence from Tito-Communist interference and control.11 The group was led in Australia by Fabian Lokovich,12 a former leader of the Ustashi Youth Movement and bodyguard to Pavelic during the Ustashi regime.13

2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: ACTION KANGAROO Along with the HOP, many Croatian nationalistic and separatist movements formed following the mass migration to Australia. These groups and movements served to create a strong network among former Ustashi members and supporters. Among these émigrés were four men by the names of Jure Maric, Geza Pasti, Ilija Tolic, and Josip Oblak. Jure Maric arrived in Australia from Austria on September 13, 1958, working as a fitter. Maric was naturalised as an Australian citizen on August 1, 1963.14 Pasti, a former Ustashi officer, arrived in Australia in February of 1954.15 Ilija Tolic left for Australia in 1958, while Oblak arrived in Australia around the same time.16

Maric, Pasti, Oblak, and Tolic were highly active within the Australian Croatian community. As well as being members of the HOP, Oblak, Tolic, and Maric were members of the Croatian-Australian Association,17 the Jure de Frantic Croatian Association, and the United Croats of Oceania group.18 Tolic, who was a forester by trade but made a living as a factory worker in Australia, was the secretary19 and later president of the Jure de Frantic Croatian Association.20 Oblak was also a member of the Croatian Club in Fremantle.21 Like the HOP, the other Croatian groups were political movements supporting the separation of Croatia from the SFRY. These groups would (to a degree) support violent separatist activity but not undertake it. These four men were among the section of the Croatian community who had became frustrated at the HOP’s lack of support and training for terrorist and revolutionary operations in Croatia.22

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2.1 AREA COMMAND FOUR On June 9, 1961, Jure Maric, Geza Pasti, Josip Oblak, and Ilija Tolic23 attended a lecture in Sydney led by the leader of the Hrvatski Narodni Otpor (Croatian National Resistance, HNO), Srecko Blaz Rover. Rover, a former Ustashi officer,24 was among the first émigrés to organise Ustashi movements in Australia following his arrival in 1950.25 The Commonwealth Police believed that Rover’s lecture deepened Maric, Pasti, Oblak, and Tolic’s dissatisfaction at the lack of revolutionary and violent action taken by the two major Croatian separatist organisations (the HOP and HNO). 26 Maric claimed that Rover’s lecture was a ‘Funerary Oration to the Late Croatia’. Agitated, the four men drove to an outer Sydney suburb and began to discuss the idea of the formation of a covert organisation for the liberation of Croatia through insurgent and terrorist means.27 During this meeting, the four men created the HRB, which was to expand into Europe, and then into Croatia.28 The principles of the organisation were later set out as follows: The HRB – as shown in its title – is a fighting organisation of all the Croatian patriots who have set themselves the task of liberating the Croatian people from the foreign yoke and of restoring the State of Croatia within its ethnic and historical boundaries.29

The Australian Branch of the HRB was codenamed Command Post Number Four, with Maric as the General Secretary or Commander of Committee Number Four.30 Area Command One was Croatia and Area Command Two was Europe (primarily in Germany and Italy), whence operations into the SFRY would be launched. Area Command Three was fascist Spain where many of the Ustashi hierarchy had fled following the fall of Pavelic’s regime.31 The role of Area Command Four was to raise funds for the operations through the Croatian community in Australia. In addition to this role was Area Command Four’s recruiting and training of HRB terrorists to lead incursions into the SFRY.32

In just over three years from its formation, the HRB Area Command Number Four had between one and two hundred members,33 with some Australian Government estimates as high as 500.34 Every member of each of the international commands of the HRB was issued with a membership number. The number of Australian members ranged from 61 to 1000. By 1967 the Australian membership numbers 61 to around

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330 had been issued. The numbers 1 to 60 were for members of the European command.35 Each of these members would have taken the ‘Oath of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood’: I swear by Almighty God and things that are most sacred to me to fight, until the end of my life, for the liberty and sovereignty of the Croatian People. By voluntarily joining the ranks of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, I pledge myself to obey and carry out without demur any orders and instructions given to me and to serve loyally the Brotherhood’s revolutionary principles.

I pledge myself to keep any secrets entrusted to me and not to disclose anything that might damage the interests of the Brotherhood and of the Croatian People.

If I offend against this oath and the Brotherhood’s Revolutionary Principles, my penalty, under the organisation’s laws, shall be death. So help me God.36

On their acceptance into the Brotherhood, members were given their membership number and were assigned to a Stozher. A stozher was a division of the Area Command and were established in most major cities. Shortly after the creation of the HRB in 1961, Maric sent Pasti to Melbourne to establish stozhers both there and in Geelong.37 The Australian command was made up of four stozhers by the mid 1960s: i. Stozher 1: Sydney; ii. Stozher 2: Wollongong; iii. Stozher 3: Melbourne and Tasmania; and iv. Stozher 4: Geelong.38 Each stozher had a commander, who was a senior member of the HRB and reported to Area Command Four.

By 1972, at the time of the HRB’s second insurgency attempt into the SFRY (discussed in Chapter II),iv the structure of the group had advanced dramatically, spanning every state and territory in the country.39 During the early 1960s, the HRB meetings took place in the home of Maric and later at Rudolf Franjic’sv residence at 63 First Avenue, Warrawong. Franjic was another senior member of Area Command Four.40 These meetings were usually held once a fortnight.41 The Oath of the HRB was also undertaken by new members at these houses.42

iv At this stage the group was known as the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation. v Franjic arrived in Australia on December 12, 1949, and was later naturalised November 9, 1965.

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The HRB maintained a high level of secrecy and was largely unknown within either the Yugoslav (Serbian and Croatian) community or by the Australian Government until 1964 when the SFRY announced it had captured 9 terrorists who were based in Australia. In a document entitled Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Maintenance of Secrecy – Fundamental Duty of Revolutionaries – Principle of Secret Operation, issued by Jure Maric and Geza Pasti, the pair outlined the operational security procedures of the HRB: a) Membership of the Brotherhood is not to be mentioned in public places; b) Do not tell even your friends anything that you do not want the Croatian People’s enemies to find out; c) A task allotted to one is to be accepted and carried out without demur; d) Any suspicions, suggestions, alterations or amendments are to be passed on only to the superior without anybody else’s presence, while it is the latter’s duty to pass it on to his superiors and properly competent officials of the organisation, who after a thorough examination of the material submitted, make their decision. e) Any printed propaganda material designated for Brotherhood members must never and nowhere be allowed to fall in the hands of persons who are not members of the Brotherhood. f) Maintenance of contacts is effected by coded correspondence, by personal conversation [section missing]; g) The official title of the organisation must never be mentioned without specific approval of the Supreme Headquarters; h) It is strictly prohibited to discuss the Brotherhood in any manner, even in a whisper, in the presence of outsiders; i) It is permitted and necessary to propagate, by spoken word and with the pen, the ideas of the Croatian Revolution as propounded by the Brotherhood, but it must never be stated openly or hinted that it is our organisation that stands behind them. j) In propounding and propagating revolutionary ideas, principles, thoughts and programmes, the source from which the matter has been taken must never be given.43

These operational procedures allowed the group to remain clandestine, to recruit from within more conservative separatist organisations, and to train with relative freedom.

2.2 THE TROIKA In a secretive booklet published by the HRB entitled Kletva (The Vow), the details of the HRB’s operational structure were detailed. This organisation (in theory) was based around an extremely compartmentalised military structure with the terrorist strike force of the Brotherhood consisting of a three-man cell called a Troika (Geli- Men).vi The troikas of the HRB are “the units which will carry the burden of the Croatian revolution”, 44 and are “mobile and can easily be placed among the people. The troika is not a fighting unit and should not openly fight with the enemy”. 45 The troika is composed of a commander, an intelligence officer, and an explosives expert

vi This formation is very similar to the military organisation of the Stern Gang cells discussed in Chapter II.

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trained in mines, time-delay explosives, booby traps, and other weaponry.46 This last individual provides the impetus behind the name ‘Troika’, which translates to ‘geli- men’ (men with gelignite).47 According to the Kletva, to ensure maximum security within the cell, the troika is formed from individuals who share strong family or friendship ties to each other so that a spy cannot be placed within the cell and so that the members are less likely to betray the group. The only person that has contact with any other members of the HRB is the commander, who communicates with the Roj commander.48 A roj is composed of four troikas. The roj commander is responsible to the vod commander, a vod being composed of four rojs. The vod is again part of a larger group, four vods making a satnija, the commander of which is known as a satnik, who commands nearly 200 men. Each satnik is responsible to a bojnik. These bojna, composed of four satnija are again part of a larger group, the stozher. The commanding officer of the stozher, the stozernik or colone, is in control of over 3 000 men.49

This structure was how the HRB was to operate inside the SFRY during a sustained campaign and never operated on this scale in Australia. According to the Kletva document, the individuals making up the troika should not know or communicate with the individuals of other troikas. This is to ensure the security of each cell. The commanders of the troikas are the only source of information and interaction between the roj or area commander.50

2.3 ACTION KANGAROO The first operation of Area Command Four was codenamed ‘Action Kangaroo’ and involved the insertion of three troikas into the SFRY to instigate revolutionary dissent among the Croatians living there and carry out terrorist activities against the SFRY Government.51 The planning for this operation was undertaken largely by the high- ranking members of Area Command Four, such as Maric, Pasti, Oblak, and Tolic, as well as individuals such as Josip Senic, Rocque Romac, and Adolf Andric. The logistics of the operation were also developed in consultation with Area Command Two.52

2.3.1 THE NINE The proposed operation would use three troikas. The first troika consisted of Ilija Tolic, Josip Oblak, and Rade Stojic. The second troika was made up of Mika Fumic, Kremsimir Perkovic, and Stanko Zdrilic. Drazen Tapsanji, Vladimir Leko, and

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Branko Podrug were the members selected for the final three troika. The members of these troikas were selected along the guidelines of the Kletva. The troika members were very close; for example Tolic and Oblak were two of the four founding members of the HRB, and Fumic and Perkovic were from the same village in Croatia.53

The inclusion of Oblak and Tolic in the cell is quite significant, as these were two of the founders of the group and among the highest ranking members of the HRB. Like Oblak and Tolic, Leko was from Sydney, while the rest of the group was based in and around Melbourne and the regional areas of New South Wales (NSW). 54 A majority of these members travelled to Australia from refugee camps in Austria and Italy at different times.55 Tapsanji had lived in Melbourne for around eight years56 before gaining Australian citizenship in the same year that he joined the HRB. 57 In contrast, Stojic left Italy for Australia in October 1962, just one year before the operation was launched. 58 In the months following Stojic’s arrival in Australia and establishment in Geelong59 he joined the HRB. 60 Perkovic arrived in Melbourne around 1959,61 followed by Zdrilic, who arrived in Sydney in 1960.62 Mika Fumic also settled in Melbourne, where he worked in a glass factory. 63

2.3.2 RECRUITMENT & TRAINING Shortly after arriving, all of these individuals joined either the HOP or the HRB. By 1963 all nine were members of both organisations. Due to the covertness of the group, the HOP was unaware of its members’ ties to the HRB and was largely unaware of its existence, allowing the HRB relative ease in recruiting the more extremist members of the HOP.64 For example, Zdrilic was recruited from the HOP by HRB member Petar Brajkovic in 1960.65 The discord between these groups was evident when the HOP discovered that Pasti was involved with the HRB and was consequently removed from the HOP committee and the group itself.66 The Melbourne HRB members were either recruited, trained, or assisted by Viktor Vicic, Ivan Smolcic, Stjepan Sefer, Luka Bilonic, and Petar Brajkovic.67

2.3.2.1 TRAINING IN AUSTRALIA The headquarters for training of the Sydney stozher was the Sydney Catholic Office at 121 Queen Street, Woollahra, the office was run by Priest Rocque Romac.68 Romac arrived in Australia in August of 1955, and in 1957 became chaplain to the NSW

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Croatian community.69 The Commonwealth Police believed that Romac had joined the HRB shortly after its inception in 1961.70 Within his Catholic office Romac ran a Croatian Club.71 On September 15, 1962, Romac established a library in the Catholic offices where a senior executive within the HRB, Josip Senic, was appointed an honorary librarian by Romac.72 Using this position Senic instructed HRB members (including the nine members of the incursion cell) in the military and combat arts as well as Croatian separatist indoctrination,73 taking care to ensure the lessons remained clandestine from both the public and from individuals within the Catholic offices. In these offices between 1962 and 1963, Zdrilic and Podrug were regularly instructed in map-reading, mines, explosives,74 and hand-to-hand combat and assassination techniques. 75

The nine insurgents also received instruction on topography and map-reading at the home of HRB leader Jure Maric76 who resided at 138 Cabbage Tree Lane, Fairy Meadows, NSW.77 In addition to this instruction, Adolf Andric prepared documents on: i. Topographic signs used by the Yugoslav military, ii. A manual of 20 pages concerning guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia, iii. A document concerning the types of poisons and acids for to be used for assassinations and in the overall revolutionary struggle, and iv. Documents outlining potential activities for terrorists in Yugoslavia.78 Andric arrived in Australia in 1961 and established himself in Geelong.79 Following his instruction and assistance with the HRB’s first incursion operation (Action Kangaroo), he was killed in the unsuccessful 1972 incursion into the SFRY.80

2.3.2.2 CAMP IN AUSTRALIA Annually, the HOP held what was later described by the Australian Government as ‘Picnic Camps’, usually in the summer for a week in the Wodonga region of Victoria. These camps usually served as an annual meeting for HOP members from all over Australia, with the attendance usually numbering around 100.81 The camps were guarded by HOP members armed with .22 calibre rifles and wearing army fatigues and singlets emblazoned with the Croatian shield.82

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During the camp of 1962, which was conducted on the banks of the Murray River, members of the Australian Citizen Military Forces (CMF) were conducting manoeuvres in close proximity to the campers on a Saturday afternoon. HOP members approached the CMF members and expressed interest in the vehicles and equipment being used in the exercise. The CMF officer allowed the HOP members to inspect the vehicles and weaponry, allowed the soldiers to give a demonstration of the equipment and its uses, and delivered a short speech on the CMF. The HOP members were also allowed to have their photos taken with the CMF equipment.83 Photos were subsequently published in the HOP magazine Spremnost of uniformed HOP members sitting on an armoured car holding sub machine guns in an article entitled ‘Today on the River Murray; Tomorrow on the River Drina’.84 vii The official government position on this event (which became extremely embarrassing following the HRB incursion into the SFRY) was that the local CMF commander saw and took the opportunity for a low scale recruiting drive.85

Mika Fumic86 and Ilija Tolic87 attended this week long camp in 1962, where they were told, along with all the members, “Today you are emigrants on the Murray River, tomorrow you will be on the Drava”.88 viii

2.3.2.3 TRAINING IN EUROPE On completion of their preliminary training in Australia, in early 1963 the nine members sporadically left Australia for Europe to undertake their operation, assembling in Stuttgart in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). On arrival in Stuttgart, the nine insurgents rallied with Area Command Two, where they received advanced lessons in the handling, construction, and use of arms and explosives.89 This instruction was given by HRB Area Two command member Niko Kovacic90 (who lived in Stuttgart),91 who instructed the group in pistol shooting in a forest in the vicinity of the Hotel Bahnhof.92 Kovacic told Podrug that “In Yugoslavia you must shoot, so that they see and hear that the Croatian emigrants are not forgetting their homeland”.93 The additional training, support, and accommodation in Stuttgart was provided by Area Command Two members Marijan Simundic and Slavko Saric.94 Simundic was later assassinated on September 13, 1967.95 The group was also vii The Drina is a river on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. viii The Drava is a major river in that runs from Italy and forms the border of Croatia and Hungary.

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assisted in Germany by Franko Orlovich and Nada Glavic, also members of Area Command Two.96

Following the training in Stuttgart, the group travelled to Milan, Italy, where they received further training and instruction concerning crossing the Italy-Yugoslavia border safely. They were individually briefed on their roles within the operation97 and were instructed to place pieces of paper with the letters ‘HRB’ written on them in the pockets of the Yugoslav military officers they assassinated.98

The group was well-versed in their objectives and was provided with a list of approved targets. This list included names of Yugoslav public and political figures marked for assassination. The troikas were also to target critical infrastructure within northern Yugoslavia (their designated area of operations) such as major bridges, public buildings, and factories,99 as well as railroads and reservoirs.100 In addition, the troikas were to target army officers and police (and procure their arms), to rob stores if cash was required, to locate the addresses of Yugoslav leaders and military storage facilities, burn down hotels, and kill foreign tourists.101 The final objective was to focus on the Croatian villages and provincial enterprises in northern Yugoslavia, spreading anti-communist propaganda and promoting civil unrest.102

The group was armed and supplied with ammunition by members of Area Command Two.103 On their crossing of the border, the group carried between them 15 kilograms of explosives, 100 detonators, 100 metres of fuse wire, six Italian Biretta pistols with 450 rounds of ammunition, two daggers, and four radios.104

2.3.3 INSERTION INTO SFRY The group moved further west from Milan and rallied at Monfalcone near the Italian- Yugoslav border.105 By this stage of the operation, the HRB members from Area Command Four were distressed and dissatisfied at the lack of weapons, ammunition, and resources that Area Command Two had provided them with.106 The three troikas of Action Kangaroo slipped across the Yugoslav border just after midnight on the morning of July 7, 1963. 107 The moon was bright, but the cloud cover was sufficient to provide the group with adequate cover from the Yugoslav security forces.108 Immediately after their insertion, the cell broke contact with Area Command Two, but

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continued with their mission.109 Following the group’s successful insertion into the communist country, the nine men split into their troikas and headed east towards the Croatian province of Yugoslavia.110

2.3.3.1 TOLIC/OBLAK/STOJIC TROIKA The first troika was made up of Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic. In the court proceedings that followed the cell’s capture, the SFRY government claimed that Tolic, who was the overall commander of the operation111 and the commander of his troika,112 led his troika through the Slovenian province of Yugoslavia from the Italian border. Late in the night in July while its residents were asleep, Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic arrived in the village of Ljubljanica, approximately 356 kilometres from Monfalcone. Ljubljanica is situated near the town of Derventa, in the Bosnia and Herzegovina province of the SFRY. Tolic’s family resided in this town, and the group sought refuge and assistance from them. On their arrival, Tolic showed his brother, Mate Tolic, their array of weapons and explosives and informed him of his mission.113 Mate Tolic allowed the men to stay overnight. Ilija’s mother, Danica Tolic, cooked food for the trio and washed their clothes. Ilija proposed a plan to destroy local infrastructure and proposed that Mate should assist the troika in destroying the Ljubljanica electricity transformer, to which Mate replied “I refuse to bring evil on myself and my village. Don’t you realise Ilija, that things here are not as you were told they were. Go back to where you came from brother”. 114 Following this refusal Mate asked the trio to leave. Tolic’s mother had advised Mate to report her son’s presence and intentions to the People’s Militia.115

These discussions with his brother may have prompted Tolic to reconsider his actions. This, combined with the fact that Area Command Two had under-supplied and under- supported the men from Area Command Four, resulted in the troika abandoning its mission, leaving Ljubljanica and attempting to return to the Italian border.116 Ilija Tolic later stated in court proceedings in Rijeka that “I made up my mind to go back. I gave up every activity. I dragged Oblak and Stojic further and further towards the Italian border. And then the end came”.117 Tolic, Oblak, and Stojic were apprehended in the city of Rijeka, in the Croatian province of Yugoslavia, approximately 277.5 kilometres from Ljubljanica, and just over 50 kilometres from the border with Italy.118

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2.3.3.2 FUMIC/PERKOVIC/ZDRILIC TROIKA The second troika was made up of Fumic, Perkovic, and Zdrilic. This troika headed to a village outside Brinje, about 154 kilometres from their Monfalcone insertion point, where Fumic and Perkovic had family. The two families sheltered the troika. Fumic’s sister-in-law, Danica, and Perkovic’s sister Zora, travelled into Brinje, where they purchased shoes for the three men so that they could move around more easily. While the families claimed that they were unaware of the purpose of the trio’s arrival, Zora hid her brother’s Beretta pistol in the cellar of her home.119

Fumic’s troika was apprehended at Koper, about 126 kilometres west of Brinje, within days of leaving his family’s village.120 The significant distance west into Slovenia indicates that Fumic’s troika was attempting to return to the Italian border. This strongly suggests that Tolic’s troika was communicating with Fumic’s troika through the radios that each of the troikas carried.

2.3.3.3 PODRUG/TAPSANJI/LEKO TROIKA The Podrug, Tapsanji, and Leko (who was carrying 5 kilograms of explosives and 14 detonators with him)121 troika headed east like the other two troikas; however, it is unclear where the trio travelled to before receiving orders from Tolic to return to the Italian border. The troika was apprehended in the mountainous Gorski Kotar region within the Croatian province of Yugoslavia on a road outside Karlovac by members of the People’s Militia.122

The members of the three troikas were arrested within a fortnight of entering the SFRY by the Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti/Sigurnosti/Varnosti (State Security Administration, UDBA) and associated forces.123 All nine members were arrested between July 19 and July 22, 1963 in the towns of Koper, Rijeka, and Karlovac.124 All had Australian travel documents or passports on them when arrested, creating considerable embarrassment for the Australian Government.125

2.3.3.4 GEZA PASTI Pasti (also an Australian citizen) left Australia for Area Command Two around the time the troikas were discovered and arrested by the UDBA and SFRY forces,126 possibly when Area Command Two lost radio communication with the group. After

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arriving in the FRG, Pasti was arrested and charged on October 3127 by German police with the illegal possession of a firearm (which he procured in Italy) and with being a member of a secret organisation (which was an offence in Germany). Pasti pleaded guilty to both charges, was sentenced to seven months imprisonment and ordered to be deported. During the proceedings of the trial, Pasti informed the court that he was the organiser of the training for the nine men in Yugoslavia.128

2.3.4 TRIALS On September 20, 1963, the SFRY Government announced that nine men from Australia (two with Australian passports) were arrested during a terrorist operation against the SFRY.129 The trial began in March of 1964 in Rijeka130 and ended on April 19, 1964.131 At the close of the trial, Oblak and Tolic received sentences of 14 years, Tapsanji received a sentence of 13 years, Leko, Stojic, and Podrug received sentences of 12 years, Fumic and Perkovic received sentences of six years, and Zdrilic received a seven year sentence.132 Fumic, Perkovic, and Zdrilic received lighter sentences after they renounced their actions and the HRB.133

As well as causing embarrassment to the Australian Government, the operation caused had the same effect on the HRB. An open letter to Area Command Four from Franjo Turk and Josip Senic,ix both members of the European command, said “we continue to be attacked, vilified and spat upon because of the nine Brothers who have so tragically ended in the Operation Kangaroo”.134 The HRB set out to rectify this embarrassment by distributing a circular giving a description of the aborted operation, pointing out the mistakes that were made and the lessons that were learned. The circular then advocated further operations aimed at sabotage and guerrilla warfare within Yugoslavia.135

Following the trials of the nine HRB members, those who assisted the troikas were also punished through court proceedings in Rijeka. Mate Tolic was sentenced to ten months imprisonment for sheltering his brother. Maria Tolic, Zora Perkovic, and Danica Fumic received sentences of seven months for harbouring the HRB members.136 ix Turk was a high ranking member of Area Command Two. Following the 1963 operation Senic travelled to Europe to take up a position in Area Command Two.

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3. RELATIONAL DATA Nine individuals were involved in the HRB Action Kangaroo cell that operated in the SFRY between July 7 and July 22, 1963. These individuals were: 1. Josip Oblak 6. Stanko Zdrilic 2. Ilija Tolic 7. Mika Fumic 3. Branko Podrug 8. Drazen Tapsanji 4. Kremsimir Perkovic 9. Vladimir Leko 5. Rade Stojic

The group should have been operating as outlined in Kletva. There should have been no contact between the troikas and all communication should have been made from the troika commander to the roj commander (Area Two Command). Following the breakaway from Area Command Two, the two troika leaders would have began communicating with the mission leader, Tolic. While none of the data available specifically discusses how the troikas communicated, it is assumed that it was achieved through the radios that each of the troikas had. All of the groups attempted to return to the Italian border following Tolic’s decision to abort the mission. This indicates that the groups were most definitely communicating with Tolic.

The contextual background establishes that Tolic was the overall commander and the commander of his troika. The contextual background was not able to definitively establish who led the other two troikas. It is assumed, for the sake of this analysis, that Tapsanji was the commander of his troika and that Zdrilic was the commander of the remaining troika. This assumption is based on two specific assertions from the available data. The first is that Tolic and Oblak, as founding members and members of Area Command Four (and Tolic as leader the operation), received a prison sentence one year longer than Stojic, the third member of their troika. Tapsanji and Zdrilic both received an extra year in prison than the rest of their respective troikas. It is assumed that this is because they were the troika leaders. The second basis for the assumption that Tapsanji held a commanding role within the troika is that Tapsanji lived in Australia and was involved with Croatian movements much longer than the other members of his troika.

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The period to be examined through social network analysis, the covert stage of the operation (as discussed in the previous chapter), begins on July 7 following the insertion into Yugoslavia and the cell’s termination of contact with Area Command Two and concludes with the arrest of the final troika on July 22, 1963. From the contextual background above, the following tables have been constructed. i. Table 1 HRB: Binary Relations, demonstrates the binary relations and interactions between the nodes in the network. ii. Table 2 HRB: Interactional Criteria Applied, illustrates the strength and duration of the different links between each of the nodes established through the interactional criteria. As discussed in the previous chapter, these results are static weighted representations of dynamic networks.

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TABLE 1. HRB BINARY RELATIONS

TOLIC OBLAK STOJIC TAPSANJI PODRUG LEKO ZDRILIC PERKOVIC FUMIC TOLIC 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 OBLAK 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 STOJIC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 TAPSANJI 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 PODRUG 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 LEKO 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 ZDRILIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 PERKOVIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 FUMIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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TABLE 2. HRB INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED

TOLIC OBLAK STOJIC TAPSANJI PODRUG LEKO ZDRILIC PERKOVIC FUMIC TOLIC 5 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 OBLAK 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 STOJIC 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 TAPSANJI 1 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 PODRUG 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 LEKO 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 ZDRILIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 PERKOVIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 FUMIC 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

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4. ANALYSIS TABLE 3. OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. CONNEXION COMMUNICATION SPEED SCORE 9 30.555% 2.444 .444

TABLE 4. ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (Standardised) TOLIC 30.000 OBLAK 25.000 STOJIC 25.000 TAPSANJI 27.500 PODRUG 25.000 LEKO 25.000 ZDRILIC 27.500 PERKOVIC 25.000 FUMIC 25.000

TABLE 5. BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (Standardised) (Standardised) TOLIC 75.000 66.667 OBLAK 0.000 44.444 STOJIC 0.000 44.444 TAPSANJI 42.857 53.333 PODRUG 0.000 38.095 LEKO 0.000 38.095 ZDRILIC 42.857 53.333

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PERKOVIC 0.000 38.095 FUMIC 0.000 38.095

TABLE 6. RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (Standardised) (Standardised) (Standardised) TOLIC 30.000 75.000 66.667 TAPSANJI 27.500 42.857 53.333 ZDRILIC 27.500 42.857 53.333 OBLAK 25.000 0.000 44.444 STOJIC 25.000 0.000 44.444 PODRUG 25.000 0.000 38.095 LEKO 25.000 0.000 38.095 PERKOVIC 25.000 0.000 38.095 FUMIC 25.000 0.000 38.095

TABLE 7. CLIQUE COUNT CLIQUE COUNT TOLIC 1 OBLAK 1 STOJIC 1 TAPSANJI 1 PODRUG 1 LEKO 1 ZDRILIC 1 PERKOVIC 1 FUMIC 1

The size of the Action Kangaroo cell was nine, consisting of three troikas. The dataset size would have been larger if the nine had not broken contact with the members of Area Command Two. Figure 1 clearly shows the organisation of the nine members

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into their troikas and the communication between the troikas as outlined in the Kletva document.

The density of the HRB cell was 30.555, a low density score indicating that the cell had a high level of structural covertness through its operational structure. The high structural covertness that the cell enjoyed was countered by the low levels of efficiency that are indicative of a low density network. While the overall network had a low efficiency, each troika formed a clique of 100% density, or an all-channel cluster, meaning the overall network was made up of three small but highly efficient sections. The network in Figure 1 resembles a line network between each of the three troikas, with each of the individual troikas resembling (small scale) all-channel networks, and Tolic’s position resembling that of a star network. This overall formation constitutes a network that has been specifically designed to be capable of high efficiency and effectiveness on small scales, while maintaining high levels of structural covertness for the overall network. The network’s low density score is complemented by the low degree of connexion, with an average of 2.444 links per node. While the density score indicates that the network has a low level of efficiency, the average communication speed was .444, a low score illustrating the lack of efficiency inherent in low density networks.

The actor level degree centrality scores illustrate that Tolic, as operational commander, had the highest level of activity (actor degree centrality) within the network (30.000). This result is clearly demonstrated in Figure 1, with Tolic acting as the roj commander discussed in the Kletva document following the cell’s break from the members of Area Command Two. Table 6 indicates that Tolic also had the highest ability to access others (the highest actor level closeness centrality score) within the network. The most significant result was that, as expected, Tolic had by far the greatest control over the flow of communication within the network with an actor level betweenness centrality score of 75.000, with the next highest score being 42.857. The reasonably low centrality score and the significantly high betweenness score indicate that Tolic was the sub-group connector within the network, as well as having the highest ability to control the communication within the network and the highest ability to access others. While the contextual background identified Tolic as the operational commander, this social network analysis demonstrates the ability to

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conclusively identify the leader of the cell (the critical node) and demonstrate the dynamics of his leadership over the cell.

The other two troika commanders, Tapsanji and Zdrilic, were the next most central individuals. This was due to their exclusive interaction with Tolic through their roles as troika commanders. An interesting result of these centrality measures was that only three members of the network had any control over the flow of communication and interaction within the network. The troika commanders were the only individuals who received betweenness scores, acting as gatekeepers (through their use of the radios), increasing the security of information and information flows within the network as well as reducing the troika members’ knowledge of the rest of the network. This segregation is best demonstrated by the clique count results, which indicate that each member is only a clique member of their particular troika.

5. DESTABILISATION Figure 1 and the discussion of the results in Table 6 clearly demonstrate Tolic’s importance to the network. This is bolstered further by the contextual background, which identifies him as the operational commander. As the individual with the highest activity, greatest ability to access others, and the individual with the most control over the communication within the network, Tolic is the critical node within the network. Figure 2 shows the same graph as Figure 1, but through the ORA program. The theoretical destabilisation techniques discussed in the previous chapter aim to reduce the information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness of the network, in turn aiming to separate and isolate critical areas of the network.

As the critical node within the HRB cell, Tolic is the first to be removed in the destabilisation attempts. Figure 3 shows the effect of Tolic’s removal on the network, immediately isolating all three troikas. With the removal of one node, the network is incapable of communication between troikas. This is the inherent risk in highly structurally covert networks.

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FIGURE 2. ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH

FIGURE 3. TOLIC REMOVAL

Although the three clusters have been isolated through the removal of Tolic, the network still has two intact troikas. Zdrilic and Tapsanji were equally the second most critical nodes identified through the centrality measures in Table 6. Figure 3 shows that following the removal of Tolic, the other troika commanders lost the connection that gave them higher centrality values and hence a higher importance to the network. While the single-step destabilisation technique has successfully reduced the information flow, decision-making capacity, and the effectiveness of the network, the troika commanders should be removed in order to further reduce the effectiveness and decision-making capacity of the network. The removal of Tapsanji and Zdrilic is demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5.

