Canadian Military History
Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 4
2013
Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
William Stewart
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Recommended Citation William Stewart "Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War." Canadian Military History 22, 2 (2013)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
William Stewart
It [5th Division] embodied the patriotism, the hopes, the ambitions and the concentrated effort of more than eighteen thousand Canadian citizens in the full vigor of their physical and intellectual manhood … yet it was destroyed and broken in an official letter covering one typewritten sheet. “Canada’s Fifth Division: A History”1
The Fifth Division was one of the liabilities the Union Government took over. It was a mistake from the start. Toronto Star, March 19182
uring the First World War, the factors listed above. The paper 5th Canadian Division fought Abstract: The 5th Division’s inception, examines the circumstances of the D career, and eventual fate in the no battles, won no honours, and division’s formation, the selection of First World War were powerfully earned no glory. Histories of the war conditioned by Canadian political its commander, the rationale for its accord it no more than the briefest of imperatives, manpower availability, continued existence, struggles with mentions, and even then its status and tension between the Canadian the British regarding its status, and is often misrepresented. It is a case authorities’ desire to satisfy British the division’s fate. demands for another division and study on the salient influence of recognition of manpower shortages. political expediency and the limits Activated in part to ensure a divisional Dawn on the Canadian conduct of the war. command for the son of Sam Hughes, Coveted by the British, but regarded it was disbanded once the threat n the summer of 1916, Sir Sam with ambivalence by its Canadian of Hughes and other political Hughes, the minister of militia necessities had receded. Its well- I political and military superiors, trained personnel were a valuable and defence, believed Canada could the division’s course and fate were addition to the Canadian Corps, when raise more divisions than the four it powerfully influenced by the three replacements were at a premium. had already fielded. Hughes was the intertwined factors of politics, The unhappy career of the division dominant figure in the 5th Division’s manpower availability, and British illustrates how political expediency formation and development. The powerfully influenced decision- demands for another fighting division making, but also the limits of senior mercurial Hughes, aged 63, was at the front. Political expediency led Canadian politicians and officers a self-made man from Lindsay, to its formation, the appointment of willingness to satisfy domestic and Ontario, whom Sir Robert Borden, the its commander, its continued survival imperial political demands. Canadian prime minister, appointed in the face of Canadian manpower to the Militia and Defence portfolio shortages, and finally to its eventual in 1911. Hughes was pugnacious, disbandment. Recruitment problems on active service. The British high partisan, grandiose, frenetic, and crucially impacted the division, as command was keen to add another unfettered by self-doubt. He was the Canadian political authorities superb Canadian division at the front, supremely confident in his judgment tried to strike a balance between their and it was relentless in pressuring of people and situations.3 This desire to satisfy the British demands Canadian authorities for it. The attitude contributed to Hughes’ for a fifth Canadian division on the aim of this article is to describe desire for personal control over “his Western Front and the ability to and analyze the history of the 5th boys.” He established a confused maintain the four existing divisions Division through the lens of three and overlapping set of authorities
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that reflected his desire to more than four divisions would centralize all decision-making be in the firing line at a time, under his aegis.4 Hughes was so no additional troops would also a dangerous man to cross be exposed to enemy fire, and, – although a staunch friend – therefore, would not increase the he was an inveterate enemy to replacement burden. This plan, those he thought wronged him however, required the British or his cause. to agree to the restricted usage Discovering Australia of the additional divisions – a had five divisions in France restriction they neither would and two in Egypt, Hughes nor could accept, as military believed Canada, with its exigencies might demand that larger population, “can put at all the divisions be committed least eight if not ten Divisions to the line. Borden would later Library and Archives Canada C-020240 Library and Archives into the field.”5 Australia’s use a variant of this approach to male population in 1911 was demonstrate to the British that 2.3 million versus Canada’s he was willing to send the 5th 3.8 million, suggesting that Division to the front, but with Hughes’ notion was not entirely unacceptable conditions. far-fetched.6 He immediately While not officially followed by ensuring a cadre authorized, the planning remained in England that for the formation of the 5th could help form a fifth and Division proceeded during the sixth division when the 4th fall of 1916 as the Canadian Canadian Division left England The pugnacious Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, authorities in England struggled for France in August 1916. minister of militia and defence from 1911-1916, to gather the specialists and The 4th Division’s artillery was the dominant figure in the formation and equipment needed for a full development of the 5th Division. remained for further training division, while trying to satisfy and could be co-opted for the the replacement demands of the 5th Division – the 4th Division in England to break up battalions to Canadian Corps.12 An active service France was supported by the British provide replacements for the heavy division required a core of 12 infantry Lahore Division’s artillery.7 losses suffered by Canadian divisions battalions, plus pioneer, medical, In September 1916, Hughes on the Somme with, “Stand firm. engineer, supply, signals, artillery, promised the chief of the imperial Let our divisions rest. We will get and headquarters units, amounting to general staff (CIGS), General Sir all six divisions in shape. Surely about 18,000 men. These units needed William Robertson, that a fifth Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every officers, NCOs, men, equipment, and division would be ready in November month [referring to the costly Battle training supplies if the division was and a sixth early in the New Year.8 of Mount Sorrel].”9 This order came to embark for the continent, but all This promise indicated Hughes was at a time when the corps had already were in short supply. confident he would remain in charge suffered 18,000 casualties on the of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Somme, with an estimated 7,000 more Detour (CEF) and could fulfill his pledge. It by the end of the month and only also illustrated the degree to which 13,000 replacements available.10 omentous changes in the Hughes was out of touch with the An unattributed document, but Mpolitical and military structure declining volunteer rate in Canada, which appears from internal evidence of the overseas forces interrupted a subject to be discussed later, and to date from October or November the formation of the 5th Division. the consequent impact on providing 1916, suggested the means by which By late 1916, the administrative and replacements for the Canadian Hughes planned to maintain six training system in England was Corps. Hughes was adamant that the divisions in the field.11 The document clearly not functioning effectively. battalions intended to form the 5th called for a force of two corps of three The most obvious manifestation of Division must not be used to supply divisions each, with one division this failure was the system’s inability drafts to the divisions at the front. In per corps always out of the line to to replace the losses incurred on the October, he responded to the request absorb replacements and conduct Somme. Despite the availability of from the Canadian authorities in training. This proposal meant no 126,420 men in England in November https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/432 2 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
