• •

CHAPTER CCLXX.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918. (IV.)

THE ~YS BATTLE-SITUATION ON APRIL 12, 1918-GERMANS ENTER BAILLEUL-BRITISH WITH­ DRAW ON THE LEFT--GERMAN ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE-DEFENCE AND Loss OF MOUNT KEMMEL-­ EXTENT OF THE NORTHERN AnvANCE-CONTINUED FIGHTING BEFORE AMIENS-!.-..INTERVENTION OF THE AMERICAN ARMy-ArR WORK-GERMAN COMMENT--THE AUSTRALIANS-" OUR BACKS TO THE WALL "-LESSONS OF THE ALLIED DEFEATS-THE SINGLE COMMAND UNDER FOCH-THE GERMANS TWICE CHECKED.

RAPTER CCLXVII brought the nar­ back to Pont d' Achelles. This made somewhat rative of the Gennan offensive on of a break in the line, and to obviate this our C the Lys front up to April 11, 1918, so troops between Pont d' Achelles and Wyt­ far as the fighting at the extremity of schaete, fell back to positions about 1,000 the British right was concerned. On the south yards east of Neuve Eglise and Wulverghem. side of Annentieres there had also been heavy This withdrawal involved in its turn a retire· fighting during this day, but here we ment from Rill 63 and the trenches held about were more fortunate than in the northern Messines. segment. Timely reinforcements had been We have seen that the Germans had suc­ received, and the 31st Division, arnvmg ceeded in penetrating our line as far as from the Somme battlefield, retook the villages Merville, where they had been 'stopped by of Le Verrier and La Becque, which the vigorous resistance on the line of the Bourre Germans had captured from us earlier in the and Lawe ; on the extreme right of the attacked day. position about Givenchy and Festubert, where North of Armentieres, the Germans con­ the attacks had not been so vigorously pressed, tinued to make vigorous attacks in the direction our troops held their positions, and this enabled of Nieppe and Neuve Eglise, and in the after­ us to restore in a certai,n measure our line in noon fighting was renewed about Messines, this part of the battlefield. As troops of t£e which they carried, but were then brought 3rd, 4th, 5th, 31st, 61st and 1st Australian to a standstill by the South African Brigade. Divisions began to arrive, the line was to a The part of the 9th Division on the south of considerable extent "firmed up," although Rollebeke was also attacked in force, but the situation was still by no means secure. drove back the enemy. On April 12 the Germans delivered, just The 34th Division at Nieppe had repulsed all before daybreak, a sudden attack on Pacaut attacks during the morning, but the progress and Riez-du-Vinage, which formed the left of the enemy in the Ploegsteert direction centre of the 51st Division, but the strenuous threatened its left flank, and tIllS made it resistance of two batteries of the 255th Brigade desirable to withdraw the troops. In the early Royal Field Artillery prevented the enemy from part of the night, therefore, they were taken crossing the Canal. Each of these batteries as Vol. XVIII.-Part 230 289 290 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

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REFEREN.CE APPROXIMATE LINE- Opening of offensive--- ~ ___ Close of offensive ---'------

THE BA ITLE OF THE LYS. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 291 they retired left a single gun within 500 yards fighting of the previous days. The position of the canal bank, which, aided by a party of was very critical. The 1st Australian Division, gunners, who held the drawbridge with rifle;; , under Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., poured so strong a fire on the enemy as to D.S.O., was at this time detraining on the stop his advance. On the right of the 51st railway-line coming up from Hazebrouck, and Division was the 3rd Division about Locon, it was necessary for the two divisions to hold which inflicted heavy :;asualties on the enemy, out at any cost until the arrival of these troops but was nevertheless gradually forced back. to prevent a complete breach in our line, which On the left of the 51st Division, t.he 61st would have allowed the enerny to move down Division now came into action on the Clarence River. Both it and the 3rd Division had pre­ viously been engaged in the fighting about Arras at the end of March, where they had suffered considerably from the strain of con­ tinuous fighting; but they formed, however, so bold a front against the Germans as to stop completely their further advance. Meanvvhile our position at Merville had been again attacked, but although the troops here were compelled to fall back a little in the morning hours, they subsequently held their ground. We may say, therefore, that from La Bassee round to Merville our line was holding out, fairly well, although to the north of this point this was not the case. The Germans attacked in great force on a front which extended from Estaires to Steenwerck at; 8 o'clock in the [Official photograph. USED SHELL-CASES ON A ROADSIDE morning, and by the afternoon our troops IN FLANDERS. about Doulieu and La B~cque were thrust . back towards the north-west. Merris and on the important railway junction of Haze­ Oultersteene were reached by the enemy, and brouck, from which he was less than five miles thus a considerable gap was made in our line distant. Attack after attack was delivered to the south 6f' Bailleul. On the north of this against our troops, but all were repelled with gap, troops of the 25th, 34th and 49th Divisions, great loss. Field-guns then were brought up the last commanded by Major-General N. G. J. to quite close ranges and concent:r:ated against Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., though attacked with the British position. With their aid, Vieux great vigour, held their ground to the south Berquin was captured, but nevertheless our and south-east of Bailleul. Major-General troops resisted in their various posts with great R. J. Pinrrey, C.B., sent a brigade from the 33rd gallantry. The Germans stormed round them, Division with a body of cyclists, a Pioneer at,tacking them in rear, but still our men fought battalion and every available man from schools on, and this gave time for · the Australians to and reinforcement camps, etc., against the deploy and dig themselves in on a line just in advancing German troops, and these, favoured front of the Nieppe forest to cover the advance hy the support of the troops on their left, to Hazebrciuck, and although at various points counter-attacked, drove the enemy back and the enemy succeeded in penetrating, there re-established our line early in the night. was no complete success on his part in drivinr; In the morning of April 13, the GermfLns back the general line tbus held. The fighting again attacked with great vigour. The 29th · was of the severest description, constantly at an 31st Divisions were holding a position north handy-strokes, but eventually the German of Merville up to Vieux Berquin in front of efforts ceased, their losses having apparently the forest of Nieppe. On their left, it wi1l be exhausted the offensive effort of their troops. remembered that the enemy had already On the right portion of our line the 4th enterp.d Merris and Oultersteene. The length Guards Brigade, holding a line of some 4,000 held, some 10,000 yards, was long and the yards, was attacked with special vigour, but troops had been sorely tried by the severe held its own with brilliant courage throughout 230-2 292 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. the day. When it is remembered that the of Neuve Eglise had not made much progress, whole of the troops engaged in this heroic although severe fighting had taken place in struggle had come up straight from the Somme its neighbourhood during the afternoon of battlefield, where they had been sorely tried April 12. The struggle continued throughout and suffered heavy losses, and that these had the night, and by the morning of April 13 the been made good by fresh men with no experience Germans had forced their way into the village. of war and only half assimilated by the units A little before noon, a counter-attack was into which they were drafted and, moreover, delivered by troops of the 33rd and 49th that they were attacked by vastly superior Divisions, which drove the enemy complotely numbers, it must 11e admitted that the fight out again and captured many prisoners. they put up was as gallant as any recorded Several heavy attacks were also made by the in British military history. Germans about Meteren and also against La North of the attack on Merris and Oulter­ Creche, but these were repulsed by the 33rd steene. the enemy's a,ssaults in the direction and 34th Divisions. In the evening the Germans renewed their attacks against the line Neuve Eglise-La Creche, and succeeded in forcin.g their way in betw~ en these two points, threatening the left of the 34th Division to the north and east of La Creche by an outflanking movement. Although our troops held their ground here during the early part of the night, the direction of the attack was such as to render it impossible for them to maintain the position, and they were therefore withdrawn during the night of the 13-14th to the Ravelsberg, a range of low hills between Bailleul and N euve Eglise, unhindered by the enemy, who had come to

(Official photograph BAILLEUL. Above: a barricade in the town. THE' TIll1ES HISTORY OF TJIE WAR. :393

[Official photograph. THE RUINED CHURCH ' OF NEUVE EGLISE. the end of his offensive spirit for the day, of country, and had, indeed, made a great owing to the heavy losses he had sustained. breach in our lines, extending from Dranoutre On the left flank of these heights at N euve r01.md through Merris and Vieux Berquin to the Eglise continuous fighting took place throughout west of Merville, and thence through Locon to the whole night Here the 33rd Division was La Bassee. engaged, and the 2nd Battalion Worcestershire From the time this fighting had begun Sir Regiment belonging to it held firmly on to the Douglas Haig had borne in mind tbe possibility Mairie until 2 p.m. on April 14. The tide of of having to give up the position his left flank battle ebbed to and fro, but by midnight on this date N euve Eglise was completely captured by the enemy. Between Neuve Eglise and Baille-t:u and south-east of Meteren, the German ~ttacks were ~ll repulsed. On April 13 and 14 there had also been some smart fighting at a number of places between Givenchy and the Nieppe vVood, in which the Germans were uniformly unsuccessful. On our. side the 4th Division on the evening of April 14 attacked and re-captured Riez-clu­ Vinage, and took 150 prisoners. April 15 saw fresh heavy German attacks against Bailleul and the Ravelsberg. The struggle was .severe. The enemy captured the eastern end of the heights, but was driven out. He then renewed his attacks, and gradually worked along the ridge until, by 7 p.m., the whole of it was in his possession, and our hold on Bailleul thus became very prec~rious. By 9 p.m. the Germans had forced their way into the town, and thus compelled our troops to abandon this part of the field and to take up [Bassa~o. a position between Meteren and Dranoutre. MAJOR·GENERAL E. P. STRICKLAND. It will thus be seen that the Germans had C.B., C.M.G. forced us to retreat over a considerable length Commanded the 1st Division. 294 THE TL7It1ES HISTORY OF THE J;TlAR .

