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Banco Central De La República Argentina BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA COMUNICACIÓN “ B “ 7701 28/01/2003 A LAS ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS: Ref.: Información cursada por el Banco de la Reserva Federal de Nueva York, relacionada con perso- nas vinculadas con actividades terroristas _______________________________________________________________ Nos dirigimos a Uds. con relación al requerimiento efectuado por el Banco de la Reserva Fede- ral de Nueva York, vinculado con la investigación penal que esta llevando a cabo sobre el terrorismo. Al respecto les señalamos, que deberán verificar si de sus registros surge que realizan operacio- nes con particulares y entidades incluidas en la denominada “Lista de Control”, que se adjunta en Anexo. En el caso en que la entidad financiera local sea controlada por una entidad financiera sujeta a la supervisión consolidada del Banco de la Reserva Federal de N.Y., deberá informar las operaciones detecta- das en forma directa al mencionado organismo de supervisión, proporcionando todos los datos que al respec- to se posean, debiendo a la vez notificar de ello a la Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias, mediante nota dirigida al Gerente responsable de la supervisión de la entidad. A su vez llevamos a su conocimiento que el presente requerimiento, así como las futuras actuali- zaciones que se efectúen, deberá considerarse como si fueran formuladas por el BCRA. Respecto de las entidades financieras cuyo controlante no esté sujeto a la supervisión consolida- da del Banco de la Reserva Federal de N.Y, en el caso de detectar operaciones de alguna de las personas u entidades incluidas en la “Lista de Control”, éstas deberán enviar una notificación al Banco de la Reserva Fe- deral de N.Y a la dirección [email protected] Dicha notificación deberá ser genérica sin identificar, por ejemplo, las personas o montos involu- crados a los fines de respetar el secreto bancario. Asimismo, deberán notificar de ello a la Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias mediante nota dirigida al Gerente responsable de la supervisión de la entidad. Finalmente les señalamos que lo solicitado no libera a las entidades financieras de la obligación de informar a esta Institución respecto de operaciones sospechosas que se registren por parte de su clientela, según lo previsto en el T.O. de Prevención de lavado de dinero y otras actividades ilícitas y de lo previsto so- bre el particula,en la Resolución Nro. 2 del 25.10.02 de la Unidad de Información Financiera. Saludamos muy atentamente. BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA ANEXO: 26 hojas Marcelo Ferrario Alberto Tulosai Gerente de Coordinación Subgerente General de Supervisión de Supervisión y Seguimiento CON COPIA A LAS CASAS, AGENCIAS, OFICINAS Y CORREDORES DE CAMBIO -1- Anexo a la B.C.R.A. Com. “B” 7701 FULL FIRST NAME MIDDLE # NAME NAMES LAST NAME DOB POB SSAN ADDRESS CITY/STATE A. Abdulrahman A. 1 Alghamdi Abdulrahman Alghamdi 09/24/68 Abdeldrim 2 Lefkir Abdeldrim Lefkir 12/04/68 Abdelghani Marakesh, 3 Mzoudi Abdelghani Mzoudi 12/06/72 Morocco Abdulaziz 4 Alomari Abdulaziz Alomari 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Bin Al Rahman Also Known Bin Mohammad 4A As: Abd Al Aziz Al Kam-ea Al Amri 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Also Known 4B As: Abdulaziz A.M. Al Omari 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Also Known 4C As: Abdulaziz Al Omari 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Also Known 4D As: Abdul Aziz Al Omari 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Also Known Abd Al Rahman 4E As: Abd Al-Aziz Muhammad Al-Unari 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ Also Known 4F As: Abdulaziz Al-Omori 05/28/79 Saudi Arabia 859 Main Street Paterson, NJ 4641 Ahmed Bourgainvilla Lauderdale By 5 Alhaznawi Ahmed Alhaznawi 10/11/80 Saudi Arabia Drive the Sea, FL 4641 Also Known Bourgainvilla Lauderdale By 5A As: Ahmad Ibrahim A. Al Haznawi 10/11/80 Saudi Arabia Drive the Sea, FL 418 South Ahmed Federal 6 Alnami Ahmed Alnami 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL 418 South Also Known Federal 6A As: Ahmad Abdullah Al Nami 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL -2- Anexo a la B.C.R.A. Com. “B” 7701 FULL FIRST NAME MIDDLE # NAME NAMES LAST NAME DOB POB SSAN ADDRESS CITY/STATE 418 South Also Known Federal 6B As: Ali Ahmed Alnami 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL 418 South Also Known Federal 6C As: Ahmad A.A. Al-Nami 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL 418 South Also Known Federal 6D As: Ahmed A. Al-Nami 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL 418 South Also Known Federal 6E As: Ahmed Al-Nawi 12/07/77 Saudi Arabia Highway, #117 Hollywood, FL Ahmed Mahmoud Lotfy Abou Mahmoud Lotfy 7 El-Kheir Ahmed Abou El-Kheir 10/05/73 Egypt(Possible) Ahmed Saleh Saeed Alkhoshy Saleh Saeed 96 Linwood 8 Alghamdi Ahmed Alkhoshy Alghamdi 07/02/79 Saudi Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known 96 Linwood 8A As: Ahmed Saleh Alghamdi 07/02/79 Saudi Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known 96 Linwood 8B As: Ahmed Al-Ghamdi 07/02/79 Saudi Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known 96 Linwood 8C As: Ahmed Salem S. Al Ghandi 07/02/79 Saudi Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ 9 Amar Chidek Amar Chidek 08/08/73 Asadullah Sayed 645 Queens 10 Ahmadi Asadullah Sayed Ahmadi 02/04/70 461-57-3825 Ave Yuba City, CA Also Known 645 Queens 10A As: Assadullah S. Ahmadi 02/04/70 461-57-3825 Ave Yuba City, CA Aysel Sen- 11 guer Aysel Senguer 05/11/75 -3- Anexo a la B.C.R.A. Com. “B” 7701 FULL FIRST NAME MIDDLE # NAME NAMES LAST NAME DOB POB SSAN ADDRESS CITY/STATE Ayub Ali 12 Khan Ayub Ali Khan 02/02/50 India(Possible) Baghdad 1/1/1965 or 13 Meziane Baghdad Meziane 8/4/55 28 B Rolleton Lester, UK Also Known 1/1/1965 or 13A As: Abu Abdullah 8/4/55 28 B Rolleton Lester, UK Benstaali Mohamed Via dal Pozzo 14 Fouad Benstaali Mohamed Fouad 08/19/63 Toscanelli Milan, Italy Daoud 15 Breshna Daoud Breshna 04/21/72 Djamel 16 Beghal Djamel Beghal 12/02/65 Eyad Al- 17 Rababah Eyad Al-Rababah 07/21/71 Jordan Fathi Ben Mustapha 18 Fitouri Fathi Ben Mustapha Fitouri 05/06/73 Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan Alqadi Rashid Ahmed United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19 Banihammad Fayez Hassan Alqadi Banihammad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19A As: Fayez Ahmad Banihammad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known Rashid Ahmed United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19B As: Fayez Hassan Al Qadi Banihammad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19C As: Fayez Ahmad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL -4- Anexo a la B.C.R.A. Com. “B” 7701 FULL FIRST NAME MIDDLE # NAME NAMES LAST NAME DOB POB SSAN ADDRESS CITY/STATE Also Known Fayez Abu United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19D As: Banihammad Dhabi Banihammad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19E As: Fayez Rashid Ahmed 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19F As: Banihammad Fayez 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19G As: Rashid Ahmed Hassan Alqadi 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19H As: Abu Dhabi Banihammad 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19I As: Ahmed Fayez 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Also Known United Arab 14545J Military Delray Beach, 19J As: Faez Ahmed 12/06/74 Emirates Trail, #180 FL Habib 20 Waddani Habib Waddani 06/10/70 Tunisia Via Bolla, #30 Milan, Italy Also Known 20A As: Habib Ouaddani 06/10/70 Tunisia Via Bolla, #30 Milan, Italy Hadi Qassim 21 Al-Faifi Hadi Qassim Al-Faifi 08/21/69 7/1/65 or 22 Hady Omar Hady Omar 10/5/67 Hakim Bougara-Blida 23 Zerzour Hakim Zerzour 02/14/68 (Algeria) Hamza Saleh 1730 South Ahmed Federal Delray Beach, 24 Alghamdi Hamza Saleh Ahmed Alghamdi 11/18/80 Saudi Arabia Highway, #260 FL -5- Anexo a la B.C.R.A. Com. “B” 7701 FULL FIRST NAME MIDDLE # NAME NAMES LAST NAME DOB POB SSAN ADDRESS CITY/STATE 1730 South Also Known Federal Delray Beach, 24A As: Hamza Al-Ghamdi 11/18/80 Saudi Arabia Highway, #260 FL 1730 South Also Known Federal Delray Beach, 24B As: Hamza Ghamdi 11/18/80 Saudi Arabia Highway, #260 FL 1730 South Also Known Federal Delray Beach, 24C As: Hamzah Alghamdi 11/18/80 Saudi Arabia Highway, #260 FL 1730 South Also Known Federal Delray Beach, 24D As: Hamza Alghamdi Saleh 11/18/80 Saudi Arabia Highway, #260 FL Hani Saleh Hassan Taif, Saudi 96 Linwood 25 Hanjour Hani Saleh Hassan Hanjour 08/30/72 Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known Taif, Saudi 96 Linwood 25A As: Hani Saleh H. Hanjour 08/30/72 Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known Taif, Saudi 96 Linwood 25B As: Hani Saleh Hanjour 08/30/72 Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Also Known Taif, Saudi 96 Linwood 25C As: Hani Saleh 08/30/72 Arabia Plaza, #417 Fort Lee, NJ Hashim Al- Al-Qunfudah, 26 Attas Hashim Al-Attas 06/09/72 Saudi Arabia Hocine 27 Khouni Hocine Khouni 09/30/77 Tizi Ouzou Hussein Ali Hassan Al- 28 Attas Hussein Ali Hassan Al-Attas 01/14/78 Jean Marc 29 Granvizir Jean Marc Granvizir 12/10/77 Kamel Tizi Ouzou 30 Azzouz Kamel Azzouz 02/01/69 (Algeria) -6- Anexo a la B.C.R.A.
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