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FIGURE 4. TAPSANJI REMOVAL

FIGURE 5. ZDRILIC REMOVAL

6. SUMMARY This chapter has conducted a social network analysis of the 1963 HRB incursion cell through the three major stages of a social network analysis. The chapter conducted a contextual background, examined and recorded the relational data, and calculated the network and nodal level measures of the network. These measures were able to determine the type of network, relative and ranking importance of each node to the operation of that network, and identify the critical nodes within the network in addition to the dynamics that put them in this position of power. These nodes were then the subject of theoretical destabilisation methods. These theoretical destabilisation methods comprehensively reduced the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the HRB cell as well as completely removing the information flow

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between the major sections of the network. In short, this chapter mapped the HRB cell, calculated the network and nodal measures, discovered the most valuable nodes, and theoretically removed those nodes to destabilise the network. The following chapter will conduct a social network analysis and theoretical destabilisation of the Aum Shinrikyo cell which operated in Australia in 1993.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO

As the second of four analysis chapters, this chapter will focus on the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist organisation. This analysis will follow the same methodological procedures as outlined in Chapter IV and as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

1. AUM SHINRIKYO The development of the religious group Aum Shinrikyo centres on the partially blind Japanese man, Chizuo Matsumoto, who would become leader of the organisation.1 Before Matsumoto harboured strong religious ambitions, he made several unsuccessful attempts to gain entry to university. Following his failure to attend a tertiary institution, Matsumoto developed his spiritual interests and began to operate an acupuncture centre.2 In 1982, Matsumoto was arrested for selling unregulated herbal medicines, hence violating Japan’s pharmacy laws, and was consequently convicted and fined.3 In 1984 Matsumoto founded the group Aum Shinsenno kai (Aum Wizard’s Society), which operated both as a publishing house and a yoga club.4 Matsumoto attempted to further develop his spiritual capacity, advancing forms of meditation and yoga within his Aum Shinsenno kai yoga club. To further develop his spiritual commitment, Matsumoto embarked on a journey to the Himalayas, where he claimed to have discovered the ‘Supreme Truth’, and on his return to Japan two months later in 1986, changed his organisation’s name to Aum Shinrikyo,5 transforming the Yoga club into a more focused religious group. Matsumoto changed his name to Shoko Asahara and established himself (the only one who possessed this supreme truth) as the leader of Aum Shinrikyo.6

Asahara’s religious cult grew with considerable pace,i with his followers forced to divorce their families,7 abstain from sex, and limit their reading to Asahara’s teachings.ii Aum’s religious doctrine developed markedly over time. Like similar Japanese religious movements of the period, Aum espoused a millenialist dogma that was initially optimistic. The Armageddon was avoidable through Asahara’s guidance and spiritual actions. However, this vision of Armageddon became increasingly violent through Asahara’s development of Aum. The foundation of Aum’s theological i Although not with the same pace as other Japanese religious organisations such as Kofuku no Kagaku. ii Eventually members were required to hand over their possessions.

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doctrine was a mix of Tibetan Buddhism, and Hindu, Japanese, and Christian themes, cosmology, and practice.8 Essentially, the doctrine was based in the concept of the Buddhist poa, described by Ian Reader as …the transference of consciousness from the living to the dead, so as to enable the dead to attain a higher rebirth than they would have otherwise merited…in Aum’s usage this concept came to imply that the spiritually advanced could enhance the lot after death of the spiritually backward.9

Asahara claimed that the teachings he gave led individuals to a state of enlightenment, endowing them the ability to perform feats such as levitation.10

In 1989, Aum Shinrikyo was reluctantly granted ‘official religious corporation status’ by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, providing the cult with significant tax breaks and a level of immunity from government investigation and prying.11 This legislation that protected religious organisations from government interference and control was heavily influenced by the United States (US) following its defeat of Japan in World War II. With this freedom, the cult developed its doctrine further when Asahara combined his teachings with the rhetoric of an imminent apocalypse.12 Aum had a number of apocalyptic scenarios, the most prevalent of which was that the event was to develop through a war between Japan and the US, which would escalate into World War Three, apparently around 1997.13 The cult conducted initiations for new members which included self-starvation, hot and cold water immersion, and drug ingestion, not all of which were voluntary. These initiations were also employed for members reaching new levels of enlightenment.14 The group sustained some fatalities through these methods and the bodies were disposed of through industrial microwaves.15 Loyalty rituals were occasionally conducted in which members were to drink the blood or bath-water of Asahara.16

In November 1989, Aum began its foray into violence against members of the public. The group targeted Tsutsumi Sakamoto, a human rights lawyer who had launched lawsuits against the cult on behalf of the families of under-aged members of Aum who had left home to join the cult. Members of Aum kidnapped Sakamoto, his wife, and his child, and injected them with lethal doses of potassium chloride. However, this method was not quick enough, and Sakamoto and his wife were subsequently beaten to death with a hammer and strangled.17

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As the cult grew, members were ranked into seven classifications of enlightenment18 and in 1994 the hierarchy of the group was organised into 22 ministries and agencies that mirrored those of the Japanese government. For example, the cult created ministries for Science and Technology, Construction, Public Relations, Justice, Intelligence, Home Affairs, Treatment, and Health and Welfare. Each ministry had a head, with Asahara holding the position of Supreme Leader. This departmentalisation was intended to facilitate a smooth transition into government.19 Prior to this, in 1990, the cult’s political wing, Shinrinto, unsuccessfully ran in the elections for the Japanese Lower House of Parliament, with Asahara as one of the candidates.20

Proportional to the exponential growth of the cult, Aum Shinrikyo, - the business, developed a vast financial portfolio, initially funded by the assets and possessions of members’ massive annual donations. The largest of Aum’s businesses was Mahaposya, which specialised in almost everything, ranging from brokerage to farming, manufacturing and retail.21 Aum’s other business ventures focused on real estate, publishing, restaurants, and computer store chains. Aum’s computer chain was one of the largest personal computer retailers in Japan.22 By 1995 Aum Shinrikyo had established large facilities with multiple multi-story buildings in both Shizuoka and Yamanashi.23 By 1995, Aum also had between 40 000 and 60 000 members throughout Japan, Russia, the US, South Africa, Germany, Sri Lanka, China, South Korea, and Australia, and had assets that totalled over US$1 billion.24

It is through these expansive financial holdings that the cult planned for both preparedness for the coming Armageddon, or the instigation of such an event through the militarisation of its members.25 The group undertook military training.26 The bulk of this militarisation was facilitated by Aum’s expansion into Russia around 1992. Through these connections, the group acquired Automat Kalashnikov Model 47 (AK- 47) assault rifles, rocket launchers, and other military equipment.27 The group manufactured the AK-47s on the assembly lines of its factories.28 Aum also acquired a Soviet built MI-17 cargo/attack helicopter from Russia, and undertook military training in the former superpower, including some tank exercises.29

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Scientists and technical specialists were recruited for the cult from Japan, Russia, and other areas of the world. These individuals were sought to assist in the implementation of Aum’s production of chemical and biological weapons and to assist in the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).30 In 1992, Aum launched a medical mission to Zaire in an unsuccessful attempt to procure the Ebola virus.31 Through the recruitment of specific sources of expertise, the group successfully produced the nerve agents sarin, tabun, soman, and VX, and the biological agents Botulism and Anthrax.32 The cult began full-scale production of these agents by the end of 1993.33 Also through this production, Aum manufactured the psychedelic drug Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (Lysergsäure-diäthylamid, LSD) which they sold to Japanese crime organisations, collectively known as the ‘Yakuza’.34

Aum Shinrikyo believed that following the nuclear Armageddon, the isolated continent of Australia would be unaffected and would therefore constitute a valuable area in which to set up a permanent facility.35 This contextual background begins in early 1993, when Aum was beginning to advance its research and production of nerve and biological agents.

2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: BANJAWARN CELL On April 22, 1993, Kiyohide Hayakawa and Yoshihiro Inoue flew into Perth on flight QF70.36 These two individuals represented a section of the hierarchy of Aum Shinrikyo. Kiyohide Hayakawa was the second in command of Aum and would in 1994, would hold the position of Construction Minister within the Aum Ministry.37 Hayakawa was fundamental in the expansion of Aum into Russia around 199238 and was in charge of the group’s pending operations into Australia. Hayakawa was accompanied by the head of the Aum Intelligence Agency and Action Squads, and karate expert Yoshihiro Inoue (who in 1994 became Intelligence Minister).39 iii After spending the night in Perth,40 the pair rendezvoused with Miki Webb, a Japanese Real

iii These individuals were not known to Australian authorities as persons of interest or as dangerous because they did not know of Aum Shinrikyo and received no intelligence from the Japanese government.

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Estate agent based in Perth,41 iv who had been informed that the pair wanted to purchase a large property with a known uranium deposit.42 Between April 23 and 26, the group flew around the state of Western Australia inspecting remote properties, claiming they were searching for properties to establish a religious facility where they would conduct experiments that would benefit mankind.43 On arrival at each property, the two Aum members would inspect it alone, sometimes for hours, using laptop computers with attachments and electrodes that the members used to test the soil.44 It is not known exactly what these tests were measuring or what results they were able to achieve.45 The trio also examined properties in South Australia and spent a day viewing locations in Tasmania.46

After viewing a number of these locations, Hayakawa decided to purchase the 190 000 hectare Banjawarn property approximately 600 kilometres north-west from the Western Australian capital of Perth. On reaching this decision, the second-in-charge of Aum attempted to purchase the sheep station for $450 000 in cash. This offer was refused.47 Hayakawa and Inoue departed Perth on April 30 on flight QF21 from Sydney to pursue the purchase through the appropriate channels.48

Following Hayakawa and Inoue’s return to Japan, and their successful identification of a property on which to establish an Aum facility, Aum Shinrikyo formed Mahaposya Australia Proprietary Limited in early May49 with Hayakawa, Asahara, and Yasuko Shimada as the company directors.50 Yasuko Shimada was born in Japan, but through her brief marriage to an Australian man in 1974, had attained Australian citizenship.51 Yasuko Shimada left Perth on November 13, 199252 to join the Aum Shinrikyo cult, paying her way into the group with 2.25 kilograms of gold.53 Shimada was included as a director due to Western Australia’s strict foreign ownership requirements regarding pastoral leases.54 On May 14, Mahaposya Australia applied for mining exploration licences for the Banjawarn property through the Western Australian Department of Mines’ mining registrar’s office at Leonora, Western Australia. The acquisition of these licences would inhibit any surveyors from mining companies entering the property.55 The following month, Clarity Investments

iv While Miki Webb associated very strongly with Aum Shinrikyo and assisted them throughout their operation in Australia, she was never a member of the cult, and her association was motivated by monetary profit.

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Proprietary Limited was formed as a subsidiary of Mahaposya Australia.56 Like Mahaposya Australia, Clarity Investments proceeded to apply for further mining exploration licences on June 8. The licences purchased by Aum Shinrikyo totalled $150 000,57 and covered the entire 190 000 hectares of the Banjawarn property.58

After applying for visas at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo on August 24, Hayakawa returned to Perth on flight SQ223 from Singapore with fellow Aum Shinrikyo member Tsuyoshi Maki on September 3.59 Hayakawa, acting on behalf of Mahaposya Australia, with real estate agent Miki Webb acting as the agent for the company,60 purchased the Banjawarn property lease for $540 000,61 of which Shimada held nine tenths, and Asahara one tenth.62 On September 6, Miki Webb was appointed the co- director of Mahaposya Australia with Asahara, and consequentially resided at the Banjawarn residence for a number of months.63 Subsequent to the purchase of the property, Hayakawa and Maki consulted a geologist regarding the acquisition of a ship for the purpose of exporting uranium ore out of Australia in 44 gallon drums.64

2.1 MAIN GROUP ARRIVES Following the purchase of the property, a large group consisting of Aum’s Ministry and scientific personnel and experts arrived in Perth on September 9, 1992, on QF70 from Tokyo.65 This group consisted of 25 members of the sect and included seven members of Aum’s hierarchy, general Aum members of varying rank, and seven female school students.66 v The flight manifesto included Shoko Asahara (the Aum Shinrikyo leader,) and other high-ranking Aum members: Seiichi Endo, who held an undergraduate degree in science and some post-graduate experience and would become Minister of Health and Welfare in 1994; Tomomitsu Niimi who became the Minister of Home Affairs; Hideo Muari, an astrophysicist who would hold the position of the Minister of Science and Technology;67 medical doctor Tomomasa Nakagawa who became the Aum Household Agency Director; and Yoshihiro Inoue who would become the head of Aum’s Intelligence Agency.68 The Aum hierarchy were accompanied by 19 other senior to low-ranking Aum members including: Aum chemist and physics graduate69 Tooru Toyoda, who was undertaking his doctoral studies, Yutaka Onaya, Yuki Kakinuma, Nobuki Ami, Satoru Go, Satoru Shinohara, v This took the total number of Aum cult members in Australia to 27 (including the seven female students).

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Masaharu Itonaga, Hideaki Tatsuta, Wakashio Togashi, Naruhito Noda, Takanori Komiyama, Akira Hori, and physicist Kenichi Hirose. While the visa applications of most of these individuals read ‘office worker’, most held advanced qualifications in the fields of science and technology.70 Included in this group were seven 14-year-old girls;71 Yukiko Kida, Yuki Kakinuma, Chikako Shimuzu, Chika Tanabe, Naoko Yamamoto, Yasiko Maruhashi, and Asahara’s daughter Miwa Matsumoto.72 The group was met at the Perth Airport by Webb and Hayakawa.73

The group paid around $30 000 for the excess freight that included gas masks, generators, ditch-diggers, protective clothing, respirators, and assorted tools74 under the pretence that they were using the equipment for gold mining.75 This excess baggage included two small tractors fitted with excavation gear.76 Due to the excessive amount of surplus baggage, Australian Customs Service officers searched the entire group and their luggage. This inspection revealed chemicals including perchloric and hydrochloric acids, sodium sulphate, and ammonium water.77 The hydrochloric acids were stored in glass bottles marked ‘Hand Soap’.78 Consequently, Australian Customs officials seized two crates of chemicals and laboratory equipment.79 Endo and Nakagawa were arrested and charged with Carrying Dangerous Goods on an Aircraft under the (Australian) Civil Aviation Act. In the days following their bail, the pair pleaded guilty in the Perth Court of Petty Sessions, and were consequently fined $2 400 each. They were also ordered to pay the court costs of $594 each.80 The group spent the night in the Ambassador Hotel in Perth and the next day departed for the Banjawarn property.81 In preparation for the arrival of Asahara and the rest of the group, Hayakawa and Maki had chartered three aircraft for the group to travel the 600 kilometres from Perth to the station.82

2.2 OPERATION BEGINS Following the main group’s arrival at Banjawarn, the individuals at the property who were not members of the cult, such as Webb, were asked to leave for the duration of the main group’s stay.83 Asahara established himself in the main house of Banjawarn and the others lived in the various other quarters of the property.84 According to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), on arrival, one of Aum’s chemists, Toyoda, quickly established a laboratory in the kitchen of an abandoned house on the ranch, about 130

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metres from the main homestead.85 The door to this lab was marked in Japanese ‘Toyoda Laboratory’ 86 and below it in English, ‘Do Not Enter’.87

In addition to the extensive scientific equipment the group had, such as laptop computers, a spectrometer, beakers, Bunsen burners, and various digital apparatus, Aum also imported electrical equipment such as transformers, static converters, generators, coaxial cabling, batteries, meters, tools, and protective equipment into the country through Mahaposya Australia.88 The chemicals used in this lab were purchased by the group through a wholesaler in Perth and were either driven back to the property by the members, or sent to the property addressed to Tsuyoshi Maki.89 The group purchased copious amounts of hydrochloric acid, ammonia solution, perchloric acid, nitric acid, chloroform, sulphuric acid, and potassium dichromate. The group also required the chemical Thioacetamide, which was unavailable from their original wholesaler. Maki flew from Perth to Melbourne and back in the same day, just to purchase the chemical worth $190.90

With the establishment of the laboratory, the chemicals available, and the qualifications of the members present, Aum was capable of producing the toxic nerve gas sarin and different types of mustard gases at Banjawarn.91 The cult members that worked in the Toyoda laboratory manufactured sarin and conducted the first trials of the chemical on 29 sheep on the property.92 The amount of sarin produced by the group is unknown; however, only 5 millilitres of the agent would have been required to kill the 29 sheep.93 The amount of agent produced is most likely to have been an impure form of sarin.vi

In conjunction with the production and experimentation with sarin, the group attempted to excavate uranium ore from the deposit located at Vickers Well on the property.94 As well as the excavation equipment that the group had flown from Japan, including two ditch diggers, for which they had paid $5 000 each to get to Australia, the group hired a backhoe without an operator and purchased a grader from a nearby property.95 The group strategically dug large test holes at particular points around the area and as they dug acquired samples down to depths of between 12 and 14 feet.96 vi In the subsequent Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks in 1994 and 1995, an impure form of sarin also was used by the cult.

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The scientists on the property conducted their own assay of the samples they collected.97 As mentioned previously, Aum intended to export the uranium ore back to Japan.98

While every member who was present on the property had some interaction with every other member on the property, the communication and interaction was concentrated within the various ranks and sections of the group. The group operated as they did in Japan, in a very segregated, hierarchical manner. For example, the ministry members had much higher levels of interaction with each other and Asahara than with the lower-ranked members and scientists, while the lower-ranked members and scientists associated more strongly with each other.99

2.3 OPERATION ENDS On September 17, just over a week after arriving in Australia, Asahara left for Japan on flight QF79 to Tokyo with Toyoda, Kida, Hori, Matsumoto, Niimi, Itonaga, Ami, Onaya, Tatsuta, Tanabe, Go, Hirose, Kakinuma, Shimizu, Maruhashi, Yamamoto, Muari, Togashi, Noda, and Inoue.100 Two days after the main group’s departure, Endo and Nakagawa departed to Tokyo on flight QF79, and Hayakawa and Maki departed for Singapore on flight QF224.101 Itonaga followed, departing on September 27 on flight QF7 to Singapore.102 This left just Komiyama, Shinohara and the recently returned Webb on the property.103 The following day, Onaya applied for another tourism visa to return to Perth.104 On October 4, Shinohara and Komiyama left Perth for Singapore on flight QF7. Later that month, Asahara, Shinohara, and Komiyama applied for visas to return to Australia at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. All were rejected. Consequently, Shinohara and Komiyama changed their application from working visas to tourist visas and lodged them at the Australian Consulate in Osaka.105

In the following months another 12 applications were lodged and all were rejected by the Australian Government.106 Asahara later appealed this decision in a letter to the Federal Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in which he explained that he required the assistance of two aides due to his vision disability and required the protection of 17 bodyguards.107 Further applications by Aum members were also submitted and later rejected.108

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On October 30, Nobuhiro Okamoto and Tomohiro Kinouchi the only two Aum members to receive visas from the Australian consulate, arrived in Perth from Hong Kong on flight CX171 to act as caretakers for the property.109 Shimada then returned to Australia for the first time since November 1992, now as a full member of the cult, on December 18.110 After two months of Okamoto and Kinouchi mismanaging the property, the Western Australian Pastoral Board informed the pair that they must employ an experienced local manager for the property, and must cut sheep numbers by 2 000 due to the degradation of the station. Webb, Shimada, and the new station manager organised for shearing teams to travel to the property.111 On February 15, 1994, Shimada was ordered back to Tokyo by the Aum hierarchy, leaving Webb to attempt to run the property. This situation worsened when Okamoto and Kinouchi were also ordered to leave and departed to Bali and Hong Kong on April 28.112 Webb’s only method of communicating with members of the organisation was by telephone.113

Shimada returned on May 14 with Tsuyoshi Maki.114 Following their arrival, the activities were quickly concluded at Banjawarn. By June the station manager left the property and in July the mining applications for the property were withdrawn.115 In late July,116 Shimada approached a Perth real estate agent claiming she wanted to “sell in five minutes” the Banjawarn property.117 In August, the property was sold for $330 000,118 vii and on October 4, Shimada departed Perth on flight SQ224 to Singapore. Maki departed the same day on flight CX172 to Hong Kong.119 The departure of Shimada and Maki left no Aum members on the Banjawarn property and most of the technical and scientific equipment had been removed.120 Before they left, the members on the property conducted a large burn of rubbish and remaining evidence and scientific equipment that the group had not sold or given away. This included various documentation of the experiments and assaying that was undertaken on the property.121 At their departure, the cult members did leave behind 32.2 litres of hydrochloric acid, 12.4 litres of ammonia solution, 5 litres of perchloric acid, 7.5 litres of nitric acid, 7.2 litres of chloroform, and 0.5 litres of potassium dichromate.122

vii The property was originally purchased by Aum for $450 000.

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Drawing on the experience gained from the testing of sarin at the Banjawarn property, Aum Shinrikyo dispersed the agent in Mastumoto, Japan, on the evening of June 27, 1994. This attack killed seven and injured hundreds of people.123 The following year, on March 20, five Aum members on separate trains pierced plastic bags filled with sarin while riding on the Tokyo subway. The attack killed 12 commuters and injured 5 500. 124

3. RELATIONAL DATA For the purpose of analysis, the Aum Shinrikyo cell is considered to have been fully operational and commenced the covert stage of its operations from the arrival of the main group at the Banjawarn property on September 11, 1993 (when all non-Aum members were ordered to leave the property and the chemical experts and scientists began their experiments). The cell is considered to have ceased this activity on the departure of Asahara and his cohort on September 17, 1993. This is due to the fact that it was in this period that Aum conducted its most covert operations: the attempted extraction of uranium ore and the production and testing of the nerve gas sarin. The size of this network is 20, and includes: 1. Kiyohide Hayakawa 11. Hideaki Tatsuta 2. Tsuyoshi Maki 12. Wakashio Togashi 3. Yoshihiro Inoue 13. Tooru Toyoda 4. Nobuki Ami 14. Tomomitsu Niimi 5. Masaharu Itonaga 15. Naruhito Noda 6. Seiichi Endo 16. Kenichi Hirose 7. Yutaka Onaya 17. Akira Hori 8. Yuki Kakinuma 18. Shoko Asahara 9. Satoru Shinohara 19. Hideo Muari 10. Satoru Go 20. Tomomasa Nakagawa

From the contextual background presented above, Table 1 represents the binary relationships between the members of the Banjawarn cell. It is clear from this table that each node interacted with every other node due to their close proximity in living together on the property. Because the contextual background was not able definitively to identify the strengths of the various relationships and the levels of interaction

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within these relationships, the interactional criteria will not be applied to this network. This will not effect the calculations of the network and nodal criteria. This was done because the individuals lived together on the Banjawarn property for the entire period under examination and hence, the interactional scores would have been the maximum for each link under the prescribed weightings. Specific confirmation of this was not available through the contextual background, as this data is not known to the Australian authorities (investigations were not conducted until after the group had sold the property) and is only known to the cell members themselves. Figure 1 is a graph of the Banjawarn cell, clearly demonstrating the binary relations of the individuals in the cell.

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TABLE 1: AUM SHINRIKYO BINARY RELATIONS S H K H N A I A I T T A A Y T K N A O T H S K A I O O I O T G O N I A M A K M N N E N N H S A Y I N R H H U G A A O A A N A U A U S O I O O O A A A W K U M G D Y M R G T H D M D S R R R W A I E I A O A A A O A I A I A E I A I A HAYAKAWA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 MAKI 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 INOUE 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AMI 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ITONAGA 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ENDO 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ONAYA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 KAKINUMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SHINOHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 GO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TATSUTA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOGASHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOYODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NIIMI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 NODA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 HIROSE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 HORI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 ASAHARA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 MUARI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 NAKAGAWA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

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4. ANALYSIS TABLE 2: OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA CELL DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. COMMUNICATION SIZE CONNEXION SPEED Score 20 100 19 100

TABLE 3. ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (Standardised) HAYAKAWA 100.00 MAKI 100.00 INOUE 100.00 AMI 100.00 ITONAGA 100.00 ENDO 100.00 ONAYA 100.00 KAKINUMA 100.00 SHINOHARA 100.00 GO 100.00 TATSUTA 100.00 TOGASHI 100.00 TOYODA 100.00 NIIMI 100.00 NODA 100.00 HIROSE 100.00 HORI 100.00 ASAHARA 100.00 MUARI 100.00 NAKAGAWA 100.00

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TABLE 4. CLOSENESS & BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED)viii BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (standardised) (standardised) HAYAKAWA 0.00 100.00 MAKI 0.00 100.00 INOUE 0.00 100.00 AMI 0.00 100.00 ITONAGA 0.00 100.00 ENDO 0.00 100.00 ONAYA 0.00 100.00 KAKINUMA 0.00 100.00 SHINOHARA 0.00 100.00 GO 0.00 100.00 TATSUTA 0.00 100.00 TOGASHI 0.00 100.00 TOYODA 0.00 100.00 NIIMI 0.00 100.00 NODA 0.00 100.00 HIROSE 0.00 100.00 HORI 0.00 100.00 ASAHARA 0.00 100.00 MUARI 0.00 100.00 NAKAGAWA 0.00 100.00

TABLE 5: CLIQUE COUNT CLIQUE COUNT HAYAKAWA 1 MAKI 1 INOUE 1

viii A ranked table is not required in this chapter as all individuals have the same score.

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AMI 1 ITONAGA 1 ENDO 1 ONAYA 1 KAKINUMA 1 SHINOHARA 1 GO 1 TATSUTA 1 TOGASHI 1 TOYODA 1 NIIMI 1 NODA 1 HIROSE 1 HORI 1 ASAHARA 1 MUARI 1 NAKAGAWA 1

The size of the Aum Shinrikyo cell was 20, a large cell, with individuals in the network ranging from the leader of the cult, to scientists, to lower-ranked members. Most significant of the network level results was the fact that the group operated with 100% density in a complete all-channel network (demonstrated in Figure 1). A completely dense cell entails maximum possible efficiency and consequently the minimum possible covertness available through structural and interactional measures. The degree of connexion score of 19 merely confirms that each member of the network interacted with every other member of the network during the covert period of the operation. This is also why the clique count for each member was one. The average communication speed was 1.00 (the maximum possible result), again illustrating the efficiency of the cell. Aum Shinrikyo countered the low structural covertness of their network through the remoteness of their base of operations (Banjawarn) and through operating in a nation whose law enforcement and intelligence agencies knew very little or nothing at all of the group’s activities in Japan and Russia. This allowed Aum to operate more overtly and achieve its mission

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objectives quickly through maximum efficiency. This is best evidenced firstly by the success of this stage of their operation and secondly by the fact that this was still achieved despite charges and convictions against some of these members following their arrival in Australia.

Due to the all-channel formation of the network (every node interacted with every other node), each member of the network had an equal degree of centrality, indicating that each individual had an equal amount of activity within the network. Likewise, each individual had identical closeness scores of 100, in that each node had access to each other node. Once again, each member received the same value for betweenness, this value being zero, indicating that no individual had control over the flow of data within the network due to each individual’s maximum closeness.

From the social network analysis measures applied above, it is impossible to determine the most important node or nodes within this network, as it is not feasible to distinguish the relative importance of each individual to the network. Through this social network analysis each individual is equally important to the network.

5. DESTABILISATION Because it is not possible to identify the nodes of critical importance to the network through sociometric measures, neither is it possible to use the traditional measures to attempt to destabilise the cell. For example, Figure 2 shows the original Aum network in Figure 1, but through the Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program. As each of the nodes in the network is of equal importance and centrality, it does not matter which node is targeted, as the removal of each will have the same effect. Figure 3 shows the cell following the removal of Toyoda from the network. Following the removal of Toyoda from the network, the formation remains the same (all-channel), the communication speed remains the same (1.00), and all of the centrality scores remain the same. The only effect the removal of Toyoda has on the structural measures is the size (from 20 to 19) and degree of connexion (from 19 to 18). While the Aum cell exhibits an extreme lack of covertness in its structural formation, the 100% density and the resulting effectiveness of the cell make it theoretically extremely difficult to destabilise.

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FIGURE 2: ORIGINAL AUM CELL

As has been demonstrated above, no nodes are of critical structural importance to the network, which makes it impossible to significantly reduce the information and communication flow within the network. Likewise, it is impossible to reduce the decision-making capability and the effectiveness of the network. This density also makes it impossible to separate critical sections of the network through the removal of a small number of nodes. Because the ranking leaders within the network are clearly and definitively identifiable through the contextual background, this allows attempts at destabilisation through targeting the Aum leadership members in an effort to reduce the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the network. Those members to be targeted are the members of the leadership and the supreme leader: Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, Muari, and Asahara.

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FIGURE 3: TOYODA REMOVAL

Figure 4 shows a hierarchical model of the Aum network represented in Figure 1. This model was determined by the ranks of the individuals and who their orders were given to. This is basically a visual representation of the hierarchical structure synthesised from the contextual background. This model clearly illustrates the command structure of the Aum network and allows destabilisation techniques to be aimed at this command structure. It must be noted that this model is not synthesised from social network analysis and is not a mathematically defined graph, but is merely a model used to visually demonstrate the effectiveness of targeting the highly ranked nodes of the network in all-channel networks. This measure attempts to remove all command members from the network, and leave the remaining cell members without any orders or hierarchy. The high-ranking individuals within the network were signified by the red nodes in Figure 1; however, the hierarchical model more clearly demonstrates the

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hierarchical relations between the leaders and followers of the network. Figure 4 shows Asahara at the top of the network as the ‘supreme leader’, followed by Hayakawa as his second-in-charge. Next are the members of the group’s leaders who received their orders from both Asahara and Hayakawa. Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, and Muari, all gave and passed down orders to the rest of the network.

Destabilisation measures that are employed against all-channel networks cannot aim at reducing the information and communication flow or the isolation of components of the network. The hierarchical destabilisation method proposed requires the conclusive identification of every leader and his/her rank within the network through the contextual background and then aims to reduce the decision-making capacity of the network. This identification was possible in the case of the Aum Banjawarn cell. This method may also require multiple steps to significantly reduce the decision- making capacity of the cell, seven in the case of the Aum cell. Even after the complete removal of the cell hierarchy, an all-channel network of 13 nodes still remains.

Despite the seeming robustness and resistance all-channel networks have against traditional destabilisation methods, as discussed previously, all-channel networks operate with minimum structural covertness due to their high density. This means that the exposure of one node by counter-terrorism authorities could potentially lead to the exposure of all the other nodes within the network. This is the case with the Banjawarn cell. In practice, if counter-terrorism authorities targeted and exposed a single individual within the network, this would potentially lead them to twenty other individuals and the Banjawarn property, and hence the exposure of every other node within the network.

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6. SUMMARY To sum, despite the extreme effectiveness of the Aum cell and its apparent resistance to theoretical destabilisation methods, the exposure of one node within the network has the potential to lead counter-terrorism authorities to every node in the network due to the total lack of structural covertness. Thus, the best destabilisation method for an all-channel network is to target the highest leadership nodes in the network that have been identified through the contextual background and remove these nodes from the network. The removal of these nodes ensures a reduction in effectiveness and the decision-making process of the network (the effects of these processes are not measurable through social network analysis due to the nature of all-channel networks). The capture or discovery of every one of these high-ranking nodes increases the ability to identify and neutralise the remaining network, due to its lack of structural covertness. In short, it is very time-consuming to fully disrupt such a network, but comparatively simple to identify each of the nodes in order to effectively destabilise it (depending on the strength of the links). This chapter has mapped, calculated the network and nodal measures, and proposed theoretical destabilisation methods for the Aum Shinrikyo cell that operated in Australia in 1993. The following chapter will conduct a social network analysis and provide theoretical methods of destabilisation for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous, LET) cell that operated in Sydney in 2003.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

CHAPTER VII – LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

This chapter will follow the methods employed in the previous two chapters by conducting a social network analysis and examining the theoretical destabilisation methods that could have been employed against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET) cell that operated in Sydney in 2003. The construction of the contextual background for this group represents the first comprehensively detailed account of this cell and its operation in Australia. As the first account of this cell and due to the recent and secretive nature of the operation and the details surrounding it, this background (as discussed in Chapter IV) has had to rely on many resources within the media. A majority of these sources are media articles based on documents released by la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) to select media outlets. The data is also derived from interviews with individuals with authoritative knowledge on the group.