h eld on the heights to the north-east. of Ypres. tinually in opposing the German offensive. T his rearward movement had been beglill on Sir Douglas; Haig felt that help was needed, the night of April 12- 13, when the British and none was forthcoming from England. H e, positions on the Passchendaele ridge were therefore, pointed out to General Foch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, the urgent need of giving the British troops some relief and affording them some rest so as t o bring the various units into good fighting trim again. General Foch at once complied with the British Commander's request, and French troops were moved up to the north, and by the middle of April were already in position close b ehind the British front in F landers. On April 16 a number of strong loca I attacks were made by the enemy on the Meteren-Wytschaete front. For the most part ~ the~e were repulsed with heavy loss by the 2!5th, '34th, and 49th D ivisions, but at the villages t hemselves the Germans succeeded in pene­ trating after a good deal of strenuous fighting of a fluctuating character. COLillter-at.tacks

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lR'lts~e ll. MAJOR-GENERAL R. J. PINNEY, C.B. Commanded the 33rd Division. left only t o b e held b y outposts. On t he night of April 15/16 a still furt?er retreat was accomplished , our troops ret iring to p ositions along the line of the Steenbeek river and the W esth oek a n d Wytschaete ridges. Our line was t hus brou ght con­ siderably nearer to Ypres, a nd t he p ronounced salient hit hert o occupied towards Passchen­ daele was abandoned. We h ave already seen the severe strain that had been put on the British Army owing to its n umerical inferiority to the Germans. The h eavy fighting between the Somme and the Oise and north of the Somme to Arras had sorely tried the British troops. They had been engaged again,t a force which exceeded them· in the proportion lR1ts~" U.. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H . B. WALKER, of 7 to 4. They ~ad come with credit out of • K.C.B. the battle, but w-ith credit which had been Commanded the 1st Australian Division. obtained by a sad diminution of their strength, were made during the evening by both British though with the satisfaction that the casualties and French troops, but these were unable t o they had inflicted on the enemy were even turn the enemy out, although at Wytschaete more severe than those they had suffered a battalion of the 9th Division at one time themselves. Many British divisions had taken reached the eastern edge of the village. At part in both the northern and southern battles, night our line was established close to its while others had been engaged almost con- WAS tern and northern boundaries. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AB. 295

The next day the enemy moved forward resulted in the Germans being defeated with from the Bai1leul-Neuve Eglise line against heavy losses, leaving over 700 prisoners in Kemmel Hill. This was an important position, Belgian hands, besides a field gun and 42 as it gave command of view and fire over the machine-guns. whole of the flat country towards Poperinghe The German version of this affair was that an?- Ypres, and · thus completely cut the roads on April 18, Belgian troops made a deter­ leading dowr1 from the latter. The preliminary l~ined attack from Merckem against the German bombardment was of a very severe description, lines, but without obtaining any noteworthy and the assault made was delivered with great result. intensity, while at the same time attacks were The same day also saw a fresh attempt m ade in the Meteren and Merris direction, thus of the Germans to gain further ground on prolonging the German assaults to the left. the southern flank of their main attack.

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rB elgian official ON THE FLANDERS FRONT: BELGIANS STRENGTHENING A DAM. The defence of the Kemmel position was . in Givenchy was bombarded with extraordinary t h e hands of the 34th, 49th and 19th Divisions, vigour and, after this was considered to have and these completely defeated the enemy's attained the desired effect, infantry attacked attempts. Here and there points of our line along the line from Givenchy to the west were occupied, but counter-attacks always of Merville. At the former place and at succeeded in re-establishing it. The left of Festubert our trenches were penetrated. the German attacks (Meteren-Merris). was also The struggle was . intense and continued beaten back with heavy loss by the 33rd and throughout the whole day, but the 1st Division, 1st Australian Divisions, th~ result being that under Major-General E. P. Strickland, C.B., at the end of the day no material gain accrued C.M.G., D.S.O., by vigorous counter-attacks, to the Germans. practically regained . our original positions. At the northern end of the Allied line the Along the rest of the line attacked the Germans Germans attempted to capture Bixschoote, gained no success ~hatever, but were beaten and tlj force the Y ser Canal, the line of attack back with exceed:ip.gly heavy loss at all points being directed along the Ypres-Staden railway. by the 4th and 61st Divisions. The attempt was a complete failure and There now came a pause in the fighting, which 296 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

[O fJi(.~at photograph. .­ SCENE ON THE FLANJ)ERS HA TTLEFIELD IN APRIL, 1918.

died down to mere local collisions, few of Meteren and Spanbroekmolen, and , by the these being of any moment, except at Festubert, morning of April 21 had relieved our forces. where a strong point known as Route" A " keep over the whole of the Kemm.el segment. was taken and re-taken several times before being finally secured by us. Farther west, the Let us now see what the German views wer e­ 4th and 61st Divisions carried but a series of wi~h regard to the fighting just described. successful minor affairs north of the La Bassee The fact that the British Commander-in­ Canal, in which some hundreds of prisoners were Chief had been obliged to call upon the northern taken and a considerable improvement in portion of his line to supply reinforcements to' our positions between the Lawe and the the troops fighting ·from Cambrai to the Oise· Clarence Rivers was effected. Meanwhile the ha,d not escaped German observation, and it French troops had been coming up and had therefore seemed to afford a favourable oppor­ taken over the ' line in the neighbourhood of tunity for an attack in the direction of Armen­ tieres. The operations, frorn the German pbint of view, were divisible into three periods. The' first, which began on April 9th, allowed von Quast to push forward with his army to the­ line Festub ert~Arment i e r es . On the next day Sixt von Armin attacked between Hollebeke and Armentieres, and the following day these­ two armies continued the forward movement. From April 16-18 the advance of these troops was continued and had as a consequence the gradual abandonment of the forward position at Passchendaele. The direction of the German attack lay across the valley of the Lys, over' the flat ground which lay south of the chalk ridge which extended from Mont des Cats to' K emmel towards H azebrouck. The ground was exceedingly mar"shy in character and covered with hedges and plantations which hindered the VIeW. It was not possible to· GENERAL VON QUAST. construct such deep and strong entrenchments Commanded German troops between Armentieres as had been made in more favourable ground, and La Bassee. and the only set-off against this was that the THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 207

numerous farms and groups of buildings allowed southernmost of that was the weakest and the construction of many favourable supporting was to play, chiefly, a defensive part. Of pqints. The river lines of the ,Lawe and Lys the remaining four, the right was intended to formed fairly favourable lines for the defence, pass to the south of Armentieres, and the some three and a half miles behind the front three central columns constituted the principal line of trenches. The Lawe joined the Lys at attack. The German troops to the south of La Bassee, without leaving their positions, were told off to pour a lively fire against the opposing British lines, while the corps of von Kraevel attacked on'the line through Givenchy, La Bassee, Festubert, and Richebourg l' A voue. The attack at first was very successful, and

GENERAL VON BERNHARDI. Commanded an Army Corps. Estaires. Behind the Lawe was the Clarence. Beyond the Lawe and the Lys the ground was first flat and then, beyond the forest of Nieppe, rose gradually until the heights to the south-east of Hazebrouck were reached. It was therefore desirable from the German point of view to push forward as rapidly as possible across the rivers and attain the better ground. The condition had not been made more easy by the fact that heavy showers in the days that immediately preceded the attack had increased GENERAL VON CARLOWITZ. the difficulties of movement. Craters and Commanded an Army Corps. trenches, and even the open country, were largely under water, while the few roads which by 10 o'clock the English third line had been lay across it had been destroyed by-artillery pierced. Then the difficulties of the gr01md fire. The assembly of the German troops was began to have their influence. It was impos- but little disturbed by the British, and at 4.15 . sible to make furti'ler progress without the on the 9th the preparatory bombardment support of artillery, and this was almost opened, the infantry assault beginning at impossible to bring up. Every crater in the, 8.45, under cover of thick fog. The German ground was full of water. The roads were useless, attack was divided up into five columns. The and it required ' the most strenuous exertions 298 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE liVAR.

of men and horses to bring any guns up to the centrations of machine-g lns poured their fire front. But the exertions of the German on the passages where the bridges had already engineers, however, allowed some to be brought been destroyed, and swept the opposite bank forward, notwithstanding -the British Field with their fire. But towards evening Hofer's Artillery, which had arranged Qeforehand to Brigade managed to pass over the Lys at the sweep the ground with its fire. lock by Bac St. Maur and threw up a protective bridge-head at Croix du Bac. During the night further passages were won east of Estaires, west of Le Marais fann, and to the south of Vieille Chapelle. This allowed a further advance of the Germans, and especially per­ mitted the south flank of Sixt von Armin's troops to advance. The task of this portion of the rno1'e northern German Army was not so difficult as the Lys was quite close to the German trenches, either before or behind them, and was easily passed. But to the north the ground towards Messines and Wytschaete was more difficult of approach and was strongly defended. Messines was surrounded and taken and powerful counter-attacks were driven Q~ck ; the

