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Shelton Ku 0099D 16663 DAT Inventamus Si Progressimus: “We Made It Up as We Went Along” The Evolution of the American Advisory Effort in South Vietnam By Mark S. Shelton B.A. Morehead State University, 1983 M.A. Morehead State University 1987 Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ______________________________ Chair: Dr. Eve Levin __________________________ Dr. Robert F. Baumann ________________________ Dr. Jacob W. Kipp __________________________ Dr. Jeffrey P. Moran __________________________ Dr. Ron Barrett-Gonzalez __________________________ Dr, Sheyda F. A. Jahanbani June 3, 2019 Date Defended: _________________ The Dissertation Committee for Mark Shelton certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Inventamus Si Progressimus: “We Made It Up as We Went Along” The Evolution of the American Advisory Effort in South Vietnam ______________________________ Committee Chair: Dr. Eve Levin June 3, 2019 Date Approved: ________________ ii Abstract This dissertation examines the efforts of the South Vietnamese government along with their American military and civilian advisors to devise and implement programs to combat the Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam prior to the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. This dissertation will focus on both the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs examining their organization, construction, and goals and the Viet Cong response to counter their implementation. It examines how the South Vietnamese with assistance from the United States military and Central Intelligence Agency under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy conducted armed nation-building from 1955‒63 on an unprecedented scale. This dissertation argues that the Viet Cong Infrastructure was so pervasive, and their control of the peasants using terror so systematic, that the price in time, treasure, and especially blood was more than either the South Vietnamese or their American allies were willing to pay to overcome. iii Table of Contents Title Page ......................................................................................................................................... i Acceptance Page ............................................................................................................................. ii Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xii Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ xiii Epigraph ...................................................................................................................................... xix Preface.......................................................................................................................................... xxi Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2. A Thousand Years of Resistance .............................................................................. 21 French Indochina .................................................................................................................... 22 Ho Chi Minh ........................................................................................................................... 26 Chapter 3. The US Army’s Effort to Counter the Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam ....................................................................................................... 37 “How Can We Lose When We’re So Sincere? ....................................................................... 37 The Domino Theory ................................................................................................................ 37 Pacification ............................................................................................................................. 40 Counterinsurgency .................................................................................................................. 44 Chapter 4. The Beginning of the Viet Cong Insurgency ............................................................. 47 Political Infrastructure ............................................................................................................ 47 Infiltration from the North ...................................................................................................... 53 v Viet Cong Terror Tactics ........................................................................................................ 58 Setting the Stage for Revolution in the South ......................................................................... 61 War According to Mao’s Teachings ....................................................................................... 62 The Rise of Ngo Dinh Diem and a Vacuum in the South ....................................................... 64 “It Would be Like Putting a Baby in a Cage of Hungry Lions” ............................................. 67 American Perceptions and the Coming of National Security Council 68 .............................. 68 Chapter 5. Communist Administrative Structure in South Vietnam ............................................ 71 Design and Concept ............................................................................................................... 71 National Liberation Front ...................................................................................................... 74 Political Power Programs ....................................................................................................... 77 Political Parties ...................................................................................................................... 81 Village-Level Politics ............................................................................................................ 83 Limitations on National Liberation Front Success ................................................................ 91 The People’s Revolutionary Party ......................................................................................... 92 Central Office for South Vietnam .......................................................................................... 96 Current Affairs Committee .................................................................................................... 98 Extensions (Organizational) ................................................................................................. 100 The Provisional Revolutionary Government ....................................................................... 101 International Role ................................................................................................................. 104 Communist Intelligence and Security Systems .................................................................... 105 The Central Research Agency ............................................................................................. 105 The People’s Security Service ............................................................................................. 108 Summary .............................................................................................................................. 114 vi Chapter 6: The Failure of South Vietnamese Pacification Programs, 1954‒60 ......................... 117 Ngo Dinh Diem’s Presidency ............................................................................................... 117 Early Pacification Efforts of the Regime .............................................................................. 123 The Agroville Program ......................................................................................................... 132 Organization of the Agroville Program ................................................................................ 137 The Agroville Program Envisioned ...................................................................................... 139 Limitations of the Agroville Program ................................................................................... 140 Final Analysis of the Agroville Program .............................................................................. 145 Viet Minh Remnants in South Vietnam ................................................................................ 149 Security Efforts to Counter Viet Cong Terrorist Activities .................................................. 150 A Question of Priorities ........................................................................................................ 154 Military Assistance Advisory Group .................................................................................... 156 Chapter 7: Diem’s Final Gamble: The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961‒63 ............................
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