DOCSLIB.ORG

0207Pentagon.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
0207Pentagon.Pdf The Pentagon Papers A secret study of the Vietnam War set off an incredible sequence of events. By John T. Correll n June 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commis- sioned a sweeping study of the Vietnam War that would later Ibecome known as “The Pentagon Papers.” Earlier, McNamara had been a lead- ing proponent of US involvement in Vietnam, but by 1967, he was disil- lusioned with the war and no longer believed in the policies he had been so instrumental in establishing. His motives for launching the Penta- gon Papers project are not clear. Years afterward, McNamara said his purpose had been to preserve a written record for researchers, but there are doubts about his explanation. When the Pentagon Papers were published by the newspapers in 1971, 50 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 former President Lyndon B. Johnson (University of California Press, 1996), and former Secretary of State Dean the idea for the study may have first Rusk—who were not informed about occurred to McNamara during a visit the project—speculated that the in- to the Kennedy Institute of Politics at tention had been to provide political Harvard in November 1966. ammunition for McNamara’s friend, McNaughton, who encouraged Mc- Robert F. Kennedy, who challenged Namara to sponsor the project, had Johnson for the Democratic presiden- been a professor of law at Harvard. tial nomination in 1968. McNaughton’s first action, after re- “I never thought to mention the ceiving his direction for the study project to the President or the sec- from McNamara, was to ask Harvard retary of state,” McNamara said in professor Richard E. Neustadt to lead his memoirs. “It was hardly a secret, it. When Neustadt was not available, however, nor could it have been with McNaughton turned to Halperin and 36 researchers and analysts ultimately Gelb, who had been faculty assistants involved.” In actuality, the study was to Henry A. Kissinger at Harvard. carried out with great secrecy, and (At one point, Kissinger himself was The Pentagon special measures were taken to avoid consulted on structure of the secret discovery by the White House. study. He does not mention this in The Vietnam Study Task Force was his memoirs.) One more Harvard con- created June 17, 1967 and tasked with nection was yet to come when Daniel creating an “encyclopedic history of Ellsberg, Ph.D., Harvard, 1963, briefly the Vietnam War.” Cleverly, McNa- joined the study in 1967 as one of the mara did not assign the job to the analysts. Papers regular historians in the Department Once McNamara set the project in of Defense. Instead, he gave it to his motion, he did not interfere with it. He trusted colleague, John T. McNaugh- figured it would take about six people ton, assistant secretary of defense for and would be finished in three months. international security affairs. General Ultimately, Gelb employed 36 analysts. supervision of the project was assigned Half of them were active duty military to McNaughton’s deputy, Morton H. officers. A fourth were federal civilian Halperin. Leslie H. Gelb, the director employees, and the final fourth were of policy planning and arms control professional scholars. When McNa- in ISA, was picked to direct the study mara left office in February 1968, the on a daily basis. study was still in progress. There was an extraordinary number of linkages between the Pentagon Pa- The Study pers project and Harvard University. Gelb’s team worked primarily from According to David Rudenstine, author documents in the Office of the Secre- of The Day the Presses Stopped: A tary of Defense files. There were no History of the Pentagon Papers Case interviews, no calls to the military Photo © Bettmann/Corbis Daniel Ellsberg. After two weeks on the run, Ellsberg (l) on June 28, 1971 arrives at the federal courthouse in Boston, where he was promptly ar- rested. Anthony J. Russo Jr. Ellsberg accomplice and co-defendant enters the federal courthouse in Los Angeles. AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 51 Only 15 copies of the study were produced. Of these, two copies were deposited with RAND, a federal con- tract research center that did a consid- erable amount of defense work. One of the RAND copies was contributed by Paul Warnke, who succeeded Mc- Naughton at International Security Affairs. The other was from Gelb and Halperin, who had been given a copy jointly. Access to the RAND copies required concurrence from two out of the three donors. Ellsberg Copies the Papers Daniel Ellsberg had drifted in and out of defense policy circles for years. He was on first-name terms with McNaughton, Halperin, Gelb, and Kissinger. He graduated from Harvard in 1952 and finished his course work Robert S. McNamara. Before his disillusionment, the Pentagon chief and for a Ph.D. in economics in 1954, but architect of the war makes an upbeat tour of South Vietnam. his doctorate was not awarded until he completed his dissertation in 1963. He served as a Marine Corps infantry of- services for input, no consultation with author Rudenstine has noted, “Sensi- ficer for two years in the 1950s, then other federal agencies. According to tive” was not part of the official clas- went to work for RAND. Halperin, these restrictions—as well sification system. They added it as a In July 1964, McNaughton offered as the top secret classification—were signal that disclosure of the contents him a job as his special assistant. In that intended to keep national security could cause embarrassment. capacity, his most important duty was advisor Walt W. Rostow from learn- The study filled 47 volumes, a total of screening all of the