1. LASHKAR-E-TAIBA LET was founded in 1989 and is also known as Paasban-e-Kashmir, Paasban-i-Ahle- Hadith, and Jamaat-ad Dawa.i The group was formed following the assassination of Abdullah Azzam Saeed in Peshawar, Pakistan. Saeed founded the Markaz-ud-Dawa- wal-Irshad (MDI). MDI is a Sunni-based fundamentalist group opposed to United States (US) missionaries in Pakistan, LET became the military wing of MDI in 1989.1 Like its founding group, LET espouses radical Sunni extremism, and chiefly operates in the disputed Kashmir and Jammu regions. The primary goal of the group is the creation of an Islamic state composed of Pakistan and the disputed regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Its objectives also entail supporting terrorism against non-Islamic states.2

The jihad in Afghanistan that followed the Soviet invasion in 1978 saw MDI operational for the first time and it is here that its links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency were forged. It is also in this theatre that LET developed relations with the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services Bureau, MAK),3 the organisation that would be absorbed into al-Qaeda.4 The links i In early 2002, LET officially changed its name to Jamaat-ad Dawa to counter an impending ban on the group by the Pakistani Government.

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between LET and the newly formed al-Qaeda continued after the defeat and withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, these links becoming official in May 1998, with the formation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.5

The group first began operations in the disputed Kashmir and Jammu regions in 1993, to conduct insurgency operations against the Indian military behind the Line of Control. Since 1993 the group has continued these operations against the Indian military in Kashmir and Jammu, as well as mounting attacks against targets in India. The group is regarded as one of the largest, most brutal, and most highly trained groups fighting in Kashmir.6 The group maintains a large arsenal of weaponry and ordinance, most commonly operating through suicide attacks, mass murders, and hit and run guerrilla style attacks, the targets of which (as demonstrated below) include civilian, military, and political targets in Kashmir, Jammu, Pakistan, and India.7

Listed below are selected examples of LET operations between 2000 and 2003: i. 22 December 2000 - attack on the military complex within the Red Fort in New Delhi, killing three people; ii. 16 January 2001 - attack on Srinagar airport, killing five; iii. 14 April 2001 - attack against Indian border security personnel, killing seven; iv. 13 December 2001 - attack against the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, killing nine; v. 14 May 2002 - attack on Indian military base in Kaluchak, killing 36; vi. 23 March 2003 - attack on Hindu Kashmiris, killing 24; and vii. 22 July 2003 - attack on an Indian military base in Kashmir, killing seven.8 The group was also reported to have been planning an attack against the US Embassy in Delhi in late 2003 and is currently active in post-war Iraq. The group maintains its links (largely established in Afghanistan) to other Islamic extremist groups in fronts such as Chechnya, the Philippines, and the Middle East.9 LET was responsible for the simultaneous July 11 bombings of trains in Mumbai, India, killing 207 people.10

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The funding behind LET originates from Islamic Non-Government Organisations (NGO),11 donations from the Pakistani diasporas in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Persian Gulf,12 and through the same set of commercial networks that al-Qaeda employs. According to an Australian Parliament research note (by Nigel Brew of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Group) the primary source of LET’s funding comes from bin Laden himself, again illustrating the close ties between the two extremist groups.13

Before 2001, LET trained members in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, LET now exclusively trains at camps in remote areas of Pakistan, a quantity of which are ‘mobile camps’, allowing for significantly greater security.14 The traditionally soft approach taken by the Pakistan Government in dealing with LET has facilitated the group’s promotion to coordinating the activities of the World Islamic Front, given Osama bin Laden’s inability to do so effectively since the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.15 This situation has signified a dramatic shift in LET’s modus operandi and area of operations, as is evident in the LET operation in Sydney in 2003.

2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2003 SYDNEY CELL As discussed in Chapter IV, certain members of the cell to be examined in this chapter remain at large and to date have not been charged with any terrorism-related offence by Australian authorities. For legal reasons, two of the individuals presented in this social network analysis will be referred to through pseudonyms, so as not to identify them. Minor details regarding other areas of the contextual background (such as events and places) also have been altered to protect the identity of the individuals in question. These changes have been made in such a manner so as not to affect the descriptive accounts of the relations and network analysis of the communications and interactions between the individuals.

2.1 WILLIE VIRGILE BRIGITTE Willie Virgile Brigitte (Aliases: Abou Maimouna, Salahouddin, Jamal, Mohamad Ibrahim Adberrahmane, Gibriel) was born on October 10, 1968 to the middle-class Christian and Victoria Marinette in Pointe a Pitre on the Caribbean island of

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Guadeloupe.16 Brigitte’s father was an engineer and his mother worked in a pharmacy.17 Brigitte did not have an Islamic upbringing and he attended a school in Pointe a Pitre all the way through to his final year of high school.18 Brigitte moved to Paris for his final year of schooling in economic management where he joined the Navy before he completed his final exams. Brigitte was in the Navy for a total of three years, between late 1989 and early 1993.19 During this period he was twice convicted of desertion.20

Following an unsuccessful career in the military, at 25, Brigitte undertook an similarly failed career as a teacher at a Catholic high school,21 later working in a rehabilitation centre for troubled children at the Puy de Dome, and then at a printery in the same area.22 Around late 1997 and early 1998, Brigitte began his conversion to Islam after studying the Bible, the Old Testament, and the Koran.23 In 1998 Brigitte adopted the Islamic name ‘Mohammed Abderrahman’ and was also known as ‘Abderrahman the West Indian’.24 Following his conversion, Brigitte began attending the infamous Omar mosque in the Muslim quarter of Paris’s Belleville district25 as well as the Abou Bakr mosque in the Paris suburb of Couronnes, where he deepened his religious understanding and learned Arabic. The suburb of Couronnes is known for its high number of migrants and for the relatively low socioeconomic status of this section of French society.26 The mosques Brigitte began attending had been known for their extremist sermons since the 1980s. The sermons delivered at these mosques espoused a militant political discourse and jihadi teachings.27 Brigitte attended the lectures and theology classes of Mohamed El Maghrebi and those of other mujahideen that lectured at the Couronnes mosque.28

Brigitte left France for Yemen on December 16, 1998,29 where he attended the al- Iman University headed by the radical Islamic scholar Sheik Abdul Majeed al- Zindani. Al-Zindani was once the mentor of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.30 The scholar lectured Brigitte at the university and deepened his understanding of both Islam and Islamic extremism. While attending the al-Iman University, Brigitte and other classmates attempted to kidnap a Western diplomat in Sanaa. Brigitte was jailed for three weeks by the Yemeni government and was consequently released and returned to France.31

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Shortly after becoming radicalised through the extremist mosques in Paris and Yemen, on his return to France, Brigitte joined the Algerian-based terrorist organisation, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group to Call and Combat).32 The GSPC split from its parent organisation, the Islamic extremist group GIA, in 1996. By 1998, the GSPC was more powerful than its parent organisation (at least within Algeria) and operated against military and government targets primarily in the remote regions of Algeria. In 2003, the group officially declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist organisations.33 The relations between the GSPC and other Islamic extremist groups were already in place when Brigitte became involved with the GSPC. Around this time, Brigitte moved into a residence with Ibrahim Keita,34 a fellow member of the GSPC.35 During the late 1990s, Brigitte and other individuals (including Keita) were involved with the GSPC and aligned groups and undertook ‘camping trips’ in the Fontainebleau Forest 50 kilometres outside Paris, and physical training on the beaches of Normandy.36 Brigitte is reported to have held a senior role within these camps, which were essentially selection courses to discover which individuals should be sent to camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan for further training.37

Following the profound lack of success with his previous career choices, Brigitte ran a Halal butchery at Villiers-sur-Marne in the greater Paris area, living in an apartment above the store.38 According to the other business owners in the area, Brigitte’s butchery held strange hours, the customers who frequented the establishment seemingly purchasing very little meat.39

In the days prior to the al-Qaeda attacks in Washington and New York in 2001, the butcher’s shop was abandoned.40 Brigitte had travelled to Pakistan to meet up with members of the GSPC camping group from France. On arrival in Pakistan following the al-Qaeda September 11 attacks, Brigitte wanted to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and the invading American forces. Despite the closure of the Afghani-Pakistani border due to the impending war,41 Brigitte managed to travel into Afghanistan and meet with members of al-Qaeda.42 Brigitte’s group of jihadis were linked to a Tunisian extremist cell that assisted in the assassination of the US-backed Northern Alliance military commander Ahmen Shah Massoud on 9 September, 2001.43 In the following months the other members of Brigitte’s GSPC camper group

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were turning up in the same area: Djamel Loiseau was found frozen to death in the Tora Bora mountains where he was engaging US troops; Samir Ferraga was killed fighting US troops; and Brahim Yadel was captured and transported to the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.44

Following his stay in Afghanistan, Brigitte travelled to a radical mosque in Lahore45 to meet with some of the contacts he had acquired through his camper training and GSPC association and also through the contacts in Afghanistan.46 From here, Brigitte was received into the inner circles of LET and admitted to the LET headquarters, the Markaz campus at Muridke, Lahore.47 It was here that Brigitte met a senior Pakistani LET contact named ‘Sajid’, who was responsible for the training and logistics of foreigners48 and other senior members of the group. During the next few months, Brigitte would again come into contact with the upper echelons of al-Qaeda.49 Brigitte was quickly recruited by Sajid and, following his training in the Markaz campus, travelled to one of LET’s high altitude training camps in the mountains of Punjab near Faisalabad, where he remained for four months.50 This camp could accommodate up to 3000 members and was divided into two sections, one for Pakistanis and the other for foreigners. Sajid was responsible for the foreigners’ section of the camp.51 Brigitte received training in small arms, logistics, guerrilla tactics, and the advanced use of Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocket launchers.52

As well as this training, Brigitte was trained in the construction and detonation of explosives. These lessons were conducted by Chechen explosives expert Abou Salah.53 Salah was the commander of these camps and, according to a French intelligence report, “went back and forth between the camp’s explosives depot where a laboratory had been installed and another sector reserved for the Pakistanis where he was occupied with [chemical and biological weapons] experiments”.54 The expertise of Salah was almost demonstrated in its full capacity in April 2004, when a plot to detonate five chemical trucks carrying sulphuric acid outside the US Embassy in Amman, Jordan was foiled. Salah is suspected to have masterminded the attack.55

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Following this training, Brigitte returned to Lahore with Sajid,56 and then re-entered Afghanistan for another short stay before returning to France through Pakistan.57 Brigitte’s instructions were to return to France and assist in the passage of LET ‘brothers’ through France. Brigitte returned to Paris in January of 2002.58

2.2 FAHEEM KHALID LODHI – THE QUARTERMASTER Around the same time that Brigitte was training in Pakistan, October 2001, Pakistani native and Australian citizen,59 Faheem Khalid Lodhi, had travelled from Australia to meet with Sajid at a LET training camp in the Punjab region outside Lahore. At this camp, Lodhi acted in an official capacity.60 His duties ranged from distributing uniforms and weapons to receiving foreign mercenaries.61 This camp, like most of its nature, specialised in urban warfare training and instruction.62 Following his duties in the training camp, Lodhi received his orders from Sajid and returned to his family home in the south-western Sydney suburb of Punchbowl63 where he and his family had lived since moving from Pakistan in the late 1990s. 64 Lodhi worked in Australia as an unregistered graduate architect.65

Lohdi, like any devout Muslim, attended prayers at his local mosque. He attended the Al Sunnah Wal Jammaah Mosque on Haldon Street in Lakemba.66 The Imam of this mosque was the Lebanese-born Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud.67 Zoud has been speculatively linked to Abu Dahdah, the leader of a Spanish al-Qaeda cell and Ali Timimi, who was linked to a Virginia-based terror cell in the US.68 Lodhi was a member of LET prior to his departure to Lahore in October 2001. On his return to Australia, Lodhi remained in contact with Sajid, calling him in Pakistan at least three times from his home between his return from Pakistan and Brigitte’s arrival in Australia in May of 2003.69 Lodhi’s orders were to recruit and make ready a small cell and await further orders.70

2.3 RECRUITING Izhar Ul-Haque arrived in Australia with his family from Pakistan in 1998. Three years later the family purchased a home in Glenwood, north-eastern Sydney.71 Izhar attended the Pennant Hills High School near the family home,72 and later (in year 11) moved to the prestigious North Sydney Boys High, where he excelled, achieving brilliant results, and was highly regarded as a hockey player on the school team.73 In

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2000, Ul-Haque sat his Higher School Certificate74 and was accepted into Medicine at the University of New South Wales (UNSW).75

During his time at the UNSW, Ul-Haque joined the UNSW Islamic Association,76 but by his second year was failing his course. Ul-Haque had become frustrated through negative experiences with Western patients, who he claimed “look at me as though I’m a frog”.77 Ul-Haque began attending the Al Sunnah Wal Jammaah Mosque in Lakemba, a significant distance from his home in Glenwood.78

Ul-Haque’s family made regular trips to Pakistan and on one such occasion in January of 2003, when the family travelled to Pakistan for one of Ul-Haque’s brother’s engagement celebrations,79 Izhar fell in with members of LET.80 Lodhi (who was also in Pakistan at the time) recruited Ul-Haque in Karachi81 and sent him to a LET camp at Aqsa near the town of Muzaffarabad.82 At this camp, because he was from Australia, Ul-Haque trained under Sajid, who was a contact of both Lodhi and Brigitte.83 While undertaking this training, Ul-Haque wrote a letter to his parents indicating that he was training with LET and wanted to undertake training in weapons and combat, to eventually die in Kashmir as a martyr.84 At the camp, Ul-Haque was encouraged to participate in the jihad against the Indian Army over the disputed regions of Kashmir and Jammu. Ul-Haque decided against participating.85 Once Ul- Haque’s family received his letter, his father and brother went to the camp to convince him to leave and continue his studies in Australia. This persuasion worked, and Ul- Haque decided to return to his UNSW course in Sydney.86 On returning to Australia from Pakistan, Ul-Haque had in his possession 30 books that detailed (with hand written notes) the use of automatic weapons, rocket launchers, land mines, and other assault weapons.87

Lodhi by this stage had formed a small cell of extremists who awaited the arrival of Brigitte, these included Izhar Ul-Haque, Saghir Junaid,ii Abdul Rakib Hasan, and Abbas Faaris.iii All of these individuals (with the exception of Ul-Haque) had trained with LET in the advanced use of weapons, explosives and warfare tactics between

ii A pseudonym. iii A pseudonym.

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1999 and 2000 in camps in the Punjab mountains outside Faisalabad with up to 3000 other recruits.88

2.4 PREPARATIONS Willie Brigitte returned to France from Pakistan in January of 2002.89 He re- established himself in Paris, staying with his old camper contact Ibrahim Keita.90 While in France, Brigitte remained in contact with Sajid through email and made calls to a satellite phone in Pakistan, known to be used by Sajid.91 Brigitte served as a contact for members of LET and associated ‘brothers’ who passed through France,92 which LET used as a country to ‘rest up’ in before launching operations in other areas of the world.93 Two such individuals who were passing through were Frenchmen Christian Ganczarskiiv and Karim Mehdi who were later arrested for the bombing of a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia in April 2002.94

Sometime around early 2003, Brigitte received a phone call from one of Sajid’s contacts in Australia who informed him that he would be the principal contact for Brigitte in Australia, and hence responsible for his welcoming and supervision.95 Brigitte obtained a new passport with no evidence of travel to Pakistan96 and then met with two of Sajid’s Pakistani contacts in Paris. In this meeting, Brigitte received 3 500 euros for his plane fare and travel expenses to Australia.97 On May 14, Brigitte left Orly Airport in Paris bound for Sydney, Australia,98 with only his passport, a tourist visa, a one way ticket, $2 000,99 and a cover story that detailed he was starting a business, and chose to do so in Australia on one of his ex-wives’ advice. He wanted to rebuild his life among the strong Muslim community in Sydney.100

The contact in Australia who called Brigitte was Faheem Khalid Lodhi.101 Lodhi was busy preparing for the arrival of Brigitte and on May 6, purchased a Vodafone Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)-card under the alias ‘Sam Praveen’.102 Lodhi had also organised for an apartment for Brigitte in the suburb of Lakemba.103 This flat, located in Donald Street, was set up by Hasan through friends.104

iv Christian Ganczarski was a guide/escort for JI member Jack Roche between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2000 (as discussed in Chapter II).

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2.5 OPERATION UNDERWAY In the early morning of May 16, Brigitte arrived in Sydney on the final leg of his flight from Paris.105 Following his instructions, after his arrival at Sydney International Airport, Brigitte travelled to the Sydney suburb of Fairfield, where he called Lodhi from a payphone.106 In this conversation, Brigitte was directed southeast to Lakemba by train,107 presumably to ensure he was not under any surveillance. Lodhi only had a brief description of Brigitte, which was limited to black hair, goatee, and glasses, which he had scribbled in his diary.108 On arrival in Lakemba, Brigitte (as instructed) dropped a newspaper he had purchased on the platform and subsequently heard someone tell him the date. This exchange was the predefined code between Brigitte and Lodhi to confirm their identities. From here, Lodhi drove Brigitte to the Al Sunnah Wal Jammah Mosque in Haldon Street, where Brigitte burned the notes he had brought with him from France.109 The Al Sunnah Wal Jammah Mosque was run by Imam Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud.110

Following their departure from the mosque, the pair then went to Donald Street, where Lodhi gave Brigitte the keys to the apartment that Lodhi and Hasan had arranged for him.111 This placed Brigitte just two train stations away from Lodhi’s Punchbowl residence to the west, in the same suburb of the Haldon Street mosque, and within the four kilometre radius in which the rest of the cell resided (with the exception of Ul-Haque). After settling in, Brigitte moved out of his Donald Street apartment and into another apartment close by in Boorea Avenue, Lakemba. Once again, this residence was set up through friends of Hasan.112

Brigitte quickly established himself in Australia, gaining a job at the Island Dreams Café halal restaurant in the Central Business District of Sydney. Brigitte used the CityRail system to get there.113 As with his previous career choices, Brigitte (according to the café owner) was a poor employee, both incredibly slow and constantly giving patrons the incorrect amount of change.114

Just one stop on the train line from the Island Dreams Café was the Redfern Gym at which Brigitte trained. The gym, owned by former professional boxer Tony Mundine, was frequented by Brigitte who spent a lot of time training with a former world kickboxing champion and professional middleweight boxer.115 Mundine (later) made

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the assessment that Brigitte “could handle himself”.116 Brigitte attended three mosques while in Sydney; the principal destination was the Al Sunnah Wal Jamaah Mosque which he attended on his first day in Australia with Lodhi. He also attended either this or a mosque closer to his house every Friday for the Salat al-Jumu’ah.117 v

Nine phone calls were made between the mobile phones of Lodhi and Brigitte between his arrival in Australia and his eventual arrest in October; both phones were registered under false names.118 Both Brigitte and Lodhi kept in constant contact with Sajid in Pakistan through the use of their mobile phones, public telephones, and through internet chat rooms.119 At some stage after arriving in Australia, Brigitte called Ibrahim Keita in France and informed him that an operation was underway.120 Brigitte also kept in frequent contact with Hasan, making 42 phone calls to the Halal butchery where Hasan worked, asking (as Jamal)121 to speak with him. On 24 of these occasions Hasan was working and on 23 occasions he took Brigitte’s call.122 The group and their associates used code words such as ‘Hanger’, ‘Black’, ‘Stone’, and ‘Alice’ to conceal the subjects of their discussions.123 Brigitte and Lodhi both possessed notes detailing how to behave in public and also rehearsed interrogatory simulations.124

Brigitte and Lodhi’s initial orders were to prepare and execute a large-scale terrorist attack in Australia.125 New orders were received from Sajid in Pakistan by Lodhi that the cell was to prepare for the arrival of an explosives expert. Lodhi informed Brigitte of the development and that Brigitte had to house the new cell member. Brigitte correctly assumed that the explosives expert was Abu Salah, the Chechen who had trained Brigitte in explosives.126 The Chechen was to travel to Sydney disguised as a supporter of the Georgian Rugby Union team during the lead-up to the Rugby World Cup.127 Abu Salah’s first visa application was rejected, as was his second, effectively leaving him stranded.128

v Friday prayers.

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2.5.1 TARGET SELECTION The group continued planning the operation despite Salah’s initial unsuccessful attempts to enter the country.vi By July the operation began taking shape and the cell began to select the targets for its mounting operation. Brigitte travelled to the Sydney Harbour Bridge and Opera House, collecting postcards which he sent back to the ‘brothers’.129 In the same month, Lodhi began working at the architectural firm Thomson Adsett, where he was employed as an unregistered graduate architect. While at work, Lodhi accessed a New South Wales (NSW) government website and gained access to satellite images of areas like Sydney’s Centrepoint, and various transport systems, as well as the Parramatta Central Business District. He also purchased a map that detailed Australia’s energy supply system which included details such as the locations of power stations, substations and the routes of gas pipelines. Lodhi also gained access to the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning, and Natural Resources website, in which he examined satellite images of the critical infrastructure and transportation systems in and around Sydney.130 Lodhi had also ordered and obtained maps of the NSW electricity infrastructure using the alias ‘M. Ralus’.131 In the top drawer of his desk at Thompson Adsett, Lodhi had stored 1500 pages of notes written in Urduvii on the construction of explosives, cyanide gas and other poisons and lethal gases, detonators, and invisible ink. These notes also detailed methods of intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence. These were in addition to the documents Lodhi had at home, which ranged from US military training manuals on warfare, to 600 odd files relating to Islamic extremism.132

In addition to the resources gained by Lodhi, Brigitte obtained maps of the Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor and maps of the Swanbourne Royal Australian Army barracks that is home to the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).133 Brigitte also placed a poster of the Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor on his bedroom wall.134

In late August, Brigitte moved again, this time to the suburb of Wiley Park, between Lakemba and Punchbowl (as far as the CityRail-travelling Brigitte was concerned). Once again, Hasan assisted in this move, signing the Ray White Real Estate lease with vi Brigitte was trained in the construction and detonation of explosives. vii The official language of Pakistan.

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Brigitte.135 Brigitte’s Wiley Park residence was the site of many meetings between Brigitte and Lodhi, who met at least ten times between Brigitte’s arrival in Australia and his arrest on October 9.136 During these meetings Brigitte’s computer was used frequently.137

2.5.2 MELANIE BROWN On 13 September, 2003, Brigitte married Australian Muslim convert Melanie Brown (known as Khadja Brown within Islamic circles) after their meeting was arranged through mutual friends. Brown, who spoke fluent Arabic, had previously been a member of the Royal Australian Army (RAA), where she specialised in electronic warfare, encryptions and digital transmissions.138 Brown served in one of the RAA’s Signal Corps Squadrons and was deployed in East Timor after the Indonesian Military-backed militia violence in the nation that followed the successful vote for independence.139 viii The pair were married at the Lakemba mosque by Imam Zoud and Brown subsequently moved into Brigitte’s Wiley Park flat.140 Following the honeymoon period, Brigitte was visited almost everyday by Lodhi, usually early in the morning. Brown was excluded from these meetings and the two men often used Brigitte’s computer. The meetings usually lasted around twenty minutes.141

In addition to excluding Brown from his meetings with Lodhi, Brigitte would leave the room to take phone calls on his mobile phone, taking measures to ensure Brown could not hear the conversation. Brigitte routinely burned documents in their kitchen sink around once a week.142 Brigitte on several occasions quizzed Brown on her previous military experience, pressing her on matters such as military equipment, firearms, vehicles, communications devices, and the US military installation at Pine Gap in the Northern Territory.143 In late September, Brigitte and Brown moved into a two-bedroom flat on the ground floor on Shadforth Street, Wiley Park. Lodhi made multiple night visits to the Shadforth Street apartment.144 The windows of the flat were covered by blankets to prevent anyone from seeing inside.145

viii The crisis in East Timor was explained in greater detail in Chapter II.

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2.5.3 CHEMICALS Following the identification of suitable targets, Brigitte and Lodhi began attempts to acquire the explosives required to undertake their operation. Lodhi approached the industrial chemical wholesaler Deltrex Chemicals through email146 regarding the bulk purchase of chemicals such as nitric acid and urea, two chemicals which can be used in the production of explosives.147 Lodhi then set up a company called ‘Eagle Flyers’ and faxed orders through to Deltrex, ordering the chemicals he had previously made enquiries about.148 In addition to the chemicals ordered, Lodhi had stockpiled in his family home, 100 rolls of toilet paper, from which the lightweight explosive nitrocellulose can be derived.149 These were just a few of the ten chemicals the cell needed to construct the explosives they required for the operation.150

2.6 CELL FAILS In France, the DST had identified Mohamad Ibrahim Adberrahmane as Willie Virgil Brigitte, after narrowly missing him before his departure to Afghanistan in 2001. The DST traced Brigitte to Australia and alerted the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) on September 19 via a communication that read: Communication from the DST in Paris to ASIO…Could you confirm Willie Brigitte is in Australia? He left France in May with a one-way ticket…had participated in a selection course in France…[and had] been twice in Afghanistan Pakistan zone where he had undergone military training .151

Brigitte was located by ASIO and subsequently arrested on October 9, 2003, he was later taken to the Villawood Detention Centre.152 Following interrogation, Brigitte was deported for working in violation of his tourist visa on October 17. On arrival in France, he was arrested and charged by the French authorities with conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.153

Subsequent to the deportation of Brigitte, Australian authorities began investigating Brigitte’s activities in Sydney and were consequentially led to Lodhi. On October 25, Lodhi drove to the Garrison Point Recreation Park at Georges Hall and from there to the car park of the Lake Gillawama Reserve. In this car park, Lodhi placed into a rubbish bin an envelope containing detailed aerial photographs of the potential targets of the operation, including the Holsworthy Army Base, Victoria Barracks, and Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Penguin. Unbeknown to Lodhi, he was under the

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surveillance of ASIO, who retrieved the envelope before a pick-up was made by another LET member.154 ix

Lodhi was subsequently interviewed by ASIO155 and his office raided.156 The intelligence collected through the Australian authorities’ subsequent activities led them to other members of the cell. On April 15, 2004, Ul-Haque was arrested and charged with training with a terrorist organisation.157 On April 22, authorities arrested Lodhi at his work place - Bishop, Hitchcock & Irwin Architects - in Alexandria. Lodhi was charged with nine offences ranging from ‘acting in preparation for a terrorist attack’ to ‘recklessly collecting or making documents to facilitate terrorist acts’ under the Criminal Code Act.158 In August, Hasan was charged with ‘making misleading statements under ASIO questioning’ during their investigations into Brigitte’s presence in Australia under the same legislation.159

3. RELATIONAL DATA Eight individuals were directly involved in the operation of this cell, which was considered to be operational and covert between Brigitte’s arrival in Australia on May 16 and his arrest on October 9, 2003. The cell examined in this contextual background had not reached full maturity. It was waiting on an explosives expert, had not selected specific final targets, and had not yet acquired all the materials for explosives construction. While this cell may have altered its structure closer to the implementation of its operation, possibly with more members absorbed into the cell, its organisation and communication for this period still gives significant insight into the operation of an Islamic extremist cell. The individuals known to be involved in this cell during the covert period were:x 1. Faheem Khalid Lodhi 2. Willie Virgile Brigitte 3. Sajid 4. Abdul Rikib Hasan 5. Saghir Junaid 6. Abbas Faaris ix It is assumed that Lodhi ‘dropped’ the documents for pick up. Willie Brigitte burned all sensitive documents that he disposed of, and it would be a safe assumption that Lodhi would do the same. x While Keita was informed of the operation by Brigitte, the data suggests that he was not involved in the operation.

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7. Izhar Ul-Haque 8. Abu Salah

The binary relations within the cell are shown in Table 1. As in the previous analysis chapters, the binary tables simply indicate whether a relationship exists or not. Table 2 displays the cell with the interactional criteria applied. Again, as discussed in the previous chapters a score of five indicates the maximum level of interaction and zero indicates no interaction.

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TABLE 1. LET BINARY RELATIONS LODHI BRIGITTE SAJID HASAN JUNAID FAARIS UL-HAQUE SALAH LODHI 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 BRIGITTE 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 SAJID 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 HASAN 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 JUNAID 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 FAARIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 UL-HAQUE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 SALAH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

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TABLE 2. LET INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED LODHI BRIGITTE SAJID HASAN JUNAID FARRIS UL-HAQUE SALAH LODHI 5 3 4 1 1 1 0 BRIGITTE 5 3 4 0 0 0 0 SAJID 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 HASAN 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 JUNAID 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 FARRIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 UL-HAQUE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 SALAH 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

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4. ANALYSIS TABLE 3. OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. CONNEXION COMMUNICATION SPEED SCORE 8 32.142% 2.250 .549

TABLE 4. ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (Standardised) LODHI 40.000 BRIGITTE 31.429 SAJID 20.000 HASAN 17.143 JUNAID 2.857 FARRIS 2.857 UL-HAQUE 2.857 SALAH 2.857

TABLE 5. BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (Standardised) (Standardised) LODHI 76.190 87.500 BRIGITTE 4.762 63.636 SAJID 28.571 63.636 HASAN 0.000 53.846 JUNAID 0.000 50.000 FARRIS 0.000 50.000 UL-HAQUE 0.000 50.000 SALAH 0.000 41.176

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TABLE 6. RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (Standardised) (Standardised) (Standardised) LODHI 40.000 76.190 87.500 SAJID 20.000 28.571 63.636 BRIGITTE 31.429 4.762 63.636 HASAN 17.143 0.000 53.846 JUNAID 2.857 0.000 50.000 FARRIS 2.857 0.000 50.000 UL-HAQUE 2.857 0.000 50.000 SALAH 2.857 0.000 41.176

TABLE 7: CLIQUE COUNT CLIQUE COUNT LODHI 2 SAJID 1 BRIGITTE 2 HASAN 1 JUNAID 0 FARRIS 0 UL-HAQUE 0 SALAH 0

As Table 3 indicates, the size of the Sydney LET cell was small, with just eight members. Six of these members were in Australia during the period examined and a majority of the interaction took place between three of the cell members. Figure 1 clearly shows the concentration of interaction between Lodhi, Brigitte, and Sajid who formed the command cluster of the cell. Figure 1 also demonstrates that Hasan was the only operation assistant to communicate with the command cluster. The rest of the operation assistants were kept isolated from the command cluster, with Lodhi acting as their link to the cell. The results of the clique count in Table 7 illustrate that the two small cliques within the network (the Lodhi, Hasan, Brigitte clique and the Lodhi,

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Sajid, Brigitte clique) formed the nucleus of the network, demonstrating the pivotal role of Lodhi and Brigitte.

The isolation of the operation assistants served its purpose by ensuring the cell had a high level of structural covertness. The figures in Table 3 further evidence this with a density score of 32.142. The low density of the network is qualified by the degree of connexion score, signifying that the average number of relations per node is 2.250. Despite the low density of the network and hence an inherent low efficiency, the average communication speed was .549. The relatively effective communication speed (in relation to the low density) of the network is a result of its small size and the fact that the network is based around a central command cluster. The network formation resembles a star network based around Lodhi.

Tables 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate that Lodhi is the most central node within the network. Lodhi’s actor level degree of centrality score of 40.000 (while not a significantly high level) shows that he had the highest level of activity within the network, followed by Brigitte (31.429) and Sajid (20.00). The high centrality scores of this trio confirm their roles within the command team. The betweenness centrality scores clearly demonstrate Lodhi’s importance to the network, Lodhi’s score of 76.190 indicates that Lodhi had by far the greatest control over the flow of information and interaction within the network, with the next highest score being 28.571. This score is a result of his links to the operation assistants who would have taken up roles such as mixing chemicals and planting/detonating explosive devices when the operation was close to fruition. Lodhi’s importance within the network is evidenced again through his closeness score of 87.500, showing that he has a significantly high ability to access others within the network. Salah was the only node within the network to whom Lodhi was not directly linked.

The next most central node was Sajid. While Brigitte had a higher degree of centrality than Sajid (shown in Table 6), Sajid had a betweenness score of 28.571, while Brigitte only scored 4.762. This result indicates that Sajid had a significantly greater ability to control the flow of communication within the network than Brigitte did. This result was due to Sajid’s connection to explosives expert Salah.

