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Medellín - Colombia Presentación Edición Especial No. 7 15 de enero de 2018 Esta es la segunda versión del Diccionario sobre Terrorismo Islámico, concretamente esta es una obra del Doctor Carlos Editor Alfredo de Jorge, académico argentino que ha dedicado la mayor Douglas Hernández parte de su vida al estudio de fenómenos políticos y sociales de importancia mundial, y que ahora es un asiduo colaborador de Autor de esta obra TRIARIUS. Carlos Alfredo de Jorge Este documento, como todas nuestras publicaciones, está Argentina. destinado a convertirse en fuente permanente de consulta para los profesionales del sector de la seguridad, la inteligencia, la defensa, Carlos Alfredo de Jorge es Doctor el cuerpo diplomático, y de todos los funcionarios encargados de en Ciencias Políticas por la prevenir la radicalización, y luchar contra el terrorismo en todas Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina “Santa María de los sus manifestaciones. Buenos Aires”, Instituto de Ciencias Al igual que el Boletín de Prevención y Seguridad ante el Políticas y Relaciones Terorrismo y las Nuevas Amenazas que publicamos de manera Internacionales. Durante más de 20 quincenal, este Diccionario también está abierto a recibir años ejerció como profesor titular en la Cátedra de Geografía Física contribuciones de nuestros lectores. Creemos firmemente que Argentina y en la Cátedra de compartir información y conocimiento es una forma efectiva de Geografía Regional de la República contribuir en la lucha para reducir a aquellos que atentan contra la Argentina, en el Consejo Superior de Educación Católica sociedad y la convivencia pacífica. (CONSUDEC). También ejerció En relación con la primea versión, esta viene ampliada con nuevas como docente en otros prestigiosos entradas, que incluyen eventos, grupos y personas de interés. centros de educación superior, Esperamos que este material sea de utilidad para nuestros incluyendo el Colegio Militar de la Nación y la Escuela Superior de amables lectores, en los distintos países del mundo. Gendarmería Nacional “Gral Brig Don Manuel María Calderón”. Posee diversas publicaciones. ¡Conocer para vencer! Información de Contacto: Douglas Hernández Medellín, Colombia Douglas Hernández Movil: (+57) 321-6435103 Editor [email protected] [email protected] 2 BREVE DICCIONARIO REFERIDO AL TERRORISMO ISLÁMICO OBJETIVOS DE LA LABOR La tarea emprendida es una guía ordenada alfabéticamente para aquellos que necesitan información actualizada acerca del terrorismo islámico. La lista está acompañada de las correspondientes fuentes bibliográficas que se han utilizado para su preparación, en caso de que alguien quiera profundizar en algún tema en particular, y un párrafo final que puede orientar la búsqueda hacia el futuro inmediato. Aunque, como dicen los historiadores, el pasado no es un evento específico que nos permite asegurar los acontecimientos futuros. Palabras clave: Islam, terrorismo, yihadismo, organizaciones y grupos, diccionario. OBJETIVES OF THE WORK The task undertaken is an ordered alphabetically guide for those who need updated information about Islamic terrorism. The list is accompanied by the corresponding bibliographical sources that have been used for their preparation, if someone wants to deepen any particular topic, and a final paragraph that can guide the search towards the immediate future. Even though, as historians say, the past is not a specific event that enables us to ensure future events. Keywords: Islam, terrorism, jihadist, organizations and groups, dictionary. OBJECTIFS DU TRAVAIL L’ache enterprise est un guide par ordre alphabétique pour ceux qui ont besoin d'informations à jour sur le terrorisme islamique. La liste est accompagnée par les sources bibliographiques correspondantes qui ont été utilisées pour leur préparation, si quelqu'un veut approfondir un sujet particulier, et un paragraphe final qui peut guider la recherche vers l'avenir immédiat. Bien que, comme disent les historiens, le passé est pas un événement spécifique qui nous permet d'assurer des événements futurs. Mots-clés: Islam, le terrorisme, le djihadisme, les organisations et les groupes, dictionnaire. 