1916, there were only 3,387 trained large, and hitherto chaotic Canadian in 1915.19 Again, the intention was men to meet the need for 16,188 organization of training camps, that the forces in Canada should replacements, because men were barracks, supply depots and other better support the overseas effort by tied up in battalions intended for facilities in England. The intention more efficiently organizing, training the 5th and 6th Divisions, inefficient was that the organization in England and dispatching reinforcements to manpower utilization, and inadequate should more effectively carry out it England. In late 1917, Kemp would procedures for returning wounded prime responsibility for dispatching replace Perley as the minister of men to active service.13 Senior officers trained reinforcements to the corps. the OMFC, while Major-General in the Canadian Corps, the British, In Canada, Borden appointed Sir Sir Sydney Mewburn took over the and even Borden complained about Edward Kemp as minister of militia militia portfolio. the disorganization and misrule.14 in place of Hughes. Kemp had served What is puzzling is that, despite Borden had a terrible dilemma. as a minister without portfolio at the his history of petulance and penchant It was apparent Hughes could start of the war. He acted as Borden’s for partisan attacks on political not rectify the serious problems trouble-shooter investigating enemies, Hughes offered only a with the overseas administration.15 operations of various departments muted reaction to the devastating loss Hughes, however, had a powerful and then served as the first chairman of his ministry. Certainly, there were constituency in Canada, believing of the War Purchasing Committee instructions to Conservatives not to his claims of accomplishments.16 attack Hughes unless he attacked Borden, non-confrontational by the government.20 Hughes’ actions, nature, feared the damage the so contrary to his modus operandi, truculent Hughes could do if strongly suggest there was an ousted. Rather than asking for undocumented quid pro quo. Most Hughes’ resignation, Borden likely it involved Garnet Hughes sought to marginalize him by – Sam Hughes’ son – receiving establishing a separate ministry command of a division, based on for overseas forces to limit Hughes’ Borden’s singular, repeated, and control over the CEF, whilst letting fervent lobbying on behalf of the him retain his cabinet role as the younger Hughes to be discussed minister of militia for forces in below. Borden’s campaign was a Canada. Hughes refused to accept recurring strand of politics that Borden’s ploy, and eventually influenced the course of the 5th
his outrageous behaviour forced Museum 19920044-371 Canadian War Division; Garnet Hughes was Borden to demand his resignation. indeed eventually appointed to After much anguish, intrigue, and command the division. pleas, Hughes finally resigned in Garnet Burke Hughes, was November 1916.17 a 33-year-old Canadian Militia This afforded Borden the officer and civil engineer. He opportunity to make changes. Sir graduated from Canada’s Royal George Perley, an astute politician Military College – first in his and an anglophile, would head a class in 1901 – passed the Militia new ministry of Overseas Military Staff Course, had long service in Forces of Canada (OMFC), and the Militia, and was the junior retain his position as acting high major in Arthur Currie’s 50th commissioner in London.18 The Regiment in Victoria before the new ministry would take over war.21 Hughes, early in the war, from the militia department the was the brigade-major of Richard Turner’s 3rd Brigade in the 1st Major-General Garnet Hughes, Canadian Division, with the rank pictured here as a brigadier when he of lieutenant-colonel, a full rank commanded 1st Canadian Infantry higher than normal for such an Brigade, did not distinguish himself appointment.22 He performed early in the war but his father’s patronage secured him command of poorly in the Battle of Second Ypres 5th Division. and the British commander of the 1st Division, Lieutenant-General
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promotions by Borden, respected Byng and was determined to minimize the appearance of political influence.28 Perley accepted Byng’s recommendation and thus thwarted the prime minister.29
Doubts About a Fifth Division
he new ministers, Perley and TKemp, had serious doubts as to the viability of a fifth division. Perley informed Borden in early November 1916 that, despite British pressure,
Library and Archives Canada PA-000698 Library and Archives it was unlikely there were sufficient troops to maintain a fifth division.30 In December, Perley asked Kemp for an estimate of manpower availability for the next six months to determine the formation’s fate. Perley admitted to being torn between his imperial duty in satisfying the CIGS and keeping the existing forces at full strength.31 Kemp’s response was Canada could send 15,000 men every three months for the next nine months, but that this would be insufficient to maintain the existing forces.32 In addition, Kemp was adamant that the 5th Division should not be sent to the front, and, believing Perley was considering acceding to the British demands, pointedly asked Borden if “Canadian authorities in England intend to The Hughes family at the Front. Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, Brigadier- act independent of our advice with General Garnet Hughes, and Brigadier-General William St. Pierre Hughes, regard to this matter.”33 Perley had to Sam’s brother, August 1916. write Kemp a soothing letter making it clear that while the formation of the Sir Edwin Alderson, transferred him overseas ministry, Perley appointed division was to proceed, it was not to the 2nd Division.23 Through his Major-General Richard Turner VC, deploying to France.34 father’s influence, Hughes received commander of 2nd Division, to head command of the 1st Brigade in Canadian forces in England. Borden Decision November 1915 which he led at was anxious that Garnet replace Mount Sorrel and on the Somme, Turner, but the commander of the nexpectedly, in late December, where he neither distinguished nor Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General UPerley gave Turner permission disgraced himself.24 The strains Sir Julian Byng, preferred Major- to proceed with the division’s of command, however, wore him General Henry Burstall, a Canadian tentative activation.35 Turner down.25 Permanent Force officer.26 Borden hurriedly inspected the infantry The first opportunity for Borden was unhappy with the selection and battalions at Witley to select which to intervene to secure Garnet a argued “I have no doubt that the man would join the division. Turner must division came when command of selected by Byng is much inferior not have been satisfied, as he ordered the 2nd Division became available. to other mentioned [Garnet].”27 one battalion (156th Battalion) that With the formation of the new Perley, given the final authority on had already been broken up to https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/434 4 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
be reformed, the 104th PEI and 105th New Brunswick Battalions Sir George Perley, head of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) to be amalgamated, and another and acting high commissioner was transferred to the division from caught between serving the Empire and Bramshott camp (160th Battalion).36 Canadian manpower realities. Turner had to strike a balance between the military effectiveness of General’s department estimated the the battalions available, the regional additional equipment and yearly origin of the units, and the ability to operating costs for the 5th Division’s maintain their strength. As a result, transportation at £245,000 or over the division initially consisted of six a million dollars over the costs for battalions from Ontario, two from a standard training camp.38 The Quebec, and one each from Alberta, most likely reason for the division’s Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, formation was political expediency and Nova Scotia. Later shortages in providing a divisional command Canadian War Museum 19920085-782 Canadian War of manpower necessitated breaking for Garnet Hughes. Borden was once up the two Western Canadian again exceedingly anxious about and one Quebec battalions and who was to command the division, their replacement by three Ontario cabling Perley in late January, battalions.37 “Please consult me before final Given the considerable doubts decision. This is very important.”39 expressed by both the ministers of Typically, Borden only intervened militia and OMFC, why then did in politically sensitive matters, and Perley authorize the formation of he had explicitly granted Perley the division? It was apparent that complete authority over promotions, it was unlikely ever to deploy to so this interference suggests he had France, and the costs of equipping a political agenda, especially as the and maintaining the division were incumbent commander had seniority considerable. The Quartermaster- over Hughes, as discussed below.40
5th Division Simplified Organization Chart
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Headquarters personnel of 5th Canadian Division. Major-General Garnet Hughes is seated fifth from the right.
