CHAPTER XI FIRST VILLERS-BRETONNEUX WHEN the Germans attacked on March goth, the British right was still south of the Luce, the first of the small con- fluent streams south of, and parallel to, the somme. The old French defence-line, held by the 1st British Cavalry Division immediately south of the Somme, extended to this front also; the part of it around Marcelcave had been lost, but it was still held farther south at Aubercourt and DCmuin. villages in the Luce valley, bordering either side of the stream. Jn the great attack on the goth, however, when the French were for the second time driven from Moreuil, the remnants of the southern divisions of the British Arniy46th and zoth-were forced back from both these villages. Early in the morning two brigades of the 2nd British Cavalry Division in reserve-the Canadian Brigade, supported by the 3rd- were hurried down to make sure of the line immediately north of Moreuil, which they did by a determined counter- attack at IO o’clock. Farther north, where the retirement on the Luce had communicated itself to the troops even beyond Marcelcave, on the plateau in front of Villers- Bretonneux. the two exhausted divisions holding the line, 66th and 39th, them- selves undertook a counter-at tack. But the effort was far beyond the power of the remnants that made it. Part ot the 66th Divi- sion succeeded in getting on to the spur on which Aubercourt lay, but was then driven b a c k : Note.-Dhruin adjoined Courcellcs. and, as often 2gth-3oth Mar., 19181 FIRST VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 299 happened in those days, the remnant of the 39th Division farther north, seeing this retreat, began to retire also. German reinforcements were observed massing at Aubercourt, apparently to continue the day’s thrust. North of Marcel- cave the 1st Cavalry Division steadied the line, but from hiarcelcave to the Luce any determined attack by the enemy might cause the front to crumble. Lieutenant-General Watts’ (XIX Corps) says in his report: As it was clear that some of the depleted divisions now in the line were not really in a fit state for further action, and could not be trusted to maintain their positions against enemy pressure, I decided to employ the 9th Australian Brigade to counter-attack south-east to restore the situation about Aubercourt. British troops of a somewhat different category-those from the I11 Corps which had been relieved by the French farther south and had received a few days, not of rest but of respite from actual fighting-were beginning to arrive, and the first of these divisions, the ISth, was to be put in imme- diately after the counter-attack, to hold whatever line the Australians had reached. The 9th Brigade, on being detached from its division and hurried down to the rear of Villers-Bretonneux on the night of March zgth, had been informed that it would be placed under the 61st Division, then in the line opposite Marcelcave. and would be held ready for counter-attacking wherever the line broke. This brigade was a very interesting force. In common with the rest of the 3rd Division, it possessed a degree of orderliness beyond that of most Australian troops -the result of General Monash’s careful handling; but also it exhibited the weakness of that division, the absence in it as yet of any universal tradition forcing commanders per- sonally to supervise their troops in certain crises of battle. Thus, for a great part of its life, the 9th Brigade had been commanded by Brigadier-General Jobson,* a man of many fine and endearing qualities, of marked ability and absolute probity, but constitutionally incapable of facing battle ‘Lieut.-Gen. Sir Herbert E. Watts, K.C.B, K.C M.G. Commanded 7th Div. 1915/17: SIX Corps, 1g17/1g. Of Bournemouth, Eng.; b. Norwood, Eng.. 14 Feb., 1858. Died 15 Oct., 1934 ’ Brig.-Gen. A. Jobson. D.S.O. Commanded 9th Inf. Bde.. 1916/17. Financial critic and public accountant: of Sydney: b. Clunes, Vic., z Apr~l, 1875. Died 7 NOV., 1933. 300 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [I915-18 conditions. The result of such weakness was that not merely was such a commander inexperienced in the conditions and psychology of battle, but he could not be certain, from contact with his subordinates in time of trial, as to which of them were the more, and which the less, practical “front line” men. Accordingly, although the troops of the 9th Brigade in no way differed from the average run of New South Welshmen-first class material, and level throughout-the leadership was markedly uneven : where the battalion com- manders possessed the necessary qualities they had, by selection and by forcing their standards on their subordinates, turned their