The Pentagon Papers A secret study of the War set off an incredible sequence of events.

By John T. Correll

n , Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commis- sioned a sweeping study of the that would later Ibecome known as “The Pentagon Papers.” Earlier, McNamara had been a lead- ing proponent of US involvement in Vietnam, but by 1967, he was disil- lusioned with the war and no longer believed in the policies he had been so instrumental in establishing. His motives for launching the Penta- gon Papers project are not clear. Years afterward, McNamara said his purpose had been to preserve a written record for researchers, but there are doubts about his explanation. When the Pentagon Papers were published by the newspapers in 1971,

50 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 former President Lyndon B. Johnson (University of California Press, 1996), and former Secretary of State Dean the idea for the study may have first Rusk—who were not informed about occurred to McNamara during a visit the project—speculated that the in- to the Kennedy Institute of Politics at tention had been to provide political Harvard in November 1966. ammunition for McNamara’s friend, McNaughton, who encouraged Mc- Robert F. Kennedy, who challenged Namara to sponsor the project, had Johnson for the Democratic presiden- been a professor of law at Harvard. tial nomination in 1968. McNaughton’s first action, after re- “I never thought to mention the ceiving his direction for the study project to the President or the sec- from McNamara, was to ask Harvard retary of state,” McNamara said in professor Richard E. Neustadt to lead his memoirs. “It was hardly a secret, it. When Neustadt was not available, however, nor could it have been with McNaughton turned to Halperin and 36 researchers and analysts ultimately Gelb, who had been faculty assistants involved.” In actuality, the study was to Henry A. Kissinger at Harvard. carried out with great secrecy, and (At one point, Kissinger himself was The Pentagon special measures were taken to avoid consulted on structure of the secret discovery by the White House. study. He does not mention this in The Vietnam Study Task Force was his memoirs.) One more Harvard con- created June 17, 1967 and tasked with nection was yet to come when Daniel creating an “encyclopedic history of Ellsberg, Ph.D., Harvard, 1963, briefly the Vietnam War.” Cleverly, McNa- joined the study in 1967 as one of the mara did not assign the job to the analysts. Papers regular historians in the Department Once McNamara set the project in of Defense. Instead, he gave it to his motion, he did not interfere with it. He trusted colleague, John T. McNaugh- figured it would take about six people ton, assistant secretary of defense for and would be finished in three months. international security affairs. General Ultimately, Gelb employed 36 analysts. supervision of the project was assigned Half of them were active duty military to McNaughton’s deputy, Morton H. officers. A fourth were federal civilian Halperin. Leslie H. Gelb, the director employees, and the final fourth were of policy planning and arms control professional scholars. When McNa- in ISA, was picked to direct the study mara left office in February 1968, the on a daily basis. study was still in progress. There was an extraordinary number of linkages between the Pentagon Pa- The Study pers project and Harvard University. Gelb’s team worked primarily from According to David Rudenstine, author documents in the Office of the Secre- of The Day the Presses Stopped: A tary of Defense files. There were no History of the Pentagon Papers Case interviews, no calls to the military Photo © Bettmann/Corbis

Daniel Ellsberg. After two weeks on the run, Ellsberg (l) on June 28, 1971 arrives at the federal courthouse in , where he was promptly ar- rested.

Anthony J. Russo Jr. Ellsberg accomplice and co-defendant enters the federal courthouse in Los Angeles.

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 51 Only 15 copies of the study were produced. Of these, two copies were deposited with RAND, a federal con- tract research center that did a consid- erable amount of defense work. One of the RAND copies was contributed by , who succeeded Mc- Naughton at International Security Affairs. The other was from Gelb and Halperin, who had been given a copy jointly. Access to the RAND copies required concurrence from two out of the three donors.

