The German Offensives, 1918. an Analysis of Operations and Leadership (Part II) Anton Paier

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4. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICTS The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis of Operations and Leadership (part II) Anton Paier

ABSTRACT DOI: 10.26410/SF_2/19/10 The second part of this article analyzes more in detail the conduct of the five German offensives on the Western Front in 1918. The first offensive (codenamed “Michael”) initially achieved astounding success mainly due to the application of infiltration tactics. However the broken terrain and the lack of an operation goal after the initial breakthrough resulted in its failure. The second offensive (“Georgette”) had limited aims, and after an initial advance was stopped by the British, who were becoming accustomed to the new German tactics. The third offensive (“Blücher”), against the French sector, was originally intended as a diversion to attract enemy reserves. However the unexpected initial tactical success induced Gen. Ludendorff to continue the offensive, funneling reinforcements into it – again without a clear operational goal. The result was the occupation of a deep and vulnerable salient with no strategic purpose. The last two offensives were even less successful and evidenced lack of coordination and the progress of the Allies in devising countermeasures to the infiltration tactics. The conclusions are that, while the German Army excelled in the tactical field, its leaders failed to develop clear strategic plans and downplayed the importance of operational art. These flaws are a major cause of the offensives’ failure, and the lessons drawn from the analysis of the German military leadership in 1918 may still have significance for early 21st century warfare. Anton Paier, PhD KEYWORDS Independent researcher Infiltration tactics; supply; “Schwerpunkt”. [email protected]

Analysis of the offensives however, as already mentioned in the first part of the article, operational and strate- - Infiltration tactics and “Mi- gic goals were subordinated to tactics, with chael” offensive the result of achieving only temporary ter- Tactical flexibility was one of the strong ritorial gains. The adaptation of operations point of the German doctrine. Too often to tactical necessities should not come to 148 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

the point where the overall plan and the twenty-five divisions. In any case, Liddell ultimate objectives are forgotten. On the Hart does not mention the fundamental other side, minor changes must be made uncertainty of the objectives of “Michael”, and opportunities sized in order to achieve which is the crucial question, as Zabecki the general objectives. The application of and other critics point out. The plan re- the new infiltration tactics was central to quired that the Second and Seventeenth the German 1918 offensives. Infiltration Armies would swing north and eventually or “storm troop” tactics were the German “roll” the British, while the Eighteenth Army answer to the deadlock of trench warfare. would protect their southern flank. But this Instead of employing mass-wave attacks, in itself would not have assured a decisive, infantry had to advance in small mutually total defeat of the British. This could have supporting groups, avoiding as far as pos- only been obtained by cutting them from sible centers of resistance and plunging the French Army with a thrust to the Chan- as much as possible into the enemy’s rear, nel or at least to Abbeville, the site of a cru- while by-passed enemy strongpoints were cial railway knot. This is what the Panzer dealt by follow-on forces. divisions accomplished in 1940. Once the Ludendorff’s orders of March 23rd, two British were cut off in the Flanders, they in days after the beginning of “Michael”, theory could still have been supplied from seem to lack an understanding of this sec- the sea. But the threat against the few ports ond aspect. Below had met a bloody check on the Channel still in their hands would while Hutier and Marwitz had realized a sig- probably have resulted in their evacuation. nificant break-through. But, since the initial At this point a little more than 100 French plan gave Below a paramount role, Luden- divisions would have confronted some 200 dorff continued to send reserves to his front German, before the arrival of significant rather than concentrating on the exploita- numbers of American troops. Would have tion of the success of the other two armies. the Germans succeeded had more rein- As already mentioned, according to Liddell forcement been fed to Eighteen Army in the Hart here lies the explanation of the failure south? It seems unlikely that the few addi- of Michael. It must be noticed however that tional divisions that the OHL had at hand here Liddell Hart focuses on tactics, in the would have made a big difference. Howev- specific case the failure of Ludendorff to er, if von Hutier had been able to take Ami- apply correctly the new infiltration tactics, ens or at least interdict it with artillery, the which required advancing along the lines of British would have indeed been placed in a minor resistance. Ludendorff, argues Lid- perilous position. It is also noteworthy that, dell Hart, chose to “feed” defeat (Below’s following von Hutier’s initial spectacular failed breakthrough) instead of success, gains Crown Prince Wilhelm’s Army Group and for this reason he ultimately failed. In (to which Eighteen Army belonged) argued truth Liddell Hart’s statement is not entirely on March 22nd for continuing the advance accurate: most of the divisional reinforce- on its current southwesterly axis, instead ments during “Michael” were actually sent of switching its efforts to the right to sup- to the Eighteenth army, seventeen out of port nearby Second Army. OHL approved. Thus, the offensive continued on divergent Gudmunsson, B.L. Stormtroop Tactics, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Zabecki, D.T. The German 1918 Offensives, Abing- House G.M. Combined Arms Warfare in the Twenti- don and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 142. Idem, eth Century, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kan- The Generals’ War, Bloomington: Indiana University sas, 2001. Press, 2018, p. 112. The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 149