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The three operation assistants within the cell were kept very distant from the command cluster of the network, with the exception of Hassan, who played a logistics role by assisting Lodhi in setting Brigitte up in Australia. Hassan was more important to the network than the other operation assistants, as demonstrated in his centrality and closeness scores in Table 6. Despite this, Hassan was far less important to the cell than Lodhi, Sajid, and Brigitte. The results in Table 6 indicate the distance the operation assistants were kept from the cell through the lack of activity, access to others, and control over the flow of information (of which they had none whatsoever, with betweenness scores of 0.000).

5. DESTABILISATION FIGURE 2. ORA: ORIGINAL GRAPH

The discussions above and the results in Table 6 clearly demonstrate that Lodhi was the most critical node within the network. Figure 2 is the original LET graph in Figure 1, but visualised through the Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) program. The first step in the attempted destabilisation of the network is the removal of Lodhi from the network. Figure 3 shows the removal of Lodhi from the network.

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The removal of Lodhi has an obvious effect on the network. As Lodhi was the only connection to the operation assistants Ul-Haque, Faaris, and Junaid, this connection is lost and these members are isolated from the network. The removal of Lodhi clearly reduces the information flow of the network by isolating three of the four operation assistants. This isolation also significantly reduces the effectiveness of the network. Because Lodhi was a key member of the command cluster within the network, his removal seriously damages the network’s decision-making capability.

FIGURE 3. LODHI REMOVAL

While the removal of Lodhi would have severely damaged the network’s information flow, effectiveness, and decision-making capacity, a line network would still exist between Hasan, Brigitte, Sajid, and Salah. While Sajid was more central than Brigitte in the network in Figures 1 and 2 (shown in Table 6), they have the same position in the network in Figure 3 in that they are the middle nodes in a line network. As a result the two have the same centrality scores and neither member is more critical to the network from a network analysis stance.

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FIGURE 4. SAJID REMOVAL

The second destabilisation stage is the removal of Sajid from the network. This was done for three reasons. The first was because in the initial network, Sajid was the second most critical node. The second was that the removal of Sajid ensured the isolation of explosives expert Salah. The final reason was Sajid’s rank and importance to the overall LET and associated Islamic extremist network. The removal of Sajid also ensures that the link from LET headquarters is severed, leaving the remaining Australian members with the inability to access an explosives expert and other reinforcements.xi Figure 4 shows the effects of the removal of both Lodhi and Sajid from the network. It is clear that the removal of the two most critical members of the network has reduced the information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness of the network to the point where it is inoperable.

xi Obviously, this stage would be very difficult, with Sajid being based in LET headquarters in Pakistan.

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6. SUMMARY This chapter has conducted a social network analysis of the LET cell that operated in Sydney between May 16 and October 9, 2003. The contextual background that was constructed as the first stage of this network analysis established a comprehensive and detailed account of the cell (which had previously not been undertaken). Through this research, the chapter continued its analysis and mapped the cell through the relational data, then calculating the nodal and network measures. This analysis allowed a significant understanding of the internal dynamics of the cell and identified the critical nodes (leaders) within this network. The chapter then applied theoretical destabilisation techniques by removing the two most critical nodes within the cell. These measures resulted in the cell’s near complete loss of information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness. The following chapter will examine the Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) cell responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

In this, the fourth of four chapters examining terrorist cells through social network analysis, the methodology will be applied to the Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) cell that undertook the 2002 Bali bombings. This chapter will then examine the theoretical techniques for destabilising these cells.

1. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH JI formed from the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia that was created in 1942. Darul Islam was a militant separatist movement with the goal of the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state governed under Shariah law. The movement was responsible for several uprisings through the 1950s and 60s in Indonesia.1 During the period Darul Islam was suppressed by the Indonesian government and forced to operate underground during the mid 1960s, several armed militant organisations formed from the group in the 1980s. One of these groups was JI, which was led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. JI established radical Islamic boarding schools (madrasah or pesantren) and training camps in Indonesia, shortly after expanding their influence into Malaysia and throughout Southeast Asia.2

In the mid-1980s, the Suharto Indonesian Government enforced a crackdown on Islamic militancy. Following the overturning of a lower court verdict by the Indonesian Supreme Court that had previously protected both Sungkar and Bashir in 1985, the pair fled to Malaysia to avoid their impending arrest.3 That year saw the first JI recruits funnelled through to the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services Bureau, MAK) in Afghanistan, to assist in the muhajidin campaign against the invading Soviet forces. This initial group numbered less than a dozen members. The following year, 1986, the number was almost five times that size. The JI mujahideen established themselves at Camp Saddah (which was then separated into ethnic divisions) where the three-year training course consisted of weapons, tactics, and explosives instruction combined with strict Salafist indoctrination.4 More specifically, the Saddah recruits learned (in the words of one such recruit): the nature of explosives and their chemical composition…then…detonators, including how to blow up different types of targets. Second was mines: land mines and anti-tank mines. We studied how to take them apart, how to plant them, and how to repair them. Of course we also learned how to shoot and how to drive tanks. Third

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was map reading…topography lessons…how to use a compass, and how to draw contour lines. This is important because if you are going to use artillery weapons, you have to know how to read maps. Fourth was infantry tactics or war tactics. We studied urban guerrilla warfare, guerrilla fighting in the mountains, attacks, ambushes and the like.5

Following this training, the recruits fought on the frontlines against the Soviet forces.6

The sending of JI recruits to Afghanistan continued until the last class arrived in 1991 following the Soviet withdrawal.7 The subsequent year, following a disagreement between Sungkar and another senior Darul Islam leader, Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar established JI as an organisation completely independent from Darul Islam.8 JI now had the distinct goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.9 Sungkar, as the amir, headed the organisation and directly oversaw the four councils of JI: i. Majelis Qiyadah (Governing Council) ii. Majelis Syuro (Religious Council) iii. Majelis Fatwa (Fatwa Council) iv. Majelis Hisbah (Disciplinary Council)10 The governing council was run by the Qiyadah Markaziyah (Central Command) which specifically directs the mantiqis of JI. These mantiqis separated JI’s operations into four divisions: i. Mantiqi I: Covered the areas of Singapore and Malaysia and provided the primary role of economic management for the group. ii. Mantiqi II: Covered the Indonesian theatre of operations and was focused on jihad and military operations. iii. Mantiqi III: Covered the Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi regions and was responsible for the training of JI. iv. Mantiqi IV: Covered Australia, Papua and the Maldives, and was established as a further fund-raising division.11 By the late 1990s, JI had established militant training camps around Southeast Asia, mirroring those in Afghanistan. 12 These camps were also attended and facilitated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and al-Qaeda (as discussed in Chapter II).

When Abdullah Sungkar died of natural causes in 1999, Abu Bakar Bashir became the amir of JI.13 JI’s operations advanced rapidly following this leadership change. On August 1, 2000, the residence of the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia was

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bombed, killing two people.14 On Christmas Eve of that year eleven teams of bombers across the Indonesian archipelago planted 38 bombs in churches and the homes of Catholic priests, detonating between 8.30pm and 10.00pm (with the exception of those that were defused or failed to detonate), killing 19 people and injuring 120.15

On August 1, 2001, JI attempted to assassinate Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri at the Atrium Mall in Jakarta. The attempt failed when the would-be assassin blew his leg off in a premature detonation.16

2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: 2002 BALI OPERATION 2.1 TENGGULUN Tenggulun is a small religious village about 200 kilometres from Surabaya, in the Indonesian province of East Java.17 Tenggulun is the birthplace of the brothers Muklas (real name: Ali Ghufron), Ali Imron (alias: Alik; Huda bin Abdul Haq), and Amrozi, born to their father Nur Hasyim and mother Tariyem (the first of Nur Hasyim’s two wives).18

The eldest of the three, Muklas, was born in 1960, followed by Amrozi in 1962, and Ali Imron in 1968.19 Muklas was the most devout of the brothers and was sent to the al-Mukmin Ngruki Islamic boarding school near Solo in Central Java in 1979.20 This school was established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir in 1971 and espoused radical Islamic preaching, praise of the revolution in Iran (in 1979), and the resistance of the mujahideen in Afghanistan.21 Muklas graduated from Ngruki and lectured there for four years until gaining permission to follow Sungkar and Bakar Bashir (who were in exile) to Malaysia.22 In late 1985 Muklas travelled to Afghanistan via Pakistan with his fellow Darul Islam members to take part in the jihad against the Soviets with individuals who by the turn of the 21st Century would constitute the upper echelons of JI. During Muklas’s time in Afghanistan, Ali Imron was allowed to attend the Ngruki school, a stint which lasted only one month.23 Amrozi also left home for a short stint in 1985, travelling to Malaysia to work, and returning six months later.24

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Muklas left Afghanistan around 1988 following the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviets. From here he travelled to Malaysia to work before planning to return home to Tenggulun.25 Muklas married the sister of a Malaysian mujahideen whom he fought with in Afghanistan. They settled in Ulu Tiram, Johor, where he was instructed by Darul Islam commanders (before the separation between the organisations) to establish a madrasah modelled on the Ngruki School in Central Java. Muklas called this school the Luqmanul al-Hakiem Islamic boarding school.26 Around 1990, Amrozi travelled to Malaysia in search of his older brother, studying in the al-Hakiem Madrasah.27 Ali Imron joined Muklas and Amrozi in Malaysia in 1990, where he also studied at Muklas’ newly established madrasah.28 In 1991, Muklas took Idris to meet the JI amir Abu Bakar Bashir, where Idris was sworn into JI.29

Idris (alias: Gembrot, Jhoni Hendrawan), an ethnic Malay, was born in Sumatra around 197030 and was a graduate of the Ngruki Madrasah in Solo.31 Idris later established himself as a businessman in Medan, Sumatra.32 During this time, however, Idris studied at the Luqmanul al-Hakiem Islamic school in Johor that was established by Muklas and at which Samudra and Ali Imron taught.33 Idris’ involvement in JI escalated in 2000, when he participated in the Christmas Eve bombings in his hometown of Medan.

Around 1995 Ali Imron travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for a year, where he attended radical madrasahs and mujahideen training camps, becoming quickly adept in the construction and detonation of all manner of explosives and demolition techniques.34 On his return, Ali Imron went back to Muklas’s madrasah in Ulu Tiram. By the mid 1990s, this Islamic school had become a meeting place for the upper echelons of JI leaders and veterans of the Afghanistan jihad.35

Ali Imron left his two brothers in Malaysia, returning to his home village in 1998 with his experience of the Afghanistan conflict, to teach at the Pondok al-Islam school that his family had established.36 In 1999 Amrozi returned to Tenggulun and, by June, the two brothers, as well as Muklas, had become involved in their first jihadist act in Indonesia. Following the fall of Indonesian President Suharto and the return to Indonesia of Bashir and Sungkar, Amrozi was selected to purchase the chemicals to

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be used in the construction of bombs to be sent for operations in Ambon.37 i After this operation, Amrozi became the supply man for JI operations, procuring potassium chlorate, aluminium powder, vehicles, phones, weapons, and ammunition. During this time Ali Imron travelled to Ambon to impart his experience and knowledge gained in Afghanistan to the militants there.38 Amrozi and Ali Imron were involved in more JI operations together before the Bali bombings of 2002.

In July 2000, Amrozi purchased a mini-van and fertiliser that were to be used in the attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia which killed two people (the Ambassador survived the attack).39 The pair worked together in the Christmas Eve operation in 2000, operating out of Amrozi’s house in Tenggulun. The brothers were involved in the acquisition, construction, and detonation of the bombs.40

2.2 OPERATION BEGINS By 2002, Muklas had risen to the highest ranks of JI. In April, after returning to Tenggulun, he contacted Imam Samudra regarding the approval and funding for a bombing following a proposal by Samudra. Imam Samudra (alias: Abdul Aziz; Kudama) was born in Serang, Baten, West Java, in 1971.41 Samudra graduated with the highest honours at the Madrasah Aliyah Negeri in Serang in 1990, where he was radicalised by former Darul Islam leader Kyai Saleh As’ad.42 Following the completion of high school, Samudra was recruited by a Darul Islam member and sent to Afghanistan where over the next two years in the mountains of Khost in the east of the country, Samudra was trained by mujahideen in the Sayyaf camp on weaponry such as various models of Kalashnikovs, the M16 assault rifle, hand guns, anti-tank weaponry, and bomb construction and detonation.43 Samudra was in Afghanistan at the same time as Ali Imron.44 Around 1993 Samudra returned to West Java where he was married, later moving to Malaysia with the exiled JI members. Although living in Sungai Manggis, south of Kula Lumpur, Samudra began attending the Luqmanul Hakiem School in Ulu Tiram. It is here that he met Muklas and Amrozi.45

i The Christian-Muslim conflict in Ambon was seen as a new front for jihad by JI.

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Samudra also met the hierarchy of JI, including Bashir and Hambali,46 and was quickly incorporated into these ranks. Along with Muklas, Samudra also accelerated into the very upper echelons of JI through the early and mid-1990s.47 By 2000, Samudra was coordinating and planning JI operations. He was part of the planning team for the Christmas Eve bombings, the bombing of the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan and Santa Arna Churches in July,48 and the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in August 2001.49

In July of 2002, Amrozi, who was working in the repair shop he had opened the previous year in Tenggulun,50 received a Short Message Service (SMS) from Imam Samudra. This message was to the effect that an operation was ready and a meeting had been arranged in the regional city of Solo.51 Amrozi left his workshop and headed to Solo for the meeting on JI’s next operation in his white Toyoda sedan. On his arrival in Solo, he picked up Samudra, as well as JI members Dulmatin and Idris.52

Dulmatin (real name: Djoko Pitono, alias: Ahamad Noval) was born in Petarukan, Pemalang, Central Java in 1970.53 Dulmatin studied at the Pemalang Islamic school54 where he excelled at mathematics until it interfered with his prayers.55 After leaving school, he became a frequent visitor to the Pondok Ngruki School in Solo56 and, like many Indonesian Islamic extremists, moved to Malaysia where the JI leaders were in exile.57 Following his recruitment by JI in Malaysia, Dulmatin was sent to camp Sayyaf in Afghanistan in 1991, where he excelled at bomb-making - so much so that he stayed in Afghanistan to lecture the new Indonesian arrivals to the camp on bomb construction and detonation.58 On his return from Afghanistan, Dulmatin was involved in the construction of the explosive devices that were used in the Christmas Eve bombings and the attack on the residence of the Philippine Ambassador.59 It was Dulmatin who received the mini-van from Amrozi for the operation against the Ambassador.60

After Amrozi had picked up Samudra, Dulmatin, and Idris, Samudra informed the other three that they had the permission and the finances for an attack against the United States (US).61 In the following weeks, Samudra and Amrozi scouted targets around Java, with their sights set on the US Embassy in Jakarta.62 In this period

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(between July and mid-August) there were at least two meetings between Muklas, Samudra, Amrozi and Zulkarnaen at a rented house in Saggrahan outside Solo.63

Zulkarnaen (real name: Aris Sumarsono, alias: Arif Sunarso), born around 1963, was among JI’s most experienced members. After graduating from the Ngruki School,64 Zulkarnaen fought with the first Indonesians in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s and by 1987 was in charge of the training of the Indonesian section of camp Saddah.65 Eight years after arriving in Indonesia, Zulkarnaen travelled to Malaysia and ran a pesantren in Pahang there for a year.66 Following these experiences, Zulkarnaen became a member of JI central command, holding the position of ‘Head of Training’ for Southeast Asia, and coordinated JI military operations in Ambon.67 Zulkarnaen was also the chief of the Al Aman Foundation, a charity that distributed aid and clothing from Arab counties.68

2.3 SOLO MEETING Following the preliminary meetings and surveillance of potential targets, a major meeting was set for the evening of August 14 in Solo.69 This meeting was set to finalise the specifics of the operation and to delegate the roles that each member of the team would play. Amrozi and Muklas left Tenggulun, stopping at the family’s Al Islam School to ask Ali Imron if he was interested in the operation. He was. A family friend, Murbarok (real name: Utomo Pamungkas), who worked at the madrasah with Imron and lived next door to Amrozi, also joined the operation at this point.70

Mubarok was born in Kulonprogo, Yugyakarta,71 around 1967,72 and was a seasoned member of JI. Mubarok smuggled firearms, ammunitions, and explosives from the Philippines to JI members in Indonesia. Many of these weapons were distributed for operations in Ambon and Poso.ii Mubarok was involved in the Christmas Eve bombings in Mojokerto in 2000.73 By 2002, Mubarok resided in Lamongan, living next door to Amrozi, and was teaching at the al-Islam school with Ali Imron.74

ii Another area of Christian-Muslim conflict on the island of Sulawesi.

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Following the addition of the two new members to the budding operation, Amrozi made a final stop on his way to the meeting in Solo, picking up Dulmatin.75 The meeting was set at the residence of Herniato, who was the secretary of the al Aman Foundation run by Zulkarnaen. Herniato did not play any part in the meeting, as Zulkarnaen would not allow it.76 The meeting began around 6.30pm and lasted until around 11.00pm.77 In addition to the four who arrived with Amrozi, the attendees at this meeting were: Imam Samudra, Zulkarnaen, Idris, and Suranto Abdul Ghoni (alias: Umar Besar; Wayan).78

Abdul Ghoni was born and raised on the island of Flores, east of Bali,79 around 1970.80 After joining JI, Ghoni travelled to Afghanistan in 1991 with what has been termed the ‘class of ‘91’. This class included JI elite such as Samudra, Dulmatin, Imron, and Mubarok. In Afghanistan, Ghoni developed his bomb-making skills through the use of potassium chlorate, sulphur, and aluminium powder.81 Like the others from the class of 1991, Abdul Ghoni used his acquired skills in the Christmas Eve operation in 2000, specifically in Mojokerto with Murbarok.82

Once the meeting was underway, Muklas (the most senior JI member) preached to the small party about the despotic traditions of western nations against Muslims all over the world. Samudra then took over and began to discuss the operation. It was to be a car bombing on the holiday island of Bali, the specific target not yet finalised.83 The designated roles for the operation were then discussed: Muklas was the overall commander; Samudra was appointed the field commander; Ali Imron was to assist Samudra; Idris was charged with organising the logistics; Amrozi was to purchase the vehicle and chemicals; Dulmatin was in charge of the construction of the bomb; Abdul Ghoni was assigned to assisting Dulmatin and mixing the chemicals, and; Mubarok was assigned to assist in the driving.84

2.4 TEAM LIMA As field commander, Samudra proceeded to establish a second cell for the Bali operation. This cell was made up of five young Islamic extremists selected from high schools in West Java. Samudra had selected and groomed these young boys through a religious study group he had formed in Banten.85 In addition, Samudra provided military and firearms training to the youths.86 These individuals were Arnasan (alias:

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Iqbal; Acong; Jimmy), Abdul Rauf (alias: Syam), Andi Octavia (alias: Yudi), Hidayat (alias: Agus), and Junaedi (alias: Dedi Amin). Abdul Rauf was born in Cipodoh, Tangerang, West Java, in 1981 and attended the Pondok Ngruki Madrasah between 1992 and 1997.87 Octavia was born in the village of Sukamanah, Malimping in 1980, and attended the Pondok Ngruki at the same time as Abdul Rauf. The two also attended the Aliyah Darul Ilmi Madrasah together. Following Samudra’s recruitment of Rauf, he convinced his classmate to follow Samudra’s teachings.88 In 1982, Arnasan was born in the same village as Octavia and also attended the Ngruki School, his parents were poor rice farmers and could not afford to send him to a madrasah.89 Argus Hidayat was also from the region of Malimping, and was recruited by Samudra following his graduation from the Aliyah Negeri Madrasah in Serang, Baten.90 Samudra called this group ‘Team Lima’.

Following the August meeting, Samudra called the five youths to his home in Solo to discuss their commitment to Islam and jihad. Samudra interrogated the five as to their preparedness for jihad in Ambon and Poso, discovering that they were all prepared. This question was followed by Samudra asking who would be a martyr, to which silence was the reply. After further individual interrogation, Arnasan indicated that he was ready to be a martyr.91

On August 22, 2002, Samudra tested Team Lima. The group was tasked to rob the Serang Gold Store. The operation and logistics were arranged by Samudra and the plan implemented by Team Lima. Rauf detonated a small diversionary device just 100 metres from the shop. Andi Octavia and Arnasan entered the store, Octavia armed with a gun. Hidayta and Junaedi stood guard outside the store with motorbikes at the ready.92 The group took five million rupiah and two and a half kilograms of gold (later sold for 400 million rupiah ($56 000)). These funds were forwarded to Idris for the purpose of the operation in Bali.93 iii

iii It is generally agreed upon that the money was not required for the operation, but that the operation was designed to test the resolve and skills of Team Lima.

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Following the Serang robbery, Hidayat and Samudra conducted surveillance of potential targets in Bali. By this stage, Team Lima had recruited three offsiders, who had no contact with Samudra: Aprianto, Pujata, and Ikhwan Fauzi who were all from the Serang area of Banten and all associated with the Persatuan Islam Madrasah.94

2.5 PREPARATIONS: BUILDING THE BOMB Following the Solo meeting, in mid-September the operation progressed into the surveillance phase: Samudra, Idris, Dulmatin, Amrozi, Mubarok, and Imron were driven around the Indonesian tourist capital, Kuta, by JI recruit and Bali local Masykur Abdul Kadir. That night, Maskyur arranged accommodation for the group at the Hotel Harum in Denpasar (the capital city of the Bali province) before the group returned to their allotted tasks.95

In late September Amrozi began the preparations for the car bomb that would be used in the operation. Amrozi visited the Tidar Kimia shop in Surabaya several times in this month, posing as a chemical salesman.96 On one visit, Amrozi had to hire a pick - up truck to collect the tonne of potassium chlorate he purchased in the form of forty 25 kilogram bags. A few days after this visit, Amrozi returned to purchase 50 kilogram of aluminium power and two bags of sulphur.97 For these purchases, Amrozi asked the salesman to issue him with a receipt for benzoate, an aromatic carboxylic acid normally used as a food additive.98 Once the purchases were complete, around September 18,99 Amrozi sent Samudra an SMS message signalling his completion of the set task.100

The bomb construction phase of the operation was firmly established in the village of Tenggulun. In late September Doctor Azahari Husin (alias: Adam) and Noor Din Mohammed Top arrived in Tenggulun.101

Doctor Azahari Husin was born in Malaysia on September 14, 1957.102 Azahari attended his final years of high school in Australia in 1975 at the Norwood High School in Adelaide, followed by enrolling in mechanical engineering at the University of Adelaide. The results Azahari produced at the University of Adelaide were poor due to a hectic social life. Following these poor results, Azahari transferred to the University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM) in 1979 and topped his class. He then

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traveled to the University of Reading, in the United Kingdom (UK) to undertake his PhD.103 Following the completion of his PhD, Azahari returned to UTM in 1991 to lecture and was promoted to the position of associate professor.104

The UTM campus at which Azahari was based was in close proximity to Muklas’s Luqman al-Hakiem Islamic boarding school, which by the 1990s had become the meeting place for the senior JI members. Following Azahari’s interest in Islam, it did not take long for him to fall in with members of JI. A lecturer from UTM, Wan Min bin Wan Mat who had attended the sermons delivered at Luqman al-Hakiem, invited Muklas to speak at his home. Azahari attended one of these lectures.105 Azahari became obsessed with the jihadist preaching of JI and was later appointed as a board member of the Lukmanul Hakiem Madrasah in Johor.106 In 2000, between April and August, Azahari received the most senior ‘special’ explosives training in Afghanistan.107 Later that year, Azahari took part first in the assassination attempt on the Philippine Ambassador in Jakarta and then the Christmas Eve bombings in which he built 13 explosive devices.108 Azahari quickly became JI’s chief explosives expert, writing the JI bomb manual109 and conducting bomb construction lectures at his home.110

The Malaysian Noor Din Mohammed Top, born August 11, 1968,111 joined JI in the same way that Azahari had. Noor Din attended UTM and after completing his science degree he went on to do his masers degree.112 During this period, he attended some of Muklas’s lectures at the home of Wan Min bin Wan Mat and quickly fell in with members of the Luqman al-Hakiem Madrasah and JI. Noor Din lectured at the Johor Madrasah on mathematics and geology and replaced Muklas as the director of the school when Muklas was promoted to head of Mantiqi 1.113

On their arrival in Tenggulun, Azahari and Noor Din visited their former mentor Muklas in his home, staying there the night. Dulmatin arrived the following day, taking them back to his residence in Solo for lengthy discussions on the bomb that would be used in the operation. Azahari and Noor Din returned to Jakarta the following day.114 While the experts were discussing the specifics of the explosive device to be used in the operation, the chemicals were being crushed at the residence of Amrozi with the assistance of Idris and Ghoni.115 The trio packed the crushed

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chemicals into twenty large cigarette cartons and then into sacks which were stitched up.116 Amrozi and Idris escorted Ghoni to the bus terminal in Surabaya along with the sacks of potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulphur. Ghoni, with the sacks of chemicals, boarded the bus bound for Denpasar, Bali.117

While the bomb preparations were taking place in Tenggulun, Samudra had contacted Team Lima by email, summoning them to Solo. Idris collected Arnasan, Rauf, Octavia, Hidayat, and Junaedi from the bus station, driving them to Samudra’s house in Solo where they stayed for a week. In this week, Arnasan once more volunteered to become a martyr in this operation and all five were sent to Bali.118

On September 25, Abdul Ghoni arrived in Bali with the chemicals purchased by Amrozi. Umar Patek,119 an instructor from the JI military academy,120 and Sarijio (alias: Sawad), an experienced operative who took part in the Christmas Eve and Philippine Ambassador operations, also arrived on September 25.121 Sarijio and Patek were tasked to assist Ghoni in the mixing of the chemicals.122

Samudra had leased a house in the Denpasar suburb of Jalan Pulau Majangan. The two-story house with high surrounding fences had had one year’s rent paid in full. The house had five bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a large lock-up garage.123 In this garage, Ghoni, Patek, and Saijio mixed the chemicals to prepare for the arrival of the construction experts.124 By the October 1, the mixing of the chemicals had been completed.125

On September 29, a second house was leased, this time by the logistics coordinator Idris under his alias Jhoni Hendrawan.126 This station was a small unit in a communal compound at 10 Jalan Marlboro, on the outskirts of Denpasar.127 Three of the Team Lima members were housed here and given a new Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card by Idris that would be used to contact them or vice versa.128 The other two Team Lima members were situated at a different location.129

The day after the mixing of the chemicals was complete, Amrozi travelled to Solo to meet Samudra to obtain funds to purchase the vehicle needed for transporting the bomb. Following this meeting, Amrozi purchased a white 1983 model Mitsubishi

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L300 minivan in a village 50 kilometres from Tenggulun.130 On October 3, Amrozi received a message from Samudra to the effect of: the chemicals are ready, bring ‘whitey’ (the minivan) as soon as possible to ‘the place’ (Bali).131 On October 5, Azahari arrived in Tenggulun and assembled at Amrozi’s residence with Dulmatin, Ali Imron, and Mubarok ready to depart for Bali. Operation commander Muklas also attended to wish his brothers and friends well.132 The group set out in two vehicles, the Mitsubishi L300 containing Mubarok and Amrozi, and a green Suzuki carrying Ali Imron, Azahari, and Dulmatin.133

2.6 BALI: CELL ESTABLISHMENT In the late evening of October 6, the convoy stopped at a service station outside Denpasar and Imron took over the driving responsibilities for the L300, taking it to store in the garage of the Jalan Pulau Majangan house that Samudra had rented. After Amrozi and Mubarok got into the Suzuki, the remaining group left for the Harim Hotel. On their arrival they were met by Samudra, Idris, Abdul Ghoni, and Umar Patek. A brief meeting ensued that recapped the specifics of everyone’s operational tasks.134 From this point on, every member of the operation used a Balinese alias, and was addressed and addressed others by that alias. They communicated using code words, referring to the bomb as dodol kudus, a type of Indonesian fruit cake. The main form of communication between each of the groups and Samudra and Idris was SMS.135 They changed their numbers frequently through SIM cards Idris purchased at the Intikom phone shop in Denpasar.136 If a call was received from an unknown caller on a certain number, it would be changed immediately.137 Following this meeting, the group split up. The bomb-makers, Azahari and Dulmatin left for the large house on Pulau Menjangan Street, accompanied by Ali Imron. Amrozi and Mubarok left for a fifth residence Idris had established in Denpasar.138

The targets for the operation had been selected during surveillance operations that had been underway since Samudra’s arrival in Bali. The principal target of the operation was the Sari Club, which offered exclusive entry to tourists, denying entry to Indonesians. The secondary target of the operation was to be Paddy’s Bar, similarly popular with tourists, but allowing Indonesians as patrons (hence the use of a smaller device). The final stage of the operation was to use yet a smaller device placed in the

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grounds of the US Consulate in Denpasar to ensure the intended target of the operation (the US) was clear. 139

By this stage, the house at 18 Pulau Menjangan Street was a hive of activity. Abdul Ghoni, Umar Patek, and Sarijo had finished mixing the chemicals and the high- ranking bomb experts, Azahari and Dulmatin, had arrived to begin the construction of the bomb. Imron was also at the residence to assist in the construction process. The security was tight in this house, Patek and Sarijo did not know exactly who Azahari was, calling him ‘Alan’ or ‘Lan’. The six men never left the house, and constantly had someone on guard.140 iv The mixed chemicals were packed into the plastic filing cabinet shelves that Mubarok and Amrozi had brought in the L300 from Tenggulun. This process was primarily undertaken by Imron, Patek, and Sarijo. The four drawers of each of the twelve filing cabinets were filled with the explosive mixture and Trinitrotoluene (TNT) chargers connected by around 150 metres of Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate filled detonation cord. There were 94 cyclotrimethylene trinitramine electric detonators attached to the TNT.141

During the several days it took to construct the bomb, Samudra was staying in the Muslim quarter of Denpasar, behind the Banyuwangi cafe and food stall in Jalan Pulau Pinang, where he had been staying intermittently since the cell had started surveilling the targets in Bali. Idris also stayed there and, as logistics coordinator, would move between the five houses around Denpasar. The two of them together visited Amrozi and Mubarok in Jalan Gatot Subroto, on several occasions taking food to the pair.142 Samudra also visited the bomb-building house on a couple of occasions to check the status of the operation.143

Following the completion of the construction of the bomb, Abdul Ghoni returned to Java. Shortly after his departure, the group that remained in the Pulau Menjangan Street house discovered that the chemicals they had packed into the filing cabinet drawers had expanded, meaning they would have to be repacked. Ghoni received an SMS telling him to return to Denpasar ask quickly as possible.144

iv Apart from the one incident where a small amount of the explosives accidentally detonated, and the group left to demonstrate to inquisitive neighbours that the noise was of no significance.