Ellsberg Copies the Papers had drifted in and out of defense policy circles for years. He was on first-name terms with McNaughton, Halperin, Gelb, and Kissinger. He graduated from Harvard in 1952 and finished his course work Robert S. McNamara. Before his disillusionment, the Pentagon chief and for a Ph.D. in economics in 1954, but architect of the war makes an upbeat tour of . his doctorate was not awarded until he completed his dissertation in 1963. He served as a Marine Corps infantry of- services for input, no consultation with author Rudenstine has noted, “Sensi- ficer for two years in the 1950s, then other federal agencies. According to tive” was not part of the official clas- went to work for RAND. Halperin, these restrictions—as well sification system. They added it as a In July 1964, McNaughton offered as the top secret classification—were signal that disclosure of the contents him a job as his special assistant. In that intended to keep national security could cause embarrassment. capacity, his most important duty was advisor Walt W. Rostow from learn- The study filled 47 volumes, a total of screening all of the information that ing about the project, telling Lyndon 7,000 pages. Of these, 3,000 pages were came in on Vietnam. Ellsberg figured Johnson, and getting it canceled. historical studies and the other 4,000 this would lead to his appointment “at The study drew mainly on McNama- pages were government documents. The the deputy assistant secretary level” in ra’s and McNaughton’s files. William official title was “US-Vietnam Relations, less than a year. That did not happen, P. Bundy, former assistant secretary 1945-1967: History of US Decision and in 1965, he moved over to the State of state for far eastern affairs, also Making Process on Vietnam Policy.” It Department and went to Vietnam as a provided some material. The OSD was dubbed “The Pentagon Papers” by foreign service officer. files included some documents from the news media in 1971. When Ellsberg returned to the Unit- the CIA and the services, but the study team had no access to White House files or to military department docu-

ments unless copies had been sent to AP photo McNamara or McNaughton. On Jan. 15, 1969, five days before the Nixon Administration took office, Gelb sent the completed study to Sec- retary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, who claims that he never read it. In his letter of transmittal to Clif- ford, Gelb said that the early chapters “concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally nonstartling—al- though there are many interesting tidbits.” The fireworks were embodied in the bulk of the study that followed, covering the overthrow of South Viet- namese President Diem, the Tonkin Gulf incident, the beginnings of the air war and the ground war, strategy and diplomacy, and candid assessments along the way. Gelb and Halperin classified the Lyndon B. Johnson. The Texan, seen here in 1964, soon became a war president. study “Top Secret—Sensitive.” As He later suspected McNamara of conniving with Robert F. Kennedy.

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 deliberately low-key prose and column after gray column of official cables, DOD photo memorandums, and position papers. The mass of material seemed to repel readers and even other newsmen. Near- ly a day went by before the networks and wire services took note.” President Nixon’s reaction that Sun- day morning was that the damage fell mostly on the Johnson Administration and that he should leave it alone. That afternoon, however, security advisor Kissinger convinced Nixon that he had to act on “this wholesale theft and unauthorized disclosure.” “The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts about our reliability in the minds of other governments, friend or foe, and indeed about the stability of our McNamara (l) and John T. McNaughton. McNamara bypassed regular DOD political system,” Kissinger said in historians in favor of giving the project to McNaughton, a trusted political ally. his memoirs. Once energized, Nixon soon became ed States in 1967, Halperin and Gelb fering them to Kissinger, Sen. J. William obsessed. Dissatisfied with the FBI’s recruited him to work on the Pentagon Fulbright, Sen. George McGovern, and progress in the case, he organized Papers for several months. He went others. He found no takers. his own group of investigators in the back to RAND in 1968. At this point, White House. They styled themselves he was choosing his friends and as- New York Times and Nixon “the plumbers” because their job was sociates primarily from the political In February 1971, Ellsberg told to stop leaks. left and his opposition to the Vietnam of War had hardened. about the papers and they began dis- What the Study Disclosed In 1969, he requested access to the cussing the possibility of publication. Most of what the Pentagon Papers RAND copies of the Pentagon papers. In March, Ellsberg made the papers revealed was already known in a general Gelb was reluctant to give approval, available to Sheehan. He held back four way, or at least suspected. A Washington but Halperin—who was then on Kiss- of the volumes, covering diplomatic Post editorial June 17 said, “The story inger’s staff at the National Security history from 1964 to 1968, to avoid that unfolds is not new in its essence—the Council—spoke up for Ellsberg and criticism that he had harmed the peace calculated misleading of the public, Gelb relented. negotiations. the purposeful manipulation of public Unknown to Halperin and Gelb, Sheehan made copies and took them to opinion, the stunning discrepancies Ellsberg had already leaked at least one his leaders. The Times decided to publish between public pronouncements and classified document to the New York the material, despite warnings from its private plans—we had bits and pieces of Times in 1968. Now, finding himself in lawyers that newspaper officials would all that before. But not in such incredibly possession of “7,000 pages of documen- be vulnerable to prosecution under the damning form, not with such irrefutable tary evidence of lying by four Presidents criminal espionage statutes. documentation.” and their Administrations over 23 years Publication of all 7,000 pages in The archive also provided complete to conceal plans and actions of mass the newspaper was not possible. The documents rather than excerpts, and murder,” Ellsberg decided to copy the editors decided to print 134 of the it exposed the differences between study and “get it out somehow.” documents along with staff-written official public statements and what Copying of the Pentagon Papers be- introductions and summaries instead of government officials were saying to gan the night of Oct. 1, 1969. Ellsberg the long and dull “narrative-analyses” each other internally. Among the in- enlisted Anthony J. Russo Jr., a like- from the actual study. The published stances noted were these. minded colleague who had recently material did not go beyond the informa- The Diem overthrow. The Ken- been let go by RAND, to assist him. tion in the study except where neces- nedy Administration professed shock They made their copies on a machine sary to establish enough context for and surprise when South Vietnamese at an advertising agency owned by a understanding by general readers. President was over- friend of Russo’s. Ellsberg carried the The first installment appeared in thrown and killed in November 1963. papers out of RAND at night in batches the Times on Sunday, June 13, with a However, in a top secret cablegram in his briefcase and returned them the front page headline that said, “Viet- Aug. 29, Ambassador Henry Cabot next morning. He made multiple sets nam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces Lodge said, “We are launched on a of the papers, which he would put to Three Decades of Growing US In- course from which there is no respect- effective use in due time. volvement.” able turning back: the overthrow of Ellsberg did not give the papers to The debut of the Pentagon Papers the Diem government.” On Oct. 30, the newspapers right away. Instead, he was underwhelming. Time Magazine McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to shopped them around Washington, of- described the layout as “six pages of the President, cabled Lodge that “once