axes, further indicating the lack of a clear reduced their divisional strength, adopting operational objective. the “triangular” division, with three infantry regiments instead of four. Enemy strengths and weaknesses The weakness of the English front was Even the best conceived plan, when it especially felt at the southern extremity, is translated from the maps to the actual where the British had to extend their lines battlefield, may meet problems or failure in order to take over a section of the French if the enemy does not conform to the ex- front. At the eve of “Michael” Gough’s Fifth pectations of the planners, which seldom Army defended 42 km of front with 12 infan- he does. We have seen how the failure of try and three cavalry divisions, while Byng’s “Michael” largely depended on the failure of Third Army occupied 28 km with 14 infantry Below to obtain a breakthrough. This failure divisions. is largely due to the nature of the adversary Tactical weakness added to the numeri- opposing the German Seventeenth Army. cal inferiority of Gough’s Army. The Fifth Of the two British Armies, which had Army tried to adopt the principle of the to bear the brunt of the German offensive, defense in depth, copied by the Germans, Byng’s Third and Gough’s Fifth, it was the without the proper understanding and train- latter that was the weaker. As we have al- ing. The line was divided in three sectors: a ready seen the force of the Allies had de- forward zone, a battle zone, and a rear zone, creased, and in particular the British order the first two zones some two km deep and of battle had been reduced by five division separated by roughly the same distance, from October 1917 (see Part I, p. 7). This while the rear zone was shallower. A typical was due to the costly offensives launched disposition for a Fifth Army’s division was in 1917, especially “Third Yipres”, better with three battalions forward, three in the known as “Passchendaele”. The losses battle zone, two in the rear zone and one suffered by the British in this long offensive behind in reserve. In theory this disposition had not been fully made up. Lloyd George, should have been very effective, as the Ger- the British premier, was not in good rela- mans who had used similar tactics against tions with the British “generalissimo”, Doug- the British had proved it. But the positions las Haig. Worried by the sterility and the of the Fifth Army had been occupied too cost of Haig’s strategy, but unable to find late and by too few troops. There had been a suitable replacement for the general, he no time to complete the works. The forward limited the flow of replacements to the army zone was well protected by barbed wire in France in order to restrain Haig from car- but lacked a continuous trench line. The rying out expensive attacks . Thus, not only battle zone was incomplete and the rear the British at the eve of “Michael” had five zone almost non-existent. By comparison, divisions less than the previous autumn: the positions of the Third Army were much they had to reduce the number of battalions stronger. Not only the portion of front to be in a brigade from four to three (except in the defended was shorter, the terrain was also Empire divisions). As a consequence now more favorable to the defensive. This helps the United Kingdom divisions had only nine to explain the failure of Below in achieving a infantry battalions instead of twelve. The breakthrough. The criticism of Liddell Hart French and Germans had since long time is thereafter justifiable: Ludendorff should After the Passchendaele offensive serious thought Middlebrook, M. The Kaiser’s Battle, London: Allen was given to replace Haig, but no candidate was Lane, 1978, p. 7. deemed suitable. Ibid., pp. 74-105. 150 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

