‘FEED THE TROOPS ON VICTORY’: A STUDY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS AND ITS OPERATIONS DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1918.

RICHARD MONTAGU STOBO

Thesis prepared in requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences University of New South Wales, Canberra June 2020

Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname/Family Name : Stobo Given Name/s : Richard Montagu Abbreviation for degree as given in the : PhD University calendar Faculty : History School : Humanities and Social Sciences ‘Feed the Troops on Victory’: A Study of the Australian Corps Thesis Title : and its Operations During August and September 1918.

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis examines reasons for the success of the Australian Corps in August and September 1918, its final two months in the line on the Western Front. For more than a century, the Corps’ achievements during that time have been used to reinforce a cherished belief in national military exceptionalism by highlighting the exploits and extraordinary fighting ability of the Australian infantrymen, and the modern progressive tactical approach of their native-born commander, Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash. This study re-evaluates the Corps’ performance by examining it at a more comprehensive and granular operational level than has hitherto been the case. What emerges is a complex picture of impressive battlefield success despite significant internal difficulties that stemmed from the particularly strenuous nature of the advance and a desperate shortage of manpower. These played out in chronic levels of exhaustion, absenteeism and ill-discipline within the ranks, and threatened to undermine the Corps’ combat capability. In order to reconcile this paradox, the thesis locates the Corps’ performance within the wider context of the British army and its operational organisation in 1918. While the study shows that the Australian Corps did comprise an unusually large percentage of experienced, well-trained and battle-hardened soldiers, it concludes that its high level of combat effectiveness was due essentially to the massive, sophisticated and resilient network of supply and support systems in place by that stage of the war. At its core, therefore, this is a study in microcosm of the BEF's doctrinal, tactical and technological evolution (or ‘learning process’), of which the Australians were prime beneficiaries. The thesis argues that, given the serious internal difficulties it faced, the Australian Corps’ success in August and September 1918 was only possible because it advanced for those two months at the absolute pinnacle of the British Army’s military development and operational capability, and against an enemy in serious decline.

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iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If it takes a village to raise a child, it also takes a small community to raise a PhD candidate. When I first considered embarking on this project, I asked a colleague who had been through the process about his experience. His reply was simple and to the point: “There’s only one requirement,” he told me. “You have to sell your soul.” A little melodramatic, perhaps, but it nevertheless pointed to an essential truth: working towards a PhD is extraordinarily demanding and is made possible only by of the support, advice and encouragement of a large number of people.

I must first thank John Connor and Bob Stevenson, my supervisors at UNSW (Canberra). Being a part-time candidate working full-time and living 300 kilometres from Canberra created a unique set of challenges; without John’s patient reassurance, I doubt this thesis would ever have been completed. While John helped with the big picture, Bob’s intricate but wide-ranging knowledge of battlefield operations and processes is quite simply extraordinary. His interest and encouragement apparently knew no bounds and I always looked forward to our conversations. Bob’s suggestions and feedback were invaluable.

Because this is an Anglo-Australian story, I have been fortunate to attend and present at conferences both in Australia and overseas. In the process, I have had the opportunity to spend time with some of the Commonwealth’s finest scholars of the Great War. I have continually been struck by the generosity of the international community of military historians, and the fact that so many have shown interest in the work of a schoolmaster from Sydney. There are too many to acknowledge all individually but I would like to single out Professor Gary Sheffield, Professor Peter Simkins, Professor Peter Stanley, Dr Jonathan Boff, Dr Andy Simpson, Dr Alison Hine, Dr Lewis Frederickson, and Dr Debbie Lackerstein, either for reading chapter drafts, making time to discuss the project, or simply offering suggestions and pointing me in the direction of useful resources. All provided advice, insight and encouragement that was greatly appreciated.

v Particularly memorable experiences among many during the course of my research included: being invited to spend time with Peter Simkins at his home in England in 2016; being given the opportunity to present a paper at the outstanding ‘1918–2018: The End of the War & The Reshaping of a Century’ conference two years later at Wolverhampton; and weeks spent trawling over almost every inch of the Somme battlefields of northern France. Good times.

I acknowledge in particular the help and advice of Professor Carl Bridge, of King’s College, London. Carl suggested the idea for my BA Honours thesis all those years ago and he was an important sounding board when I was considering whether or not to embark on a PhD. Carl helped to foster my passion for History when I was young, and also my ability and love for cricket; both have been extremely important in shaping the person I am today. Staying with Carl during my trips to London was another wonderful part of this whole experience.

This undertaking would also not have been possible without the support of the Headmaster of Shore School, Dr Timothy Wright, as well as that of my many colleagues. Shore strongly promotes academic and professional development, although I am sure I tested the limits of its goodwill more than once. To Nicole Mansfield, Dr Luis Siddall, and the rest of the Shore History Department, I thank you for your patience and interest.

I must also recognise the assistance of the wonderful Bernadette McDermott at UNSW (Canberra), and in particular for delaying her retirement until she had at least seen me through – it will be difficult to imagine ADFA without her. In addition, the staffs at various archives both in Australia and Britain were all extraordinarily accommodating and helpful.

Finally, but most importantly, to my wonderful, long-suffering family – there are not enough words to express my love for you all. To Tom, Charlie, and Annie: thank you for putting up with my obsession for all these years and even for offering to

vi proof-read sections. No longer will I disappear into my study to ‘tinker with a chapter’ (well, not for a little while, at least). And, above all, to my amazing wife, Jen, who unwittingly bought a ticket on the same PhD rollercoaster. It looks like the ride is finally over and we might be able to move onto another (perhaps even a holiday somewhere together).

Richard Stobo

6 June 2020

vii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Maps and Figures ix

Abbreviations xi

Notes xv

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Narrative 25

Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 71

Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline 116

Chapter 4 Commanders and Command 157

Chapter 5 Communications and Control 200

Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water 235

Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering 271

Chapter 8 Firepower 310

Conclusion 355

Appendices 364

Bibliography 375

MAPS AND FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Map of area captured by the Australian Corps between 8 24 August to 5 October 1918. Figure 1.2 Map of 2nd Division’s objectives in Phase 1 of attack on 8 30 August 1918. Figure 1.3 Map of 3rd Division’s attack at Bray on 22 August 1918. 42 Figure 1.4 Map of 1st Division’s advance south of the Somme between 45 23-26 August 1918. Figure 1.5 Map of 2nd Division’s advance 27 August to 2 September 50 1918. Figure 1.6 Map of Australian Corps divisional boundaries on 26 64 September 1918, three days prior to the attack at the Hindenburg Line. Figure 1.7 Map of 2nd Division’s attack at Montbrehain (Beaurevoir 66 Line) on 3-5 October 1918. Figure 1.8 Phases of the Australian Corps’ advance from 8 August to 5 68 October 1918. Figure 2.1 Recorded heights at enlistment of Australian soldiers in the 78 1918 sample. Figure 2.2 Recorded weights at enlistment of Australian soldiers in the 78 1918 sample. Figure 2.3 Year of enlistment of Australian soldiers in 1918. 82 Figure 2.4 Ages of Australian soldiers killed at Gallipoli in 1915 and 83 Australian soldiers killed during the advance in 1918. Figure 2.5 Age comparison between Australian and British soldiers killed 84 during the advance. Figure 2.6 Place of birth of Australian soldiers in 1918. 89 Figure 3.1 AIF men re-joining and new reinforcements 1916-1918. 118 Figure 3.2 Total quarterly number of AIF losses 1916-1918. 119 Figure 3.3 AIF wastage on the Western Front 1916-1918. 121 Figure 3.4 Total infantry strength of 1st Division during 1918. 122 Figure 3.5 Summary of convictions classified in charges August and 145 September 1918. Figure 3.6 Australian Corps and III Corps courts-martial in August and 148 September 1918.

ix Figure 3.7 Absenteeism in Australian Corps and III Corps in August and 149 September 1918. Figure 4.1 Monash and Australian Corps HQ Senior Officers at 165 Bertangles, 22 July 1918. Figure 5.1 Diagram of wireless communications network on the 209 Australian and III Corps fronts in mid-August 1918. Figure 5.2 Total messages and packages received, handed in and 212 transmitted by Australian Corps Signals Office during August 1918. Figure 5.3 Australian Corps motorcycle mileage in August and 224 September 1918. Figure 5.4 Aerial oblique photograph of Bray and surrounds (looking 229 east) taken on 19 August 1918, three days before 3rd Division’s attack. Figure 6.1 Average admission to field ambulance and evacuation to base 243 in Australian divisions in August and September 1918 as % of divisional strength. Figure 6.2 Total weekly admission to field ambulance and evacuation to 244 base in Australian Corps and III Corps in August and September 1918 as % of divisional strength. Figure 7.1 Inglis bridge carrying the Bray-Chuignolles road over the 301 Somme at Bray, September 1918. Figure 8.1 7th AFA Brigade Field Artillery barrage map for 8 August 315 1918. Figure 8.2 Barrage map for attack at the Outpost Line on 18 September 325 1918. Figure 8.3 Vickers machine guns arranged in pairs on 13th Brigade’s 334 front on 8 August 1918. Figure 8.4 Mark V tanks moving forward near Bellicourt ahead of the 350 attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918.

x ABBREVIATIONS

AA&QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General AASC Australian Army Service Corps ADB Australian Dictionary of Biography ADMS Assistant Director Medical Services AD Assistant Director ADLR Assistant Director of Light Railways ADS Advanced Dressing Station AFA Australian Field Artillery AFC Australian Flying Corps AIF Australian Imperial Force ALTM Australian Light Trench Mortar AMF Australian Military Forces AMT Australian Motorised Transport ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corps AOH Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 AOHMS Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914-1918 APM Assistant Provost Marshal ARP Ammunition Refilling Point ASC Army Service Corps AUO Australian Corps advance signals exchange office AWL Absent Without Leave AWM Australian War Memorial BAC Brigade Ammunition Column Bde Brigade BEF British Expeditionary Force Brig-Gen. Brigadier General BGGS Brigadier-General, General Staff BHQ Battalion Headquarters Bn Battalion BOH British Official History Bty Battery CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force

xi CF Citizen Forces CLRO Corps Light Railway Officer CMF Commonwealth Military Forces CO Commanding Officer Coy Company Cpl Corporal CRA Commander, Royal Artillery DAA&QMG Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General DAAG Deputy Assistant Adjutant General DAC Division Ammunition Column DAG Deputy Adjutant General DCM Distinguished Conduct Medal DDMS Deputy Director Medical Services DDS&T Deputy Director of Supply and Transport Div. Division DLR Director of Light Railways DOD Died of Disease DOW Died of Wounds DR Despatch Rider DRC Divisional Report Centre DRS Despatch Rider Service DRLS Despatch Rider Letter Service DSO Distinguished Service Order FA Field Artillery FOO Forward Observation Officer FSR Field Service Regulations GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GOCRA General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery GS General Services GSO1 General Staff Officer Grade 1 GSO2 General Staff Officer Grade 2 GSO3 General Staff Officer Grade 3 HA Heavy Artillery

xii HE High Explosive HMSO His Majesty’s Stationery Office HQ Headquarters IWM Imperial War Museum (London) KIA Killed in Action L/Cpl Lance Corporal Lt-Gen. Lieutenant-General Maj. Major Maj-Gen. Major-General MAL Motor Airline MC Military Cross MDS Main Dressing Station MG Machine Gun MGGS Major-General, General Staff MID Mentioned in Despatches MLP Motor Loading Post MM Military Medal MO Medical Officer MP Member of Parliament MT Motorised Transport MTO Motorised Transport Officer NAA National Archives of Australia NAM National Army Museum (London) NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NLA National Library of Australia NSW New South Wales OBE Order of the British Empire Off. Officer OC Officer Commanding OR Other Rank OTC Officers’ Training Corps oz British imperial ounce Pte Private PUO Pyrexia of Unknown Origin

xiii Qld Queensland QM Quartermaster QMG Quartermaster General RAP Regimental Aid Post RFC Royal Flying Corps RGA Royal Garrison Artillery RMC Royal Military College RMO Regimental Medical Officer RTA Returned to Australia SA South Australia SAA Small Arms Ammunition SLNSW State Library of New South Wales SMTO Senior Mechanical Transport Officer SS Stationery Service Temp CO Temporary Commanding Officer TAS Tasmania TM Trench Mortar TNA The National Archives (Kew) TO Transport Officer VC Victoria Cross VD Venereal Disease VD Volunteer Officers’ Decoration Vic. Victoria WA Western Australia WO War Office 2-i-C. Second in Command 2nd Lt 2nd Lieutenant

xiv NOTES ORGANISATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1918

Formation Composition* Size (men) Commander Army c. 2-4 Corps + HQ + Army troops c. 200,000 General Corps c. 2-4 Divisions + HQ + Corps troops c. 60,000 Lieutenant-General Division 3 Brigades + HQ + Divisional troops 15,000 Major-General Brigade† 4 Battalions + HQ 4,000 Brigadier-General Battalion 4 Companies + HQ 1,000 Lieutenant-Colonel Company 4 Platoons + HQ 250 Major (or Captain) Platoon 4 Sections 60 Lieutenant (or 2nd Lieutenant) Section 15 Corporal

* The composition and size of armies/corps varied depending on the number of corps/divisions respectively under command at any one time.

† British brigades reduced their size in January 1918 from four battalions to three. The Australian Corps did not follow suit, preferring to keep the four-battalion structure.

MEASUREMENTS

Imperial Metric

Length 1 mile = 1.61 kilometres

1 yard = 0.91 metres

1 foot = 30.48 centimetres

1 inch = 25.4 millimetres

Weight 1 stone = 6.35 kilograms

1 pound = 0.45 kilograms

1 ounce = 28.35 grams

Area 1 square mile = 2.59 square kilometres

1 square yard = 0.84 square metres

1 square foot = 0.09 square metres

xv INTRODUCTION

On a cool autumn day in 1927, the City Council of Melbourne held a ceremony to honour one of its most revered and celebrated citizens, Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash, who had commanded the Australian Corps during the victorious final months of the war in 1918. The crowd received Monash enthusiastically and presented him with an illuminated address. Monash expressed his gratitude and claimed to be “the most fortunate of men in having been placed at the head of the finest fighting machine the world has ever known.” He acknowledged the acclaim that followed the Corps’ celebrated success at Hamel on 4 July 1918 but wanted to make clear that “the predominating achievement of the Australian victories came after that date.” Monash doubted, however, “whether Australians yet realise how important the Australian victories in the last 100 days of the war were as a factor in ending the war.”1

The achievements of the Australian Corps during August and September 1918 occupy an important place in Australia’s national mythology. For the first and only time in the war, all five Australian divisions on the Western Front fought together in an eponymous formation under the overall command of one of their own, the Australian-born Monash. In Dale Blair’s words,

The final year of the war is almost as important as the events of 1915 in shaping the Anzac legend. Unlike Britain’s popular memory, where the victories of 1918 were for many years lost to a ‘curious feat of amnesia’ brought on by a general revulsion toward the ghastly battles of 1916-17, Australia saw in the final battles an emphatic and everlasting proof of its soldiers’ high performance. Just as the original Anzacs burst upon the stage with a fanfare of the grand opening, later Australian divisions, filled mostly with ‘rainbows’ and ‘hard thinkers’ … closed with equal panache.2

1 ‘Sir John Monash’, The Argus, Melbourne, Victoria, 15 March 1927. 2 Dale Blair, Dinkum Diggers: An Australian Battalion at War, Melbourne University Press, Victoria, 2001, p. 135.

Introduction

The Corps’ final advance began at Amiens on 8 August 1918 and concluded eight weeks later with the 6th Brigade’s final action at the small village of Montbrehain on 5 October. During that time, the Australian divisions drove the German line back by nearly 40 miles in just 59 days, enclosing an area of roughly 250 square miles in the process. They liberated more than 100 French villages and towns, captured nearly 23,000 German prisoners, about 170 guns, and vast quantities of other weapons, ammunition and supplies.3 This impressive catalogue of achievement came at a critical juncture in the Australia’s military narrative and did much to enhance the Digger’s reputation as one of the most effective fighting men on the Western Front.4 If the Gallipoli campaign in 1915 laid the foundation for the Anzac legend, the Corps’ advance under Monash in the summer and autumn of 1918 later must surely serve as its capstone.

It was the most concentrated period of operational activity undertaken by the AIF during the war. It tested the resilience of the Corps and its support systems to the limit and by early October, the Corps could no longer to hold its place in the line. The divisions were all sent back to Fourth Army’s rest area near Abbeville to recuperate, with a view to renewing operations the following spring. Although the men did not know it at the time, their war was over. Friedrich Ebert’s newly installed provisional government in Germany accepted the Allies’ armistice terms only a few weeks later.

There is no doubt the Corps experienced considerable battlefield success during this time. The question is why? The traditional and popular explanation attributes it above all to the unique character and superior fighting skills of the Australian soldier (or ‘Digger’), and also to Monash’s progressive, inspired leadership.5 According to

3 ‘Report on Operations of the Australian Corps’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. According to Monash, the five Australian divisions were responsible for 23% of the prisoners, 23½% of the guns, and 21½% of the territory captured in the period from 27 March and 5 October. Monash, Australian Victories, Hutchinson, London, 1920, p. 282. 4 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 152. 5 For example, see Peter FitzSimons, ‘There's an inconvenient truth about Anzac Day: our soldiers are exceptional’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April, 2017.

2 Introduction that view, Australian soldiers were natural, resilient, battle-hardened fighting men at the peak of their game, and led by one of the best – if not the best – commander on the Western Front. It is unsurprising therefore that they swept all before them in a triumphant march to victory.

But therein lies a paradox. The heavy casualties sustained during the advance and dearth of fresh reinforcements resulted in an acute shortage of manpower as the advance progressed, leaving fighting units to go over the top increasingly tired and numerically weak. Indeed, as Charles Bean pointed out at the end of September 1918, “Australian battalions had never been so effective as in the last month when they were all far below strength.”6 The strain on all concerned was enormous and played out in escalating issues of exhaustion, ill-discipline, absenteeism and desertion. Yet the Australians continued to experience considerable success in battle. How can this apparently contradictory situation be reconciled?

As Murray, Millett and Watman have noted, “victory is an outcome of a battle; it is not what an organisation does in battle. … Judgments of effectiveness should thus retain some sense of proportional cost and organisational process.”7 With that in mind, and while the broad narrative of the final advance is relatively well known, surprisingly little close critical attention has been given to organisational and operational aspects of the Australian Corps’ performance during that time. This is because the traditional narrative of the AIF in the First World War is rooted deeply in the socio-cultural sphere – not the military-operational one – and serves primarily to buttress a deep-seated popular belief in Australian military exceptionalism.

Because the Corps’ achievements under Monash appear to confirm that belief, the reasons for its success have effectively been shielded from critical re-evaluation. As a result, we are left with a narrow, self-serving explanation that it is unsatisfactory

6 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 936. 7 Allen R Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organisations’, International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 38-39.

3 Introduction and seriously incomplete. With the attention fixed almost exclusively upon the exploits and experience of the Digger in the line, the complex systems and processes that underpinned and gave shape to his exploits have been almost entirely neglected by historians. A more comprehensive analysis of the performance of the Australian Corps and the reasons for its success during the final advance is needed.

This thesis does that by focusing on the activity of the Australian Corps during August and September 1918 at a more granular level than has hitherto been the case. It addresses both socio-demographic and military-operational aspects of the Corps and its performance to determine the reasons for its impressive level of success on the battlefield. Who were the men and officers that comprised the Australian Corps in mid-1918 and how did they cope with the strenuous demands of the final advance? How effectively did the Corps meet the many operational, logistical and organisational challenges of the period, and what did that mean for its combat effectiveness? And, finally, to what extent was Monash justified in describing the Corps’ achievements during August and September 1918 as truly ‘Australian victories’?

The broad structure of the study is loosely modelled on Jonathan Boff’s study of Third Army during the Hundred Days, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918. Like that work, it is thematic in nature.8 The first chapter provides a contextual narrative of the Corps’ operations from 8 August to 5 October and locates them within the broader context of the Allied operations on the Western Front. Comparisons are drawn in the process with the neighbouring British III Corps, which operated immediately to the north of the Australians throughout the advance to the Hindenburg Line.

8 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. I am grateful to Dr Boff for taking the time to meet with me in London to discuss my research, and for allowing me to use his work in this way.

4 Introduction

Chapter 2 addresses the issue of the ‘Digger myth’ by presenting a detailed demographic analysis of the Australian soldiers in 1918, including their training and combat experience. Chapter 3 then examines the effects of this particularly strenuous period of fighting on the overall strength, morale and discipline of the Corps, and demonstrates that, despite its successes on the battlefield, it was in fact beset by considerable internal problems brought about a desperate shortage of manpower and sheer exhaustion. Chapter 4 considers the quality and experience of the Corps’ senior commanders and staff in mid-1918, and the challenges they faced in exercising effective battle procedure during this exacting period.

The focus then turns away from the character and experience of the front-line fighting men and onto more prosaic but nevertheless vital doctrinal processes and operational systems that facilitated their success. Despite the fundamental importance of these systems in facilitating the Corps’ success, historians have largely ignored them. This thesis seeks to redress that imbalance. Chapter 5 considers the nature and effectiveness of the communications systems that linked the Corps’ forward and back areas at various stages of the advance. How well did it up to the rigours of mobile warfare and a continually moving line, and what implications did that have for the conduct and nature of operations?

Given the serious difficulties with manpower and morale already described, Chapter 6 examines how effectively the Corps managed the health and welfare of the men during the advance, including the provision of medical treatment, sanitation and evacuation systems, and the supply of food and water to forward areas. In particular, the chapter illustrates the importance of these systems in sustaining not only the health of the troops but also their morale, and it highlights the ingenious and pragmatic methods employed by experienced doctors and quartermasters to work around the numerous challenges they faced.

Attention then turns to the crucial role played by logistics units during the advance, and particularly the issues of supply, transport and engineering, all of which will all

5 Introduction be considered in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 then examines the nature and employment of firepower on the Australian front during the advance to determine whether or not the Monash and the Australians had indeed discovered a ‘winning formula’. The Conclusion draws all of the threads together in an overarching assessment of reasons for the success of the Australian Corps in its final two months in the line.

Two seminal works produced in the first half of the Twentieth Century have defined the popular understanding of the Australian Corps’ performance in 1918. The first was The Australian Victories in France in 1918, written by Monash himself and published in 1920.9 The title of the book speaks for itself. Monash carves the performance of the Australian Corps during the final advance out from that of the wider British army and gives it a truly nationalistic and self-aggrandising flavour. The account is laced with false modesty, with Monash essentially ascribing the Corps success to outstanding command, organisation and staff work, including his own foresight and planning.

Monash goes to great lengths to make clear that the Australian troops in 1918 were exceptional fighting men. He describes the Digger as intelligent, well-educated, practical, adventurous, curious, adaptable and imbued with an independent, democratic spirit. The Australian was physically impressive, possessed “a personal dignity all his own”, and while attentive and diligent at training schools, “conservatism in military methods was no part of his creed.” Above all,

[he was] easy to lead but difficult to drive. His imagination was easily fired. War was to him a game and he played for his side with enthusiasm. His bravery was founded upon his sense of duty to his unit, comradeship to his fellows,

9 Monash began to write what he termed his ‘individual memoir’ in England on 8 August 1919 while fulfilling his newly appointed role as Director-General of Repatriation and Demobilization.Whether by design or not, Monash began writing on the first anniversary of the Battle of Amiens, the first time in which all five AIF divisions fought alongside each other, under Australian command, in the war. Australian Victories was submitted as his Doctor of Engineering thesis at the University of Melbourne, and published in London in February 1920. See Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, 1982, p. 475.

6 Introduction

emulation to uphold traditions, and a combative spirit to avenge his hardships and sufferings upon the enemy.10

All Monash had to do, therefore, was ‘feed his troops on victory’. In this way, he claimed, he taught them “to believe, because of success heaped upon success, that they were invincible. They were right, and I believe that I was right in shaping a course which would give them the opportunity of proving it.”11

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Australian Victories in establishing the singular reputation of the both the Australian soldier and the Australian Corps in the national consciousness, “Though Monash’s book contains exaggerations and inaccuracies,” Bean wrote, “it does not overstate the fighting value of the A.I.F., nor does it really rate the force higher than did many leaders and writers, British, Allied and enemy, …”.12 Bean also praised Monash for making ‘influential opinion’ in Australia aware of its outstanding success. The publication of Australian Victories so soon after the peace combined with Monash’s authoritative voice, intimate knowledge of operational detail and accessible narrative to ensure the initial run of 5,000 copies sold well in Australia.13 It was received less well overseas, however, with critics criticising Monash’s penchant for ‘Australian boasting’.14 Nevertheless, Australian Victories was seminal in shaping the popular impression of the Corps under his command, and remains so to this day.15

The second important account of the Australian Corps published at that time is The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th,

10 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 289-290. 11 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 290. 12 Charles Bean, Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1946. 13 The initial run sold well despite the relatively expensive price of 27s/6d. A cheaper edition was printed in 1923 but by then it was just one among a host of Great War publications on the market. Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, 1982, pp. 418-419. 14 Serle, John Monash, p. 419. A British population deeply traumatised by four years of war and privation did not countenance the self-serving declarations of a comparatively unknown Dominion commander from the antipodes. In any case, the BEF’s Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, was unquestionably the hero of the hour. Haig was feted widely after the war, presented with a gift of £100,000 by the government, and made an Earl in 1919. He became Baron Haig of Bemersyde in 1921. 15 For example, in Richard Travers’ best-selling book, Diggers in France, at least 76 of the 134 endnotes in the two chapters covering the period 8 August to 5 October 1918 refer to Australian Victories. Richard Travers, Diggers in France: Australian Soldier on the Western Front, ABC Books, Sydney, 2001, pp. 388-393.

7 Introduction

1918, written by Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery.16 Montgomery served as Rawlinson’s Chief of Staff in the Fourth Army in 1918 and was an unabashed admirer of both Monash and the Australians. Like Monash, he attributed the Corps’ success to the Australians’ unique national characteristics, including an “aggressive attitude” in the line and “skill and cunning as well as … surpassing gallantry.”17 Praise from a such significant figure of Britain’s military establishment appeared to be a powerful affirmation of Australian military exceptionalism. While Montgomery’s narrative is spiced with a ‘Boy’s Own’ flavour, his macroscopic viewpoint nevertheless provides a valuable overview of Australian operations during the final advance.

Monash and Montgomery both ensured that a heroic, glamorised narrative of the Corps’ achievements was quickly cemented in the public consciousness, but Bean’s twelve-volume Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 gave it powerful official sanction. Published between 1924 and 1942, the Official History is Australian military history’s magnum opus and has served as its bedrock – both in style and substance – for nearly a century.18 It marked a clear departure from traditional European ‘staff’ histories written by soldiers, for soldiers. Because Australia had no tradition of official military literature upon which to draw, Bean navigated uncharted

16 Archibald Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1920. NB. The author’s name used in this thesis, is an abridgement of Montgomery-Massingberd. 17 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, pp. ix and 5-6. 18 Twelve volumes of the Official History were published during that period. The first two centered on the Gallipoli campaign, and appeared in 1921 and 1924 respectively. The final volume published, in 1942, was The A.I.F. in France During the Allied Offensive, 1918. It appeared as Australian forces were fighting another war and deployed both in the Middle East and Pacific theatres. Bean authored six of the volumes himself and edited the remainder. Volumes I-XI relate to Australian operations in the various theatres, while Volume XII is a general photographic record. In addition, AG Butler wrote three volumes, The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services 1914-1918, published between 1938 and 1943. Bean produced a single-volume abridgement of the Official History in 1946, entitled Anzac to Amiens. In addition, Bean published Two Men I Knew in 1957. This highly personalised account of General Sir William Bridges and General Sir Cyril Brudenell White verged on hagiography in places.

8 Introduction

waters and mapped his own course.19 His was to be a popular ‘democratic’ history not intended merely for military specialists.20

Bean had no practical military experience before the war. He had worked variously as a lawyer, journalist and teacher, and the Official History is imbued with corresponding traits: close attention to historical detail, as well as a strong commitment to storytelling and instruction. Bean lived among the Australian troops during the war and witnessed almost every major engagement involving them; this experience deeply informed his writing.21 Regarding war as the greatest test of the young Federation’s race and manhood, Bean believed the Australian soldiers passed it with flying colours.22 Bean was in awe of their bravery, character and heroism, and made it his life’s work to educate the Australian public to that end.

The final volume of the Official History was Volume VI, The AIF in France: May 1918– The Armistice. It was not published until 1942, by which time Australian soldiers were again involved in a global conflict, although this time much closer to home. Volume VI is particularly relevant as it describes the period of operations of the Australian Corps covered by this thesis. Although that final volume was published nearly 80

19 Peter Stanley, ‘First World War Official Histories Introduction: Charles Bean and the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918’, Australian War Memorial website, http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/introduction/ 20 Joan Beaumont, Australia’s War 1914-18, Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1995, p. 150-151. Bean witnessed the Australian soldiers landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, went ashore later that day, and remained on the peninsula for the duration of the campaign. His first-hand experience of the Anzacs during his time at Gallipoli formed within him a deep regard for the ‘ordinary’ Digger and it became his life’s mission to ensure that the deeds that he witnessed would be clearly articulated for all future generations. Bean consistently extolled the innate qualities of the Australian soldier in his regular despatches during the war. His articles were widely syndicated in the Australian press and lapped up by a jubilant Australian public. The governing authorities recognised their value and were quick to appropriate them. The Department of Education in New South Wales reprinted Bean’s initial report of the ANZAC landing in April 1915 for use by students in the state’s secondary schools within a week of its publication, for example, and the Federal government capitalised on the sense of national euphoria by making the Bean’s image of the volunteer Australian soldier integral to subsequent recruitment campaigns. 21 Bean was present at every significant Australian action at Gallipoli and on the Western Front, with the exception of the fighting at Fromelles on 19-20 July 1916. He was at that time on the Somme, as preparations were being made for the Australian attack at Pozières on 23 July. He nevertheless travelled up to Fromelles a day after the battle, and returned to the Somme in time to witness 1st Division’s attack. 22 Robin Gerster, ‘On Re-reading Bean’s Official History’, Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 76, Issue 3 (Spring 2017), https://meanjin.com.au/essays/on-re-reading-beans-official-history/, viewed 7 December 2016. Unlike his British counter-part, Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Bean had no military background. He had worked before the war as a lawyer, journalist and teacher, however, and his writing is imbued with corresponding traits: close attention to historical detail with a commitment both to story-telling and instruction. As Australia’s official correspondent, Bean was given the rank of honorary Captain. Edmonds was a career soldier with the engineers.

9 Introduction years ago, Bean’s detailed rhetoric and prodigious output meant that re-assessment of his work was slow and hesitant. In particular, the large shadows cast by Monash and Bean have militated against critical re-evaluation of the Australian Corps. Instead, their accounts have been taken at face value and re-appropriated or re- constructed ever since.

What was the function of a corps formation in 1918? Before war broke out in 1914, the division was the British army’s basic strategic unit.23 The rapid, massive expansion of the BEF in 1914 and 1915 soon saw the creation of the ‘corps’ formation, however, with two or more divisions brought together under a single ‘corps commander’. In Directing Operations, Simpson maps the development of the British corps on the Western Front from little more than an administrative ‘post- box’ in 1914 to an integral component in the planning and execution of operations four years later with particular responsibility for the organisation and allocation of artillery for set-piece attacks. By 1918, the corps was “the highest level of command in the BEF concerned with the detail of operations, and success was crucially dependent on the planning of corps staff”.24 There were 20 British corps formations on the Western Front by that time, including the Australian Corps, Canadian Corps and Cavalry Corps.25

Monash himself described a corps formation in 1918 as “a subordinate tactical and military authority with a more or less fixed geographical jurisdiction”, whose commander had responsibility for a specific frontage of “definite depth and a definite area, for his administrative and executive direction.” Each corps was allocated to one of the five BEF armies that had formed in Europe by 1916. The

23 The division in 1914 consisted of three infantry brigades (each comprising four battalions) and was supported by two brigades of divisional artillery, one heavy and three medium trench-mortar batteries, and a divisional ammunition column. There were also three field companies of engineers, three field ambulances, as well as a pioneer battalion, machine gun battalion, and supply, sanitation and veterinary services. This meant a nominal strength of 18,000 to 20,000 men, 5,000 horses, and nearly 1,000 vehicles. Stevenson, To Win the Battle, pp. 2-3. 24 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 226. 25 A number of additional corps served in other theatres: XI Corps (Italy), XII Corps (Salonika), XX and XXI Corps (both Palestine). XXIII Corps was formed early in 1918; a Home Force, it was used to provide reinforcements for units in France.

10 Introduction corps commander was responsible to his army commander for the tactical defence of a designated geographical area, including its entire trench and fortification system. He was also responsible for formulating detailed plans for both advance and withdrawal from the corps’ designated area, as necessary.26 The BEF’s structure was relatively fluid, however, with corps sometimes moving between armies, and divisions moving between corps as the need arose. The number of divisions comprising a single corps could vary at any time, therefore, according to the strategic and tactical requirements of the moment.27

The corps commander controlled all functions relevant to the welfare of the troops within his area of responsibility. This involved maintaining transport arrangements, including roads, railroads, canals and traffic control; the organisation of communication networks; the billeting and accommodation of troops; ensuring appropriate networks of supply including food, forage, munitions and engineering materials; the provision of water for troops and animals; sanitation, medical and evacuation arrangements; the establishment of engineering and ordnance workshops; provisions for laundry, bathing and rest camps, as well as entertainment and recreation facilities; and, finally, the establishment of schools for military training and officer education.28 If a division of 18,000-20,000 men was akin to a small town,

26 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 3. 27 Divisions occupied and maintained a corps’ frontage but they also needed rest away from the line. From 1914 until 1917, a British corps usually comprised only two or three divisions, which proved inadequate given the demand for rest and rotation. As a result, divisions were moved out of a particular corps entirely for a period and replaced by another from elsewhere, depending on availability from GHQ or Army Reserve. This resulted in a lack of doctrinal and operational consistency, however, as divisions served under a succession of different corps and army commanders. The Canadian Corps was an exception. Formed in 1915 following the arrival in France of the 2nd Canadian Division, it was placed initially under the command of Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson. Lieutenant- General Sir Julian Byng took over command in 1916 until his promotion to lead the British 3rd Army in mid-1917. There were four CEF divisions on the Western Front at that point, and the Canadian Corps was placed under the overall command of General Sir Arthur Currie (himself a Canadian) until the end of the war. The constancy of this arrangement, together with the Corps’ attendant services, enabled a degree of homogeneity in command and administration thought to be lacking in other British corps. Monash, Australian Victories, p. 4. 28 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 3.

11 Introduction as Robert Stevenson has suggested, then a corps comprising some 60,000-80,000 people in 1918 was at the very least a small city.29

The creation of the Australian Corps had a long and involved gestation. Although under the overall command of the BEF, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) that fought on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 operated essentially as a geographically distinct quasi-national force, although it was entirely dependent on British logistic support.30 Following the general evacuation in December, the Australians and New Zealanders returned to Egypt where the AIF welcomed the arrival of 40,000 fresh reinforcements, effectively doubling its size. This led to the creation of two new Australian divisions, bringing the number in Egypt to four.31 These were re-organised (along with the newly-established New Zealand division) into ‘I Anzac Corps’ and ‘II Anzac Corps’, commanded by British Indian Army Generals William Birdwood and Alexander Godley respectively. Meanwhile, an Australian 3rd Division was raised in Australia in February 1916. Comprised entirely of new men, it was sent directly to England to organise and train for an extended period under its new commander, Monash.32 Following this general re-organisation, the divisions moved to France in the spring and summer of 1916 and were placed, in Bean’s words, “in the gigantic hand of GHQ.”33 Any hope of creating a ‘national

29 Stevenson described the division as akin to a small town, both in size and the fact that it was self-administered, containing everything necessary to train and fight. It was ‘a complex organisation, a system of systems.’ Robert Stevenson, To Win the Battle, p. 2. 30 For a detailed analysis of this aspect of the Gallipoli campaign, see Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2014. 31 By the end of the Gallipoli campaign, there were two Australian divisions (1st Division and 2nd Division) and two extra brigades (4th Brigade and 8th Brigade). According to Bean, Birdwood created four new brigades (two for each division) by ‘splitting certain of his existing battalions into halves, and then expanding each half, by means of reinforcements, into a complete battalion.’ The 16 ‘veteran’ battalions of 1st Division and 4th Brigade were selected, while the 16 battalions of 2nd Division and 8th Brigade (all only relatively recently formed) were not affected. Meanwhile, the arrival of New Zealand reinforcements allowed for the creation of a complete New Zealand division. C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: Volume III – The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1916. (12th edition). Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, pp. 36-37. 32 Monash commanded 4th Brigade during the campaign on Gallipoli. 33 Bean, AOH Vol. III, p. 73.

12 Introduction

army’ quickly dissipated as the divisions were absorbed into the massive organisation of the BEF on the Western Front.34

The possibility of a distinct national formation was first raised formally in January 1916, during the reorganisation in Egypt. With the support of the Commonwealth government, Birdwood proposed the creation of an ‘Australian and New Zealand Army’ comprising both Anzac corps. The British War Office denied this on the grounds that “… it is not possible to predict now what measures the military situation may demand by the time the two divisions in Egypt became ready to take the field and the third division reaches the Mediterranean …”35 During his visit to England in 1916, Prime Minister William Hughes proposed the establishment of an ‘Australasian Army’. The New Zealand government rejected that idea but the British Government indicated in-principle support for the creation of an ‘Australian’ army. Haig and the War Office opposed that suggestion, however, although they did give an undertaking that “every effort will be made to meet your wishes regarding formation of an Australian army as soon as circumstances permit; and this has always been our intention.”36

34 Initially, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Divisions constituted Birdwood’s I Anzac Corps, while 3rd Division (which did arrive in France until November 1916) was part of Godley’s II Anzac Corps, along with the New Zealand Division and 34th British Division. 35 Bean, AOH Vol. III, p. 156. 36 Bean, AOH Vol. III, p. 155-158. Hughes requested that Birdwood be given at least tactical control of the Australian divisions. This too was refused but he did receive administrative command. The Australian government also expressed a desire for Australian representation at the War Office. It believed that a senior Australian officer in London would be best placed to deal with questions related to AIF record-keeping, the supply of war matériel, the repatriation of invalided soldiers to Australia, and a myriad of other issues that pertained particularly to the national interest. The Army Council and Birdwood pointed out that the Commandant at the AIF’s Administrative HQ in London already served in this capacity, however, mitigating the need for another representative. The request was denied and the Australian government did not press the matter. Charles Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume V – The Australian Imperial Force in France During the Main German Offensive, 1918, Angus & Robertson Ltd., Sydney, 1938, pp. 8-12; Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 108. This situation contrasts with the experience of Australia’s sister dominion, Canada, whose insistence on the formation of a Canadian Corps saw its initial two divisions grouped together in 1915. By June 1917, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie (a Canadian) was in command. The creation of an ‘Australian’ (or ‘Australasian’) army did not fit in with Haig’s general plan for the campaign in Europe; in any case, he did not believe there were enough Australian divisions to stand alone as a single army formation. Haig also was also unimpressed by the quality of Australian command. Following 2nd Division’s attack at Pozières in July 1916, for example, Haig wrote in his diary, “Some of their Divisional Generals are so ignorant and (like many Colonials) so conceited, that they cannot be trusted [to work out unaided the plans of attack].” Haig diary entry 29 July 1916, in Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, Orion Books Ltd, 2006, p. 211.

13 Introduction

The creation of an ‘Australian Corps’ would satisfy a number of political objectives for Hughes. Firstly, it would provide the newly established Commonwealth with direct access to the British Commander-in-Chief. Secondly, it was felt that unity of military leadership, administration and policy would lead to greater homogeneity of purpose and increased efficiency both on and off the battlefield. The grouping of Australian formations under unified command might arrest declining morale within the AIF and spur enlistments at home, which were declining at an alarming rate. Finally, the establishment of an Australian Corps would likely lead to the ‘Australianisation’ of senior officers and staff. The Australian government had long desired this but Birdwood had resisted it in his position as commander of I Anzac Corps. According to Bean, Birdwood was reluctant to place Australian soldiers on to the staffs of British formations, despite simultaneously pressing the claims of British officers on Australian staffs. In any case, British GHQ believed that Australian units were essentially imperial in nature and that British and Australian staffs should be interchangeable.37

The matter rested there for a time but calls for the creation of a national formation were renewed in 1917 following the heavy losses at Bullecourt in May. Incompetent British command was blamed. Haig remained reluctant, however, claiming that a five-division corps was unwieldy.38 No one man could command five divisions, he believed, and an odd number of divisions militated against the established system of divisional relief.39 Regardless, the Australian government continued to press their cause with the Army Council.40

37 See also Douglas E Delaney, The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and India, 1902- 1945, Oxford University Press, 2018. 38 Bean Diary, November 1917, AWM38 3DRL 606/93/1; Letter, Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor- General, 12 September 1917, AWM255 A197. 39 Regarding the issue of an odd number of divisions, Bean states that Plumer (GOC Second Army) had informed Birdwood of the impending creation of corps with three divisions but they would only to be temporary arrangements. Bean’s Diary, November 1917, AWM38 3DRL 606/93/1; Letter, Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor-General, 12 September 1917, AWM255 A197. 40 The ambitious and influential Keith Murdoch acted as intermediary between Hughes and Lloyd George.

14 Introduction

By October 1917, in the wake of the terrible fighting in the Ypres salient, the badly battered Australian 4th Division suffered acutely from the lack of fresh recruits and was no longer fit to take its place in the line. It faced possible disbandment but Birdwood and his Australian Chief of Staff, Brudenell White, circumvented the issue by suggesting that 3rd Division be transferred from II Anzac Corps to join its sister divisions in I Anzac Corps. The 4th Division would be withdrawn to replenish its strength and serve as a depot division for the others.41 Because this would result in a four-division formation, Haig finally relented. The issue was resolved. Bean claimed that the announcement “came as a complete surprise to the divisions emerging from Third Ypres” and “was everywhere hailed with delight”, although there is only passing reference to it in battalion histories and unit diaries (if indeed it is mentioned at all).42 The ‘Australian Corps’ formally came into existence on 1 January 1918, under Birdwood’s command.

When Ludendorff’s offensive commenced against the British Fifth Army on the Somme on 21 March, the Australian Corps was in the north resting at Hazebrouck, near Messines, as part of Second Army.43 The Corps was spared the worst of the German army’s onslaught but the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions were despatched piecemeal to the south to help plug holes in the British line.44 This saw Australian formations fight a series of successful defensive actions on the Somme during the next two months, including Hébuterne (27 March and 5 April), Dernancourt (28 March and 5 April), Morlancourt (28-30 March and 4-9 May), Villers-Bretonneux (4 and 24-25 April), and Ville-sur-Ancre (19 May). The Australians suffered 15,000

41 In addition to the infantry, the 3rd Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps (AFC) was allocated as a corps squadron, and Nos. 54 and 55 (Australian) Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) siege batteries, renamed Nos. 1 and 2 Australian siege batteries respectively, were also attached. Charles Bean, AOH Vol. V, p. 14. 42 Charles Bean, AOH Vol. V, p. 13. 43 The five divisions were still recuperating and replenishing their strength following the severe battering they had received during the previous twelve months. 44 1st Division was also despatched to the Somme at the beginning of April but then detached from the Corps and sent back to north to help hold the line. Under the control of XV Corps, it took part in the fighting at Hazebrouck in April and Merris in July. It disengaged from XV Corps on 3 August and returned to the Somme, arriving in the area on 8 August.

15 Introduction casualties during this eight-week period, and fresh replacements were increasingly hard to get.

Having seen off the German offensive on the Somme, the British formations paused to draw breath. Australian units in the line maintained an aggressive posture, however, and were described by Montgomery as, “always inquisitive, seldom idle, and [they held] the greatest contempt for ‘Fritz’”.45 In a process known as ‘peaceful penetration’, well-organised raiding parties (often with artillery support) isolated, attacked and captured German outposts, and then consolidated the newly-won positions.46 Small sections of the enemy line were simply dissolved away, and the front steadily advanced. The tactical experience gained by the Australians and the information gleaned from prisoners during this time proved valuable in future operations, while the constant disruption of the defences served to undermine the already tenuous morale of the Germans opposite the Fourth Army on the Somme.47

On 31 May 1918, Birdwood replaced Hubert Gough as commander of the British Fifth Army, and John Monash was officially appointed commander of the Australian Corps. The five Australian divisions on the Western Front were under the collective command of one of their own citizens for the first time. Furthermore, the brigades were all back with their parent divisions by then, although 1st Division remained at Hazebrouck, attached to the British XV Corps.48 The period culminated in the celebrated victory at Hamel on 4 July. That was the last major action fought by the Australians prior to 8 August, which marks the beginning of the period under consideration in this thesis.

45 Montgomery, Story of the Fourth Army, p. 5. 46 Joffre referred to these actions as ‘nibbling’. See Bean, AOH Vol. VI, Angus & Robertson Ltd., Sydney, 1942, p. 344. 47 Montgomery, Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 5-6. 48 1st Division was initially entrained to head south before being ordered back to Hazebrouck and placed under the command of XV Corps. It would not arrive in the Australian Corps area until 8 August, before joining the battle the following day. 1st Division was involved in any major operational planning with the Australian Corps, however, until the attack at Chuignes on 23 August. 1st Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/42/43.

16 Introduction

Certain aspects of the Australian Corps and its operations during the final advance have received scholarly attention in recent decades. Monash was the subject of two important studies in the early 1980s. The first was Geoffrey Serle’s John Monash: A Biography, which was published in 1982.49 By his own admission, Serle was not a military specialist and relied heavily on Bean for his understanding of the AIF in battle.50 Serle’s work helped to revive Monash’s reputation, which had ‘faded from memory’.51 Peter Pedersen’s Monash as Military Commander was written at much the same time but did not appear in print until 1985.52 This important work complemented Serle’s by focusing on Monash from a military command viewpoint. It is an even-handed analysis informed by the author’s long experience in the Australian army and appreciation of operational planning. Pedersen concludes that Monash was a capable commander in the final year of the war but not necessarily a great one.53 Monash as Military Commander remains the definitive work on its subject nearly four decades after publication.54

While Monash’s name still resonates in the public consciousness, only two of his five divisional commanders in mid-1918 have been the subject of published biographies – John Gellibrand (3rd Division) and Talbot Hobbs (5th Division).55 Of the 15 brigade commanders, biographies have been published on just three: Iven Mackay (1st Brigade), Gordon Bennett (3rd Brigade) and Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott

49 Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne University Press, 1982. 50 Serle, John Monash, p. x. 51 Serle, John Monash, p. 529. Serle notes that ‘Australians are not given to praising famous men or making legendary heroes of many other than bushrangers and sportsmen.’ 52 Peter Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1985. Pedersen’s book is the published version of his PhD, which was submitted in 1982. 53 Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, pp. 293-302. 54 The aura surrounding Monash has grown exponentially in recent decades and his star shines brightly nearly 90 years after his death in 1931. See Roland Perry, Monash: The Outsider Who Won the War, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2004; Tim Fischer, Maestro John Monash: Australia’s Greatest Citizen General, Monash University Publishing, Melbourne, 2014; Grantlee Kieza, Monash: The Soldier Who Shaped Australia, ABC Books, Sydney, 2016. 55 They are John Gellibrand (3rd Division) and Talbot Hobbs (5th Division). Peter Sadler, The Paladin: A Life of Major General Sir John Gellibrand, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2000; John Taylor, Between Duty and Design : the Architect Soldier Sir J.J. Talbot Hobbs, University of Western Australia Publishing, Perth, Western Australia 2014; David Coombes, The Lionheart : A Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Talbot Hobbs, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2007. In Australian Victories, Monash refers to his divisional commanders by name only 20 times in all. Rosenthal and Sinclair-Maclagan together account for 14 of those.

