Led by RB-66 Destroyer, pilots flying Air Force F-4C Phantoms drop bombs on communist military target in North Vietnam, August 1966 (U.S. Air Force) The Limits of Airpower or the Limits of Strategy The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies By Mark Clodfelter or most of the world’s population, destroyer USS Maddox in the Tonkin and Cambodia—supposedly “neutral” America’s air wars in Vietnam are Gulf, occurred a half-century ago this countries in the conflict. Four million F now ancient history. The first U.S. August. Seven months later, America tons fell on South Vietnam—America’s bombing raids against North Vietnam, began its longest sustained “strate- ally in the war against communist conducted in response to attacks by gic bombing” campaign, Operation aggression. When the last raid by B-52s North Vietnamese patrol boats on the Rolling Thunder, against the North. over Cambodia on August 15, 1973, That effort, and the Linebacker cam- culminated American bombing in paigns that followed, dropped a million Southeast Asia, the United States had Dr. Mark Clodfelter is a Professor of Military tons of bombs on North Vietnam. dropped more than 8 million tons of Strategy at the National War College. Three million more tons fell on Laos bombs in 9 years.1 Less than 2 years JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 111 In May 1967, Air Force F-100 Super Sabre fires salvo of rockets at jungle target in South Vietnam (U.S. Air Force) later, Cambodia, Laos, and South a strategy dependent on it when trying an independent, stable, noncommunist Vietnam were communist countries. to achieve conflicting political goals. South Vietnam. His successor, President Did the inability of bombing—and The legacies of the air wars there remain Richard Nixon, pursued a much more innumerable airlift and reconnaissance relevant to political and military leaders limited goal that he dubbed “peace sorties—to prevent the fall of South grappling with the prospects of applying with honor”—a euphemism for a South Vietnam demonstrate the limits of air- airpower in the 21st century. Vietnam that remained noncommunist power, or did it reveal that the strategy The reliance on airpower to produce for a so-called decent interval, accompa- that relied heavily on airpower’s kinetic success in Vietnam was a classic rendi- nied by the return of American prisoners application to achieve success was funda- tion of the “ends, ways, and means” of war (POWs).2 mentally flawed? From the perspective of formula for designing strategy taught Yet those definitions of victory were 50 years after the bombing began, and 40 today at staff and war colleges worldwide. only partial definitions of the term. They years after the last bomb fell, the answer Airpower was a key “means” to achieve defined the positive political objectives to both questions remains yes. Yet the the desired “ends”—victory—and how sought—those that could be achieved two questions are intimately related, and American political and military leaders only by applying military force. Equally answering them reveals the enormous chose to apply that means to achieve important, though, were the negative impact that a political leader can have victory yielded the air strategy they fol- political goals—those achievable only by on the design and implementation of an lowed. Much of the problem in Vietnam, limiting military force. To achieve true air strategy, especially in a limited war. though, was that the definition of vic- victory in Vietnam, both the positive and Ultimately, Vietnam demonstrates both tory was not a constant. For President negative objectives had to be obtained—a the limits of airpower and the limits of Lyndon Johnson, victory meant creating truism for any conflict. That challenge 112 Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 was enormously difficult for American in the South and create a stable govern- than 6,000 Americans died from mines political and military leaders in Vietnam ment there. Although they knew that and booby traps.5 because the negative goals often appeared the indigenous Viet Cong contributed For President Johnson, the real to have an equal, if not greater, weight more manpower to the enemy’s cause problem was translating the application than the positive goals, especially during than did the North Vietnamese army of military force into a stable, noncom- the Johnson era of the war. (NVA), they also believed that the Viet munist South Vietnam, and doing so in Cong (VC) could not fight successfully a way that minimized American involve- Johnson’s Use of without North Vietnamese assistance. ment and the chances of a broader war Airpower in Vietnam Accordingly, they designed an air with China or the Soviet Union while President Johnson had a multitude of strategy that gradually increased pres- also