GENERAL VON KRAEVEL. Commanded an Army Corps. The British resistance on both flanks by Armentieres and on the south bank by Givench;r and -Festubert stopped the German attack, and although Richebourg l'Avoue was taken there was not much fUrther progress on this flank. Armentieres was not seriously attacked. In the centre the German made better progress. The British artillery does not appear to have had so much effect here, and this enabled the Germans to bring their guns and mine-throwers farther forward. The troops of General von Bernhardi stormed Richebourg St. Vaast and Lacouture, and by evening reached the neighbourhood of the GENERAL VON EBERHARDT. Lawe. The column on the right of Bernhardi, Commanded the Prussian 10th Reserve Corps. unde:: General von Carlowitz, captured Germans were equally successful in the attacks Laventie and pushed on to the Lys, where they on the wood south-west of Hollebeke, and they found the passages behind Sailly and Estai1'es pushed on farther towards VVytschaete. South blown up. The right column, under von of this part of the field, Ploegsteert and Le Bizet Stettin, taking Bois Gren1er in flank, moved on (on the road from Ploegsteert Wood to Armen­ Fleurbaix and then reached the Lys at Bac tieres) were taken, but the wood itself was St. Maur, successfully held, which compelled the Germans In the meantime the B~itish had brought up to pass by on the other side of it. Houplines, their reserves to the far side of the Lawe and near Armentiere~, was taken, though the town the Ly~ to positions which were to be found itself was not touched, but connexion was behind these natural obstacles. Strong con- made with the army of von Quast. On April 10 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 299 fighting was renewed, and met with opposition On April 11 Wytschaete was for a time in from the newly-arrived British reserves. Von the Germans' possession, but was eventually Hofer, however, was enabled to push forward lost by them, though the German line was firmly from Croix du Bac and captured Steenwerck, established on the eastern edge of the village and thereby facilitated the passage of German and moved forward about 1,100 yards to the troops over the Lys at Erquinghem. More east of Wulverghem towards the south. Between to the south, in the neighbourhood of Estaires, the Douve brook and the eastern edge of the Germans met with strong resistance, Ploegsteert Wood von Eberhardt followed up especially by Sailly. South of Estaires the the retreating British, broke through with German engineers Inanaged to throw a bridge, their left wing by Romarin and joined on and the troops coming over it attacked Estaires by Pont de Nieppe the southern t'.ssa~ting in flank and rear, and eventually captured c~llUnn. Von Stettin on April 11 had pushed the village. Genera'] von Bernhardi's right flank his outpost line as far as La ChapelIe attacked the passage over the Lawe at L e d'Armentieres, and on the night of April 11112,

~Officz,a t pluJ t ogl'aPJ~ ­ AN OUTPOST IN OUR FRONT LINES IN FLANDERS.

Gorgue, and also beat back the British counter­ advanced towards Rouplines. Further pro-. attacks from the direction of Lestrem and gress was made between Al'mentieres and Vieille ChapelIe. Later in the day the Germans the Lys. The river was crossed and were able to penetrate between these two N ieppe taken. Armentieres itself was points and secure a further passage over the surrounded, and the garrison a.fter a bitter Lawe. resistance surrendered in the afternoon of the The Germans found the greatest opposition 11 th. In the meantime the German forces in the r egion of Bethlme, where the British which had been pushed forward towards the were defending the mining ground in that neigh­ north-west, after a fluctuating fight, captured bourhood. Here General von Kraevel's troops the station of Steenwerck, and thus guarded the . bravely resisted the cOLmter-attacks of their right of the rnovem ent against attack, and put opponents, but were obliged to content them­ them in a position to advance on the line selves with a moderate advance and a concen­ Dailleul-N euve Eglise and the Kemmel H eights trated artillery fire to stop their enemy's progress. to the north of it. 230 -3 BOO THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

HAZEBROUCK: THE GRANDE PLACid.:. As it was at the beginning of the war.

More to the south the right wing of General Kemmel heights, which were nece~sary to von Carlowitz after severe fighting, took protect the further advance westward of their Doulieu, while his left wing penetrated into troops over the lower ground. Neuf Berquin as far as the church. General On April 13, the left of Sixt von Armin's von Bernhardi, after passing the Lawe at La army, supported by the right wing of von Gorgue, won forward to Merville, while the 'left Quast, took N euve Eglise and the heights t o of bis fl!lrce took Lestrem and then Pacaut, and, the left (the Ravelsberg). wheeling to the right, moved . on Merville, There was practically no change on April 14, which was taken after a stubborn defel1ge but the n ext day further successes were gained. . between 1 0 and 11 0' clock. In the early morning Sieger's Corps, after a The advance between Lestrem and Vieille short artillery preparation, captured the Chapelle led to huther enemy progress towards trenches east of ' iVulverghem, and then the La Tombe-Willot and BouzetelL"'C. VonKraevel, village itself, advanced over the Wytschaete­ in spite of a very determined resistance and ' iVnlverghem road and seized, after a hand­ the repuJse of many counter-attacks, eventual ly grenade fight, three of the great craters • succeeded in capturing thE! village of Les Lobes. made by the British in the previous On April 12, thE' Germans made but little year's fighting round vVytschaete. Late in further progress. In local fights about v\Tulver­ the afternoon troops of von Eberhardt and ghem and to the north of Romarin, some advan.ce j\1arschall captured .the commanding heights was made on the line Bailleul-Neuv~ Eglise, west of vVulverghem and east of Bailleul. Over which cleared the way for the ad'vance on the rest of the front the Germans contented Kemme·l. The right flank of von Quast's themselves with consolidating the ground army took L es Trois Pipes, while von Carlo­ gained. witz's troops after taking Doulieu pushed On April 13, Carlovvitz took Merris, Vieux forward to the south of Vieux Berquin. Berquin and the village of Verte Rue, and b eat Bernhardi improved his success of the off several strong counter-attacks, and, follow­ previous day by the capture of the north ing some of these up, took many prisoners. portion of Calonne, while Kraevel took Cornet The result of the fighting up to April 15 was Malot and Locon; they thus reached· the that the German front had been pushed so far limIt Gf their task. forward as to threaten the line from Hazebrouck . In the next few days the German efforts to Poperinghe and Ypres. It also interrupted were directed against the line Bailleul-Neuve the roads leading from the south by Bailleul Eglise, with a Vle.w to the capture of the and Neuve Eglise to Ypres, and thus t,hreatened THE· TIl\!lES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 301 directly the British lines in front of the latter' flooded state of the ground in places, they now point; the result was the withdra;val of the drew rein before their strength was used up. British from the Passchendaele salient. Thf, Put in colloquial English, this means that for Germans pushed forward and on the evening of a time the Gern;.an forces had shot their bolt. April 16 occupied a line from Mangelaare­ But the battle of Armentieres, the German Langemarck - Zonnebeke-Veldhoek. On the name for what we call the battle of the Lys, same day General Sieger at 7.30 a.m. captured had not only won back the ground lost by the Wytschaete and the heights to the north-west Germans in the previous year, but had also .and west of this point. General von Eberhardt advanced far beyond what the British' had then .advanced to the valley of the Douve and the captured. Besides very heavy losses in killed K emmel brooks, and Bailleul was also occupied and wounded, about 20,000 prisoners had heen

r Officl:al photograph. ARTILLERY OFFICERS OBSERVING FROM KEMMEL HILL. by Marschall's tre>ops after its abandonment taken, 400 guns, thousands of machine-g1.lls by the British. Meteren was also captured, and large amounts of equipment and provisions thus widening the front which threatened an had been captured. advance against the heights about Mont It will be observed that there is bv.t little Kemmel, and this-village was held in spite of difference between t,he German and the British TIlany counter-attacks of British and French accolllt of the nine days' battle. troops, supported by tanks. In the next few days the continuous strength­ It must be remembered that the German -ening of the Allied forces became rnore and aim in this part of the field was 1.mdoubtedly nlOre evident. Especially did the increase in to capture Hazebrouck, with a view to a further the number of guns of heavy calibre strengthen advance against the northern ports and also the effect of their artillery bombardment, while to cut, off the northern portion of the Allied , ' I the coming up of more fresh infantry divisions line extending to the Yser, The position of Blade their resistance more formidable, the Kemn1.el heights was absolutely necessary To sum up the German view of the situation : to the Germans before this advance could be After nine days' continuous fighting in difficult carried out. Held by 1:1S it formed an excellent ground, rendered more difficult by the artillery position which took in flank any further OF TiV 30~ THE TIlvlE:-.J HISTORY THE AR