17 Introduction

(15th Brigade).56 The 57 battalion commanders have received even less attention, with only Maurice Wilder-Neligan (10th Battalion) and Leslie Morshead (33rd Battalion) given close biographical study.57 William Westerman’s excellent Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War 1914-1918 (2017) is therefore an important contribution to the field.58

Because of the pre-eminence of the Digger in the national mythology, Australia’s military historiography for the past century has resided primarily in the socio-cultural sphere. Despite that, close demographic studies of the AIF have been few and usually focus on the first waves of volunteers. Lloyd Robson, Bill Gammage and Patsy Adam-Smith all produced important work in this area in the 1970s.59 Jean Bou and Peter Dennis’s chapter on the composition of the AIF in The Australian Imperial Force (2016) is also weighted heavily towards the recruits of 1914 and 1915.60 Ashley Ekins explores questions of discipline and exhaustion within the Corps during the final advance in his chapter ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’, in 1918 Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of History (2010)61, but there is still considerable scope for a more nuanced study of the composition of the Australian Corps in 1918.

56 Ivan Chapman, Iven G. Mackay: Citizen and Soldier, Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975; AB Lodge, The Fall of General Gordon Bennett, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986; Frank Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965; Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliott, Scribe Publications Pty Ltd, North Carlton, Victoria, 2002. Mackay and Bennett received greater attention than their fellow brigadiers of 1918 because they rose to command 6th and 8th Divisions respectively in the Second World War. 57 Peter Holmes, A Magnificent Anzac: The Untold Story of Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Wilder Neligan, C.M.G., D.S.O. and Bar, D.C.M., Croix de Guerre, M.I.D., Peter Lloyd Holmes Publications, Reedy Creek, Queensland, 2013; J.H. Moore, Morshead: A Biography of Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead, Haldane Publishing, Victoria, 1976. As with Mackay and Bennet, the biography of Morshead is a function of his role as a commander of 9th Division in the Second World War. 58 William Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War 1914-1918, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. 59 L.L. Robson, ‘The Origin and Character of the First A.I.F, 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence’, Historical Studies, Vol. 15 (1973), pp. 737-749; Bill Gammage, The Broken Years, Australia University Press, Canberra, 1974; Patsy Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Sphere, Victoria, 1978. 60 Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, ‘The Composition of the A.I.F’, Ch. 4 in Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2016. 61 Ashley Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion: Morale, Discipline and Combat Effectiveness in the Armies of 1918’, Ch. 7 in Ashley Ekins (ed), 1918 Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of Memory, Exisle Publishing Ltd., Auckland, 2010, pp. 111-129.

18 Introduction

There are a handful of scholarly studies of individual battles fought by the Corps during the Hundred Days.62 Michele Bomford’s Beaten Down by Blood: The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne is a valuable account of that celebrated battle, while Peter Stanley’s The Men of Mont-St Quentin: Between Victory and Death focuses on the men in a single platoon in 21st Battalion and follows the men’s story into civilian life.63 Michael Molkentin has produced excellent work in recent years on the Australian Flying Corps.64 Elizabeth Greenhalgh challenges popular misconceptions surrounding the Australian role in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line in late September 1918 in Zombie Myths of Australian Military History: The 10 Myths That Will Not Die, while Dale Blair’s The Battle of Bellicourt Tunnel: Tommies, Diggers and Doughboys on the Hindenburg Line, 1918 examines Fourth Army’s attack against that formidable defensive system in more detail.65 Pedersen also critiques the Corps’ battle procedure during the advance in a chapter in 1918 Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of History (2010) and concludes that it generally adapted well to the challenges of mobile warfare.66 This thesis also examines that aspect.

More broadly, a large number of popular narratives concerning the AIF on the Western Front have been produced in recent years. Notable among them are books by Robin Corfield67, Roland Perry68, Les Carlyon69, Patrick Lindsay70, Richard

62 John Laffin, The Battle of Hamel: The Australians’ Finest Victory, Kangaroo Press, Australia, 1999; Peter Pedersen, Hamel, Leo Cooper (Pen & Sword), South Yorkshire, 2003. Typical of Laffin’s work, The Battle of Hamel, sits firmly within the traditional Anzac mythology. Pedersen produced Hamel as part of the ‘Battleground Europe’ series. It is a concise operational study and considerably more nuanced and balanced than Laffin’s nationalistic account. 63 Michele Bomford, Beaten Down by Blood: The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, Big Sky Publishing, NSW, 2012; Peter Stanley, The Men of Mont St Quentin: Between Victory and Death, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2009. 64 Michael Molkentin, The War in the Air, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2014. 65 Dale Blair, The Battle of Bellicourt Tunnel: Tommies, Diggers and Doughboys on the Hindenburg Line, 1918, Frontline Books, London, 2011; Elizabeth Greenhalgh, ‘Australians Broke the Hindenburg Line’, Ch. 4 in Craig Stockings (ed), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History: The 10 Myths That Will Not Die, University of New South Wales Press Ltd., Sydney 2010, pp. 70-92. NB. The subsequent chapter, by Craig Stockings, challenges the myth of the Australian military exceptionalism with a study of the 2nd AIF. See Stockings, ‘There is an idea that the Australian is a born soldier …’, Ch. 5 in Stockings (ed), Zombie Myths, pp. 93-115. 66 Peter Pedersen, ‘Maintaining the Advance’, Ch. 8 in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 144-145. 67 Robin Corfield, Don't Forget Me, Cobber: The Battle of the Fromelles, 19-20 July 1916: An Inquiry, Corfield, Australia, 2000. 68 Perry, Monash: The Outsider Who Won the War, Random House Australia Ltd., New South Wales, 2004. 69 Les Carlyon, Gallipoli, Pan Macmillan Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, 2001; and The Great War, Pan Macmillan Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, 2006. 70 Patrick Lindsay, Spirit of the Digger, Pan Macmillan, Sydney, 2003; and Fromelles: The Story of Australia’s Darkest Day, Hardie Grant, Prahran, Victoria, 2007

19 Introduction

Travers71 and Peter FitzSimons72, which have all served to maintain the profile of the Australian experience in the public consciousness. Like Bean, many of these authors have a background in journalism and an eye for story-telling. Each reinforces the belief in Australian military exceptionalism and few seek to contextualise the AIF’s performance in broader operational terms. As Joan Beaumont has suggested, the history and memory of Australia’s First World War experience are too often confused, with the Digger continually reframed to meet the cultural and political imperatives of each particular generation.73

The war’s centenary saw the publication of just two books that focused in particular on the exploits of the Australian Corps in 1918. They are Pat Beale’s Legends of War: The AIF in France in 1918 (2017), and Will Davies’ The Last 100 Days: The Australian Road to Victory in the First World War (2018). Unsurprisingly, both fed into the conventional narrative by relying heavily and uncritically on the work of Monash and Bean. It is reasonable to imagine that both of those men would look upon recent popular First World War writing and commemoration in Australia with approval.

Because the focus has been centred for so long upon the heroic exploits of the Australian infantryman in the line, more prosaic aspects of the AIF’s performance during the war have received scant attention.74 Apart from a handful of references in the narrative and a few footnotes, Bean devotes only one page in Volume VI of his Official History to matters of front-line supply. Monash is a little more expansive in Australian Victories but even he relegates logistics substantially in comparison to the achievements of the infantryman and his commanders.

71 Richard Travers, Diggers in France: Australian Soldiers on the Western Front, ABC Books, Sydney, 2008. 72 Peter FitzSimons, Gallipoli, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2014; Victory at Villers Bretonneux: Why a French Town Will Never Forget the Anzacs, Penguin Random House Australia, North Sydney, 2016; Monash's Masterpiece: The Battle of Le Hamel and the 93 Minutes that Changed the World, Hatchett Australia, Sydney, 2018. 73 See Adrienne Francis, ‘All Commemoration is Political’: Historians Lead Charge Against Gallipoli ‘Myth’, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-11/war-and-memory-australians-experiencing-commemoration- fatigue/5081544, 14 April 2014. 74 Graham Wilson, ‘The Relevance of Miscellany Administrative, Support and Logistic Units of the A.I.F’, Sabretache, Vol. XLIV, No. 1, March 2003, p. 60.

20 Introduction

That does not mean that AIF logistics have been ignored entirely by historians. Neville Lindsay published a history on the Royal Australian Army Service Corps in 1992, including a chapter on its role in the First World War. Ross Mallett’s 1999 MA Thesis, ‘The Interplay Between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF’, also includes discussion of the Australian advance in 1918 but it focuses on the action at Hamel in July and, to a lesser extent, the first day at Amiens. Mallett deals with subsequent operations by the Australian Corps in a single paragraph. Rhys Crawley examined the logistic support for the Anzacs in Climax at Gallipoli, while Robert Stevenson did likewise in To Win the Battle and subsequent The War with Germany.75 Nevertheless, the role of operational logistics in the AIF’s combat experience deserves considerably more attention than it has received.

This study must also be seen against the wider backdrop of developments in the field of British and Commonwealth First World War historiography in the last few decades. The ‘lions led by donkeys’ school of scholarship, which focuses on the tragic experience of soldiers and highlights systemic failings in British generalship and command, has dominated the popular imagination for more than a century. Only relatively recently have scholars shifted attention away from the terrible ‘mud and blood’ battles of 1916 and 1917 and onto the final victorious campaign of 1918.76

John Terraine’s pioneering work in the 1960s and 1970s opened the way for historians from Britain and across the Commonwealth to explore operational aspects that underpinned the British army’s success on the Western Front. Notable among them are Shelford Bidwell, Dominick Graham, Peter Simkins, Gary Sheffield, Dan Todman, John Bourne, JP Harris, Niall Barr, Tim Travers, Ian

75 See Neville Lindsay, Equal to the Task: The Royal Australian Army Service Corps, Historia Productions, Kenmore, 1992; Ross Mallett, ‘The Interplay Between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF’, MA Thesis, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1999; Stevenson, To Win the Battle, pp. 58-83; Chapter 7 in Stevenson, The War With Germany, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2015. 76 Sheffield and Todman edited a collection of important essays on British command structures from GHQ to battalion level, for example, in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1918, Spellmount Ltd, Gloucestershire, 2004.

21 Introduction

Malcolm Brown, Tim Cook, Paddy Griffith, Simon Robbins, Glyn Harper, Chris Pugsley, Albert Palazzo, Trevor Wilson and Robin Prior, William Philpott, Andy Simpson, Spencer Jones, Alexander Watson, Jonathan Boff, Jim Beach, Peter Hart, Chris Phillips, Brian Hall, and Aimée Fox.

These authors have all examined various aspects of the ‘learning process’ undertaken by the British army or its Dominions during the war. All were born long after the conflict ended and could access archival documents not available until the mid- 1960s. As a group, they have rejected the popular ‘Blackadder’ or ‘poets’ view of futility and incompetent leadership, concentrating instead upon the operational evolution of the BEF in areas such as doctrine, firepower, tactics, command and control, communications, intelligence, manpower, training and logistics.77 Any assessment of the Australian Corps’ performance during the final advance must necessarily be informed by that discussion.

Of particular relevance to this study is Andy Simpson’s Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918, published in 2006.78 Simpson did not consider the Australian Corps or Canadian Corps, however, because he viewed them as distinctive formations with unique national characteristics and cohesion, and because they had “a literature of their own”.79 While there is a considerable amount of scholarly literature concerning the Canadians’ performance during the war, the same cannot be said for the Australian Corps.80 Furthermore, there are no academic

77 For overviews of the evolution of the historiography of this revisionist movement, see Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919, Praeger Publishers, Connecticut, 1998; Sheffield’s Forgotten Victory (The First World War: Myths and Realities), 2001 and The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, 2009; Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918, Spellmount Limited, Gloucestershire, 2006; Boff, Winning and Losing, 2012. 78 Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918, Spellmount Limited, Gloucestershire, 2006. 79 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. xv. 80 This is partly because Canada’s official history of the war did not appear until the 1960s and is not nearly as comprehensive as the Australian equivalent. This has given scholars scope to examine the Canadian experience independent of a substantial and authoritative pre-existent narrative. The Canadian Corps has therefore received close attention from scholars, including Bill Rawling, Ian Malcolm Brown, Shane B Schreiber, and Tim Cook. Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1992; Ian Malcolm Brown, ‘Not Glamorous but Effective: The Canadian Corps in the Set-Piece Attack, 1917-1918’ in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 421-444; Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1997; Tim Cook,

22 Introduction studies that make a comprehensive examination a corps formation’s operations from base to battlefront during a single campaign.

The nature of the Australian Corps’ performance during August and September 1918 needs to be evaluated more critically than has hitherto been the case. This thesis does that by examining a range of operational factors that shaped its exploits on the battlefield and facilitated its success. It will show that Corps’ performance during this strenuous period was in fact strained and uneven, with formations and systems pushed to their physical, emotional and operational limits. A number of the Corps’ internal structures were breaking down by early October, and the chronic manpower shortage saw its combat capability ground down to the point that it was unable to maintain its place in the line. This thesis will argue that the Australian Corps was successful despite its internal problems because it operated for those two-months deeply embedded within a powerful British Army at the pinnacle of its operational capability on the Western Front, and against an enemy at the lowest point of theirs. While in some respects it is of course a uniquely Australian story, it is – at its core – an imperial British one.

At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916, Viking Canada, Toronto, 2007; Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, Viking Canada, Toronto, 2008. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914- 1919, Ministry of National Defence, Ottowa, 1962 Given the overarching influence of Australian Victories and Bean’s Official History, the Australian Corps has not received similar critical attention. In terms of literature concerning the Australian Corps, Simpson refers primarily to John Millar’s PhD, A Study in the Limitations of Command: General Sir William Birdwood and the A.I.F, 1914-1918, submitted in 1993. However, there is no obvious distinction between I Anzac Corps, II Anzac Corps, and the Australian Corps. It also does not consider the operations or performance of the Australian Corps under Monash following Birdwood’s appointment to command Fifth Army on 31 May.

23 Figure 1.1 Map of area captured by the Australian Corps between 8 August and 5 October 1918.1

1 Molkentin, The War in the Air, p. 200. A copy of the original map from which this was drawn is reproduced in Appendix 1.

CHAPTER 1

NARRATIVE

At 4:20 AM exactly on 8 August 1918, the weight of more than 2,000 British guns of Henry Rawlinson’s British Fourth Army crashed down upon the German line on the Somme River, ten miles east of Amiens. The ferocity of the bombardment was breathtaking, even to old hands. According to Lieutenant Hector Brewer, who enlisted in the first rush of Australian volunteers in August 1914:

Suddenly the whole length of sky sprang to life with one long flash of venomous light. The air was filled with sharp detonations and continuous roar of guns which echoed and re-echoed along the valleys. It was music to our ears. For they were our guns, dealing out death and destruction to the War Lord's hordes. The great fight has started.1

“Such a noise!” wrote Captain Edward Gill, the Adjutant of the 49th Battalion.

It baffled description. The guns rattled at Messines, but never such as this. The sky from a point on our own extreme right, to our own extreme left was lit with fire… Truly a magnificent sight. Armageddon was raging in its full tempestuousness. The spoilers of France and Belgium were feeling the weight of the mighty avenger.2

Randolph Dunkley, waiting to attack with 59th Battalion in the second phase of the operation, wondered if every British gun on the Western front had fired simultaneously by someone touching an electric button.3 Exactly two minutes later, seven divisions of British, Australian and Canadian infantry rose from their trenches in a heavy ground mist and, accompanied by tanks, advanced across a 13-mile front.4

1 Hector Brewer Diary, 8 August 1918, SLNSW, MLMSS 1300/6. The suddenness and ferocity of the bombardment was an unforgettable event. For Eric Wren, “The heavens lit up with a sheet of flame, terrifying in its dynamic splendour, and the earth seemed to burst open with volcanic fury.” Eric Wren, Randwick to Hargicourt: History of the 3rd Battalion, A.I.F, Ronald G McDonald, Sydney, 1935, p. 308. 2 49th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/66/1. 3 59th Battalion War Diary, AWM4 23/76/31, App. 10. 4 The artillery firepower supporting Fourth Army comprised 52 Royal Field Artillery brigades, 26 Royal Garrison Artillery brigades, and 13 ungrouped batteries of long-range guns. Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10.

Chapter 1 Narrative

The situation facing the German army in mid-1918 was bleak. Strangled by the Allied blockade, its home front was beset by crippling shortages and industrial unrest that proved fertile ground for radicals inspired by Lenin’s Bolshevik’s success to the east. At the front, meanwhile, the failure of the Spring Offensive and increasing lack of manpower saw the army verging on collapse. The average strength of German battalions had dropped to 670 (20% below establishment), with some companies reduced to just 50 men. Reserves had to be rushed south from the British front in mid-July to shore up the line on the Marne, while British intelligence classified more than half of Germany’s divisions as ‘temporarily unfit’ because of the recent fighting.5 The casualties suffered during the spring also included a high proportion of junior officers and NCOs, which saw younger, inexperienced soldiers given front- line command.

The influenza outbreak in the middle of the year only compounded matters. A combination of poor diet, combat fatigue, and inadequate shelter in newly won positions made front-line solders particularly susceptible, with one in five soon indisposed because of disease.6 Put simply, by the middle of 1918 the German army was in ‘a terrible condition’.7 Conversely, the Allies were strengthened immeasurably by the arrival of American troops in large numbers during the first half of the year. More than a million were in France by the start of July, and another 250,000 joined them during the month.8 Victory appeared to be only a matter of time.

The Germans opposite Fourth Army on the Somme in early August were in particularly poor shape. Prisoners captured on the Somme in early July spoke of the influenza epidemic ravaging the ranks, problems with discipline (including looting)

5 This classification applied to 106 of the 201 Germans divisions on the Western Front on 31 July 1918. Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries July 1918, TNA WO 157/196. 6 Robert Foley, ‘From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918’, Ch 4 in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of History, Exisle Publishing Ltd, Auckland, New Zealand, 2010, p. 83. Foley states that, in June and July, more than 530,000 German troops in the field suffered from the influenza. 7 Foley, ‘From Victory to Defeat’, Ch 4 in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 82. 8 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 584. According to Edmonds, 318,621 American troops were in France by March, 1918. By July, the number was 1,169,062 and this rose to 1,415,128 by August, an increase of 246,066 men.

26 Chapter 1 Narrative and a general deterioration of morale among men and officers alike.9 With their strength and resolve crumbling, many suffered from apathy, fatalism and fatigue.10 This was certainly apparent on the Australian front at Amiens, where little had been done to prepare the German defences against an attack. The line was dug only roughly in places, with few well-defined communications trenches or dugouts. Even barbed wire was lacking. The British were well aware of this: aerial reconnaissance had produced nearly 40,000 photographs of German front and back areas for distribution to units in the week before the attack.11

The geography of the region near Amiens was well-suited for a major offensive. The Australians occupied the centre of Fourth Army’s front, immediately south of the Somme River. In front lay a wide, open plateau known as the Santerre. It was a gently undulating landscape that had been cultivated by generations of farmers for centuries.12 Its firm, chalky ground was ideal for a large-scale attack supported by tanks, armoured cars, cavalry, aeroplanes, and a vast array of light and heavy artillery. The region encompassed an irregular collection of small towns and villages, with copses and isolated farm buildings dotted in between. Orchards and trees surrounded many of the settlements, and church steeples that often rose above them provided troops with important navigational landmarks. The main transport arteries were a long, straight Roman road stretching eastward from Amiens to St Quentin, cutting directly through the lower third of the Australian line, and its accompanying rail line.

Immediately south of the Australians were the four large divisions of the Canadian Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions). These arrived in the Fourth Army sector from the north in great secrecy during the first week of August. The Canadians

9 Fourth Army Intelligence Summary 3 August 1918, TNA WO 157/197 10 Alexander Watson, Enduring the War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 189-198. 11 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 25-26. Some 160,000 maps of the area were also issued to the troops. ‘Summary of Operations, 8th August 1918’, Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10 12 The Australian 1st Division arrived in the Somme area from Hazebrouck on 8 August. It joined the fighting the following day.

27 Chapter 1 Narrative attacked on a front of 7,500 yards stretching between the railway and the Amiens- Roye road, angling to the southeast.13 Further south again, the French First Army would join the attack 45-minutes later and after a heavy preliminary bombardment. Although often depicted as a British offensive, this was in fact an Allied affair.

Across the river to the north of the Australians was Sir Richard Butler’s British III Corps. Three of its four divisions (12th, 18th and 58th Divisions) sat astride the Morlancourt Ridge rising between the Somme and the Ancre rivers.14 Their task was to capture the high ground that overlooked the river and old British outer defences between Etinèhem and Dernancourt, thereby establishing a defensive flank for the more extensive operations of the Australians and Canadians to the south. The Morlancourt Ridge was difficult terrain, particularly in comparison to the rolling farmland on the Australian front south of the Somme. The narrow plateau was largely featureless save for a small brickyard, three large woods (Gressaire, Malard, and Tailles) all thick with summer foliage, and a long ribbon of road that snaked its way eastwards for about ten miles between the towns of Corbie and Bray. Where the ground fell away to the river on the right, 58th Division had to advance across a series of ridges and thickly wooded ravines. The small hamlet of Sailly-Laurette nestled in a bend on the northern bank but the most formidable feature was the high spur looming over the riverside village of Chipilly. German field guns on its crest had excellent observation over the British front and also the Australian left flank across the river. They could even see the church spires of Corbie, six miles to the west behind the British line.15

Preparations for the attack on 8 August were impressive by any measure. The arrival of the Canadians, British reinforcements and a myriad of support units saw Fourth Army swell from 260,000 to nearly 450,000 men in the ten days before the

13 The Canadian front was about 7,500 yards in a straight line but some 9,500 yards through the trenches. 14 47th Division held the ground on III Corps’ front north of the Ancre River as far as the town of Albert, but it did not take part in the attack on 8 August. 15 Fourth Army Order No. 20 (G), Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/437/6 App. F; Butler Papers, IWM 69/10.

28 Chapter 1 Narrative offensive.16 Despite the scale of the build-up, every effort was made to ensure secrecy and surprise. Orders were issued as late as possible and boundary adjustments delayed to disguise the movement of divisions into the line. Moves were made at night, with men, guns and transport concealed in woods and villages during the day.17 Roads in back areas were covered by straw to muffle the sound of vehicles and tanks.18 Preparations along the Australian front were carried out almost without a hitch, leading Rawlinson’s Chief of Staff, Montgomery, to describe the situation south of the Somme on the eve of the offensive as ‘most satisfactory’.19 Across the wire, Ludendorff informed his commanders on 4 August that no Allied offensive was in prospect, reassuring them that such an operation would only hasten the Allies’ demise.20

The Australian 3rd Division (left) and 2nd Division (right) advanced in the first phase of the attack on a front of 8,000 yards that stretched from the Somme River in the north to the Amiens-Nesle railway south of Villers-Bretonneux. Setting out with their tanks at Zero behind the ferocious barrage and in a heavy ground mist, both divisions reached the first objective line by 8:00 AM. The Germans were caught entirely off-guard by the scale and violence of the onslaught. With most of their guns swiftly neutralised by British counter-battery fire, resistance was weak at best, and often non-existent.

16 According to Edmonds, the feeding strength of Fourth Army increased from 257,562 men and 54,562 animals to 441,588 men and 98,716 animals between 27 July and 10 August. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 21-23. 17 58th Division War Diary, TNA WO 95/2990. 18 C.T. Atkinson, The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment 1914-1919, London, Simkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co, 1924, p. 403. 19 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 51. 20 In his Order of the Day to divisional commanders on 4 August, Ludendorff wrote, “I am under the impression that, in many quarters, the possibility of an enemy offensive is viewed with a certain degree of apprehension. There is nothing to justify this apprehension, providing our troops are vigilant and do their duty… At the present moment we occupy everywhere positions which have been very strongly fortified … Henceforward, we can await every hostile attack with the greater confidence [and] we should wish for nothing better than to see the enemy launch an offensive, which can but hasten the disintegration of his forces.” ‘Extracts from GHQ Summary, No. 603, Dated 26 August 1918 – Captured Order’, Fourth Army Intelligence Summary 28 August 1918, TNA WO 157/197.

29 Chapter 1 Narrative

Figure 1.2 Map of 2nd Division’s objectives in Phase 1 of attack on 8 August 1918.21

The second phase of the attack commenced exactly 20 minutes later and according to timetable. At that time, 5th Division began to pass through 2nd Division on the right, while 4th Division passed through 3rd Division on the left. There was no supporting barrage for this phase of the operation and the mist cleared to reveal a beautiful summer’s day. The battle assumed the character of more open warfare and in many places the demoralised Germans simply gave way. One Australian commander described his battalion’s advance as a ‘triumphal march’ that resembled a parade ground drill.22 It was a ‘picnic’ compared to previous Australian battles, another soldier wrote.23

21 AWM4 1/44/37 22 ‘Personal Narrative of Operations’ by Lieutenant JE Grieve, 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31, App. 11. 23 Newton Wanliss, The History of the Fourteenth Battalion, A.I.F.: Being the Story of the Vicissitudes of an Australian Unit During the Great War, The Arrow Printery, Melbourne, 1929, p. 329.

30 Chapter 1 Narrative

Despite the scale and numbers involved in the operation, only one Victoria Cross was awarded to an Australian because of an action on that day.24 That in itself suggests that hard, close quarter fighting was the exception, not the rule. The Australians were on the second objective line by noon and began to push on to the third and final one, which was achieved almost everywhere a few hours later. The only difficulties were on the far left of 4th Division’s front near the river. The broken ground there made the going difficult and restricted the use of tanks, while German guns on Chipilly spur continued to fire down on the advancing troops.

It was a different story on the British front north of Somme. The German defenders opposite III Corps on the Morlancourt Ridge were more alert and resolute than their comrades on the Santerre, and held stronger positions. There were problems even before the major offensive began. A strong, unexpected German raid by the strong and fresh 27th Württemberg Division before dawn on 6 August unseated the 18th Division on the high ground in the centre and drove it back 800 yards. Two days of heavy fighting followed as the British tried to re-establish their line in time for the Fourth Army’s attack, but it was only partially successful in doing so.

The III Corps advanced by some 2,500 yards on 8 August but failed to capture the batteries on Chipilly Spur, let alone the more distant final objective of the old British line. This left the Australian left flank exposed to machine gun and artillery fire from across the river. German positions in the three large woods proved particularly stubborn, while the weather and terrain also militated against success. The thick fog lingered heavily on the ridge all morning, particularly in the ravines and folds of ground that led down to the river on 58th Division’s front on the right. There were few landmarks to guide the infantry and both visual and verbal communication was often impossible due to the mist and deafening sound of artillery. Troops quickly

24 It was awarded posthumously to Lieutenant Alfred Gaby, who commanded D Company of 28th Battalion (2nd Division). With his company held up by barbed wire, Gaby found a gap in it and advanced in the face of strong machine gun and rifle fire. According to his citation, Gaby ran along the parapet, still alone and at point-blank range, and emptied his revolver into the garrison. His action resulted in the capture of 50 Germans and four machine guns. Gaby was killed three days later, during the fighting near Lihons.

31 Chapter 1 Narrative

lost direction, close tank support – so important to the Australians’ success south of the river – was severely restricted, and aerial reports were impossible until the fog cleared by early afternoon. Hard fighting took place on the ridge throughout the morning, with the afternoon spent trying to consolidate positions and resist local counter-attacks.25 Butler described the situation on his front that evening as ‘difficult’.26

Recriminations followed. Monash ascribed III Corps’ problems to inadequate staff- work and leadership.27 The British official historian, James Edmonds, blamed poorly-trained young troops and inexperienced junior commanders.28 Some Australians appreciated the challenges facing the British, however, and were sympathetic. “In justice to the Tommies,” wrote one, “it should be stated that their difficulties were enormous. The bend of the Somme at Chipilly, the marshes on one side, and the almost unscalable heights on Fritz’s front, heights covered with field guns, made their task a terrible one.”29 Butler returned to England on the evening of 11 August suffering from ‘insomnia and nervous exhaustion’.30 King George V conferred Monash’s knighthood at Bertangles Chateau the following day.31 The contrasting experience of Monash and Butler at Amiens could hardly have been more stark.32

25 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10/1. 26 III Corps General Staff Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/680. 27 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 126-127. 28 Edmonds BOH Vol. 4, p. 82. 29 Harold Roy Williams, An Anzac on the Western Front: The Personal Reflections of an Australian Infantryman from 1916- 1918, Pen & Sword Military, South Yorkshire, 2012, p. 154. 30 Command of III Corps passed for the time being to Lieutenant-General Alexander Godley. Familiar to Australian troops as GOC of the New Zealand Division at Gallipoli, and then GOC II Anzac Corps on the Western Front in 1916-1917, Godley commanded III Corps until Butler returned on 11 September. He had a strong reputation as an administrator but not as a front-line tactician. His performance at Passchendaele on 12 October 1917, which resulted nearly 3,000 New Zealand casualties, is a case in point. Ray Grover, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Vol. III), Auckland University Press, 1996. 31 Monash had received his knighthood in the King’s New Year’s Honours List on 1 January, 1918. The investiture ceremony took place on the steps of his headquarters at Bertangles Château on 12 August, 1918. 32 David Millichope argues that Butler had been suffering from influenza for nearly a month. This is consistent with the outbreak that struck the BEF at the end of June. David Millichope, ‘A Re-assessment of the Performance of Lieutenant-General Sir Richard H. K. Butler As Corps Commander’, MA Thesis, Birmingham University, 2010, p. 15. Even Monash acknowledged in Australian Victories that Butler’s sick leave was arranged some “some days before … as he had for some time been far from well.” Monash, Australian Victories, p. 136.

32 Chapter 1 Narrative

Even allowing for the problems north of the Somme, the attack on 8 August was a singular triumph for Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, and for Monash’s Australian Corps in particular.33 The four Australian divisions advanced seven miles during the day, capturing the villages of La Motte, Warfusée, Bayonvillers, Harbonnières, Morcourt, Gailly, most of Cérisy, and more than 170 German guns.34 The cost was remarkably light by Western Front standards, with only 650 Australian casualties and fewer than 80 killed.35 It was a different story for the Germans opposite Fourth Army, who lost 27,000 men on that one day alone. That figure included 12,000 prisoners, two-thirds of whom passed through the Australian cage.36

Tributes flowed for Monash and his Corps.37 Haig was particularly fulsome in his praise. “The brilliant and predominating part taken by the Canadian and Australian Corps in this battle is worthy of the highest commendation,” he wrote. “The skill and determination of these troops proved irresistible.”38 Bean described it as the AIF’s “greatest ‘set-piece’ of the war” and Monash’s masterpiece.39 “Never had the Australian Corps had such a successful day,” wrote Montgomery, “and, as it was the first time it had been in action as a corps of five divisions, the result was especially satisfactory both to it and to its commander, Sir John Monash.”40 The Germans saw

33 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 135. 34 ‘Report on Operations of Australian Corps. Villers Brettoneux (sic). 8th August, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Australian Corps War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10 App. 22. 35 According to Edmonds, the Australians suffered 652 casualties on 8 August, including 77 killed and 78 missing. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 159. 36 It is difficult to be precise about the number of captures on 8 August. The ‘Report on Operations’ in the Australian General Staff War Diary states that the Australians captured 183 Officers, 7,742 Other Ranks, 173 guns on 8 August, as well as “numerous machine guns, trench mortars, and anti-tanks rifles.” ‘Report on Operations of Australian Corps. Villers Bretonneux (sic). 8th August, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Australian Corps War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. Edmonds, Montgomery and Monash all use these figures in their narratives. The Fourth Army General Staff War Diary for 8 August states that the Australians captured 149 Officers, 6,410 Other Ranks, and more than 200 guns. The exact number of prisoners captured by Fourth Army on 8 August is also uncertain. Montgomery put the number of prisoners at 12,000. The German prisoners were drawn from at least eleven different divisions. Edmonds BOH Vol. 4, p. 73; Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 43; Monash, Australian Victories, p. 129; 37 Writing to Lloyd George two days after the battle, Churchill opined that it was “the greatest British victory that has been won in the whole war, and the worst defeat that the German Army has yet sustained.” Cited in Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1986, p. 591 38 JH Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915-April 1919), JM Dent & Sons Ltd, London and Toronto, 1919, p. 261. 39 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 604. 40 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 43.

33 Chapter 1 Narrative the day differently. According to the official post-war German monograph, “As the sun set on 8th August on the battlefield, the greatest defeat which the German Army had suffered since the beginning of the War was an accomplished fact.”41

The first day of the offensive was an almost unqualified success but the exploitation was far less edifying, and characterised by what has described as ‘seat-of-the-pants planning’.42 German resistance also stiffened, particularly on the Australian front on the Santerre. This period exemplified the challenges during the advance posed by the transition from the well-planned, organised set-piece to more open, improvised fighting. What transpired was something of a hybrid battle: there were elements of static warfare reminiscent of the Somme in 1916, as well as more mobile, chaotic encounters.

Shortly before midnight on 8 August, Rawlinson had instructed his commanders to continue the advance to a general line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-Dernancourt.43 The Australian 4th Division would hold its position by the river on the left, while 1st, 2nd and 5th Divisions conformed to the Canadian advance on the right by establishing a line from Lihons (on the Australian right flank) northwards through Framerville to Méricourt. The Australians would advance between the Amiens- Chaulnes railway and the Amiens-Brie Road but the extent of their role in operation rested upon the success of the Canadians (assigned the principal role in the attack) on the right and III Corps across the river on the left.44

Currie and Butler fixed the time for the attack at 5:00 AM on 9 August and informed Monash accordingly. Currie then changed it to 10:00 AM because of the delayed arrival of the British 32nd Division, promised to him by Rawlinson. Butler decided that III Corps would nevertheless attack Chipilly at dawn.45 Currie again altered the start time south of the river, giving verbal orders at 7:30 AM that brigades would

41 ‘Die Katastrophe des 8. August 1918’ cited in Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 88. 42 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p. 381. 43 Montgomery, Story of the Fourth Army, p. 51. 44 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10. 45 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 93-96.

34 Chapter 1 Narrative not move off until 11:00 AM. Australians were not informed of the latest change. When the attack did eventually get underway, however, things progressed well in the southern sector and the Canadians soon captured le Quesnel, a first day objective. Unlike the previous day, no mist hindered the attackers and visibility was excellent from the outset.

On the Australian front, it was clear by 9:30 AM that 1st Division (which arrived in the area from Messines only the previous afternoon) would not make its jumping- off point in time to support the Canadians. As a result, the 6th Canadian Brigade asked Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliot’s exhausted 15th Brigade (situated on the right edge of the Australian line) to conform to its advance by covering its left flank. The 5th Division’s commander, Talbot Hobbs, agreed and 15th Brigade moved off at 10:00 AM with no clear objective, being told simply to keep going until 1st Division arrived. Matters were not helped by the absence of an artillery barrage, while the single tank supporting them was only a last-minute loan from the Canadians. Nevertheless, 15th Brigade pressed forward, capturing 300 Germans and 21 machine guns by early afternoon.46 On its left, Edwin Tivey’s 8th Brigade also advanced, securing the village of Vauvillers and capturing 150 prisoners in the process.

The troops of 1st Division finally arrived on their start line shortly before 2:00 PM and began to pass through 15th Brigade, supported by 14 tanks. The 1st Division’s primary objectives were the village of Lihons (4 miles away) and the strongly fortified hill in front of it. At 4:30 PM, 2nd Division began to move through 5th Division south of the Amiens-Foucaucourt road and attacked Framerville on a two-brigade front. The fighting by 1st Division at Lihons raged for three days before the village was finally taken at a cost of nearly 1,600 casualties. In return, the Australians captured more than 200 prisoners, 24 guns, 40 trench mortars and nearly 200

46 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 54. See also Pedersen, The Anzacs, p. 379.

35 Chapter 1 Narrative machine guns.47 Bean was unflattering in his assessment, describing it as “a classic example of how not to follow up a great attack.”48

Because the Somme River had proved an unsatisfactory inter-corps boundary, Rawlinson agreed with Monash’s request on 10 August that the Australians take over the northern bank. Monash immediately moved Sydney Herring’s 13th Brigade (4th Division) across and combined it with the American 131st Regiment (previously attached to the British 58th Division) to create a temporary composite formation (‘Liaison Force’) under the overall command of 7th Brigade’s Evan Wisdom. This formation effectively served as an extra division under Australian command and Monash reorganised his frontage, which had increased to nearly 23,000 yards.49

On the night of 10-11 August, the 3rd and 4th Divisions attempted a joint encircling movement on either side of the river in order to cut off Etinèhem Spur to the north and the ridge east of Proyart to the south. At the same time, the 2nd Division conformed on the right. The attack by 13th Brigade north of the river was successful but Walter McNicoll’s 10th Brigade’s ill-conceived operation on the southern side was not. The latter, which involved three tanks moving along the road in the dark, failed miserably and incurred heavy losses. It was only because Germans north of the river beat a hasty retreat in the face of the 13th Brigade’s attack that those on 10th Brigade’s front around Proyart also pulled back.50

Before first light on 11 August, the battalions of 11th Brigade began to clear Méricourt and Cateaux Woods on the southern bank of the river, and patrols from 10th Brigade moved through the village of Proyart. Liaison Force sealed off Etinèhem spur on the northern bank, although the Germans were not finally driven out of the village for another two days. Regardless, by that evening, Lihons, Proyart, Chipilly and Etinèhem were all effectively in Australian hands and Rawlinson’s

47 Stevenson, To Win the Battle, pp. 195-198; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 682. 48 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 682-684. 49 Butler also remove his exhausted 58th Division from the line to rest, and 18th Division was pushed forward once again from Corps reserve. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 93-121. 50 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 685-701.

36 Chapter 1 Narrative objectives for 9 August had finally been achieved on the Australian front. The price was terrible, however. Fourth Army had suffered more than 22,000 casualties between 8 and 13 August. This included 6,000 Australians, and nearly 2,000 from 1st Division alone.51

Bean believed the cost of these operations was well out of proportion to any successes, and that planning by Rawlinson, Monash and Currie left much to be desired.52 He described attacks in the southern sector of the Australian front as hastily organised and wasteful. Because commanders were keen to drive attacks home with all urgency, men had no chance to recuperate, and officers had insufficient time to relay detailed battle orders to subordinates. Successful attacks in 1918 still required considerable and well-directed artillery support but this was largely absent at Etinèhem, Proyart and Lihons. The tanks that were so effective on 8 August were also now few in number, and those that were available often had to traverse difficult terrain, sometimes at night. When sent forward in daylight without the cover of smoke-shells to screen their movement, they were easy targets for German field guns. The result was fierce hand-to-hand combat more reminiscent of the bloody trench fighting of 1915 and 1916 than the more sophisticated operations of 1918, and heavy losses. It would have been even worse but for the German army’s disintegrating resolve and lack of reserves.

Rawlinson convened a meeting with his senior commanders on the afternoon of 11 August to outline the way forward.53 Given the difficulties encountered in the preceding days and stiffening German resistance, Currie voiced his concerns about continuing the offensive. Monash agreed. Rawlinson reassured them that he “did

51 The total casualty figures from 7-14 August were: Cavalry Corps – 887; III Corps – 6,250; Canadian Corps – 9,074; Australian Corps – 5,991; Total – 22,202. See Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 159-160. The Australian casualty figures were: 1st Division – 1,931; 2nd Division – 1,295; 3rd Division – 1,095; 4th Division – 784; 5th Division – 886. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 684. 52 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 475. 53 The meeting was held at the Australian 2nd Division’s headquarters at Villers-Bretonneux. In attendance were: MGGS and GOCRA Fourth Army; GOC and BGGS of Cavalry, III, Canadian, and Australian Corps; GOC Tank Corps; GOC 5th Brigade RAF. Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 16.

37 Chapter 1 Narrative not intend to use any more men than was absolutely necessary.”54 Rawlinson believed that Ludendorff had little option but to stage a fighting withdrawal eastward along the Somme and establish a defensive line on its western bank. But Rawlinson was cautious.55 He planned to launch another set-piece operation in the near future but in the meantime allowed small raiding parties to dribble forward on both sides of the river, as long as they did not incur unnecessary casualties in reckless attacks.

The Canadian divisions were withdrawn from Fourth Army and sent to join Horne’s First Army in the north. Command of that section passed temporarily to Monash, which meant the Australian line stretched for nearly 16,000 yards before the French took over the southern portion two days later. Monash again reorganised his front. The tired 3rd Division was withdrawn on 14 August and replaced in the line by the British 17th Division, temporarily under Australian command but with Rawlinson’s strict instruction that it not be used for offensive operations.

The Australians now approached the old 1916 Somme battlefields. Old trenches and shell holes scarred the landscape, and belts of old wire lay obscured in lank summer grass.56 The Somme meandered gently to the north-east on the Corps’ northern flank for nearly ten miles through a river valley that was nearly a mile wide and up to 70 yards deep. Marshes, backwaters and dense woodland on either side impeded the advance, and the plateau through which the river cut was riven with steep gullies. This was very different to the rolling farmland to the south. The river itself was characterised by a series of seven fairly uniform horseshoe bends, each roughly 2,000 to 2,500 yards across at the base. The small villages of Bray, Suzanne, Maricourt, Curlu and Hem lay in the successive northern bends, while Chuignolles, Chuignes, Cappy, Frise and Feuillères were nestled on the southern side. All were in German hands and each had to be taken in turn.

54 Lloyd, Hundred Days, p. 65. 55 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 16. 56 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 16.

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Tanks and artillery could not operate easily in the terrain by the river and a different tactical approach was required. Monash planned to use the high ground on both sides of the river to cordon off the ‘base’ of each horseshoe in succession. Faced with the prospect of being trapped in the bend, the Germans would have little choice but to surrender or withdraw to the far side.57 Meanwhile, British long-range guns would be pushed forward and trained on roads and bridges behind the German front to disrupt communication lines, paths of retreat and the retirement of artillery.58

Wisdom’s ‘Liaison Force’ continued to press forward on the northern bank past Etinèhem and towards the village of Bray, while 2nd Division drove the German line back on the southern bank by an average of 1,000 yards on a 2,000-yard front east and south of the small village of Herleville.59 Further south again, the 4th Division relieved 1st Division on the right of the Australian line, with 4th Brigade occupying Lihu Farm before reaching the edge of Madame Wood. Most of the territory Rawlinson had hoped to capture in a single set-piece operation was therefore now in Australian hands.

There was one setback, however, when 2nd Division’s 6th Brigade failed to capture Herleville in a poorly planned operation on 18 August, and lost 117 troops for the capture of only 15 Germans.60 Nevertheless, Fourth Army had taken 23,000 German prisoners across its entire front in just two weeks of fighting. An increasing number surrendered of their own accord, and many stated openly that Germany could no longer win the war.61 Recognising its predicament, the German High Command sent fresh reserves and additional artillery to the Somme to strengthen resistance there during the withdrawal.62

57 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 138; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 693 58 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10. 59 Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM 23/1/35/10, App. 22. 60 Three companies of 22nd Battalion, in the centre of 6th Brigade front, held a 1,000-yard line prior to the attack. They comprised just 30, 24, and 36 men respectively. The fourth, in reserve, had about 40 men. 6th Infantry Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/6/36, App. 75. See also Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 693-720. 61 ‘4th Army Intelligence Summary 14 August 1918’, TNA WO 157/197. 62 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10.

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Fourth Army paused for a few days at this point to draw breath before operations recommenced on 22 August. On that morning, III Corps attempted to drive the Germans back to a line east of Albert and north of Bray, with the 47th and 12th Divisions attacking at 4:45 AM between the Bray-Corbie Road and the village of Bécordel-Bécourt, four miles to the north. In the Australian 3rd Division, Henry Goddard’s 9th Brigade conformed on the right of the British by advancing along the broken, forested northern bank of the Somme towards Bray itself.

There was no preliminary bombardment for the general attack but British planes had conducted heavy aerial bombing of German positions on previous nights. This only served to warn the Germans of an attack, however, and the vital element of surprise was lost. In the event, the Germans placed down their own heavy bombardment along the British line just hours before the general operation commenced.63 The steep river valley made it difficult to arrange accurate artillery fire to cover 9th Brigade’s advance towards Bray. The plan was to strike out north, therefore, and encircle the village. If that proved impossible, Bray would be isolated and taken later.

A 250-gun barrage landed about 300 yards ahead of the Australian formations. It was a blazing summer’s day and the terrain proved difficult, particularly as the shells fell raggedly in the broken country. Mist and dust enveloping the ground ahead of the attacking troops added to the difficulties, while the handful of supporting tanks were soon beset by mechanical problems. On the left, British troops of 47th Division were silhouetted against the clear morning sky as they crested the rise above the ironically-named ‘Happy Valley’. This made them easy prey for German machine guns and artillery firing over open sights, and the Australian troops in advance of them on the right were exposed to heavy enfilade fire, including from the rear.64

63 Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/63. 64 Edmonds blamed faulty staff work and the inexperience of young British troops. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 199.

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According to a plan more reminiscent of the failures of 1916 and 1917 than the more sophisticated tactics of 1918, the Australians had to halt at 6:30 AM on 9th Brigade’s first objective line for 66 minutes, in order to give the British (who had set out from positions some 2,000 yards behind the Australian line) time to catch up. This gave the Germans an opportunity to re-establish themselves, and the British 12th and 47th Divisions were subsequently forced to pull back in the face of determined counter-attacks. The Australian left flank was left well and truly in the air.65 Monash and the 3rd Division’s commander, John Gellibrand, wanted Goddard’s men to press forward but officers on the ground did not, particularly given the heavy machine gun fire pouring out of Bray. Monash and Gellibrand relented, allowing the troops of 9th Brigade to dig in between the village and the steep sides of the river valley, a few hundred yards ahead of the British.66 The three Australian battalions suffered nearly 400 casualties between them during the day.