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At some point during the operation, Muklas alerted Idris via SMS that he was going to travel to Bali to visit the group for a period of three days. During this visit, he was subjected to the same security procedures as the rest of the cell, often kept in a room on his own and isolated from the other individuals. Idris picked Muklas up from the bus station in Denpasar, taking him to a small house where he later returned with food and Amrozi. The following night, October 9, Muklas was taken on a surveillance run of the intended targets.145 Idris then took Muklas to visit the bomb construction team on Pulau Menjangan Street. 146 Before his departure by bus, Muklas very briefly spoke to Ali Imron and Samudra.147

October 10 was a busy day. The bomb (after the re-packing) was being loaded into the L300, and the devices for the Paddy’s Bar and the US Consulate bombings were being constructed by Dulmatin and Azahari. The Paddy’s Bar device was a vest loaded with about one kilogram of TNT. The consulate device was only half that. Each device was wired to a mobile phone to allow for the detonation by Idris from a distance, should the other detonation methods fail.148 Samudra met with Team Lima who, with the exception of Arnasan, were instructed to return to their homes in Java. October 10 also saw the arrival of Feri, a friend of Ali Imron’s from the Al-Islam school in Tenggulun and recruited by Samudra to wear and detonate the vest to be used in the Paddy’s Bar diversionary explosion.149 Amrozi assisted Ali Imron and Idris in the purchase of a motorbike to make their get-away following the completion of the operation in Kuta. By the evening of October 10, all of the devices were ready, as were all elements of the operation. The JI members began to leave Bali that night, and by the afternoon of the following day, only Samudra, Ali Imron, Idris, Arnasan, and Feri remained in Bali.150

2.7 IMPLEMENTATION On the evening of October 12, Ali Imron, while pretending to fix something on the motorbike they had bought, dropped the small 500 gram device outside the US Consulate in the Renon suburb of Denpasar, and returned to the Palau Menjangan residence around 10.30pm, where Idris, Arnasan, and Feri awaited him.151 Neither of the selected suicide bombers could proficiently drive, so Imron, Arnasan, and Feri piled into the L300 and left for Kuta, followed by Idris on the motorcycle. Imron stopped at an intersection on Legian Road, about half a kilometre north of Paddy’s

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Bar and the Sari Club. Arnasan only had to drive the vehicle in a straight line towards the target, so Imron joined Idris on the motorbike. During this stage of the implementation, the diversionary US Consulate device detonated, causing minor damage. 152

Arnasan stopped the L300 directly outside the Sari club, where Feri got out of the L300 and walked towards Paddy’s Bar. At 11.07pm Feri detonated the TNT in his vest, instantly killing himself and eight patrons inside the bar.153 The explosion and resulting devastation caused people to flood out of the bigger pubs and clubs to investigate the explosion. At 11.08:31pm the L300 minivan outside the Sari Club was detonated. The resulting explosion ripped through the Sari Club and surrounding buildings. The shrapnel from the L300 was found up to 350 metres away.154 The operation resulted in 202 people dead, of which 88 victims were Australian.155

3. RELATIONAL DATA 17 individuals were involved in the operational JI Bali cell between October 6 and October 11, 2002. The covert stage of this operation begins with the last major meeting the cell had before dispersing into the houses around Denpasar on October 6 and ended on October 11, after a majority of the cell dispersed and just the detonation team remained. The members included in the cell for the covert period of the operation were: 1. Muklas 10. Arnasan 2. Amrozi 11. Abdul Rauf 3. Ali Imron 12. Andi Octavia 4. Samudra 13. Hidayat 5. Dulmatin 14. Junaedi 6. Idris 15. Patek 7. Mubarok 16. Feri 8. Azahari Husin 17. Sarijo 9. Abdul Ghoni From the contextual background, the following tables illustrate the relationships and levels of interactions of the cell members. Table 1. Jemaah Islamiyah: Binary Relations, shows the binary relationship of the 17 cell members, displaying which

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members interacted together. Table 2: Jemaah Islamiyah Interactional Criteria Applied, shows the codified strengths of these links through interactional criteria.

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TABLE 1. JI BINARY RELATIONS

D S U M A A O H J M A A L U Z R C I U S U M I M M I B A G N T D N P A K R M U A D A H H A R A A A A F R L O R D T R R A O S A V Y E T E I A Z O R I I O R N A U I A D E R J S I N A N S K I I N F A T I K I O MUKLAS 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 AMROZI 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IMRON 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 SAMUDRA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 DULMATIN 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 IDRIS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 MUBAROK 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AZAHARI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 GHONI 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 ARNASAN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 RAUF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 OCTAVIA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 HIDAYAT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 JUNAEDI 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 PATEK 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 SARIJO 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

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TABLE 2. JI INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA APPLIED

D S U M A A O H J M A A L U Z R C I U S U M I M M I B A G N T D N P A K R M U A D A H H A R A A A A F R L O R D T R R A O S A V Y E T E I A Z O R I I O R N A U I A D E R J S I N A N S K I I N F A T I K I O MUKLAS 2 2 1 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 AMROZI 2 0 2 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IMRON 2 0 3 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 SAMUDRA 1 2 3 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 DULMATIN 1 0 3 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 IDRIS 5 4 3 5 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 MUBAROK 0 5 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AZAHARI 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 GHONI 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 ARNASAN 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 RAUF 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 OCTAVIA 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 HIDAYAT 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 JUNAEDI 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 PATEK 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 FERI 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 SARIJO 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1

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TABLE 3. OVERALL STRUCTURAL CRITERIA CELL DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. COMMUNICATION SIZE CONNEXION SPEED SCORE 18 43.382% 6.941 0.6296

TABLE 4. ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) ACTOR DEGREE CENTRALITY (Standardised) MUKLAS 56.250 AMROZI 25.000 ALI IMRON 56.250 SAMUDRA 93.750 DULMATIN 56.250 IDRIS 62.500 MUBAROK 18.750 AZAHARI 56.250 ABDUL GHONI 56.250 ARNASAN 31.250 ABDUL RAUF 31.250 ANDI OCTAVIA 31.250 HIDAYAT 31.250 JUNAEDI 31.250 PATEK 56.250 FERI 37.500 SARIJO 56.250

TABLE 5. BETWEENNESS & CLOSENESS CENTRALITY (STANDARDISED) BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (standardised) (standardised) MUKLAS 1.944 69.565

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AMROZI 0.278 55.172 ALI IMRON 1.389 69.565 SAMUDRA 50.972 94.118 DULMATIN 1.389 69.565 IDRIS 5.139 72.727 MUBAROK 0.000 53.333 AZAHARI HUSIN 1.389 69.565 ABDUL GHONI 1.389 69.565 ARNASAN 0.000 57.143 ABDUL RAUF 0.000 57.143 ANDI OCTAVIA 0.000 57.143 HIDAYAT 0.000 57.143 JUNAEDI 0.000 57.143 PATEK 1.389 69.565 FERI 0.000 48.485 SARIJO 1.389 69.565

TABLE 6: RANKED CENTRALITY MEASURES CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (standardised) (standardised) (standardised) SAMUDRA 93.750 50.972 94.118 IDRIS 62.500 5.139 72.727 MUKLAS 56.250 1.944 69.565 ALI IMRON 56.250 1.389 69.565 DULMATIN 56.250 1.389 69.565 AZAHARI 56.250 1.389 69.565 PATEK 56.250 1.389 69.565 GHONI 56.250 1.389 69.565 SARIJO 56.250 1.389 69.565 FERI 37.500 0.000 48.485 ARNASAN 31.250 0.000 57.143 JUNAEDI 31.250 0.000 57.143

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ABDUL 31.250 0.000 57.143 RAUF OCTAVIA 31.250 0.000 57.143 HIDAYAT 31.250 0.000 57.153 AMROZI 25.000 0.278 55.172 MUBAROK 18.750 0.000 53.333

TABLE 7: CLIQUE COUNT CLIQUE COUNT SAMUDRA 4 IDRIS 3 MUKLAS 2 ALI IMRON 2 DULMATIN 2 AZAHARI 2 PATEK 2 GHONI 2 SARIJO 2 FERI 1 ARNASAN 1 JUNAEDI 1 ABDUL RAUF 1 OCTAVIA 1 HIDAYAT 1 AMROZI 2 MUBAROK 1

The size of the JI Bali cell was 17, a large cell, perhaps unnecessarily so, with at least four individuals not playing any role in the operation. Figure 1 shows that through the size of the cell and the roles that each of the members played, contingency plans were

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available were the cell to be disrupted. These contingency roles were taken up by Team Lima (excluding Arnasan) and Amrozi and Mubarok. These individuals were in place to take over any unskilled roles (mixing/packing chemicals, driving, surveillance, making purchases, or suicide bombingv) that were vacated through other members being compromised, falling ill, or backing out of the operation. As the graph in Figure 1 demonstrates, these operation assistants were kept significantly isolated from the rest of the group.

The density of the cell was 43.382, which indicates a mix between structural efficiency and covertness. The relatively high density score of the network is largely due to the two all-channel clusters of Team Lima (Octavia, Arnasan, Junaedi, Hidayat, Rauf, and Samudra) and the bomb construction team at the Jalau Manjangan Street house (Patek, Imron, Azahari, Dulmatin, Ghoni, and Feri). These all-channel (maximum density) highly efficient clusters were vital to the success of the operation, at least in the case of the Manjangan house, as the precise and time-efficient construction of the explosive devices required heavy coordination and efficiency. Measures were taken within this cluster to (attempt to) counter the low levels of structural covertness that this density created. All individuals were operating under aliases, using mobile phones to communicate with individuals outside the cluster, and above all, these members never left the house (with the one exception following the explosion inside the garage).

The 43.328 density score of the cell indicates that the network was established as a compromise between structural efficiency and covertness. The focus on efficiency in sections of the network (and the overall network) leads to a reduced structural covertness. This observation is supported by the high degree of connexion score of the cell, 6.941, indicating that the exposure of one node within the cell could potentially lead to almost seven other nodes. From these nodes it is possible that the entire cell would be exposed. The higher density score also resulted in a high average speed of communication, 0.6296, which again contributes to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the group. While the cell’s network formation appears very dense, its structural covertness was increased by the isolation of the all-channel clusters.

v This last role would largely be reserved for the members of Team Lima.

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From Table 3 it is clear that Samudra had the highest centrality scores of the cell. Samudra was the most active within the network, with an actor-level degree centrality score of 93.750. Samudra had the highest ability to access others with an actor-level closeness centrality score of 94.118 and he had the greatest control over the flow of information in the network with an actor level betweenness centrality score of 50.972. The most significant aspect of this finding is that by a considerable margin, Samudra had the highest control over the communication within the network (betweenness). This result was exclusively due to his connection to Team Lima and the suicide bomber Arnasan. While this cluster did not have a major role to play in the operation (Arnasan excluded), they were the reinforcements for the operation had anything gone wrong. Samudra’s centrality scores are further evidenced by the graph in Figure 1, in which Samudra resembles the hub in a star network. Table 7 demonstrates Samudra’s position further in that he is the only node connected to four cliques within the network.

Idris, in his role as logistics commander, yielded high centrality scores also. However, these were not as significant as those of Samudra. The cell was quite centralised overall, with the members of the Pulau Menjangan residence (bomb construction team) seemingly the centre of the operation. The lowest centrality scores were reserved for the contingency members, who were kept to the periphery except when called upon for assistance. Mubarok had the lowest scores as he was kept very isolated and did not play any significant part in this stage of the operation.

5. DESTABILISATION From Figure 1, it is clear that the JI Bali cell was organised into clear components or cliques. The Team Lima clique, the bombing construction clique, and the smaller operation assistants clique, with the commanders linking the sections while attempting to remain on the periphery. The social network analysis of the JI cell identified Samudra as the most important node within the network due to his high activity, his ability to access others within the network, and his significantly high ability to control the flow of communication and information within the network. This identifies Samudra as the critical node within the network. Consequently, Samudra is the first node targeted in theoretical attempts to destabilise the cell. Figure 2 shows the

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Organisational Risk Analyser (ORA) image of the cell before the destabilisation attempts are made. Figure 3 shows the network following the removal of Samudra.

FIGURE 2: ORA ORIGINAL GRAPH

Figure 3 shows that the removal of Samudra completely reduces the information flow between Team Lima and the rest of the cell. The removal of Samudra has isolated the suicide bomber Arnasan and the contingency members who were intended to absorb the loss of a suicide bomber. As the ranked centrality measures show, Idris is the next most important individual within the network. Figure 4 shows the network following the removal of Idris.

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FIGURE 3: SAMUDRA REMOVAL

FIGURE 4: IDRIS REMOVAL

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The removal of Idris further reduces the decision-making capacity and the effectiveness of the network, as two-thirds of the command team has been neutralised. Muklas, Imron, Ghoni, Husin, Patek, Dulmatin, Sarijo, will all have the same level of activity within the network due to this connection, while Muklas will have the highest amount of control over the flow in the network, and a greater ability to control others. Muklas would be the most important (and highest ranking) individual remaining in the network, and as Figure 5 demonstrates, his removal will further isolate members of the network.

FIGURE 5: MUKLAS REMOVAL

The removal of Muklas completes the neutralisation of the command team in the network and leaves three isolated, all-channel clusters, the most dangerous of which is the bomb-makers in the Jalan Manjangan Street house, due to the explosives the group possesses and the suicide bomber who is in the clique.

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The destabilisation methods used against the JI Bali cell have successfully reduced the information flow, reduced the decision-making capacity, and the effectiveness of the overall cell. These measures also separated and isolated the cell into three smaller, high density clusters. While these measures have successfully destabilised the cell to a large degree by reducing the information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness through this three-step destabilisation process, the all-channel cluster of the bomb construction team still represents a threat with explosives and one suicide bomber in place. Further action would have to be taken to neutralise this cluster if the arrest or neutralisation of Samudra, Idris or Muklas did not lead authorities to the Palau Manjangan house.

6. SUMMARY This chapter has examined the final terrorist cell of the thesis through social network analysis and examined the theoretical destabilisation techniques that aim to disrupt the network. As in the previous chapters, the social network analysis of the JI cell was able to distinguish and understand the internal dynamics of the network, identify the leaders, and understand each member’s relative position within the network. Using these results, theoretical destabilisation techniques were able to theoretically establish the most effective method by which to disrupt the cell from a counter-terrorism perspective, by targeting the vulnerabilities in the network formation. The following chapter will examine the results of the analysis, conduct a comparative analysis of the cells and the results, discuss the possibility of contributions to a predictive capacity within terrorism studies, and examine the destabilisation results.

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT.

CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS

The previous four chapters have examined terrorist cells from the groups the Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET), and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI) through social network analysis and have attempted to model disruption techniques for each of these networks through theoretical destabilisation methods. In doing so, these chapters have attempted to resolve and satisfy the research questions and objectives of the project by attempting to discover how terrorist cells have operated in Australia by describing, understanding, and explaining the organisation and communication of these cells. In this chapter, this understanding will be deepened through a comparative analysis of the cells and the social network analysis results. The chapter also will attempt to provide insight into how a JI cell might attempt to operate effectively in Australia and then examine the effectiveness and applicability of the destabilisation methods employed.

1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CELLS The application of social network analysis to the cells examined in each of the four chapters measured both the network and node level criteria of the terrorist cells. While these results were discussed in previous chapters, the following discussion will serve as a comparative analysis of the contextual background and the network and nodal level criteria of each of the different cells. This analysis has the potential to distinguish which of the cells was the most successful, structurally covert, efficient, and effective, as well as make generalisations about how terrorist cells operate (despite the small sample). Such an analysis will also distinguish where the potential lies for these cells to become more structurally covert or efficient in their operations, and identify these threats for potential intelligence and counter-terrorism applications.

1.1 CONTEXTUAL OBSERVATIONS The first observation made from the contextual backgrounds was that each cell used local operatives or localised command structures in its operation. The HRB incursion cell was armed, housed, and trained by the European command of the group in Italy

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and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Aum Shinrikyo used Yasuko Shimada, an Australian citizen, in its operation. The use of Shimada was firstly to ensure the purchase of the Banjawarn property through Western Australia’s strict foreign ownership legislation and secondly for a level of local expertise. The cult also involved local real estate agent Miki Webb in a majority of its financial activities, although she was not officially part of the cult and did not take part in any of the covert activities of the group. The LET cell was predominantly made up of individuals already based in Australia, using only Brigitte, Sajid, and Salah as the overseas/outside members. While all of the JI cell members were from outside the province of Bali, the group employed the expertise and local knowledge of JI member Masykuri to assist in the logistics and surveillance.

Although local knowledge and intelligence appear vital in the operations of terrorist cells, it is important to note that these individuals were kept significantly isolated from the rest of the cell. To illustrate, Tolic was meant to keep in contact with the HRB area command via radio contact, Shimada was not on the property while the cell was in its covert stage, the Australian members of the LET contingent were kept to the periphery (excluding command members Lodhi and Hasan), and it was difficult to assess Masykur’s level of interaction within the JI cell (short of the fact that he conducted and assisted in the surveillance). This finding makes it clear that terrorist cells use local contacts in order to either establish themselves logistically or assist in the operation (although seemingly only for their limited expertise).

1.2 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES Table 1 represents the comparative network level criteria results of each of the networks examined within the project. The first observation to make is that the cell size of each of the networks differed significantly, with the dataset sizes ranging from eight to 20, the LET cell being the smallest, followed by the HRB cell with nine, and the remaining two cells, JI with 18, and Aum with 20. Three of the cells yielded reasonably low to medium density scores, with the HRB cell scoring 30.555, the LET cell scoring 32.142, and the JI cell with a significantly higher score of 43.382. This result contrasted sharply with the Aum cell which yielded a 100 density score due to i Masykur was not included in the cell as it was impossible to determine the levels and directions of his interaction with the rest of the cell.

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its all-channel formation. From these results, it can be (tentatively) concluded that terrorist networks of a small size will generally be more structurally covert. This assertion is made due to the JI cell with a network size of 18 scoring a significantly higher density value.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the JI cell attempted to maintain high levels of structural covertness through its network structure by separating and isolating different sections of the network, whereas the Aum cell was established through a focus on efficiency (other measures were taken to ensure levels of structural covertness). This assertion is further supported by the degree of connexion scores of the cells. In smaller cells it is much easier to yield a small degree of connexion and hence a smaller density and greater level of structural covertness. The two cells in this project that generated the lowest levels of structural covertness (highest density) were the only two cells that successfully completed their objectives. This result illustrates the significance and effectiveness of efficiency within terrorist operations. JI (although not operating in Australia) and Aum (whose mission was focused on experimenting and training) met their mission objectives by countering their high density through alternative features in their methods of operating. For example, the Aum cell operated in an extremely remote area of Australia with no individuals from outside the group or authorities within a significant distance. The JI cell used code names, alternating mobile phones, and discreet methods of operating to undertake their mission successfully.

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE NETWORK LEVEL RESULTS CELL SIZE DENSITY DEGREE OF AV. CONNEXION COMMUNICATION SPEED HRB 9 30.555% 2.444 .444 AUM 20 100.000% 19.000 1.000 LET 8 32.142% 2.250 .549 JI 18 43.382% 6.941 .6296

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The results in Table 1 indicate that despite having lower levels of structural covertness, large efficient cells are more effective.ii These results are indicated by both the density and average speed of communication scores. The JI and Aum Shinrikyo cells, while more dense, enjoyed the highest average communication speeds and efficiency, due to efficiency being the inverse of structural covertness with regards to density. This again assisted the successful completion of their missions. This finding is further substantiated by the time frames of each of the operations, with the efficient cells completing the covert stage of their operation with considerable pace.iii

The graphs generated from the relational and interactional stages of the social network analyses of the cells clearly demonstrated the network formation of the cells. Although they varied significantly in their formation, there is one distinction that can be drawn from these graphs. Each cell employed high density clusters within the network in order to facilitate maximum efficiency for the specific objectives that were required. The HRB cell employed all-channel networks in each of its troikas. Although each cluster consisted of only three nodes, the maximum efficiency of this section of the network facilitated the effectiveness of the activities of that troika. The LET cell had a high density cluster that was made up of the command section of the cell. JI had two all-channel sections within the network, the first being Team Lima, which was awaiting orders (although they were kept in two groups for most of the operation) and the bomb construction team at the Menjangan house in Denpasar. The operation’s success rested on the completion of this task and therefore the cluster was orientated around maximum efficiency to complete this objective in the shortest possible period of time.

1.3 NODE LEVEL MEASURES When comparing the nodal level measures, the first observation to be made is that the operational/field commanders of the cells (identified through the contextual backgrounds) were the critical nodes in each of the cells (excluding the Aum cell, due

ii And hence more dangerous. iii The HRB cell was intended to be in the SFRY for a lengthy period of time in order to achieve its objectives.

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to its all-channel formation).iv While there were higher-ranking members within the network, such as Muklas within the JI cell, and Sajid within the LET cell, the individuals who were allocated the position of operation/field commander received the highest degree of centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality within their respective networks, consequently constituting the critical nodes within the networks. These results are demonstrated in Table 2.

TABLE 2. CRITICAL NODE CENTRALITY RESULTS CENTRALITY BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS (Standardised) (Standardised) (Standardised) TOLIC 30.000 75.000 66.667 LODHI 40.00 76.190 87.500 SAMUDRA 93.750 50.972 94.118

The second finding that can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the node level results is that while the commanders of the cells had slightly higher levels of degree centrality and closeness, every cell commander (with the exception of Aum) had a significantly higher level of betweenness (ability to control the flow of communication) than the rest of the network. These results are demonstrated in Table 3, which illustrates the ranked betweenness scores of the members of each cell (Aum excluded). This finding appears to indicate that the leader of a terrorist cell, while having close to normal or slightly higher levels of activity and ability to access others within the network, must monopolise control over the flow of information within the network.

The exclusivity of betweenness is further supported when examining the levels of betweenness of the lower ranked members. Only three of the eight nodes within the LET network registered a betweenness score, as was the case in the HRB network, with only three of nine. This is also the case in the JI network, with only two of the 18 scoring above two percent betweenness levels. This result indicates that betweenness (the ability to control the flow of data and interaction within a network) is an essential quality for a cell commander and command team to have. Additionally, this iv This observation illustrates a clear role of social network analysis in identifying operational commanders within cells where such positions are unknown.

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result indicates that the control over the flow of information in a terrorist cell is strictly regulated by the command team, specifically the cell commander. Additionally, any member with a substantial level of betweenness has significance and influence over the network.

TABLE 3. RANKED BETWEENNESS LEVELS FOR HRB, JI, & LET HRB LET JI BETWEENNESS BETWEENNESS BETWEENNESS MEMBER 1 75.000 76.190 50.972 MEMBER 2 42.857 28.571 5.139 MEMBER 3 42.857 4.762 1.944 MEMBER 4 0.000 0.000 1.389 MEMBER 5 0.000 0.000 1.389 MEMBER 6 0.000 0.000 1.389 MEMBER 7 0.000 0.000 1.389 MEMBER 8 0.000 0.000 1.389 MEMBER 9 0.000 - 1.389 MEMBER 10 - - 0.278 MEMBER 11 - - 0.000 MEMBER 12 - - 0.000 MEMBER 13 - - 0.000 MEMBER 14 - - 0.000 MEMBER 15 - - 0.000 MEMBER 16 - - 0.000 MEMBER 17 - - 0.000

The closeness scores indicated that access to others within a network is not a criterion exclusive to critical or important nodes within a network. While in all cases the critical node held the highest closeness score, all of the nodes within each of the networks had a relatively high ability to access others within the network.

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2. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA: A MODEL FOR INSIGHT Although groups such as LET and other al-Qaeda affiliated extremist groups present more of a threat to Australia’s national security, it is important not to overlook the potential threat of JI to Australia. The group’s proximity to Australia, its operations against Australian interests in Southeast Asia, its strong operational and financial ties to al-Qaeda’s leadership, and its previous intentions to attack facilities on Australian soilv indicate that the group’s potential for attacks inside Australia should not be underestimated. Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that the arrests, fracturing, and factionalism that have been endured by JI since the 2002 bombings have severely weakened the organisation as a whole. This section of the chapter aims to answer the second research question of the thesis: How might a JI cell operate in Australia? In order to answer this question, the results of the contextual background and social network analysis of JI will be examined and analysed in an attempt to offer insight into how such a cell might operate in Australia.

From the results of the social network analysis conducted in Chapter VIII several inferences were made about how a JI cell might operate in Australia. The first is that the cell would make preparations outside Australia or in a remote area of Australia and then form as a reasonably dense cell, while isolating sections of the network to provide a level of structural covertness. In attempting this structural covertness, the formation would also promote efficiency through all-channel clusters within the network. These high density sections would complete the preparations for the operation as quickly as possible and then disperse before the implementation of the operation. Because the cell would be structurally less covert, once it moved into the target area, the cell members would ensure other facets of the modus operandi were focused on covertness (such as code names and covert communications). This supports the assertion that the JI cell would be established in either an Islamic or Southeast Asian community or diaspora where the members could remain inconspicuous from members outside that community.

v Evidenced by the existence of Mantiqi 4 and the intentions of the Ayub brothers and Jack Roche, discussed in Chapter II.

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This cell would have a high ranking field commander, who would (be perceived to) not have a prominent profile with Australian authorities (to allow his passage into the country), and who would most likely have the highest level of activity and ability to access others. This commander almost certainly would have the highest level of control over the network (most probably by a significant margin). Due to the high betweenness, closeness, and degree centrality levels, this field commander would be the critical node of the network. In the 2002 Bali cell, JI used high-ranking members such as Muklas, Azahari, and Samudra. It can be assumed that individuals of this stature would not be deployed to operations in Australia, as they would be flagged on either on arrival to or departure from Australia or would attract unnecessary attention. High ranking members of any Islamic extremist organisation are highly valued by such organisations (due to their experience) following the commencement of the War on Terror and hence would not be risked. Muklas’ involvement in the 2002 Bali cell, which consisted of visiting the group in Bali, unnecessarily involved one of the group’s highest ranking commanders. The involvement may have served unification and motivational purposes (following disagreements and arguments within the cell), but was operationally unsound. Were the group to operate in Australia, it can be speculated that it would be considerably smaller than the Bali cell and would use local contacts to assist members in the initial stages of the operation, and possibly as suicide bombers. These individuals would be used for local knowledge and the acquisition of resources locally.

3. DESTABILISATION DISCUSSION The destabilisation techniques employed in the previous four chapters aimed at answering the research question ‘What are the most effective methods of destabilising [terrorist] cells?’ The destabilisation techniques in these chapters targeted the critical nodes within the networks. The critical nodes (nodes most vital to the network) were those identified through the node level criteria of social network analysis, specifically, those which had the highest levels of activity, the highest ability to control the flow of information within the network, and the highest access to others within the network. The critical node was the first node to be targeted and the next most critical nodes were removed until the network was satisfactorily disrupted. Although a satisfactory level of disruption was not mathematically quantified in any sense, the network was considered disrupted when the information flow, decision-making capacity, and

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effectiveness were reduced to a level that rendered the network incapable of operating. This method ensures the maximum destabilisation effect of traditional disruption techniques through the removal of the methodologically identified critical nodes.

3.1 CRITICAL NODES The social network analysis of the four networks in this project calculated the node level criteria for each of the nodes within each of the networks. From these calculations, the nodes critical to the network were identified. The theoretical destabilisation of dynamic networks through social network analysis requires the removal of the most critical node/s within the network to cause the maximum disruption. As discussed previously, the nodes identified as the operational/field commanders through the contextual background were also discovered to be the critical nodes within the networks. These nodes were Tolic within the HRB cell, Lodhi within the LET cell, and Samudra within the JI cell.

Each of the case studies discovered that the removal of the critical node in each network caused significant disruption. The removal of Tolic from the HRB cell instantly isolated all three troikas from each other and left Tolic’s troika without a commander. Lodhi’s removal from the LET cell would have significantly disrupted the network and isolated the operation assistants from the rest of the cell. The removal of Samudra from the JI cell would have isolated Team Lima, which included one of the operation’s suicide bombers and the replacement/backup members. All of these measures successfully reduced the information flow, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness of the network, in addition to isolating sections of the network.

Despite the effectiveness of the theoretical techniques, the cells still maintained differing levels of operational effectiveness and functionality (reduced communication, decision-making capacity, and effectiveness) following the removal of the most critical node. Therefore, subsequent stages of destabilisation were employed. While the HRB cell had little effectiveness left and no information flow between the troikas, the subsequent two destabilisation stages aimed at the removal of Zdrilic and Tapsanji as the next most critical nodes and troika leaders. These stages aimed to further reduce the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the

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remaining troikas. The subsequent stage within the LET cell removed Sajid, due to his higher level of betweennessvi than Brigitte (despite Brigitte having a higher level of centrality). Following these two stages, the LET cell’s communication flow, decision- making processes, and effectiveness were all critically reduced. The JI cell, as the second largest network (after the Aum cell), typically required more stages of destabilisation than the HRB and LET cell. The second most critical node within the JI cell was Idris, whose removal further reduced the decision-making capacity and effectiveness of the network. The final removal within the process was Muklas (the third most critical node of the network), which left the network in three non- connected networks, two of which were all-channel.

3.2 ALL-CHANNEL NETWORKS As discussed previously, the Aum cell was the deviant case within the sample of this thesis. This cell consisted of an all-channel network with a density of 100%, causing each node within the network to be ranked equally, due to each node holding an identical position within the network. These results entailed maximum centrality and closeness, and minimum betweenness. From these results, it was impossible to determine a critical node through social network analysis and thus impossible to employ theoretical destabilisation measures against the network. As a consequence, the chapter employed hierarchical methods of destabilising the network as the leaders of the network were identifiable through the contextual background. In essence, the destabilisation methods attempted to remove the leaders from the network. Although an all-channel network remained following the removal of these seven nodes, the decision-making capacity of the network was judged to have been dramatically reduced.

The destabilisation attempts on the Aum Shinrikyo cell generated discussions on the disruption of all-channel networks, which initially appeared resistant to destabilisation methods. As a node was removed from the network, the only criteria within the network that would change were the size and degree of connexion, with the network formation remaining as an all-channel network. This entailed that any effective destabilisation measure would have to remove every node from the network.

vi As established, betweenness is a powerful indicator of leadership within covert networks.

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Inversely, if a node is removed from or discovered within the network, this node has the potential to identify or lead to every other node within the network due to the total lack of structural covertness. As the Aum cell demonstrated, the blatant lack of structural covertness within the network formation of a cell can be countered through other elements of a cell’s modus operandi. Such networks have significant potential to pose problems for counter-terrorism measures. For example, internationally dispersed all-channel networks that have very weak levels of interaction could prove very difficult to disrupt effectively.

As covered in the network formation discussions above, the JI cell also employed all- channel clusters within its cell. These were the bomb construction team based at the Menjangan house in Denpasar and Team Lima. The destabilisation measures for the JI cell would leave two all-channel networks following the three destabilisation attempts, leaving a potentially problematic situation regarding the efficiency of the clusters and the potential continued operation. This would leave authorities with the dilemma of destabilising an all-channel network. Due to the more dangerous of the two networks being based at the one residence, the task’s difficulty is reduced dramatically.

3.3 DESTABILISATION APPLICATIONS The subsequent discussions will examine the potential applications of the results of the social network analysis and destabilisation applications to counter-terrorism operations aimed at the disruption of these cells and their operations.

3.3.1 HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO It is difficult to analyse the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (SFRY) operation against the HRB cell as the members were all captured within four days of each other and did not complete their mission, although it is pertinent to note that the group was attempting to return to the Italian border when apprehended. The difficulty in this analysis is increased by the lack of information about the particulars of the SFRY operation. When examining the application of the theoretical destabilisation techniques to real world applications against the HRB network, it is clear that the removal of Tolic would have been the most effective strategy, as he controlled the information between the three troikas. It would depend on the stage of the operation at

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which the techniques were implemented. Obviously, Tolic had ordered the three troikas within his cell back to the Italian border and was abandoning the operation, making it difficult to gauge how effective the methods employed by the SFRY were, as the group may not have been operating under its normal covertness or methods of operation. 3.3.2 AUM SHINRIKYO In the case of the Aum cell, all of the nodes within the network were living on the one property for the entire period that the cell was considered operational, and so, were a node to be discovered at the Banjawarn property, the entire cell was likely to be disrupted. Despite this tentative assumption, Chapter VI examined a hierarchical method of destabilisation which aimed at removing the leadership from the cell. This method would have been successful at disrupting the network, as the cult members would not have continued the operation without the Supreme Leader (Asahara) and his hierarchy (Hayakawa, Endo, Nakagawa, Niimi, Inoue, and Muari). The most concerning fact regarding this cell is that despite convictions of carrying dangerous goods on an aircraft and the confiscation of chemicals and laboratory equipment by the Australian Customs Service, the group undertook and successfully completed its mission. It must be noted again, however, that the Australian authorities knew little, if anything, of the religious cult and once they did learn of their backgrounds, refused to grant the visas they required to return to the country. Despite their lack of knowledge of the group, the identification of one of the individuals who was charged by the Australian Customs Service as a member of Aum Shinrikyo would have most likely have lead to the identification of the entire group as an Aum cell (again) through the lack of structural covertness. This would have led to the surveillance or withdrawal of visas from the cell, which although unlikely, may have delayed or hindered the cult’s 1994 attack in Matsumoto and 1995 Sarin attacks in Tokyo.