TAKING WOMEN INTO SAFETY. German advance westward. With long range . been occupied by the British. Counter-attaehs guns we could bring fire from it to bear over the made by French troops during the night and ground right up to Messines, H ollebeke and the following day were stopped by German fire. Ypres, while to the south Ploegsteert Wood and On the evening of April 24, the situation was Armentieres were within range. Its height. as follows: Nine divisions bElonging to the 300 feet above the surrounding country, gave corps of von Eberbardt and SiegeI' extended it a wide command of view, which allowed in an arc from Bleugelhoek north of Neuve observation well behind the German lines, and Eglise past Wulverghern and Wytschaete. which made the local cover afforded by houses, North of this point the German line bent hedges and plantations of very little use. backwards to the north of Hollebeke. Sieger's The capture of Kemmel did away with the danger troops were north of Wulverghem, Eberhardt's to the Germans of having their lines up to to the south. It will thus be seen that a Meteren taken in reverse by artillery fire, and heavy concentric attack wa'S intended against in turn gave them the same. widE{ outlook and the Kernmel heights. The German artillery observation which it had afforded to us when preparation had commenced on the 19th and we held it. extended on both sides of the actual point As has been seen, the first attempt to capture destined to be carried. this =-nportant point was a failure, and for the At half past three on April 25 the German next few days the fighting was comparatively artillery fire reached its fullest intensity, and insignific.ant. It was very important for von ~t 6.45 a.m. the infantry, wi*h their accompany­ Eberhardt to gain more room to the north ing artillery, went forward to the assault. for his troops so that it might be possible from Pivoting on their left flank, so as to hold in the north of Wytschaete to direct an attack on check any attack from the direction of Bailleul, the Kemmel position. the German divisions directed their efforts On April 22, his left flank occupied the with their centre and left straight . up the Salonne F'arm south-wei3t of Dranoutre, and Kemmel heights. The rest of the German the evening of the next day he attacked the force was directed against the British right, Bleugelhoek Hill, an outlyer on the south­ which was on the Messines-Kemmel road at a west of the MOlmt Kemmel ridge, which had point about half way between Kemmel and I 1HE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 303 vVytschaete. Evidently the German object the evening the British had been gradually was to turn that flank and push in between it forced back and h eld a line running from and the French on K emmel. Hill 60 to Voormezeele, then past the north of Ait~r very severe fighting the right flank Vierstraat to the jlllction with the French of von Eberhardt's men, which consisted of about La Clytte. Sieger's Corps was now in mountain troops and Bavarians, captured the touch with Eberhardt's troops and the German forward positions h eld by the Fren ch and line extended over K emmel in front of the finally reached the Kemmel crest. Several of position held by the British A consider:­ t he advanced posts occupied by the French and able amount of gr01:Lhd had been lost, and part of the village held out till the evening, to restore the situation reserves were rapidly although Kemmel village itself was taken about hurried up. 10 a.m. On the German right,. the British On April 26 a large number of fresh British lin e was h eld by the 9th ' Division and and French Divisions, after severe artillery attached troops from the 49th Division. The preparation, made a vigorous attack from the fighting, which b egan h ere at 7 a.m., was very north against the hill and village of Kemmel. severe, and heavy losses were inflicted on the The British troops employed were the 25th Germans by rifle and machine-gun fire at close Division, with troops attached from the 21st range, but eventu ally the right fl.ank of the and 49th Divisions, together with French troops 9th · Division was forced to fall back fighting The French penetrated into Kemmel village strenuously to Vierstraat, though the wood and took over 300 prisoners. According to just south of that. point still held out till one 'the German account, prisoners stated that the o'clock. order had been given that K emmel was to be Later on, the German progress extended to ret aken nQ matter at what cost. The advance the southernmost of the great craters exploded was at first fairly succeesful, but the Allied in the previous year on the Messines ridge and troops found themselves, after they had pene­ St. Eloi was taken. In the afternoon the trated into the German position, struck on attack was pushed on with great vigour against both flanks by heavy machine-gun fire, and the ground h eld by the 21st Division, and by they were unable to maintain the gro"Lmd won.

·MACHINE GUNNERS GUARDING A RIVER BANK., 304 THE TI)j,lES , HISTORY uP, THE WAR.

Troops of Sieger's Corps counter-attacked and the night of April 26/ 27 they were taken back helped to drive back the Allies. vVhile thus, in to the line Pilckem-Wieltje to the west end' the centre of the German line, the Allies' of Zilleb eke Lake and Voormezeele, and here­ counter-attack was being deaJt with9 the right they were able to make good their stand. The· flank of Sieger's corps pushed forward along retreat of the British troops was observed! the Ypres-Comin e3 Canal towards the north, from K ennnel Hill, and was also reported and reached a position between Voormezeele by von Bockmann's Corps, which was on the­ and the ~lbow of the Ypres-Comines Canal. right of Sieger's. The German troops followed' The enemy renew'ed his attacks later in up on the h eels of the retreating British, but no the IilOrning, but made little progress, and event of special moment occurred on April 28 ~ then only at a few points. Troops of the 21 st, The next day, however, a severe bombard­ 30th, 39th and 49th Divisions and the South ment of the Allied positions opened at 3.10 a.in., African Brigade of the 9th Division were all and two hours later a series of infantry attacks. engaged in severe fighting during which they was made against the French and British made several counter-attacks, which gained positions from the west of Dranoutre to Voor~ some success. The centre of von Eberhardt's mezeele, but all of these were brought to a Corps was forced slowly back by some of standstill. Against Locre many desperate these, but eventually the Germans came on a ttacks were made with a view to gaining the again and pressed them back. The French high ground behind it known as the Scherpen­ were able to take Locre, but, according berg, the object of which was to facilitate­ to the German account, this was recaptured progress westward on to Mont Rouge and Mont by them notwithstanding the strenuous defenc.e Vidaigne, which, with Mont Noir, formed a· made by the French garrison. At the end of part of the range which commenced at K emmel,. the day Kemmel Hill remained in the hands Locre itself being situated in the valley which of the Germans, notwithstanding the repeated separated these two parts. The Germans at . efforts of the Allies to turn them out of it, and one time forced an entrance into Locre, and the progress that the right flank of the German even penetrated to the orossroads between. attack had made to the north-west of Voor­ Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge, but in both. mezeele rendered the position of the British left instances French counter-attacks drove them a dangerous one. Especially did it threaten back after a very severe conflict. the line of retreat of the troops to the east of To the north of this part of the field, where Ypres. It was, therefore, determined to with­ the British held the front, the line was occupied' draw these from their salient position, and on by the 21st, 49th and 25th ·Divisions. These·

./

[Offi.ctal phol'J ~ rfl.ph. HOT WORK WITH A 6-INCH HOWITZER -oN t THE WESTERN FRONT. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 305 were attacked with great vigour about 5 a .m . a further small gain was made by the enemy and a little later. Our fire drove them back, about Voormezeele, the general line of the but after half an hour's pause the German in­ Allies was firmly held, while the Germans had fantry came on again in massed formation, with suffered enormous losses, which had brought bayonets fixed, against the 49th Division. The them to a full stop. This same day the Ger­ fire from our troops carried devastation into mans had made another attack on the Belgian their ranks, and resulted in the assailants troops holding the Ypres-Staden railway, but being forced to retreat with extremely heavy the prompt advance of the Belgian troops not losses. -The 25th Division was again attacked only drove back the German attack, but forced about half-past eight without success, and them-out of the ground they had gained in their

;J [Offi,c"lQ.t pJuJtograph. A SOLITARY POST ON A CANAL IN NORTHERN FRANCE.

throughout the morning the German infantry first attack. At this point the enemies' efforts came on again and again to attack tIns Division were entirely fruitless. and also the 49th and 21st, to which were The next day the French, by a smart COl.mter­ attached troops of the 30th and 59th Divisions. ~ttack early in the morning, drove the enemy In all these cases the attacks were made in out of the eastern portion of Locre, to dense formation, with the result that they which he had managed to cling on the 29th_ were repulsed with h eavy losses. Our artil­ According to the German accounts, the lery -fought with it.s usual ability, and in­ fighting round Kemmel had resulted in the flicted great loss on the front lines and also on capture of 8,200 prisoners, 53 guns and the troops massed behind them. Our infantry 233 machine-guns - They make no men­ not only punished the Germans by its tion of their losses, which were undoubtedly accurate fire, and in more than one-case went more severe than those of the Allies. Th3 end forward to meet them and qrove them back of the month practically terminated the with the bayonet, or at least the sight of the German efforts of further advance on thi part British troops coming on to attae;k with the of the line. bayonet decided the Germans to withdraw before the British cold st-eel reached them. We have seen that the !"ight of the French The result of the whole day was that, although on the left of the German advance against 306 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

CHAUNY, AND CHAUNY CHURCH.