3 ACLARACIÓN INTRODUCTORIA El presente trabajo ha sido pensado en función de las continuas escaladas terroristas que han ocurrido en todos los ámbitos del mundo, algunos de gran resonancia como el del World Trade Center, en la ciudad de Nueva York, o los más recientes sucedidos en España (en diversos convoyes que convergían, entre otras, a la estación Atocha, del 11 de marzo de 2004, con un saldo de 177 decesos y 1857 heridos); en Londres, (el 7 de julio del año 2005, con un saldo de 56 muertos y 700 heridos); en Francia (París, Charlie Hebdo, del 7 de enero de 2015; Niza el 14 de Julio de 2016, entre otros tantos); en Bélgica, Turquía, Bangladesh, India, Egipto, Filipinas, Indonesia, Yemen, Kuwait, Arabia Saudita, Irak, Siria, Rusia, Pakistán, Afganistán, Argelia, Túnez, Mali, Uzbekistán, Turkmenistán, etc. La República Argentina -desgraciadamente- ha sufrido dos de ellos que han marcado a fuego a nuestra sociedad. El atentado perpetrado en la embajada de Israel el día 27 de marzo de 1982 (que dejara el trágico saldo de 22 muertos y 242 heridos) y el atentado a la AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina), acaecido el 18 de julio de 1994, con 85 personas muertas y 300 heridas de distinta consideración, ambos casos aún sin resolverse. PROEMIO El esquema fenomenológico, geográfico, temporal y político ✓ Para comprender este fenómeno y coincidiendo con las ideas del pensador y sociólogo noruego Johan Galtung (especialista en el estudio de los conflictos sociales y un avanzado en las investigaciones sobre los procesos de paz) podemos afirmar que el terrorismo se basa en una acción de violencia que genera efectos psíquicos desproporcionados respecto a sus consecuencias materiales y adquiriendo peculiaridades propias. En concreto: la intención de suscitar reacciones emocionales tales como ansiedad, incertidumbre, pánico o amedrentamiento entre quienes forman parte de un determinado agregado de la población, de manera que resulte factible condicionar sus actitudes y dirigir sus comportamientos en una dirección determinada hacia sus propios objetivos más que el deseo de causar daños tangibles a personas o cosas. Lo cual ayuda a distinguir a dicha violencia de tantas otras, habitualmente de mayor alcance y magnitud, extendidas sobre todo por su destructividad potencial y/o efectiva. Johan Galtung, distingue tres tipos de violencia, a saber: ➢ La directa ➢ La estructural y ➢ La cultural. 4 La violencia directa es la física, la que tiene como objeto “herir o matar” a otra persona o a varias de ellas, mientras que la violencia estructural es más sutil, pero no menos grave: consiste en agredir desde la esfera política o económica, causando hambre, miseria, enfermedad o la muerte de la población; no hay aquí un hombre que ataca a otro directamente sino toda una estructura que “aporta en contra de las necesidades básicas de una población”. A su vez sostiene que una -la estructural- sirve de soporte a la otra -la directa- ya que la violencia directa, física y/o verbal, se hace visible a través del comportamiento. Pero la acción humana no surge de la nada: tiene sus raíces. Dos de ellas son indicativas: la cultura de la violencia (heroica, patriótica, patriarcal, sectaria, etc.) y la estructura violenta en sí misma por ser demasiado represiva, explotadora o alienante; demasiado estricta o permisiva para la comodidad del pueblo. En las obras en cuestión la violencia se presenta en sucesivas etapas, si se quiere, cronológica. Dependiendo del caso la violencia puede comenzar por un desafío verbal, desembocar luego en una agresión de un cuerpo hacia otro, que logra, incluso, finalizar en la muerte de uno de los combatientes. Pero la realidad puede superar a la ficción. Toda violencia es una violación y cae de maduro que no es necesario recurrir a actos de violencia física para violar la humanidad de otra persona. Basta con hacer, por ejemplo, de la lengua un arma. Los recursos para tal propósito ya han sido sistematizados: nombrar con distorsión, corregir el vocablo con el que el supuesto enemigo se nombra a sí mismo, deformar los nombres propios, provocar la risa, advertir o amenazar con cada palabra. O lo que es igual, efectuar un trasbordo ideológico inadvertido, algo usual en los grupos terroristas que utilizan sistemáticamente a esta metodología de infiltración subrepticia sobre las mentes desprevenidas. Y es oportuno recordar que la violencia verbal, tan utilizada en los discursos políticos, suele normalmente preanunciar la violencia física. Se denomina fundamentalismo a distintas corrientes religiosas que promueven la interpretación literal de un texto «fundamental» ante el cual ninguna otra autoridad puede invocarse y que debería imponerse sobre las leyes de las sociedades democráticas. Esta definición pasa ya a ser clásica para situar al fenómeno terrorista del fundamentalismo islamista (o islámico) yihadista, muy cercano al wahabismo y al salafismo, que tratan de basar y justificar sus amenazas a través de la interpretación del Corán. En un sentido amplio también se lo identifica con el fanatismo o extremismo, aunque este último término se suele reservar para actitudes específicamente políticas. El caso que estamos analizando se aproxima más a esta última acepción, dadas las actitudes de intransigencia de los grupos fundamentalistas involucrados. Debe tenerse en cuenta que esta posición pierde cualquier sustento desde
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