information that ing about the project, telling Lyndon 7,000 pages. Of these, 3,000 pages were came in on Vietnam. Ellsberg figured Johnson, and getting it canceled. historical studies and the other 4,000 this would lead to his appointment “at The study drew mainly on McNama- pages were government documents. The the deputy assistant secretary level” in ra’s and McNaughton’s files. William official title was “US-Vietnam Relations, less than a year. That did not happen, P. Bundy, former assistant secretary 1945-1967: History of US Decision and in 1965, he moved over to the State of state for far eastern affairs, also Making Process on Vietnam Policy.” It Department and went to Vietnam as a provided some material. The OSD was dubbed “The Pentagon Papers” by foreign service officer. files included some documents from the news media in 1971. When Ellsberg returned to the Unit- the CIA and the services, but the study team had no access to White House files or to military department docu- ments unless copies had been sent to AP photo McNamara or McNaughton. On Jan. 15, 1969, five days before the Nixon Administration took office, Gelb sent the completed study to Sec- retary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, who claims that he never read it. In his letter of transmittal to Clif- ford, Gelb said that the early chapters “concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally nonstartling—al- though there are many interesting tidbits.” The fireworks were embodied in the bulk of the study that followed, covering the overthrow of South Viet- namese President Diem, the Tonkin Gulf incident, the beginnings of the air war and the ground war, strategy and diplomacy, and candid assessments along the way. Gelb and Halperin classified the Lyndon B. Johnson. The Texan, seen here in 1964, soon became a war president. study “Top Secret—Sensitive.” As He later suspected McNamara of conniving with Robert F. Kennedy. 52 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2007 deliberately low-key prose and column after gray column of official cables, DOD photo memorandums, and position papers. The mass of material seemed to repel readers and even other newsmen. Near- ly a day went by before the networks and wire services took note.” President Nixon’s reaction that Sun- day morning was that the damage fell mostly on the Johnson Administration and that he should leave it alone. That afternoon, however, security advisor Kissinger convinced Nixon that he had to act on “this wholesale theft and unauthorized disclosure.” “The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts about our reliability in the minds of other governments, friend or foe, and indeed about the stability of our McNamara (l) and John T. McNaughton. McNamara bypassed regular DOD political system,” Kissinger said in historians in favor of giving the project to McNaughton, a trusted political ally. his memoirs. Once energized, Nixon soon became ed States in 1967, Halperin and Gelb fering them to Kissinger, Sen. J. William obsessed. Dissatisfied with the FBI’s recruited him to work on the Pentagon Fulbright, Sen. George McGovern, and progress in the case, he organized Papers for several months. He went others. He found no takers. his own group of investigators in the back to RAND in 1968. At this point, White House. They styled themselves he was choosing his friends and as- New York Times and Nixon “the plumbers” because their job was sociates primarily from the political In February 1971, Ellsberg told to stop leaks. left and his opposition to the Vietnam Neil Sheehan of the New York Times War had hardened. about the papers and they began dis- What the Study Disclosed In 1969, he requested access to the cussing the possibility of publication. Most of what the Pentagon Papers RAND copies of the Pentagon papers. In March, Ellsberg made the papers revealed was already known in a general Gelb was reluctant to give approval, available to Sheehan.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Pentagon Papers: Secrets of the Vietnam War Adriana Kelly Junior
    The Pentagon Papers: Secrets of The Vietnam War Adriana Kelly Junior Division Paper 1,890 Words 1 The Pentagon Papers are a series of classified government documents leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971. These papers revealed the lies that both the public and Congress were told about the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, and were essential to the withdrawal from the war. Daniel Ellsberg inspired many other whistleblowers to come forward and break the barriers between the public and the government. The involvement of the United States in Vietnam reaches all the way back to 1946. Vietnam was previously a French colony, but during WWII Japan overthrew the French and gave Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia freedom. When WWII ended in 1945, Japan was removed from the area and Vietnam needed new leadership. Ho Chi Minh, a Vietnamese nationalist with Marxist ideas 1, led a group called the Viet Minh to fight for Vietnamese independence against the French, who were trying to reclaim Vietnam. The United States had to pick a side in this war, which is usually referred to as the First Indochina War. On one hand, the United States wanted to support independence and free Vietnam from French rule. But on the other hand, if Vietnam was independent it would be communist which could trigger something called the domino theory. The domino theory states that if one political event in a country, surrounding countries will follow with similar events. Politicians in America were afraid if Vietnam became communist, surrounding countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand would follow.