have sent the reinforcements to the two dressed up in comic disguise. Men with top Armies in the south, instead of obstinately hats on their heads. Men staggering. Men trying to achieve a decisive breakthrough who could hardly walk”. in Below’s sector. Three and half year of austerity, made much worse by the enemy blockade, had Supply problems led tothis. And, even worse, drunkenness It is not at all given that, even if Ludendorff now combined to check the progress of had reinforced the success of the Second the German armies, as even Crown Prince and Eighteenth Army, the Germans would Rupprecht later admitted. Certainly this have reached decisive results. On the path was partly due to the break of the supply of the attacking armies laid the old bat- system on the old Somme battlefield. Men tlefield of the Somme, an area completely with empty stomach can hardly be ex- devastated. When the German reached it, pected to fight effectively. So it is doubtful their supply system broke down, since it that in such conditions, even if Ludendorff was extremely difficult to bring forward the had sent his reserves to the Eighteenth supplies on the broken terrain. This is also and Second armies, “Michael” would have pointed out by Nordensvan to explain why succeeded. The logical conclusion is that the German offensive ran out of steam . the centre of gravity of the offensive should One more factor hindered the prosecu- have been elsewhere. Not to the north, tion of the German offensive. A German evidently, since the strength of the British Staff officer, Rudolf Binding, in his diary Third army there prevented any decisive for March 28th describes it: “Today the breakthrough. Probably the only chance advance of our infantry suddenly stopped would have been to the south, with the axis near Albert. Nobody could understand of the advance passing south of Amiens. In why. Our airmen had reported no enemy this way the old Somme battlefield would between Albert and Amiens. ... Our way have been skirted to the south. The opera- seemed entirely clear. I jumped into a car tional goal for the German armies should with orders to find out what was causing have been to reach the Channel, and so the stoppage in front. As soon as I got near cutting in two the Allied armies. This could the town I began to see curious sights. probably have been accomplished also by Strange figures, which looked very little like reaching the Channel south of the Somme, soldiers, and certainly showed no sign of or swinging northward after achieving advancing, were making their way back out a breakthrough in the south. Of course we of the town. There were men driving cows are in the realm of speculation here, any- before them on a line; others who carried a way the OHL seemed to ignore the impor- hen under one arm and a box of notepaper tance of this operational objective. under the other. Men carrying a bottle of If the choice of Ludendorff to advance wine under their arm and another open in on a terrain unsuitable to supply cost him their hand. Men who had torn a silk draw- “Michael”, the ultimate defeat of the suc- ing-room curtain from off its rod and were cessive offensives cannot be attributed to dragging it to the rear as a useful bit of loot. this reason. Instead, a series of spectacular More men with writing paper and coloured tactical successes distracted him from pur- notebooks. Evidently they had found it Ibid., pp. 107-108. desirable to sack a stationer’s shop. Men Herwig, H.H. The First World War: Germany and Nordensvan C.O. Världskriget 19l4-1918, Stockholm: Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, London: Arnold, 1997, Ĺklén & Ĺkerlunds Förlags, 1922, p. 352. p. 410. The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 151

suing coherent operational and strategic The second part of the offensive fell on objectives. It would be correct to state that troops part of which had been transferred in the offensives following “Michael” Luden- from the St Quentin sector, and were by dorff reinforced the tactical success at the now used to the German methods. To the expense of the overall operational and stra- south of the vital hills there was a shallow tegic plan. He cannot be blamed to fail of dish where the river Lys flows, and here applying correctly infiltration tactics. John was the area where the German attached Laffin points out that the Germans were on April 10th. Thick fog filled the entire dish used to “feed” success when they took the on the morning of the attack, thus giving offensive. The problem is that these local the British troops who had already expe- successes distracted the German general- rienced “Michael” an illusion of familiarity. issimo from the overall aim. But what was They had learned some countermeasures exactly this overall plan? As we mentioned, from their previous experience: forward Ludendorff intended to defeat the British posts were left unmanned and booby Army with a series of blows aimed to either trapped, reserve battalions were stationed smash or exhaust it and at the same time to whenever possible behind the junctions prevent the French sending reinforcement of brigades, and reserve brigades behind to their ally. It was a strategy of frontal at- the junctions of divisions. Moreover, now tacks that resembled much more Falken- the British troops had learned to retreat hayn’s attritional strategy at Verdun than when threatened of encirclement, instead the flanking, encircling operations planned of remaining in place and being cut off. The by Moltke the Elder and Schlieffen. It is not German advance became slow and costly, thereafter incorrect to say that in the last reminding the past Allied offensives. The three years of WWI German strategic and British made a methodical fighting with- operational planning had actually declined, drawal and Ludendorff was unable to feed and had almost been replaced by a fixation reinforcements fast enough. A decisive vic- for tactics. tory was probably unattainable. Even the capture of Yipres probably would not have “Georgette” much changed the situation. The objective of the second German Only the encirclement and capture of offensive, renamed “Georgette” (Klein large numbers of prisoners would have re- Georg), was very limited: the conquest sulted in a decisive victory and this could of the Yipres salient. South and west of have been achieved only if the attacking Yipres there is a series of small hills, the German forces had advanced all the way most prominent of them being Mt Kemmel to the sea, cutting off the Second Army and Mt des Cats. The control of these hills and the Belgians. It is doubtful that the would have forced the British to evacuate Germans could have achieved such a re- the Yipres salient, because the Flanders sult even if Ludendorff had poured more terrain is so flat that even the possession troops into the offensive. The enemy this of these modest mounds gives a tactical time was more prepared. A minor gain for advantage. The first part of the offensive the Germans could have been the weaken- was very successful, because it fell on two ing of other Allied sectors in order to rein- undermanned Portuguese divisions, which force Yipres. But what actually happened were completely routed. was that the Germans lost at least as many soldiers as their enemy. The only consola- 152 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

