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The Internal Dynamics of Terrorist Cells: a Social Network

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THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TERRORIST CELLS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST CELLS IN AN AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT STUART KOSCHADE Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours) Centre for Social Change Research Queensland University of Technology Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy qualification 2007 i KEYWORDS: terrorism, terrorist cells, terrorism studies, social network analysis, Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Ustashi, Ustasha, Aum Shinrikyo, Lashkar-e- Taiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, history of terrorism, Australia, destabilisation techniques, betweenness, critical node, counter-terrorism, Willie Brigitte, Faheem Khalid Lodhi, Shoko Asahara, Imam Samudra, Muklas, Bali bombing, Islamic extremism. ABSTRACT: The rise of the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement, which was mobilised by the al-Qaeda attacks of and responses to September 11, 2001, heralds a new period in the history of terrorism. The increased frequency and intensity of this type of terrorism affects every nation in the world, not least Australia. Rising to meet the challenges posed by terrorism is the field of terrorism studies, the field which aims at understanding, explaining, and countering terrorism. Despite the importance of the field, it has been beleaguered with criticisms since its inception as a response to the rise of international terrorism. These criticisms specifically aim at the field’s lack of objectivity, abstraction, levels of research, and levels of analysis. These criticisms were the impetus behind the adoption of the methodology of this thesis, which offers the distinct ability to understand, explain, and forecast the way in which terrorists interact within covert cells. Through social network analysis, this thesis examines four terrorist cells that have operated in or against Australia. These cells are from the groups Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood), Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community) and operated between 1963 and 2003. Essentially, this methodology attempts to discover, map, and analyse the interaction within the cells during the covert stage of their respective operations. Following this, the results are analysed through the traditional social network analysis frameworks to discover the internal dynamics of the cell and identify the critical nodes (leaders) within the cells. Destabilisation techniques are subsequently employed, targeting these critical nodes to establish the most effective disruption techniques from a counter-terrorism point of view. The major findings of this thesis are: (1) that cells with a focus on efficiency rather than covertness were more successful in completing their objectives (contrary to popular belief); and (2) betweenness centrality (control over the flow of communication) is a critical factor in identifying leaders within terrorist cells. The analysis also offered significant insight into how a Jemaah Islamiyah cell might operate effectively in Australia, as well as the importance of local contacts to terrorist operations and the significance of international counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Firstly I would like to thank my family for their support – Mum, Dad, Michael, and Fiona - without you this project would have been all the more difficult. Equally vital has been the support from my principal supervisor Dr. John Synott, whose guidance has been fundamental in the completion of this thesis. Additionally my associate supervisors Dr. Ian Wells and Dr Jean-Louis Durand have also been essential, their advice and guidance has been invaluable. To my most excellent band of brothers, my friends, thank you for your support in an endeavour that could surely threaten to send the sanest of people around the bend: Nigel Lee, Grant Gilmore, Ross Marks, Elliot Wren, Stewart Forsyth, Jolon Knight, Jonas Howard, Chris O’Hallaren, Dave Hartley, Robert Hueston, Steven York, Matthew Wren, and Shannon Boyd. Similar sentiments go to the Grange Thistle Football Club. I must also thank many staff at QUT for their