    [Show full text]
  • Vietnam Case Study
    Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Vietnam Case Study Jeffrey H. Michaels Stabilisation Unit February 2018 This report has been produced by an independent expert. The views contained within do not necessarily reflect UK government policy. Author details The author is a Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, Kings College London. This case study draws on a combination of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are mainly limited to US Government documents, particularly those dealing with the internal deliberations of the Nixon administration as well as the minutes of meetings at the 1972-1973 Paris peace talks. The secondary sources used include a much wider range, such as general histories of the conflict, as well as more specific diplomatic histories that draw on primary source material from each of the key participants in the conflict (US, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Provisional Revolutionary Government, USSR and China). Background to Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project This case study is one of a series commissioned to support the Stabilisation Unit’s (SU’s) development of an evidence base relating to elite bargains and political deals. The project explores how national and international interventions have and have not been effective in fostering and sustaining political deals and elite bargains; and whether or not these political deals and elite bargains have helped reduce violence, increased local, regional and national stability and contributed to the strengthening of the relevant political settlement. Drawing on the case studies, the SU has developed a series of summary papers that bring together the project’s key findings and will underpin the revision of the existing ‘UK Approach to Stabilisation’ (2014) paper.
    [Show full text]
  • Section Summary 16 the WAR’S END and IMPACT SECTION 4
    Name Class Date CHAPTER Section Summary 16 THE WAR’S END AND IMPACT SECTION 4 When Nixon became President, he believed that a peace deal could READING CHECK be negotiated with North Vietnam. When these negotiations stalled, however, Nixon gradually began to pull American troops out of How many American troops Vietnam. He believed that the South Vietnamese Army should fight were killed in Vietnam? on its own and called this approach Vietnamization. He hoped that American supplies to the South Vietnamese Army would be suffi- cient for the army to secure and hold South Vietnam. In 1970, however, Nixon ordered a ground attack on communists in Cambodia, which angered antiwar activists at home who claimed that Nixon was widening the war, not ending it. Protests erupted on many college campuses. At Kent State University, members of the National Guard fired into a group of protesters, killing four. This led to demonstrations on other campuses, including Jackson State in Mississippi, where two students were killed. Other events also outraged the public. American troops killed VOCABULARY STRATEGY over four hundred unarmed Vietnamese in the village of My Lai. What does the word induced The Pentagon Papers showed that the government had been dishon- mean in the underlined sen- est with the public and with Congress about the Vietnam War. tence? Circle the words in the American bombing finally induced the North Vietnamese to underlined sentence that could resume negotiations. In January 1973, the United States, South help you learn what induced Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong signed the Paris Peace means.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pentagon Papers Case
    The Legacy of John Adams The Pentagon Papers Case In 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara commissioned a study of the his- tory of US decision-making of policies involving Indochina, specifically Vietnam. The resulting documents became known as the Pentagon Papers. In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg, a government researcher, gave copies of the documents to the press. On June 13, 1971, the New York Times began publishing arti- cles about the documents and the Washington Post published infor- mation later that same week. On June 15 the government went to a New York federal district court seeking an injunction prohibiting the Times from publishing arti- cles about the Pentagon Papers. A scanned image of The New York Times front page of May, 1973. The government pursued similar action against the Post in the District of Columbia. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the New York dis- trict court who had refused to grant an injunction, granted an injunction as to the Times, who immediately appealed. The District of Columbia court refused to grant an injunction as to the Post and the government appealed. The two cases were consolidated for hearing and the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on June 26, 1971. The government argued that prior restraint (prohibiting information from being published) was necessary to protect national security; howev- er, on June 30, a divided Court refused to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers because the government failed to meet the burden to justify prior restraint. New York Times Co. v United States became an important precedent in support of the First Amendment’s freedom of the press.
    [Show full text]
  • A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers Ken Hagan
    Naval War College Review Volume 56 Article 16 Number 3 Summer 2003 Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers Ken Hagan Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Hagan, Ken (2003) "Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 3 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss3/16 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 168 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Hagan: Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers specialized and foreign terms used in the abruptly dismissed the government’s book, at exactly the right level of detail. case, because in the last few weeks evi- In sum, The Other Side of the Mountain dence had materialized showing that is a unique and valuable contribution to agents of the Richard M. Nixon admin- the study of unconventional warfare. In istration had denied Ellsberg his right view of the ongoing U.S. operations in to a fair trial by burglarizing his psychi- Afghanistan, the editors would be per- atrist’s office in search of material with forming a civic service were they to which to blackmail him into not releas- produce a revised and reedited version ing more documents.
