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ISSUE NO. 1 | DECEMBER 2003 IN THIS ISSUE: 1 AL QAEDA AND THE NYU REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST THREAT LAW AND SECURITY APUBLICATIONOF THE CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW Table of The Center on Contents COLLOQUIUM Overview Law and Security page 2 New York University School of Law’s Center on Law and Security is a study and policy program established to examine the legal dimensions of counterterrorism Rohan Gunaratna, “The Future of Al Qaeda” and peace keeping at the national and international levels. pages 2-5 The Center’s main initiative for Fall 2003 was its Program on Law and Security. Daniel Benjamin, “Fundamental The Program convenes policy makers, academics, and law enforcement officials to Issues in Counterterrorism” discuss and make recommendations on a wide range of security issues, among them: pages 5-6 • Transformations in legal procedures in the wake of September 11 William Wechsler, • Regulatory reform in the matter of information sharing among law “On Terrorist Financing and the USA PATRIOT Act” enforcement agencies page 6 • The role of international organizations in rebuilding Iraq • Democracy and Islam FALL EVENTS Noah Feldman, • Preparedness in New York City and other urban areas nationwide and abroad “Reflections on Iraq” • International codes for apprehension and punishment of terrorists pages 7-8 • Bioterrorism and legal restrictions on scientific research Fall Conference, “Are We Safer? • Secrecy in government and among nations Transformations in Security After September 11” pages 8-9 In This Issue REGULAR FEATURES Issue One is focused upon Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization held responsible for Updates on Terrorist Trials pages 6-7 the September 11 attacks. In its pages, some of the world’s leading experts address Student Summer Internships the security lessons learned from September 11 and make recommendations for page 9 future security strategies. Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network Book Reviews and of Terror, assesses the new kinds of threats from Al Qaeda and other terrorist organi- Recommended Readings zations; Daniel Benjamin, co-author of The Age of Sacred Terror, offers recommenda- pages 10-11 tions for U.S. foreign policy in its efforts to stem the tide of terrorism; and William Profiles page 11 Wechsler, expert on terrorist financing, assesses the banking regulations of the USA PATRIOT Act. In addition, our regular features include: Updates on Terrorist Trials; News Digests from China and the Middle East on the war in Iraq; and Profiles in Brief. 2 About the Colloquium The Center for Law and Security hosts a col- loquium each Monday afternoon. Present are law students, Professors Richard Pildes and Stephen Holmes, a number of interested Alongside Professors Pildes and Holmes, Rohan Gunaratna assesses the threat of Al Qaeda. members of the School of Law faculty and a handful of guests. Each week participants detention. Further, the colloquium partici- Counterterrorism in Israel. He led the team delve into the issues and current state of the pants examined the delicate balance between that designed and built the U.N. database on debate over a specific topic, ranging from ter- national security and liberty, exploring the Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and its entities. rorist financing to the USA PATRIOT Act to USA PATRIOT Act and its more controver- Mr. Gunaratna contends that Al Qaeda the rebuilding of Iraq. The fall semester speak- sial sections, such as Article 215 which allows has been reduced to a third or less of its size as ers included Robert Baer, author of Sleeping access to personal and financial records of sus- of September 11, 2001. However, other, small- With the Devil; Jack Goldsmith, Assistant U.S. pected terrorists. Scholars on the Middle East er terrorist organizations have developed at the Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel; explored the ways in which U.S. policy has same time, some actually related to Al Qaeda, Debra Livingston, Professor of Law, Columbia maneuvered between terrorism as a crime and although only by self-definition if not neces- University; Bruce Hoffman, the RAND terrorism as an act of war and analyzed the sarily by actual connection. Mr. Gunaratna Corporation; and many others, among them legal ramifications of each stance. contends that the war in Iraq interrupted the the authors of the excerpts that follow. Below are some examples of the colloqui- pace of the disruption of the Al Qaeda net- A number of themes emerged from the um’s proceedings: work by damaging our relationship with coun- colloquium meetings. Discussions elucidated Rohan Gunaratna: Mr. Gunaratna, tries and sources of information. many of the complexities that law enforcement author of the best-selling Inside Al Qaeda: agencies and policy makers face in the wake of Global Network of Terror,is considered the lead- THE FUTURE OF AL QAEDA September 11. For example, in the realm of ing expert on Al Qaeda and its affiliates. He Ideological