support: Professor Clive Bean, Associate Professor Gavin Kendall, Dr. Ken Parker, Dr Paul Harrison, Dr Mark Brough, Dr Barbara Hanna, Waveney Croft, Gail Stringfellow, Chanel Hopkinson, Kerry Pert, Margaret Miles, Eve Teague, and Christie Anne Williams. My sincerest thanks also go out to the following: Noni Kenny, Chad Whelan, Luke Howie, Sally Hose, Mark Branagan, Martin Chulov, Jeff Penrose, Chantal Enter, Liz Jackson, Flt Lt Ian Tindall, Dr Carl Ungerer, Lucia Falzon, Ian Shaw, the Research Network for a Secure Australia, the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre and Athol Yates, Chris Flaherty, John McDonald, Dave Lawson, Jane Doutre, Anna King, Danelle Dobson, Jonathan Farley, and Kathleen Carley. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP xiii TERMS, PHRASES & LANGUAGE xiv CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION 1 1. TERRORISM 2 2. ORIENTATION OF THESIS 4 3. SUMMARY OF THESIS 5 3.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 5 3.2 THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 6 3.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 7 3.4 DATA, ANALYSIS, & CONCLUSIONS 8 4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 9 CHAPTER II: THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 11 1. A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 14 1.1 ANCIENT TERROR & ASSASSINATION: C4 BC – C1 AD 15 1.2 ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: CIRCA C1-C13 16 1.2.1 PERIOD SUMMARY 18 1.3 LEFT-WING & REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: CIRCA 1790 – 1910 19 1.3.1 THE ANARCHIST MOVEMENT 19 1.3.2 RUSSIAN TERRORISM 21 1.3.3 ANTI-OTTOMAN TERRORISM 22 1.3.4 IRISH TERRORISM 23 1.3.5 PERIOD SUMMARY 24 1.4 RIGHT-WING & POST WWI TERRORISM: CIRCA 1917 – 1960 24 1.4.1 THE IRON GUARD 25 1.4.2 ZIONISM 25 1.4.3 THE USTASHA 26 1.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 27 1.4.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 28 1.4.6 PERIOD SUMMARY 29 1.5 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CIRCA 1960 – TODAY 30 1.5.1 CONTINUING GROUPS 31 1.5.1.1 THE IRA(s) 31 1.5.1.2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 32 1.5.2 NEW GROUPS 33 1.5.2.1 PALESTINIAN GROUPS 33 1.5.2.2 ARMENIAN GROUPS 35 1.5.2.3 COMMUNIST GROUPS 36 1.5.2.4 HEZBOLLAH 38 1.5.2.5 ALGERIAN TERRORISM 39 1.5.2.6 AUM SHINRIKYO 40 1.5.2.7 AL-QAEDA 41 1.6 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 45 1.6.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 46 1.6.2 CHECHEN REBELS 48 1.6.3 THE AL-QAEDA MOVEMENT 48 1.6.4 THE WAR IN IRAQ – CONSEQUENCES 49 2. TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA 51 iv 2.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 52 2.2 EARLY TERRORISM 53 2.3 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 53 2.3.1 USTASHI GROUPS 53 2.3.2 PALESTINIAN TERRORISM 57 2.3.3 THE HILTON BOMBING 58 2.3.4 THE JCAG 58 2.3.5 AUM SHINRIKYO 59 2.4 DOMESTIC TERRORISM 60 2.5 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62 2.5.1 PRE 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 62 2.5.1.1 JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH MANTIQI 4 & JACK ROCHE 62 2.5.1.2 SYDNEY OLYMPIC GAMES 64 2.5.2 POST 2001 ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 65 2.5.2.1 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 65 2.5.2.2 MALLAH & THOMAS 66 2.5.2.3 THREATS TO AUSTRALIA 67 2.5.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM RAIDS – NOVEMBER 2005 67 3. SUMMARY 68 CHAPTER III: THE FIELD OF TERRORISM STUDIES 71 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 72 1.1 EARLY LITERATURE 73 1.1.1 EARLY 1970S – POLITICAL SCIENCE RESPONSES 73 1.1.2 MID 1970S – INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 74 1.1.3 1980S – ‘BOOM PERIOD’ 78 1.1.3.1 SCHMID & JONGMAN’S APPRAISAL 79 1.2 CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM STUDIES 80 1.2.1 THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM 81 1.2.1.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM 82 1.2.1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM 82 1.2.2 TERRORISTS 83 1.2.2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 84 1.2.2.2 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 84 1.2.