Strategic Surprise: the Dispersal of Agent Orange
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STRATEGIC SURPRISE: THE DISPERSAL OF AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM AND KOREA IN THE LATE-1960s by Heather M. Haley, B.A. A thesis submitted to the Graduate Council of Texas State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a Major in History August 2016 Committee Members: Ellen Tillman, Chair Ron Milam James McWilliams Dan Utley COPYRIGHT by Heather M. Haley 2016 FAIR USE AND AUTHOR’S PERMISSION STATEMENT Fair Use This work is protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States (Public Law 94-553, section 107). Consistent with fair use as defined in the Copyright Laws, brief quotations from this material are allowed with proper acknowledgment. Use of this material for financial gain without the author’s express written permission is not allowed. Duplication Permission As the copyright holder of this work I, Heather M. Haley, authorize duplication of this work, in whole or in part, for educational or scholarly purposes only. DEDICATION I would like to dedicate this research in loving memory to my mentor, colleague, and friend, Dr. James W. Pohl (1931–2015) 7, I: 13 Dear Heather, Thank you for your beautiful Christmas card and note. Of course, graduate school is tough. It’s supposed to be. It’s presumed that you want to be a historian, that you want to join the clan, the fellowship, the company of historians. If you want to be a historian, your professors want you to be tough, brave, and true—that you can do the job. I know that you have the ability not only to meet the challenges but also the courage and intelligence to conquer the challengers. I know that because I remember your intelligence and determination as an undergraduate. I have not the slightest doubt that you can match the other good graduate students, and not only match them but exceed them. So, suck in your stomach, set your jaw, and always remember your strengths. I have no concerns about your intelligence or your grit. Sincerely, [signed] James W. Pohl ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In May 2016, I participated in Texas State University’s commencement ceremony where I received my Master's Degree in History, with a concentration in Public History. It took four long years to complete the work associated with this degree and I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who helped me with my thesis: STRATEGIC SURPRISE: THE DISPERSAL OF AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM AND KOREA IN THE LATE-1960s I would like to begin by acknowledging my adviser, Dr. Ellen Tillman, for agreeing to serve as my committee chair. Thank you for guiding me over the years. You have set the example of excellence as a researcher, mentor, instructor, and role model. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. James McWilliams, Mr. Dan Utley, and Dr. Ron Milam (Associate Professor of History, Texas Tech University) for agreeing to serve on my committee. I truly appreciate your assistance as I navigated this process. Special recognition must be given to the veterans with whom I spent a great deal of time. These men include Edward A. Erdmann III, Rocky Burke, Larry Ritter, Charles Groff, and Charles Sims. It was my privilege to work with you and document your stories. I would especially like to thank my family for their love, support, and constant encouragement. In particular, I would like to thank my husband Christopher, my parents, my sister, and my extended family. A very special debt of gratitude is due to my friend and colleague Matthew Eng at the Naval Historical Foundation for his unwavering encouragement dating back to the “Violent Skies: The Air War Over Vietnam” conference in October 2015 and our continued e-mail and Facebook Messenger conversations about this project. I also wish to thank Jonathan Mummert and William Clark for their time in reviewing some of the earliest drafts of the Vietnam chapter and providing valuable feedback. I extend gratitude to my many colleagues and collaborators in the History Department at Texas State University who provided feedback and support as I worked on my thesis. The list of individuals includes: Dr. James Pohl, Dr. Elizabeth Makowski, Dr. Kenneth Margerison, Dr. Mary Brennan, Dr. Lynn Denton, Dr. Jessica Pliley, Dr. Margaret Menninger, Dr. Bryan Mann, Dr. Bryan Glass, Dr. Jason Mellard, Bryttne Lowden, Lisa Merritt, Chad McFadon, Kimberlee Ortiz, Kendra DeHart, Samantha Spears, Malak Carrillo, Jamie Ross, James Davis, Brian Brown, Kimberlee Ortiz, Ashley An, Courtney McClure, Bowman Henderson, Signe Fourmy, Candice Shockley, Ethan Raath, Rebecca Spann, Nathan Jones, Russell Hill, Todd Richardson, Christopher Simons, Rachael v Lunsford, Jennifer Ruch, Rachel