McNicoll’s 10th Brigade relieved 9th Brigade north of Bray on the night of 23-24 August, while the 3rd Pioneer Battalion held a line southwest of the village. At 1:00 AM, 40th Battalion attacked, having arrived at the start line only just in time after a 7½-mile march in the dark along heavily congested roads. The forward troops were initially held down by German machine guns northwest of the village but they eventually pushed forward with the help of 37th Battalion.67 By nightfall on 24 August, 3rd Division finally captured Bray after three days of heavy fighting, and the 3rd Pioneers were able to establish crossings and advanced posts on the left bank of the river.68

While the fighting around Bray was underway, the Australians launched their own major attack on 23 August to the south along a general line Herleville-Chuignes- Chuignolles, to improve the general position between Lihons and the river. Two 1st

65 9th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/9/22. App. 10. 66 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10. See also Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 729-733. 67 ‘Narrative of Operations of Third Australian Division, North of the Somme, From August 13th 1918 to 2ndSeptember 1918’, 3rd Division General Staff Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/46/22, App. 27. 68 Australian Corps General Staff Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/35/7.

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Division brigades set out behind a heavy bombardment with a handful of tanks at 4:45 AM. They moved through the Chuignes valley before pushing on to the top of the strongly defended heights of Froissy Beacon. German guns located on Froissy Beacon could fire down onto Bray across the river and 3rd Division’s success in that area was largely contingent upon their capture.

Figure 1.3 Map of 3rd Division’s attack at Bray on 22 August 1918.69

The fighting in Chuignes valley was much more difficult than anticipated and losses were heavy.70 On the 1st Division’s right, the British 32nd Division (under Australian command until 11 September) finally captured Herleville, which had resisted the Australian 6th Brigade a week before. These combined operations saw more than 3,000 Germans captured in just 24 hours. Bean described it thus: “This attack, south of the Somme, though delivered by only two divisions, was one of the hardest blows ever struck by Australian troops”.71 He neglected to mention that one of those two Australian divisions was British.

69 3rd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/46/22. Note the bend in the British 12th Division’s line near Happy Valley, north of the Australians. 70 ‘Report on Operations of Australian Corps. Villers Bretonneux (sic). 8th August, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Australian Corps War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. 71 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 736.

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While hard fighting took place in the centre and right of Fourth Army’s front, the British 18th Division had considerable success of its own in the northern sector. Having captured Bellevue Farm and the railway sidings at Vivier Mill on 22 August, 55th Brigade moved through the shattered ruins of Albert. Recapturing this iconic town not only secured the left flank of Fourth Army and protected Third Army’s right flank, it also gave the British a vital bridgehead on the Ancre and an important section of the Amiens-Bapaume road that would serve as a major supply artery in future operations. The psychological value of retaking Albert was also considerable. With its cathedral’s distinctive golden spire, Albert lay behind British lines from 1915 until the spring of 1918, serving as a key base for troops moving to and from the Somme battlefields. The Tommies’ attachment to that iconic, blood-soaked region in general, and to Albert in particular, was profound.72

Upon debouching from Albert on 23 August, the troops of 18th Division were held up by heavy German machine gun fire. Working closely with the neighbouring 38th Division of V Corps (Third Army) on the left, the British managed to push on the following day and capture Tara and Usna Hills in the face of strong opposition.73 They were now approaching the old front line of July 1916 and, with the Germans obviously disorganised, decided to press on. Familiar battlefields again saw heavy fighting and La Boiselle, Bécourt Wood, Montauban were recaptured by 28 August.74 At the same time, 12th Division captured Fricourt and Mametz before helping 18th Division to capture Bernafay and Trônes Wood, and then attacking the strongly-defended Maltz Horn Farm.75 Although often lost in the wider narrative of the war, this was an impressive period of operations by two highly capable and effective BEF divisions.

72 George Nichols. The 18th Division in the Great War. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922, p. 369. See also Michael Stedman, Advance to Victory 1918, Leo Cooper Publishing, South Yorkshire, 2001, p. 86. The ‘Leaning (or ‘Hanging’) Virgin’ on top of Albert Cathedral had fallen during the German advance in the spring. 73 18th Division War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/2017. 74 18th Division War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/2017. 75 12th (Eastern) Division War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/1827.

43 Chapter 1 Narrative

Successes all along the front during this time made Haig increasingly confident that victory was possible before the year was out. He urged his commanders to be aggressive, realising that much depended on driving home the advantage before German reinforcements arrived and the weather turned in autumn.76 Rawlinson also wanted to deny the Germans time to prepare defences on the western side of the Somme.77 This all sat easily with Monash, who continued to press his tired formations forward relentlessly.

Haig instructed Rawlinson on 25 August to pause operations while Horne’s First Army attacked to the north. Rawlinson permitted ‘aggressive patrolling’ to continue, however, and Monash obliged. With Bray and the Chuignes valley secured, the pursuit of the German retirement along the Somme resumed on the Australian front. Monash held a conference with his divisional commanders and told them that he planned to advance with three divisions in line south of the Somme. These were (from north to south): 2nd Division, 5th Division and the British 32nd Division. Each would operate on a narrow single-brigade frontage. North of the river, meanwhile, the 3rd Division had to cross the maze of trenches and shell holes of the old Somme battlefields, which provided plenty of cover to the Germans as they fell back.78

The Allies were clearly in the ascendancy across the Western Front by this time. The Canadians spearheaded a First Army offensive near Arras on 26 August and advanced the British line on a 12,000-yard front. The French continued to hammer away in the south, and their First Army reached Roye on 27 August before advancing to Noyon a day later. On Fourth Army’s front, the German withdrawal along the Somme continued. Roads along which they could retire their guns were limited in

76 Haig Memo to Monash and Butler, 27 August 1918, Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 51. 77 HN Wrigley, The Battle Below: Being the History of No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, Errol G Knox, Sydney, 1935, p. 96. 78 NG McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh: “History of the Thirty-Seventh Battalion A.I.F, Modern Printing Co., Pty, Ltd, Melbourne, p. 234.

44 Chapter 1 Narrative number, while the British knew the location of every bridge across the river and targetted them with long-range guns.79

Figure 1.4 Map of 1st Division’s advance south of the Somme between 23-26 August 1918.80

79 ‘Memo to Monash and Butler, 24 August 1918’, Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 46. 80 AWM4 1/42/44

45 Chapter 1 Narrative

North of the Somme, the Australian 3rd Division worked with the British 58th Division to capture the village of Maricourt on 25 August. On the southern bank, the 1st Division and the British 32nd Division continued to push forward with aggressive patrols, while British artillery pounded German lines of communication. Gellibrand’s 3rd Division captured the riverside village of Suzanne, while Cappy fell to 1st Division on the southern bank.81 The 2nd and 5th Divisions then replaced the two Australian divisions in the line. The Germans continued to beat a hurried retreat. In 5th Division, 8th Brigade immediately sent out strong patrols to improve the forward positions south of the river and work around to the north of Foucaucourt. To their right, 32nd Division advanced nearly a mile between Foucaucourt and Chaulnes, meeting little resistance. North of the river, 3rd Division captured Vaux Wood. In just five days since 22 August, the Australian Corps had captured more than 100 officers and 3,750 other ranks.82

Effective mobile artillery support during this period of fast-moving operations was crucial. Rawlinson instructed commanders to push guns forward rapidly – in singles or sections, if necessary – but knew that mechanical difficulties and ammunition supply would inevitably restrict their use.83 He forbade engagements that risked heavy losses. Monash continued to drive his formations hard nevertheless. He instructed brigades to employ fighting patrols and infiltration tactics until they reached the limit of their endurance, at which point units were to be withdrawn and replaced by fresh ones. In this way, Monash intended to maintain as much pressure as possible on the Germans as they fell back.

The Germans handled their guns effectively during the withdrawal along the Somme. An intense artillery bombardment designed to deplete ammunition dumps and stall the advancing troops preceded each step back. Heavy guns covered field

81 ‘Summary of Operations, 26 August 1918’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/35/7. 82 ‘Summary of Operations, 27 August 1918’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/35/7. 83 ‘Haig Memo to Monash and Butler, 27 August 1918’, Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 51.

46 Chapter 1 Narrative artillery as it withdrew, before the reverse occurred. Single field guns remained hidden in copses for as long as possible to cover the infantry retirement, while German planes targetted British transport and supply lines.84 The speed of the pursuit meant that German guns were often abandoned, however, along with hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition and stores of provisions.

The machine gun played a central role in the German retirement. The undulating terrain on both sides of the river allowed machine gunners to disguise their positions until the last moment before pulling back. The succession of rapid attacks saw sections of the German line give way on the Australian front and strongly-defended positions were outflanked and rushed, but it could be difficult nevertheless. In the words of one Australian soldier:

The enemy’s machine gun strength was truly remarkable and there is no doubt that, if the spirit of all the men behind these weapons had been equal to that displayed by the German Army in previous years, the attack battalions would not have made such extraordinary progress. As it was, however, though his being rushed from position to position, the morale of the enemy was beginning to decline.85

This period of rapid tactical improvisation was in stark contrast to the meticulously planned offensive at Amiens only a few weeks earlier, or even more recent smaller brigade and battalion-level operations. Operational flexibility was at a premium and that tested the decision-making abilities of commanders long familiar with the stasis of trench warfare. It also posed considerable challenges for supply and communication units that had to keep pace with the advancing line. Roads deteriorated under the constant strain of heavy traffic, and repair crews struggled to maintain them in working order. Tanks were increasingly scarce because of battle- damage, breakdowns and exhausted crews, and the front line was soon far ahead of established fuel and supply dumps.

84 ‘Haig Memo to Monash and Butler, 27 August 1918’, Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/14/10, App. 51. 85 McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh, p. 234.

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The Australian Corps advanced more than 5½ miles astride the Somme in the last ten days of August, while III Corps pressed forward a similar distance to the north. The Germans opposite Fourth Army faced a difficult choice. They could reinforce their numbers and utilise existing trenches and wire to establish new defensive positions on the western side of the river. Alternatively, they could cross to the eastern bank and use the river itself to block the advance. As Rawlinson anticipated, the Germans opted for the latter and began to take up positions in the old 1917- 1918 winter line on the far side. This conserved manpower by shortening the German front and enabled them to select the best ground from which to defend. The main force began to move to the eastern side behind a massive barrage on 27 August as part of a general withdrawal along the Western Front that stretched from Belgium in the north to the First French Army front in the south. The Australian 5th Division and British 32nd Division approached the western bank of the river two days later but it was clear by that time that resistance was stiffening.86

The Fourth Army had advanced for three weeks astride the Somme as it wound gently to the north-east but now it approached the point where it turned directly across the line of advance. On the Australian front, the river bent south-east at the small village of Cléry before turning due south at the walled town of Péronne a few miles on. On III Corps’ front, the river was narrower and canalised as it turned north. Crossing the river on the Australian front in particular was a difficult proposition. The marshland there was often waist deep and stretched for more than 1,000 yards in places. It was crisscrossed by numerous deep channels, while the river itself contained hundreds of small overgrown islets. Things were made even more difficult by the destruction of every suitable crossing point during the German withdrawal.

86 Clive Grimwade, The War History of the 4th The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919, Headquarters of the 4th London Regiment, London, 1922, p. 453; Michele Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2012, p. 7.

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Monash’s initial plan was to ‘bounce’ the Somme in a direct attack from the west but he knew a frontal attack was ill-advised. He decided therefore to concentrate on his northern flank. While the British divisions of III Corps attacked Mont St Quentin from the north-west on 29 August, the Australian divisions would attempt to bridge the river in as many places as possible to the south-west before driving eastwards. The 2nd Division would cross the river at the tiny village of Halle, with 5th Division securing the Péronne bridgeheads on the southern flank (if they were not already destroyed). Otherwise, 5th Division would follow 2nd Division north across the river before swinging south on the eastern side to take up a position to attack Péronne from there. Meanwhile, 3rd Division would seize the high ground north- east of Cléry and push on to Bouchavesnes Spur, before attacking Mont St Quentin from the north.87

Monash’s plan depended heavily upon the capture of Mont St Quentin. Situated a mile north of Péronne, its commanding heights held the key to the German positions in the area, and the fall of the town itself was a natural corollary.88 It was a formidable proposition. Although rising only 140 feet above the surrounding countryside, Mont St Quentin commanded both the north-south and east-west reaches of the river, and effectively served as Péronne’s sentinel.89 Observation posts and machine gunners looked down across its bare slopes, which were laced by thick belts of wire and the remains of old trench systems. Four German divisions, including the élite 2nd Prussian Guards, defended its heights.90 The Germans knew that Mont St Quentin had to be held at all costs.

87 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 357-358. 88 ‘Narrative of Operations, 31st August-2nd September, 1918’, App. 8, 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38. 89 ‘Narrative of Operations, 31st August-2nd September, 1918’, App. 8, 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38. 90 The German formations defending Mont St-Quentin were 21st Division, 2nd Guards Division, 38th Division, and 232nd Division. ‘Summary of Operations, 31st August, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army War Diary, August 1918, AWM 1/14/10. Captain Blofield, commander of 142nd Trench-Mortar Battery, was able to advance with one man and capture 80 German soldiers, indicating the variable state of morale within the German ranks. See also Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 97; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 772-845; Monash, Australian Victories, p. 164.

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Figure 1.5 Map of 2nd Division’s advance 27 August to 2 September 1918.91

Monash underestimated both the strength of German defences in the area and the difficulty in securing river crossings. The operation that commenced on 29 August soon faltered and failed.92 Monash then ordered his 3rd Division to attack Cléry from the north early on 30 August and secure the crossing at Ommiécourt before advancing north-east along Bouchavesnes spur in a combined operation with III Corps. The success of that operation was vital, as the attacks by the 2nd Division and 5th Division at Mont St Quentin and Péronne respectively were now contingent upon the spur’s capture.93

An understrength 5th Brigade doubled-back on 30 August to cross the river at Feuillères, before attacking up the slopes of Mont St Quentin at 5:00 AM in the pre- dawn light and under the cover of a field artillery barrage. The Germans were

91 AWM4 1/44/38 92 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, p. 53. 93 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, pp. 56-57.

50 Chapter 1 Narrative surprised initially by the boldness of the enterprise but counter-attacked two hours later and drove the Australians back. Hard fighting raged on the slopes for the next three days as the three brigades of 2nd Division were thrown forward after the other, before 7th Brigade finally pushed past the summit on 2 September.

While the battle raged on Mont St Quentin, 5th Division advanced into the citadel of Péronne. Crossing the river at Buscourt, Tivey’s 8th Brigade attacked from the north and Elliott’s 15th Brigade fought its way into the town from the south-west. Fighting in the narrow, cobbled streets was an entirely different proposition to any other Australian action during the advance and posed its own peculiar set of operational challenges, which will be discussed in due course. Péronne finally fell on 2 September (the same day as the capture of Mont St Quentin), after three days of hard fighting.

To the north, meanwhile, 3rd Division pushed forward north of Mont St Quentin on 30 August but was halted by machine guns and snipers in front of Cléry Copse, Road Wood and Marrières Wood. The Germans were determined to hold that area and grouped their guns effectively for ‘vigorous defence’.94 Because neither the 2nd Division nor the British 58th Division had advanced on the flanks at that point, the Australian troops had no choice but to dig in and wait for nightfall. Rawlinson instructed Godley (acting-commander of III Corps at that time)95 to push his British divisions forward the next day and turn the German line from the north. At 5:10 AM on 31 August, ten minutes after the Australian 5th Brigade attacked Mont St Quentin, the British 174th Brigade (58th Division) advanced towards the ridgeline overlooking the village of Bouchavesnes. Twenty minutes later, the 47th Division attacked on the left behind a barrage, enabling the Australian 3rd Division on the right to resume its advance. German machine gun nests well-sited close to the

94 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 358. 95 As described in the note on Page 32, Godley was acting-commander of III Corps in Butler’s absence between 12 August and 11 September.

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Bapaume–Péronne road soon held up 174th Brigade, however, and the operation stalled.96

The British renewed their attacks on 1 September. After a difficult approach, 173rd Brigade (58th Division) overcame strong opposition on the western edge of Bouchavesnes village, capturing more than 300 prisoners and eight field guns in the process. At the same time, the 47th Division moved into the nearby village of Rancourt and repulsed a German counter-attack.97 Pausing for a day to re-organise, 18th Division advanced against the western edge of the heavily defended St Pierre Vaast Wood. This followed a 30-minute bombardment and, in an excellent example of inter-corps co-operation, the 18th Division was assisted by a smoke screen placed down in the Morval Valley by guns of the neighbouring 38th Division in V Corps (Third Army). South of Bouchavesnes Spur, the 55th Brigade encountered heavy fire from Priez Farm. Hard fighting took place in the area throughout the afternoon before 55th Brigade launched a successful evening attack in conjunction with 38th Division, under the covering fire of converging creeping barrages. The 18th Division captured 700 prisoners for comparatively little loss in what the division’s historian described as a ‘glorious day’, on which “there was most workmanlike co-operation between artillery and infantry in bringing off a bold and unusual coup.”98

Fighting continued across the III Corps front on 2 September. With many of its exhausted platoons at half-strength or less by that time, 58th Division was replaced in the line by the 74th (Yeomanry) Division, only recently arrived in France from Palestine.99 After a difficult approach, the 74th Division attacked the forward slope of the Tortille Valley and immediately came under fire from the elite German Alpine Corps. To their left, however, 47th Division captured the southern part of St Pierre

96 58th (London) Division War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/2990. 97 Alan H. Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division 1914 – 1919, London, Amalgamated Press Ltd, 1922, p. 191. 98 George Herbert Fosdike Nichols, The 18th Division in the Great War, Edinburgh, William Blackwood and Sons, 1922, p. 384. 99 David Martin, Londoners on the Western Front: The 58th (2/1st London) Division in the Great War. Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2014, p. 16.

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Vaast Wood and 18th Division finally secured the northern portion, allowing 74th Division to progress.

Rawlinson lavished praise on the Australians for the successes during this period. “The capture of Mont St Quentin by the Second Division is a feat of arms worthy of the highest praise,” he wrote to Monash. “The natural strength of the position is immense, and the tactical value of it, in reference to Péronne and the whole system of the Somme defences, cannot be overestimated.”100 Bean described the captures of Mont St Quentin and Péronne as “the most brilliant achievement” of the AIF during the war.101 Monash claimed with typical hubris that the Australians had turned the line of the Somme to the south as well as the Canal du Nord, thereby opening “a wide gate through which the remainder of the Fourth and Third Armies could pour, so as to roll up the enemy's line in both directions.”102 The Australians were the “spearhead which pierced the Somme line”, he declared, and led the Allied advance that in turn forced the Germans to retire again to the defences of the Hindenburg Line.103

The victories at Mont St Quentin and Péronne capped off an impressive month for the Australians. The Corps had advanced 25 miles since 8 August at a rate of a mile a day, capturing 14,500 German soldiers, more than 300 guns, howitzers and minenwerfers, and 1,000 machine guns in the process.104 The fighting in the final days was particularly severe, however, and the three forward divisions were exhausted. The operations between 29 August and 2 September resulted in some 3,000 casualties. The 2nd Division had suffered particularly heavily and was withdrawn from the line; it would not be fit for operations for another month.105 It was also an impressive period for the ‘ordinary’ British divisions of III Corps but that fact has

100 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 193. 101 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 873. 102 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 178. 103 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 198. 104 AWM4 1/35/8 ‘Summary of Operations, 1st September 1918’, Australian Corps War Diary. 105 Australian casualties from 31 August to 2 September were: 2nd Division – 1,370; 3rd Division – 597; 5th Division – 1,130 (14th and 15th Brigades only). In addition, 3rd Division had lost some 1,200 men between 24 and 30 August. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 438n.

53 Chapter 1 Narrative long been subsumed by the Australian narrative. If the victories by 18th, 47th, 58th and 74th Divisions at St Pierre Vaast Wood and Bouchavesnes had been achieved by Australian troops, one could surmise they would be held up as testament to the Diggers’ remarkable fighting prowess, much in the same vein as the victories at Mont St Quentin and Péronne.

Context is also important. Fourth Army’s operations in early September were only one component in a series of concerted British offensives that stretched northwards to the Scarpe River. The Canadians in First Army turned the Droucourt-Quéant line near Arras by 2 September, unhinging the northern portion of the Hindenburg defensive system and forcing the Germans to abandon the Lys salient. In Third Army, the New Zealanders cleared Bapaume and the British pushed on to a line running from Quéant to Sailly-Saillisel. By the first week of September, all of the land won by the Germans in Ludendorff’s great Spring Offensive was back in Allied hands.

The Germans were forced to fall back yet again. On Third Army’s front, they retreated behind the Sensée canal and the Canal du Nord. On Fourth Army’s front, they moved back into the familiar defences of the Hindenburg Line on the St Quentin Canal. The Germans rid themselves of a long salient by abandoning territory won in the spring, but wars are not won by forced retirements. Furthermore, having to re-occupy old defensive positions was demoralising for both front-line troops and civilians at home.106

On 3 September, Haig ordered a temporary halt to large-scale operations but nevertheless wanted to maintain pressure along the German front.107 Fourth Army was not entirely across the Somme by that time and Monash requested a 24-hour pause to bring forward artillery. Rawlinson instructed him to press on. The British

106 Crown Prince Rupprecht, returning to the front after sickness, recorded in his diary that he had seen a troop train adorned with the inscription ‘Slaughter cattle for Wilhelm & Sons’. It was not only the troops, however. Rupprecht recorded in the same diary that “Public feeling is not only very bad in Bavaria, but also in North Germany.” Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 413-414. 107 James Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 421.

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32nd Division again led the Australian Corps’ advance, with the Australian 3rd and 5th Divisions kept pace on the left and right respectively. On the III Corps front, the 12th, 18th and 74th Divisions also moved forward. The Germans did not always give ground easily during their withdrawal. They continued to employ strong rear- guard actions and laid waste to the land. The sound of exploding dumps rent the air and distant villages burned, glowing in the night sky.108 Regardless, Fourth Army’s line advanced by 3,000 yards in just a few days. German prisoners taken during this time urged the British to keep attacking so that the war might be ended quickly.109

German positions immediately east of Péronne were not particularly well constructed and the general withdrawal to the old familiar defences of the Hindenburg Line commenced on 4 September.110 The Australians adopted a policy of moving in set bounds, with divisions setting their own pace to make contact with the line of resistance wherever the enemy made a stand. Patrols moved forward to maintain touch but the movement of the main body of troops was more deliberate. According to the 14th Brigade’s war diary:

This policy has been adopted because we (5th Division) are regarded, with the 3rd Division, as the two tired divisions of the Corps, and it has been decided that we shall be used up in covering the distance to the enemy line of resistance, which is then to be dealt with by the comparatively fresh Divisions (1st, 2nd and 4th) from Corps Reserve... The Division could really carry on much more strenuous war than this but the policy is not to be departed from and is suited to our tastes.111

On the Australian Corps front, the British 32nd Division advanced its line on the eastern side of the river to conform to 5th Division on the left, and by 5 September

108 ‘4th Army Intelligence Summary 5 September 1918’, TNA WO 157/198; W.E. Grey, The 2nd City of London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the Great War (1914-1919), Headquarters of the Regiment, London, 1929, p. 372. 109 ‘Intelligence Summary 8 September 1918’, Fourth Army War Diary, September 1918, TNA WO 157/198. News of the reverses was also having a detrimental effect on the German home front. Crown Prince Rupprecht, returning to the front after sickness, recorded in his diary at the time that he had seen a troop train adorned with the inscription ‘Slaughter cattle for Wilhelm & Sons’. It was not only the troops, however. Rupprecht recorded in the same diary that “Public feeling is not only very bad in Bavaria, but also in North Germany.” Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 413-414. 110 This involved a retirement on the Third Army front, First Army front, and parts of the French front east of Noyons. 111 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM 4/23/14/30

55 Chapter 1 Narrative the Australian front ran from Athies to Bussu, through Doingt.112 On the same day, Rawlinson made clear to his commanders that the pursuit was to be conducted vigorously with strong advance guards. The Germans must be denied respite and prevented from destroying roads and railroads, which would be important in the major operations to come.113

The villages of Roisel, Bernes, Caulincourt, Villevecque, Trefoon, Beauvois and Heudecourt fell to Fourth Army on 7 September, with another 1,000-yard advance the next day in the face of stiffening resistance.114 Monash held a conference with his two front-line divisional commanders, Ewen Maclagan (4th Division) and Tom Glasgow (1st Division), on 9 September. He informed them that the old British main line two miles ahead was probably strongly held on the spurs at Le Verguier and near Hargicourt. A well-planned set-piece was necessary but the ground immediately in front of them was lightly held and could be taken by ‘energetic patrols’.115 In the meantime, the battered Australian divisions were given something of an operational and physical break in preparation for what would be their final actions of the war.

The entire Allied front continued to surge forward. The First and Third French Armies made gains to the south of the Australians, while the British Third Army also advanced to the north. Aware of the challenges that lay ahead, Rawlinson cautioned his commanders on 11 September against attacking the Hindenburg Line defences without thorough preparation. He stressed the importance of maintaining pressure on the retreating enemy, however, as each day allowed them an opportunity to bring in fresh reserves. Knowing that the Germans would fight determinedly in its final line of defence, Rawlinson would attack the Hindenburg Line only when he had sufficient artillery and tank support to do so.116

112 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 201. 113 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 450. 114 AWM4 1/14/11, General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army Unit Diary, September 1918. 115 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 885. 116 Rawlinson memo to commanders, 11 September 1918, Fourth Army Unit Diary AWM4 1/14/11

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That Fourth Army now approached the old battlefields of 1917. Three lines of disused British trenches lay ahead, beyond which were three more lines comprising the original Hindenburg System. German prisoners confirmed that the area was particularly well defended.117 The British were unsure initially which positions the Germans would choose as their main line of resistance but they had to capture the old British Reserve Line first. On 10 September, III Corps attacked the heavily fortified villages that lay on that line (Épehy, Peizières, Ronssoy and Lempire) but all remained in German hands after two days of bitter fighting, and the operation was called off. As the same time, the Australians isolated and overran a number of machine gun posts in the forward section of the line near Hesbécourt on 11 September by means of peaceful penetration.

The more substantial old British main line was heavily wired both to its east and west but the old outpost line beyond was less well-constructed and vulnerable should the main line fall. Lying across what was the no man’s land in 1917, the former German outpost line was now a cratered wasteland overgrown by weeds and long summer grass. Following the capture of the area in March, the Germans merged the old British lines with their own original line to create a new ‘Outpost Line’ for the Hindenburg system. This posed a substantial obstacle to the Fourth Army’s advance but its capture would provide excellent vantage points to look down across the main Hindenburg Line defences that lay beyond.

Haig allowed Rawlinson to attack the Outpost Line in mid-September, partly to determine the difficulty of breaking into the main German defensive positions beyond. Because this operation required a good deal of preparation, Fourth Army paused for a week prior to the attack on 18 September and Rawlinson brought forward nearly 1,500 guns and Howitzers. Only 20 tanks were available, however, with the rest kept back for the subsequent operation against the Hindenburg Line itself. Because it was obvious to both sides that a major operation was pending, the

117 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10/1.

57 Chapter 1 Narrative element of surprise was out of the question and there was no attempt to disguise preparations.118 Monash gave his 1st and 4th Divisions the responsibility for attacking the Outpost Line on the Australian front. The 3rd and 5th Divisions would then be used against the Hindenburg Line, with the tired 2nd Division held back to break through the Beaurevoir Line beyond.

The Australian attack commenced at 5:30 AM on 18 September in a heavy mist following a night of torrential rain. The 1st Division progressed well initially on the left but 4th Division encountered stubborn resistance around the village of Le Verguier, which was defended by at least 50 machine guns. Both divisions reached the second objective line by 10:00 AM but the 4th Division was unable to progress further. It halted, with a view to re-commencing the attack later that night. At 11:00 PM and in a heavy downpour, the troops of 4th Division advanced under a hastily arranged barrage and captured the high ground overlooking the Hindenburg Line.119

The Australians’ success at the Outpost Line was certainly impressive. Two understrength divisions advanced three miles against strong positions and captured more than 4,200 prisoners, 76 guns, 300 machine guns and 30 trench mortars. The 12th Brigade alone captured nearly 500 Germans, despite its 46th Battalion numbering only 120 men. The Australians took the villages of Le Verguier, Hargicourt and Villeret, as well as the strong points around Cologne, Grand Priel and Ascension Farms. Casualties were also comparatively light given the scale of the operation. The two brigades of 1st Division lost 490 of their combined ‘hopping over strength’ of 2,854 men (17.2%), while the two brigades of 4th Division lost 532 of the 3,048 men (17.5%) who went forward.120 Monash had reason to be pleased but his subsequent claim was typically extravagant: “There is no record in this war of any previous success on such a scale won with so little loss.”121 Rawlinson

118 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10. 119 Fourth Army Operations 11-24 September 1918, AWM 45/23/21. 120 ‘Report on Operations of the Australian Corps’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. 121 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 233.

58 Chapter 1 Narrative reported that many Germans were now apparently unwilling to face the Australians.122

Things did not progress as smoothly on III Corps’ front to the north. The 74th Division progressed well initially on the right of the line and kept close touch with the neighbouring Australian 1st Brigade. Thick fog made direction-keeping difficult but a successful flanking attack by the 15th Suffolks against the hamlet of Templeux- le-Guérard forced the German garrison there to surrender.123 In the centre, 18th Division advanced assisted by tanks and entered the village Ronssoy. The British troops captured some 1,000 prisoners but found the adjacent village of Lempire immediately to the east much harder going. Three days of heavy fighting followed and, according to Nichols, “there was scarcely a moment … when our men were not facing a desperate and skillful enemy at close quarters, and amid every form of difficulty, showed a steadiness and courage that this record can do little more than barely indicate.”124

On the far left, the British 12th Division finally overcame the formidable defences of Épehy on the morning of 19 September and pushed past the railway line east of the village. The fighting in that area raged for two full days (and throughout the night) and included scores of small close-quarter conflicts both in trenches and the open. According to Butler, the German Alpine Corps “lived up to its reputation and scarcely a single post, trench or copse was yielded without a determined struggle.”125 At the same time, the 2/22nd Londons (58th Division) passed through the village of Peizières but had difficulty mopping it up.126 Five days of difficult combat followed in the labyrinthine trench system that cut across the high rolling farmland to the east. The fighting was particularly severe around the strong points of The

122 Sir Archibald Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918, Hodder and Stoughton Limited, London, 1919, p. 130. 123 15th Battalion (Suffolk Regt) War Diary, September 1918, TNA WO 95/3153 124 George Nichols, The 18th Division in the Great War. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922, p. 405 125 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10. 126 58th Division War Diary, September 1918, TNA WO 95/2991

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Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, all of which remained in German hands.127

These were the worst days for the British divisions since the advance commenced on 8 August, and their casualties were heavy. The four divisions lost more than 7,000 men (including 300 officers) in just five days.128 The failure of the 12th and 58th Divisions to capture their final objectives also meant that the British line was nearly 1,000 yards short of the Australians on the right, which led to significant problems in preparing for the attack at the main Hindenburg defences ten days later. Nevertheless, the British had driven the German defences back by an average of 5,000 yards across a four-mile front, and secured a good portion of the Outpost Line in the process. These operations also capped off a strenuous period for Fourth Army, which captured some 46,500 German prisoners (including more than 1,000 officers) during seven weeks of fighting but suffered more than 70,000 casualties.129 With the Outpost Line finally breached, the formations of Fourth Army paused again in preparation to attack the imposing defences of the Hindenburg Line itself.

The success of the recent Allied advances convinced Marshal Foch to press for victory before the year was out. He planned four co-ordinated convergent assaults stretching from the Belgian coast down to Mézières. This would place unsustainable pressure on the Germans by exploiting their shortage of manpower and paucity of resources, all of which was compounded by the influenza epidemic sweeping through the army’s ranks.130 Germany’s allies were also giving way by this time. Allegiances were shifting in the east as Slavic nationalism spread south from the Slovene lands into Dalmatia and Bosnia. The ancient Hapsburg monarchy in Austria-Hungary was in its death throes.131 The Bulgarian government had called for

127 General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/14/11. 128 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10, App. C1. 129 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 145. 130 In July 1918, 20% of German troops at any one time were out of action, due to influenza. See Robert T Foley, ‘From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918’, Chapter 4 in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, pp. 83-84. 131 See Dennis Showalter, ‘War in the East and the Balkans, 1914-1918’ p. 78, Chapter 5, and Mark Cornwall, ‘Austria-Hungary and “Yugoslavia”, pp. 382, Chapter 25, in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War I, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012.

60 Chapter 1 Narrative an armistice, its army disintegrating and beset by disease, and fearful of the spectre of Bolshevism. Of greatest concern, however, were the red flags flying in the industrial heartland of Germany itself. Workers’ and soldiers’ soviets were established and the sailors at Kiel were mutinous. Revolution was in the air. Ludendorff feared not only the collapse of the German army but the destruction of the Reich itself.

To take advantage of the situation, French and American forces launched an offensive in the Meuse-Argonne on 26 September to eliminate the St Mihiel salient. The British First and Third Armies pushed towards Cambrai during the next two days, while the newly-created Flanders Army Group (including the British Second Army) advanced towards Ghent. On 29 September, Rawlinson’s Fourth Army and Debeney’s First French Army began to attack the Hindenburg Line itself.132

The Hindenburg Line was the most formidable defensive system on the Western Front. Its main battle zone included a section of the Canal du Nord, known as the St Quentin Canal, linking the Somme to the Scheldt River in the north. The canal was relatively deep for much of its length and about 30 yards across, with steep banks. On the Australian front in the centre of Fourth Army, the canal headed into a four-mile long tunnel that ran from Bellicourt to Le Catelet. This provided the Germans with shelter for troops, equipment and medical facilities, and it was mined with galleries, hidden passages and shafts through which infantry could emerge above ground and counter-attack.133 It also created a 6,000-yard wide ‘land-bridge’ over the canal, however, which presented a possible crossing point for attacking troops. The Germans defences in that area were particularly strong as a result. A

132 In his despatch of 21 December, Haig expressed a view that, “The results from these different attacks depended in a peculiarly large degree upon the British attack in the centre. It was here that the enemy defences were most highly organised. If these were broken, the threat directed at his vial systems of lateral communication would of necessity react upon his defence elsewhere.” Cited in Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 137. 133 Elizabeth Greenhalgh, ‘Australians Broke the Hindenburg Line’, Chapter 4 in Craig Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History: The 10 Myths That Will Not Die, University of New South Wales Press Ltd, Sydney, 2010, pp. 76-77. NB. The British had obtained an undated but detailed plan of the German defences between the Oise and Bellicourt, during the attack on 8 August. Although depicting the defences of 1917, it revealed everything from dugouts and machine gun emplacements to billets, balloon sheds, and landing grounds.

61 Chapter 1 Narrative triple line of trenches projected westwards for 1,200 yards around the small village of Bony, and it was well supported by concreted pillboxes, dugouts and wire. To attack the land-bridge was a difficult proposition by any measure and the Germans were confident their positions afforded “the most favourable conditions for a stubborn defence by a minimum garrison.”134

Rawlinson gave Monash responsibility for planning the general operation. The Australian commander had only two divisions in any shape to attack by this time: the 3rd and 5th Divisions.135 The 2nd Division, which was still recovering from its battering at Mont St Quentin a month earlier, was in reserve. Monash planned to send his two divisions across the land-bridge behind the two divisions of the American II Corps (27th Division and 30th Division) on a concentrated front. Once on the other side, the troops would fan out north and south respectively to envelop the German defences there. To the north, the divisions of III Corps would mop up the area west of the canal once exploitation of the breach commenced. Surprise was again out of the question, and so Monash planned for a heavy preliminary bombardment provided by more than 1,600 guns and including some 30,000 gas shells, which opened on the evening of 26 September. It continued for the next 56 hours until the infantry attack itself commenced at 5:50 AM on 29 September.136

Because the III Corps’ line on the right was still well behind the Australian line, at 5:30 AM on 27 September the two American divisions launched a preliminary attack to capture the necessary ground. The Americans made a promising start but German counter-attacks soon drove them back and by evening they remained 1,000 yards short of the intended line. Monash asked Rawlinson to postpone the main operation for 24 hours but the request was refused.137 The Americans made one final effort at

134 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 148. 135 In reserve was 2nd Division, which had been resting since its attack at Mont St Quentin in early September.Both 1st and 4th Divisions were out of the line after their operations against the Outpost Line. Neither would see action again before the Armistice. 136 The artillery supporting Fourth Army comprised seventeen field artillery brigades and thirteen heavy brigades. General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army Diary, 26 September 1918, AWM4 1/14/11. 137 General Staff, Headquarters 3rd Division Diary, ‘Narrative of Operations 29 September – 2 October 1918’, AWM4 1/46/23 App. 3; Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 252-253.

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4:55 AM on 29 September to secure the jumping-off positions in time for the attack but this was only partially successful. They were still well short when the general operation commenced an hour later.

By the time the Australian 3rd Division started to pass through the Americans at 9:00 AM on 29 September, the protective barrage was well out of reach. The understrength 10th and 11th Brigades advanced across cratered, rain-soaked country in mist against a well-prepared enemy in what was now essentially an improvised daylight attack. The Australians soon found themselves in the same battle zone as the Americans who failed to mop up isolated German strong points. The troops came under heavy machine gun and artillery fire from Guillemont Farm, and every tank was soon put out of action by German field guns.138 Communications broke down, which led to erratic, confused reports from forward positions, and sometimes none at all.

The situation was more promising on the right, where 5th Division’s troops had set out at Zero in heavy fog and rain towards the village of Bellenglise. Progress south of Quennemont Farm was encouraging and they managed to capture Bellicourt, near the tunnel entrance. These gains were threatened by the difficulties on 3rd Division’s front to the north but the situation was saved by the remarkable success of the British IX Corps to the south. In one of the most remarkable feats of the war, the 46th Division’s 137th Brigade crossed the canal at Ricqueval and captured the bridge in there intact. This caught the Germans entirely by surprise and they had little choice then but to withdraw rapidly. It also secured the Australian right flank but troops in 3rd Division’s sector on the left remained stalled, confounded by confusion and stubborn German defences. Misleading reports from airmen about

138 General Staff, Headquarters 3rd Division Diary, ‘Narrative of Operations 29 September – 2 October 1918’, AWM4 1/46/23 App. 3.

63 Chapter 1 Narrative the progress of the Americans also discouraged Monash from calling in artillery assistance when the attack resumed at 3:00 PM.139

Figure 1.6 Map of Australian Corps divisional boundaries on 26 September, three days prior to the attack at the Hindenburg Line.140

Although the northern end of the land-bridge was still fiercely contested, Fourth Army had driven three miles into the German line on the right by evening, capturing most of the defences there and half of the support line beyond.141 The Australian divisions renewed operations the next morning by attacking northwards along Bony Spur and Railway Spur respectively, with a view to securing the northern entrance to the tunnel.142 With the flanks giving way, German resistance on the land-bridge weakened but the positions were not finally consolidated by the Australians until 2

139 ‘Summary of Operations, 29 September, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/14/11; See also Monash, Australian Victories, p. 265. 140 AWM4 1/46/23 141 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 111. 142 General Staff, Headquarters 3rd Division Diary, October 1918, ‘Narrative of Operations 29 September – 2 October 1918’, AWM4 1/46/23 App. 3. 5th Division captured Joncourt, Estrées, and Folemprise Farm On 1 October.

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October.143 The 3rd and 5th Divisions suffered some 2,500 casualties between them in just four days. Battered and exhausted, they left the line for the final time in the first week of October.

Following the operation against the Hindenburg Line, Monash only had the three weakened brigades of 2nd Division left to carry out the final Australian actions of the war, against the Hindenburg system support line (also known as the ‘Beaurevoir Line’) at the village of Montbrehain. The 2nd Division’s attack commenced on 3 October but Montbrehain was not finally in Australian hands until mid-afternoon on 5 October, after three days of fighting. One German reportedly stated that his men were thoroughly sick of fighting and would not have resisted if they had known Australian troops were attacking them.144 The Australians captured more than 600 prisoners and 150 machine guns in this final action but the cost was heavy, with 1,700 casualties in just 72 hours, or about 1.5 men every minute for three days. This included 400 men in the already-understrength 6th Brigade on 5 October alone. Soldiers later claimed that they had never seen so many enemy dead concentrated in such a small area.145 It was to be the last Australian action of the war.

Exhausted and desperately short of men, the Australian Corps was played out. The 30th American Division relieved the 6th Brigade in the line on the night of 6 October and Monash formally handed over command of the sector to the GOC American II Corps, George Read. With the Beaurevoir Line breached, the way was open for Fourth Army’s advance to continue across open farmland largely untouched by the ravages of the war. A good deal of hard fighting lay ahead for the Allied troops across the Western Front, however, and significant challenges had to be overcome

143 ‘Summary of Operations, 1 October, 1918’, General Staff, Headquarters Fourth Army Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/14/12. 144 6th Infantry Brigade Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/6/38, App. 20. 145 ‘Report on Operations of 6th Infantry Brigade for Period 2nd October to 6th October, 1918’, 6th Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/6/38 App. 22. According to the 6th Brigade war diary, 12 officers and 594 OR were captured on 5 October. Bean cites a figure of nearly 400 prisoners captured by 6th Brigade on 5 October, however. See Charles Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1043. Monash and Edmonds both cite a number of 600 prisoners. John Monash, Australian Victories, p. 250 (p. 278); Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 175.

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before the Germans finally agreed to an armistice on 11 November.146 The Australian divisions were spared these difficulties because they were all recuperating in Fourth Army’s rest area west of Abbeville, many miles behind the line.147

Figure 1.7 Map of 2nd Division’s attack at Montbrehain (Beaurevoir Line) on 3-5 October.148

There has long been a belief that the Australian troops were asked to do more hard fighting than British troops in the final months of the war, because of their supposedly greater level of combat effectiveness. The 3rd Brigade’s diarist vented his frustration in his entry for 19 August, for example, when he wrote, “Isn’t it about time that some of the English divisions did something and the Australians given a rest? This Brigade has not been out of the line for more than 8 days since the

146 Boff, Winning and Losing, pp. 31-35 147 It was not the end of operational activity for every Australian unit on the Western Front, however. The No. 3 Squadron AFC continued to operate with Fourth Army until the armistice, while Nos 2 and 4 Squadrons flew with the RAF’s 8th Wing in Flanders. All three squadrons remained on service in Europe throughout the winter of 1918- 19. A number of ground units were also active in forward areas with Fourth Army during October. These included the 1st and 2nd Australian Tunnelling Companies (which were placed under the command of II American Corps) and the Australian Corps Salvage Section. To the north, the 36th Heavy Artillery Brigade continued to serve with British XV Corps in 2nd Army until early November Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1044n. 148 AWM4 1/44/39, App. 14.

66 Chapter 1 Narrative beginning of March.”149 As we shall see in Chapter 3, the refusal by men in 59th Battalion’s B Company to move forward on 5 September was justified in similar terms, while Bean noted in his diary on the eve of the attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September that Australian formations were asked repeatedly “to do other people’s work”, another thinly veiled sleight against the British divisions of III Corps.150

This narrative dispels that myth. The Australian Corps was certainly pushed hard in August and September and suffered heavily but no more was expected of it than was asked of III Corps, which advanced alongside throughout. Butler’s divisions drove the German line back a similar distance and captured a comparable amount of territory and number of guns.151 While the divisions of III Corps captured only 65% of the number of prisoners taken by the Australians, it is important to remember that more than 30% of the Australian captures occurred on a single day, 8 August.152

Little separated the Australian Corps and III Corps in terms of operational tempo, something also at odds with the popular narrative that Australian units were thrown more frequently into action in place of unwilling or less competent British troops.153 Australian divisions attacked what can be described as well-established and strongly- defended positions on seven days of the advance, while divisions of III Corps did so on eight.154 Australian divisions undertook operations at short notice against well- defended local positions and trenches on 15 occasions (three of which were carried

149 3rd Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/3/34 150 15th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM 4/23/15/31; Bean Diary, 27 September 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/117/1. 151 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10, App. D and E. According to Butler, the divisions of III Corps captured about 150 German guns between 8 August and 5 October. Monash claimed that the Australians captured 173 German guns in the same period. 152 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10. See also Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 189. Australian figures are probably inflated slightly by the fact that cavalry captures were also credited to them, as the Cavalry Corps (which did not operate on III Corps front) had no prisoner cage of its own. 153 The ‘assault of well-prepared positions’ were well planned and co-ordinated attacks and might otherwise be termed a ‘set-piece’ operation. The ‘attack of field positions consisting of fortified localities and trenches’ involved ‘semi-open’ manoeuvre against strong points and was improvised in nature. The ‘pursuit, by advanced guards, of Germans from one rear-guard position to another’ was more freewheeling, as the enemy retired to secure defensive positions. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 574; Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 38. 154 Boff also employs these classifications in his study of Third Army operations during The Hundred Days.

67 Chapter 1 Narrative

out by the British 32nd Division in late August and early September, then under the command of the Australian Corps), while the British divisions of III Corps did so on 25 days.

Figure 1.8 Phases of the Australian Corps’ advance from 8 August to 5 October 1918.

Date Type of Operation Number of days 8 August Set-piece attack 1 9-13 August Improvised attack 5 14-15 August Pause 2 16-17 August Advanced the line 2 18 August Improvised attack 1 19-21 August Pause 3 22-23 August Set-piece attack 2 24 August Improvised attack 1 25-29 August Pursuit 5 30 August Pause 1 31 August Set-piece attack 1 1-2 September Improvised attack 2 3-4 September Pause 2 5-9 September Advanced the line 5 10 September Pause 1 11-14 September Advanced the line 4 15-17 September Pause 3 18 September Set-piece attack 1 19-20 September Pause 2 21 September Improvised attack 1 22-28 September Pause 7 29 September Set-piece attack 1 30 September-1 October Improvised attack 2 2 October Pause 1 3 October Set-piece attack 1 4-5 October Improvised attack 2

The Australian divisions did undertake more ‘freewheeling’ or mobile operations than the British in the final months of fighting. They engaged in actions reasonably termed ‘pursuit’ or ‘peaceful penetration’ on 13 of the 59 days (primarily during the

68 Chapter 1 Narrative final weeks of August and in early September), while the British divisions of III Corps did so only seven days.155 In all, however, Australian divisions were involved in active operations on only 35 of the 59 days between 8 August and 5 October, while the British divisions in III Corps were in action on 40 days during the same period.