tion for the OHL was that in three weeks the mistake with their “V” missiles during WWII. British lost all the territory they had gained The second factor was due to the early fail- during several months of struggle the previ- ures of the Allied armored offensives. The ous year at great expense.. Allies made the mistake to employ the tanks too early, before correcting some mechani- First German use of armor cal problems, and in too little numbers. This The end of “Georgette” was anticipated condemned the tanks’ baptism of fire to by the last spasm of the previous offensive, disaster, but had the unexpected and, for “Michael”: on April 24th there was a final at- the Allied, positive effect to cause German tempt to redeem the hollow triumphs in the skepticism regarding the efficacy of tanks. south. This episode, in itself rather little in Instead, the Germans developed dedicated the context of the conflict, is remarkable be- antitank weapons, the first of which was the cause it saw the first use of the tanks by the T-Gewehr of 1918, an enlarged bolt-action German, and even the first clash between rifle firing a 13-mm steel-cored projectile at armored vehicles. Actually, it was because over 900 m/s to penetrate 22 mm of hard- of the use of tanks that the Germans hoped ened plate at 100 m10. to achieve a tactical surprise. Undoubtedly The Germans succeeded in building they caused a certain consternation among only one operative tank, the A7V, of which the British troops, now for the first time on 100 exemplars were ordered in Decem- the receiving end of an armored thrust. But ber 1917 but only about 20 were actually the number employed by the German was produced. It was a clumsy machine, with too little to cause more than a local effect. the tracks encased in the armored chas- A lot has been written about the inability sis, which limited their mobility. Most of the of the Germans to field more tanks at an ear- vehicles deployed in April 1918 were actu- lier date, and about the shortsightedness of ally captured British tanks. On April 24th Ludendorff who, despite his tactical ability, an historical event took place at a local- failed to recognize the value of armored ve- ity called Villers-Bretonneux: the first tank hicles. Undoubtedly the history of German battle in history. In reality only a handful armor in WWI is a typical example of “too vehicles were employed by each side, and little too late”. There are two factors how- the skirmish ended with few losses without ever that help explaining why the German a clear winner. Anyway, the basic techniques lagged behind their enemies in armored and tactics of combat between tanks were warfare. First, one has to remember that the employed, so it remains a milestone in mili- German industry was hard pressed with the tary history. At this point a question surges necessity to provide large amount of essen- almost spontaneously: would the Germans tial and proven equipment. The blockade have won if they had had a mechanized forced the Germans to channel their dwin- force in the spring 1918? Probably no one dling resources on weapons whose utility can answer this question better than Heinz was unquestionable. Still, it is true that the Guderian, the father of the panzer forces: Germans had enough resources to pro- “We cannot declare categorically that the duce the almost useless “Paris guns”, and Germans would have accomplished the that the means employed for building those breakthrough if they too had possessed white elephants would have been better mobile troops, but it is a question which spent on tanks. Strangely, in a sort of historical reiteration, the Germans made a similar 10 Hogg I.V., Weeks J.S. Military Small Arms of the 20th Century, Iola, WI: Krause Publications,2000, p. 387. The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 153

