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Why Terrorists Quit: Involvement in a Terrorist Organization

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Why Terrorists Quit: Involvement in a Terrorist Organization JULY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 8 Why Terrorists Quit: involvement in a terrorist organization. England, was trained in Afghanistan There are a number of cases of terrorist and Pakistan to use shoe bombs to Gaining From Al-Qa`ida’s “drop-outs,” and studying their destroy aircraft. His assignment was to Losses motivations for turning their backs target airliners bound from Europe to on their former compatriots is highly the United States. While his associate By Michael Jacobson useful for creating an effective counter- Richard Reid—now better known as terrorism strategy. “The Shoe Bomber”—attempted to blow in recent months, there has been a spate up an American Airlines flight from of seemingly good news in the counter- Many Candidates to Study Paris to Miami, Badat simply bailed on terrorism arena, as former terrorist Despite al-Qa`ida’s reputation for the plot, leaving his dismantled bomb in leaders and clerics have renounced ferocity and secrecy and its purported his parents’ house.9 their previous beliefs. Former Egyptian esprit de corps, many individuals have Islamic Jihad head Sayyid Imam al- quit the organization, making this a Al-Qa`ida is hardly alone in suffering Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl), whose productive area of study. In fact, al- from defections. Some of its affiliates treatises al-Qa`ida often cited to Qa`ida has seen its share of key members have had important losses as well, justify its actions, has written a new turn against the group from its earliest ranging from foot soldiers to key book rejecting al-Qa`ida’s message days. These include: leadership personnel. Al-Qa`ida’s and tactics.1 Shaykh Salman bin Fahd Indonesian-based affiliate Jemaah al-Awda, an extremist cleric whose - Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese national, Islamiyah (JI) was dealt a blow when incarceration in the 1990s by the Saudis who was one of the first members of Nasir Abas—one of JI’s four regional reportedly helped inspire Usama bin al-Qa`ida and was involved in the commanders—left the organization.10 Ladin to action, went on television to unsuccessful efforts in the early 1990s to Noman Benotman, the former leader of decry al-Qa`ida’s operations, asking procure uranium for the organization;5 the al-Qa`ida-affiliated Libyan Islamic Bin Ladin, “How much blood has been - Essam al-Ridi, an Egyptian who first Fighting Group (LIFG), also abandoned spilt? How many innocent people, traveled to Afghanistan in 1982 to the terrorist cause, turning not only on children, elderly, and women have been fight the Soviets and later purchased the LIFG but on al-Qa`ida as well.11 In killed…in the name of al Qaeda?”2 In the an airplane in the United States for al- June 2008, Abu Hadhifa, a long-time United Kingdom, former members of Qa`ida;6 veteran of the Algerian jihad, who had the radical group Hizb al-Tahrir3 (also - L’Houssaine Khertchou, a Moroccan risen to become the commander of al- spelled Hizb-ut-Tahrir) established the who joined the organization in 1991 and Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Quilliam Foundation, which describes trained to serve as Bin Ladin’s personal forces in eastern Algeria, dropped out of itself as “Britain’s first Muslim counter- pilot.7 AQIM and turned himself in to Algerian extremism think tank.”4 authorities.12 Even in the 9/11 plot—where attention While these are clearly positive has focused on al-Qa`ida’s ability to Factors Causing Operatives to Quit developments and may have a real convince 19 people to kill themselves as In these various cases, patterns are impact on preventing the next generation part of the attack—Bin Ladin was not evident in why they made the decision from going down the path of extremism, entirely successful. Two Saudis who to leave the terrorist or extremist what effect will these renunciations were selected for the plot—Mushabib organization. Not surprisingly, have on al-Qa`ida’s current members, al-Hamlan and Sa`ud al-Rashid— some have departed after becoming and on others who are well on their decided after leaving the training disillusioned with the group’s tactics way to becoming terrorists? What are camps in Afghanistan not to participate and strategy. Former EIJ leader Dr. the factors that can turn a would-be in the attacks. In the summer of 2001, Fadl, Saudi cleric Shaykh al-Awda, and terrorist away from this dangerous al-Qa`ida nearly faced an even bigger the founding members of the Quilliam path? Do former terrorists’ and obstacle when Ziad Jarrah, the pilot Foundation all seem to fit this profile. extremists’ messages carry particular of Flight 93, was deliberating about weight with this group? Unfortunately, whether to withdraw from