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 53 permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life. ALSO—To emerge from the crisis without unac- ceptable taint from methods used. NOT—To ‘help a friend,’ although Photo © Bettmann/Corbis it would be hard to stay in if asked out.”

The Case Goes to Court The Justice Department had several options in how to proceed with the Pentagon Papers case. One of its most powerful tools was the , which authorized criminal prosecution of whoever “communi- cates, furnishes, [or] transmits” clas- sified information to unauthorized persons or who “publishes or uses” such information “in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States.” Leslie H. Gelb. DOD policy planning head had day-to-day control of the study. He later became a State Department official and New York Times correspondent. The government decided to move first against the newspapers. Instead of waiting until the articles had been a coup under responsible leadership to deny that the mission of ground published and then prosecuting on has begun, ... it is in the interest of the troops in Vietnam had changed. In July, criminal charges, the Justice Depart- US government that it should succeed.” Johnson approved the deployment of ment chose to seek “,” Bundy said there should be no direct 44 ground battalions to Vietnam. attempting to block any further publi- US intervention on either side “without Purpose of the war. In early 1964, cation before it happened. That legal authorization from Washington.” Johnson and McNamara said that approach was far more difficult than Escalation of the war. In the 1964 the central US aim was to secure an criminal prosecution. election campaign, the Democrats “independent, non-Communist South In a telegram to the New York Times depicted Republican challenger Barry Vietnam.” In a March 24, 1965 “Plan June 14, Attorney General John N. M. Goldwater as a dangerous ex- for Action for Vietnam,” McNaughton Mitchell said the material was pro- tremist, determined to expand the listed a different set of priorities: tected by the Espionage Act and that war into . In fact, the “US Aims: 70 percent—To avoid a “further publication of information Administration’s thoughts were not all humiliating US defeat (to our reputa- of this character will cause irrepa- that different from Goldwater’s. tion as a guarantor). 20 percent—To rable injury to the defense interests In September, a contingency plan keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory of the United States.” Then as later, by McNamara’s confidant, McNaugh- from Chinese hands. 10 percent—To the government could not seem to do ton, proposed actions that “should be likely at some point to provoke a military response [and] the provoked response should be likely to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished.” Care should be taken, Mc-