we cannot ignore when we look back on German offensive would have been again this episode. In view of the appalling condi- directed to the front north of the Somme tion of the roads behind the German front River. Only the Americans claimed that at the time, and the considerable volume the next enemy offensive would be across of transport which was needed to sustain the Chemin-des-Dames. But America was the infantry divisions and the artillery, it is still the junior partner in the Alliance, and very likely that only armored units with full its warnings were not listened. Even worse, cross-country mobility would have had any the commandant responsible of the area chance of success; the opportunity was that would have received the attentions of magnificent – of that there can be no doubt, “Blücher” was General Duchesne. Choleric for the enemy were heavily depleted and in and stubborn, he ignored Petain’s disposi- a state of considerable disarray”11. tions about a defense in depth, and packed Guderian’s words seem to reflect the the French and British troops under his belief that a German mechanized thrust command in the forward trenches. The would have been decisive. It seems French front-line divisions and the British a reasonable assumption, provided that 50th and 8th Divisions were sandwiched for mobile troops one does not only mean between the Ailette and the Aisne, with a collection of tanks, but also the accom- a depth of only few miles. The preparation panying infantry armored carriers and of artillery was even more intense than for tracked supply vehicles, indispensable to “Michael”, and by evening the attacking negotiate the disrupted terrain on which troops had already reached the river Vesle. the advance took place. In his memories Ludendorff wrote: “I had believed that we would succeed merely in “Blücher” reaching the region of Soissons and Fis- The third German offensive, “Blucher”, mes.” But the point is that “Blücher” was showed the OHL at its best regarding intended as a diversion to attract French both preparation and execution. Bruch- troops away from the Flanders. It was not müller, now nicknamed “Durchbruch- intended to advance so much. But, as B. müller” (Breakthrough Müller), was given Pitt points out, “nothing succeeds like suc- sole charge of the artillery. He planned the cess”.12 At this point Ludendorff forgot its barrages in a masterly way. Assault and overall plan and started feeding troops to reserve divisions moved to their allotted ar- the offensive, instead of interrupting it and eas with the smoothness and the precision shifting forced to the north as originally of a clockwork. Especially the precautions planned. The result was that the attackers for ensuring surprise were elaborated to were funneled into a salient that ultimately an unprecedented extent. All the vehicles assumed the form of a trap. Far from hav- had their wheels greased and padded, no ing the possibility to reach a decision by troop movement was allowed by day, and trapping enemy forces, the Germans man- if a unit was spotted by an enemy aircraft, aged just to stretch their defensive lines to it turned about as if it marched to rear ar- a vulnerable position, where they were in eas instead than to the front. But maybe danger to be attacked on the flanks and cut the greatest contribution to Blücher’s suc- off. The Germans got closer to Paris, but it cess was given by the enemy. Both British was a dead end. and French were convinced that the next 11 Guderian H. Achtung-Panzer!, London: Arms & Ar- 12 Pitt, B. 1918 – The Last Act, London: Cassell, 1962, mour Press, 1995, p. 92. p. 148. 154 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

It is important to pay attention on this the time, since Ludendorff still thought he aspect of “Blücher”. Here the German gen- would move the artillery train back to the eralissimo fed apparent victory rather than Flanders against the British. But once this defeat, but at the expense of the overall op- idea was substituted by the alluring hope erational plan. Ludendorff acted correctly at of reaching Paris after the success on the the tactical level, while committing a mistake Chemin-des-Dames, then the benefits of at the operational-strategic level. Infiltration a second attack westward to support the tactics indeed require to reinforce success. main advance became apparent. The task But on the operational and strategic level, of transferring a huge artillery train through feeding success in the wrong place can be roads crowded with reserves and supplies useless and detrimental to the overall plan. being flushed to the main advance was for- With “Blücher” the Germans only gained a midable. So it was six days after “Blücher” badly defensible position, and paid it with had been called off that von Hutier could huge losses of troops that could have been announce that he was ready to launch employed elsewhere. another offensive. It was an improvement The fourth German offensive, although upon the previous performance, but it was small in scale compared with the three gi- not enough. Moreover, General Pétain had gantic battles that preceded it, was signifi- not been distracted enough by the battle cant in revealing the lessons being learned to the south to forget other sectors. If the by the respective army commands. The Germans could make initial gains, it was first lesson concerns the value of time co- largely due to the reluctance of the French ordination in war. Twelve days had been Generals Humbert and Debeney to apply allowed to elapse between the end of the the defensive dispositions of Pétain, even if main German advance towards Amiens their disobedience was not as complete as and the opening of “Georgette”, while that of Duquesne. Pétain was able to have twenty-six days had gone by from the his plan for an elastic defense partially end of “Georgette” to the start of “Blücher” adopted, and the German offensive did not across the Chemin-des-Dames. Observes go far. Ludendorff was clearly disappoint- from both sides started to understand that ed: “The action of the Eighteenth Army”, he such a lapse of time between two attacks wrote, “had not altered the strategic situa- lost for the second one opportunities which tion... nor had it provided any fresh techni- may have been created for it by the first. Lu- cal data”13. dendorff’s chief of operations, Oberst-leut- It is interesting to see how in the mean- nant Wetzell, tried to remedy to this mistake. while the proportion of forces had changed. During the planning stage of the “Blücher” On paper, if one looks at the number of attack he had suggested that as soon as divisions deployed, both contenders had the Chemin-des-Dames had fallen and the grown stronger. By the middle of May, the main purpose of Bruchmüller’s artillery train 192 German divisions employed at the start had been accomplished, it should be imme- of “Michael” had increased to 207 . The Al- diately transferred a few miles westward, to lies showed on paper that the number of the stretch of line immediately adjoining the their divisions had grown to 188 over the “Blücher” front. This front - between Noyon same period. The extra German divisions to the east and Montdidier to the west - was were all late arrivals from the eastern Front, still held by von Hutier’s Eighteenth Army. while the increase in the number of Allied Wetzell’s suggestions were not accepted at 13 Ibid., p. 163. The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 155