Brown, Kimberley Diedrich, Katie Hedger, Kathleen DesOrmeaux, John Aylesworth, Droo Gudman, Joseph Grogan, and Ashley Johnson. A special debt of gratitude belongs to Dr. Ronald Johnson for his infinite patience and his most heartfelt prayers and guidance over the course of my studies as a graduate student. It is with great joy that I recognize you in this completed manuscript. I would also like to thank my extended Fort Ticonderoga family for their enthusiasm, encouragement, and for taking a chance on a Vietnam-era historian: Beth Hill, Rich Strum, Judy Contompasis, Matthew Keagle, Miranda Keagle, (my little brother) Richard Tomczak, Georgia LaMair, Alex Franzoni, Shaun Pekar, Gibb Zea, Lauren MacLeod, Eliza West, Nicholas Spadone, Margaret Staudter, Jana Violante, Cathrine Davis, Joseph Gagné, Sam Levitt, Jack Marshall, Damian Niescior, Zech Yaw, Mary Challman, Bonnie Sheeley, Todd Braisted, Adelaide Smallidge, Nathalie Smallidge, Gordon Hamilton, Ron Vido, and Stuart Lilie. I would also like to extend my thanks to High Brew Coffee in Austin, TX. You are ridiculously amazing. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii LIST OF MAPS ................................................................................................................. ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................x CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1 II. RANCH HANDS AND ORANGE CLOUDS: HERBICIDAL WARFARE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE IN THE VIETNAM WAR .........................................................................21 III. DEFOLIATING FENCE AND FOXHOLE: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESPONSE TO AN IRREGULAR THREAT ALONG THE KOREAN DMZ ................................................47 IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................73 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................78 vii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Estimated Acres Treated with Herbicides in South Vietnam ........................................34 2. Number of Non-Pregnant Mice After Repeated Daily Doses of 2,4,5-T (1971) ...........43 3. Hospitals and Quarters Admissions and Incidence of Selected Conditions, Fiscal Year 1970 (Rates per 1,000 average strength per year) ..............................44 4. Balance of Conventional Military Power in Korea (Nov. 1966) ...................................55 5. Priority, Scope, and Defoliant Requirements in Korea..................................................63 viii LIST OF MAPS Images Page 1. Tactical Zones, Republic of Vietnam, 1965 .................................................................25 2. Korean Demilitarized Zone, Eighth U.S. Army Front Line, 27 July 1953 ..................48 ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Description 2,4.D 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid 2,4,5-T 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid ACTOV Accelerated Turnover to Vietnam ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam CCZ Civilian Control Zone CDTC United States-Vietnamese Development and Test Center CINCUNC Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command CIP Counter-Insurgency Plan COMNAVFORV Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam DMZ Demilitarized Zone DOA Department of the Army DOD Department of Defense DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea GVN Government of the Republic of South Vietnam JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JSA Joint Security Area KATUSA Korean Augmentation to the United States Army x KPA Korean People's Army KSC Korean Service Corps LST Landing ship, tank MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam NLF National Liberation Front NVA North Vietnamese Army PBR River patrol boats PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder RAG River assault groups ROK Republic of Korea SEALORDS South-East Asia Lake, Ocean and Delta Strategy TCDD 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin UNC United Nations Command USA United States Army USAF United States Air Force USFK United States Forces, Korea VA United States Department of Veteran's Affairs VC Vietcong VNN Vietnamese Navy xi I. INTRODUCTION The dispersal of chemical warfare agents in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s remains a contentious topic among scientists, scholars, and veterans as each question the morality of U.S.-initiated herbicide operations in the region.1 In fact, twenty- two American scientists, including seven Nobel laureates, called on President Lyndon Johnson in September 1966 to suspend the use of antipersonnel and anti-crop chemical weapons, fearing the international proliferation of chemical warfare agents: The United States, along with