3.3.3 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA The potential effectiveness of the measures employed against the LET cell can be demonstrated by examining the arrest of Brigitte in October 2003. Despite the removal of Brigitte (the third most critical node) from the network by Australian authorities, the cell continued to operate. Following Brigitte’s arrest, Lodhi attempted to purchase chemicals through a wholesaler and attempted to pass on detailed information of potential targets to another member of the cell. It is theoretically sound

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to say that through the destabilisation measures, if Lodhi (as the critical node) was targeted instead of Brigitte (although he may not have been known to authorities) then the cell would have been significantly more disrupted and would not have been able to continue with the operation. The removal of Brigitte and the continued activities of Lodhi could have had potentially catastrophic results if the cell had been close to the implementation of its operation. This potential situation is akin to the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui prior to the al-Qaeda attacks of 2001. Despite his arrest and removal from the network (although not suspected of terrorism at the time), the operation continued through to fruition in the form of the September 11 attacks. This was possible because Moussaoui was not a critical node within the network and the cell was structurally established as a covert network capable of accommodating the loss of Moussaoui. This assertion supports the need for the surveillance of identified nodes in order to appropriately map the cell and identify the critical nodes for counter- terrorism operations through social network analysis.

The social network analysis results of the LET cell found that Sajid was the second most critical node and that his removal as the second stage of the destabilisation process would have effectively destabilised and disrupted the network. This stage would be practically unfeasible for Australian authorities to implement as Sajid was based in Pakistan. While international intelligence and counter-terrorism coordination may have produced the removal of Sajid, Brigitte would be a far more suitable and feasible target for the Australian authorities.

One of the weaknesses of the methodology, which is best demonstrated in the case of the LET cell, is the criteria by which the relational data was collected. This stage of the methodology aimed to record the interactions of the nodes but only such interaction that was for or assisted in the terrorist operation. In a close community such as the Islamic community in Lakemba (around which the LET cell was based), it is quite possible that all of the nodes within the network knew each other and knew they were involved in the cell. Despite this, these links could not be included in the relational data because their interaction did not relate to the terrorist cell or the operation. If this was the case, it may not have been difficult to re-establish the links that were lost through the proposed destabilisation measures. This weakness is

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synthesised for all of the cells examined and adds further evidence to Sparrow’s discussions of difficulties in examining covert networks.1

It is important to note that the LET cell did not develop into its final formation, which would have come about when the cell became slightly more dense in the bomb- construction process. In this process Salah may have been integrated into the command cell (or a bomb construction clique may have formed) and the operation assistants who were kept isolated of the command members may also have been integrated or kept in an isolated all-channel cluster as was used in the JI cell. It can eventually be assumed that one or more of the operation assistants would have the task of either placing or detonating the explosives.

It is important to note at this stage the way in which the cell was disrupted in reality. The French intelligence agency La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, DST) tracked Brigitte to Australia and warned Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) of the LET member’s presence in Australia. It has been acknowledged by ASIO that without the warning from DST, Brigitte would still be in Australia.2 This illustrates the necessity of international intelligence and counter-terrorism networks and cooperation.

3.3.4 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH Because the JI cell achieved its objective in Bali and was not disrupted, it is difficult to predict the effects of the proposed destabilisation methods. The theoretical removal of Samudra from the network would have resulted in the isolation of Team Lima. However, due to the nature of covert networks, there is a good chance that Idris, as the logistics coordinator, would have been able to communicate and re-establish the link to the group. This is possible despite the fact that Idris did not interact with Team Lima during the covert stage of the operation. The removal of both of Samudra and Idris would have isolated Team Lima and removed two-thirds of the command team from the cell.

As discussed previously, following the three stages of the theoretical destabilisation process, two all-channel networks would remain. The first would have been Team Lima, which would have not posed a significant threat. However, the second larger

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network was based at the house in Manjangan Street and had both a suicide bomber and a large quantity of explosives in a Vehicle Based Explosive Device (VBED). Despite the removal of the leaders of the cell, it is possible that the operation would have gone ahead, albeit on a lesser scale. Again, parallels can be drawn with the Zacarias Moussaoui case. Within structurally covert networks, if the node within the network does not lead to further nodes (even if they are critical nodes), then operations can still continue.

4. SUMMARY This chapter has conducted a further analysis of the results and analysis of the previous four chapters. This further analysis has aimed at answering the research questions of this thesis. Specifically, these questions aimed to discover how terrorist cells have operated in Australia, how JI might operate in Australia, and the most effective methods for destabilising these terrorist cells. This chapter conducted a comparative analysis of the contextual backgrounds and the network and node level social network analysis results. The focus then shifted to examine how a JI cell would operate in Australia in light of the results of the social network analysis of the cell. Finally, the chapter examined the effectiveness of the destabilisation techniques, followed by the potential real world applications of the destabilisation techniques. The following chapter will conclude by reviewing the development of the thesis through its chapters, and offering an examination of the research objectives and questions. The chapter will discuss the findings of the analysis and the applications and implications of the project to the terrorism studies, intelligence, and counter-terrorism industries.

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CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION

This, final chapter in the thesis will examine specifically what this thesis has accomplished over the preceding nine chapters and discuss the major findings, the applications of these findings, the contribution to knowledge, and the importance of terrorism studies in the contemporary international political and social environment.

1. REVIEW From the outset, this thesis has attempted to firmly establish the importance of a full and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, its history, the groups that employ the tactic, and the way in which it is employed. Championing this line of inquiry, the central research question of this thesis has attempted to answer the question ‘How have terrorist cells in Australia operated?’ As established in Chapter III, this level of understanding of terrorism in Australia has rarely been approached. This thesis, guided by the central research question, has applied the analytical framework of social network analysis to four terrorist cells that have operated in or against Australia between 1963 and 2003. These cells were from the groups Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, HRB), Aum Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure/Righteous, LET), and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, JI). In addition to understanding how terrorist groups in Australia have operated, the thesis attempted to contribute to a predictive capability within terrorism studies (synthesised from the criticisms of the field) by posing the question ‘How might a JI cell operate in Australia?’ The final research question of the thesis, ‘What are the most effective methods for destabilising these cells’, employed the use of theoretical destabilisation techniques to provide specific counter-terrorism applications to each of the terrorist cells.

In employing social network analysis and the designed methodology presented in Chapter IV to examine the way in which terrorist cells have operated in Australia, the thesis has met the research objectives proposed in Chapter III. This thesis has described, understood, and explained the way in which three terrorist cells have operated in Australia through their cell structure, communication, and interaction. The thesis has also provided a methodology that has largely satisfied the traditional

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criticisms of terrorism studies. Finally, the thesis has contributed to a predictive capability within terrorism studies, although this contribution is limited. The results of the analysis of how JI would operate in Australia provided a strong insight into this issue, but it would be pretentious to assume that this constitutes a complete and effective predictive ability.

2. MAJOR FINDINGS This thesis has generated two major findings that can be synthesised from the previous chapter. The first is the conclusion that efficiency is more conducive to the success of a terrorist cell than structural covertness (with regard to a cell’s level of density). The second major finding is that betweenness is a critical indicator of the importance of a node to a terrorist network. These findings are discussed along with their applications to both the academic and counter-terrorism fields.

2.1 EFFICIENCY OVER COVERTNESS The first major finding of this doctoral thesis was that the larger and denser cells within the sample were the cells that were successful in meeting their objectives. This finding provides evidence that small covert cells are not the most effective way in which terrorist cells can operate, as is widely thought. This finding challenges the importance of structural covertness as the critical property for terrorist cells. Having a higher density allowed the cells to complete their objectives quickly through their consequential high levels of efficiency. This finding indicates that higher density cells with a focus on efficiency may be more effective than cells operating with a high level of structural covertness.

This major finding was underpinned by further generalisations regarding the utility of efficiency within networks. The first of these generalisations was that the level of efficiency (density) generally increases with the size of the dataset. The second generalisation was that the cells within this sample employed higher density areas within sections of the network to facilitate and increase efficiency within those areas of the network. The final generalisation that again supports the effectiveness of higher density cells is that cells of a larger size and with a higher density are more resistant to destabilisation tactics. It is necessary to qualify again, however, that operating with a

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higher density can result in a much more rapid identification and destabilisation of the network despite the greater number of stages required.

2.1.1 APPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS This first major finding has significant applications that apply to terrorism studies, social network analysis, counter-terrorism, and intelligence fields in challenging the concept that terrorist cells need to operate as low density covert cells in order to complete their objectives. This finding has the most relevant applications to the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields examining covert cells through social network analysis. The finding indicates that perhaps the most threatening type of terrorist cell is one with a reasonably high density that forms, then efficiently and rapidly completes its required preparations, subsequently disperses, and then implements its attack. These types of cells appear within this project to be more dangerous than cells that are less efficient (but more structurally covert) and take a significantly longer period of time to complete their objectives. The concept of this type of efficient cell directly challenges the danger of the ‘sleeper cell’ so often portrayed by the media as well as governments, and suggests that a far more dangerous possibility exists to threaten the internal security of Australia and other foreign governments.

2.2 BETWEENNESS AS CRITICAL The second major finding of this thesis was the critical importance of betweenness, that is, the amount of control over the interaction and communication within terrorist cells. This result has indicated that the most important criteria for determining the importance or criticality of a node is the ability to control interaction and communication within the network and that any individual with a reasonable level of betweenness should be considered a major player within the network. The node with the highest level of betweenness will almost certainly be the critical node within the network.

2.2.1 APPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS This finding provides useful applications to the social network analysis field in evaluating the critical importance of betweenness to leaders within covert networks, particularly in the identification of leaders and critical nodes. Naturally, these

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applications can be extended to the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields. In the assessment or surveillance of terrorist or suspected terrorist cells, individuals who are identified with a significant level of betweenness are likely to be high-ranking individuals or to hold a position within the command cluster of the network. As will be discussed later when examining applications to the intelligence and counter- terrorism fields, this assists in identifying targets for further surveillance or the principle targets for counter-terrorism operations.

2.3 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN AUSTRALIA While this thesis cannot claim to have fulfilled its third objective through its examination of how a JI cell would operate in Australia, it did provide significant insight and analysis into how such a cell might operate. The findings of this analysis suggested that a JI cell in Australia would: i. Make preparations outside or in a remote area of Australia;i ii. Form as a reasonably dense cell, isolating sections of the network to contribute to structural covertness, while maintaining all-channel clusters to complete selected tasks efficiently; iii. Disperse before the implementation of the operation; iv. Attempt to counter their higher density (low structural covertness) through measures such as concealing themselves within an Islamic or Southeast Asian diaspora in addition to other covert measures;ii and v. Have a reasonably high-ranking commander who is not widely known within intelligence spheres.

2.3.1 APPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS The findings that were synthesised from the analysis of the JI cell in this project, as mentioned previously, while providing some insight into how a JI cell may operate in Australia, do not provide a predictive model of how the group might conduct its operations in Australia. Such a model would require in-depth comparative analysis of other social network analyses of other JI cells (avenues for further research will be discussed subsequently), leading to a much higher degree of reliability and validity in i Although this is increasingly difficult with ever-increasing security in a post-September 11 environment. ii This point echoes the above footnote, as intelligence resources are well established within these communities.

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predicting how the group would operate in Australia. The most significant application of this analysis to Australian counter-terrorism authorities is the continued or initialising of surveillance of individuals with known and suspected links (training, financial, family, and religious) to JI and its associated groups.iii The second application of these results is the reiteration of the critical and vital importance of international intelligence cooperation with Indonesian, Philippines, and other Southeast Asian governments. This particularly applies to individuals who trained as JI members in Afghanistan between 1985 and 2001, as well as individuals who have received training or fought in Ambon, Poso, or Mindanao.

3. FURTHER APPLICATIONS In addition to the counter-terrorism and intelligence applications that have been made from the two major findings and the results and conclusions of the thesis, a further two observations were distinguished for their applications to the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields.

3.1 LOCAL CONTACTS As discussed in the previous chapter, all of the groups examined within this thesis used local contacts in either the establishment or operation of the terrorist cell. This finding (as discussed in the case of JI) leads to the recommendation of surveillance of individuals within Australia who have any links to known terrorists or terrorist groups, or individuals who are known sympathisers of such groups. This includes individuals who trained or fought in Afghanistan during the conflict with the Soviets and those who have fought or received training in areas such as Ambon, Poso, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Jammu. Local contacts are almost essential for terrorist operations to take place in a foreign country and the removal of this support base or the identification of potential terrorists through the surveillance of these individuals could disrupt the formation of a cell before it even begins. Although the profiling of Southeastern Asians, South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims is generally considered

iii While within this thesis such links are considered dormant during the covert period of an operation, the aim should be to discover them before the covert stage of the operation is implemented.

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controversial, it is extremely likely that a terrorist cell would hide within such a diaspora or an Islamic community to increase its covertness.iv

3.2 INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION The final application of the results to the counter-terrorism field is the observation of the importance of international counter-terrorism cooperation. Due to international terrorism’s influence on Australia between the 1960s and 1990s and the lack of conflicts that originated in Australia, a vast majority of the terrorist events in Australia involved an international element or foreign nationals. Despite the threat from domestic Islamic extremists, as was seen in the case of the LET cell in this project, foreign nationals will generally still be involved in such cells due to their vastly superior experience in areas such as combat, counter-surveillance, and explosive construction and detonation. Likewise, international cooperation between governments and national intelligence agencies is necessary in monitoring Australians travelling to areas such as Mindanao, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, and other areas throughout South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East for the purpose of joining groups, undertaking training, and combat experience. The three cells in this project that operated within Australian borders could have been disrupted through international counter-terrorism cooperation.

4. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE This thesis aimed from the outset to contribute to the field of terrorism studies through a variety of avenues. The thesis firstly aimed to contribute to the field by attempting to design a methodology that satisfied the traditional and endemic criticisms of terrorism studies. The second avenue intended to provide research into terrorism in Australia, aiming to understand and explain events and groups that were previously largely unexamined. The final area in which this thesis hoped to contribute was the counter-terrorism and intelligence arenas; thus counter-terrorism recommendations regarding each of the cells were made and the method proposed as a useful intelligence tool.

iv This is not to say that JI would not use operatives of Caucasian or other appearance, as in the case of Jack Roche.

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4.1 TERRORISM STUDIES The three research objectives of this thesis introduced in Chapter III were specifically designed to counter the criticisms of terrorism studies that were considered to be both widespread within the field and inhibiting the progress and maturation of the field. In meeting these objectives, this thesis has provided a methodology and piece of literature that has specifically attempted to describe, understand, and explain the organisation and communication of terrorist groups in Australia through its application of social network analysis to the cells from the groups HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, and LET. This contribution consists of a descriptive, contextual background and an applied academic analysis of terrorist cells, where none had been undertaken previously.v

4.1.1 ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS The thesis provided a methodology that largely satisfied the criticisms of terrorism studies by meeting the objectivity, abstraction, level of research, and level of analysis criticisms. The objectivity criticism of terrorism studies was met through a focus on the value-neutrality approach to the research, data collection, and analysis. This methodology had the specific intention of ascertaining a neutral view of terrorism, the groups, and the individuals within the groups.

The use of the firmly applied methodology of social network analysis ensured that the abstraction criticisms of the field were not applicable to the thesis, as the project specifically dealt with terrorists, examining their interaction and communication with other terrorists. The thesis specifically sought to discover and understand the “internal dynamics and human characteristics of its subject”,1 and in doing so, explicitly attempted to understand the phenomenon.

The third criticism of terrorism studies concerned the levels of research that occur within the field. The methodology met this criticism through a specifically research- based and empirically-grounded research project. The principal solution to this criticism is the generation of primary sources. Interviews with members of the HRB were sought to gain primary data relating to the 1963 incursion into the Socialist

v As was established in the review of literature on terrorism in Australia.

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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). However these interviews could not be conducted. Other primary sources were accumulated through National Archives of Australia (NAA) archives, such as the diaries, notebooks, letters, and meeting minutes of the HRB. One of the other major sources of data in the thesis were police and government reports which provided a level of research that is grounded, reliable, and achieved a high level of value-neutrality.

The final criticism of terrorism studies, levels of analysis, was resolved through the adoption of social network analysis as the thesis’ framework for analysis. This method specifically aimed to explain and understand the subject which is being studied and, as discussed in Chapter IV, can even be utilised for predictive purposes. The use of social network analysis allowed for both the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the networks examined within the scope of this project. This methodology provided a concrete and focused analysis of the data collected, providing the level of analysis desired by the critics of terrorism studies. While the use of strong methodologies and analytical frameworks can subdue many of the criticisms of terrorism studies, some of these criticisms stem from negative appraisals of academia in general and are endemic and unavoidable within various approaches and methodologies.

4.1.2 FURTHER RESEARCH This thesis attempts to provide an exploratory approach in its examination of terrorist cells in Australia. The HRB, Aum Shinrikyo, and LET contextual backgrounds provide either the first or the most comprehensive descriptive examinations of these cells and their operation in Australia. From the four contextual backgrounds that have been presented, any amount of work can be synthesised and any number of analyses can be applied to this research, which would aim to contribute further to understanding and explaining terrorism in Australia.

The findings and applications within this project have been made from a small data set, which detracts from the authority of these results, but opens the door for research that would seek to qualify or challenge these results. Such research, employing a comparative analysis of the cells in this thesis and others, would result in more definitive generalisations about the way in which different cells operate, particularly the effectiveness and success of efficient cells over structurally covert cells.

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As discussed previously, further social network analysis needs to take place into other JI cells that have operated against Australian targets in Indonesia. This endeavour would certainly provide a more authoritive insight (through an increase in reliability and validity) into the way JI cells operate and further contribute to predicting how a cell would operate were one deployed to Australia. If this research were to yield consistent and accurate results on the way in which JI cells operate, these results would be profoundly useful in counter-terrorism operations. If it is found that a group uses a consistent networking modus operandi when deploying cells, this could potentially provide a strong predictive capacity to the field, particularly if it is found that other groups have a consistent cell formation or template. This consistency is most prevalent within groups that undertake identical or similar training, for example al-Qaeda’s use of the al-Qaeda manual, or JI’s use of the same training camps that are instructed by the same individuals. It is clear that the HRB would have consistently used troikas and it is also apparent that Aum Shinrikyo would operate in an all- channel formation.

4.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TOOL Chapter IV of this thesis discussed the usefulness and importance of social network analysis and its applications to the study and analysis of terrorist and covert networks. The use of social network analysis as the framework for analysis in this methodology has further demonstrated the substantial application that the method has to the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields.

The first use of social network analysis as a tool for intelligence analysis is that it can accurately identify the leader of a cell or leader within a clique that is a part of a wider network. In addition, the method can identify how this individual is the leader or critical node through its measurement of level of activity, control over the flow of information and interaction, and ability to access others. The method can also identify the subsequent most critical nodes. In addition to allowing a greater understanding of the dynamic of the leadership structure within the cell (including leadership struggles), this allows for the identification of the primary targets for counter- terrorism operations, or which individuals should be the focus of greater intelligence and counter-terrorism resources. To draw upon the argument in the previous chapter,

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the LET cell provides a perfect example of how the method would be effective within the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields. The method would have identified Lodhi (following surveillance) as the critical node following a social network analysis and the cell would have been significantly more disrupted following Lodhi’s removal. Theoretically, it would have been very difficult for the cell to continue its operation following Lodhi’s removal.

While the nodal level measures can distinguish the leadership levels and amount of activity a node is involved in, the network level measures allow the analyst an understanding of the type of network they are dealing with. These measures permit an analyst to distinguish the cell’s orientation towards either structural covertness or efficiency, allowing insight into the timeframes that the cells may be operating within. For example, a very dense efficient cell has the ability to implement or execute tasks at very short notice and hence may potentially pose more danger. Alternatively, less dense, structurally covert cells will take an extended period of time to do the same task due to a lower level of efficiency. The network level measures also give insight into the best methods of destabilising the cell.

The social network analysis software utilised within this thesis is clearly more accurate and effective than ‘second phase’vi software discussed by Klerks2 in Chapter IV regarding the visualisation of covert cells and their behaviour. Social network analysis and its various software can clearly visualise a covert cell so that the lines and levels of interaction and communication are clear. This ‘third phase’ visualisation of the cell through social network analysis is a mathematically defined graph and is hence more accurate than a link diagram used within second phase methods of visualisation.vii

vi Klerks discusses three phases of network visualisation: the first being hand-drawn charts and maps using different coloured pins; the second phase using computer software; and the third phase employing social network analysis, which has a focus on the content of the contacts, the context, and the analysis of such information. vii As discussed, social network analysis offers the ability to identify critical nodes/vulnerabilities within networks as well as allowing an understanding of the internal dynamics and relationships within the network.

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Yet again, it is important to refer to Sparrow’s concerns of examining covert networks. The appropriate application of social network analysis to identify the leaders and the type and characteristics of cells requires the surveillance of the cell to ensure that all nodes have been included within the cell. On the inclusion of each new link or node, the network and nodal criteria must be recalculated and the results re- examined. Social network analysis allows intelligence agencies to understand the structural covertness or efficiency of the network, how it operates and interacts, who the leaders are within the networks, and consequently identify the points of weakness within this network or the most effective method to destabilise the network. In the words of Sun Tzu: “A clever strategist or tactician can turn the enemy’s strength into a decisive weakness”.3

4.2.1 FURTHER RESEARCH This aspect of the thesis has opened up areas for research to further demonstrate the critical applications that social network analysis can offer to the intelligence and counter-terrorism fields. The first of these is research that conducts case studies of previous counter-terrorism operations and evaluates the success of these operations in contrast to the success of the operation if social network analysis was employed to identify and destabilise the critical nodes within the cell, such as the example of LET within this thesis. The second application echoes previous recommendations that aim to conduct comparative analyses of social network analyses of different types of cells. Furthermore, a similar analysis could examine the types of cells that individual groups have employed with a view to identifying similarities and patterns to assist in predicting, preventing, and preparing for terrorist operations in Australia.

5. TERRORISM STUDIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY The rise of 21st Century Islamic extremism, particularly since the (as yet) unparalleled attacks on September 11, 2001, has captivated the world. The war on terror has become the driving force behind US foreign policy, resulting in the invasions of Afghanistan and arguably Iraq. The global nature of the threat has forced rapid changes in security procedures and policy, some of them preventative and others reactionary. The figurehead of al-Qaeda and the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement, Osama bin Laden, has not been apprehended through the coalition’s

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campaign in Afghanistan or through the cooperation of the Pakistani Government and its intelligence agencies. The struggling occupation of Iraq is facilitating the combat training and radicalisation of a new breed of mujahideen, who, like the Afghan Arabs and mujahideen of the 1980s, will disperse to their home countries with a desire to continue the global struggle. 21st Century Islamic extremism, as the current phase of terrorism and potentially the most threatening and violent stage thus far, is today and will remain a dire and significant international issue that could continue to shape international politics and security for many years to come. This scenario requires the continued championing, advancement, and improvement of the field of terrorism studies.

This thesis has provided a response to the major criticisms of the terrorism studies field, made important additions to the research and analysis of terrorism in Australia, and produced specific applications from the study to both terrorism studies and the counter-terrorism and intelligence fields. With terrorism arguably more profuse, intense, and inventive today than at any previous stage within its history, it is absolutely vital that the field aims to facilitate the description, understanding, explanation, and prediction of terrorism. The unprecedented increase in the frequency, severity, and media attention of terrorism and the dynamic growth of terrorism studies since 2001, has produced many studies that have advanced past many of the traditional criticisms of the field and provided concrete analysis into terrorists and terrorist groups, as well as the other foci of the field, particularly the counter-terrorism focus. In addition to the advance in the levels of analysis and the methodologies employed by the traditional disciplines, other disciplines such as engineering, business, and the natural sciences are contributing to research focusing on terrorism. These research areas, in addition to those that currently make up the field, must focus on the integration of these approaches into a framework that will facilitate the development of the terrorism studies discipline, a feat that has eluded the research area since its inception.

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ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism: Terrorism Knowledge Base (2006) Retrieved: May 11, 2006, from http://www.tkb.org/IncidentDateModule.jsp. 2 Ibid. 3 Jennings, P. (2005) ‘National Security Check: How far have we come?’, Paper presented at Security 2005 Conference, Sydney, August 31 to September 1. 4 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5 Krebs, V. (2002) ‘Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells’, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, pp. 43-52. 6 Carley, K. (2005) Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

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CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM

1 Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2004) ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, p. 777. 2 Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, pp. 8-9. 3 Shafritz, J., Gibbons, E., & Scott, G. (1991) Almanac of Modern Terrorism, Oxford: Facts on File, p. ix. 4 Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003. 5 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 5. 6 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18. 7 Aristotle, Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 12-13. 8 Cicero, Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, p. 6. 9 Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications, p. 2. 10 Ibid. 11 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 7-8. 12 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 13. 13 Ibid, p. 14. 14 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 15 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 15. 16 Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 112-124. 17 Ibid. 18 Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications, pp. 3-4. 19 Proundhorn, P. (1994) What is Property? Or an Inquiry into the Principle Right of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 20 Hoffman, B. (1998) Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz, p. 17. 21 Most, J. (1885) ‘Action as Propaganda’, Freiheit, July 25. 22 Pisacane, C. Quoted in Woodcock, G (ed.). (1977) The Anarchist Reader, Glasgow: Fontana, pp. 43- 44. 23 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 26. 24 Heinzen, K. Quoted in Laqueur, W. (1978) The Terrorism Reader, Philidelphia: Temple University Press, p.26. 25 Ibid, p. 53. 26 Griset, P. & Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in Perspective, London: Sage Publications. 27 Most, J. (1884) ‘Advice for Terrorists’, Freiheit, September 13. 28 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 29 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 30 Ibid. 31 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press. 32 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19. 33 Ibid. 34 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press, p. 63. 35 Ibid, p. 64. 36 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 37 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 64-67. 38 Katusky, K. (1920) Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the Natural History of the Revolution, London: National Labour Press, p. 2. 39 Ibid, p. 220. 40 Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 264-265. 41 Dadrian, V. (1995) The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, Oxford: Berghahn Books.

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42 Duffy, M. (2004) ‘Who’s Who: Mehmed Talaat Pasha’, Retrieved: August 3, 2004, from http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/talaat.htm. 43 Duffy, M. (2004a) ‘Who’s Who: Ahmed Djemal Pasha’, Retrieved: August 3, 2004, from http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/djemal.htm. 44 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 45 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press. 46 Dadrian, V. (1995) The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 50-51. 47 Poulton, H. (2000) Who are the Macedonians? , London: Hurst & Company. 48 Hennessy, T. (1997) A History of Northern Ireland: 1920 – 1996, Hampshire: Macmillan. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Bew, P., Gibbon, P., & Patterson, H. (1995) Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political Forces and Social Classes, London: Serif. 53 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 54 Payne, S. (1995) A History of Fascism, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 55 Radu, I. (1990) The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania, New York: Columbia University Press. 56 Metz, H. (1988) Israel: A Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office. 57 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press. 58 Ibid. 59 Metz, H. (1988) Israel: A Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office. 60 Ibid. 61 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 62 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, pp. 1-2. 63 Holocaust Encyclopaedia (2004) Retrieved: August 6, 2004, from http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005449. 64 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, pp. 1-2. 65 Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 81-89. 66 Spears, J. (2002) Muslim Brotherhood, Retrieved June 9, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm. 67 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 70. 68 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press. 69 Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 50. 70 Metz, H. (1993) Algeria: A Country Study, Washington: Government Printing Office. 71 Ibid. 72 Kushner, H. (2003) The Encyclopaedia of Terrorism, London: Sage Publications. 73 Hacker, F. (1976) Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror & Terrorism in Our Time, New York: Norton & Company Inc, p. 35. 74 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 25. 75 Coogan, P. (1996) The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace, London: Arrow Books. 76 Taylor, T. (2002) ‘United Kingdom’, in Y. Alexander (ed), Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 77 Coogan, P. (1996) The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace, London: Arrow Books, pp. 57-59. 78 Ibid, p. 182. 79 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 80 The Belfast Agreement (1998) 81 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 82 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, pp. 168-169. 83 Oglaigh na hEireann (2005) ‘IRA Statement’, July 28.

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84 Spears, J. (2002) Muslim Brotherhood, Retrieved: June 9, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mb.htm. 85 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 70. 86 Information Division (1993) HAMAS: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Israel Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, Retrieved July 21, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/930100.htm. 87 Pike, J. (1998) Palestine Liberation Organisation, Retrieved: June 18, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/plo.htm. 88 Kushner, H. (2003) The Encyclopaedia of Terrorism, London: Sage Publications. 89 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 90 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 141. 91 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, p. 131. 92 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 166. 93 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 94 Pike, J. (1998) 15 May Organisation, Retrieved: July 26, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/15_may.htm. 95 Pike, J. (1998) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Command, Retrieved: August 6, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pflp-sc.htm. 96 A Hijack on the High Seas – Part One, (2002) Retrieved: August 6, 2004, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A730900. 97 Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, p. 32. 98 Ibid, p. 34. 99 Pike, J. (1998) Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Retrieved: August 4, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/asala.htm. 100 Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, p. 32. 101 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 28. 102 Pike, J. (2004) Red Army Faction, Retrieved: August 10, 2004, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/raf.htm. 103 Rote Armee Fraktion (1998) ‘Communiqué: The Urban Guerrilla is History’, April 20. 104 Varon, J. (2004) Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies, Berkley: University of California Press, p. 2. 105 Ibid, pp. 2-3. 106 Meade, R. (1990) Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 219-220. 107 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 28. 108 Meade, R. (1990) Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 183-184. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid, p. 206. 111 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 28. 112 United States Department of State (2002) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 113 Rauger, X. (1993) ‘The Red Brigades: Farewel to Arms’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 16, 1, pp. 315-325. 114 United States Department of State (2000) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 115 Farrell, W. (1990) Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army, Lexington: Lexington Books. 116 Ibid. 117 United States Department of State (2002) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington.

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118 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, pp. 121-122. 119 Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 147. 120 Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 363- 364. 121 St John, P. (1996) ‘Insurgency, Legitimacy, and Intervention in Algeria’, Commentary: A Canadian Security Intelligence Service Publication, no. 65, January. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 125 Central Intelligence Agency (2004) The World Factbook 2004, Dulles: Brassey’s Inc. 126 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 127 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 128 Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 102-103. 129 Nojumi, N. (2002) The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilisation, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, New York: Palgrave, pp. 84-88 130 Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p. xiv. 131 Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, p. 64. 132 Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 2-3. 133 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, pp. 1-5. 134 Ibid. 135 Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 3-4. 136 Azzam, A. (1979) Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman, Saudi Arabia. 137 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 25. 138 Huband, M. (1999) Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle for Islam, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 9. 139 Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Phoenix, pp. 76-78. 140 Ibid, pp. 51-63. 141 Azzam, A. Quoted in Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, p. 73. 142 Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, pp. 87-100. 143 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 22. 144 Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 5-23. 145 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, p. 132. 146 Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Pheonix, pp. 90-91. 147 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington: Government Printing Office, p. 60. 148 Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books, p. 34. 149 Al-Qaeda (nd) The al-Qaeda Manual. 150 Bin Laden, O. (1996) Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, Statement. 151 Ibid. 152 Bin Laden, O., Hamzah, M., Rahman, F., Taha, A., & al-Zawahiri, A. (1998) Jihad Against Crusaders and Jews: World Islamic Front Statement, Statement.