divisions had been caused by the transfer America were being made available just as to France of British divisions which had fast as Britain could ship them across the been serving in Italy, Salonika and Pales- Atlantic. By the end of May, some 750,000 tine, together with the arrival of more Ameri- men in their prime had arrived in France, cans. and there were many more to come15. Looking at the number of divisions may Thus from the start of the German of- be deceptive, however. The real point is, fensives the numerical odds had progres- of course, the maintenance of divisional sively shifted to the side of the Allies. Nor strengths. In this regard it is significant that there was evidence of a significant quali- by the end of the battle of Noyon the av- tative superiority on the part of the Central erage strength of German field battalions Powers. Ludendorff’s policy to concentrate had been reduced from 807 men to 692, the best troops in assault divisions gave and this despite the arrival at the front of the Germans an initial advantage. This 23,000 recruits of the 1899 class as well as policy was a gamble, because when the 60,000 men withdrawn from such services battle raged on without reaching a deci- as the Field Railways, the Motor Transport sion these elite troops, bearing the brunt and even the Air Force. The Germans were of the fighting, received disproportionately close to scrape the bottom of the barrel. high losses. Gradually the German Storm The British and the French were them- troops were reduced and annihilated by selves not far from it, but there were impor- the attrition during the offensives. As a re- tant differences of degree. There had been sult Ludendorff was soon to be left with an 88,000 men on leave from the British Army army from which the finest elements had – incredible though this may seem – on the been drained and consumed, and thus im- evening of March 2l, and another 30,000 paired in its ability to carry on a prolonged attending courses or at depots in France, resistance. and this had been partly responsible for the low rifle strength of many of the Fifth The Second Battle of the Marne Army battalions. When the battalions suf- It may seem exaggerated to state that in fered losses, these men were immediately the last offensives “the Supreme Command available as replacements. There had also renounced further plans for a decisive bat- been 100,000 men retained in England for tle, and made other diversionary offensives 16 several reasons - the official one being as in the hope of something turning up.” But a guard against a possible invasion. The undoubtedly, as we have seen, the strate- Government’s decision to lower the age gic direction of the OHL was very uncertain, limit of troops made available for service and it worsened with the last German effort. overseas from nineteen to eighteen and-a- Ludendorff made several errors. Probably half created a pool of 170,000 men ready the greatest was with regard to morale, for to replace those lost in the battles.14 As a he allowed the attack to be called “Frieden- consequence, while after the attack on Mt sturm” – “Peace Offensive” - and encour- Kemmel in March Haig had been forced aged the belief that this was the final stroke to reduce ten of his divisions to cadres, by which would win the war for Germany, and July they had all been reconstituted. And of thus release the soldiers from the abattoir course, as far the Allied manpower was con- at the front and their families at home from cerned, the immense human reserves from the grip of hunger and disease. This may 15 Ibid., p. 165. 14 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 16 Ibid., p. 178. 156 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