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES 86 1.2.2.4 POLITICAL SCIENCE 87 1.2.3 TERRORIST TACTICS 88 1.2.3.1 TARGET SELECTION 88 1.2.3.2 WMD & CBRN 89 1.2.3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS 90 1.2.3.4 CYBER-TERRORISM 92 1.2.3.5 GENERAL TACTICS 93 1.2.4 COUNTER-TERRORISM 94 1.2.4.1 NATIONAL 94 1.2.4.2 INTERNATIONAL 95 1.2.4.3 NON-STATE 96 1.2.4.4 GENERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STUDIES 97 1.3 AUSTRALIAN LITERATURE 98 1.3.1 USTASHI LITERATURE 98 1.3.2 THE HILTON BOMBING & ANANDA MARGA 100 1.3.3 TERRORISM IN EARNEST 101 1.3.3.1 POST 2001 RESEARCH IN AUSTRALIA 107 2. ISSUES WITHIN TERRORISM STUDIES 110 2.1 CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF TERRORISM STUDIES 111 2.1.1 OBJECTIVITY 111 2.1.2 ABSTRACTION 112 2.1.3 LEVELS OF RESEARCH 112 2.1.4 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 113 v 3. POST 2001 ANALYTICAL RESEARCH IN TERRORISM 113 STUDIES 4. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS 118 CHAPTER IV: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 121 1. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 122 1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIELD 122 1.1.1 SOCIOMETRIC ANALYSIS 123 1.1.2 HARVARD APPROACH 126 1.1.3 MANCHESTER APPROACH 127 1.2 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS – COVERT NETWORKS 127 1.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS & TERRORISM STUDIES 130 1.3.1 VALDIS KREBS 131 1.3.2 FURTHER TERRORISM RESEARCH 136 2. IMPLEMENTATION 136 2.1 THESIS OBJECTIVES 137 2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 138 3. METHODOLOGY 139 3.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 140 3.1.1 THE CASE STUDY 140 3.1.2 DATA COLLECTION & SOURCES 141 3.1.2.1 GOVERNMENT SOURCES 142 3.1.2.2 NGO & MEDIA SOURCES 142 3.1.2.3 INTERVIEWS 144 3.1.3 NEGATING CRITICISMS – CASE STUDIES 145 3.2 RELATIONAL DATA 146 3.2.1 INTERACTIONAL CRITERIA 147 3.2.1.1 MATRICES 148 3.2.1.2 GRAPHS 150 3.3 NETWORK ANALYSIS 152 3.3.1 NETWORK LEVEL MEASURES 152 3.3.1.1 SIZE 153 3.3.1.2 DENSITY 153 3.3.1.3 DEGREE OF CONNEXION 154 3.3.1.4 AVERAGE COMMUNICATION SPEED 155 3.3.1.5 CLUSTERS 156 3.3.1.6 NETWORK FORMATION 157 3.3.2 NODE LEVEL MEASURES 158 3.3.2.1 ACTOR LEVEL DEGREE CENTRALITY 159 3.3.2.2 ACTOR LEVEL CLOSENESS CENTRALITY 160 3.3.2.3 ACTOR LEVEL BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 161 3.3.2.4 CLIQUE COUNT 162 3.4 DESTABILISATION TECHNIQUES 163 4.
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  • El Viaje De La Muerte”1

    El Viaje De La Muerte”1

    Informe de la ONG británica Reprieve que sacó del anonimato muchas historias de presos de Guantánamo y cómo EEUU los compró “El viaje de la muerte”1 Más de 700 prisioneros fueron enviados ilegalmente a Guantánamo con la ayuda de Portugal Reprieve, 28 de enero de 2008 Traducido del inglés para Rebelión por Germán Leyens La organización británica Reprieve muestra de modo concluyente que territorio y espacio aéreo portugueses han sido utilizados para transferir a más de 700 prisioneros para ser torturados y encarcelados ilegalmente en Guantánamo. Mediante la comparación de registros de vuelo obtenidos de las autoridades portuguesas,2información del Departamento de Defensa de EE.UU. mostrando fechas de llegada de prisioneros a Guantánamo, y testimonios no confidenciales de los propios prisioneros, 3 Reprieve puede identificar por primera vez a 728 prisioneros enviados a Guantánamo pasando por la jurisdicción portuguesa. La investigación también muestra que Portugal ha jugado un papel sustancial de apoyo en el programa general de entregas [‘extraordinarias’]. Por lo menos nueve prisioneros transportados pasando por la jurisdicción portuguesa fueron severamente torturados en prisiones secretas en todo el mundo antes de su llegada a Guantánamo.4 Vuelos de entregas de prisioneros a Guantánamo pasando por jurisdicción 1 Definición de Adil Zamil, prisionero transportado en el Vuelo RCH108Y que pasó por jurisdicción portuguesa hacia Guantánamo: “Llamo el viaje a Guantánamo ‘El viaje de la muerte.’ Discretamente estuve deseando que el avión se cayera para terminar con el dolor que sentía.” Fuente: “Kuwaiti Gitmo Detainees Speak Out about Abuse” [Detenidos en Guantánamo hablan del abuso], de Rania El Gamal, Kuwait Times, 1 de diciembre de 2006 2 Registros de vuelo obtenidos por Ana Gomes, miembro del Parlamento Europeo, en 2006 revelan que aviones cruzaron en por lo menos 94 ocasiones el espacio aéreo portugués en camino a, o desde, Guantánamo entre 2002 y 2006.