slopes, which were somewhat exposed to the French fire, and from which a direct attack against them would have been very difficult. The woods behind the German trenches served to cover local movements of troops to the east ...... or west, but were of no utility from a defensive point of view. These considerations show why at first the Germans m~de great efforts to cap­ ture the ground on the right bank of the Divette, and many attacks were delivered in vain about Renaud, but finding their efforts Amiens ~as, by its position, open to a counter­ useless they pushed on ahead to Montdidier, attack from the German lines. Mont Renaud contenting themselves merely with observing may be looked upon as the strongest point in it. But as long as the French held Mont the French line between Montdidier and Ailette. Renaud it was necessary for the Germans to It is situated on the north side of the Divette, watch the ground there, lest it should form a which runs through a valleY'with steeJ;? hills on starting-point for an attack against the German either side, to join the Oise south of N oyon, and communications back to La Fere. The French stands as a sentinel on the right of the heights appear to . have thoroughly appreciated the coming down to it from Le Plemont. This objectionable position which the very pro­ river line was a fairly efficient obstacle, owing nOlmced salient offered, and early in April made to the nature' of the ground, .though the stream arrangements for withdrawal from it, thongh was not of much importance,. It had been there was no intention of moving backwards greatly strengthened by the French engineers, unless the Germans came forward. The French and as long as this was held no German advance position joined on to ours at Barisis and was possible past it directly to the south. The extended down past Freyne and Quincy to the Germans hold the opposite bank on the lower canal which connected the Oise and the Aisne. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The line in que~tion, which was occupied b:y French, and they also claim t~ have taken part of the French Sixth Army, was a difficult 1,400 prisoners. one to hold, because the marshy part of the The attack was continued the n~xt day, and lower forest of Coucy was commanded by the the French were forced back to the western high ground of St. Gobain, and it was evidently bank of the Ailette, Pierremande and Folem­ undesirable to adhere to this when a determined bray being taken. On the western side of the advance of the enemy might have interrupted forest of Coucy a hillock to the north-east of the French line between Noyon and Chauny. F6lembray, was captured, and the Germans It was, therefore, determined to retire when made good their advance as far as Verneuil necessary to a line which would do away with and took some more prisoners. They made the obtrusive salient which the French position a direct attack on Couey castle by a ravine offered at this point. which ran up towards it, and the French Between Chauny and La Fere, vVestphalian machine-guns fired into the compact mass and other troops, five divisions in all, under which came up along it, and cut down the von Boehn, after a short but powerful advancing Germans by hundreds. The French artillery preparation, advanced in the early gradually fell back on Coucy-Ie-Chateau, and morning of April 6. The attack was divided there halted to wait further developments. into hvo parts : the right he directed against Seeing that a further attack was imminent on the twin hills of Amigny and Chauny, from · April 8, it was determined to withdra:w the which a wide field of view dominates the valley whole of the French forces, with the exception of the Oise : the left against the French line of a small retaining force .left in the castle, to in the northern part of the Coucy Wood south the banks of the canal, and this was successfully of Barisis. The artillery preparations had been accomplished, the loss being very trifling, for not extremely effective, and for this reason very a single gun or machine-gun had to be aban­ little further resistance was offered, and the doned. The retaining force left in the castle heights were captured with very ·slight losses. fought with the utmost bravery, and were able The. right attack crossed th~ Oise and stormed to hold back the Germans for a considerable the suburbs of Chauny; it then proceeded on­ time. Many brave deeds were done by the French ward and a storm of artillery preparation was rear-guard in their retreat from the Coucy directed against the village of Sinceny, which Chateau, among which may be specially was captured in the late afternoon. This signalled out the gallant action of an ambulance did not satisfy the troops, who pushed man who found himself left alone in the castle farther forward on the road to Pierre.mande, with a badly-wounded soldier unable to walk. which was reached at nightfall. The left Taking him on his back, he carried him down portion attacked the French positions in to the bank of the Ailette to a bridge which Coucy \Vood and the line Bichancourt to was partially broken down. Before he could ChRlmy was reached. The attack was, cross he had to repair it, and, putting down his as in the previous operations of this n1.an, he hlmted about for a plank to repair the advance, covered by a very heavy fire of gap. This found and put in place, he hoisted artillel'Y and trench mortars, which the the man on to his back and crossed the river. Germans claim inflicted heavy loss on the H e then destroyed the t emporary r epair, leaving

Battle line

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE couey FRONT. 308 THE TIMES HiSTORY OF THE WAR. the bridge in a worse condition than before, probably what we could not take away when carried off his comrade to the nearest the French took over that portion of the front. dressing station, and proceeded to join his For the French the defeat was (in German unit. For this act of courage al'ld coolness opinion) a painful one, as it pressed them stiU he was given the Croix de Guerre. farther away from the spot where their artil­ The new French line now ran from Mont. lery was searching for the Paris guns (i.e., St. Renaud across the Oise and up the south bank Gobain). to Quierzy, whence it went south-east on the The attack on the Coucy tront was not the· only one made in the intervening period between April 10 and the renewal of the German endeavours to reach Amiens. On the night of April 9 a determined attempt was· made on the French holding Hangard, and after a severe struggle, in which the front fluctuated backwards and forwards, the enemy

was driven back. Small local attacks Wel'C also made n ear Castel on the Avre and to the· west of N oyon, but all were defeated. StilL the German Higher Command did not give up its attempt to push forward on the south of Amiens without a further effo:rt. An intense artillery preparation began on the morning of the 11th, and after continuing some hours ·the enemy launched an attack against the trenches. held by the British and French on the line H angard-Hourges. The first attacks were all driven back, but the enemy piled on division after division and after a series of furious. assaults which lasted all the day succeeded in penetrating into Hangard. Counter-attacks made by the French enabled them to r e­ capture the western part of the village, where fighting went on fiercely late into the night~ but eventually the Germans were driven out. At the HO'urges extremity, notwithstanding repeated attempts, the Germans made no pro­ [Aust1alian ojJicia.l b hoto{?ra1> ' . gress, so that the net result of the fighting GENERAL PERSHING IN FIELD UNIFORM. Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in was a small gain, subsequ ently lost, a nd France. very heavy German casualties in killed and south side of the Aisne-Oise canal and the wounded. Ailette to join on to the old line of trenches, This day, t oo, there was some fighting near a little south of Mortier. Noyon, where the enemy threatened attack On April 9, in spite of the rain. which had and massed troops for the purpose. These turned the roads into rivers of mud, the canal were, however, caught by the French artillery line of Bichancourt-Beauc01:t:rt was reached by and the advance was completely stoppecl. the Germans. The total number of prisoners On the 16th the Germans attacked at Boye ll es~ taken was estimated by them at 2,000. between Arras and Albert. The attack was This operation on a width of six to ten miles delivered in some force and with considerable was, the Germans claimed, almost equal t o pertinacity, but WR,S h eld by the British troops. that of the first British battle of Cambrai, During the time that this fighting h <1d b een which gained for us in one day's fighting going on there had been a certain number of . ground to a depth of 4-1 miles and about 2,000 local actions in the Champagne and in the prisoners. Half of the lower wood of Coucy neighb01uhood of VerduIl, but not any of was again in German hands. The booty, im.portance. Near Toul, on April 13, the which was a1rnost entirely of British make, was Germans violently bornba,rded the line held by THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W AB. 309' the Americans, north-west of the town, on the you that the American people will be proud to. right bank of the Meuse. After considerable take part in this, the greatest and most striking artillery preparation their infantry attacked, battle of history." but the Americans held their ground along Following out this idea, American troops nearly the whole line. At a few points the were brought up wherever th~y were required ;. Germans mana~ed to penetrate, but counter­ part Jought with the British; part were sent attacks drove them out with a loss of 64 down south to relieve troops of the French killed and 20 wounded, while 36 were taken First Army, which had come up to the Somme ; prisoners. others went into Italy. This explains how it· On April 10 it was officially announced that was that on April 13 Americans were fighting the Americans were taking part in the fighting. in the neighbourhood of T ou1. In the forest It had been the original intention of their of Apremont, when the Germans made a Commander-in-Chief to wait until his own vigorous attack on the French p0sitions near

[French official pho!ogmf h. A BIG FRENCH GUN TRAINED ON .. BIG BERTHA'S CRADLE."

unit:,; were sufficiently organized to enable the ' Varre Brule and gained a footing in S0111C oii American Army to take the field as an entity, the advariced portions of the line, a sharp but circumstances did not adrnit of such delay. counter-attack carried out by French and vVhen General 1"och, at the crisis of the Somme American troops in combination drove them battle, was made ComIllander-in-Chief of the out again. On this occasion 22 prisoners,. Allied fOIces in France, General Pershing came belonging to six different units, were taken by to him and spoke as follows: "I have COI11e the Americans. to tell you that the American people will hold On April 20 another attack was delivered by it a high honour that their troops should take the Germans against the American positions, part in the. present battle. I ask you to pern1.it this time against those to the west of t.his in my name and in theirs. At the present Remi€n'es Forest., north-west of Toul; 1,200 moment there is only one thing to do, to fight. German shock troops made the attack and' Infantry, artillery, aeroplanes-all that I have after a heavy bombardment penetrated the­ I put at your disposal-do what you like with American trenches and captured the village­ them, ' More will come-in fact all that may of Seicheprey. But a counter-attack was soon be. necessary. I have come expressly to tell organized against it, and after severe hand-to- / 310 'llHE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

hand fighting, in which the Germans lost very planes were shot down by our anti-aircraft fire. heavily, they were driven back, leaving the On the sarn.e date the French reported that; American positions virtually intact. Another they had brought down seven German incident of the fight was that two German machines and two of their captive b alloons, aeroplanes, attempting at a low elevati.on to besides dropping about five tons of projectiles on the stations and cantonments in the Roye region. Fighting in the air went on. On April 7, visibility being good, there was considerable air activity and some fighting with hostile aero­ planes. April 10 was not favourable for air work, but a certain amolmt of fighting took place between the low-flying aeroplanes accom­ panying the German attack and ours opposing t.hem; so misty was it, that the fighting was done at an average height of 200 ft. It met, however, with considerable success, four of the enemy's machines being brought down and three others shot down by our infantry fire. Against this we had to put a loss of seven. The next day saw a daylight raid on Luxem­ bourg station without loss to u s. Our men lOfficial photograph. GENERAL PERSHING'S HOUSE AT THE dropped a ton of bombs with good effect, and AMERIC AN HEADQUARTERS IN FRANCE. experienced no loss from the anti-aircraft gun machine-gun the American trenches, were fire. brought down by our Ally's fire. April 11 saw a good deal of fighting on the April 19 saw a smart piece of work dOlle by battle front, in which the Germans got rather the French in the Avre valley, 10 miles south­ the w'orst of it. east of Amiens on the heights west of the Avre, The n ext day th~ weather improved, and where they attacked on a line from Themmes, there was great activity in the air along the close to where the river Luce crosses the road whole front. Several long distance reconnais­ and railroad running from Moreuil to Amiens sances were made and photographs taken, and just before It joins the Avre, andMailiy-Raineval many aerial combats fought with a loss of five or six miles farther to the south. It was four of OUI' machines;. 21 of the Germans more in the nature of a sortie than a great were crashed, and 14 others driven dovvn out attack, the number of 'troops employed being of control. During the night a considerable small, but they made an advance which, at its amount of bombing was done. greatest depth, measured a mile, recovered · On April 13, the weather being very favour­ useful ground, and brought back 500 prisoners. able for flying, the war in the air increased in intensity. Large numbers of low-flying Our aircraft had done valuable work in the machines were employed in bombing and in fighting round Armentieres in spite very oft8n sweeping with machine-gun fire roads packed of most unfavourable weather. On April 6 our with the enemy's troops. Over them 36 tons machines had watched the enemy's movements of bombs were dropped, and more than 100,000 along the whole of the battle-front since rounds of amm·unition expended. dawn, and about noon reported a concen­ . While these attacks were b eing carried out, tration of hostile troops south of the Somme. other formations flying at a greater h eight Notwithstanding the rain, a large force of our were engaged by the enemy's aeroplanes, aeroplanes went up and dropped over 500 which were extremely active on this part of bombs on the enemy's assembled infantry, the front; 40 hostile aviators were brou.ght besides firing 15,000 rounds at them from their down by our men and two shot down by our machine-guns. All this was naturally not done anti-aircraft fire, and 20 of their machines were without opposition, and 13 hostile machines driven down out of control. W e also de3troyed were brought down and 11 others driven three hostile observation balloons, and with a down out of control, while two German aero- loss to ourselves of only 12 aeroplane3 missing. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 311