have given impetus to the first attack, but it progressed far enough to almost cut off it was to retort against him during the fol- the vital position of Rheims itself. Then, lowing days, precisely as the realization enemy reserves and exhaustion brought it that the deceptively announced Grouchy’s to a halt. troops were in reality Prussians turned the It is evident that, had the German adopt- French at Waterloo from hope to despair ed their usual secrecy precautions so as and lost the day to Napoleon. to prevent the Allies to adopt appropriate In the preparation of the offensive, Lu- defensive countermeasures, the attack dendorff disregarded two essential tactical east of Rheims would probably had been factors. The first was the time element, be- successful. The fall of the Rheims position cause the battle of Noyon had ended on would have probably forced the Allied to June 1lth, while “Friedensturm” didn’t begin move in this sector their strategic reserves, until July 15th. Time aids the defender more allowing Ludendorff to renew the Lys offen- than the attacker, at least when the defend- sive with good prospects of success. The er can watch the attacker’s moves, and consequence of the German setback was prepare himself accordingly. Unfortunately not only the abandonment of the renewed for the Germans, this was actually the case, attack on the Lys sector, but a crack in the since Ludendorff ignored the factor of se- German morale. Now that the “Peace Of- crecy over his concentration of forces. This fensive” had failed, hope turned into de- lack of secrecy is the more difficult to un- spair for the German soldiers. The subse- derstand if ones considers the exceptional quent Allied offensives were to accelerate efforts he made to mask his intentions and the moral – even more than the physical strength in his first three offensives. By the – collapse of the German Army. evening before the attack, all his plans were known to the Allies: 49 German divisions, in Consequences of the defeat three armies, were to attack on either side The five German offensives largely con- of Rheims, while successively 31 divisions sumed the German reserve of manpower. under Crown Prince Rupprecht were to re- Perhaps even more decisively, they con- new the battle of the Lys in the north. sumed the moral reserve of the German East of Rheims the Allies had prepared Army in exchange for five wedges of French an unpleasant surprise for the Germans. soil imbedded in the Allied lines. As a con- They had evacuated the front line trenches, sequence, when the Allied started their leaving only scattered machine gun posi- new offensive phase, there was little left to tions, and prepared their main defenses in meet them. On the paper the German Army, the rear beyond the range of the German with more than 200 divisions, still looked artillery. As a consequence in this sector impressive. But in fact it was a shadow of the German offensive ended in a bloody what it had been on March 20. failure. West of Rheims, instead, the Ger- When the Allied attacked at Amiens on man attack was initially very successful. 8th August, it became the “Black Day of the The Allied troops here manned the forward German Army”. Traditionally the Allied vic- positions in force, and had to endure the tory has been attributed to the use of the ordeal of the German bombardment. The tanks en masse. Even if there is much truth German advance was so successful that, in it, even more importance should be at- even if it could not hope to link up as had tributed to the moral collapse of the Ger- been intended with the attack on the east, mans. It was not the first time that the Ger- The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 157

mans dealt with tanks, but this time seven With hindsight it is not difficult to see divisions were routed. Perhaps even more what mistakes could have been avoided in important than the collapse of the front order to improve the chances of success. troops – from which they partially recov- Regarding “Michael”, the sector chosen ered – was the disheartening of Ludendorff for the offensive should have been shifted himself. in order to avoid the broken terrain of the The battle of Amiens was followed by a old Somme battlefield, which obstructed continued offensive on a broad front, which the flow of supplies. Once “Michael” had was to lead to the rupture of the so-called been launched, Ludendorff should have “Hindenburg Line”- in reality a complex net- sent more reinforcements to Hutier, even if work of defenses extending from Lille to he indeed gave him more divisions than to Metz. It was to be the first time on the West- his colleagues. In a nutshell, for “Michael” ern Front that a powerful defensive position the wrong “Schwerpunkt” was chosen. Re- organized in deep was completely broken. garding the subsequent offensives, their The final consequence was German surren- main purpose was to attract and consume der and the armistice of 11 November 1918. the allied reserves. Here the mistake was that Ludendorff, lured by the initial success, Conclusions did not halt the offensives when he should After this analysis, I want to summarize have. in a nutshell the answers to the questions Moreover, too long time was allowed to posed at the beginning of this essay. First, elapse between the various offensives, al- the opinion of the historians: as we have lowing the Allies to reorganize themselves clearly seen it is divided. On one side we and reform their reserves. Thus it was have those historians like Liddell Hart, who a problem of wrong timing. But above all, overestimate the proficiency of the German as we have amply discussed, it was a prob- Army and its leaders, probably with the lem of lack of clear operational goals. Even purpose to further evidence the flaws of if these errors had been avoided, it is still the Allied leadership. Among the Germans, unlikely that Germany could have achieved after the war there has been a tendency a decisive victory. The fact is that Germa- to defend the reputations of Hindenburg ny lacked the material, physical strength and Ludendorff and to attribute the defeat to overcome its enemies. This is also the to the so called “stab in the back”. On the opinion of Dr. Gerhadt Gross of the MGFA other side there are historians, especially in (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt) at recent years, which have evidenced how Potsdam, with whom I have corresponded the German leadership was flawed at the on the topic. Gross writes: “In my opinion operational, strategic and political level. the German army had no chance to lead These historians make large use of com- a successful offensive in spring 1918 for ments by German officers, because even despite tactical innovations in the field of if Ludendorff and Hindenburg had a formi- attack neither the material nor the person- dable reputation in Germany, it was by no nel resources of the German empire did means unanimous. Those comments have suffice to achieve a victory over the Entente been reported in this essay, and there is a after the U.S.A. had entered into the war.” large amount of evidence to indicate that The best chances for the Germans prob- indeed the criticism of the German High ably would have been given by the capture Command is justified. of the crucial railway knots behind the Brit- 158 4.2. LESSONS LEARNED AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

