Frustrated Belligerence the Unhappy History of the 5Th Canadian Division in the First World War
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Canadian Military History Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 4 2013 Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War William Stewart Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation William Stewart "Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War." Canadian Military History 22, 2 (2013) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War William Stewart It [5th Division] embodied the patriotism, the hopes, the ambitions and the concentrated effort of more than eighteen thousand Canadian citizens in the full vigor of their physical and intellectual manhood … yet it was destroyed and broken in an official letter covering one typewritten sheet. “Canada’s Fifth Division: A History”1 The Fifth Division was one of the liabilities the Union Government took over. It was a mistake from the start. Toronto Star, March 19182 uring the First World War, the factors listed above. The paper 5th Canadian Division fought Abstract: The 5th Division’s inception, examines the circumstances of the D career, and eventual fate in the no battles, won no honours, and division’s formation, the selection of First World War were powerfully earned no glory. Histories of the war conditioned by Canadian political its commander, the rationale for its accord it no more than the briefest of imperatives, manpower availability, continued existence, struggles with mentions, and even then its status and tension between the Canadian the British regarding its status, and is often misrepresented. It is a case authorities’ desire to satisfy British the division’s fate. demands for another division and study on the salient influence of recognition of manpower shortages. political expediency and the limits Activated in part to ensure a divisional Dawn on the Canadian conduct of the war. command for the son of Sam Hughes, Coveted by the British, but regarded it was disbanded once the threat n the summer of 1916, Sir Sam with ambivalence by its Canadian of Hughes and other political Hughes, the minister of militia necessities had receded. Its well- I political and military superiors, trained personnel were a valuable and defence, believed Canada could the division’s course and fate were addition to the Canadian Corps, when raise more divisions than the four it powerfully influenced by the three replacements were at a premium. had already fielded. Hughes was the intertwined factors of politics, The unhappy career of the division dominant figure in the 5th Division’s manpower availability, and British illustrates how political expediency formation and development. The powerfully influenced decision- demands for another fighting division making, but also the limits of senior mercurial Hughes, aged 63, was at the front. Political expediency led Canadian politicians and officers a self-made man from Lindsay, to its formation, the appointment of willingness to satisfy domestic and Ontario, whom Sir Robert Borden, the its commander, its continued survival imperial political demands. Canadian prime minister, appointed in the face of Canadian manpower to the Militia and Defence portfolio shortages, and finally to its eventual in 1911. Hughes was pugnacious, disbandment. Recruitment problems on active service. The British high partisan, grandiose, frenetic, and crucially impacted the division, as command was keen to add another unfettered by self-doubt. He was the Canadian political authorities superb Canadian division at the front, supremely confident in his judgment tried to strike a balance between their and it was relentless in pressuring of people and situations.3 This desire to satisfy the British demands Canadian authorities for it. The attitude contributed to Hughes’ for a fifth Canadian division on the aim of this article is to describe desire for personal control over “his Western Front and the ability to and analyze the history of the 5th boys.” He established a confused maintain the four existing divisions Division through the lens of three and overlapping set of authorities Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2013 22, Number 2, Spring 2013, pp.31-47. 31 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4 that reflected his desire to more than four divisions would centralize all decision-making be in the firing line at a time, under his aegis.4 Hughes was so no additional troops would also a dangerous man to cross be exposed to enemy fire, and, – although a staunch friend – therefore, would not increase the he was an inveterate enemy to replacement burden. This plan, those he thought wronged him however, required the British or his cause. to agree to the restricted usage Discovering Australia of the additional divisions – a had five divisions in France restriction they neither would and two in Egypt, Hughes nor could accept, as military believed Canada, with its exigencies might demand that larger population, “can put at all the divisions be committed least eight if not ten Divisions to the line. Borden would later Library and Archives Canada C-020240 Library and Archives into the field.”5 Australia’s use a variant of this approach to male population in 1911 was demonstrate to the British that 2.3 million versus Canada’s he was willing to send the 5th 3.8 million, suggesting that Division to the front, but with Hughes’ notion was not entirely unacceptable conditions. far-fetched.6 He immediately While not officially followed by ensuring a cadre authorized, the planning remained in England that for the formation of the 5th could help form a fifth and Division proceeded during the sixth division when the 4th fall of 1916 as the Canadian Canadian Division left England The pugnacious Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, authorities in England struggled for France in August 1916. minister of militia and defence from 1911-1916, to gather the specialists and The 4th Division’s artillery was the dominant figure in the formation and equipment needed for a full development of the 5th Division. remained for further training division, while trying to satisfy and could be co-opted for the the replacement demands of the 5th Division – the 4th Division in England to break up battalions to Canadian Corps.12 An active service France was supported by the British provide replacements for the heavy division required a core of 12 infantry Lahore Division’s artillery.7 losses suffered by Canadian divisions battalions, plus pioneer, medical, In September 1916, Hughes on the Somme with, “Stand firm. engineer, supply, signals, artillery, promised the chief of the imperial Let our divisions rest. We will get and headquarters units, amounting to general staff (CIGS), General Sir all six divisions in shape. Surely about 18,000 men. These units needed William Robertson, that a fifth Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every officers, NCOs, men, equipment, and division would be ready in November month [referring to the costly Battle training supplies if the division was and a sixth early in the New Year.8 of Mount Sorrel].”9 This order came to embark for the continent, but all This promise indicated Hughes was at a time when the corps had already were in short supply. confident he would remain in charge suffered 18,000 casualties on the of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Somme, with an estimated 7,000 more Detour (CEF) and could fulfill his pledge. It by the end of the month and only also illustrated the degree to which 13,000 replacements available.10 omentous changes in the Hughes was out of touch with the An unattributed document, but Mpolitical and military structure declining volunteer rate in Canada, which appears from internal evidence of the overseas forces interrupted a subject to be discussed later, and to date from October or November the formation of the 5th Division. the consequent impact on providing 1916, suggested the means by which By late 1916, the administrative and replacements for the Canadian Hughes planned to maintain six training system in England was Corps. Hughes was adamant that the divisions in the field.11 The document clearly not functioning effectively. battalions intended to form the 5th called for a force of two corps of three The most obvious manifestation of Division must not be used to supply divisions each, with one division this failure was the system’s inability drafts to the divisions at the front. In per corps always out of the line to to replace the losses incurred on the October, he responded to the request absorb replacements and conduct Somme. Despite the availability of from the Canadian authorities in training. This proposal meant no 126,420 men in England in November https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/432 2 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War 1916, there were only 3,387 trained large, and hitherto chaotic Canadian in 1915.19 Again, the intention was men to meet the need for 16,188 organization of training camps, that the forces in Canada should replacements, because men were barracks, supply depots and other better support the overseas effort by tied up in battalions intended for facilities in England. The intention more efficiently organizing, training the 5th and 6th Divisions, inefficient was that the organization in England and dispatching reinforcements to manpower utilization, and inadequate should more effectively carry out it England.