Naughton said, so these actions were AP/Wide World Photos not “distorted to the US public” before the upcoming elections. The ground war. In October 1964, Morton H. Halperin. Johnson said, “We are not about to send McNaughton’s deputy had American boys nine or ten thousand general supervisory author- miles away from home to do what ity over the project. In 1969, Asian boys ought to be doing for he moved from the Pentagon themselves.” to ’s Nation- al Security Council staff. The In March 1965, two Marine battal- FBI, acting without a court ions landed at Da Nang for the sole order, wiretapped numer- purpose of defending the air base there. ous conversations between Less than a month later, their mission Halperin and Ellsberg. was changed “to permit their more ac- tive use.” The White House directed that “premature publicity be avoided” to “minimize any appearance of sud- den changes in policy” and continued

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 The Papers and National Security Most accounts of the Pentagon Papers case focus on freedom of the press issues, and the effect on Henry A. Kissinger (l) and national security is usually treated as Richard M. Nixon. At first, Nixon ignored the leak, but secondary. Kissinger convinced him he The bottom line is that the Pentagon had to act on “this wholesale Papers were grossly overclassified theft and unauthorized disclo- and did not cause a national security sure.” Once energized, Nixon became obsessed, organizing problem of any significance, although his own group of unofficial they might have done so. The Viet- “plumbers” to plug national nam War was not yet over in 1971. security leaks. The Pentagon Papers gave the North Vietnamese rich insights into early US objectives, strategies, uncertainties, and degrees of commitment. However, the documents were several years old by the time of publication so the insights, to considerable extent, had been overcome by events. For the most part, the Pentagon Papers were about the machinations of politicians rather than about opera- tions of the armed forces, and their anything right. The telegram was mis- distribute, he surrendered and was publication appears to have had little takenly transmitted to a fish company indicted on June 30 by a in or no effect on the remaining course in Brooklyn. Los Angeles for violating the Espio- of the war. Also on June 14, McNamara had din- nage Act and for theft of government Solicitor General Erwin N. Gris- ner with his friend, the noted New York property. More charges, including con- wold, who presented the government Times columnist James B. Reston, and spiracy, were added in December. By case to the Supreme Court, had not told him he thought the Times should Ellsberg’s accounting, he faced the pos- been permitted to see all of the papers. continue publishing the papers. sibility of 115 years in prison. Russo In 1989, Griswold called it an instance After the first three installments, was named as a co-conspirator. of “massive overclassification” and the Federal District Court in New York The trial began in January 1973. said he saw no “trace of a threat to issued a temporary restraining order It came to a surprise ending after the national security” in what was against the Times. Ellsberg, who had prosecutors told the judge on April published. multiple copies of the papers, dropped 26 that they had learned that two Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of De- out of sight and made deliveries else- government employees, E. Howard fense at the time, said he had not read where. As soon as one newspaper was Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy—who the full report when he came to the enjoined, the next one picked up pub- had already been convicted of con- Pentagon. “I had already spent seven lication. began spiracy, burglary, and wiretapping in years on the defense subcommittee of publication June 18, followed by the the Watergate case—had broken into the House Appropriations Committee Boston Globe, the Chicago Sun-Times, the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist listening to McNamara justify the the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and 12 looking for evidence. escalation of the war,” he said. “How other papers. Hunt and Liddy were, of course, “the we got into Vietnam was no longer Lawyer Edward Bennett Williams plumbers,” who had been recruited my concern.” advised the Washington Post to go by the White House to stop leaks in Attorney General Mitchell said that ahead and publish. “What’s Nixon go- the Pentagon Papers case. They had Laird had told him publication of the ing to do?” he said. “Put every major burglarized the psychiatrist’s office in Pentagon Papers would damage na- editor and publisher in jail?” , prior to their break-in tional security. However, according to On June 30, the US Supreme Court at the Watergate in June 1972. Rudenstine, who interviewed Laird for reversed the injunctions against the Nor was that all. Without a court The Day the Presses Stopped, “Laird newspapers, ruling that the govern- order, the FBI had wiretapped tele- contended he was glad the papers were ment had not met the “heavy burden of phone conversations between Morton in the public domain, for he felt they showing justification for the enforce- Halperin and Ellsberg. The tapes and strengthened his policy recommenda- ment of such a restraint.” However, logs of the wiretaps had “disappeared” tions that the United States should pull five of the nine justices mentioned from the files of both the FBI and the its troops out of South Vietnam far explicitly that the government could Justice Department. more quickly than it was doing.” prosecute the newspapers under the On May 11, the judge declared a Few people have ever seen or read criminal statute. mistrial and dismissed the charges more than a fraction of the Pentagon against Ellsberg and Russo. The cover- Papers. Study director Gelb estimated Ellsberg and Russo up of the Watergate burglary by the that the New York Times published only The FBI chased Ellsberg for two plumbers eventually led to Nixon’s about five percent of the material from weeks. When he ran out of copies to resignation in 1974. the study. A Bantam paperback in July