Shortly after Perley’s decision figure.43 Byng, in his congratulatory Hughes’ appointment on 10 February, to activate the division in early note to Hughes on his appointment, and he took over the division three January, Turner asked Hughes, commented “When you left I thought days later.45 On learning of Hughes’ still commanding the 1st Brigade, you anything but quite fit and that appointment from Perley, Borden if he would accept command with you really wanted a proper rest.”44 cabled, “Quite approve of proposed the stipulation that the division The 5th Division’s war diary recorded appointment.”46 might not proceed overseas, Hughes was junior to at least until the replacement the incumbent divisional situation improved.41 Hughes commander, Brigadier-General replied on 20 January, R.G.E. Leckie, and this provides accepting the appointment further evidence that Hughes’ and seeking Turner’s support, appointment was politically and hoping his acceptance motivated. Leckie’s promotion would not preclude him from to command of a brigade at the opportunity to command the front predated Garnet’s, a division at the front.42 The and Leckie had been the chief Canadian Representative to the of the general staff on the British General Headquarters elder Hughes’ Acting Sub- in France, Lieutenant-Colonel Canada PA-008006 Library and Archives Militia Council, until relieved Manley Sims, formally offered by Turner in December 1916. the division to Hughes, on 3 Leckie would have been an February. Hughes accepted with the information from Sims Lieutenant-General Sir Richard that Canadian authorities did E.W. Turner, VC, general officer not intend to send the division commanding the Canadian Forces to France. Sims informed Turner in the British Isles and later chief that Hughes was not in good of the general staff of the OMFC, was the man who had to provide health and should be recalled replacements for the losses immediately – photographs suffered by Canadian units on the of Hughes, as commander of Western Front. 1st Brigade, show a haggard https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/436 6 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
understandable appointment given Replacements Received and Dispatched his experience, seniority, and the January 1917 to January 191852 need to find him a substantive post in England commensurate with his Received From Canada Drafts To France Differential rank. His relief was “a complete surprise” to Leckie, and he was January 1917 3,819 3,241 578 incensed that a third officer junior February 1917 3,487 4,527 (1,040) to him had received a division – the March 1917 9,769 5,858 3,911 other two being Major-General David Watson (4th Division), and Major- April 1917 15,197 9,342 5,855 General H. Burstall (2nd Division). May 1917 10,176 13,710 (3,534) Leckie demanded another command June 1917 5,317 6,242 (925) at the front or at least a promotion to major-general to antedate Garnet’s July 1917 261 2,766 (2,505) promotion in recognition of his being August 1917 2,261 4,936 (2,675) superseded. Perley had no position to September 1917 2,057 8,871 (6,814) offer Leckie in England; the Canadian Corps did not want him, so Perley October 1917 3,160 5,584 (2,424) had to inveigle Kemp in Canada to November 1917 5,057 12,151 (7,094) find Leckie a suitable position and December 1917 3,157 3,755 (598) promotion.47 January 1918 1,446 3,801 (2,355) Decline in Recruiting Total 65,164 84,784 (19,620)
he second factor influencing the 60 percent.49 The British born was and July.51 The chart illustrates Tfate of the 5th Division was the high as a result of the recent influx the challenge the OMFC faced in Borden government’s mishandling of immigrants from the UK just prior finding sufficient replacements, of the manpower situation leading to the war. as it provided almost 20,000 more to shortfalls in replacements. Lacking Major-General Willoughby men than it received from Canada. an appreciation of manpower needs Gwatkin, chief of the general staff in Combing-out units in England and and resources, the government Ottawa, sent Borden a memo in April returning wounded men made up did not recognize the decline in 1917 setting out in detail the serious the difference. volunteers in 1916, in part because the shortfall in manpower, and pleaded large number of battalions moving that 50,000 men be compelled to Demands by the British overseas masked the situation.48 serve. Gwatkin estimated that the Many of these battalions, however, CEF needed 20,000 to 30,000 men he final factor that shaped had not been able to recruit to over the summer, but that there Tthe story of the 5th Division full strength; there were severe were only 18,496 men in the CEF was demands by the British for its difficulties finding volunteers for in Canada, and most of these were early dispatch to the front. In early service, especially in Quebec and the unsuitable or unavailable. Only November 1916, shortly after Perley Maritimes. According to a June 1916 4,000 men were joining per month, took over as minister of the OMFC, report from the Special Committee and some of these would be unfit he met Robertson, who made a on Recruiting, while Ontario had for active service.50 The result of this strong plea to deploy the 5th Division reached 75 percent of its quota of was a collapse in the number of men to France, but Perley resisted. He recruits, the Western provinces 114 arriving in England from Canada. explained the Canadian manpower percent, the Maritimes were only The chart below illustrates how the situation to Robertson and argued at 48 percent and Quebec at 25 numbers sent overseas declined from that it was unlikely that five divisions percent, and the Quebec total was a peak of 15,197 in April 1917 to a low could be sufficiently reinforced. predominantly English-speaking. of 261 in July. The March and April He obtained Robertson’s grudging The same report indicated only three peaks were the result of Canadian agreement that it was wiser to percent of French-speaking men authorities rushing drafts to England, maintain four full-strength divisions enlisted while the equivalent totals as the Admiralty could not guarantee in France than five understrength.53 for Canadian-born anglophones protection against U-Boats in the Nevertheless, the deputy CIGS wrote were 13 percent and UK born were long daylight hours of May, June Perley on 17 November 1916 pressing
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for more details on progress the 5th Division would be with appointing command and a source of replacements if staff personnel for the division necessary, potentially delaying and reiterating Robertson’s its readiness, and agreement interest in the division.54 Perley that Canada could not raise pushed back in his reply and another divisional artillery asked for time to build up his formation.63 The British wanted organization before he could the 5th Division to be used as give a definitive answer.55 replacement source only if there The British, recognizing were no trained replacements Perley’s reluctance to make a available. In addition, as the 5th commitment, responded with Division was a home defence “Sir William Robertson hopes Museum 19930003-726 Canadian War unit, it required dedicated you will agree to forming a artillery.64 Field Marshal Sir division at Witley as soon as Douglas Haig’s decision as the possible, for training purposes, commander in chief of the British without prejudice to the question Expeditionary Force (BEF) to of its subsequently being sent reorganize divisional artillery overseas.”56 This would become solved the artillery problem, a standard British negotiating by reducing the number of tactic, in the face of Canadian field artillery brigades per intransigence, to move the division. His proposals freed Canadians closer to the position up sufficient guns to form a new sought by the British. 