During the night a good deal of bombing work dropping some 23 tons of bombs. The was done. German aviators were by no means aggressive, On the next few days the weather did not apparently the experience of the past few p ermit of much aerial work, but still our men days had taught them caution, but we managed fought against the advancing German infantry to destroy 13 of their machines, and six others at low elevations with good success. were driven down out of control. This with April 21 saw an improvement in the weather, a loss of but five to ourselves. Amongst our of which our airmen took full advantage, successes was the destructIOn of the well-known firing many thousand rounds of machine-gun German airman Rittmeister Baron M. von ammunition on the German infantry, and Richthofen, who was brought down and fell in

rOfj cial ;tho/cgt(l/h. A GIANT BRITISH BOMBING PLANE BEING TUNED UP. 312 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. our lines. He was credited by the Germans main effort of the Germans, or, rather, that it with having destroyed 80 of our ,machines. might be found more desirable to make that He was a gallant man and a chivalrous fighter. effort in another direction. His body was interred by us with full military The principal aim of the German Command is the honours. weakening of the enemy, and as t his result can only be The examples that have been given are obtained by big battles, the German leaders will not only . n ot avoid the latter, J:-.. ut will force them on. By this I ·typical of the air fighting in the field abQut do not m ean to sa y /:,h a t this a im will be carried out on Armentieres. t he pre~e nt ba ttlefield; it n:.ay be a ttempted on a ny portion of the ot her front!:: .

Some of the German comments on the . The Germans were legitimately proud of the situation are quite worthy of record as showing great successes they obtained in,· thE: first days the varying views put forward as the fighting of the offen~jve. Said the Nardde?!.ttrench warfare, which had lasted for three years and a half, with three Armies on the defensive, This was certainly not Foch's idea, but we into a war of movem'ent., and try to reali se the trem endous must remember that he did not come into full preparations, in addition to the m ere "nlo,ring of huge -command of all the Allied forces till March 26, masses of troop.:; nece<:;s ary for the successful completion of our break ,through, we must see that it is a sheer and up to that date there was good reason impcssibility to advance at the !': ame r a te as during t he for supposing that PMain had thought the last few days, when the troops often covered 12 ~ile s a day. protection of Paris the most important duty he had to perform. However, from the moment At the end of March, German opinion was ·that Foch came into office it was evident that " that our victorious course is not to be checked. he was determined to maintain an united front. Its objectives have been decided upon and and to resist to the end every German attempt everything has been taken int.o calculation." to separate the French and British Armies. It may here be< remarked that when English Von Ardenne, in the Berl1:ner Taqe9latt of papers published the fact that documents had March 26, showed that he fully appreciated the been found on Germarl prisoners which showed possibilit.y of the Somme Y battle not being the that the objectives laid down at the commence·

[Official photogral" FUNERAL- OF BARON VON HICHTHOFEN. THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 31B

RICHTHOFEN'S WRECKED MACHINE AND HIS GUNS.

m ent of the attack were not reached, "in sacred duty if th~ y tried to do otherwise, for' war is always so great an evil that it cannot be ended quickly accordance with plan," denials at once appeared enough . It follow;: , therefore, that it is necessary to ill the German Press. This seems to be some­ at.tack , because the offonsive alone can bring a vict orious what contradictory to the abnve statement, peace, indep endent' of the wiII of the enemy. Trench w arfare m eans the ind.efinite prolongation of the war • \vhich was made in the F rankfurter Zeitung of with all its injuries and dis~ dvantage3 . This nec8ssity March 30. Still there appears to have been, was bitterly f ~ lt for years, so long as wo ha d t o divide our foroe<; between East a nd W eq t . With lis, it was notwithstanding' the pffian of victory shouted only a m easure of necessity: for the British a nd Fren ch <; 0 loudly, some faint glimmering of doubt as it was a sign of impotence. ' Through all these years, in to whether the great. ideas on which the countless a ttaoks, they h ave rightly endeavoul'ed to get rid of t rench warfare a nd restore open fight ing, but all a dvance was based would be ' altogether t heir a ttempts broke d own against the lillshatter able a ttainec!,. At the end of the mOLth we are told wall of t h e resistance of our troopC' . The d elight of the E nt ente knew no bound8. Still, " thp. conquest, of Paris, with which our fireside as I have already rem arked , everything on earth is strategists are already busying themselves, rela tive. First and last, Hindenburg always dictates the m ethods of' fighting. The enemy has to foHow his hardly plays a part in our calculations. It is lead, presuma bly flven when h e r f> treat 'l, and aB long as urgent.ly necessary to utter a warning against , tris is the case there is n o question of ~ sta11dstiil in an y' causing unnecessary excitement at home by sense. The en emy i" obligod to UBe his reserves wherever Hindenburg wishes. This is t he mosP stt'iking feature such fi:mciful suggestions ," This somewhat of the present period of the fi ghting-the enemy has ye t conveys the impression that at the end of the a ttempted no stra t egio oounter-attack. Hindenburg's first positions h 9.ve hypnotised the enemy q ommand : first nine days' fighting the results did not look a ll they seem oapable of doing is to rush up one division so promising as had been hoped when it was after another and , pla ce them wherever the German fitart.ed, pressure seems greatest. Our en emy is incapable a pparen t ly, of any origina l t,hought; theyadoptfl d the According to Gaedke, the vvell-kno~Y n German ideas of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in t.he construct,ion military critic, the b eginning of the German of t heir tren oh syst em. . offensive was regarded by us as evidence of the The last remark was undoubtedly justified, b ast e with which the German High Comman d as we had adopted the system of an outpost \O\ ' R . ~ trying to end the war. line occupied only by machine gunners. This only shows ignora nce of the conclitions n ecessary Further, we are informed that the whole count ry a s for mi li tary success. Evt3 ry High Command must far as and even beyond Paris consist ed of lines of l w ,! 11l'<1 J1y endeavour t o end t he war a s quickly as their tren ches, one behind the other, and they h ad llsed more st ren h : b perrr. it- <; . It wonld be a breach of t heir most ba rbed wire than in a whole year previously. 31t..< THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

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Their tact,ics h'ld been founded on Hinden­ tralian divisions which were destined to play bllrg's system of elastic defer:.@e. a great part in resisting the German advance The Germans were quite certain there could from the apex of the salient which threatened be no question of direct concerted action on Amiens. the part of the British and French forces as a When the German offensive commenced on result of the unity of command, March 21 the five Australian divisions were in The interruption of railway traffic bet.ween Albert and Flanders, three being in the front line, or in Amiens had put a stop to that idea, The fronts h aving close support, while th~ Third and Fourth been divided into two separate sectors the British can only bring up troops to the northern battle area-1:,':!., the were somewhat farther back. north side of the Avre·Somme line-and the French control t h e reo·t of France. The British, "ith t.heir railway system thus awkwardly affected, are in an extremely tight corner. They can only h ave one aim now, to cnde::1vour by every means at their disposal to re-establish a fresh firm line, even if it be only thinly held, so that the German advance may be .stemmed. Only in this way can catastrophe be averted, The remark of the Vossische Z eitu.ng of April 2 is well worthy of note:

ThA idea of victory must be revived in lB by Clll'rent events. Peace is certainly on the horizon; the ice has been broken. I write this bnin!?: well aware that t he city reader [i.e., thf> Bel'lin reader] has bccome a h ardened scep tic, t.hat his daily question is, " When shall we have peace? ,. Hindenburg's victory in the \Vest h as brought peace appreciably nearer. The hme is now ripe for the reappearance of optimism in our capital. General Foch's plan was very differont from that which was hoped for by the Versailles Council, becaill'e now at tho best. t he reserve army will not be able to d ecide the war, but only to avert catastrophe from the British Army, because Foch could .c hoose neither t h e time nor th(J place for the offensive. At first Foch was compelled [O fl;c~ al photograph. to put in his troops wherever they were want,eel, but A MACHINE-GUN POSITION. they admit h e did sUf'cecd in resisting on the Upper Avre long enough for tIle E nglish t.o place t hemselves in front On March 24 and 25, the 3rd and 4th Di­ of Amiens for the Thircl French Army to gain !'t firm visions were ordered 'to the south of Arras, footing close behind l\'[ontdidier and Noyon. On the where it was the original intention to use other hand, Foch did not su cceed in gaining a positive strategic su ccess on the lines of his plan. them as an in'lmediate support, but the swift It may be permitted here to remark that it. progress of the German advance caused them is always foolish to prophesy, especially in the to be sent still 'more to the south, and on the bloody drama of war in which the psychical 25th they were detrained at Doullens, where plays so important a part, until after the eVEi nt. one brigade-the 4th Infantry Brigade-·was The German view of the situation so far as pushed up into the' front line to stop the the fighting was concerned may be taken from German advance at Hebuterne, where it was a r eport of a senior officer given in the wireless employed for the next month, taking part in of April 11. "The difficulties of the attack somewhat severe fighting. The other two lay chiefly in the condition of the cOl.mtry. brigades of the 4t.h Australian Division, aft.er The ground was so soaked and the newly made marchu'lg all night, reached in the early shell-holes filled with water as to make any morning t.he gr01md on the Amiens side of advance very difficult, and the British there­ Albert, and here they learned of the severe fore appear to have regarded an attack in fighting which the Fifth' Army had been such conditions as uTIpossible, and. had there­ exposed to and of its retreat. The two Aus­ fore appreciably weakened their line here. tralian brigades took. up a line west of Albert The enemy's artillery had been silenced and and Dernancourt on the Ancre, and the 3rd the enemy's infantry positions had been Division a line from the Ancre to the Somme. Before the Australian line could be properly shelled and were ripe for ~he assault. The German infantry masses pressed forward un­ organized and before their guns had all arrived. ceasingly, and simply overran the deeply they were incessantly attacked by the Germans fortified line of advance for five miles." at Dernancourt and n ear Morlancourt, where they inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Let us now deal with the work of the Aus- On March 30 the attempt to pierce the 3rd 316 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

~ustralian Division was defeated; but our Division now came up, so that the whole lir e troops holding the line from Hamel south of the from Albert to the French was now held 1 y Somme were driven back, ' and the enemy's Australian troops stretched out in a thin lir e advance on Villers-Bretonneux and Hangard without reserve. was thus getting dangerously near ...~iens. On April 5 a fresh German attack was made Meanwhile the 5th and 2nd AUBtralian Divisions with four divisions against the two brigades had come up and their reserve brigades were of the 4th Australian Division at . Dernan­ sent forward and occupied a line about a mile court near Albert. After very severe fighting and a half in front of Villers-Bretonneux they managed to drive the enemy b ack and On April 4-5 the Germans, as we know (Chap­ practically maintained their position. The ter CCLXVII, p. 193), launched two converging situation here then was. that the two British attacks towards funiens, that of the 4th was divisions, the Australians and the N ew Zea­ towards the village of Villers-BretollllelL"I{, where landers, now held the line £rorn I-Iebuterne t o they drove in the British on the north-east of Hangard, the only reserve b eing the 1st the village, but the Australians in front of the Australian Division' which had b een brought. town held thcirgr01md, and the British cavalry down from the north at Messines, where they coming up restored the situation. In the handed over the line to the battle-worn trool) ~ afternoon, the Germans again drove back the who had been brought up from the Somme right of the Austrabans and the troops on the The situ ation remained much the sanle for' right of them, but a counter-attack of two the next fortnight, the only change b eing that Australian battalions and one of a London ' the line in front of Villers-BretonnelLx was regiment r e-estaOlished the line in front of handed over to the 8th British division, Villers-Bretonneux, although tho Germans still thus enabling the Australians to concentral e held a part of their defence towards Hangard. more effectively f9r the defence of the line In the evening the 5th Australian Brigade held. was hurried up to support the troops in Villers­ On April 23, four German divisions were BretonnelL"I{. The next day it was detached employed against the British portion of the southwards and put in next the French at line, and h ere, for the first occasion, German Hangard Wood. The rest of the 5th Australian and British tanks came into conflict on the

AUSTRALIAN DISPATCH RIDERS. THE TiMES HiSTORY OF THE WAR. 317

[A ustralian official pl;otcgraph. AUSTRALIANS IN A SUNKEN ROAD. Allied front between the Somme and the Avre through belts of wire and join up with thE} Valleys. The usual fog favoured the Germans, 15th Brigade in position in front of the town. and about 6.30 a.m., after an intensive bom.­ This was practically accomplished before dawn, bardment, which had begun three hours so that the Germans in Villers-Bretonneux previously, the Germans advanced against the and the woods were surr01mded by our troops. whole British front south of the Sonnne. O"LtI' infantry and t.anks also did exc81Ient work German tanks broke through our line south of in gathering up the Germans. Thus, two Villers-Bretonneux and, turning north and battalions 6f the 8th Division, on the n10rning south, opened the way for their infantry. of April 21, pushed through the streets, meeting These eame on. A severe infantry attack took with house-to'-house resistance, but, aicled by place, in ~vhich great losses were infiieted on tanks, they completely overcame it and thE} the German infantry by O"LU infantry fire and village was again in our possession. also .by our light tanks, but event.ually the J n addition to the losses inflicted, W8 captured enemy gained possession of Villers-Breton­ ] ,000 prisoners .and also the German tank, the neux. On the edge of t·he wood, to the west of "Elfriecle," which had been abandoned, and this place, a counter-attack by t.he 8th Division was broLlght into our lines (see picture, p. 49)_ stopped any further progress. To the south From April 24, the Aust.ralians were left on sonle of our heavy tanks drove back the the Villers-Bretonneux front extending from German tanks, and thus stopped the infantry the Ancre across the Somme to the French attacks some distance to the east of Cachy. position about Hangard. The Germans madE} Korth of VilleTs-Bretonneux all attacks were no further attack against these troops, which repulsed. During the night a brigade of the now covered the immf1diate approach to 18th Division a,nd the . 13th and 15th Brigades . Amiens. On the contrary. it was the turn of of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions made a the Australians to 1'11ake many useful small­ brilliant counter-attack under circumstances of advances, which greatly improved our line. In great difficulty, as the whole of the plan had succession they took from the Germans Villes, to be worked out in detail in so short a time. Treux, Morlallcourt, Sailly-le-Sec, and points The ] 3th Brigade had never been near the in front of Villers-Bretonneux. . Altogether, ground. It had to advance two miles by night during the next few months, before t.he great in the face of many machine-glill positions and offensive, about fifteen smart affairs were 318 'rHE TIjVIES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

r

[Official P hOLO{! aph. GOING UP TO THE FRONT.

fought in front of Amiens, and some 3,000. for the purpose, and their own machines were prisoners were taken. extraordinarily clumsy and inefficient. They therefore relied upon an extremely h eavy The period of the war just described marks concentration of artillery, combined with the a consIderable departure from the previous fire of an imInense number of trench nlortars, methods, of which the initiation was un­ to cut through the wire entanglements. These doubtedly due to the British attack on Cambrai preparations, which only lasted a few hours, in the autumn of 1917. It, was the Brst occasion did not give rise on our part to any large on which the lengthy pn~ lirninary bombardment concentration of reserves to meet them, for the • before the infantry attack was omitted. best of rea~ons-Sir Douglas Haig had none at Now it must be evident that a . long pre­ his disposal. It was a certainty from the first parat'ory artillery fire n ecessarily indicates to that the long-drawn-out line of the .5th Army the enemy the point selected for the attack. was liable to be broken by a sudden and resolute _ No matter how much the assfl:ulting party m8,y assault. Artillery tire was, of course, met by €I~deavour to hide this by extending the area artillery fire, and our guns were in ' sufficient over which the shell fire is distributed, in the numbers to deal to a great extent with the very nature of the case the preparation.must b e batteries of the Germans in known positions, most intense where the actual assault is to be but the fog which covered the growld well on dp.livered. This accounts very la.rgely for the to midday on the opening day of the fight feeble results of our previous offensives. The prevented our artillery concentrating against Germans knew just as well as we did where the the moving masses of infantry over ground on attack was to be delivered and made arrange ­ which it was impossible to see where they were, ments accordingly. In the Cambrai attack so that they thus advanced almost unscathed the preliminary bombardment was no indication by shell fire. of what was about to happen. Short and The Germans had, as we know, introduced intense bombardments had often been carr.ied the use of poison gas, in spite of the prohibition out without their being followed by infantry of the Hague Convention: but while, in its attacks. On this occasion the wire entangle- . origiJ?al form, it had been u seful as a defensive ments were destroyed by our tanks, which thus . Ineasure, and even to cover an offensive prepared passages for the advance of our nlovement over a short space, its range had infantry. In the German March offensive a been so limited that immediately behind the similar procedure was not possible, for the fighting line it produced little or no effect. Germans had not got tanks in sufficient numbers But by the use of gas shells this had been THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. altered. It was now possible to bombard om the enemy, under modern conditions, knows battery positions with lethal shells, which would the position of the opposing troops and is at any rate hinder, if they did not destroy, the nearly always aware of the point at which gun detachments. The combination employed guns are concentrated, and hence can deal was ingenious: agai.nst our battery positions with them. On the other hand the defensive, 70 per , cent of the shells fired cont~ined gas equally well informed as to the position of which irritatf'd the nope and throat (tear­ what may be described as the enemy's opening producing gas), 10 per cent. were poison gas fire batteries, has t ·:) rely on observation pure and simple, and 20 per cent. high ex­ during the · fight for artillery fire against the plosive. The idea appears to have been that ever shifting positions of the infantry advance. the irritating shell s would lead the men to We have seen that fog interfered very con­ remove their masks, when the poison shells siderably with this. But it did more. The would affp,ct them. The high explosives were, Germans had gathered together an i ~~~ense of CO"lITse, intended for destructive purposes number of mine-throwers, i.e., short-range pure and simple. When the b::>mbardment of artillery throwing shells of considerable power, the i.nfantry positions was "lmdertaken, and and on these they relied very largely for the the creeping barrage brought into play, while destruction of our wire entanglements. They the poison-ga'-' shells were kept at 10 per cent. of knew our positions, ·they had arranged before the number employed, the irritating shells were where the mine-throwing weapons were to be reduced to 30 per cent. and the high explosiv8s placed, and hence the fire from them was increased to 60 per cent. There is no doubt accurate. Moreover, owing to the weather that this long-range gas-bom.hardment was of it was impossible for us to spot these posit.ions, some utility, and tended at any rate to which were rendered invisible so long as the (hrninish our artillery fire. But our gas-masks fog held. This short-range powerful project.ile were efficacious and our ca~lJalties from gas artillery, quite a mode~n feature in war, was were not h eavy. The effect of the German gas on tl1is occasion employed to a hitherto shells was, therefore, comparatively unim­ unheard-of extent. Hence it was that the portant. British army was exposed to an extremely Now it must be observed. that in the attack heavy ~e, to. which it could not efficiently •