The divisions of III Corps also spent more time in forward areas during August and September than did the Australian divisions, even when not involved in active operations. For the 55 days between 6 August and 1 October, the British 12th, 18th and 58th Divisions spent 39, 41 and 33 days in the line respectively. Within the Australian Corps, only the 3rd Division (36 days) spent a comparable number, while the 1st Division (24 days), 2nd Division (21 days), 4th Division (25 days) and 5th Division (25 days) all spent considerably fewer days in the line. The British divisions also continued to fight through to the armistice in November, whereas the Australian divisions did not. The evidence does not therefore support claims that the Diggers did more of the heavy lifting than their British cousins during the final advance.

There were also occasions when British units stepped forward to take the place of tired Australian units. During the first week of September, for example, the Australian 8th Brigade had been fighting at Péronne more or less continuously for 48 hours. One officer described it as ‘the heaviest and weariest work the battalions have done. COs could scarcely expect the battalions to do such work.’156 The troops were instructed to march to Mont St Quentin early on 6 September and pass through 14th Brigade of the British 32nd Division (then under Australian command) north of the Roman road. Recognising the exhausted state of the Australian soldiers, the 32nd Division’s commander, Thomas Lambert, requested that his own men press on to the second objective (they were already on the first) to give the Australians a

155 This figure does not include the fighting by the British 54th Brigade on 6-7 August following the German raid on Morlancourt Ridge. 156 8th Infantry Brigade Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/6/38, App. 20.

69 Chapter 1 Narrative day’s rest. Monash agreed. The British reached the objective at 9:30 AM, as did the 97th Brigade to the south.157

The advance undertaken by the Australians during August and September 1918 was characterised by the combined arms warfare that typified this period of fighting across the Western Front, something that will be explored in detail in Chapter 8. It is also true that the battlefield achievements of the Australian Corps during its final two-month advance with Fourth Army were impressive; that is not in dispute. The six divisions that fought in the advance (including the British 32nd Division) comprised 10% of the 60 British army divisions in France but were responsible for more than 20% of the prisoners, guns and territory taken in the final months of the war.158 They engaged 30 German divisions in the process (about half were classified as ‘very good’), including some on two or three occasions. What is also apparent, however, is that the Australian Corps had the distinct advantage of being in a position to catch the surging swell of victory as the Allies drove the Germany back across the Western Front, and they rode it for as long as they possibly could. That proved extremely difficult at times, as this thesis will show.

157 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 880. 158 ‘Report on Operations of the Australian Corps’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. According to Monash, the five Australian divisions were responsible for 23% of the prisoners, 23½% of the guns, and 21½% of the territory captured in the period from 27 March and 5 October. Monash, Australian Victories, p. 282.

70

CHAPTER 2

THE “DIGGERS,” 1918

Charles Bean opens the final volume of the Official History with a chapter entitled ‘The “Diggers,” 1918’. He describes an idyllic scene behind the line in May 1918, in which a company of soldiers in the 21st Battalion relax at a brewery in the village of Querrieu, a few miles east of Corbie.1 This thesis will also consider the theme of ‘The “Diggers,” 1918’ by examining the quality of men comprising the Australian Corps in the final months of the war, including their training and combat experience. In the process, it will address the issue of Anzac exceptionalism by drawing comparisons with the Digger’s counterpart in the BEF, the Tommy.

Monash claimed that the Australian Corps in 1918 comprised “the flower of the youth of the continent” and was “composed of men carefully selected according to a high physical standard, from which, happily, no departure was made, even although recruiting began to fall off in the last year of the war”.2 To what extent was this true? The initial surge of volunteers in 1914 certainly allowed recruiting officers around Australia to be selective and about one-third of all volunteers were rejected in the early months of the war because they did not meet minimum standards.3 The physical quality of the first volunteers is evident in a random selection of 250 killed and buried at Gallipoli in 1915. Their enlistment papers show an average height of 5’7¾’ and weight of 149 pounds (nearly 11 stone).4 The fact that newspaper reports

1 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 8-18. 2 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 291. 3 Australian Military Forces Instructions for Medical Examinations for Mobilization: Recruitment Standards for First Expeditionary Force (August 1914), AWM27 533/38. The physical standards for enlistment into the AIF at the start of the war were broken into three categories. Those joining from the permanent force had to be aged between 18 and 30, stand at least 5’7’’ tall and have a 35’’ chest expansion. Those joining from the militia had to be between 18 and 35 years old, with a minimum height of 5’6’’ and a chest expansion of at least 33’’. All other volunteers were to be between 18 and 45 years old, stand at least 5’4’’ tall and also have a 33’’ chest expansion. Ernest Scott, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Vol. XI: Australia During the War, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p. 211. Artillery gunners were to be 5’7’’ to 5’10’’ tall, while drivers were to be 5’4’’ to 5’7’’ tall. 4 The sample of 250 Australian soldiers was derived from a search of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission register for men in the AIF bearing the surname Brown, Jones, Smith, or Williams killed in 1915 and buried in Turkey, including Gallipoli. Commonwealth War Graves Commission website, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war- dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. These statistics align broadly with the findings of Bou and Dennis in their analysis of men in the initial convoy to sail in 1914. Bou and Dennis analysed more than 1,100 soldiers in the first convoy of

Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

from Gallipoli resulted in a spike in enlistments in the first half of 1915 enabled these standards to be maintained.5

Losses at Gallipoli and the AIF’s expansion from two to five divisions at the end of the year saw an urgent demand for reinforcements. It was soon apparent, however, that a large proportion of the Australian male population was unable to meet the AIF’s minimum standards.6 With no recourse to conscription, the government was compelled to lower the physical requirement, with the minimum height reduced in stages during 1915 to 5’2’’.7 This addressed the problem in the short term but the flow of volunteers declined again during 1916. A subsequent reduction was necessary and by April 1917 the minimum height for an Australian recruit was a bare 5’0’’.8

What about the men’s physical fitness? Australian training camps were meant to sift out those unsuitable for front-line service but many slipped through, particularly as the number of volunteers fell. As early as 1916, increasing numbers of men were re- assessed as medically unfit after disembarkation in Britain and sent back to Australia.9 The AIF’s Surgeon-General in England, Neville Howse, VC, complained

17,000 men and found most to be between 5’7’’ and 5’9’’ in height. Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, ‘The Composition of the AIF’, Ch. 4 in Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2016, p. 83. The fact that men with defective vision or poor teeth were rejected also points to the fact that it was a physically impressive cohort. This first Australian troops to land and fight at Gallipoli informed Bean’s impression for the remainder of the war, and that did much to shape the popular understanding thereafter. 5 Some 36,500 volunteers signed up in July (the greatest monthly total for the war) but the flow of volunteers decreased rapidly thereafter. The number dropped by 20,000 in September, to just 16,500. Even fewer stepped forward in October, as the monthly total fell to below 10,000 for the first time in the war. The protracted nature of the conflict, lack of real information about the fighting at Gallipoli, growing undercurrent of frustration with British command, and dissatisfaction with conditions at the large training camps in Sydney and Melbourne all contributed to the overall decline. Scott, AOH Vol. XI, pp. 290-294. 6 Scott, AOH Vol. XI, pp. 294-295; Michael Tyquin, ‘Unjustly accused? Medical authorities and army recruitment in Australia 1914-1918’, Journal of Military and Veterans Health (Vol. 22 No 2), June 2014, p. 21. 7 It was lowered to 5’4’’ for all volunteers in February, to 5’3’’ in May and then finally to 5’2’’ in July. Medical Examination of Recruits pamphlet (1916), AWM27 533/42. By this time, bad teeth were no longer a reason to reject a potential recruit. 8 Scott, AOH Vol. XI, p. 439n. 9 In November 1916, the hospital ship Karoola, “carried back to Australia a lot of men who should never have left it,” reported the OC, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Craig. “Numbers of our troops have never reached the firing line because route marches and training have proved too much for their tired feet,” wrote Craig. “A keen recruit tries to hide his defects but the examining officer should be keen enough to detect them.” Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, p. 901.

72 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

repeatedly about this to the Director-General of Medical Services, Colonel Fetherston. His frustration was obvious in a letter written of June 1917:

Am afraid you are still sending a large number of men away for a Cook’s tour. They never get beyond Salisbury as they are absolutely unfitted even for service on L. of C.; in fact many are unfit for Home Service. You will admit that I have frequently called attention to the class sent, and now comes a knock-out. I am to make arrangements for an examination of the next lot of reinforcements immediately upon their arrival, and you will get a hell of a report if they are like the preceding ones, but I hope my frequent prayers to you will prevent a rotten lot coming forward…

I only wish that you could personally examine many of the men sent forward. You would be paralysed with horror as many of the men are so palpably totally unfit for any service. In the days of rush you would certainly be excused, but in these days, when you have plenty of time, you should be able to produce some machinery to avoid such a public waste. I am writing to you strongly on this point because I feel certain you will be called upon later to explain, as it is now being generally talked about. I have referred to it frequently in my despatches only when compelled to do so. I know you have checked it, but it would make your hair turn white if you could see some of the men. Hope the official report after the examination of the July reinforcements will not cause your sudden death.10

Fetherston’s reply was ominous: “If you are only to get first class men, it is good- bye to reinforcements,” he wrote. “You would not get 1,000 a month of the type you apparently want.”11

The Australian Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) in England, Colonel Douglas McWhae, complained to Howse in 1917 that men of all ages were being accepted in Australia, including many with obvious physical defects. “It is very hard to understand,” McWhae wrote, “how medical officers have passed these old men

10 Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, pp. 844-845. In the event, Howse sent some 100 officers and 5,000 men back to Australia in late July. 11 Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, p. 902. For a comparison with the situation concerning declining standards in Canada, see ‘No Longer Cause for Rejection’, Chapter 2 in Nic Clarke, Unwanted Warriors, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2015.

73 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 fit for general service.”12 This was evident in a convoy of 5,500 Australian reinforcements that arrived in Britain in August, with more than 300 (about one in 18) re-classified immediately on disembarkation as ‘medically unfit’ for service. For example, Scottish-born Robert Bushby was taken on strength in the 1st Pioneers at the age of 59 years 8 months. McWhae thought he looked even older. Bushby claimed the recruiting officer in Sydney instructed him to say he was 44. William Brookes was at least 45 (‘probably over 50’, according to McWhae) and a long- standing asthmatic who did no training in Australia because he could not ‘stand the walking’. William Park was so obese that McWhae believed he was “unlikely to be fit for profitable employment in England”.13

Recruitment in Queensland lagged behind the rest of Australia by that time and a disproportionate number in the convoy from that state were re-classified as unfit. It seems that some regional recruiting officers were particularly generous in their assessments. Frank Scott enlisted at Cairns in far north Queensland. He claimed to be 44 years old but was in fact 60. This was so obvious that McWhae could not understand why Scott was even considered, let alone accepted. Clement Dearden enlisted at Townsville, also in far-north Queensland. Dearden was 65 (McWhae thought he looked older) but the recruiting sergeant never asked for his real age, directing him instead to write down 44 years 10 months. Dearden also suffered from chronic bronchitis and was admitted to hospital as soon as he disembarked. While more than half of those reclassified were over the maximum age of 44 years (and no doubt others slipped through), 17-year old George Sherlock from Western Australia was one of nearly 400 men in the convoy under the minimum age of 18. This was not a problem in itself but Sherlock weighed barely 8 stone and had a ‘defective’ physique. He was immediately repatriated.14

12 Nominal Roll of Unfits Arriving in August 1917 (Convoy A) Men classified ‘Unfit’ AWM27 37/1. See also Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, p. 473. 13 Nominal Roll of Unfits Arriving in August 1917 (Convoy A) Men classified ‘Unfit’ AWM27 37/1. 14 Nominal Roll of Unfits Arriving in August 1917 (Convoy A) Men classified ‘Unfit’ AWM27 37/1.

74 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

These were not the only ‘defectives’ accepted in the final years of the war. Among those arriving from Australia were men with chronic conditions including deafness, significant vision impairment, hernias, long-standing and debilitating injuries, heart problems, haemorrhoids, obesity, anaemia, rheumatism, epilepsy, persistent bronchitis, incontinence, congenital syphilis, emaciation, flat feet, varicose veins, bunions and even one case of swollen testicles. At least 1,700 of the 4,400 Australians who arrived in September and October 1917 had dental problems that required an ‘immense amount of treatment’ before they could be sent to the line. This was a costly strain on resources.15 The haste to send recruits to Europe also meant many men embarked without proper inoculation, and some brought infectious diseases from home. Two ships in December 1917 included nearly 300 men infected with mumps or measles. All required immediate segregation and hospitalisation in England.16

Men with old surgical issues were also accepted. William Donovan, a labourer from Western Australia, had no thumb or forefinger on one hand. He was immediately re-classified and sent home. Also common were old fractures that had not set properly and caused ‘lameness and stiffening’ that rendered men useless as soldiers. The case of Thomas Richards is particularly intriguing. Having already enlisted in 1915 in 45th Battalion, Richards received shrapnel wounds to both forearms and a thigh during the fighting on the Somme in 1916, was discharged and sent home. He re-enlisted in Sydney the following year, however, and was passed fit to join 17th Battalion. The medical officer who first saw Richards in England noted that he “cannot flex left hand and hand grip is absent. Quite useless for any military service.” Richards again returned to Australia.17

15 Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, p.474. 16 Enlistment and Examination of Recruits for A.I.F (Medically Unfit Men Arriving in England, December 1917), AWM25 370/98. The Euripides arrived in Britain carrying 111 men with mumps and 48 cases of measles, 37 of which were transferred to hospital immediately on arrival. The Aeneas carried 166 men with mumps, 58 of whom were hospitalised. 17 Nominal Roll of Unfits Arriving in August 1917 (Convoy A) Men classified ‘Unfit’. AWM27 37/1.

75 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

Howes expressed his frustration once again in a letter to Fetherston in January 1918:

Defence are annoyed at number of rejections but cannot for the life of me see why they still wish to send unfits unless it be a desire to quote big numbers independent of their fitness. It is not a question of a very high standard at all, as I went and saw a group of them (reinforcements rejected in England). Old men of 55 and 60, and they looked it, who were absolutely persuaded by the recruiting agents to put down their ages at 40. And similarly with boys of 16 and 17, who were told by the recruiting agencies that they were 21 and entered as such. It is simply a scandal.18

The declining quality of volunteers was also apparent to long-serving veterans in the line. Reinforcements received by 11th Battalion in late 1917 were described by one soldier as “very different in appearance from the earlier drafts … [who] were now replaced by all sorts and ages”.19 Nearly 50 recruits joined the 42nd Battalion in January 1918 but only about half were considered by the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) to be up to standard, with at least seven ‘quite unfit for service in the field’. One was 52 years old, while two more were 49 and 46. The RMO described the general fitness of the battalion at the time as good (despite a mild outbreak of influenza) but believed many of the new men would “not be able to undergo the summer campaign with the Unit.”20

These men represent only a minority of recruits, of course, but what do we know of the general physical standard of soldiers comprising the Australian Corps in 1918? Size has long been valued as an indicator of physical prowess and soldiering ability; a taller man held a natural advantage over a smaller one in close-quarter combat because of his height and reach. Bean claimed the Australian soldier possessed impressive and naturally superior physical characteristics to his European counterpart. He described the average Digger as tall, lean and imbued with an innate

18 Butler, AOHMS Vol. II, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1940, p. 903. 19 Walter Belford, “Legs-Eleven”: Being the Story of the 11th Battalion (A.I.F) in the Great War of 1914-1918, Imperial Printing Co Ltd, Perth, Western Australian, 1940, p. 521-522. They included a father and son from rural Western Australia, Charles and John Winter. Charles was a 51-year-old Welsh miner (he recorded his age as 45) and signed on in March 1917. He had been rejected twice previously because of his age. John was 16 when he enlisted at the same time but his age was recorded as 18½. Both served with the 11th Battalion until the end of the war. 20 42nd Battalion War Diary, January 1918, AWM4 23/59/15.

76 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 athleticism ideally-suited to combat.21 The Digger came from hardy Anglo-Saxon stock, which had been transplanted in the sunny climes of the antipodes and flourished there. This image found a receptive audience in both Australia and Britain because it sat comfortably with late-Victorian notions of masculinity and allayed fear of racial or moral decline in the colonies.22

As appealing as this was, there was nothing particularly remarkable about the physical stature of Australian soldiers in 1918. The average height of a random selection of 400 soldiers killed during that year and buried in France is 5’6.9’’.23 This was nearly an inch shorter than the average for the men at Gallipoli three years earlier. Only 69 in the sample (17.3%) were 5’10’’ or taller, and a mere 15 (3.75%) were 6’0’’ or more.24 It is notable that the 14 officers comprised only 3.5% of the sample but had an average height of 5’8.3’’, which was about 1½ inches taller than that of the soldier in the ranks.25 The 49 NCOs were also at least ½-inch taller on average than the general cohort. It is fair to conclude from this that the average Digger of 1918 was hardly the antipodean cornstalk of legend.

Nor were the men in the sample particularly robust. As is evident in Figure 2.2 (overleaf), those in the sample had an average weight at enlistment of only 141.7 pounds (slightly more than 10 stone) but one in five weighed 126 pounds (9 stone) or less, and a handful did not even tip the scales at 112 pounds (8 stone).26 This is almost a stone less than the 1915 men.

21 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1079. 22 See Martin Crotty, Making the Australian Male: Middle-Class Masculinity, 1870-1920, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001. 23 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. This selection comprised the 400 men listed on the CWGC register with the surname of Brown, Jones, Smith or Williams who served in Australian ground forces, were killed in 1918 and buried in France. Nearly one-third (31.0%) was shorter than 5’6’’, while about one in ten (9.2%) was 5’3’’ or less (or below the minimum standard of 1914). The two shortest men in the sample were Private William Jones and Private William Brown, both of whom were 5’1’’. 24 The tallest was 28-year old Victorian Private Edwin Smith, who was 6’3’’. 25 Twenty of the officers were taller than 5’6’’ and three were over 6’0’’. 26 The two lightest were artilleryman Fred Smith, a Victorian labourer, and William Brown, a South Australian farmer serving in the 43rd Battalion. Each weighed 102 pounds (7st 4lb) at enlistment. The heaviest was 27-year old Bert Smith, a Tasmanian labourer in 47th Battalion, but at 6’0’’ and 184 pounds (12st 2lb) he was not a large man by

77 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

Figure 2.1 Recorded heights at enlistment of Australian soldiers in the 1918 sample. (NB. All heights recorded that include a ½-inch have been rounded up).

70

60

50

40

30 No of men

20

10

0 5’1’’ 5’2’’ 5’3’’ 5’4’’ 5’5’’ 5’6’’ 5’7’’ 5’8’’ 5’9’’ 5’10’’ 5’11’ 6’0’’ 6’1’’ 6’2’’ 6’3’’

Officers NCOs Men

Figure 2.2 Recorded weights at enlistment of Australian soldiers in the 1918 sample.

160

140

120

100

80

No of men 60

40

20

0 Less than 126 lb 127-140 lb 141-154 lb 155-168 lb 169-182 lb More than 183 lb Weight

Officers NCOs Men

modern standards. The officers were again exceptions in this regard, with an average weight at enlistment was 154.7 pounds (11 stone). This was nearly 14 pounds (1 stone) heavier than the average for men in the ranks.

78 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

These figures were compiled before embarkation, of course, and the privations of life at the front probably saw many men lose weight over time, suggesting an average weight of less than 10 stone by mid-1918. This was apparent to Lieutenant Harold Williams of 20th Battalion, who observed a group of Australians coming out of the line in September 1918. Most had lost “as much as two stone in as many months”, he wrote, “and their earth-stained uniforms hung loosely from their bodies.”27

How did the size of the average Digger and Tommy compare? Bean claimed that Australian soldiers were physically superior because they had avoided the “ravages caused by industrialization” that had so diminished “the physique of sections of the English people.” Indeed, Australian soldiers arriving in Europe for the first time were ‘horrified’ by the sight of men born and raised in an England known “only from folk-lore”.28 “The British are mostly far weaker troops than the Dominion troops,” he noted in his diary in mid-1918, “because their environment makes them so.”29

Once again, the evidence does point in that direction. In 1922, Britain’s Ministry of National Service produced a report entitled ‘Stature in Relation to Physical Standards of Fitness’ that analysed the health of the nation’s male population. It provides a useful yardstick for comparison.30 There were variations across regions but the average height of an English soldier called up in the final two years of the war was 5’6¾’’.31 This was only marginally shorter than the average Australian soldier in our random sample. When Irish (5’7.2’’) and Scottish (5’7.4’’) men are included, the average height of a British soldier called up in 1917 and 1918 war was 5’7’’, or a fraction taller than the average Australian in the sample.32 There was also little

27 Williams, Comrades of the Great Adventure, p. 289 (also cited in Gammage, The Broken Years, p. 203); Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine (War Section), Vol. XV, No. 8 (June 1922), p. 20. AWM27 37/10/16. 28 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1079. 29 Bean Diary, 20 July 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/116/1. 30 The Ministry used medical records of all British men called up in 1917 and 1918 to gauge their physical condition, and extrapolate from that the general health of men in the nation. ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine’, p. 20. AWM27 37/10/16. 31 ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine’, p. 20. AWM27 37/10/16. 32 ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine’, p. 20. AWM27 37/10/16. It is reasonable to assume that men who enlisted before 1917 are likely to exceed the average physical standards of later conscripts. If that is indeed the case,

79 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 difference between the average Digger and Tommy in terms of weight. British recruits in 1917 and 1918 weighed 144.6 lbs on average, slightly more than their Australian counterparts.33

Was a small stature necessarily a disadvantage in the extraordinary environment of the Western Front? In fact, the opposite was almost certainly true. Smaller men could move more easily through the constricted and narrow passageways of a trench system, while their low profile was undoubtedly advantageous when patrolling no- man’s-land at night. Smaller men could find shelter or protection on a battlefield more easily and, presumably, were less likely to be struck by a sniper’s bullet. Smaller men were also better suited to the cramped confines of a tank.34

In any case, size had no obvious bearing on bravery or resourcefulness. That can be illustrated simply by the example of 5’3’’ South Australian Private Jimmy Woods of 48th Battalion, who won the Victoria Cross for his work at Le Verguier on 18 September. Woods, who also weighed only 9 stone, had tried to enlist in 1914 but was rejected because of his stature. He was only accepted in September 1916, following the official lowering of physical standards. Another smaller man to win the Victorian Cross during this period was Lieutenant Joe Maxwell, VC, DCM, MC (and Bar). Maxwell enlisted in 1915 and became one of the most highly decorated Australian soldiers in the war. He stood just 5’4½’’ tall and, like Woods, weighed only 9 stone at enlistment.

It is true that the average height of the 20 Victoria Cross winners during the advance was nearly 5’8’’, which was slightly above than the average. Nine were 5’7’’ or less, however, with the average skewed considerably by the tallest four men (three of

therefore, the average across the BEF in 1918 was even taller again. The Report also noted that German troops had the same average height as the English. Standing over them all in 1918 were the newly-minted America soldiers, whose average height was 5’8¼’’. This was more than an inch taller than both the Australians and the English. The Report also notes that the average height of professional footballers at Wolverhampton Wanderers and Sheffield United in 1914 was 5’6½’’. 33 ‘Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine (War Section)’, p. 20. AWM27 37/10/16. 34 Shane Croucher, ‘How Britain's 'Devil Dwarfs' Helped Allies Win World War One’, International Business Times, 2 August 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bantam-battalions-how-britains-devil-dwarfs-helped-allies-win-world- war-one-1458322 (viewed 22 June 2016).

80 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 whom were officers), who stood at 5’11’’.35 Anyway, a strong build offered little protection against shrapnel, machine gun bullets, or gas. Certainly, it did not help 3rd Battalion’s Lieutenant Malcolm Keshan in during the fighting in the Chuignes Valley on 23 August. The 26-year-old Keshan was killed despite being “a fine type of clean-living young man whose splendid physique and physical fitness were an inspiration to his men.”36

The men themselves recognised the discrepancy between myth and reality in 1918. It was certainly evident to the 5th Battalion’s Albert Keown, who wrote after the war:

It would be ridiculous to suppose that every man in the AIF was true to the type that war correspondents and newspaper men have created. The long, lean and brown Colonial, with the easy confidence of look and manner, wonderful daring in battle, and most astounding intelligence, was not always evident on a battalion parade. Perhaps this was because the infantry of the AIF, having the most difficult and dangerous work to perform received as reinforcements all the ‘culls’. The man who just squeezed through the medical barrier at enlistment (and some of them seem to have found no one on the gate, so to speak), and who suffered from hernia, flatfootedness, or general lack of intelligence, always reached the infantry.37

The average Australian and Britain soldier in 1918 were largely indistinguishable in terms of size and physique, therefore, which is unsurprising given they were cut from the same genetic cloth. Indeed, if a British battalion marched out the line in mud- spattered uniforms followed by an Australian one during the final advance, it would have been difficult at a glance to tell them apart.

35 See Appendix 3. None of the Australian VC winners during the advance was 6’0’’. The tallest were Lieutenants Alfred Gaby and Edgar Towner (both 5’11¾’’), and Lieutenant George Ingram and Corporal Alex Buckley (both of whom were 5’11½’’). The two most celebrated recipients of the VC (both of whom received their awards before 1918) were Albert Jacka, VC, MC (and Bar), who stood 5’6½’’ and ‘Mad’ Harry Murray, VC, CMG, DSO (and Bar), DCM who was slightly taller than the average at (5’8½’’. 36 Eric Wren, Randwick to Hargicourt: History of the 3rd Battalion, A.I.F, Ronald G. McDonald, Sydney, 1935, p. 321. 37 Albert Keown, Forward with the Fifth: A History of the Fifth Battalion, 1st A.I.F, (First published in Melbourne, 1921) revised edition compiled by Carl Johnson, History House, Melbourne, 2002, p. 217.

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There were some notable demographic differences, however. The decrease in volunteers in 1916 and 1917 and failure to introduce conscription meant the Australian Corps contained a greater proportion of older and battle-hardened soldiers in the final months of the war than did comparable British formations. That is also evident in the sample of men killed in 1918.38 As Figure 2.3 shows, there was still a sprinkling of 1914 ‘originals’, while nearly 80% more had enlisted in 1915 or 1916. Fewer than one in six had volunteered in 1917, and only one in a 100 in 1918. It is reasonable to conclude that the overwhelming majority of Australians who took part in the final advance saw action in the years before 1918 and were therefore seasoned fighting men.39

Figure 2.3 Year of enlistment of Australian soldiers in 1918.

50%

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0% 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918

Men with surname Brown, Jones, Smith or Williams killed in 1918 Total Enlistments in the AIF

38 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. This selection comprised the 450 men listed on the register killed in 1918 with the surname of Brown, Jones, Smith or Williams, who served in Australian ground forces and were buried in France. 39 The important role played by conscripted soldiers in the Canadian Corps during the fighting of the Hundred Days is examined in Patrick Dennis, Reluctant Warriors: Canadian Conscripts and the Great War, UBC Press, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2017.

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Figure 2.4 Ages of Australian soldiers killed at Gallipoli in 1915 and Australian soldiers killed during the advance in 1918.

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0% 22 or younger 23-25 26-28 29-31 32 or older

Aust soldiers killed 1915 Aust soldiers killed Aug-Sept 1918

As Figure 2.4 indicates, the difference between the average age of Australian troops in 1918 and those who served at Gallipoli in 1915 is also marked.40 The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) register gives the ages of 3,702 Australians killed in 1915 and buried on the peninsula. Their average age was 25 years and 8 months. The average for 3,572 Australian soldiers killed between 6 August and 6 October 1918 and buried in France is 26 years and 7 months.41 This is a difference of only one year but the distribution of ages is revealing. Nearly one man in three (30%) killed in 1915 was 21 or under, with another third (31%) aged between 22 and 25 years.42 Only one man in six (17.5%) in the 1918 sample was 21 or under, however, and 29.5% were aged between 22 and 25. In other words, while less than 40% of Australian front-line troops in 1915 were 26 or older, that figure rose to more than one man in two (53.0%) three years later.43

40 For a detailed breakdown of these figures, and the comparison with III Corps, see Appendix 2.2. 41 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. This is also slightly above the average age of Australian soldiers for the entire war, which, according to the Official History was 26 years and 5 months. Butler, AOHMS Vol. III, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1942, p. 898-899. 42 Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, ‘The Composition of the A.I.F’, Ch. 4 in Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2016, p. 75. 43 Bean appreciated the value of the high percentage of seasoned troops in 1918. “The young Australian recruits, drafted in like half-wild colts,” he wrote, “many with an almost complete disrespect for custom and authority, were probably moulded more powerfully by these senior comrades of Anzac and Pozières, … than by any other influence since they left their mothers’ knees.” Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 5.

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How did this compare to the BEF in the final year of the war? A search of the CWGC register supports Edmond’s belief that BEF divisions in mid-1918 included a comparatively high proportion of ‘eighteen or nineteen year-old boys’.44 That is certainly apparent in the divisions of III Corps, which bore the brunt of the German offensive in the spring. The CWGC provides the ages of 2,235 British soldiers in III Corps killed between 6 August and 1 October 1918 and buried in France. Figure 2.5 illustrates the contrast between the ages of the Australian and British soldiers during the advance.

Figure 2.5 Age comparison between Australian and British soldiers killed during the advance.45

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 22 or younger 23-25 26-28 29-31 32 or older

Aust soldiers killed Aug-Sept 1918 III Corps soldiers killed Aug-Sept 1919

At time of his death in 1918, the average age of the British soldier was only 23 years and 4 months. That is more than three years younger than the average Australian listed for the same period. The distribution also points to the comparative youth of the BEF in 1918. More than half (59%) of the British soldiers were 22 or less, while only 28% were 26 or older.46 The median age for the Tommy was 21 years (25 for

44 See Edmonds, BOH (Vol. IV), p. 184. See also Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 54. In his analysis of Third Army, Boff states that the average age of British soldiers in that formation was 24.95 during the Hundred Days, and 26.18 for the war as a whole. 45 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. 46 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016.

84 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 the Australians), while the mode was 19 years (23 years for the Australians). It is clear that Australian soldiers in 1918 as a cohort were older and more combat- experienced than the British troops immediately to their north.

The average age of Australian and British junior officers killed during the advance leads to a similar finding. Nearly half (45.1%) of the 1,173 Australian junior officers and NCOs listed by the CWGC were 27 or older, while fewer than one in ten (9.2%) were 21 or younger. Only one-third (33.6%) of the 529 British junior officers and NCOs listed were older than 27, and more than a quarter (27.0%) were 21 or younger. The discrepancy is even more stark among the Australian and British Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants, where the difference was about two years (27.9 years for the Australians and 26.0 years for British). While only 10.5% of Australian junior officers were 22 or younger, more than a quarter (26.3%) of British junior officers had yet to reach their 23rd birthday.47

Post-war memoirs and III Corps unit histories point to a considerable degree of ‘combat naivety’ in the British ranks. Brigadier-General Arthur Maxwell (CO 174th Brigade) reported at the end of August 1918 that his battalions were made up “since the fighting of August 8/9th, mainly by young soldiers with four months’ training only and no previous experience in the line.”48 The commander of the 15th Londons, Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland Feilding, described many of the men in his battalion in early September as,

very young – in fact, quite boys. They wear khaki shorts with grey hose-tops turned down over their puttees. On their sleeves they have canary yellow hearts as a distinguishing badge… With their khaki ‘shorts’ showing about 4 inches of knee the men went forward, looking, as Desmond Young said, like a lot of boys going to a football match.49

47 Commonwealth War Graves Commission website, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 14 December 2017. 48 ‘Report on Operations August 1918’ 174th Brigade Unit Diary, August 1918, AWM 45/23/105. 49 Rowland Feilding, War Letters to a Wife: France and Flanders, 1915-1919, The Medici Society, London, 1929, p. 306. Captain Macey of the 9th Essex (12th Division) recounted the story of a new young officer’s first experience of the

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The loss of experience in British battalions was also apparent to one soldier in the 8th Londons (Post Office Rifles) who was wounded in April at Villers-Bretonneux and could not take his place in the line for the opening of the offensive on 8 August. He re-joined his unit after the fighting at Chipilly on 10 August, only to discover that he was “the sole survivor of the thirty odd London Rifle Brigade signalers who had joined the Post Office Rifles in the previous January.”50 This loss of experience was not unusual. According to one divisional history, “There were a few, but very few, among the cadres which returned to England in May, 1919, who had served with the 47th Division during all its four years in France and Flanders.”51

This relative lack of battlefield experience was apparent on the night of 12-13 August, when the Australian 56th Battalion moved into trenches occupied by the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment in preparation for the attack at Chaulnes. Long- serving Australian Lieutenant Harold Williams encountered a number of British soldiers lying in the bottom of a trench.52 There were two sentries on lookout but no officer present. The soldiers informed Williams they had not seen their officer since arriving in the line three nights ago. According to Williams,

Being directed to company headquarters I asked for the officer in charge of No. 10 Platoon, a young man wearing the two stars of a full lieutenant came forward, and said that he commanded it. I asked him why he had not been in the post to hand over. He made some lame excuse, and I told him that it was rather bad trench manners to leave a lance-corporal to hand over a post. I requested him to come forward and point out the dispositions. No, he could not do that; he did not know whether his post had been

line, in late August. While resting near Montauban prior to the attack against the strongly held Maltz Horn Farm, the young officer expressed the hope that he might procure some milk and eggs from the farm. In the event, he was disappointed when it took a considerable time to find the one twisted girder that remained of what was Maltz Horn ‘farm’. John W Burrows, The Essex Regiment (9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, & 15th Battalions), John H Burrows & Sons, Ltd., 1935, p. 117. 50 Martin, Londoners on the Western Front, p. 163-164. 51 Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, p. 211. Captain Macey of 9th Essex in 12th Division recounted the naivety of a young officer who took his place in the line for the first time in late August. While resting near Montauban prior to the attack against the strongly held Maltz Horn Farm, the man expressed the hope that he might procure some milk and eggs from the farm. In the event, he was disappointed, particularly as it took a considerable time to find the one twisted girder that remained of what once was Maltz Horn ‘farm’. Burrows, The Essex Regiment, p. 117. 52 Williams had enlisted in August 1915.

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wired, had not the vaguest idea of where the right post of his company was situated or of the proximity of the Germans, or whether any reserve ammunition or bombs were in the trench. … They were the poorest line soldiers that I ever came in contact with in France, and the fault obviously lay with the officers. Men who would put their platoons into posts and remain away from them all the while they were holding a front line were not fit to be officers.53

However, the death of young Australian 2nd Lieutenant Percy Binns near Lihons on 13 August shows that inexperienced junior officers were not confined to the BEF. According to the 2nd Battalion’s history:

Binns, a comparatively new officer, let his courage run away with his caution, for in a patrol during the morning … he had to be restrained by Private Alex Orr, of C Company, who was with him. Binns, enthusiastic as ever, went out again in the afternoon, on this occasion being accompanied by a Corporal and one man. The German outpost was encountered, and Binns rushed it, only to fall victim to a German bullet as he breached the parapet.54

Bean understood the value of experienced and battle-hardened troops to the Australian Corps in 1918. “The young Australian recruits, drafted in like half-wild colts,” he wrote, “many with an almost complete disrespect for custom and authority, were probably moulded more powerfully by these senior comrades of Anzac and Pozières, … than by any other influence since they left their mothers’ knees.”55 This reliance upon a disproportionately large percentage of veterans came with a significant cost, however. The strain of life at the front was accumulated over time and was seriously detrimental to the psychological and physical well-being of the men. This was clearly evident as numbers fell dramatically during the advance and ever more was expected of the increasingly battle-weary Diggers. The effects of this prolonged period of strain upon the strength and combat capability of the Corps

53 Williams, An Anzac on the Western Front, p. 160. 54 F.W. Taylor and T.A. Cusack, Nulli Secundus: A History of the Second Battalion, AIF 1914-1919, John Burridge Military Antiques, Swanbourne, Western Australia, 1942, pp. 322-323. 55 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 5.

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will be examined in detail in Chapter 3.

Regardless, no degree of experience offered protection against the lethal killing power of machine gun bullets and artillery. As Aubrey Wiltshire noted in his diary following the fighting on 8 August:

The 18-pounder battery close to us had a couple of prematures to start with. The blast and fire and hellish din of this barrage give one an idea of what modern war is. Soft flesh and blood has no chance and personal valour is of no avail against merciless machinery.56

What else can we learn about the composition of the Australian Corps in mid-1918? British-born men constituted about 20% the AIF throughout the war. This is consistent with the general Australian population at the time and evident in the selection of soldiers killed in 1918.57 More than one in five of the men in that sample was born overseas, almost all in the British Isles.58 The remainder were born in Australia but were very likely to be only one or two generations removed from Britain, their descendants having been part of the large wave of British emigration to the colonies in the final decades of the Nineteenth Century.59 The men of the AIF were therefore imbued with an innate sense of imperialism, and many described

56 Wiltshire Diary, 8 August 1918, SLNSW MLMSS 3058/2/21. 57 Bou and Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, p. 96. According to the 1911 Commonwealth Census, 14.7% of the Australian male population in 1911 was born in the British Isles. 1911 Commonwealth Census, Volume II (Part II) Birthplaces, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government website, http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/0354DDBB061331F2CA2578390011E1AF/$File/1911%20Ce nsus%20-%20Volume%20II%20-%20Part%20II%20Birthplaces.pdf, viewed 27 June 2017. See also Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, ‘The Composition of the A.I.F’, Ch. 4 in Bou and Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, p. 96. It is also worth noting that John Simpson Kirkpatrick, the iconic ‘man and the donkey’ of Gallipoli fame, was a merchant seaman from Tyneside who jumped ship in Sydney in 1909. Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918, Harper Perennial, London, 2005, p. 97. 58 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016. The selection included eight men born in New Zealand, two in America, as well as one from each of the Netherlands, Canada, South Africa, and Russia. Extrapolating these figures across the AIF, it is reasonable to assume that as many as 20,000 of the 100,000 Australian soldiers serving in Europe in the final year of the war were not Australian by birth. Bean recognised this but downplayed it in his narrative. Instead, he used it simply to distinguish British-born from native Australians by proffering the idea that officers’ batmen and grooms were more likely to be ‘immigrants from the Old Country’, as it was difficult to get Australian-born soldiers to serve in such roles. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 6. 59 The advent of steamships, the Suez Canal and telegraph, as well as overcrowded cities and the search for opportunity abroad all did much to promote emigration to Australia. Eric Andrews suggests Australian settlers were “increasingly British in origin by 1914”, with the number of pre-war arrivals from the British Isles peaking between 1909 and 1913. Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, p. 11.

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‘going home’ to fight.60 The Australian Corps was culturally and ethnically British at its core, therefore, albeit with provincial but superficial idiosyncrasies.61

Figure 2.6 Place of birth of Australian soldiers in 1918.

Place 1911 Census Total AIF Embarked Men in sample killed in 1918 New South Wales 30.33% 26.56% 122 30.5% Victoria 28.65% 27.90% 87 21.75% Queensland 9.98% 8.52% 38 9.5% South Australia 9.42% 8.40% 27 6.75% Tasmania 4.31% 3.95% 17 4.25% Western Australia 1.44% 2.42% 14 3.5% British Isles N/A N/A 87 21.75% NZ, US or Canada N/A N/A 6 1.5% 23.25% Total Born Overseas 15.87% 22.25% 93

Total 100.00% 100.00% 400 100.00%

Determining a cohort’s precise socio-economic situation and pre-war employment is difficult, in part because a single job description on enlistment papers can suggest a wide range of skills, education or wealth. Nevertheless, it is evident that most Australian soldiers in the 1918 sample were unskilled or low-skilled workers, with nearly one in three (31.3%) identifying simply as ‘labourer’.62 Only one man in five (20.1%) could be classified confidently as working in a ‘country calling’. One quarter of the men (24.8%) were ‘tradesmen’, with another 9.5% in employment difficult to categorise.63

Only about one in nine (11.5%) men in the sample worked in clerical or professional roles that probably required a good level of formal education. The general education

60 Michael McKernan, The Australian People and the Great War, William Collins Pty., Ltd., Sydney, 1984, p. 118. 61 About 88% of the soldiers in the sample were single at enlistment. 62 The term ‘labourer’ is an uncertain and generic but almost certainly includes poorly educated, unskilled workers, as well as those unemployed at the time of enlistment. Because the terms ‘farm labourer’, ‘farm hand’, and ‘stockman’ are also used, it is reasonable to conclude that many ‘labourers’ worked and resided in urban centres. See Appendix 1. 63 These included, for example, ‘body builder’, ‘hawker’ and ‘fish curer’.

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of the AIF as a whole was probably relatively poor, however, with one Australian male in every five (18.5%) before the war probably unable to read or write.64 The number of pre-war professionals in the AIF is also probably under-represented in casualty figures. Men from professional backgrounds and with higher levels of education were more likely to be staff officers or commanders (and therefore comparatively remote from combat) than those with less education or lower socio- economic status, who dominated the fighting ranks.65

Bean and Monash championed the idea of a unique, cohesive set of national values that bound the soldiers of the Australian Corps in 1918. This included an idealised ‘bush ethos’ that permeated the ranks, and an intrinsic admiration for the institutions and industrial relations of the ‘workingman’s paradise’. Bean maintained that the British army had developed along traditional feudal lines but the AIF’s development, unconstrained by history, was organically egalitarian and democratic in outlook.66 This in turn made the Australians a more effective fighting force than the British. One might conclude from Bean that, unlike the British, once Australian civilians enlisted and put on their uniforms, they simply cast aside their pre-war differences.67

James Edmonds supported Bean’s claim that Australian units possessed a greater degree of homogeneity than British units in 1918. He attributed this in part to the retention of four-battalion infantry brigades, however, which sheltered the

64 1911 Commonwealth Census, Volume II (Part IV) ‘Education’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government website, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/2112.01911?OpenDocument, viewed 22 July, 2017. 65 Nathan Wise, ‘The Lost Labour Force: Working-Class Approaches to Military Service During the Great War’, Labour History (No. 93, November 2007), p. 164. There was strong consensus in terms of religious belief within Australian ranks, with over half identifying with the Church of England and another quarter subscribing to one of the other Protestant churches. For data table, see Appendix 2c. Only about one in six Australian soldiers in the 1918 sample identified as Roman Catholic. This was considerably below the figure of nearly 20% for the AIF during the war but also similar to the general Australian population at the time. This decline almost certainly reflects the conflicted views of the relatively large Irish Catholic population in Australia, who recognised a local nationalist attachment but also the ideological rejection of service in a British imperial endeavour. See 1911 Commonwealth Census, Volume II (Part VI) ‘Religion’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government website, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/2112.01911?OpenDocument, viewed 22 July, 2017. See also Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, ‘The Composition of the AIF’, Ch. 4 in Jean Bou and Peter Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2016, 87-91. 66 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 1081-1084. 67 Nathan Wise, ‘The Lost Labour Force’, Labour History, No. 93, (November 2007), p. 165.

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Australians from the ‘tactical and human’ dislocation that followed the reorganisation of the BEF into three-battalion brigades in early 1918.68 Edmonds believed that maintaining all five Australian divisions in a single ‘national’ formation facilitated a “true esprit de corps enhanced by a very valuable particular patriotism.”69 This might appear reasonable on the surface but does the evidence support it?

It is easy to view the AIF as a self-contained, unified entity throughout the war but this overlooks the fact that its five divisions were spread across two different corps (I and II Anzac Corps) for their first two years in France.70 They came together into a single corps formation only at the start of 1918 but even then were not always under unified command, with divisions separated and individual brigades extracted during the German onslaught in the spring.71 Furthermore, the Australian Corps was itself a composite formation at times during the advance times. The British 17th Division was attached to the Corps on 12 August (although only used as a line division) and replaced by the British 32nd Division on 21 August. As we saw in Chapter 1, that division fought successfully alongside 1st Division in the Chuignes valley on 23-24 August, helped to lead the subsequent advance along the Somme, and remained under Australian command until 11 September.

Edmonds also believed the transfer of sick and wounded Australians through their own depot on the way back to the line was advantageous because it facilitated

68 Issues stemming from the numerical strength and Australian battalion disbandment will be discussed in the next chapter. 69 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 179. 70 Monash himself acknowledged this fact. “The autumn offensive of 1917, aiming at the capture of the Passchendaele ridge, was the first occasion on which the whole of the five Divisions were simultaneously engaged in the same locality in a common enterprise,” he wrote, “but even on that occasion they still remained distributed under two different Corps Commands, and had not yet achieved the long-desired unity of command and of policy.” Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 7-8. The implication, possibly intended, is that the ‘long-desired unity of command and of policy’ was only arrived at after his appointment to Corps command. 71 While 1st Division remained in the north at Hazebrouck, attached to XV Corps, the other four were sent south to the Somme to plug gaps in the line. The 3rd Division and 4th Division joined VII Corps, and 5th Division was placed under the command of III Corps. Meanwhile, 4th Brigade was separated from 4th Division and spent nearly a month under the temporary command of the 37th Division in IV Corps. The first brigade to see action during this time was 4th Brigade, following its relief of the battered 19th British Division at Hébuterne on 26 March. The Germans renewed their offensive along the Somme on 24 April, capturing Villers-Bretonneux and the nearby woods. At 3.00am on 25 April, Hobbs’ 5th Division was placed under the command of III Corps and, with British 58th Division, launched a counter-attack that re-captured the town. See Bean, AOH Vol. VI, Chapter 2.

91 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 reassignment to their old battalions.72 Given that there were only five Australian divisions to maintain, that system was logical and practical. In contrast, the sheer scale of the BEF in 1918, with its 46 British divisions, meant that returning convalescents had to be allocated to units as needed. This created so-called ‘rainbow’ battalions comprising men from different regions, which Edmonds claimed militated against comparable unit cohesion and morale.

Once again, the evidence suggests otherwise. In the first place, most Australian battalions in 1918 could also be described as ‘rainbow units’. While recruitment in Australia early in the war was indeed generally carried out along regional and state- based lines, any sense of local identity was increasingly diluted as the war dragged on and enlistments dried up. Australian recruits before 1917 were usually assigned in advance to regional units but the heavy losses during that year saw reinforcements pooled and allocated where needed.73

This is evident in the sample of Australian soldiers killed in 1918.74 The 46th Battalion (4th Division) initially comprised men from Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia, but among the six in the sample was one who enlisted in Brisbane. Of the four men from the 2nd Pioneers (2nd Division), two enlisted in Brisbane, one in Melbourne and one in Perth. The distance from Brisbane to Perth is some 2,700 miles, or 1,000 miles further than from London to Moscow.