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153 Ibid. 154 Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Pheonix, pp. 108-116. 155 Ibid, pp. 171-172. 156 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington: Government Printing Office. 157 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, pp.48. 158 Ibid, pp. 43-45. 159 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 105. 160 Ibid, p. 117. 161 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2001) East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, pp. 119-139. 162 Ibid, 145-146. 163 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 165. 164 Ibid, pp. 224-226. 165 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, pp. 123-124. 166 Soetjipto, T. & Sukarsono, A. (2004) Jakarta Embassy Blast Kills Eight, Retrieved: September 14, 2004, from http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=580370§ion=ne ws. 167 Elegant, S. (2005) ‘To Kill a Bombmaker’, Time, Vol. 166, 21, p. 22. 168 Myers, S. (2003) ‘Suicide Bombing on Russian Train Near Chechnya Kills 42’, The New York Times, December 6, p. 3. 169 Dolgov, A. & Filipov, D. (2004) ‘Moscow Bombing Kills 39 Blast Wounds 130; Putin Blames Attack on Chechen Rebels’, Boston Globe, February 7, p. 4. 170 Myers, S. (2003) ‘Suicide Bombing on Russian Train Near Chechnya Kills 42’, The New York Times, December 6, p. 3. 171 United States Department of State (2004) Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 172 Cooper, C. & Higgins, A. (2003) ‘Moroccan Authorities Suspect International Link in Bombings’, The Wall Street Journal, May 19, p. 4. 173 Ibid, p. 4. 174 ‘International: After Madrid; Morocco and al-Qaeda;’, (2004) The Economist, Vol. 370, 8368, p. 67. 175 Warning of More Attacks in Turkey. (2003) Retrieved: August 5, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/20/turkey.blast/index.html. 176 Conte, A. (2005) Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 139. 177 Reid, T. (2003) ‘Bush Finally Admits War is not Over’, The Times, August 23, p. 18. 178 UN Iraq Security “Dysfunctional”. (2003) Retrieved: August 5, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/22/sprj.irq.un.security/index.html. 179 ‘Six More Hostages Kidnapped’ (2004) The Daily Telegraph, July 23, p. 37. 180 Fahmy, M. (2004) ‘Terrorist Threat to Behead Marine – Iraq’s New Dawn’, The Daily Telegraph, June 29, p. 5. 181 ‘Rebels Release Camp Blast Video’ (2004) The Australian, December 28, p. 9. 182 ‘Cradle of War, School of Jihad’ (2005) The Economist, Vol. 376, 8435, pp. 41-42. 183 Ibid. 184 Forbes, M. (2004) ‘Nations’ Anger at Downer’, The Age, July 27, p. 1. 185 Pincus, W. (2004) ‘Zarqawi Is Said to Swear Allegiance to Bin Laden’, Washington Post, October 19, p. 16. 186 Crumley, B. (2005) ‘The New Bin Laden?’, Time, Vol. 166, 10, p. 21. 187 Powell, B. & MacLeod, S. (2006) ‘How they Killed Him’, Time, Vol. 167, 25, p. 33. 188 Norland, R. & Hirsh, M. (2006) ‘Fighting Zarqawi’s Legacy; He was a Monster, and now he’s Dead. But his Savage Influence will outlive him. A Look at the Battles Ahead’, Newsweek, Vol. 147, 26, p. 32. 189 al-Hawali, S., al-Awdah, S., & al-Qarni, A. (2004) An Open Address to the Struggling Iraqi People, November 5, Statement, Saudi Arabia. 190 ‘Cradle of War, School of Jihad’ (2005) The Economist, July 16, pp. 41-42.

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191 Crawford, L. & Parker, G. (2004) ‘Anzar Government “Ignored Evidence” Madrid Bombings’, The Financial Times, March 26, p. 7. 192 ‘Osama’s Boast – Chilling Tape Confession to Spanish Blast’ (2004), The Daily Telegraph, March 15, p.1. 193 Nur al-Iman (2005) Statement: The Secret Organisation Group of Al-Qaeda in Europe, July 7. 194 Shaw, A. (1968) ‘Violent Protest in Australian History’, Historical Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 35-39. 195 Pinto, S. & Wardlaw, G. (1989) ‘No. 9: Political Violence’, in National Committee on Violence (ed.), Violence Today, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, pp. 2-3. 196 Evans, R. (1986) ‘The Battles of Brisbane: The Conscription Struggle 1916-17’, World Review, Vol. 25, 3, p. 21. 197 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 15. 198 Sinclair, A. (2003) An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism, London, Macmillan, pp. 176- 177. 199 Shaw, I. (2006) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 25. 200 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 201 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, A Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 412 202 Murphy, L. (1973) “Croatian Terrorism”, Senate Hansard, March 27, 1973, p. 537. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid, p. 533. 205 Suljack, J. (1971) Croatian Call, November-December Issue. 206 Murphy, L. (1973) “Croatian Terrorism”, Senate Hansard, March 27, 1973, p. 533. 207 Ibid, p. 530. 208 ‘Today the River Murray , Tomorrow the Drina’ (1963) Spremnost, January-February. 209 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 3. 210 Murphy, L. (1973) “Croatian Terrorism”, Senate Hansard, March 27, 1973, p. 531. 211 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, pp. 6-9. 212 Attorney-General’s Department (1972) Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia - Annexure D:Signficant Incidents Within the Yugoslav Community in Australia 1964-1972, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 5 July. 213 Hocking, J. (2004) Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy, Sydney: University of NSW Press, pp. 127-129. 214 Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, pp. 38-41. 215 Ibid. 216 Murphy, L. (1973) “Croatian Terrorism”, Senate Hansard, March 27, 1973, p. 543. 217 Ibid, p. 535. 218 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, p. 7. 219 Attorney-General’s Department (1972) Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia - Annexure D: Significant Incidents Within the Yugoslav Community in Australia 1964-1972, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 5 July. 220 Mooney, R. in Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin. 221 Senate Hansard (1973) Croatian Terrorism, March 27, p. 529. 222 Ibid, p. 535. 223 Wright, T. (2005) ‘Playing Catch up: When Terrorism First Struck Australia, ASIO was Looking the Other Way’, The Bulletin, Vol. 123, 6483, pp. 21-25. 224 Reeve, S. (2001) One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and Israeli Revenge Operation “Wrath of God”, New York: Arcade Publishing. 225 Greenwood, I. (1972) Terrorism and Violence in Australia, Cabinet Submission 896, September 29, 1972, p. 3. 226 Hulme, A. (1972) “Israeli Bomb Mail Found in Australia”, Statement delivered September 25, 1972. 227 Greenwood, I. (1972) Terrorism and Violence in Australia, Cabinet Submission 896, September 29, 1972. 228 Williams, C. (2001) ‘Terror Trails on the Home Front’, in The Canberra Times, 25 September. 229 Ibid.

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230 Hocking, J. (2004) Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy, Sydney: University of NSW Press, p. 83. 231 Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, p. 98. 232 Molomby, T. (1986) Spies, Bombs, and the Path of Bliss, Sydney: Potoroo Press, p. 14. 233 Terrorist Group Profile: Ananda Marga (2005) Retrieved: July 20, 2005, from: http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=252. 234 Williams, C. (2001) ‘Terror Trails on the Home Front’, in The Canberra Times, 25 September. 235 Ibid. 236 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 237 Van Beima, D. (1995) ‘Prophet of Poison’, Time Australia, 13, pp. 25-31. 238 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 239 Ibid. 240 United States Department of State (2004) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington, p. 96. 241 Greenwood, I. (1972) Terrorism and Violence in Australia, Cabinet Submission 896, September 29, 1972, p. 4. 242 Ibid, pp. 3-8. 243 Mooney, T. (1986) “Australia and Terrorism”, Paper presented at the First Pacific International Congress of the American Society for Industrial Security, 29 April, 1986. 244 Ibid. 245 McGlade, H. (2000) ‘The International Prohibition of Racist Organisations: An Australian Perspective’, Murdock University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 7, 1. 246 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 135-145. 247 Ibid, p. 146. 248 Ibid, pp. 181-192. 249 Ibid, pp. 197-205. 250 Ibid, pp. 205-216. 251 Greenland, H (2005) ‘Operation Terror’, The Bulletin, March 9, 2005, pp. 18-24. 252 Virginia, M. (2000) ‘Nuclear Scare for Australia in run-up to Olympic Games’, Financial Times, August 28, p. 8. 253 Fickling, D. (2003) ‘Al-Qaeda Threat to Olympics’, The Guardian, May 31. 254 Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 204-205. 255 Four Corners (2004) The Australian Connections, Retrieved: July 26, 2004, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm. 256 Stevenson, A. (2003) ‘Let me Defend Myself Pleads Islamic Youth Leader’, Sydney Morning Herald, September 14. 257 Fickling, D. (2003) ‘Al-Qaeda Threat to Olympics’, The Guardian, May 31. 258 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 259 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 260 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 261 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 262 Miranda, C. (2004) ‘Blueprint for Attack – Revealed: The Daily Telegraph Outlines for the First Time Allegations of a Frightening Terror Plot in Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, June 11, p. 7. 263 Connolly, E., Creagh, S., & Kennedy, L. (2004) ‘Terror Suspect “Used Government Website”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 24. 264 Chulov, M. & Stapleton, J. (2004) ‘Cleric Named as Terror Recruiter’, The Australian, March 22, p. 1. 265 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 266 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1.

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267 Chulov, M. & Crawford, B. (2004) ‘A “Nice, Intelligent Guy” with Friends in Deadly Places’, The Australian, April 17, p. 2. 268 King, D. (2006) ‘Terror Plotter gets 20 Years’, The Australian, August 24, p. 1. 269 O’Brien, N. (2007) ‘Plotter’s Jail Term Stuns His Ex-Boss’, The Australian, March 17, p. 4. 270 Chulov, M (2005) ‘Aussie Wanted to be Bomber’, The Australian, July 20, p. 1. 271Butcher, S. (2005) ‘I was Tortured in Pakistan, says Terrorism Suspect’, The Australian, February 15. 272 Greenland, H (2005) ‘Operation Terror’, The Bulletin, March 9, 2005, pp. 18-24. 273 Milne, G. (2005) ‘PM Hints at More Train Security’, The Sunday Telegraph, July 10, p. 3. 274 Baird, J. (2005) ‘With the Accent, New Emphasis’, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 13, p. 37. 275 Munro, I. & Nicholson, B. (2005) ‘Jihad Threat in a Familiar Aussie Twang’, The Age, August 11, p. 1. 276 Gadahn, A. (2005) in Ross, B. (2005) ‘Tape Released: American Al-Qaeda Member Warns of Attacks’, Retrieved: September 13, 2005, from http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Investigation/story?id=1115448&page=1. 277 Stewart, C. (2005) ‘Terrorist Threat to Aussie Embassy’, The Australian, May 23, p. 3. 278 Daley, P. (2006) ‘The Terror Trail’, The Bulletin, Vol. 123, 64792. 279 Stewart, C. & Leys, N. (2005) ‘Terror Plot Foiled After 17 Arrested’, The Australian, November 9, p. 1. 280 Ibid. 281 Daley, P. (2006) ‘The Terror Trail’, The Bulletin, Vol. 123, 64792.

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CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES

1 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, p. 143. 2 Gurr, T. (1970) Why Men Rebel, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 3 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, pp. 4-6. 4 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, p. 143. 5 Wilkinson, P. (1974) Political Terrorism, London: Macmillan Press. 6 Ibid, pp. 9-20. 7 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 8 Ibid, pp. 32-34. 9 Ibid, pp. 108-155. 10 Ibid, p. 125. 11 Sobel, L. (ed.) (1975) Political Terrorism, New York: Facts on File, Inc. 12 Ibid, p. 125. 13 Alexander, Y. (ed.) (1976) International Terrorism: National, Regional, & Global Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers. 14 Freedman, R. (1976) ‘Soviet Policy Toward International Terrorism’, in Y. Alexander (ed.) International Terrorism National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 115-143. 15 Wesiband, E. & Roguly, D. (1976) ‘Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy, and Legitimacy’, in Y. Alexander (ed.) International Terrorism National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers, pp. 258-311. 16 Hacker, F. (1976) Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror & Terrorism in Our Time, New York: Norton & Company Inc. 17 Ibid. 18 Alexander, Y. & Finger, S. (eds.) (1977) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press. 19 Ibid, pp. 5-61. 20 Friedlander, R. (1977) ‘The Origins of International Terrorism’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, p. 30. 21 Miller, J. (1977) ‘Political Terrorism and Insurgency: An Interrogative Approach’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 18-29. 22 Mallin, J. (1977) ‘Terrorism as a Military Weapon’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 92-105. 23 Evans, E. (1977) ‘American Policy Response to International Terrorism: Problems of Deterrence’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 106-210. 24 Rubin, A. (1977) ‘International Terrorism and International Law’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 121-127. 25 Evans, A. (1977) ‘The Realities of Extradition and Prosecution’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 128-140. 26 Cooper, H. (1977) ‘Terrorism and the Media’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 141-156. 27 Johnpoll, B. (1977) ‘Terrorism and the Media in the United States’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 157-165. 28 Alexander, Y. (1977) ‘Terrorism and the Media in the Middle East’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 166-208. 29 Alexander, Y. & Finger, S. (eds.) (1977) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 65-117. 30 Mickolus, E. (1977) ‘Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, pp. 209-269. 31 Ibid, p. 211. 32 Ibid, p. 246. 33 Margolin, J. (1977) ‘Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism’, in Y. Alexander, & S. Finger, (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: John Jay Press, p. 271.

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34 Ibid. 35 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 36 Ibid, pp. 43-49. 37 Ibid, p. 143. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 149. 41 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 141-146. 42 Ibid. 43 Wardlaw, G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 44 Ibid, 66-68. 45 Ibid, pp. 69-71. 46 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, p. 149. 47 Schimid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. 48 Ibid, pp. 5-31. 49 Ibid, p. 62. 50 Ibid, p. 129. 51 Ibid, p. 178. 52 Ibid, pp. 177-179. 53 Ibid, p. 185. 54 Ibid. 55 Gordon, A. (1995) ‘Terrorism and Computerized Databases: An Examination of Multidisciplinary Coverage’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7, 4, p. 176. 56 Gordon, A (1996) ‘Terrorism and Science, Technology, and Medicine Databases: New Concepts and Terminology’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8, 1, p. 170. 57 Gordon, A. (2005) ‘Terrorism as an Academic Subject after 9/11: Searching the Internet Reveals a Stockholm Syndrome Trend’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 1, pp. 45-59. 58 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 5. 59 Schmid, A. (2004) ‘Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 197-221. 60 Ibid, p. 214. 61 Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Hirch-Hoefler, S. (2004) ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 777-794. 62 Ibid, p. 786. 63 Sedgwick, M. (2004) ‘Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 795-814. 64 Schbley, A. (2004) ‘Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, 2, pp. 105-134. 65 Ibid, p. 120. 66 Abuza, Z. (2005) ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 6, pp. 453-479. 67 Wrighte, M. (2002) ‘The Real Mexican Terrorists: A Group Profile of the Popular evolutionary Army (EPR)’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25, 4, pp. 207-225. 68 Reinares, F. (2004) ‘Who are the Terrorists? Analysing Changes in Sociological Profile Among Members of ETA’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 6, pp. 465-488. 69 Alam, A. (2003) ‘The Sociology and Political Economy of “Islamic Terrorism” in Egypt’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 4, pp. 114-142. 70 Ibid, p. 139. 71 Rabbie, M. (1991) ‘A Behavioural Interaction Model: Toward a Social-Psychological Framework for Studying Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, 4, pp. 134-163. 72 Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2001) ‘The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, pp. 37-71. 73 Ibid, p. 68.

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74 Ranstorp, M. (1998) ‘Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of bin Laden’s Fatwa’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 21, 4, pp. 321-332. 75 Ibid, p. 327. 76 Piazza, J. (2006) ‘Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18, 1, pp. 159-177. 77 Ibid, p. 159. 78 Drake, C. (1998) ‘The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, 2, pp. 53-87. 79 Ibid, 55. 80 Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A., & Canetti-Nisim, D. (2003) ‘The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and their Victims’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 3, pp. 139-153. 81 Bunker, R. (2000) ‘Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, 1, pp. 37-48. 82 Ibid. 83 Gressang, D. (2001) ‘Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 3, pp. 83-106. 84 Moghadam, A. (2003) ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, 2, pp. 65-92. 85 Silke, A. (2006) ‘The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18, 1, pp. 35-46. 86 Weimann, G. (2005) ‘Cyberterrorism: The Sum of all Fears?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 2, pp. 129-149. 87 Ibid, p. 130. 88Valeri, L., & Knights, M (2000) ‘Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet, and Offensive Information Warfare’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, 1, pp. 15-36. 89 Ibid, p. 17. 90 Valeri, L., & Knights, M (2000) ‘Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet, and Offensive Information Warfare’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, 1, p. 30. 91 John, P. (1998) ‘The Politics of Aviation Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, 3, pp. 27-49. 92 Ibid, p. 29. 93 Foxell, J. (2001) ‘Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and their Impact on Food Security’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2, pp. 107-129. 94 Ibid, p, 107. 95 Pedahzur, A. & Ranstorp, M. (2001) ‘A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 2, pp. 1-26. 96 Bamford, B. (2004) ‘The United Kingdom’s “War Against Terrorism”’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 4, pp. 737-756. 97 Bures, O. (2006) ‘EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 18, 1, pp. 57-78. 98 Benasahel, N. (2006) ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 1, pp. 35-49. 99 Dhanapala, J. (2005) ‘The United Nations’ Response to 9/11’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, 1-2, pp. 17-23. 100 O’Neil, P. (2005) ‘Complexity and Counter-Terrorism: Thinking About Biometrics’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 6, pp. 547-566. 101 Ibid, p. 548. 102 Veness, D. (2001) ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International Perspective’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, pp. 407-416. 103 Ibid, p. 407. 104 Ibid, p. 408-416. 105 The Geli-Men: The Ustasha and Australia, (1972) Brisbane: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (Queensland Branch). 106 Ibid, p. 8. 107 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia. 108 Ibid, p. 12. 109 Shaw, L. (1973) Trial by Slander: A Background into the Independent State of Croatia and an Account of the Anti-Croatian Campaign in Australia, Canberra: Harp Books.

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110 Ibid, p. 109. 111 Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic. 112 Ibid, p. 61. 113 Alister, P. (1997) Bombs, Bliss, & Baba: The Spiritual Autobiography Behind the Hilton Bombing Frame-Up, Maleny: Better World Books. 114 Anderson, T. (1985) Free Alister, Dunn, and Anderson: The Ananda Marga Conspiracy Case, Glebe: Wild & Woolley. 115 Clifford, W. (1981) ‘Terrorism: Australia’s Quiet War’, The Reader’s Digest, October, pp. 39-43. 116 Ibid, p. 39. 117 Ibid, pp. 40-41. 118 Ibid, p. 41. 119 Ibid, pp. 41-42. 120 Ibid, p. 42. 121 Ibid, pp. 42-43. 122 Wardlaw, G. (1986) ‘Terrorism and Public Disorder: The Australian Context’, in D Chappell & P Wilson (eds.), The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s, Sydney: Butterworths, pp. 150-164. 123 Ibid, pp. 150-151. 124 Ibid, pp. 152-158. 125 Ibid, pp. 158-160. 126 Ibid, pp. 160-163. 127 Ibid, pp. 163-164. 128 Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books. 129 Clifford, W. (1981) ‘Terrorism: Australia’s Quiet War’, The Reader’s Digest, October, pp. 39-43. 130 Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, pp. 1-12. 131 Wardlaw, G. (1986) ‘Terrorism and Public Disorder: The Australian Context’, in D Chappell & P Wilson (eds.), The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s, Sydney: Butterworths, pp. 150-164. 132 Crown, J. (1986) Australia: The Terrorist Connection. Melbourne: Sun Books, pp. 1-12. 133 Ibid, pp. 108-119. 134 Ibid, p. 144. 135 MacKenzie-Orr, M. (1991) ‘Terror Australis’, Security Management, Vol. 35, 8, pp. 87-90. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Taylor, T. (1992) ‘Australian Terrorism: Traditions of Violence and the Family Court Bombings’, Australian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 8, pp. 1-24. 139 Ibid, pp. 1-7. 140 Ibid, pp. 8-13. 141 Ibid, p. 24. 142 Hocking, J. (1993) Beyond Terrorism: The Development of the Australian Security State, St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin. 143 Ibid, pp. 5. 144 Ibid, p. 7-11. 145 Ibid, p. 16. 146 Ibid, pp. 35-39. 147 Ibid, pp. 41-44. 148 Ibid, pp. 44-53. 149 Ibid, pp. 65-91. 150 Ibid, pp, 99-109. 151 Ibid, pp. 126-140. 152 Ibid, pp. 142-159. 153 Ibid, p. 196. 154 Williams, C. (2001) ‘Terror Trails on the Home Front’, in The Canberra Times, 25 September. 155 Ibid. 156 Hocking, J. (2004) Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism, and the Threat to Democracy, Sydney: University of NSW Press. 157 Ibid, p. 194. 158 Ibid, p. 195. 159 Ibid, pp. 197-205.

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160 Ibid, pp. 212-225. 161 Ibid, p. 243. 162 Ibid, pp. 248-249. 163 Chulov, M. (2006) Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism from Within and Without, Sydney: Macmillan. 164 Borgu, A. (2004) ‘Combating Terrorism in East Asia – A Framework for Regional Cooperation’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 48-59. 165 Ungerer, C. & Rogers, D. (2006) ‘The Threat of Agroterrorism to Australia: A Preliminary Assessment’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2, pp. 147-163. 166 Williams, C. (2002) ‘Australian Security Policy, Post 11 September’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, 1, p. 13. 167 Hocking, J. (2003) ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia’s New Security Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49, 3, pp. 355-371. 168 Michaelsen, C. (2005) ‘Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, 4, p. 321. 169 Gordon, A. (2001) ‘Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 116. 170 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, p. 141. 171 Ibid. 172 Merari, A. (1991) ‘Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, 1, p. 88. 173 Ibid, p. 89. 174 Gordon, A. (1999) ‘Terrorism Dissertations and the Evolution of a Specialty: An Analysis of Meta- Information’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 2, pp. 141-142. 175 Silke, A. (1996) ‘Terrorism and the Blind Men’s Elephant’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8, 3, p. 27. 176 Poland, J. (1988) Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 177 Gibbons, E., Scott, G. & Shafritz, J. (1991) Almanac of Modern Terrorism, Oxford: Facts on File. 178 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, pp.1-14. 179 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 10. 180 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 1. 181 Ibid, p. 2. 182 Hoffman, B. (1992) ‘Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, 1, p. 28. 183 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 7. 184 Ibid, p. 10. 185 Jongman, A. & Schmid, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, pp. 179-180. 186 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 5. 187 Gurr, T. (1988) ‘Emperical Research on Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might be Improved’, in R. Slater & M. Stohl (eds.), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism, New York: St Martins Press, pp. 116. 188 Merari, A. (1991) ‘Academic Research and Government Policy on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, 1, pp. 88-102. 189 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 7. 190 Jongman, A. & Schmid, A. (1988) Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Databases, and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, p. 138.

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191 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 3. 192 Ibid, pp. 9-11. 193 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 20. 194 Bergen, P. (2001) Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, London: Phoenix. 195 Bergen, P. (2006) The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader, New York: Free Press. 196 Burke, J. (2004) Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London: Penguin Books. 197 Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press. 198 Corbin, J. (2002) The Base: In Search of al-Qaeda – The Terror Network that Shook the World, London: Simon & Schuster. 199 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers. 200 Testas, A. (2004) ‘Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 253-274. 201 Krueger, A. & Maleckova, J. (2003) ‘Education, Poverty, and Terrorism’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, 4, pp. 119-144. 202 Testas, A. (2004) ‘Determinants of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 254-255. 203 Ibid, pp. 269-270. 204 Gentry, C. (2004) ‘The Relationship Between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology, and Gender’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, 2, pp. 274-293. 205 Ibid, p. 275. 206 Ibid, pp. 280-289. 207 Denny, L., Post, J., & Sprinzak, E. (2003) ‘The Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, 1, pp. 171-184. 208 Ibid, pp. 177-183. 209 Stern, J. (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, New York: HarperCollins. 210 Lester, D., Lindsay, M. & Yang, B. (2004) ‘Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 4, pp. 283-295. 211 Ibid, p. 283. 212 Ibid, p. 292. 213 Ibid, pp. 292-293. 214 Silke, A. (2001) ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, 4, p. 1. 215Ibid, p. 2.

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CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

1 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, pp. 7-38. 2 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 20. 3 Krebs, V. (2004) ‘Connecting the Dots: Tracking Two Identified Terrorists’, Retrieved: May 1, 2004, from http://www.orgnet.com/tnet.html. 4 Freeman, L. (nd) ‘The Study of Social Networks’, The International Network for Social Network Analysis, Retrieved: May 5, 2005, from http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/INSNA/na_inf.html. 5 Deckro, R. & Renfro, R. (2001) ‘A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government’, paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 4. 6 Ibid, p. 5. 7 Aftergood, S. (2004) ‘Secrecy News: Social Network Analysis and Intelligence’, Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, Vol. 2004, 15, Retrieved: May 17, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/02/020904.html. 8 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 7. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Almack, J. (1922) ‘The Influence of Intelligence on the Selection of Associates’, School and Society, Vol. 16, pp. 529-530. 12 Wellman, B. (1926) ‘The School Child’s Choice of Companions’, Journal of Education Research, Vol. 14, pp. 126-132. 13 Chevaleva-Janovskaja, E. (1927) ‘Groupements Spontanes d Enfants a l Age Prescolaire’, Archives de Psychologie, Vol. 20, pp. 219-223. 14 Bott, H. (1928) ‘Observations of Play Activities in a Nursery School’, Genetic Psychology Monographs, Vol. 4, pp. 44-88. 15 Hubbard, R. (1929) ‘A Method for Studying Spontaneous Group Formation’, in D. Thomas, (ed.) Some New Techniques for Studying Social Behaviour, New York: Columbia University, Child Development Monographs, pp. 76-85. 16 Hagman, E. (1933) ‘The Companionships of Preschool Children’, University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, Vol. 7, pp. 10-69. 17 Kohler, W. (1925) The Mentality of Apes, Mitcham: Penguin Books. 18 Bergson, H. (1907) L’Evolution Creatrice, Paris. 19 Freud, S. (1910) ‘Three Contributions to Sexual Theory’, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, January 1. 20 Bernheim, H. (1884) De la Suggestion dans l'État Hypnotique et dans l'État de Veille, Paris. 21 Comte, A. (1830) Positive Philosophy, Paris. 22 Marx, K. (1977) The Civil War in France, Moscow: Progress. 23 Galton, F. (1892) Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences, London: Macmillan. 24 Moreno, J. (1934) Who Shall Survive?: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations, Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co, p. 10. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid, p. 11. 27 Ibid, pp. 12-20. 28 Ibid, pp. 23-27. 29 Ibid, pp. 58-56. 30 Moreno, J. (1937) ‘Sociometry in Relation to Other Social Sciences’, Sociometry, Vol. 1, 1/2, p. 206. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid, p. 211. 33 Lewin, K. (1951) Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, D. Cartwright (ed.), New York: Harper Torch Books. 34 Cartwright, D. & Harrary, F. (1956) ‘A Generalisation of Heider’s Theory’, Psychological Review, Vol. 63, pp. 277-292. 35 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 13. 36 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15. 37 Cartwright, D. & Harary, F. (1956) ‘Structural Balance: A Generalisation of Heider’s Theory’, Psychological Review, Vol. 63, pp. 277-292.

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38 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 7. 39 Lunt, P. & Warner, W. (1941) The Social Life of a Modern Community, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 110. 40 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 41 Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1922) The Andaman Islanders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 42 Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1930) The Social Organisation of Australian Tribes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 43 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, pp. 4-5. 44 White, H. (1963) Anatomy of Kinship, Englewood Cliff: Pretence Hall. 45 Boyd, J (1969) ‘The Algebra of Group Kinship’, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 6, pp. 139-167. 46 Lorraine, F. & White, H. (1971) ‘Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks’, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol.1, 4 pp. 9-80. 47 Freeman, L. (2004) The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science, Vancouver: Booksurge Publishing. 48 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 7. 49 Barnes, J. (1954) ‘Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish’, Human Relations, Vol. 7, pp. 39-58. 50 Bott, E. (1957) Family and Social Network: Roles, Norms, and External Relationships in Ordinary Urban Families, London: Tavistock. 51 Mitchell, J. (ed.). 1969. Social Networks in Urban Situations, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 52 Boissevain, J. (1969) Hal-Farrug: A Village in Malta, New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston. 53 Boissevain, J. & Mitchell, J. (1973) Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction, The Hague: Mouton. 54 Sparrow, M. (1991) ‘The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects’, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 251-252. 55 Ibid, p. 253. 56 Ibid, p. 262-263. 57 Ibid, p. 263-272. 58 Baker, W. & Faulkner, R. (1993) ‘The Social Organisation of Conspriacy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equiptment Industry’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, 6, pp. 837-860. 59 Klerks, P. (2001) ‘The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands’, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, p. 57. 60 Ibid, p. 60. 61 Deckro, R. & Renfro, R. (2001) ‘A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government’, paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 9. 62 Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2001) ‘Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Publications, p. 315. 63 Ibid, p. 323. 64 Krebs, V. (2002) ‘Uncloaking Terrorist Networks’, First Monday, Vol. 7, 4, Retrieved: May 5, 2004, from http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs/index.html. 65 Krebs, V. (2002) ‘Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells’, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, pp. 43-52. 66 Vos Fellman, P. & Wright, R. (2001) ‘Modelling Terrorist Networks: Complex Systems at Mid- Range’, A Dual International Conference on Ethics, Complexity, and Organisations, available at http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/FellmanWright.pdf, p. 3. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid, pp. 4-5. 69 Ibid, p. 10. 70 Ibid, p. 13. 71 Ibid, p. 14. 72 Ibid. 73 Farley, J. (2003) ‘Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 26, 6, p. 403. 74 Ibid, p. 405-407.

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75 Carley, K., Reminga, J. & Kamneva, N. (2003) Destabilising Terrorist Networks, NAACSOS Conference Proceedings, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 76 Farley, J. (2003) ‘Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 26, 6, p. 404. 77 Ibid. 78 Sageman, M (2004) Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 79 Ibid, pp. 107-120. 80 Ibid, pp.137-174. 81 Carley, K., Dombroski, M., Tsvetovat, M., Reminga, J., & Kamenva, N. (2003) ‘Destabilising Dynamic Covert Networks’, Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, National Defence War College: Washington DC. 82 Carley, K. (2005) Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 83 Carley, K., Diesner, J., Reminga, J., & Tsvetovat, M. (2005) Toward an Interoperable Dynamic Network Analysis Toolkit, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 84 Deckro, R. & Renfro, R. (2001) ‘A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government’, paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 5. 85 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 3. 86 Ibid. 87 Bromley, D. (1986) The Case Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines, Chichester: Wiley. 88 Yin, R. Quoted in Robson, C. (2002) Real World Research, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 89 Bromley, D. (1986) The Case Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines, Chichester: Wiley, p. ix. 90 Yin, R. (1989) Case Study Research: Design & Method, Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 15-16. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 93 Ibid, p. 21. 94 Sparrow, M. (1991) ‘The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects’, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 262-263. 95 Crothers, R., Boyle, M., Dickerson, T., & Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 96 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington, Appendix A: Aum Shinrikyo Members 97 CI-CE-CT Mission Statement (2006) Retrieved: April 17, 2006, from http://www.ci-ce- ct.com/frameset.asp. 98 Yin, R. (1989) Case Study Research: Design & Method, Newbury Park: Sage, pp. 21-22. 99 Ibid, p. 21. 100 Ibid. 101 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 2. 102 Ibid, p. 3. 103 Sparrow, M. (1991) ‘The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects’, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 262-263. 104 Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 28. 105 Ibid, p. 33. 106 Ibid. 107 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 39. 108 Borgatti, S, Everett, M, & Freeman, L. (2002) Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 109 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 180-182. 110 Beauchamp, A. (1965) ‘An Improved Index of Centrality’, Behavioural Science, 10, pp. 161-163. 111 Sabidussi, G. (1966) ‘The Centrality Index of a Graph’, Psychometrika, 31, pp. 581-603.

