‘NO TIME FOR TEARS FOR THE DYING’: STRETCHER-BEARERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-1918.

Liana Markovich

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of New South Wales, Canberra School of Humanities and Social Sciences

November 2015

ABSTRACT : ‘NO TIME FOR TEARS FOR THE DYING’: STRETCHER- BEARERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-1918.

In the century since the Great War began there has been little research into the war experience of British, Indian and Dominion stretcher-bearers that served the Western Front. The unarmed regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers provided a key role in the provision of health care on the Western Front and carried out their duties in the same conditions faced by combatant personnel. Yet the stretcher-bearers are largely absent from the common military narrative of ‘fighter and gallant hero’; the study of military medicine, the Army Medical Service and its Corps has subsumed their wartime experience.

Stretcher-bearers dealt with sick, badly wounded, horribly maimed and dying men on a daily basis. Charged with the task of removing the sick and wounded from the battlefields, they saved the lives of countless men. What we do know of these men, is generally found in the narratives of the wounded; as very few stretcher-bearers have told their own story. This thesis significantly adds to the knowledge of this group of non-combatants. An examination of the problems and challenges faced by this group of non-combatants, which negatively affected their work, is given. These problems derived from either internal Army issues, from external forces or a combination of both.

This thesis significantly contributes to the knowledge of the Great War by providing a human dimension to the work and place of these non-combatants. The stretcher-bearers assessed by this thesis are from Australia, Britain, Canada,

India, New Zealand and Newfoundland.

i Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

TEXT NOTE ...... v

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...... v

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS, MAPS, TABLES AND CHARTS ...... vii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1 – 1873 – 1914: THE ARMY MEDICAL CORPS ...... 31

CHAPTER 2 – THE STRETCHER-BEARERS ...... 70

CHAPTER 3 – 1914 ...... 96

CHAPTER 4 – 1915 ...... 131

CHAPTER 5 – 1916 ...... 167

CHAPTER 6 – 1917 ...... 206

CHAPTER 7 – 1918 ...... 246

CONCLUSION ...... 281

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 292

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

So many people have guided and assisted me through this journey. Dr John Connor was my immediate supervisor and must, of course, be the first of many to receive my sincere thanks. His expertise and guidance shown to me is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to my second supervisor, Professor Peter Stanley, for his honest critique of draft chapters and his advice regarding the thesis direction.

I would also like to acknowledge the assistance and guidance of the following academics at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. These are Emeritus Professor Peter Dennis for allowing access to the AIF database, also Dr Craig Stockings (Postgraduate Co-ordinator), Professor Jeffrey Grey, Dr Eleanor Hancock and Dr Christina Spittel all who offered insight into the process. Encouragement from Head of School Professor David Lovell is much appreciated, as is the guidance and advice from the Graduate Research Unit. The work and dedication of the administrative staff at ADFA is also acknowledged, in particular Bernadette, Marilyn, Shirley and Vera.

International academics also have helped and encouraged my research. My thanks go to Dr Jessica Meyer of Leeds University, Dr Leo van Bergen of Univesiteit Leiden, Dr Tim Cook of the Canadian War Museum, Dr Damien Fenton of Massey University and Ministry for Culture and Heritage, New Zealand. Particular thanks go to Dr David Parsons of St. John’s, Newfoundland, who divulged much pertinent information about the medical service of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment (RNR) and kindly also played host and tour guide during my brief visit to his beautiful island.

iii The assistance of many of the international institutions and their staff is acknowledged. The staff of The Rooms, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador and Dolores Ho at the National Army Museum, Waiouru, New Zealand warrant special mention. Thanks go to Captain Peter Starling, RAMC and his staff at the Army Medical Services Museum, Keogh Barracks, United Kingdom. The staff in the archives at the Australian War Memorial, The Library and Archives of New Zealand, Canadian War Museum, Library and Archives Canada, Hamilton and Toronto, (Ontario) libraries, British Library, Imperial War Museum, National Army Museum, The Wellcome Library and Archives and the National Archives, Kew. Without the financial support and funding from the Australian Postgraduate Association, ASCANZ and UNSW this project would not have been possible.

My fellow PhD candidates Miesje de Vogel, Umut Ozguc and her partner Sarp, Kerry Neale, Emily Robertson, and Kelly Frame at ADFA are acknowledged for their input and emotional support. Thank you to all the dear friends who generously gave their time to read and comment on my very rough chapters. Paul, Lesley, Liz, Heather, David, Rachael, Tim, Bess and Lachlan all contributed in some manner to the final product. In this regard, extra thanks must go to Greg Daly who read, re-read and read everything again just when I really needed the support and to Sharon Milton for her expert and detailed critique of the entire thesis. Thank you to my mother-in-law Yvonne Vesel who has passed to me the Walsh/Bennett family history, I promise to take good care of these histories. Also thanks to friends who have put up with me during the process.

My greatest and warmest thanks are reserved for my husband Peter Vesel. Without his emotional support and encouragement, this work could not have been completed. Peter has spent much of his free time, reading drafts, discussing, assessing the work and the lives of these men. His time and patience can never be repaid and I am grateful for his continued love and commitment.

iv TEXT NOTE

Where possible, little has been altered in the direct quotations. Some words have been added to improve the flow of the comment or to correct details. Australian English has been adopted throughout. Place names are taken from the Australian and British Official Histories; where these differ however, the Australian usage prevails. The use of Imperial measurement as used by the sources has been maintained with an approximation in metric given. In order to maintain a similarity in style, all field ambulances referred to will be recorded as thus; ‘5th Canadian Field Ambulance’ or ‘1st New Zealand Field Ambulance.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIF Australian Imperial Force

AAMC Australian Army Medical Corps

ADMS Assistant Director of Medical Services

ADS Advanced Dressing Station

AMS Army Medical Service

AMC Army Medical Corps

ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

ASC Army Service Corps

BEF British Expeditionary Force

CAMC Canadian Army Medical Corps

CCS Casualty Clearing Station

CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

DAG Deputy Adjutant-General

v DADMS Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services

DDMS Deputy Director of Medical Services

DGAMS Director General of the Army Medical Service

DMS Director of Medical Services

FAU Friends Ambulance Unit

GHQ General Head Quarters

G-o-C General Officer Commanding

GOI Government of India

HQ Headquarters

IEF ‘A’ Indian Expeditionary Force (A)

IMS Indian Medical Service

MAC Motor Ambulance Convoy

MDS Main Dressing Station

MO Medical Officer

NZEF New Zealand Expeditionary Force

NZMC New Zealand Medical Corps

PMO Principal Medical Officer

POW Prisoner of War

QMG Quarter Master General

RAP Regimental Aid Post

RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps

RASC Royal Army Service Corps

RMO Regimental Medical Officer

TF Territorial Force

VAD Voluntary Aid Detachment

VD Venereal Disease

vi

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS, MAPS, TABLES AND CHARTS

1.1 - Medical Administration on the Western Front ...... 43

1.2 - RAMC scheme of evacuation on the Western Front, 1915 ...... 46

1.3 - Regimental stretcher-bearer brassard ...... 47

1.4 - Collecting and Evacuating Zones...... 49

1.5 - Army Casualty Form W3088 ...... 51

1.6 - Stretcher-bearer squad ...... 55

1.7 - Red Cross Brassard ...... 56

1.8 - Certificate of Attainment ...... 58

2.1 - Percentage of non-combatant RAMC personnel (1914-1918) ...... 73

2.2 - Occupation: 4th Australian Field Ambulance, AIF ...... 76

2.3 - Age: 4th Australian Field Ambulance, 4th Infantry Brigade, AIF ...... 78

2.4 - Religious Denomination of members of the AAMC ...... 81

4.1 - Indian Corps, IEF ‘A’ casualties 10 – 12 March 1915 ...... 134

4.2 - Use of a wheeled stretcher ...... 153

5.1 - Table of casualties of the British Forces Medical Corps ...... 183

6.1 - Light railway during at Picardie Somme, 1917 ...... 222

6.2 - Table showing issue of canvas stretchers ...... 226

6.3 - Headstones of members of the AAMC buried at Lijssenthoek Cemetery .. 233

vii INTRODUCTION

Non-combatant regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers of the British Forces undertook their duties in unprecedented circumstances on the battlefields of the Western Front during the Great War, 1914-1918. Stretcher- bearers had the responsibility of tending to and evacuating the sick and the wounded from the battlefield and were instrumental in the saving of the lives of many men. Stretcher-bearers carried those sick and wounded, who were unable to walk, to places where they would receive medical care. Any delay in evacuating wounded men caused many problems, such as a wound infection; prolonging the recovery time or even resulted in death. The Army needed sick and wounded men to recover quickly so that they could once again take an active part in warfare. Yet we know very little of their personal experience of war. This thesis seeks to close the gap on our understanding of the work of these men and their Great War experience on the Western Front.

Historians have provided a multi-layered narrative of the experience of the Great War, ranging from active participation in military operations and conflict, to the impact war has had on society. Examinations of support roles in war such as supply, transport, communication and medical services, for example, are missing. The invaluable role of medical personnel including the regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers has been subsumed by the assessment and re- assessment of the military histories concentrating on battles and key personalities. This thesis is significant as it closes some gaps in our knowledge about these men who remain largely un-examined by historians. British historian of medicine and war, Mark Harrison, has rightly argued ‘the role of medicine in warfare and the management of armed forces has yet to receive the attention it

1 deserves’.1 This is certainly true and there remains scope for work to be undertaken on the topic of military medicine during the Great War.

The work that has been undertaken chiefly centres on the administration of the Army Medical Service and its Corps, the experience of the medical officers and certain topics such as shell shock, poison gas, nursing and developments of medical procedure.2 However, stretcher-bearers remain glaringly absent from most assessments of military medicine and the medical aspects of war. The unarmed stretcher-bearers are an example of a group who are predominantly overlooked from the common military narratives that frequently reflect the ‘fighting spirit’3 of the combatant.

There are two main objectives of this thesis. The first is to examine the many problems and challenges faced by British Forces regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers that had a direct and negative impact upon their ability to evacuate the sick and wounded, and the attempts made to minimise these problems. The second objective of this thesis is to make a significant contribution to the knowledge of these non-combatants by drawing directly on their personal experience and the observations of others who witnessed their work. Examined in this thesis are stretcher-bearers of the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian and

1Mark Harrison, ‘Medicine and the Management of Modern Warfare: an Introduction’, History of Science, Vol. 34.4, 1996, p. 380. 2 For significant works which examine military medicine in the Great War see: Thomas Scotland and Steven Heys (eds), War Surgery 1914-18, Helion & Co., Solihull, England, 2012; Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010; Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004; R. Cooter, M. Harrison & S. Sturdy (eds), War, Medicine and Modernity, Sutton, Gloucestershire, 1998; John Charters ‘Lice and Louse-Born Disease in the British Army on the Western Front, 1914- 1918’, MA Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2006; Bill Rawling, Death their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and War, AGMV Marquis, 2001; Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, McLelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto, 1999; Desmond Morton ‘Military Medicine and State Medicine: Historical Notes on the Canadian Army Medical Corps in the First World War, 1914- 1919’, in David Naylor (ed.), Canadian Health Care, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1992.; Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2000. 3 Stephen Garton, ‘War and Masculinity in twentieth century Australia’, Journal of Australian Studies, Volume 22, Issue 56, 1998, p. 94. 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Forces also including those of the Newfoundland Regiment. The Australian stretcher-bearers are the primary focus of the thesis primarily due to availability of primary source material; however, where possible it has been supplemented by evidence from stretcher-bearers of other nations. The narrative, largely drawn from personal accounts, will clearly relate the challenges of stretcher-bearing during the Great War and provides substantial new insights into the experience of non-combatants in warfare. These challenges, many a direct result of internal army problems whilst others derived from external problems beyond human control, frequently resulted in poor outcomes for the sick and wounded. An examination of the many difficulties presented to non-combatant stretcher-bearers during some battles on the Western Front is performed. The thesis argues many internal and external forces challenged and frequently altered the pre-war plans for evacuation of the sick and wounded, the consequence of which severely constrained the ability of the stretcher-bearers to complete their tasks to the pre-determined level and timeframe. The role of the stretcher-bearer is explained to demonstrate their centrality in the chain of evacuation.

The significance of this thesis centres on the wartime experience of the stretcher-bearers; it is not a complete picture of the Army Medical Service (AMS) or the Army Medical Corps (AMC) on the Western Front, and only covers the portion of the chain of evacuation that stretcher-bearers worked. Overviews of certain battles conducted by British Forces on the Western Front are given in order to provide a background to the manner in which medical evacuation by the stretcher-bearers was carried out. These are; the Battle of Mons and Marne, 1914; Neuve Chapelle and the Battles of Ypres, 1915; Battle of Mount Sorrel, Beaumont Hamel, Pozières, Mouquet Farm and the Battle of Flers, 1916; The Battle of Vimy, Bullecourt, Messines, The Battles of Ypres, including Menin Road, Polygon Wood and the First and Second Battles of Passchendaele; the Battles of St Quentin, Bapaume, Arras, Villers-Bretonneux, the Marne and those battles during the final 100 Hundred days of war.

3

Some of the problems examined by this thesis that had a direct impact on these non-combatant stretcher-bearers include inadequate planning and preparation by senior commanders, the breakdown in internal communication, the nature of modern warfare, weather conditions, the terrain (the physical characteristics of the land) of the Western Front, and actions by the enemy. Problems related to the internal planning and preparation for warfare hindered the ability of stretcher-bearers to carry out their valuable work. In the planning and preparation stages, the War Office, Army and senior personnel of the AMS severely underestimated the numbers of wounded needing evacuation from the battlefield. Errors in calculating the expected numbers of wounded arose early in the war from the use of an outdated formula.

Other internal Army issues that compromised the ability of the stretcher-bearers to carry out battlefield clearance included a lack of adequate resources such as personnel, equipment and transport, inadequate training, and confused or inappropriate routes of evacuation. Internal failures along the Line of Communication (LoC) such as supply and transport, and problems of miscommunication amongst the headquarters and divisional units further hampered battlefield clearance. Lost or confused messages requesting assistance or relief were not received. Stretcher-bearers lost their way in the maze of trenches due to poor communications and signage, resulting in some of these being captured by the Germans and taken as prisoners.

Problems also arose from technological changes of modern war, which forced the Army Medical Service and Medical Corps to undergo a rapid change in policies and procedures. Sophisticated means of killing such as long-range artillery, rapid firing machine gun, strafing and poison gas impelled the Medical Corps to look at new ways of treating the wounded and better ways of managing

4 medical evacuation. As this thesis will show, the failure to manage some of these internal problems negatively affected the reputation of the Army Medical Service, the Medical Corps and its stretcher-bearers.

Admittedly, many of the problems examined by this thesis were out of the control of all parties involved, such as bad weather, the terrain and the actions of the enemy. Bad weather, such as that experienced in 1916 and 1917, had a detrimental impact on all the belligerents. Importantly and central to this thesis, prolonged wet weather hindered the ability to evacuate the sick and wounded. It was at times, as Keegan described the area in Flanders of 1917, a ‘quagmire’4 unfit for passing, crossing, or transport that was central to the work of the non- combatant stretcher-bearers.5

The terrain of Northern France and Belgium in which British Forces served has been clearly identified, within the literature of the Great War, as a hindrance. The boggy and swampy land, particularly in Belgium, rapidly deteriorated during the cold and wet seasons. The battleground, subjected to barrages of artillery strikes, became shattered and unsuitable for vehicles or foot traffic. The flatness of the terrain in which many of the British Empire Forces examined by this thesis operated, forced these armies during the static years of warfare to burrow into the ground to construct hundreds of kilometres of trenches. Entrenchment brought with it many challenges for the stretcher-bearers who were forced to carry out medical evacuation through the rabbit warren of trenches. Movement through the trenches was difficult due to congestion and the inappropriately sized canvas stretchers. Problems of carrying the wounded through the trenches forced the medical corps to re-evaluate the way evacuation would be carried out.

4 John Keegan, The First World War, Hutchinson, London, 1998, p 384. 5 In 1916 and 1917, poor weather had a great effect on the conditions of warfare. For more on the impact of the weather during these years, see Peter H. Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres, Leo Cooper, London, 1997. 5

Other external factors examined are the action of the enemy during warfare. The enemy impeded the work of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers. The actions of the Germans against these non-combatants had a direct and negative impact on the stretcher-bearers’ ability to evacuate the sick and wounded. Stretcher- bearers were not immune from danger. They were subject to the same threats as combatants and yet they were unarmed. Prior to the Great War, ceasefires to collect the wounded were institutionalised; however, during the Great War this practice was largely curtailed. The impact of the enemy upon stretcher-bearers is a significant feature of this thesis. Many personal accounts such as letters, diaries and personal narratives demonstrate how the fear of German bullets, shells and shrapnel affected their work and drove them to act. Stretcher-bearers also related their apprehension of being caught out in friendly fire and how being shelled by their own forces limited their ability to work.

The gaps in the literature regarding the wartime experience of the non- combatant stretcher-bearers of the British Forces, means their position and role is not fully understood. Australian historian Nathan Wise demonstrated an awareness that the non-combatant was missing and argued the historiography of the Great War continues to maintain its ‘obsession with combat and {should] consider the history of the work within the military’.6 Wise also argued that there was much work needed that examined the roles of men who occupied supply, medical and other non-combatant duties. Noted Australian military historian Jeffrey Grey argued in 2003 that new areas of military history needing exploration were ‘institutional studies, both of the individual services in different periods and of different parts of the services’.7 Academia has generally failed to examine this group, with a few recent exceptions. Historians such as Dutchman Leo van Bergen, Britons Jessica Meyer and Mark Harrison have confirmed the

6 Nathan Wise, Anzac Labour: Workplace Cultures in the Australian Imperial Force during the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2014, p. 142. 7 Jeffrey Grey, ‘Writing about War and the Military in Australia’, Australian Historical Studies, 34:122, p. 385. 6 necessity to conduct a thorough academic examination of these non- combatants’ role.8 Recently, work has begun to be undertaken by military and social historians, which gives us a better idea of the role and experience of the stretcher-bearers.

A 2015 publication by Australian historian Mark Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: Saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda, affords an insight into the Australian experience for this group of non-combatants.9 Johnston has identified many of the problems that faced the Australian stretcher-bearers and has used photographs and many personal records such as diaries and letters in combination with unit and official histories to provide an insightful record of the Australian stretcher-bearers.

Similarly, the 2014 publication Wounded: A new history of the Western Front in World War 1 by Briton Emily Mayhew has also made inroads into the wartime experience of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers. She rightly identified that this group of men have been subsumed in the historiography and argued stretcher-bearers ‘are all but invisible... [and] marginalis[ed]’.10 Her chapter on stretcher-bearers contains relevant information on the process of evacuation, the experience of the men who carried out this work and their narrative of war. This thesis will contribute further evidence of the wartime experience of British stretcher-bearers.

8 See Jessica Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009; Leo van Bergen, Before my helpless sight:suffering, dying and military medicine on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 2009; Mark Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit. 9 Mark Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda , Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2015. 10 Emily Mayhew, Wounded: A new history of the Western Front in World War 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. p. 230. 7 Some of the work undertaken tended to include stretcher-bearers in an assessment of medicine and its development during the Great War. For example the Doctoral Thesis ‘Stretcher bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’11 by Canadian Heather Moran examines the learning curve experienced by the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC), developments in military medicine and the role of individual Canadian Medical Officers (MO). The thesis title enticingly alludes to stretcher-bearers as a focal point; however, this is not the case. Stretcher-bearers are not foci, nor do they share the story with the surgeons. They are included only as minor actors within the larger and dominant Great War experience of the CAMC. The thesis has limited new primary source material on the role and experience of Canadian non-combatant stretcher-bearers.

Briton Stephen Western’s Masters Thesis ‘The Royal Medical Corps and the Role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front’12 addressed the role of the stretcher-bearer in the chain of evacuation. Like this thesis, Western has included new evidence regarding the experience of the British stretcher-bearers of the Royal Medical Corps (RAMC) and other personnel of the British Field ambulances.

In a 1938 Masters Thesis, A. M. Davidson assessed the Great War experience of the New Zealand Medical Corps.13 The work ‘The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance: a history of its activities from the outbreak of the Great War to the conclusion of the Sinai Campaign, August 4, 1914 – January 12, 1917’ included the role and experience of the stretcher-bearers of a mounted field ambulance.

11 Heather L. Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2008. 12 Stephen Western, ‘The Royal Army Medical Corps and the role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front, 1914-1918’, MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011. 13 A. M. Davidson, ‘The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance: a history of its activities from the outbreak of the Great War to the conclusion of the Sinai Campaign, August 4, 1914 – January 12, 1917’, MA Thesis, University of New Zealand, 1938. 8

Prior to the Great War, the medical corps (British and Dominion) held a far from salubrious reputation. The Great War would change this poor standing largely through the actions of the non-combatant medical personnel including the stretcher-bearers, who became equals to their infantry and artillery brethren. Proof of this development in the reputation of stretcher-bearers is found in the countless personal ‘autobiographical’ narratives published during and after the Great War.14 Additionally, newspapers and magazines of the era testify to the importance of the stretcher-bearer to the soldiers and their families.

There are thousands of published texts which examine the Great War yet, as already stated, few academic works record the non-combatant stretcher-bearer. A possible reason for this might be that the authors of military history have purposely sought to separate the combatant from the non-combatant. Historians Claire Herrick and Pamela Etcell have previously argued the non-combatant stretcher-bearers are viewed as non-participants in the act of war.15 A fault in this argument is that there is a proliferation of work assessing the impact of the war upon other non-combatants such as citizens and the role of female nursing staff during the Great War.16

The examination and assessment of the role of women in the Great War is a well-established and vibrant genre across all countries examined in this thesis. Female nurses and those women who served with the Voluntary Aid Detachments (VAD) dominate this genre, written largely in or from a post

14 One of the earliest works that significantly related the experience of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers is E. C. Vivian, With the Royal Army Medical Corps (R.A.M.C.) at the Front, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1914. 15 Claire E. J. Herrick, ‘Casualty Care during the First World War: The experience of the Royal Navy’, War in History, 2000, 7, pp. 154-179; Pamela Etcell, ‘Our Daily Bread: The Field Bakery & the Anzac Legend’, PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, Western Australia, 2004. 16 Significant works that examine non-combatants (but not nurses) in war are: Angela Woollacott, On her their lives depend: munitions workers in the Great War, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994; Ute Daniel, Margaret Ries (translator), The War from Within: German Women in the First World War, Berg Publishers, Oxford and Gordonsville, VA:, 1997. 9 feminist perspective. An outstanding contemporaneous text The War Effort of New Zealand17 dealt with the wartime experience of New Zealand nurses, beginning with a moving account of the sinking of the transport ship the Marquette in which several nurses and men perished and goes on to ably describe their service on the Western Front.18 Nurses and nursing work are well entrenched, to use a military metaphor, in the current historiography with scholars having done much to establish the important role of female nurses.19

However, there still exists a lack of imperative or drive by historians to relate the experience of men occupying non-combat roles in warfare, for example, the role of male nursing staff is yet to be fully assessed.20 Male nursing staff such as the orderlies were particularly important in the hospitals designed and set up for soldiers of the Indian Expeditionary Forces ‘A’ (IEF) and other cultures where beliefs precluded females from interacting with men.

Men of religion who served as Chaplains on the front-line have also gained the due respect owed to this important role. Claire Herrick’s 2000 article on the medical arrangements of the Royal Navy during the Great War identified and

17 H. Maclean, ‘New Zealand Army Nurses’, in Lt. H. T. B. Drew (ed.) The War Effort of New Zealand, Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, Auckland, 1923. 18 The Marquette was torpedoed on the 23/10/1915, 31 New Zealanders, Nurses and Medical Corps and other personnel lost their lives at sea. For a personal account by a New Zealand nurse see the Marlborough Express, Volume XLIX, Issue 278, 24 November 1915, p. 5. http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=d&d=MEX19151124.2.17.26 19 Nurses have fared better than the other support services. Driven by the proliferation of literature arising from the powerful feminist movement beginning in the 1970’s there had been an accurate perception, that women’s role in war had been subjugated and ignored. See Ruth Rae, Scarlet Poppies: the army experience of Australian nurses during World War One, College of Nursing, Burwood, NSW, 2004; Christine Hallett, Containing Trauma: Nursing Work in the First World War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2009; Lindsay A. Deacon, Beyond the Call: An account of dedication and bravery by Australian nurses in the First World War, Regal Press, Launceston, TAS, 2000; Peter Rees, The Other Anzacs: Nurses at War, 1914-18, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2008; Jan Bassett, Guns and Brooches: Australian Army nursing from the Boer War to the Gulf War, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992; Susanna De Vries, Heroic Australian women in war: astonishing tales of bravery from Gallipoli to Kokoda, HarperCollins, Pymble, NSW, 2004; Kathryn McPherson, Bedside Manners: The Transformation of Canadian Nursing, 1900-1990, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1996. 20 With the exception of Stephen Western’s Masters Thesis, ‘The Royal Army Medical Corps and the Role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front’, op. cit. 10 lamented a lack of historical endeavour in the assessment and examination of these non-combatant units.21 The article thoroughly related the many problems experienced by the RAMC in the delivery of primary and acute care on board ships and at sea.

The exclusion of the non-combatant stretcher-bearer from the military narrative relegates the non-combatant’s role in warfare to a marginalised one. Australian historian Glen St. J. Barclay has argued that if the study of military history was to continue, historians were going to have to ‘seek Australian content more and more in the experience of non-combatants’.22 Similarly, Mark Harrison stated that the role of those men and women that contributed to the care of the ill and wounded on the Western Front has ‘largely faded from view [and] little is remembered’.23 Stretcher-bearers are not the only non-combatant group which served during the Great War that have yet to have an in-depth study of their work undertaken.

Other non-combatant personnel who served on the front-line were the Army Service Corps (ASC), communication, administrative, postal, and quartermaster personnel. Yet an imbalance continues to exist in the historiography. Briton Gary Sheffield argued that there exists within the historiography of the BEF ‘significant’24 gaps, citing areas of work that needs to be undertaken being command-hierarchy, logistics and training.25 Pamela Etcell’s 2004 PhD Thesis ‘Our Daily Bread: The Field Bakery and the Anzac Legend’ examined the recruitment, duties and responses of the non-combatant Australian Imperial

21 Claire E. J. Herrick, ‘Casualty Care during the First World War: The experience of the Royal Navy’, op. cit. 22 Glen St. J. Barclay, ‘Australian Historians and the Study of War, 1975-88’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 41, Supplement 1, 1995, p. 249. 23 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 1. 24 Gary Sheffield, ‘Military Revisionism’, in H. Howard, A part of History: Aspects of the British Experience of the First World War, Continuum, London, 2008, p. 5. 25 ibid. 11 Force (AIF) bakers during the Great War.26 Etcell presents a sustained and original insight into the work, reputation and problems of this unit during the Great War.

Rachel Duffett has significantly contributed to the historiography of the non- combatant with the recent publication of her excellent work on rations, food and the experience of the British ASC.27 Duffett relates the importance of these non- combatants in maintaining the health and morale of the men at the front and confirms the hypothesis of this thesis, that, historians have placed an excessive amount of resources and energy into the study of ‘strategy and tactics’28 and have consistently ignored those others to languish on the edges of the historiography.

Australian Bruce Faraday examined the administration in the AIF during the Great War. This excellent Doctoral Thesis focuses on the various non-combatant arms, significantly relating the way in which the Australians managed medical administration and evacuation on the Western Front.29 Faraday’s work however, does not closely examine the non-combatant stretcher-bearer in his thesis.

Writing about the Great War began very early on, with some accounts published during 1914. The earliest works that detail the experience of the non-combatant medical corps stretcher-bearers are; With the RAMC at the Front,30 A Surgeon in Belgium,31 The Great War and the RAMC,32 and Field Ambulance Sketches.33

26 Etcell, ‘Our Daily Bread: The Field Bakery & the Anzac Legend’, op. cit. 27 Rachel Duffett, The stomach for fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2012. 28 ibid., p. 6. 29 Bruce D. Faraday, ‘Half the battle: The Administration and higher organisation of the AIF, 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, UNSW, 1997. 30 Vivian, With the Royal Army Medical Corps (R.A.M.C.) at the Front, op. cit. 31 H. S. Souter, A Surgeon in Belgium, Edward Arnold, London, 1915. 32 F. S. Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C, Constable and Company Ltd., London, 1919. 33 A Corporal, Field Ambulance Sketches, John Lane Co., New York, 1919. 12 These texts recounted their particular units’ participation in a battle or campaign and are on the whole generally positive accounts. The work of the stretcher- bearers is discussed in the text, however, without providing much detail. One of the better accounts of a stretcher-bearer, written in 1937 by Canadian Frederick W. Noyes, who served with the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance is Stretcher- bearers at the Double; History of the Fifth Canadian Field Ambulance which served overseas during the Great War, 1914-1918. Written in an engaging manner it provides a very good insight into the work of the stretcher-bearers on the Western Front.34 It recalled the origin of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, training and experience of war. This text provided the reader with a clear and truthful account of the harsh realities of stretcher-bearing by the CAMC on the Western Front.

The historiography of the British Forces Army Medical Service in the Great War is dominated by the Official Medical Services histories. Written shortly after the war’s end and in the interwar period, these official histories have varying degrees of content and substance. For example, History of the Great War based on Official Documents, Medical Services edited (and some written) by Sir William G MacPherson was produced between 1921 and 1925. These detailed texts present a range of subjects central to this thesis, including evacuation of the wounded, the problems, and the successes of the medical service during key battles and engagements.35 The Western Front editions provide a thorough,

34 F. W. Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double; History of the Fifth Canadian Field Ambulance which served overseas during the Great War, 1914-1918, Hunter Rose Company, Toronto, 1937. 35 The Colonel-Commandant of the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), Major General Sir William Grant MacPherson, KCMG, CB, compiled, authored and co-authored the Official Medical Histories. Those texts appropriate to this thesis are: Sir W.G. Macpherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. I, Macmillan, London, 1921; Sir W.G. Macpherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. II, Macmillan, London, 1923; Sir W.G. Macpherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. III: Medical Services during the operations on the Western Front in 1916, 1917 and 1918; in Italy; and in Egypt and Palestine, HMSO, London, 1924; Sir W.G. Macpherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: Diseases of the War, Vol. II, 13 analytical and interesting narrative of not only the Army Medical Service but also the RAMC, including the stretcher-bearers. These texts cover a range of topics; however central to this thesis are the volumes on the Western Front. These volumes provided the reader with an understanding of the manner in which the RAMC (Regular and Territorial) was formed, how it was raised for war, detailed the training provided and related the RAMC experience on the Western Front.

Generally, these volumes provide a clear explanation and analysis of the different problems and successes of medical care including evacuation that was undertaken during the Western Front battles. They introduce to the reader key individuals that helped shape the Army Medical Services and provide details of the many successful medical advances in wound care, surgical treatments and medicine. The Official Histories are however not without some concerns. Critically, the volume regarding the Somme Battles of 1916, gives little indication as to the many challenges of providing for the health care needs of the British Forces during this period, suffice to acknowledge that large numbers of wounded were dealt with. The Official Historian conveys a sense of lethargy or weariness in the text.

The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services is a well-researched and written three-volume account of the Australian Army Medical Corps (AAMC) in all theatres in which they served.36 Written and edited by Arthur Graham Butler, who served as a MO during the Great War, these volumes detail the manner in which medical care and evacuation were undertaken during the Great

Macmillan, London, 1922-23; T. J. Mitchell and Miss G. M. Smith, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War, HMSO, London, 1931. 36 A. G. Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume I – Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne, 1930; A. G. Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume II – The Western Front, Australian War Memorial, 1940; A. G. Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume III – Special Problems and Services, Australian War Memorial, 1943. 14 War. Butler was the sole author of the Western Front volume. He thoroughly engaged with the task and related his criticism of the medical services and Army (Australian and British) with clarity. However, it lacks a personal touch and rarely discussed the stretcher-bearers’ experience of the war.

New Zealand’s official medical history The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918 written by Andrew Dillon Carbery lacks the detail of the British and Australian volumes and might be regarded as a unit history.37 Carbery detailed the nature of the war for the New Zealand Medical Service (NZMC) and related personal accounts by senior personnel and RMOs, however, the minutiae of battle preparation, evacuation routes, and changes to procedure in line with developments for the NZMC are missing. An additional problem for the modern reader is the overuse of jingoistic language.

Canada’s Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service written by Sir Andrew Macphail lacks many of the intricate elements that are found in the British and Australian official histories. Macphail’s overuse of unsubstantiated accounts by ‘unnamed’ personnel of the Canadian Army Medical Services is deeply troubling; as historian Tim Cook stated, the use by Macphail of these ‘ambiguous’38 individuals only serves to obfuscate what the true account might have been. Additionally the text fails to give much detail of the Canadian non-combatants’ experience. It lacks the subtleties of Butler and has no footnotes to garner further detail.39

37 A. D. Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., Wellington, 1924. 38 Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the writing of the World Wars, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2006, p. 55. 39 Sir A. Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service, F. A. Acland, Ottawa, 1925. 15 John George Adami also produced for the Canadian War Records Office a unit history of the CAMC during the Great War. Adami was the Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) for the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) and published the text War story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps in August 1918. He hinted that a second volume was likely; this however did not eventuate. The style and format of the text is challenging due to the uncritical language and clearly demonstrated Adami’s evidently pro-government bias. It is insufficient in detail to go any way of fulfilling its stated objective. It too fails to give an insight into the experience of the Canadian stretcher-bearer.40 Conversely, Adami’s personal and public war records offer a great amount of significantly important and relevant evidence and are used within this thesis.

The literature pertaining to the history of the Indian Medical Service (IMS) and their Western Front experience is scant. Regimental histories dominate the literature with little credence or reference to the work of the non-combatant medical corps. 41 J. W. B. Merewether and Lieutenant Colonel F. Smith do refer to the health care of Indian troops in their co-authored narrative The Indian Corps in France however, but it does not offer sufficient detail regarding the medical situation, other than to relate the problems for the Indian soldiers.42 A 1923, Indian Government publication India’s Contribution to the Great War gives the reader a great deal of information on the formation and set up of the IMS, its Army Medical Field Ambulances and personnel. The text also relates in detail to the statistical information of the medical service establishments.43

40 J. G. Adami, War story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, Published for the Canadian War Records Office by Colour Ltd and Rolls House Publishing Co., Ottawa, 1918. 41 See George Morton-Jack , who argued that the Indian history of the Great War is dominated either by a Eurocentric (Anglo) or Indian bias, see George Morton-Jack , ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’, War in History, 2006, 13(3), pp. 329-362. 42 J. W. B. Merewether and Lieutenant-Colonel F. Smith, The Indian Corps in France, L. Murray Ltd. London, 1917. 43 Government of India, India’s Contribution to the Great War, Superintendent Govt. Pr., Calcutta, 1923. 16 It is appropriate at this stage to explain how primary evidence from the archives of the Newfoundlanders has been used in this thesis. There is no official medical history of the Newfoundland Regiment. This thesis will examine the way medical evacuation was undertaken for the Newfoundlanders at Beaumont Hamel. The regiment did not have a field ambulance; however, they did have their own regimental stretcher-bearers. For a large part of their Great War experience, the RNFR was attached to the British 88th Infantry Brigade, 29th Division and were ably served by the non-combatant stretcher-bearers of the field ambulances attached to the brigade.44 Consequently, the narrative (of the participation of the RNFR) is derived predominately from the British sources, supplemented by information sourced in the Newfoundland archives, making a significant contribution to the knowledge of the Newfoundland Regiment on the Western Front.

The current historiography of the Army Medical Services during the Great War is dominated by medical developments and medicine, and the role of the doctors (Medical Officers and Surgeons). Briton John Pearn accurately summed up the state of the military medicine historiography in 2003 when he spoke of the many ‘technical advances in medicine’45 brought about by war and its contribution to the health and welfare of society. Examinations of shell shock, the many advances in the treatments of diseases such as dysentery, cholera, tuberculosis, diphtheria, enteric, venereal and the various trench diseases dominate the genre.

Historians Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz have presented a comprehensive reference source that detailed the developments of military medicine over the

44 RNFR is utilised in this thesis though not officially granted the ‘Royal’ prefix until 28 September 1917, it is customary in military histories, to identify this small contingent by the acronym RNFR. Sourced 12/07/2012, http://army.ca/inf/rnfldr.php 45 John Pearn, ‘Civilian Legacies in Army Health’, Health and History, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, p. 5. 17 centuries in their text A History of Military Medicine.46 Roger Cooter and Steve Sturdy examine the progress of military medicine.47 Their work takes a broader view that examines and comments on military medicine over a period of two hundred years, but does not assess the work of the non-combatants as a stand- alone group. British historian Mark Harrison writes of the ways that military medicine has evolved and the contribution military medicine has made to public health.48 Harrison examines the manner in which medical care, on and off the battlefield, has developed during the last century. In his assessments he clearly demonstrates a high value for the work of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers, yet acknowledges that there still needs to be an in-depth assessment of those ‘many thousands who worked on the Western Front or in other theatres as doctors, orderlies and nurses’.49

Claire Herrick, as mentioned previously, worked on assessing the non-combatant medical corps personnel that served in the Royal Navy.50 Her work clearly demonstrates that for those non-combatant medical personnel serving on board a ship posed many challenges and there were many problems to be overcome in dealing with caring for the wounded. British historian Jessica Meyer examines the experience of the non-combatant British medical corps stretcher-bearers and orderlies though her work differs greatly from this study.51 Meyer’s work is a gendered history examining the ways in which masculinity (British) was constructed through different textual mediums during and after the Great War.

46 Richard A. Gabriel, and Karen S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine, Greenwood Press, New York, 1992. 47 Roger Cooter and Steve Sturdy, ‘Of War Medicine and Modernity: Introduction’, in Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, War, Medicine and Modernity, op. cit. 48 See Mark Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War, op. cit.; Roger Cooter and Steve Sturdy, ‘Of War Medicine and Modernity: Introduction’, in Cooter, Harrison, & Sturdy, (eds.), War, Medicine and Modernity, op. cit. 49 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 1. 50 Herrick, ‘Casualty Care during the First World War: The experience of the Royal Navy’, op. cit. 51 Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain, op. cit. 18 Australian historians have undertaken limited research into the Great War experience of the AAMC and the Australian Field Ambulances. In 1970, Jacqueline Gurner examined aspects of the formation of the AAMC and its wartime experience.52 Kate Blackmore similarly looked at the Great War experience of the AAMC and repatriation of personnel.53 Australian authors who have contributed to the historiography of the AAMC during war are Michael Tyquin who has written extensively on the experience of the AAMC during the Great War and developments in medicine.54 Robert Likeman has written about the work of the doctors, the role of the field ambulance and the medical corps.55

Ron and Sue Austin have provided assessments of certain Australian Field Ambulances which do go some way to providing an insight into the work of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers.56 In their 1995 publication The Body Snatchers: A history of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance they acknowledged the glaring gaps in the historiography ‘this is the first book written since 1919, detailing the activities of an Australian Field Ambulance’.57 The text comprehensively related the experiences of the stretcher-bearers attached to this unit. It is written in an accessible style suitable for a lay audience describing rather than analysing the work of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance.

52 Jacqueline Gurner, The origins of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1970. 53 Kate Blackmore, The Dark Pocket of Time: War, Medicine and the Australian State, 1914-1935, Lythrum Press, Adelaide, 2008. 54 Michael Tyquin, Forgotten men: the Australian Army Veterinary Corps, 1909-1946, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2011; Michael Tyquin, Madness and the Military: Australia’s experience of the Great War, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2006; Michael Tyquin, Little by little: a centenary history of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2003. 55 Robert Likeman, Men of the Ninth: a history of the Ninth Australian Field Ambulance 1916- 1994, Slouch Hat Publications, McRae, Vic., 2003. 56 Sue Austin and Ron Austin, The body snatchers: the history of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, 1914-1918, Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, Vic., 1995, Ron Austin, Wounds and Scars: From Gallipoli to France the history of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance, 1914-1919, Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, Vic., 2012. 57 Austin, The body snatchers: the history of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, 1914-1918, ibid., p. 1. 19 Richard Travers’ excellent study of the Australian experience of the Great War, Diggers in France: Australian soldiers on the Western Front, provides a significant insight into medical care in the AIF.58 His chapter Wounded provides many first hand accounts of the way that military medicine, particularly that practised by the AAMC, was undertaken.

Australian Ron Ramsay published the memoir of his father Roy Ramsay Hell, hope and heroes: life in the field ambulance in World War 1: the memoirs of Private Roy Ramsay, AIF.59 In the introduction, Ron Ramsay identified the shortcomings in the historiography: ‘as far as I was aware, such a story had seldom been told from the point of view of the stretcher-bearer and medic’.60 In a more recent Australian publication Diaries of a Stretcher-Bearer 1916-1918 the Great War experience of Edward Charles Munro is retold. Munro served as an AAMC stretcher-bearer on the Western Front.61 Munro, awarded the Military Medal for his actions during the Battle of Bullecourt in May 1917, candidly related his involvement and experience in the 5th Australian Field Ambulance. The text gives the reader a clear understanding of the work and wartime experience of an Australian stretcher-bearer on the Western Front and is remarkable for its honesty and detail. The work is unusual as it portrayed the reality of life on the Western Front in a manner few others have done. For example, the author graphically described the technical aspects of the stretcher-bearers’ work in evacuating the wounded and frankly related his personal fears and those of his AAMC stretcher-bearer squad while working in harsh conditions and whilst under fire.

58 Richard Travers, Diggers in France: Australian soldiers on the Western Front, ABC Books, Sydney, 2008. 59 Roy Ramsay, Hell, hope and heroes: life in the field ambulance in World War 1: the memoirs of Private Roy Ramsay, AIF, Rosenberg Publishing, Kenthurst, 2005. 60 ibid., p. 7. 61 Edward C. Munro, Donald Munro (ed.), Diaries of a stretcher-bearer: 1916-1918, Boolarong Press, Brisbane, 2010. 20 The recent New Zealand historiography is limited. Although historians have increased their awareness and understanding of New Zealand’s role in the Great War, assessments of their contribution to medical care in war are few. A recent text published by Brendon O’Carroll touched on the Great War experience of the stretcher-bearers of the NZMC.62 The text utilises photographs and a simple narrative to describe the participation of the stretcher-bearers from New Zealand during the Great War. Critically, the text fails to deliver any new information on the aspects of service by NZMC non-combatant stretcher- bearers.

Historian Ken Treanor provided the most appropriate assessment of the work of the stretcher-bearers of the NZMC on the battlefields of the Western Front in his text Staff, Serpent and the Sword: 100 years of the Royal New Zealand Army Medical Corps.63 The work is essentially a unit history of the NZMC, which closely related their experience of the Western Front and has included the non- combatant stretcher-bearers. Glyn Harper, an historian who has written extensively on the New Zealanders in the Great War, discussed medical care and the wounded as part of a larger narrative involving operational and social history.64 A recent publication New Zealand and the First World War : 1914-1919 which marks the Centenary of New Zealand’s participation in the Great War by historian Damien Fenton has good basic information relating to the chain of evacuation and includes photographs and copies of items from service records.65

Canadian historians Bill Rawling and Desmond Morton have both added to our knowledge of the Great War experience of the CAMC and the stretcher-

62 Brendon O’Carroll, Khaki Angels: Kiwi stretcher-bearers in the First and Second World Wars, Ngaio Press, Wellington, 2009. 63 Ken Treanor, Staff, Serpent and the Sword: 100 years of the Royal New Zealand Army Medical Corps , Wilsons Scott Publishing, Christchurch, 2008. 64 Glyn Harper, Massacre at Passchendaele : the New Zealand story, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2000; Glyn Harper, Spring offensive : New Zealand and the second Battle of the Somme, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2003: Glyn Harper, Dark Journey, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2007. 65 Damien Fenton, New Zealand and the First World War: 1914-1919, Penguin, Auckland, 2013. 21 bearers.66 Canadian historian Tim Cook has endeavoured to rectify the glaring gaps in the Canadian understanding of the medical experience of the Great War.67 In his text At the Sharp End, Cook undertook a review of medicine and medical evacuation on the Western Front. His use of primary sources that reflected the positive and negative aspects of medical care is exemplary. It demonstrated stretcher-bearers’ faults as well as virtues and is an outstanding contribution to the genre. This thesis will fill in some of the gaps that still exist in the experience of the Canadian regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers on the Western Front.

The experience of the Indian Medical Service during the Great War and specifically for this thesis on the Western Front is under-examined. Colonel A. Ghosh has edited the text History of the Armed Forces Medical Services: India is an excellent resource. Similarly, Singha and Chakravorty have also provided interesting and detailed information on the recruitment and development of the Indian Medical Service during the Great War in the IEF ‘A’ which served on the Western Front.68 These significant works have been useful for this thesis as a starting point in which to build upon. Mark Harrison gives an in-depth assessment of the Indian Medical Service during the Western Front and Mesopotamian campaign, which highlights the difficulties of medical evacuation for the stretcher-bearers.69 Recent works published by historians Corrigan and

66 Rawling, Death their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and War, op. cit.; Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, op. cit. 67 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916 , Viking Canada, Toronto, 2007; Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Viking Canada, Toronto, 2008; Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War, op. cit. 68 A. Ghosh, (ed.), History of the Armed Forces Medical Services: India, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 1988; R. Singha, Front Lines and Status Lines: The follower ranks of the Indian Army in the Great War, University Of Cambridge, Centre of South Asian Studies Occasional Paper No. 27; U. N. Chakravorty, Indian Nationalism and the First World War (1914-1918), Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1997. See also Mario M Ruiz, ‘Manly Spectacles and Imperial Soldiers in Wartime Egypt, 1914–19.’ Middle Eastern Studies 45.3 (2009): 351-371. 69 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit. 22 Roy also briefly discusses these non-combatants.70 A 2014 publication by George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War, does provide a good insight into the administration of the Indian Army including the establishment of the Indian Medical Service prior to the Great War and changes made after its arrival in France in 1914.71

Critically, few historians currently challenge or question the reasons for the failures of the Medical Services during the Great War. Harrison has identified the problems that faced the RAMC. Ana Carden-Coyne has undertaken an examination of the internal deficiencies of the British Army Medical Services and argued that the RAMC were subjected to accusations of poor handling of the wounded, breakdowns in the evacuation process and mismanagement of resources (internal and external problems). She explained how senior officials of the War Office sought to rectify the reputation of the RAMC through a campaign of ‘medical propaganda... [whose objective was to] maintain public morale’.72 A deficiency in Carden-Coyle’s examination is the lack of discussion regarding the effect that these issues had on the personnel of RAMC, specifically those at the lower end of the hierarchy, such as the stretcher-bearers.73 Mark Johnston discussed those issues in relation to the Australian experience.74

Dutch medical historian Leo van Bergen stated that the medical services of all countries involved in the Great War, were afflicted by internal and external

70 Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches. The Indian Corps on the Western front, 1914-1915, Spellmount, Stroud UK, 2006; K. Roy, (ed) The Indian Army in the two World Wars, History of Warfare Series, Vol. 70, Extenza Turpin, Leiden, 2011. 71 George Morton-Jack , The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014. 72 Ana Carden-Coyne, ‘Soldiers’ Bodies in the War Machine: Triage. Propaganda and Military Medical Bureaucracy, 1914-1918’ in James Peto and Nadine Monem (eds), War and Medicine, Black Dog Publishing, London, 2008, p. 77. 73 Criticism of the Army Medical Corps would not only lay with the British, but the other belligerent medical units would suffer similar treatment. 74 See Harrison, The Medical War: op. cit., and Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: Saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda, op. cit. 23 pressures arguing, ‘no amount of organization could resolve all the problems that inevitably arose’.75 Van Bergen writes extensively on aspects of Dutch, Belgian, and German military medicine during the Great War. His work, translated into English, affords a clear assessment not only of doctors but also relates the fate of the stretcher-bearers. Van Bergen published Before my helpless sight which examined the experience of wounded in war. His interesting narrative proves there is a place for the non-combatant stretcher-bearers in military history.

One of the key aims of this thesis is to bring to light the experience of stretcher- bearers that served on the Western Front. It seeks to give a voice to those men who served as stretcher-bearers. The reaction of individual stretcher-bearers to their wartime experience is clearly given. Emotional assessments of the war experience of men who served at the front are not rare in the historiography, however there are very few that specifically concentrate on the non-combatant in war. This thesis has utilised many primary sources in order to relate the war experience of the stretcher-bearers. The major primary sources used for this thesis were located in the government and non-government national institutions of the countries examined, with the exception of India.76 Travel to Great Britain, New Zealand, Canada and Newfoundland was undertaken in order to source these important documents, which include War Office records, Cabinet files, memorandum, operational and daily orders, embarkation and nominal rolls, personnel files, unit diaries and records, Army services files, admission and discharge records.

75 Van Bergen explains that the military planners frequently failed to pass on their knowledge of and plans for battle to the medical services, he wrote, ‘During major offensives especially, about which military medical services were not always informed in advance, the system became overloaded.’ Leo van Bergen, Before my helpless sight, op. cit., p. 310. 76 The Indian records sourced for this thesis, are held in those British Institutions such as the British Library, TNA and the Imperial War Museum. 24 Evidence such as these, whether they be primary or secondary sources, need to be treated with clarity and an open mind. The nature and intended purpose of original sources needs to be considered prior to usage lest they influence the historian. Much of this thesis has utilised primary evidence and I have attempted to assess these documents without bias. I have actively questioned the purpose of each source, the author’s motivation, the intended reader, why it has been preserved and how the source relates to the others examined. A careful and considered approach to these sources has, I believe, allowed for the re- examination of the Great War experience by the non-combatant stretcher- bearers.

Private material such as letters, diaries and memoirs written by the stretcher- bearers is a feature of this thesis. Oral histories have also been used. The use of these primary sources has enabled this thesis to critically analyse and evaluate the internal and external forces that hampered the work of the stretcher- bearers. Access to Indian primary source documents such as personal narratives, letters and diaries of Indian stretcher-bearers has unfortunately not been included in this thesis. As Kate Hunter has argued, original source material from Indians troops are rarer because ‘those from the millions of lesser educated... do not survive in any significant numbers.77

Through the examination of records left by the stretcher-bearers, I have been able to gain a better understanding of the experience of these men. Care has been taken to assess the validity of the evidence, ensuring that any bias is identified. Australian historian Bill Gammage rightly warned interpretation of letters, diaries and unpublished accounts are to be treated with caution, as ‘none

77 Kate Hunter, Diaries and Letters as testimonies of war, published on The First World War website, Adam Matthew Ltd. http://www.firstworldwar.amdigital.co.uk/FurtherResources/Essays/DiariesAndLetters 25 was obliged to be accurate’.78 Letters present problems as they may have been, or were written, with the view that the censor would vet them. Letters written to a loved one at home do not always tell the full story as they were written with their audience in mind. For example, it would be rare for a young man to write to a mother or sister of the reality of war. Jessica Meyer also argued that ‘inarticulateness’79 also formed the substance of letters, with many men lacking the education in which they could describe their surroundings and experiences. Yet these accounts should not be summarily dismissed. These letters and manuscripts are valuable in forming an idea of the experience of these individuals and they are used in this thesis, I believe, with care and, in combination with official documents and modern evidence and opinion, make for a significant contribution to the historiography.

Personal diaries written by men each day (as opposed to those compiled after the war) provide an invaluable expression of the intimate experience of war due to their reflective and authentic nature. They were not subject to censorship though they may have been self-censored. Many of the diaries provide vital clues to the author’s personality and their emotional state at the time of writing. Diary entries written at or close to the time (of the event) are far more reliable as they provide the historian with a greater understanding of the context in which they were written.

Great care was taken when using the oral histories. These recollections are at best sketchy and patchwork, which can be attributed to the age of the participants, who at the time of recalling their experiences, varied from 100 years to an astonishing 107 years. One gets a sense of what might have been had these histories been recorded earlier, in some of the recollections there is a hint

78 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p. XIII. 79 Meyer, Men of war: masculinity and the First World War in Britain, op. cit., p. 29. 26 that the information contained within the memory is not an experiential memory but learned memory.

This is not strictly an operational assessment; it does examine some problems involved with planning, command and the logistics of undertaking medical care on the Western Front. It is not the intention of this thesis to re-evaluate or examine the developments of new medical treatments or medicine. This thesis is not an examination of the entire chain of evacuation. The chain of evacuation is a series of steps in which many different agents undertake their role/duties. This thesis only examines the area served by stretcher-bearers in the Collecting and Evacuation zones, from the Regimental Aid Posts (RAP) to the Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS). This thesis does not include nursing staff (female) nor does it examine the role of the Red Cross or the St. John Ambulance Brigade, although there is a great deal of evidence which clearly demonstrates that these groups significantly contributed to the medical evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers.

Presented in chronological order, this thesis discusses the establishment of the role of the stretcher-bearer and examines men who served as bearers during the Great War. The thesis examines the issues that plagued the evacuation process, beginning at the medical response during the British Army Retreat at Mons in August 1914 and ending with the declaration of the Armistice in November 1918. Through these examinations, this thesis will clearly demonstrate the internal and external problems and challenges that faced the medical corps stretcher-bearers.

Chapter 1 This chapter specifically examines the designated role of regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers as of August 1914. It sets up the framework in which the stretcher-bearers operated, by explaining their importance in the chain of evacuation. This chapter briefly relates the development of the Army Medical Corps of the various British Forces examined by this thesis, between

27 1873 and immediately prior to August 1914.80 It will be shown the Corps experienced a homogeneous British way of operating based on the British RAMC.81 The role and training of the non-combatant regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers is explained and the role of stretcher-bearers in the chain of evacuation is established. This confirms the centrality of stretcher- bearers to efficient and effective medical care, and establishes how the many problems faced on the Western Front impacted on their work. The medical situation at embarkation for the Western Front is established, which will show that the framework of medical evacuation as of August 1914 was substantially untested.

Chapter 2 This chapter examines who the stretcher-bearers were. It examines the social traits of the men who served as stretcher-bearers. It seeks to determine if there were typical types of men that served as stretcher-bearers. The chapter aims to significantly add to our knowledge of these non-combatants and their experience of war.

Chapter 3 explains how in August 1914, errors made by senior commanders severely impinged on the ability of stretcher-bearers to effectively evacuate the wounded. It also introduces the impact of the actions of the enemy, which will be shown to be a constant external pressure that would have dramatic consequences on medical evacuation by stretcher-bearers throughout the war. This chapter will demonstrate that the reality of war was much different to that which the men had trained and that peacetime training had not sufficiently prepared them for modern warfare. The major outcome of this chapter will highlight that, as of August 1914, there existed a low level of the experience of war within the medical corps and stretcher-bearers.

80 The historiography of the evolution of military medicine and the development of the British Army Medical Service is well established. It is the development of the role of the stretcher-bearer which is central to this thesis. 81 Examined are the Army Medical Corps of the Expeditionary Forces of Britain (BEF), Canada (CEF), India (IEF ‘A’), New Zealand (NZEF) and Australian Imperial Force (AIF). 28

Chapter 4 will examine the changes to medical evacuation brought about by the pressures of modern warfare. Large numbers of wounded presented a challenge to the medical services and the bearers. The breakdown in transport, an internal army problem, delayed removal of the wounded, which forced stretcher-bearers to hand, carry wounded over long distances. The Western Front in 1915 had settled into static warfare and entrenchment had a severe impact on their abilities. Long-range weaponry proved that there was no longer a safe way of transporting sick and wounded for the stretcher-bearers. Gas warfare used for the first time on the Western Front also provided many new challenges.

Chapter 5 will relate in depth the personal experience of the non-combatant stretcher-bearers on the Somme in 1916. It will demonstrate the British Forces’ stretcher-bearers had a homogeneous experience of war. Manpower shortages and breakdowns in transportation logistics continued to hamper the medical service. The British Forces’ had taken steps to rectify the problem of having too few stretcher-bearers; however, compounded external pressures derived from poor weather, enemy actions and the type of warfare complicated the work of the stretcher-bearers.

Chapter 6 examines the external pressures faced by stretcher-bearers during the Battles of Third Ypres 1917. These forces included poor weather, deterioration in the terrain and conditions and, sickness. Extensive and detailed accounts from stretcher-bearers are given; the use of personal narrative dominates this chapter, significantly expanding our knowledge of the experience for the bearers.

Chapter 7 relates that during the Spring Offensives of 1918, the Germans applied a great amount of pressure on the British Forces. This external pressure forced the retreat of some British Forces’ units and subsequently caused a repetition of

29 problems that had previously been experienced at Mons in 1914. The field ambulances were now on the move as a mobile warfare developed. This mobility forced changes in the way medical evacuation from the battlefront had to be implemented. This chapter closely examines the importance of mobility for the stretcher-bearers. With the Armistice declared on 11 November 1918, the war ends. This chapter will relate the stretcher-bearers’ response to this event through an examination of their letters and diaries.

At the conclusion of this thesis, it will be shown that regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers of all belligerent armies were at the forefront of the provision of acute medical care to the wounded. The thesis will also confirm the change in perception of the Army Medical Service, the Army Medical Corps and stretcher-bearers.

30 CHAPTER 1 – 1873 – 1914: THE ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

Late in the Great War, Canadian stretcher-bearer William Bradley wrote of his work on the Western Front. Private Bradley succinctly described his role as a non-combatant stretcher-bearer:

I can see you don’t understand what the stretcher-bearer work is, well we go over the top with the men, a stretcher-bearer for each platoon and we carry no rifle or arms of any kind, but a field and shell dressing and bandage up our wounded. We go right to our objective before we dress the wounded. It is hard sometimes when a fellows pal falls and cannot stop to dress his wound.1

For stretcher-bearers the method of treating battle casualties during the Great War bore little resemblance to their pre-war training. On the battlefields of the Western Front, stretcher-bearers discovered that modern war called for a set of skills inconceivable in peacetime. In August 1914, the British Army quickly realised that pre-war training was little substitute for the reality of modern battle and that the expectations of performance were subject to many pressures. Various problems faced by these stretcher-bearers would prove that stretcher bearing during modern warfare was less about protocol, skills and training, but more about flexible work practices, brute strength and stamina. The aim of this chapter is to explain the developments within the British Forces medical corps between 1873 up to August 1914, when the British declared war against Germany. It explains the role of the stretcher-bearers within the three stage chain of evacuation. The set-up of the medical corps for the battlefields of the Western Front is established and what problems were the faced by these largely untested corps’ is explained.

1 Letter dated 4/10/18, William David Bradley to Miss Beatrice Peacock, William David Bradley, Ref: 58A 1 257.6, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum (hereafter CWM), Ottawa. 31

Before the British declaration of war against Germany on 4 August 1914, British military medicine had undergone centuries of change, appraisal and re-appraisal with significant developments occurring during the twenty years immediately prior to the Great War. Scholars have argued that the modernisation in the structure, policy and procedure of the British Army Medical Service had its origin in the appalling medical conditions experienced by British soldiers during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, specifically the losses of British soldiers due to disease and infection where ‘roughly 75 percent of all British deaths were caused by disease’.2 During the Crimean War, the traditional practice of removing the wounded during a lull in fighting ceased. The wounded lay untreated in the open without shelter or food and water until untrained bandsmen could remove them to the regimental hospital. These bandsmen were non-combatant musicians attached to infantry or artillery regiments and served as stretcher-bearers.3

After the failures of the British Army at Crimea, a plan to restructure the Army commenced. From 1868, a period of renewal and change instituted by the British Secretary of State of the Army, Edward Cardwell, began. Cardwell’s reforms were designed to ensure Britain had an army that could protect its own interests and cement her (British) sphere of influence. Cardwell’s reforms included the restructure of the War Office and change in the administration of the Army.4 Further enhancements such as changes to the regimental system and the purchase of commissions followed. Cardwell is accredited with securing a

2 G. C. Cook, ‘Influence of diarrhoeal disease on military and naval campaigns’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. 94(2), February 2001, pp. 95-97; Mark Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit.; H. E. Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2004; Gabriel, and Metz, A History of Military Medicine, op. cit.; R. McLaughlin, The Royal Army Medical Corps, Leo Cooper Ltd., London, 1972; Gurner, The origins of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, op. cit.; Rawling, Death their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and War, op. cit.; Steven Pagaard, ‘Disease and the British Army in South Africa, 1899-1900’, Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2, Apr. 1986, p. 71. 3 Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815 – 1914, p. 233. 4 H. Bailes, ‘Patterns of thought in the late Victorian Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 4:1, 1981, pp. 29-45.

32 professional system of management, planning and strategy. The development of the medical corps reflected the new professionalised British Army.5

From Cardwell’s review, many improvements in military health care arose, such as the development of the skills of existing army medical personnel, sanitation and the development of nursing and medical services at the front line. These radical reforms also contributed to changes in public health care practices and policies. One of these changes included the establishment of a specialist bearer company attached to each battalion in 1873.6 Each bearer company consisted of one MO and sixteen regimental stretcher-bearers, who had responsibility of carrying the wounded for medical treatment.

Developments in military medicine during the latter stages of the nineteenth century included significant advances made in the understanding of disease transmission and sanitation.7 The establishment of the RAMC in 1898 resulted in the medical service becoming a specialised, autonomous unit, which consisted of smaller units; one being the Bearer Section. The main activity of these specially trained stretcher-bearer units involved the application of first aid and evacuation of the sick and wounded. Stretcher-bearers lay the sick or wounded on a canvas stretcher and physically carried the casualty to a point behind the line of battle for further medical attention; a process called the hand carry. It is the hand carry and removal of the sick or wounded from the battlefield by the stretcher-bearers that is central to the examination of this thesis.