    [Show full text]
  • Beacon Press and the Pentagon Papers
    BEACON PRESS AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS Beacon Press 25 Beacon Street Boston, Massachusetts 02108-2892 www.beacon.org Beacon Press books are published under the auspices of the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Allison Trzop, the author of this history, and to the Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock for their generous support of this project. © 2007 by Allison Trzop Originally submitted as a master’s degree project for Emerson College in May 2006 All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 10 09 08 07 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the uncoated paper ANSI/NISO specifications for permanence as revised in 1992. Composition by Wilsted & Taylor Publishing Services It’s tragic when a nation, dedicated and committed to the principle of freedom, reaches such a point that the greatest fear we have is from the government itself. edwin lane 1971 june 13 The New York Times publishes its first article on the Pentagon Papers under the headline “Vietnam Archive.” june 29–30 Senator Mike Gravel reads from the papers to his Senate subcommittee and enters the rest into its records. The papers are made public. august 17 Beacon Press publicly announces its intention to publish the papers. october 10 The government version of the Pentagon Papers is published. october 22 The Beacon Press edition of the Pentagon Papers is published simultaneously in cloth and paper in four volumes. october 27 FBI agents appear at the New England Merchants National Bank asking to see UUA records.
    [Show full text]
  • Vietnam's Changing Historiography: Ngo Dinh Diem and America's
    Vietnam’s Changing Historiography: Ngo Dinh Diem and America’s Leadership Derek Shidler Derek Shidler, who earned a B.A. in History from Southern Illinois University, is now a graduate student at Eastern Illinois University and a member of Phi Alpha Theta, where he is researching the Vietnam War. This paper was written for Dr. Shelton’s History 5000, Historiography, in the fall of 2008. The Vietnam War has certainly produced burgeoning scholars and literature. In the decade or so after the Vietnam War ended, most scholars wrote critically of the United States’ intervention in Indochina. Heated debates began to take place within books, article, and conferences. Given the lavish attention, three scholarly views have arisen and become increasingly heated. Orthodox scholars follow the traditional doctrine that America’s involvement in the war was unwinnable and unjust, while the revisionists believe that the war was a noble cause and Vietnam, below the 17th parallel, was a viable and stable country, but policies and military tactics were improperly executed. The heated debates have focused on two central issues—Ngo Dinh Diem and his reign over South Vietnam and poor leadership by American presidents and top officials. Orthodox scholars argue that Diem as a corrupt tyrannical puppet, while revisionists believe Diem was an independent leader who knew what was necessary to allow his young country to survive. According to the orthodox scholars, American presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson and other top officials did their best to control the situation in Vietnam, though the war was doomed from the beginning.
    [Show full text]
  • A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg R
    WHAT IF DANIEL ELLSBERG HADN’T BOTHERED? HEIDI KITROSSER* INTRODUCTION In his book, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg recounts the aftermath of a 1969 New York Times story regarding Ellsberg and five of his colleagues at the RAND Corporation.1 The six had sent a letter to the Times calling for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The result was a story headlined “six RAND experts support pullout: back unilateral step within one year in Vietnam.”2 The response within RAND to the letter’s signatories was almost entirely negative. In a series of inter-office memos, RAND employees lamented that the letter could jeopardize RAND’s longstanding “contractual and confidential relationship with the Defense Department.”3 One wrote to the signatories: “while you may feel strongly enough to lay your own jobs on the line, you do not have the right to lay mine there as well.”4 Another wrote that the signatories had “unleash[ed] a torpedo so unerringly as to strike at least glancing blows on your largest and most faithful clients, your employer, and your fellow researchers simultaneously.”5 While Ellsberg resigned from RAND before going on to leak the Pentagon Papers (“Pentagon Papers” or “Papers”), the other signatories had intended to stay on. However, due to blowback from the letter, one signatory was told to find another position while the others reportedly hung “‘on to [their] jobs by [their] fingernails.’”6 Of course, the professional and personal risks that the signatories took paled in comparison to those that Ellsberg went on to take in secretly photocopying and leaking—first to members of Congress and then to the New York Times and other members of the press—the Pentagon Papers, a classified history of the Vietnam War that the Defense Department had commissioned.