4th Division artillery in France This Canadian reluctance and permanently assign the 4th may have contributed to On the hunt for more Canadians – General Division artillery in England to Robertson’s subsequent advice Sir William Robertson, British chief of the 5th Division.65 to the new British Prime the imperial general staff, talking to a Keen for a fifth Canadian Minister David Lloyd George to Canadian officer in March 1918. division, Haig drove Robertson’s prod the Dominions to increase demands. In early January, he recruitment. This resulted in an England.60 Undeterred, Robertson wanted to know from Robertson appeal from Lloyd George to the sent a handwritten note in reply four when it would be ready to deploy, Dominions requesting more men in days later reiterating the necessity of as he was counting on it in his December 1916.57 The British believed sending the division to the front.61 plans for 1917, including the Arras Canada could contribute more, as, at To reach a decision, Robertson, the offensive and an expected attack in the beginning of 1917, the British had deputy CIGS, and the secretary of Flanders. Robertson had to inform already imposed conscription and state for war Lord Derby met with Haig there was “no definite decision” had 17.2 percent of its men in uniform Perley and Turner. Not surprisingly on deploying the division.66 Haig, while only 9.6 percent of Canadian given the British enthusiasm for the seemingly oblivious of the doubtful men served.58 division and Canadian ambivalence, status of the division, continued all The British doggedly persisted the two sides left with a different through 1917 to assume it would and Robertson wrote to Perley understanding of the meeting’s reach him. As late as mid-January again on 1 January 1917 urging decisions. Both parties agreed that 1918, he still counted the 5th Division dispatch of the division to France in there were not enough drafts in the in his total of divisions available to February.59 This was an impossibly pipeline to maintain a fifth division him to commit to the line in France.67 short lead-time, even if the Canadian in the field. Despite this, the British In February 1917, unable to authorities been in favour of sending believed the 5th Division was to be get commitment from Canadian the division. Perley stalled, asked manned as soon as possible with “A” authorities in England, the British for yet more time to gather data category men - soldiers fit to serve on High Command sent a formal plea on the reinforcement situation active duty – and the 4th Division’s through the Colonial Office to and to speak with Turner, a task artillery was to remain with the the governor-general of Canada complicated by the fact that Turner 5th Division until replacement requesting more troops and was implementing significant reforms units arrived from Canada.62 specifically the 5th Division. Perley in the Canadian administration in Perley wanted it understood that advised the secretary of state for the https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/438 8 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
colonies, Walter Long, not to mention cover expected losses from the spring were to vindicate this strategy as the the 5th Division in the cable, and offensive in which the Canadian casualties at Vimy Ridge and follow- warned there would be consequences Corps was to participate, so the on operations stressed the Canadian if the request became public.68 Perley British analysis was flawed. replacement system almost to the was most likely concerned that such The War Office asked for a breaking point. overt British pressure would have definitive answer to their earlier During Borden’s visit to England negative political consequences requests at the end of February. for the Imperial War Conference and affect recruiting. The British Perley’s deputy minister, Walter early in 1917, he and Perley met with approach failed. Gow, replied on 2 March politely Long who, again, made a plea for the Also in February, the War Office, but firmly telling the British they 5th Division‘s commitment. Borden based on instructions from the British could not meet their demands. Gow was willing to consider sending the War Cabinet, asked for the “despatch referred to the conference in January division if the British could guarantee of the 5th Canadian Division to France and said that nothing significant had that only four divisions would be in as soon as its training is sufficiently changed the conference’s decisions. the line at a time, harking back to advanced.”69 Three aspects of this Gow reiterated the standard the earlier proposal. Long could not request are interesting: the War Canadian position that upcoming possibly guarantee this, as Borden Office was invoking the considerable operations would place a severe likely knew.72 There was one final prestige and power of the British strain on the replacement system, attempt at a meeting of the Imperial cabinet in its request to apply more thus making it impossible to support War Cabinet on 30 March, where pressure on the anglophile Perley; five divisions, and it was thus not Borden evaded the issue when the note included a detailed listing advisable to send the division to Robertson queried him about the of Canadian manpower resources France.71 The Canadians adopted division’s availability.73 The British available in England and base depots a consistent position, asserting it were hoping to confront Borden in France to counter Canadian claims was better to maintain four full- and force a commitment in front of insufficient replacements; and, strength divisions than five weak of his peers, but Borden was too the division was to move, not when ones and that Canadian resources shrewd a politician to allow this to its training was complete, but only were inadequate. Subsequent events happen. In mid-March, as a possible when “sufficiently advanced,” in recognition that the Canadian replacement numbers were unlikely to be adequate. The British objective was to get the division to France, so, if the replacement situation did further deteriorate, it would be a far more difficult decision to disband it in France than if it were in England. It would, also, be an additional incentive for Canadian authorities to ramp up their recruiting effort or introduce
compulsory service. The British Museum 19930065-032 Canadian War insistence on getting the division to France while it was still forming perplexed Turner.70 In penciled comments on the letter, Turner noted that the replacements listed as available would be insufficient to
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden (centre) looking uncharacteristically determined as he stands with his minister of militia, Major-General S.C. Mewburn (left) and his minister of the OMFC, Sir Edward Kemp (right), July 1918.
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Brigadier-General A.E. Swift (left), commander of the 14th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and Major-General Garnet Hughes (right) along with two unidentified women at the 5th Canadian Divisional Sports Day, October 1917.
they form a division out of Canadian Forestry and Railway troops. Turner and Kemp refused to change the organization of the corps, and Kemp Canadian War Museum 19930003-263 Canadian War pointed out the short sightedness of Wilson’s Forestry and Rail request as it would cripple timber production and essential railway construction.80
Division’s Development
eturning to the division’s Rdevelopment, the War Office officially authorized its organization on 18 January following the 12 January 1917 conference, with Turner’s headquarters issuing the compromise, Gow notified the War Robertson, not satisfied with just a Canadian order shortly afterwards.81 Office that the 5th Division was ready direct appeal to Perley, also cabled The division formed at Witley to move within England and Scotland the Canadian governor-general on Camp in Surrey, approximately 60 as necessary. This would place the the necessity of getting the division kilometres southwest of London. It division in a more useful mobile to the front.78 Gow was finally able consisted of three infantry brigades role in home defence. Gow was also to close down the British requests – the 13th, 14th and 15th. Brigadier- careful to ensure the War Office was with a carefully reasoned letter that General J.F.L. Embury commanded aware the division was incomplete.74 explained the Canadians rather than the 13th Brigade. Embury was Nine days later, the British tested having a surplus of replacements 42 years old, a solicitor, and the the division with a two-day State of would probably have to use the 5th prewar Militia commander of the Emergency, based on a purported Division to keep the Canadian Corps 95th Saskatchewan Rifle Regiment. German invasion, which the division at full strength through 1917 with He had successfully led the 28th passed.75 present levels of attrition. He pointed (Saskatchewan) Battalion in Turner’s It was