5 The professionalization of the British Infantry began in 1870. See Corinne Lydia Mahaffey, ‘The fighting profession: the professionalization of the British Line Infantry Officer Corps, 1870-1902’, PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004. 6 Peter Lovegrove, Not least in the Crusade: A Short History of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, UK, 1951, p. 17. 7 Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World; 1500 to the present day, Polity Press Ltd., Cambridge, 2004. 33 Control and prevention of disease remained problematic for the British and Colonial Armies during the South African War (1899-1902), when sanitation officers, unit commanders and ranking officers failed to comply with protocols previously issued.8 Additional problems related to insufficient medical officers being available and a breakdown in transportation of the wounded which resulted in many men dying unnecessarily. Compounding these problems, the distances between the battle areas and the field hospitals were too great and timely evacuation of the sick and wounded failed to occur.

Due to these many problems, after the South African War, another public review of the British Army, including the Army Medical Service, was ordered. The 1904 Royal Commission on the South African War resulted in a comprehensive restructuring of the Army Medical Service and stricter controls of disease prevention recommended.9 As a direct result of the Royal Commission, the administration, policies, and procedures of the RAMC, Dominion and Indian Army Medical Service (IMS) were changed. The appointment of an advisory board for the Army Medical Service, with the Director-General of Medical Services, Sir Alfred Keogh, as the Chairman, helped manage the health of soldiers.10 Canadian historian Andrew Macphail related the influence of Keogh on the medical care of the armies of the Dominions: ‘[he] developed a plan for a unity of method. He suggested that Canada, Australia and South Africa should create in the Dominions medical services similar to that existing in England, organized and equipped to the same pattern’.11

8 Many deaths occurred throughout British Forces particularly Typhoid Fever, commonly known as enteric fever, a bacterial disease transmitted through contamination of water and food. 9 See ‘Care of the sick and wounded in the South African War’, The Lancet, 9 September 1905, pp. 772-773. 10 ‘The Annus Medicus’, The Lancet, 28/12/1907, pp. 1844-1866. 11 Macphail, History of the Canadian Forces, 1914-19: The Medical Services, op. cit., p. 10. 34 Under the direction of Keogh, the Army Medical Service would become truly modernised.12 Sir W. G. MacPherson, the Official British historian stated of the many improvements and developments during the interwar period (1902-1914) ‘[i]mportant changes were effected not only in the professional education of the regular medical officer, but also in the graduated training of officers and men of the RAMC’.13 Additional changes that directly related to the manner in which non-combatant stretcher-bearers would operate also were developed, when:

The [combination] of old bearer company and field hospital into one unit, the field ambulance. The object of this step was to attain increased mobility at the front, and more particularly to combine under one command the two intimately related functions of collecting the wounded and affording immediate but temporary care of the same.14

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the British Army took steps to establish a large part-time Territorial Force for home defence, which included the establishment and training of the medical corps and its field ambulance units and personnel.15 The British Army Medical Service forged links with various external groups, such as the Red Cross, St. John Ambulance Brigade and the VAD organizations.

In 1906, the AAMC introduced the field ambulance, which consisted of stretcher- bearer and tent divisions.16 Refinements and regular training of the few permanent members and volunteers would allow the AAMC to evolve into a skilled and competent arm of the Australian military. Under the direction of Surgeon-General Williams, the AAMC began to modify their practices to suit

12 Keogh appointed DGAMS in December 1904, retired in 1910, only to be recalled to the post by Lord Kitchener in 1914. 13 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 36. 14 Adami, War Story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 23. 15 The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/acts/territorial-and-reserve-forces-act-1907 16 Tyquin, Little by little, op. cit., p. 84. 35 Australian conditions.17 The official Australian historian of the medical services A G Butler stated that the Australians were able to improve upon the skills of the British, by being far more ‘mobile’18 improving military health care by being able to provide aid and to transport the wounded. 1906 witnessed the official introduction of field ambulance units to the Australian Army Medical Corps, consisting of bearer (stretcher–bearer) and the tent divisions.19 However, the training of stretcher-bearer personnel suffered from ‘opposition from combatant officers and Army apathy’,20 which constrained the skills of the regimental bearers. Refinements and regular training of volunteers would allow the AAMC to evolve into a skilled and competent arm of the Australian Military, yet by 1914, they were like most of the Dominion Forces, untested and untried in war.

Canada had experimented with a regimented system of provision of medical care to its Militia Army. There were however, many deficiencies in the system, which contributed to the ill health of the militia during the Northwest Campaigns.21 These included a lack of equipment, unskilled medical officers, and poor knowledge of sanitation and diet. In 1899, the ‘regular’ Army Medical Service was founded by under the direction of Surgeon-Major J. Hubert Neilson,

17 William Duncan Campbell Williams served as the PMO, NSW Army Medical Corps, Sudan Contingent 1885; additionally he served during the Boer War 1899. In 1902 he was appointed to the role of Director General Medical Services (Australia). Williams served as DMS Australia during the First World War, however age and health issues saw his appropriateness for the position questioned. Williams returned to Australia in 1916, his career and reputation having been tarnished. Williams born 30/07/1856, died on 10/05/1919. Jacqueline Gurner provides a comprehensive review of Williams as the instigator of reform of the Colonial and Australian Army Medical Corps. See Jacqueline Gurner, The origins of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps. op. cit. 18 These mobile units were aligned to the Lighthorse Regiments, thus we see a development in the two streams of AAMC, mobile and fixed. Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume I, op. cit., p. 4. 19 Tyquin, Little by little, op. cit., p. 84. 20 ibid., p. 106. 21 Campaigns included those of the Red River Rebellion in 1869 and later events led by Louis Riel and the Metis peoples conducted during the period 1884 and 1885. The Canadian Medical Association in 1896 declared that the Canadian Militia Medical Service was ‘antiquated and discredited.’ See Ian McCulloch, ‘Crucible of Fire: The South African War and the Birth of the Canadian Army Medical Corps’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol. 153(10), Nov 1995, p. 1495. 36 DGMS.22 Some of the innovations Neilson introduced were ‘six bearer companies and six field hospitals, which would be raised in major cities’.23 In 1904, further changes and improvements were instituted when the Canadian Army officially created the CAMC, a permanent and non-permanent Militia Army Medical Corps, with these later becoming one corps in 1909.24 The Canadians also instigated a Nursing Service incorporated into the CAMC.25 As at August 1914, ‘the Canadian Army Medical Service consisted of 20 officers, 5 nursing sisters, and 102 other ranks in the regular permanent force’.26 Heather Moran’s thesis confirmed the CAMC followed the procedures for medical evacuation set by the RAMC.27

New Zealand had maintained a Colonial medical corps established in 1845.28 Colonial and Maori disturbances, generally referred to as the New Zealand Wars in the middle to late half of the nineteenth century, saw a move to enforce compulsory training of the militia. However, the New Zealand Defence Force maintained a primarily voluntary force.29 New Zealand volunteers served in the South African War and they too suffered a disastrous medical situation. Of the 232 New Zealanders who died in service in South Africa ‘57%... died from disease’.30 In 1905, New Zealand set up a more formalised medical corps, including a Bearer Corps, with further developments occurring in 1908 when the New Zealand Army adopted the RAMC doctrine, which included the establishment of the field ambulance and a nursing service. These territorial units experienced many internal problems that would limit their effectiveness. One such problem was the inability to maintain staffing levels for their voluntary Medical Corps. This resulted in a poorly trained and partially developed medical

22 McCulloch argued that the slow development of the Canadian Medical Corps actually began in 1893 with reforms by Neilson DGMS of the Canadian Militia Medical Service, ibid., p. 1494. 23 ibid., p. 1495. 24 ibid., p. 1497. 25 Adami, War Story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 19. 26 Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service, op. cit., p. 5. 27 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 26. 28 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 1. 29 ibid., p. 3. 30 ibid., p. 5. 37 corps ill prepared for war. When New Zealand entered the war on 5 August 1914, her medical service had only ‘5/7th of the normal establishment’.31

In 1902, Commander-in-Chief of India, Lord Kitchener, undertook a radical overhaul of the way that the Indian Army was arranged which included reform of the medical services bringing them into line with the British system.32 The Medical Services of the Indian Army, prior to the Great War, encompassed four health departments: Indian Medical Service, Indian Medical Department, Indian Military Nursing Service and the Indian Hospital Corps, each with a distinct and particular role and identity.33 At the outbreak of the Great War, the Indian Army had ‘two branches, combatant and non-combatant. The non-combatant force consisted of Supply and Transport Corps, Indian Medical Service, and Ordnance Services’.34 The stretcher-bearers attached to a field ambulance, were derived from ‘the medical follower establishments, who provide the menial and lower grade categories in military hospitals, field medical units etc, and who are represented chiefly by the Army Bearer and Army Hospital Corps’.35 Indian stretcher-bearers received training in accordance with RAMC principles.

The Indian Army was arranged in specific cultural groups and as such was dependant on adherence to strict guidelines in recognition of these cultural aspects.36 Various followers, such as sweepers, water carriers and cooks

31 ibid. 32 See Lt-Gen. V. K. Kapoor, ‘Indian Army through the Ages’, SP Landforces Journal http://www.spslandforces.net/story.asp?id=73 33 Major Donovan Jackson, India’s Army, Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd, London, 1940, p. 463. 34 Chakravorty, Indian nationalism and the first world war (1914-1918), op. cit., p. 10. 35 Government of India, India's Contribution to the Great War, op. cit., p. 84. 36 ‘With regard to medical personnel which served the Indian Army the personnel derived from India were: (a) The IMS – ‘a corps of officers more than half of whom are in civil employ’ (b) The IMD - ‘consisting of military assistant and sub-ass surgeons, whose functions are supplementary to those of IMS in military hospitals. (f) ‘the medical follower est.’s, who provides the menial and lower grade categories in military hospitals, field medical units etc, and who are represented chiefly by the army bearer and army hosp corps’, ibid., pp. 83-84. 38 supported the Medical Service including the Bearer Corps. Major Donovan Jackson stated that the followers were; ‘the most important persons in the Indian Army and are now treated on exactly the same footing as the combatants’.37 The Indian Medical Service had its’ own manual based on that of the RAMC. It included, however, specific information for medical care on the frontier and in mountainous regions, which were not part of a European style of war. Morton-Jack confirmed that the IMS ‘had neither the capacity nor the equipment’38 necessary for a European style of warfare in August 1914 but this issue was attended to once the IEF ‘A’ had settled in France.

Although this thesis does not specifically examine non-British Forces’ medical services, it is appropriate to add a brief overview of the manner in which German and French stretcher-bearers operated during the Great War. German medical corps stretcher-bearers were essentially set up in a similar manner to the British. They were however, more flexible and able to grow larger or reduce in size very quickly.

In the German Army, the medical units were comprised of a corps of Sanitäts- officier-korps, a corps of medical officers and a corps of rank and file called the Sanitäts-mann-schaft, such as the medical troops, pharmacy and medical stores.39 The stretcher-bearers, the Krankentrager ‘were organised in two platoons each of 5 sections; 1 NCO, and 12 privates with 3 stretchers allotted to the platoon were 6 stretcher-bearers for the ambulance wagons, 3 NCOs and 3 orderlies for work at the Dressing Station’.40 Later in the war, a decision by the German Army to use men of lower physical standards as stretcher-bearers effectively backfired on the Germans and will be explained in chapter 5 of this

37 Jackson, India’s Army, op. cit., p. 470. 38 Morton-Jack stated this had developed by December 1914. Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front, op. cit., p. 289. 39 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Service in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 921. 40ibid. 39 thesis. A similar action during the war by British Forces on the Western Front, saw an exponential growth in size of their medical establishments and is explained in chapter three of this thesis.

The Australian Official Historian, Butler, gave a basic appreciation of the French Army Medical Corps. The French non-combatant stretcher-bearers belonged to the other ranks of the service, Section d’Infirmiers, and were allotted on lines similar to those of the British Army.41 They were organised as stretcher-bearers and hospital orderlies, but within the field units their roles were ‘interchangeable’.42 For each French infantry division there were allocated ‘177 stretcher-bearers (Brancardiers)’.43 The French Army Medical Corps also divided evacuation into two stages, the first being at the line of battle or in forward areas manned by the RAP and the second being the rear area of evacuation. It was the philosophy of the French medical corps to have their wounded evacuated as soon as possible and as such very little medical work was done in the forward areas; stretcher-bearers would clear this forward area immediately. The advances made by the French in classifying casualties resulted in a very different medical corps than that of the British, as related by Butler ‘showed the need for the specialisation of ambulances (la necessite de specialiser les ambulances): to allot one section of them to surgery, another for sick, and a third for those gassed’.44

The publication of the 1911 RAMC Training Manual provided the basis for instruction, policies and procedures for the various medical corps examined by this thesis.45 It will be shown the manual was the basis of procedures and policies of all the British Forces medical corps, as the Colonial Institute confirmed: ‘these services... the organisation [of which is] the same, so that a description of the

41 ibid., p. 913. 42 ibid. 43 ibid., p. 914. 44 ibid., p. 915. 45 War Office, Royal Army Medical Corps Training Manual, HMSO, 1911. 40 Royal Army Medical Service is a description also of the Dominion Medical Services’.46

The manual gave clear and unequivocal information on how to establish, recruit, train and deploy a field ambulance. Additionally it determined the rights and responsibilities of personnel that served in the medical corps during peace and in war. It set down the doctrine for treatment and evacuation of the sick and wounded during a European War. The manual affirmed: ‘the Royal Medical Corps is maintained firstly, with a view to the prevention of disease, and secondly, for the care and treatment of the sick and wounded’.47 Historian of surgery Harold Ellis affirmed that the care of wounded came after upholding army establishments: ‘the British manual listed the goal of triage as first conservation of manpower and secondly the interest of the wounded’.48

The responsibility for prevention of disease lay with MOs, the field ambulances and sanitary units. Additionally all personnel were expected to adhere to protocol for keeping billets, their work places and themselves clean. The RAMC Training Manual detailed the manner in which collection of the sick or wounded was to be carried out during warfare. It clearly stated that a field ambulance of a division should provide ‘immediate medical assistance of the infantry and other troops in a division in war... [including] a bearer division for the early medical assistance and collection of wounded’.49 The RAMC Training Manual also set out the manner in which personnel should receive individual training and the training of a unit.50

46 Received 4 July 1917, NZEF HQ, Wellington, ‘Notes on Royal Army Medical Service’, Archives New Zealand , (hereafter NZA), AD1, 1004 51/635. 47 War Office, Royal Army Medical Corps Training Manual, op. cit., p. 1. 48 Harold Ellis, A History of Surgery, Greenwich Medical Media Ltd, London, 2001, p. 305. 49 ibid., p. 103. 50 For an outline of the individual and collective unit training see ibid., pp. 3-12. 41 Field Service Regulations, Parts I and II determined that a field ambulance and its stretcher-bearers would have a varying role dependant on the action, for example, whether the force that it was attached to was in an advance, holding a defensive action or in retirement.51 Arrangements of how many field ambulances and personnel would be present during an engagement were determined prior to the action, by the Commanding Officer (CO) of the field ambulance responsible for fulfilling this obligation. The plans included but were not limited to, how the sick or wounded were to be evacuated, the routes for the walking wounded and those needing to be carried, the location of the RAP, the dressing stations and collecting zones. It was vital that all members of the Corps were aware of these plans, so that collection, evacuation and treatment could be properly organised. The bearer division during an action would, either all or in part, be in advance; that is with the troops, not in the rear as the tent division of the field ambulance. The purpose of this was to allow for swift evacuation of sick or wounded to the rear. It will be shown that this procedure was fraught with difficulties during a swift advance and in the case of a retreat.

At the declaration of war with Germany, the British Forces’ Army Medical Service established the following hierarchy. Sir Alfred Keogh held the position of Director General Army Medical Services, (DGAMS). This position had the responsibility of co-ordination of the various medical services (medical, dental and veterinary) from London, based at the War Office. The Director General of Medical Services (DGMS) Sir Arthur Sloggett carried out the co-ordination of all Army Medical Services, BEF, on the Western Front and was based in France. The figure below relates the complicated system of hierarchy for the Army Medical Service on the Western Front.

51 ibid., p. 104. 42 1.1 - Medical Administration on the Western Front52

Each infantry division had one Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) in charge of overseeing the work of its’ field ambulances. The ADMS had the responsibility for the arrangement of medical plans, including the location of field ambulances, main dressing stations (MDS) and walking wounded collecting posts. Each infantry division was allocated three field ambulances, one for each infantry brigade with a Lieutenant Colonel as CO.53 The CO of the field ambulance had the responsibility of organising the location of the RAP, Advanced Dressing Station (ADS), CCS and other day-to-day operations. As of August 1914, each brigade’s field ambulance had 234 personnel including Officers, MOs and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Other Ranks (OR).54

52 Butler, Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 24. 53 This situation differed from that of an Artillery Brigade that was trained to provide basic medical care and be largely self-sufficient. Butler gives a basic assessment of how medical care was afforded the artillery. ‘In 1915 a Field Artillery Brigade had an RMO and 2 combatant ‘orderlies’ In 1916 Australian Brigades (3 Batteries only) had four AAMC ‘attached’, ibid., p. 279. 54 This was the original 1914 establishment and would change later in the war. Note each of the countries examined had developed their field ambulance establishment similar to the British. 43 Each field ambulance had three sections: ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, with each of these having a bearer and tent division.55 Each of these units had one officer, a Captain or Lieutenant, who specifically organised the stretcher-bearers. This arrangement allowed a field ambulance to be ‘mobile’ by providing one or more sections to give medical assistance to their brigades, or others as needed.56 Also attached to a field ambulance were transport (horsed and motor) and a Sanitary Section.57 It followed the infantry units into the field by separating into smaller units and undertaking tasks including evacuation and medical care as required.

It was envisaged that teams of stretcher-bearers would be able to separate from the larger field ambulance and be sent to areas as needed. A field ambulance and its components was designed to be ‘elastic’.58 It will be shown that this flexibility was at times impossible to maintain, particularly early in the war and during the strain of a forced retreat, as experienced at Mons in 1914 and repeated again in 1918 during Operation Michael.

The ‘Evacuation Route’ or ‘Chain of Evacuation’ is the stages in which sick or wounded were transferred from the battlefront to the rear areas. Medical evacuation and care of the sick and wounded were dealt with over three zones. These were the Collecting, Evacuation and Distribution Zones.

The Collecting and Evacuation Zones ran along the Lines of Communication (LoC). The Collecting Zone was closest to the battlefront, and had two separate groups

55 This refers to an Infantry Field Ambulance only. Cavalry Field Ambulance were smaller and had different levels of authority. Cavalry field ambulances were smaller and mounted (for the most part), and could be mounted or dismounted depending on requirements. Cavalry stretcher- bearers worked in teams of four. 56 Butler, Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 8. 57 For a full examination on the establishment of a Field Ambulance. As of 1911, see Captain G. Law, ‘The evolution of the Field Ambulance 1906 to 1918’, Defence Force Journal, No. 66 Sept/Oct 1987, pp. 53-67. 58 Major G. R. N. Collins, Military Organization and Administration, Hugh Rees Ltd, London, 1918, p. 4. 44 providing medical care within the area, the regimental medical establishment and the medical corps. The evacuation chain began with the regimental establishment and involved the regimental stretcher-bearers; from there control devolved to the stretcher-bearers of the medical corps. The following diagram shows the RAMC chain of evacuation on the Western Front during the war.

45 1.2 - RAMC scheme of evacuation on the Western Front, 191559

The regimental medical establishment the furthest forward, comprised of a Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) attached to a battalion from the medical corps.60 He had with him also from the Medical Corps an NCO and 4 OR responsible for sanitation and water duties. Note that the medical orderlies were trained in first-aid. Additional personnel included a medical orderly and a driver,

59 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p.7. 60 ‘Each infantry battalion had attached to it on mobilization one officer and five men of the RAMC’, MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 43. 46 2 NCOs and 16 regimental stretcher-bearers (RSBs) taken from the battalion. Regimental stretcher-bearers remained with its battalion (company or section) until necessary such as when ‘an action is imminent’61 they were placed in charge of the MO of the battalion and reported directly to him.

The regimental stretcher-bearers were not under protection of the Geneva Convention while carrying arms, hence the laying down of their arms which were collected and placed in the in the regimental medical cart.62 All regimental stretcher-bearers were issued with a brassard that had been marked with the letters ‘SB’.63

1.3 - Regimental stretcher-bearer brassard64

61 War Office, Royal Army Medical Corps Training Manual, op. cit., p. 103. 62 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864, Sourced 02/12/2012, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full 63 The weapons of the RSB were stored. War Office, Royal Army Medical corps Training Manual, op. cit., p. 107. 64 ‘White woollen brassard (armband), lined with white linen, with a white metal buckle, and five brass riveted eyelets at the free end for size adjustment. The letters 'SB' (stretcher bearer), in fine red wool cloth, are appliquéd in the centre.’ Lance-Corporal A. Kennedy, 52nd Battalion, AIF, Australian War Memorial (herewith AWM), REL 01274. 47 The Australian experiences in garnering regimental stretcher-bearers proved to be a difficult one, and as such all men serving in military bands were delegated as non-combatant stretcher-bearers. This was the case still in 1914, as demonstrated by Australian Private Fred Bennett, 6th Australian Field Ambulance wrote his mother, ‘all bandsmen are turned into [regimental] stretcher- bearers’.65

Essentially regimental stretcher-bearers collected wounded from where they fell on the battlefield and took them to the designated RAP. Any sick or wounded who were able to walk were directed to the RAP by these stretcher-bearers. Regimental stretcher-bearers were vital in not only providing acute medical treatment but also went a long way to uphold unit morale. The following illustration and explanatory note gives a succinct overview of the responsibilities relevant to this thesis within the Chain of Evacuation.

65 Letter dated 14/01/1916, Private Fred Bennett, 6th Field Ambulance, AWM, 3RL/7507. 48 1.4 - Collecting and Evacuating Zones66

The plain circles represent the Regimental Aid Posts (RAPs)

The circle with a dot are the Advanced Dressing Stations (ADSs)

The circle with the cross are the Main Dressing Stations (MDSs)

The rectangles are the Casualty Clearing Stations (CCSs)

66 Source http://www.vlib.us/medical/ramc/ramc.htm

49 The duties of the RSB included application of a first field dressing to stem blood loss and to ‘collect’ the wounded, removing them from the battlefield if possible. If it was impossible to remove a wounded man, he was rendered as comfortable as possible, his location was noted and he was advised that he would be removed as soon as practicable. The first field dressing usually applied to a wound by the wounded man himself if able, a comrade or regimental stretcher- bearer. The stretcher-bearers laid the sick or wounded on a canvas stretcher and carried him to the RAP.

The RAP, often simply called the ‘aid post’ was the furthermost forward medical treatment area. Men and medical personnel regarded the RAP as being one of the most dangerous places due to being located close to the front line and generally under constant enemy fire. The location of the RAP was selected by the RMO, and needed to be placed in a central location, accessible for all personnel. They had to be located not too far forward of the troops and were supposed to provide shelter or protection from the enemy. However, incorrect placement by inexperienced RMOs would become problematic over the course of the Great War (on the Western Front).

All lightly wounded men able to walk made their own way following a pre- determined route to the Walking Wounded Collecting Post which was generally situated between the RAP and the ADS. It was therefore vital that prior to an action (offensive or defensive), men of the battalion were advised of the placement of their RAP and their evacuation route. During the war, it was found that internal communication frequently broke down with many men and stretcher-bearers being unaware of the planned evacuation route.

At the RAP the RMO would assess the condition of the wounded, apply immediate treatment and tag the casualty for further medical treatment if

50 necessary. Mortally wounded men were made as comfortable as possible, usually given pain relief such as morphine and were not evacuated further back. The medical tag, ‘Army Casualty Form W3088’, stated the nature of the wound, what treatment had been taken and where the wounded was to be relocated for further treatment. The tag displayed below belonged to Australian Lance Corporal A H Lee, who received a shrapnel wound whilst in France, the date shown on the medical tag, is as he moved through the medical system.

1.5 - Army Casualty Form W3088 belonging to Lance Corporal A. H. Lee, 3rd Machine Gun Company, AIF, 6 May 1917, Shrapnel wound right buttock67

When the regimental stretcher-bearers had delivered their sick or wounded comrade to the RAP, it marked the end of their responsibilities in the chain of evacuation. However, during the war when there were great numbers of wounded, evidence shows that RSB were called on to help the medical corps stretcher-bearers further back along the evacuation chain and vice versa as will be explained.

67 AWM, REL 36887.001 51 From the RAP, the chain of evacuation continued rearward with the responsibility falling to the non-combatant stretcher-bearers of the medical corps field ambulance. British War Establishment allotted 108 stretcher-bearers for each of the field ambulances.68 These non-combatant stretcher-bearers worked in the area from the RAP back to the ADS. As the war progressed and due to personnel shortages, medical corps stretcher-bearers were permitted to go forward of the RAP, which will be discussed further in latter chapters of this thesis.

The work of evacuating the sick or wounded was very physical; generally, a casualty was carried by hand from the RAP, back along the chain of evacuation to the ADS. During the war many developments in the way that stretcher-bearers transported casualties occurred and is discussed in later chapters of this thesis. The ADS was usually located near or adjacent to a road or junction of roads, where motorised or horse drawn ambulances could continue the removal of the sick or wounded along the next stage of the chain of evacuation. Beyond the ADS was the CCS where the sick and wounded were treated and where evacuation further back was organised.69 From the CCS stretcher-bearers generally had little input in the chain of evacuation, as this role would be taken over by the transport section of the field ambulance and then by the tent section.

In pre-war plans for evacuation, it had been determined a hand carry should not exceed more than 1,000 yards (~914 m) in good weather and circumstances, and no more than 600 yards (~548 m) during poor circumstances.70 The stretcher- bearers had to carry the casualty on a stretcher to either the dressing station or the motor ambulance post where the casualty was transported further back. A hand carry typically utilised a canvas and wood stretcher that weighed

68 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 27. 69 The CCS were originally called ‘Clearing Hospitals’, but this was changed during the war. ibid., p. 42. 70 ibid., p. 25. 52 approximately 30lbs (~13.6 kg). The stretchers used were generally made of wooden poles and supporting traverses to keep the frame square, four short legs to keep the stretcher from resting on the ground and a canvas on which the patient lay. A pillow was also supposed to be included but this was frequently found to be impractical on the Western Front. The total weight of a typical (Mark 1 and Mark 2) stretcher was 30lb and the maximum length of the poles was 7’ 9’’ (236cm). An AAMC canvas stretcher is described as:

The canvas is cream-coloured, 183.5 cm long, ending with woven ends extending slightly beyond the wooden cross-members. On either side, it is secured into place beneath a flat wooden rod screwed onto the heavier lateral frame rods. The frame rod ends are shaped to form rounded, smooth handles, very worn. The cross-members are reinforced with metal plates, 6cm wide, painted pink.71

Shoulder straps became imperative when carrying over long distance and through wet or muddy terrain; however, they provided only some relief, as after a while these would cut into the shoulders. Much work was undertaken over the course of the war to lighten the stretchers and to make them more flexible; however, the changes barely gave the stretcher-bearers much relief from their strenuous task. In later chapters, it will be shown that external forces such as mud and wet weather placed further burdens on the bearers by weighing down the stretchers and the wounded man’s clothing.

In theory and best practice, a hand-carry was performed by men working in teams of six called a bearer squad. The official New Zealand historian Carbery described the organisation of a bearer squad as consisting of:

71 The description given is from a stretcher that had been made and donated to the AAMC by employees of the Victorian Railways in 1916. The stretcher is currently on display in the Museum of Victoria, item number SH891487. http://museumvictoria.com.au/collections/items/261179/stretcher-canvas-circa-1916 53 1 officer, 1 sergeant, 1 bugler and 36 bearers. Duties: to collect the wounded from the RAP and carry them to the car collecting posts or to the advanced dressing station. The total bearer personnel of the field ambulance, 3 officers, 3 sergeants, and 108 bearers, with 4 men to the stretcher can carry 27 lying cases in one trip.72

Of those six men, four did the actual lifting and carrying of the patient on the stretcher, the fifth man would carry the sick or wounded person’s personal items such as rucksacks and weapons, with the sixth man guiding or leading the squad. A British stretcher-bearer described how his stretcher squad was organised, and confirmed that the bearer squads were offered some freedom of choice in how the squad operated:

In the line, our squad consisted of four men of whom one was in sole charge. These were usually pals, the leader being chosen by mutual agreement. At such time, we usually did 24 hours duty taking our rations with us. We also took a stretcher and blankets, and when receiving a wounded man from RAP, these were left in exchange.73

The following photograph demonstrates the structure of a medical corps stretcher-bearer squad. Note each man is numbered; this designates their role in the process of the hand-carry. No. 4 is the man in charge of organising the bearer squad and also generally in charge of rendering first aid to the wounded, however as will be shown in later chapters this was impractical on the Western Front.74

72 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. XIX. 73 WW1 Diary of Edwin Ware, RAMC/PE/1/707/WARE, Army Medical Service Museum hereafter (AMS), Keogh Barracks, Mytchett, Surrey, p. 33. 74 War Office, Royal Army Medical Corps Training Manual, op. cit., p. 110. 54 1.6 - Stretcher-bearer squad 75

Stretcher-bearers of the field ambulance were non-combatants and as such received protection under the Geneva Convention. Early in the war, only the small round insignias denoting the medical corps sewn onto the sleeve of their uniform identified the medical corps stretcher-bearers. This changed in 1915 when the stretcher-bearers were issued with a brassard (a cloth strip) with a Red Cross sewn on it, to be worn on the upper left arm. The CO of a field ambulance needed to ensure that the issuing of brassards were recorded and certified in a roll, also the wearers were issued with appropriate paperwork that needed to be carried with them at all times, in order to gain protection of the Convention. In readying his field ambulance for war, Australian Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Sutton, AAMC, 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, recorded: ‘Mobilization 1st stage... signed Brassards Base Depot – Medical Store Brisbane mobilised’.76 The figure below clearly shows the stamp issued as per the Geneva Convention.

75 G. M. Dupuy, The Stretcher Bearer, Oxford Medical Publications, Oxford, 1915, p. 14. 76 Diary entry 5/8/1914, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Sutton, AWM, 2DRL 1227/5. 55 1.7 - Red Cross Brassard worn by a member of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance77

The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, gave rights to non-combatants and protection to those who served as stretcher-bearers during warfare.78 Article 9 of the Convention, entitled these rights to those exclusively involved in the ‘removal, transportation and treatment of the sick and wounded’.79 This protection provided these non-combatants certain rights, such as not being taken as a prisoner and being returned to its unit as soon as possible. The Official British History demonstrated the importance given to the wearing of the Red Cross Brassard:

Article 18, [of the Geneva Convention]... The heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground… is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical service of armies… [and] any other brassard than that stamped and delivered by competent military authority would however, have no value as a protection.80

77 AWM, REL 31/247. 78 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864, Sourced 02/12/2012, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/120?opendocument 79 Article 9, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. 1906. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/120?opendocument 80 See footnotes, MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 212 - 216. 56 Voluntary groups were given protection under Article 10 of the Geneva Convention if they provided medical care and were duly ‘authorised to assist the [Army] medical services in time of war’.81 Organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Order of St. John, the Society of Friends and St. Andrews Ambulance Association worked closely with the British Army to provide medical care, which included volunteer stretcher-bearers.

The necessity for rapid evacuation of the wounded to the ADS or CCS cannot be stressed enough, as a badly wounded man’s chance of surviving depended on receiving swift medical care. Blood loss, shock, head and abdominal wounds all needed immediate assessment and treatment with aseptic cleansing of wounds in which bacteria had entered a high priority. Training of stretcher-bearers needed to cover a variety of tasks necessary for them to quickly and efficiently deal with the sick and wounded on the battlefield. The physicality of lifting, carrying and loading stretchers would be the dominant skill required, but not the only one they would need to learn.

Some men of the RAMC received a formal and structured education which included the reading, writing and maths skills necessary for many roles with a field ambulance. For example the medical orderly attached to serve the RMO in the forward areas needed these skills to assist with sorting of wounded and record keeping where possible. Private L. McDougall, RAMC, attained his Second Class, Certificate of Education during his training in March 1914. The competencies he attained were arithmetic and simple writing.

81 ibid., p. 215. 57 1.8 - Certificate of Attainment, Private L McDougall, 13/03/1914, RAMC.82

Peacetime training of medical corps stretcher-bearers across all British Forces followed a similar structure, designed around the contents and policies of the relevant edition RAMC training manual. Training included stretcher drill; the lifting, loading and unloading stretchers; first aid; how to splint fractures; bandaging; sanitation and tent work. In a letter, Lieutenant Colonel J. J. de Zouche-Marshall of the East Surrey Bearer Company explained his teaching regime in 1907:

82 Private L. McDougall , RAMC 729/4, Muniment Collection, Archives and Manuscripts Collection, Wellcome Library and Archives (hereafter Wellcome Library), London. 58 The examination paper set at about the middle of March, consisted of twelve exhaustive groups of questions... this two months of labour took us slowly, but I hope surely, through anatomy, physiology, triangular and roller bandaging (the practical work being taught concurrently), fractures, dressing and antiseptic treatment of wounds.83

Group training reinforced procedures and ‘live’ practice allowed the men of the bearer section to hone their skills in lifting and carrying. During peacetime the Canadian (Permanent) Medical Corps training regime included a ‘full medical corps camp’84 conducted over a period of sixteen days, such as the one held in 1911 at London, Ontario. The camp included training in ‘a scheme of attack and defence, which called into play purely the work of the regimental medical officer with a battalion, next schemes calling into play the work of the field ambulance with the brigade, and, finally, the divisional co-operation of field ambulance... were worked out’.85 This formal training gave the men of a field ambulance the knowledge and skills of operating a field ambulance in the event of war, with the information distributed to the militia field ambulances throughout Canada.

Prior to 1914, peacetime training for the part-time Australian medical corps stretcher-bearers included ‘drill, first aid, discipline, disease prevention, medical establishments and army forms and correspondence’.86 Additionally the Australian stretcher-bearers received their training over 6 days each year.87

In recognition that carrying a wounded man was intensely strenuous work, stretcher and physical drill occupied the majority of the training of stretcher-

83 Letter Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. de Zouche-Marshall, British Medical Journal, 27 April 1907, p. 1034. 84 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 19. 85 ibid. 86 Tyquin, Little by little, op. cit., p. 108. 87 ibid. 59 bearers during peacetime. This centred on keeping these men strong enough to withstand the rigours of bearer duty by maintaining the stamina, speed and agility necessary to perform the role. The 1911 RAMC Training Manual affirmed the importance of repeating stretcher drill to prevent the wounded from being disturbed or distressed during a carry. The manual stated ‘bearers trained and habituated to this duty perform it with ease and dexterity’.88 The training given to the sixteen regimental stretcher-bearers of a battalion bore little difference to those men of the medical corps. They received instruction and training from the battalion’s RMO. This involved basic first aid, how to stem blood flow, bandaging, fracture care and pain management. Stretcher-bearers were trained to safely lift and carry wounded men whilst being mindful to minimise unnecessary injury to themselves and their wounded, and to minimise stress. The training manual for the IMS confirmed:

Military training, especially in the ranks of the Army Bearer Corps, must also include such training as will keep them physically fit for their duties in the field... [and] stretcher drill... [including] correct handling, loading and carriage of wounded.89

Wartime training of stretcher-bearers differed little, with the exception of a shorter and more intensive period needed to get the recruits fit and prepared for war. At enlistment, all members of the RAMC received training in military matters, instruction in regulations and procedures, and discipline. They also received physical training, marching and repetition in drill. Australian stretcher- bearer Edward Munro recorded: ‘in the early stages at the camp there was a shortage of rifles, so in order that some instruction in rifle drill might be imparted to the recruits, we were issued with pieces of bamboo as substitutes’.90

88 War Office, Royal Army Medical Corps Training, op. cit., p. 147. 89 Major-General M. H. S. Grover, Medical services India: Military training, Government of India, Simla, 1911, p. 14. 90 Munro, Diaries of a stretcher-bearer: 1916-1918, op. cit., p. 2. 60 Historian Mark Johnston stated wartime training of Australian Army Field Ambulance stretcher-bearers was conducted over ‘three weeks’91 and included first aid, such as how to splint fractures and how to apply dressings to stem blood flow or for a head injury. Heather Moran explained the Canadian experience of training: ‘varied, based on the progress of the unit and, at times, the need for units at the front’.92

The history of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance recorded that they remained in camp for five months. A member of the field ambulance, Canadian Frederick Noyes, who served as a stretcher-bearer, described the first few days of camp life as: ‘all those innumerable fatigues which go into the embryonic stage of the soldier’.93 Noyes described the daily routine as having included ‘infantry drill, stretcher drill, and first-aid treatments such as bandaging, putting on splints [for fractures], stopping haemorrhages, etc. Three lectures a day were given by the officers.’94 Early in the war, the use of the ‘Linton Splint’ for broken limbs was almost exclusively used. However, the Linton Splint did not offer much by way of relief for men with thigh or hip fractures. Far too often men with these types of wounds died along the chain of evacuation from shock and blood loss. Stretcher- bearers were by 1917, trained almost exclusively in the use of the Thomas Splint for these types of fractures as it was found:

The difference in condition between wounded who were thus splinted [Thomas Splint] and those otherwise dressed, was very striking. All medical officers commented on the vast improvement effected by the use of this apparatus in handling a condition heretofore fraught with extreme danger to the injured. Some of the RMO’s were of the opinion

91 Mark Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: Saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda, op. cit., p. 11. 92 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 51. 93 Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double, op. cit., p. 5. 94 Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double, op. cit., p. 6. 61 that a supply of these splints should have been brought up to the forward RAP’s by the ambulance bearer parties.95

More detail on the efficacy of the Thomas Splint is discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis. Training also involved practice using a fellow member simulating a wound. This reinforced essential skills such as first aid, assessment of wounds, bandaging, splinting and stemming blood loss. A British stretcher-bearer explained during these real life scenarios, ‘[the] wounded man had to be dressed on the spot using triangular bandages only [as improvised tourniquet] loaded on to your stretcher and retire’.96

Physical training of stretcher-bearers featured heavily in their wartime preparations as Private William Gannicliffe of the 3/2nd West Lancashire Field Ambulance explained. This confirmed the necessity of stretcher-bearers having to develop and maintain a high level of fitness in order to carry out their work. In Gannicliffe’s detailed memoir, he recorded the training regime for stretcher- bearers of the medical corps:

At Blackpool we had P. T. [physical training) every day on the shore, route marches out from the country and back and really serious lectures on the names of bones, the circulation of the blood, pressure points and the digestive system. Practical work was confined to the triangular bandage... a word on the P.T. might be of interest – no NCO apparently knew any Swedish Drill and we did schoolchild stuff for a time.97

95 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 311. 96 W. Gannicliffe, Memoir, Wellcome Library, RAMC 801/11, p. 9. 97 Swedish Drill was a set of exercises designed to increase flexibility in a group. See Nancy A. Nygaard, ‘Too awful for words: Nursing narratives of the Great War’, PhD, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002, p. 8; Gannicliffe memoir, op. cit., p. 2. 62 Stretcher practice consumed a great deal of the day for the recruits of the medical corps, particularly those in the bearers units. Private Gannicliffe described a typical day as beginning with reveille at 6.30am, parade, P. T. or a three mile run, breakfast, a full dress parade for the C/O’s inspection and dinner in their billets. Stretcher drill commenced at 2pm:

Always with six men to a stretcher... static form of stretcher drill was opening and closing stretcher by numbers, still in squads of 6... Nos 1 and 2 knelt and removed slings, stood up, opened stretcher and kicked open the stays, laid stretcher flat and placed the slings folded once with loop over handles and free ends over the far handles ‘buckle uppermost... on the command of ‘lift stretchers’ Nos 1 and 2 stepped between the handles, bent down, pressed the loops over the handles, lifted the stretcher and stood to attention... exact uniform timing was the objective.98

Note Gannicliffe’s assertion that timing was imperative to the lifting and carrying process. Wounded who had been evacuated by untrained stretcher-bearers, have related the experience as being poor, because the untrained bearers did not know how to lift safely or with care. Sudden jerking, bumping or unstable carries caused further pain to already wounded men. It will be shown the use of untrained bearers during peak casualty periods could not sustain a carry, particularly over poor terrain, causing a delay in the evacuation of sick and wounded and causing distress to the casualty.

The rigours of stretcher-bearing such as the physical strain and undoubtedly the mental strain sorely tested these men. The length of a carry by the field ambulance stretcher-bearers was frequently overly long. The RAMC Training Manual of 1911, had stated: ‘it will seldom be possible to commence the collection of wounded until the firing line has advanced... the main work of

98 Gannicliffe, ibid., p. 8. 63 collecting wounded takes place after a battle’99 but this would prove impractical on the Western Front. The overlong carries for the stretcher-bearers during the war will be shown in this thesis, to be one of the major problems faced by stretcher-bearers.

At the declaration of the war with Germany on 4 August 1914, Britain had easily established ‘six Regular and fourteen Territorial Divisions’100 ready for service overseas which included the Army Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC). At the beginning of the war, there were 9,000 regular and volunteer members of the RAMC available for service.101 Problems in getting all men ready for war meant that not all field ambulances were available to depart for service overseas with its brigades. British historian of the RAMC F. S. Brereton recorded that these internal difficulties in staffing were already present at the declaration of war:

The active list contained too few officers and men... to staff all the units needed... men must be called from the reserve... even from amongst volunteers to make the organisation effective.102

Initially RAMC stretcher-bearers were recruited from the Reserve and Territorial Forces supplementing those of the Regular Army, the ‘Old Contemptibles’.103 Personnel of the various field ambulances across the country received notification of the imminent departure of their brigades in the war against Germany. The units were quickly organised and despatched for duty, as the Unit history of the 1st South Midland Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance related: ‘the War Office telegram ordering mobilisation of the ambulance was received at

99 War Office, RAMC Training Manual, op. cit. p. 110. 100 B. Poe, ‘British Army Reforms, 1902-1914’, Military Affairs, Fall, 1967, p.137. 101 This figure would grow to 133,000 by November 1918. Major J. Edwards, ‘The Royal Army Medical Corps’ in Famous British Regiments, No. 3, 1945, p. 28. 102 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 11. 103 ibid. 64 Birmingham at 6pm, on August 4 1914... mobilisation proceeded rapidly and on 10 August the unit, completely equipped marched to Warwick’.104

Similarly, the CO of the 1st British Field Ambulance, 1st Division BEF, quickly organised his men into action.105 Major H. A. Hinge detailed the way in which he mobilised his field ambulance: ‘9am, 5 August 1914, received over from DDMS Aldershot Command mobilisation orders for [1st British Field Ambulance] mobilisation to take place at Connaught Hospital’.106 The field ambulance however failed to reach establishment due to a lack of manpower. The war diary noted ‘recruits coming in all day – medical inspection - none rejected... 54 recruits joined today - delay is caused due to shortness of NCOs’.107 It took the field ambulance until 17 August, before the ambulance made establishment and were able to embark for the Western Front, arriving at Étaples Base on 22 August 1914. Corporal C. Chamberlain of the 9th British Field Ambulance marvelled at the swiftness of the embarkation to the port city of Le Havre, France. In his personal diary he recorded: ‘the move came eventually and rather suddenly, for the on the night of August 19th, the orders that we were for the Front reached us’.108

Within days of the declaration of war, the personnel of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance were advised of its mobilisation by their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Sutton. On 7 August, Lieutenant Colonel Sutton’s field ambulance was ready: ‘addressed the men at 8.30am and they marched to Lytton’.109 The men of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance spent the next month finalising their

104 Lt-Colonel Sawyer, The Birmingham Territorial Units of the Royal Army Medical Corps , 1914-1919, Allday, Birmingham, 1921, p. 21. 105 The 1st Division, BEF was commanded by Major-General S. H. Lomax, the Infantry Brigades were 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th. 106 Diary entry 05/08/1914, War diary of the No.1 Field Ambulance, 1st Division (BEF), The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO 95/1257. 107 ibid. 108 Diary entry 20/08/1914. The war diary of 19464, Corporal C. Chamberlain and the 9th Field Ambulance 1914, Wellcome Library, RAMC 699. 109 Diary entry 7/08/1914, ibid. 65 establishment, and underwent a period of training at Ennogera, Queensland, before departing Australia on the Rangatira from Brisbane on 25 September, 1914.110

The New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) with its medical corps, were quickly organised to occupy and secure the ‘German Wireless Station at Samoa [which] was an urgent Imperial Service’.111 The Samoan Force of two transports, and 1,383 men including members of the 4th New Zealand Field Ambulance, occupied Samoa on 29 August 1914.112 The main New Zealand Force encountered many problems to be overcome before they could embark. They did not have enough ships to transport the force, the presence of German cruisers in the area, and without a suitable sized escort meant the embarkation of the main body (NZ) was delayed until 16 October.113 The NZMC faced the problem of a shortage of trained personnel, as they did not have a ‘cadre of regular officers and NCOs as in the combatant formations’.114 Recruiting of suitably trained personnel delayed the field ambulances reaching the necessary numbers to meet establishment.

Additionally, the problem of distance and a dispersed population directly influenced the ability of the NZMC to be swiftly despatched for service.115 Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C. Mackie Begg, the 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance commenced mobilization from 11 August 1914.116 A shortage of personnel however, resulted in the field ambulance having to spend the period 24 August - 16 October 1914, traversing the small island nation collecting new recruits. The unit’s war diary also showed there were further problems such as a

110 Nominal Roll 3rd Australian Field Ambulance AAMC, AIF, AWM 8/26/46. 111 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit. p. 14. 112 ibid. 113 ibid., p. 19. 114 ibid. 115 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance - War Diary, Archives New Zealand (hereafter NZA), Ref. WA119/172/119a. 116 ibid. 66 lack of equipment.117 The Australian and NZMC would not arrive on the Western Front until 1916, due to their participation in the Dardanelles Campaign.

The manner in which the CAMC mobilized was similar to their Dominion counterparts. The 1st Canadian Field Ambulance, 1st Canadian Division departed Canada in October, 1914 and commenced training in Britain, arriving there on the 14 October 1914. After a suitable period of training, they embarked for France arriving on 12 February 1915. 118 The 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, 2nd Canadian Division, originated in the Hamilton area of Ontario. The field ambulance was an amalgamation of 106 men from the pre-war militia, field ambulance companies and new recruits.119 The field ambulance spent five months training in Ontario before embarking for service in Europe. However, internal problems with provision of accommodation, rations and services whilst in camp would lead to unrest and disobedience from within the field ambulance personnel and other troops. One incident of poisoning and complaints about rations almost brought about the downfall of the ambulance. Frederick Noyes, the unofficial historian of the unit recorded: ‘the men were offered a discharge from military service for $10’ the amount actually charged for release was $15.120 Eventually the field ambulance left Halifax on the vessel Northland in April 1915, ‘with the Second Canadian Contingent’.121 After a short period in England they finally reached France on 15 September, 1915.

An Indian Corps, IEF‘A’ was quickly despatched to France and ‘proceeded to provide at once for France an expeditionary force of a strength of two infantry

117 ibid. 118 1st Canadian Field Ambulance War Diary, Feb – Mar 1915, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG9-III-D-3, Volume 5026. 119 Colonel A.R.C. Butson, A History of the Military Medical Units of Hamilton, Ontario in Peace and War 1900-1990, no page number given, http://batteredbox.wordpress.com/2010/07/24/hx- 23hamiltonfieldambulance/ 120 ibid., p.8. 121 Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double, op. cit., p.1. 67 and two cavalry divisions’.122 This included the IMS and the field ambulances of the Lahore Division, Meerut Division and a Cavalry Brigade. These units were British and Indian units with a majority of British officers. The Indian Field Ambulances arrived in Marseilles on 30 September 1914.

For the Government of India, the challenge of raising and maintaining an additional 41 field ambulances during the war, and sending 64 field ambulances to theatres of war abroad placed a great strain on the Army.123 India had the additional pressure of fulfilling the needs of a culturally diverse Army that further strained the medical corps’ ability to maintain and uphold the welfare and wellbeing of the Indian Forces. The huge numbers of men who served in the Indian Army Bearer Corps and their ‘camp followers’ in the Great War is demonstrated in the following statement:

The strength of the Army Bearer Corps at the outbreak of the war was 3,258 including 108 reservists: during the War it expanded to a strength of 22,750... over 1,700 ward orderlies, i.e.: specially enlisted soldiers trained as medical attendants, were also sent overseas, after being attached to one of the various war hospitals in India for a period of instruction... 979 British O/R, 2,674 Indian O/R and 26,179 followers were sent overseas to the various theatres up to 31/10/18. 124

This unprecedented growth would see the Indian and the British RAMC units struggle in their ability to supply the Indian Field Ambulances.125 Additional problems occurred in the provision of culturally appropriate facilities and

122 Government of India ‘India's contribution to the Great War’, op. cit., p. 74. 123 In India before the war, there were 65 Field Ambulances. Also See appendix ‘A’ for a complete list of the growth of the Indian Medical Service during the Great War, ibid., p.87. 124 ibid., p. 86. 125 George Morton-Jack stated of the Indian Corps, IEF ‘A’, ‘Overall it contained 20 748 British and 89 335 Indian soldiers sent from the subcontinent, supported by 49 273 Indian labourers. It fought in the front line at Ypres, Neuve Chapelle, and Loos, and suffered 34 252 combatant casualties’. Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’, op. cit., p. 339. 68 practices for the vast numbers of the medical follower establishments (in France and Belgium), ‘who provide the menial and lower grade categories in military hospitals, field medical units etc, and who are represented chiefly by the army bearer and army hospital corps’.126

This chapter has afforded the reader with a clearer understanding of the role of the regimental and the medical corps stretcher-bearers as of August 1914. It seeks to determine if there were typical types of men that served as stretcher- bearers. It has also shown how these inexperienced medical corps were established, their preparation for war and what basic training stretcher-bearers received. The next chapter examines who the stretcher-bearers were. Was there one type of man who enlisted in the medical corps to work as a stretcher- bearer? It aims to significantly extend our knowledge of these non-combatants and their experience of war.

126 Government of India ‘India's contribution to the Great War’, op. cit., p. 84. 69 CHAPTER 2 – THE STRETCHER-BEARERS

The aims of this chapter are twofold. The first aim is to establish a profile of the AAMC stretcher-bearers. A review of certain physical and social characteristics of these men is undertaken. The data comes directly from the service records of the some 12,145 individuals who enlisted in the AAMC during 1914-1918. This information will allow an impression to be made of a typical Australian stretcher- bearer at the outbreak of war in 1914. It is then compared to other analysis of medical corps personnel previously undertaken. This thesis acknowledges that not all members of the medical corps worked as stretcher-bearers, however it allows for an insight into some traits held by members of this non-combatant arm of the army. The focus of the Australians is driven purely because of availability of data; this is not meant to overlook those men from other countries. It is acknowledged that significant gaps in our understanding of the stretcher-bearers from the other countries examined by this thesis exist, meaning a truly comparative experience cannot be given.

The second aim of the thesis is to introduce the personal story of non-combatant stretcher-bearers. As explained in the introduction, very little is known of the personal experience of these non-combatants. Their ‘voice’ is sorely missing in the history of the Great War. This lack of formal assessment of their contribution in the historiography is incongruous, as many historians have previously acknowledged that their work was central to the maintenance of positive morale and good health. The Official Australian historian of the Army Medical Services, Arthur Graham Butler, summed up the importance of the stretcher-bearer to an army in the following:

70 The evacuation of wounded was incomparably the most engrossing and difficult of medical problems and was intimately bound up with the treatment of wounds and of their physiological effects.1

We know little about the tens of thousands of men from across Britain and the Dominions who served with the Army Medical Corps. The chapter provides important new evidence of the intimate story of many of the stretcher-bearers, taken directly from private letters, diaries, oral histories and unpublished sources. The records were selected as the men had participated or were present in those battles examined by this thesis. It offers a significant insight into their personal circumstances pre-war and during the war, importantly it manages to humanise this neglected cohort.

Canadian DGMS Lieutenant Colonel George Adami, in his text, War Story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, related the type of men that served as non- combatant stretcher-bearers in the CAMC. Adami highlights the unique and individual qualities of these Canadian men:

The Army Medical Service appealed to a very distinct and valuable element in the general population – to men who, while thoughtful, and, what is more, eminently patriotic, were not of the militant disposition, men who, in the absence of conscription and the long era of peace, had had no training as soldiers, to whom, before the full realization of what this war signified had been borne in upon us, the thought of the active destruction of their fellow-men, even for the sake of a great cause, was distinctly repugnant. Such men are no cowards, as has been abundantly proved by their devoted and fearless work as stretcher-bearers at the

1 Butler, Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 271. 71 front, than whom none are more exposed to bodily danger, and as a body they have suffered heavily.2

By 1 July 1918, the number of enlisted and serving personnel in the RAMC totalled 47,686. Similarly, the Army Medical Corps of the Dominion and Indian Forces also grew during the course of the war, for example the AAMC grew exponentially with 16,066 personnel departing Australia for overseas service (during 1914-1918). Similarly, the Canadian contingent was quite substantial with 21,453 men and women who served in the CAMC and 3,633 men and women who served with the NZMC. In the case of the IMS, it has not been possible to ascertain how many members of the medical services (including the Bearer Corps) departed for service on the Western Front, due to a lack of access to primary source material. In the previous chapter, however, an explanation was provided in relation to the growth of the Indian Medical Service.

By November 1914, some 26,336 British men had enlisted for duty with the RAMC though this is not to infer there were 26,336 men working as stretcher- bearers.3 The number of members of the RAMC that served on the Western Front varied throughout the course of the war. A noteworthy point is while the absolute size of the RAMC increased, there was a proportional reduction in size in comparison with the other non-combatant arms of the army. Over the period of the war, there is a reduction in size of the total non-combatants from 31.36% to 10.22% with the portion of RAMC reducing from 5.25% to 3.42%. This is likely due to better planning and control of resources within the RAMC, such as the transfer of transport drivers to the Army Service Corps in 1916 and the use of large numbers of non-RAMC personnel for bearer duties by regimental personnel and the use of prisoners. Table 2.1 gives an idea of the change in staffing ratios

2Adami, War Story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 45. 3 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p.138. 72 for the RAMC during the course of the Great War. It compares the proportion of RAMC personnel to all other non-combatant services in the British Army.

2.1 - Percentage of non-combatant RAMC personnel (1914-1918) compared to that of all British personnel serving in France. 4

Comparative strengths and percentages of the different arms and branches of the service in France and other Theatres. British Troops – Other ranks only, since September 1914, France.

Percentage of arm or branch to total strength.

1st September 1914

Non-Combatant = 16.63%

Royal Army Medical Corps 5.25% (of the total non-com = 31.36%)

st 1 September 1915

Non-combatant = 17.64%

Royal Army Medical Corps 4.53% (of the total non-com = 25.68%)

1st September 1916

Non-combatant = 15.51%

Royal Army Medical Corps 3.37% (of the total non-com = 21.66%)

1st September 1917

Non-combatant = 22.30%

Royal Army Medical Corps 4.50% (of the total non-com = 20.20%)

1st March 1918

Non-combatants = 32.27%

Royal Army Medical Corps 3.19% (of the total non-com = 9.9%)

st 1 July 1918

Non-combatant = 33.45%

Royal Army Medical Corps 3.42% (of the total non-com = 10.22%)

4 War Office, Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914- 1920. London, HMSO, 1922, p. 65.

73 Statistical examinations contemporaneous and recent have been carried out that give a better insight into the make up of the men who served in the medical corps (therefore some serving as stretcher-bearers). At the end of the war, in a unit history of the RAMC, Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Brereton, stated that a significant proportion of these British non-combatants had pre-war administrative occupations rather than manual labour. The majority, reported Brereton, were drawn from occupations such as: ‘clerks, schoolmasters, and students of all disciplines’5 and included many members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade.6 Unfortunately the destruction of British WW1 personnel records during the Second World War make it impossible to compare the occupations of those who served in the BEF.

This author’s honours thesis examined the original members of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance which served at Gallipoli and found that the Australian situation was vastly different with a low proportion of these men having been drawn from the administrative areas.7 This reflects the statistical analysis undertaken by the Official Australian Historian Ernest Scott who examined the occupation of men of the AIF in the Great War.8 Scott’s analysis showed that tradesmen and labourers dominated the AIF, with clerical and professional men making up only a small proportion of the total numbers enlisted.

Data presented in the following chart supports Scott’s analysis. Some reasons for the difference between the British and Australian Forces might be; the rate of pay for Australian soldiers above the weekly average earnings, work for labourers and the working class was intermittent, rural labourers had poor pay, sons were expected to contribute to the upkeep of the family, a small Australian

5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 Liana Markovich, ‘Linseed Lancers, Body Snatchers and Other Cheery and Jovial names: the role of the stretcher-bearer, Gallipoli 1915’, BA Honours Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2009. 8 Ernest Scott, Official history of Australia in the war of 1914-1918: Australia during the War; Volume XI, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936, p. 874. 74 population. There was also a lack of any main administrative industry in Australia as at 1914, with a dependence of agriculture and mining in the Australian economy. Additionally the effect of conscription in Britain had a significant effect on the make-up of the BEF. Conscription in Britain was instigated in January 1916, due to a fall in the rates of volunteers, and after heavy losses at the Somme.9 Men who worked in those designated reserved occupations such as; miners, tradesman and factory workers were exempt from service overseas, whereas clerks and the other administrative occupations were likely to be conscripted.

The following chart shows the peacetime occupations of the 257 members of the 4th Australian Field Ambulance, AIF, which embarked from Melbourne, Australia, on 22 December 1914. The data, though significant to our understanding of some Australian stretcher-bearers, is limited to the initial group of men who served in this field ambulance. It cannot be said to be typical attributes of all Australian men in the AAMC throughout the war.

9 See John Connor, ‘The ‘superior’, all-volunteer AIF’, in Craig Stockings (ed.), Anzac's dirty dozen: Twelve myths of Australian military history, NewSouth Publishing, Kensington, N.S.W., 2012, p. 39. 75 2.2 - Occupation: 4th Australian Field Ambulance, AIF 10

Canadian Heather Moran carried out an examination of the occupations of 370 ORs of the CAMC. Moran’s thesis examined men who served in either a CCS or in one of two Canadian Field Ambulances, the Canadian CCS No. 1-3 and 1st and 6th Canadian Field Ambulances. It could be argued that the data presented, might be skewed by the introduction of conscription into Canada, but Moran does not explain date range. However, in an attempt to draw a simple comparison of the two countries, Moran’s data confirmed that the Canadian experience was similar to that of the Australian with men being drawn from a variety of occupations. Moran recorded in her Doctoral Thesis:

10 Data collected from Unit embarkation nominal rolls, 1914-18 War, AWM 8/26/47. 76 What was interesting about the other ranks was their varied backgrounds. The majority of men who volunteered for medical units did not have any previous medical experience... twenty-nine per cent had served in a militia medical unit or held a position such as a nurse, hospital attendant, x-ray operator, or undertaker... [t]he kinds of pre-war occupations listed on attestation papers include policemen, carpenters, iron workers, shoe makers, and a host of other trades and labour jobs.11

Further analysis of all the men that served in the 4th Australian Field Ambulance over the course of the war, has been found the average age at enlistment was 24.6 years.12 Additionally, the marital status of the 351 members of this Australian unit was examined and showed that 82% of the volunteers were single, 16% married and 2% widowed.13 Heather Moran, in her statistical comparison of 370 men who served in the CAMC, calculated the average age to be 25.3 years and that 81% of the men reviewed were unmarried at time of enlistment.14

The following chart gives the ages of the 351 Australian men who served in the 4th Australian Field Ambulance during the war.

11 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 45. 12 Data retrieved from the Nominal Rolls, AWM, 8/26/47. 13ibid. 14 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 45. 77 2.3 - Age: 4th Australian Field Ambulance, 4th Infantry Brigade, AIF 15

Stephen Western examined the manner in which medical orderlies were recruited into the RAMC during the Great War. Although the medical orderlies Western examined in his thesis were not stretcher-bearers, there was during the war sufficient flexibility in work practices that these men might have undertaken rotation through the stretcher-bearer role, particularly after the Somme in 1916, which is explained in a later chapter of this thesis. Western recorded:

If a volunteer had prior medical experience, he was likely to be recruited in to the RAMC. John Upton, for example, was a member of the St. John Ambulance Brigade and enlisted in the RAMC on 13 November 1915. Another volunteer, James Brady completed his first aid certificates before

15 Unit embarkation nominal rolls, 1914-18 War, AWM 8/26/47, ibid. 78 also volunteering as a local orderly.16 This helped to get him to the top of the list when volunteers were needed for the RAMC.17

Australian historian, Mark Johnston, recently wrote of the reasons why Australian men volunteered to serve in the AIF and central to this thesis, why they enlisted with the medical corps as stretcher-bearers. He rightly determined that there were many reasons: ‘the vast majority of Australian stretcher-bearers had chosen to go to war. That does not mean they wanted to kill... when the First AIF was formed, stretcher-bearing was seen as a job less willing than others to kill’.18

Another Australian man who volunteered for service with the medical corps as a stretcher-bearer was Foster Hunter, a Methodist student of theology. Private Hunter enlisted with the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance on 8 May 1915 and served in Egypt and France. Throughout the war, Private Hunter’s letters to his mother are highly emotional and very descriptive, particularly in relation to his war service. In a letter to his mother, Private Hunter explained his reasons for voluntarily enlisting in the AIF:

I gave my services voluntarily... I do not regret having enlisted, but wait till I can speak to you to relate what actually took place while on active service in France. Thank God for His intervention when the goal was within Germany’s grasp.19

16 James Brady, a man who Stephen Western mentioned in the quotation above, did in fact serve as a stretcher-bearer during the war, and is referred to in the 1916 and 1917 chapters of this thesis. 17 Western, ‘The Royal Army Medical corps and the role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front’, op. cit., p. 28. 18 Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda , op. cit., p. 6. 19 Letter Foster Hunter to Sarah Ann Cowen, 11/02/1917, AWM, 1DRL/365. 79 Throughout Britain and the Dominions, some men had a religious reason or conscience for volunteering to serve in the medical corps or as stretcher-bearers. In Australia and New Zealand, the major churches ably supported the war’s cause.20 This is also the case for Britain and her other Dominions.