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112 Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 113 Freeman, L. (1977) ‘A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness’, Sociometry, 40, pp. 35-41. 114 Carley, K. (2002) Summary of Key Network Measures for Characterizing Organizational Architectures, Unpublished Document: CMU 2002. 115 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-189. 116 Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2001) ‘Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Publications. 117 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 118 Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 35. 119 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 102. 120 Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1952) Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London: Cohen and West, p. 11. 121 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 101. 122 Beauchamp, M. (1965) ‘An Improved Index of Centrality’, Behavioural Science, 10, 161-163. 123 Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 40. 124 Ibid. 125 Carley, K. (2002) Summary of Key Network Measures for Characterizing Organizational Architectures, Unpublished Document: CMU 2002. 126 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 110. 127 Scott, J. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: Sage Publications, p. 129. 128 Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2001) ‘Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Publications, p. 316. 129 Boissevain (1974) Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 40. 130 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 178-179. 131 Ibid, p. 179. 132 Ibid, p. 184. 133 Sabidussi, G. (1966) ‘The Centrality Index of a Graph’, Psychometrika, 31, pp. 581-603. 134 Wasserman, S. & Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 185. 135 Ibid, pp. 187-189. 136 Freeman, L. (1977) ‘A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness’, Sociometry, 40, pp. 35-41. 137 Carley, K., Diesner, J., Reminga, J., & Tsvetovat, M. (2004) ‘An Integrated Approach to the Collection and Analysis of Network Data’, North American Association for Computational Social and Organisational Science Annual Conference, available at http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/events/conferences/2004/2004_proceedings/Carley_Diesner_Reminga. pdf. 138 Carley, K. (2006) ORA, the Organizational Risk Analyser, Pittsburgh, PA: Centre for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems. 139 Carley, K., Lee, S. & Krackhardt, D. (2002) ‘Destabilising Networks’, Connections, Vol. 23, 3, pp. 79-92. 140 Ibid, p. 84. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid, p. 80. 144 Ibid. 145 Carley, K. (2005) Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

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146 Carley, K., Schneider, M., Schofield, D., & Reminga, J. (2005) ORA: The Organisational Risk Analyser V. 1.5.5, Carnegie Mellon University: Sun Microsystems. 147 Deckro, R. & Renfro, R. (2001) ‘A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government’, paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 4. 148 Ibid, p. 5.

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CHAPTER V: HRVATSKO REVOLUCIONARNO BRATSTVO

1 Tanner, M. (1997) Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, New Haven: Yale University Press. 2 Criminal Investigations Branch: Special Branch (1964) Brief History of ‘Ustashi’ Movement till end of War in 1945, Victoria Police: Melbourne. 3 Davies, D. (1972) The Ustasha in Australia, Melbourne: Communist Party of Australia, pp. 1-2. 4 Criminal Investigations Branch: Special Branch (1964) Brief History of ‘Ustashi’ Movement till end of War in 1945, Victoria Police: Melbourne. 5 Tanner, M. (1997) Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press: New Haven. 6 Lampe, J. (1996) Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 7 Prime Minister’s Department (1967) Briefing Notes for Prime Minister, The Yugoslav Community in Australia, Prime Minsiter’s Department: Canberra, 13 December. 8 Victoria Police (1964) Victorian Police Report On Croatian Movements in Australia, Victoria Police: Melbourne. 9 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 10 Ibid. 11 Department of Immigration (1963) Meeting at the Department of Immigration on the 25th November, 1963 Concerning Activities of Croatian Migrants, Department of Immigration: Canberra. 12 British Embassy (1964) Memorandum to Department of External Affairs, Trial of Yugoslav Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 22 April. 13 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 407. 14 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Attorney General’s Department, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Commonwealth Police: Kingston, 25 January. 15 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 404. 16 ‘No Terror Training in Australia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 1. 17 Croatian Australian Association (1960) Meeting Minutes, No. 38 Emergency Closed Meeting of the Executive of the Croatian Austrlaian Association, Croatian Australian Association: Wollongong, 8 April. 18 Jure de Francetic Croatian Association (1959) Meeting Minutes, Committee Meeting No. 1, Jure de Francetic Croatian Association: Warrawong, 26 January. 19 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 20 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 21 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 411. 22 Ibid, p. 413. 23 Ibid, p. 412. 24 Ibid, p. 420. 25 Ibid, p. 397. 26 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 27 Ibid. 28 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 29 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Senic, J. (1966) Letter to Jure Maric, 21 July. 33 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 34 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Disturbances in the Yugoslav Communities, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra, 29 July. 35 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 36 Ibid.

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37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Commonwealth Police (1972) Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation, Commonwealth Police Force: Canberra. 40 Attorney-General’s Department (1967) Minute Paper, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Issue of Search Warrants, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 13 February. 41 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 42 Attorney-General’s Department (1967) Minute Paper, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Issue of Search Warrants, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 13 February. 43 Maric, J. & Pasti, G. (nd) Duplicate Handout, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Maintenance of Security – Fundamental Duty of Revolutionaries – Principle of Secret Operation. 44 Kletva, quoted in The Geli Men: The Ustasha & Australia, Bertrand Peace Foundation, p. 3. 45 Ibid. 46 Kletva, quoted in Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic. 47The Geli Men: The Ustasha & Australia, Bertrand Peace Foundation. 48 Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, p. 41 49 Ibid, p. 39. 50 Ibid, p. 41 51 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 3. 52 Department of External Affairs (1964) Memorandum to Prime Minister’s Department, Activities of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 27 May. 53 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 54 ‘No Terror Training in Australia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 1. 55 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 3. 56 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 57 Ibid. 58 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Unclassified: Terrorist Trail, Australian High Commission: London, 15 April. 59 Attorney-General’s Department (1964) Briefing Sheet, Questions for the Attorney General, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 7 August. 60 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Restricted: Terrorist Trial, Australian High Commission: London, 22 April. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Unclassified: Terrorist Trail, Australian High Commission: London, 15 April. 64 Attorney-General’s Department (1964) Draft Statement, Yugoslav Immigrant Organisations, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra. 65 Prime Minister’s Department (1964) Briefing Sheet, Questions for the Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Department: Canberra, 7 August. 66 Attorney-General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra. 67 Department of External Affairs (1964) Memorandum to Prime Minister’s Department, Activities of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 27 May. 68 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Restricted: Terrorist Trial, Australian High Commission: London, 22 April. 69 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 418. 70 Ibid, p. 418. 71 Ibid, p. 409. 72 Ibid, p. 417. 73 Ibid, p. 417. 74 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 417. 75 ‘9 Migrants Seized on Terrorist Charge: Govt says Plot Made in Sydney’, The Sydney Daily Mirror, September 5, 1963, p. 3.

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76 Attorney-General’s Department (1967) Minute Paper, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Issue of Search Warrants, Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra, 13 February. 77 Crime Intelligence (1967) Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, New South Wales Police: Sydney, 17 March. 78 Commonwealth Police (1967) Draft of Report to Attorney-General, Croatian Brotherhood: Documents Seized from Adolf Andric of Geelong, Commonwealth Police: Kingston, October. 79 Commonwealth Police (1966) Report to the Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Seizure of Documents from Adolf Andric, 133 Victoria Street, North Geelong, Victoria, Commonwealth Police: Kingston, 25 July. 80 Jurjevic, M. (1973) Ustasha Under the Southern Cross, Melbourne: M. Jurjevic, p. 39. 81 Criminal Investigations Branch: Special Branch (1964) Brief History of ‘Ustashi’ Movement till end of War in 1945, Victoria Police: Melbourne. 82 House of Representatives (1964) Question No. 280, 27 August. 83 Criminal Investigations Branch: Special Branch (1964) Brief History of ‘Ustashi’ Movement till end of War in 1945, Victoria Police: Melbourne. 84 ‘Today the River Murray, Tomorrow the Drina’ (1963) Spremnost, January-February. 85 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 86 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Unclassified: Terrorist Trail, Australian High Commission: London, 15 April. 87 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 88 Ibid. 89 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 409. 90 British Embassy (1964) Memorandum to Department of External Affairs, Trial of Yugoslav Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, April 22. 91 Maric, J. (1964) Address Book, Exhibit 215, Commonwealth Police. 92 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 93 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 94 Department of External Affairs (1964) Memorandum to Prime Minister’s Department, Activities of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 27 May. 95 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (1967) Communique to Departemnt of External Affairs, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation: Canberra, 17 November. 96 Department of External Affairs (1964) Memorandum to Prime Minister’s Department, Activities of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 27 May. 97 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 409. 98 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 99 ‘9 Migrants Seized on Terrorist Charge: Govt says Plot Made in Sydney’, The Sydney Daily Mirror, September 5, 1963, p. 3. 100 British Embassy (1964) Memorandum to Department of External Affairs, Trial of Yugoslav Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, April 22. 101 Ibid. 102 ‘9 Migrants Seized on Terrorist Charge: Govt says Plot Made in Sydney’, The Sydney Daily Mirror, September 5, 1963, p. 3. 103 British Embassy (1964) Memorandum to Department of External Affairs, Trial of Yugoslav Emigrants in Rijeka, Department of External Affairs: Canberra, April 22. 104 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 409. 105 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 106 Ibid. 107 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 409. 108 Ibid. 109 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 110 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 409.

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111 Australian High Commission (1964) Inward Cablegram to Department of External Affairs, Restricted: Terrorist Trial, Australian High Commission: London, 20 April. 112 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 117 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 118 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’ (1963), The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, p. 3. 119 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of a Group of Terrorists in Rijeka’, Politika, April 17, p. 8. 120 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 3. 121 Dimitrijevic, R. (1964) ‘Trial of Terrorist Group in Rijeka’, Politika, April 16, p. 7. 122 Ibid. 123 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 410. 124 ‘Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 1963, p. 3. 125 Aarons, M. (2001) War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for Fugitive War Criminals Since 1945, Melbourne: Black Inc, p. 410. 126 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 127 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (1964) Memorandum to Prime Minister’s Department, 9728, Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation: Melbourne, August. 128 Attorney General’s Department (1964) Draft of Press Statement on Croats, Attorney General’s Department: Canberra. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 ‘Rijeka Circuit Court Passes Sentence on Ustashi Terrorists’ (1964) Politika, April 19, p. 10. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Senic, J. & Turk, F. (nd) Open Letter to Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood Command Post No. 4. 135 Commonwealth Police (1967) Report to Commissioner, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood: Execution of Search Warrants, Commonwealth Police Force: Kingston: 17 October. 136 ‘Rijeka Circuit Court Passes Sentence on Ustashi Terrorists’ (1964) Politika, April 19, p. 10.

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CHAPTER VI: AUM SHINRIKYO

1 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 2 Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, pp. 20-21. 3.Ibid. 4 Ibid, p. 21. 5 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 6 Penrose, J. (2004) Aum Supreme Truth: The Cult at the End of the World, Presentation, Retrieved: September 22, 2004. 7 Van Beima, D. (1995) ‘Prophet of Poison’, Time Australia, 13, pp. 25-31. 8 Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, pp. 12-34. 9 Ibid, p. 17. 10 Van Beima, D. (1995) ‘Prophet of Poison’, Time Australia, 13, pp. 25-31. 11 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 12 Van Beima, D. (1995) ‘Prophet of Poison’, Time Australia, 13, pp. 25-31. 13 Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1. 14 Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, pp. 30-34. 15 Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1. 16 Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS, p. 31. 17 Bellamy, P. (2005) False Prophet: The Aum Cult of Terror; Aftermath, Retrieved: July 11, 2005, from: http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/prophet/10.html?sect=22. 18 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 19 Ibid. 20 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 21 Bellamy, P. (2005) False Prophet: The Aum Cult of Terror; Aftermath, Retrieved: July 11, 2005, from: http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/terrorists/prophet/10.html?sect=22. 22 Penrose, J. (2004) Aum Supreme Truth: The Cult at the End of the World, Presentation, Retrieved: September 22, 2004. 23 Reader, I. (2000) Religious Violence in Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Surrey: Curzon Press. 24 Penrose, J. (2004) Aum Supreme Truth: The Cult at the End of the World, Presentation, Retrieved: September 22, 2004. 25 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Penrose, J. (2004) Aum Supreme Truth: The Cult at the End of the World, Presentation, Retrieved: September 22, 2004. 32 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.

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35 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 36 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 37 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo - Appendix A: Aum Shinrikyo Members, United States Congress, Washington. 38 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 39 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo - Appendix A: Aum Shinrikyo Members, United States Congress, Washington. 40 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 41 Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1. 42 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 43 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 44 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 45 Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1. 46 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 47 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 48 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 49 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 50 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra. 51 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 52 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 53 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 54 Ibid. 55 Department of Minerals and Energy (1995) Statement to Australian Federal Police, Background to Subject Mining Tenements, Australian Federal Police: Canberra. 56 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 57 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 58 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 59 Ibid. 60 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra.

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61 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 62 Tickner, L. (1995) ‘Member of Cult had Local Passport’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 13, p. 3. 63 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra. 64 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 65 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 66 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Attachment A, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 67 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 68 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Attachment A, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 69 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 70 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 71 Ibid. 72 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Attachment A, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 73 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra. 74 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 75 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 76 Ibid. 77 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 78 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 79 Ibid. 80 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King: Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra. 81 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 82 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 83 Ibid. 84 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 85 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 86 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect

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Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 87 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 88 United States Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1995), Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, United States Congress, Washington. 89 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King; Summary of Enquiries Made, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Branch: Canberra. 90 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 91 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 95 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 96 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 101 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Boyle, M., Crothers, R., Dickerson, T., and Penrose, J. (2004) Police in Australia – Issues and Innovations in Australian Policing (Case Studies): The AFP Investigation into Japanese Sect Activities in Western Australia, Retrieved: April 20, 2005, from: http://www.aic.gov.au/policing/afp.html. 107 Ibid.. 108 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 109 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 110 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 111 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 112 Australian Federal Police (1995) Australian Federal Police Minute: Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 113 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 114 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 115 Department of Minerals and Energy (1995) Statement to Australian Federal Police, Background to Subject Mining Tenements, Australian Federal Police: Canberra. 116 Penrose, J. (2004) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] September 1. 117 McGeough, P. (1995) ‘Deadly Dry Run: Outback Link to Subway Gassing’, The Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, p. 1. 118 Australian Federal Police (1995) History of Aum Shinrikyo in Australia, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 119 Ibid.

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120 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 121 Penrose, J. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Canberra [Telephone] August 9. 122 Australian Federal Police (1995) Operation Sea King, Asia/Pacific Crime Assessments Branch, Strategic Intelligence Division: Canberra. 123 Reader, I (1996) A Poisonous Cocktail?: Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence, Copenhagen: NIAS. 124 Juergensmeyer, M. (2000) Terror in the Mind of God, Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 102-103.

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CHAPTER VII: LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

1Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (2005) Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from http://nationalsecurity.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/0/F8712E53751DBCA9CA256DD A00824828?OpenDocument. 2 Brew, N. (2004) Lashkar-e-Taiba’ and the Threat to Australia, Research Note: 36 2003-04, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra. 3 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Listed Entities, Retrieved: March 15, 2005, from http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/Entities_e.asp#30. 4 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington: Government Printing Office. 5 International Islamic Front (2001) Retrieved: March 15, 2005, from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/IIF.htm. 6 United States Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Washington. 7 Brew, N. (2004) Lashkar-e-Taiba’ and the Threat to Australia, Research Note: 36 2003-04, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra. 8 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (2005) Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from http://nationalsecurity.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/0/F8712E53751DBCA9CA256DD A00824828?OpenDocument. 9 Brew, N. (2004) Lashkar-e-Taiba’ and the Threat to Australia, Research Note: 36 2003-04, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra. 10 Girigharadas, A. (2006) ‘India’s Police Say Pakistan Helped Plot July Train Bombings’, New York Times, October 1, p. 1.12. 11 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (2005) Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from http://nationalsecurity.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/0/F8712E53751DBCA9CA256DD A00824828?OpenDocument. 12 Williams, C. (2004) Terrorism Explained: The Facts About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups, Sydney: New Holland Publishers, pp. 159-160. 13 Brew, N. (2004) Lashkar-e-Taiba’ and the Threat to Australia, Research Note: 36 2003-04, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra. 14 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (2005) Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from http://nationalsecurity.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/0/F8712E53751DBCA9CA256DD A00824828?OpenDocument. 15 Raman, B. (2004) Paper 890: Thailand and International Islamic Front, Retrieved: March 14, 2005, from http://www.saag.org/papers9/paper890.html. 16 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 17 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 18 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 19 Ibid. 20 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 21 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Hooper, B. (2003) ‘Dreadlocked Terrorist’s Three Wives and a Butchery’, The Daily Telegraph, November 11, p. 4. 22 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 23 Ibid. 24 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 25 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8.

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26 Ibid. 27 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 28 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 29 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Hooper, B. (2003) ‘Dreadlocked Terrorist’s Three Wives and a Butchery’, The Daily Telegraph, November 11, p. 4. 30 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Miranda, C. (2003) ‘Radical Cleric Trained Brigitte’, The Daily Telegraph, November 10, p. 4. 31 Ibid. 32 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 33 Aftergood, S. (2004) Salafist Group for Call and Combat, Retrieved: March 23, 2005, from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/salaf.htm. 34 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 35 ‘Willie Brigitte Planned Australian Attack: Informer’ (2003) The Sydney Morning Herald, November 22. 36 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 37 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Connections to Four Corners of Evil’s Extremes – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 22, p. 4. 38 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 39 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 43 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘A Serpent Planning to Strike at Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, March 24, p. 25. 44 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm 45 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Connections to Four Corners of Evil’s Extremes – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 22, p. 4. 46 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8 47 South Asia Terrorism Portal (2001) Lashka-e-Toiba: ‘Army of the Pure’, Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm. 48 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 49 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘A Serpent Planning to Strike at Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, March 24, p. 25. 50 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 51 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 52 Miranda, C. (2004) ‘Bringing Brigitte to Court’, The Daily Telegraph, July 19, p. 17.

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La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Hooper, B. (2003) ‘Dreadlocked Terrorist’s Three Wives and a Butchery’, The Daily Telegraph, November 11, p. 4. 53 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 54La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘A Serpent Planning to Strike at Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, March 24, p. 25. 55 Chulov, M. & Higgins, E. (2004) ‘Chechen Bomber in Link to Brigitte Plot’, The Australian, September 6, p. 1. 56 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 57 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 58 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 59 Accused ‘Had Maps, Photos’ (2004) Retrieved: December 14, 2004, from http://www.news.com.au/common/printpage/0,6093,11687423,00.html. 60 Ibid. 61 Chulov, M (2004) ‘Architect “Acted as Terrorist Official”’, The Australian, December 15. 62 Accused ‘Had Maps, Photos’ (2004) Retrieved: December 14, 2004, from http://www.news.com.au/common/printpage/0,6093,11687423,00.html. 63 Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) ‘How net around Suspects was Tightened’, The Australian, April 23, p. 4. 64 Easterly, T. (2005) Sydney Man Charged with Terrorism-Related Offences, Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1093299.htm. 65 Connolly, E., Creagh, S., & Kennedy, L. (2004) ‘Terror Suspect “Used Government Website”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 24. 66 Harris, T. (2004) ‘On the Line after Years in Obscurity’, The Australian, March 23, p. 2. 67 Ibid. 68 Chulov, M. & Stapleton, J. (2004) ‘Cleric Named as Terror Recruiter’, The Australian, March 22, p. 1. 69 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 70 Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Plot to Bomb Power Grid – Sydney Man Charged with Preparing for Terrorist Attack’, The Australian, April 23, p. 1. 71 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 72 Ibid. 73 Chulov, M. & Crawford, B. (2004) ‘A “Nice, Intelligent Guy” with Friends in Deadly Places’, The Australian, April 17, p. 2. 74 Ibid. 75 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 76 Ibid. 77 Harris, T. (2004) ‘Ul-Haque saw the West as “Animals”’, The Australian, April 30, p. 4. 78 Dowling, J. (2004) ‘Terrorism Suspects Linked to Prayer Hall’, The Age, May 30, p. 2. 79 Crawford, B. (2004) ‘Jailing of Student “A Stunt”’, The Australian, April 19, p. 4. 80 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 81 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 82 Harris, T. (2004) ‘Ul-Haque saw the West as “Animals”’, The Australian, April 30, p. 4. 83 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 84 Harris, T. (2004) ‘Ul-Haque saw the West as “Animals”’, The Australian, April 30, p. 4. 85 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 86 Harris, T. (2004) ‘Ul-Haque saw the West as “Animals”’, The Australian, April 30, p. 4. 87 Ibid.. 88 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 89 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm.

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90 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 91 Koschade, S. (2005) Interview with Martin Chulov, Sydney [Telephone], June 3. 92 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 93 Chulov, M. (2005) Interviewed by Stuart Koschade, Sydney [Telephone] June 3, 2005. 94 Goodsir, D. (2003) ‘French Stymie Jail Access to Brigitte’, The Sydney Morning Herald, November 22. 95 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 96 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 97 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 98 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 99 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 100 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 101 Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 102 Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) ‘How net around Suspects was Tightened’, The Australian, April 23, p. 4. 103 Chulov, M. (2005) ‘Butcher in Brigitte’s Circle: AFP’, The Australian, August 6, p. 9. 104 Chulov, M. (2005) ‘Butcher “Helped House Terrorism Planner”’, The Australian, August 17, p. 6. 105 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 106 Ibid. 107 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 108 Connolly, E. (2004) ‘Documents Link Suspect to Brigitte’, The Age, June 11, p. 5. 109 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 110 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Connections to Four Corners of Evil’s Extremes – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 22, p. 4. 111 Ibid. 112 Chulov, M. (2005) ‘Butcher in Brigitte’s Circle: AFP’, The Australian, August 6, p. 9. 113 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 114 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Architect “Acted as Terrorist Official”’, The Australian, December 15, p. 5. 119 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 120 ‘Willie Brigitte Planned Australian Attack: Informer’ (2003) The Sydney Morning Herald, November 22. 121 ‘Man Lied to Spies, Says AFP’ (2005) The Herald Sun, August 17, p. 10. 122 Chulov, M. (2005) ‘Butcher in Brigitte’s Circle: AFP’, The Australian, August 6, p. 9. 123 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 124 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Suspect Names Seven – Brigitte Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 25, p. 8.

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125 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Connections to Four Corners of Evil’s Extremes – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 22, p. 4. 126 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 127 Suspect ‘Planned Australia Attack’ (2004), Retrieved: February 28, 2005, from http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/21/australia.terror. 128 Chulov, M. & Stapleton, J. (2004) ‘Cleric Named as Terror Recruiter’, The Australian, March 22, p. 1. 129 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 130 Connolly, E., Creagh, S., & Kennedy, L. (2004) ‘Terror Suspect “Used Government Website”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 24. 131 Chulov, M (2004) ‘ASIO Monitored Suspect’s Web Use’, April 24-25, p. 6. 132 Miranda, C. (2004) ‘Blueprint for Attack – Revealed: The Daily Telegraph Outlines for the First Time Allegations of a Frightening Terror Plot in Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, June 11, p. 7. 133 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Interrogations of Willie Brigitte (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1131449.htm. 134 Williams, E. (2004) Interview with Harry Durimel, Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1132190.htm. 135 Chulov, M. (2005) ‘Butcher in Brigitte’s Circle: AFP’, The Australian, August 6, p. 9. 136 Connolly, E. (2004) ‘Documents Link Suspect to Brigitte’, The Age, June 11, p. 5. 137 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Jackson, L. (2004) Four Corners: Program Transcript, Willie Brigitte, Retrieved: January 4, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1040952.htm. 138 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Why I Married the Terrorist – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 23, p. 4. 139 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 140 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Why I Married the Terrorist – Willie Brigitte: Terror Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 23, p. 4. 141 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Testimony: Melanie Brown (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1132151.htm. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 ASIO Management and Willie Virgil Brigitte’s Dark Terrorist Network In Australia (2004) Retrieved: June 17, 2005, from http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/frameset.asp. 145 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in Testimony: Melanie Brown (2004) Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1132151.htm. 146 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Hunt Closes on Terror Cell’, The Australian, April 17, p. 1. 147 Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) ‘How net around Suspects was Tightened’, The Australian, April 23, p. 4. 148 Miranda, C. (2004) ‘Blueprint for Attack – Revealed: The Daily Telegraph Outlines for the First Time Allegations of a Frightening Terror Plot in Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, June 11, p. 7. 149 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Architect “Acted as Terrorist Official”’, The Australian, December 15, p. 5. 150 Connolly, E. (2004) ‘Documents Link Suspect to Brigitte’, The Age, June 11, p. 5. 151 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8. 152 Williams, E. (2004) Interview with Harry Durimel, Retrieved: March 24, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1132190.htm. 153 La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (2004) Brigitte Dossier, in English, B. (2004) ‘Suspect Names Seven – Brigitte Dossier’, The Daily Telegraph, March 25, p. 8. 154 Miranda, C. (2004) ‘Blueprint for Attack – Revealed: The Daily Telegraph Outlines for the First Time Allegations of a Frightening Terror Plot in Sydney’, The Daily Telegraph, June 11, p. 7. 155 Callinan, R. & Chulov, M. (2004) ‘How net around Suspects was Tightened’, The Australian, April 23, p. 4.

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156 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Hunt Closes on Terror Cell’, The Australian, April 17, p. 1. 157 Chulov, M. (2004) ‘Student Doctor on Terror Charge’, The Australian, April 16, p. 1. 158 Chulov, M. & Crawford, B. (2004) ‘A “Nice, Intelligent Guy” with Friends in Deadly Places’, The Australian, April 17, p. 2. 159 ‘Man Lied to Spies, Says AFP’ (2005) The Herald Sun, August 17, p. 10.

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CHAPTER VIII: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

1 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra. 2 Ibid 3 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, pp. 1-5. 4 Ibid. 5 International Crisis Group interview (2003) March, in Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 5. 6 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 53. 7 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 6. 8 Ibid. 9 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (2002) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 3. 10 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 11. 11 Ibid. 12 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra. 13 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (2002) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 3. 14 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, p. 56 15 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 224-226. 16 Ibid, p. 166. 17 Elegant, S. (2002) ‘The Family Behind the Bombings’, Time Asia, November 19. 18 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 19. 19 Ibid, p. 18. 20 Ibid, p. 24. 21 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, National Capital Printing, Canberra, pp. 43-44. 22 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 32. 23 Ibid., pp. 42-61. 24 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 25 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 56. 26 Ibid, p 58. 27 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 28 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 29 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 30 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 31 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 222. 32 Ibid. 33 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 34 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 35 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p 126. 36 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 37 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p 159. 38 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 39 Ibid., pp. 219-220.

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40 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, pp. 33-34. 41 Ibid, p. 41. 42 Ibid, pp. 41-42. 43 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 83-85. 44 Ibid, p. 85. 45 Ibid, pp. 88-89. 46 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 47 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 89. 48 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 34. 49 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (2002) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 26. 50 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 51 The Bali Confessions (2003) Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10 February. 52 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 270-271. 53 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 40. 54 Ibid. 55 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 86. 56 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 40. 57 The Bali Confessions – Suspects (2005) Retrieved: March 10, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/suspects.htm. 58 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 86. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, pp. 219-220. 61 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 270. 62 Ibid. 63 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 64 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 46. 65 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 52. 66 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 46. 67 Ibid. 68 ‘Bali Bombing’s Fund Manager Sentenced to Life in Prison’ (2003) Antara, October 16, p. 1. 69 ‘Witness in Amrozi’s Trial Tells About Solo Meeting’ (2003) Antara, June 4. 70 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 274. 71 ‘Bali Bombing’s Fund Manager Sentenced to Life in Prison’ (2003) Antara, October 16, p. 1. 72 Wockner, C. (2003) ‘Mubarok Spared Death Sentence’, Daily Telegraph, October 17, 2003, p. 5. 73 ‘Bali Bombing’s Fund Manager Sentenced to Life in Prison’ (2003) Antara, October 16, p. 1. 74 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 274. 75 Ibid. 76 ‘Bali Bombings Planned in Solo, Witness Says’ (2003) Antara, June 12. 77 ‘Witness in Amrozi’s Trial Tells About Solo Meeting’ (2003) Antara, June 4.. 78 Ibid. 79 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 86. 80 ‘Life for the Bali “Helper”’ (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7. 81 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 86. 82 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 45. 83 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 275. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid, p. 276.

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86 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates (2002) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, pp. 24-26. 87 Ibid, p. 24. 88 Ibid, p. 25. 89 Suriadi, K. & Wockner, C. (2003) ‘Suicide Bomber’s Message of Hate: Killer’s Will Urges More Bloody Attacks’, Herald Sun, July 31, p. 3. 90 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 24-25. 91 Goodsir, D. (2003) ‘Ruthless Enforcer Pulled the Strings’, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 11, 2003, p. 9. 92 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 25. 93 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 277. 94 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 26. 95 Australian Federal Police (n.d.) Retrieved: March 9, 2005, from http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/raw/Bali/SummaryBaliPOIs.pdf. 96 Miller, W. (2003) ‘Chemical Salesman Sorry, and Forgetful, About Dealings with Amrozi’, The Sydney Morning Herald, June 10, p. 6. 97 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 278. 98 Miller, W. (2003) ‘Chemical Salesman Sorry, and Forgetful, About Dealings with Amrozi’, The Sydney Morning Herald, June 10, p. 6. 99 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 100 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 278. 101 Ibid, p. 281. 102 Debelle, P. (2004) ‘After the Fruits of the Good Life, an Adelaide Student Turns to Bombs’, The Age, September 11, p. 6. 103 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 121-122. 104 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 105 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 126-127. 106 Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (2003) International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 39. 107 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 10. 108 Ibid, p. 33. 109 Perrin, A. (2003) ‘Hambali’s Heir Apparent’, Time Asia, August 25. 110 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 33. 111 United States Department of the Treasury (2003) Office of Foreign Assets Control: Recent OFAC Actions, Retrieved: May 5, 2005, from http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20030905.html. 112 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 127. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid, p. 281. 115 ‘Life for Bali Bomb “Helper”’ (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7. 116 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 282. 117 ‘Life for Bali Bomb “Helper”’ (2004) The Australian, February 10, p. 7. 118 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 282. 119 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 120 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 285. 121 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, International Crisis Group: Jakarta, p. 44. 122 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 123 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 285.

349

124 Turnbull, W. (2003) A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network, Monterey Institute of International Studies: California. 125 Ibid. 126 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2002) ‘Amrozi Lied to Escape Firing Squad’, The Sydney Morning Herald, November 15, p. 9. 127 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 128 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2002) ‘Amrozi Lied to Escape Firing Squad’, The Sydney Morning Herald, November 15, p. 9. 129 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 289. 130 Ibid, p. 277. 131 The Bali Confessions (2003) Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10 February. 132 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 283. 133 The Bali Confessions (2003) Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10 February. 134 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 284-285. 135 Ibid, p. 286. 136 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 137 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 286. 138 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2, and Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 284-285. 139 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 288-289. 140 Ibid, pp. 285-287. 141 ‘The Bali Bomber’s Song’ (2003) Jakarta Tempo, February 18. 142 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 143 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 287. 144 Ibid, p. 289. 145 The Bali Confessions (2003) Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, 10 February. 146 Chua, E. (2003) ‘Ex-UTM Don and Samudra Charged’, The Business Times, June 3, p. 20. 147 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 290-291. 148 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 149 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, pp. 292-293. 150 Ibid, p. 293. 151 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 152 Neighbour, S. (2004) In the Shadows of Swords, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, p. 298 153 Goodsir, D. & Miller, W. (2003) ‘The Night Terror Touched Our Lives: Bali Remembered – How the Terror Unfolded’, The Age, October 4, p. 2. 154 Ibid. 155 Australian Federal Police (2003) 2002-2003 AFP Annual Report, Canberra: Australian Federal Police.

350

CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS

1 Sparrow, M. (1991) ‘The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An Assessment of the Prospects’, Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 262-263. 2 The French Connection, (2004) Sunday, Nine Network, Sydney, February 8.

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352

CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION

1 Brannan, D., Esler, P., & Strindberg, N. (2001) ‘Talking to “Terrorists”: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, 1, p. 7. 2 Klerks, P. (2001) ‘The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands’, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, p. 60. 3 Collins, L. & Reed, W. (2005) Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-Ups, and Consequences, Melbourne: HarperCollins.

353

354

THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK

ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

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