not until the end of May out that Canadian authorities had 2nd Division until wounded at that the British again returned to already raided the 5th Division to the Battle of Courcelette on 15 the issue of the division – more supply replacements for the front.79 September 1916. After recovering, urgent now given the success of the In a curious coda to these he commanded the 10th Training Canadian Corps in the Arras offensive demands for the 5th Division, in June Brigade, which became the 13th and Borden having announced a 1918, the new CIGS, General Sir Henry Brigade.82 The commander of the 14th proposed conscription act. Robertson Wilson, made a desperate request. Brigade was Brigadier-General A.E. pointed out the satisfactory state of The German spring offensives had Swift, who was in his late forties and reinforcements in the Canadian Corps reduced a number of British divisions was a Permanent Force major, with and that the division was needed at to cadre strength, and the British were service in the South African War. the front.76 Supporting Robertson’s anxious to field more formations. Prewar, he was the inspector of arms position was the fact, noted in Haig’s Wilson asked the Canadians to and ammunition. He commanded the diary in early July, that the Canadians replace one battalion in each of their 2nd Battalion in the Canadian Corps were the only force in the BEF with a brigades with an American battalion, for over a year and then led the 11th surplus of replacements. All the other thus freeing up forces to form a fifth Training Brigade, which became the contingents were under-strength.77 division. Alternatively he suggested 14th Brigade.83 Brigadier-General https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/440 10 : Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
February 1917. He had been GSO Top right: Major-General E.C. Ashton, 2 of the 2nd Division while Turner former commander of the 15th Canadian was the division’s commander, so Infantry Brigade, as adjutant-general of his selection was likely a result of the Canadian Militia. He would rise to be him being a known quantity. Hore- the chief of the general staff. Ruthven was a decorated veteran Bottom right: Brigadier-General J.F.L. of the South African war and was Embury, former commander of the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, wounded during 1914. Recognizing photographed later in 1918 as head of the necessity for front line experience the Canadian Section, GHQ. in the division, Hughes recruited staff and commanders from the Canadian Corps. His familiarity with officers in the 1st Division led E.C. Ashton, who would have a Museum 19910051-007-11 Canadian War him to poach predominantly from long and distinguished career in the division. Currie, exasperated at the Canadian Army, commanded the number of officers he was losing, the 15th Brigade. Prewar, Ashton, a told Hughes in May that the division 43-year-old physician, was in charge was off-limits to further transfers, an of a Militia artillery battery and had understandable reaction.86 passed the Militia Staff Course. He The battalions selected to make formed the 36th Battalion and later up the division were far from ready commanded the 9th Reserve Brigade, for active service, despite the troops and the Canadian Training Division being embodied for over a year on at Shorncliffe. He was recalled to average.87 An early February 1917 Canada in November 1917 to take assessment of the division’s infantry over as the adjutant-general, and units indicated a desperate need he later rose to chief of the general for trained drafts, instructors and staff in the late 1930s.84 It is difficult new leadership.88 The training cycle to evaluate the three brigadier- consisted of ten weeks individual generals as they did not command instruction before December 1916 their brigades in battle, but Swift and and 14 weeks thereafter, followed Embury had commanded battalions by company preparation, company at the front for an extended period, marches, battalion exercises, brigade
so were as qualified as any in the Museum 19930065-778 Canadian War training, brigade marches and finally Canadian Corps for promotion to division exercises.89 As nine of the brigadier-general. Turner, as GOC 12 battalions arrived in England 2nd Division, rated Embury as the before October 1916, they should battalion commander most qualified have completed the battalion level for appointment as a brigade GOC in preparation as they had three full March 1916.85 Ashton’s later ascent months preparation time in England. to the senior post in the Canadian By February, however, only four were Army also suggests a competent ready for company training with the commander. remainder needing to complete At its activation, the division was individual training and receive drafts incomplete, and over the course of the and instructors. Turner’s order that next month, three battalions (160th, eight of the battalions provide trained 161st, and 199th), the divisional replacements to the Canadian Corps signal company, brigade machine further impeded progress. As a gun companies, engineer field result, six of the eight battalions were companies, and division train arrived under-strength, and the other two at Witley. However, Lieutenant- consisted of untrained drafts, which Colonel Christian Hore-Ruthven, the crippled their readiness.90 British GSO 1, the chief staff officer Poor leadership at the battalion of the division, did not join until 27 level also hampered the division’s
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training. Few officers and NCOs claimed he had to resist tremendous because of insufficient recruits. had any front experience, and so pressure from the politicians to Additionally, there was an imbalance were inadequately prepared to select Hughes. Historians A.M.J. in battalions from regions. Based on instruct their men. Hughes replaced Hyatt in his biography of Currie and population, British Columbia had five battalion commanders in May Desmond Morton in his A Peculiar four more battalions and Quebec and June and another left because Kind of Politics both suggest he two more than they should have had, of illness.91 Later in January 1918, probably exaggerated the pressure while Ontario had ten fewer than its Hughes indicated three of his placed on him. Hyatt also argues population warranted.102 Shortfalls in battalion commanders should be Currie had a guilty conscience about recruiting, moreover, made the 128th replaced if the division crossed to his treatment of his former friend.98 (Saskatchewan), 199th (Quebec), France which strongly indicates a Currie later had a heated three- and 202nd (Alberta) Battalions weak command cadre at the battalion hour meeting with Garnet who unsustainable, and Turner disbanded level.92 pleaded for the opportunity to them in May. They were replaced by The division was beginning command the 1st Division, but the 164th (Ontario), 198th (Ontario), to show progress by May 1917 Currie adamantly refused. According and 208th (Toronto) Battalions. regaining strength and completing to Currie, Hughes stormed out Adding to the travails of the division, more advanced training, such that the vowing vengeance for the rejection.99 five battalions lost a total of 2,100 division started brigade exercises.93 Henceforth, Currie believed Garnet other ranks as replacements for the Garnet informed Currie that three was an implacable enemy and that corps in France, all but destroying battalions were still under-strength, Garnet and his father were sure to them as effective units.103 but “We are fairly well advanced try and undermine him. However, The British Inspector of Infantry’s with the training” and would be Currie continued to correspond with assessment of the division at the end ready in five to six weeks.94 Garnet and meet with him in England of June showed only four battalions when on leave, which tends to belie fit for home defence, five more A Division in France his claim and suggests he overstated anticipated as being ready in July for Garnet? the animosity.100 and the remaining three not until August.104 Readiness for home n June, another opportunity Disruption in England defence was a lower standard than for Iemerged to provide Garnet overseas service, which underlined Hughes with a front-line division. n late May, Turner had to make the how far the division would have to Major-General Sir Arthur Currie Idifficult decision