Even when men enlisted from the same state, they might be drawn from places many hundreds of miles apart. Of the nine men in the sample listed from Queensland’s 49th Battalion (4th Division), five signed on in Brisbane, two in regional Toowoomba (80 miles west of Brisbane), one in tropical Rockhampton (380 miles

72 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 179. Four came under control of the Australian Corps again in April 1918 but all five were finally not brought together until the operation at Amiens in August. Even then, 1st Division arrived from the north only on the evening of the first day of the offensive, and was hours late reaching the line for its attack on the second day. 73 Michael Tyquin, ‘Unjustly accused? Medical authorities and army recruitment in Australia 1914-1918’, Journal of Military and Veterans Health (Vol. 22 No 2), June 2014, p. 24. 74 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 8 June 2016.

92 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 north), and one in the far-north coastal town of Mackay (590 miles north). The distance from Brisbane to Mackay is similar to that from Land’s End to John o’Groats. The 13 men listed from 3rd Battalion (1st Division) were all from New South Wales but enlisted in centres as far afield as metropolitan Sydney, the inland country towns of Cootamundra (240 miles south-west), Inverell (360 miles north), Bathurst (125 miles west), and larger industrial coal-port of Newcastle (100 miles north). Finally, 34th Battalion was one of three in 9th Brigade (3rd Division) recruited originally from the Hunter Region of New South Wales and proudly christened ‘Maitland’s Own’. Five of the eight men from that battalion in the 1918 sample had enlisted in metropolitan Sydney, however, more than 100 miles from Maitland.

In any case, there is no obvious reason to assume Australians identified more or less strongly with their local region than Londoners, Yorkshiremen, Welshmen, Ulstermen or Scots identified with theirs, for example, or that British formations possessed a greater or lesser provincial ‘character’ or fighting spirit. According to Maude, the 47th Division not only enjoyed uniformity of command during the war (having only two divisional commanders) but was “allowed to remain to the end what it was from the beginning – a division of London Territorials, and as such it had a homogeneity and a civic patriotism such as few other divisions possessed.”75 Despite this last statement, there can be no doubt numerous other British battalions were imbued with a similarly parochial spirit.

Peter Simkins has pointed out that too much emphasis is usually placed on the significance of local or regional identity when considering the performance and fighting spirit of British formations in 1918.76 There is no evidence that a unit’s

75 Maude, The History of the 47th (London) Division, p. 211. Only one of its nine battalions in 1918 (4th Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers) was not recruited from London. However, it was also Territorial formation and, according to Maude, “quickly assimilated itself. So, too, did the occasional drafts for London battalions which were received from other regiments.” 76 Peter Simkins, ‘‘Up the Sharp End’: The Experience of the 12th (Eastern) Division in the Hundred Days, August- November 1918’, Ch. 8 in From the Somme to Victory: The British Army’s Experience on the Western Front 1916-1918, Praetorian Press, South Yorkshire, 2014, pp. 186-187; Peter Simkins, ‘The War Experience of a Typical Kitchener

93 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 combat capability was inhibited because it comprised men from different parts of the country. By that time, a unit’s sense of identity and fighting spirit – whether Australian or British – had been forged in the crucible of combat, with close-knit communities of men in units formed across both the BEF and AIF. These powerful fraternities were sealed by a common purpose, terrible adversity, blood and sacrifice.

Having considered the demographic composition of the Australian Corps in mid- 1918, we will now examine the issue of training. How well prepared were Australian soldiers for battle in 1918 and what did that mean for their combat effectiveness during the advance? Bean believed Australians were already ‘half a soldier before the war’.77 However, they were no more natural soldiers than their British counterparts and a great deal of training was necessary to turn them into capable fighting men. About half of those recruited in the early months of the war had some form of military experience but that varied greatly and was often little more than weekend- service with a local militia unit. A handful of volunteers had prior experience in active operations (primarily in South Africa) but the battlefield expertise of the AIF had to be built from the ground up.78

The training process began in Australia, where new recruits received at least three months of basic training before sailing for Europe. It was often rushed and ineffective, however, because of a chronic shortage of knowledgeable instructors and the urgent demand for men in the line.79 The influx of volunteers in 1915 and early 1916 saw camps swell, which placed pressure on the limited resources. Because conditions deteriorated and instructors were often ignorant of the reality of fighting in Europe, preparation of recruits prior to embarkation was usually manifestly

Division: The 18th Division, 1914-1918’, Ch. 23 in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle, Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced, Pen & Sword Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2016, p. 309. 77 Bean Diary, September/October 1916, AWM38 3DRL 606/60. Bean also stated that the “rank and file of the Australian Imperial Force could be trained in a few months, provided the officers knew their work and were men capable of handling men.” Bean, AOH Vol. I, p. 47. 78 Bou and Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, p. 131. 79 Scott, AOH Vol. XI, p. 227.

94 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 inadequate.80 As a result, the knowledge and competence of the average Australian soldier arriving in Britain after three months of training was believed to be similar to a British soldier with just three weeks of instruction.81 This situation clearly had to be addressed and before crossing to France, Australian recruits had to complete up to 14 weeks of basic training at the AIF’s facility on Salisbury Plain. They undertook a programme of preliminary training (two weeks), intermediate training (eight weeks), as well as platoon and technical training (four weeks). The syllabus adhered closely to that used throughout the BEF and was informed by Field Service Regulations I (1909).82

As for all British recruits, the preliminary stage was short, intense and designed to habituate civilians into military life.83 The programme was strenuous and graduated, with an emphasis on physical fitness, route marching and close-order drill. It introduced the men to more practical aspects of fighting, including use of the bayonet, bombing, weapons handling, rifle shooting and anti-gas measures. Recruits were placed into pressure situations and (ideally) young, keen officers were attached from the relevant brigade to train them. More often than not, however, the brigade sent ‘tired’ officers to instruct, thereby giving them a rest.84 The need to rush reinforcements to France in 1918 saw the 14-week programme often compressed into just ten, but men who passed through it were nevertheless described by the 3rd Division’s ADMS in July of that year as in ‘good health and physically fit’.85

80 Scott, AOH Vol. XI, pp. 228-229. Accommodation for recruits was so poor in the large training camp at Liverpool near Sydney in 1916 that the nearby German internment camp was considered markedly superior. 81 Stevenson, The War with Germany, p. 84. 82 'Notes on the Training of reinforcements at Base Training Camps, 31 October 1916', AWM 25 947/839; Troops also learned about more esoteric matters during the Preliminary stage, including saluting, foreign uniforms, and regimental history. See also Bruce Faraday, ‘Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918’, PhD thesis, UNSW (Canberra), 1997, p. 145; Lewis Fredrickson, ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918: An Imperial model of training, tactics and technology’, unpublished PhD thesis, UNSW (Canberra), 2015, p. 64; and Bou and Dennis, The Australian Imperial Force, p. 142. 83 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 15. 84 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 15. 85 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 15. In mid- 1918, men completed 33¾ hours of training each week during the preliminary stage.

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The intermediate stage was more specialized. While soldiers continued to develop individual skills, including musketry, bayonet training, night work and sentry duty, they also focused on small unit work such as squad, platoon and company drill. The heavy losses incurred during 1917 increased the demand for men at the front and many reinforcements therefore crossed to France following this intermediate stage. The final four weeks of platoon and technical training concentrated on the practical application of all that had gone before. Overall, therefore, the general training of Australian recruits in England was sound, well designed, and followed a logical progression from the individual to collective and from the theoretical to more practical fieldwork.86 It was also virtually identical to that experienced by every British recruit during the war.

Preparing troops for life in the line did not end once they had crossed to Europe. On arrival in France, men were sent immediately to a school for reinforcements. Each Australian school was incorporated into one of the four large BEF training bases situated at Le Havre (infantry and artillery), Rouen (infantry, cavalry, engineers), Calais (infantry) and Étaples (primarily infantry but also home to small Australian artillery and engineering schools).87 Schools also continued to train men who remained at the base depot for an extended period. The training system in France served a number of functions. One was to ensure all reinforcements (including Australians) reached an acceptable standard before being sent to the front.

86 Fredrickson, ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918’, p. 66. 87 Douglas Gill and Dallas Gloden, ‘Mutiny at Etaples Base in 1917’, Past & Present No. 69 (1975), pp. 88-112. Situated in sand dunes about 15 miles south of Boulogne, the ‘bull-ring’ at Étaples had a particularly fearsome reputation. The camp’s discipline, harsh training regime, oppressive conditions in which soldiers were housed, and difficulty in obtaining passes into town, all served to make the soldiers’ experience ‘demoralising beyond measure’ and ‘like passing through hell for two weeks’. The effects of Étaples on soldiers was articulated by Wilfred Owen in a letter to his mother at the end of 1917: “A vast, dreadful encampment. It seemed neither France nor England, but a kind of paddock where the beasts are kept a few days before the shambles … Chiefly I thought of the very strange look on all the faces in that camp; an incomprehensible look, which a man will never see in England; nor can it be seen in any battle, but only in Étaples. It was not despair, or terror, it was more terrible than terror, for it was a blindfold look, and without expression, like a dead rabbit’s.” H. Owen and J. Bell (eds), Wilfred Owen: Collected Letters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 521. Étaples was closed down in September 1917, following a week of rioting and demonstrations by British soldiers (including Australians), protesting their conditions and treatment.

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A second was to promulgate the latest tactical and operational doctrine throughout the BEF.88

All recruits, whether British or Australian, received a week of testing at these bases, as well as instruction in musketry, bombing, grenades, bayonet fighting and formation drills. Men were lectured about conditions at the front, including entrenching, wiring, patrolling, skirmishing and sanitation. They were even subjected to a chamber in which gas was released.89 Musketry practice in particular formed the backbone of a soldier’s training and all had to be proficient in the use of the Lee Enfield No. 1 (Mark III) rifle. Soldiers had to demonstrate the ability to fire the weapon in a number of positions and under various conditions before they could take their place in the line.90

The first four Australian divisions arrived in France in mid-1916, which coincided with preparations for the British offensive on the Somme.91 The AIF had expanded substantially by that time, with units comprising a mix of Gallipoli veterans and recent volunteers. Even the most seasoned were ill-prepared for the peculiar demands of war against the Germans on the farmland of France and Belgium, however. The Australians found themselves fighting the highly trained and well- equipped formations of the most powerful industrial nation in Europe.92 They had to familiarise themselves with an entirely different landscape to that at Gallipoli, as

88 ‘Training – France 1917: General methods of Training Reinforcements, & Notes on the Training of Reinforcements at the Base Training Camps’, AWM25 947/8. 89 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, HMSO, London, 1917, p. 4. 90 1st Division GS War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/42/37, App. 3. Musketry training in 1918 included such tests as ‘lying and firing over cover’, ‘standing taking cover’, and ‘lying (and) taking cover behind stones or sandbags and firing around them with the side of the rifle only rested.’ 91 Monash’s newly-formed 3rd Division remained in England throughout 1916, organising and training on Salisbury Plain. 92 According to Bean, the failure by 2nd Division at Pozières on 29 July 1916, “drew upon the Anzac Corps staff an informal but emphatic reprimand from Haig, who thought it due to over-confidence engendered by success in Gallipoli. ‘You are not fighting Bashi-Bazouks now,’ he said to Birdwood and White in their office at Contay. “This is serious, scientific war, and you are up against the most scientific and most military nation in Europe.’” Bean, AOH Vol. III, p. 643.

97 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 well as a range of unfamiliar weapons and tactics. In the words of Robert Stevenson, the Diggers had to ‘return to the classroom’ but proved to be good students.93

The fighting on the Somme in 1916 made plain glaring deficiencies in the preparation of the New Army volunteers. It also demonstrated to British High Command the inadequacy of existing battalion organisation and tactical doctrine for the unprecedented demands of large-scale industrialised trench warfare. This led to a Training Directorate for all British arms and services in France being established in January 1917, with Brigadier-General Sir Arthur Solly-Flood appointed as its first Director-General. One of Solly-Flood’s first tasks was to revise British Army battle manuals and key tactical principles.94 He aimed for uniformity of training and doctrine throughout the BEF and Dominion forces by ensuring co-ordination and standardisation across the board, from GHQ down to Army and Corps, and then to Division and Brigade.95 This revolutionised the entire training system across the BEF and enabled GHQ to disseminate the most recent lessons doctrinal thinking quickly and efficiently throughout the army.96

The re-appraisal of doctrine and tactical methodology was based upon the plethora of ‘lessons learned’ reports submitted by units after operations. These were collated and distilled, with key findings articulated in a myriad of ‘SS’ pamphlets and periodical ‘Notes on Recent Fighting’ issued by the General Staff during the final two years of the war. The result was a prescribed but evolving and flexible set of

93 Stevenson, The War with Germany, p. 101; Fredrickson, ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918’, p. 27. 94 Edmonds, BOH Vol II, pp. 571-572. 95 Brigadier-General RJ Kentish to Sir Ivor Maxse, February 1917, Maxse Papers, IWM 69/57/7. Lieutenant- General Sir Ivor Maxse replaced Solly-Flood as Inspector-General of Training in June 1918. Maxse was the former CO of 18th Division and then XVIII Corps. He was regarded highly as an innovator and tactician, as well as for his organizational skills, and the operations of units under his command were renowned for the thoroughness of their training and preparation. Maxse attempted to establish a more coherent and consistent policy towards training but too late in the war to have any real effect on the AIF. Correlli Barnett, ‘Maxse, Sir (Frederick) Ivor (1862–1958)’, rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34955, accessed 14 July 2016]. See also Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 86; and Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Frank Cass, London, 2005, pp. 83-97. 96 Fredrickson, ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918’, p. 109; Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 86.

98 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 training and doctrinal principles adopted by every British and Dominion unit on the Western Front including, of course, the Australians.97 Of particular importance was SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons in Offensive Action, 1917, issued by the General Staff in February 1917.98 The pamphlet, which was revised and reissued exactly a year later, was predicated on the following premise: ‘In order to ensure the necessary a degree of uniformity of training and tactical method throughout the Armies, there must be uniformity of organization in all battalions’.99

The general system of training Australian troops was based on SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, first issued in June 1917.100 According to the pamphlet, ‘Experience has shown that there are certain special and technical forms of training which cannot be exploited to the fullest extent in units. For these it will be necessary to send personnel to schools.’101 It was at the permanent training schools in France that the influence of BEF doctrine on Australian troops was most pronounced.102 A key objective of the schools was ‘to co-ordinate policy and system and so to arrive at uniformity of doctrine’ and at its heart were two conjoined and steadfast tenets: ‘Commanders of formations are responsible for the efficiency of the units under their immediate command’ and ‘Commanding Officers are responsible for the training of all Officers, NCOs and men in their units’.103

The formalised system of training in the British army (including the Australians) was in principle a top-down process but there was nevertheless scope for initiative and independence. SS 152 prescribed the syllabuses and general subjects to be taught at the various schools, for example, as well as the number of students in each cohort and the training literature used.104 There was also an attempt to standardise delivery

97 Fox, Learning to Fight, pp. 79-85. 98 SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons in Offensive Action, 1918, HMSO, London, 1918, LHCMA 7/33. 99 SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons in Offensive Action, 1918 100 SS 152 was first issued in June 1917, before being revised and re-issued in January 1918. 101 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, p. 4. 102 Bruce Faraday, ‘Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918’, unpublished PhD thesis, UNSW (Canberra), 1997, p. 145. 103 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, pp. 4 & 8. 104 Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 87.

99 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 of content, with the mode of instruction to adhere closely to the established principles of ‘explanation, demonstration, practice’.105 However, the process itself was left ultimately to individual commanders and that gave divisions considerable independence, reflecting the BEF’s increasingly decentralised, flexible command structure and diversity of approach by the final year of the war.106

GHQ-level schools were responsible for training instructors in specialist matters, including anti-aircraft fire, small arms, wireless, bridging and sound ranging. Army schools taught particular operational tasks, such as scouting, observation and sniping. They also trained senior commanding officers and staff officers, prepared junior infantry officers to serve as company commanders, and sergeants to serve as CSMs. Officers and NCOs received instruction in the tactical employment of Lewis guns and machine guns, while men were trained in artillery, trench mortars and signals. Corps schools prepared soldiers for platoon command and front-line activities, including bombing, the use of Stokes mortars and Lewis guns, signals and anti-gas measures.107 Corps schools also had an infantry ‘parent’ school for training platoon commanders and sergeants, as well as a signal school, anti-gas school, and sometimes schools for mounted troops.108

Following the closure of the Étaples ‘bull-ring’ in November 1917, corps schools had the added responsibility for the general training of reinforcements in France. The establishment of the Australian Corps on 1 January 1918 led to the creation of its own corps school on the Somme at Aveluy, near Albert. Each of the five divisions had their own wing that operated the same instructional courses as those mentioned above.109 The Australian school was well regarded and described by one soldier as “the largest and one of the best fitted Corps Schools in France.”110 It assumed,

105 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France. 106 Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 87. 107 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 59. 108 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, pp. 7-8. 109 1st Division GS War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/42/37, Apps. 1 & 2. 110 1st Division GS War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/42/37.

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the proportions of a small military college, with highly trained instructors. … Under a system of competitive work by the divisions it turns out keen soldiers, and is of high value as a preparatory school for officer candidates from the ranks.111

The division was the largest permanent formation in the BEF and bore the greatest responsibility for preparing troops under its command.112 Because individual commanders shaped a formation’s training program, it was in a soldier’s interest to remain part of the same large, stable organization for an extended period of time. British divisions often moved between corps, with some doing so as often as twenty times in a single year.113 While there was movement between them, the five Australian divisions had remained in either I Anzac or II Anzac Corps throughout 1916 and 1917. That led to greater consistency in training that almost certainly facilitated their operational efficiency in the final months of the war.

Bean claimed the most effective training occurred at brigade schools.114 The focus at this level was primarily on the development of combined small unit skills and battlefield tactics. Particular emphasis was placed on the platoon as the primary fighting and tactical unit in 1918. Battalion-level training at brigade schools was therefore the most practical and relevant preparation for front-line troops, as they worked in their fighting units and were repeatedly put through individual and small- unit exercises. Appropriate responses to real battlefield situations became ingrained as a result. Army and corps commanders had overall responsibility for the preparation of troops under their command but it was at division, brigade and battalion-level that the core of a soldier’s practical training experience was carried out.115

111 The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January, 1918, cited in Fredrickson, ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918, p. 213. 112 Martin Samuels, Command or Control? : Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918, Frank Cass Ltd, London, 1995, p. 121. 113 While commanding XVIII Corps, Maxse commanded thirty different divisions at various times during 1917. This constituted nearly half the number of divisions in the entire BEF. Griffith, British Fighting Methods in the Great War, p. 51. 114 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 22-23. 115 SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France.

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The importance placed on training is evident in the fact that some 2,500 Australian officers and troops were away from their units during May 1918 to attend various army, corps or divisional schools.116 During July 1918, 2nd Division had 9 Officers and 23 Other Ranks at GHQ schools, 34 Officers and 115 Other Ranks at army schools, and 72 Officers and 190 Other Ranks at corps schools.117 This meant nearly 500 men were away from 2nd Division during the month attending training schools. Despite the shortage of manpower during the advance, 367 men were absent from the division attending schools in August, and 165 men did likewise in September.118

Despite the popular impression, the experience of Australian troops was dominated by training, not battle.119 This is evident in the time individual formations spent training during the war. During its four years overseas, the men of 1st Division spent about a quarter of their time engaged in training of some description.120 Even more was spent training at battalion level, as the experience of the 21st Battalion (2nd Division) shows. Between March 1916 and October 1918, the battalion spent about 930 days on the Western Front. It was in the line for 193 days (20.5%) but spent 364 days (39.1%) engaged in training. This was fairly typical of Australian units and does not consider more time spent by individual soldiers at specialist training schools.121 Nor does it include days spent undertaking route marches, which was regarded as a form of training because they were thought to develop fitness, morale and discipline.

116 Bean, AOH Vol VI, p. 22. 117 ‘2nd Australian Division Statement of Personnel Sent to Schools During Month of July, 1918’ 2nd Division Diary, July 1918, AWM4 1/44/36, App. 90. 118 ‘2nd Australian Division Statement of Personnel Sent to Schools During Month of August, 1918’ 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 82; ‘2nd Australian Division Statement of Personnel Sent to Schools During Month of September, 1918’ 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38, App. 19. There were 94 Officers and 273 Other Ranks absent in August, and 41 Officers and 124 Other Ranks in September. 119 Huw Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2006), p. 220 Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036383 120 Stevenson, The War with Germany, p. 162. 121 Bruce Faraday, ‘Half the Battle’, p. 146. 21st Battalion spent 38.6% of its time in training; 13th Battalion (4th Division) spent about 38% of its time training; 1st Battalion (1st Division) spent 36%; 55th Battalion (5th Division) spent 30%; and 44th Battalion (3rd Division) spent 48%. This last figure is slightly misleading, however, as it takes into account time training in Europe. Because 3rd Division was raised in Australia and sailed for Europe essentially as a complete entity, it spent a disproportionate amount of 1916 and the early part of 1917 training in England.

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The company was the British army’s basic tactical unit at the start of the war but by 1918 it was the platoon. Following the revision of SS 143 in early 1918, platoons were re-organised into four sections of five to nine men, including an NCO.122 It was the smallest unit in 1918 to possess all weapons with which the infantry were armed and comprised one section of riflemen, one section of bombers, one section of rifle grenadiers, and one section of Lewis gunners.123 This meant that platoons were equipped with two sections based primarily on firepower (rifle grenadiers and Lewis gunners) and two that could manoeuvre easily and close rapidly with the enemy (riflemen and bombers). It is important to recognise that, despite these developments, the rifle never lost its prominence as a front-line weapon. With the exception of the two primary Lewis gunners, every member was ‘first and foremost a rifleman’, although he had to be trained to use bombs and at least half were also trained as rifle grenadiers.124 Australian platoons in 1918 were therefore flexible, adaptable, self-contained fighting units. They were typical in this regard and not exceptional, however, when compared to the BEF as a whole.

All five Australian divisions adopted this new organisation in the spring of 1918 with comparative ease. For example, the battalions of 1st Division were instructed to re- organise themselves immediately after arriving in Corps reserve on 8 March. Because the Australians were thoroughly familiar with British doctrine and procedures by

122 SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons in Offensive Action, 1918. For more on this, see John Lee, ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Division on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917’, Chapter VI in Sheffield and Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front, p. 120. 123 Previous to this, platoons operated essentially as lines of infantry supported only by a small number of specialists, including rifle grenadiers and Lewis gunners. In order to use the rifle grenade, a flat plate was placed on the base of a Mills bomb. This was then fitted into a specially designed metal cup or discharger attached to the rifle’s muzzle, and fired by means of a blank cartridge. One senior Australian staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel James Durrant claimed that veteran infantry “could hit a large shell-hole five times out of six at a hundred yards, and do very good practice at twice that distance, or even further.” Durrant, JMA. ‘Some Aspects of the Operations of the 2nd Australian Division from the 27th August to the 2nd of September, 1918’, Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXI (October 1935 and January 1936), p. 19, cited in Lloyd, Hundred Days, p. 85. Durrant, a Gallipoli veteran, was appointed assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General of 2nd Division in December 1917. 124 SS 143 The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, pp. 7-8. One rifle section should be trained to act as a bombing team.

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that time, and as the new formation meant only a slight modification to methods already employed by the division, no particular difficulty was anticipated.125

That proved to be the case. After only two days, the 9th Battalion demonstrated the new formation to its sister battalions in 3rd Brigade by ‘attacking’ three objectives at a training facility known as ‘The Maze’, near Hazebrouck.126 The new organisation was bedded down during the next three weeks and ‘attack practice in the new formations’ formed a large part of the training.127 Companies trained every day (except Sundays) until 4 April, when battalions began to move back into the line.128 In 3rd Division, meanwhile, 7th Battalion altered its usual practice of separating the men into groups of specialists and training them apart from the rest. Instead, platoons remained intact and trained as miniature units under their own officers and expert instructors. This made clear to the men that it was now “largely a platoon commander’s war.”129

Another document that was seminal in preparing Australian formations was SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, issued in January of that year.130 Unlike its previous incarnations in 1916 and 1917, the 1918 version was written with a transition to more open fighting in mind and it outlined the stages of an offensive operation.131 Australian divisions adhered closely to its principles throughout the advance; it provided the scaffolding for the set-piece attacks at Amiens on 8 August

125 1st Division General Staff War Diary, March 1917, AWM4 1/42/26. 126 The demonstration included barrages placed down by Stokes mortars and rifle grenades, the latter bursting on the ground at a range of only 150-180 yards, due to the use of cut down rifles. 1st Division General Staff War Diary March 1917, AWM4 1/42/26. 127 1st Division General Staff War Diary, March 1917, AWM4 1/42/26. 128 1st Division General Staff War Diary, March 1917, AWM4 1/42/26. 129 McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh, p. 172. 130 SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, pp. 8-9. 131 These included: establishing and maintaining mastery over the enemy’s artillery and aircraft before and during the attack, depriving the enemy of their capacity to counter-attack; the provision of a moving barrage of artillery and machine gun fire, in depth, to protect the infantry advance; the selection of intermediate objectives to enable the infantry to re-organise in readiness for the next phase of the advance; the selection of a final objective line well within both the capacity of the attacking troops and the zone of effective artillery support; ensuring enough troops in strength on the final objective to ward off an immediate enemy counter-attack; organizing the defence on final objective line in depth to minimize effects of enemy artillery fire; holding sufficient reserves near the front to defend against an organized counter-attack; and beginning preparations as soon as possible for the next phase of the advance. SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, pp. 8-9.

104 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 and in the Chuignes valley on 23 August, for example, as well as the Outpost Line and Hindenburg Line in the final weeks of September. Monash was ultimately responsible for organising, equipping and preparing the Australian Corps for operations but he did so within in a clearly articulated and well thought-out British doctrinal framework.

The training program for 3rd Division on the eve of the advance in July 1918 is illustrative. The troops spent the first few days of the month out of the line in corps reserve, resting and refitting. They also re-organised units as the recent disbandment of the 36th Battalion meant that the 9th Brigade now operated on a three-battalion basis. The training programme was designed to ensure familiarity with the new organization, which required ‘many minor modifications of detail though not of principles.’132 General training commenced with a clear focus on small unit work, while a week-long divisional class was set up for junior officers (including machine gunners and pioneers) to concentrate on platoon training and tactics.133

Because 3rd Division expected to be out of the line for a week or more, at least one day was allocated to battalion training. The NCOs were given close instruction in the areas of discipline and administration, as many ‘minor neglects of trench discipline’ (including dirty rifles, loose ammunition, or litter around living quarters) were thought to result from the inexperience of junior commanders. Troops were sent to the division’s new ‘gas training ground’, while signal classes were run both for beginners and more experienced signallers.134

Time spent working alongside tanks formed an important part of training soldiers in mid-1918. The sophisticated nature of infantry-tank co-operation was evident on 8 July, four days after the successful operation at Hamel. Two battalions of 3rd Division conducted exercises with tanks at the Australians’ tank-training facility at

132 9th Brigade War Diary, July 1918, AWM4 23/9/21. 133 9th Brigade War Diary, July 1918, AWM4 23/9/21. 134 9th Brigade War Diary, July 1918, AWM4 23/9/21.

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Vaux. One company attacked and seized a ‘first zone’, while a second leap-frogged through to capture a ‘second zone’. Men carrying flags represented the creeping field artillery barrage by indicating the line of average impact. Infantry and tanks moved to the barrage line in waves.135

The exercise familiarised men with the new Mark V fighting tank but also focused on other aspects of an attack. They had to follow a barrage that crept forward at the rapid rate of 100 yards every two minutes, and fire No. 27 (smoke) rifle grenades in the direction of imaginary hostile strong points for the tanks to deal with. To prepare for all eventualities, a subsequent exercise saw the ‘barrage’ deliberately move too far ahead of the infantry, forcing them to rely upon their own covering fire or, where possible, that provided by the tanks. The entire exercise was deemed a marked success.136

Training developed battlefield skills but also highlighted weaknesses. At the end of July, 28th Battalion conducted an exercise with tanks and many tactical shortcomings were obvious. Because only a handful of the troops had previous experience working with the machines, many simply watched them instead of concentrating on their own movements. The exercise also demonstrated that advancing in sections instead of platoons (or half-platoons) made it difficult to maintain a line, while Lewis guns were employed most effectively when operated boldly and further ahead to cover the leading infantry. Smoke bombs were not used successfully for signalling and it was clear that more training in that area was needed. Finally, the battalion commander, Patrick Currie, realized that the signalling scheme was too advanced for troops who had trained for a long period only in sections.137

Training was particularly important immediately prior to an operation, and demonstrations were intended to be as relevant and realistic as possible. Mock-

135 9th Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/9/21. 136 9th Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/9/21. 137 28th Battalion War Diary, AWM4 23/45/41, App. 7.

106 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 attacks were organised if time allowed and a suitable area was available. For example, 60th Battalion conducted one prior to the attack at Amiens on 8 August. The men were camped near Renacourt at the beginning of the month. Reveille sounded at 4:30 AM on 2 August and 80 minutes later the troops commenced a 2½-hour march in heavy rain to Vaux, where they witnessed demonstrations of tanks working with infantry drawn from the nucleus of 15th Brigade. A company of 57th Battalion ‘attacked’ two trench systems in the first demonstration. Each comprised a firing line and designated strong points, with red flags denoting the objectives. The men formed up in lines of sections in single file, with two rifle sections and one Lewis gun section composing each of the four platoons. Tanks formed up under cover in rear. A barrage fell on the line at ‘Zero’ and the tanks moved forward through the infantry, flattening the wire and making tracks for the men to follow. The attacking infantry followed behind, with sections covering each other as they passed through the defiles made by the tanks.138 A second demonstration involved tank-infantry co- operation against a fortified farm. When that finished, a company of 60th Battalion repeated the first exercise for 59th Battalion. This was not as successful, however, and highlighted the need for more practice and repetition.139

All of this work paid handsome dividends, something apparent less than a week later when the battalion advanced at Amiens on 8 August:

A Company of 59th Battalion attacked towards Bayonvillers, and they rounded on the right. They incurred and machine gun fire from the right edge of the village but there were not delayed by this because of assistance by tank. After securing the village the company worked around to the left again covered its front. Remained in touch with 31st Battalion on their left all day. The company then move towards Harbonnières, were altered according to orders, and B Company of the Battalion, who were in support, went through the village and mopped up. Following this, A Company resumed its advance through the village and leapfrogged through B

138 Particular emphasis was given to the use of phosphorous bombs as a means of calling tanks in to assist men dealing with strong points. When a position was ‘silenced’, the tank used a white flag to signal to the infantry to continue the advance. 60th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/77/31. 139 60th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/77/31.

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Company, making a bid for the final objective, or Blue Line. About 200 yards from that line, a machine gun firing from the right flank cause problems, and there were also shot at from the left. They were held up for 15 minutes, before Lt Dunkley saw a tank returning to the British line, which he traced, and told the officer in charge of his troubles. The officer kindly consented to ‘about turn’ and made for the machine gun post. Company followed the tank, and took up a position in the old trench system in the Blue Line.

The successful actions by 59th Battalion on that day clearly illustrated the value of training and discipline in the conduct of battlefield operations. Indeed, when the troops moved forward from Warfusée-Abancourt at 8:20 AM in the second phase of the attack, one NCO later reported that “looking around you would think it was just a parade ground manoeuvre, and not the actual thing, to see the troops on either side moving forward, keeping their relative positions and direction as if marching by some drawn line on the ground.”140

Training was usually adjusted to meet the physical condition of troops once the advance itself was underway, and exercises tailored to the changing conditions at the front. When battalions moved into a back area for a spell, the first few days were spent resting, re-organising and refitting, after which time training commenced. Lessons from recent operations were incorporated into syllabuses. Specialist training was also prioritized to cover losses, while infantry sections and platoons practised advancing in open warfare formation under machine gun fire.141

The mobile operations during August and September presented particular difficulties with regard to training. These included not only the men’s physical and mental condition but also more practical considerations, such as inclement weather and the availability of suitable training areas behind a continually moving front. When out of the line, Australian battalions usually trained for 3-4 hours each

140 ‘Narrative by Sergeant RER Alexander (CO No. 1 Platoon, C Coy)’, 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App. 10. 141 30th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/47/37.

108 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 morning during the advance, with afternoons set aside for rest and recreation. Sundays were given over to rest following morning church parades.

The 30th Battalion undertook only light training the day after coming out of the line on 11 August. The four companies were given exercises in open warfare formation, with an emphasis on dealing with enemy machine guns. The report noted that:

The experience gained in the recent operation was taken into consideration and the faults noticed in it were pointed out to the men. All formations from forming up in the trenches to the final objective were gone through, and the action of the NCOs in case of a hold-up by the section or platoon coming under machine gun fire, was carefully watched by Officers and criticized. A sharp lookout was kept for hostile aeroplanes during the training.142

The training program for the 1st Battalion from 30 August to 5 September was also adapted to meet the peculiar demands of semi-mobile operations. After 30 minutes of company drill, platoons broke down for an hour into specialist sections. Lewis gunners were given instruction in technical aspects of the weapon, as well as making effective use of the ground during an attack, scouting, and providing covering fire. Rifle sections worked on estimating distances, indicating targets, and fire discipline. Troops also trained in bayonet fighting and extended-order work, including best use of ground, and spent time doing patrol exercises with a view to advancing towards definite targets.

Platoon training then followed for 45 minutes. A variety of attacking formations were employed, including extended and open order, lines of sections, and sections in line echeloned. Changes of objective and direction were made in each formation to improve tactical flexibility, as well as fire-direction and control. Platoons also worked on simple tactical schemes for attacks against small and definite localities, as

142 30th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/47/37.

109 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 well as picquets with definite frontages, and practised advancing in vanguard, flank guard and rear-guard positions.

The final 75 minutes were given over to work in companies. Commanders were instructed to ensure it followed closely the training already undertaken by the platoons. “At first this will merely consist in co-ordinating the work of platoons on the lines laid down above,” the programme stated, “followed later by a simple attack, advanced guards, etc., and outpost schemes.”143 The afternoon was then given over to ‘recreational training’. The entire programme reflected a logical and sensible progression from small unit to larger unit training, entirely relevant to the nature of the operations in prospect, and made allowances for the men’s battle-weary physical condition at the time.

Soldiers working with specialised equipment had the added burden of having to repair and renovate it when out of the line, which meant less time for rest or training.144 Following their strenuous operations in August, the men of the 4th MG Battalion spent six of the first seven days out of the line holding:

frequent ceremonial parades for the purpose of steadying the men and improving their discipline, which had become slack owing to the frequent moves and the detailing of units on separate tasks. As the whole period of training is likely to be short, great care had to be exercised to prevent the men becoming tired and stale.145

Machine gunners were also shown how to use captured German weapons. Specialist training for 58th Battalion on 19 September included instruction in the use of a German machine gun, for example, and the class received it with ‘the greatest enthusiasm’. Another lecture was given the next day to a similarly receptive audience on the use of the German heavy and light machine gun.146

143 1st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/18/34, App. 15. 144 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4, App. E. 145 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4, App. E. 146 58th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/75/32.

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Men and officers alike appreciated the importance of ‘recreational training’ when out of the line to enhance both their physical and psychological condition. The Australians adhered closely to the principle in SS 143 that emphasised the importance of intra-unit competition and games. According to that document, these activities facilitated morale and:

too much attention cannot be paid to the part played by games in fostering the fighting spirit. They afford the Platoon Commander an unrivalled opportunity, not only of teaching his men to play for their side and work together in the spirit of self-sacrifice, but of gaining and insight into their characters.147

Games and competitions were important in the life of a unit and eagerly anticipated. Cricket and football matches played within and between battalions were commonplace, and companies challenged each other in other contests, including tug-o-war. The activities did not always involve tests of physical strength or skill. A popular activity in 48th Battalion, for example, was the “good old Paper Chase, in which all ranks could join most heartily.”148 Prize money was given out and sometimes medals were distributed.149

Ray Leane (CO 12th Brigade) understood “the value of spending a lot of time on Sports and Competitions when out of the line against using all the time on hard training. The best results are obtained from Australians by keeping them fit both in body and mind.”150 The 12th Brigade held a ‘Sports Gathering’ on 4 September and the programme provides an insight into the importance of such events for unit morale. The competition was held in a paddock near Vaux and commenced at 11:00 AM. The officials comprised brigade and battalion officers, and included Leane himself. Battalion bands played throughout the afternoon and a ‘Wet and Dry

147 SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons in Offensive Action, 19, p. 16 148 48th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/65/31. 149 48th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/65/31. It appears that tokens such as medals were particularly valued after because of their enduring value after the war. 150 12th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/12/31, App. 19; 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24; 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32, App. 21. 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24.

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Canteen’ was set up for the men. Officers were served ‘afternoon tea and light refreshments’ in a separate marquee, where an orchestra also played.

Gambling was also central to the day. Each battalion provided two bookmakers and the 12th Field Ambulance provided one. Events included traditional athletic contests but included light-hearted party games. The names of events referenced Brigade’s wartime experience and included ‘The Chipilly Effort’ (obstacle race), ‘The Proyart Dash’ (100-yard dash), ‘The Diggers’ Struggle’ (tug-o-war), ‘The Harbonnières Harmony’ (musical chairs), and ‘Ludendorff’s Left’ (blindfold boxing). 44th Battalion held its own sports day a fortnight later and men competed in ‘The Best Dressed Soldier’, ‘Old Buffers’ Race’ (for men aged 40 or over), ‘Potato Race’, ‘Stretcher-Bearer’s Race’. There was also a ‘Band Race’, in which blindfolded bandsmen sprinted for 50 yards while playing a tune. Prize money varied from 10 to 20 francs for winning an event, and 50 francs was awarded to ‘best character or characters on the ground’. The brigade’s Pierrot Troupe performed in the evening.151

While resting helped to rejuvenate the men’s physical condition, it was difficult for any unit near the front line to have a complete respite from the psychological strain of the advance. While troops in 57th Battalion spent some two weeks out of the line following their operations at Péronne in early September, German planes attempted several bombing raids and the men knew they might be called on at any time to re- enter the line.152

It is popularly believed that Australians paid only lip-service to the ceremonial aspects of military life, such as march discipline and saluting, because these activities ran counter to their egalitarian or democratic ‘national character’. They were also thought to be only incidental to the main business of fighting and were therefore largely irrelevant. In reality, Australian commanders emphasised the importance of

151 12th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/12/31, App. 19; 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24; 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32, App. 21. 152 ‘Monthly Report of RMO, 57th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/22/32, App. 26.

112 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918 such aspects of army life in order to turn raw civilian volunteers into capable and professional soldiers. An instruction issued by 5th Division HQ to its battalions in 1917 highlighted this:

A battalion which is slack in march discipline, is slack in battle and no good anywhere. A battalion which marches badly is like a man who doesn’t wash. If you don’t take pride in your marching, you don’t take pride in your Regiment.

Significantly, the standard to be met was British: ‘You can, if you try, march as well as the Guards.153

The effect of a well-directed training programme in preparing Australian soldiers for combat was clear. The successful advance by 41st Battalion north of the Somme during August demonstrated to its commanding officer, Alexander Heron, that the men had “adapted from ‘trench to trench’ to open warfare successfully, a sure proof that the men were trained and tried soldiers.”154 In his history of the 6th Battalion, Ron Austin writes that:

The major difference between 1915 and 1918 was that 6th Battalion had become a well-trained, battle hardened unit by 1918. It was now professional in every sense of the word and fully capable of carrying out the ‘shock troop’ role to which it had been allotted.155

Australian troops took training seriously and this transformed them into a highly experienced and professional organisation by the final year of the war. The 1st Division’s commander, Tom Glasgow, summed it up thus:

Although during the war period we had the services of a large number of experienced and enthusiastic citizen force officers and men, it took approximately six months to train them to a sufficient standard to enable them to take part in military operations. Speaking from personal experience, I may say that, although we established our

153 ‘5th Australian Division Training Memos and Syllabus (France) up to July 1918’, AWM25 947/72. 154 41st Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/58/22. 155 Ronald J Austin, As Rough as Bags: The History of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF, 1914-1919, self-published, McCrae, Australia, 2005, p. 275

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organisation in 1914, and started training at the beginning of 1915, the force did not reach the zenith of its efficiency until the autumn of 1917.156

Monash assumed command of an Australian Corps in mid-1918 that was therefore an entirely different proposition to the small, amateurish force of enthusiastic, naïve volunteers that had sailed for the Middle East four years previously.157 Men and officers alike were by that time well trained, thoroughly versed in the latest British tactics and doctrine, familiar with the extraordinary and hostile environment in which they operated, and had shared a long experience together fighting in cohesive and coherent units. They recognised the value of that experience to their combat effectiveness. Following closely behind the infantry of 3rd Division in the first phase of the attack on 8 August 1918, the men of the 3rd Pioneers knew they were a significantly more experienced, efficient and well-organised formation than during ‘the bad days of Ypres’ a year earlier. Important lessons had been assimilated, including those drawn from the defensive operations in the spring. This led one soldier to conclude that:

Perhaps, after all, the big German offensive had been the best thing which could have happened, if it taught the value of the unlimited objective, and generally a wider view of things than had previously existed.158

Little distinguished the Digger from the Tommy in 1918 apart from idiosyncratic, superficial differences that had little bearing on either’s capacity to undertake operations. Most Australians in the early Twentieth Century craved a national identity but only within the well-established imperial British framework. They were, after all, provincial Britons. We must therefore avoid a post facto understanding of the performance of the Australian Corps that sets out merely to validate or buttress popular or contemporary aspirations of Australia and its place in the world.

156 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 114, p. 5240, cited in Stevenson, The War with Germany, pp. 210-211. 157 See Grey, A Military History of Australia (3rd Edn), p. 93. 158 M.B.B. Keatinge, War Book of the Third Pioneer Battalion, The Specialty Press Pty, Ltd, Melbourne, 1919, p. 115.

114 Chapter 2 The “Diggers,” 1918

Owing to the dearth of fresh recruits, the Australian Corps contained an unusually large percentage of battle-hardened veterans in the final months of the war. These men were familiar with life in the line and well versed in the principles of British doctrine, as well as the latest developments in battlefield technology. This reliance on seasoned veterans came with a significant cost, however, as the cumulative strain of army life on pre-war civilians detrimental in the long term to the psychological and physical well-being of the men. This became increasingly apparent as the advance wore on, unit numbers fell dramatically, and even more was asked of increasingly battle-weary men. Their mettle and resilience were tested severely by widespread exhaustion and some of the hardest fighting of the war. The impact of this strenuous period upon the men, and the implications that had for their combat effectiveness, will be examined next.

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CHAPTER 3

STRAIN AND DISCIPLINE

Many of the issues that confronted the Australian Corps during August and September 1918 stemmed from a desperate shortage of manpower.1 The AIF had suffered particularly heavily during the previous twelve months and too few volunteers were stepping forward to replenish the fighting ranks. The chronic shortage of fresh recruits saw numerically weak units going over the top during the advance, with more increasingly asked of fewer. The strain on all troops was enormous, and particularly for those early volunteers who had already experienced more than their share of heavy fighting during the war. Exhaustion levels rose within the ranks, compounded by the broiling summer heat and heavy autumn rains, as well as constant moves into and out of the advancing line.

The performance of the Australian Corps during the final advance 1918 therefore sits at the intersection of two apparently competing narratives. As Bean noted at the end of September 1918, “Australian battalions had never been so effective as in the last month when they were all far below strength.”2 The final advance appears on the one hand to be a period of almost unbridled battlefield success for the Corps but at the same time many of its units were chronically understrength and beset by a myriad of internal problems including exhaustion, ill-discipline and widespread absenteeism. Having considered the quality, training and experience of the troops comprising the Corps in mid-1918, this chapter will examine the impact this extraordinarily strenuous period of warfare on the numerical strength of units, as well as the physical and emotional well-being of the men themselves, and the implications that had for its operational capability as a whole.

1 The French and German armies had both already undertaken a similar restructure. 2 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 936.

Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline

The five Australian divisions had suffered 77,000 casualties during the murderous offensives of 1917.3 This included 20,000 dead, which was well over an entire division. Unsurprisingly, the infantry suffered most heavily, with over 80% of those killed from its ranks.4 With no end to the war in sight, Birdwood informed the Australian government in November that at least 7,000 new recruits were required every month to keep all five divisions at fighting strength when operations resumed in the spring. Bean placed the figure at 5,400 but the failure of the conscription plebiscite in October 1917 meant little chance of even that being achieved.5 Only about 2,000 volunteers enlisted in each of January and February 1918, while in March the number fell to a mere 1,500.

To address the problem in the short term, the embryonic 6th Division then forming in England was disbanded and its troops used to reinforce the other five. Men were also combed out of non-combatant units during winter months of 1917-1918 and sent to the fighting formations while they rested at Hazebrouck.6 In this way, most front-line units were largely replenished by the time the German offensives commenced in March 1918. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions each exceeded 13,000 rifles, while even the battered 4th Division counted more than 12,000.7

3 Butler gives the number of AIF personnel killed in 1917 as 20,036, and the total casualties (including killed) as 76,836. See Butler, AOH Medical Services Vol. III, p. 896. The CWGC lists 19,963 AIF dead buried in France and Belgium, who died between 1 January and 1 November 1917. Commonwealth War Graves Commission register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 15 October 2013. About 38,000 Australian casualties were suffered during the fighting at Passchendaele, at an average of 450 a day. These casualties were suffered primarily in April and May at Bullecourt, and between June and November in the Ypres salient. See also Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920, CPI Antony Rowe, Eastbourne, pp. 263-264; Bean, AOH Vol. V, p. 1; Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 204; Gammage, The Broken Years, p. 190. 4 Commonwealth War Graves Commission register, http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx, accessed 15 October 2013. According to the CWGC register, 16,500 (82%) of those listed belonged to infantry units. A further 1,424 (7.1%) belonged to the Australian Field Artillery. Commanding officers were not spared either. Included among the dead in 1917 was the most senior Australian to be killed during the war, Major-General William Holmes, commander of the 4th Division. Holmes was killed rather unluckily behind the line by a stray shell on 2 July 1917, while leading the NSW Premier, William Holman, on an inspection of the front. This earned Holmes the unenviable distinction of being the highest-ranked Australian to die in the war. 5 Also in Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 875. See also Michael Tyquin, ‘Unjustly accused? Medical authorities and army recruitment in Australia 1914-1918’, Journal of Military and Veterans Health, Vol. 22 No 2 (June 2014), p. 27. 6 According to Butler, 19,645 Australian battle-casualties and 80,988 non-battle casualties returned to the line during 1917, and another 66,837 fresh reinforcements were taken on strength. Butler, AOH Medical Services Vol. III, p. 923. 7 In all, there were more than 120,000 Australian soldiers in Europe by the end of March 1918. Australia. Army. Australian Imperial Force (1914-1921), Australian Imperial Force: statistics of casualties, etc. compiled to 30th June, 1919, Records Section, AIF, London, 1919 p. 22.