ish lines, which may have forced an evac- 1914-18...”17. And in Forgotten Victory (2001) uation. It is of course difficult to say how he concludes: “This statement was written likely it would have been for the Germans in 1987, but at the beginning of the twenty to gain those objectives, even if the correct first century it still holds true”18. choices had been made. In particular the 1918 German offensives According to Clausewitz an attacker has show the interdependence between the lev- to have at least a 2,5 superiority over its en- els of warfare. Tactical excellence in itself is emy in order to have a reasonable chance not useful if it is not used in the frame of clear of success. Even with the reinforcements and sound operational goals. In turn, opera- from the East, the numerical superiority tional plans must serve the overall strategic, of the German army was far less than that, and ultimately political, objectives of war. and in every case destined to last a very short time, since the immense human re- Bibliography sources of the USA were flowing to Europe. Asprey, R.B. The German High Command Of course by careful concentration and at War, New York, NY: Morrow & C, 1991. Guderian, H. Achtung-Panzer!, New York, surprise it is possible to achieve an over- NY: Cassell, 1995. whelming local superiority. But here comes Gudmunsson, B.L. Stormtroop Tactics, a problem that is characteristic of the First Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. World War: even if the attack enjoyed initial Herwig, H.H. The First World War: Germa- success, the defender could always move ny and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, reinforcements and reserves by railway to London: Arnold, 1997. the menaced point, faster than the attack- Hogg, I.V., Weeks J.S. Military Small Arms ing troops, moving by foot, could advance. of the 20th Century, Iola, WI: Krause Pub- This problem was never solved during lications, 2000. World War I, and made a decisive strategic House, G.M. Combined Arms Warfare in penetration virtually impossible. Only with the Twentieth Century, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001. the adoption of extensive mechanization it Livsey, A. The Viking Atlas of World War I, is possible to solve this impasse. But we London: Penguin, 1994. have to wait for the next war to see that. Middlebrook, M. The Kaiser’s Battle, Lon- Another important issue is the relevance don: Allen Lane, 1978. of these military operations to modern war- Neillands, R. The Great War Generals on fare. The immense technological changes the Western Front 1918-1918, London: occurred in the last 100 years may let as- Robinson, 1999. sume that World War I does not provide Nordensvan, C.O., Världskriget 1914-1918, many useful lessons for 21st century war- Stockholm: Ĺklén & Ĺkerlunds Förlags, fare. In this regard Gary Sheffield, pro- 1922. fessor of War Studies at the University of Pitt, B. 1918. The Last Act, London: Cas- sell, 1962. Wolverhampton and former historian at the Randal, G. Kaiserschlacht 1918, Oxford: United Kingdom Joint Services Command Osprey Publishing, 1991. and Staff College, wrote: “The armies of Europe and the United States still train for 17 Sheffield G. Blitzkrieg and Attrition: land operations essentially the same style of warfare that in Europe, 1914-1945, in Sheffield G. and McInness C. (eds), Warfare in the 20th Century, London: Allen & was developed on the Western Front in Unwin, 1988, p. 76. 18 Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory, London: Headline Book Publishing, 2001, p. 231. The German Offensives, 1918. An Analysis... 159

Sheffield G. Blitzkrieg and Attrition: land operations in Europe, 1914-1945, in Sheffield G. and McInness C. (eds), War- fare in the 20th Century, London: Allen & Unwin, 1988. Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory, London: Headline Book Publishing, 2001. Travers, T. How the War was Won: Com- mand and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918, London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Zabecki, D.T. The Generals’ War, Bloom- ington: Indiana University Press, 2018. Zabecki, D.T. The German 1918 Offensives, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006. About the author Anton Paier is an Italian-born Swedish citi- zen. He received a Master’s degree from the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Litera- ture at the University of Genoa (Italy) with a thesis on the US Armored Forces in WWII. He has a Bachelor’s in Military History from the University of Stockholm, a Master’s in Biomedical Laboratory Sciences from the Karolinska Institute, and a PhD in Biomedi- cal Engineering from the University of Tartu (Estonia). He is currently editing scientific articles.