Threat law enforcement, the focus on terrorism shifted advises numerous local, national, and interna- More than the organization itself, the ideology policies to include not only pursuit of crimi- tional policing agencies and policy institutes of Al Qaeda remains a resilient threat. Although nals after a crime has been committed but and is currently the head of Terrorism Al Qaeda can still mount operations, with the additional means of crime prevention; an Research, Institute for Defense and Strategic increase in pressure Al Qaeda will become rele- approach which entails an added emphasis on Studies in Singapore, and an honorary fellow gated to an ideology. As Al Qaeda increasingly surveillance as opposed to apprehension and at the International Policy Institute for depends on like-minded groups to conduct attacks, other Islamist groups will become more like Al Qaeda. For instance, Mas Salamat Kasthari, the Chief of Jemmah Islamiyah ( JI) of news excerpts Singapore was planning to hijack an Aerofloat plane from Bangkok and crash it to the Changi International Airport in Singapore in 2002. The FROM CHINA tactic of using an air vehicle as a weapon was an “The situation in Iraq is a sword over the head of President Bush.” Al Qaeda invention. Furthermore, the killing of 202 civilians in Bali by the same group was not Renmin Ribao, China, September 18, 2003 Southeast Asian in character. Southeast Asia had never witnessed a mass fatality terrorist “Iraq’s oil deposits are plentiful and easily accessible. This is directly related attack before. Likewise, the JI attack in Bali to China’s resource security.” witnessed the first suicide attack by a Southeast Asian terrorist. During the past decade, JI and Diqui Zazhi, September 30, 2003, reprinted in Renmin Ribao other associated Islamist groups had come under Al Qaeda influence in a substantial way. “In addition to oil and trade, China and Iraq have developed widespread, Traditionally, with better trained, more experienced and highly committed operatives, lasting cooperation in chemicals, transportation, and engineering.” Al Qaeda wanted to attack more difficult tar- Diqui Zazhi, September 30, 2003, reprinted in Renmin Ribao gets especially strategic targets, and leave the easier and tactical targets to its associated groups. With Al Qaeda decentralizing, its oper- THE REVIEW OFLAWANDSECURITY| DECEMBER 2003 3 atives are working together closely at a tactical world. While the immediate (one to two years) FROM CHINA level with these other groups. As a result, the consequences are apparent, the mid-(five years) lethality of the attacks conducted by the associ- and long-term (ten years) consequence of Iraq is a hotspot for great power ate groups of Al Qaeda is increasing. As Bali in fighting primarily an ideological campaign mil- 2002 and Casablanca in 2003 demonstrated, itarily is yet to be seen. All indications are that politics, so China must actively the attacks conducted by the associate groups Islamism — whether it is in Turkey, Pakistan, of Al Qaeda can be as lethal as the attacks con- Malaysia, or in Indonesia — is moving from assert its interests there. China ducted by the parent group itself. With attacks the periphery to the center. U.S. intervention in conducted by Al Qaeda’s associated groups Iraq has spiked the ideological fuel prolonging needs Iraqi oil and trade, and should posing a threat as great as Al Qaeda itself, the the strength, size and life of Islamist political push for greater U.N. involvement. theatre of war will widen. Government security parties and terrorist groups. and intelligence agencies will be forced to mon- Iraq must be returned to the Iraqi itor the technologies, tactics and techniques of Successes and Failures a wide range of organizations. The greatest failure of the U.S.-led coalition is people. Many countries want recon- Especially after the U.S.-led coalition its lack of capability to neutralize the core lead- intervened in Afghanistan on October 7, ership of both Al Qaeda and the Islamic struction to be multilateral, but they 2001, Iraq is an attractive base for Al Qaeda. Movement of the Taliban. While preparations The Islamists desperately need a new theater for protracted guerrilla operations against the are unwilling to commit resources to produce psychologically and physically coalition forces inside Afghanistan are coordi- war-trained operatives. nated by the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed to the effort. Rather than risk being Although branded a “War against Omar, terrorist operations worldwide including shut out of the lucrative Iraqi recon- Terrorism” by the U.S., the fight is in reality in Afghanistan are coordinated by Osama bin against a radical ideology which produced Laden and his deputy, principal strategist and struction market, China should work Muslim youth willing to kill and die and designated successor Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. for international cooperation and “ THE FIGHT IS IN REALITY AGAINST A RADICAL IDEOLOGY WHICH pledge resources to reconstruction.
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