to gut the division progress to be efficient for service on received command of the Canadian for replacements for the Canadian the Western Front. Hore-Ruthven, Corps after Haig promoted Byng Corps – a serious setback to the the division’s GSO 1, was even more to command Third Army. This left division’s preparations. Lieutenant- pessimistic as he estimated that nine an opening for Hughes to take over General Sir Julian Byng, earlier in battalions would complete battalion Currie’s former command, the 1st May and still the commander of training only in August and three Division, and Borden wanted to the Canadian Corps, was unhappy in September. This did not include ensure Garnet received it.95 Again, with the number of untrained men brigade or division exercises. In the matter of what to do with Hughes he was receiving and suggested it addition, three of the battalions were loomed large. Manley Sims met was time to use the 5th Division new to the division, and he rated Currie on 10 June, and Currie claimed as a source of trained personnel. them as weak or only fair.105 Sims tried to negotiate with him This must have been a factor in Through June and July the division regarding the position, but Currie Turner’s decision to use the 5th conducted individual and battalion rejected any interference.96 While Division for replacements.101 The level training. Then, peculiarly, at Currie did not rule out offering division experienced considerable the end of July the King inspected the Hughes a division, he thought the turnover at the battalion level as the division, which was traditionally the Permanent Force officer Brigadier- desperate need for trained manpower last act before proceeding overseas, General A.C. Macdonell a better necessitated scouring the division but, as the earlier evaluations attest, choice.97 It was unlikely, however, repeatedly for drafts and even entire the division was far from ready.106 that Currie had any real intention battalions to replace losses. Between At the same time, according to the of giving Hughes a division, as its official formation date of 23 January unpublished 5th Division history, demonstrated later in 1918 when he and the end of May, one-quarter Turner queried Hughes as to when refused him once again. Currie later of its battalions were disbanded the division would be ready to
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proceed to France, and Hughes reassigned to help build aerodromes of changes to the election act to give thought they would be ready by the for the Royal Air Force, which was the government an edge, one of first week of August. Apparently, another sign that the division’s future which was to allow overseas military there were considerations of sending was bleak.114 votes to be assigned to, essentially, the division over, but probably notice any riding the government wished.119 of the long-planned Canadian attack Denouement Military votes from the contingents at Hill 70, finally launched 15 August abroad were potentially critical to 1917, and the expected casualties, hile the division trained in the government’s success, so it was necessitated second thoughts.107 In WEngland, attacks at Hill 70 imperative that the military vote June, Turner believed it would be in August and Passchendaele in for the government. Australia had possible to commit the 5th Division October and November 1917 drained run two referenda on conscription, at the beginning of August if Canada the available manpower pool, and and both failed, in part, because of could provide an additional 10,000 it became increasingly difficult to the lack of support of the Australian men by August and another 10,000 justify the 5th Division remaining as military.120 Breaking up the 5th by October.108 In July, however, only a home service division in England. Division before the election could 261 men and 2,261 in August arrived In late October, Borden and the embitter its members and potentially from Canada.109 Borden at the end of Canadian War Committee considered throw its votes to the Opposition. June informed Perley he wanted to if dissolution of the division was The unpublished 5th Division history give volunteering more time before appropriate and wanted Perley and asserts highly placed military and enforcing the proposed Military Turner’s views. Turner requested government officials explicitly Service Act – conscription.110 This an analysis by his adjutant-general, promised that if Borden’s Unionist effectively ended any possibility of Major-General P.E. Thacker. Without party won the division would go to gaining the additional recruits that using the 5th Division, and assuming France.121 Hughes and members of the Turner needed. Two days after the 10,000 conscripts arrived in January, staff actively campaigned in favour of King’s inspection, Lieutenant-Colonel Thacker estimated the Canadian the Unionist government contrary Hore-Ruthven transferred to take forces in France would still run to regulations.122 The Unionist party over as the GSO 1 of the 3rd Division out of replacements by May 1918, won the election by a sufficient in the Canadian Corps. This move and this was before the outcome majority, such that the military vote further indicated the improbability of the election on conscription was switching was not necessary. of the Division reaching France.111 known.115 Borden again cabled Perley With the election success, In August, instead of embarking stating definitively that the War the division anticipated it would the full division, Perley and Turner Committee had decided to break soon cross to France.123 A further decided to send the 5th Division’s up the division.116 Despite the dire complication at this time was that the artillery to France at the request of the replacement prediction and the War British were reducing each infantry CIGS, along with supporting signals Committee decision, both Perley brigade by one battalion because of and supply units.112 This was the only and Turner agreed that the division manpower shortages.124 The British formation of the division to serve organization should remain intact, War Office suggested the Canadians at the front. Compared to infantry, but it be used to supply replacements adopt the same organization, which artillery units did not have the same if needed.117 Previously, the policy would free enough battalions to raise casualty rate and so did not present was that the division would only a sixth division and would necessitate the same demands for replacements. supply drafts if the reserve battalions a second corps. Initially, Kemp, who The preparations for the artillery to had no replacements available.118 had replaced Perley as minister of move began on 7 August, with the This provokes the question why the OMFC, and Turner favoured this artillery inspected by the Duke of Perley and Turner agreed to keep proposal. Currie, however, opposed it Connaught, the former Canadian the division intact. It was most and recommended the more efficient governor-general, on 14 August, and likely political expediency related to and effective approach of expanding it embarked six days later.113 the December 1917 federal election the engineer, signals, machine gun For the remainder of the year, the on the issue of conscription. The and transportation establishments, division conducted more elaborate prime minister had persuaded select and adding 100 supernumeraries and extensive brigade level exercises, Liberals to join a Unionist Party slate to each of the existing infantry including six-day marches, trench in favour of conscription. To help battalions.125 Kemp accepted the plan, warfare training, and practice attacks. ensure the election of the Unionist but it would require disbanding the In October, the engineers were party, Borden also enacted a number 5th Division.
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A shortage of replacements was the ultimate reason for the disbandment of 5th Division so that its 10,000 trained could be disbursed among the existing four divisons of the Canadian Corps. The influx of manpower was important in allowing the Canadian Corps to maintain its combat power during the heavy fighting of the Last Hundred Days campaign.