battalions into outstanding fighting machines ; but this quality did not run level throughout the brigade, and a small proportion of the officers were unsuitable. At Messines Monash laid great trust in Jobson’s leadership, but after that battle Jobson’s attitude failed to satisfy him. In the actual matter of difference between them-an inclina- tion on the brigadier’s part to believe that his battalions had been overtried by comparison with others-Jobson was not altogether without justification ; but he felt his own deficiencies, and, when Monash offered him an opportunity to resign, he was not sorry to accept. Birdwood thereupon sent to the 3rd Division one of his artillery commanders, who had been pressing a claim for promotion and who must first be tried in an infantry command-Brigadier-General Rosenthal. Rosenthal, in civil life an architect, with some reputation also as a singer, a man with a breezy, thrusting personality, and keen, simple enthusiasms--especiaIly for the British Empire, its history, and its traditions-brought to the leader- ship of the brigade a robustness and audacity intensely welcome to its members. He had always been an ardent soldier, and in the old Australian militia had commanded the first battery to be armed with howitzers. His vigour at the Anzac Landing -when his cautious superior, General Hobbs, could see no positions suitable for field-guns, but Rosenthal had insisted that they could be placed in th.e front line and had secured Bridges’ leave to emplace and command them there- had established his reputation in the A.I.F. Throughout he had given an example of spirited front-line leadership, and he 1915-181 FIRS?’ VILLERS-BIIETONNEUS 301 never hid his light under a bushel. He wore his heart, like his five wound stripes, consistently upon his sleeve. He loved not only to be in the front line but to be seen there. To his brigade this type of leadership came like a fresh draught to a man thirsty for natural stimulant. A new life infused the force. The troops leapt at the breezy courage that was keen to test any danger before they entered it. Rosenthal was well aware that his officers were not yet of level quality, but it hardly needed the first test, at Passchen- daele. to show that he was fortunate in having two battalion commanders marked beyond most others as fighting leaders. One, Lieutenant-Colonel Morshead of the 334 was a dapper little schoolmaster, only 28 years of age, in whom the tradi- tions of the British Army had been bottled from his childhood like tight-corked champagne ; the nearest approach to a martinet among all the young Australian colonels, but able to distinguish the valuable from the worthless in the old army practice ; insistent on punctiliousness throughout the battalion as in the officers’ mess, with the assistance of a fine adjutant, Lieutenant Jones: and an imperturbable second-in-command, Major White, and with his own experience of fighting as a junior captain of the 2nd Battalion upon Baby 700 in the Anzac Landing, he had turned out a battalion which anyone acquainted with the whole force recognised, even before Messines, as one of the very best. The other outstanding leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Milne of the 36th, was of an entirely different mould, a rugged Scottish-Australian mechanician, with little respect for polish or extreme formality but a high sense of duty-a noted fighter from the day when he too had led his men up the hills at the Landing. On this tour of detached duty for his brigade, Rosenthal was unfortunate in that the British commanders under whom he was acting would not permit him to place his headquarters where he wished, up with his troops in the village of Cachy two miles south-west of Villers-Bretonneux, but held him at Gentelles a mile farther back, in close touch with themselves. The line lay only from two to three miles ahead of Villers- Rretonneux, and, as Cachy was liable to be severely shel!ed ’Lieut R. C. Jones, M.C.; 33rd Bn. Draughtsman; of Deniliauin. N.S.W.: b. Deniliquin. 1889. Died of gas poisoning. 3 May. 1918. 302 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [3oth Mar., 1918 in the daytime, the battalions were withdrawn during the day to the large wood, Bois l’Abbd,’ close behind Villers- Bretonneux. On subsequent nights when it was fine they spent the night here also; they returned to Cachy to sleep only if the weather was very wet. Rosenthal placed a forward brigade report-centre in the wood; and it was there that OD March 30th-when the )SIX Corps decided to use the brigade io restore the line near Aubercourt-he verbally gave to Colonel Morshead the order to carry out with his battalion the counter-attack.