An examination of 12,145 service records of individuals who enlisted in the AAMC, gives a clear indication that non-conformist faiths dominated. Of the total 12,145 members of the AAMC, only 12 men stated they had no religion. 5,901 men nominated the Church of England as their religion, the rest of the cohort belonged to non-conformist churches. In the AAMC there were 1,731 Methodists, 1,693 Presbyterians and 1,610 Roman Catholics. The remaining 1,192 men (approximately 10%) belonged to other non-conformist religions, such as Quakers, Seventh Day Adventists, Brethren, Congregational and Christadelphian.

20 Transcript interview, Stephen Crittenden and Michael McKernan, The Religion Report, Radio National (Australia), 4 August 2004. 80 2.4 - Religious Denomination of members of the AAMC (Non-Conformist, 1914- 1918)21

In Britain during the war, ‘of the approximately 16,500 men who were Conscientious Objectors... about 15,200 represented religious bodies… the most predictable … was the Society of Friends, the Quakers’.22 Quakers as a religion believed that the individual had a choice, it was a person’s ‘inner light’23 that determined their path in life. British figures given at the 1923, Meeting of Friends London showed that 33.6% enlisted in the armed services during the Great

21 Data collected from AWM 8/26/47. 22 Robert L. Cannon, ‘The British Government and the War Resisters during World War One: A study in Confrontation and Compromise’, MA Thesis, California State University, 1999, p. 34. 23 ibid., p. 73. 81 War.24 A further 1,200 conscientious objector Quakers served in the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) during the Great War.25 Some Quakers, however, viewed the participation of the FAU as, ‘an ambulance corps at the rear, healing the fighters to fight again, is as much a part of the military equipment of today as the man with the bayonet’.26 Australian Quakers had previously called for exemptions from the Defence Act of 1910 that implemented compulsory military service for young men and boys, aged less than 21 years. Additionally, some members refused to participate in non-combatant work within the Army, stating that this work was inextricably linked to militarism.27 The Australian Census of 1911, shows that there were a total of 519 Australian males who gave their religion as either Society of Friends or Quaker.28 A total of 30 Australian Quakers enlisted for service in the AIF with 5 serving in the AAMC.29

Three Australian brothers Oberlin, Frederic and Thomas Gray, practising Quakers, enlisted and served with the AAMC. Oberlin Herbert Gray a farmer, was the first of the Gray boys to enlist, joining the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance as a stretcher-bearer on the 30 December 1914. He served in Egypt, Gallipoli and France. Oberlin was wounded in action sustaining a ‘GSW- right heel’30 on 4 May 1917 in France and was sent to England for recovery, rejoining his unit in November 1917. Oberlin died of wounds on the 24 August 1918 on the Somme after suffering a ‘GSW and Fracture to the skull’31 and is buried at the Daours Communal Cemetery Extension.32

24 ibid., p. 75. 25 Felicity Goodall, A Question of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in the Two World Wars, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1997, p. 63. 26 Will Ellsworth-Jones, We will not fight: the untold story of the First World War’s Conscientious Objectors, Aurum Press, London, 2008, p. 31. 27 John Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service 1916-1919, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 74. 28 1911 Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Bureau of Statistics, http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/B8982A23D75F18B6CA2578390013015D/$Fil e/1911%20Census%20-%20Volume%20II%20-%20Part%20VI%20Religions.pdf 29 This figure also includes 1 female nurse. Data kindly provided by Emeritus Professor Peter Dennis, the AIF Project. 30 Oberlin Herbert Gray, No. 2552, Personal Dossier, NAA, B2455, Barcode 4671810 31 ibid. 32 ibid. 82 Frederic Oliver Gray enlisted on 23 May 1916 as a 20 year old with his father’s written permission. He embarked with the AAMC reinforcements on the 11 September 1916, later transferring to the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance to be with his brother Oberlin.33 On Frederic’s enlistment papers, the response to the question about prior service in the army has been marked as ‘evaded service’34 likely this is a reference to the Compulsory Military Training, which operated in Australia during 1911-1914. This comment has clearly not been written in Frederic’s handwriting but by another person and reflected the negative attitude to pacifism by this unknown person.

Frederic Oliver Gray in his peace testimony stated that he had attempted to join the Friends Ambulance Unit in Britain, but was unable to. Frederic Gray’s war experience found him to be fully engaged in the activities of warfare. In his work as a stretcher-bearer Private Gray saved the lives of countless wounded men. For his bravery whilst under fire attending to the wounded at Lagincourt on the 15 April 1917, he was awarded the French Legion D'Honneur, Medaille Militaire for saving the life of a French soldier. The citation revealed that Frederic had repeatedly run out under heavy machine gun fire to rescue French soldiers. Frederick served in Belgium and France and was working alongside his older brother Oberlin on the Somme when Oberlin was killed. He returned safely to Hobart after the war, where he continued his farming activities.35

The youngest of the three Gray brothers Thomas Edward Gray, also a Quaker, enlisted in the AAMC on 23 May 1916 alongside his older brother Frederic.

33 Gray’s AWM record has the incorrect spelling of his Christian name as ‘Frederick’, I have used the correct spelling of ‘Frederic’ taken from his attestation record. Frederic Oliver Gray, No. 14820, Personal Dossier, NAA, B2455, Barcode 4671627. 34 Attestation Papers, Frederic Oliver Gray, ibid. 35 Peace Testament Frederick Oliver Gray (note different spelling from NAA record), recorded Hobart Regional Meeting, Un, http://www.quakers.org.au/?page=DAQB 83 Thomas was put to work caring for sick men during his training period in camp at Hobart where he contracted cerebro spinal meningitis and died.36

Other members of non-conformist religious groups volunteered to serve in their country’s Army, including the Army Medical Corps. Religious groups such as the Congregationalists, though not pacifists, considered participation in war to be ‘a bitter necessity’.37 The Christadelphian were ‘conscientiously opposed to bearing of arms on the ground that the bible which they believed the word of god commands them not to kill’.38 For members of the Christadelphian sect, the decision was clear-cut; this group ‘takes no part in politics, voting or military service’.39 Australian Seventh Day Adventists held the view was they could not participate in warfare:

As a Christian church believing in the undiminished authority and perpetuity of the moral law, given by God Himself in the Ten Commandments we hold that we are thereby forbidden to take part in combatant service in time of war.40

During the early years of the war, men across the Dominions were given the freedom to nominate which arm or service they wished to volunteer for. For some young Australian men, their families or guardian gave permission to enlist in the war effort on the proviso that they were to serve in the non-combatant medical corps. Many men were selected for service as stretcher-bearers for their skills, either medical or administrative, and some for their physique. Many men however, were simply allocated to the medical corps as vacancies occurred.

36 Thomas Edward Gray, Service number not issued Discharged – Death before embarkment, NAA B2455, Barcode 4671901. 37 ‘Religion: The Churches and the War’, Time Magazine, 22 December 1914, htttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,932019,00.html 38 Rae, Conscience and politics: the British Government and the conscientious objector to military service, 1916-1919, op. cit., p. 74. 39 J. Bowker, (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 216. 40 Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service 1916-1919, op. cit., p. 75. 84 Some of these men entered the war as volunteers and some as conscripted men. An examination of these men’s records confirms that there were many reasons for their enlistment with the medical corps.

The stretcher-bearers examined by this thesis enlisted for a multitude of reasons. Evidence provided by scholars clearly demonstrated there existed a keenness for voluntarism, particularly at the beginning of the war. Scholars have also shown there was no discernible difference between the motivations of non-combatants and combatants to go to war. At war’s end, Australian medical orderly Lance Corporal R. Morgan summed up his and many other men’s reasons for enlisting as: ‘most of us enlisted for one of two reasons. Patriotism or Love of adventure, but not one had the slightest conception of the terrible price required of the Patriots or Lovers of adventure’.41

Young Australian men, who volunteered for non-combatant duties such as stretcher-bearing, shared the same motivations as the rest of the 52,561 men who voluntarily enlisted in the AIF in the first year of the war.42 John McQuilton in his study of regional Australia during the Great War rightly asked ‘why did these men go?’43 It was Bill Gammage’s insightful observation that Australian young men enlisted for ‘a thousand particular and personal reasons’44 which succinctly summarised the myriad of personal experiences.

There was a belief, misplaced, as the war would prove in some parts of the community that the non-combatant medical corps was a safe option. Australian Frederick Brown of the 12th Australian Field Ambulance exemplifies this

41 Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume II – The Western Front, op. cit., p. 770. 42 Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Viking (Penguin Group), Camberwell, 2007, p. 16. 43 John McQuilton, Rural Australia and the Great War: from Tarrawingee to Tangambalanga, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., 2001, p. 174. 44 Gammage, The Broken Years, op. cit., p. 10. 85 preconceived notion. Brown believed the medical corps might offer him some security from danger. Highly devout, Brown’s manuscript hinted at a moral dilemma in his serving in the armed forces. Brown recorded in his manuscript: ‘I wanted to persuade my mother that I was not going actually to fight, but would be a non-combatant. Besides, like many others, I fancied the AMC might be somewhat safer’.45 He initially resisted enlisting for war service; however, his manuscript offers evidence of substantial workplace pressure to serve with the AIF. He eventually enlisted on 18 June 1915, being assigned to serve with the 12th Australian Field Ambulance. Brown, as many other men, underestimated the dangers posed to medical corps stretcher-bearers, suffering a gunshot wound in action on 4 October, 1917, in France. He later returned to Australia on 8 November, 1918, having been medically discharged.46

Australian Arthur Witcombe, father of nineteen-year-old Alfred Witcombe, placed a codicil on his son’s enlistment: ‘this is to certify that my son Alfred has my consent to enlist for active service with the medical corps only’. Given the perception that the AAMC was a safer option, it could be argued Witcombe Snr felt the medical corps might protect his son from harm.47 Alfred was a slight young man standing at only 5 foot 2 inches (~165 cm) and weighing 122lbs (~55 kg) and gave his occupation as Clerk. Alfred was enlisted into the AAMC 2nd General Hospital reinforcements and, in April 1917, he was transferred to serve in the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance. His time in France was dogged by illness and he was unable to endure the work of a stretcher-bearer. After the war, he was discharged in Australia.48

In order to serve in the army a man must have attained the age of eighteen years. Young men aged between eighteen and twenty-one years needed a

45 ‘Private Brown: An Autobiography’, Frederick E. Brown, AWM, PRO1157, p. 10. 46 Frederick Eales Brown, DSO, Service no. 13264, NAA, B2455, Barcode 1796282. 47 Private Alfred Witcombe, Service No. 8570, Personal Dossier, NAA, B2455, Barcode 8855852. 48 Discharged September 1919, Private Alfred Witcombe, Service No. 8570, Personal Dossier, NAA, B2455, Barcode 8855852. 86 parent or guardian’s permission. British stretcher-bearer, Walter George Cook, volunteered for service with the RAMC, enlisting in January 1915, when he was fifteen years of age. Private Cook explained his initial impetus to volunteer came after his uncle had returned wounded from the Western Front. The uncle related how there were not enough stretcher-bearers during the Retreat at Mons and men had to be left on the battlefield. Cook stated: ‘that night... I decided I might be able to enlist in the army to help’.49 However, due to being underage at the time, Cook gave a false date of birth, recording: ‘I put on 2.5 years to my age and was accepted... [I wanted] to join the medical service... [as] I had passed my first aid scout test’.50 Cook was allocated to the 27th British Field Ambulance, serving as a stretcher-bearer.

Briton James Brady and a friend attempted to enlist with the BEF at the declaration of war despite being underage. He recalled how the recruiting Sergeant reprimanded them and advised them, ‘[w]hy don’t you two lads buggar-off home and tell your mother to change your nappies’?51 In August 1915, Brady had been accepted into the RAMC as a stretcher-bearer with the 43rd British Field Ambulance. In his memoirs, Brady recorded his motivation to enlist. The statement demonstrated a sense of loss felt by the young man as his circle of friends began to enlist for war service:

Immature and simple in my adolescence I recall experiencing a sense of deep loss as my circle of friends began to thin out with every blare of the military band… I could not rid myself of the feeling that I was being left behind in the gloomy tranquility of home.52

49 Walter George Cook, Oral history, Imperial War Museum (hereafter called IWM), Catalogue no. 9352. 50 ibid. 51 Private Papers of J. Brady, RAMC, IWM, Catalogue no. 09/23/1, p. 44. 52 ibid., p. 40. 87 A similar experience is recorded by Fred Baldwin who also was under age at enlistment. Baldwin served as a stretcher-bearer with the 100th British Field Ambulance, arriving on the Western Front in November 1915. In an interview, he recalled his motivation to enlist:

I knew this fellow and I asked him what I should join? He advised me I should join the RAMC – I had no idea what that was, he took me to the recruiting sergeant, when I told him I was 17 and a half, well he says to me ‘why don’t you have a walk around for a while’. So I went out for a while and when I went back in and told him I was 18 and a half. That is how I joined the army.53

Cecil Warthin, a British stretcher-bearer with the RAMC spoke of his decision to enlist in the war effort and the roundabout manner in which he came to serve with the RAMC:

I joined up in September 1914, so I was just gone 18, It was a thing to do... I went up... to try the marines... but had poor sight... I was rather disappointed. Later I saw a poster for the Medical Corps, so I went up the street and signed up [for the RAMC].54

For some men adventure and excitement were reasons to enlist. In his examination of the Australian soldier tourist, Richard White, posits Australian volunteers of 1914 - 1918, decided the risks of warfare, were overshadowed by the chance to experience the world.55 Likewise, New Zealander Christopher Gower Clement ‘Bud’ Veitch, a stretcher-bearer with the 2nd New Zealand Field

53 Fred Baldwin, Oral history, IWM, Catalogue no. 24884. 54 Cecil Warthin, Oral history, IWM, Catalogue no. 24863. 55 See Richard White ‘The Soldier as Tourist: The Australian Experience of the Great War’, in A. Rutherford and J. Wieland (eds) War: Australia’s Creative Response, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1997, pp. 117-129. 88 Ambulance confirmed that he enlisted, for an ‘adventure’.56 Veitch was badly gassed on 22 October 1917, and following his partial recovery was declared unfit for active service. He was then posted to England to work in a convalescent unit in February 1918, and later discharged in New Zealand in December 1918.57

Many men who resided in the Dominions during the war had been born in the British Isles. Of the 370 Canadian men surveyed, Heather Moran found 48% were born in Canada and 50% were born in Britain, Scotland or Ireland.58 Similarly, many Australian members of the AIF and consequently the AAMC were born in the United Kingdom, these men enlisted for war service for many reasons some included a desire to return home to Britain, or in order to preserve ‘the unity of the British race’.59 Many viewed the AIF as the easiest and cheapest way of returning. Eric Andrews stated many men considered themselves as Englishmen and like many other Australian volunteers the loyal subjects of the British Empire, were bound to ‘the bonds of the homeland’.60 The war offered them the opportunity to return home, this is what drove Australia’s most famous stretcher-bearer Private John Kirkpatrick Simpson, to enlist in the AIF.

At the outbreak of the war, Australian troops initially earmarked for service on the Western Front, were to undertake the majority of their training in England. Simpson however, found himself with the majority of the Australian contingent not on the battlefields of France and Belgium, but in Egypt preparing for the ill- fated Dardanelles Campaign against the Ottoman Forces. Simpson wrote to his

56 ‘Bud’ Veitch, Real name Christopher Gower Clement Veitch, 3/1205, NZMC, Oral History Transcript, Accession no. 1999-3052, The Kippenberger Military Archives and Research Library, National Army Museum, Waiouru, New Zealand (hereafter Kippenberger). 57 Christopher Gower Clement Veitch, New Zealand Defence Force, Personnel Archives, NZA, AABK, R24064273 58 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 45. 59 L. L. Robson, The First AIF: A study of its Recruitment 1914-1918, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1982, p. 16. 60 E. M. Andrews, The Anzac illusion: Anglo-Australian relations during World War 1, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993, p. 44. 89 mother at Christmas in 1914, ‘I would not have joined this contingent if I had known that they were not going to England’.61

Francis Bell a thirty three year old miner from Western Australia had previous wartime experience, having served with 2nd Australian Commonwealth Horse (ACH) during the South African War.62 Bell enlisted with the AAMC in September 1915. The MO who examined Bell at enlistment, inscribed Bell’s papers with ‘I consider him fit for active service with medical corps only’.63 Due to his poor health, he was initially attached to the No. 1 Stationary Hospital reinforcements, later being transferred to the 4th Australian Field Ambulance and served in France, where he was wounded in July 1918.

British members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade had enlisted in the medical corps because they had been given assurances they would only serve at home. The controversial decision in 1916 by the British authorities to transfer these men to active service caused outrage within the voluntary groups.64 This decision was driven by manpower shortages after the Battle of the Somme and is discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. Briton Percival Ballard who had served in the St. John Ambulance Brigade before the war, opted for service at home. In his memoir, he recorded:

At the start of the war the Germans began to bomb London with Zeppelins. As a member of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, I joined the Royal Medical Corps and I remained for a time in this country to deal with the possible casualties from these attacks. With the loss of the Zeppelins

61Letter dated 25/12/1914, Letter John Simpson Kirkpatrick to his mother, AWM, 3DRL/3424. 62 Private Francis Bell, Service no. 7983, born in South Australia, enlisted 7/9/15, at Blackboy Hill Camp, WA, Francis Bell, Personal Dossier, NAA, B2455, Barcode 3008502. 63 Dr. S. Beveridge, page 3, Bell attestation papers, ibid. 64 See correspondence file ‘Men enlisted into RAMC from St. John and St Andrew’s Ambulance Associations: withdrawal of immunity from transfer to combatant units’, TNA, WO 32/18576. 90 the raids ended and I was transferred to the Royal Engineers and sent to France.65

As previously explained, in the introduction of this thesis, the Newfoundland Regiment did not have its own field ambulance, rather relying upon the British RAMC field ambulances for medical care. They did however take with them regimental stretcher-bearers. Documents held in the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador clearly show that men who had attained their St. John Ambulance Association accreditation departed with the Newfoundland Regiment. As an example, the ‘Non-combatant Selection Committee of the St. John Ambulance Association’, paid for the transportation of J. G. Higgins, Frederick Janes, Eldred Churchill, Ernest St Clair, F. Cormick, Edward Moyle and John Woods. All of these men had ‘volunteered for service in this capacity’66 as hospital orderlies and stretcher-bearers to travel to France and serve the men of the regiment.

For Newfoundlander Edward Hirst, his lack of St. John Ambulance Association accreditation meant he was unable to travel with the Newfoundland Regiment. He then sought other ways of serving as an ambulance man. A letter written by Hirst to the secretary of the St. John Ambulance Association demonstrated his frustration:

I wish to get information from the nearest town where they are sending out first aid men, or preparing them for the RAMC. I want to enlist as an medical corps man, either as RAMC or CAMC for either home or foreign service. I see no opportunity of being drafted away from our own St. John

65 Memoir written by Sapper Percival Ballard, Templer Study Centre, National Army Museum, London (hereafter Templer Study Centre) Reference: 2005-05-43. 66 Memo dated 8/11/1915, Patriotic Association of Newfoundland, Provincial Archive of Newfoundland and Labrador (hereafter The Rooms), MG 632, Box #2, file 3. 91 Ambulance Corps. I am not a first aid man, because since last April I have waited for lectures and could not get them.67

Dave Grossman’s work on the psychology of soldiering, and Fried, Harris and Murphy’s work on the development of team/army unity affords us with valuable insights into the mindset of young men trained for military purposes.68 These authors concur that the formalised structures of military life and indoctrination becomes the primary driver of volunteerism. Discipline and authority was an accepted social and familial practice. Fried, Harris and Murphy discuss the way intensive military training ensures there is a willingness to participate in armed conflict, stating the structures of military training and years of drill and training ensure that a ready and willing military force would join the war’s cause.69

Some men enlisted in the army with friends. Large groups of men from towns large and small enlisted en masse in order to foster their own esprit de corps, the British ‘Pals’ or ‘Chums Battalions’ being prime examples of this. These relationships helped young men, many who were away from home for the first time, cope with the rigours of army service. They also became an extension of the family unit by providing each other with succour. Briton Bertram Andrews enlisted in November 1915, with four of his friends. Bertram recorded in his diary: ‘enlisted with Messrs Holman, Edwards, Evans and Roberts’.70 They all went on to serve with the 72nd British Field Ambulance attached to the 24th British Division, formed as part of Kitchener’s Third New Army.

67 Letter Edward Hirst to St. John Ambulance Association, 29/12/1915, St. John Ambulance Brigade Association, The Rooms, MG 996-1, folder 3. 68 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to kill in War and Society, Back Bay Books, Little Brown and Company, New York, 1996; M. Fried, M. Harris and R. Murphy, (ed’s), War: the anthropology of armed conflict and aggression, Published for the American Museum of Natural History [by] the Natural History Press, Garden City, N.Y., 1968. 69 Fried, Harris and Murphy, (eds), ibid., p. 176. 70 Diary entry 1/11/1915, Bertram Leslie Andrews, AMS, RAMC/PE/1/1099/AND. 92 In his manuscript Canadian H. M. (Tiny) Morris confirmed friendship lay behind his voluntary decision to join the CAMC in September 1915. Morris wrote: ‘Lieutenant–Colonel Tanner was a local Moosomin [a small town in Saskatchewan, Canada] Doctor and was recruiting for the Ambulance Corps while I was attending normal school... I knew about 6 Moosomin men who had joined this unit, so I made it my first choice if he [Tanner] was still recruiting’.71

Not all men volunteered for service. By mid 1916, there was a growing need to ensure that all eligible men had or would, at the very least, attempted to enlist in their national armies for military service. A steady decline in those men who voluntarily enlisted began to push the matter into the public domain with a move towards compulsion by the state. Compulsion was seen as being an equitable manner in which to guarantee the appropriate numbers of men for overseas service. Historian Ilana R Bet-El rightly argued the imposition of conscription in Britain came about because the country had been ‘drained by a year and a half of war’72 and too few volunteers were available. The Military Service Act that passed in Britain on 27 January 1916, compelled men aged between 19 and 41, unmarried or a widower without dependant children, to serve in the armed forces.73 In August 1916, New Zealand passed the Military Service Act, and Canada introduced similar legislation on the 29 August 1917. Newfoundland similarly introduced conscription but not until 1918. The Australian Government did try to introduce similar legislation by way of plebiscites, in 1916 and again in 1917, but the Australian people rejected this.

Historians Grey, Dennis and McGibbon have argued: ‘the question of conscription within Australia, Canada and New Zealand proved enormously

71 H. M. (Tiny) Morris, ‘The story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1’, 1978, LAC, MG 30 – E379. 72 Ilana R. Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War, The History Press, Gloucestershire, 2009, p. 3. 73 The House of Lords, Britain and the First World War: Parliament, Empire and Commemoration, House of Lords Library, March 2014, p. 11. http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/LLN-2014-013/britain- and-the-first-world-war-parliament-empire-and-commemoration 93 divisive’74 as it was in Britain. For British, Canadian and New Zealanders, compulsion would become a factor in the recruitment and selection of personnel for the medical corps, including the non-combatant stretcher-bearers. Religious communities across the Dominions worried that the imposition of conscription and pressure on young men, would lead these men to break with their religious doctrine. The Reverend Mr F G Rampton of the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Auckland, requested Colonel R. W. Tate, the Adjutant General District Headquarters Auckland, confirm that the non-combatant medical units were unarmed. Colonel Tate replied: ‘I give you the absolute assurance the N Z Medical Corps, the personnel of which is organised into ambulance and other medical units… does not entail the bearing of arms or engaging in combatant service’.75

There were two aims of this chapter, which have been met. This chapter has successfully added significant evidence to our understanding of men of the medical corps who acted as stretcher-bearers. It has also compared some attributes held by men of the Australian and Canadian medical corps, allowing for a better insight into the traits of stretcher-bearers. The voice of the stretcher- bearers has also been introduced, and will in later chapters feature in order to relate their wartime experience. The chapter has also provided an insight into the complex issue of the motivations of men to serve with the medical corps during the war and has shown that there was no one reason why men volunteered; there were many and various public and private motivations.

The following chapter will examine the events and consequent problems that had a direct impact on the stretcher-bearers ability to carry out medical

74 J. Grey, P. Dennis, and I. McGibbon ‘Australia and New Zealand’ in R. Higham, with D. E. Showalter, (eds) Researching World War I: A Handbook, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 2003, p. 270. Also see Paul Baker, King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1988. 75 Correspondence undated, Colonel R. W. Tate, the Adjutant General, District Headquarters Auckland to Rev. Mr F.G Rampton, Religious Objector regard to Service Medical Unit, Territorial Force, NZA, AD1 734 10/407/10. 94 evacuation of the wounded beginning in August 1914. It will demonstrate the effect that internal army problems and those external issues present had on the Army Medical Corps, specifically the RAMC and Indian Medical Service. The experience for the stretcher-bearers was the beginning of four years of learning of how to cope with the many challenges posed on the battlefields of the Western Front.

95 CHAPTER 3 – 1914

When the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) set out for war in mid August 1914, they took with them all their available RAMC field ambulances including the non- combatant stretcher-bearers. From the outset, the RAMC was on the back foot, short in men, vehicles, wagons and stretchers, which presented many challenges that directly affected the ability of these stretcher-bearers to undertake their work.

Unarmed British regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers struggled to carry out their duties in the manner in which they had been trained during peacetime, due to a number of internal and external problems. As a direct result of these problems, in the early months of the war, the procedures for medical evacuation of the sick or wounded were delayed or collapsed. In some instances wounded were abandoned to the enemy. Many of the problems that arose during this early period would recur periodically throughout the course of the Great War. The internal army problems examined in this chapter that specifically affected stretcher-bearers were the lack of sufficient personnel, supply and communication. Those external issues that hampered the evacuation of the sick and wounded were the actions of the enemy and the impact of the weather. These problems all affected transportation which subsequently had a significant impact on evacuation; it is argued that these were frequently a combination of internal and external issues.

Under the pressure of warfare, the RAMC failed to operate as planned and trained for in peacetime. The inability of the RAMC and its stretcher-bearers to carry out efficient evacuation in the opening stages of the war contributed to a negative perception of the medical service and instigated a demand for reform. The greatest criticism of the delay in treating the wounded came after the initial

96 attempt to halt the Germans in Belgium failed, resulting in the forced retreat from Mons. The Retreat, which began on 24 August 1914, and lasted until 3 September 1914, was beset by many internal problems involving the treatment of and evacuation of the wounded. Of the Retreat from Mons, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Sadlier Brereton, RAMC, recorded ‘the 23 of August was to set the medical service on a course which would carry its various units through scenes of carnage and expose it to vicissitudes as intense as any ever experienced’.1

Historians have given many explanations for the failure of the RAMC to undertake evacuation of the wounded during The Retreat. These arguments generally offer one ‘prime’ reason to explain the failures. To attribute a single factor to the breakdown in medical evacuation at that time is flawed; there were many reasons, and frequently a combination of reasons, that contributed to the problems. This thesis contends that a lack of available means of transport, the lack of personnel and resources, the number of wounded, the breakdown in co- ordination and communication between Headquarters, Brigades and field ambulances, a lack of war experience among personnel, actions of the enemy, the weather and the nature of The Retreat were all major contributing issues. Supply and weather issues would once again have an impact on the British Forces’ medical services with the onset of winter, in the latter months of 1914. It is however, the early months of the war which this chapter primarily focuses on.

The Official History of the Medical Services Volume II gave the clearest indication that there existed for the medical service at Mons an almost total breakdown in ways of operating and procedure along the BEF’s Lines of Communication (LofC). MacPherson additionally identified that numerous breakdowns within the collecting and evacuation zones related to a breakdown in transport, but made a defence for this when he argued: ‘it is doubtful if the presence of motor

1 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 38. 97 ambulances would have made much difference... because of congestion on the roads’.2 MacPherson also identified medical care of the sick and wounded failed because of the nature of The Retreat from Mons.3 Similarly, Brereton argued that during The Retreat the ‘breakdown in horse transport and of the paralysing effect it had on our otherwise efficient field ambulances’4 was the greatest contributor to the failure of the medical evacuation process.

Modern historians have also examined these problems, publishing significant works on the medical response to war. Mark Harrison argued that while there were many problems faced by the RAMC on the Western Front in the first months of the war, the ‘chief problem at Mons and other early engagements was the lack of field ambulances [not vehicles rather the unit]’.5 These assertions, whilst certainly valid, undersell those other issues faced by the RAMC and the stretcher-bearers, which have already been mentioned. These examinations have significantly contributed to our knowledge, however, gaps exist, specifically, the 1914 experience of the stretcher-bearers who remain largely absent.

A public outcry ensued after reports that the RAMC field ambulances had abandoned some British troops during The Retreat from Mons. The medical correspondent of The Times wrote: ‘it was perfectly clear the means of coping with the mass of wounded and sick had proved less than sufficient’.6 Criticism in the British press of the conduct of the RAMC during The Retreat resulted in Lord Kitchener dispatching Colonel Arthur Lee MP to France to review the breakdown in medical care and evacuation. Lee’s report acknowledged the difficulties in evacuating the wounded and sick during the early months of the Great War and found the circumstances that prevailed were beyond the control of both the RAMC and the military. Lee believed the criticism of the RAMC and Army in

2 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 227. 3 ibid. 4 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 14. 5 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 20. 6 The Times, London, 13/10/1914, p. 4. 98 general was unwarranted. He wrote: ‘the RAMC did its utmost in the situation with which it was suddenly confronted I have every reason to believe’.7 Lee argued the conditions that the RAMC was subjected to during the Retreat were ‘difficult and abnormal... [and the RAMC deserved] credit rather than condemnation’.8 Lee had clearly identified there were other forces at work that prevented the RAMC from conducting itself as a trained unit despite preparations during peacetime, which needed to be addressed. This confirms the argument of this thesis that many internal and external forces challenged and frequently altered the pre-war plans for evacuation of the sick and wounded. Colonel Lee also added in support of the RAMC ‘most of the complaints and criticisms which have reached you, from unofficial sources, have been either much exaggerated or else based on a lack of appreciation between peace and war’.9

However, notwithstanding Colonel Lee’s overall assessment, he did identify certain issues, such as supply and logistics, staffing levels and the development of doctrine and training for senior personnel of the RAMC, which required attention from the authorities. These recommendations should have initiated a review by authorities to quickly identify the issues, examine the events and expedite changes. A lack of imperative however, by the War Office, to tackle these problems delayed the changes. Improvements of the medical arrangements on the Western Front did not commence until ‘the end of December [1914, when] the whole of the administrative medical service was re- organized’.10

The BEF began its campaign against the German Forces following its arrival in France on 22 August 1914. The original War Office plans were that six infantry

7 Letter dated 18/10/1914, Colonel Arthur Lee to Lord Kitchener, The Lee Reports, Wellcome Library, RAMC 446/7. 8 ibid. 9 Letter dated 12/10/1914, The Lee Reports, ibid. 10 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 336. 99 divisions were to be sent into France and which would settle in the ‘Maubeuge – Le Cateau – Hirson’11 area. British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French issued Operational Order No. 5 on 20 August 1914, ‘the British Army will move north of the River Sambre’.12 This meant a march from Le Cateau towards the coal town of Mons in order to protect the Mons - Conde Canal. The major problem for the BEF at that time was that they only had four infantry divisions, one cavalry divisions and too few field ambulances available.

After heavy fighting against the Germans and the news that the French Fifth Army were to withdraw on 24 August after suffering many losses, the British Commander in Chief, General Sir John French, issued a general order to retire south towards Le Cateau at 5pm on 23 August 1914.13 A contemporary assessment of the actions stated: ‘It was intended to defend at Mons... [but this] was never carried out because it was anticipated by an unexpected and most unwelcome order to retire in conformity with French movements on the right’.14 The British retreat from Mons (The Retreat), began at dawn on 24 August 1914 and would end on the night of 3 September 1914.

Typically, medical evacuation of wounded would normally flow backwards away from the battlefront; however at Mons in August, this was not the case. Medical evacuation by the field ambulances had to be run at ‘right angles... with [the troops] marching away from them’15 leaving the stretcher-bearer personnel stranded in forward areas. A contemporary account by E. Charles Vivian, RAMC, explained the problem faced by the medical corps stretcher-bearers during The

11 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1933, p. 14. 12 ibid., Appendix 10, p. 508. 13 ibid., p. 84. 14 Ernest W. Hamilton, The First Seven Divisions: Being a detailed account of the fighting from Mons to Ypres, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1916, p. 8. 15 Dr John S. G. Blair, In Arduis Fidelis: Centenary History of the Royal Army Medical corps , Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1998, p. 132. 100 Retreat; this thesis acknowledges there was little the Army or the RAMC could do to overcome this issue. E. Charles Vivian explained:

With the combatant line in retirement, too, the R. A. M. C. have the worst of the work, and at times are literally forced back from the wounded on the field by the fire of the approaching enemy. At the best, they have to pick up the casualties and again get behind the retiring line, in order to keep the wounded out of harm's way.16

With the British line being pushed back, stretcher-bearers were caught out in forward areas. The diarist of the 3rd East Anglian Field Ambulance recorded the unit’s experience when The Retreat from Mons was issued:

We had just time to dump our kits, and some had started to make tea, when down the road there came a sudden rush of troops. Orders were given to get on the move, and so we retraced our steps in the direction from which we came. That was how we took part in the ‘Great Retreat from Mons’! During this retreat, we were marching by day and dealing with wounded and stretcher bearing by night.17

The number of casualties handled by the RAMC and its field ambulances during this period is unknown, as many of the units involved either did not keep full and proper records or these records have been lost.18 There is no definitive figure of the numbers of dead, wounded or missing of the British during the period 20 August 1914 - 3 September 1914. MacPherson recorded: ‘the approximate number of casualties from the 22nd to the 28th [August 1914] however is estimated’.19 Similarly, Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, the Official

16 Vivian, With the Royal Army Medical Corps (R.A.M.C.) at the Front, op. cit., p. 127. 17 Unknown, A record of the 3rd East Anglian Field Ambulance, during the Great War, 1914-1919, Wyman, London, 1931, p. 81. 18 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 224. 19 ibid., p. 225. 101 British Historian of the war, recorded the British losses for the period 23 to 27 August 1914, as 14,811 excluding the missing.20 By 27 August, the British realised they were facing a disaster and, ‘as the BEF retreated from Mons and its reserves dwindled, Kitchener summoned the Sepoys to France, explaining to the General staff at Simla: ‘we are in a tight place [and] are employing every possible source’’.21

The war diary of the 4th British Field Ambulance clearly expressed the problems faced by the unit during The Retreat from Mons in August 1914. In the diary, Lieutenant Colonel M. Fullane, RAMC, the CO of the ambulance, related the almost complete disintegration of the unit during The Retreat. This field ambulance experienced many problems that had a substantial and negative impact on its workings. Some of the significant problems faced by Fullane were being separated from his brigade, sections of the field ambulance that were lost for days, forced abandonment of wounded, a significant lack of transport, the capture and taking as prisoners of his field ambulances personnel and the death and the disablement of the field ambulance horses.

The diary, written by Lieutenant Colonel Fullane in December 1915, and drawn largely from his memory of events, is regarded as an overtly partisan version of the event and great care is needed to ignore this bias. Fullane confirmed the necessity of writing the diary post factum:

The diary of a medical field unit during active operations enables one to give a straightforward and unvarnished account... unfortunately; such a

20 Edmonds, History of the Great War based on Official documents: Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, op. cit., p. 224. 21 Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’, op. cit., p. 338. 102 record could not be maintained for the 4th Field Ambulance during the Great Mons Retreat of 1914.22

However, the diary, when added to other evidence makes a compelling argument that there were many internal and administrative problems, which directly affected the working of his field ambulance. These issues and some external pressures combined to make evacuation of the sick and wounded by his stretcher-bearers impossible, and sadly, many wounded were left abandoned to the enemy, or died from a lack of medical care. Many sources of evidence support Fullane’s assertions of an unmitigated failure in process and procedure during The Retreat. For example, the personal diary of Captain Vellacott, RAMC, of 7th British Field Ambulance, recorded the necessity to abandon British wounded ‘when orders to move came on... wounded left by order at hospital. Afterwards heard that this [the hospital] was badly shelled’.23

The 9th British Field Ambulance was similarly affected during the Retreat. The diary of Corporal C Chamberlain, RAMC, explained the circumstances faced by the bearers of the field ambulance whilst in the area near Sars on 25 August 1914. It demonstrated the severe impact of the field ambulance being separated from its Brigade who had retreated. With the stretcher-bearers moving back and forth between the RAP and the dressing stations, they found themselves alone in the forward areas. Chamberlain recorded, ‘we collected a good number of wounded. In the heat of dressing them, we had to leave taking with us our wounded, but unfortunately lost our flags. It was a case of ‘every man for himself’.24 Two days later Corporal Chamberlain and his bearers found themselves once again under immense pressure during the retreat, as Chamberlain explained:

22 ‘Outcome of the Operations of No. IV Field Ambulance during the Mons Retreat, 25/8/14, 26/8/14, 27/8/14’, TNA, WO 95/1336. 23 Diary entry 24/08/1914, Diaries of Captain Vellacott, IWM, Catalogue no. 67/4/1. 24 Diary entry 25/08/1914, The War Diary of 19464, Corporal C. Chamberlain and the 9th Field Ambulance 1914, op. cit. 103 We collected 40 wounded and managed to dress 20 of the serious cases before we had to run for it again, for the O.C. had been informed that the Uhlans were close to hand. Only one case was left behind, and I had to stay with him until he died of an awful abdominal wound and head injuries.25

In his history of the 6th British Field Ambulance, G A Kempthorne, RAMC, wrote of the field ambulances’ experience on 26 August 1914, during The Retreat and in the days following. It demonstrated the situation whereby communication between HQs, brigades and the field ambulances broke down. In this scenario, the effect of the communication breakdown resulted not only in the wounded being abandoned, but also the personnel of the field ambulance. The field ambulance had been attending to the wounded of the 6th British Infantry Brigade near Maroilles. Kempthorne, a MO with the field ambulance, had set up an ADS when at 10pm on the evening of 26 August 1914, ‘message received from ADMS to send squad back to Maroillles for wounded. Captain Priestly and Egan and 12 Other Ranks and carts [were sent forward]’.26

When they arrived at the position, the Germans already had the dressing station in their control and the members of the field ambulance were captured, including the ADMS (Colonel Thompson) and his staff officers (Major Irvine). Kempthorne stated the personnel of the field ambulance were ‘left to work out their own salvation’.27 The members of the field ambulance were not aware of their exact position, also they did not know where the Infantry Brigade had retired to and there was no communication from HQ or the CO of the 6th Infantry Brigade.

25 Diary entry 26/08/1914, ibid. 26 Diary entry 26/08/1914, A. G. Kempthorne, Manuscript/ History of the 6th Field Ambulance Wellcome Library, RAMC 1802, Box 361 27 ibid. 104 Another problem that had a direct and negative impact on the work of the stretcher-bearers was the breakdown in communications, particularly during the Retreat from Mons. The internal communication arrangements of the BEF and its medical corps rapidly failed during the confusion. Communication relied on the ability of messages being passed up and down the line, but this was impossible during The Retreat. Many COs of the field ambulances reported not receiving notification of the decision to retire; they also had scant information to go on, or had the unfortunate experience of receiving confused messages.28

Once the Retreat had begun, a breakdown in communication from Brigade HQs to the senior officers of the field ambulance occurred. Those members of the field ambulance in the forward areas, such as the stretcher-bearers and MO at the RAP, were caught in-between the advancing Germans and the withdrawing British. For those stretcher-bearers attending to the wounded, the breakdown of ’internal’ communication resulted in many of them falling into the hands of the Germans. Many simply became lost or separated from their field ambulances and their brigades. Some reported having spent the next ten or twelve days wandering the countryside endeavouring to catch up with their comrades. These men and the wounded they had with them, carried very few rations and little feed for their animals which added to their woes.

The medical staff attached to the Coldstream Guards for example, found themselves in a precarious situation whilst attending to the wounded. Their wounded were left in the forward exposed areas as the Guards Brigades fought off the German attackers. Lieutenant-General Sir John Ross-of-Bladensburg wrote: ‘Captain Sinclair, RAMC, their Medical Officer [2nd Battalion], having been sent back into the world with all the medical equipment to help the wounded, was unfortunately captured, and until the equipment was replaced there were

28 Blair, In Arduis Fidelis: Centenary History of the Royal Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 150. 105 no means of dealing with the sick or wounded’.29 With the loss of one of their medical officers and important medical equipment, their wounded would have to be treated by other field ambulances when possible.

Communication within the 1st British Division did not initially falter and as a result, the personnel of field ambulances were generally well informed of their position and situation. However, in the confusion of The Retreat, the communication process within the Division began to suffer with men who became disengaged from each of their respective brigades. For the ADMS of the 1st Division, the breakdown of communication resulted in his not knowing the whereabouts of some of his field ambulances or Divisional HQ. This meant sick or wounded men had to wait to for some time before getting treatment.

The personnel of the 2nd and 3rd British Divisions, including their regimental and field ambulance stretcher-bearers, suffered greatly following the almost complete breakdown in communication during the Retreat from Mons. This greatly impeded the ability of the stretcher-bearers to carry out evacuation of the wounded. A simple spelling error in a note compromised the work of the 7th British Field Ambulance, when the field ambulance became lost:

Halted for orders... but got none, so Major F. [Fielding] took us on, asking any officers we met which way 7th Brigade had gone... got orders signed by Major Chopping, [DADMS 3rd Division]... only to find that he had so misspelt the words [so] that we could not tell the direction.30

Members of the 4th and 6th British Field Ambulances lost their way during The Retreat after messages failed to get through to Divisional HQ or to the field

29 Lt-Gen. Sir John Ross-of-Bladensburg, The Coldstream Guards 1914-1918, Volume 1, Oxford University Press, London, 1928, p. 55. 30 Diary entry 25/08/1914, Diaries of Captain Vellacott, op. cit. 106 ambulances, which resulted in many members of these field ambulances being taken prisoner by the Germans. The 4th Field Ambulance ‘lost 8 medical officers, 3 ambulances and about 130 stretcher men’31 taken by the advancing German Forces, they would become prisoners of war, and unable to lend medical assistance to its brigade. For Lieutenant Colonel M. Fullane and his 4th British Field Ambulance, a lack of written communication and miscommunicated messages severely influenced the safety of his personnel and the wounded.

Fullane was severely censured for his failure to remain with his brigade and for the loss of so many of his men. At the inquiry into his actions during The Retreat, Fullane argued successfully that a complete breakdown in internal communication occurred, and stated that this emanated from the manner in which the Infantry Brigade Commander dealt with the field ambulance. The following written statement by Fullane details his view of the situation; it demonstrated how the orders, which were not received, resulted in this field ambulance becoming separated from its brigade. Fullane recorded:

I received verbal orders from Colonel H. Thompson... to retire at once with my section, including the heavy transport and forty or fifty wounded... [however] as no orders were presumably received by Major Collingwood... it was difficult to state where our brigade had taken up... so far as 4th field ambulance is concerned we advanced due W. [West] from Maroilles... at that point a panic occurred. Refugees – men women and children, detached troops and odd transport etc, etc, etc were stampeding towards us... We halted and rallied our men as best we could during the confusion.32

31 Diary entry 28/08/1914, 5th Field Ambulance, 2nd Division Medical, TNA, WO 95/1337. 32 ‘Outcome of the Operations of No. IV Field Ambulance during the Mons Retreat, 25/8/14, 26/8/14, 27/8/14’, TNA, WO 95/1336. 107 The precarious situation faced by this field ambulance in the confusion of The Retreat was not helped by the action of ambulance transport personnel, when ‘two shots were then fired by the ASC ambulance drivers of our unit who ‘lost their heads’.33 Fullane’s unit separated from the retreating column, which resulted as he saw it:, ‘we remained entirely out of touch with the Brigade of Guards during the night of 25 August, although repeated efforts were made to effect communication with their staff’.34 By the time, the field ambulance did receive field messages circumstances had altered dramatically.

The remaining members of the 6th British Field Ambulance, including its stretcher-bearers, found themselves caught out behind their retreating brigade in enemy territory, becoming lost during and, with the German Forces advancing, they were effectively on the run. The CO made an attempt to locate his Brigade when he sent a ‘message relaying our location was taken by cycle orderly to the ADMS. This was never delivered as Div’l HQ could not be found’.35 The ambulance was lost and over the next few days and nights, ‘everyone seems to have been out of touch with headquarters, and the C/O’s of the units of the 6th Brigade, having received general orders as their line of retreat, seem to have been left to work out their own salvation’.36 They still had with them some wounded who had received little access to medical care in the circumstances.

After three days retreating from the advancing Germans, the CO of the 6th British Field Ambulance elected to follow a battery of British artillery. The unit history of the field ambulance stated that they had passed across the enemy’s front to La Groise, however movement of troops along the narrow roads obstructed their

33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35Manuscript history/scrapbook of 6th Field Ambulance, Wellcome Library, RAMC 1802. 36 ibid. 108 progress. Rations were becoming very short, as was medical equipment. Finally, ‘the ambulance took their place with the [retreating] column on August 31st’. 37

The stretcher-bearers of 7th British Field Ambulance became separated from their cohort tent division on 24 August 1914, after being ordered to assist with the wounded. Lieutenant Hamilton, RAMC, of the field ambulance, explained the experience in a letter to his wife:

There was incessant firing near us – not only big guns but also maxim and rifle fire. Shells were bursting here and there and now and then a column of smoke would tell us of a house on fire... we saw there was a big fight on and that we were probably retiring – about 1.30 we had our orders and moved off towards the front... I had 2 ambulances and about 24 men in my party; we went along a little road towards the front and met men retiring. There were some wounded and we did what we could for them... I sent my two men back. I hope they reached our lines in safety.38

The men of the 7th British Field Ambulance who remained with the wounded were unable to communicate their position or predicament to the rest of the field ambulance who had continued on with their retreat. Lieutenant Hamilton sent most of his bearer party away to try to re-unite with the rest of the field ambulance while he stayed with the wounded officer and other wounded men. The field ambulance did not rejoin their brigade until the 8 Spetember1914.39 Hamilton and the wounded became prisoners of the Germans. According to family records, Major Hamilton was released by the Germans in a prisoner swap on 9 January 1915, this has not been able to be confirmed.40

37 ibid. 38 Hamilton Family history, IWM, Catalogue no. 87/33/1. 39 ibid. 40 ibid. 109 These breakdowns along the Lines of Communication, vital to the upkeep of an army, also resulted in the wounded, field ambulance personnel and stretcher- bearers being without rations, equipment and means of evacuating the wounded during the Retreat from Mons. Later in 1916, an internal review into the continued failures along the LofC acknowledged: ‘a complicated system of communications [existed] to keep it well supplied with reinforcements, munitions, food, and other stores’.41

Mark Harrison rightly argued that another factor that contributed to the problems of medical evacuation occurred at embarkation of the BEF for France. The urgency with which the BEF had to leave for war, meant many of their Brigades (and their requisite medical personnel) were unavailable. The original War Office plans were that six infantry divisions would be sent into France.42 However only four infantry divisions and one cavalry divisions were sent at that time. With fewer divisions available there was also a shortage of field ambulances, their medical personnel and equipment all necessary to assist the sick and wounded. Each Division was to have taken with them three fully manned and supplied field ambulances, with a total of 10 officers and 224 OR. Only the Cavalry Corps and the 1st Infantry Division had their full complement of medical personnel. At first contact with the Germans on 22 August 1914, the BEF field ambulances available were:

Cavalry Corps - 5 Cavalry Brigades with 5 Cavalry Field Ambulances.43

I Corps - 1st Infantry Division with 1st, 2nd, 3rd Field Ambulances

2nd Infantry Division with only 5th Field Ambulance

II Corps - 3rd Infantry Division with only 7th Field Ambulance

5th Infantry Division with only 1/3rd Field Ambulance

41 Ross-of-Bladensburg, The Coldstream Guards 1914-1918, Vol. I, op cit., p. 424. 42 Edmonds, History of the Great War based on Official documents: Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914., op cit., p. 14. 43 Please note that the Cavalry Field Ambulance was set up differently to that of an Infantry Field Ambulance and is not assessed by this thesis. 110 19th Infantry Brigade, had no Field Ambulance

The missing field ambulances (4th, 6th, 8th and 9th British Field Ambulance) arrived in France later than their Infantry brigades, which left these brigades and its personnel without appropriate medical care. The failure of the War Office to provide sufficient medical personnel strained the resources of the field ambulances present, and significantly reduced the ability of the stretcher- bearers’ ability to remove the sick and wounded from the battlefront. As previously stated, in order for a field ambulance to operate efficiently, it needed its full establishment. This necessity had been established in 1912, as shown by the following instruction: ‘it must be remembered that a field ambulance is absolutely useless without its full complement of bearers’.44 Additional problems occurred when these missing field ambulances did finally arrive in France were unable to locate for a short period, the brigades they were to be attached due to The Retreat.

The decision was taken that the available field ambulances would be broken up and dispersed to provide a modicum of medical care for the brigades lacking its medical establishment. The decision to split and disperse the field ambulances to brigades without its own ambulance, proved to be problematic for the RMOs and stretcher-bearers. These working units faced extra difficulties such as lack of medical personnel, a shortage of supplies and equipment and inability to identify the brigades they had been assigned to. Additional problems included where to place the RAPs, understanding of the line of evacuation, and where the ADSs were located. Brereton clearly identified that those brigades without their full complement of field ambulances suffered the greatest in casualty numbers. He argued:

44 Government of India , Report of a Committee to revise the present field medical organisations and the equipment of field medical units, Simla, Government Branch Press, 1912. 111 Certain field ambulances were still en route to the scene of operations, and it unfortunately happened that those divisions which were chiefly engaged and which suffered the majority of casualties were ill provided with medical units. There is no suggestion that this was due to negligence or want of foresight on the part of any individual. It was just unfortunate.45

There also existed the problem of under-utilised field ambulances of the 1st Division, while the field ambulances of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were over- worked. This is due in part to the 2nd Division which played a far more active role in the defence of Mons. Having arrived in Mons on 22 August 1914, the orders for the 2nd Division was to delay the enemy until a more defensible line could be established. However, compounding the issue was the decision taken by the French to retire after they failed to hold the line. To cope with the shortage of field ambulance personnel and equipment, the ADMS of the 2nd Division took the decision to separate and distribute as best possible the three sections ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ sections to the brigades encountering the Germans. This is certainly what a field ambulance was designed to do, however, the poorly executed and haphazard manner of the distribution resulted in the placement and whereabouts of the stretcher-bearers being unknown to the RMOs, and the locations of the RAPs being unknown to the wounded, transport personnel and the stretcher-bearers. The nature of the Retreat forced the RAMC to set aside (temporarily) the pre-war plans for medical evacuation of the wounded, the consequences of which severely constrained the ability of the stretcher-bearers to complete their duties.

The lack of field ambulances, medical equipment and stretcher-bearer personnel was clearly apparent to members of the British Forces during the Retreat from Mons, and had a demoralising effect on the men. Men who relied on the medical corps for care and treatment understood the predicament that they faced during

45 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 34. 112 the retreat. A wounded British officer lying unattended recalled his personal fears during the Retreat:

My one fear at this time was to be left behind and taken prisoner, and the only hope, a very forlorn one, was that the battalion stretcher-bearers would be able to carry me away. But I heard some one in the dark say that there were no stretchers, and that orders had come to retire and leave all wounded.46

However, problems relating to transport prevented the stretcher-bearers clearing the wounded away during The Retreat. This arose through a combination of problems, mainly from a shortage of available vehicles, the effects of the Retreat and a breakdown in communication. Each British division (in 1914) was supposed to be supplied with 10 ambulance wagons to carry the sick and wounded. These wagons either were horsed or motorised, and were specially fitted and organised to carry wounded or sick in relative comfort. In August 1914, there was a definite shortage of ambulance wagons which made evacuation of the wounded extremely difficult for the RAMC and stretcher- bearers. Lieutenant Colonel Fullane of the 4th British Field Ambulance had the following criticism of the lack of motorised and non-motorised vehicles in which to evacuate the wounded:

Certain facts... stand out as worthy of comment. In regards the evacuation of our wounded to the base: I sincerely trust that as a corps we will never again agree to the impossible task that was forced upon us of trying to evacuate wounded without suitable transport. Admittedly, the provision of horse transport for field ambulances was due to

46 ‘An Exchanged Officer’, Wounded and a Prisoner of War, William Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1916, p. 68. 113 compromise. Motor transport was too expensive for a public who did not believe in war, and still less in ‘costly’ preparation in its prosecution. 47

Support for Fullane’s assertion that there was a lack of imperative by the War Office to adequately resource the field ambulances is given by various people such as Colonel Lee, Brereton and the Official Historian, all of whom stated the public purse had failed to provide an adequate supply of wagons and motorised vehicles. Brereton argued ‘the field ambulances... were rendered semi-inactive because of the need of equipment which could have been supplied’.48 Frustration with the transportation problems lead the ADMS of the 1st British Division to record: ‘at 7.30pm it was learnt that wagons had not yet arrived. At 8pm learnt that wagons will not arrive tonight... difficult to know what to do with cases [wounded] in field ambulances. Too many to take on in wagons’.49 The lack of appropriate numbers of vehicles and other transport the wounded which had been transferred from the battlefield to the dressing stations causing much consternation amongst the RMOs and field ambulance COs.

Major Fielding of the 7th British Field Ambulance, was forced to leave many wounded behind during the Retreat from Mons and he wrote of the consequences of the problem. Major Fielding, with a lack of transport available, found he had to make decisions on the ‘run’, sorting the walking wounded and those seriously wounded also became problematic:

I ordered the bearers to dress and leave behind all seriously wounded for whom there was no accommodation in the ambulance wagons… [the] walking wounded were to be sent on at once to Hyon dressing station; the ambulance wagons were to carry all stretcher cases for which there was accommodation; for the rest I ordered the bearers to dress and leave

47 ‘Outcome of the Operations of No. IV Field Ambulance during the Mons Retreat, 25/8/14, 26/8/14, 27/8/14’, op. cit., p. 6. 48 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 14. 49 Diary entry 29/08/1914, ADMS 1st Division H.Q., TNA, WO 95/1242. 114 behind all seriously wounded for whom there was no accommodation in the ambulance wagons.50

Even those field ambulances that had sufficient wagons experienced trouble evacuating the sick and wounded. Congestion on the roads was another major problem that prevented medical evacuation. The 6th British Field Ambulance was delayed by heavy congestion on the roads of Belgium ‘the road was blocked with motor transport lorries and civilian refugees’51 which severely affected the ability of the field ambulance to join its Brigade and attend to the Brigades’ wounded. Crowded roads full of soldiers, civilian refugees, and supply transport affected the clearing work of the field ambulance. The war diary of the 5th British Field Ambulance recorded a similar issue when the unit was ‘unable to turn back to evacuate owing to traffic’.52 The ADMS of the 1st British Infantry Division lamented the many and various problems which his field ambulances faced during the Retreat:

Consequent to message received, 3 waggons [sic] were detached to Bonnet to bring in some wounded; casualties not numerous so far as we knew. Difficult to get waggons [sic] along owing to blockage by inhabitants with their carts, flocks and herds etc. Some cases of heat exhaustion in the afternoon. Many men began to ‘fall out’ at this stage.53

The demands of caring for the wounded during The Retreat tested some men to their limits. For British stretcher-bearer George Carter, frustration led him to criticise the treatment of the wounded and medical corps personnel, which he felt was inequitable. The dangers posed during the Retreat and a lack of wartime experience is clearly apparent in the statement made by Carter:

50 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 43. 51 Kempthorne, History of the 6th Field Ambulance, op. cit. 52 Diary entry 27/08/1914, 5th Field Ambulance, 2nd Division Medical, op. cit. 53 Diary entry 24/08/1914, ADMS, 1st Division H.Q., op. cit. 115 The road ran through a wood – a mule cart track, peppered with shell holes and almost ankle deep in mud. Along it dashed the ammunition teams at full gallop, yelling as they dashed through the inky night. ‘Ammunition first! – make way for ammunition’... the ambulance could not get through, even when they were not stuck in the mud – and men where dying by the roadside. This is the army rule – ammunition before everything, wounded second.54

The statement by Carter demonstrated a degree of naivety, with the author repudiating the purpose and instruments needed in war, and failed to acknowledge the purpose of an army is to utilise all available means to fight the enemy. The harsh reality was that supply of ammunition was a priority in order to overcome the enemy and those other units had to make way for supply. The following year the War Office would issue a notice to the effect that wounded must make way for the progress of warfare:

Evacuation of wounded is from a humanitarian point of view essential, but when it clashes with the question of victory or the reserve, there is no wounded soldier who would desire to be given preference at the expense of his fighting comrades.55

Further issues relating to transport were the state of the Belgian roads in which wagons, carts and vehicles had to travel. Belgian roads with their pronounced camber and centre ridges proved to be problematic forcing ambulance wagon drivers to be particularly cautious and placed the wagons under severe structural stress. The structural integrity of the wagons and motor vehicles available was tested, their simple suspension systems unable to cope with the cobbles. Compounding these problems was the loss of horseshoes on the animals pulling

54 Entry 28/08/1914, George Carter, IWM, Catalogue no. 67/18/1. 55 Letter dated 31/07/1915, War Office to The Secretary, Admiralty, 31 July 1915, TNA, MT 23/427. 116 the ambulance wagons.56 The farriers and Army Service Corps personnel needed to be vigilant against the ‘exasperating frequency’57 of breakdowns. This might not have been overcome if each field ambulance had been allotted their own farrier, and proper equipment, however a field ambulance of 1914 did not and ‘to effect repairs, men had to be begged – almost stolen – from the ASC and cavalry units’.58

The constant toil on the horsed wagons and the death and maiming of horses further diminished the field ambulances transportation capabilities. Long days and nights of marching meant little time for food, water or rest for the animals. Corporal Chamberlain of the 9th British Field Ambulance wrote ‘the hill climbing took all the freshness out of our horses and they perspired profusely – the perspiration running off them in streams’.59 Major A. Corbett-Smith of the Royal Field Artillery wrote of his horse becoming lame: ‘nothing matters now but keeping on the move. Yes, [I had] better shoot him. He deserves a clean end’.60 The lack of fresh horses to pull the wagons resulted in some of the field ambulances eventually lagging behind the infantry brigades and some who lost their brigades altogether.

Weather conditions also added to the challenges of stretcher-bearing in 1914. When the BEF arrived in France in August, the heat of the summer quickly exacerbated the toll on the men. The long march from Le Cateau towards the coal town of Mons in order to protect the Mons - Conde Canal on 20 August 1914, caused numerous problems. W. Bentham of the 8th British Field Ambulance described the circumstances of the march to Mons:

56 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 29. Also Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat, to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, op. cit., p. 52. 57 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 29. 58 ibid. 59 Diary entry 20/08/1914, Corporal C. Chamberlain, op. cit. 60 Major A. Corbett-Smith, The Retreat from Mons: By one who shared in it, Cassel and Company Ltd., London, 1916, p. 185. 117 Our memorable march. One that will ever remain in our minds... referring to our march to Mons. During that day we marched a distance of 37 to 38 miles [~59 – 61 km]... When we at last arrived at Mons we were done up... we were all expecting a good rest which was denied us, yet I never heard a single man make any complaint, but all trudged along as best they could.61

The advance made by the British troops during the period 20 August – 5 September 1914, covered some 151.5 miles to 250 miles (~243 – 400 km).62 Fatigue caused many men to fall ill and many more became ill with heatstroke and sunburn. These sick men needed treatment by the RMOs and evacuation to base camp. Brereton argued that the problems of footsoreness stemmed from the fact that the BEF was a predominantly reservist army with little physical training prior to embarkation.63

A shortage of ambulance cars forced the medical corps to improvise ways to evacuate their sick and wounded. The solution, it seemed, lay with the availability of empty supply wagons that returned to depots to re-stock. The use of supply vehicles to transport wounded, although recognised as being unsatisfactory, continued during period of high casualty rates. These wagons and trucks were not designed to carry patients; they had no suspension, were dirty and travelled at high speed. They should not have been utilised as surrogate ambulances as would become apparent, in fact they caused more problems for the sick and wounded.64 The wounded were justified in their complaints at the use of these unsuitable vehicles; however, there was no other option.

61 Diary entry 23/08/1914, With the British Forces in France, Being the Diary of W. Bentham, During The Great European War, IWM, Catalogue no. 06/90/1. 62 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, op. cit., Appendix 29, p. 542. 63 Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., op. cit., p. 29. 64 Blair, In Arduis Fidelis: Centenary History of the Royal Army Medical Corps op. cit., p. 151. 118 As the Army had failed to provide enough wagons to load wounded onto and with stretcher-bearers unable to carry wounded men for long distances, many of the wounded were abandoned. This decision to abandon the wounded to the Germans went on to have serious repercussions for the Army and the medical corps. The ADMS 1st British Division reported that, ‘the GOC objected to leaving the cases, deposited by the 1st Field Ambulance in the local Red Cross Hospital’.65 In an attempt to overcome this issue the DADMS, 1st British Division took the unusual but necessary step of revising the manner in which the field ambulance operated. It was decided the best way to use resources available included the implementation of a new (or old) way of working altering those pre-war plans once again:

I rearranged the Field Ambulances so that Tent Division only march with the train [divisional train, supply column]. The Bearer Divisions with all available ambulance wagons march with their Brigades. This is quite feasible when casualties are small in number... the Ambulance wagons are urgently required with the Brigades. Thus, we revert practically to the old Bearer Company and Field Hospital organisation.66

The lack of ambulance wagons meant that stretcher-bearers had no choice but to hand carry wounded from the RAP to places of safety and dressing stations; during the Retreat this meant many kilometres. This delayed medical treatment for the wounded, leading to poor outcomes for them. Harrison identified that failures in swift evacuation of the wounded ‘severely diminished the recovery chances of the wounded and it was an open secret that many had died from wound infections which had become entrenched on their long and uncomfortable journey to hospital’.67 The hand carry also had to be taken in the relative safety of darkness, which meant the many wounded and their stretcher- bearers had to hide in safety during the day, so not to be captured by the

65 Diary entry 30/08/1914, ADMS 1st Division H.Q. Aug – Dec 1914, op. cit. 66 Report to Captain Brereton RAMC, dated 14/12/1915, ADMS 1st Division HQ, Aug 1914 to Dec 1915, ibid. 67 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 20. 119 Germans. At this time, so early in the war, the medical corps and regimental stretcher-bearers lacked the physical fitness required to carry a man on a stretcher for a great distance, certainly any distance greater than the 1,000 yards (~914 m) for which their pre-war training had prepared them.