    [Show full text]
  • 13. Vietnamization and the Drama of the Pentagon Papers
    211 niques of the National and G. Lansdale, In the :airy Report, where the emy resistance" (Gravel vilty of such reasoning, 13. Vietnamization and the Drama that there is a need for !ei ed.. II:415). In late of the Pentagon Papers :as "civic action" teams ;ands of pieces of bard by an American menu- by Peter Dale Scott images, as wLcti they ;hi to get "back on his The Nixon strategy which underlies both Vietnamization and the Peking visit lent" slap in the face to envisages a return from overt to covert operations in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Gravel ed., 11:114. Army is being withdrawn from Vietnam, while Congressional exposures reveal me to question the right the Mafia influence behind the corruption there of its senior personnel.' But the ddy way we were doing Army's place is being filled by a billion-dollar "pacification" program, including Islam there at all. an expansion of the CIA's controversial assassination project, Operation Phoenix? in evaluations of their Generally speaking, the responsibility for ground operations in Indochina (as nl supervisory personnel opposed to the ongoing air war) is being taker. from the regular military, and new officers underwent given back to the various U.S. intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA. The ever•expanding U.S. in- friendly," "cooperative," political success or "momentum" of the antiwar movement, at this point, is thus ire. However, if he was being exploited to strenethen the very intelligence activities which did so much to in for trouble. bring about the war in the first place.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rules of Defeat: the Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement
    THE RULES OF DEFEAT: THE IMPACT OF AERIAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON USAF OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1968 Major Ricky James Drake Phenix City, Alabama A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The School of Advanced Airpower Studies For Completion of Graduation Requirements School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama May 1992 Disclaimer The views in this paper are entirely those of the author expressed under Air University principles of academic freedom and do not reflect official views of the school of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, the U.s. Air Force, or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32 ABSTRACT During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs were directives issued by civilian authority to guide the conduct of all US aerial operations in Southeast Asia. To the men "in the field" these rules provided detailed guidance to be followed by all commanders, air planners, control personnel, and combat crew members in the actual planning and flying of combat missions. ROEs allowed President Lyndon Johnson to apply measured amounts of air power both to avoid escalation of the war into World War III and to preserve domestic social programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom of the Press and Ethics
    VOLUME 17 ISSUE 4 An Integrated Curriculum For The Washington Post Newspaper In Education Program Freedom of the Press and Ethics ■ Post Reprint: “Documents Reveal U.S. Effort in ’54 to Delay Viet Election” ■ Word Find: Pentagon Papers and the Press ■ Activity: The First Amendment and The New York Times Company v. United States ■ Activity Resource: The Who and What of the Timeline ■ Timeline: France and the U.S. in Vietnam ■ Guest Commentary: “I had a front-row seat to the Pentagon Papers intrigue. Here’s what happened.” ■ Post Reprint: The Photographs That Brought the War Home ■ Word Find Answers: Pentagon Papers and the Press Jan. 14, 2018 ©2018 THE WASHINGTON POST VOLUME 17 ISSUE 4 An Integrated Curriculum For The Washington Post Newspaper In Education Program The content in this resource folder focuses on American engagement in Vietnam and the freedom of the press to publish from the report that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had commissioned in 1967 to provide documentation for historians. When Daniel Ellsberg leaked the report in 1971 to The New York Times, it became known as the Pentagon Papers. A FREE PRESS? “France and the U.S. in Vietnam” provides a timeline from 1945 to 1973 when the Paris Peace Accords were signed and American troops were withdrawn. You and your students may find the “Who and What of the Timeline” helpful before reading the full timeline. Text that appears within quotation marks in the timeline are from the Pentagon Papers that may be read in its entirety on the Library of Congress website.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Surprise: the Dispersal of Agent Orange
    STRATEGIC SURPRISE: THE DISPERSAL OF AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM AND KOREA IN THE LATE-1960s by Heather M. Haley, B.A. A thesis submitted to the Graduate Council of Texas State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a Major in History August 2016 Committee Members: Ellen Tillman, Chair Ron Milam James McWilliams Dan Utley COPYRIGHT by Heather M. Haley 2016 FAIR USE AND AUTHOR’S PERMISSION STATEMENT Fair Use This work is protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States (Public Law 94-553, section 107). Consistent with fair use as defined in the Copyright Laws, brief quotations from this material are allowed with proper acknowledgment. Use of this material for financial gain without the author’s express written permission is not allowed. Duplication Permission As the copyright holder of this work I, Heather M. Haley, authorize duplication of this work, in whole or in part, for educational or scholarly purposes only. DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this research in loving memory to my mentor, colleague, and friend, Dr. James W. Pohl (1931–2015) 7, I: 13 Dear Heather, Thank you for your beautiful Christmas card and note. Of course, graduate school is tough. It’s supposed to be. It’s presumed that you want to be a historian, that you want to join the clan, the fellowship, the company of historians. If you want to be a historian, your professors want you to be tough, brave, and true—that you can do the job. I know that you have the ability not only to meet the challenges but also the courage and intelligence to conquer the challengers.
    [Show full text]