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 55 and let readers assess it themselves. You are welcome to question that judgment, but you have presented no basis for challenging it.” Contrary to Keller’s claim, there is Photo © Bettmann/Corbis no law, court decision, or precedent from the Pentagon Papers case or any- where else that legalizes the leaking of national security information or allows newspapers to decide for themselves which secrets to publish. The Espionage Act is still in effect. Under that act, in January 2006, for- mer Department of Defense analyst Lawrence A. Franklin was sentenced to more than 12 years in prison for passing classified information to a pro-Israel lobbying group. Those who received the material from him are vulnerable to prosecution under the same act. E. Howard Hunt. Along with G. Gordon Liddy, Hunt on Sept. 3, 1971 burglarized a doctor’s office, seeking dirt on Ellsberg. Watergate came nine months later. “Whistle-blowing,” in which federal employees reveal the government’s dirty laundry to the news media and 1971 reprinted the Times reports and and unofficial publishing activity, the Congress, is often regarded positively sold 1.5 million copies. Pentagon Papers remain classified by the public. There are several “whis- A fuller text appeared in the so- today. tle-blower protection acts,” but they do called Gravel edition, published in not give leakers nearly as much latitude four volumes by in The Age of Whistle-Blowing as some enthusiasts believe. 1971. Ellsberg had given one of his With the passage of time, Ellsberg In the case of national security in- sets to Sen. (D-Alaska), has become something of a folk hero. formation, a whistle-blower can take who entered it into the Congressional A popular misconception has also the information to Congress or to an Record. The preface to the Gravel arisen—reinforced by the New York inspector general within the depart- edition says that it consists of “about Times and others—that after the Pen- ment. Passing such information to 2,900 pages of narrative, 1,000 pages tagon Papers experience, the press is the newspapers is a crime under the of appended documents, and a 200- free to publish classified information Espionage Act. page collection of public statements whenever it chooses. Ellsberg and Russo were not acquit- by government officials justifying US That belief was expressed again ted, nor was the law set aside. The case involvement in Vietnam. According by Bill Keller, executive editor of against them was thrown out of court to the information reported in the the New York Times, in a letter May because it had been compromised by press, the Defense Department study 2, 2006 to the Wall Street Journal, outrageous actions on the part of the included in total a narrative of about which had criticized the Times for government. 3,000 pages and documents amounting the recent publication of classified The Supreme Court decision on the to about 4,000 pages.” information. Pentagon Papers had nothing to do The Gravel edition had low circula- “Presidents are entitled to a respect- with freedom of the press. The Justice tion, as did a House Armed Services ful and attentive hearing, particularly Department went after the newspapers Committee version authorized by the when they make claims based on the seeking prior restraint and failed to Nixon Administration and issued by safety of the country,” Keller said. In make its case. As a majority of the the Government Printing Office in the current instance, “President Bush Supreme Court justices noted, the 1971. and other figures in his Administration avenue to criminal prosecution was The classification imbroglio came were given abundant opportunities to still wide open. full circle in 1974 when Morton Hal- explain why they felt our information In a technical sense, the government perin—who was responsible for ap- should not be published. We considered had a number of legal moves remain- plying the top secret-sensitive classi- the evidence presented to us, agonized ing, but the series of fumbles had made fication to begin with—sought public over it, delayed publication because of it politically impossible to push the release of additional parts of the papers it. In the end, their case did not stand up prosecution any further. under the Freedom of Information to the evidence our reporters amassed, The outcome of the case was the Act. He obtained most of the mate- and we judged that the responsible result of government bungling and rial, which was published in 1983 by course was to publish what we knew malfeasance and nothing else. ■ the University of Texas. The last of the documents was finally published in 2002 by the National Security John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now Archive. a contributing editor. His most recent article, “The Flying Tigers,” appeared in the Curiously, despite all of the official December 2006 issue.

56 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007