These numerous issues were not the only problems to be overcome by the non- combatants during The Retreat. The actions of the enemy posed series challenges to medical evacuation. This is of course an external problem and one about which very little could be done. The pressure placed upon the British stretcher-bearers by the Germans had a severe impact on the evacuation of wounded soldiers and importantly, would severely affect the stretcher-bearers themselves. There was an expectation by these non-combatants that they would be safe from German attack, however, this was not the case. The following evidence relates how stretcher-bearers were placed in dangerous positions and at very great risk; it examines how evacuation was affected by the action of the enemy.

W. Bentham recalled the problem of German shelling whilst attending to British wounded during the Retreat from Mons, he recorded:

That day, Aug 25th [1914] saw our second big battle... make another retirement that night, to a place called Montigne, a place of about 15 miles [~24 km]. We arrived in the early morning, and without any rest, went straight up to the firing lines to collect wounded, and the fighting was terrible... we hoisted our Red Cross Flag, one on almost the top of the spire, but they were of little use, for that night at the time when we had 6 patients in the church, the Germans started to shell us, and eventually brought the church down in ruins.68

68 With the British Forces in France, Being the Diary of W. Bentham, During The Great European War, op. cit. 120 The RAMC suffered a large number of casualties during the period 22 August 1914 to 3 September 1914, and quickly needed to replace 34 Officers and 590 Other Ranks. The war diary of the ADMS 1st British Division related the deaths of some of his stretcher-bearer personnel in September 1914, near Moulins: ‘verbal orders to all to begin evacuation... while doing so a high explosive shell fell near killing 2 men RAMC and a patient’.69 Members of the Cavalry field ambulances were also at high risk having earlier been dismounted. Corporal Chamberlain of 9th British Field Ambulance recorded the death of an acquaintance, Sergeant Johnson RAMC, who had served with the 2nd Cavalry Field Ambulance, who ‘had his head blown clean off’.70 The diarist of the 3rd East Anglian Field Ambulance described a confrontation with the German Army during the Retreat from Mons:

Our actual first sight of the enemy was on September 1st. We were in a little French village when the Germans managed to get across a small river. This led to hand-to-hand fighting. We took what cover we could from doorways, etc. During this fighting orders were given for the ‘stretcher-bearers’ to get into the horse ambulances, and they were driven at terrible speed across the firing line. Arriving at a little village, we found that one of our artillery batteries had been badly cut up - the L Battery. This proved to be the gravest part of our work during the retirement.71

Due to the artillery and rifle fire, stretcher-bearers were not permitted to collect the wounded whilst the danger to them was considered extreme. Evacuation had to be carried out only when it was safe to do so, which meant delays in attending the wounded. The DDMS, 1st British Division, made enquiries as to what was to be done for the wounded remaining on the battlefield: ‘many cases are lying on

69 Diary entry 15/09/1914, War Diary, ADMS 1st Division HQ, op. cit. 70 Diary entry 14/09/14, ‘The War Diary of 19464, Corporal C. Chamberlain and the 9th Field Ambulance 1914’, op. cit. 71 Unknown, A record of the 3rd East Anglian Field Ambulance, during the Great War, 1914- 1919, op. cit., p. 81. 121 ridge, between two lines of fire, consulted G.S. [General Staff] as to collecting of these. Replied not to attempt collection beyond outpost line’.72

Problems similar to those experienced by the British during the Retreat would also affect the stretcher-bearers during the later battles of 1914. However, as time went on, there were some improvements made in staffing and transport. During the First Battle of the Aisne, 12 - 15 September 1914, intense shelling by British, French and Germans destroyed most of the bridges that linked the south and north banks of the river Aisne. This required the field ambulances to set up strategically placed dressing stations and collecting posts along the river where pontoons had been erected.73 The pontoon bridge allowed the wounded to be ferried directly across the river, reaching the Main Dressing Station at Verneuil, some ‘4kms away’74 without crossing into German held territory.

Continued attack from the Germans made evacuation of the wounded by the regimental stretcher-bearers difficult. As an officer explained, the predicament for his regimental bearers ‘the bullets must have been close overhead, for the men [the stretcher-bearers] put me back into the trench, jumped in after me and waited till all was quiet’.75 Stretcher-bearer Edgar John Drage, who served with both the 4th and 5th British Field Ambulances, wrote of his experience as a stretcher-bearer and cycle orderly. The diary, written some time after the events, delivered an insight into the experience of stretcher-bearing on the Western Front whilst under fire. It demonstrated how dangerous the work of the stretcher-bearers was:

Shells began to burst all around us, of course we had to see about clearing but not without loss, a driver of the Army Service Corps who was

72 Diary entry 15/09/1914, War Diary ADMS 1st Division H.Q., op. cit. 73 A British hospital had been established at Braisne. Typed account of the medical services at the Battles of Mons, the Marne and the Aisne. Wellcome Library, RAMC 761/1/4. 74 Manuscript history/scrapbook of 6th Field Ambulance on the Western Front, op. cit. 75 ‘An Exchanged Officer’, Wounded and a Prisoner of War, op. cit., p. 66. 122 driving a wagon was hurt and died afterwards, he had his leg blown off. Lieutenant Howell who stopped to attend to him, had a part of his foot blown off. We went back to the village; we had to run for it of course. The horses were fagged out and couldn’t pull the wagons up the hill leading to the village, so we had to help pull the wagons up, we nearly done too... It was terrible to see. Horses and men laid dead in heaps, just as they had been struck there were two officers both dead and their horses too. We brought them back in separate parties, on the stretchers of course. We got through it alright, without being shelled again but we expected to get it every minute.76

Stretcher-bearer Private E. Powell of the 20th British Field Ambulance also had a similarly terrifying experience. In his wartime diary he recorded having to take cover from intense German artillery in September, near Soissons, France: ‘at about 10 o’clock a battery opened fire... [and] the Germans tried to find their range and the shells were falling short into our wagons... it got too hot for us so we done a bunk at top speed’.77

Because of the problems of the lack of available transport, the War Office accepted offers of assistance from voluntary groups. Voluntary organisations such as the British Red Cross quickly stepped in to fill the breech through public donations of motorised vehicles. By October 1914, a number of ‘Red Cross’ motor ambulances were brought in to help with evacuation of the wounded. The volunteer association donated many motorised ambulances to replace the horsed wagons, which not only increased the number of wounded that could be evacuated at any one time, but it also shortened the length of time for evacuation and gave the wounded a more comfortable ride. Having more motor vehicles relieved the stretcher-bearers of their long carries. The Indian Corps, for

76 Diary entry 14/09/1914, Private Papers of E J Drage, IWM, Catalogue no. 11/4/1. 77 Diary entry 13/09/1914, Private E. Powell, Wellcome Library, RAMC 1241. 123 example, were beneficiaries of the donated vehicles: ‘a large fleet of motor ambulances [English and American Red Cross] also the Corps have allotted to it 5 motor ambulances... two with the Meerut Division and two with the Lahore Division and the 5th to HQ’.78

The lack of ambulance trains in which mass evacuation could be carried out had significantly improved the numbers of casualties being moved and the quality of accommodation for those meant to travel in them. Field ambulance personnel were located at the railways, to sort and load the wounded, quickly moving large numbers of men. This was not without risk and COs of the field ambulances were very aware of the risk of having large numbers of men waiting to board the ambulance trains. The shelling of Ypres by the Germans in October 1914 caused the DADMS GHQ great consternation: ‘[We were] called up at 4am by wire from RTO, that railway station at Ypres was being steadily and accurately shelled, the ambulance [7th British] and improvised train being in the station’.79

Supply issues would become problematic for the field ambulances and stretcher- bearers of the IEF ‘A’ on the Western Front in 1914. The lack of medical equipment and necessary items had a major impact on the stretcher-bearers of the Indian Army bearer Corps. When Lieutenant Colonel Trehern, DDMS Indian Corps, inspected the newly arrived ambulances of the Meerut Division in October 1914, he found that they had arrived without their slings in which the stretcher- bearers were to carry the wounded. An order was issued to have these delivered immediately.80

78 Diary entry 31/10/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, TNA, WO 95/1093. 79 Diary entry 2/11/1914, DADMS, Headquarters Branches and Services: Director Medical Services, TNA, WO 95/3977. 80 Diary entry 22/10/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 124 The Indian stretcher-bearers also struggled with their stock of blanket stretchers they had brought with them from India. Although the blanket stretcher was suitable for carrying sick through the trenches, MacPherson argued they were ‘not suitable for carrying serious cases, such as cases of fracture of the thigh’.81 Supplying the field ambulances with sufficient blankets or stretchers became a difficult task for the Quartermaster’s Department and medical stores. The issue of supplying suitable numbers of stretchers would plague the medical corps and placed extreme hardships on stretcher-bearers throughout the course of the war. Without them, the care and treatment of the wounded in the early and final stages of the evacuation was compromised. So often, these items were lost when loading patients, sick or wounded, from the clearing station or hospital onto ambulance trains, and they were never returned.82

Additional problems arose for the IMS that had to deal with men who suffered from malaria. The requisite treatment given to ill men was the pharmaceutical drug, quinine.83 Without proper treatment, a sufferer of malaria could quickly become ill with the possibility of death from organ failure. The Indian Corps was initially unable to be supplied with sufficient quantities of prophylactic quinine by the Advanced Medical Store depot. In October 1914, the supply of quinine became scarce and that which was available could not be used for certain castes due to the use of bovine products in the manufacturing process. This placed the health of Indian Corps personnel at risk. This problem was solved after the DDMS Indian Corps lodged a formal and urgent request to have supplies brought from Divisional Supplies Depot.84

81 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 120. 82 Diary entry 30/10/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 83 ‘Symptoms of malaria include fever, headache, and vomiting, and usually appear between 10 and 15 days after the mosquito bite. If not treated, malaria can quickly become life-threatening by disrupting the blood supply to vital organs.’ http://www.who.int/topics/malaria/en/ 84 Diary entry 26/10/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 125 As 1914 progressed, the weather in Belgium and France began to deteriorate. The drop in temperature, the wind and rain, although acknowledged as an external problem, resulted in an increase in sickness and disease, which contributed to a increased workload for stretcher-bearers. Many men, including those of the field ambulance, were required to sleep in the open, alongside roads without cover. The stretcher-bearers of the 6th British Field Ambulance, having collected wounded during the evening ‘spent [the night] in wet clothes’.85 Men in this condition were susceptible to chill and combined with fatigue, often fell sick very quickly.

In October, the cold began to have a serious impact on the health of the British and of the newly arrived Indian Forces and further slowed down the evacuations carried out by the stretcher-bearers. Most British men had prior experience with snow and cold conditions and their winter uniforms were suited to the conditions. Mark Harrison stated that the Indian stretcher-bearers undertook their work with much difficulty in the cold and quickly deteriorating conditions ‘wearing only the sandals in which they had arrived’.86 Conversely, a different perspective is given in the war diary of the Indian Corps DDMS, which noted in October ‘at present moment Indian troops are with clothing in my opinion sufficient for winter and could not carry anymore’.87 Historian of the Indian Army on the Western Front, George Morton-Jack also defended the Indian and British authorities over the supposed supply issues and the notion that the Indian Sepoy was unable to endure the cold weather. Morton-Jack recorded:

Indeed it could be said that the British notion that the martial races of northern India were hardened by the Himalayan climate was effectively substantiated on the Western Front. The sepoys’ familiarity with cold weather, combined with the vast improvement of pre-war clothing terms,

85 Diary entry 12/09/1914, G. A. Kempthorne, Manuscript/ History of the 6th Field Ambulance, op. cit. 86 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 53. 87 Diary entry 24/10/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 126 ensured that the north western European weather did not destroy their will to collaborate.88

Not all of the Indian Forces present on the Western Front however, had experienced such extreme cold as faced in October and through the winter months. The following statement from the Censor of Indian Mails reflected the experience of Indian men to the conditions on the Western Front. A wounded Indian wrote home: ‘I have no confidence in being able to escape death. In this sinful country it rains very much and also snows and many men have been frost bitten. Some of their hands and feet cannot be stretched out... some have died like this’.89 The DDMS Indian Corps recorded in his war diary ‘heavy snow fell and very cold’.90 With the cold weather came illnesses such as colds and flu, which placed a heavy demand on the Indian Medical Service. The Indian Army Bearer Corps worked diligently, their Commander Willcocks ‘informed the War Office that the Indian Corps was fighting well. That included the Indian stretcher- bearers, whose efficiency shone’.91 The work of these stretcher-bearers also received great praise from MacPherson in the Official Medical History:

The impression that the work of the stretcher-bearers would break down was not justified for from the very first the rank and file of the Army Bearer Corps proved themselves both courageous and efficient and capable of carrying on their duties without any strengthening whatever from the RAMC.92

In November 1914, outbreaks of mumps and enteric fever affected Indian personnel, as did an increase in gas gangrene cases and reportedly high rates of

88 Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’op. cit., p. 352. 89 Undated letter, 1914-1915, Censor of Indian Mails, Asia, Pacific and African Collection, British Library (hereafter BL), IOR/L/MIL/5/825 - 1914-1915 90 Diary entry 19/11/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 91 Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’ op. cit., p. 339. 92 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 132. 127 hand wounds.93Morton-Jack stated within the Indian ranks: ‘on 22 November 1914 sickness in the Indian Corps accounted for 11% of its British strength but only 5% of its Indian’.94 Some of the Indian men, and one would expect the British men, began to find the conditions both physically and mentally challenging. The Censor of the Indian Mails lamented, ‘adverse signs are growing more conspicuous... I am inclined to regard as a rather ominous sign of mental disquietude’.95

Cold weather and illness were not the only contributing factors to the men’s mental state. Stretcher-bearer George Harding of the 23rd British Field Ambulance described in his diary his terrifying experience of German artillery near Ypres in late October 1914. The diary affords a clear sense of the danger and fears of these non-combatants. It is rare to find such descriptions of war written by stretcher-bearers and is therefore highly significant, and is written in a manner that does not glorify the experience of these non-combatants rather expresses the fear the stretcher-bearers were subject to. Harding wrote: ‘we are on a field caught like rats in a trap, first under the many shells of our own guns and nicely in range of the enemies’ guns, have to nap under shelter, what bit of it there is, the noise of the battle is absolutely deafening’.96

The following day Harding recorded the gruesome reality of collecting the wounded who lay with dead and dying amongst them ‘one of our men is among them with his head blown off, but such sights are now simply a thing of the past’.97 Harding also imparted how fatigue and the monotony of collecting the

93 Morton-Jack discounts the claim that Indian rates of hand wounds were higher than those of the British. See Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’ op. cit., p. 356. Diary entry 7/11/1914, DDMS Indian Army Corps, op. cit. 94 Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’ op. cit., p. 355. 95 Entry 23/01/1915, Censor of Indian Mails (part 1), op. cit. 96 Diary entry 23/10/1914, Campaign diary, Private G. Harding (George), AMS, RAMC/CF/4/3/23/HARD/M35/1. 97 Diary entry 24/10/1914, ibid. 128 wounded in harrowing circumstances affected him ‘left again for hell at 9.30’.98 Under trying conditions, Harding honestly expressed his anger and hatred of the Germans. In this diary excerpt Harding related his emotional reaction on being ordered to collect a wounded German Dragoon whilst working in Ypres. Harding wrote: ‘I found him lying in a dark place near Hotel-de-Ville. [He] Had two bullet wounds in {the} abdomen and right arm broken. Could have finished him off but ----’.99

Civilians were not exempt from the perils of warfare, with the stretcher-bearers of the medical corps sometimes having to give assistance. Corporal Chamberlain of the 9th British Field Ambulance explained:

Day of all days. The shells had burst over the hospital and we had to ‘fly for it’ on several occasions. The first shell burst as Major Bliss and I were dressing a Frenchman. Two children – a boy and a girl – had been severely shot. The girl had her eye out, her right hand blown off... she was a pitiful sight... Bugler Freeman had been sent back to Braisne as the shelling had been too much for him. No wonder, for in the afternoon he had been knocked down by the concussion of a shell.100

This chapter has shown that there were numerous problems during the early months of the war; all of these had a negative impact on the ability of stretcher- bearers to carry out their work. Many of these problems were a combination of issues that occurred simultaneously frequently forcing the medical corps to reassess their pre-war expectations. Nonetheless, stretcher-bearers worked as best they could. MacPherson accurately summarised the valuable work of regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers in 1914. He wrote:

98 Diary entry 29/10/1914, ibid. 99 Diary entry 14/10/1914, ibid. 100 Diary entry 22/09/1914, The War Diary of 19464, Corporal C. Chamberlain and the 9th Field Ambulance 1914, op. cit. 129 One only has to picture the regimental and field ambulance stretcher- bearers struggling slowly for three or four thousand yards [~2.7 – 3.65 km], carrying inert and badly stricken comrades... in their heroic task of clearing wounded from the battlefield... to realise the urgent need at times for additional bearers, field stretchers, blankets, comforts, and all forms of mechanical transport. Slowly but surely this need was met.101

Many problems impeded the ability of stretcher-bearers, both regimental and medical corps to assist the sick and wounded. To argue that one problem dominated over others does not give a true and complete picture of the challenges presented to stretcher-bearer personnel. Many of these problems would continue to plague the War Office, British and Indian Expeditionary Forces, and those additional Dominion Forces that would later serve on the Western Front.

The following chapter will examine changes in the way of warfare on the Western Front during 1915. Mobile warfare had effectively ceased, with belligerents settled into the stalemate of failed offensives. An increase in the use of artillery, the release of deadly poison gas contributed to the problems faced by non-combatant regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers.

101 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 24.

130 CHAPTER 4 – 1915

In 1915, the Western Front had settled into static and entrenched warfare, which featured high velocity machine guns, bombardment by massive amount of heavy artillery and the beginning of gas warfare.1 On the battlegrounds of France and Flanders, the effect of this type of warfare resulted in the death of 48,604 British Forces and 224,963 wounded.2 Many problems which had been present in 1914 remained unresolved. Many problems were new in which solutions had to be found by the medical corps in order to maintain the good health of their armies. During the year, significant battles were launched in which it was hoped to break the deadlock. The battles that are significant to this thesis are the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10 – 13 March 1915, The Battle of Gravenstafel (Second Battle of Ypres3), 22 - 23 April 1915, The Battle of Aubers, 9 May 1915 and The Battle of Loos 25 September – 8 October 1915.4 In these battles, the medical services were once again severely tested with the regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers pushed to their physical limits. Each of these battles posed their own specific or particular problem to the provision of medical care. Some of the problems were because of internal Army issues; many were external.

Internal problems examined in this chapter relate to the underestimation by the Army of the numbers of wounded, transportation issues and the breakdown in communication between units. External issues examined are the nature of warfare, particularly the use of gas, high explosive shelling, the trench system and the impact of enemy action. Again, it is argued that there is no one primary

1 The use of chlorine gas at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, is discussed in this chapter. 2 These figures have been calculated by the author using the monthly figures published in the Official History. See; The War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914-1920, op. cit., pp. 254-256. 3 This is officially known as The Battles of Ypres, 1915. 4 Battle names have been taken from, Captain E. A. James, A record of the battles and engagements of the British Armies in France and Flanders, 1914-1918, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1924. 131 source of the problems; rather it is the combination of issues that caused many of the problems for regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers.

For the stretcher-bearers who served at Neuve Chapelle; the large numbers of wounded requiring evacuation over a short period time inevitably led to delays in evacuation. These delays included retrieving the wounded from the battlefield and evacuating the wounded back behind the lines. This, in combination with transportation issues, predominantly congestion on available roads and intense shelling, further hampered the work of the stretcher-bearers. British C-I-C, Sir John French, instigated a proposal for the capture of Neuve Chapelle during March 1915. It had been planned to capture the German held village and then the British Forces were to advance on the Aubers-Haute Pommerau Ridge.5 Sir Douglas Haig determined that it would be ‘not a minor operation... [but] a serious offensive movement.6 The offensive was led by the 7th and 8th British Divisions of IV Corps (Rawlinson) and the Meerut and Lahore Divisions, Indian Corps (Willcocks), and conducted over the period 10 -13 March 1915.

The Battle of Neuve Chapelle began on 10 March 1915 and utilised massive amounts of heavy artillery ‘over a narrow front of 2,000 yards [~1.82 km], some 340 British guns fired their 35 minute bombardment, delivering the equivalent to 288 pounds [~130 kg] of high explosive per yard of opposing trench’.7 Neuve Chapelle is regarded as a battle in which the British Forces failed to take advantage of their initial breakthrough.8 During the preparations for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Army commanders expected the battle would last no more than ten days and expected an estimated 3,000 wounded per day, however the battle did not continue over the expected length and was stopped after German

5 Nick Lloyd, ‘“With faith and without fear”: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 4, October 2007, p. 1062. 6 ibid. 7 Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918, Longman Educational Ltd, Harlow, England, 2001, p. 166. 8 Keegan, The First World War, op. cit., p. 209. 132 counter-attacks.9 Fought only over three days it came with a very heavy casualty rate, with over 11,000 British Forces (British and Indian) casualties, and approximately 10, 000 German.10 Historian George Morton-Jack stated the decision to withdraw from the battle came after pressure from the Commander of the Indian Corps, Willcocks:

Willcocks despaired that all Indian advances suffered heavy losses for no gain. On the morning of the 12th he cancelled all Indian Corps attacks for the day. He intended ‘to make it understood that the Indians cannot be treated as pure machines’. Distraught that sepoys were often sacrificed unnecessarily, he argued that ‘Western attainments [must not be put] on a higher plain than human nature’.11

Previous large-scale bombardments had proved to the medical services that it was impossible to clear a battlefield during such action, and meant changes to evacuation were needed. In preparation for expected large numbers of wounded at Neuve Chapelle, staffing levels of available field ambulances had been increased. The Meerut Division was used to good effect in the early stages of the battle. As Brigadier P Mortimer, 3rd Company, Meerut Divisional Train, recorded: ‘Meerut Division alone took 450 prisoners... Garwhali Brigade led the assault on Neuve Chapelle which was occupied within half an hour’.12 However, this early success could not be sustained and came with a very casualty rate. The Lahore Division that had been kept in reserve were mobilised after the Meerut Division had been badly reduced.

The 3rd (Lahore) Division were attended to by the 7th and 8th British Field Ambulance and the 11th, 122nd and 113th Indian Field Ambulances. They were

9 Appendix 88 25/03/1915, War diary, DGMS First Army, BEF, TNA, WO 95/44. 10 Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 166. 11 George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, p. 347. 12 Diary entry 11/03/1915, Brigadier P. Mortimer, Typed transcript, IWM, Catalogue no. 12327, p. 16. 133 into position on the evening of 12 March 1915 after the Meerut Division had been severely depleted. MacPherson reported all the stretcher-bearers of the Indian divisions, including the British field ambulances attached, were Indian. In a report of the medical arrangement conducted by the 8th British Meerut and Lahore Divisions, during the period 10 to 14 March 1915, it was stated the various field ambulances cleared a total of ‘564 British Officers and 8,892 British and Indian other ranks’.13 In a later report DGMS First Army, BEF, McPherson recorded ‘9,642 wounded who passed through the hands of the medical services of the 1st Army.14 The Indian divisions suffered 4,200 casualties over the three days with 14 stretcher-bearers of the RAMC being wounded and 2 killed. The following table shows the casualties suffered by Indian Corps during the first two days of the battle.

4.1 - Indian Corps, IEF ‘A’ casualties 10 – 12 March 191515

British Officers and O/R Indian Officers and O/R

Killed 405 430

Wounded 1552 1531

The large number of casualties overwhelmed those field ambulances of the divisions and help was requested to assist with clearing and attending to the wounded. The numbers of wounded over-stretched the exhausted stretcher- bearers, forcing the DGMS to send 50 men of the North Midland CCS and ‘1

13 Appendix 49, March 1915, War diary, DGMS First Army, BEF, op. cit. 14 Appendix 54, 17 March 1915, War diary, D.G.M.S, First Army, BEF, op.cit. 15 Appendix ‘O’, Force “A” notes from War Diaries, Part V., General Staff Army HQ, India , March 1915, Central Press 1915, B/L, MSS Eur D978 134 officer and 150 men of the 6th Cheshire Unit’.16 Additional help was obtained from the Royal Field Artillery that gave 98 drivers to carry the wounded and found a number of willing ‘French civilians’.17 However, these volunteer stretcher-bearers did not have training in the correct technique for carrying a stretcher and, combined with a lack of physical fitness for stretcher carrying; it was found these bearers became physically spent within a short period. Further issues arose with the use of untrained men, as they did not understand nor appreciate the nature of work in the RAP, such as sorting men and could not be relied upon to maintain their nerve during a carry.

In an attempt to deal with the large numbers of wounded, 690 bearers of the Indian Army Bearer Corps were also used.18 Nine bearer divisions were employed at one time or other and worked for eight hours at a time in groups of three.19 This pattern of working in groups of three, was not what had been planned nor trained for pre-war, but came as a direct result of the strain felt by the overwhelmed field ambulances during situations where large numbers of wounded were present.

The underestimation of numbers of wounded forced MacPherson to seek help from outside the Division. The numbers of wounded exceeded the anticipated and planned for figure of 3,000 per day. The Army had few options. Wounded had to be evacuated swiftly, yet field ambulance or regimental establishments did not allow stretcher-bearers to be kept in reserve. MacPherson stated that during the entire course of the war on only one occasion did a divisional medical service seek help for the stretcher-bearers from outside their division (the 8th British Division).20 This was due to the fact that the stretcher-bearers of the field ambulances were ‘practically exhausted and unable to tackle the work without

16 Appendix 54, 17 March 1915, War diary, DGMS, First Army, BEF, op. cit. 17 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 378. 18MacPherson, ibid., p. 374. 19 ibid. 20 ibid., p. 365. 135 such help’.21 This decision shows that there was scope for flexible work practices to be introduced during these peak periods.

Heavy shelling hampered the work of not only the stretcher-bearers, but also had a flow on effect as it prevented available transport safely using the roads. During the battle of Neuve Chapelle, and at the subsequent battle of St Eloi (14- 15 March), heavy shelling prevented the stretcher-bearers from collecting the wounded. MacPherson explained how a large number of wounded lay in No Man’s Land in the cold for days ‘being unable to be cleared [as] the enemy’s artillery searched the roads... [and came] under fire and added to the dangers of collecting the wounded’.22 Extra regimental stretcher-bearers were sent on 13 March to collect those wounded of the 8th British Division that remained on the battlefield. During the period 10-14 March 1914, 125 additional men supplemented the stretcher-bearer parties, and collected ‘161 officers and 4,225 other ranks’.23

The account of Indian participation in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle by Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Barnett, IMS, the MO of the 34th Sikh Pioneers, Lahore Division, affords an understanding of the war experience of his stretcher-bearers. Barnett, who was a Captain (RMO) at the time, described the opening of the battle at Neuve Chapelle and the impossibility of attending to the wounded during the heavy shelling:

The most frightful bombardment this morning, tiles falling off roofs and windows breaking... [I] gave 56 helmets to Dhooly bearers and instructed them not to lose them... I will be deaf for days... I went to see if any Sepoy

21 Appendix 54, 17 March 1915, War diary, DGMS, First Army, BEF, op. cit. 22 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, , op. cit., p. 367. 23 Appendix 54, 17 March 1915, War diary, DGMS, First Army, BEF, op. cit. 136 lying on road but could not reach [them], just then shells falling took cover behind barricade.24

Shelling severely disrupted the provision of medical care away from the battlefront, with those who worked at dressing stations also being subjected to enemy fire. At Neuve Chapelle on 17 March 1915, a high explosive shell detonated in the dressing station of the 112th Indian Field Ambulance (Lahore Division), killing the sick and wounded who were being cared for and also many men of the field ambulance. The war diary recorded:

The following men of this unit were killed, Sepoy Ward Orderly Saman Khan [130 Balucchis], he was attending the sick at the time. No. 4183 bearer Pitamba... the conduct of the bearers deserves praise, they were steady and cool under trying circumstances. The name of the senior man 4009 Naik Wadhawa was brought to the ADMS. The bearer company was at once withdrawn by the ADMS.25

Although many of the transportation problems of the previous year had been in someway better controlled and managed by March 1915, the sheer volume of wounded needing transportation away from the battlefront was another issue faced by the stretcher-bearers at Neuve Chapelle. In anticipation of transportation problems, close work and co-operation between GHQ and the divisional medical service was undertaken. This involved the organisation and supply of motor and horsed wagons as ambulances, which had been brought in from other sectors to cope with the numbers of expected wounded. The Divisional Motor Ambulance Convoys (MAC) were advised of the routes of evacuation and, in co-operation with the French, it was organised to increase the number of ambulance trains, to take extra sitting and lying down cases. In

24 Diary entry, 10 March 1915, Private papers Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Barnett, IWM, Catalogue 90/37/1. 25 Diary entry 17/03/1915, War Diary 112th Indian Field Ambulance, ADMS, WO 95/1181/1. 137 addition, railheads had their personnel increased to cope with the offloading from ambulance cars to trains and extra provisions of stretchers and blankets were supplied.26

Despite all the careful planning, congestion of ambulances still occurred. To overcome the problem of congestion on the roads ‘an army order was issued... that from noon to 6am [10 March] the roads were to be used [only] for motor ambulance convoys’.27 The orders laid down prior to the battle demanded that horsed ambulance wagons were to move in convoy formation quickly but this resulted in bottlenecks on the narrow roads and resulted in the faster motor vehicles being blocked. An additional problem which slowed down medical evacuation, a repetition of a 1914 problem, occurred when the ‘horses also soon became exhausted and added to the slowness of the movement’.28 The inability to offload patients onto mechanised or horsed ambulance wagons caused the stretcher-bearers many issues, often forcing them to hand carry a wounded man for much further than originally planned.

Even with these problems, the hard work of the stretcher-bearers of the Indian Corps and their RAMC counterparts was acknowledged. DGMS MacPherson, in his report regarding the medical arrangements at Neuve Chapelle, sent the following letter of appreciation to the COs of the Meerut, Lahore Division and the British 7th and 8th Divisions:

I should like to let you know personally how much I appreciate the work that has been done by yourself and your field ambulances... I can say that the work which you and your field ambulances have done seems to me to have risen to the occasion in a degree which deserves the highest

26 These trains were temporarily on loan from the French, a full complement of trains, for the BEF were not yet available. See Colonel A. M. Henniker, Official History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western front: 1914-1918, N & M Press Reprint, East Sussex, 2009, p.118 27 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 370. 28 ibid., p. 374. 138 commendation, and hope you will let your units know how fully this is appreciated.29

During April, the British medical services were faced with a new weapon, poison gas, which had a significant and negative effect on men during the Second Battles of Ypres. The Second Battle of Ypres, an offensive launched by the Germans, was a series of battles that began on 22 April, with the Battle of Gravenstafel Ridge and officially ended on 25 May 1915. British Forces suffered 59,275 casualties including those up to 31 May.30 At Gravenstafel, the CAMC needed to deal with the effects of gas attack. Gas warfare had a significant impact upon the work of the stretcher-bearers, by making evacuation difficult during a gas attack and changing the manner in which they were to work.31 The war diary of the DADMS Indian Corps, recorded that instructions were in place that specified the use of gas equipment. On 29 May, he visited the various Indian field ambulances to ‘emphasize the importance of orders that every man must have and understand the use of gas respirators’.32 MacPherson astutely summed up the situation for the medical services during the first gas attack, recording: ‘the medical services of the Second Army had to contend with many difficulties. The confusion and demoralisation caused by the first gas surprise added to the difficulties’.33 The wearing of the gas mask during a gas attack would be vitally important in order to keep men safe.

An additional problem during this battle was the use of heavy artillery bombardment that wrecked havoc on all belligerents. It was a war, as Dennis Showalter wrote, that had ‘an emphasis on ever larger numbers of guns and

29 War diary, DGMS, First Army, BEF, op. cit. 30 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and Captain G.C. Wynne, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1915: [Vol.1] Winter 1914-15, Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Battle of Ypres, HMSO, London, 1927, p. 356. 31 ibid., p. 356. 32 Diary entry 27/05/1915, War Diary, DADMS, GHQ, TNA, WO 95/3977. 33 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 421. 139 shells’.34 Working to clear the wounded from the battlefield during a bombardment would be a very hazardous activity for stretcher-bearers, the consequence of which meant a delay in treating and attending to those wounded men. Stretcher-bearers were forced to work in the trench system in order to clear the wounded. The trench system on the Western Front came with its own particular problems, which will be examined later in this chapter.

On 22 April 1915, at Gravenstafel, Belgium, German Forces released chlorine gas upon the French held (Allied) line during the first engagement in the Second Battle of Ypres. Also present in the area were the British V Corps, 27th and 28th Divisions, 1st Canadian Division and the 13th Infantry Brigade. When inhaled the chlorine affected the lungs by turning into hydrochloric acid after making contact with water (contained in the lungs). There were different reactions to the chlorine gas which were dependent on the dose and how high the concentration of the chlorine gas was. Chlorine caused some form of irritation (eyes, throat, lungs); some men died from the gas and others were permanently disabled by the chlorine. British stretcher-bearer Robert John Stratton of the 85th British Field Ambulance, 28th Division, recorded his reaction to the first gas attack. Although Stratton’s unit were not directly affected by the release of the gas, it is used to give a sense of panic that ensued following the German release of chlorine gas on that day: This was the occasion of the first gas attack; the French colonial (Algerian) coloured troops, utterly defenceless and unprepared for the new horror of chlorine gas... gave-way, small blame to them but the Canadians did not; they died. There were ugly scenes along the roads; the French colonial troops can only be described as panic stricken at this time... our

34 Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Mass Warfare and the impact of technology’ in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, (eds) Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914– 1918, German Historical Institute, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 81. 140 troops greeted them with ‘ah you bastards, you let the Canadians down’.35

Field Marshall Sir John French relayed his disgust for this new type of warfare: ‘the Germans tried every means in their power to get possession of that unfortunate town... they had no recourse to that mean and dastardly practice, hitherto unheard of in civilised warfare, namely, the use of asphyxiating gases’.36 Within months, however the British would employ similar tactics. The use of poison gas in warfare did not provide the expected definitive breakthrough and success. It did however, change the landscape of war using a tool of fear, as Ian Beckett argued: ‘gas had a more lasting impact... its real function was as a ‘force multiplier’’.37

When the poison gas was released on the battlefields in 1915, it was greatly feared until ways and means of responding to gas attack were instituted. Canadian historian Jack Granatstein acknowledged men feared bombing and shelling but also: ‘gas too was feared – no one liked the idea of coughing up one’s lungs from chlorine or drowning as the lungs filled with fluid from phosgene or being burned, blinded, and blistered by mustard gas’.38 Albert Palazzo correctly asserted that the use of gas warfare on the Western Front drove change through ‘innovation... and adaptation’.39 Poison gas and its medical effect on men, forced the British Forces and all other belligerents to develop better ways of managing medical care on the Western Front. There were many different types and forms of poison gas used with varying degrees of efficiency and efficacy. Early gas attacks utilised chlorine that was visible, however later

35 ‘Notes from overseas, 1915-1916’, Private Robert John Stratton, NAM, Ref. 1992-04-73-01. 36 Edmonds and Wynne, Military operations, France and Belgium, 1915: Winter 1914-15, Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Battles of Ypres, op. cit., p. 357. 37 Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 176. 38 J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s army: waging war and keeping the peace, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2002, p. 103. 39 Albert P. Palazzo, Tradition, Innovation and the pursuit of the decisive battle: Poison gas and the British Army on the Western Front, 1915-1918, PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1996, p. 2. 141 gases proved far more deadly and bothersome. Stretcher-bearers, both regimental and medical corps, needed to be alert to the dangers of invisible or undetectable gases, such as Phosgene.40 There are various estimates given for the number of men and civilians affected by ‘poison’ gas over the course of the war. Canadian Tim Cook suggested the figure to be ‘over a million’41 adding there was controversy about the actual number. Dutch historian Leo van Bergen argued: ‘in the war as a whole, West, East and elsewhere, around 800,000 soldiers are said to have been affected by gas, with a margin of error of an astonishing 200,000 either way’.42

It is clear from the literature that gas proved to be problematic for not only the belligerent armies, but for their medical services, stretcher-bearers and men. New ways of dealing with those affected by gas, while under threat of a gas attack, became necessary for the medical corps and stretcher-bearers. Regimental stretcher-bearer Michael Mossop of the 1/5th Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment recalled: ‘they used gas on the Canadians in early 1915... well I never smelt it at all, you couldn’t identify it at all [because] of the cordite about’.43 Donald Richter stated that phosgene ‘raised the lethal capacity... [as] it did not signal its presence by the telltale detectable odour... [nor did it produce] severe coughing as did chlorine’.44

Marion Leslie Girard’s 2002 examination Confronting Total War: British responses to Poison Gas 1914-1918, acknowledged the military medical machine ‘recognized how little medical knowledge existed in regard to gas wounds. Why

40 Phosgene was not used until December 1915. Donald Richter, ‘The Experience of the British Special Brigade in Gas Warfare’, in Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, Facing Armageddon: The First World War experienced, Leo Coper Ltd, London, 1996, p. 353. 41 Tim Cook, ‘Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 4, October 1998, p. 755. 42 van Bergen, Before my helpless sight: op. cit., p. 176. 43 M. Mossop, Oral History, IWM, Catalogue no. 10686. 44 Richter, ‘The Experience of the British Special Brigade in Gas Warfare’, op.cit., p. 353. 142 should they have possessed any? Gas was a new weapon’.45 The medical response was quick, with testing quickly undertaken to understand the effects of the gases and how best to manage them. In the testing environment, the CO of the Canadian Mobile Laboratory experienced for himself the effects that chlorine had on men. He wrote to the Surgeon-General Sloggett, DGMS, advising him ‘the effects were disastrous... it made our eyes bloodshot and run water for a couple of hours’.46

In order to continue their valuable work, stretcher-bearers had to ensure they themselves did not fall foul to the effect of gas poisoning. To overcome the problem of gas inhalation, the following instruction was issued: ‘respirators are being prepared and will be issued to each field ambulance for distribution to Brigades. Sodium Bicarbonate, Sodium Thuosulphate and Glycerine will be drawn by field ambulance... and issued to Regimental Medical Officers for use of moistening masks in trenches’.47 The order required the stretcher-bearers to don their gas respirators whenever evacuating the wounded when a gas threat was present. This made the work of the stretcher-bearers harder, as the respirators were large and cumbersome. The stretcher-bearers had the additional problem of having to work slower and with more care to prevent respirators being dislodged. Stretcher-bearers who failed to take care with their own gas respirators became a casualty themselves.

Accounts by stretcher-bearers of working in, and under the threat of, a gas attack demonstrate how unwieldy the respirators were to wear while attempting to attend to those sick or wounded. They regularly complained that the goggles continually fogged up, blocking their vision. The early gas respirators used in

45 Marion Leslie Girard, Confronting Total War: British responses to Poison Gas 1914-1918, PhD Thesis, Yale University, 2002, p. 148. 46 Undated report G. G. Nasmith, Miscellaneous extracts, folder 2, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services op. cit. 47 Routine Orders, 10/05/1915 ‘Protection from Gas’, Folder 1, File 6, Assistant Director of Medical Services, 1st Canadian Division [textual record], LAC, RG9-III-C-10, Vol 4542. 143 1915 were, as the III Corps Medical Society reported, ‘crude affairs indeed’.48 The user of the gas respirator had to put them on carefully in order to get it into the correct position; however, the eyes remained unprotected with only ‘a small piece of veiling... [which was] found to be inefficient’.49

During Second Battle of Ypres of 1915, increased heavy shelling prevented the work of regimental stretcher-bearers evacuating wounded from the battlefield and the medical corps stretcher-bearers from RAPs and ADS. The inability of the stretcher-bearers to quickly clear the wounded due to sustained and heavy shelling meant many of the wounded lay in No Man’s Land for days, unable to be cleared as ‘the enemy’s artillery searched the roads... [and came] under fire’.50 An article published in The Times of India related the circumstances of the collection by stretcher-bearers of an Officer of the Indian Army, Major Carden of the 15th Sikhs, 3rd Lahore Division, who was mortally wounded. In the article, which also reviewed the Indian participation at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, it was reported:

Major Carden met his death in going to the assistance of Captain Muir, who was mortally wounded. He [Carden] was put in a stretcher and as he was being taken away both bearers were hit and dropped him. Two more men picked up the stretcher, and Major Carden was then hit again … the gallantry of the stretcher-bearers, not only in this but in every action, cannot be too highly praised.51

Captain J. W. Barnett described his personal fear and that of his stretcher- bearers during a particularly heavy shell attack. In his diary, Barnett recorded:

48 Undated. ‘Minutes of the meetings of 3rd Corps Medical Society (on the Western Front)’, Wellcome Library, RAMC/2053. 49 ibid. 50 Sir W.G. MacPherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. II, The Medical Services on the Western Front, and during the operations in France and Belgium in 1914 and 1915, Macmillan, London, 1923, p. 367. 51‘Indian Heroism’ in The Times of India, 6 September 1915, p. 13. 144 ‘regiment on ahead, [I] asked Kaman Singh and stretcher-bearers if they would walk or run... [we] never run so hard – for 3 miles [~4.82 km]... could have cried when out of shell range but [was] too tired’.52 Fear effectively froze some of the non-combatants, preventing them from undertaking their duties; the following excerpt from Barnett’s memoirs ably described the acute fear response of himself and his stretcher-bearers during a shelling barrage during the Second Battle of Ypres. Additionally that this senior officer resigned himself to the possibility of his own death is significant:

Shelling continues, 2 brigades used up completely... now lost 90 men... Ghurkha jammed under beams in burning house... call this war – it is murder. All fellows looking done, drawn faces. Sat in cellar most of day, Hutch put knee out... Hutches’ nerve almost gone – clinging to me like a child... shall not forget that night. Allen packed with gravel, man with hideously smashed legs, crying for chloroform... other man with shell piece in lung coughing life out on my blankets. Am indifferent whether killed or not.53

Even when the wounded were in the capable hands of experienced stretcher- bearers there was still was no certainty that they would reach the comparative safety of the ADS or CCS. The bravery of the stretcher-bearer could be a determining factor in the success. Some stretcher-bearers proved their mettle in the heat of the battle. Captain J. H. Jordan of the 1/5th London Field Ambulance, described the evacuation of a wounded officer and another man during a period where there was heavy shelling of the road:

Shells dropped fairly close and a maxim gun was fired upon the party. The road was deserted of all other troops who were in the trenches... on this road we had to cross nearly 1 mile of road deserted by troops and 4 large shells burst striking the ground quite close and in one place the wounded

52 Diary entry 1/05/1915, Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel during the war. Private papers Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Barnett, op. cit. 53 Diary entry 29/04/1915, ibid. 145 officer himself insisted on taking to trenches but could not manage to walk far so had to be carried again.54

It was so dangerous to collect men during a bombardment that a re-assessment of the manner in which evacuation was carried began to be re-considered. In April 1915, the Canadians began to consider the manner in which their stretcher- bearers would work after they identified the following problems such as: how to carry out evacuation of wounded during a barrage, transportation problems and constant shelling of RAPs and ADSs being some. Canadian Heather Moran discussed the problems faced in clearing a battlefield by the CAMC in her thesis, and offered ways that the CAMC tried to overcome these:

The Canadians moved into the line in the middle of April [1915], immediately realized that the ‘ideal’ evacuation system that their training had envisioned would not work on this terrain, and made an effort to correct the medical plan that had been used in the salient. The aid posts were two miles [~3.2 km] behind the trenches, too far for the stretcher- bearers to carry the wounded, and there was no way to use ambulance wagons to assist them. The Regimental Medical Officers decided to move the aid posts forward... all the wounded would have to be collected at night.55

Much of the carrying work of the stretcher-bearers had to be carried out at night and through the system of firing and communication trenches. The complicated trench system caused delays in getting the sick and wounded to medical care. These systems which had developed on the Western Front by 1915 posed their own particular problems for stretcher-bearers, which slowed down the rate of evacuation. Ana Carden-Coyne confirmed the necessity to re-assess the way that

54 Appendix 2, War Diary, 1/5th London Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/2724. 55 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 68. 146 the wounded were transported through the trench system. She noted: ‘RAP trenches were often so narrow that stretchers had to be tilted or patients lifted by blanket, which could distress both the injured and the bearers’.56 For defensive reasons, trenches were not straight, rather built in a ‘zigzag’ pattern, hence stretcher-bearers had to deal with narrow corners and corridors. In order for the stretcher-bearers to travel through the trench system, they had to manoeuvre their stretcher around corners; for the stretcher-bearers, this continued to slow their work and made it harder. Major G. H. Colt explained the difficulties: ‘the type of front line trench in which all devices [stretchers] so far tried for moving badly gassed or wounded man have failed. In a trench less than 28 inches [~71 cm] wide, bearers cannot pass a right-angled corner... the strain on them is great’.57

A similar observation regarding the difficulties of evacuating wounded through the trench system was recorded by Lieutenant Colonel J. W. B. Merewether of the IEF ‘A’. The note reaffirms this thesis argument, that pre-war training and ways of operating were severely tested by the change in warfare. Merewether stated: ‘the method of dealing with the wounded in trench warfare necessitated much consideration and all existing systems had to be revised and adapted to the new conditions. It must be remembered that the almost continuous shell fire made the task of the removal of wounded a very difficult and dangerous task’.58 Stretcher-bearer Edwin Ware of the 133rd British Field Ambulance described the difficulties of manoeuvring a wounded man along the trenches when using the heavy and unwieldy canvas stretchers. This example also detailed the ways that the trench systems were reconfigured and improved, allowing for better passage and ease of movement for all:

We took our turn in bringing the wounded down the trenches from the Regimental Aid Post to the Advanced Dressing Station. This was

56 A. Carden-Coyne ‘Soldiers’ Bodies in the War Machine: Triage, Propaganda and Military Medical Bureacracy, 1914-1918’ , op. cit., p. 71. 57 Major, G. H. Colt, ‘Letters, notes and answers’, in British Medical Journal, 13 April 1918. 58 Merewether and Smith, The Indian corps in France, op. cit., p. 497. 147 extremely arduous, as there was a sharp turn in the trenches every few feet to lesson the effect of shells or bombs dropping in the trenches. We partly closed the stretcher and at each turn, had to raise it almost shoulder high, and only two men could handle it. Later the corners were rounded off a bit, but whenever the enemy allowed us to go in the open we took the risk. For this, we showed our red cross... if a bullet whistled over, it was interpreted, as ‘Fritzie’ says no.59

It was swiftly recognised that there needed to be improvements and developments made to the older style canvas stretchers. Many new designs were trialled on the Western Front, these were usually undertaken at a local unit level, and if satisfactory, the plans were sent to the ADMS of the Dvision for his consideration. Some new stretchers were made narrower, some were made for sitting, all however were designed with two objectives, to ease the wounded man’s difficulties and to ease the burden on the stretcher-bearers. A design for a new pattern stretcher submitted by Lieutenant C. Hamilton Withers hoped to overcome some of the difficulties of the patient and the stretcher-bearers:

Designed for use more particularly in those cases where the patient is liable to experience, in transit down line of communication, considerable pain or discomfort when of necessity he is repeatedly lifted on and off the regulation stretcher... the width in the case of this new stretcher may be reduced from the standard... which greatly facilitates the transport of the patient through passages.60

Major Colt, RAMC, devised a jointed-pole trench stretcher specifically designed to ease a wounded man’s pain and the burden on the arms and shoulders of the stretcher-bearers. This new type of stretcher had the wounded man sitting on a canvas sling and the poles of the stretcher were affixed with leather strapping

59 Undated entry, WW1 Diary of Edwin Ware, AMS, RAMC/PE/1/707/WARE, p. 33. 60 C. Hamilton Withers, ‘A new pattern stretcher’, RAMC Journal, March 1915, p. 278. 148 across the body of the stretcher-bearers freeing up their hands ‘to aid the patient or save themselves on uneven ground’.61 There were many such types of stretchers designed and patented over the course of the war, however none was ever acknowledged as being the ‘perfect’ type.

Time was of the essence in getting the gravely ill and grievously wounded back behind the lines for medical treatment. Keeping the patient as comfortable as possible with minimal disruption during the evacuation had been identified as a major factor to a good health outcome for the wounded, as it helped to mitigate the effects of shock. Doctors had identified that men with abdominal wounds had better outcomes if they did not lie down flat, so a stretcher that could have a folding frame on which men could sit up became necessary. Additionally, the original stretchers proved to be heavy, too long in length and cumbersome to negotiate the tight trenches and needed reassessment. To overcome some of these carrying issues, many men submitted plans and drawings for new stretchers. For example Lieutenant J. S. Goodacre RAMC, offered his own design for a sitting stretcher, which could be used for short distances, ‘from the firing trenches’62 to a place where the stretcher-bearers could transfer the patient onto a normal stretcher.

The trench system caused many other problems for the stretcher-bearers, including how to understand the planned route of evacuation through the countless kilometres of trenches. Knowledge of the trench system was imperative. Guides, often members of a unit that had previously occupied a particular area of the trench system assisted the bearer squads to find their way through the maze of trenches. In an attempt to overcome the problem of bearer

61 The original stretcher was in production by Messer’s Waring and Gillow Oxford Street London by January 1916, it is assumed that prototypes of this stretcher were tested prior to January 1916, hence being included in this chapter, Colt, ‘Letters, notes and answers’, op. cit. 62Lieutenant J. S. Goodacre, ‘Chair Stretcher’, RAMC Journal, September 1915, p. 350. 149 squads becoming lost or disorientated in the trenches, which diverted time away from their work, Captain Carlin, RAMC, wrote to the ADMS, 2nd Division:

I suggest that the [Field Ambulance] unit holding the area collects the wounded as far as possible with groups often searching dug outs etc., and then that guides who know the way about the trenches should be provided to accompany the stretcher squads of the bearer sub-division. Guides are an absolute necessity in the darkness.63

After the Battle of Neuve Chapelle it was acknowledged that the problems of large numbers of wounded needed to be addressed. Medical corps personnel in reserve were now to be utilized when the need arose, such as it did at the Battle of Aubers Ridge. On 9 May 1915, at Aubers Ridge, British divisions of Haig’s First Army and the 3rd Lahore and 7th Meerut Divisions launched an attack on German positions, in an attempt to push the Germans back and secure the ridge. The attack suffered from many problems, not least limited firepower, it also involved a desperate hand to hand battle in the German trenches. The short but deadly battle came at a very high cost with 11,000 British Forces casualties. Expressing concern for his stretcher-bearers, the CO of the 5th British Field Ambulance, Captain H. S. W. Carlin, wrote of his concern about the physical stress and strain upon his stretcher-bearers working at Aubers Ridge. In a report to the ADMS 2nd British Division, Carlin remarked: ‘I consider... the relief of bearers to be very important. Stretcher-bearers have strenuous work and cannot keep it up without rest. I suggest that when tent sub-divisions are unemployed, the personnel could be used as stretcher-bearers’.64

When this action could not be utilised, relief stretcher-bearers were called for from other units in the rear at rest. Captain Bell of the 2nd British Field

63 Letter dated 1/6/1915, Captain Carlin to ADMS, Short report on the work of the Field Ambulance, 9-21 May 1915, ADMS, 2nd Division, Wellcome Library, RAMC 793/23/3. 64 ibid. 150 Ambulance, described during May, the urgent need for relief by replacement stretcher-bearers to clear the wounded:

Established a dressing station at Estaminet le Touet, 1 officer, 1 NCO and 6 men, dealt with a large number of wounded during the day approximately 610... as no ambulance were allowed past this point, this dressing station soon became full of wounded... Later on in the afternoon urgent msg’s were received from the RMO of the regiment asking for help for the RSBs.65

Canadian H. M. (Tiny) Morris, commented on the recruitment of more stretcher- bearers during periods whereby large numbers of wounded need evacuation:‘casualties would be so numerous that infantry soldiers were assigned to help us. If there were German prisoners, we put them to work carrying our own and their wounded’.66 These volunteers, such as Canadian infantryman William Merston were called to serve as regimental stretcher- bearers. In a letter dated 30 May 1915, Merston wrote of his experience with the stretcher-bearers after a battle, and recorded the novelty of stretcher-bearing:

In the evening some of us volunteered to help the stretcher-bearers and worked all night carrying out the wounded from our first trench, which we captured the evening before... it was exciting work as we had no cover and, of course we had to be quite silent.67

Michael Roper has rightly argued the historian should treat this type of positivistic account with caution because, ‘it is the very protestation of good

65‘Report from Captain Bell on the units’ performance on 9/05/1915 - in charge of the bearer division’, War Diary, 2nd Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/1258. 66 H. M. (Tiny) Morris, Manuscript, The Story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1, LAC, MG-30- E- 379, p. 12. 67 Letter dated 30/05/1915, William Charles Merston to an unknown person, William Charles Merston, George Metcalf Archival Collection, CWM, Textual Records 58A 1 216.22. 151 spirits that suggests all was not well’.68 The reality was that the work carried out in the dark, exacerbated by having to work all through the night at a job the infantryman was unused to, might be considered a period of extreme stress.

This utilisation of untrained men as stretcher-bearers presented additional problems for the COs of field ambulances. To assist in making up a shortfall of bearers it was decided to ‘make full use of Class ’B’ men, convalescents and other soldiers who would not be employed in the fighting line’.69 These unfit men and the use of untrained fit men, resulted in these men being unable to withstand the rigors of stretcher-bearing as the hand carry extended up to ‘2 miles [~3.2 km]’.70 This meant more and more men were called upon to assist.

Additional problems during the Battle of Aubers Ridge included a lack of available transport, stemming from the difficulty of getting ambulances to the front. This forced stretcher-bearers to hand carry longer and more dangerous routes. At Aubers Ridge there was a chronic shortage of wheeled stretchers available, which put a greater burden on the stretcher-bearers. The blame is attributed to the Divisional Quartermaster in this internal supply issue. To minimise the burden of the stretcher-bearers, a wheeled stretcher had been introduced to the Western Front. The war diary of Advanced GHQ, Second Army, reported in May 1915: ‘the need for wheeled stretchers is being severely felt… the fighting on 9th and 10th instants to show how much these are needed’.71

The wheeled stretchers had provided much relief for the stretcher-bearers, as they eased the burden of a hand carry. Although they were extremely useful in

68 Michael Roper, The secret battle: Emotional survival in the Great War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2009, p. 21. 69 DA & QMG Order, First Army, No. C133, MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 431. 70 ibid., p. 365. 71 Diary entry 15/05/1915, War Diary, Advanced G H Q, Second Army, copy in, Papers of Private John J. Kershaw, Wellcome Library, RAMC 924. 152 alleviating the burden for the bearers, they were problematic as they could only be used on flat, even and smooth surfaces, which prevented their use over boggy or shell damaged land. Regimental stretcher-bearer Michael Mossop credited these labour saving devices as ‘a big wheel… bigger than a bicycle wheel and you could push them along easy’.72 Only one man was needed to operate the wheeled stretcher and the wounded generally had a more comfortable ride. Some wheeled stretchers were designed with large wheels similar to those on a wagon, others were more compact and could be folded, making transportation of them in the field ambulance wagons easier. Advancements in design, included suspension, frequently the ‘leaf type’ making the ride more comfortable and keeping the wheeled stretcher stable. Such a simple yet effective apparatus would have eased the burden on the wounded man and for the stretcher-bearers.

4.2 - Use of a wheeled stretcher73

72 M. Mossop, Oral History, op. cit. 73 NB the improvised splint on the wounded mans’ leg. Western Front. c. 1916. Scottish Highlanders on the move with a wounded German soldier on a wheeled stretcher. (Donor British Official Photograph C369), AWM, H08379. 153

In the aftermath of the Second Battle of Ypres, it was acknowledged that the problem of replacing wounded or injured stretcher-bearers had begun to take a toll on the establishment of the field ambulances. It became very clear to the Army and medical corps that in preparation for a large battle many men would be needed to work as stretcher-bearers. In July 1915, the medical corps came to recognise the urgent need for relief of stretcher-bearers and established the ‘Emergency Stretcher-bearer Unit’ located at Boulogne.74 This group was used to assist in the clearing of wounded from overwhelmed dressing stations and CCSs, and they were also used to load and unload wounded from trains and ships. The personnel to fill this unit were those men previously wounded or injured and listed as below medical classification Class ‘A’, that is, they were not yet fit to return to normal duties. Medical officers were pressured to ensure that these below ‘A’ class men were quickly made fit and moved back to a frontline unit.

74 The camp in which the Emergency Stretcher-bearer Unit was established was known as ‘Windmill Camp’, Diary entry 14/08/1915, War diary, Emergency Stretcher-bearer Unit, TNA, WO 95/4117. 154 It is clear from the correspondence and war diary of this unit that there a certain negative attitude held against these men for not being fit enough to serve in a combatant role. The CO of the unit makes many references to the constant call from senior personnel of the Army for these stretcher-bearers to be medically examined and too often, re-examined. The Commander recorded his feelings of the constant pressure borne upon him and the non-combatant stretcher- bearers. It also reinforces the statement that stretcher-bearers needed a good level of physical fitness:

The constant medical boards on men and the uncertainty of remaining in this unit makes the men discontented and renders discipline now difficult than it would otherwise be. The general opinion that stretcher-bearer work is light and can be done by any ‘old crook’ is entirely wrong, it is very strenuous work, lifting loaded stretchers from the top compartments of an ambulance car, requires the services of physically strong men. This fact should be recognised in joining a stretcher-bearer unit.75

Later in 1915, at the Battle of Loos, the problem of large numbers of wounded, combined with transportation issues once again severely hampered the evacuation of the wounded. This British led offensive, conducted from 25 September - 8 October 1915, during which British Infantry and Cavalry Divisions of the British First Army, and Indian Divisions took part, came at a great cost, with 16,000 British dead and approximately 25,000 wounded over the course of the battle. British historian John Keegan described Loos as: ‘in strategic terms, was pointless’.76 German machine gunners mowed many of the dead and wounded down. The Germans referred to the battlefield as ‘the corpse field of Loos’.77 As well as the machine gun, Loos also featured the release of poison gas against the German held lines. Despite widespread disgust and condemnation of

75 Diary entry 2/12/1915, ibid. 76 Keegan, The First World War, op. cit., p. 219. 77 ibid. 155 the German use of gas in April, the British released 5,100 cylinders of chlorine gas at Loos in retaliation to ‘the chemical gauntlet thrown down by Germany’.78

For the medical service, despite having made substantial plans, the sheer volume of casualties saw an almost complete breakdown in evacuation.79 The combination of large numbers of wounded and lack of available transportation were the main problems. It had been estimated the number of wounded over the course of the battle expected to last only a ‘several days’80 would be 39,000. RAMC Operational Order No. 2, dated 19 September 1915, demonstrated an awareness of needing to be flexible in regards to staffing levels and appropriate relief.81 The plans included a contingency plan should positions become overwhelmed by the number of wounded or if a RAP had to move forward during the advance. This demonstrated an awareness of the necessity to adopt and implement new plans and allowed for a measure of autonomy by officers commanding the various dressing stations of the field ambulances present.

The order included flexibility in dealing with the wounded, such as ‘dressing stations are so situated and established that they should be capable of not only dealing with casualties brought to them but so they may be able, should occasion arise to afford mutual help to one another’.82 The plans allowed for the provision of extra stretchers to be allotted to each field ambulance and additional reserve stretchers were to be held at each CCS. Also obtained for each field ambulance were extra wheeled stretchers and blankets. The line of evacuation for each of the Brigades had been clearly identified, with bearer relay posts being instituted and MAC vehicles being available at collecting posts. Additional CCS were also

78 Palazzo, ‘Tradition, Innovation and the pursuit of the decisive battle: Poison gas and the British Army on the Western Front, 1915-1918’, op. cit., p. 159. 79 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 455. 80 ibid., p. 453. 81 Issued by Colonel J. D. Ferguson, Commanding Officer, 47th (London) Division, RAMC Operational Order No. 2, 19/09/1915, War Diary, 1/5th London Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/2724. 82 ibid. 156 instigated in the anticipation that as one CCS became clogged others would take in the overflow. There were twelve CCSs able to take a maximum of 11, 568 patients.83

In order to manage the large numbers of wounded a new way of distributing men within the collecting zone was improvised, which assisted in the management and treatment of men. The implementation of Divisional Collecting Stations during the Battle of Loos ensured that the walking wounded were attended to promptly and that a quick turnaround of these men was maintained. Medical corps stretcher-bearers guided the walking wounded to the collecting station so that they could receive prompt medical attention. The CO of the 27th British Field Ambulance, recorded: ‘the collection and evacuation of wounded by the unit was carried out expeditiously and without any hitch. The Divisional Collecting Station on Rue d’Annequin was a great success the walking wounded arriving regularly’.84 This change in operation provided a more streamlined way of dealing with the wounded and relieved the work of the stretcher-bearers somewhat.

