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H U M A N ON THEIR WATCH R I G H T S Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility WATCH for False Positive Killings in Colombia On Their Watch Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia Copyright © 2015 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-32507 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org JUNE 2015 978-1-6231-32507 On Their Watch Evidence of Senior Army Officers’ Responsibility for False Positive Killings in Colombia Map .................................................................................................................................... i Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 16 Methodology .................................................................................................................... 18 I. Command Responsibility for False Positive Killings ....................................................... 20 Large-scale ............................................................................................................................. 22 Systematic ............................................................................................................................. 24 Modus Operandi .............................................................................................................. 24 Profile of Victims .............................................................................................................. 25 Organizing, Planning, and Logistical Coordination Required for Killings ............................ 25 Common Motives: Pressure to Boost Body Counts and Rewards ....................................... 26 False Positives Required Actions by Brigade and Tactical Unit Commanders ............................ 30 Official Documentation .................................................................................................... 31 Authorization to Move Troops ........................................................................................... 32 Authorization of Payments and Rewards ........................................................................... 33 The Implausible Circumstances of Reported Combat Killings ................................................... 34 Types of Weapon Reportedly Found on Victims ................................................................. 34 Location and Function of the Military Unit ......................................................................... 36 Hundreds of Common Criminals Reported As Killed in Military Operations ........................ 36 An Illustrative Case .......................................................................................................... 37 Routine Killings Across a Seven-Year Span ....................................................................... 38 Credible Public Reports of False Positives ............................................................................... 39 II. Profiles of Specific Brigades and Commanders Implicated in False Positives ..................41 4th Brigade ............................................................................................................................ 42 14th Brigade ........................................................................................................................... 48 11th Brigade ............................................................................................................................. 51 16th Brigade ............................................................................................................................ 54 7th Brigade .............................................................................................................................. 57 12th Mobile Brigade................................................................................................................ 58 28th Brigade ............................................................................................................................ 59 8th Brigade ........................................................................................................................... 60 9th Brigade ........................................................................................................................... 62 10th Brigade ........................................................................................................................... 64 15th Mobile Brigade ................................................................................................................ 65 Testimony against Army Officers above the Brigade-Level ...................................................... 66 III. Obstacles to Accountability ......................................................................................... 70 Military Authorities’ Lack of Cooperation with Investigations ................................................... 70 Reprisals against Key Witnesses ............................................................................................. 71 Killing of Nixón de Jesús Cárcamo ..................................................................................... 71 Threats and Harassment against Carlos Eduardo Mora ...................................................... 72 The Rape of a Key Witness’s Wife ...................................................................................... 73 Other Attacks against Witnesses ...................................................................................... 74 Support for Lieutenant Colonel González del Río ..................................................................... 74 Military Contracts and Other Army Funds .......................................................................... 76 Cars and Lodging for González del Río’s Defense, and Other Gifts ..................................... 77 The Military Justice System ..................................................................................................... 77 Past Failure to Investigate False Positives ......................................................................... 79 Military Judges’ Alleged Role in Covering-Up False Positives ............................................. 80 Expectations of Impunity .................................................................................................. 81 Lack of Credibility and Independence .............................................................................. 82 Delay Tactics by Defense Lawyers .......................................................................................... 84 Shortcomings within the Prosecutor’s Office ........................................................................... 85 Caseload ......................................................................................................................... 86 Ineffective Distribution of Cases ....................................................................................... 87 Lack of Effective Coordination between Prosecutorial Units ............................................. 88 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 90 Annex 1: A List of Commanders of the 11 Brigades Analyzed in this Report ........................ 91 Map Summary Between 2002 and 2008, army brigades across Colombia routinely executed civilians. Under pressure from superiors to show “positive” results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas, soldiers and officers abducted victims or lured them to remote locations under false pretenses—such as with promises of work—killed them, placed weapons on their lifeless bodies, and then reported them as enemy combatants killed in action. Committed on a large scale for more than half a decade, these “false positive” killings constitute one of the worst episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades. In September 2008, a media scandal over army troops’ killings of young men and teenage boys from the Bogotá suburb of Soacha helped force the government to take serious measures to stop the crimes, including by dismissing three army generals. Prosecutors are now investigating more than 3,000 alleged false positives by military personnel. Upwards of 800 army members have been convicted for extrajudicial killings committed between 2002 and 2008, most of them low-ranking soldiers. The convictions have covered a handful of former battalion and other tactical unit commanders, but not a single officer who was commanding a brigade