ulfic~at pn~to5 r aPh. A DEMONSTRATION OF LIQUID FIRE AND THE MAN WHO OPERATES IT. :

320 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR. 321

[French official photograph. BOMBARDMENT OF A GERMAN FACTORY BY FRENCH AIRMEN. The factory may be seen on fire. The nearest bombs appear to be falling wide of their mark, but this is an illusion due to the ohlique direction of their fall.

tion, nor even if they had been were there the situation been regarded from the proper enough troops in local reserve to garrison them. point of view, i.e., that the whole Allied front Our troops were not surprised, they knew the formed a concrete whole which could not he attack was coming. But in the. circumstances organized in segments without liability to a it is not to be wondered at that they were solut,ion of continuity at the meeting points of .. defeated; t he wonder is that, taking all these these segments, viz., at the j1..mction of the factors into consideration, they held out as well different nationalities holding them, so crit~ca: l as they did. There is no doubt that about a position would not have arisen. March 25 the situation was a critical one. The Germans, as we .have seen (Chapter But it was saved by the support given to our CCLXIII, pp. 38 & 47), believed that if they t.oo weak line by the French.' struck at the point where the British lin eceas~d 322 THE TIMR8 HI8'1 'ORY OF THE WAR.

[A ItSil'aiian afficial photO,!'Y?cI' i WRECKED MACHINERY IN A FACTORY IN NORTHERN FRANCE. and the French line began they would be able to the French line between Verd1.ill and Nancy. break them asunder. They knew that the position The latter hypothesis must b e ruled out of the French Army of Reserve was such that it because it would have been too eccentric would take some time for it to come up in any to the advance on the Franco-Brit,ish considerable strength to aid the British. It will junction point and would have involved too be remembered that only the Third French Army large a deduction of force from what was was at first available, for the small force .de­ distinctly the line from which the grtatest tached from the Sixt.h French Army which was results were to be obtained, i.e., the direction on the right of the Fift.h British Army at Barisis which the Germans selected. Moreover it and to the south was only a very small nne and must be remembered that this double line quite insufficient to bring 11p Sir Hubert Gough's of attack had been effectually beaten on army to an equality of strength with the large August 27, 1914 (se8 Vol. XVII, p. 208), German numbe.rs opposed to hllTl (Chapter The Germans then had not sufficient strength CCLXIII, p. 55). The next reinforcements to to carry out the offensive against the right arrive were those front the First French Army flank of the Allies and also against their left round Toul. Toul to Montdidier is a distance of flank; much less had they now. It would about 150 miles. It was "a gamble" to oppose seem, therefore, to have been b etter to have the Fifth British Army to attaclc by the very had a considerable part of the French R eserve superior numbers it was quite certain would Army nearer to their left flank and more be brought against it. It was another gamble easily available to help the British right flank. to have the reinforcements, which in all human This was not done and the British right was probability would be needed, such i:1 long driven in and the flood of invasion only way off from the point at whic~ they would stopped with diffcculty, almost certainly be required. It may be urged The political and personal difficulties whic·h that the first duty of the French was to impeded the establishment of a sin.~ l e, united protect Paris, and that it was not certain command have already been explained (Vol. whether ' the Germans would attack the XVII, Chapter CCLIV), and it has b een seen French from the neighbourhood of Reims 01' how nothing but the m enace of overwhelming whether they would direct the assaults against disaster produced the necessary decision But THE TIMES HIS TORY OF THE WAR. 823 it will be well to emphasize afresh the lessons of r hetoric into reality, from speech into strategy." t h e great battles which have just b een described. The only possible u se such a 00lmcil could be The Supreme War Council was formed in the was denied to it--it had" no executive power." middle of November, 1917, "with a view to the The only practical good that the Council in­ b etter co-ordination of military action on the augurated was the formation of a committee vVestern front." "It was to watch over the for the control and distribution of the Allied general conduct of the war ... to prepare reserves, at the head of which General Foch r ecommendations for the decision of the was placed. But the only common-sense G overnments and k eep itself informed of solution of the problem was- complet e and t h eir execution and report thereon to the entire unity of command under one m an. il.'esp ective Governments. . . . The meetings Instant and rapid decisions are necessary for {)f the Supren'le War Council will take place success in war against a rational opponent. a t least once a month." But all the time 'iVe know that when the great Duke of Marl­ " the l\1lilitary Staffs and military commands borough was moving down to the banuhe in {)f the Armies of each Power remain responsible 1704, the remarkable arrangement was made to their respective Governments." that he should command the Army one day This r epresented the limit of agreement which and the Elector of Baden the next. But could be reached at the date in question. But ' even two hundred yea,rs ago it was not proposed it ,is difficult to see how the actions of the to put the command in commission between various Allied armies could have been quickly three or four generals. * 'iV e know what the 'co-ordinated by it towards the 'common end­ result was in 1704, how Marlborough had to t he destruction of the enemy, which is the storm the lines of Schellenberg in the evening first and the last and the only object of an because he knew that if he did not the Elector proper ly conceived and properly carried out wOLud certainly not do so the next day. Had {)perations of war. To use Mr. Lloyd George's {)wn words, the Allies had passed endl8ss * Ther t3 were Belgian, Briti<;h, French, Italian, and U nited State" troop» all engaged in the 'Vestern theatre resolutions but had never passed "from of war .

[Canadian Wa' R e ~ o ,. as. THE NEWSBOY IN THE TRENCHES. A little French boy selling English papers. 324 THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

he refrained, it is doubtful if the victory by all ranks of our Army under the most trying of Blenheim would have been gained by circumstances. him. " Many amongst us now are tired. To those The Supreme Council was an excellent I would salY that victory will belong to the side institution, which continued to perform valuable which holds out the longest. fLmctions to the end of the war. But.it COllld "The French Army is moving rapidly and not possibly create the proper co-ordination in great force to our support. between the French and the British, as was " There is no other course open to us but to clearly shown when the German blow was fight it out. Every position must be held to struck. It was not until March 26, 1918, when the last man; there must be no retirement. l\1arsha} ]'och had been given supreme direction With our backs to the wall, and b,elieving in of the strategy of all the Allied Armies on the the justice of our cause, each one of us must "'? estern front, that there was breathed through fight on to the end. the whole of the Allied forces a spirit very " The safety of 01.11' homes and the freedom of different from that which had hitherto existed. mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each The new commander had one idea and one only, one of us at this critical moment." . to ensure the mutual support between the vari­ W ell did our troops fulfil their duty and ous armies, to ensure their proper co-ordination hold grin11y on to the grolmd they were defend­ for the one thing needful-the overthrow of the ing. But it must be remembered that we had eneluy. but 56 divisions in all to oppose the German The results were soon made evident-the host, and that without 01.11' Ally's aid the German advance on Amiens was stoPVed. heroic resistance which stopped the northern 'When the E1flemy then tnrned his attention to irruption at Kemmel, as the southern had been the region of the Lys, French troops were dammed in front of Amiens, would not have sent up there to strengthen the sorely tried been possible British troops there. How critical the situa­ The result of the fighting was to exhaust tion was at one time is shown by the British the German efforts. Superiority in numbers Conllllander-in-Chief's order to the British Army had not availed against the stubborn bravery un April 11 :- of the .Franco-British soldiers, the very energy "To all ranks of the British ~my in lfrance of t~e enemy which led him to make attack and Flanders. after a~tack, each involving huge sacrifices, was "Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began to destroy the" will to victory " in his troops. his terrific attacks against us on a 50-mile His gain in territory was considerable, but front. His objects are to separate us from the although on the north and south he could French, to take the Channel Pm-ts, and destroy look on the Promised Land of Hazebrouck the British Army. a.nd Amiens in front of him, in both directior. s "In spite of throwing already 106 divisions lay the still unconquered foroes which stopped into the battle, a~d enduring 'the most reckless all further progress. The object of war is the sacrifice of human life, he has, as yet, made destruction of the opponent's military forces. little progress towards his goals. We owe this The casualties the Germans had inflicted on to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of themselves by tl}eir vigorous but vain attacks, 01,11' troops. which led to no decision, were the first step "Words fail me to express the admiration towards our final success, for the very heavy which I feel for the splendid resistance offered losses he had .suffered he could not replace.