When the British released the gas on the German positions at Loos, the lack of wind caused the gas to hang ‘about in No Man’s Land or even drifted back into the British trenches’.85 Gas and machine gun casualties poured into the RAPs and dressing stations. Captain E. S. B. Hamilton, of the 47th British Field Ambulance, recorded his experience of the large numbers of casualties during the Battle of Loos. Hamilton wrote:

The great attack began about 5 o’clock on Saturday 25th, when our gas was let loose. It seems to have been a failure... about noon we heard that 47 [47th British Field Ambulance] had crowds of wounded pouring in... just

83 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 452. 84 Diary entry 25/09/1915, War Diary, No. 27 British Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/1758. 85 Keegan, The First World War, op. cit., p. 218. 157 after this our first convoy arrived and we started work. By 5.30 we had admitted 572 with only ‘A’ and ‘B’ sub-divisions to do the work as ‘C’ were mobilised and were soon sent off... In fact I can’t give any clear account of where everybody was at various times as the whole thing was sort of a long nightmare with the only thing clear being the necessity for dressing more and more people every minute.86

Hamilton’s war diary detailed the many problems and dangers of attending to the wounded during a gas attack at Loos. The following entry clearly related how multiple problems combined to delay medical evacuation. In addition to the problems experienced from the release of gas, the field ambulance were also affected by traffic congestion, heavy shelling, and the large numbers of casualties which all combined to make it impossible to attend to the needs of the wounded. In addition, it is important to note the dire affects that shelling and gas had on the animals of the field ambulance:

On Saturday 25th ‘C’ section was set off with Fredlander and Smith to establish an [advanced] dressing station near Loos. They were blocked on the road as second line transport was going up, and [they] only arrived at 3am. About 8am when they were badly shelled – gas shells. Both officers were gassed... they sent back the men at once and tried to save the transport but had some horses and mules killed and the others were un- manageable and had finally to leave the lot... Altogether we lost 8 men all believed wounded and 19 animals, Sheppard had 1500 wounded mostly walkers through his dressing station. He had only 1 NCO and 6 men to help him.87

86 Diary entry 30/09/1915, Hamilton Family history, IWM, Catalogue no. 87/33/1.

87 Diary entry 30/09/1915, ibid. 158 For the stretcher-bearers working at Loos, the release of gas pushed them to act even more swiftly to treat the affected men due to the damage the chlorine had on the men. Lieutenant Guy Matthews, of the 1/5th London Field Ambulance, observed: ‘during the 26 September 1915, I was sent with two men by the ADMS, to take my sub-division to Grenay Church to intercept any gassed men who might be coming down and afford them such treatment as soon as possible’.88 In order to rapidly treat and evacuate those gassed men, new ways of operating had to be devised. Private Walter George Cook described the heavy casualties at Loos and how he and the stretcher-bearers coped with those casualties ‘in three days... we had 4000... mainly machine gun bullets in legs and chest... all I could do with the gas cases was give them... ammonal phials – you broke them and put it between their lips that was all one could do’.89 To care for the wounded during the gas attack the stretcher-bearers themselves needed to wear a gas mask, at that stage the British used a PH Gas Mask. Private Cook related the difficulty of assisting the wounded whilst wearing the cumbersome and hot gas mask: ‘there was difficulty in doing neat clean jobs because of one’s gas mask which is tucked in here [under shirt], I think they called a PH gas mask.90

It had been accepted that transportation issues needed to be addressed, so that the wounded could be quickly evacuated away from the battlefront. The DMS 1st British Division reported additional motor ambulances were supplied and were situated at various points in order to remove the wounded. Each divisional medical service had been allocated ‘21 motor ambulances and 9 horsed wagons’91 which were to work only between the battlefront and the main dressing stations. Stretcher-bearers were to follow usual procedures by collecting the wounded from the battlefield, removing them to the RAP and then, after assessment, taking them taken further back, by either hand carry or

88 Report dated 28/09/1915, War Diary, 1/5th London Field Ambulance, op. cit. 89 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 90 ibid. 91 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Volume II, op. cit., p. 455. 159 on a wagon or motor ambulance. The plans for evacuation were expressly clear; all possible contingencies had been provided for with special preparations taken to allow for gas casualties and surgical cases. Teams of stretcher-bearers from numerous field ambulances were waiting to be moved into position and to provide relief as necessary.

However, congestion developed at the main dressing stations as stretcher- bearers cleared the battlefronts quicker than planned. Transportation failed very early on in the battle. Sergeant John Evans, RAMC, recorded in his diary: ‘memorable day. Big battle... Wounded arrived at dressing station... kept rolling in all day and after night. Constantly under shell fire... 900 cases treated Sailly’.92 The DMS 1st Division recorded: ‘at 9.30am, large numbers were reported at ADS and evacuation was necessarily slow as all available MACs were working between Advanced Bearer Posts and ADS. What was possible was being done by MACs, motor lorries and country carts lent by a French farmer’.93 By 10.30am, only four hours after the start of the Battle of Loos, the situation in the dressing stations of the 1st British Division was dire and reinforcements of bearers were called from all available field ambulances in the vicinity.94

The report of the medical arrangements of the Battle of Loos clearly showed a failure by the MACs to meet expectations. It is unclear from the Official history and the war diary whether this might be because of communication problems. However, given their earlier orders, this is the most suitable explanation. The report related: ‘[2nd field ambulance] reported that no cars of No. 8 MAC had so far reported’.95 This meant large numbers of wounded waited on their stretchers for evacuation, in turn resulting in a ‘shortage [of stretchers] reported from ADS

92 Diary entry 25/09/1915, John Q. Evans, Wellcome Library, RAMC 968. 93 ‘Report Battle of Loos’, 1st Division, IV Army Corps, War Diary No. 5 Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/1337. 94 Diary entry 25/09/1915, ibid. 95 ibid. 160 and Bearer Post in the forenoon’.96 Because of the transportation issues, the stretcher-bearers were unable to clear the next wave of wounded from the frontline RAPs as replacement stretchers failed to arrive.

A slight shortage of wheeled stretchers was evident. The arrangements had included increasing the numbers of wheeled stretchers, but as the war diary of the 5th British Ambulance advised ‘there were to be issued on the strength of 20 per division (only 16 at present in the division)’.97 Whilst this shortage of wheeled shortage existed, the stretcher-bearers were faced with physically carrying wounded for longer periods and over greater distances, leading to the problem of fatigue and strain for the stretcher-bearers. The tireless work of the stretcher-bearers at Loos pushed the men located in the ‘ADS and Bearer Posts’ to exhaustion having worked around the clock without rest.98 Private John Evans confirmed exhaustion had been a dominating feature of his time at the ADS, he recorded: ‘unable to cope well, wounded in afternoon but cleared by midnight... 560 cases Sailly’.99

By noon on 26 September, with 661 casualties remaining in the ADS of the 1st Division, swift action needed to be taken to have the wounded attended to.100 Colonel S. MacDonald, the DMS 1st Division, reported that empty motor lorries were used to carry the wounded back, which had previously been shown to be unsuitable, as they were not designed to carry stretchers and provided little or no comfort to those wounded. However, any further delay in attending to the wounded outweighed the consequences of using motor lorries.

96 ibid. 97 ibid. 98 ibid. 99 Diary entry 26/09/ 1915, John Q. Evans, op. cit. 100 ‘Report Battle of Loos’, 1st Division, IV Army Corps, op. cit. 161 Captain J. H. Jordan complimented the work done by his stretcher-bearer corporal, Corporal Heal whilst attending to the many wounded during the battle of Loos. In his official report of the medical situation at Loos Captain Jordan recalled that Corporal Heal ‘had to evacuate a man with a broken thigh whose extrication from the house in which he was in necessitated the breaking of some windows’.101 In a report to the CO of the 5th London Field Ambulance, Captain C. E. Whitehead noted the dangers posed to the stretcher-bearers on the evening of 25 September 1915:

I estimate that the number of wounded brought in by the bearers of my sub-division was 60. Most of the cases had to be carried about a mile. There was a certain amount of firing on the bearers by the enemy by shells, snipers and a machine gun which was turned on to the entrance of trench 25.102

Lieutenant Guy Matthews of the 5th London Field Ambulance, recorded how dangerous it was to carry out medical evacuation during daylight hours. The work of retrieving men from the battlefield generally had to be carried out in the cover of darkness:

The area [near Loos] was cleared of wounded by us during the night 26 - 27 September. Towards dawn on the 27th I went with Captain Watt and a special party... [cleared the] wounded of another division. Only one journey could be made to this house as it was rapidly growing daylight and hostile sharp-shooters made further visits impracticable.103

The diaries and manuscripts of stretcher-bearers confirm exhaustion wrecked their bodies and frequently their minds. Mental exhaustion exacerbated by the constant demands on the body and the sights and smells of attending to the

101 Appendix 2a, 29/09/1915, ibid. 102 Captain C. E. Whitehead, report 2/10/1915, ibid. 103 Report, 29/09/1915, War Diary, 1/5th London Field Ambulance, op. cit. 162 wounded, bloodied, dying and dead wore down a man’s spirit. Canadian stretcher-bearer H. M. ‘Tiny’ Morris wrote:

We were kept in the line for much longer periods. After one of these tough sessions – weariness from long carries through the mud, long irregular hours, in all kinds of weather, no adequate shelter when not carrying, dirty and unshaven, we would eventually be relieved. I was sure when washed and clean shaven, I would show signs of fatigue by a lined and drawn face. To my disappointment, my pocket mirror showed nothing of the sort. I looked healthy and normal in very way. Such it is to be young.104

Problems of maintaining the health of all British, Indian and Dominion Forces resulted in the revision of the training for RAMC orderlies and stretcher-bearers. By July 1915, efficient and timely cleaning of wounds had been identified as a way of reducing infection. Removal of dirty clothing, cleaning of wounds and application of sterile bandages served to address the large number of potentially fatal asepsis cases. A memorandum stated that large wounds were to be cleaned as best as possible at the front and along the chain of evacuation. This resulted in the training of medical personnel including the RMOs, medical orderlies and stretcher-bearers about how to debride and clean wounds at the RAP. 105

Additional evidence that demonstrated change had been instituted to the training program is found in the training records of the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance. When comparing the pre-war training given to the personnel of a field ambulance, to that received during 1915, it is clear that medical corps stretcher-bearers had gained more responsibility. The Canadian 1915 syllabus showed that scientific knowledge was passed on to stretcher-bearers in order to improve medical outcomes for the wounded. The training of the stretcher-

104 H. M. (Tiny) Morris, Manuscript, The Story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1, op. cit. 105 Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume II – The Western Front, op. cit., p. 316. 163 bearers of the field ambulance in 1915 concentrated on new ways of dealing with ‘hygiene of the generative system... [and] bacteria and causes of disease’106 also ‘shock, loss of consciousness and fits... [and] effects of cold, foreign bodies in the eye and ear’107 in addition to regular drill and fitness. Other techniques and knowledge passed on to the medical corps stretcher-bearers included haemorrhage, wound care, anatomy, antiseptic treatment and the care of fracture.108

Pain management such as giving a badly wounded man a, ‘half a gram by mouth’ of morphine by the regimental stretcher-bearers became problematic, and its use became strictly controlled by the RMO and medical practitioners along the chain of evacuation. Training and instruction in the way pain management should be dealt with was given to stretcher-bearers as overuse of morphine in the forward areas (and consequently along the chain of evacuation) meant:

Unquestionably the dosage of morphia in the early years of the war had been excessive: some of the wounded dosed themselves from private stores, and half a grain by the mouth was not infrequently given at the RAP; if hypodermic injection of a further dose was administered at the ADS or MDS the patient was dangerously drugged by the time of his arrival at CCS.109

This is not to infer that stretcher-bearers were responsible for primary health care, but this training gave them knowledge on how to minimise risk, prioritise patients, and to operate effectively under times of extreme stress whilst maintaining basic control of the evacuation procedures. When dealing with large

106 Order #245, 8/09/1915 ‘Syllabus of Training, No. 4 Field Ambulance, ADMS, 2nd Canadian Division, Folder 5, File 3, LAC, RG 9, Series- III-C-10, Vol. 4543. 107 Order #226, 17/08/1915, ibid. 108 It is assumed that these new ways of working were also used by the medical personnel of the other British Forces medical corps; however, a search of the records has not been able to confirm this. 109 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 284. 164 numbers of wounded, some RMOs relied on experienced stretcher-bearers to assist with the sorting of the wounded. Sorting of the lightly and badly wounded allowed those with a better chance of survival to be evacuated, moribund patients were kept at the RAP until they died where space prevailed. Evidence of the increased responsibility for stretcher-bearers comes from Walter George Cook, stretcher-bearer of the 27th British Field Ambulance. Cook confirmed: ‘the difference between the training and the actualities took some bridging because men were being killed... you had to ascertain whether a man was alive or not... if he was dead then he was no trouble’.110

None of the battles fought by the British Forces on the Western Front during 1915 would go to securing a victory. Many problems existed and negatively affected the medical services but there were many positive developments taken to improve the health of men. Improvements and regulations regarding sanitation had improved life in billets and in some way in the trenches with the introduction of divisional baths and delousing units, drinking water quality had improved, gas officers instructed and drilled men in ways of protecting themselves. Research into disease developed and hospitals were set up to prevent the spread of airborne ailments. Despite such improvements, much work remained.

This chapter has clearly demonstrated that whilst some of the issues and problems from 1914 had been addressed, there were still many other problems that remained unresolved for the medical services during 1915. Stretcher- bearers encountered greater difficulties and challenges when carrying out medical evacuation on the Western Front, such as at Loos, where these men were pushed to their limits. Long hand carries taxed all stretcher-bearers who lamented a lack of respite. Gas warfare also had a very real effect on the stretcher-bearer’s way of working, but artillery fire posed the greatest threat.

110 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 165 The following chapter examines 1916, which proved to be a very difficult time for combatants and non-combatants. External problems such as rain, cold, mud that slowed down the medical evacuation of the wounded and the personal experiences of the stretcher-bearers reflected the difficulties to be overcome. 1916, is dominated by the loss of thousands of men in No Man’s Land during the fierce fighting on the Somme battlefields, during which the medical services struggled to cope.

166 CHAPTER 5 – 1916

The year 1916, is synonymous with immense loss of life and countless wounded during the major battles of Verdun and the Somme. The medical services of the British Forces treated 1,144,497 battle and non-battle casualties.1 The authorities had addressed many problems seen in the previous years, including transportation and communication. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, many other problems faced the British Forces’ regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers. Some issues were internal problems such as supply and communications between units, most however, derived from external forces such as large numbers of wounded, shelling, the impact of enemy action and the weather. Many of the problems experienced were as a direct result of the combination of issues, the effect of which was to make evacuation of the wounded very difficult. For example, the combination of large numbers of wounded and a lack of supplies of canvas stretchers meant the bearers were unable to carry the wounded.

The Battles examined are the Battle of Mount Sorrel, 2-13 June 1916, the Battles of the Somme, 1 July – 18 November 1916 (including Beaumont Hamel, the Battle of Pozières and the fighting for Mouquet Farm and the Battle of Flers – Courcelette). In early 1916, British Forces were well below establishment. The recruitment campaigns of 1915, had failed as previous moves by Britain to maintain the numbers of voluntary recruits had slowed in late 1915. Significant changes were introduced in 1916, such as conscription and the arrival of new Allied Forces on the Western Front. The results of the British National Registration Act had shown there were many men eligible to serve and there was a growing need to ensure that all eligible men had, or would at the very least, attempt to enlist in the national armies. Britain demanded of her own citizens

1 T. J. Mitchell and Miss G. M. Smith, History of the Great War based on Official documents: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War, op. cit., p. 14. 167 and those of her Dominions, a regular supply of new recruits. The steady decline of men voluntarily enlisting began to push the matter into the public domain. An ‘equitable’ manner in which to guarantee the appropriate numbers of men for overseas service saw compulsion enacted. The Military Service Act was introduced in January 1916 in Britain and following that in some of the Dominions specific to this thesis Canada, New Zealand and Newfoundland.

To help overcome manpower shortages in the British Army, the army had begun to reassess the fitness of the men who served, the intention of the change being to select the fittest men for the combatant services and the others would serve with the non-combatants. The reassessment of a man’s fitness for service had begun in 1915 when Class ‘A’ men serving in the RAMC were ‘transferred to infantry battalions to meet demands for reinforcements to the expeditionary force. Between September and through November 1915, 8,000 men were recruited into RAMC with a medical classification of ‘B2’ class. Class ‘B1’ and ‘B2’ men were considered suitable to fill the garrison and labouring duties at the permanent base (PB), which included the Medical Corps and Army Service Corps’.2

This, it was felt, would alleviate the shortage of stretcher-bearers during peak periods. Although this appeared an obvious solution in overcoming the shortage of stretcher-bearers, this decision proved to be a false economy of manpower, which will be explored further in this chapter. Additionally, conscription had a negative impact on the make-up of the RAMC as MacPherson confirmed:

In the years... subsequent to 1915, enlistment to the RAMC was determined by the Military Service Acts... men allotted to it... were chiefly men of physical fitness lower than that required for combatant units, with

2 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military operations, France and Belgium, 1916: [Vol. I], Sir Douglas Haig's command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme, (maps and sketches compiled by A.F. Becke), Macmillan, London, 1932, p. 152. 168 the result that men of the highest category already in the Corps were gradually drafted into the field medical units: their places in the medical units on the lines of communication and at home being taken by new recruits of lower categories.3

Private Walter Cook, RAMC, recalled that the volunteers and regular members of the medical corps did not always warmly receive men conscripted into the ranks of the RAMC. Cook told how the recruitment of new personnel into the field ambulances, many of whom were conscripted men, changed the make-up and esprit de corps of the units. Cook stated: ‘we lost men ourselves... as we lost our volunteers from 1914 we had conscripted men who were sometimes conscientious objector type... the same spirit and dash which our original Scottish lads had wasn’t there’.4 By July 1916, growth in the RAMC had increased to 10,669 officers and 114,939 other ranks. 5

A further significant change to the composition of the Allied Forces on the Western Front in 1916, was the arrival in March of Australian and New Zealand Forces. There had been a regrouping of the Australians and New Zealanders following their participation in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915. The Official Australian Historian, A. G. Butler, confirmed that the Australian Forces underwent a period of renewal and change to overcome internal divisions and petty politics and to overcome external pressures. He recorded in the Official History:

The Gallipoli campaign had caused a break in the internal development of the AIF, but a break which greatly influenced the nature and direction of its subsequent progress to self-government. For better or for worse the spirit

3 MacPherson, Medical Services General History, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 139. 4 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 5 Edmonds stated that these served in ‘all theatres’ and that he could not account for the numbers attributed solely to the BEF. See Edmonds, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916: Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 94. 169 of Nationalism had entered the Australian people and directed the reorganisation of their force in all its branches and services. There could now be no question of the piecemeal absorption of any part of the AIF into the British Army.6

The NZEF also underwent change, involving developments in its administration, command and procedural changes. The change had been instigated when:

The Imperial Government in view of the large numbers of New Zealanders available, suggested the formation of a New Zealand Division; this was ultimately agreed to by the New Zealand Government in February, 1916, and the mobilisation of the Division was authorised by Corps Routine Orders on the 18th of February. Major General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.M.G. assumed command of the Division.7

The Australian and New Zealand divisions were incorporated into two new Corps. The new Corps were organised into I ANZAC, General Birdwood commanding, arrived in France in March 1916, and II ANZAC, General Godley commanding, arrived in France in April 1916. These worked with and alongside other British Forces’ personnel and included their Army Medical Services, Army Medical Corps field ambulances, including the stretcher-bearer personnel.

These changes were needed, specifically in the AAMC, after they had undergone a testing period in Egypt and in Gallipoli, which left the Corps ‘traumatised in a completely different way where it had its hands full coping with an internal crisis of its own as well as with the human debris of defeat’.8 DMS AIF, Major -General

6 Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume I – Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea, op. cit., p. 475. 7 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 141. 8 Tyquin, Little by little: a centenary history of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 162. 170 Howse, initiated new training procedures that included ‘more exact methods, which embodied also the policy of enlistment for the medical corps as a whole and not territorially for units connected with particular States. Four weeks drilling in camp was followed by six weeks in a military hospital on orderly duty, and seven on nursing duty. Training led up to voyage-duty in a transport’.9 Additionally Howse installed his ‘two-section field ambulance’10 on the Western Front that he hoped would be the way all field ambulances could work. His reasoning behind this change was that he considered these infinitely more mobile in comparison to the larger three-section ambulance. However, after much pressure from the War Office, he was forced to disband the use of this system and revert to the regular field ambulance. In an interesting development near the end of the war, this type of field ambulance would be introduced across the British Forces present on the Western Front as will be explained in a later chapter of this thesis.

The NZMC experienced a shortage of manpower in early 1916, and new recruits were mobilised to serve in the NZMC by March 1916. To ensure these men were better trained, a more formal training program for its personnel was developed, which A. D. Carbery, the Official Historian of the New Zealand Medical Service, recorded as having worked very well:

A training camp for Ambulance Details and NZMC generally, had been established at Awapuni Race Course near Palmerston North... The success of this camp was assured from the start, when Major J Hardie Neil, NZMC, was appointed Assistant Camp Commandant and became responsible for the training of all NZMC details... The need for a depot had been long felt by NZMC officers in New Zealand, its realisation during the War and its

9 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 141. 10 Michael Tyquin, Neville Howse: Australia’s First Victoria Cross Winner, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1999, p. 81. 171 undoubted efficiency was a source of considerable gratification to officers of the Corps.11

These changes to training of the Australian and New Zealanders went some way to ensure that there was a homogenous level of knowledge and skills. For the Australians and New Zealanders however, the scale of modern warfare as fought on the Western Front was very different to that they had encountered in the Dardanelles. On the Western Front, large-scale warfare meant huge numbers of wounded, often overwhelming the modern medical corps. For stretcher-bearers, the numbers of wounded needing attention physically and mentally pushed them to their limits as was experienced by the Canadians at Mount Sorrel.

During the Battle of Mount Sorrel, 2-13 June 1916, three Canadian divisions launched a counter-attack at Mount Sorrel, after experiencing an ‘artillery barrage of unprecedented intensity’12 by the Germans. The fighting against the Germans was designed to prevent them ‘breaking into the Ypres Salient and possibly cutting off British Forces further to the North’.13 At 8.30am on the 2 June 1916, the Germans bombarded the Canadian positions. There was a large number of wounded on this day with ‘few survivors’.14 In total over the thirteen days of fighting (attack and counterattack), the Canadian suffered 8,500 casualties which included 1,000 dead.15 There was a litany of issues, which contributed to stretcher-bearers being unable to evacuate the wounded in a timely manner; generally, the greatest problems occurred when two or more issues combined.

11 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 143. 12 Andrew Iarocci, The Canadians in the Ypres Salient, Leaflet for the Canadian Battlefields Foundation, www.cbf-fccb.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Ypres-E.pdf 13 This battle is noteworthy for the use of Flammenwerfer (flamethrower) by the German 121st Regiment. Flamethrowers were designed to frighten the enemy and were used to good effect. Cook, At The Sharp End: Canadians fighting the Great War: 1914-1916, op. cit., p. 358. 14 ‘A temporary setback – The fighting for Mount Sorrel and Observatory Ridge in June 1916’, Folder 1, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services, Miscellaneous, op. cit. 15 ibid. 172 During the battle, a combination of large numbers of wounded and the impact of shelling and machine gun fire meant that medical evacuation of the wounded was either not possible or suffered from delays. Compounding this was congestion at the ADSs and the CCSs, which prevented speedy clearance of the wounded. The fighting was particularly fierce with machine gun, high explosive and shrapnel shells causing most of the wounds and deaths. The death and destruction of the Canadians over the first three days of fighting 2-6 June 1916, was overwhelming; to date, there is no definitive number of wounded attended to during the period. It is estimated that the field ambulances handled 2,570 casualties over the three days. So heavy was the shelling that the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade recorded many of their personnel simply could not be accounted for as ‘men were buried by the terrific bombardment’.16 It is also estimated that 30 men of the 3rd Canadian Division Field Ambulances were killed or wounded.17 It remains unknown how many regimental stretcher-bearers were killed or wounded.

With many regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers having been caught out in No Man’s Land or at the RAPs, and with the problem of huge numbers of wounded needing evacuation, volunteers were called to help. The number of regimental stretcher-bearers required to clear the front trenches of Canadian wounded impelled Major Leask, CAMC, 10th Canadian Field Ambulance, 3rd Canadian Division, to secure 200 men who were detailed from the 7th Infantry Brigade ‘to assist us bringing in the wounded’.18 Canadian stretcher-bearer, Private William Shaw Antliff, volunteered to go forward to relieve. In a letter home, Antliff described the circumstances: ‘during the last couple of days we have been sending 20 men a day up the line... everyone was told to fall in for a

16 Major John Alexander Cooper, History of Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1915- 1919, Privately Published, London, Undated, p. 12. 17 ibid. 18 Memo dated 4/6/1916, Major Leask to O/C, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance. Folder 2, File 6, LAC, RG9,III, C10, Vol 4559. 173 muster parade. They wanted 120 of us to go up the line during the night and give the other ambulances a hand out... I volunteered’.19

At 11.45am on 2 June 1916, the 8th and 9th Canadian Field Ambulances, 2nd Canadian Division were warned to be prepared to assist with large numbers of wounded. This was planned in order to be able to better control the flow of wounded and to provide swift medical treatment. These field ambulances set up additional dressing stations to assist with collecting, dressing and sorting the wounded of the 3rd Canadian Division. Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Gunn recorded:

Stretcher–bearers of the ambulance were ordered to stand to and prepare for any emergency, while a later message ordered them to proceed at once to Poperinghe and report to the officer commanding [10th Canadian Field Ambulance]... these stretcher-bearers went forward on the night of the of June 2nd and from Poperinghe were sent to Brandhoek, where the Main Dressing Station was operated.20

However, so many wounded had flowed into the ADS of the already over- stretched 3rd Canadian Division, that the decision was taken to temporarily erect a temporary Main Dressing Station (MDS) to deal with the serious cases. This had to be done because it was impossible to transfer those seriously wounded by road during the heavy barrage. Transport that had been organised to cope with large numbers of wounded broke down due to congestion and shelling of the roads and many of the motor ambulance drivers were killed which ‘seriously retarded the evacuation of the wounded’.21 Additionally, because of the heavy fighting, it was impossible to communicate to the brigades, which dressing station and line of evacuation the wounded should take. The failure of messages such as the new line of evacuation might be considered an internal breakdown,

19 Letter dated 3/06/1916, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, CWM, Textual Records, Ref. 58a 1 240.3. 20 Memo dated 4/6/1916, Major Leask to O/C, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, op. cit. 21 ibid. 174 however the circumstances were exceptional and blame cannot be apportioned to any one Officer of the Brigades or Field Ambulances.

Danger from the high explosive and shrapnel shells caused numerous problems for the CAMC at Mount Sorrel. Those stretcher-bearers who were at the battlefront could not return with their wounded because of the constant machine gun fire and shelling. This caused a bottleneck at the RAPs and meant stretcher-bearers waiting at collecting posts were sent forward to assist. The stretcher-bearers of the 9th Canadian Field Ambulance reported that they had a carry of about 1200 metres, over ground which was constantly under attack.22 This put them and their casualties at great risk. The danger the stretcher-bearers were exposed to exacted a heavy toll on the bearer squads, as an official report of the battle demonstrated:

Private Link of the Canadian medical corps was carrying a wounded man to safety when... a shell blew him [the patient] off his back... Corporal Martin was found... in a kneeling position beside a patient, evidently he was dressing his wounds, when death occurred from a shrapnel wound in the side. The body of Private Brady [the wounded man] was never found.23

Canadian MO Captain Harold McGill, recorded how perilous it was to attempt any rescue of the wounded during the constant barrage at Mount Sorrel. McGill described German machine gun fire as coming in ‘sheets’24 and wrote any attempt to stand upright during a machine gun volley as a ‘short route to suicide’.25 The Canadian regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers were unable to reach the wounded without putting themselves at risk; additionally,

22 ‘A temporary setback – The fighting for Mount Sorrel and Observatory Ridge in June 1916’, Adami Papers (Misc), Director Medical Services, LAC, RG-9, III, B2, Vol. 3745. 23 ibid. 24 Whilst at Hill 62 (Sanctuary Wood) – part of the Battle of Mount Sorrel. Harold W. McGill & Marjorie Norris, Medicine and duty: the World War I memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, Medical Officer, 31st Battalion, C.E.F., University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 2007, p. 177. 25 ibid. 175 those lightly wounded who were able to crawl or walk could not reach the RAPs and had to remain in No Man’s Land. Due to the heavy machine gun fire, many of the wounded lay unattended to, out in the open for 48 to 72 hours, as they could not be cleared.26

As the collection of wounded was unable to be carried out over open ground, the bearers were forced to move what wounded they could through the trench system. Once again, the shelling had made the trenches unstable, subject to collapse; they were also filled with the dead and dying, with equipment and troops. The narrowness of the trenches posed many problems for these stretcher-bearers as Private William Shaw Antliff recalled:

We heard from the others their experiences up the line. They were right in the front line trenches climbing over dead bodies and a lot of them were so sickened by it they were completely fagged... after getting our patient at the end of the communication trench, we set back... Harry and I worked on one stretcher and we had some job. Our first case was pretty badly wounded and at every bump, he groaned terribly... the result was very sore shoulders and arms for us.27

The Official History by Macphail afforded only half a page on the medical experience of Mount Sorrel, his language is at best restrained. He himself did not offer an opinion, but instead chose to quote senior officers of the Army and the Canadian Medical Service.28 Conversely, in the DMS Canada Papers, Adami files, the reports are not as restrained. Macphail made no mention of the internal problem of supply and re-supply within the 3rd Canadian Division when the field ambulances of the division failed to receive their supplies from the Divisional Quartermaster. These meant the field ambulances and stretcher-bearers did not

26 ibid. 27 Letter dated 8/06/1916, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, op. cit. 28 Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service, op. cit., p. 61. 176 have enough canvas stretchers in which to carry the wounded. They attempted to overcome the lack of stretchers by improvising with blankets, of which there were too few and bathmats that ‘caused much suffering and necessitated double the men required to carry’.29

The stretcher-bearers, it has been acknowledged, were faced with a most dangerous task. Captain Wade, CAMC, recognised the work of the Canadian stretcher-bearers when he wrote: ‘I cannot speak too highly of all NCOs and SBs of ‘B’ section who were present and assisted in evacuating our patients through what has been reported as the most terrific and intense hail of lead and iron which the British front has ever known’.30 While there were many battles in 1916 that had a high casualty rate, such as Mount Sorrel, the military history of 1916 is dominated by the Somme, which Private James Brady, RAMC, 43rd British Field Ambulance, recalled as a period whereby: ‘it was a test for supermen and we were NOT supermen’.31

The Somme, officially known as the ‘Operations on the Somme’, was a series of twelve battles, three attacks and numerous other ‘tactical incidents’32 made by British Forces during the period 1 July 1916, through to 18 November 1916.33 It utilised 96 British, 70 French and 147 German divisions.34 It has become synonymous with the very worst times of the British Forces’ Great War experience, ranking along with the experience and reputation of that of Passchendaele in 1917. In examining the primary and secondary accounts of the stretcher-bearers who served on the Somme, it is apparent the battle experience had a distinct change from those previously encountered. For stretcher-bearers,

29 A temporary setback – The fighting for Mount Sorrel and Observatory Ridge in June 1916’, op. cit. 30 ibid. 31 Private Papers of J. Brady, RAMC, op. cit., p. 54. 32 Captain E. A. James, A record of the battles and engagements of the British Armies in France and Flanders, 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 10. 33 ibid. 34 R. Foley ‘Learning War's Lessons: The German Army on the Somme, 1916’, Journal of Military History, Vol.75, Nr.2 (April 2011), pp. 471-504. 177 the unprecedented numbers of wounded totally overwhelmed their ability to carry out medical evacuation.

The Somme was definitely a period of war where combatant and non-combatant were driven to the point of exhaustion; where fear dominated their daily experience, and where men, mired in the filth and mud of the terrain, struggled to cope. In the 24-hour period of the opening day of the Battle of the Somme ‘enormous’35 numbers of dead and wounded created a hellish experience that these non-combatants never forgot. In an interview British stretcher-bearer Frederick Charles Goodman recalled his experience of the Somme as, ‘too awful to describe’36 even when recalling at the age of ninety. Goodman fraught with emotion during the interview was very reluctant to discuss the Somme but is pushed by the interviewer to do so. The interview is almost painful to listen to however; the very fact that after such a long period the experience of the Somme still disturbed this elderly man is a powerful testament to the horrors of war. While care must be taken with oral histories they cannot be disregarded as Canadian historian, Tim Cook wrote about the use of the oral history to a historian as being ‘an invaluable resource for any historian... [as they] provide searing accounts of men at war.’37

Planning for the Somme began at the Chantilly Conference, 6 - 8 December 1915. The primary aim was to push the Germans to their limits on all fronts (East, West, and Italian), which the Germans would be forced to defend. The plan stated that the French were to carry out the larger offensives against the Germans and for the British Forces would carry out supporting attacks. However, the original plans did not come to fruition. After a continued assault on the French city of Verdun, the French were in no position to carry out the planned

35 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 51. 36 Frederick Charles Goodman, Oral history, IWM, Catalogue no. 9398. 37 Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, op. cit., p. 650. 178 large-scale attack, as historian Peter Hart confirmed: ‘the sheer size of the commitment demanded by the Battle of Verdun soon derailed any thoughts of the French Army making the major contribution to the planned offensive on the Somme’.38

It is commonly assumed the British role at the Somme was to relieve the pressure experienced by the French at Verdun, where the French ‘had suffered almost two million casualties since the war began’.39 This assumption is incorrect, the French though under great pressure were able to maintain their front against the Germans but did come away with a decisive defeat.40

Edmonds described the large numbers of casualties during the Somme 1916 as:‘hitherto unparalleled’.41 On the opening day of the Somme Battles, 1 July 1916, around 60,000 British men became casualties, with approximately 20,000 dead. On this day alone, 23,689 wounded men were admitted to the British Forces field ambulances.42 Sixty percent of the casualties on the first day came about from machine gun wounds.43 Some of these men were walking wounded; the majority however, were stretcher cases. In the lead- up to the battle of the Somme, extensive planning and preparations were made for the medical care and treatment of wounded men during the battle.

In anticipation of large numbers of wounded, Director-General of the Medical Services (DGMS), Sir Arthur Sloggett, adopted a sophisticated approach for

38 Peter Hart, The Great War, Profile Books Ltd., London, 2013, p. 209. 39 Department of Veterans Affairs, Fromelles and the Somme: Australians on the Western Front – 1916, Canberra 2006, p. 3. 40 Hew Strachan, The First World War: a new illustrated history, Simon and Schuster. London. 2003, p. 185. 41 Edmonds, Military operations, France and Belgium, 1916: Vol.1, Sir Douglas Haig's command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme, op. cit., p. 91. 42 MacPherson, Medical Services during the Operations on the Western Front 1916, 1917, 1918; in Italy; Egypt and Palestine, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 51. 43 Richard Holmes, The Western Front, BBC Worldwide Ltd., London, 1999, p. 127. 179 medical treatment during the planning of the Somme Offensive. Working in conjunction with his Deputy, MacPherson, and the Directors General of the Dominion Medical Corps, the plans, based on prior experience, utilized an innovative programme of changes and restructure. Some of these changes included subtle but effective use of medical corps stretcher-bearers forward of the RAPs. British stretcher-bearer George Cook confirmed this marked and significant change in protocol. Cook explained at Delville Wood in September 1916, the medical corps stretcher-bearers worked well forward of their usual positions and that the regimental and medical corps bearers worked in unison. This is a further example of when pre-war training and procedures were altered in order to take control of the many problems facing the medical corps and their stretcher-bearers. Cook recalled: ‘when we went in to get the wounded we were under constant fire from the enemy, it was a terrible time... we were working as a whole because of the immense casualties’.44

A stretcher-bearer of the 6th London Field Ambulance explained how he helped carry three men at the same time during the British attack on Delville Wood (15 July – 3 September 1916): ‘we were four to a stretcher... and my squad had three cases – one on the stretcher, one carried pick-a-back, and a third who limped on the fourth bearer’s shoulder’.45 Richard Capell, MM, a stretcher-bearer with the 6th London Field Ambulance described the overwhelming numbers of wounded on the Somme. He wrote: ‘it is to be remember that we humble folk were seeing the unrelievedly tragic side of things – a succession of wounded so countless [as it seemed] that later on it was a surprise to find there still were survivors in the Division!’46

44 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 45 6th London Field Ambulance (47th London Division) History, notes and autobiographical accounts re: activities during the First World War, Wellcome, RAMC 80120/5, p. 5. 46 ‘Stretcher-bearing on the Somme’ contributed by Richard Capell, 6th London Field Ambulance (47th London Division) History, notes and autobiographical accounts re activities during the First World War, Wellcome, RAMC 801/20/5. 180 Further changes included an increase in regimental stretcher-bearers, where the number of regimental stretcher-bearers per battalion was doubled from 16 to 32; additionally, the plan employed medical corps personnel at rest, to serve as stretcher-bearers in peak periods. This change acknowledged more stretcher- bearers meant quicker evacuation of the wounded. It was recognised that in order to maintain good morale, swift evacuation of the wounded was a priority. There was, of course, a pragmatic understanding (by the authorities and the men) that the emphasis on swift evacuation also improved the chances of a wounded man recovering faster, allowing him to return to service at the battlefront sooner. However, the reality was not quite as straightforward. On the Somme, it was found that some of these additional regimental stretcher-bearers were placed at unnecessary risk by being too close to the battlefront, waiting in groups to be of use, whilst under constant fire.

Frequently there was miscommunication regarding the numbers of wounded needing clearance, which meant teams of relief stretcher-bearers were sent to relay points with little work to do. To counter this problem of bearer groups waiting around in exposed locations, ‘it became a rule, therefore to retain reserve bearers at the RAP until it was definitely ascertained that they were required’.47 Other beneficial changes included clearer lines of evacuation for walking wounded, sorting of the badly wounded, greater number of bearer relay posts and flexibility of staffing in the ADS.

Additional bearer relay posts were formed as it was determined that the hand carry was too long, being greater than ‘1,000 yards [~ 914 m]’48, and it was also recognised that there were times when the carry for the stretcher-bearers was just too difficult or dangerous, such as times of bad weather conditions or over poor terrain. The number of stretcher-bearers at each relay post depended on

47 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. II, , op. cit., p . 19. 48 ibid., p . 25. 181 circumstances, with the numbers usually ranging between sixteen and twenty- four bearers, and these were reinforced every twelve hours when the workload was heavy.49 Additional collecting posts were also put into place along the lines of evacuation. These allowed stretcher-bearers to transfer the wounded from the hand carry to a wheeled convenience such as a wheeled stretcher, a trolley or truck. The walking wounded were always directed to the collecting posts after having been seen at the RAP. Stretcher-bearers worked at the collecting posts to help with the loading of wagons and trucks and pushing of the wheeled stretchers.

The plans also directed that sorting of wounded men, particularly those who required immediate assistance, such as those with abdominal or head wounds, were transported immediately for specialised treatment and bypassed the previous double handling at the ADS and CCS. The placement of Aid Stations, a type of first aid kit into cutouts in the walls of trenches, replaced the larger and heavier medical pannier, which had to be carried by the stretcher-bearers. This simple change proved to be a great help to the stretcher-bearers.50 British stretcher-bearer, Private Cook, recalled that on the Somme these aid stations went some way to unburden the stretcher-bearers’ load. Cook recalled: ‘the medical pannier... [which usually] had to be carried up to the line to where the troops were, later [turned into] field Aid Stations. These were made into dugouts and life was very much easier to deal with wounded men’.51 Private Cook also re- counted that ‘a static dressing station [was devised] so that one unit handed over to another everything they needed... [that] was a very good moment’.52 These changes in procedures lessened the time it took to set up and helped to ensure that medical care was as good as possible given the circumstances. Despite these substantial changes and preparations, nobody could have prepared the units adequately for what was to eventuate.

49 ibid. 50 It is unclear if these were developed across the whole of the Western Front. 51 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 52 ibid. 182 The heavy workload and high casualty rate amongst the British Forces’ medical units during the period on the Somme was acknowledged by British C-I-C., Sir Douglas Haig:

The losses entailed by the constant fighting threw a specially heavy strain on the Medical Services. This has been met with the greatest zeal and efficiency. The gallantry and devotion with which officers and men of the Regimental Medical Service and Field Ambulances have discharged their duties is shown by the large number of the RAMC and Medical Corps of the Dominions who have fallen in the field.53

5.1 - Table of casualties of the British Forces Medical Corps for the period July to November 1916 on the Somme.54

Killed Wounded Missing

Officers 52 188 5

Other Ranks 406 2,107 38

Total 458 2,295 43

On the Somme, many brigades were decimated by high casualty rates. The Newfoundland Regiment was practically wiped out at Beaumont Hamel on 1 July 1916. The Newfoundland Regiment had been attached to the 88th British Infantry Brigade, 29th British Division on the Somme. The plan to capture Beaumont Hamel involved battalions of the ‘88th Brigade [who] under pre-arranged orders

53 General Headquarters, Sir Douglas Haig's 2nd Despatch (Somme), 23 December 1916, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/haigsommedespatch.htm 54 MacPherson, Medical Services during the Operations on the Western Front 1916, 1917, 1918; in Italy; Egypt and Palestine. Vol. III, op. cit., p. 52. 183 were to move forward at 8.40 to attack the third line system’.55 However, they were delayed, and did not move until 9.15 due to the first wave who failed to reach their objective. Having finally been given the order to move, the Newfoundlanders moved off across open land without sufficient fire cover. They were, as the war diary told ‘mown down in heaps’56 and subjected to a barrage of artillery all through the day and into the night. The unwounded of the Newfoundland Regiment finally reached their own line after having ‘crawl[ed] back... where some 68 had answered their names in addition to stretcher- bearers and H.Q. runners’.57 The Newfoundlanders did not have their own field ambulance, although as previously explained they did take with them some members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, medical care was afforded to them by the 1/1st South Midland Field Ambulance.

The large numbers of wounded at Beaumont Hamel placed a great strain on the stretcher-bearers of the field ambulances. The tent sub-division of the 1/1st South Midland Field Ambulance under the command of Major H F W Boeddicker recorded: ‘about 500 cases received medical attention before being sent to hospital’.58 By 12.45pm on that day the stretcher-bearers of the 1/1st South Midland Field Ambulance worked hard to clear the ‘congested’59 trenches of wounded, taking care to deal with ‘more serious class of cases [that]... required careful handling’.60

So large were the numbers of wounded, that the Worcestershire Regiment of the 29th British Division had expected to attack at 12.30pm, however this was delayed twice as they were ‘unable to get to their position at 12.30 [due to] the

55 Diary entry 1/07/1916, War Diary, Newfoundland Regiment Diary, The Rooms, MG9-1.03.018 56 ibid. 57 ibid. 58 ibid. 59 Report to DMS 29th Division, 1/07/1916, War Diary, 1/1st South Midland Field Ambulance TNA, WO 95/2752/1/1. 60 ibid. 184 number of wounded blocking the trenches’.61 The war diary of the 29th British Division clearly showed that large numbers of wounded was reported to Corps HQ, who subsequently delayed any further attacks by the Division. Many of those wounded at Beaumont Hamel lay in No Man’s Land for more than 24 hours before help could be given to them, such was the intensity of the fighting. Stretcher-bearers were simply unable to make any move towards helping retrieve the wounded as the war diary of the 29th Division recorded at 2:15pm on 2 July 1916, some 33 hours after the battle commenced:

North of Beaumont Hamel a party of 40 Germans came out of their trenches under a Red Cross flag to collect our wounded; our stretcher- bearers were also out in no man’s land in this sector at the same time. Many dead and wounded still lie out in no man’s land.62

The medical units present at Beaumont Hamel also suffered senior personnel casualties including Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Howkins and Captain H. P. Thomason of the 1/1st South Midland Field Ambulance who ‘were wounded by German shrapnel whilst in charge of the stretcher squads who were working in the trenches’.63 Newfoundlander regimental stretcher-bearer, Private Stewart Dewling, was awarded the Military Medal for bravery on 1 July 1916, when he ‘brought in 6 wounded men under machine gun fire’.64

The Australian troops and stretcher-bearers on the Somme suffered the same type of problems when attempting to evacuate the wounded during the Battle of Pozières. Huge casualties overwhelmed the medical services and the stretcher- bearers working in the Australian held sector. The Official History for the Australian Medical Services confirms that of the Australian Forces that went into battle over the period 23 July to 12 August 1916, 33% of those would become

61 ibid. 62 ibid. 63 Diary entry 2/07/1916, ibid. 64 ‘Particulars of citations of decorations awarded members of the RNR, WW1’, op. cit. 185 casualties.65 In total, over the entire Pozières campaign, more than 23,000 Australian men became casualties.66

The Battle of Pozières, undertaken by divisions of III British Corps and Reserve Army, I Anzac Corps (1st, 2nd, 4th Australian Division) began on 23 July and ceased on 3 September 1916. The battle included the capture of the town of Pozières and a forward movement along the ridge towards the fortifications at Thiepval. The medical services of the British and Australian Divisions had considered in their planning the best way to carry out evacuation of the wounded. The war diary of DDMS I Anzac Corps recorded its frustration at the reluctance of the British to re-consider their plans within the area. On 19 July 1916, at a combined British/Australian meeting, it was acknowledged that the Australians would not receive assistance from the British medical services within the same area. The meeting also conferred that the line of evacuation for the Australians would be problematic due to the size and line of the front to be taken. The Australian DDMS clearly demonstrated an awareness of the difficulties to be faced by the AAMC, and acknowledged they had few options to improve the line of evacuation and were forced to, ‘do what they could’.67

One of the major problems along the line of the evacuation was the placement of the divisional ADS, which, according to Butler, was exceptional. It was stressed that the line of evacuation in normal circumstances should flow backwards in order for the sick and wounded to move through the various stages and specifically for the work of the stretcher-bearers, through the collecting and evacuating zones. The line of evacuation became, for the Australians,

65 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918 Vol. II, op. cit., p. 53. 66 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of the War 1914-1918: Volume III – The Australian Imperial Force in France: 1916, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p. 862. 67 Diary entry 19/07/1916, War Diary, DDMS, I ANZAC Corps, AWM, AWM4/26/15/6. 186 malformed, squeezed into a long and thin ‘single strand’68, contrary to doctrine. Additional problems for evacuation in the Australian sector came about with the Albert-Baupaume Road, which ran diagonally across their front and was heavily exposed and unusable for medical clearance.

In order to overcome anticipated issues the decision was made by the Australians that a new way of thinking about the line of evacuation was necessary. The narrowness of the area that the Australians occupied signalled a significant change in protocol that ultimately improved medical care in that area. It was determined that the usual practice of changing the administration of the medical services each time an infantry division was brought in or out of the line was a waste of time and resources. The usual protocol for handover of the field ambulances meant changing all manner of equipment and record keeping. The new mode of operating in the Australian sector saw the ADMS of the Australian division taking control of ‘all clearance’69 of the wounded. This change in operations in the sector helped manage control of evacuation of Australian wounded.

The Australians also followed the new practice instituted by the RAMC of allowing medical corps stretcher-bearers to work in the forward areas in front of the RAPs to assist the regimental stretcher-bearers. Doctrine had previously considered the forward areas out of bounds for medical corps stretcher-bearers, however it was apparent that as a brigade advanced, the RAPs and the RMO were often left behind and the regimental bearers were unable to keep up. Evidence showed that this had been a serious problem for the RAMC in 1914 and this new way of working was meant to overcome any of these issues. However, as well planned and thought through as these changes were, other problems still faced the stretcher-bearers, slowing their work.

68 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 53. 69 ibid., p. 67. 187 During the battle, the Australian stretcher-bearers were hampered by the large numbers of Australians waiting in reserve in preparation to join the attack. This forced the line of evacuation to slow, as wagons, cars and trucks had to make way for those moving forward. It delayed the work of the stretcher-bearers, as they were unable to offload their wounded when no ambulance wagons arrived at the arranged collecting points. The large numbers of wounded which needed medical evacuation pushed the stretcher-bearers to their physical limits. For example, during the period 19 - 26 July 1916, at Pozières, 4,411 Australian wounded required evacuation whilst subject to severe shelling, bombing and gas attack. AAMC stretcher-bearer, Private Frederick Brown, described seeing exhausted Australian stretcher-bearers at Pozières taking a few minutes to rest at ‘Casualty Corner’ after a long carry. Frederick recorded:

A number of men lying down in the shelter of the bank looked mightily like casualties. I had never seen a dead man in my life, but these men looked very white. Just as I had decided they must be dead, one of them moved, and I changed my mind, deciding that they must be weary stretcher- bearers - as we might be shortly [if we were still alive].70

The Australian regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers who worked in the Pozières sector recalled their time there as being particularly hazardous, due to artillery bombardment. Private Leonard Bryant, of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance, made frequent diary entries of his wartime experience. The diary is very useful in understanding the nature of the Australian experience. His entries, when with the field ambulance at Pozières, clearly demonstrated the difficulties experienced and how very dangerous the sector was for the stretcher-bearers:

I was sent... to check the No.2 station at the Chalk Pit, the track was strewn with both German and our own dead and [who] could not be buried on account of incessant artillery barrages from Fritz. While carrying the wounded back we were continually shelled having many narrow escapes...

70 Handwritten manuscript, Frederick E. Brown, AWM, MSS1360, p. 6. 188 thousands of shells dropping on our side daily, two bearers badly hit while standing outside the dugout dressing a wounded man.71

A common thread in the writing of the Australian men, who served as stretcher- bearers at Pozières, is the dangers posed in a small sector, named Sausage Valley, a supply road at Pozières. In the Official Australian History, Bean related that in some areas of this sector only one man at a time could pass along the roads so heavy was the fighting.72 The RMO of the 2nd Australian Battalion, Captain Henderson, AAMC, recorded just how dangerous it was to work as a stretcher-bearer in that sector. Henderson described the danger of working at an aid post in the sector: ‘our dugout seems right in the barrage line, for shells are falling thick and fast all round this place. Stretcher-bearers have not returned in numbers sufficient to clear [the wounded]’.73

Private Septimus Elmore, AAMC, MM and Bar, recorded his experience as a stretcher-bearer during the Great War in his manuscript ‘No Ordinary Soldier’. Written later in life it, affords a clear understanding of day to day life in and out of the trenches. In the following excerpt, Elmore related how quickly stretcher- bearers could become lost as they worked in the dark. It also gives an insight into the fears of these men. Describing his experience at Sausage Valley on 5 August 1916, Elmore recorded:

I am in the lead of the stretcher-bearers and push on without looking back until we are a considerable distance beyond the ruins of Pozières. On turning around I find that there are only three of us the other seventeen with the Lance Corporal in charge being nowhere in sight… we are afraid that if we proceed further we might get into German territory. It is no place to linger long, so we retrace our steps and join up with our main party. So

71 Diary entry 25/07/1916, Leonard Clyde Bryant, AWM, PR00142. 72 Bean, The Official History of the War 1914-1918: Volume III, op. cit., p. 862. 73 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 58. 189 we again run the gauntlet and later… rejoin our comrades… it is one of the most miserable nights I have ever experienced, for when we are not carrying we are crowded into an old German dugout permeated with the smell of the dead.74

Private Arthur Adams of the 13th Australian Field Ambulance expressed similar concerns of the problems of trying to collect and evacuate the wounded in the sector. He wrote of being overworked and in a very dangerous position on the night of 25 July 1916: ‘keep going all day and only get about 2 hrs sleep and on again all night. Simply hell. Bob of my squad hit in head. Steel helmet saved his life. Some of the 5th field ambulance come [sic] to help as a lot of their men got hit’.75 Private Adams suffered a compound fracture of his thigh and died as a result of his wounds on 9 August 1916, after having made his last diary entry ‘quieter day, tho some awful cases come through’.76

Private Frank Shoobridge of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance recorded his Great War experience in two small diaries. These diaries also gave an excellent and sustained account of his work in the field ambulance and as a stretcher- bearer at Pozières. Shoobridge, like many of his AAMC comrades, was subjected to intense shelling whilst carrying out medical evacuation of the wounded. Here he described how his luck in ‘running the gauntlet’ ran out on 23 July 1916:

Wounded started coming in faster than we could get them away and the dug outs being full we had to put them out in the open where many of them got wounded again after we had dressed them we were running three to a stretcher... We picked up many men who had been wounded and gassed on the way to the trenches. We were within 100 yards [~91 m] of the aid post on our 5th trip having got through safely 10 times when a

74 Septimus Elmore, MM and Bar, 1916 and 1917. Entry 05/08/1916, ‘No Ordinary Soldier’, Septimus Elmore, AWM, MSS1825. 75 Diary entry 25/07/1916, Arthur James Adams, AWM, 1DRL/0004. 76 Diary entry 8/08/1916, ibid. 190 *** shrapnel burst right above us. Stredwick who was carrying in front was hit through the thigh and the head. Doonan was hit in the head and I got a bit in the knee and splinters in the face. Doonan went on and sent out fresh bearers to bring the patient in’.77

At Pozières, Private Septimus Elmore also related the difficulty of carrying the wounded over the heavily shelled ground, craters littered the landscape, it was almost impossible to maintain one’s footing and additionally forced the stretcher-bearers to weave in an out around them. Elmore explained the conditions: ‘here the ground is indescribably churned up, pitted so thickly with shell craters that there is only a yard or so between the rims of each, in some places… we drop about half our bearers about half-way as relay bearers… [we] have some ‘warm’ carries’.78

Private Frederick Brown recounted an unusual experience whilst stretcher bearing on the Somme. In his manuscript, he offers an ironic description of the challenges of working whilst under fire. The use of black humour by men was common and is a tool that deflected fear and the horrible reality of warfare:

At the end of the week we were ordered up into the thick of things again [Pozières] and this time I had a taste of stretcher-bearing under fire, 12 hours on and 12 off... One member of our stretcher squad got a slight wound and was replaced by another man who had never been in shellfire before. As he and I were carrying a man, he in front and I behind, a shell screamed and burst about 50 yards [~45 m] away. He ducked but I being already a veteran, simply remarked ‘it’s all right, you never hear the one that gets you.79

77 Diary entry 23/07/1916, Frank Sydney Shoobridge, AWM, PRO0626. 78 Entry 27/07/1916 ‘No Ordinary Soldier’, Septimus Elmore, op. cit. 79 ‘Private Brown: An Autobiography’, AWM, PRO1157, p. 12. 191 In a description of shelling at Pozières, an Australian Veterans Affairs publication recorded how men were blown up by a direct hit of a shell; some men were buried and died by the earth dislodged by shells. The publication recounted the following experience:

It was hard to reach the wounded and many daring stretcher-bearers died during attempts. In one case, a tough 44 year old former bushman, Private E ‘Darkie’ Jenkins, worked with the wounded with great tenderness, carrying them to cover, erecting shelter, sharing water, and trying to lift their spirits. He did this until he was blown to pieces by a shell.80

Private Jenkins was Edward Jenkins, a separated man with four children, who enlisted in New South Wales in June 1915. Jenkins was allotted to the 3rd Battalion, AIF. His service record holds the notification of his death, with the date of death given as some time between the 22-27 July 1916. He had been serving as a stretcher-bearer for the unit when he was killed by the shell. Sadly, his file also recorded that the Imperial War Graves Commission could not locate the site of Private Jenkins grave in 1924, even though it is recorded that Jenkins was ‘buried on 10/10/17, close to road from Contalmaison to Pozières, just S.E. Pozières, 3 ¾ miles [~6 km] N.E from Albert’. This area was very heavily shelled over the months of the battle, as Australian stretcher-bearer Leonard Clyde Bryant, MM explained. Bryant recorded in his diary:

Three of my mates who proceeded back from Contalmaison, previously thinking they were much safer, were blown to pieces [these men] being Stan Thompson, Rose and Jack Simms, Tomo and Jack Simms were dug out and again buried. Rose has not been found up to date.81

80 Department of Veterans Affairs, Fromelles and the Somme: Australians on the Western Front – 1916, op. cit., p. 7; Service record, Edward Jenkins, NAA, B2455, Barcode 7372341. 81 Diary entry 25/07/1916, Leonard Clyde Bryant, op. cit. 192 In an effort to overcome the problem of stretcher-bearers being shot at by snipers, it became common practice for bearer squads to use the white flag when collecting the wounded. The white flag denoted an informal truce, so that wounded and dead might be collected and removed from the battlefield. Kenneth Cunningham explained whilst at Pozières ‘we were within sight of the German observers and one of us who was not having his turn in carrying the stretcher would carry a white flag. This custom has been in use for some time now in this part of the line [so I hear) and the snipers on both sides do not fire at these stretcher-bearers’.82

The problems and associated dangers of German activity in areas that the stretcher-bearers worked, is demonstrated with the capture of Australian stretcher-bearers at Mouquet Farm, part of the Battle of Pozières. Fifteen Australian stretcher-bearers of the 13th Australian Field Ambulance and five regimental bearers had been following a Belgian guide through the complicated trench system at Mouquet Farm on 31 August 1916, when they were captured by German Forces and taken as prisoners of war.83 The Geneva Convention 1906 expressly prohibited stretcher-bearers being held captive, as Article 9 explained: ‘personnel charged exclusively with the removal, transportation, and treatment of the sick and wounded... shall be respected and protected under all circumstances. If they fall into the hands of the enemy they shall not be considered as prisoners of war’.84 These non-combatants should rightly have been returned to their Army; however, for reasons unclear, these Australian men were taken to the German POW camp at Dulmen and held for eighteen months until their release into neutral Dutch territory in February 1918.

82 Diary entry 22/08/1916, Kenneth Cunningham, AWM, 3DRL/1898. 83 Statement by Repatriated Prisoners, Report, AWM, AWM 30/B11/17. 84 ‘Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 6 July 1906’, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/180?OpenDocument 193 This group of stretcher-bearers suffered greatly whilst held in the German POW Camp. The Australian Red Cross reported that stretcher-bearer Private Keogh, during the term of his imprisonment, had: ‘been kept for 3 months spending 10 hours of every day with two raving madmen, unfettered, with whom they had to fight with continually’.85 In order to overcome the problem of capture and imprisonment of stretcher-bearers, it was imperative that stretcher-bearers wear their brassards, so that the enemy could easily identify them as non-combatants. To re-iterate the importance of this, the CO of the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance, Major Webster, issued the directive: ‘all ranks to wear Red Cross brassard’.86

The harsh working environment at Pozières had a long and lasting toll on many of the stretcher-bearers and many did not believe they would survive this period. Australian stretcher-bearer, Private Kenneth Cunningham of the 5th Australian Field Ambulance, wrote honestly of the fear he held whilst working on the Somme. He recorded in his diary: ‘if I believed that hell was a matter of physical torture, I could not imagine it worse than this place... the mental strain is almost the worst of it... we had the most terrible experiences and the hardest physical work I ever expect to have’.87

The horrors of war were inescapable in the trenches of the Somme. By 1916, these trenches had been used by thousands of troops, German, Belgian, French and British, and began to reveal their own narrative many years after the war. Australian stretcher-bearer, Private Frederick Brown, described in detail the horrors of working and living in the trenches near Contalmasion. Some of the details (written by men) of life in the trenches is particularly graphic, but it is necessary to re-publish these in order to honestly relate the awfulness of their experience. Brown recalled he was sent to collect wounded from a forward RAP

85 Request from Miss M. E. Chomley, Australian Red Cross, to Brig-Gen Griffiths, Commander AIF H.Q., London, 17/05/18, AWM 10/4332/18/29. 86 Order No. 447, 3/7/1916, No. 4 Canadian Field Ambulance, LAC, RG9III, C-10, Vol. 4550, file 27. 87 Working near Pozières. Diary entry 24/08/1916, Kenneth Cunningham, op. cit. 194 and, as he moved up the line to collect wounded, he realised an awful truth of life in the trenches: ‘what is this under our feet? The floor of the trench seems sort of spongy. And what is this protruding from the side? Heavens! I felt like screaming. Here were human bodies, left where they fell’.88

This was not solely a problem for the Australians, the toll of the constant shelling, bombing and gunfire on the Somme added to the strain of dealing with severely wounded men. Canadian historian, Tim Cook, wrote of Private Alfred Andrews, who volunteered to act as a regimental stretcher-bearer. In his retelling of Andrews’ account, Cook highlighted the challenges of tending the wounded, by these volunteers who had ‘reached their limits’ physically and mentally. For regimental bearers, the men they were dealing with were likely comrades of the battalion in which they served. This imposed a further challenge on these volunteers in wanting to do the best for their friends and colleagues. Andrews recorded: ‘I first had to go and get a stretcher. I was so tired I could hardly hold the stretcher and seeing an ambulance man I asked him to help. He refused and said he’d carried all the men he was going to. If I had had my rifle, I’d have shot him. I was so mad’.89

New Zealand stretcher-bearer, Tano Fama, of the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance, wrote about the impact of losing a comrade whilst working on the Somme.90 Fama recorded ‘running the gauntlet’ of German artillery fire when stretcher-bearing at Death Valley and described the numerous dead on his route between the RAP and the ADS as thus:

The path through the valley was strewn with dead, mostly Germans. More than once, it was my sad misfortune to come across our own stretcher- bearers lying dead on the track. That is where it hurts mostly – when one

88 ‘Private Brown: An Autobiography’, Private Brown, op. cit., p. 6a. 89 Cited in Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians fighting the Great War: 1914-1916, op. cit., p. 195. 90 Gaetano Joseph Fama, Service No. 3/668, Alexander Turnbull Library Manuscript Collection, Library and Archives New Zealand (hereafter Alexander Turnbull), MS-Papers-10732. 195 finds one’s own chums who a few moments before were full of life and vigour now lying dead beside the patient they were carrying.91

The weather had a negative impact on the work of the stretcher-bearers working during the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, 15 – 22 September 1916. The poor weather conditions severely affected the ability of the stretcher-bearers to undertake the evacuation of the wounded. The motor vehicles and horsed wagons stopped in their tracks due to the muddy and slippery conditions of the roads in forward areas. This forced the stretcher-bearers of the 6th London Field Ambulance to hand carry men from the ADS at High Alley and Flat Iron Copse back down the line to the main dressing station at Bottom Wood. The unit history related: ‘the weather conditions became extremely bad and wounded had to be man handled... a carry sometimes necessitating five or six hours’.92 When it began to rain, the shell holes filled with water and the terrain became hazardous due to the sticky, cloying mud. Shell holes were the ‘perfect’ place for a wounded man to take refuge in as they offered protection and shelter from the eyes of the enemy. Captain Neil Cantlie wrote of the frustration in his stretcher- bearers having to search for the wounded in these holes. In September 1916, on the Somme he recorded: ‘it is extremely difficult country for evacuation, and at night searching for wounded is difficult as they hide and remain in shell holes’.93

The mud and shell ridden terrain slowed the evacuation of the wounded as the stretcher-bearers quickly tired. The records of the 8th Canadian Field Ambulance described the attempts made to evacuate the wounded in these harsh conditions:

91 Letter dated 1/10/1916, Gaetano Joseph Fama to recipient unknown, ibid. 92 ‘Stretcher-bearing on the Somme’ contributed by Richard Capell, 6th London Field Ambulance (47th London Division) History, notes and autobiographical accounts re activities during the First World War, op. cit. 93 Diary entry 16/09/1916, War diary kept by Captain Neil Cantlie, RAMC, with the 6th Division at the Battle of the Somme, Sept - Oct 1916, Welcome Library, RAMC/242. 196 I undertook the clearing of their wounded. They found, as they went over this shell swept country many wounded still lying in shell holes and dug outs... the ambulance bearers worked very thoroughly and in fact most of them carried on until absolutely exhausted. The bad conditions of the Somme added difficulty to difficulty as the heavy rains made the open country... a veritable quagmire.94

The combination of poor weather and a long carry slowed down evacuation of the wounded at Flers. This problem of an overly long hand carry in such an exposed position severely tested the stretcher-bearers assigned to this dangerous sector. The RAP situated at Leuze Wood was 5,000 yards (~4.5 km) from the nearest MDS at Montauban.95 Additional to the challenge of such a long carry was that the RAP and line of evacuation were under constant fire from German artillery and machine gunners. This constant fire meant no horsed or motorised wagons were able to assist the bearers.