the operation. JI commander Abas began to turn at this point there are too few answers In an emotional conversation, Ramzi bin on his organization and to cooperate to these important questions. What al-Shibh—the Hamburg-based liaison with Indonesian counter-terrorism can be examined, however, are cases of between the cell and the al-Qa`ida authorities after JI adopted a Bin individuals who have decided to quit leadership—was able to persuade Jarrah Ladin fatwa that called for attacks on to stay the course.8 civilians. Abas believed that jihad was 1 Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within,” New York- Defections from al-Qa`ida have er, June 2, 2008. continued since 9/11. For example, Sajid 9 Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussain, “New Wave 2 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unravel- Badat, a young Muslim from Gloucester, of British Terrorists are Taught at Schools, Not in the ing,” The New Republic, June 11, 2008. Mountains,” Times Online, July 14, 2005. 3 Although Hizb al-Tahrir is banned in some countries, 5 U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden et al., Southern District of 10 Bob Simon, “Switching Sides: Inside the Enemy it is not banned in the United Kingdom. New York, 2001. Camp,” 60 Minutes, May 6, 2007. 4 Susannah Tarbush, “The Quilliam Foundation,” al- 6 Ibid. 11 Bergen and Cruickshank, “The Unraveling.” Hayat, May 26, 2008. For a detailed analysis of the Quil- 7 Ibid. 12 “Report: Al-Qaeda Maghreb Commander Turns liam Foundation, see James Brandon, “The UK’s Experi- 8 9/11 Commission, “9/11 Commission Final Report,” Self In,” Middle East Media Research Institute, June 8, ence in Counter-Radicalization,” CTC Sentinel 1:5 (2008). July 2004. 2008. JULY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 8 only to be fought on the battlefield in While strategic differences appear once he returned to his home country the defense of Islam. Abas later said to be an important factor, more petty and resumed contact with his family.23 that he felt “sinful” after the 2002 Bali grievances have also played a role in bombings, since he had helped train al-Qa`ida members deciding to turn Lessons for the Government the bombers in the attacks.13 AQIM their backs on the organization. Issues Developing a better grasp of this commander Hadhifa turned himself in, relating to money have frequently phenomenon is critical for the United according to his family, after reaching caused problems, as some terrorists States and its allies’ counter-terrorism the conclusion that the jihad in Algeria have viewed inadequate compensation efforts. Broadly speaking, it will was not legitimate.14 Far more shocking as a sign that they are being treated be difficult for the United States to was the decision of Bin Ladin’s son unfairly. For example, Jamal al-Fadl effectively counter radical ideology `Umar to quit al-Qa`ida in the wake of began embezzling funds from al-Qa`ida without understanding all aspects of 9/11, calling the attacks “craziness” and during their years in Sudan based on his the radicalization cycle—including both saying that “those guys are dummies. displeasure with his salary—stealing why and how people are drawn in to They have destroyed everything, and approximately $100,000 total. When terrorist and extremist organizations for nothing. What did we get from Bin Ladin learned of al-Fadl’s actions, and why people have walked away. September 11?”15 he ordered him to repay the money. After repaying about $30,000, al-Fadl A comprehensive study exploring the A lack of respect for the group’s fled, fearing retribution if he did not drop-out phenomenon could have great leadership has also been a factor. Former return the full amount.19 practical benefits for the United States LIFG head Benotman had real differences and its allies. Governments could use with Bin Ladin over the direction of Khertchou, on the other hand, became the knowledge gleaned to shape their the global jihadist movement, and he bitter after one of Bin Ladin’s aides counter-radicalization programs, which claims to have asked the al-Qa`ida amir turned down his request for $500 to are growing in popularity throughout to get out of the terrorism business at cover the costs of his wife’s cesarean the world. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, a 2000 summit, realizing that they section. His anger level increased when Egypt, Indonesia and Singapore, as were fighting a losing battle. After 9/11, al-Qa`ida paid the expenses of a group well as the United Kingdom and the Benotman resigned from his position of Egyptians who were sent to Yemen to Netherlands, are among the countries in the LIFG, concerned that the United renew their passports. “If I had a gun,” that have put these types of programs States would likely respond to the attack Khertchou later testified, “I would shoot into place in recent years.
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