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Naval War College Review Volume 56 Article 16 Number 3 Summer

2003 Secrets: A Memoir of and the Pentagon Papers Ken Hagan

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Recommended Citation Hagan, Ken (2003) "Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 3 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/16

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 168 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Hagan: Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers

specialized and foreign terms used in the abruptly dismissed the government’s book, at exactly the right level of detail. case, because in the last few weeks evi- In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain dence had materialized showing that is a unique and valuable contribution to agents of the Richard M. Nixon admin- the study of unconventional warfare. In istration had denied Ellsberg his right view of the ongoing U.S. operations in to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychi- Afghanistan, the editors would be per- atrist’s office in search of material with forming a civic service were they to which to blackmail him into not releas- produce a revised and reedited version ing more documents. This revelation for general publication. became part of the unfolding drama of the , the surreptitious WILLIAM C. GREEN forced nighttime entry into the Demo- Department of Political Science CSU San Bernardino cratic Party headquarters by the same agents of the administration. President Nixon attempted to buy the silence of one of the burglars, E. Howard Hunt, with a seventy-five-thousand-dollar bribe. Facing impeachment for at- Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking Pen- tempting to cover up the break-in, guin, 2002. 498pp. $29.95 Nixon wailed about Ellsberg: “The sonofabitching thief is made a national For Americans who were adults during hero....AndtheNew York Times gets a the , the name Daniel Pulitzer for stealing documents.” Ellsberg is portentous; it either suggests a whiff of or connotes heroic Secrets is a book that must be read by patriotism. Ellsberg is a Marine Corps anyone seeking to understand how the veteran, Harvard Ph.D., former senior United States formulates its strategy official in the Office of the Secretary of and policy. Ellsberg demolishes the Defense, a highly regarded analyst for “quagmire” thesis favored by such in- the RAND Corporation, and a civilian fluential liberal interpreters as Arthur M. observer of platoon-level combat in Schlesinger, Jr. By that interpretation, Vietnam who defiantly chose to “walk beginning with Harry S. Truman up to point” with the troops he was observ- the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, ing. In March 1971, Ellsberg released to each president made a deeper commit- a seven-thousand- ment of American military power and page, highly classified Department of clandestine activity, under the convic- Defense history of American involve- tion that his actions would achieve a ment in Vietnam. Covering the war South Vietnamese victory over the in- from the Truman administration vaders from the communist North. through the of early 1968, From Ellsberg’s perspective, there was this study became known as “The Pen- no quagmire, only endless presidential tagon Papers” when the New York deception of Congress and the public, Times began publishing it on 13 June. who were led to believe decade after de- Ellsberg’s action earned him federal fel- cade that surely the next step would re- ony indictments and a protracted crim- sult in the successful establishment of a inal trial. On 11 May 1973 the judge permanently independent South

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003 1 BOOK REVIEWS 169 Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 3, Art. 16

Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action Republican , who was officer for Vietnam, reporting person- advocating precisely the kind of sus- ally to John McNaughton, Secretary of tained air campaign that Johnson had Defense Robert S. McNamara’s princi- already planned and would begin once pal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg be- safely reelected president. came convinced that every president One can applaud or condemn Daniel knew that his commitments would Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What prove insufficient to accomplish the one cannot do is ignore the power his goal of preserving ’s in- memoir has to inform Americans about dependence. However, none of them how the executive branch conducted its could withdraw American support— foreign policy and military strategy because a communist victory in South from the 1940s until 1974. As the Vietnam would create an unbearable United States apparently heads (at this political liability in the climate writing) toward another major war, the of “wars of national liberation” backed skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at by the Soviets and . the top have really changed. Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s KEN HAGAN aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964. Professor of Strategy On that day his office was receiving Naval War College—Monterey, California live reports of North Vietnamese patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. de- stroyer Maddox, the presence of which off was one of several provocations staged by the Johnson Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Sta- administration to elicit a military reac- lin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and tion from Hanoi. The administration Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50 publicly claimed that two distinct sets of attacks were made, first on the The collapse of the and Maddox and a short time later on the the opening of major Russian archives Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner have provided an opportunity to add Joy. Drawing on his direct experience greatly to our understanding of the in the Office of the Secretary of De- character of the Soviet navy. Eminent fense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Mad- researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail dox’s skipper raised doubts about the S. Monakov have contributed much to second set of attacks within a few hours this understanding with their study of of announcing them. The Johnson ad- Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy ministration nonetheless went to Con- when Josef Stalin controlled the devel- gress describing both attacks as bona opment of the Soviet Navy, from 1935 fide, because together they appeared to until his death in 1953. They have un- justify a long-planned escalation of the covered extensive details of the massive air war. Once armed by Congress with shipbuilding program, most of which the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson never came to fruition. Strategy, how- made a few direct retaliatory air strikes ever, remains as murky as ever. This and then posed as the presidential peace study complements but does not re- candidate. He was running against place Monakov’s series of articles on

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