As has been explained previously, the stretcher-bearers were trained for a shorter carry, optimally no more than 1,000 yards (~900 m) in good conditions. To overcome the strain on the bearers, five relays posts were devised along the 5,000-yard (~4.5 km) line of evacuation and an additional rest station was improvised to give additional food and drinks.96 Re-current, repetitive journeys through the rain and mud sapped the stretcher-bearers’ energy and spirit. The physical strain, compounded by the mental strain of working in such trying conditions, severely affected the men’s morale. British stretcher-bearer Richard Capell penned the following experience of working as a stretcher-bearer at Flers:

94 Historical records of No. 8 Canadian Field Ambulance, Lt-Colonel J. T. Gunn, IWM, Catalogue no. 02(71).814, p. 27. 95 Diary entry 10/09/1916, War diary kept by Captain Neil Cantlie, RAMC, with the 6th Division at the Battle of the Somme, Sept - Oct 1916, Wellcome, RAMC 242. 96 Diary entry 10/09/1916, War diary kept by Captain Neil Cantlie, RAMC, With the 6th Division at the Battle of the Somme, Sept - Oct 1916, op. cit. 197 We little squads of bearers had this huge tract to cover, loaded with water and stores on the way up, and on the way back the sufferings of the wounded... and it rained! It rained of course on the 15th [September 1916]. It rained most of that weekend. And again that other weekend a fortnight later. Surely there were never nights so black. The ground was saturated. One plunged into morasses, or fell, stretcher and all, into some old trench. Is there a more disgusting sensation that that of sinking knee-deep in mud when harnessed to a loaded stretcher?97

As the winter approached, deteriorating conditions further exacerbated problems for the stretcher-bearers. Whilst the mud proved to be hazardous to all who tried to cross it, it was made worse when carrying a load:

A stretcher party slipping and sliding over the abyss of mud were vainly trying to find some means of crossing a trench that yawned across their path... one squad carrying a ‘hefty’ German, are in difficulties, the rear man has collapsed in the river, sinking gracefully down over the prostrate body on the stretcher; he seems incapable of extricating himself and as the others go round to help him, he is heard to softly murmur... ‘oh you b---- Hun’.98

At Flers, Australian stretcher-bearer Leonard Clyde Bryant found the muddy conditions intolerable and it became a period where his patience was tested. In his diary, he recorded:

Two stretcher cases, first got stuck in the mud up to my knees, second, had a narrow escape shell bursting twenty yards [~18 m] in front received a mud bath, if we would not have rested would have dropped on us... OS

97 ‘Stretcher-bearing on the Somme’ contributed by Richard Capell, 6th London Field Ambulance (47th London Division) op. cit. 98 ibid. 198 [this is the fellow’s name] and I had to carry right through, on account of useless partners, half starved.99

It is impossible for this thesis to fully illustrate the level of strain the bearers experienced on the long carries. It was back breaking work. Carrying a weight of 60 kilograms (the patient) for six hours caused tremendous strain on the hands, forearms, back, neck and shoulders. This confirms the necessity of having only the fittest of men to carry out bearer duties. After a long carry stretcher-bearers also suffered from leg pain, as they had to tense their leg muscles to keep from slipping over in wet and muddy conditions. During periods of bad weather, the muddy conditions and long carry forced the bearers to have regular stops and relief parties took over the carry. All of which further delayed medical treatment for the wounded man.

The long carries exacted a heavy toll on the stretcher-bearers’ physical health. Lifting and carrying the wounded over long distances caused many injuries to the stretcher-bearers. Field ambulance ‘Admission and discharge books’ afford an insight into some of the various injuries caused to stretcher-bearers. In the case of Canadian stretcher-bearer John Cicero Comish of the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance, carrying the wounded brought on a previously undiagnosed Dyspnea or chronic shortage of breath and pain in the cardial region and meant that he could not return to work with the field ambulance after treatment.100 Comish’s medical record showed that he was admitted to hospital whilst on the Somme and never regained full fitness again resulting in his subsequent medical discharge in 1919. His medical file recorded the following description of his condition: ‘first noticed trouble with heart Sept. 1916 after carrying patient mile

99 Diary entry 31/10/1916, Leonard Clyde Bryant, op. cit. 100 Private John Cicero Comish, Regimental no. 1243, electrician by trade, married, aged 27 years at enlistment in 1914, served in the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance, discharged medically unfit 1919. Comish was diagnosed with ‘DAH’, which is explained as, ‘Diffuse alveolar hemorrhage’, (DAH) Admission and Discharge book, No. 105, 4th Canadian Field Ambulance Hospital, C.E.F., LAC, RG150, Vol. 516. 199 and a half. Dysp. palpitation [Dysplasia) and pain over heart became worse... [he] tried to march to the Somme [but] had to fall out’.101 Comish’s medical classification of B3 meant that he was no longer fit for service at the Front and he took up a position as ward clerk at the Kitchener War Hospital, Brighton for the duration of the war.

Herniation was a common injury for the stretcher-bearers. Left untreated a hernia prevented a man from being able to carry out heavy lifting or hard physical labour without pain, which greatly diminished their job prospects later in civilian life. Canadian bugler (therefore also a stretcher-bearer) Frank Hall Temperton of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, developed a hernia whilst serving on the Somme in September 1916.102 Temperton had been seen by his RMO on 15 September 1916, after ‘he noticed a sensation of the belly wall ‘giving way’.103 His medical record showed that he was diagnosed with an Inguinal Hernia on the right hand side with surgery to repair the tear undertaken in October 1916.104

Stretcher-bearer Private Thomas Hardcastle of the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance similarly suffered a herniation injury on 22 September 1916. The Medical Review Board recorded: ‘while acting as a stretcher-bearer at Somme, strained himself and found he could not carry back’.105 Private J C Porter, also a stretcher-bearer

101Service record, Private John Cicero Comish, Regimental no. 1243, LAC, C.E.F. Headquarters File no. 30746. 102Service Record, Private Frank Hall Temperton, Regimental No. 1767, LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9565 – 59. 103 Medical review board, Service Record , Private Frank Hall Temperton, Regimental no. 1767, LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9565 – 59. 104 Entry 12/09/1916, Admission and Discharge book, No. 105, 4th Canadian Field Ambulance Hospital, C.E.F., LAC, RG150, Vol. 516. 105 Medical review board, Service Record, Private Thomas Hardcastle, Regimental no. 1646, LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4038 – 20. 200 of the 4th Canadian Field Ambulance, was admitted to the same Canadian hospital with Inguinal Hernia on 28 August 1916.106

The physical strain rendered many men unable to continue with bearer duties and forced transfers to other duties. The flow on effect being the necessity of having to find replacement bearers. Temporarily utilising unskilled regimental stretcher-bearers helped alleviate the immediate problem of delays in evacuating the wounded, but it also lead to other problems for the medical corps stretcher-bearers. Canadian William Antliff, CAMC, explained when the regimental bearers had finished carrying the wounded, medical corps personnel had to rectify errors made. Again, it demonstrated that there was more to stretcher-bearing than simply loading a casualty onto a stretcher. Antliff wrote: ‘after being brought into this station [dressing station) by the regimental stretcher-bearers, our boys carry the wounded 150 yards [~137 m] ... [some of the wounded] had not been dressed and we had to fix them up as best we could’.107

During periods of high demand for stretcher-bearers during the Somme battles of 1916, the ‘PB’ class men of the Army Medical Corps, when not working in their own duties as orderlies or medical attendants, were called upon to fill the ranks as stretcher-bearers. In 1916, the utilization of physically sub-standard stretcher- bearers caused many of these stretcher-bearers to break down. These men were unable to carry out the backbreaking work. In order to overcome the problem of these relief stretcher-bearers ‘breaking down’ more stretcher-bearer relay posts were formed.

106 Private J. C. Porter, Regimental No. 22948, 4th Canadian Field Ambulance. Admission and Discharge book, No. 105, 4th Canadian Field Ambulance Hospital, C.E.F., LAC, RG150, Vol. 516. 107 Letter dated 19/09/1916, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, William Shaw Antliff, op. cit. 201 DMS AIF, Major General Howse, disagreed with the British policy of employing ‘PB’ class men along the lines of communication and refused to utilise these men as stretcher-bearers. Howse, in a communiqué to General Birdwood of I Anzac Corps wrote: ‘employment of ‘PB’ men should be carefully restricted... one ‘A’ class man is worth at least four ‘PB’.108 Howse and senior members of the AAMC recalled that a previous attempt to employ ‘PB’ men in the AAMC was unsuccessful and they could not see how these men would be suitable for the rigours of duty with the medical corps on the Western Front. This clear and unambiguous statement by Howse demonstrated that he considered his British counterparts lacked the acceptance that stretcher-bearing was a physically demanding job and that these ‘B’ class men would need to be replaced at a greater frequency.109

Similarly, the New Zealanders did not alter the way they assessed the stretcher- bearers fitness for duty. The British reconsidered their decision to fill the ranks of stretcher-bearers with lower category men later in the war, as MacPherson confirmed, ‘6,700 recruits of the highest national service group were posted to the RAMC in the summer of 1918’.110 The decision by the German Army to replace fit stretcher-bearers with men of lower medical classes caused similar problems to that of the British, when staffing levels in the medical services rose ‘at a cost of a thirty per cent increase in medical establishments’.111 This was due to the problem of men from lower categories of fitness, could not cope with the difficulties and physical strain of bearing and need to be replaced at a more frequent rate.

108 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., Appendix 7, p. 908. 109 ibid., p. 906. 110 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 139. 111 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 916. 202 A further change instituted to cope with large numbers of the wounded during the Somme Operations included using all men of all sections of the field ambulance. These men could be called on to assist with clearing the battlefields, trenches and RAPs of wounded. The Unit history of the 8th Canadian Field Ambulance explained how this was actioned within the divisional line.112 The author, Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Gunn, recorded that during periods of exceptionally heavy workload: ‘one field ambulance actually clearing the line. One field ambulance in charge of a rest station [and]... one field ambulance in reserve’.113 During active conditions the whole of the stretcher-bearers in the two ambulances in the rear were detailed to assist the ambulance clearing the battlefront. Private P. W. Gray, a stretcher-bearer of the 99th British Field Ambulance, recorded being called to assist with retrieval of wounded in September 1916: ‘have got to go to RAP with forty more chaps to help’.114

On the Somme, Captain Neil Cantlie of the 6th British Division, recorded that the fulfilment of demands for additional stretcher-bearers from the Infantry were often delayed. He reported that his request for assistance for his stretcher- bearers might take more than three hours to be fulfilled, citing, ‘the journey often in the dark and the difficulty of keeping to the correct route were factors which caused this delay’.115 Captain Neil Cantlie’s frustration at relief bearers becoming lost is shown in his report on the medical arrangements on the Somme. This was an internal communication problem that delayed the arrival of help for the wounded. He recorded in his report: ‘panicky message are reported from different sources. 100 men despatched at the request of the 16th Infantry Brigade to act as bearers. A guide provided by the Brigade lost his way and 100 men only carried 2 wounded cases’.116 To overcome these problems the division (and others) installed sixteen stretcher-bearers at the Brigade headquarters so

112 ‘Historical records of 8th Canadian Field Ambulance’, Lt-Colonel J. N. Gunn, op. cit. 113 ibid., p. 16. 114 Diary entry 23/09/1916, Private P. W. Gray, IWM, Catalogue no. 76/219/1. 115 Report, Medical services on the Somme, 6th Division, War diary kept by Captain Neil Cantlie, RAMC, with the 6th Division at the Battle of the Somme, Sept - Oct 1916, op. cit. 116 ibid. 203 that they could easily be reached by telephone or message and were in contact with the brigade RMOs. Additionally, it was found that having one officer whose only responsibility was to maintain and control the movement of the relief stretcher-bearer party’s helped alleviate confusion, and ‘doubling-up’117 of bearers.

Unfair criticism levelled against the RAMC in the aftermath of the Somme campaign led to an evaluation of its performance. A particularly harsh critique from Sir Almroth Wright, a noted British bacteriologist, resulted in a call for a review of the operations of the Army Medical Service. The public attack on the RAMC was clearly misplaced. External forces had such an impact on medical evacuation that no amount of reform would have been able to overcome these significant issues. Historian John Blair has correctly declared: ‘Wright’s attack upon the evacuation arrangements was ill-conceived’.118 Blair did acknowledge there were some areas where the system might have been improved; however, the medical corps did its best in the appalling circumstances. Given the scale of war seen in 1916, and considering the overwhelmingly large numbers of wounded treated by the RAMC, the evidence shows that the system did in fact work.

This chapter has demonstrated that most of the problems during 1916 were obviously out of the control of medical services and the stretcher-bearers. Large numbers of wounded, particularly in the opening battles of the Somme overwhelmed the medical services, however in most respects the work taken to clear the wounded from the battlefields was better managed in 1916 compared to earlier years. Organizing larger numbers of stretcher-bearers to carry out evacuation of wounded in very trying circumstances helped alleviate delays in evacuation as did the introduction of bearer relay posts. Working under intense

117 ibid. 118 Dr John S. G. Blair, In Arduis Fidelis: Centenary History of the Royal Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 141. 204 shell and artillery fire was out of the control of the medical services, and made the work of the stretcher-bearers very hazardous resulting in many bearer deaths and wounding. The problem of bad weather in 1916, made working conditions difficult however, these would be much worse in 1917.

The next chapter will examine the conditions faced by the stretcher-bearers in 1917, which saw a further deterioration in the circumstances and plight of and non-combatants. A return to the battlefields of Belgium, specifically to Ypres and the Passchendaele Ridge made stretcher-bearing a difficult and problematic experience.

205 CHAPTER 6 – 1917

1917 witnessed significant developments related to the war, not only on the Western Front. The declaration of war on Germany by the United States in April promised a large American Army on the Western Front.1 The withdrawal of Russia from the war after a series of revolutions in February and November allowed the Germans to redeploy some of their forces from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. The political sphere had been altered in the late stages of 1916 into 1917 with David Lloyd George replacing H. H. Asquith; The French General, Robert Nivelle, replaced General Joffre, and the French Armies revolted after years of hardships and in response to the Nivelle Offensive. The year would prove to be a continuation of mass killing and destruction.

On the Western Front in 1917, British Forces participated in two significant battles, the French-Anglo Nivelle Offensive2 and the Third Battle of Ypres. Massive amounts of artillery and high explosive mining allowed the British to make substantial gains, such as at Messines. Improvements in planning of operations, training and better management of resources saw a change in the direction of the war, but these could not be sustained. This chapter examines the medical experience of British Forces stretcher-bearers during the following battles: The Battles of Arras including The Battle of Vimy, 9 – 14 April 1917, 1st Battle of Bullecourt, 11 April 1917, The Battle of Messines, 7 – 14 June 1917, The Battles of Ypres, 1917, 31 July - 10 November 1917 including Menin Road, Polygon Wood and the First and Second Battles of Passchendaele.

1 The United States of America, having declared war against the Germans in April, sent their 1st Division to France in June 1917. The 1st American Division fought alongside French Divisions at Nancy in October 1917. However, they (the American Expeditionary Force, AEF) were not used until June 1918. 2 British Forces participated in the The Arras Offensive, 9/4/17-15/05/1917. 206 In regards to the treatment of the sick and the wounded, 1917 witnessed a fine- tuning and review of medical treatment and evacuation. British historian Mark Harrison made the following critical observation: ‘the development of the medical services [during this period] was a vital element of the reforms which transformed the BEF, into a war-winning force’.3 Large numbers of wounded at many times during 1917 overwhelmed the army medical services. For example, heavy casualties experienced by British Forces at Arras came with a cost of ‘160,000 British and Australian troops, 13,000 of whom died in the first three days’.4 This external problem (large numbers of sick and wounded), as has been shown in previous chapters of this thesis, arose from an outdated theorem that had been applied. By 1917, this form of calculation was no longer appropriate. Instead, the medical services relied on thorough examination of previous battle casualty numbers and worked closely with the army in calculating expected casualty figures. This was not, however, an exact science and large numbers of wounded continued, which quickly blocked evacuation routes. Controlling medical evacuation improved because it had become a matter of ‘maintenance of manpower’5 and as such, better management and flexible plans developed within the divisional medical services.

Problems remained which had a direct and negative impact on the stretcher- bearers during 1917. The greatest proportion of these came from external pressures such as periods of poor weather, the deterioration of the landscape, length of carry, shelling by artillery and large numbers of wounded. These problems were not new however, what had changed was the scale of the problems. In many circumstances, a multiplier effect arose, the combination of external problems such as poor weather and a deterioration of the landscape resulted in terrain that became impossible to traverse, forcing stretcher-bearers to long and arduous hand carries.

3 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 65. 4 ibid., p. 77. 5See Harrison for a discussion of the political imperative to maintain effective medical treatment. ibid., p. 76. 207 Internal problems suffered in previous years, such as transportation and supply, had improved significantly; this was due to better co-ordination within divisions and their medical services. Rather, it was those external issues such as poor weather, which had a significant impact on transportation. Staffing issues had improved, with hundreds of regimental stretcher-bearers used when needed, but breakdowns in communication still occurred, even though these had improved from previous years of the war.

As previously stated any delay in carrying out evacuation had a detrimental effect on the health of a soldier and directly influenced manpower shortages. Rapid evacuation of the wounded by stretcher-bearers to the ADS or CCS cannot be stressed enough. A badly wounded man’s chance of surviving depended on receiving swift medical care. Blood loss, shock, head and abdominal wounds all needed immediate assessment and treatment; and aseptic cleansing of wounds in which bacteria had entered became a high priority. The historiography of the Great War has comprehensively documented the deterioration of living conditions for British and German Forces on the Western Front during 1917. After three years of warfare, life on the Western Front for combatants and non- combatants had not improved, in fact in some areas it had badly deteriorated. As evidenced by the description of the Ypres Sector by British stretcher-bearer, Private A. Ellis: ‘BODIES EVERYWHERE some from battles of previous years. All around a great barren wash, mud, stench and shell holes’.6

Sickness was also a factor that had to be better managed with wet conditions contributing to high rates of sickness. For example during the Battles of Third Ypres, 1 July – 10 November, the British Fifth Army had an approximate total of 42,000 men report admitted as sick.7 The chief concern for the medical services

6 Diary entry 18/08/1917, Private A. Ellis, AMS, RAMC/CF/4/3/22/EELI, Box 35/1. 7 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III: Medical Services during the operations on the Western Front in 1916, 1917 and 1918; in Italy; and in Egypt and Palestine, op. cit., p. 171. 208 was sicknesses such as Trench Foot, Trench Nephritis and Pneumonia.8 In the month of August 1917, in the New Zealand Divisions alone, more than 2,293 were lost with sickness, a rate of ‘20 per cent per month, or about double that recorded for the whole of the [New Zealanders’] first year in France’.9

The Battle of Vimy, part of the larger Battle of Arras, was a successful attack on German positions conducted over 9 – 14 April 1917, by the 24th British Division, 1 Corps, First Army and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Canadian Divisions, Canadian Corps. It was a successful attack and secured the initial objective, being the capture of Vimy Ridge. The battle witnessed an intensive barrage and an attack led by all four Canadian and one British divisions: ‘after desultory field gun fire all night and during the earlier hours, Hell seemed to had been let loose... with an intensity and ferociousness unequalled heretofore’.10 Sir Andrew Macphail’s Official history recorded that the medical services of the Canadian Corps ‘never broke down; it was never in any danger of breaking down’.11 However, this statement by Macphail belies the problems faced in evacuating the sick and wounded during the attack, as Heather Moran has rightly argued: ‘despite long and careful planning for Vimy, difficulties would arise... [for the CAMC] the work was not perfect’.12

Once again, as this thesis has shown, the many problems to be overcome for those at Vimy, arose through a combination of forces, internal and external, all which severely tested the ability of the stretcher-bearers to carry out their work. In his re-telling of an incident, which occurred on the evening of 9 April 1917, at Vimy, Macphail acknowledged that internal problems existed and had an effect

8 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 327. 9 ibid. 10 Report Undated, No. 5 Canadian Field Ambulance April 1917, Miscellaneous reports Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services, LAC, RG-9-III- B-2, Volume 3745. 11 Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service, op. cit., p. 96. 12 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 165. 209 on the ability of the medical services to treat the wounded. The internal problem directly related to the success of the attack and the need for artillery to go forward, which effectively stopped the transport units of the various field ambulances. The following example allows for an appreciation of the dissonance between the medical corps and the army that occurred during peak periods and is used in its entirety:

The field of Vimy was cleared before night fell. At dark a Canadian general officer passed the ADS at Aux Rietz. Willing to find fault, now that the battle was over and won, he demanded to know why some hundreds of wounded were lying on the road. He was offered the alternative: whether he preferred that the wounded awaiting convoy should be resting on stretchers, covered with blankets, protected by serum, comforted with morphine, nourished with food and drink, their wounds dressed; or that they should be lying unattended on the cold field that snowy night. He was recommended to seek further back for the cause of delay.13

A lack of available transport combined with transport congestion delayed the evacuation of the wounded. The 4th Canadian Field Ambulance experienced congestion at the ADS when ‘trains of 2 cars and gasoline motor were expected to arrive every 20 minutes, but actually only at 2 hour intervals... line blocked for 1 ½ hours and from 5 – 9 pm. Many wounded had to be left lying out in a field near road most afternoon and evening’.14 This problem was not confined only to the Canadian field ambulances, the 2/2nd London Field Ambulance, also reported a shortage of motor ambulances during the Battle of Vimy. The field ambulance had many lightly wounded that required evacuation from the ADS to the Corps Rest Station, but no motor ambulances were available. To overcome this problem they reverted to the unsuitable, but necessary practice of requisitioning

13 Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-19: The Medical Service, op. cit., p. 97. 14 Entry 9/04/1917, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Webster, Report Vimy Ridge, April 1917, Divisional Troops: 4 Canadian Field Ambulance, TNA, WO 95/3807. 210 ‘empty lorries and wagons’.15 Knowing this was an unsuitable method of transportation for wounded men, the British and Canadians set about, within a few days of the attack, to improve matters. The Official British history explained that once Vimy Ridge had been taken, engineers went to work fixing roads and laying light rail and it was ‘as if, like the army of Cadmus, they sprung from the ground’.16 Canadian stretcher-bearer Private Andrew Coulter who recorded: ‘better facilities for taking out wounded now’ also confirmed the improved means of transport.17

A further issue was how to manage evacuation backwards whilst the line was moving forward during the advance of the Canadian Corps. This, as has been previously discussed would over the course of the war, present many problems for the medical services. As the battlefront moved quickly forward the regimental stretcher-bearers lost contact with the RAPs, additionally the length of carry from the battlefront increased when the Canadian front advanced: ‘the distance from the starting point became longer, so much further did our men have to carry their burdens’.18 It was also found that the regimental stretcher- bearers and the walking wounded lost their line of evacuation, which lengthened the time it took for men to receive medical care and assistance.

At Vimy, the Canadian casualties amounted to 11,297.19 In one Canadian Field Ambulance, the 2nd Canadian, received and treated over 1600 patients within the first two days.20 Daytime evacuation from the battlefield was almost impossible,

15 Report Phase ‘B’, April 1917, War Diary, 2/2nd London Field Ambulance, WO 95/2944/2. 16 Captain Cyril Falls, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: France and Belgium, 1917, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras, MacMillan, London, 1940, p. 338. 17 Diary entry 10/04/1917, Private Andrew Robert Coulter, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum, Textual records, 58A 1 221.1. 18 ibid. 19 Falls, History of the Great War based on Official Documents: France and Belgium, 1917, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras, op. cit., p. 342. 20 Actual figure is 1642, Figure calculated from War diary entries 9/4/17- 13/4/1917, Diary Entry 9/04/1917, War Diary, No. 2 Canadian Field Ambulance, 4th Canadian Division, LAC RG9-III-D- 3, folders 822-825. 211 forcing collection to be carried out at night. This was, as has been explained, a very dangerous, but necessary activity, as Private Clifton Kell recorded in his diary: ‘was nearly all night getting a wounded man out... got hit on head and helmet saved me’.21 As it was impossible to get to them wounded until evening, very many of those wounded died whilst waiting to be evacuated, as Private Andrew Robert Coulter recorded ‘terrible number of wounded. At one time nearly 500 dying on stretchers in open. Worked 24 hours steady’.22 Three members of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance were killed at Vimy with a further three being wounded.23

At Vimy, the combination of long carries and large numbers of wounded forced the Canadian field ambulances to call for volunteers and German prisoners to supplement the bearer squads. Private James Fournier, a Canadian with the 22nd Infantry Battalion, described how he was seconded to work as a stretcher-bearer at Vimy. Fournier recorded his personal experience of stretcher-bearing at Vimy in his manuscript:

I was ordered to turn in my rifle and bayonet and report to the Medical Officer as I would be on his staff for the Vimy attack. He equipped each of us with a bag of bandages and other things required to care for wounded men giving us what instructions he could in the short space of time we had at our disposal, we were now ready for the big show.24

Reinforcements for regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers came from various units. This was essential to relieve the problem of short-staffed bearer squads and to help cope with the large numbers of wounded. Personnel from tent sections of the field ambulance in reserve were utilized. The war diary of the

21 Diary entry 10/04/1917, Private Clifton Kell, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum, Textual records, 58A 1 244.1. 22 Diary entry 9/04/1917, Private Andrew Robert Coulter, op. cit. 23 Butson, A History of the Military Medical Units of Hamilton, Ontario in Peace and War 1900- 1990, op. cit., no page number given. 24 James Arthur Fournier, Reminiscences, Incomplete Manuscript, Toronto Public Library, p. 67. 212 2/2nd London Field ambulance showed the filling of the ranks of medical corps stretcher-bearers in the frontline position: ‘10 NCOs and 34 OR’s from tent section sent up the line to act as bearers and to assist at ADS’.25

However, this was not the only problem to be faced by the CAMC. The effect of poor weather upon the terrain and trenches also posed many problems. The Canadian preparations leading up to the Battle of Vimy included a tour of the trenches that had been badly affected by the wet spring. After preliminary checks of the trenches the situation appeared bleak for the bearers as the CO of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, Lieutenant Colonel C. F. McGuffin, recorded: ‘no light task lay before our men should it be found necessary to carry stretcher patients along the trenches. With very few exceptions - and then only in parts - the trenches were inches deep in slimy mud’.26 Snow also covered the ground in which the wounded lay while waiting for evacuation, leaving the wounded susceptible to further medical issues from exposure.

For the medical corps attached to the Australian Brigades of the 4th Australian Division, and the 62nd British Division, the First Battle of Bullecourt developed into an ordeal that saw them unable to cope with the numbers of wounded, leaving many men unattended and dying. The Bullecourt Operation, which commenced on 11 April 1917, sought to capture and hold a portion of the Hindenburg Line. The attack had been planned to have substantial support for the infantry from tanks, however due to the failure of the tanks and without suitable artillery cover, the attack failed.27 The Australians suffered an inordinately high casualty rate, numbering 2,339 including POW from the 4th

25 Diary entry 14/04/1917, War Diary, 2/2nd London Field Ambulance, op. cit. 26 Diary entry 1/04/1917, War Diary, 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, LAC, RG9, Militia and Defence, Series III-D-3, Volume 5028, File: 827. 27 The plan to have the tanks lead the infantry into battle meant that there could not be an initial artillery barrage and the practice of utilising a creeping barrage could not be used. See C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of the War 1914-1918: Vol. IV, The Australian Imperial Force in France: 1917, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne, 1939, p. 288. 213 Brigade and 950 from the 12th Brigade.28 The initial attack was followed up with a further attack launched on 3 May in which Australian and British divisions participated. Casualties were very high, in the First Battle of Bullecourt, ‘the 4th and 12th [Australian Brigades], suffered over 3,300 casualties; [and] 1,170 Australians were taken prisoner’29 and during the Second Battle of Bullecourt, the casualty count totalled ‘7,482 from three Australian Divisions’.30 During these battles between 11 April and 17 May 1917, the medical corps of the Australian brigades which fought, suffered ‘234 AAMC men were killed or wounded’.31

Orders issued to the AAMC on 7 April 1917, for the Bullecourt Operation, determined that ‘regimental bearers will not be allowed in rear of the RAPs. Ambulance bearers will not be allowed in front’.32 Here the problem arose which saw the regimental stretcher-bearers having the longest carry back to the RAPs, whereas the stretcher-bearers of the medical corps had a carry of only a ‘few hundred yards’.33 To overcome the problem of the disproportionate length of carry and because the regimental bearers had become casualties themselves, the previous order was cancelled and the medical corps stretcher-bearers would move forward of the aid posts. It was a simple way in overcoming these issues for the regimental stretcher-bearers and the wounded and clearly demonstrated the awareness that flexible working procedures had to be used to overcome such problems.

To cope with the large numbers of wounded, the Australian stretcher-bearers worked long shifts retrieving the wounded. During the First Battle of Bullecourt, Captain Leonard May, AAMC, wrote: ‘the bearers have been out all day – one

28 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 134. 29 Australian War Memorial. First Battle of Bullecourt. Retrieved 30 May2015, from: https://www.awm.gov.au/units/event_110.asp 30 Australian War Memorial. Second Battle of Bullecourt. Retrieved 30 May 2015, from http://www.awm.gov.au/units/event_73.asp 31 ibid., p. 135. 32 ibid., p. 133. 33 ibid., p. 136. 214 squad carried at least 13 trips, and one squad was shelled. They are a fine lot of boys’.34 The territory in which the stretcher-bearers had to work was very dangerous, and consequently evacuation could only be safely carried out at night, at daybreak it was found to be far too dangerous as the Official Australian Historian A. G. Butler explained:

On this sector, when full daylight came and supplies and reinforcements were cut off, the alternatives presented to the ‘walking’ wounded as to the uninjured were either to be captured or to face the re-crossing of the old No-Man’s Land (including the wire belt) under continuous aimed rifle and machine-gun fire.35

A further problem faced by Australian regimental and medical corps stretcher- bearers lay with the numbers of wounded in No Man’s Land caught up in the wire. After many attempts to assist the men trapped on the wire, it was deemed that they could not be evacuated as the situation was far too dangerous. C. E. W. Bean reported: ‘the Germans working among the wounded in the wire shot some of those who were evidently hurt too badly for recovery.36 The number of wounded trapped on the wire that the stretcher-bearers were unable to safely retrieve, prompted a move by German and British Forces to enact an unofficial truce. Compassion for men who cried out for help drove both sides to lay down their arms (albeit for a short period) to allow regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers to collect the wounded.

In June, the IX and X Corps, British Second Army and II Anzac Corps launched a successful attack on German positions along the Wytschaete Ridge-Messines Ridge as part of the larger Flanders Offensive. Tunnelling companies had tunnelled under the German positions and laid mines under them over a period

34 Diary entry 15/04/1917, Captain (later Major) Leonard May, AWM, 1DRL/0490. 35 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918., Vol. II, op. cit., p. 134. 36 Footnote #155, Bean, The Official History of the War 1914-1918: The Australian Imperial Force in France:1917, Volume IV, op. cit., p. 340. 215 of years. On 7 June, the Messines attack was launched, when nineteen mines were detonated under German positions. The mines were detonated at 0310 and the noise was reported by many contemporaries and historians as being the ‘loudest ever created by man until that time’. 37

The planning and preparation by the British Forces for the Battle of Messines included the medical services, which had developed sophisticated plans for evacuation. Additional stretcher-bearers were allotted at divisional HQs so that they could assist the regimental stretcher-bearers, also extra supplies had been brought up the line and kept in strategic positions. The number of transport units, divisional collecting posts, dressing stations, and CCSs were increased. MacPherson stated the plans for medical evacuation and treatments were prepared ‘with the same amount of care and detail as those for the attack’.38 Prior to the attack it was estimated the numbers of casualties for the II Anzac corps be 15,000.39 The New Zealanders had expected a 30% casualty rate within their brigades at Messines. More than 3,700 New Zealand casualties were actually received.40 In each battalion, the numbers of regimental stretcher- bearers increased to 48 to cope with the number of wounded.

Private William Roy Robson, NZMC, wrote of his Great War experience with the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance in his detailed diaries. Whilst working at Messines he recorded the numbers of wounded New Zealanders that had passed through his dressing station. The following excerpt from his memoirs reflected the high numbers of wounded. It also is an example that shows the wounded men had already been dressed prior to coming to the dressing station:

37 John H. Gray, From the uttermost ends of the earth: the New Zealand division on the Western Front 1916-1918: a history and guide to its battlefields, Wilson Scott Publishing, Christchurch 2010, p. 90. 38 MacPherson, Medical Services : General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 120. 39 13 Field Ambulances served the area. Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 284. 40 Damien Fenton, New Zealand and the First World War: 1914-1919, op. cit., p. 63. 216 This morning 3.30am the mines under the Messines-Wytshaete were exploded. Our boys did very well taking the village of Messines. We were very busy for the next 3 days. We had over 900 men, all of whom had to be re-dressed once a day... plenty of work very little sleep.41

However, for the divisions of II Anzac Corps, situated on the southern sector of Messines area, the medical planning had faltered almost from the start. One problem eventuated from the type of operation in the sector – which saw regiments ‘leap-frogging’42 over and through each other as the advance was made. The regimental stretcher-bearer parties became entangled with each other, each not knowing whom they were supposed to be assisting and leading to confusion with relay posts. The Official New Zealand history lamented that there existed a great deal of confusion when the Germans began their counter- attack, with the lines of evacuation faltering due to heavy shelling and transportation past the collecting points was effectively curtailed.43 From zero hour to midnight on 7 June, casualties of the II Anzac Corps field ambulances stood at 5 killed and 10 wounded. The actual number of casualties in the southern sector has been debated. Carbery claimed that for the period 00:00 hour 7 June, to 24:00 11 June 1917, the total number of casualties for the New Zealand divisions was 3,63344 casualties killed and wounded, whereas Bean put the figure at 4,978.45 The Australians had 6,800 casualties, the British divisions approximately 15,380.46

Some changes to procedure introduced were overly convoluted. Complicated lines of evacuation dependent on type of wounds created more confusion for

41 Diary entry 07/06/1917, War Diaries of William Roy Robson, 3/1082, Alexander Turnbull, MSX-3484. 42 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 128. 43 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 300. 44 ibid., p. 315. 45 Bean, Official History of the War 1914-1918: Vol. IV, The Australian Imperial Force in France: 1917, op. cit., p. 682. 46 ibid. 217 those at the tail end of the scheme, such as the regimental and field ambulance stretcher-bearers. For example, at Hill 63, two lines of evacuation were set up for the Australian and New Zealand divisions around the hill. This practice resulted in a narrowing of the line of the evacuation when the two joined, causing delays at the ADSs and at CCSs.

Further problems occurred with the sorting and categorising of wounds. Australian historian, A. G. Butler, severely criticised the medical arrangements for the Battle of Messines, as excluding the care of the wounded. These plans severely slowed down the sorting and treating of the wounded and slowed evacuation from the RAPs. Butler recorded in the Official History:

Every possible factor in the problem of collecting, clearing, treating and evacuating casualties was foreseen and exactly provided for... [but] this, however, is far from saying that the methods adopted are suited to general application, or were even in the best interests of the wounded at the time.47

In essence, Butler correctly argued that there existed an overly convoluted medical arrangement, which contained excessive categorisation of the wounded. For this arrangement to be successful, internal expertise in managing the plans was needed, but it never eventuated. The Australian Official History confirms that there existed three levels of control at Messines, which went against all other practice. Additionally, instructions that sorted medical care into eleven distinct groups caused a great deal of confusion for RMOs and NCOs in charge of bearer parties. Once again, the pre-war ways of operating were changed in order to better manage evacuation, without success.

47 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II., op. cit., p. 160. 218 Historian Christopher Pugsley similarly criticised the medical arrangements for Australian and New Zealand Corps.48 Pugsley argued in The ANZAC experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, the battles at Passchendaele and Messines witnessed a failure in ‘coordination of the corps, engineer, artillery and medical plans’.49 Writing of the internal problems of clearing the battlefield at Messines, Pugsley recorded: ‘the New Zealand Division found its stretcher-bearers exhausted and its clearing stations rapidly filling because they had to collect the wounded who had been left to die’.50

One of the positive outcomes to occur in 1917 and used at Messines was the new treatment of fractures, especially of the leg and below the knee, when the Linton splint was replaced with the Thomas splint. The Thomas splint, when applied by the stretcher-bearers, saved the lives of countless men over the course of the war. Not only did it save the lives of many men but it also relieved the mental burden on stretcher-bearers who had been subjected to the anguish of men with these types of wounds. An unstable fracture causes immeasurable pain and discomfort, as the bones rub against each other; blood loss (internal) also occurred and bacteria can enter when there has been a piercing of the skin. Every bump caused many of the wounded man to cry out in pain, morphia was used to treat the pain but was either insufficient or in many occurrences overdoses occurred.51

The issue with the earlier splints, such as the Linton, was instability in the fracture, which resulted in men dying from shock, haemorrhage and sepsis. Briton John Kirkup argued compound femurs (fractured) received at one British base hospital in 1916 accounted for only 1.7% of all wounds, but these had an

48 Christopher Pugsley, The ANZAC experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Birkenhead, Auckland, 2004. 49ibid., p. 239. 50 ibid. 51 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II., op. cit.,p. 334. 219 alarmingly high mortality rate of 80%,52 and the life-saving Thomas splint reduced this mortality rate. All British Forces’ stretcher-bearers were taught how to apply the Thomas splint during 1917 as its use was ‘embodied in a system of drill, by numbers for the instruction of stretcher-bearers’53 as Kirkup explained:

The leg and fracture were firmly extended against the resistance of the ischium. Unfortunately, it was not till 1917 that this splint was officially supplied and every British stretcher bearer instructed to apply it rapidly by numbers, preferably in a team of three and in the dark if required.54

The 3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance confirmed the progress made in saving lives once the Thomas splint was introduced:

It is distressing to record that in the first Somme battle 75 per cent of cases of fractured thighs died... Subsequently, in the battles of Messines and Bapaume, Thomas's splint, a light iron frame-work effecting separation of the broken ends and the immobilization of fragments, was used, and the rate of mortality was reduced to 20 per cent, and, in favourable conditions, to as low as 15 per cent.55

Transportation at Messines had been planned well in advance with trams lines and light railway were constructed, existing roads were repaired and the main roads were screened off from the German positions to allow for a safer journey. In co-operation with the railways and MACs, numbers of trains and motor vehicles were increased. Ambulance trains also were managed very well, but these could only assist evacuation of the wounded from a certain point in the line of evacuation. Stretcher-bearers had still to get the wounded to a point, such

52 John Kirkup, Fracture care of friend and foe during World War I, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Surgery, Volume 73, 2003, pp. 453–459, p. 453. 53 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II., op. cit., p. 942. 54 Kirkup, Fracture care of friend and foe during World War I, op. cit., p. 457. 55 Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Austin, The Official History of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, L T Watkins Ltd, Wellington, 1924, p. 548. 220 as a road, tramline or railhead. These improvements were driven by the criticism and inherent deficiencies exposed ‘in the wake of the Somme Offensive’.56 The use of light rail offered the stretcher-bearers some respite from the long hand carry of wounded men, and were well utilised in the dry months, being able to fit four and up to six stretcher-cases on a trolley.57 Despite these developments and improvements, the combination of external problems at Messines badly affected the ability of the stretcher-bearers from evacuating the sick and wounded away from the battlefront, when poor weather and damage from artillery occurred.

The light rail, as has already been explained, worked very well during dry weather, however were close to being unusable in wet weather as the following example confirms. The combination of heavy vehicle traffic and shelling ruined what light rail was available for the New Zealand field ambulances as the war diary of the 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance lamented:

5am. The evacuation of stretcher cases by the trolley on the tramline was found to be useless, although several attempts were made at this time to get the trolley working properly. It would seem the cause for the non- success of the trolleys was due to roughly laid line – the trolleys ran off frequently, also to the line being damaged by shellfire, and also to parts of the line being sunk into the ground by tanks crossing it; all three made it very bad for the bearers to handle the trolleys even when carrying even two cases.58

The following photograph shows an example of the light railway used on the Western Front during relatively dry weather. Note the wheels on the carriage are not covered with mud, when it rained the ground as became very wet and muddy and rendered the track and trolley useless.

56 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 86. 57 Dependant on the gauge of rail used. 58 Diary entry 7/06/1917, No 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance, War Diary, 1914-1919, NZA, Item No. R23817182, Record Group WA119 Box 173, Series 131/1. 221 6.1 - Light railway during at Picardie Somme, 191759

Preparations for the battle also involved the revision of gas procedures. In the New Zealand field ambulances for example, much work was done to ensure the safety of all men. The training included ‘special drills and a very stringent inspection of box respirators... and gas standing orders were promulgated, which were of a very complicated and comprehensive nature’.60 If gas penetrated a RAP or ADS, all work by the MO and his orderlies, had to cease at once. Stretcher-bearers would then have to find another location to take the wounded. This created more work and exposed all to risk of danger. The war diary of the 1st New Zealand Field Ambulance recorded their experience of gas and shelling whilst near Messines. The entry detailed how shelling impacted the work of the bearers and medical personnel at the front: ‘communication trenches were badly shelled with high explosives and occasional tear and gas shells: many of these fell

59 Source AWM, E00249. 60 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 273. 222 close to the two RAPs hindering the work and indeed stopping for a time the work of the RMOs’.61

Between 31 July 1917 and 10 November 1917, British Forces participated in eight battles against the Germans. The four-month campaign, officially known as The Battles of Ypres, 1917, included the following battles (in date order): The Battle of Pilckem, Langemarck, Menin Road, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, Poelcapelle, First and Second Battle of Passchendaele. Some reasons for the 1917 British offensive were that the French were unable at that time to carry out an offensive action because of unrest within their own Forces; the need to secure the Belgian coast and ports, effectively stemming German submarine attacks; and also Haig mistakenly believed that the Germans were ‘near to collapse’.62 Each of these battles included intense bombardment by heavy artillery and set piece actions. Butler described the problem for the medical services during the Ypres Battles as: ‘attack and defence, together with the terrain and weather determined the nature of the medical problem’.63 The salient was and remained at that time a very dangerous area.

The diarist of the 2/1st London Field Ambulance recorded the prospective return to Ypres, having been there previously in 1916, did not bode well for the men. The unit diarist recorded their general reaction: ‘Ypres! - the name was so often heard on men’s lips, that one seemed to know that grim and tragic city of the dead by heart’.64 Returning to Ypres caused great consternation, as Canadian stretcher-bearer ‘Tiny’ Morris related: ‘we were marching towards the battle of Passchendaele on the water logged plain beyond Ypres... usually there is chatter,

61 Diary entry 7/06/1917, No 1 New Zealand Field Ambulance, War Diary, op. cit. 62 British Generals Gough and Plumer felt that Haig had overestimated the pressures felt by the German Army. Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Passchendaele: the Sacrificial Ground, Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, 2000, p. 60. 63 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 183. 64 Unknown, ‘An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th Division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919’, Morton, Burt and Sons Limited, London, 1924, p. 55. 223 sometimes singing, when marching but, on this occasion, there was dead silence. George McConnel spoke up and wanted to know what was wrong, why we were so quiet’.65

The Ypres Salient presented many challenges for the medical services and the stretcher-bearers, one of them being how to treat and work with Mustard Gas. Gas posed many difficulties for men during the Battles of Ypres, 1917, when a new type of gas used by the Germans in July 1917 proved to be particularly loathsome and dangerous. Of these, Phosgene presented the most serious problem as ‘low concentrations are also disabling and even fatal, especially if breathed for considerable time, but the effects are not evident for several hours’.66 On the evening of 12-13 July 1917, during the Battles of Ypres, the Germans used mustard gas on British positions, causing 1,300 men to report to the British CCSs for treatment.67 It burnt the skin and eyes and required swift attention for those affected.68 MacPherson reported that during the period 12 July to 16 November 1917, the incidence of gas casualties (in the Fifth Army) increased and were of a far more serious nature, with ‘mortality’69 from gas poisoning being greater than seen in previous years. The problem of getting men affected by mustard gas back from the battlefront to suitable medical care proved to be another problem for the medical services to overcome. Gerald Fitzgerald confirmed ‘the complexity of treatment required in mustard injuries involved a new level of aid and medical care’.70 Mustard gas victims, if sufficiently affected, needed bathing in hot soapy water to remove all traces of the gas. Mustard gas had to be removed from the patient and their clothing that meant time was a priority.

65 Attributed to around 14/10/1917, H. M. (Tiny) Morris, Manuscript, The Story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1, op. cit., p. 31. 66 ‘Notes on Gases used in Enemy Shells’, 3/10/1917, 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Headquarters, Folder11, File 6, LAC, RG-9, III-C-3, Volume 4102. 67 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 170. 68 Gerald Fitzgerald ‘Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I’, American Journal of Public Health, 2008 April; 98(4): 611–625, p. 617. 69 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 170. 70 ibid. 224 Additionally, traces of the gas could affect the stretcher-bearers and medical staff handling those wounded. New ways of training the stretcher-bearers in managing gas wounds were introduced. The training included the use of artificial respiration, and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to clear the lungs of the heavy gas, which filled the patient’s lungs causing them to drown in their own fluids. An instruction was issued by the Director of Medical Services that ordered ‘all stretcher-bearers are to be thoroughly instructed in the method of carrying out artificial respiration, especially with reference to gas poisoning’.71

Many improvements had been made in relation to transport and supply leading up the Battles of Ypres. For example internal supply issues had generally improved by 1917. In July, DMS Skinner, Fifth Army and his ADMSs, whilst working on battle plans for the Third Battle of Ypres, made suitable and well judged plans for treating a large number of wounded. The Quartermaster for the Fifth Army duly arranged for the issue of over 8,000 stretchers, to the field ambulances of the Fifth Army for the Third Ypres Operations. DMS Skinner had instituted three advanced stores depots in the preparation of the battles. See table below.

71Item 39 ‘Special Instructions to Clearing Stations, Motor Ambulance Convoys’, DMS Instructions, 1st Army, 1/3/1917, TNA, WO 95/198. 225 6.2 - Table showing issue of canvas stretchers to field ambulances, Fifth Army, 1917. 72

Month Number of stretchers issued

July 1917 1,908

August 1917 1,638

September 1917 2,168

October 1917 2,234

November 1917 1,050

Unfortunately, these stretchers failed to become available to the field ambulances when required. MacPherson observed: ‘what [had] became of the enormous numbers of stretchers sent up to armies was at all times a mystery to those whose duty it was to endeavour to recover them’.73 17, 825 stretchers and a further 19,433 kept in reserve, had been allocated to be used by all the divisional field ambulances.74 Carelessness in the handling and storage of the stretchers and other equipment such as splints, blankets resulted in many, if not most, of the equipment being rendered unusable when required. Effectively, the responsibility to ensure these items were stored correctly, and where possible, safely, belonged to the CO of the field ambulances. Large numbers of the stretchers had been left in the open; subsequently they rotted and fell apart due

72 MacPherson, Medical Services during the Operations on the Western Front 1916, 1917, 1918; in Italy; Egypt and Palestine. Vol. III., op. cit., p. 166. 73 ibid. 74 ibid. 226 to the incessant rain in August and again in October. Additionally, shelling of stores dumps also ruined or seriously damaged equipment, with Butler recording: ‘750 blankets, 300 stretchers and many Thomas and other splints and dressings were sent up to the forward posts. Three large dumps had to be placed in the open and these suffered much from shelling.75

A stretcher shortage at many of the RAPs occurred when the transport could not reach forward areas due to the danger posed on the roads, and due to the poor condition of the roads. The usual practice of ambulance wagons returning empty stretchers failed to eventuate. This forced stretcher-bearers to attempt to find them. Without sufficient stretchers to carry the wounded, the problem of what to do with the wounded arose. Some stretcher-bearers attempted to piggyback lightly wounded men, but this practice proved to be unsustainable. Blankets used as substitute stretchers could not be used for all cases as they caused a great deal of pain. Lacking the means to carry men, the problem of men being left on the ground outside the RAP arose. New Zealand stretcher-bearer, Sidney Stanfield, remembered wounded men being exposed to the cold and lying in the mud, ‘they weren’t even laying on stretchers, just laying on the ground with an oil sheet tied over them if anyone thought to do that, or if one of their mates could do it. Just laying there, because the stretchers were used for picking up other men, you see, there couldn’t be a stretcher for every stretcher case’.76 The cold and wet summer had a terrible impact on all those who served during the Battles of Ypres, 1917. The wet weather caused many problems for the Australian stretcher-bearers during the Battle of Menin Road and for all during the two Battles of Passchendaele.

In this area of Flanders, the water table was particularly high and rainfall such as that, which fell during the months of August and October 1917, rapidly turned

75 ibid., p. 236 76 ‘Sidney Stanfield remembers Passchendaele’, World War 1 Oral Archive, Alexander Turnbull, OHC-002761. 227 the land into a quagmire.77 The ground was given very little opportunity to dry out over the summer. A combination of the heavy, persistent rain and bombardment by artillery shells added to the deterioration of the land. This had a major impact on all who served there, as a stretcher-bearer recorded: ‘had to go by Mud Lane route and as it has been raining for about 5 or 6 days it did not belie its name’.78 During the Battle of Menin Road, 20 – 25 September 1917, undertaken by divisions of the Second and Fifth British Armies and I Anzac Corps, the combination of warfare (heavy and persistent artillery bombardment), poor state of the roads and the terrain meant medical evacuation of the wounded was slow and difficult. Additionally, all the medical corps working in the area, including the AAMC, suffered large losses. The Battles of Polygon Wood, Broodseinde, and Poelcappelle followed the Menin Road action. There were many casualties in the AAMC during this period, so much so, that an order was issued by DDMS Manifold: ‘casualties amongst the AAMC are of serious gravity... please see that all bearer officers fully realise that bearers should not take undue risks’.79

Menin Road was a thoroughfare that ran through a great portion of the Ypres sector and was the main route for supply and evacuation for the British. This road, clearly visible to the Germans holding the ridge, provided little shelter to those forced to travel on it. The transportation problem became acute for the Australian stretcher-bearers of the I Anzac Corps working on the Menin Road during 20 - 24 September 1917. The bearers were forced to carry the wounded up to 8,000 yards (~7.3 km), as the heavy, constant shelling and the deterioration of the Menin Road prevented their use of wheeled stretchers and motor ambulance wagons.

77 See R. Prior and T. Wilson for an examination of the problems of the weather at Passchendaele 1917, R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele: the untold story, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1996. 78 Diary entry 1/08/1917, War Diaries of William Roy Robson, op. cit. 79 Cited in Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914- 1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 218. 228 Medical plans for evacuating the wounded had been developed earlier in the year. The necessity for quick evacuation of the wounded had been discussed, yet forces out of the hands of the medical services on the Ypres salient made this nearly impossible. Prior to the Battle of Menin Road, the Australian medical service had disengaged its AAMC drivers and replaced them with AASC. This also occurred in the other medical services. The reasoning for this was that it freed up AAMC men to fill positions such as bearers, orderlies and the like. The Australian field ambulances, under instructions from the DDMS Colonel Manifold, set about ensuring all lines of evacuation were in place, relief bearers, relays posts were determined, and sufficient and appropriate transport had been organised for the wounded. However, a lack of experience by Manifold and his Deputies resulted in insufficient medical personnel available.

Insufficient understanding of the battleground resulted in many dreadful errors. Butler argued the landscape such as the swamps had not been taken into consideration, and lines of evacuation went straight through these. The transport was contained in too narrow an area, which was under direct surveillance by the Germans and was almost constantly shelled, making movement impossible. Some parts of the line of evacuation consisted of only a plank road that could not cope with the amount of foot traffic. Wheeled traffic was impossible due to the shelling along the Menin Road, and impossible along the plank road which had quickly sunk into the morass. All evacuation except for the walking wounded could only be done by hand carry using the canvas stretchers. However, as it has already been shown, there was a dearth of stretchers available.

The AAMC stretcher-bearers responsible for clearing the wounded in the Menin Road area (during the Battles of Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde) in late September and early October 1917, suffered a high casualty rate within their ranks: ‘casualties in this Division [1st Australian] among bearers total seventy, and

229 the bearers have had little rest’.80 It is unknown how many regimental stretcher- bearers were killed. On 20 September 1917, the war diary of the DDMS, I ANZAC Corps, recorded the large number of casualties of AAMC personnel on that first day of the battle. Killed were Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas, 5th Field Ambulance, wounded were Major Heydon and Captain Johnson and added: ‘AAMC casualties were fairly heavy occasioned by long carry over heavy ground’.81 The war diary also stated that 31 personnel from the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance were reassigned to ‘replace corresponding number of 6th Australian Field Ambulance’.82

The 6th Australian Field Ambulance lost many of its men over the period 20 September – 9 October 1917. A Red Cross missing and wounded report detailed the circumstances involved when four men of a bearer squad were killed:

On 27th Sept. 1917 Sgt. Ellis was taking a party to a post through a fairly heavy barrage. A high explosive shell burst in the midst of the party killing Ptes. Etheridge, Maguire and Moore instantly and seriously wounding Sgt. Ellis. Sgt. Ellis was evacuated to 17th British Casualty Clearing Station but died in the early hours of the following morning... L/Sgt Robertson was just about to leave his post when a high explosive shell killed him instantly.83

In a letter to the parents of one of these men, Private Virgil Maguire, CO Major Fraser praised the work of Maguire’s four-man squad, all of whom were killed. He explained the circumstances of the men’s deaths: ‘this time the shells were particularly plentiful; of the four in his squad, three were killed outright and the

80 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 211. 81 ‘Diary entry 20/09/17, War Diary, Deputy Director of Medical Services, 1st ANZAC Corps, AWM 26/15/20. 82 Appendix 1, ibid. 83 Letter dated 11/02/1918, First World War, Red Cross Missing and Wounded Files, 1914-18 War, AWM, https://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1490290/ 230 fourth died soon after his wounds’.84 In a further condolence letter, Colonel S. H. Mosely spoke of Virgil’s importance to the field ambulance: ‘he was one of our best and one of a squad known to all for their coolness and courage in the most dangerous and difficult work. Our stretcher-bearers are noted for their bravery and he was one of the best’.85

The war diary of the 6th Australian Field Ambulance does not exist, and it is not known what has happened to it, but the DDMS hinted that there were extraordinary circumstances within the unit at the time. It is also noted the field ambulance was severely under strength on 2 October 1917, with ‘strength of Unit, 10 Officers, 182 other ranks’.86 This meant that the unit had to be bolstered from other field ambulances within the Division, which had a negative flow on effect. The war diaries of October 1917 detailed the difficult and dangerous situation faced by its stretcher-bearers working along the 2nd Australian Divisional front from 1 – 10 October 1917:

There were no duck-boards... at times these carries were terrible and the mud in many cases was up to the knees... one carry was especially bad, viz, the one in front of the brick-kiln where the bearers had to wade through the swamp... added to this the shell fire of 5.9 shells, which at times and places was very heavy made the arduous work a severe mental strain... no praise could be too high for the way the bearers kept doggedly to their work, not withstanding their extreme exhaustion. The Infantry bearers if possible suffered more than the ambulance men, as their shoulders were not hardened to the use of the stretcher handles.

The 6th Australian Field Ambulance, though having lost many men as casualties, worked tirelessly over September and October, with the men of the unit being

84 Letter of condolence from Major A. C. Fraser dated 30/9/1917, Virgil Maguire, AWM, 1DRL/0468. 85 Letter from Colonel S. H. Mosely to Maguire’s parents, 14/10/1917, ibid. 86 Diary entry 1/10/1917, War Diary, 6th Australian Field Ambulance, AWM 26/49/22, AWM 231 acknowledged for their work and bravery during the period 4 – 12 October 1918. The unit (in total) were awarded 1 Distinguished Conduct Medal, 3 bars to the Military Medal and 14 Military Medals; it was an extraordinary feat for a unit pushed to their very limits.87

Butler tells of many more AAMC casualties: ‘in this battle [Polygon Wood] the 4th Division field ambulances sustained 15 casualties, the 5th, 47’.88 The total number of deaths recorded by the CWGC as being buried in Belgium of AAMC personnel between 20 September – 11 October 1917, was 83. In comparison, for the same period and in the same location, 168 members of the RAMC were killed or died from wounds and are buried in Belgian cemeteries.89 The following photograph shows the headstones of three members of the AAMC who died from their wounds received on 27 September 1917, during the operations around the Menin Road, these are: Sergeant E. Ellis, Private D. Emmett and Private Foster Hunter all members of the AAMC.

87 Diary entry 31/10/1917, War Diary, 6th Australian Field Ambulance, AWM, AWM26/49/22. 88 Footnote #47, Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 218. 89 CWGC, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx?cpage=1 232 6.3 - Headstones of members of the AAMC buried at Lijssenthoek Cemetery 90

Very quickly, it was found that not enough medical corps stretcher-bearers were able to get to and from the RAPs, as Major Willis, the MO of the 7th Australian Infantry Battalion noted: ‘badly in need of bearers and stretchers. Despite our distance from the line the regimental bearers are now clearing us more rapidly than the ambulance is clearing back’.91 It cannot be fully explained why there was this delay; however, a possible explanation might be that as the front was moving forward, the distances between the RAPs and the ADSs grew wider. Butler also commented that many of the wounded sought treatment at the various ADSs for minor wounds, which slowed down the evacuation and increased the turn around time, delaying treatment for the wounded.

90 43 members of the AAMC are buried at the Lijssenthoek Cemetery, Belgium. The first death occurring on 22/08/1917, Lance Corporal Henry Thorsen and the final death recorded on 09/11/1917 of Private Harry Thomas. Authors’ personal photograph, taken in July 2011. 91 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 207. 233 The length of carry for stretcher-bearers once again posed problems during 20- 21 September, and again on 9-12 October, for the field ambulances of I Anzac, when the length of carry in some places measured up to ‘8,000 yards [~7.3 km]’92 and was undertaken over ‘a battlefield converted into a sea of mud... [with] six bearers were required for each stretcher’.93 On the evening of 9 October, it took each bearer team over five hours to carry between the RAP and ADS.94

Flexibility was allowed in this sector when it was decided that the line of evacuation previously organised was unsuitable. The duckwalks were unsuitable and did not provide an appropriate route for stretcher-bearers to walk over. (duckwalks also called duckboards, trench-mats or trench-gratings, were planks of wood, six feet long and wide enough to fit one man). When wet they became very slippery, causing bearers to lose their footing and then provided a very rough experience for the wounded man. Additionally, only two men, one in front and the other at the rear, could carry a stretcher. This was contrary to training and placed further strain on these men. Many deaths occurred when the stretcher-bearers, walking along the duckwalks, lost their footing and fell into the mud and water. The patient being carried, if unconscious, would have quickly drowned; those patients falling into the water would most likely have suffered an agonising death.