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Conscription was enacted, but not want Hughes, ostensibly because despite the unrelenting pressure there was to be a considerable lag he had been away from the front for a of senior British officials and the before trained conscripts arrived at year. Hughes rejected Turner’s offer call of empire, Perley, Kemp, and the front. Borden faced increasing of command of a training area, an Turner placed greater importance on pressure to disband the division as appointment in which Hughes could the pragmatic issues of manpower recovered wounded were sent back retain his current rank.132 Eventually, availability and Canadian interests. to the line, while the under-strength Hughes accepted an unpaid position Had they not done so, the Canadian 5th Division and its 10,000 trained in the British Munitions Ministry and Corps would not have had the infantry remained in England.126 Green returned to Canada, without significant advantage of going into Canadian War Museum EO-2995 Canadian War This was pressure he found difficult any backlash from Sam Hughes battle at full strength in the crucial to resist.127 Following the election towards Borden or the government.133 offensives in the second half of 1917 success, the need to respond to Contrary to the views of some and in 1918. At some point if the 5th manpower shortages outweighed historians, the breakup of the 5th Division had gone to the Front, the the necessity of maintaining the Division did not solve the manpower Canadian authorities would have had shell of the 5th Division and keeping crisis but did provide a vital buffer to the difficult choice of disbanding units Sam Hughes mollified through the supply the corps with well-trained or even divisions, with the resulting employment of his son as a division reinforcements while the conscripts loss of influence, to maintain the commander. Kemp ordered the trained.134 Of the 10,000 infantry corps at some semblance of strength. division’s disbanding on 10 February in the division, 7,200 became the The unhappy history of the division 1918.128 This order was a shock to source of the 100 supernumeraries illustrates how political expediency Garnet Hughes who lamented: “After per battalion and replacements for 50 powerfully influenced decision- all we had hoped and planned and men per infantry battalion that Currie making, but also the limits of how worked for it was a stunning blow had drafted to bolster his machine far senior Canadian politicians and that the Division should be broken gun organization.135 The usual losses military figures were willing to satisfy up.”129 in holding the line quickly used up domestic and imperial political needs It was a similar blow to the the remaining 2,800 men long before in the face of manpower constraints. division’s officers as many of them the Battle of Amiens in August 1918. faced the prospect of having to The other units of the division were return to Canada or revert in rank sent as drafts to the Canadian Corps Notes to get to France. In particular, there or added to replacement pools in was a problem of what to do with England. 1. Canada’s Fifth Divsion: A History the 120 surplus infantry captains, (unpublished 1918), Officer of the Division, 14/7, Library and Archives majors, and lieutenant-colonels from Conclusion Canada [LAC] MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes the disbanded battalions along with Fonds, p.1a-2. Garnet Hughes and his brother- he 5th Division’s inception, 2. “The Late Fifth Division,” Toronto Star, March 1918. in-law, Byron Green, a battalion career, and eventual fate were T 3. Stephen John Harris, Canadian Brass: The commander in 5th Division.130 After powerfully conditioned by Canadian Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 some initial reluctance and a plea political imperatives and the tension (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p.87; Tim Cook, The Madman and from Kemp, Currie agreed to accept between the Canadian authorities’ the Butcher (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2010), more surplus officers with most wish to satisfy British demands and pp.39-62. having to revert only a single rank. their recognition of the realities of 4. Harris, Canadian Brass, p.111; Ronald Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career Any officer with experience overseas manpower availability. Activated in of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916 could return to the front at their part to ensure a divisional command (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University previous rank.131 billet for the son of the dangerous Press, 1986), p.188; Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics (Toronto: The political implications of Sam Hughes, the 5th Division trained University of Toronto Press, 1982), p.42. Garnet Hughes returning to Canada hard and effectively in difficult 5. Cable, Hughes to Borden, 15 August 1916, concerned Borden. Garnet, himself, circumstances for battles it would 77912, LAC MG 26 H v146, Borden Fonds. 6. Frederick William Perry, “Manpower demanded the War Office recall never fight. Instead, once the threat of and Organisational Problems in the the British Regular Major-General Hughes and other political necessities Expansion of the British and Other Commonwealth Armies During the Louis Lipsett, commander of the 3rd had receded, its well-trained infantry, Two World Wars” (PhD dissertation, Division, as a means of creating a machine gunners, engineers, and University of London, 1982), p.293. vacancy for him, but Kemp refused signallers were a valuable addition 7. Canada’s Fifth Division, LAC, p.2. 8. Robertson to Haig, 28 September 1916, to intervene. Currie indicated he did to the Canadian Corps. Ultimately, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives
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(UK) [LHCMA] 7/6/68, Robertson 32. Cable, Borden to Perley, 27 December 59. Robertson to Perley, 1 January 1917, LAC Fonds. 1916, 39111, LAC MG 26 H v74/75, RG 9 III v104. 9. Cable, Hughes to Carson, 14 October Borden Fonds. 60. Perley to Robertson, 6 January 1917, LAC 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, LAC RG 9 III v52. 33. Kemp to Borden, 15 January 1917, 39115, RG 9 III v104. 10. Maj. Macfarland A/DAG to Carson, 17 LAC MG 26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds. 61. Robertson to Perley, 10 January 1917, LAC October 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, LAC RG 9 III 34. Perley to Kemp, 17 January 1917, 39119- RG 9 III v104. v52. 39120, LAC MG 26 H v74/75, Borden 62. Conference Summary, 13 January 1917, 11. Proposal for Second Corps, Undated Fonds. LAC RG 9 III v104. (October-November 1916), LAC RG 9 III 35. Memorandum, 5th Division, 22 December 63. Perley to Whigham, 16 January 1917, LAC v4676. 1916, C-84-43, LAC RG 9 IIII v3304. RG 9 III v104. 12. D.D. of S&T to QMG, 21 October 1916, 36. Thacker to GOC, Cdn. Troops, Bramshott, 64. Whigham to Perley, 17 January 1917, LAC C-84-43, LAC RG 9 IIII v3304. 24 December 1916, C-84-43, LAC RG 9 IIII RG 9 III v104. 13. ASMC Minutes, 9 November 1916, LAC v3304; Allan Bartley, Heroes in Waiting: 65. 5th Division GS War Diary, 31 March RG 9 III v107. The 160th Bruce Battalion in the Great War 1917; William Sanders Marble, “The 14. For more on the abysmal state of the (Port Elgin, ON.: Brucedale Press, 1996). Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less: The administration in England, see William 37. Proposal on Reorganizing Battalion Place of the Artillery in the BEF, 1914- Stewart, “’Every Inch a Soldier’: New Affiliation Undated, Unsigned, LAC RG 1918,” (PhD, King’s College, London, Perspectives on the Military Career of 9 III v104. 1998), p.145; Report on the Work of the a Controversial Canadian General, Sir 38. Hogarth to QMG, 31 March 1917, LAC General Staff Branch During the Month, Richard Turner,” (PhD, University of RG 9 III v104. May 1917, LAC MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Birmingham, 2012), Chapter 5. 39. Cable, Borden to Perley, 26 January 1917, Fonds; War Office to Administrative HQ, 15. Flavelle to Borden, 18 September 1916, v8/2, LAC MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley CEF, 18 December 1916, O-31-33, LAC RG Queen’s University Archives [QUA], Fonds. 9 III v2881, LAC; Administrative HQ, CEF 6, Loc 2127, Box 2, Joseph W. Flavelle 40. Cable, Borden to Perley, 12 January 1917, to War Office, 3 January 1917, O-31-33, Fonds; Ross Diary, 25 November 1916, 31656, LAC MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds. LAC RG 9 III v2881. LAC MG 30 E392 v1, Ross Fonds. See also, 41. Note to Garnet Burke Hughes, Undated 66. Haig to CIGS, 24 January 1917, The Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden: (ca. January 1917), 5, LAC MG 27 II D23 National Archives (UK) [TNA] WO A Biography, vol. 2 (Toronto: Macmillan v14, Hughes Fonds. 