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While the Australian divisions were spared the worst of the German spring offensive, it was nevertheless clear that Birdwood needed to husband his forces carefully in preparation for operations later in the year. The pool of fresh reinforcements had been largely drained, however, leaving precious few to fill the ranks as the year wore on. This is evident in the fact that 29,000 men re-joined their units during the fighting that took place between April and June 1918 but only 12,700 fresh recruits arrived in the line during the same period.8 The increasing disparity between the number of men re-joining their units and the declining number of fresh reinforcements in the years from 1916 to 1918 is clearly borne out in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 AIF men re-joining and new reinforcements 1916-1918.9

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Rejoining New Reinforcements

8 For a discussion of the process by which wounded soldiers convalesced and were returned to the line, see Butler, AOH Medical Services Vol. II, pp. 446-481. 9 Australian Imperial Force Statistics of Casualties, etc. (compiled to 30th June 1919), Records Section, AIF Headquarters, London.

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The average infantry strength of an Australian division on the eve of the advance was 10,561, which was still about 1,500 men below establishment.10 Some individual fighting units were significantly understrength.11 The number of men in 28th Battalion on the eve of the attack at Amiens on 8 August was described as ‘very low’, for example, having received no reinforcements since May.12

Figure 3.2 Total quarterly number of AIF losses 1916-1918.13

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There is a popular belief that Monash placed the welfare of the men above all other considerations and employed the most advanced battlefield technology effectively to provide them with maximum protection and minimise casualties.14 Certainly, the success at Hamel and on 8 August appeared to point in that direction. Monash himself claimed that losses during the Corps’ final two months of fighting were “only a small fraction of Australia’s contribution to the casualty toll for the whole period of the war… It was the low cost of victory after victory which spurred them on to

10 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 484. Bean also notes the average infantry strength of the four Canadian divisions on 31 July was 12,777. The NZ Division comprised 12,634 infantry. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 484n. 11 Australian Imperial Force: Statistics of Casualties, etc. (compiled 30 June 1919), Records Section AIF London. 12 28th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/45/41. 13 Australian Imperial Force Statistics of Casualties, etc. (compiled to 30th June 1919), Records Section, AIF Headquarters, London. 14 AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1.

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still greater efforts.”15 Bean, an open critic of Monash, believed the Australian commander was driven primarily by personal ambition, however, and not,

the lives of his troops and the greater interest of his side … Monash was not a leader whose operations were economical of men – although he claimed to be so. His constant raids, not always in favourable circumstances, and such operations … were as expensive as those of any commander.16

Bean supports this by pointing out that casualties in Monash’s 3rd Division in 1917 were greater than in any of the other four Australian divisions.17

The casualty figures during the advance itself appear to support Bean’s assertions. The Australian Corps suffered about 22,500 battle casualties between 8 August and 5 October 1918, including 4,660 dead.18 This was a rate of some 380 casualties a day, or more than 600 for every mile of ground gained. A further 9,128 men were evacuated because of sickness during that time.19 This amounted to nearly 13% of all Australian casualties suffered on the Western Front during more than two years of fighting but incurred in just 59 days. The Australians suffered as many casualties in their final eight weeks on the Western Front as they had throughout the entire eight-month Gallipoli campaign. The loss of more than 14,100 men in August alone made it the AIF’s third bloodiest month of the entire war.20

15 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 289. 16 AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1. 17 AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1. 18 In the immediate aftermath of the fighting, Australian Corps losses between 8 August and 5 October were given officially as 21,142 (including 3,144 dead). ‘Report on Operations of Australian Corps’ Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10. This figure is almost certainly low. Monash used these figures in Australian Victories, claiming that 3,566 men were killed, 1,432 died of wounds, 16,166 were wounded, and 79 missing. Monash, Australian Victories, p. 289. Included in these figures are some 1,500 men from British 32nd Division and nearly 1,000 from British 17th Division while under Australian command. Once they are taken into account, Australians lost 18,512 men (including 2,688 dead) between 8 August and 28 September, prior to the fighting at the Hindenburg Line. Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. According to Butler, total battle casualties for the AIF on the Western Front from 1916 to 1918 were 179,455, including 44,764 dead. Butler, AOH Medical Services Vol. I, App. 1, p. 865. 19 ‘Fourth Army Weekly Wastage Returns August-October 1918’, AWM 45/42/11. 20 Only losses suffered by the AIF in October 1917 (20,061) and July 1916 (16,361) were greater. Butler, AOHMS Vol. I, App. 1, p. 865.

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This all meant the five Australian divisions were understrength by a combined total of some 8,500 men at the beginning of September, and more hard fighting lay ahead. It was apparent that the Corps would soon run out of men. “The numbers are going down pretty fast,” Bean noted in his diary. “Battalions are going into some of these fights only 150 strong; 300 or 350 seems to be a big number in the fighting line nowadays.” The combat capability of the Australian Corps was being ground down rapidly and Bean feared his beloved ‘dominion army’ would soon cease to exist.21 At the very least, one division would have to be disbanded during the winter of 1918- 19, or early in the following spring.22

Figure 3.3 AIF wastage on the Western Front 1916-1918.23

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Infantry losses during the advance were spread fairly evenly across the divisions. Figure 3.4 (overleaf) shows a general decline in 1st Division’s fighting strength of more than 44% during the course of 1918. During the final advance itself, the average strength of a battalion in 1st Division dropped from 702 men at the

21 Bean Diary, 4 September 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/116/1. Also in Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 875. 22 Scott, AOH (Vol. XI), p. 471. 23 Australian Imperial Force Statistics of Casualties, etc. (compiled to 30th June 1919), Records Section, AIF Headquarters, London.

121 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline beginning of August to 435 by early October. This was an overall decline of 38.5% from an already diminished base.24

Figure 3.4 Total infantry strength of 1st Division during 1918.25

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The average strength of battalions in both the 2nd and 3rd Divisions on the eve of the advance was 760 but that fell to 601 and 590 respectively by 30 September. This meant a decline of 20.9% in 2nd Division and 22.4% in 3rd Division.26 Maclagan’s 4th Division fared a little better. The average strength of its battalions was 867 men on 1 August and 713 men on 28 September, an overall loss to the division of 17.8% of its strength. However, the 4th Brigade suffered particularly badly during that period, its strength dropping by some 37.9%. The general decline in 5th Division’s battalions during September was only 8%, falling from 799 to 732, but it nevertheless remained about 20% below establishment.27

24 1st Division War Diary, August & September 1918 AWM4 1/42/43 & 44. 25 1st Division War Diaries, January-October 1918, AWM4 1/42/36-45. 26 2nd Division A&Q Staff War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 1/45/33 App. 4; 2nd Division A&Q Staff War Diary, October 1918 AWM4 1/45/35 App. 4; 3rd Division A&Q Staff War Diary, August & September 1918, AWM4 1/47/21 & 22. 27 4th Brigade War Diary, August & September 1918, AWM4 23/4/35 & 36. This also reflects the fact that the strength of 5th Division was replenished as much as possible in preparation for the attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September.

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The 3rd Battalion’s experience clearly illustrates the decline in fighting strength of front-line units during the advance. The battalion first went into action on 9 August with 693 men but that fell to 619 after a week of fighting, which meant a decline of 12% of its strength.28 The battalion attacked at Chuignolles on 23 August with 614 men but suffered 176 casualties (28.7% of its strength) in just 24 hours.29 Some companies were hit particularly heavily. For example, C Company comprised 5 officers and 100 other ranks on 23 August but lost 4 officers and 60 other ranks (61% of its strength) on that day alone.30 Only 408 men moved off the tapes for the attack at the Outpost Line on 18 September. This included all 22 officers because none could be spared for the battalion nucleus. When relieved for the final time on 23 September, 3rd Battalion could muster only 308 men. It had lost more than 55% of its strength in just 47 days.31

To make matters worse, the Australian government informed Monash in the second week of September that 6,000 ‘1914 men’ would receive six months’ leave to Australia. This came only days before the planned attacks by 1st and 4th Divisions at the Outpost Line but the men had to be ready to entrain at just 48 hours’ notice.32 This inevitably resulted in a considerable loss of battlefield and administrative experience in some units. The entire staff of 8th Battalion’s headquarters left with barely a day’s notice, as did their understudies and almost all of the transport personnel. Every CQM departed, along with the battalion’s QM, RSM, all CSMs, Lewis Gun Sergeant and Provost Sergeant. A number of those men had been placed

28 3 Officers and 55 Other Ranks formed 3rd Battalion’s nucleus for the attack, giving it a total fighting strength of 751 men. 29 1st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/18/34. 30 Despite its heavy losses, C Company continued to move forward in close support of B and D Companies once they passed through at 6:15 AM. Almost immediately, D Company came under heavy machine gun and anti-tank gunfire that killed all but one of its officers. Although wounded, Lieutenant EH Jackson, DCM, remained on duty until the remnants of his company could be incorporated for the time being into the battered C Company. Having lost all of D Company’s officers, Lieutenant CLL Burrett was sent from Battalion HQ to take command of this composite formation for the next phase of the attack into the village of Chuignes itself. Wren, Randwick to Hargicourt, p. 320. 31 1st Brigade Unit Diaries August & September 1918, AWM4 23/1/37 & 38. This situation was repeated elsewhere. The strength of 39th Battalion fell from 19 officers and 249 other ranks on 26 August to 8 officers and 142 other ranks just four days later, an overall decline of 44%. 10th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/10/22, App. 22. 32 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 937.

123 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline deliberately into those positions in recent months; some were genuine promotions but others were assigned to headquarters to spare them during the advance. Despite being with the battalion since the beginning of the war, the men were ‘hustled away without warning’. There was little opportunity for farewells, which caused resentment on the part of their comrades. It also took time for the Battalion to find new transport staff, and for those men to adapt to its routines.33

Australian battalions coped with the decline in strength in a variety of ways. Many simply absorbed the losses and carried on as best they could. Some combed soldiers out of non-combatant services to strengthen the line. The companies of 4th Battalion replenished their strength in mid-September for a period by returning cooks, batmen, quartermaster and transport staff, and certain specialists (including anti-aircraft Lewis gun sections and signallers) from headquarters to platoons.34 In this way the battalion held a relatively wide frontage by placing three platoons from each company in the line, with the fourth in support to cover headquarters. Each post had to be carefully sited to ensure mutually supporting strong points, with angled machine gun and rifle fire to cover gaps, and liaison patrols worked hard to maintain communication between the positions. Despite the apparent logic of this organisation, the lack of effective fighting strength nevertheless meant many positions remained vulnerable.35

Some battalions re-organised themselves into just three companies for periods during the advance but this undermined their operational flexibility. Two days before its attack at Hargicourt on 18 September, 2nd Battalion disbanded one company because of a lack of men and went over the top only three companies strong. B Company soon suffered heavy casualties, however, which left just two companies to continue the attack. Having completed its task of mopping up, C Company was ordered forward to fill a gap on its northern flank. It came under heavy shelling

33 8th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/25/45, App. 11. 34 4th Battalion War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 23/21/43 App. 3. 35 4th Battalion War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 23/21/43 App. 3.

124 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline almost immediately from Guillemont Farm and, with no company in support, was forced to withdraw.36

Battalions also reduced their companies temporarily to two or three platoons, which had a similar effect.37 This was evident in 15th Brigade after the fighting at Péronne in early September. Reinforcements arrived on 4 September but 58th Battalion’s B Company, which comprised only one officer and 47 other ranks by that time, was re-organised into just two platoons for the attack at Flamicourt the following day.38 Both 55th and 56th Battalions were so short of men that they fought for a time as a single formation.39

Crucially, a shortage of men undermined an infantry unit’s combat capability by reducing its capacity to bring the sufficient firepower to bear. In line with British army doctrine, Australian platoons were re-organised in early 1918 into sections of Lewis gunners, rifle grenadiers, bombers and riflemen This provided considerable tactical flexibility but for a battalion to operate with maximum combat capability in 1918, it needed to be brought as close as possible to establishment (900 men) and possess the requisite 30 Lewis guns, 8 trench mortars and 16 rifle grenades, as well as an ample supply of bombs.40

The Lewis gun in particular was central to infantry attacks in the final year of the war and Australian soldiers appreciated its importance. “Rifles and Lewis guns reported on very favourably, ‘B’ Company's arms being in an exceptionally satisfactory condition,” noted one of 18th Battalion’s officers following an inspection in mid-August. “This goes to show that the ‘diggers’ know the full value of their rifles and Lewis guns and consequently look after them.”41 Monash also placed considerable stock in the weapon. According to Bean, he was willing “to take

36 Taylor and Cusack, Nulli Secundus, p. 329. 37 By the end of 12 August, for example, 18th Battalion had been reduced to just two weak platoons and had to be reorganized. 18th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/35/37 38 58th Battalion War Diary, September AWM4 23/75/32 App. 3 39 AD Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, London, 1920, p. 353. 40 SS 143 The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, pp. 7-8. See also Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale, p. 138. 41 18th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/35/37.

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the fewest possible … men into action. So long as they have 30 Lewis Guns it doesn’t matter very much what else they have.”42

Each platoon had to maintain the proper proportion of rifles and Lewis guns, and was to notify its battalion headquarters immediately if its strength fell to less than 16 men.43 However, the declining strength of Australian battalions during the advance eroded their capacity to bring concentrated Lewis gunfire to bear. One soldier might fire a Lewis gun from the hip for a short period, while two could obtain a reasonable rate of fire using a bipod, but it required a team of at least five to ensure maximum efficiency and prolonged use.44 This in turn meant at least 150 men were needed to service Monash’s 30 guns for any length of time.

The shortage of troops by the end of August left many battalions with only pairs of Lewis gunners, forcing them to leave guns behind. As Bean pointed out in early September:

An increasing difficulty for the Australians in this continuous fighting, coming after four months of ‘peaceful’ penetration was the diminishing strength of their battalions. Companies of the 34th had dwindled to 3 platoons, and the platoons to about 15 men; these were strong in Lewis guns but the gun-teams comprised only two or three men, who carried half a dozen magazines instead of 15 or 20. One company had now to guard the left and one march in reserve leaving only two, 80 rifles in all, for the main attack.45

42 Bean Diary, 8 September 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/116/1. Peter Simkins argues that the manpower shortage in 1918 was compensated to a degree by the increased availability of Lewis guns and rifle grenades. Peter Simkins, ‘‘Building Blocks’: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the BEF’s Operations, 1916-1918’, Ch VII in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 145. 43 4th Battalion War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 23/21/43 App. 3. 44 War Establishment Infantry – 1918, AWM25 327/9. A Lewis gun team of five would operate with one man firing the gun, a second on hand to change magazines, with the remaining three carrying spare magazines. Firing at a rate of 500-600 rpm, a Lewis gun would empty its magazine in five seconds. In fact, SS 143 designated a section of nine men for each Lewis gun: five to operate it and four armed with revolvers, rifles, and/or grenades, to protect the main team. When only two guns were available, sections tried to keep one in operation continually, with the second on hand to double the firepower if circumstances were appropriate. 45 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 794.

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On 9 September, companies of 60th Battalion were instructed to carry only one Lewis gun each when pursuing the Germans beyond the Somme Canal.46

The increasing shortage of specialist Lewis gunners was keenly felt and units had to take urgent measures to address the problem. In August, all available men in the Cyclist Corps were trained to use the weapon, while 2nd Brigade instructed its battalions in September to arrange ‘special classes in this arm’ to train ‘as many men … as possible’, including in the use of German machine guns.47 Despite measures such as these, the lack of well-trained and experienced Lewis gunners threatened the combat capability of units. Following the operations at the Outpost Line later in the month, a company commander in 14th Battalion reported that, “Lewis Gun teams are insufficiently trained tactically i.e. the whole team rendering themselves liable to direct fire whereas they only need to do so infrequently.”48

Specialist riflemen were also taken from sections and trained as Lewis gunners, which in turn weakened the rifle sections. On the eve of the attack at the Outpost Line in mid-September, John Mitchell (CO of 8th Battalion) wrote:

Our strength is not strong and reinforcements are practically nil, a few men, only, returning from hospital and a few reinforcements to the 37th Battalion being transferred to us. The Battalion is organised on a 3-company basis, ‘C’ Coy having been disbanded, and with 3 platoons in each company, with an average strength in each company of 104. Headquarters personnel is of necessity large since it takes almost as many in HQ to run a weak Battalion as a really strong one, which is one reason in accounting for the shortage of riflemen in a strength of 440. It is only possible to man 16 Lewis Guns, and with partially trained men. During the coming months of training, specialists will be practically the only men trained. The real rifleman is almost a novelty.49

46 60th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/77/32 App. 13. 47 Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 12/3/8; 2nd Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/2/41, App. 21. 48 14th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/31/46, App. 10. 49 ‘Commanding Officer’s Report for Month Ending September 30th, 1918’, 8th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/25/45, App. 11.

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Numerically weak battalions still attacked on fronts of 850 to 1,000 yards (sometimes up to a mile) with men necessarily spread thinly across the line.50 The 18th Battalion could muster only 13 officers and 249 other ranks for its final attack at Mont St Quentin on 31 August, which meant one man in the line for every ten yards of front.51

The manpower shortage limited the amount of firepower a unit could employ but also undermined its capacity to engage in operations for any length of time. This was apparent in 46th Battalion’s experience at the Outpost Line on 18 September. The attack began well enough but German reinforcements soon worked their way in behind the weak Australian left flank. The advance stalled on that side, holding up the neighbouring 14th Battalion’s right flank.52 Unable to progress, men in 46th Battalion tried to hold onto their positions but those on the right were forced to retire and conform before dawn on 19 September. “The cause of the withdrawal was not that the men could not cope with the situation mentally, in fact they rather enjoyed it,” noted Lieutenant Wilfred Pleasance after the action, “but it was the sheer physical impossibility for the men to carry on owing to the small number of men engaged, the prisoners taken (more than 500), and the wide front attacked, the width being 1,500 yards. Number of men engaged, about 150 all told.”53

Attacking in small numbers against determined resistance was extremely difficult – often impossible – for even the most experienced and well-trained soldiers. During operations near Joncourt at the Outpost Line in mid-September, one company of 18th Battalion advanced against heavy enemy machine gun fire. The wire in front of them was uncut, however, and the only course was to climb over it. Having managed to do so, Lieutenant Dryden and a dozen men began to work forward but were soon

50 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 936-937. 51 18th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. 52 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32. 53 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32. The 46th Battalion lost 150 men during the operation, including 1 officer killed and 5 wounded, 14 other ranks killed and 130 wounded. German prisoners captured included 17 officers and 496 other ranks.

128 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline held up because they had no longer had any Lewis guns or rifle grenades.54 Hard fighting continued throughout the morning and the defenders were eventually overcome, but only with assistance from other companies in the battalion. “The great difficulty that faced the attacking Australians,” noted the after-action report, “was the very small and dispersed nature of their force.”55

While the shortage of infantrymen was increasingly desperate, it was markedly less severe in other units that supplied supporting firepower, including, crucially, the artillery and machine guns. The decline in strength in 1st Division’s artillery was only 3.1% during August. It lost 11.2% of its strength during September but was still much better off in relative terms than the division’s infantry battalions.56 It was similar in the 5th MG Battalion, whose numbers fell during August from 52 officers and 935 other ranks to 49 officers and 880 other ranks. This was an overall decline of just 5.9%. Once again, its losses during September were greater but still comparatively light at 11.5%.57 Fewer reinforcements were therefore needed to bring these units back to establishment. In addition to returning convalescents, the arrival of 90 fresh recruits replenished the strength of 4th MG Battalion in August, and the battalion comprised still 47 officers and 845 other ranks at the end of the month.58 It lost 9 officers and 124 other ranks during September (including 4 officers and 52 other ranks on ‘1914 leave’) but received 4 officers and 179 other ranks to replace them. This meant that it had 42 officers and 900 other ranks at the end of the month, which was close to establishment.59

Another consequence of the manpower shortage was a lack of carrying parties, which had significant implications for the provision of firepower and close infantry

54 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. 55 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. 56 1st Australian Divisional War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/10/48, App. 9; 1st Australian Divisional War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 13/10/49, App. 11; 5th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/5/6; 5th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/5/7. 57 The greater decrease in September can be explained in part by the heavy fighting around Péronne early in the month (141 of the total decrease of 291 were killed in action or wounded), but also by 84 officers and men on leave to the UK. 5th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/5/7. 58 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4, App. D. 59 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/4/5, App. G.

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support. The inability to provide sufficient ammunition in time limited 2nd Division’s use of mortars at Mont St Quentin at the start of September, and restricted operations by mortars and machine guns in the 1st Battalion as they approached the Outpost Line two weeks later.60 To address the mortar situation in particular, James Robertson, commanding 6th Brigade, suggested that one gun with a double crew per battalion was sufficient, allowing those not firing the gun free to carry ammunition. He also thought that a permanent party of at least six men per battalion be established for the same purpose but it is unclear whether or not this was acted upon, if at all.61 Mark V* supply tanks were an obvious means of transporting mortars but too few were available as the advance progressed. Pack mules were also used to carry mobile reserves of mortar ammunition but the animals were obviously vulnerable to artillery and machine gun fire.62

How did the manpower situation in the Australian Corps during the advance compare to that in the BEF? The introduction of conscription in Britain in 1916 had addressed the issue of falling recruitment but the problem facing the BEF at the end of 1917 was serious nevertheless.63 The average infantry strength of the 46 active BEF divisions in August 1918 was 9,389 men (about 1,100 fewer than in Australian divisions) but this masks the fact that one in every four British battalions had been disbanded in January 1918 because of declining numbers.64 British divisions were

60 ‘Operations of 6th Infantry Brigade, August 31st – September 4th 1918’, 6th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/6/36, App. 43. ‘Report on Operations 15/9/1918’, 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, Appendix 7. 61 ‘Operations of 6th Infantry Brigade, August 31st – September 4th 1918’, 6th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/6/36, App. 43. 62 12th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/12/31, App. 19. 63 The British army suffered more than 540,000 casualties during 1917, including 122,000 dead. The number of British casualties from April to November 1917 was 542,947, including 121,903 killed. Sheffield states that 50.3% of all enlistments in the British army occurred after the introduction of conscription in the spring of 1916. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920, CPI Antony Rowe, Eastbourne, pp. 263-264. See also Gary Sheffield. Command and Morale, p. 132. In order to address the problems, Lloyd George reorganised the Ministry for National Service and combed out men from essential industries. A new Military Service Act was introduced in February 1918 but the demands of total war and resistance by the British labour movement meant the government never made up the shortfall. Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914- 1918, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1986, p. 536. As Wilson says, as 1918 dawned, Britain had “to dip deep into its barrel of manpower.” 64 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 484. Bean notes the average infantry strength of the four Canadian battalions on 31 July was 12,777, and the NZ division comprised 12,634 infantry. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 484n.

130 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline reduced from twelve battalions to nine, and brigades comprised three battalions instead of four. Not only did this result in a loss of tactical flexibility on the battlefield but British units also had to spend more time in the fighting or support lines and less in reserve. Despite pressure from the British government, the AIF did not follow suit and instead retained its four-battalion brigade and twelve-battalion divisional structures.65

It is difficult to be precise about the strength of individual British battalions in mid- 1918 because accurate figures are not always available. Boff estimates that Third Army battalions comprised between 700 and 900 men at the beginning of August.66 Battalions in III Corps were strengthened in preparation for the Amiens offensive and were probably slightly larger on average than Australian battalions but the difference was not substantial. Battalions in 36th Brigade (12th Division) comprised 965 men on average at the start of August, for example, and the strength of the battalions in 47th Division was similar.67

Similar to Australian fighting units, British casualties also climbed at an alarming rate during the advance. The number of casualties for the five main divisions (12th, 18th, 47th, 58th and 74th Divisions) that comprised III Corps for some or all of the period 8 August to 28 September was 30,438 men. This figure included 8,214 killed or missing, which was 26.9% of the total.68 A further 8,635 men from those divisions were evacuated because of sickness.69 This meant that III Corps suffered 50% more battle casualties than did the Australian Corps during the same period, including an

65 The Australian 36th, 47th, and 52nd Battalions had all been disbanded the spring of 1918 because of the manpower shortage. 36th Battalion (9th Brigade) was disbanded on 30 April; 52nd Battalion (13th Brigade) on 16 May; and 47th Battalion (12th Brigade) on 31 May. The Canadian Corps also maintained the four-battalion brigade structure throughout the war. 66 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 41. 67 The ration strength of the three infantry battalions in 36th Brigade were: 9th Royal Fusiliers – 43 Officers and 881 Other Ranks; 7th Royal Sussex – 48 Officers and 971 Other Ranks; 5th Royal Berkshire – 38 Officers and 913 Other Ranks. This was a total of 129 Officers and 2,765 Other Ranks. 36th Brigade War Diary, August 1918 WO 95/1855/3. The average strength of a battalion in 47th Division at the beginning of August was about 950 men. 47th Division A&Q War Diary, August 1918 TNA WO 95/2707. NB. 47th Division was situated north of the Ancre and did not take part in the Amiens offensive. 68 Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. 69 ‘Fourth Army Wastage Returns August-October 1918’, AWM 45/42/11.

131 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline additional 1,715 officers.70 It was a daily rate of 585 casualties over the two-month period, which was roughly the attacking strength of a battalion in mid-1918 for every 24 hours of the advance.

Losses in British divisions make for particularly sober reading. The 58th Division suffered more than 7,500 casualties (including 300 officers) during the two months, one-third of whom were lost between 6 and 13 August alone during the fighting on Morlancourt Ridge.71 This meant that 58th Division lost more than half of its establishment strength during the eight-week advance, at a daily rate of more than 130 men.72 The 12th Division fared even worse. It suffered 7,793 casualties in two months (including nearly 350 officers) at a rate of about 140 casualties a day.73 One battalion, the 7th Sussex, had experienced seven weeks of almost continuous fighting by 24 September. It lost more than 40 officers and 800 other ranks during that time, which led one soldier to observe that “the original battalion that had gone into action on 8 August had almost ceased to exist.”74

Unlike Australian units, however, the British could replenish their ranks with conscripted men and this enabled them to absorb the losses more easily. Nearly 13,500 men (including 500 officers) joined the four divisions of III Corps between 8 and 31 August.75 That fell to 415 officers and 6,412 other ranks in September but the total number of 20,430 reinforcements in two months made up about two-thirds of the losses suffered by III Corps during that time.76 In 58th Division, the 2/2nd Londons received a draft of 314 men following its operations at Chipilly on 8 to 10 August, with more arriving soon after. These included a new battalion commander (Lieutenant-Colonel J Walsh, DSO, from the Northumberland Fusiliers), a new 2-i-

70 Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. 71 58th Division lost 2,406 men between 8 and 15 August. 72 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10. The number of casualties for the 58th Division was 317 Officers and 7,225 Other Ranks; this was a total of 7,542 all ranks. 73 12th Division General Staff War Diary, August 1918 TNA WO 95/1827; 12th Division General Staff War Diary, September 1918, TNA WO 95/1827. 74 Owen Rutter (ed.), The History of the Seventh (Service) Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment, 1914-1919, Compiled by a Committee of Officers of the Battalion, The Times Publishing Company Ltd., London, 1934, p. 251. 75 These were the 12th Division, 18th Division, 47th Division, and 58th Division. 76 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10.

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C (Major SJM Sampson, MC, from the 4th Londons), and more than a dozen 2nd Lieutenants. It brought the strength of the 2/2nd Londons close to establishment once again, with 26 officers and 931 other ranks by 22 August.

The lack of reinforcements in Australian units meant their strength tended to decline steadily during the advance but the number of men in British formations fluctuated considerably with the arrival of each new draft. The three battalions of 36th Brigade in 12th Division comprised 2,894 men of all ranks at the beginning of August, for example, and could still count 2,769 on 15 September. This was an overall decline of just 4% after six weeks of heavy fighting.77 Within the division itself, the numerical strength of the 5th Berkshires fell in August from 23 officers and 718 other ranks to 14 officers and 303 other ranks by the end of the month. This was an overall loss of 424 men (including more than 250 on just two days, 22 and 26 August), or 57.2% of its strength.78 The 6th West Kent’s, suffered nearly 500 casualties between 8 August and 8 September but received 348 men (including 8 officers) in the last few days of August and was once again close to establishment.

With only a few of ‘Old Contemptibles’ left by mid-1918, there were few British soldiers with experience in mobile warfare before the advance commenced. As Charles Messenger of the 8th Londons observed:

The fighting was now very different to what it had been during the past three and a half years of war. No longer were attacks set piece across trench lines with massive preliminary bombardments and strictly limited objectives. It was very much open warfare, with troops advancing until they came under fire, and then an attack being mounted. However, it took time for the troops to get used to this more mobile fighting, and reactions were often slow, with lengthy pauses before attacks went in. The rifle,

77 36th Brigade War Diary, September 1918 WO 95/1855/3 After fighting almost continuously since drafted into 18th Division at the last minute for the attack on 8 August, 36th Brigade’s 7th Sussex was taken out of the line on 28 August for a few days to rest and refit. Badly in need of reinforcements, it received 13 officers and 253 other ranks just two days later. Owen Rutter (ed.), The History of the Seventh (Service) Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment, 1914-1919, Compiled by a Committee of Officers of the Battalion, The Times Publishing Company Ltd., London, 1934, p. 234. It was similar situation in other British divisions. 78 5th Royal Berkshire Battalion War Diary, August 1918 TNA WO 95/1856. The Berks suffered 81 casualties on 22 August and another 174 on 26 August, which equated to 45% of its trench strength in just two days.

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which had tended to take second place to more specialised trench weapons like the grenade, now really assumed its former prominence.79

Edmonds believed the arrival of new men from other units served to undermine a unit’s cohesion; in reality, it was often beneficial, in fact, as new personalities and fresh ideas could reinvigorate its ‘spirit’ and add much-needed combat experience. The 2/4th Londons (58th Division) received nearly 500 reinforcements between 10 and 22 August, including 16 junior officers from its sister London battalions.80 Most were drawn from 14th Division, which had suffered heavily during the spring. According to one of the battalion’s officers:

The drafts of young soldiers on which the Battalion had been depending of late, though of excellent material, were obviously not so desirable as fully seasoned soldiers; and the 14th Division men were therefore particularly welcome. With a seasoning of old 2/4th London men and the remnants of the KOYLI, who had come from the 16th Entrenching Battalion, they helped to make up once again a really fine Battalion.81

In any case (and as with Australian units), a lack of men did not necessarily prevent British battalions from achieving objectives. Prior to its attack against the heavily fortified village of Épehy on 18 September, the 6th Buffs comprised only 15 officers and 320 other ranks. Supported by well-placed artillery fire, the Buffs gained their objectives by evening for the loss of just 38 men.82 It is a vignette of success that would sit easily within the Australian narrative. Despite their heavy losses, the battalions of 12th Division advanced nearly 30 miles between 8 August and 28

79 Charles Messenger, Terriers in the Trenches: The Post Office Rifles at War 1914-1918, Picton Publishing, Chippenham, 1982, pp. 122-123. 80 The 2nd Lieutenants received by the 2/4th Londons at this time came from the following battalions: 1st Londons (3); 2nd Londons (3); 3rd Londons (2); 5th Londons (5); 8th Londons (2); 9th Londons (1). In addition, four 2nd Lieutenants returned to 4th Londons. 81 Clive Grimwade, The War History of the 4th Battalion The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) 1914-1919, Headquarters of the 4th London Regiment, London, 1922, p. 443. 82 6th Buffs War Diary, September 1918 TNA WO 95/1860.

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September, capturing thousands of prisoners, 22 guns, 320 machine guns, and 72 trench mortars.83

Back on the Australian front, the rising levels of strain and exhaustion inevitably ground down the combat effectiveness of Australian units but Monash continued to drive the advance as hard as he could. Whereas in previous years a battalion suffering heavy losses might expect a month out of the line (and probably longer), fighting units in mid-1918 remained in forward areas for weeks at a time, and the effects of the strain were cumulative.84 The shortage of fresh reinforcements increased the burden on men who had already suffered more than their share of heavy fighting and time in the line. Commanders wanted to press attacks home with all urgency and men were often called on to fight without sufficient time for rest and recuperation. On 12 August, after three days of hard fighting at Amiens, the commander of 5th Division, Hobbs, informed an exhausted 60th Battalion that he wanted to reward them with a long spell but all available troops were ‘required to strike hard’ while the opportunity presented itself.85 The battalion went into action again the following day.

The experience of 22nd Battalion highlights the strenuous nature of the advance during August. The battalion took part in 2nd Division’s attack on 8 August and the exploitation phase near Framerville in the days following. It remained in the forward area for the next week and took part in 6th Brigade’s failed attack at Herleville on 18 August. It was finally relieved in the line that evening. After a short ‘rest’ (which included days spent marching to and from the back areas in the summer heat) the battalion moved back into the line east of Morcourt on 25 August and commenced

83 Owen Rutter (ed.), The History of the Seventh (Service) Battalion, The Royal Sussex Regiment, 1914-1919, Compiled by a Committee of Officers of the Battalion, The Times Publishing Company Ltd., London, 1934, p. 251. 84 Typically, men with little or no combat experience first became ‘battlewise’ as they adjusted to the physical and psychological demands of the fighting. A period of high efficiency followed before the first signs of combat exhaustion appeared, which might include sleeplessness, anxiety and a loss of self-confidence. The next phase, emotional exhaustion, was more insidious and saw the soldier exhibit signs of apathy, preoccupation and almost complete withdrawal. ‘Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion’, Roy L Swank and Walter E Marchand, The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1947, Vol. 105(5), p. 549. 85 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31.

135 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline to press forward again early the following morning, by way of raids and aggressive patrols.86 Although comprising only 318 men by then, the battalion captured Dud Wood before dawn on 27 August, with forward scouts reporting that the Germans continued to withdraw.

The 22nd Battalion received orders to continue the advance that afternoon but enemy resistance stiffened and the men were forced to dig in and wait for nightfall. Two companies moved forward early in the evening but sections of Dompierre had not been mopped up, leaving Germans on the edge of the village to on them before retiring.87 The battalion prepared to attack Herbécourt in the early hours of 29 August after a short preliminary bombardment but found that the Germans had withdrawn during the night. Exhausted, the men relieved in the line but the respite was only temporary; they were fighting once again only three days later, at Mont St Quentin.

Junior commanders and officers had to be particularly attentive to the physical and psychological welfare their men, in order to keep them in the best possible condition to fight. Having attacked in the first wave at Amiens on 8 August, 44th Battalion took part in the heavy fighting around Bray a fortnight later, before ‘hopping the bags’ three times in just twenty-four hours at Suzanne on 26 August. At the subsequent muster, the battalion numbered just 250 “almost physically exhausted fighting men”. Nevertheless, the troops continued to “march, fight, and dig their way along the Somme” for another week in what was described by one soldier as a ‘continuous nightmare’.88

When 44th Battalion was finally relieved on 3 September after the heavy fighting at Bouchavesnes, the men were informed they would receive at least ten days’ rest but probably three weeks, or even a month. The brigade issued instructions that evening,

86 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/39/36. 87 ‘Report on Operations 25-30 August 1918’, 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM 23/39/36, App. 17. 88 C Longmore, ‘Eggs a Cook’: The Story of the Forty-Fourth, Colortype Press, Perth, 1921, pp. 163-166.

136 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline however, for the battalion to move off again at dawn. Wary of the troops’ likely reaction, the junior officers risked the wrath the commander, James Cannan, by not issuing the order to units until morning. The leading companies began to push forward through Péronne to Doingt early on 5 September but, fortunately, enemy resistance was only slight. As one of the men later recalled, the most significant obstacle facing the troops was not the enemy on this occasion, but exhaustion.89

Major operations took their toll on the men but so too did the more subtle and persistent action of ‘nibbling’ or ‘peaceful penetration’. “The work of silent penetration makes heavy demands on the endurance of all ranks,” reported the 22nd Battalion’s commander, Aubrey Wiltshire, at the end of the August, “and the constant advancing of the line means the movement not only of the firing line, but also of the support and reserves. Consequently, the men getting little or no sleep, and feel the strain more than if they had to carry out a straight-out attack under a barrage.”90 It was a common refrain. The battalions of 14th Brigade were not involved in the fighting at Amiens but were instructed to adopt ‘an aggressive attitude’ in the days that followed to convince the Germans that another major offensive was pending.91 They gradually edged their way forward in this way by 2,000 to 3000 yards but the Germans shelled the area constantly and included a good deal of gas.92 It was a costly period for the brigade and men would probably have preferred a single set-piece operation instead. As one soldier put it, “the ‘peaceful penetration’ process in the new area … offers attractions though it is generally a more expensive process with less satisfactory results.”93

There was little respite for soldiers in forward areas, even when not in the firing line itself. This can be seen in the experience of 4th Battalion, which remained in support

89 Longmore, ‘Eggs a Cook’, pp. 163-166. The battalion’s RMO believed the situation might have been eased if motor transport was provided for at least some of the distance covered. ‘Medical Officer’s Report for the Month of August’, 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/23, App. 5. 90 ‘Report on Operations 25-30 August 1918’, 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM 23/39/36, App. 17 91 14th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/14/29, 92 14th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/14/29, 93 14th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/14/29,

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for 1st Brigade for most of September. Its commander, Cecil Sasse, reported at the end of the month:

It will be seen during the period … that the Battalion was not actually in any attack, but the work of the battalion was of a most exhausting nature, coming as it did after the previous month of hard and bitter fighting, and spent as it was – in, and in close proximity to, the line. Indeed, one might say that, with the exception of a few days, the Battalion was never out of effective gun range, and was bombed almost continually at night. Our casualties for the period were light, surprisingly so, but the men towards the close of the month, were weary and tired, mentally and physically to the point of exhaustion. Our depleted strength and the large fronts held entailed a great strain on all ranks, and it was only after relief that the effect was most marked and noticeable.”94

It was a common refrain, and evident in Gallipoli veteran’s Hector Brewer’s diary entry in mid-August:

The fact is however that the present situation opens a favourable opportunity to first class troops of the allies to get in a smashing blow against the Hun as he is falling back at all points now. As Australians troops are reckoned second to none in the whole world it is not surprising that we are kept at it. It is a great strain on the men though. We have done a considerable amount of marching of late, and I find that my staying power is a good deal under strength since being gassed.95

Men had to march increasingly long distances as the advance progressed and this eroded their staying power. “The long march after a leave from the front line to the bivouacs, a distance of 6,000 yards, imposed a severe tax upon the little strength the men still retained,” noted 8th Battalion’s commander, John Mitchell, at the end of the month, “and it was only sheer determination and pluck that enabled them to

94 ‘Commanding Officer’s Report for Month Ending September 30th, 1918’, 8th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/25/45, App. 11. 95 Brewer Hector Brewer Diary, 14 August 1918, SLNSW MLMSS 1300/6. Enlisting as a 19-year-old in August 1914, Brewer served at Gallipoli, where he was wounded at Lone Pine and evacuated from the peninsula. In France and Belgium, Brewer served as a signals officer at Fromelles, Fleurbaix, the Somme, Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde Ridge during 1916 and 1917, before being gassed at Villers-Bretonneux on 17 April 1918. He was back in the line in time for the opening of the offensive on 8 August.

138 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline reach their destination. Upon arrival many were so completely exhausted that they sank down and slept just where they halted.”96 Brigades were often instructed to march at double intervals. Not only did that stretch the column to more than 6 miles in length but the other troops and transport often moved into the gaps, slowing the entire process.97

The hot, dry conditions in August did not help matters. The 54th Battalion marched ten miles in the heat on 13 August, as the Amiens offensive was drawing to a close. The roads were powdered with fine dust caused by heavy traffic, which made the exercise ‘rather fatiguing’, according to one soldier.98 The 2nd Division’s RMO described the situation along the main Villers-Bretonneux – St Quentin Road at the time as “something appalling owing to the continued dry weather. Warfusee, Villers- Bretonneux are continually enveloped in a thick cloud of dust.”99

Frequent moves at the height of summer were enervating and the adverse effects of life in forward areas were cumulative. The hot days of August were particularly oppressive and the continual movement of traffic and men along dirt roads and farm tracks threw up large clouds of dust. After being relieved from reserve positions during the night of 21-22 August, 32nd Battalion moved from Morcourt Valley across rough country tracks to the Aubigny area. The men undertook the march ‘under the most trying conditions’ and did not arrive at their billets until 8:30 PM. The companies did 1½ hours of physical training and bayonet drill the following morning before heading to the canal for a swimming parade in the afternoon. The battalion moved forward again only three days later and was patrolling in the line that evening.100

96 ‘Commanding Officer’s Report for Month Ending August 31st, 1918’, 8th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/25/44, App. 11. 97 3rd Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM 4/23/3/34. 98 54th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/71/32. 99 2nd Division Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32. 100 32nd Battalion War Diary, AWM4 23/47/37.

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The frequent changes of position taxed energy reserves even more. Men often had to construct new dugouts on an almost daily basis, and returned to the line tired. “Whenever the men did receive a spell,” wrote 44th Battalion’s RMO at the end of August, “they had to march back and then return to the line by, once again, marching at least the same distance and sometimes more.”101 Instead of marching back to a rest area, he believed they should have remained where they were until ordered forward once again. “In other words, while being spelt, they were rarely rested … and their efficiency was reduced considerably, as a result.”102

Australian soldiers were approaching the limits of their endurance by late August. Hobbs voiced his concerns to Monash on the eve of the 5th Division’s attack at Péronne but the Corps commander was unmoved. “When, late on the afternoon of August 31st, [Hobbs] urged upon me with much earnestness the stress upon his troops, and repeated the anxious representations of his Brigadiers,” Monash wrote, “I was compelled to harden my heart and to insist that it was imperative to recognize a great opportunity and to seize it unflinchingly.”103 Monash informed Hobbs that a six-day rest and a bath restored the elasticity of the division. After all, he claimed, “the troops are not tired – a little footsore.”104

Despite the glibness of this assessment, time away from the line could certainly be restorative, if only in the short term. It was not uncommon for men in the 7th Field Artillery Brigade to be sent back to the wagon lines to rest and recuperate, for example, and for a gun team to consist for a period of only two or three men.105 The 26th Battalion was engaged heavily in four operations during August. The advance on 8 and 9 August tired the men but the fighting on 11 August was particularly

101 ‘Medical Officer’s Report for the Month of August’, 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/23, App. 5. 102 ‘Medical Officer’s Report for the Month of August’, 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/23, App. 5. 103 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 194. According to Monash, Hobbs took this in his stride, although that is difficult to imagine. “His response was loyal and whole-hearted,” wrote Monash, “His Division followed the lead which he thus gave them, and he led them to imperishable fame.” 104 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 875. 105 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 74.

140 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline gruelling. The battalion then received a ten-day rest at Bussy, which, according to Major James Alexander, “acted as a great reviver to the troops, more especially as it brought them in contact with the civilian life again and thus effected a complete change in their surroundings. … As a result the operations towards the close of the month were undertaken with vigour and the men at the present moment are looking quite fit and cheerful.”106

Following the fighting at Bouchavesnes in early September, the 42nd Battalion rested briefly before pressing the German retirement to the Outpost Line. The troops had already taken part at least nine separate attacks during of August.107 Lieutenant Herbert Crail described his company’s six-mile approach to the line on 5 September. It was “carried out under trying conditions caused by heavy traffic and dust on the roads,” he wrote, “combined with an oppressive heat which was of a fatiguing nature.”108 After assembling in the trenches on a dark night, Crail’s company moved forward again at 11:40 PM through copses and along a valley before encountering fire just short of the Green Line, where the attack stalled.109 Artillery support was arranged and the advance continued early next afternoon, but the Red Line was not secured until nearly 6:00 PM.

The men were relieved at 2 AM on 7 September and commenced the long march back to rest in Buire Wood. They had been without sleep for more than forty hours. On finally reaching their billets, they “the men were so tired with their exertions that they were content to roll themselves in their blankets and sleep in the open.”110 This was all done in appallingly hot weather, along crowded, dusty roads, which according to Crail, left the men “fatigued in the extreme”.111

106 26th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/43/37 App. 19. 107 ‘Adjutant’s Report for August 1918’, 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/22, App. 1. These attacks were conducted on 8th, 11th, 12th, 22nd, 24th (x2), 26th, 28th, and 30th August. 108 ‘Narrative of Operations from 5th to 8th September, 1918’ (C Company), 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 1. 109 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 1. 110 ‘Narrative of Operations from 5th to 8th September, 1918’ (C Company), 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 1. 111 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 1.

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The strain was relentless. The troops of 24th Battalion rested at Cappy for three weeks after the battle at Mont St Quentin. The battalion moved forward again on the evening of 27 September and marched through Dompierre and Assevillers before bivouacking at Le Mesnil. They arrived before 1:00 AM on a particularly dark night and were the only 6th Brigade battalion not to ‘have companies lost due to the good work of the connecting file and clever map reading.’112 The next day was cold and wet. The men sought whatever shelter they could before setting off again at 7:00 PM again along muddied roads to their next bivouac near Tincourt, nearly 20 miles from their original resting place at Cappy just 24 hours earlier.113

The increasing number of casualties during the advance and lack of fresh recruits meant the Australian Corps was being forced increasingly ‘to feed on itself’, something the normally sanguine Bean knew it could ill-afford to do. The presence of a high proportion of veterans in front-line units facilitated a growing sense of fatalism within the ranks. The prospect of victory neared with every engagement but so too did the likelihood that a man might not live to see it.114 This led Bean to believe the AIF verged on physical and ‘moral’ collapse. He had already noted in May that, “the length of the war is beginning to try some of the older hands. A man gets sick at heart – stays away 24 hours – and then is afraid to come back. This sort of desertion is becoming more common.” 115

The pressure was not confined solely to the ranks. The demands placed upon staff officers were almost unceasing during this time and proved too much for some. On 28 August, prior to the fighting at Péronne, Lieutenant-Colonel John Peck, CMG, DSO, who was GSO 1 of 5th Division and a highly-regarded pre-war regular, “was overcome by the constant strain of major operations”, suffering a breakdown while carrying out a reconnaissance of the line with his CO, Hobbs, and was evacuated to

112 24th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/41/36. 113 24th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/41/36. 114 Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, p. 364 115 Bean, AOH Vol. V, p. 1. Bean Diary, 14 May 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/110/1. See also Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, pp. 113-114.