The Australian authorities realised that during the first two days of the battle, evacuation was beset by various problems, and began the process of re- organising practices for medical evacuation. The Official Australian History explained how flexibility in decision making along the line of evacuation during the Battle of Menin Road was used to overcome some of these issues:

On both fronts the clearing of casualties quickly became systematised. By

92 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 157. 93 ibid., p. 157. 94 ibid. 234 the method of trial and error-on a balance of the prime factors concerned, namely, distance, danger, and the duckboard tracks-the bearers and their officers and NCOs worked out the best routes and posts. Early on the 23rd in the 1st Division arrangements were adequate and personnel sufficient. Though the bearers ‘had a heavy time’ and casualties were considerable.95

Conditions did not improve in any way during the two Battles of Passchendaele. The First Battle of Passchendaele, 12 October 1917, and the Second Battle of Passchendaele 26 October - 10 November 1917, has become a byword for extreme hardship. The bad weather, particularly which which occurred in the latter part of 1917, had a definite negative impact on the lines of evacuation and for the stretcher-bearers. The external problems faced by the medical corps and stretcher-bearers were extensive, and evacuation of the wounded became a long, slow process in which many wounded died without getting any access to treatment. The Australian MO, Major Taylor, re-told of a situation at Passchendaele where stretcher-bearers had done all they could to reach 87 wounded of the 66th British Division (they had been wounded 4 days prior), and the hardships it placed on these Australian bearers:

All my men are done - many of the emergency infantry have run off. A good few cases will have to remain out all night-it is impossible to carry now - too dark and no tracks. Must have fresh bearers, all you can get together, at 5 a.m. It will take 150 fresh men to clear the field by tomorrow evening.96

The conditions were so appalling that many wounded could not be collected. In a desperate attempt to rescue the British casualties trapped in No Man’s Land for days, various field ambulances of the New Zealand Division were instructed to clear the area. Stretcher-bearer William Robson gave an insight into the

95 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 210. 96ibid., p. 239. 235 experience: ‘the 49th Division whom we relieved, went out leaving 200 stretcher cases for us to shift – most of whom had been out for 4-5 days... we had as many as 1000 infantryman on to help with the bearing’.97 This is not a criticism of those other field ambulances who worked in the area and whom had to leave their wounded behind. It demonstrated how particularly bad the conditions for operating a scheme of evacuation on the battlefield at Passchendaele. A. D. Carbery, the Official Historian of the Medical Services for New Zealand, confirmed the many external problems that faced the stretcher-bearers of the NZMC at Passchendaele:

The difficulties were exceptional, the wounded came in as fast as they were cleared; there was a two mile stretch devoid of cover and constantly swept by shell fire... nearly every stretcher had to be carried three miles [~4.8 km] by hand over ground in places a foot [~300 mm] deep in mud.98

Historians have argued both for and against the decision to continue the battle following the ‘catastrophic return of atrocious weather conditions’99 in August and again in October 1917. Nigel Steel and Peter Hart argue that Corps Commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, had no direction from Haig and he therefore decided that he should, ‘try, try and try again’100 to win. Hew Strachan argued Passchendaele was the ‘embodiment of the First World War’s waste and futility. But it had a clear strategic purpose’101 being to secure the Belgian Coast. Passchendaele Ridge was an easy location to defend due to its vantage point over the surrounding lower ground. The Germans had occupied the ridge from 1914 through 1917, which allowed them full visibility of any offensive launched. Roads and trenches in the British sectors were under constant surveillance and easily attacked by the Germans. The two battles came at an extraordinarily high cost. Canadian historian, Tim Cook, aptly described living and working in the area

97 Diary entry 11/10/1917, War Diaries of William Roy Robson, op. cit. 98 Carbery, New Zealand Medical Services in the Great War: 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 342. 99 Steel and Hart, Passchendaele: the Sacrificial Ground, op. cit., p. 257. 100 ibid., p. 161. 101 Hew Strachan, The First World War: A New Illustrated History, op. cit., p. 244. 236 as a: ‘horrific pervasiveness of quick-sand like mud and buried corpses brought to mind Dante’s images of hell’.102

British stretcher-bearer, Private H. V. Reed of the 52nd British Field Ambulance, gave an example of the difficulties for the stretcher-bearers’ experience of Passchendaele, when he recorded the following intimate recollection. The demonstration of despair as described by Private Reed (written in his later years) that the experience had a long lasting and profound impact on this stretcher- bearer:

I found myself on the 25th day of that month on Passchendaele Ridge – a most unhealthy spot... more than once I found myself helpless in the mud nearly to my waist and had to be pulled out with the aid of an empty stretcher... the stench in places was awful and dead bodies, both human and animal were littered all over the place... it is impossible to record the misery and dejected feeling I experienced there.103

Mud, rain and cold left stretcher-bearers exhausted to the point of collapse. It required substantially more time and men to carry in the wounded. Everyone was tested to the point of breaking. Carrying out medical evacuation at Passchendaele had become, as Canadian DDMS 1st Canadian Division had predicted: ‘the prevailing conditions of the evacuation of wounded will be a matter of extreme difficulty... the deep soft mud... [will] render the work of carrying, one of an extremely arduous nature’.104 Regimental stretcher-bearers, it was acknowledged, would have an equally difficult time as their medical corps brethren: ‘a word for the [regimental] stretcher-bearers would not be out of

102 Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, op. cit., p. 309. 103 H. V. Reed ‘My Bit’, Unpublished manuscript, IWM, Catalogue no. 08/147/1. 104 Corps Medical Instruction, 21/10/1917, 1st Canadian Division, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services, CWM, RG-9, III-C-10, Vol. 4541. 237 place. It was quite a common occurrence for men to sink to the thighs and waists in the soft slimy mud which drew one down, down forever downward’.105

The poor conditions led to a delay in clearing the wounded, resulting in wounded men being stockpiled, awaiting clearance from the area. New Zealander Sidney Stanfield, recalled the difficulty of collecting wounded in the rain of October 1917, at Passchendaele. In an interview given in 1988, it was clear Sidney had not forgotten any of the horror of Passchendaele. His experience, even so many years after the war, is common for men that served at Passchendaele. Stanfield’s emotional tone (on the recording) when describing this episode, revealed the acute difficulties for men when trying to reconcile the events:

It rained and rained and bloody rained, see... we were picking them up from a gathering point as a regimental aid post. Well there were hundreds of men laying out, around. You couldn’t get them inside, it was an old German concrete emplacement and you couldn’t get them all inside, but the doctors were working inside. And they were just laying around where they’d been dumped by the stretcher-bearers from off the field and at one period I believe there were 600 stretcher cases laying round the place in the wet and cold, just dying there where they were dumped off.106

William Shaw Antliff explained how difficult it was to extricate oneself from puddles, shell holes and streams. The shell-ravaged terrain had filled with water, with the water being unable to drain away:

We got to a little stream 4 feet across and three feet deep. Myself and another fellow jumped in the water and we boosted the stretcher across. I

105 Attributed to the 38th Infantry Battalion, AIF, Unit History, Cited in Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 239. 106 ‘Sidney Stanfield remembers Passchendaele’, World War 1 Oral Archive, op. cit. 238 don’t know how we would have got clear only two engineers came and pulled us out.107

At Passchendaele, many of the seriously wounded who were unable to summon help took shelter in the shell holes that littered the landscape. Stretcher-bearer Randolph Norman Gray, of the NZMC, served at Passchendaele in 1917. He recorded the dire circumstances many of the wounded found themselves in No- Man’s Land:

The ground was indescribable, shell holes covering every foot, and filled with water. Wounded men were drowned in dozens of cases... stretcher- bearers had been working within 200 yards [~180 m] of the pillboxes, being sniped at by rifles and machine guns, and dying in dozens. Eight men could scarcely get one wounded man away from the awful morass.108

Also killed at Passchendaele were five stretcher-bearers of the 9th Australian Field Ambulance, the men were Privates Charles O. D. Edser, Francis Henry Hughes, Bernard Fox, C. J. Walshe, E. Sullivan and Corporal B. H. Sutherland. These men were either killed outright or were badly wounded by the same shell on the 12 October. The circumstances relating to their deaths are not extraordinary, as many tens of thousands of other men were killed by shelling, however that the bodies of Private Edser and Fox were never recovered tells us much about the nature of the fighting and difficulties of working in the terrain. Private Edser was killed by a shell fragment in the neck whilst stretcher-bearing on the Zonnebeke Road. His comrade fellow stretcher-bearer Private W. M. Menzies, described Edser’s death as:

I was close up to Edser at the time he was killed. He was stretcher bearing at Frost House, Zonnebeke Road and was on the way back for another case

107 Letter dated 3/11/1917, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, William Shaw Antliff, op. cit. 108 Diary entry 28/10/1917, Gray family papers: Diary and letters to Gray family from Norman Gray, Alexander Turnbull, MS Papers 4134, Folder 3. 239 when a shell got him. He was badly hit about the body. His body was left up there [No Man’s Land] till October 20th. I don’t think he would ever be buried. It was impossible to get his body down, being too much mud and too heavy work.109

The problem of heavy rain also affected the stretcher-bearers’ ability to perform evacuation, by adding additional weight to their carry. The rain made uniforms heavy; it soaked through the canvas of the stretchers and the mud stuck to the clothing of the wounded. Carrying a stretcher laden with a patient and blankets balanced on the shoulder for hours caused much pain for the bearers. William Shaw Antliff, a Canadian stretcher-bearer, found himself in a similar, trying position. Remembering that the canvas stretchers were heavy, and with the addition to the weight of the wounded man, manoeuvring, lifting and carrying became a burden. As Antliff recorded: ‘we got stuck in a bad place where we sunk in the mud up to and over our knees and loaded down as we were with the stretcher it seemed impossible to get out’.110

Additional problems occurred when stretcher-bearing occurred while the feet were wet, as this brought on blisters. Long periods of walking caused aching, fatigued legs and feet and led to trench foot. Private William David Bradley, a Canadian stretcher-bearer attached to the 54th Canadian Infantry Battalion, ably described his experience when he wrote home: ‘there is lots of mud in the trenches and when I came out my feet were as tired as could be’.111

In an attempt to alleviate the burden of men having to work and walk in the mud, duckboards were laid, however these were not without their own

109 Private Edser’s death is recorded on the Menin Gate Memorial. Letter dated 23/03/1918, First World War, Red Cross Missing and Wounded Files, 1914-18 War, AWM, 1DRL/0428. 110 Letter dated 3/11/1917, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, William Shaw Antliff, op. cit. 111 Letter dated 20/11/1917, William David Bradley to Miss Beatrice Peacock, William David Bradley, op. cit. 240 problems as has been discussed previously. The diarist of the 8th Canadian Field Ambulance provided his perspective on the efficacy of carrying a stretcher over the trench mats:

The distance of the carry would be approximately 2 ½ miles [~4 km]... trench mats had been placed along the route, but these being so narrow, to avoid the dangerous possibility of the bearers slipping from the side of these into the sinking ground beneath, it was impossible to adopt the usual system of a 4 man carry shoulder high, and necessary to reset to the 2 man system, which of course, greatly added to the arduous work.112

The 4th Canadian Field Ambulance recorded the dangers faced by stretcher- bearers who feared sinking into the muddy morass, ‘from Mitchell Farm forward Duck walks commence about ¼ mile [~400 m] in front and lead clear through to Tyne Cottage, making progress quicker but treacherous for carrying stretchers over’.113 The unit history of the 2/1st London Field Ambulance further testifies to the danger posed by the mud. The unit historian wrote: ‘the carrying track was nothing more than a single line of duckboards... [in] a sea of mud, and one false step might well have proved fatal. As was evident from the numbers of drowned men [and horses]... submerged in that dreadful swamp’.114

In his plans for medical arrangements for the October operations of his Divisions, the Canadian DMS advised the COs of the field ambulances that, due to the difficult conditions, additional bearers would be required ‘it is therefore estimated that at least 400 stretcher-bearers per brigade will have to be

112 ‘With the Canadians in their attack on Passchendaele Ridge’, Report 30/11/1917, War Diary No. 8 Canadian Field Ambulance, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services, op. cit. 113 Report Undated, No. 4 Canadian Field Ambulance, November 1917, ibid. 114 The 2/1st London Field Ambulance, ‘An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th Division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919’, Morton, Burt and Sons Limited, London, 1924, p. 56. 241 detailed, in addition to the ordinary medical personnel’.115 Due to the very difficult conditions, the stamina of stretcher-bearers was soon tested and it became necessary to increase the numbers of bearers in each squad: ‘Brigade and battalion stretcher-bearers were carrying in squads of 10 men to a stretcher to Regimental Aid Posts’.116 This had a flow on effect with men who were at rest being called to serve as regimental bearers without having had sufficient time out of the front to recover. Long shifts, which were common during an engagement, prevented the bearers from getting any respite or proper rest, which led to fatigue, sickness, and physical and mental breakdowns.

William Shaw Antliff explained how the constant demands on medical corps stretcher-bearers to work beyond their physical and emotional limits took a toll on unit morale. Antliff and his bearer squad were having a rest after nearly drowning in a water filled shell hole. These men were ordered by a senior officer to return to the front line to collect more wounded. After their near death experience, Antliff and his men, pushed beyond their emotional and physical limits, disobeyed the direct order. Antliff explained:

You could have knocked me over with a feather I was so surprised and altho [sic] I could have gone myself and one other was in fair shape, the other four men on the squad could scarcely lift a stretcher let alone carry any distance. As I was in charge of the squad I made a strenuous kick and as the [9th Canadian Field Ambulance] NCO backed me up, we finally got out of it.117

Additional problems arose with heavy casualty rates amongst medical corps personnel including the stretcher-bearers. The issue of units working below

115 ‘Medical Arrangements Canadian Corps’, Memorandum dated 21/10/1917, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services, op. cit. 116 ‘The Clearing of the line during the Operations for the Capture of the Passchendaele Ridge’, 2- 11th November 1917, 1st Canadian Division Report, Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services op. cit. 117 Letter dated 3/11/1917, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, William Shaw Antliff, op. cit. 242 establishment was an internal problem that all armies tried to manage. Colonel W. H. Parkes, DMS, NZEF, acknowledged the heavy toll on his stretcher-bearers who worked in clearing the battlefields:

The heavy casualties among New Zealanders during the Passchendaele Offensive was particularly noticeable in the NZMC and the Division is very considerably under strength in stretcher-bearers. To meet the shortage I have drafted every available ‘A ‘ class man from base hospital units... even the stationary hospital in France is handing over a draft of ‘A’ class men... and they will be replaced by ‘B’ and ‘C’ class men as orderlies.118

Under strength units meant men were not relieved out of the line as frequently. The inflexibility of army doctrine (in boosting personnel numbers) and the terrible conditions caused Colonel Parkes to criticise the limitations of corps and divisional establishments. He recorded his dissatisfaction: ‘it seems almost impossible for stretcher-bearers to operate under such awful condition. The transport of wounded therefore emphasises the need of a full complement of personnel, in fact there should be attached bearers in excess of establishment but this is not permitted’.119 Senior personnel acknowledged a lack of stretcher- bearers and the terrible conditions; however, they could only provide short-term relief. New Zealander, Private Horatio Hall, described the long, hard days and nights stretcher-bearing at Passchendaele. In his diary he wrote: ‘we were kept going all day and most of the night without rest... it rained during the day and made everything very unpleasant and hard work carrying especially at night’.120

The numbers of stretcher-bearers in each bearer squad increased during the wet and cold weather. The established routine was a bearer-squad which consisted

118 Report Colonel Parkes, dated 14/12/1917, Establishments and Recruitment – Organisation Medical Services NZEF, NZA, AD1 829, 29/168. 119 ibid. 120 Diary entry 4/10/1917, Horatio Hall, Kippenberger Military Archives and Research Library, Accession No. 1997.487. 243 of six men, four men to carry the stretcher, one man to lead and one who carried the wounded man’s equipment. Initially at Passchendaele, each bearer squad increased in size with six men allocated to carry the stretcher in rotation. Danger from attack by the Germans was also present as James Brady, a stretcher-bearer with the 43rd British Field Ambulance, explained:

It was 6 men to a stretcher to clear casualties from the ridges... every man up to his thighs in thick, clinging mud... we moved 1 step at a time...it took 1 hour to travel 100 yards [~91 m] all the time being shot at by Germans who chose to ignore the red-cross brassards on our sleeve and the red-cross pennant we carried.121

Danger of being killed on the job was a constant worry. Stretcher-bearers, though non-combatants, were subjected to the same threats to their life as their combatant comrades. Some locations along the Western Front posed more of a threat to life than others. Canadian stretcher-bearer William Shaw Antliff, also wrote about his frightening experience with shells falling short of their target at Passchendaele:

After watching a few burst on the road ahead of us we decided that he who turns and runs will live to run another day and we beat it across the shell holes. Here we got hopelessly stuck... we put the patient down for a rest and had only moved on again 25 yards [~22 m] when a big one hit where we had just been. The bits flew thru the helmet the patient was using as a pillow.122

Private Norman Randolph Gray a stretcher-bearer of the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance rose through the ranks of the medical corps attaining the rank Second Lieutenant by July 1917. In October 1917 at Passchendaele, Norman was

121 ‘Private Papers of J. Brady RAMC’, op. cit., p. 109. 122 Letter dated 23/10/1917, William Shaw Antliff to his mother, William Shaw Antliff, op. cit. 244 shelled and gassed, which nearly cost him his life. From the hospital at Wimereux he wrote to his parents telling of the loss of eight of his men, and how he tried to dig those buried alive out of the mud and dirt. Solemnly, Lieutenant Gray recorded: ‘there is no time for tears for the dying’123 from which the title of this thesis is derived.

In 1917, in France and Belgium the official British figure given for the wounded is 1,064,414, officer and other ranks.124 This figure does not include the wounded that died, nor does it include those KIA or missing, or prisoners, however the figure affords us with an idea of the challenge posed to the medical services. In 1917, external pressures made stretcher-bearing on the Western Front very difficult. Stretcher-bearers, at the forefront of medical evacuation, worked under significant difficulties. Internal problems with the army and medical service hierarchy were better managed, with the medical service becoming an integral part of planning for battle.

1918, the final year of the war, would once again push the medical services to their limits, when the British were under threat of defeat, not dissimilar to that posed in August 1914 at Mons, and then later in the year as the war developed into a war of movement. Stretcher-bearers, as we have seen in earlier chapters, would struggle to maintain contact with their infantry brethren when on the attack and moving forward. The New Year would offer little respite.

123 Diary entry 27/11/1917, Norman Gray, Alexander Turnbull, Gray Family, Diary and letters to Gray Family from Norman Gray, MS-Papers-4134, Folder 3. 124 War Office, Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914- 1920, op. cit., p. 253-265. 245 CHAPTER 7 – 1918

Significant developments in the way the war was conducted on the Western Front throughout 1918, led to the cessation of hostilities on 11 November 1918, when an armistice was declared.1 These developments included a change from static trench warfare to a war of movement, new tactics and greater co- ordination between specialist arms such as the air force, tanks divisions and artillery. The battles of 1918 were a series of offensive, counter-offensive and retreat actions, by both the Allied Forces and the Germans. 1918, might be describes as a year of two phases. In the first phase from March to July, the Germans fiercely attacked and gained control, and in the second phase the British, French and American Forces drove the Germans back.

In March, as the Germans advanced, many Allied Forces men caught in a rapidly enforced retreat were left on the battlefield, or separated from their units. For the medical services, it was sadly a case of déjà vu, redolent of the medical catastrophe experienced at Mons in 1914. Of the retreat, an unnamed British stretcher-bearer recorded: ‘a tank man I was talking to said it is a worse retreat than Mons so far as hardships were concerned and I am inclined to believe him’.2 A combination of problems for the stretcher-bearers involved the actions of the enemy, communication, transport issues, the large numbers of wounded and manpower issues.

The second phase of the war in 1918 saw the Germans on the retreat, when French and British Forces began to apply newly developed techniques and tactics. Commentators have offered many scenarios and explanations as to why the Germans failed to capitalise on their early successes (which are beyond the

1 The Compiègne Armistice was signed on 11/11/1918. 2 Letter dated 1/04/1918 ‘A letter written by a medical orderly in France’, IWM, Misc 278 item 3742. 246 scope of this thesis). After this failure, the Allied Forces began their steady advance that ended with the agreement to an Armistice. Creeping barrage, tanks, training and co-ordination of specialist forces were the decisive elements to the British successes. This is not to say that there were no problems present for the British in the second half of 1918, and casualty rates certainly remained high.3 What did occur however was a thoroughly coordinated and controlled plan of action designed to defeat the German Army. This included planning and flexibility in the provision of medical evacuation of the wounded, which was regarded as an integral part of battle management.

Essentially mobile warfare forced the British Forces to reconsider the manner in which casualties and treatment of wounded were best managed. This chapter examines problems experienced by the British Forces’ stretcher-bearers, firstly in retreat and under severe pressure from March to July 1918, and subsequently when the British began to take the ascendency in August 1918. This is necessary, as there was a definite change in the experience of the war by the stretcher- bearers in 1918.

On 21 March 1918, the German Army launched an offensive against British and French-held lines in France and Flanders. The offensive named Operation Michael, was the first of four German offensives conducted during the spring, the others being Georgette, Gneisenau and Blücher-Yorck. Thousands of troops recently returned from the campaign on the Eastern Front had bolstered the German Army. By 20 March 1918, there were 192 German divisions in France and Flanders, whereas Allied numbers totalled 169.4 A problem for Allied Forces

3 NB: The casualty rates published for this period include sick, wounded, killed and POW. 4 Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, Allen Lane, London, 1978, p. 20. 247 at that time was a lack of fighting experience within its Armies, such as the Americans and the new British Armies.5

During Operations Michael and Georgette (The Battle of the Lys), which began on 21 March 1918, and concluded on 4 July 1918, there were many problems to be overcome by the British Forces’ medical services and their stretcher-bearers. The problems examined are fierce fighting and a forced British retreat, with large numbers of casualties. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, it was shown that medical evacuation of the sick and wounded during a retreat proved to be a complex issue for the medical services to operate in. The problems examined arose during the Battles of St Quentin, 21-23 March 1918; Bapaume, 24-25 March 1918; Rosieres, 26-27 March 1918; Arras, 28 March 1918; Avre, 4 April 1918; Ancre, 5 April 1918; Villers-Bretonneux, 24-25 April 1918; Hamel, 4 July 1918 and during the Second Battle of the Marne, 20 July – 2 August 1918.

On the eve of the battle (Operation Michael), 52 Infantry and 3 Cavalry British Forces divisions lined up against a front that spanned 126 miles (~200 km), a massive defensive position to hold.6 The offensive opened with a ferocious and sustained barrage of British held positions on 21 March 1918. The fierceness of the barrage overwhelmed the British positions. An unnamed British stretcher- bearer described the shelling of the billets where he and his stretcher squad were resting on the 21 March 1918, as follows:

A high velocity shell came through the roof of the loft where all the men were. Blew all the floors away, killed two lovely horses, our transport which

5 After the Passchendaele Offensive in 1917. Lloyd-George refused to allow the trained men in England to be sent to France. Martin Middlebrook contended that the British Armies had been depleted of men and had struggled to maintain a fit fighting force, being 70,000 under strength. Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, op. cit., pp. 21-25. 6 Earlier the British had undergone a reorganization of its divisional structure, with a reduction of the number of battalions per brigade to three. Gary Sheffield, ‘Finest hour? British Forces on the Western Front in 1918’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010, p 56. 248 were stabled underneath, all the men went down amongst them. I dashed to the window and saw what I shall never forget, the men were all running out and scattering fearing another shell.7

British positions, in some places, quickly fell to the Germans due to the extended front and because ‘the British line had been held with so few men and so few guns’.8 Many British units began to retire as the attacking German Army captured ever more positions. The initial attack left many British divisions reeling, having suffered large losses, with ‘38,000 casualties’9 at the end of the first day. Gary Sheffield argued the British made mistakes on that first day, yet overall, the Germans failed to capitalise on their early success and on 12 March, began ‘a series of operations that [ultimately] resulted in a strategic disaster for the Germans’.10

On that first day, a heavy fog diminished visibility. Attempting to collect the wounded from the battlefield became a difficult and disorientating procedure, as it was hard to determine where the wounded lay or exactly where on the battlefield a person was working. These issues slowed down the rate of collection and evacuation, negatively influencing the chances of a wounded man’s recovery. Stretcher-bearer Private A. H. Flindt of the 27th British Field Ambulance reported:

The first journey was really mind-bending. One couldn’t see a couple of yards around and shells seemed to be landing under our feet... we knew the way down the winding trench to the next post – quite a distance with a heavy man on a stretcher – but we were glad of the protection that the

7 ‘Personal Experience of an NCO in charge of a stretcher squad’, Wellcome Library, RAMC 1781, p. 25. 8 J. E. Edmonds, A Short History of World War 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1951, p. 280. 9 Gary Sheffield, ‘Finest hour? British Forces on the Western Front in 1918’, op. cit., p 57. 10 ibid., p 56. 249 trench gave us... subsequent journeys were made in a sort of bemused, half-awake state which stifled fear and kept us going like automatons.11

The British had been aware that a major attack was forthcoming. In preparation for a large-scale attack by the Germans, the British Forces’ medical services took steps at Corps and Divisional level to take a ‘defensive position’12 in anticipation of a possible breakdown in the line of evacuation.13 This demonstrated an awareness of, and an attempt to, mitigate similar problems and errors experienced by the British field ambulances during the Retreat at Mons in 1914. Even though it was clearly identified by the DMS and his DGMS that a German attack would put the field ambulances and medical services under intense pressure, not all of the participants accepted the recommendations and plans. At a meeting in March, the DMS British Fifth Army had been warned that his ‘casualty clearing stations might be lost in the event of an attack’.14 His refusal to heed this advice resulted in the loss and capture of those CCSs during the British withdrawal over the 21-26 March 1918. Dressing stations and CCS in forward areas began to close as the Germans advanced; this forced the swift evacuation of the sick and wounded.

Instructions issued in early 1918, stated that a CCS should prepare for the eventuality of relocating quickly and, as such, only a certain portion of their stores and equipment would be able to be moved. The following account highlights the pressures put on stretcher-bearers and orderlies of the Army Medical Corps. During the retreat, field ambulance personnel had to quickly relocate their dressing stations and CCSs because of the threat of being captured by the Germans. Having to pack and move a CCS, as well as the patients in a

11 Originally cited in Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, op. cit., p. 152. 12 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 202. 13Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, op. cit., p. 296. 14 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 212. 250 short period resulted in a frantic rush. Packing all the equipment and loading patients into wagons took much effort and time. In a letter to his mother, this unnamed orderly, who also worked as a stretcher-bearer, described events of the 21 March 1918:

It was found that the enemy was too close to leave the patients at all, so we all stuck to and commenced to clear the hospital of all patients it was a big job for the CCS was more than full and nearly all were stretcher cases and we could get no transport for them. The infantry had already retreated down behind us... We left carrying our rations and half a dozen stretchers at the back of the party. I belong to one of the carrying party, of course we travelled slower than those who were marching and after a bit we lost the main party... The whole affair has been a terrible experience one which I do not wish to go through again.15

MacPherson stated that the withdrawal and abandonment of British Forces’ dressing stations and many CCSs made it impossible for the DMS of the Third Army to maintain the setline of evacuation during the German Offensive. The clearing stations were pushed further back, thus extending the clearance of wounded in terms of both time and distance. Generally, in an offensive position, two CCS were placed in forward positions to expeditiously cope with the many casualties, leaving one in the rear to take any overflow. During the retreat however, the situation was reversed. The ADMS Third Army had to ensure that the CCSs were moved in time and that new routes of evacuation were organised and distributed.16 The problem of moving a CCS is that these units were very large and not fully mobile and ‘over 100 lorries [were needed] to move a CCS’.17

15 Letter dated 1/04/1918, ‘A letter written by a medical orderly in France’, op. cit. 16 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 201. 17 ibid. 251 A reorganisation and revision of the practices of the CSSs occurred during 1918, in order to overcome these problems. The DGMS issued orders on 2 April 1918, in preparation for an upcoming offensive, which clearly and plainly stated that under no circumstances would it be acceptable to have a CCS too far forward and that these must be situated as far back as possible from the front-line with ‘intermediate dressing stations’18 acting as mobile CCSs. This is evidence that the army had allowed the medical service increased flexibility in their operations.

Managing clearance during a retreat is a very difficult task and inevitably, some of the wounded were left behind on the battlefield. Private Flindt recorded an order to retire as his unit was in danger of being cut off from his Brigade: ‘a despatch rider arrived from HQ, ordering us to evacuate our post [RAP]... the Division who were supposed to support our right flank but who had simply disappeared in the day’s confusion’.19

Private A. V. Atkinson, of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance, related the loss of forward areas and resulting confusion during the first day of Operation Michael in the Unit History and war diary. The war diary recounted the impact of the German advance on the stretcher-bearers and demonstrated the manner in which evacuation lines became confused. Atkinson recorded: ‘after terrific barrage enemy attacked in huge number. Guards Division lost Monchy. Canadian Division on Vimy Ridge held their ground. Our division fell back from ‘blue line’ to ‘red line’ and held on. Eight of our men in forward aid post captured. Myself and several others very fortunate. Rushed up to line in cars’.20

18 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 252. 19 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle:21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, op. cit., p. 299. 20 Diary entry 28/03/1918, ‘London Soldiers – Unarmed Comrades: being the story of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance and their service with the 56th London (Territorial) Division in France 1916-1918’, Compiled by Private A. V. Atkinson, AMS, RAMC/CF/4/3/22/ELLI. 252 Stretcher-bearer William Robson, of the 2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance, recorded his personal experience of operating during the British retreat in March 1918. His unit had been at Caestre when they were ordered to pack up the dressing station and be ready to move out. They remained standing to, for three days before they entrained to Mailly-Mallet. The unit had been on the move for five days, sleeping in open paddocks and without proper food throughout the period. Robsons’ diary entry for that day reflected the confusion and uncertainty experienced when the brigades of the division retreated. On 28 March 1918, Robson wrote: ‘it appears the division we were supposed to relieve here did not wait to be relieved but hopped it before we got in. Consequence was when the Dirks came up to take over the line they met Fritz coming into this village in column en route, and now he is 2 miles [~3.2 km] from here’.21 The New Zealand Division suffered terribly from a lack of available transport as Carbery pointed out that owing to ‘a lack of sufficient busses [sic] and lorries’22 medical evacuation of their wounded was ‘hampered’.23

Similarly, stretcher-bearer Walter George Cook, of the 27th British Field Ambulance, explained how, after collecting the wounded, he was unable to locate any transport for them, as ambulance cars could not negotiate the congested roads. This was a common problem, not only in the circumstances of a retreat, but as a by-product of war, when narrow country roads quickly become jammed with transport of all kinds, such as supply vehicles. In the scenario Cook is referring to, however, it is a problem directly caused by the retreating British Forces. Cook stated: ‘I stayed to help the walking wounded. I carried a chap with another chap, and the roads were jammed. Our transport retreating as far as the eye can see... I walked for ten miles [~16 km]’.24 Despite the warnings, the stretcher-bearers of this field ambulance had found themselves forward of their own line, trapped and abandoned because the evacuation line was forced to run

21 Diary entry 28/03/1918, War Diaries of William Roy Robson, op. cit. 22 On the 28/03/1918, the NZ Divisions participated in the First Battle of Arras, Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 386. 23 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 24 ibid. 253 parallel to the front and not backwards. This was a repeat of the situation that previously occurred at Mons in 1914, when field ambulance and regimental stretcher-bearers found themselves too far forward of the rapidly retreating line. Bearer squads advancing forward to collect the wounded at the frontline were impeded by the retreating infantry. Cook explained his feeling of helplessness during the retreat: ‘I was treating wounded at the Catacombs, when suddenly an alarm went that the Germans were breaking through... You can’t just go away’.25

Stretcher-bearer H. V. Reed explained the difficulties faced by the stretcher- bearers located near Warlincourt:

That night we again retired... it was at this stage that I lost all my equipment. The battalion Sgt Major and his batman were both wounded and a stretcher-bearer was mortally wounded. Word came through early in the afternoon, ‘every man for himself’ so we broke away and made back. One of the aid post staff was sent out here with a verbal message and never returned... I was still with the doctor and his little aid post staff now minus one... the road was a congested mass of motor lorries, ambulances, stretcher-squads, gun teams and transport wagons. I lost the rest of our party here so jumped in a motor lorry and got a good lift towards Meaulte... we again fell back and marched in the darkness through Meaulte to Warloy.26

Evacuation of the wounded during a retreat (as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis) is problematic due to the external pressures imposed. Medical units in forward areas became separated from their brigades and were left unprotected and alone. Some of the wounded were abandoned to the enemy and CCSs fell in to German hands.27 Typically during a retreat of an army, medical evacuation of

25 Walter George Cook, Oral history, op. cit. 26 H. V. Reed, My Bit, Unpublished manuscript, op. cit. 27 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 211. 254 the wounded would normally flow backwards, however in March this was not the case. Medical evacuation by the field ambulances ran parallel, particularly in the British Third Army zone, leaving the stretcher-bearer personnel caught out in forward areas. As the retreating brigades flowed backwards the stretcher- bearers remained far too forward, which forced them to carry over a longer line of evacuation. During this period, communication broke down in a manner similar to the experience at Mons in 1914 as the British Divisions came under the intense pressure from the German offensive. For the New Zealand field ambulances, ‘amended orders’28 were issued and received at the time and the resultant miscommunication imposed a burden on the stretcher-bearers, causing them to become separated from their brigades and field ambulance.29

MacPherson related how the movement along the lines of evacuation during this period suffered from miscommunication. He stated, in the British Third Army: ‘there appears, however, to be some confusion at Edgehill [CCS] owing to orders and counter orders’.30 This breakdown in communication caused problems further up the line as it became unclear where the wounded were to be transported to, and staff had to be retained at the closed CSS in case wounded were transferred to closed CCSs. In the chaos of the retreat, a breakdown in communication sometimes resulted in messages being either not received or as the following example demonstrates, confused messages received. A British stretcher-bearer explained:

I was detailed to go with [the] ambulance through Chaany to a quarry to collect some wounded... we got through with difficulty and when we got there some one had [already] collected the wounded. When we returned (back to its ambulance]... the Germans were there firing through the

28 H. V. Reed, My Bit, Unpublished manuscript, op. cit. 29 The New Zealand Division were attached to IV Corps, Third Army at the time. 30 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 236. 255 streets. We were lucky to get away. It wasn’t long before the Germans broke right through and cut us off with the French.31

Confused orders and messages resulted in much confusion and dissatisfaction; it also hampered the work of the stretcher-bearers. The field ambulances of the New Zealand Division, for example, were to have been attached to the British Fifth Army at Arras, but after some disorganisation and miscommunication due to pressure of the German attack they were moved around numerous areas, finally settling with IV Corps, Third Army. The Official Historian of the New Zealand Medical Services, Carbery, highlighted the many problems faced by the New Zealanders during this period:

Some confusion and delay in the concentration of the Division had resulted from alterations in the orders issued by the Higher Command, but these amended orders were caused by the rapid fluctuations in the disorganised British lines of resistance... in view of the confusing alterations in our detraining orders the ADMS ordered general instructions to the field ambulance commanders... that they were to act for the present, under the orders of their respective brigade commanders.32

After the initial problems during the March attacks, the British Forces’ medical services worked to overcome any such future problems. Planning and co- ordination was undertaken between the army and medical services in early April to prepare for further German attacks. The assorted Corps DMSs and their ADMSs made extraordinarily detailed provisions for medical care during these dangerous times, demonstrating how flexibility between the army and the medical services developed over the course of 1918. The liaison and open

31 ‘Personal Experience of an NCO in charge of a stretcher squad’, op. cit., p. 27. 32 25-27 March 1918, Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 386. 256 communication between the army hierarchy and the medical services alleviated many (but not all) issues that had previously hindered medical care.

On 9 April 1918, the ADMS of the 9th (Scottish) Division and the commanders of the field ambulances met to discuss plans for medical arrangements in light of German preparations for an attack. After the failure of the routes of evacuation during the retreat in March, work had to be undertaken to overcome a repeat of the situation. The CO of the 27th British Field Ambulance recorded: ‘medical arrangements in case of retreat, MDS to return back to the site of a CCS’.33 This clearly shows the field ambulances had begun their preparations with the worst possible scenario in mind, that of a forced retreat. The plan showed that there had been a rethinking of the way that evacuation rearwards was to be carried out and involved alerting all relevant personnel and men of the manner in which evacuation would be carried (in retreat).

During the German Operation Georgette (Battle of Lys), 9 - 29 April 1918, the British sector experienced large numbers of wounded. Over 24,920 men presented to the field ambulances of the First and Second British Armies.34 Coping with the large numbers of wounded meant stretcher-bearers were in short supply and heavily in demand. Large numbers of wounded meant a call for volunteers to act as stretcher-bearers. Australian, George James Wright of the 10th Infantry Battalion described working as a regimental stretcher-bearer for the first time in April 1918. He related having to deal with many wounded and of the confusion present on the frontline:

Of course, being a new hand I had to lie low and let them do the thinking and the talking. However, we risked it after a while and got to the front line. There we found just a little confusion. We were wanted in all directions. The company was back to the front line, having failed for the

33 Diary entry 9/04/18, 27th Field Ambulance, 9th (Scottish) Division, TNA, WO 95/1758. 34 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 270. 257 time being to get to their objective, and some were going back and forth bringing the wounded and dead into the shelter of the trench.35

Both British and German Forces suffered large numbers of casualties during these battles (March through April) and some battalions almost wiped out during these intensely fought German Offensives. Edmonds gives a summary of the numbers of British Forces casualties for the period 21 March – 30 April as being 239,793.36 German losses for the same period amounted to 348,300.37 This figure however does not afford a full picture of the numbers of wounded. The field ambulances of the British First Army did not keep any records of admission for the days between 12 – 21 April, and for the period 12 – 16 April 1918, by the Second Army. In a repeat of what had occurred at Mons in August 1914, the field ambulances of these Armies who were in retreat, found once again that record keeping was untenable.

The Royal Newfoundland Regiment attached to the 88th British Infantry Battalion suffered so many casualties that the Battle of the Lys was its last active engagement of the Great War.38 The war diary of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment during the Battle of the Lys recorded that they were forced to retire from Neuve-Église to the Ravelsberg Heights on 11 April 1918, after having suffered, ‘5 officers casualties & about 190 O/Rs’.39 From 26 April 1918, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment was detached from the 29th British Division and attached to GHQ.

35 ‘A Gentle man goes to war’, Manuscript, G. J., Wright, AWM, PR86/308, p. 44. 36 Brigadier-General, Sir James Edmonds, History of the Great War based on Official Documents, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, Volume II, HMSO, London, 1937, p. 490. 37 ibid. 38 Awarded the ‘Royal’ pre-fix on 28 September 1917. 39 Diary entry 12/04/1918, Royal Newfoundland Regiment War Diary, 1914-1919, op. cit. 258 Many of the British Forces’ field ambulances suffered many casualties within their ranks during the German Offensives of March and April 1918. The 2/1st British Field Ambulance recorded the events of 6 April 1918, as ‘a tragic day for the unit – the saddest we had experienced... one of a number of high velocity shells fired into Danville, killing five and seriously wounding eleven others... (Daly, Dewey, Robertson, Weeks and Egerton)’.40 Later in the year, this field ambulance would lose a further three men during the German retreat in November 1918.41 Shell and machine gun fire, along with the continued use of gas, were not the only threats posed to personnel of the field ambulances. Aerial bombing occurrences became more common, with attacks on positions near MDSs and hospitals causing much loss of life. The St. John Ambulance Brigade of Newfoundland reported the heavy loss of life of its bearers and orderlies when the Germans dropped many bombs during the period 31 May to 7 July 1918. In total 64 casualties were experienced by these volunteer Newfoundlanders.42

Staffing shortages due to casualties within the ranks of regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers greatly affected the manner in which the sick and wounded could be evacuated. The DDMSs of the various medical services, needed to replace men of the field ambulances quickly, however, suitably trained and fit men were not always available, with fully fit men transferred to the combatant arms (as previously discussed). A good example that demonstrated a chronic shortage of stretcher-bearers was the situation experienced by the field ambulances of the 51st (Highland) Division. On 7 April, the ADMS of the division estimated, they were ‘working 150 (mostly bearers) under strength’.43 The COs of the field ambulances of the division had advised HQ of the lack of stretcher-bearers but as Lieutenant Colonel Rorie explained, reliefs only arrived on 12 April 1918; some five days after the problems had been

40 The 2/1st London Field Ambulance, ‘An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th Division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919’, op. cit., p. 68. 41 ibid. 42 Memo 7/6/1918, Sir William Harwood, the St. John Association, St. John Ambulance and Red Cross Files, The Rooms, MG 632, Box 7, File 31. 43 David Rorie, A Medico’s luck in the War: being reminiscences of RAMC work with the 51st (Highland) Division, Milne and Hutchinson, Aberdeen, 1929, p. 209. 259 reported.44 Chronically under-strength field ambulances (from wastage) forced the re-organisation and distribution of personnel of many field ambulances to shore up numbers. For example, the 43rd British Field Ambulance lost one officer and had fifty-five ORs who were listed as missing, having been captured by the Germans on 21 March at Flavy-Le Martel. By 20 May 1918, the field ambulance had been reduced to a cadre due to ‘disorganisation of the division’45 and relieved of their duties. Steps to overcome this issue were enacted and the unit was reformed, rejoining the 14th British Division on 6 June 1918.

The war diary of the 27th British Field Ambulance recorded the arrangements for distributing medical and sanitary personnel during operations in April 1918, to overcome similar problems they had previously experienced in March. The CO demonstrated the need for flexibility within field ambulances, specifically the ability to shift men as needed. This flexibility went a long way to alleviate internal staffing issues. This also allowed for a better scheme of evacuation when large numbers of wounded were received. The war diary showed on 9 April:

Orders received from ADMS that in view of the possibility of active operations on this front that one officer and 40 ORs should proceed to reinforce the 28th fld amb. at Kemmel.46 On this day to ensure that the wounded were cleared quickly it was necessary the have the stretcher- bearers of the 27th British Field Ambulance move forward of the RAP.47

Evacuating the wounded became an issue for the British field ambulances during the Battle of the Lys, 9 – 29 April 1918 when transport failed to arrive. This breakdown in transport stemmed largely from the actions of the enemy, which prevented the ambulance cars from operating. This significant problem occurred

44 ibid. 45 The itinerary of the 43rd Field Ambulance, RAMC (14th (Light) Division) (Sept 1914-June 1919), Compiled by William C. Dickson, 1934, 43rd Field Ambulance, First World War Welcome Library, RAMC 801/13/1. 46 Diary entry 9/04/18, 27th Field Ambulance, 9th (Scottish) Division, TNA, WO95/1758. 47 Diary entry 10/04/18, ibid. 260 in Lieutenant Colonel Rorie’s field ambulance and across the division, when they did not have sufficient vehicles to clear its MDS, which caused considerable congestion of the wounded waiting to be evacuated. Rorie explained that the field ambulance commanders utilised the few vehicles from the ambulances to clear the wounded back. The difficulty of doing this was that it forced personnel from the field ambulance to be responsible for loading and unloading the vehicles, meaning that there were fewer men available to act as stretcher- bearers between the RAP and the ADS. Rorie also explained that during the Battle of the Lys, his field ambulance experienced the problem of clearing the wounded from the ADS back to the MDS. He referred to this problem as the ‘old difficulty’48 as traffic congestion on the roads during the retreat once again recurred.

Working on the forward line provided many challenges for the MO of a battalion. They had the responsibility of finding accommodation for the wounded and the regimental medical team with the additional responsibility of keeping men in the battalion healthy. DMS Howse was particularly concerned with the provision of accommodation for his stretcher-bearers, specifically issuing a directive that: ‘commanding officers of the field ambulances... [provided] shelter and protection at the frontline’,49 this action he hoped would reduce the number of casualties. Australian MO, Captain Leonard May, recorded how his medical detail, including his stretcher-bearers, negotiated sleeping accommodation in the RAP located near Messines: ‘I am keeping one man on sentry all night, against gas etc. – 2 shifts one up till 2.30am, and the other till dawn. My 2 [RAMC orderlies] and the 4 bearers cut out for it on a pack of cards. That solves the accommodation issue’.50

48 Rorie, A Medico’s luck in the War: being reminiscences of RAMC work with the 51st (Highland) Division, op. cit., p. 209. 49 Tyquin, Neville Howse: Australia’s First Victoria Cross Winner, op. cit., p. 104. 50 Captain Leonard May, DSO, MC, Diary entry 9/01/1918, Captain Leonard May, op. cit. 261 This thesis has clearly demonstrated the inherent dangers posed to stretcher- bearers in the forward posts. The RAP, being the furthest forward position occupied by the Army Medical Corps, was always considered to be a highly dangerous place to work. One of the duties of the RMO included making sure the wounded had been cleared from the forward areas. Australian stretcher-bearer Edward Munro recorded in his memoirs the dangers faced by the stretcher- squads whilst surveying and checking the aid posts in April 1918. Munro wrote:

Occasionally I made trips around the RAPs and relay posts with Captain Whish, which sometimes was not without excitement, particularly when shells were falling around a post. We had to decide whether to continue on to the post and hope that the shelling would cease by the time we reached it or to bypass it. I was always relieved when the Captain deemed it advisable to avoid such a post.51

British stretcher-bearer Private P. W. Gray, attached to an artillery battery, recorded his reluctance to spend much time in the forward areas. Collecting wounded in the forward areas, was particularly dangerous and regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers were always mindful of the threats to themselves and their wounded. Gray in his diary recorded: ‘After tea went to loading and RAP. Not a very healthy spot. The RAP is at Dickebusch Chateau’.52

In July 1918, shelling of positions near Hamel by gas affected the work of Australian stretcher-bearer Raymond Cormack, who wrote ‘4.30pm, plenty of shell gas. Had helmets on for a short time’.53 Australian stretcher-bearer Edward Munro, recorded how he and another stretcher-bearer were caught in a gas attack, fortunately, for Munro, the gas did not turn out to have long-term effects:

51 Munro, Diaries of a stretcher bearer: 1916-1918., op. cit., p. 111. 52 Diary entry 5/05/1918, Private P. W. Gray, op. cit. 53 Diary entry 9/07/1918, Raymond Fairhurst Cormack, AWM, PR01271. 262 On one occasion, another chap and I were carrying a stretcher with a wounded man on it when one of these burst nearby. We should have been killed but strangely enough, nobody was hurt. However, we didn’t escape unscathed, for a black cloud of smoke rolled towards us which we took to be poisoned gas. There wasn’t enough time to don our gas masks and we made a dash for the protection of the RAP with its protective curtains. But before we got there the acrid fumes enveloped us. My throat got terrible dry, my eyes began to smart and water. My nose started to run. I thought I was a goner, mustard-gassed.54

During the Second Battle of the Marne, 15 July – 6 August 1918, a failure along the supply chain reaching the field ambulances of the 51st (Highland) Division occurred, with the supply chain cut, they were left without sufficient supplies to care for, and evacuate, the wounded. The field ambulances were forced to operate during a very busy period with only the available supplies kept in their wagons. The wagons had limited space in which to hold enough blankets, stretchers, bandages and the like for a unit in the midst of battle. The unit’s diarist Lieutenant–Colonel Rorie recorded: ‘we were faced with the fact, that apart from the want of this necessary link in the chain of evacuation, the ambulances would be dependant upon their War Establishment of stretchers and blankets’.55 Similar situations like this were an unfortunate part of the war, when the focus of the supply chain was servicing the needs of artillery and the combatant arms. To overcome the shortages in stretchers and blankets and other necessary equipment, the field ambulance borrowed supplies from French units nearby. Without suitable numbers of stretchers, the bearers of the field ambulances ‘improvised’56 by gathering natural resources from the nearby

54 Munro, Diaries of a stretcher bearer: 1916-1918, op. cit., p. 120. 55 Rorie, A Medico’s luck in the War: being reminiscences of RAMC work with the 51st (Highland) Division, op. cit., p. 221. 56 ibid. 263 woods where they found ‘a plentiful supply of stout saplings to serve as stretcher poles’.57

A new phase of the war began in August when British and French Forces began to dominate the German Armies; for the British Forces’ medical services, this meant a change in their way of working. On 8 August 1918, near Amiens, the British Fourth Army, along with the ‘storm troops’58 of the Canadian and Australian divisions and also two American divisions, were central to pushing the Germans back ‘eight miles [~12.9 km] on a front of 15,000 yards [~13.7 km]’.59 This was a turning point of the war in 1918 and was achieved with extreme efficiency, but not without heavy casualties, with the Germans losing 27, 000 men and the British 9,000.60 New ways of warfare were used with good effect, such as the ‘Contact Patrol’,61 the co-ordination of planes to act as spotters and using armoured vehicles for reconnaissance. British changes in tactics and training meant a new and decisive plan of action. Armed with tanks, set piece battle using, ‘bite and hold tactics’62 and the creeping barrage would win the war. This new phase, the Hundred Days Offensive, stopped when the Germans ‘in full retreat... [had] no reasonable prospect of offering further resistance to the Allied onslaught’63 agreed to an armistice, effectively ending the war on the Western Front.

For the British Forces’ medical services and its corps, a new phase of the war had also begun. With the Germans being pushed back and British Forces swiftly moving forward reclaiming German occupied territory, mobility was paramount

57 ibid. 58 Cook, ‘Creating the faith: The Canadian gas services in the First World War’, op. cit., p. 780. 59 Richard Travers, Diggers in France, ABC Books, Sydney, 2008, p. 291. 60 Of the 27,000 German casualties, Richard Travers stated 12,000 of these were taken prisoner. Richard Travers, Diggers in France, ABC Books, Sydney, 2008, p. 291. 61 ibid., p. 287. 62 ‘Bite and hold’ had been used in 1917 with some success, at Amiens it was used on a larger scale with great success, Robin Prior, ‘Stabbed in the front: The German defeat in 1918’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010, p 46. 63 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 87. 264 to maintaining and attending to the health of the sick and wounded. Planning for the medical preparations began earlier, being organised and carried out in secret to effect the greatest surprise on the Germans. British Forces’ now had the technical proficiency to carry out the attack on the German positions after having planned and trained for months.

On 1 August 1918, the Australian DDMS Anzac Corps called a top-secret meeting in which he insisted from ‘ADMS, CRE and GOC, 3rd Australian Division and C E Corps, [that] I required completion of the work by August 6th. Drafted plan for new offensive’.64 Conversely, the DMS of the British Fourth Army, O’Keefe, was only advised of the plan on 6 August, two days before the offensive was launched due to the secrecy surrounding the offensive. It is a testament to the experience of the medical corps Commanders, particularly of the field ambulances, that the wounded were so well managed. Harrison stated that the professionalism of the army and its medical services and ‘flexibility’65 in operating were the keys to its success. However, the need for secrecy was not always adhered to by senior officers, as Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, AAMC, 6th Australian Field Ambulance, 2nd Australian Division, explained that he became aware of the impending attack on the Germans, recording in his diary: ‘2nd August 1918, Saw Col. [Colonel] rumours of stunt in a few days’.66 Coutts later added: ‘6th August 1918, Ellis told me as a secret that the hop over was to be on the 8th in the morning’.67

Australian stretcher-bearers were moved into the line on 6 August 1918, to set up and prepare for the advance. In anticipation of heavy casualties all available men were prepared and advised of the need to be ready to move off, as noted by Australian stretcher-bearer Edward Munro, MM:

64 Diary entry 01/08/1918, War Diary, DDMS Anzac Corps, AWM, AWM4, 26/17/8. 65 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 87. 66 War diary and Manuscript, Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, AAMC, AWM, PR83/155, p. 73. 67 ibid. 265 It is expected that a big advance will shortly be attempted on this front whereby it is hoped that the Huns will be pushed back many miles. Every available man has been detailed for stretcher-bearing including batmen, buglers, cooks and some other neutrals who usually do not have to venture into the danger zone.68

It can be said that transportation of the wounded was better planned for, with co-ordination between medical services and railways and MACs. However, the recurring problem of congestion on the narrow roads presented itself during the British advance, a problem that had plagued medical evacuation since August 1914. With British Forces’ troops being relieved from their trenches and chasing the Germans back trucks, wagons and lorries carrying all manner of equipment and of course men began to fill the road system. Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, AAMC, recorded: ‘the main road from Villers-Bretonneux to Warfusee- Abancourt, along which nothing had passed for months (as it ran through No Man’s Land) had suddenly become more crammed with traffic than it ever has been’.69 The war diary of the DDMS Anzac Corps hinted that transportation was unfortunately slow at that time and made a point of recording if there had been greater British casualties, evacuation of the wounded would have likely failed:

Fourth Army were very pleased with the medical arrangements for the recent offensive, but as in the Battle of Messines, had the anticipated number of casualties occurred we should have had serious trouble. However, as a result of my experience in the Messines battle, I formed a reserve of divisional cars and secured [additional] accommodation... owing to the small number of casualties the MAC was sufficient but would have been quite inadequate for the anticipated casualties.70

68 Original diary entry 06/08/1918, Munro, Diaries of a stretcher-bearer: 1916-1918, op. cit., p. 122. 69 War diary and Manuscript, Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, op. cit., p. 76. 70 Diary entry 16/08/1918, War Diary, DDMS Anzac Corps, op. cit. 266 During the British advance, previously identified problems with communication did still occur and were a direct result of the war of movement. For Australian Captain Leonard May, poor communication between his brigade and himself during the Amiens Offensive resulted in a lack of knowledge as to the line of evacuation and being without stretcher-bearers. Captain May demonstrated his frustration at the poor communication links: ‘today we have been marching again... orders are constantly cancelled at the last moment, and at present I know nothing of the clearing arrangement’.71 The pressure of maintaining open communication inks was during this period severely tested with message being directed through HQ and back to the brigades, as this further entry detailed: ‘I got my bearers only after I sent three runners after them’.72 It cannot be ascertained from the official Australian history if this was a one off situation, but it is likely as a result of the manner of warfare at that specific time.

Further failures in communication occurred later that month during the Second Battle of Bapaume that commenced on 21 August 1918. Stretcher-bearers of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance found that messages sent by them failed to arrive at Brigade HQ. The men of the field ambulance, having been brought forward to the line, established its RAP in a railway dugout the day before and advised of the location. However due to the communication breakdown, these men waited for two days without receiving any wounded. A day later a ‘sergeant came along, informing us [of their correct sector) so sent to proper position’.73 They were unable to assist any men of its brigade for two days and blame the men of the ASC for having sent them to the wrong location.

Additionally, some men of the medical corps who were working in the rear areas became separated from their units as the war of movement developed. This had

71 Diary entry 9/08/1918, Captain Leonard May, op. cit. 72 Diary entry 10/08/1918, ibid. 73 Diary entry 21/08/1918 ‘London Soldiers – Unarmed Comrades: being the story of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance and their service with the 56th London (Territorial) Division in France 1916-1918’, Compiled by Private A. V. Atkinson, op. cit. 267 the effect of these men having to search for their own ambulance (unit); and notably it left the field ambulance below establishment, which had a direct and negative impact on medical evacuation of the wounded. Similarly, this problem also affected men who were returning from leave and had to locate their battalion or brigade HQ. A failure to report in might have meant a man could have been classed as AWOL. A British stretcher-bearer described how, after returning from leave, it took him many days to locate his field ambulance. He explained the situation in late August 1918 (likely at Albert):

I found [my] unit had moved into action. Stayed overnight in old billet... caught goods train for Arras... stayed the night at hospital at St Jean. Met a lot of our fellows going on leave. Informed our unit the other side of Cambrai and advancing rapidly... got into troop train at Arras station... detrained in pouring rain and marched by guide to Divisional reception camp. Guide lost the way... informed our unit is somewhere beyond Valenciennes about 30 miles [~48 km] away. Only thing he could suggest was to get there as best we can. Railways all destroyed. Got on to the main Cambrai – Valenciennes Road obtained ride in ambulance car right to HQs a village beyond Valenciennes. Arrived about 6.00pm. Along road evidence of hurried German retreat.74

Shelling, either by the Germans or British, continued to pose a serious threat to the work of evacuating the wounded by stretcher-bearers. Although acknowledged as being an external factor that no one could control, evacuation of wounded by bearers was severely hampered during periods of shelling. During the Battle of Amiens in August, British stretcher-bearers reported they were subjected to direct fire from German shelling. The following account related how stretcher-bearers who were collecting the wounded at a relay post, a dugout, situated in a communication trench near the frontline on the Villers-Bretonneux Road were fired upon by the Germans:

74 Diary entry 23/08/1918, ibid. 268 It wasn’t long before the shells began to fly. The first one went over us, the second in behind us. I said to the lads ‘come on out of it quick’. We dashed back along the road and took cover in a trench. The Germans must have seen us because they began to shell the trench [where they had just been]... When it ceased I ordered the men back and when we arrived at our dugout [it] had received a direct hit burying all our kit... we certainly would have been killed if we had stayed there.75

For many men, previously to this new phase of warfare, the war had been a hellish but static experience. A Canadian stretcher-bearer described this new mobile phase of the war during a successful attack:

Here was the Canadian Corps over 120, 000 strong, going into a scrap that was different from anything it had known in the past. Here a man could stand up. He could move about on top of hard dry ground – not under it or through it – in knee-deep mud... Our bearer squads moved forward almost a mile without encountering any difficulties... here we were kept busy giving first aid to the infantry casualties which were occurring immediately in front of us.76

For some men however, the Battle of Amiens a very frightening experience of war when some men who had been in service since the outbreak of the war had become emotionally spent. War weariness, stress and depression affected men from all countries and resulted in men being unable to continue with their taxing duties including the stretcher-bearers, such as Canadian stretcher-bearer H M (Tiny) Morris, who wrote of his personal experience with fatalism during the Battle of Amiens:

75 ‘Personal Experience of an NCO in charge of a stretcher squad’, op. cit., p. 128. 76 Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double, op. cit., p. 211. 269 It was on this night that I had a feeling of depression as never before. I felt that the war would go on and on. Eventually, I would be either killed, maimed for life or, if fortunate, get a ‘Blighty’... it was strange that I felt this way in the midst of a successful battle and our own casualties were light – 2 killed and 2 wounded.77

The psychological effect of gas warfare was examined by Canadian historian Tim Cook who explained the physical and mental effects of mustard gas, which was used extensively on the Canadian front at Amiens:

Gas caused casualties even among well-disciplined soldiers – but it was among the rest – the shell-shocked, the careless, the frightened, and the wounded where gas was most effective. Soldiers already exhausted from their advances, were continually harassed with gas and worn down physically and psychologically.78

Australian stretcher-bearer Edward Munro conversely wrote of his disappointment when he was withdrawn from stretcher-bearer duties. Immediately prior to the Amiens battle, Munro had been moved from his usual role of bearer to ‘B Section Tent Sub-section’ as his mother had personally requested his transfer after her two other sons had been killed. Munro recorded his dissatisfaction with the decision ‘it was an unusual experience for me to watch bearers move off whilst I remain and I’m not particularly pleased at being left behind’.79

With the pace of the war and the advance building Canadian William David Bradley, usually a regimental stretcher-bearer, found himself transferred from

77 H. M. (Tiny) Morris, Manuscript, The Story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1, op. cit. 78 Cook, ‘Creating the faith: The Canadian gas services in the First World War’, op. cit., p. 781. 79 Original diary entry 06/08/1918, Munro, Diaries of a stretcher-bearer: 1916-1918, op. cit. p. 122. 270 non-combatant duties to combatant when he was attached to the 54th Canadian Infantry Battalion, at Amiens. In a letter to his wife he explained the circumstances on 8 August 1918, when he was required to become an infantryman:

The Canucks have been into full swing however we came through it, what we did I cannot tell, it certainly is a time we shall never forget... but listen this is something funny, the S.B [Brassard] was taken from me and I was a fighting man for the advance, but the man who took my place was shot direct through the head he was sitting up, dressing a wounded man. He was told to keep down till the position was taken as the man was not badly wounded and of course he didn’t. But now I am given the job back again which I am pleased over.80

As the Allies continued to press the Germans further back during September through November 1918, the work of the stretcher-bearers began to get a little easier. As the infantry gained ground on the German positions, better roads and access to mechanised vehicles began to assume the main responsibility of moving wounded back behind the lines. It was no longer necessary to hand carry over long distances. For Raymond Cormack, a stretcher-bearer with the 12th Australian Field Ambulance, the issue of taxing hand carries over long distances was alleviated as the roads over which the bearers had to carry were much improved. At Amiens, Cormack recorded in his diary ‘we have a carry of a thousand yards [~914 m] along a good road all the way’.81 This is not to say that stretcher-bearers had little to do; the regimental bearers still had to collect the wounded from the battlefield and remove them to the RAPs. The medical corps bearers then had to carry or wheel the wounded from the RAP to a collecting post, but essentially the days of extra long or particularly arduous carries began to reduce.