158/22. of Canada, 1980), p.15. 42. Hughes to Turner, 20 January 1917, 14/5, 67. Haig Diary, 15 January 1918, Part 1 No.96, 16. Haycock, Sam Hughes, p.187. LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds. National Library of Scotland [NLS] 17. Ibid., pp.302-306; Morton, A Peculiar Kind 43. Sims to Turner, 3 February 1917. Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary, Haig of Politics, pp.84-90; Cook, The Madman 44. Byng to Hughes, 20 February 1917. Papers. and the Butcher: pp.176-178. 45. 5th Division GS War Diary, February 68. Cable, Secretary of State for the Colonies 18. Haycock, Sam Hughes p.265. 1917, LAC RG 9 III v4864. to the Governor-General of Canada, 17 19. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, p.148; 46. Cable, Borden to Perley, 27 January 1917, February 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. Biography of Kemp, G.A.Q. 4-41, LAC v8/2, LAC MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley 69. 121/Overseas/2820 (S.D. 2), 22 February RG 24 v1816, LAC; Haycock, Sam Hughes, Fonds. 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. p.150. 47. Leckie received command of a military 70. Perley to Secretary, War Office, 23 20. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, p.92. district and a temporary promotion to February 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. 21. Royal Military College Results for 30 major-general to satisfy him. Leckie to 71. Cubitt to Perley, 28 February 1917, LAC June 1899, 14-1, LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Secretary, Canadian Headquarters,10 RG 9 III v104, LAC; Gow to Secretary, War Hughes Fonds; Bernd Horne and Stephen February 1916, 10-L-10, LAC RG 9 III Office, 2 March 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. Harris, eds., Warrior Chiefs (Toronto: v293, LAC; Perley to Turner, 25 April 72. The note is unsigned but internal Dundurn Press, 2001), p.19. 1917, 10-L-10, LAC RG 9 III v293. evidence indicates the writer was not in 22. Career Outline for Garnet Hughes, LAC 48. Robert Craig Brown, “Unrequited Faith: the military and was most likely Long. RG 24 v1754. Recruiting in the CEF 1914-1919,” Revue Meeting Notes, Unsigned (Walter Long), 23. Stewart, “Every Inch a Soldier,” pp.64, Internationale D’ Historie Militaire 51(1982), 6 March 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. 72-73. p.63. 73. J. L. Granatstein, Broken Promises: The 24. Ibid., p.95. 49. Report of the Special Committee on History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: 25. Byng to Hughes, 20 February 1917, 14/5, the Co-Ordination of Recruiting and Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), p.60. LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds; Production to the Annual Meeting, LAC 74. Gow to Secretary, War Office, 15 March Sims to Turner, 3 February 1917, LAC MG RG 24 v22019. 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. 30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds. 50. Memorandum Relating to the Military 75. 5th Division GS War Diary, March 1917. 26. Cable, Perley to Borden, 2 December 1916, Situation in Canada on the 1st of May 76. M.O. 3562, 25 May 1917, LAC RG 9 III 31645, LAC MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds. 1917, GAQ 10-47c, LAC RG 24 v1843. v104. 27. Cable, Borden to Perley, 6 December 1916, 51. Cable, Perley to Kemp, 3 March 1917, LAC 77. Haig Diary, 4 July 1917, NLS. 31646, LAC MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds. RG 9 III v104. 78. Robertson to Governor-General, 25 May 28. Perley to Borden, 28 June 1917, LAC RG 52. Sailings from Canada, GAQ 11-7, LAC RG 1917, 39133, LAC MG 26 H v74/75, 9 III v107. 24 v1844, LAC; Report to Kemp, 18 May Borden Fonds. 29. Cable, Perley to Borden, 20 December 1918, LAC MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds. 79. Gow to MG Callwell W.O., 30 May 1917, 1916, 31649, LAC MG 26 H v62, Borden 53. Perley to Borden, 10 November 1916. LAC RG 9 III v104. Fonds; Cable, Borden to Perley, 22 54. Whigham to Perley, 17 November 1916, 80. Kemp to Wilson, 21 June 1918, R-3, LAC December 1916, 31652, LAC MG 26 H v62, LAC RG 9 III v104. MG 27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds; Wilson to Borden Fonds; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of 55. Perley to Whigham, 23 November 1916, Kemp, 14 June 1918; Turner to Kemp, 14 Politics, p.100. LAC RG 9 III v104. June 1918, M-7-36 v1, LAC RG 9 III v3088. 30. Perley to Borden, 10 November 1916, 56. Whigham to Perley, 24 November 1916, 81. Division Formation Order, 23 January 39104, LAC MG 26 H v74/75, Borden LAC RG 9 III v104. 1918, 14/9, LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Fonds. 57. Brock Millman, Pessimism and British War Hughes Fonds. 31. Cable, Perley to Kemp, 19 December 1916, Policy, 1916-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 82. When the 5th Division finally disbanded, LAC RG 9 III v104. 2001), pp.35-38. he returned to Saskatchewan, but Kemp 58. Ibid., p.90. recalled him to head the Canadian Section
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at GHQ in June 1918. John Fletcher 106. 5th Division GS War Diary, July 1917. 129. Hughes to Fallis, 17 February 1918, 14/6, Leopold Embury Service Jacket, LAC RG 107. Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds. 150 Acc92-93 v2901, LAC; Department of Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916 (Toronto: 130. Canada’s Fifth Division, LAC, p.14. Militia and Defence, The Quarterly Militia Viking Canada, 2007), pp.263-268. 131. Currie to HQ OMFC, A.29.1.50, 21 List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected 108. Perley to Turner, 11 June 1917, LAC RG January 1918, S-6, LAC MG 27 II D9 v161, to June 30, 1914) (Ottawa: Department of 9 III v104. Kemp Fonds. Militia and Defence, 1914), p.287. 109. Report to Kemp, 18 May 1918. 132. Cable, Kemp to Borden, 26 February 1918, 83. He later returned to Canada to command 110. Cable, Borden to Perley, 23 June 1917, LAC MG 26 H v141, Borden Fonds. the 259th Battalion destined for Siberia. LAC RG 9 III v104. 133. Currie to Brig Gen F.W. Hill, 15 August Albert Edward Swift Service Jacket, LAC 111. Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Parsons, a 1918, LAC MG 30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds; RG 150 Acc92-93 v9465, LAC; Quarterly Canadian staff officer who served in the Byron Green Service Jacket, LAC RG Militia List, pp.49 and 423. 2nd Division eventually replaced Hore- 150 Acc92-93/166 v3770.; Garnet Burk 84. Ernest Charles Ashton Service Jacket, Ruthven in October. 5th Division AQ War Hughes Service Jacket, LAC RG 150 LAC RG 150 Acc92-93 v269, LAC; Diary, 29 July, October 1917. Acc92-93/166 v4590. Quarterly Militia List, p.170. 112. Cable, Perley to Borden, 9 August 1917, 134. A.M.J. Hyatt, “Sir Arthur Currie and 85. Turner to Carson, 23 March 1916, 8-1-70, LAC RG 9 III v104. Conscription: A Soldier’s View,” Canadian LAC RG 9 III v31. 113. 5th Division AQ War Diary, August 1917; Historical Review L (1969), p.295; J.K. 86. Currie to Hughes, 21 May 1917, 14/5, Paul Douglas Dickson, A Thoroughly Marteinson, We Stand on Guard: An LAC MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds. Canadian General: A Biography of General Illustrated History of the Canadian Army 87. The average was 12.8 months based on the H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto: University of (Montréal: Ovale Publications, 1992), organization date to the end of January Toronto Press, 2007), p.56. p.182. 1917. These totals include the three 114. Canada’s Fifth Division, LAC, 9. 135. The staggering success of the German battalions added in May 1917. Barbara 115. Thacker to Turner, AG 21-1-1 (C), 1 March offensive caused Currie to increase Wilson, “Guide to Sources Relating to November 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. the firepower of his divisions by adding Units of the Canadian Expeditionary 116. Cable, Borden to Perley, 7 November a third MG company to each division’s Force - Infantry Battalions,” (Library 1917, LAC RG 9 III v104. MG battalion on 10 April. To obtain the and Archives Canada, 2012)
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