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England. Peck was by all accounts an outstanding and well-loved soldier. Gellibrand thought that he “was out of the top drawer as a soldier”, while Bean described him as “one of the best officers in the A.I.F.” 116

The 59th Battalion’s RMO reported early in September that the men had reached ‘the limit of their endurance’.117 Ellis described troops in 5th Division during that month as “gaunt skeletons of the proud formations that had fought so blithely years ago.” He went on to say that the fighting,

summoned to the assembly line thousands of men sick almost unto death, physically enervated, nervously bankrupt. Even in the 5th Australian Division men were breaking under the strain. Men who had been decorated and redecorated for acts of the highest courage were now deserting it; if, that is, to creep away for a week and sleep in some dingy cellar and then to return to battalion headquarters and say, ‘I was knocked up. I have been away for a sleep and a rest. I’ll take whatever punishment is coming to me. I’m alright for the line again now’. If that constitutes deserting.118

The impact of this period upon the capacity of men to undertake operations for any length of time were obvious. The 25th Battalion’s RMO described his experience of men evacuated with ‘shell shock’ or ‘Not Yet Diagnosed’ (NYD) and treated for a ‘more or less prolonged period’ at base before being returned to the line. “I think I am correct in stating,” he noted, “that every one of these cases became AWL when the battalion had to go into action.”119 Often men suffering from shell shock (or some other nervous disorder) but court-martialled for AWL would serve their punishment but re-offend soon after returning to the line. Some

116 Ellis, Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 342. The precise nature of Peck’s illness is difficult to determine. While Ellis implies that it was a nervous breakdown, the 5th Division War Diary states simply that Peck was ‘seized with a fit and taken to the CCS’. 5th Divisional War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/50/30. The entry for Peck in the ADB, however, makes the point that Peck had suffered from illness for much of the war, which he had borne ‘with great courage’. See A. J. Hill, ‘Peck, John Henry (1886–1928)”, ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/peck-john-henry- 8007/text13953, accessed online 14 June 2016. Men serving under Peck were similarly impressed, including Albert Jacka (14th Battalion), who is reported to have said simply, “He’ll do me.” 117 59th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/76/32, App. 12. 118 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, pp. 362-363. 119 ‘Special Note re. NYD’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25.

143 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline even encouraged others to do likewise.120 The effects were residual. Even if a man did not re-offend after returning to the line, he might well prove to be, in the view of one RMO, “an expense, a hindrance, and has a very bad effect on his comrades, as it is well known that one man who ‘has the wind up’ will tend very much to ‘put the wind up’ his mates too.”121 None of this served the interests of units being drained of their physical and emotional strength but advancing in the face of increasing resistance.

Absenteeism and desertion within the Australian ranks reached endemic proportions during the advance and the comparison with III Corps during the same period is stark, as is evident in Figure 3.5 (overleaf). With the manpower shortage already a significant problem, 20th Battalion had about 80 men (15% of its strength) AWL at the end of August.122 This only increased the burden on those remaining with the unit. At 60th Battalion’s parade on 24 August, Herbert Layh read a message from Haig to Australian officers and NCOs, in which the British GOC expressed frustration at the situation in the AIF, particularly at “a time like this when every available man was needed.” Layh instructed every NCO to write down the reasons that men absented themselves. Elliott addressed his 15th Brigade after church parades the following morning and spoke at length about the severity of the situation.123

The Australian soldier of the First World War has long held a notorious although cherished popular reputation for being difficult to control, particularly when out of the line.124 In Bill Gammage’s words, however, the Digger of 1918 was not

120 ‘Special Note re. NYD’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25 It was suggested by the RMO that any man evacuated for NYD should never to the firing line. The obvious objection was that others would follow suit but he dismissed the idea, believing that evacuated men would soon be ‘forgotten’, and that greater time, expense and inconvenience was incurred if he returned to the line and re-offended. The idea was never adopted. 121 ‘Special Note re. NYD’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 122 Bean Diary, 14 May 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/110/1. 123 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31. 124 Peter Stanley, Bad Characters: Sex, Crime, Mutiny, Murder and the Australian Imperial Force, Pier 9, Murdoch Books Australia, Sydney, 2010, pp. 126-127.

144 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline necessarily the ‘intractable individualist’ of 1915, and was more tolerant of important military procedures and formalities. Nevertheless, many Australian soldiers retained a deep-seated contempt for army regulation and, were increasingly likely to “assert [their] independence with practised guile and unrelaxed persistence.”125 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the escalating strain of the advance resulted in a breakdown of discipline in some units, particularly during September.

Figure 3.5 Provost-Marshal’s summary of convictions classified in charges during August and September 1918.126

Desertion Absence All other Total convictions Australian Corps 1st Division 44 56 10 110 2nd Division 73 98 38 209 3rd Division 11 36 3 50 4th Division 63 99 27 189 5th Division 25 57 17 99 Total 216 346 95 657 Average per Division 43.2 69.2 19 131.4

III Corps 12th Division 1 7 15 23 18th Division 2 5 10 17 47th Division 0 4 6 10 58th Division 0 1 1 2 Total 3 17 32 52 Average per Division 0.6 3.4 6.4 10.4

Monash leant heavily on his divisional commanders throughout the advance, particularly when it came to matters of discipline. He also instructed battalion commanders in mid-August to pay close attention to ‘slackness’, which he thought was “more noticeable at the present time than it has been for a long time

125 Gammage, The Broken Years, pp. 230-231. 126 Administrative Staff, Headquarters, Australian 2nd Division War Diaries, August-October 1918, AWM4 1/45/33-35.

145 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline previously.”127 Australian officers held considerable authority and punitive power but most relied on influence and personality to maintain order, particularly in front- line units. They did this by sharing the privations and hardships of the men, encouraging and cajoling them and, on occasion, even moderating directions from above.128

Some took a different approach that did not necessarily endear them to their men. One was Major Leslie Fussell, who was given temporary command of 17th Battalion after the fighting at Amiens. “He was a crank on discipline,” wrote one soldier, “which as far as I could see meant saluting, boot polish and brass and shaving soap. He lined us all up the first day and told us he expected to permanently in charge of the 17th Battalion and that discipline would have to be improved and that we were about the worst in the British Army in that respect.”129

The manpower shortage, heavy workload and escalating exhaustion saw an increasing number of acts of open defiance. The problem was not consistent across the five divisions, however, which suggests that good discipline could be maintained if units were administered appropriately. The Assistant Provost Marshall (APM) of the Australian Corps in 1918, Lieutenant-Colonel William Smith, described the 4th and 5th Divisions as the worst in terms of crime during this period, while Gellibrand’s 3rd Division was “far and away the best.”130 Bean downplayed criminality within Australian ranks in the Official History but expressed more candid views in his diary, while at the same time protecting the image of longer-serving veterans. “They are letting the criminals of Australia come over here now,” he wrote, “letting a man off a sentence to go into prison on the condition that he will enlist

127 4th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/21/43, App. 4. Monash drew particular attention to dress (‘ill- fitting clothing in a bad state of repair’), saluting (‘gradually becoming extinct’), gambling (‘’Two-Up’ being publicly played on every possible occasion’), march discipline (‘great slackness … noticeable amongst the Companies and Transport’), and duties (‘guards and picquets not uniformly turned out … sentries not au fait with the compliments to be paid, etc.’). 128 Stanley, Bad Characters, pp. 126-127. 129 Papers of Private Herbert Eric Churches, AWM PR01478. 130 4th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/21/43, App. 4; Bean Diary 18-22 June 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/116

146 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline and come over here. It is a wildly foolish thing to do – to ruin the good name of Australia for the sake of a quota of recruits.”131

Enforcing discipline drained resources and placed an imposition on all concerned. The search for absentees in particular consumed valuable time and manpower, as did the subsequent need to escort and guard offenders. Courts-martial were laborious and required a large number of men, not only to staff them but also to act as witnesses. The administrative burden was also significant and the amateurish nature of many trials resulted in numerous reviews and appeals, only prolonging the process.132 Furthermore, it was not unusual for men whose actions verged on ‘desertion’ to be charged with the lower-grade crime of AWL, which resulted in a lesser Field Punishment. There was also a reasonable chance that higher authority might commute the punishment for absenteeism, resulting in a ‘false leniency’ that encouraged more men to desert and accept the risk of being caught.133

War-weariness affected most formations in the British army in 1918 but problems concerning discipline were significantly greater in the Australian Corps than in comparable BEF or Dominion formations. For every British, Canadian, New Zealand or South African soldier in military prison in the final year of the war, there were about nine Australians.134 Of the 485 convictions by courts-martial recorded by Fourth Army during August, 271 (55.8%) were from the five Australian divisions. More than eight out of every ten were for AWL (53.5%) or desertion (28.4%).135 The British divisions of III Corps recorded fewer than 60 convictions during August, or about 20% of the Australian number. That figure included only one for desertion

131 Bean Diary 18-22 June 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/116. 132 ‘Special Note re. NYD’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25; Stanley, Bad Characters, pp. 71-72. 133 ‘Special Note re. NYD’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25 134 ‘Military Prisons in the Field. BEF. France’, in Statistical Abstract of Information Regarding the Armies at Home and Abroad, IWM 83558, cited in Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 115. 135 NB. 32nd British Division also recorded one conviction for desertion and one for AWL, while part of the Australian Corps in August. Fourth Army A&Q War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/445/2.

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and nine AWL.136 It is important to remember that the higher Australian figures occurred despite comparatively fewer men in the ranks, which only exacerbated the problem. Figure 3.6 shows a comparison of formal discipline in the Australian Corps and III Corps during the two-month advance, while Figure 3.7 (overleaf) shows a comparison of absenteeism.

Figure 3.6 Australian Corps and III Corps courts-martial in August and September 1918.137

120

100

80

60

40 No. of Courts Matial Courts of No. 20

0

Aust Corps III Corps

The contrast between the Australians and the British soldiers in III Corps during September was even plainer. Of the 538 convictions recorded in Fourth Army during the month, 394 (73.2%) were Australian. This included 193 for AWL and 139 for desertion.138 III Corps recorded only 33 convictions for the same period.139 This was 8.4% of the Australian total, just 6.1% of Fourth Army’s for the period, and included only six deserters and nine convictions for AWL.140 Given the low

136 These were the 12th, 18th, 47th, and 58th Divisions. Fourth Army A&Q War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/445/2. 137 Administrative Staff, Headquarters, Australian 2nd Division War Diaries, August-October 1918, AWM4 1/45/33-35. For data table, see Appendix 5. III Corps figures for 31 August are not recorded. 138 This figure of 394 convictions within the Australian Corps comprises 361 (67.1%) convictions from the Australian divisions and another 33 (6.1%) Corps troops. A further 21 convictions involved troops of 32nd Division, which was under the command of the Australian Corps at the time. 139 The five divisions in III Corps for part or all of September were 12th, 18th, 47th, 58th, and 74th Divisions. 140 Another 15 troops in III Corps were convicted by courts-martial in September, including four for AWL. Despite their reputation for irreverent behaviour, only five Australians were convicted for ‘disobedience’ during September. Fourth Army A & Q War Diary, September 1918, TNA WO 95/445/4.

148 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline numerical strength of Australian units in comparison to those in III Corps, the number of men who failed to take their place in the line severely threatened the combat flexibility and capability of the Corps by decreasing small-unit fighting strength and increasing the general workload for those that remained.

Figure 3.7 Absenteeism in Australian Corps and III Corps in August and September 1918.141

180 160 140 120 100 80 60

No. of absemtees 40 20 0

Aust Corps III Corps

In September, stress fractures in the Corps’ internal structure became increasingly obvious. As we have seen, the AIF had resisted calls by the War Office in early 1918 to adopt a three-battalion brigade structure. The manpower shortage did see three battalions disbanded in May, however, and as the final advance progressed Monash anticipated that more reductions were inevitable. In the event, he received instructions to that effect from the government on 19 September. The greatest numerical shortage (both actual and prospective) was in the 18 NSW and 18 Victorian battalions.142 Monash consulted his brigadiers before nominating the 19th, 21st, 25th, 37th, 42nd, 54th and 60th Battalions for disbandment, with the troops distributed to other battalions in their respective brigades.143 Commanders anticipated some resentment on the men’s part but hoped the ‘deplorable slur’ on

141 III Corps figures for 31 August are not recorded. 142 ‘Birdwood letter to GOC 2nd Division, Australian Corps, 10 September’, 6th Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/6/37, App. 7. 143 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 937.

149 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline the reputation of the Corps that would result should ensure “no man … would willingly bring [it] about”.144

That belief was misplaced. Men in the 37th and 60th Battalions obeyed every command at their parades on 22 September except the last: the instruction to move off to new units. Walter McNicoll, 10th Brigade’s commander, addressed the men of 37th Battalion. While the officers and NCOs joined the 38th Battalion as ordered, the troops refused. The division’s commander, John Gellibrand, took the unusual step of speaking to the men directly without any officers present, but to no avail.145 Monash himself then received a delegation of men and listened to their grievances. In the event, the Corps commander relented and convinced Rawlinson to delay the order until after the operation at the Hindenburg Line. Bean noted simply in the Official History that the “refusal was eventually overcome”.146

These ‘disbandment mutinies’ have long viewed through the lens of ‘mateship’, which holds to the view that men possessed considerable pride in their battalion and were therefore justified in refusing to see it broken up. The protests were in stark contrast to the comparatively straightforward process of disbanding three battalions earlier in the year, however; at that time, the military situation was significantly direr and men less likely to voice vigorous opposition as a result. In other words, it would appear that questions of mateship and unit pride could be relatively easily set aside for the greater good. In September, however, and with victory in sight, they were not.

From an operational standpoint, the refusal to disband militated against the combat capability of not only their own understrength battalion but also the battalion that would receive the extra men. The redistribution of troops would mean slightly fewer formations but more would brought up to strength and able to employ maximum

144 6th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/6/37 (Appendix 7). 145 Bean Notebook ‘August-October 1918’, AWM38 3DRL 606/203/1, p. 44. 146 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 875-876. In the event, the 37th Battalion remained as a fighting formation until after the Australians were withdrawn from the line in October.

150 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline small-unit firepower on the battlefield. In other words, it was more efficient to have one full battalion at full strength with a full complement of weaponry than two battalions at half-strength with less firepower and the inevitable reduction of combat capability and stamina. It also required the same number of staff for a battalion of 300-400 men as it did for one of 750, which further underscored an inefficient use of resources.147

Not everyone escaped punishment following the disbandment mutinies. Charles Story had replaced the highly regarded Charles Knox-Knight as commander of 37th Battalion following the latter’s death near Proyart on 11 August.148 In marked contrast to Knox-Knight, one officer described Story as “born to lead but never to command.”149 Story was a courageous and decorated soldier but poor administrator and “rather downright and impulsive, particularly when the welfare of his men was concerned.”150 On learning of the order to disband, Story asked 10th Brigade’s temporary commander, John Lord, for the directive to be reconsidered. Having been told that was impossible, Story took his protest directly to the commander of 3rd Division, Gellibrand, and even to Monash, Birdwood and the Australian Prime Minister himself, Billy Hughes, who was visiting London at the time. This disregard for the chain of command saw the “powers that be … [fall] on Story like an avalanche.”151 Story was removed from command and sent back to England. The situation was papered over but the fabric of the Corps was fraying.152

There were similar demonstrations in the weeks that followed, although not on the same scale or with the same ramifications. The 6th Brigade’s depleted strength prior to its attack against the Beaurevoir Line on 3 October saw battalions re-organised along three-company lines. “It has therefore become necessary to disband one of

147 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 935. 148 Knox-Knight’s death is described more fully in Chapter 2. 149 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 142. 150 NG McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh: ‘History of the Thirty-Seventh Battalion AIF’, Modern Printing Co. Pty. Ltd, Melbourne, 1936, p. 248; 151 McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh, p. 248 152 Ekins, ‘Fighting to exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, pp. 115. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 936-937.

151 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline our companies,” wrote one officer, “and after serious consideration C Coy was named as the company to go … C Coy was naturally hurt and a deputation came to the CO but after the maths was explained thoroughly the men very sensibly accepted the inevitable with fine dignity and sense of duty.”153

Of even greater concern were incidents of whole-unit combat refusal, the first recorded instance of which took place on 5 September. The troops in 59th Battalion were to have been relieved late on 4 September following the fighting at Péronne, and the companies began to move out after dark. Having already passed battalion headquarters, the men were ordered to stand fast and prepare to move forward once again the next morning in order to move through Péronne and establish a position to the rear of the 57th Battalion’s outpost.

Many of the exhausted men were suffering from the effects of gas that drenched the area and the final platoon did not reach its billeting area until 3:30 AM on 5 September, with most spending the night in an open trench. The battalion then received an order at 5:00 AM to move forward within the hour but troops in B Company (and a few in A Company) refused. Some junior officers sympathized with the men, believing it was the only way to impress their concerns upon higher command. The battalion commander, James Scanlan, informed his brigade commander, Elliot, of the situation. According to Scanlan, “the men ... were in an exhausted condition after their trying experience of the last few days but this was no excuse for their refusing to go forward.” Scanlan was instructed to push on with the remaining three companies and leave the remaining one company where it was. He then handed his resignation to Elliot but it was not accepted.

The mutinies also point to the level of anti-British sentiment that existed with Australian ranks at that time. Its development can be traced back to the earliest days

153 24th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/41/36.

152 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline at Gallipoli and it has long been enshrined deeply within the mythology of Anzac.154 Following the combat refusal by 59th Battalion’s B company on 5 September, the men informed Scanlan that they:

did not consider that the Australians were getting a fair deal: they had been in the fighting zone since the beginning of February last and promises of a Corps relief were never fulfilled. They considered they were being exploited for the benefit of English Units and the only course open to them in their present exhausted condition was to remain where they were. The nature or amount of punishment meted out to them was of no consequence.155

A more serious incident occurred only a few weeks later. Having been relieved on the night of 18 September following heavy fighting at the Outpost Line, more than 120 men in 1st Battalion refused to return to the line on 21 September after their leave was suddenly cancelled. They had already reached bivouac when they received an order on the morning of 20 September to assist in an improvised attack by the four tired divisions of III Corps.156 It came at what Bean described as “a difficult time”. D Company had also lost nearly every officer in the recent fighting. Its NCOs, many of whom were inexperienced in the role, made representations to Lieutenant George Steen, and drew attention to the physical and emotional condition of the men.157 Steen dismissed these concerns and instructed the NCOs to prepare for the attack.158 The battalion commander, Bertie Stacy, spoke to the men but their resolve hardened. When the time came to attack, only three diminished companies went forward, comprising 10 officers and about 80 men in all. Supported by accurate machine gun and artillery fire, however, the operation was successful.159

154 Dale Blair, ‘‘Those Miserable Tommies’: Anti-British Sentiment in the Australian Imperial Force, 1915-1918.’ War and Society, Vol. 19, No. 1 (May 2001). 155 15th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM 4/23/15/31. 156 The Australians were to hold 500 yards of the southern flank, southwest of Malakoff Wood. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 933. 157 Only Steen and Lieutenant Blake remained but both would be wounded (Steen, mortally) on 21 September. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 932-933. 158 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, pp. 158-159. 159 The men involved in the attack on 21 September were distributed as follows: A Coy – 41 men; B Coy – 18 men; C Coy – 19 men; D Coy – 0 men. 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, Appendix 12; Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’, in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 117; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 933-934. Mutiny was

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There can be little doubt that combat fatigue played a part in this episode and NCOs stated repeatedly at the subsequent trials that the men were not fit to attack.160 One officer in 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Sydney Traill, told the court-martial hearing that, “the men had had a hard time and their nerve was just about gone to shreds.”161 The commander of 1st Brigade, Iven Mackay, had also noted in his diary a few days earlier that 1st Brigade was no longer “up to concert pitch in attack”.162

As Ashley Ekins has pointed out, however, the 1st Battalion had experienced heavy fighting during the previous four weeks but it was not exceptional in this regard when compared to other units. Stacy himself placed the blame squarely on the men. He claimed that they “have NOT had a hard time as we have known hard times in the past but shelling has been fairly constant near their dugouts and their nerves seemed on edge and they made themselves believe they were not fit to take part in an attack.”163 He also highlighted the “over-mention of the troops in the newspapers and believed they over-valued themselves in comparison to others.”164 Bean ennobled the event by describing it in industrial relations terms, regarding it to be “more of a strike than a mutiny”.165 He blamed a handful of ‘recalcitrants’ who led others “too weak not to follow”.166

one of two crimes within the AIF punishable by death but 119 men were charged with the non-capital offence of desertion. All except one were found guilty and given prison sentences ranging from 3 years (for privates) to 10 years (for NCOs). The 118 convicted men were held in an Australian Corps compound until 19 December 1918, and then transferred to the No. 11 French military prison at Audricq. The men were sent to England on 30 March 1919 to serve out the remainder of their sentences at HM Prison Portland but General Hobbs (who succeeded Monash as acting lieutenant-general and Corps commander on 28 November 1918) recommended remittance, which was granted on 25 April 1919. Edward Garstang, ‘Crime and Punishment on the Western Front: The Australian Imperial Force and British Army Discipline’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2009, p. 166. See also Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 939-940. 160 1st Battalion AIF Field General Court Martial, AWM25 52/122, pp. 2-6. 161 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p. 157. 162 Iven Mackay Diary, 19 September 1918, AWM38 3DRL 6850/6. 163 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, App. 12. Also cited by Ekins, ‘Fighting to exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 119. 164 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, Appendix 12; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 933. Garstang attributed the men’s action to ‘group think’, which also had a positive effect in bolstering a formation’s sense of identity. Edward Garstang, ‘Crime and Punishment on the Western Front: The Australian Imperial Force and British Army Discipline’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2009, p. 227. 165 Bean Diary, 27 September 1918, AWM38 3DRL 606/117/1. 166 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, App. 12.

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Significantly, the profile of the mutineers did not differ significantly from the average Australian soldier in terms of background, length of service, time spent with the battalion, medical history, disciplinary records or bravery awards.167 Instead, it seems clear that the strain of operations had worn the men down to the point that they were losing the will to fight.168 The fact so many men refused to go forward with their comrades in a comparatively minor action also flies in the face of the supposedly unbreakable bond of mateship believed to exist within Australian ranks, however. Furthermore, the incident in 1st Battalion was also not the last event of its kind. A few days later, on 25 September, a dozen men of the 3rd Australian Tunnelling Company refused orders to move forward. The mutineers were court- martialled and received sentences of one to two years.169

The Australian Corps in mid-1918 comprised more than its share of well-trained, battle-hardened soldiers, and that contributed to its combat effectiveness in the final months of the war. It is far from a complete explanation for the Corps’ success, however. While the accumulated experience of the men no doubt contributed to the Corps’ battlefield effectiveness, the resultant fatigue and strain resulted in internal difficulties that beset front-line units and even threatened the resolve of some to undertake operations. Ironically, the peculiar nature of a Corps comprising a large percentage of experienced, long-serving volunteers therefore undermined its capacity to function in the longer term as an effective front-line formation.

The casualty figures during the advance show that Monash was not sparing of his men’s lives in his pursuit of victory. As a result, any assessment of the Australian Corps’ effectiveness during the final advance must be qualified by the terrible human toll exacted. While victory is often measured simply in terms of ground gained, prisoners taken, and weapons captured – as Monash was inclined to do – these are not the only indicators of military effectiveness. As has already been pointed out,

167 Ekins, ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 118. 168 Stanley, Bad Characters, p. 210; Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 189. 169 Ekins ‘Fighting to Exhaustion’ in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, pp. 120-121. The convicted mutineers had their sentences suspended on 25 April 1919.

155 Chapter 3 Strain and Discipline victory is the outcome of battle but not necessarily an accurate gauge of what the organisation does in battle; any assessment of military effectiveness must therefore consider the proportional cost to the fighting force.170 With that in mind, the battlefield success of the Australian Corps in the final months of the war was dearly bought.

The advent of more open warfare in August and September 1918 tested the Corps’ resilience and discipline across the board. The strain on the battle-weary units tore at its fabric and that only increased with every day of the advance. Mounting casualties and a lack of fresh reinforcements saw fighting units bled white, depriving them of small-unit firepower, operational flexibility and collective stamina. At an individual level, the burden on a dwindling number of men in the line rose at an exponential rate and played out in escalating rates of ill-discipline, absenteeism and desertion. The more determined Monash was to drive his exhausted, understrength formations on to victory, the less likely the prospect of his Corps being in the line at the end to witness it.

Without the luxury of a large pool of fresh reinforcements to replenish the ranks, front-line units had to do everything within their power to ensure all available men were kept in the best possible condition to fight throughout, and provisioned with sufficient weapons, ammunition and supplies. If we are to explain the achievements of the Australian Corps in August and September 1918, we must look beyond superficial and simplistic explanations grounded in idealised national tropes and look instead to more prosaic operational factors. This in turn placed enormous pressure on the systems that supported them and facilitated their ability to undertake operations. How effectively those systems coped with the challenges posed by this extraordinary period of mobile and comparatively fast-paced operations will be addressed in the chapters to follow.

170 Allan R Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organisations’, International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer, 1986), pp. 37-38.

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CHAPTER 4

COMMANDERS AND COMMAND

Having considered the experience and strength of the Australian Corps’ manpower during this strenuous period of fighting, we will now turn our attention to the character and effectiveness of the senior commanders and staff responsible for planning and conducting its operations. The actions of the Corps during the final advance posed enormous challenges for the effective exercise of battlefield command and control. The period comprised large-scale set-piece operations and numerous smaller freewheeling actions across a varied and often difficult landscape. The speed of the advance and distances involved often meant insufficient time to plan and prepare for attacks, and that in turn necessarily required a flexible, decentralised approach. This chapter focuses on issues related to command during the final advance by addressing two central questions. Firstly, who were the commanders of the Australian Corps during the final advance and how well- prepared were they for the demands of mobile operations? Secondly, how effectively did those men exercise their command both before and during operations?

It is unsurprising that Monash has received the lion’s share of credit for the success of the Australians in the final months of the war, although his own assessment is typically inflated and self-aggrandising. “I won the confidence of the men I led,” Monash boasted in Australian Victories, “and have retained that confidence today. Hardly a military leader of the war has escaped criticism, but I am happy in the knowledge that I have never had to meet any criticism of my tactical leadership of the Australian field army.”1 The aura surrounding Monash has certainly grown

1 ‘Sir John Monash’, The Argus, Melbourne, 15 March 1927. Monash’s post-war reputation stands in stark contrast to that of Sir Arthur Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps in 1918. Sam Hughes, Canada’s former minister of militia and defence denounced Currie in 1919 as a “murderer, a coward, a drunkard, and almost everything else that is bad and vile.” Hughes even accused him in parliament of being an ‘incompetent criminal’ because of the heavy casualties sustained by the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days. Currie launched defamation proceedings in 1927 against an Ontarian newspaper that had repeated Hughes’ claims. He won the widely-publicised trial but it broke his health. Despite his success with the Canadian Corps during the war, and unlike other generals throughout the Empire (including Monash), Currie never received public thanks from the government during his lifetime, nor a

Chapter 4 Commanders and Command

considerably in recent decades and his star shines brightly nearly 90 years after his death in 1931.2

Monash’s celebrity rests in part on the fact he was not a British Regular before the war, but a citizen-soldier from the antipodes. He was unshackled from the hide- bound approach of the conservative, reactionary, professional and elitist commanders of the BEF, and could view operational and tactical planning through a more progressive and effective lens. Despite this popular belief, Monash shared a great deal more in common with his contemporaries in the British Army than otherwise.3 In broad military terms, Monash’s long experience with the militia forces in Australia before 1914 was influenced deeply by imperial systems and doctrine.4

cash reward. His reputation was restored only after his death in 1933. Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 (Vol. 2), Penguin Group, Toronto, 2008, pp. 631-632. 2 Monash is depicted on the Australian $100 note and his name is memorialised in the landscape both in Australia and France. His name is particularly prominent in his home city of Melbourne. Examples the City of Monash (a local government area), Monash University and the Monash Freeway. The Monash Country Club is a premier golf course in Sydney. It opened in 1950 but traces its origins a Jewish Social Golf Club that started in 1931, the year of his death. The Australian government’s Sir John Monash Centre, situated next the Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux in France, is intended to “educate a new audience about Australia’s early role in international affairs, reshape patterns of visitation to the Western Front battlefields and in so doing, provide a lasting legacy from the Centenary of Anzac.” It opened on Anzac Day 2018. Monash’s reputation has received official sanction at the highest levels of government. “Monash was a brilliant leader,” opined the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, during the launch of Tim Fischer’s Maestro John Monash: Australia’s Greatest Citizen General in 2014. “In 1918, he and the Australian Army helped to change the course of history. His tactics and organisation were the difference between victory and continuing stalemate.” ‘A Message from the Prime Minister The Hon. Tony Abott MP, on the Launch of Maestro John Monash’. http://www.publishing.monash.edu/books/mjm-9781922235596-Message-from-the-Prime- Minister-2014.pdf. Viewed 16 March 2019. Fischer led Australian National Party from 1990 to 1999 and was Deputy Prime Minister in the Howard government from 1996 to 1999. Prior to his death in August 2019, Fischer also led a popular campaign to promote Monash posthumously to the honorary rank of Field Marshal. See, for example, ‘Posthumous Promotion? Fischer Ramps Up Monash Campaign’, Sydney Jewish News, 8 December 2017. Fischer launched the campaign in 2008, and has been the Chairman of the Saluting Monash Council. Monash was promoted to General in 1929 but the push for further promotion to Field Marshall has been unsuccessful at this point. On 17 April 2017, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that the promotion would not be awarded. The campaign continues, however, and the Defence (Honour General Sir John Monash) Amendment Bill 2018 was introduced into the Australian Parliament by the Member for Indi, Cathy McGowan, on 22 October 2018; it lapsed, however, with the dissolution of the House of Representatives on 11 April 2019 prior to the Federal election. See https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r6207, viewed 17 April 2019. 3 Monash attended an exclusive private school in Melbourne (Scotch College) from which he graduated dux in 1881, before going on to Melbourne University to study engineering. Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 8. 4 Monash joined the University company of the Victorian Rifles in 1884 as a 19-year-old before transferring to the North Melbourne Battery of the Metropolitan Brigade of the Garrison Artillery two years later. Monash was given command of the Victorian section of the CMF’s Intelligence Corps in 1908 and gained valuable experience in mapping and staff work before taking command of 13th Infantry Brigade in 1913. Monash also won the first army gold-medal essay competition in 1911 on ‘The Lessons of the Wilderness Campaign, 1864’ (Commonwealth Military Journal, April 1912). Geoffrey Serle, ‘Monash, Sir John (1865–1931)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/monash-sir-john- 7618/text13313, published first in hardcopy 1986, accessed online 20 December 2017.

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Monash had spent 30 years in the CMF by 1914 and was thoroughly conversant with the latest developments in British military doctrine, tactics and technology.5

Monash turned 53 six weeks before the advance commenced on 8 August. This was similar to the average age of British corps commanders at the time (53 years 5 months), although his appointment on 31 May 1918 (70 days before the Amiens offensive) made him considerably less experienced in the role. British corps commanders had been in their post for an average of 493 days by the time the Fourth Army offensive commenced on 8 August.6 Nevertheless, Monash had certainly demonstrated the capacity for higher command by 1918.7 In Pedersen’s words, “It was as appropriate as it was fortunate that the Australian Corps should throw up such a man in time to command it in its last and greatest battles.”8 Monash possessed a calm, deliberate temperament, powerful intellect and outstanding organizational skills, and could endure periods of extraordinary strain.9 He commanded the 4th Brigade on Gallipoli in 1915 before being tasked with organising and training the newly-formed 3rd Division on Salisbury Plain in 1916. During that time, he could also avail himself of the hard-won tactical lessons drawn from British fighting on the Somme that were distilled and promulgated throughout the British army during the next two years in a myriad of training pamphlets.10

Monash’s 3rd Division crossed to France in November 1916 and took part in the terrible battles in the Ypres salient in 1917. His reputation for meticulous planning

5 For a discussion on the development of military education in Australia in the decades before the war, see John Connor, ‘Australian Military Education, 1901-18’, Chapter 4 in Douglas E Delaney, RC Engen, & M Fitzpatrick, (eds) Military Education and the British Empire, 1815–1949, 2018, UBC Press, Vancouver. 6 This figure, which amounts to nearly 15 months, excludes Monash’s own tenure. Only Richard Stevens had less experience than Monash on 8 August, having commanded the X Corps for just 37 days. The longest serving corps commander on 8 August 1918 was Richard Haking (XI Corps) with 1070 days (nearly three years), while Alexander Godley (II Anzac Corps and XII Corps) and Aylmer Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) had been in command for 906 days and 874 days respectively. 7 According to the ADB, Bean reported the saying that Monash ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’. Geoffrey Serle, ‘Monash, Sir John (1865–1931)’, ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/monash-sir-john-7618/text13313, accessed online 11 February 2020. 8 In Pedersen’s words, “by any standard Monash was a successful general and, with Currie and Maxse, a figure of major importance in World War I.” Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 302. 9 Hobbs to Bean, 27 April 1937, AWM38 3DRL 606/276/1. See also Serle, Monash, p. 376. 10 Recent work by Aimée Fox on the BEF’s transmission of lessons within and across theatres has demonstrated the nature and effectiveness of this process. See Fox, Learning to Fight, 2017.

159 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command was established during that time. The fighting at Messines in June in particular convinced him of the importance of ‘bite and hold’ tactics predicated on limited objectives and sufficient numerical strength to beat off counterattacks during the consolidation phase. He was little different in this to other senior British generals at the time, however, including the Fourth Army’s commander, Rawlinson.11

Monash’s exalted reputation as a corps commander was established at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July, 1918. In an oft-cited passage, Monash described the Australian success at Hamel as an example of “a perfected modern battle plan” and compared it to:

a score for an orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony. The whole programme is controlled by an exact time-table, to which every infantryman, every heavy or light gun, every mortar and machine gun, every tank and aeroplane must respond with punctuality; otherwise there will be discords which will impair the success of the operation, and increase the cost of it.12

The battle at Hamel was certainly an impressive combined-arms operation, albeit a limited one. Meticulous planning saw artillery, tanks and planes work in concert with the infantry to achieve the objectives in less than two hours. The operation also served as a trial run for the Fourth Army’s attack at Amiens a month later. Monash deservedly received praise for the victory but his tactics were a logical extension of technological and doctrinal developments within the British army during the previous two years, which could also be seen in the attack at Cambrai in November

11 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-1918, Blackwell Publishers, South Yorkshire, 1992, p. 144. In Andy Simpson’s words, Monash was “a product of the same military system, and as a corps commander represented the same school of military thought … (and) had acquired experience comparable with that of his fellow British commanders.” Andy Simpson, ‘Monash: The Outsider as Insider’, Wartime, Summer 2016 (Issue 73), p. 39. 12 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 56. The British tank commander at Hamel, Brigadier-General Anthony Courage, believed the firepower provided by the tanks made an artillery barrage unnecessary, and Monash initially concurred. He was eventually dissuaded by Blamey (Chief of Staff), Maclagan (4th Division’s commander) and Coxen (Corps artillery commander) and incorporated more artillery than he originally intended. Bou (ed.), The AIF in Battle, p. 129.

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1917. Furthermore, the defenders opposite the Australians at Hamel were not the resolute and well-trained German infantrymen of previous years.

Despite the obvious exhaustion of the troops and lack of fresh reinforcements, Monash drove the divisions hard during the final advance and must receive his share of blame for the problems of morale and discipline that manifested within the ranks, and which were described in Chapter 3. Monash certainly had his critics. Bean questioned Monash’s ability to handle his troops, believing he “never really grasped the mentality of his men”.13 “For all his great qualities he was not, I fancy, quite straight and courageous enough,” wrote Bean. “If the mutinies which began in September had been followed by others (the ending of the war prevented it), Monash was not the best man to deal with them.”14

John Gellibrand succeeded Monash as GOC 3rd Division on 31 May 1918. According to Gellibrand’s biographer, Peter Sadler, the new commander was:

far from happy with the division he had taken over from Monash, frequently noting untidy and dirty areas. He ordered the convening of a mess meeting in mid-June – ‘the first for a very long time’ – and visited the Australian-French liaison post, where ‘it was clear that a visit to the front line (by the divisional commander) was most unusual and also most necessary.’15

The long serving commander of 4th Brigade, Charles Brand, was another critic. Brand declined to contribute to an article about Monash for Reveille in 1937. In a pointed letter to the editor, Brand wrote that he held “views on Sir John Monash’s ‘front line’ service which might detract from his other qualifications as a leader. He is dead now so better let his good and bad points sleep with him.”16

13 AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1. 14 AWM38 3DRL 606/274B/1. Bean also cites one unnamed senior Australian officer who stated that Monash “had no moral courage.” 15 Sadler, The Paladin, p. 81. 16 AWM38 3DRL 606/276/1.

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Because operational planning had effectively been decentralised from army level to corps by mid-1918, Rawlinson gave Monash a free hand for most of the advance. The organisation of major set-piece operations was centralised at corps level but control of the artillery and planning for smaller actions frequently devolved to divisions.17 Andy Simpson likens the role of a corps commander in 1918 to “a clutch in a car, intervening when a change of gear was necessary, either taking control of artillery if pace slowed for a set-piece, or releasing it when a faster advance was required.”18 Monash was therefore more ‘general manager’ or CEO than active battlefield commander. In any case, the rapid tempo of the advance made it difficult – often impossible – for Monash to play a pivotal role in operational planning, let alone exercise close control once an attack was underway.19

Monash never visited the fighting line during the advance to see conditions for himself, nor journeyed as far forward as a brigade headquarters during active operations.20 He remained instead for the most part at the Corps HQ, which moved forward only three times during the two months. This meant that it was 30 miles behind the fighting line at times.21 The Corps HQ was located at Bertangles Chateau for the opening of the offensive at Amiens on 8 August, a few miles north of the city and about 14 miles behind the line. When the Australians pushed east of Proyart five days later, Monash and his staff were 20 miles back.22 The headquarters moved to a group of houses in the village of Glisy (four miles south-east of Amiens) on 13

17 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 188. 18 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 209; See also Serle, John Monash, p. 376; Carl Bridge, ‘Monash, Sir John (1865–1931)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35060, accessed 22 Oct 2017]; Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 188. 19 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 209; Simpson, Directing Operations, pp. 175-225. See also Serle, John Monash, p. 376; Carl Bridge, ‘Monash, Sir John (1865–1931)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, January 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35060, viewed 22 Oct 2017. 20 The closest Monash came to doing so was a visit to Mont St Quentin and Péronne on 6 September, four days after fighting there had ended. Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, pp. 298-299. This stands in marked contrast to British commanders such as Aylmer Haldane, who visited the front line 18 times during his first two months in command of VI Corps in 1916. Haldane inspected the length of the corps front (18,000 yards) three times, and moved through 15 of the 32 communication trenches. Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 188. 21 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 188. This stands in marked contrast to British corps commanders such as Aylmer Haldane, who visited the front line 18 times during his first two months in command of VI Corps. Haldane inspected the length of the corps front (18,000 yards) three times, and moved through 15 of the 32 communication trenches. 22 Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/35/8. See also Monash, Australian Victories, p. 207.

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August. This again placed Monash 14 miles behind the line but that stretched to nearly 24 miles by the time the Australian divisions reached the west bank of the Somme two weeks later.

The Corps HQ moved into a derelict chateau in Méricourt on 31 August. This was 17 miles due east of Glisy but the actual line of moves was closer to 23 miles.23 This placed Monash about 12 miles behind the operations at Bouchavesnes, Mont St Quentin and Péronne. It moved for a final time on 8 September to a group of huts at Belloy Wood, near Assevillers. The line then more or less stabilised in preparation for the attacks against the formidable Hindenburg defences ten days later. Monash was now five miles back and closer than at any previous point in the advance. This allowed him to exercise greater control over the planning and conduct of operations by the 1st and 4th Divisions at the Outpost Line on 18 September, and by the 3rd and 5th Divisions at the St Quentin Canal four miles to the east ten days after that.24 As we shall see in due course, however, his close oversight of the attack at the Hindenburg Line at the end of September left a good deal to be desired.

Monash was fortunate to be surrounded by highly experienced and capable senior staff. All fitted easily into the British mould and differed little in character, background or military experience to their counterparts in other British corps. All were professional soldiers before the war and had spent time at British staff colleges. Each was deeply informed by the latest in British military doctrine and had considerable practical experience coping with the challenges of staff work on the Western Front during the years of the war itself.

Thomas Blamey was Chief of Staff. Although only 34, Blamey had extensive pre- war training and wartime experience as a staff officer.25 On his arrival in France in

23 ‘Monthly Report on Australian Corps Signal Company August 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Coy War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 43. 24 Australian Corps War Diary, August & September 1918, AWM4 1/35/8 & 9. See also Monash, Australian Victories, p. 207. 25 Blamey joined the Commonwealth Cadets in 1906 before transferring to the AMF in 1910. He attended Staff College at Quetta in 1912 where he gained not only a thorough insight into the workings of the British army but also came into contact with some of its finest soldiers. He served briefly in the War Office in London before war broke out and

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1916, Blamey succeeded the highly capable Brudenell White as GSO 1 of 1st Division, following the latter’s promotion as Birdwood’s Chief of Staff in I Anzac Corps. He remained in that position until 1 June 1918 when he again succeeded White, but this time as Chief of Staff in the Australian Corps. Blamey was well prepared for that role, having spent the previous three months as White’s understudy. Blamey’s strong and prickly character did not endear him to all but there is no doubt that he served Monash well during the advance.26

Walter Coxen commanded the Corps artillery.27 Coxen was 48-years old, had more than 20 years of gunnery experience with the Queensland artillery by 1914 (including two periods of training in England), and had previously commanded the 36th Heavy Artillery Group from its establishment in 1915.28 A contemporary described Coxen as having “all outstanding characteristics so essential in a good soldier, a devotion to duty which is almost fanatical, a love of order and good discipline; a mind always filled with a desire to solve a problem, and make himself a more efficient soldier.”29 Coxen commanded of 1st Division’s artillery on the Western Front in 1917 before

travelled to Egypt to join the AIF in January 1915 as GSO3 of 1st Division, before being appointed its assistant A&QMG in September. Reveille, Vol. 13, No. 3, November 1939. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 194. 26 For example, Birdwood described Blamey as “an exceedingly able little man, though by no means a pleasing personality.” David Horner, ‘Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert (1884–1951)’, ADB, published first in hardcopy 1993, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/blamey-sir-thomas-albert-9523/text16767, accessed online 6 December 2017. Bean regarded Blamey as “a man of nimble intellect and wide comprehension (although) not always possessing the necessary tact”. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 194. Bean also described him as “a man of very quick intelligence and exceedingly definite in his views.” Bean, AOH Vol. I, p. 76. 27 Coxen was educated at Toowoomba Grammar School and the exclusive Brisbane Grammar. Like Blamey, he was a professional soldier before the war. The first was a two-year stint at the gunnery school at Shoeburyness in the 1890s (which he passed with honours), followed immediately by a year of training at Aldershot. The second period of training in England commenced at Woolwich in 1907, where Coxen qualified as an ordnance officer by “passing the most difficult and intricate artillery examination that the artillery service can present.” The only AIF unit on the Western Front manned exclusively by pre-war regulars, the 36th HA Brigade was the first Australian formation to arrive in France, in February 1916. Also known as the Australian Siege Brigade, it first saw action with British XVII Corps near Arras, before taking part in Fourth Army operations on the Somme during the second half the year. Coxen was given command of 1st Division’s artillery in 1917, taking part in the operations at Bullecourt and Lagnicourt in April and May, as well as 3rd Ypres later in the year. A mark of Coxen’s ability is evident in the fact he was promoted to Major-General in 1927, and appointed Chief of the Australian General Staff in 1930. His nickname, ‘Wacky’, was derived from his initials: W(alter) A(dams) C(oxen). Reveille, Vol. 3, No. 9, May 31, 1930. 28 Also known as the Australian Siege Brigade, it first saw action with British XVII Corps near Arras, before taking part in Fourth Army operations on the Somme during the second half the year. 29 Reveille, Vol. 3, No.9, May 31, 1930. See Warren Perry, ‘Coxen, Walter Adams (1870–1949)’, ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/coxen-walter-adams-5800/text9843, published first in hardcopy 1981, accessed online 7 December 2017.

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being appointed GOC Australian Corps Artillery in January 1918.30 Coxen commanded as many as 1,200 guns ranging from 8-pounders to 15-inch at various times in that role, including 550 on 8 August alone.

Figure 4.1 Monash and Australian Corps HQ Senior Officers at Bertangles, 22 July 1918.

Standing (L to R): Brigadier-General Cecil Foott, CE; Brigadier-General Robert Carruthers, DA & QMG; Brigadier- General Thomas Blamey, BGGS; Brigadier-General Lyons Fraser, BGHA; Brigadier-General Walter Coxen, BGRA.

AWM E02750

31 Cecil Foott was the Australian Corps’ Chief Engineer (CE). Foott was appointed DA&QMG of 1st Division at the start of the war and promoted to AA&QMG following the death of William Bridges at Gallipoli in May 1915. Foott continued to serve with 1st Division in France until he was transferred to AIF depots in England

30 Coxen commanded 1st Division’s artillery at Bullecourt and Lagnicourt in April and May 1917, as well as at 3rd Ypres later in the year. 31 The 42-year-old Foote was born in Bourke, NSW, but educated at Toowoomba Grammar School, Qld, which happened also to be Coxen’s alma mater. Foott qualified as an engineer before serving as a commissioned officer in the Queensland Militia Garrison Artillery and then Permanent Artillery in the 1890s. Foott had twenty years of experience in military artillery units before the war. He was promoted to the newly formed Royal Australian Artillery in 1901, but transferred to the Australian Royal Engineers a year later. Foott was another Australian to attend British Staff College. He spent two years at Camberley and graduated in 1913, before spending a year at Portsmouth Naval College. Like Blamey, Foott travelled directly from England to join the AIF in Egypt in January 1915. Reveille, Vol. 4, No. 11, July 31, 1931; Warren Perry, ‘Foott, Cecil Henry (1876–1942)’, ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/foott-cecil-henry-6204/text10663, published first in hardcopy 1981, accessed online 7 December 2017.