80 Letter dated 15/08/1918, William David Bradley to Beatrice Peacock, op. cit. 81 Diary entry 16/08/1918, Raymond Fairhurst Cormack, op. cit. 271 A noticeable improvement in the method of evacuation during September 1918 is evident from the war diaries of the 42nd British Field Ambulance.82 The field ambulance had taken up position again around the Belgian city of Ypres,83 where better infrastructure had been put in place, such as wheeled stretchers, tram or train lines and motorised vehicles. Also the evacuation routes shortened as the ADS and CCS were able to be situated further forward, thus saving time and the lives of wounded men. The war diary recorded the following ways that men were evacuated from the line on 6 September 1918, near Essex Farm: ‘method of evacuation of sick and wounded, from RAP to Collecting Post wheeled stretcher... by car direct to Main Dressing Station... walking and slight wounded light railway from Dullhallow... car to Main Dressing Station’.84

One problem that continued was the manpower shortage within British Forces’ Armies. The War Office had made many attempts to increase numbers of recruits but there simply were not enough replacements. Some fit men of the RAMC were transferred to the infantry as was the case for Private Ashton Nesbitt of the 1st West Riding Field Ambulance who had served as a stretcher-bearer and medical orderly. His forced transfer to the infantry was against Nebitt’s personal beliefs. In his wartime diary he wrote of his displeasure at the decision and that he took his argument to the House of Lords, however no evidence of his complaint has been located:

In referring to my possible transfer to infantry, Kathleen [his wife] tells me not to forget the voices which has never been silenced when we needed help... It is officially announced that we are being transferred to the Infantry tomorrow. Have been to service this evening and communion and feel equal to the ordeal tomorrow. I SHALL REFUSE

82 War diary, 42nd British Field Ambulance, 14th British Division, TNA, WO 95/1891. 83 See Schedule A, General Principles of Defence, ‘The defence of Ypres is entrusted to the 14th Division, the battle zone of the Division, lies therefore between that Town and the enemy’, War Diary General Staff, 14th Division, TNA, WO 95/1876. 84 Diary entry 6/09/1918, War diary 42nd British Field Ambulance, WO 95/1891. 272 COMBATANT SERVICE ABSOLUTELY AND ACCEPT IMPRISONMENT OR ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT. God help me! & Kathleen.85

The Dominions likewise, were unable to ramp up the numbers being sent. The British Minister of National Service called for an additional 1.25 million men to be enlisted into the British Forces, before 30 June 1918.86 Of these, 320,000 were designated to fill Lower Category Army and Air Force positions including the medical corps stretcher-bearers in the British field ambulances.87

The use of lower category men in these roles has already been discussed in this thesis as being a false economy and it has been repeatedly shown that bearers needed to be fit and have appropriate levels of stamina.88 DMS Howse, refused to entertain the notion of using any lower class men for either combatant or non-combatant duties. Butler reported that Howse and Surgeon General Fetherston based in Australia, were at odds with each over the use of unfit men, but Howse eventually won out and only fit men served as stretcher-bearers.89 In a report of AAMC training facilities in Britain, Howse made his position very clear: ‘all stretcher-bearers had to be sent overseas in a high state of physical fitness as generally immediately on arrival they were put on stretcher-bearing work which was of a very strenuous nature’.90

85 Nesbitt’s emphasis. It is not known what the outcome of Nesbitt’s appeal was. Diary entry 01/07/1917, Private Papers of A. Nesbitt, IWM, Catalogue no. 14152, Folder 2. 86 ‘Problem of the maintenance of the Armed Forces’, report 15/11/1917, TNA, CAB 24/4. 87 ibid. 88 For Australian Forces, a different classification system was used in the last six months of the war, devised by Lieutenant-Colonel Woolard, this new and proved to be highly detailed and unusable. See Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 458. 89 For an interesting description of the relationship between Howse and Fetherston see Butler, ibid., p. 820. 90 Report of AAMC Training Depot, Parkhouse, compiled by Colonel McWhae, 30/05/1918, AWM, Howse Papers, 2DRL/1351, Box 35. 273 In an attempt to alleviate the shortage of men across all services, the British Army took the step of reducing the number of battalions in each division from twelve to nine; the Australian Corps eventually disbanded one battalion in the 3rd Division, two battalions in the 4th Division, and three battalions in the 5th Division; the New Zealand Division, which had expanded to sixteen battalions in June 1917, returned to twelve battalions in February 1918, while the Canadian Corps divisions retained the twelve battalion structure to the end of the war.

The Australian field ambulance establishments changed in September 1918, when DMS Howse reduced the field ambulance to two sections, which he had previously attempted to install in 1916. In 1918, changes in the NZMC field ambulances also began after the New Zealand Division suffered heavily from sickness, such as trench fever. To overcome the shortage of fit men within the field ambulances it was arranged that ‘reinforcements of men and NCOs of good physique and excellent morale were forthcoming from the 4th Field Ambulance, now called the Reinforcements Field Ambulance’.91

Additionally, the British War Office took the steps of reversing their previous commitment of affording immunity to men who served the war effort in some volunteer capacity. Men who were serving as non-combatants in the RAMC and the Home Hospitals Reserve, would be liable for transfer to the infantry as combatants and sent overseas to France or Italy to serve as combatants. These men had volunteered early in the war opting not to serve overseas and to work in support roles and services in the Territorial Force (TF) hospitals (which at the outbreak of the war had been rapidly mobilised). The TF hospitals were until April 1917, under the administration of the Territorial Forces County Associations, they were then placed under the control of the ‘military ordnance

91 Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 385. 274 authorities in each command’.92 These men had been assured prior to their enlistment that they would not be transferred to combatant service at any time.

This decision caused some disquiet from men who had voluntarily enlisted in the RAMC Territorial Forces before the war broke out. Lieutenant Colonel H. G. MacKenzie, 83rd British Field Ambulance, wrote to the Director General Medical Services: ‘a substantial injustice has been done to certain TF soldiers... I endorsed their protest, pointing out the unfairness of granting a privilege who happened to belong to a civil association which was denied to the TF soldier’.93 Also affected by this decision were members of the volunteer organisations, such as the St. John Ambulance Brigade and St. Andrews Ambulance Association, who complained via their organisations, to no avail. It is not clear how many men were actually transferred but it is a clear demonstration of the desperate manpower shortages felt by the BEF.94

Even though the Allied Forces had begun to take back ground, it was still dangerous on the battlefield, as the following excerpt of the war diary of the 5th Canadian Field Ambulance recalled:

It was a disastrous day as far as this unit was concerned. The Officer Commanding, Major J. F. Burgess, Captain F. Clark, with two motor ambulances, was making a round of the posts... when a shell came over, landing between the two cars. Eleven casualties resulted, Captain MacNeill being killed, Captain A. Parker severely wounded in the head (since died of wounds), Lieutenant Colonel Kappele, was wounded in thigh and arm. Major J. F. Burgess in left arm, Captain Clark in left forearm. The two drivers were also hit, Lyne in the right arm, and Murphy between the

92 MacPherson, Medical Services: General History Vol. I, op. cit., p. 73. 93 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H. G. G. MacKenzie to DGMS, BEF, 24/4/1918, ‘St. John Ambulance Protest’, TNA, WO 32/18576. 94 Secret Memo, 9/Medical/339/AG1, 23/7/1918, The Secret Memo, actually contains the phrase ‘such personnel will henceforth be considered liable for transfer to other arms under the Army Transfer Act 1915. ‘ St. John Ambulance Protest’, ibid. 275 thighs. Private Stanley... was severely wounded in abdomen and left foot (since died of wounds); Private Nicholls, one of the guides, was wounded in the pelvis, and died on the way to the MDS. Private Gordon, the other guide, was hit in the thigh... The casualties were evacuated immediately.95

As the German Army was pushed increasingly further back, keeping pace with the infantry proved to be difficult for the stretcher-bearers and other medical personnel of the British Forces, with equipment and stores to carry, these non- combatants tending to lag behind. As the RAP moved forward, the distance between them and the ADS grew ever wider, lengthening the carry. However, as the British Forces advanced, they were able to take advantage of the recently abandoned German ADSs and CCSs as a stop gap measure. British stretcher- bearer H. V. Reed, RAMC, 52nd British Field Ambulance, explained how he and his fellow bearers tried to maintain contact with the advancing battalion they were attached to ‘we are now into that historic month of November 1918, and at the latter stages our squads were moved in motor ambulances in order to keep up with the rapidly moving troops’.96

A British stretcher-bearer commented in his diary about the circumstances faced by his unit during the advance of British Forces in early November 1918. This evidence demonstrated how field ambulances were settled with their brigades in the advance through Belgium. The 2/3rd London Field Ambulance, now located in Belgium, had to keep pace with its unit in order to care for any wounded British or German. The bearer recorded ‘after the retreating enemy again this morning,

95 Diary entry 12/10/1918, War Diary, 5th Canadian Field Ambulance, LAC, RG9, Militia and Defence, Series III-D-3, Volume 5028. 96 H. V. Reed, ‘My Bit’, Unpublished manuscript, op. cit. 276 through numerous villages quite untouched although every cross road blown up. Cavalry and artillery going forward in large numbers’.97

The Germans were driven past their line at ‘Sambre and Scheldt’98 on 4 November 1918 by British Divisions (infantry, artillery and cavalry). The war effectively ended where it had begun, when, ‘Mons had been captured... by elements of the Royal Canadian Regiment and the 42nd Battalion of Montreal’.99 Negotiations for peace by the Germans had begun to be organised and the armistice was signed at 11.00am on 11 November 1918 bringing about the end of four years of warfare.

The British Forces’ field ambulances still received casualties and stretcher- bearers still attended to the sick and those wounded in the latter stages of the war. The unit history of the 2/1st British Field Ambulance recorded that this sort of war did not come without a cost to the unit, an entry made on 17 November 1918 after the Armistice recorded the deaths of ‘Hield, Farrow, Jevons’100 who were all killed in action during the advance. Australian doctor Major Donald Dunbar Coutts recorded the circumstances of his hearing of the armistice:

Heard about 12 o’clock that the Armistice had been signed and hostilities had ceased. I was walking down the road to see a sick civilian when all the whistles began to blow and all the anti-aircraft guns around Amiens began

97 Diary entry between 1-9/11/1918, ‘London Soldiers – Unarmed Comrades: being the story of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance and their service with the 56th London (Territorial) Division in France 1916-1918’, Compiled by Private A. V. Atkinson, op. cit. 98 C. E. W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918, -- Volume VI, University of Queensland Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, St Lucia, Qld, 1983, p. 1049. 99 Jonathan Vance, Death so Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War. UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997, p. 12. 100 Entry 17/11/1918, Unknown, An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919, op. cit. 277 to blow... great celebrations in Amiens and many casualties during the evening.101

Canadian stretcher-bearer Private Frederick Noyes wrote of hearing of the armistice and the reaction of men of his unit, 5th Canadian Field Ambulance. Noyes was one of the original men of the 5th Field Ambulance and ably described the men’s relief:

It wasn’t until about 3 o’clock in the afternoon that official information reached our unit... most of us were too dazed too fully appreciate the portent of the communiqué. About the uppermost thought in our minds was that the war was over and we were still alive – ALIVE!102

The diarist of the unit diary of the 2/2nd London Field Ambulance recorded: ‘armistice with the enemy was signed at 11am. No notice was taken by troops of this area who were not interested in the least. Unit as usual was much too busy to indulge in any celebrations of the event’.103 Regardless of the declaration of the armistice, many British Forces’ units and their field ambulances continued advancing into German territory. For these men the war was also not over and their work was to continue, as sickness was now the prime problem. Private Atkinson explained his reaction: ‘told to scrub equipment and paint tin hats as our division was told off to follow Germans back to the Rhine. Much grumbling on part of fellows’.104 His unit would stay in Belgium until 25 May 1919 when they were finally sent back to England and demobbed on 31 May 1919. The outbreak of influenza in the camps and in the civilian population meant the field ambulances and their stretcher-bearers who stayed on in France and Belgium were kept busy. The Australian Official Historian Butler concurred that influenza

101 War diary and Manuscript, Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, op. cit., p. 103. 102 Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double, op. cit., p. 234. 103 Diary entry 11/11/1918, 2/2nd London Field Ambulance, op. cit. 104 Diary entry 23/08/1918, London Soldiers – Unarmed Comrades: being the story of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance and their service with the 56th London (Territorial) Division in France 1916-1918’, Compiled by Private A. V. Atkinson, op. cit. 278 kept those Australian CCSs and general hospitals busy from October 1918 and that deaths attributed to broncho-pneumonia increased substantially.105

A stretcher-bearer of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance entered in his diary: ‘on arrival back at aid post in village at 9.30am signaller in formed us armistice to be signed at 11 o’clock. Thought he was pulling my leg so made him rather vexed by treating it as a joke... can hardly yet realize was it really over’.106 This stretcher- bearer also demonstrated that although the armistice was declared at 11 am, the bearers had wounded who still needed to be evacuated ‘a few minutes later [after the armistice was declared] a trooper and officer of cavalry came along slightly wounded’.107

Private H. V. Reed, wrote about his reaction to the armistice in his manuscript. The knowledge for him and likely others, that active warfare had come to an end, was met with disbelief. Reed recorded: ‘the same day we began our return march – not a jubilant, singing crowd in spite of the happy fact! The sensation is beyond description and I cannot say whether I wanted to laugh or cry. I did neither, but just marched along, occasionally speaking a few words’.108 He went on to describe the day of his de-mobbing back in Britain. It reflected the end of a period of severe and intense stress but also the end of a period where men had come to form close and intimate relationships. Reed wrote: ‘my next move was when I left the old mob with my demobilisation papers in my pocket. That was no doubt a happy day, but a little lump came into my throat when saying goodbye to my comrades’.109

105 Mark Harrison discusses the rates of influenza in his text. See Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 141-141. Butler, Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 776. 106 ibid. 107 ibid. 108 H. V. Reed, ‘My Bit’, Unpublished manuscript, op. cit. 109 ibid. 279 In 1918, warfare became mobile; which did have its own particular problems for the stretcher-bearers, such as maintaining contact with their units. However, it was the year when the field ambulances and the stretcher-bearers became what they had initially been set up to be mobile and flexible units. The development of an integrated system of communication between the medical service and the combatant army proved invaluable to medical evacuation of the wounded.110 Mark Harrison argued that during the last 100 days of the war, the manner in which the British Forces’ medical services handled evacuation of the wounded was ‘the most impressive aspect of the British operations on the Western Front’.111 Perhaps military historians might argue other aspects, such as tactics, training and the weapons utilised in 1918 were far more significant. However, the medical services of 1918 did indeed out perform all expectations and certainly met their raison d’etre. At last, after four years of warfare, British Forces’ stretcher-bearers, regimental and medical corps, successfully proved that they were the mainstay of initial medical treatment and care of the wounded.

110 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 91. 111 ibid.

280 CONCLUSION

This thesis had two objectives. The primary objective of this thesis was to examine those problems faced by British Forces’ stretcher-bearers on the Western Front during the Great War. The second was to significantly add to our knowledge and awareness of the wartime experience of these non-combatants.

This thesis has related the important role that regimental and medical corps stretcher-bearers occupied, being the first line in the treatment of the sick and wounded. The stretcher-bearers, regimental and medical corps, helped the Army Medical Service and its Corps attain its ‘three strands of purpose’,1 these being to the military, to the nation and for humanity. The work of the British Forces’ medical corps during the four years of war, in France and Belgium, demonstrated that providing care for the sick and wounded was an essential task for the sustainment of armies. The thesis has successfully argued many internal and external forces challenged and did change the pre-war plans for evacuation of the sick and wounded, all which delayed and constrained the ability of the stretcher-bearers. An analysis has been undertaken explaining some of the many problems faced by these men when carrying out evacuation of the sick and wounded. A review has been conducted of the internal Army (British Forces) issues that derived from errors or misunderstandings in command, planning and communication. This thesis has shown that there were numerous operational issues which the Army Medical Service had to overcome; many of these issues were repeated over the years of the war, such as transportation, numbers of casualties, the breakdown in supply and poor lines of communication. Also examined were those problems which were external to the control of the Army, such as the weather, the terrain and the action of the enemy. In order to

1 Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Services in the war of 1914-1918. Vol. III, op. cit., p. 981. 281 investigate these problems extensive research has been conducted, in public (Government) and private papers.

The Official British Medical history gives a figure of over four million British patients ‘required evacuation from the casualty clearing stations to the base by ambulance transport’2 during the course of the war. The evacuation of these sick and wounded men commenced with the regimental and medical corps stretcher- bearers at the front line. This thesis has demonstrated that the process of evacuation was subject to many internal and external forces that severely influenced and usually impeded the flow of sick and wounded. Many of the problems that affected the stretcher-bearers resulted in medical evacuation being negatively impacted.

Medical treatment of men had vastly improved by war’s end. Historian Richard Holmes compared the problems of medical care during the first great battle at Le Cateau in 1914, with that provided in ancient times, and explained medical care of soldiers had not advanced over the centuries: ‘[A] major battle like Le Cateau simply swamped the available medical facilities. For most wounded the ancient aspects of the war – painful journeys on stretchers or across a comrade’s back, confusing waits in crowded aid posts or dressing stations... were more apparent than the modern’.3

The learning process for the British Forces’ army medical services during the Great War developed incrementally, mainly in the areas of surgery and medical treatments. Evacuation of the sick and wounded remained a relatively straightforward process. That is not to say that the evacuation process did not change, there were enhancements that were designed to ameliorate the

2 T. J. Mitchell and G. M. Smith, Medical services; casualties and medical statistics of the Great War, op. cit., p. 106. 3 Richard Holmes, Riding the Retreat: Mons to the Marne Revisited, J. Cape, London, 1995, p. 69. 282 difficulties for the stretcher-bearers and patients. Some of the significant changes were the size and weight of canvas stretchers; improvements made in relation to wheeled and motorised transport; the introduction of bearer relay posts and permanent field aid stations along the trench system. Other developments taken over the course of the war were permission given for medical corps stretcher-bearers being allowed to go forward of the RAP, training in skills pertaining to triage such as resuscitation, pain management, wound shock and haemorrhage identification and control, the introduction of the Thomas Splint.

Secondary to the examination of the problems that the stretcher-bearers faced, this thesis also significantly added to our awareness of the personal experience of these non-combatant stretcher-bearers. Previous work, including the official histories of the various British Empire Army Medical Services, and more recent examinations have brought to our attention the many challenges faced in the provision of medical care and evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield. However, what had been missing is the personal engagement with these men. This thesis has related the personal wartime experience of many stretcher- bearers of the British Forces and has given a very clear picture of their work on the battlefields of France and Belgium. Use of archival material such as the diaries, letters and other unpublished sources penned by stretcher-bearers has also given an intimate insight into their Great War experience. Additionally, the attempt to compare certain social traits of Australian stretcher-bearers with those from other British Forces has shown that these men came from all manner of social backgrounds. Further work might be undertaken to give a deeper understanding of these non-combatants.

At the outbreak of war, stretcher-bearers and the medical corps were regarded an unfavourable light. To use some Australian examples that reflected the attitude that prevailed across the British Empire Australian Lieutenant Colonel,

283 Joseph Beeston, AAMC, wrote ‘prior to this campaign the medical corps was always looked upon as a soft job. In peacetime, we had to submit to all sorts of flippant remarks and were called Linseed Lancers, Body Snatchers and other cheery and jovial names’.4 Similarly, the CO of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Sutton, wrote in his diary in 1915, of the poor reputation of the Army Medical Corps. Sutton’s comment reflected a view that non-combatants were, as George Bernard Shaw portrayed in his 1894 play Arms and the Man, not real soldiers: ‘How long, how long O Lord. We are only chocolate soldiers, non-combatants and cannot stand this much longer’.5 The Official Australian history of the medical services confirms the poor standing of the AAMC before the war, Butler wrote: ‘in peace times the medical service is not a popular one. In particular, the recruiting of regimental stretcher-bearers’.6

These terms were used in a highly derogatory fashion to emphasize the initial low standing and poor perception of the AAMC and its personnel. Michael Tyquin argued that the Australian stretcher-bearers were prior to August 1914: ‘usually selected for this job [by the Medical Officer] because they were not good at drill or handy with a rifle’,7 which likely affirmed the negative view held toward members of the AAMC prior to the war. Yet this negative view was not limited to Australia, a similar view was taken across Britain and in the Dominions. Stephen Western confirmed the poor reputation of the Royal Army Medical Corps and its stretcher-bearers with the abbreviation RAMC being referred to as ‘Rob All My Comrades’.8 Similarly, the CAMC also had a difficult start, which led to a poor reputation being formed and reinforced during the South African War.9

4 J. L. Beeston, Five months at Anzac: a narrative of personal experiences of the officer commanding the 4th Field Ambulance, Australian Imperial Force, W.C. Penfold, Sydney, 1916, p. 21. 5 Diary entry 14/05/15, Alfred Sutton, Private Records, op. cit. 6 Butler, Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume I – Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea, op. cit., p. 7. 7 Michael Tyquin, Little by Little, op. cit., p. 106. 8 Western ‘The Royal Army Medical Corps and the role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front’, op. cit., p. 21. 9 Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, op. cit., p. 16. 284 Lieutenant Colonel John George Adami described the pre-war reputation of the CAMC officers, as: ‘not a few believed that they were ornaments to their regiments’.10

This perception was quickly extinguished on the battleground where stretcher- bearers were able to demonstrate their gallantry while retaining a measure of compassion. Through the actions of stretcher-bearers in risking their lives to administer assistance to wounded soldiers, they came to be considered as equals by their infantry and artillery brethren. A. G. Butler stated the conduct of the stretcher-bearers at the beginning of the war gained: ‘what they desired - not a halo of sentimental eulogy, but the confidence of the men who fought with them and comradeship on terms of equality with them’.11

As non-combatants, there was a pre-war notion that these men would not be required to face danger as a soldier would do, but as the Great War proved, these men faced danger on virtually every trip they took onto the battlefield. In the words of Tim Cook: ‘shells and bullets made no distinctions between combatants and non-combatants’.12 Fellow soldiers such as Private Edward Lynch of the 45th Australian Infantry Battalion, came to admire and acknowledge the work and bravery of these non-combatants. Lynch recorded his admiration of the work of these men on the Somme: ‘our stretcher-bearers having a gruelling time today carrying out trench feet cases... slow, laborious work, but the bearers stick to it like the men they are’.13

10 Adami, War story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, op. cit., p. 17. 11 Butler is describing the death of Private. Simpson Kirkpatrick, I have used this to demonstrate how these men were transformed by their bravery from Linseed Lancers to equals. Butler, The Official history of the Australian Army Medical Service in the war of 1914-1918. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 159. 12 Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War: 1917-1918, op. cit., p. 291. 13 E. P. F. Lynch and Will Davies, Somme Mud: the war experiences of an infantryman in France 1916-1919, Random House Australia, North Sydney, 2008, p. 33. 285 Contemporary historians of the Great War medical corps acknowledged that there existed, in the minds of the public and soldiers prior to the Great War, a less than favourable attitude to men who served as non-combatants. This was due to the inculcation of boys and young men during Victorian times as, ‘the ideal male/soldier was... a fusion of romantic ideas of heroism and self- sacrifice’14 caring for sick and wounded was akin to nursing duties, such as stretcher-bearing or the male nursing orderlies and was strictly speaking a woman’s work. Mark Harrison confirmed the change in perception not only of the medical corps as a unit, but also of the stretcher-bearers during the war. Harrison argued: ‘there was evidently a great deal of respect for regimental doctors and nurses and despite many lurid stories, for the stretcher-bearers who accompanied them in the collection of the wounded’.15 This reference acknowledged certain traits attributed to the non-combatant stretcher-bearer, such as these men undertaking feminine work, of homosexuality and of weakness and cowardice. These traits were formed by the perception that warfare was an act confirming, ‘masculine identities as [a] soldier, through redefinitions of the masculine ideals’,16 consequently men not actively participating in fighting must be the opposite of masculine.

Gender identity during that era, reflected views that were heavily influenced by ‘bureaucratically rationalized violence’17 and the struggle to control and direct the ‘reproduction of masculinity’.18 These views changed as soon as the sick and wounded required care. Assisting and attending to the wounded had shaken any passive attributes and began to be considered a pro-active trait, not as an act of aggression against an aggressor, rather their acts of bravery and risk taking

14 Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War, op. cit., p. 188. 15 Harrison, The Medical War, op. cit., p. 298. 16 Meyer, Men of War, op. cit., 141. 17 Connell argued this was developed through the structures and practices of the militaristic ‘training of (Australian) secondary school boys through army cadet corps.’ See R. W. Connell, Masculinities: How masculinities are made and how they differ; why gender change occurs and how men handle it; how social science understands masculinity; how we can pursue social justice in a gendered world, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1995, p. 192 – 195. 18 ibid., p. 195. 286 gained them a reputation of being braver than the soldier, they had become equals.

Australian historian Peter Cochrane, in his work examining the myth of Simpson, Australia’s most famous stretcher-bearer, recounted a story by an Australian wounded soldier who acknowledged and appreciated the caring attitude by Australian stretcher-bearers: ‘they were 'so tender and solicitous'... they might almost have been women, so gently did they deal with us’.19 Where once considered the preserve of women, nursing and caring for a wounded individual began to take on a ‘saintly bearing’20 and emerged as a manly duty, an act of humanity at its purest. These men defied the image of passivity and femininity, long associated with the medical corps; instead, they became accepted as the ideal of masculinity and ‘a powerful image of salvation’.21 The previously held view of these non-combatants, belied the physical attributes needed by stretcher-bearers, such as strength, stamina, speed and agility necessary to perform the role. This early perception was soon replaced with a far more pragmatic and accepting ‘big men in character, they show themselves thoroughly in action’.22

These non-combatants, the first line of medical care, had to provide for horribly and terribly wounded men. At the battlefront, stretcher-bearers worked in aid posts that were likened to ‘butcher’s shops where the dying were cast aside’.23 On a carry, stretcher-bearers faced the horrifying and grim result of warfare, the sights they saw were shocking and ranged from men suffering from serious wounds including heavy bleeding, missing limbs, horrendous wounds to the head

19 Quoted in P. Cochrane, Simpson and the donkey: the making of a legend, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic. 1992, p. 111. 20 ibid., p. 89. 21 Cochrane, Simpson and the donkey: the making of a legend, op. cit., p. 88. 22 ibid. 23 John Nicol and Tony Rennell, Medic: Saving lives from Dunkirk to Afghanistan, Penguin Group, London, 2010, p. 33. 287 and face and those suffering from shell shock. Yet these men carried on with their work as directed with only a few men recording the awfulness.

These men were not heroes; but certainly, they did brave things. The countless awards received by men of the medical corps attests to their spirit. The written history of these men might be sparse but they are remembered in many other ways. Memorials, statues and artwork recognise their sacrifice and efforts. A book of commemoration of the RAMC is on permanent display in Westminster Abbey. This lists those who died, including the stretcher-bearers, during the Great War and the Second World War. In the roll, 6,873 names are recorded, not an insignificant number, but one that pales in comparison to the numbers of infantry and artillery lost during the same period. All the countries examined by this thesis hold similar Rolls of Honour for the medical corps personnel.

During the fieldwork and research for this thesis, I viewed artwork depicting the work of stretcher-bearers at many institutions that commemorate the Great War. It was found that there existed significant depictions of stretcher- bearers carrying or attending to wounded, proving the importance of these non-combatants. Beside the main entrance to the Australian War Memorial, there is a significant monument to the AAMC stretcher-bearer Private John ‘Simpson’ Kirkpatrick. Simpson, an AAMC stretcher-bearer, carried out his work in a manner different to the rest of his cohort. Simpson’s decision to work independently from his battalion, alone, assisted by a donkey, has resulted in representation of characteristics lauded as being foremost to Australian masculine identity. Simpson has become emblematic of the mythical Australian fighter/soldier, the digger, the gallant hero. This is not a view I personally subscribe to; Simpson was a flawed human being, not dissimilar to many of the Australian soldiers of the AIF, he was in my opinion, ill disciplined and put his life and the lives of the men he carried at a greater risk than was absolutely necessary. A better representation of the work of the stretcher-bearer is found

288 within the walls of the Australian War Memorial. Peter Corlett’s sculpture, Man in the Mud, better reflects the Western Front experience of war by the stretcher-bearers. Corlett used a photograph of Australian soldiers at rest by an RAP at Picardie, as his inspiration. Corlett’s figure wears a brassard on his left arm, imprinted with ‘SB’.24

At Fromelles a sculpture of a man carrying a wounded comrade on his back represents the desperation of men to assist their wounded comrades, when stretchers and stretcher-bearers were not available. The sculpture of Australian Sergeant Simon Fraser, 57th Australian Infantry Battalion, though not a stretcher- bearer, organised rescue parties for the wounded earning himself a ‘Mention in Despatches’25 in 1917. Fraser had come across the wounded man on one of his journeys to collect wounded, when the man pleaded to Fraser: ‘[d]on’t forget me cobber’.26 Fraser recorded that carrying his comrade on his back was the only manner in which he was able to evacuate this man: ‘it was no light work getting in with a heavy weight on your back, especially if had a broken leg or arm and no stretcher-bearer was handy’.27 The depiction, which has become explicit to the Australian notion of ‘mateship’, surely cannot only be an Australian trait which attempts to exemplify this ideal, but one that transcends all countries.

However, stretcher-bearers should not be considered more virtuous than others should; the evidence cannot justify such a broad statement. A recent publication stated that breaches of discipline within the Australian Forces during 1918, were more than ‘60 per cent’28 greater than those of the Canadians, therefore one could assume that stretcher-bearers were just as likely to be part of these

24 See AWM http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/E04850/ and AWM ART41003 25 London Gazette, 04/01/1917, Page 256, position 46. 26 Australians on the Western Front, Department of Veterans Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/fromelles/fromelles-casualties.html 27 Cited in Patrick Lindsay, Fromelles: The story of Australia’s darkest day, the search for our fallen heroes of World War One, Hardie Grant Books, Prahran, Victoria, 2007, p. 141. 28 Ashley Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010, p. 127. 289 fractious activities. Stretcher-bearers of all nations were tested and pushed at times beyond their limits, and did at times refuse to do their work. British infantryman Private Surfleet recalled: ‘we handed our burden [a wounded comrade] over to them [RAMC stretcher-bearers]; I can still see those swine sitting there, smoking and drinking tea while that lad lay there on a stretcher’.29

Significant work remains to be undertaken on the war experiences of this cohort group of non-combatants. Work to be carried out might examine the Cavalry Field Ambulances across all theatres of war. The experience of British Forces’ field ambulances and their stretcher-bearers during the East African, Sinai, Palestine and Mesopotamian Operations is also yet to be carried out. The high levels of sickness during these campaigns as opposed to battle related wounds suggest that a different narrative may be uncovered.

All the British Forces’ stretcher-bearers on the Western Front had a similar homogenous experience of war. No one group of stretcher-bearers had a better or worse experience than the others. Getting the bloodied, bruised and maimed, to medical care was the highest priority. This was the stretcher-bearers’ primary role. When Frederick Charles Goodman of the 2/1st London Field Ambulance was asked about seeing dead bodies and casualties he replied openly and with honesty about the gruesome task of working with the badly and mortally wounded on his arrival in France in 1916:

When I got to France and I saw these different things ... the first time I saw a casualty... that was one of the first things I saw, blood and those things and I fainted and I had to pull my self together I thought my god what am I in? I cant stand this it was awful... as time went on I became quite callous, it’s an awful thing to say, dreadful, but we saw so many of these one after

29 Cited in Leo van Bergen, Before my helpless sight, op. cit., p. 303. 290 the other, one was worse than the one before... we had to get use to some very awful things.30

Stretcher-bearers deserve greater acknowledgement and recognition for their toil during the war. This thesis has significantly contributed to our awareness of the work of these men and has gone someway to filling the gaps in our knowledge. It has given these men a voice by relating the personal experience of war for this group of non-combatants. The following excerpt relates one man’s reaction to the work of these men and sums up the importance of the stretcher- bearers in providing reassurance to combatants in times of stress:

A wave of movement spreads along the trench. It’s the stretcher-bearers getting into position behind the men who are to go over so soon. Someone wants to know why they must always parade their stretchers under our noses at moments like these, but most of us are relieved to know they will be following us. Many a time we have heard the desperate pleadings for ‘stretcher-bearers!’ when none was to be had, the agonised appeal cutting through the crash of the battle with the awful, compelling significance of its urgency. Stay with us this morning, you Stretcher-bearers, for very soon your mates will need you as they have never needed man or woman before.31

30 Frederick Charles Goodman, Oral history, op. cit. 31 Lynch, Somme Mud: the war experiences of an infantryman in France 1916-1919, op. cit., p. 259. 291 BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

ALEXANDER TURNBULL LIBRARY, MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION, LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES NEW ZEALAND, WELLINGTON (ALEXANDER TURNBULL)

Private Records

MSX-3484 War Diaries of William Roy Robson

MS Papers 4134 Gray family Papers

MS-Papers-10732 Gaetano Joseph Fama

Oral Histories

OHC – 002761 Sidney Stanfield Remembers

ARCHIVES NEW ZEALAND, WELLINGTON (NZA)

Official records

AABK New Zealand Defence Force, Personnel Archives

WA119 War Diary, New Zealand Expeditionary Force

AD1 Army Department [Record Group]

829, 29/168 Inwards Correspondence - Establishments and Recruitment – Organisation Medical Services, NZEF

734, 10/407/10 Territorial Force - Religious Objector regard to Service, Medical Unit

1004 51/635 Notes on Royal Army Medical Service

ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES MUSEUM, KEOGH BARRACKS MYTCHETT, SURREY (AMS) Private Records

RAMC/PE/1/1099/ANDR Bertram Leslie Andrews

292 RAMC/CF/4/3/22/ELLI Private A. Ellis

RAMC/CF/4/3/22/ELLI London Soldiers – Unarmed Comrades: being the story of the 2/3rd London Field Ambulance and their service with the 56th London (Territorial) Division in France 1916-1918’, Compiled by Private A. V. Atkinson

RAMC/CF/4/3/23/HARD/M35/1 Campaign Diary, Private G. Harding (George)

RAMC/PE/1/707/WARE WW1 Diary of Edwin Ware

ASIA, PACIFIC AND AFRICAN COLLECTION, BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON (BL)

India Office Records

IOR/L/MIL/5/825 1914-1915, Censor of Indian Mails

MSS Eur D978 General Staff Army HQ, India, March 1915

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL, CANBERRA (AWM)

Official records

AWM 4 Australian Imperial Force unit war diaries, 1914-18 War

AWM 8 Unit embarkation nominal rolls, 1914-18 War

AWM 10 Australian Imperial Force Administrative Headquarters registry

AWM30 Prisoner of War Statements, 1914-18 War

Private Records

1DRL/0004 Arthur James Adams

3RL/7507 Fred Bennett

MSS1360 Frederick E. Brown

PRO1157 Private Brown: ‘An Autobiography‘

PR00142 Leonard Clyde Bryant

PR01271 Raymond Fairhurst Cormack

293 PR83/155 War diary and Manuscript, Major Donald Dunbar Coutts, AAMC

3DRL/1898 Kenneth Cunningham

1DRL/0428 C. O. D. Edser

MSS1825 Septimus Elmore

1DRL/365 Foster Hunter

2DRL/1351 Howse Papers

1DRL/0468 Virgil Maguire

1DRL/0490 Captain Leonard May

PRO0626. Frank Sydney Shoobridge

3DRL/3424 Letters from John Simpson Kirkpatrick to his Mother

2DRL 1227/5 Lieutenant Colonel A. Sutton

PR86/308 ‘A Gentle man goes to war’, Manuscript, G. J. Wright

Art and Ephemera Collection

REL 01274

REL 36887.001

E00249

REL 31/247

GEORGE METCALF ARCHIVAL COLLECTION, CANADIAN WAR MUSEUM, OTTAWA (CWM)

Textual Records

Ref: 58A 1 240. 7 William Shaw Antliff

Ref: 58A 1 257.6 William David Bradley

58A: 1 221.1 Private Andrew Robert Coulter

58A: 1 244.1 Private Clifton Kell

294 58A: 1 216.22 Major William Charles Merston

IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM, LONDON (IWM)

Private Records

Catalogue no. 90/37/1 Private papers, Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Barnett

Catalogue no. 06/90/1 ‘With the British Forces in France’, Being the Diary of W. Bentham, During the Great European War

Catalogue no. 09/23/1 Private Papers of J. Brady, RAMC

Catalogue no. 67/18/1 George Carter

Catalogue no. 11/4/1 Private Papers of E. J. Drage

Catalogue no. 76/219/1 Private P. W. Gray

Catalogue no. 02(71).814 Historical records of Number 8 Canadian field Ambulance, Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Gunn

Catalogue no. 87/33/1 Hamilton Family history

Catalogue no. 14152 Private Papers of A. Nesbitt

Catalogue no. 06/63/1 Diary Lieutenant Colonel J. du P (Jack) Langrishe

Catalogue no. 12327 Brigadier P. Mortimer

Catalogue no. 08/147/1 H. V. Reed

Catalogue no. 67/4/1 Diaries of Captain Vellacott

Misc 278, item 3742 A letter written by a medical orderly in France

Oral Histories

Catalogue no. 24884 Fred Baldwin

Catalogue no. 9352 Walter George Cook

Catalogue no. 9398 Frederick Charles Goodman

Catalogue no. 10686 M. Mossop

Catalogue no. 24863 Cecil Warthin

295 KIPPENBERGER MILITARY ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH LIBRARY, NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM, WAIOURU, NEW ZEALAND

Private Records

Accession No. 1997.487 Horatio Hall

Accession No. 1993-975 ‘Diary of 3/158A, Lt-Col Percival Fenwick’

Oral Histories

Accession No.1999-3052 Christopher ‘Bud’ Gower Clement Veitch-Transcript

LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, OTTAWA (LAC)

Official records

Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada fonds

RG-9-III-D-3 War Diaries, Canada, Canadian Army, Militia and Defence

B-2, Volume 3745 Adami Papers, Director of Medical Services

C-3, Volume 4102 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Headquarters

C-10, Vol 4542 Assistant Director of Medical Services, 1st Canadian Division

MG9-1.03.018 Newfoundland Regiment War Diary

RG150, Vol. 516, Hospital admission and discharge books of Canadian Medical Corps overseas

RG 150 C.E.F. Headquarters Files

Accession 1992-93/166 C.E.F. Service Files

Private Records MG 30 – E379 H. M. (Tiny) Morris, ‘The story of my 3 ½ years in World War 1’

MUNIMENT COLLECTION, ARCHIVES AND MANUSCRIPTS COLLECTION, WELLCOME LIBRARY, LONDON

Private Records

296 RAMC 242 War diary kept by Captain Neil Cantlie, RAMC, with the 6th Division at the Battle of the Somme, Sept - Oct 1916

RAMC 699 The war diary of 19464, Corporal C. Chamberlain and the 9th Field Ambulance 1914

RAMC 968 John Q. Evans

RAMC 801/11 W. Gannicliffe, Memoir

RAMC 924 Papers of Private John J. Kershaw

RAMC 729/4 Private L. McDougall

RAMC 1241 Private E. Powell

RAMC 1781 ‘Personal Experience of an NCO in charge of a stretcher squad’

RAMC 801/13/1 No. 43 Field Ambulance, First World War

RAMC 1813 The 2/1st London Field Ambulance

RAMC 1802 Manuscript/ History of the 6th Field Ambulance

RAMC 446/7 The Lee Reports

RAMC 446/13 First World War materials

RAMC 761/1/4 Typed account of the medical services at the Battles of Mons, the Marne and the Aisne

RAMC 2053 ‘Minutes of the meetings of 3rd Corps Medical Society (on the Western Front)’

RAMC 793/23/3 Short report on the work of the Field Ambulance, 9- 21 May 1915

RAMC 801/20/5 6th London Field Ambulance (47th London Division) History, notes and autobiographical accounts re activities during the First World War

297 NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA, CANBERRA (NAA)

Official records

CA 2001 Australian Imperial Force, Base Records Office

B2455 First Australian Imperial Force Personnel Dossiers, 1914-1920

TEMPLER STUDY CENTRE, THE NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM, LONDON (NAM)

Private Records

Ref: 2005-05-43 Memoir written by Sapper Percival Ballard

Ref: 1992-04-73-01 ‘Notes from overseas, 1915-1916’, Private Robert John Stratton

Ref: 2006-09-25 Private Albert Moody

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, LONDON (TNA)

Official records

WO 95 War Office: First World War and Army of Occupation War Diaries

WO 32 War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series)

CAB 24 War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda (GT, CP and G War Series)

MT 23 Admiralty, Transport Department: Correspondence and Papers

THE ROOMS, PROVINCIAL ARCHIVES, ST. JOHN’S, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, (THE ROOMS)

Official records

MG 632, Box 7 St. John Ambulance and Red Cross Files

MG 996-1 St. John Ambulance Association

298 MG 632, Box 2 Patriotic Association of Newfoundland

MG 9 1.03.018 War Diary, Royal Newfoundland Regiment,

MG 9 1.03.012 Particulars of citations of decorations awarded members of the RNR, WW1

TORONTO PUBLIC LIBRARY, SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

James Arthur Fournier, Reminiscences, Incomplete Manuscript

CONTEMPORARY NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

Marlborough Express

The Times, London

The Lancet

RAMC Journal

British Medical Journal

The Times of India

Time Magazine

PUBLISHED SOURCES

THESES

Robert L. Cannon, ‘The British Government and the War Resisters during World War One: A study in Confrontation and Compromise’, MA Thesis, California State University, 1999.

John Charters, ‘Lice and Louse-Born Disease in the British Army on the Western Front, 1914- 1918’, MA Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2006.

A. M. Davidson, ‘The New Zealand Mounted Field Ambulance: a history of its activities from the outbreak of the Great War to the conclusion of the Sinai Campaign, August 4, 1914 – January 12, 1917’, MA Thesis, University of New Zealand, 1938.

299 Pamela Etcell, ‘Our Daily Bread: The Field Bakery & the Anzac Legend’, PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, Western Australia, 2004.

Bruce D. Faraday, ‘Half the battle: The Administration and higher organisation of the AIF, 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, UNSW, 1997.

Marion Leslie Girard, ‘Confronting Total War: British responses to Poison Gas 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, Yale University, 2002.

Corinne Lydia Mahaffey, ‘The fighting profession: the professionalization of the British Line Infantry Officer Corps, 1870-1902’, PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004.

Liana Markovich, ‘Linseed Lancers, Body Snatchers and Other Cheery and Jovial names: the role of the stretcher-bearer, Gallipoli 1915’, BA Honours Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2009.

Heather L. Moran, ‘Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine during the First World War, 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2008.

Nancy A. Nygaard, ‘Too awful for words: Nursing narratives of the Great War’, PhD, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2002.

Albert P. Palazzo, ‘Tradition, Innovation and the pursuit of the decisive battle: Poison gas and the British Army on the Western Front, 1915-1918’, PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1996.

Stephen Western, ‘The Royal Medical Corps and the Role of the Field Ambulance on the Western Front, 1914 – 1918’, MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2011.

OFFICIAL HISTORIES

C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of the War 1914-1918: Volume III – The Australian Imperial Force in France: 1916, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1941.

--The Official History of the War 1914-1918: Vol. IV, The Australian Imperial Force in France: 1917, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne, 1939.

--Volume VI – The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918, Volume VI, University of Queensland Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, St Lucia, Qld, 1983.

300 A. G. Butler, The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-1918: Vol. I, Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea, Australian War Memorial, Melbourne, 1930.

--The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914–1918: Vol. II, The Western Front, Australian War Memorial, 1940.

--The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918, Volume III – Special Problems and Services, Australian War Memorial, 1943.

A. D. Carbery, The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914-1918, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., Wellington, 1924.

Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914, Mons, The Retreat to the Seine, The Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1933.

--History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military operations, France and Belgium, 1916: [Vol. I], Sir Douglas Haig's command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme, (maps and sketches compiled by A.F. Becke), Macmillan, London, 1932.

--History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918,[ Vol. II], HMSO, London, 1937.

Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and Captain G.C. Wynne, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1915: [Vol.1] Winter 1914-15, Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Battle of Ypres, HMSO, London, 1927.

Captain Cyril Falls, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: France and Belgium, 1917, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras, MacMillan, London, 1940.

Government of India, India’s Contribution to the Great War, Government Printer, Simla, 1923.

Major-General M. H. S. Grover, Medical services India: Military training, Government of India, Simla, 1911.

301 Colonel A. M Henniker, Official History of the Great War: Transportation on the Western front: 1914-1918, N & M Press (Reprint), East Sussex, 2009.

Sir A. Macphail, History of the Canadian Forces, 1914-19: The Medical Services, Minister of National Defence, F. A. Acland, Ottawa, 1925.

Sir W.G. Macpherson, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. I, Macmillan, London, 1921.

--History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. II, The Medical Services on the Western Front, and during the operations in France and Belgium in 1914 and 1915, Macmillan, London, 1923.

--History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: Diseases of the War, Vol. II, Macmillan, London, 1922-23.

--History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: General History Vol. III: Medical Services during the operations on the Western Front in 1916, 1917 and 1918; in Italy; and in Egypt and Palestine, HMSO, London, 1924.

J. W. B. Merewether and Lieutenant Colonel F. Smith, The Indian Corps in France, Published under the authority of His Majesty's secretary of state for India in council, J. Murray, London, 1917.

T. J. Mitchell and Miss G. M. Smith, History of the Great War based on official documents by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War, HMSO, London, 1931.

Ernest Scott, Official history of Australia in the war of 1914-1918: Australia during the War; Volume XI, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936.

War Office, Statistics of the military effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920, London, HMSO, 1922.

War Office, Royal Medical Corps Training Manual, HMSO, 1911.

302 UNIT HISTORIES

J. G. Adami, War story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, Published for the Canadian War Records Office by Colour Ltd and Rolls House Publishing Co., Ottawa, 1918.

Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Austin, The Official History of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, L T Watkins Ltd, Wellington, 1924.

Dr John S. G. Blair, In Arduis Fidelis: Centenary History of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1998.

F. S. Brereton, The Great War and the R.A.M.C., Constable and Company Ltd, London, 1919.

Colonel A. R. C. Butson, A History of the Military Medical Units of Hamilton, Ontario in Peace and War 1900-1990, date unknown, available on-line http://batteredbox.wordpress.com/2010/07/24/hx- 23hamiltonfieldambulance/

Major John Alexander Cooper, History of Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1915-1919, Privately Published, London, Undated.

Major J. Edwards, ‘The Royal Army Medical Corps’, Famous British Regiments, No. 3, 1945.

The 2/1st London Field Ambulance, ‘An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th Division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919’, Morton, Burt and Sons Limited, London, 1924.

Robert Likeman, Men of the Ninth: a history of the Ninth Australian Field Ambulance 1916-1994, Slouch Hat Publications, McRae, Vic., 2003.

F. W. Noyes, Stretcher-bearers at the Double: History of the Fifth Canadian Field Ambulance which served overseas during the Great War, 1914-1918, Hunter Rose Company, Toronto, 1937.

David Rorie, A Medico’s luck in the War: being reminiscences of RAMC work with the 51st (Highland) Division, Milne and Hutchinson, Aberdeen, 1929.

Lt-Gen. Sir John Ross-of-Bladensburg, The Coldstream Guards 1914-1918, Volume I, Oxford University Press, London, 1928.

Lt-Colonel Sawyer, The Birmingham Territorial Units of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 1914-1919, Allday, Birmingham, 1921.

303 Ken Treanor, Staff, Serpent and the Sword: 100 years of the Royal New Zealand Medical Corps , Wilsons Scott Publishing, Christchurch, 2008.

Michael Tyquin, Little by little: a centenary history of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2003.

--Forgotten men: the Australian Army Veterinary Corps, 1909-1946, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2011.

Unknown, A record of the 3rd East Anglian Field Ambulance, during the Great War, 1914-1919, Wyman, London, 1931.

Unknown, An outline of the 4.5 years service of a unit of the 56th Division at home and abroad during the Great War 1914-1919, Morton, Burt and Sons Limited, London, 1924.

E. C. Vivian, With the Royal Medical Corps (R.A.M.C.) at the Front, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1914.

BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS

A Corporal, Field Ambulance Sketches, John Lane Co., New York, 1919.

An Exchanged Officer’, Wounded and a Prisoner of War, William Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1916.

E. M. Andrews, The Anzac illusion: Anglo-Australian relations during World War 1, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993.

Ron Austin, Wounds and Scars: From Gallipoli to France the history of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance, 1914-1919, Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, Vic., 2012.

Sue Austin and Ron Austin, The body snatchers: the history of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, 1914-1918, Slouch Hat Publications, McCrae, Vic., 1995.

Paul Baker, King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1988.

Jan Bassett, Guns and Brooches: Australian Army nursing from the Boer War to the Gulf War, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992.

J. L. Beeston, Five months at Anzac: a narrative of personal experiences of the officer commanding the 4th Field ambulance, Australian Imperial Force, W.C. Penfold, Sydney, 1916.

304 Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918, Pearson Education Ltd, Harlow, England, 2001.

Ilana R. Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War, The History Press, Gloucestershire, 2009.

Kate Blackmore, The dark pocket of time: War, Medicine and the Australian state, 1914-1935, Lythrum Press, Adelaide, 2008.

J. Bowker (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

Ana Carden-Coyne, ‘Soldiers’ Bodies in the War Machine: Triage. Propaganda and Military Medical Bureaucracy, 1914-1918, in James Peto and Nadine Monem (eds), War and Medicine, Black Dog Publishing, London, 2008.

U. N. Chakravorty, Indian nationalism and the First World War (1914-1918), Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1997.

Peter Cochrane, Simpson and the donkey: the making of a legend, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic. 1992.

Major G. R. N. Collins, Military Organization and Administration, Hugh Rees Ltd, London, 1918.

R. W. Connell, Masculinities: How masculinities are made and how they differ; why gender change occurs and how men handle it; how social science understands masculinity; how we can pursue social justice in a gendered world, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1995.

John Connor, ‘The ‘superior’, all-volunteer AIF’, in Craig Stockings (ed.), Anzac's dirty dozen: Twelve myths of Australian military history, NewSouth Publishing, Kensington, N.S.W., 2012.

Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2000.

--Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the writing of the World Wars, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2006.

-- At the Sharp End: Canadians fighting the Great War: 1914-1916, Viking Canada, Toronto, 2007.

--Shock Troops: Canadians fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, Viking Canada, Toronto, 2008.

305 Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, War, Medicine and Modernity, Sutton, Gloucestershire, 1998.

Major A. Corbett-Smith, The Retreat from Mons: By one who shared in it, Cassel and Company Ltd., London, 1916.

Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches. The Indian Corps on the Western front, 1914-1915, Spellmount, Stroud UK, 2006.

Ute Daniel, Margaret Ries (translator), The War from Within: German Women in the First World War, Berg Publishers, Oxford and Gordonsville, VA:, 1997.

Lindsay A. Deacon, Beyond the Call: An account of dedication and bravery by Australian nurses in the First World War, Regal Press, Launceston, TAS, 2000.

Department of Veterans Affairs, Fromelles and the Somme: Australians on the Western Front – 1916, Canberra, 2006.

Susanna De Vries, Heroic Australian women in war: astonishing tales of bravery from Gallipoli to Kokoda, HarperCollins, Pymble, NSW, 2004.

Rachel Duffett, The stomach for fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2012.

G. M. Dupuy, The Stretcher Bearer, Oxford Medical Publications, Oxford, 1915.

J. E. Edmonds, A Short History of World War 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1951.

Ashley Ekins, Fighting to Exhaustion, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010.

Will Ellsworth-Jones, We will not fight: the untold story of the First World War's Conscientious Objectors, Aurum Press, London, 2008.

Damien Fenton, New Zealand and the First World War: 1914-1919, Penguin, Auckland, 2013.

M. Fried, M. Harris and R. Murphy, (eds), War: the anthropology of armed conflict and aggression, Published for the American Museum of Natural History [by] the Natural History Press, Garden City, N.Y., 1968.

Richard A. Gabriel, and Karen S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine, Greenwood Press, New York, 1992.

306 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974.

A. Ghosh, (ed.), History of the Armed Forces Medical Services: India, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 1988.

Felicity Goodall, A Question of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in the Two World Wars, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK, 1997.

Government of India, Report of a Committee to revise the present field medical organisations and the equipment of field medical units, Simla, Government Branch Press, 1912.

John H. Gray, From the uttermost ends of the earth : the New Zealand division on the Western Front 1916-1918: A history and guide to its battlefields, Wilson Scott Publishing, Christchurch 2010.

J. Grey, P. Dennis, and I. McGibbon, ‘Australia and New Zealand’ in Robin Higham with Dennis E. Showalter (eds), Researching World War I: A Handbook, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 2003.

Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to kill in War and Society, Back Bay Books, Little Brown and Company, New York, 1996.

Jacqueline Gurner, The origins of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1970.

Christine Hallett, Containing Trauma: Nursing Work in the First World War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2009.

Ernest W. Hamilton, The First Seven Divisions: Being a detailed account of the fighting from Mons to Ypres, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1916.

Glyn Harper, Massacre at Passchendaele: the New Zealand story, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2000.

--Spring Offensive: New Zealand and the second Battle of the Somme, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2003.

--Dark Journey, HarperCollins Publishers, Auckland, 2007.

Mark Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

--Disease and the Modern World; 1500 to the present day, Polity Press Ltd., Cambridge, 2004.

307 -- The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.

Peter Hart, The Great War, Profile Books Ltd., London, 2013.

Richard Holmes, The Western Front, BBC Worldwide Ltd., London, 1999.

--Riding the Retreat: Mons to the Marne Revisited, J. Cape, London, 1995.

Major Donovan Jackson, India’s Army, Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd, London, 1940.

Captain E. A. James, A record of the battles and engagements of the British Armies in France and Flanders, 1914-1918, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, 1924.

Mark Johnston, Stretcher-bearers: saving Australians from Gallipoli to Kokoda, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2015.

John Keegan, The First World War, Hutchinson, London, 1998.

Peter H. Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres, Leo Cooper, London, 1997.

Patrick Lindsay, Fromelles: The story of Australia’s darkest day, the search for our fallen heroes of World War One, Hardie Grant Books, Prahran, Victoria, 2007.

Peter Lovegrove, Not least in the Crusade: A Short History of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Gale and Polden Ltd., Aldershot, UK, 1951.

E. P. F. Lynch and Will Davies (ed.), Somme Mud: the war experiences of an infantryman in France 1916-1919 Random House Australia, North Sydney, 2008.

H. Maclean, ‘New Zealand Army Nurses’, in Lt. H. T. B. Drew (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, Auckland, 1923.

Harold W. McGill & Marjorie Norris, Medicine and duty: the World War I memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, Medical Officer, 31st Battalion, C.E.F., University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 2007.

R. McLaughlin, The Royal Army Medical Corps, Leo Cooper Ltd., London, 1972.

Kathryn McPherson, Bedside Manners: The Transformation of Canadian Nursing, 1900-1990, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1996.

308 John McQuilton, Rural Australia and the Great War: from Tarrawingee to Tangambalanga, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., 2001.

Emily Mayhew, Wounded: A new history of the Western Front in World War 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.

Jessica Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009.

Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive, Allen Lane, London, 1978.

Desmond Morton, ‘Military Medicine and State Medicine: Historical Notes on the Canadian Medical Corps in the First World War, 1914-1919’, in David Naylor (ed.), Canadian Health Care, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1992.

--A Military History of Canada, McLelland and Stewart Limited, Toronto, 1999.

George Morton-Jack , The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014.

Edward C. Munro, Donald Munro (ed.), Diaries of a stretcher-bearer: 1916-1918, Boolarong Press, Brisbane, 2010.

John Nicol and Tony Rennell, Medic: Saving lives from Dunkirk to Afghanistan, Penguin Group, London, 2010.

Brendon O’Carroll, Khaki Angels: Kiwi Stretcher-bearers in the First and Second World Wars, Ngaio Press, Wellington, 2009.

Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Viking (Penguin Group), Camberwell, 2007.

Roger Perkins, Regiments and Corps of British Empire and Commonwealth: 1758- 1993: A Critical Bibliography of Their Published Histories, Newton Abbot, Devon, 1994.

Robin Prior, ‘Stabbed in the front: The German defeat in 1918’, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010.

R. Prior and T. Wilson, Passchendaele: the untold story, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1996.

309 Christopher Pugsley, The ANZAC experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Birkenhead, Auckland, 2004.

John Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service 1916-1919. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Ruth Rae, Scarlet Poppies: the army experience of Australian nurses during World War One, College of Nursing, Burwood, NSW, 2004.

Roy Ramsay, Hell, hope and heroes: life in the field ambulance in World War 1: the memoirs of Private Roy Ramsay, AIF, Rosenberg Publishing, Kenthurst, 2005.

H. E. Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2004.

Bill Rawling, Death their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and War, AGMV Marquis, Ottawa, 2001.

Peter Rees, The Other Anzacs: Nurses at War, 1914-18, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2008.

Donald Richter, ‘The Experience of the British Special Brigade in Gas Warfare’, in Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, Facing Armageddon: The First World War experienced, Leo Coper Ltd., London, 1996.

L. L. Robson, The First AIF: A study of its Recruitment 1914-1918, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1982.

Jane Ross, The myth of the Digger, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, c1985

K. Roy, (ed.) The Indian Army in the two World Wars, History of Warfare Series, Vol. 70, Extenza Turpin, Leiden, 2011.

Thomas Scotland and Steven Heys (eds), War Surgery 1914-18, Helion & Co., Solihull, England, 2012.

Gary Sheffield, ‘Military Revisionism’ in H. Howard, A part of History: Aspects of the British Experience of the First World War, Continuum, London, 2008.

-- ‘Finest hour? British forces on the Western Front in 1918’, in Asley Ekins (ed.), 1918, Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Exisle Publishing Limited, Auckland, 2010.

310 Dennis E. Showalter, ‘Mass Warfare and the impact of technology’ in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, (eds) Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918, German Historical Institute, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

R. Singha, Front Lines and Status Lines: The follower ranks of the Indian Army in the Great War, University Of Cambridge, Centre of South Asian Studies Occasional Paper No. 27.

H. S. Souter, A Surgeon in Belgium, Edward Arnold, London, 1915.

Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, Passchendaele: the Sacrificial Ground, Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, 2000.

Hew Strachan, The First World War: A New Illustrated History, Simon and Schuster, London, 2003.

Richard Travers, Diggers in France: Australian soldiers on the Western Front, ABC Books, Sydney, 2008.

Michael Tyquin, Neville Howse: Australia’s First Victoria Cross Winner, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1999.

--Madness and the Military: Australia’s experience of the Great War, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2006.

Leo van Bergen, Before my helpless sight: suffering, dying and military medicine on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 2009.

Jonathan Vance, Death so Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War. UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997.

R. White, ‘The Soldier as Tourist: The Australian Experience of the Great War’ in A. Rutherford and J. Wieland (eds) War: Australia’s Creative Response, Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1997.

Nathan Wise, Anzac Labour: Workplace Cultures in the Australian Imperial Force during the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2014.

Angela Woollacott, On her their lives depend: munitions workers in the Great War, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994.

311 JOURNAL ARTICLES

H. Bailes, ‘Patterns of thought in the late Victorian Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 4:1, 1981, pp. 29-45.

Glen St. J. Barclay, ‘Australian Historians and the Study of War, 1975-88’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 41, Supplement 1, 1995, pp. 240- 253.

G. C. Cook, ‘Influence of diarrhoeal disease on military and naval campaigns’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. 94(2), February 2001, pp. 95- 97.

Tim Cook, ‘Creating the Faith: The Canadian Gas Services in the First World War’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 755-786.

Gerald Fitzgerald, ‘Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I’, American Journal of Public Health, 2008 April; 98(4), pp. 611–625.

R. Foley ‘Learning War's Lessons: The German Army on the Somme, 1916’, Journal of Military History, Vol.75, Nr.2 (April 2011), pp. 471-504.

Stephen Garton, ‘War and Masculinity in twentieth century Australia’, Journal of Australian Studies, Volume 22, Issue 56, 1998, pp. 86-95.

Jeffrey Grey, ‘Writing about War and the Military in Australia’, Australian Historical Studies, 34: 122, pp. 384-386.

Mark Harrison, ‘Medicine and the Management of Modern Warfare: an Introduction’, History of Science, Vol. 34.4, 1996, pp. 379-410.

Claire E. J. Herrick, ‘Casualty Care during the First World War: The experience of the Royal Navy’, War in History, 2000, 7, pp. 154-179.

Lt-Gen. V. K. Kapoor, ‘Indian Army through the Ages’, SP Landforces Journal http://www.spslandforces.net/story.asp?id=73

John Kirkup, Fracture care of friend and foe during World War I, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Surgery, Volume 73, 2003, pp. 453–459.

Captain G. Law, ‘The evolution of the Field Ambulance 1906 to 1918’, Defence Force Journal, No. 66 Sept/Oct 1987, pp. 53-67.

Ian McCulloch, ‘Crucible of Fire: The South African War and the Birth of the Canadian Army Medical Corps’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol. 153(10), Nov 1995, pp. 1494-1497.

George Morton-Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’, War in History, 2006, 13(3), pp. 329-362.

312 Nick Lloyd, ‘“With faith and without fear”: Sir Douglas Haig’s Command of First Army during 1915’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 4, October 2007, pp. 1051-1076.

McCulloch, I., ‘Crucible of Fire: The Boer War and the Birth of the Canadian Army Medical Corps’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, Vol. 153(10), Nov 1995, pp. 1494-1497.

Stephen Pagaard, ‘Disease and the British Army in South Africa, 1899-1900’, Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 71-76.

John Pearn, ‘Civilian Legacies in Army Health’, Health and History, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, pp. 4-17.

B. Poe, ‘British Army Reforms, 1902-1914’, Military Affairs, Fall, 1967, pp. 131- 138.

Mario M. Ruiz, ‘Manly Spectacles and Imperial Soldiers in Wartime Egypt, 1914– 19’, Middle Eastern Studies 45.3 (2009): 351-371.

WEBSITES AND ELECTRONIC SOURCES http://www.quakers.org.au/?page=DAQB http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/B8982A23D75F18B6CA2578 390013015D/$File/1911%20Census%20-%20Volume%20II%20- %20Part%20VI%20Religions.pdf http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/180?OpenDocument http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/haigsommedespatch.htm http://www.firstworldwar.amdigital.co.uk/FurtherResources/Essays/DiariesAndL etters http://museumvictoria.com.au/collections/items/261179/stretcher-canvas-circa- 1916 http://www.vlib.us/medical/ramc/ramc.htm http://www.awm.gov.au/units/event_73.asp http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx?cpage=59&sort=name&order=asc http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/LLN- 2014-013/britain-and-the-first-world-war-parliament-empire-and- commemoration

313 http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/haigsommedespatch.htm http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/acts/territorial-and-reserve-forces-act- 1907 www.cbf-fccb.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Ypres-E.pdf https://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls http://www.awm.gov.au/units/event https://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1490290/ http://www.who.int/topics/malaria/en htttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,932019,00.html

OTHER

The AIF Project

Transcript interview, Stephen Crittenden and Michael McKernan, The Religion Report, Radio National (Australia), 4 August 2004.

314