maximizing American prestige on the negative objectives that prevented him sure on the North, allowing President world stage. While airpower had seemed from applying massive military force in Johnson to gauge reactions from the an ideal means to accomplish those ends, Vietnam. While he did not intend to Chinese, Soviets, American public, and in truth it could not do so. The original lose “that bitch of a war” in Southeast other global audiences while he slowly Rolling Thunder raids in March and April Asia, he also had no intention of surren- opened the bombing spigot. Rolling 1965 bolstered the morale of many South dering “the woman [he] really loved,” Thunder would creep steadily northward Vietnamese who desired a noncommunist the Great Society programs aimed at until it threatened the nascent industrial government, but the South’s government reducing poverty and achieving racial complexes in Hanoi and Haiphong, and was in shambles. After enduring seven equality.3 Achieving the Great Society North Vietnamese President Ho Chi different regime changes—including five became an important negative objective Minh, being a rational man who certainly coups—in 1964, South Vietnam’s politi- for Johnson, one that would prevent prized that meager industry, would real- cal leadership faced another crisis on the him from applying extensive military ize the peril to it and stop supporting eve of Rolling Thunder, delaying the start force. Doing so, he feared, would cause the Viet Cong. Denied assistance, the of the air campaign by 2 weeks before a the American public to turn away from insurgency would wither away, and the semblance of order returned to Saigon. the Nation’s disadvantaged to focus war would end with America’s high-tech The governments that followed—those instead on its military personnel in aerial weaponry providing a victory that of presidents Nguyen Cao Ky and harm’s way. Johnson further feared that was quick, cheap, and efficient. Nguyen Van Thieu—were corrupt and applying too much force against North Those assumptions provided the out of touch with the Southern popu- Vietnam would cause its two large foundation for President Johnson’s air lace.6 No amount of American airpower allies, China and the Soviet Union, to strategy against North Vietnam, and all could sustain such regimes. Indeed, less increase their assistance to the North, of them were seriously flawed. Battles than 6 weeks after the start of Rolling possibly even with overt intervention. such as Ia Drang and Khe Sanh, as well as Thunder, National Security Advisor As a U.S. Senator on the Armed Ser- the Tet Offensive, were anomalies during McGeorge Bundy advised President vices Committee, he had seen firsthand the Johnson presidency; for most of his Johnson that South Vietnam would fall what could happen when American time in office, the Viet Cong and their to the Viet Cong if Johnson did not shift leaders miscalculated regarding China North Vietnamese allies rarely fought the focus of America’s military involve- during the drive to the Yalu River in the at all. Together, they fought an average ment to ground power. The President Korean War, and he aimed to prevent of one day a month from 1965 to 1968, ultimately concurred, and in summer a similar mistake in Vietnam. Finally, and as a result, their external supply re- 1965 he embarked on a program that Johnson was concerned about America’s quirements were minimal. VC and NVA increased American troop totals from worldwide image, with the globe seem- forces in August 1967 numbered roughly 75,000 to more than 200,000 by the end ingly divided into camps of communism 300,000, of whom 250,000 were Viet of the year, with further escalations to fol- and capitalism. Exerting too much force Cong. Yet that combined force needed low.7 The shift in emphasis from airpower against North Vietnam would make only 34 tons of supplies a day from to ground power preserved the Saigon the United States appear as a Goliath sources outside of South Vietnam—an government, but did little to assure that it pounding a hapless David, and likely amount that just seven 2½-ton trucks governed competently. drive small nations searching for a bene- could carry and that was less than 1 per- Yet Johnson never completely aban- factor into the communist embrace. cent of the daily tonnage imported into doned his hope that airpower might Those negative objectives combined North Vietnam.4 No amount of bombing yield success. In the summer of 1966, he to produce an air strategy founded could stop that paltry supply total from ordered the bombing of oil storage facili- on gradual response, particularly for arriving in the South. Still, in fighting ties in Hanoi and Haiphong, convinced President Johnson’s bombing of North an infrequent guerrilla war, the VC and that trucks were vital to move North Vietnam.