165 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command as DA&QMG in mid-1917. Foott returned to France in March 1918 as the Corps’ CE under Birdwood, and continued in that role following Monash’s appointment at the end of May. Foott was a personable, practical and efficient officer, who possessed excellent administrative skills and a reputation as an experienced, reliable and tireless worker.32 Intelligent, methodical and ‘transparently honest’, Foott was described by one contemporary as:

sound and quick in grasping the essentials of a problem, he was a master of the art of lucid explanation. Above all, he believed in straight dealing. With juniors and seniors alike he advanced his views. Sarcasm formed no part of his make-up; faint praise never dropped from his lips. … Most painstaking in his efforts to help a colleague, he was ruthless in his condemnation of the shirker.33

An engineer himself, Monash was effusive in his praise of Foott’s ability to get work done effectively during the strenuous advance.34

Despite the ‘Australianisation’ of the Corps in mid-1918, not every member of Monash’s senior staff was a native-born Australian. Robert Carruthers, a British a pre-war regular with the Indian Army, was the DA&QMG. Carruthers had served in that role with 1st Division at Gallipoli, before holding the same post with I Anzac in France and then with the Australian Corps from January 1918.35 Lyons Fraser was a 50-year-old Londoner who served as GOC Australian Corps Heavy Artillery (BGHA) in 1918, having commanded the Heavy Artillery of I Anzac Corps on in France from April 1916. In the case of Fraser, Bean believed that it made sense to have a British officer in charge of the Corps heavy artillery, as all of the guns were British. His rationale for the retention of Carruthers is more abstruse. According to Bean, Carruthers allowed the AA&QMG, the Australian Lieutenant-Colonel George Somerville, a pre-war regular in the AMF, “to play a leading part in the administration. Monash, apprehending that, if he dispensed with Carruthers,

32 Reveille, Vol. 4, No. 11, July 31, 1931. 33 Reveille, Vol. 4, No. 11, July 31, 1931. 34 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 197. 35 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 210.

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Somerville’s activity might be restricted, retained the existing arrangement.”36 Why Monash did not simply promote Somerville to the position of DA&QMG is unclear.37

Intelligent, experienced commanders led the five Australian divisions during the advance. They were Tom Glasgow (1st Division), Charles Rosenthal (2nd Division), John Gellibrand (3rd Division), Ewan Sinclair-Maclagan (4th Division) and Talbot Hobbs (5th Division). Gellibrand and Maclagan were pre-war Regulars with the British army, while Glasgow, Rosenthal and Hobbs all had between 20 and 30 years of pre-war training with the Australian militia.38 Glasgow, Gellibrand, and Maclagan were decorated veterans of the Boer War.39 Glasgow and Gellibrand were recipients of the DSO, while Maclagan had received it twice. Connections to the British army’s military traditions were obvious. Gellibrand and Maclagan attended English staff colleges before the war and Hobbs made four trips back to England (all at his own expense) to attend instructional schools in artillery.40 Not all were Australian-born, with Maclagan and Hobbs born and raised in Britain. Gellibrand was born in Tasmania but grew up in England from the age of two; he did not return to Australia until he was nearly 40.41

The average age of the five Australian divisional commanders on 8 August 1918 was 46 years 7 months. That was almost identical to that of their counterparts in the

36 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 210. 37 Carruthers was an Indian Army officer and a long-time friend of Birdwood’s before the war and had been secretary of the Bombay Yacht Club before he was called out of retirement in 1914. Monash might simply have been reluctant to replace him. John Bourne, ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918: An Empirical Portrait with Some British and Australian Comparisons’ in Dennis and Grey (eds), 1918 Defining Victory, p. 3. 38 Hobbs served with artillery militia units both in England and Australia for more than 30 years before 1914. Both Glasgow and Rosenthal had some 20 years’ experience with mounted infantry units and artillery units respectively. 39 Maclagan had also seen service with the Indian Army in Waziristan. 40 Gellibrand was an outstanding student at Sandurst, where he was a contemporary of Churchill. Graduating in 1893, Gellibrand received the General Proficiency Sword for the highest aggregate mark of the 87 cadets to graduate that year. He also received the best marks in drill and narrowly missed the military law prize. Sadler, The Paladin, pp. 14-15. 41 Maclagan arrived in Australia in 1901 at the age of 32 to help facilitate the organisation of the fledgling Australian army. Hobbs, a qualified architect, emigrated to Australia at the age of 23 in 1887.

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BEF, which was 45 years 9 months.42 Their length of tenure varied considerably, however. Hobbs and Maclagan had held their positions for 585 days and 403 days respectively on 8 August, giving them nearly 1,000 days of combined experience. Glasgow, Rosenthal and Maclagan had just 189 days of divisional command experience between them, however. Although comprising only a fraction of the 450 British generals in mid-1918, the Australian divisional commanders’ combination of age, background and military experience was not unusual, and probably fairly typical.43

Whether in or out of the line, the role of brigade commanders was particularly important, though difficult. As Peter Simkins has described, brigade commanders were responsible for determining the number of battalions to be employed in an operation, and their respective roles. During the operation itself, he had to adjust his plans to meet often rapidly changing circumstances, determine when and how to deploy his reserves, and seize opportunities that presented themselves. This required excellent tactical judgment, although his actual influence over the course of a battle was necessarily affected by his ability to communicate with his battalion commanders in a timely fashion, something that will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. When out of the line, the brigade commander was responsible for the training and welfare of all men under his command, and for ensuring that his staff and subordinate commanders were thoroughly familiar with battle procedure, and able to exercise their own initiative and good judgment once the ‘fog of war’ descended upon the battlefield.44

Like the commanders above them in the Australian Corps in mid-1918, the 15 brigade commanders were drawn almost exclusively from the affluent and educated

42 The youngest divisional commander in the Australian Corps in 1918 was Glasgow (42) and the oldest was Hobbs (53). The average age of British divisional commanders had dropped from 55 in 1914. Bourne, ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918’ in Dennis and Grey (eds), 1918 Defining Victory, p. 6. 43 Bourne, ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918’ in Dennis and Grey (eds), 1918 Defining Victory, p. 3. This figure includes the 63 divisional commanders in 1918. 44 Peter Simkins ‘‘Building Blocks’: Aspect of Command and Control at Brigade level in the BEF’s Offensive Operations, 1916–1918’, Ch. 7 in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, pp. 145-146.

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strata of society. They were overwhelmingly Protestant as a group, likely to have attended a private school, and all but one worked in a white-collar occupation before the war.45 This background had much in common with their counterparts in the BEF but that is not surprising given that it points to a common skill set vital for effective command on the battlefield.46 This included strong organisational and administrative abilities, as well as the capacity to assimilate information and distribute written orders rapidly, often in the most trying of circumstances.

The average age of the 15 Australian brigade commanders on 8 August 1918 was 40 years 6 months.47 This was only fractionally younger than the average British brigade commander in 1918, which was 42.48 Like their British counterparts, the Australian brigade commanders could draw on considerable wartime command experience. All but one had commanded a battalion during the war, and eight of them received their brigade command appointments immediately following the expansion of the AIF in 1916. Those men had been in the post for at least 600 days (nearly two years) by the time the advance commenced, which contrasts with the remaining seven, who were appointed only in spring 1918 as part of the ‘Australianisation’ process.49

45 Bennett, Cannan, Wisdom, Leane, Goddard, Herring all worked in business; McNicoll, Brand, and Mackay were schoolmasters; Tivey and Robertson were stockbrokers; Martin was an accountant; and Elliot was a lawyer. The exception was Heane, who was a grazier, but even he had worked previously as a certified auditor. 46 Three (Tivey, Wisdom, and Goddard) were British-born. Wisdom and Goddard emigrated to Australia at the age of 22 and 20 respectively. Tivey, however, had arrived in Australia with his family before his 1st birthday. See also Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’, Ch. 7 in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 154; Bourne, ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918’ in Dennis and Grey (eds), 1918 Defining Victory, p. 6. 47 The youngest Australian brigade commander on 8 August was 31-year-old Gordon Bennett (3rd Brigade); the oldest was 51-year-old Edwin Tivey (8th Brigade). Bennett was only 28 at the time of his appointment, in 1916. By comparison, the youngest BEF brigade commander during the war was 25-year-old Roland Boys Bradford, VC, who was assumed command of the 186th Brigade in November 1917, only to be killed three weeks later at Cambrai. Peter Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’ in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 154. 48 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1081n. See also Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’, Ch. 7, in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 154. Australian brigade commanders in 1918 were younger on average than their predecessors in the AIF in 1915 and 1916, who were usually over 45, but this can be explained largely by its rapid expansion in early 1916. ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918’ in Dennis and Grey (eds), 1918 Defining Victory, p. 5. 49 These were Tivey (8th Brigade); McNicoll (10th Brigade); Elliott (15th Brigade); Brand (4th Brigade); Cannan (11th Brigade); Wisdom (7th Brigade); Heane (2nd Brigade); Bennett (3rd Brigade). The three longest serving, (Tivey, McNicoll and Elliot) were all appointed in February 1916 and were their brigade’s only substantive commander during the war. Robertson (6th Brigade) was the most junior, having received his appointment on 5 July 1918. Mackay (1st Brigade), Martin (5th Brigade), Goddard (9th Brigade) and Herring (13th Brigade) were all appointed in May or early June. See David Clare Holloway, Combat Colonels of the AIF in the Great War, Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, Sydney, 2014, pp. 29-52.

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One notable difference between Australian and British brigade commanders in 1918 was the fact that none of the Australians were pre-war Regulars, although all had served with local militia forces before 1914 and three were Boer War veterans.50 Regardless, their wartime experience more than made up for this and by 1918 they had all proven themselves to be resilient, battle-hardened men who had been tested repeatedly in combat. All received the DSO at least once during the war and three were awarded it twice.51 Bennett, Tivey, Leane, and Elliott were Mentioned in Despatches eight times; Heane, Robertson, Brand seven times; Mackay, Wisdom, and Martin six times; Stewart, Cannan, McNicoll, Herring five times; and Goddard three times.52 This is an impressive record but not exceptional, as most brigade commanders across the BEF in 1918 were also decorated veterans and included eight recipients of the Victoria Cross.53 In the III Corps, ten of the 12 brigade commanders on 8 August 1918 had received the DSO during the course of the war.54 The commander of the 55th Brigade, Edward Wood, received it four times, the last for his action at Ronssoy during the fighting at the Outpost Line on 18 September 1918. A remarkable soldier by any measure, Wood was also MID nine times, wounded five times, gassed twice and even buried once.55

50 The Boer War veterans were Brand, Tivey and Elliott. With regard to the militia, 11 of the 15 brigade commanders in 1918 had served with infantry units. Of the rest, two (Robertson and Heane) served with mounted infantry, one (Wisdom) with artillery and one (Martin) with AASC. The most inexperienced was Mackay, who joined the militia only in 1913. 51 The dual recipients were Leane, Stewart and Mackay. Leane also received an MC for his action at Gallipoli on 4 May 1915. Elliot received his DCM during the Boer War. 52 Honours and Awards, Australian War Memorial website, https://www.awm.gov.au, viewed 21 December 2017. 53 Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’, Ch. 7 in Sheffield and Todman, Command and Control, p. 155. 54 Montgomery, Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 304-306. 55 Wood arrived at Ronssoy in the middle of the fighting on 18 September. Despite his orderly being killed, he immediately entered a German dugout alone and brought out seven fully armed prisoners. Later, and again single- handedly, he captured more than twenty Germans by “the simple and cheerful expedient of pelting them in their dug-out with lumps of chalk and old boots.” Wood was unaccompanied and unarmed on each occasion. According to Fosdike, Wood was seen “stalking along monumentally, a big cigar between his teeth, the familiar lance used as an alpenstock in his grasp. General Wood’s unconcerned calm in the hottest of the fighting, and the smooth readiness of his decisions, had much to do with the success of the 55th Brigade in the great counter-offensive of 1918.” Nichols, The 18th Division in the Great War, p. 399. According to one after action report, Wood “captured 34 Huns … sufficiently alarming the inmates to cause them to come out and surrender.” ‘Narrative No. 4: The Capture of Ronssoy and Exploitation of the Ground Beyond that Village’, 55th Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/2048. Another British brigade commander in 1918 with four DSOs was William Croft (27th Brigade). See also Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’, Ch. 7 in Sheffield and Todman, Command and Control, p. 155.

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Their wartime experience meant Australian brigade commanders in 1918 understood their men, were concerned about their welfare, and familiar with the terrible conditions at the front. Because their headquarters were usually located close to their line battalions, brigade commanders could journey forward to the fighting trenches – and sometimes beyond – to reconnoitre.56 Particularly notable in this regard was the 15th Brigade’s commander, Elliott, who often consulted his battalion and company commanders in forward positions. This was particularly evident during the difficult operations at Péronne in early September.57

The transition to mobile operations in mid-1918 brought about a host of tactical challenges on an almost daily basis and that highlighted the importance of capable, resilient battalion commanders.58 Bean claimed the absence of any “basic social barrier” between officers and their men resulted in an esprit de corps “impossible under a more feudal tradition”, such as that which apparently existed within the BEF.59 Monash agreed, stating there was “no officer caste, no social distinction in the whole force. In not a few instances, men of humble origin and belonging to the artisan class rose, during the war, from privates to commanders of battalions.”60

The evidence does not necessarily point in that direction. In William Westerman’s words, Australian battalion commanders “sat somewhere between Charles Bean’s idealised Australian bushman and the landed gentry who formed the British Army’s regular officer corps, and probably closer to the latter.”61 Most Australian battalion

56 Christopher Moore-Bick, Playing the Game: The British Junior Infantry Officer on the Western Front 1914-18, Helion & Company Ltd, Solihull, 2011, pp. 152-153. 57 59th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/76/32. A particularly notable incident involving Elliott took place during this time. Elliott’s 15th Brigade headquarters was located at Orme de Barleux on heights west of the Somme overlooking land south of Péronne. According to Bean, Elliot learned only at 7:30 AM on 1 September that the 14th Brigade was already in Péronne. This compelled him to order 58th and 59th Battalions across the river ‘at once by any possible route’. Elliott went straight down the hill in view of the enemy to the main road bridge, which had collapsed. Elliott clambered across a steel girder and stood on the ramparts. A German machine gun opened fired at Elliott at this point and he fell into the canal. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 851. 58 Peter Simkins, ‘‘Up the Sharp End’: The Experience of the 12th (Eastern) Division in the Hundred Days, August- November 1918’, Chapter 8 in From the Somme to Victory: The British Army’s Experience on the Western Front 1916-1918, The Praetorian Press, South Yorkshire, 2014, p. 193. 59 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 1085-1086. 60 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 294. 61 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 144.

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commanders were products of the Empire’s late-Victorian military system and did not represent a particularly wide arc of the social spectrum. The majority enjoyed comparatively privileged backgrounds and a good education, which in itself distinguished them from most of the men under their command.62 Nearly two-thirds (61.5%) had worked in white-collar professions before the war, something also at odds with the demography of the AIF as a whole.63

It was remarkably similar across the BEF. According to Gary Sheffield, nearly 60% of the British battalion commanders at the end of the war came from “broadly middle-class occupations” and the rest represented the upward social mobility of the “artisan class”, including engineers in particular.64 Again, this highlights the need for strong literary and managerial skills to organise and control up to 900 men in the field. Only six (10.5%) worked in rural occupations but they were likely to be drawn from the landed gentry.65 Also reflective of the ‘Britishness’ of the Corps’ cohort of officers is the fact that all but two of the 57 Australian battalion commanders identified with a Protestant church, and the vast majority with the Church of England in particular.66 Nearly half (46.3%) were married before the war, which contrasts to the 88% of fighting troops in 1918 who were single at the time of enlistment.67

62 Those educated at fee-paying and exclusive Australian private schools included Henry Crowther (Brighton Grammar in Melbourne), Alexander Heron (Brisbane Grammar), Edmund Drake-Brockman (Guildford Grammar in Perth), Charles Johnstone (Melbourne Grammar), Austin Holland (Sydney Grammar), Norman Marshall (Scotch College in Melbourne), Charles Watson (Xavier College, Melbourne), Frederick Forbes (Caulfield Grammar, Melbourne), and James Clark (The Hutchens School, Hobart). British-born Maurice Wilder-Neligan was a product an English Public School, Bedford Grammar. 63 They included nine schoolmasters, six lawyers, six accountants, five from the banking sector, three from ‘business’, three clerks, and three public servants. 64 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 32; Peter Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War, Ashgate Publishing, Surrey, 2015, p. 161 65 Harold ‘Bill’ White (35th Battalion), for example, was a grazier from one of the wealthiest families in the New England district of New South Wales. This general breakdown is at odds with that of the AIF as a whole but similar to the background of battalion commanders across the BEF. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, pp. 162-163. 66 Of the 57 Australian battalion commanders during the advance, only Chalmers (27th Battalion) and Corrigan (46th Battalion) identified as Catholic. This figure of 3.5% is significantly lower than that for the Corps as whole in 1918, in which nearly 15% of the men identified with Catholicism. See Chapter 2 p. 89. 67 According to the sample of 450 soldiers killed in 1918 and recorded on the Commonwealth War Graves Commission register (see Chapter 2), about 88% were single at enlistment.

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Australian battalion commanders in mid-1918 were considerably younger as a group than their predecessors in the AIF. The average age of the 16 Australian battalion COs that landed at Gallipoli in April 1915 was 46. That average dropped over the next three years as the AIF expanded, casualties increased and younger men were necessarily promoted. According to Westerman, the average age of an Australian battalion commander at appointment for the entire war was 36 years.68 The average for the 57 battalion COs in substantive command on 8 August 1918 was only 33 years 3 months years, however.69 This was only fractionally younger than that for a battalion commander in the BEF at the time, which was 34 years 10 months.70

Despite their comparative youth, Australian battalion commanders in mid-1918 all had extensive pre-war and wartime experience that was important for effective leadership. Charles Davies (32nd Battalion), Maurice Wilder-Neligan (10th Battalion) and Duncan Sasse (4th Battalion) were pre-war British regulars. All but two of the others – Norman Marshall (54th Battalion) and John Corrigan (46th Battalion) – had served with Australian militia units before enlisting. Fred Chalmers (27th Battalion), John MacArthur (29th Battalion) and Burford Sampson (15th Battalion) fought in the Boer War, while Edmund Drake-Brockman (16th Battalion) attended Staff College at Quetta in 1908-09. Of the 57 Australian battalion commanders in the advance, 39 (68.4%) served at Gallipoli in 1915, and 20 (35.1%) of those landed with the first waves on 25 April. Given this level of pre-war training and experience and the small size of the original Australian contingent, it is

68 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 147. 69 The three oldest on that day were 49-year-old Geoffrey Hurry (38th Battalion), 48-year-old John Lord (40th Battalion) and 46-year-old Ernest Martin (34th Battalion). Another four were aged over 40. Robert Henderson (39th Battalion) was 43, while William Bateman (19th Battalion), James William Clark (30th Battalion) and James Purcell Clark (44th Battalion) were all 40. Sixteen (28.1%) were under 30 and the youngest, Douglas Marks (13th Battalion), was only 23. Marks enlisted at the age of 19 in August 1914. He was only 22 years 7 months when promoted to the substantive rank of Lieutenant Colonel in November 1917. “He was probably one of the youngest battalion commanders in the British Army,” wrote a contemporary after the war, “but, although a youth in years, he was a veteran in experience of military craft, and during the ensuing months of training and trench warfare, had his battalion working like a well-oiled machine.” Reveille, Vol. 10, No. 3, November 1936. See also Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 175. 70 Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, p. 189.

173 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command unsurprising that every Australian battalion commander in mid-1918 received his commission on enlistment or very soon thereafter.71

There is nothing to suggest that the Australians were any more or less suited to command than their British counterparts. To develop the necessary skills for formal command (and to weed out those less capable), men with leadership potential were identified and sent to training schools for officers and NCOs. The experience of William Arrell was fairly typical. Arrell was an unmarried schoolmaster from Brisbane who enlisted early in 1915 as a Lieutenant in 9th Battalion and first saw action at Gallipoli. His command experience thereafter was cumulative. He served initially for six months as a platoon commander, ten months as a company commander and six months as his battalion’s 2-i-C (twice as acting-CO). He was then appointed temporary-CO of 49th Battalion on 1 July 1918 and led it effectively until 18 September.72

Arrell was well prepared for battalion command when the time came. He had attended five courses for officers by the beginning of 1918, the last being a 10-week course for senior officers held at Aldershot from October to December 1917. At its conclusion, Reginald Kentish, a British Lieutenant-Colonel of the Royal Fusiliers, assessed Arrell in the following terms: “A smart officer with plenty of self- confidence and determination. He is active and handles men well. From his work during this course I consider he would make a good commanding officer ... A capable officer of the right stamp.”73 Kentish was right. Arrell was awarded the DSO for his leadership of 49th Battalion during operations along the Somme in late August and early September.

71 Marshall, Corrigan, and Percy Woods enlisted as sergeants. Marshall received his commission three days after the Gallipoli landing; Woods received his on 19 May 1915; while Corrigan was appointed 2nd Lieutenant on 14 May 1915. 72 ‘Senior Officers School Confidential Report on Major WL Arrell, 49th Battalion’, NAA B2455. 73 ‘Senior Officers School Confidential Report on Major WL Arrell, 49th Battalion’, NAA B2455.

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Australian battalion commanders were in their posts for nearly a year (328 days) on average when the advance commenced in August.74 This masks considerable variation, however, as ten (17.5%) were appointed in 1916 and 26 (45.6%) appointed in 1918.75 The latter is a significant percentage but smaller than for the BEF. Nearly three-quarters (71%) of British battalion commanders in 1918 had received their appointments only that year, reflecting the impact of the German offensive upon officers in front-line units.76 There can be no doubting the courage of the Australian battalion commanders in 1918. All had been decorated for bravery during the war. All were Mentioned in Despatches at least once, and most multiple times.77 All but one received of the DSO, while 22 (38.6%) received it twice.78 Of particular note is Major Blair Wark, who was appointed temporary-CO of 32nd Battalion during the advance at the age of only 24. Wark received the Victoria Cross for his actions at Bellicourt on the Hindenburg Line between 29 September and 1 October.79

Having considered the quality of the Australian commanders in mid-1918, how effectively did they exercise tactical control during the advance? The tempo of operations undertaken by the Australian Corps during August and September 1918

74 This was almost twice as long as the average tenure of a British battalion commander at the same time, which was 185 days, or six months. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, p. 188. 75 The three longest-serving commanders in 1918, John Lord (40th Battalion), Arthur Woolcock (42nd Battalion) and Charles Elliot (12th Battalion), each commanded their battalion since its arrival on the Western Front in February of that year. On the other hand, Austin Holland (56th Battalion), William Bateman (19th Battalion) and William Brazenor (23rd Battalion), took charge of their battalions less than a week before the offensive on 8 August. Burford Sampson became acting-commander of 15th Battalion on the eve of the attack following the mortal wounding on 6 August of its long-serving and popular CO, Terry McSharry. That was a result of the heavy German bombardment that fell during the German raid on III Corps’ front across the river. 15th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/32/41. 76 Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, p. 188. 77 Bertie Stacy (1st Battalion) and Edmund Brock-Drakeman (16th Battalion) were both Mentioned in Despatches six times during the war. Frederick Forbes (20th Battalion) and Jack Mitchell (5th Battalion) were both Mentioned in Despatches five times. This is an impressive catalogue of bravery but not unique. Peter Hodgkinson’s analysis of battalion commanders in the British 5th, 9th, and 42nd Divisions during the Hundred Days points to a similar record. Such decorations do not necessarily point to the exercise of effective leadership but they suggest some of the requisite character traits, including acumen, initiative, and resilience. Hodgkinson, British Infantry Battalion Commanders, pp. 189-200. 78 The lone exception was William Davis (25th Battalion) but he was one of five battalion commanders to receive the MC. Other recipients of the MC were: Donald Moore (3rd Battalion); Douglas Marks (13th Battalion); Henry Crowther (14th Battalion); and Aubury Wiltshire (22nd Battalion). Charles Derham, who assumed temporary command of the 29th Battalion on the 9 August following the wounding of John MacArthur, was also a recipient of the MC, as was Alexander MacKenzie, who assumed temporary command of 4th Battalion on 19 September, following the wounding of Duncan Sasse. MacKenzie was also a recipient of the DSO. 79 Bean described Wark as a “young and vigorous officer.” Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 972.

175 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command inevitably saw command and control decentralised in accordance with best practice and framed by principles set out clearly in FSR 1 and SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918.80 The planning of set-piece operations throughout the British army on the Western Front – including the Australian Corps – followed a predictable and established pattern. The army commander first sanctioned an operation, determined a general scheme of attack and conveyed that to the corps commander. The corps commander then allocated tasks to his divisional commanders and informed them of the general artillery plan. Each divisional commander carried out reconnaissance on his front, established objectives and formulated a suitable plan of attack for his infantry, which he then sent back to the corps commander for approval.81

Once the corps commander approved the plans, divisional warning orders were issued to the relevant subordinate commanders. Brigade commanders and their staffs were to be given time to reconnoitre the ground before finalising arrangements with their battalion commanders.82 Orders had to be typed, timetables prepared and instructions distributed. Detailed attack plans were drawn up and artillery support calculated. Forward battle headquarters and observation posts were constructed, machine gun posts sited and improvements made to existing accommodation. Supply lines were established, medical support organised, approach routes and assembly areas mapped, with food, water and ammunition stockpiled in designated locations. Brigade signals officers needed time to repair communication lines and lay new ones. Co-operation with tank and Royal Flying Corps (RFC) units was worked out, intelligence arrangements were made, as were preparations for the provision of engineering stores.83

Because of the numerous conferences held at corps and divisional level, ‘Divisional Operation Orders’ were in reality little more than a final summary of the various

80 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 161. 81 SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918 (January 1918), HMSO, p. 12-13. 82 SS 135, pp. 12-13. 83 SS 135, pp. 12-13. See also Simkins ‘Building Blocks’ in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 150.

176 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command instructions. These included the corps’ general objective and those for divisions on either flank. They summarised intelligence that related to enemy formations opposite, made clear divisional and brigade objectives (including frontages), outlined artillery and machine gun arrangements, the allotment and employment of pioneer and engineering units, and the approximate hours at which contact planes would fly over the line. They also established the position of the Divisional Report Centre (DRC).84 Any subsequent orders from divisional headquarters had to be issued at least 24 hours before Zero to allow sufficient time for company and platoon commanders to amend their own.85 All of this meant that a set-piece operation would usually commence only after days or weeks of careful planning. This rigorous process (known as ‘battle procedure’) did much to influence the success or otherwise of an operation.

Planning for the attack on 8 August on the Australian front was driven very much from the top down and exemplified battle procedure best practice.86 Orders were issued as late as possible to maintain the vital element of surprise but with enough time for lower levels to complete preparations. Preparations had commenced nearly three weeks previously, on 21 July, when Rawlinson met with his Chief of Staff (Montgomery) and GOCRA (Charles Budworth), as well as the commanders and Chiefs of Staff of the Australian and Canadian Corps, to outline the proposed operation. Monash and Blamey then thrashed out a general plan of attack for the Australian divisions, including divisional frontages, artillery arrangements (including the movement of guns) and the employment of engineering units. Monash met with his divisional commanders on 31 July to outline his plan. The next day he issued a

84 All reports from the line during at an operation were sent back to the Divisional Report Centre, which collated them and conveyed information to the Divisional headquarters. Brigades also established advance report centres, to which battalions reported. 85 SS135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918 (January 1918), HMSO, pp. 12-13. See also Simkins ‘Building Blocks’, Ch 7 in Sheffield and Todman (eds), Command and Control, p. 150. 86 The genesis for the offensive by Fourth Army on the Somme can be traced back to mid-July, following the success of the Australians at Hamel at the beginning of the month. On 17 July, Haig agreed to Foch’s request for a major British offensive, and selected Rawlinson’s Fourth Army on the Somme to carry it out. Four days later, Rawlinson met with his three corps commanders, Butler, Monash, and Currie, as well as the senior cavalry, tank, and air force commanders, and proposed his plan of attack. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 504-505; Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, pp. 239-244.

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Corps memorandum that reiterated the salient points.87

Monash claimed his regular battle conferences led to “uniformity of tactical thought and method” within the Corps.88 Given the wartime experience of his commanders, he was probably right but there were nevertheless signs of tension, even in the best- planned operations. When Gellibrand challenged the wisdom of divisions attacking on such wide fronts on 8 August, Bean noted simply that “Monash did not encourage his interjection.”89 In accordance with principles set down in SS 135, Monash promulgated more than 20 ‘battle instructions’, which amplified those issued by Fourth Army headquarters.90 Having considered the orders submitted by his divisional commanders, Monash held a final battle conference on 4 August. He clarified matters concerning artillery, brigade dispositions, assembly positions, dress, equipment, approach marches, timings, tank allocations, machine guns, pack transport, signals and salvage.91 The entire process worked smoothly and the attack on 8 August was a resounding success.

In contrast to the limited-objective ‘bite and hold’ attacks of 1917 that allowed time for newly-won positions to be consolidated in preparation for the inevitable counter- attacks, gains on 8 August were to be exploited as far and rapidly as possible. Rawlinson did not formally issue orders for the exploitation phase until after midnight on 8-9 August and he assigned the primary responsibility for the attack to Currie, whose Canadian Corps was on the left of the Australians. Given the fluid situation at the end of that first day and subsequent time constraints, implementing the same involved level of preparation that preceded the initial attack was simply out of the question. In the event, Currie changed the proposed time for the attack on 9 August three times during the morning, and barely a third of the tanks that took part in the previous day’s fighting were available to support the infantry.

87 The memorandum was entitled ‘Secrecy’. See Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 98-100. 88 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 268. 89 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 494n. 90 Monash Papers, AWM38 3DRL 2316; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 504-505. 91 Monash Papers, AWM38 3DRL 2316.

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Monash deserves credit for the Australians’ success on 8 August but he also deserves blame for the operational problems that followed. Monash had no previous experience during that war of commanding of a mobile battlefield prior to Amiens and, while he had demonstrated impressive organisational skills in preparing for the multi-divisional attack of 8 August, his execution of the exploitation phase left a great deal to be desired.92 The next few days of fighting on the Australian front were marked by disjointed and uncertain planning made on the run.93

Monash had been considering the exploitation phase since 6 August and had briefed Glasgow (GOC 1st Division) on 7 August about the possibility. He did not inform Rosenthal (GOC 2nd Division), until early on the morning of 8 August itself, however, as the success of that day was becoming apparent.94 Uncertain of the proposed start time, Monash told both that the attack would not commence before 10:00 AM but then left them to co-ordinate the attack themselves. He directed them simply to maintain ‘close liaison’, thereby effectively abrogating his responsibilities as Corps commander. In the event, instructions on 9 August were at various times contradictory, altered or late.95 Some never even arrived at the headquarters of the unit concerned.96 The momentum of the advance was lost on what Edmonds described as a day of “wasted opportunities” that furnished “another example of the old saying ‘Order, counter-order, disorder.’”97

The experience of the Australians bears this out. The 1st Division arrived on the Somme from Hazebrouck only on the previous evening and Monash did not realise that its units were not in a position to move forward until the plan for their advance was already in train. This left Glasgow only ten hours to carry out a complex set of arrangements. These included liaising with the neighbouring 2nd Canadian Division on the right flank and communicating instructions to its own 2nd and 3rd Brigades,

92 Pedersen, ‘Maintaining the Advance’, Ch. 8 in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 140. 93 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p. 381. 94 Pedersen, ‘Maintaining the Advance’ Ch. 8 in Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 137. 95 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 329. 96 Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, p. 345. 97 Edmonds, BOH Vol IV, p. 114.

179 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command which were both some three miles distant at that time.98 Troops had just reached their bivouac areas when orders arrived by car and motorcycle, and brigade commanders then had to amend the orders for distribution down to battalions. As a result, 2nd Brigade did not commence its move to Harbonnières – ten miles away – until 9:00 AM. Currie had postponed the general attack until 11:00 AM but the two Australian brigades were simply unable to make the start line in time nevertheless.99

This left Hobbs, the commander of 5th Division, little choice but to order his 15th Brigade to remain in the line and “to go on till the 1st Division came up.”100 This lack of definite objectives was a glaring departure from the principles clearly set down in SS 135. Back in 1st Division, the 8th Battalion’s CO, John Mitchell, hurriedly called his company commanders together to explain his attack plan and dispositions, with a view to passing through 5th Division’s brigades at 1:00 PM. The distance to the line was too great for his units to be in position on time, however, and they did not begin to move through 15th Brigade until 1:20 PM.101 The lack of foresight and planning was also apparent in the fact that no forward ammunition dumps were established for the 2nd and 3rd Brigades before the attack; everything had to be carried forward from Rosières, which was already more than two miles behind the line. This meant that 8th Battalion soon ran out of bombs on 9 August and men were desperately low on rifle ammunition when trying to cope with

German counter-attacks at Lihons during the morning.102

The battle procedure in 2nd Division was even worse. Rosenthal did not send warning orders to his brigade commanders until nearly 8:00 AM, and met with them 90 minutes later in a hastily arranged conference at Villers-Bretonneux to determine a plan of attack. The battalion commanders were all instructed to meet at 11:00 AM

98 Stevenson, To Win the Battle, pp. 195-199. 99 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 620. 100 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/15/30, App 8I; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 621 101 8th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/25/44, App. 5. 102 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 676.

180 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command but some did not learn about this until after the appointed time. Because the various conferences did not finish until 1:30 PM, the earliest that 2nd Division units could advance was determined to be 4:30 PM.103 The situation was chaotic. Rupert Sadler (CO 17th Battalion) arrived at the designated meeting place to find no one else there from 5th Brigade. According to Bean, Sadler “wore out two horses trying to find his battalion” and, because he had not done so by 4:00 PM, was compelled to ask the 19th Battalion (in support) to take its place.104

Orders concerning artillery support on 9 August were similarly confused. Covering 2nd Division’s attack on the left, the 13th AFA Brigade learned only at 9:00 AM that operations would recommence but received no details about the relevant infantry units involved, let alone their locations. It was only by chance that 2nd Division’s CRA, Owen Phillips, made an unplanned visit to the 13th FA Brigade’s headquarters at 10:30 AM and was able to drive the artillery brigade’s commander, Hector Caddy, to the 7th Infantry Brigade’s headquarters to arrange a fire plan.105

Miscommunication and mistakes were inevitable. The operation planned for the 10th Brigade on 10 August was delayed until 10:00 PM because of German observation balloons in the area, but the order did not reach 40th Battalion until the troops had already left their bivouacs. The men had to halt and find makeshift shelter to avoid enemy shelling. Some were forced on to a main road near the brigade HQ because it was difficult to negotiate trenches and wire in the area, but this exposed them to attacks by enemy planes. Wounded men, animals and broken limbers blocked the road, compounding 40th Battalion’s difficulties. The troops were subjected to heavy German fire and, with any chance of surprise lost, the operation failed.106

103 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 637. 104 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 637-638. 105 13th Artillery Australian Field Artillery Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/40/30, App. 28/7. Also cited in Pedersen, ‘Maintaining the Advance’, Ch. 8 in Ekins (ed.) 1918 Year of Victory, p. 139. 106 40th Battalion War Diary AWM4 23/57/29, App. 1.

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The desire by some senior commanders to retain close control once operations had commenced meant opportunities were missed. Following 12th Brigade’s success on 8 August, its commander, Ray Leane, believed that his men could push on to capture the village of Proyart. Maclagan (GOC 4th Division), however, denied the request. Leane repeated it the following evening but Maclagan again refused. Leane continued to edge patrols forward and they were soon within 500 yards of the village but the arrival of German reinforcements by that time meant that the opportunity to take Proyart quickly was lost. It took another three days of hard fighting and heavy casualties before Proyart was eventually in Australian hands.107

The 15th Brigade’s commander, Harold Elliott, suggested in the wake of the fighting at Amiens that each front-line battalion be allotted one ‘section of opportunity’, whose commander would remain with the battalion CO throughout and act under his orders.108 There is no evidence that this proposal was ever acted upon. Decentralised command also depended upon the initiative and leadership of lower- level commanders and effective means of communication, and that could also lead to problems. Gordon Bennett, commanding 3rd Brigade, expressed frustration at the lack of certainty about 11th Battalion’s line on the evening of 11 August, “due to the fact that there is not enough personal supervision of the line by the Battalion Commander [John Newman].”109

Australian staff officers faced considerable challenges when planning and preparing for attacks during this period of semi-mobile open warfare. The shortage of relevant up-to-date maps was a constant frustration for staff officers during the advance.110 Staff officers usually used the 1:20,000-scale maps but a scale of 1:10,000 was considered ideal. The 1:40,000-scale map issued to commanders for 6th Battalion’s

107 Bean Notebook, AWM38 3DRL 606/211/1. 108 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30, App 8. 109 3rd Brigade War Diary, AWM4 23/3/34. 110 British maps were printed to one of three scales: infantry maps were drawn to a scale of 1:10,000; artillery maps were 1:20,000; while general planning maps were 1:40,000. Ryan J. Moore, ‘Maps of The First World War: An Illustrated Essay and List of Select Maps in The Library of Congress’, The Occasional Papers No. 7, A Philip Lee Phillips Map Society Publication, Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Summer 2014. https://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/pdf/plp/occasional/OccPaper7.pdf.

182 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command operations around Harbonnières on 9 August was totally inadequate, as its small scale made it difficult to pinpoint the locations of Australian units or sections of enemy resistance. To ensure the men were not hit by the supporting barrage when it opened, shells fell on a line 700 yards ahead of the likely forward positions before the infantry attacked up the long, bare glacis slope towards Lihons. This was much too far ahead of the advancing troops and provided little protection, while its rapid lifts of 100 yards every two minutes only compounded the problem. One battalion commander reported later that it would have been better simply to concentrate shoots on the well-defended Crépey Wood and Lihons itself, rather than provide such a poorly placed and ineffective barrage.111

When 1st Division received an order at 3:30 AM on 10 August to continue the attack at Lihons, the detailed set of trench maps indicated the trench lines to be fought over. The ground upon which the attack was to take place lay at the corners of four separate maps, however, and they had to be stuck together by officers. Not only was there precious little time to do so, but the men had no scissors, pins or paste, and the only available light was provided by candles or electric torches.112 There were even occasions when units attacking adjacent to each other used maps of different scale to plan their respective operations. For 2nd Division’s attack at Mont St Quentin in early September, the artillery and infantry brigades were issued with 1:20,000-scale maps, while the neighbouring 14th Brigade in 5th Division had 1:40,000-scale maps. The discrepancy caused ‘considerable difficulties’.113

The rate of the advance meant maps were not necessarily up to date when an attack took place. A few days after the 4th Division’s successful attack on the Outpost Line on 18 September, Syd Herring (CO 13th Brigade) reconnoitred the captured ground. It was “very interesting to be able to study the ground leisurely and with safety so

111 3rd Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/3/34, App. 13. 112 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 654. 113 ‘Report on Operations 31 August–2 September, 1918’, 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/14/30, App. 1; ‘Narrative of Operations 9-11 August 1918’, 6th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/23/33, App 24.

183 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command soon after the operation,” he noted, “and while the tactics were still fresh in the mind.”114 It was clear that the large-scale maps issued to battalions before the attack were totally inadequate. Many old trenches and long belts of wire put into place prior to the Spring Offensive were not marked, despite their existence being known and clearly shown on aerial photographs.115

The extraordinary demands placed upon staff officers during the advance proved too much for some. On 28 August, the GSO 1 of 5th Division, Lieutenant-Colonel John Peck, CMG, DSO, “was overcome by the constant strain of major operations.”116 Peck suffered a breakdown while carrying out a reconnaissance of the line with his divisional commander, Hobbs, and was evacuated to England. A highly respected pre-war regular, Peck was by all accounts an outstanding and well- loved soldier. Gellibrand thought that Peck to be “out of the top drawer as a soldier”, while Bean “regarded him as one of the best officers in the A.I.F.”117

The tactical methodology employed by Australian units during the advance highlights the flexible, decentralised nature of operations throughout the British army at that stage of the war. This was inevitable given the nature of the fighting, as Monash himself recognised in Australian Victories:

Divisional Headquarters would … almost as soon as the battle commenced, fall out of touch with Brigades, and they in turn with their Battalions; information as to the actual situation at the fighting front would travel slowly, and would reach those responsible for making consequential decisions long after an entire alteration in the situation had removed the need for action. This inevitably placed considerable responsibility upon subordinate leaders to make decisions for themselves, without waiting for guidance or

114 13th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/13/32. 115 13th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/13/32. 116 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 342. 117 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 342. The precise nature of Peck’s illness is difficult to determine. While Ellis implies that it was a nervous breakdown, the 5th Division War Diary states simply that Peck was “seized with a fit and taken to the CCS”. 5th Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/50/30. The entry for Peck in the ADB, however, makes the point that Peck had suffered from illness for much of the war, which he had borne ‘with great courage’. See A. J. Hill, 'Peck, John Henry (1886–1928)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/peck-john-henry-8007/text13953, published first in hardcopy 1988, accessed online 14 June 2016. Men serving under Peck were similarly impressed, including the celebrated Albert Jacka (14th Battalion), who is reputed to have said simply, ‘He’ll do me’.

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orders from higher authority, and to grasp the initiative by taking all possible action on the spot in the light of the circumstances and situation at the moment.118

Australian units adopted a fairly standard and uniform attack formation at Amiens on 8 August. Every brigade except one advanced on a two-battalion front.119 Each battalion operated on a frontage of about 1,000 yards, which was typical for attacking battalions throughout the BEF at that time, and employed two companies in the line. Tanks led the way, accompanied by screens of scouts who served as ‘beaters’ and pointed out enemy positions for the machines to deal with. The main body of infantry usually followed 150 to 200 yards behind the tanks, with the support battalions another 200 yards to the rear.120

Exercising control once an attack was underway was often difficult in even the best- planned operations, however. The deafening barrage in the early stages of the attack on 8 August made verbal communication between men virtually impossible, while heavy fog combined with smoke from the shells made visual signalling difficult even when soldiers were close to each other. With visibility reduced to only a few yards, communication between troops and tanks was virtually out of the question and men could often only locate the barrage in front of them by its sound. It was almost inevitable that companies soon became mixed-up on the battlefield and any semblance of co-ordinated command and control essentially disappeared.121

The fog clung particularly heavily to broken ground by the river on the left of the Australian front and this caused troops in 48th Battalion to swerve blindly to the right and off their line of attack. To their left, meanwhile, troops in 13th Battalion also lost direction and struck part of the 48th Battalion’s objective. Units advancing in the second phase became lost moving forward to the Green Line, which was to

118 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 87-88. 119 The exception was 7th Brigade, which placed three battalions in the line, and one in support. 120 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 530-531; 6th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/23/33, App. 24; Wren, Randwick to Hargicourt, p. 309. 121 ‘Operations of 8th and 9th August, 1918 Narrative by Lieutenant R Dunkley’, 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App 10; 26th Battalion War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/43/37.

185 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command serve as their jumping-off point, and there were even instances of Australian troops fighting other units already established on that line.122

Prismatic compasses were issued to help troops maintain direction. Usually, only junior officers carried the small number of compasses in each battalion, however, and few other men were trained to use them.123 In any case, they generally proved of little value. One platoon in 59th Battalion moved forward in the fog on the right of the Australian line on 8 August with a single compass. According to the platoon commander, Sam Herriot, the weight of flying steel in the air affected the magnetic field and rendered the instrument useless.124 With no visible landmarks to guide them, Herriot’s men came across two of the 31st Battalion’s platoons advancing directly across their path. He then led his men in what turned out to be a southerly direction and they encountered scattered sections of 2nd Division on a metalled road, accompanied by a single tank. The officers of the various units conferred hurriedly and decided (correctly, as it turned out) that they were on the main east- west road and not far from Warfusée. With the tank leading the way, Herriot’s platoon resumed the advance, along with the men picked up from 2nd Division.125

The standard attacking formation adopted by Australian and British units alike during the advance was ‘artillery formation’ (or ‘diamonds’). Walter Downing’s description is instructive:

We assembled in front of the Blue Line in four waves, each consisting of a double line of dots, each dot a little group of section of men in single file, each group placed on the forward and reverse angles of the teeth of an imaginary saw, in a slanting, zig-zag pattern. There was a space laterally between the sections of thirty yards; between each successive section it was two hundred. This is technically known as ‘artillery formation’ because, to do serious harm, a shell must fall very close by the men, and no single shrapnel burst can damage more than one section. Hence it gives the maximum protection against shelling.

122 Bean Notebook, AWM38 3DRL 606/211/1. 123 30th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/47/37. 124 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App 10. 125 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App 10.

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Also, on encountering machine gun fire, it is easy to extend from this formation into a single line.” 126

There was no single uniform method of attack, however, and a variety of formations were employed in response to the particular circumstances of the moment. Units of 26th Battalion attacked on 8 August on a two-company front in three waves, for example. The first consisted of ‘two lines in extended order’, while the second and third comprised ‘lines of sections in single file.’127 In the second phase of the attack, companies of 32nd Battalion crossed the Green Line at 8:20 AM in artillery formation. Fog made the going difficult but the men did not encounter serious opposition until they entered Morcourt Valley, at which point the company commanders ordered them to ‘open out’. They then continued the advance in ‘short rushes’ and captured more than 120 prisoners.128

The companies of 5th Battalion attacked on 9 August with the leading four platoons in two waves, followed by two support platoons in one wave and two reserve platoons to the rear, also in one wave.129 Company commanders in 58th Battalion pressed their advance against strong opposition on the same day by ‘rushes of alternate sections, each covering its neighbour with fire.’130 Companies of 8th Battalion moved forward in ‘shallow columns’ on 10 August but the junior officers instructed them to ‘shake out into extended order’ when they encountered machine gun fire near Rosières.131

The experience and tactical flexibility of lower-level commanders was also evident north of the Somme. Sections in 49th Battalion set out from Gressaire Wood on 10 August in artillery formation with tanks in front but encountered heavy machine gun fire after 1,000 yards. The battalion immediately broke down into lines of

126 Downing, To the Last Ridge, p. 142. 127 26th Battalion Unit War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/43/37, App. 5. 128 32nd Battalion Unit War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/49/37, App. 1. 129 ‘Narrative of Operations of 5th Battalion AIF in the Attack on 9th and 10th August, 1918, in the Vicinity of Vauvillers and Lihons’, 5th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/22/42. 130 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 626. 131 8th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/25/44, App. 5.

187 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command skirmishers. The Germans fired a few shots before withdrawing and the troops reformed into artillery formation and continued. When next confronted by enemy positions near a crossroads, the companies again shook out into lines.132 One company of 6th Battalion advanced on the same day by a series of ‘short rushes’ in the face of intense fire at Lihons, while two other companies in the same battalion advanced in ‘extended order about two paces apart’.133

The pursuit along the river valley of the Somme during August required a particularly flexible tactical approach. Iven Mackay (GOC 1st Brigade) instructed his battalion commanders to ‘dribble’ forward small posts during the day when moving along the wooded edges of the river, and to consolidate their positions at night.134 For the attack by 43rd Battalion at Bouchavesnes in the first week of September, A Company moved forward in ‘skirmishing order’, while B Company moved along the canal in ‘driblets’ to join them.135

The need to press the advance during August saw battle procedure condensed at all levels, with greater responsibility inevitably falling on onto the shoulders of subordinate commanders. This in turn resulted in a more ‘bottom up’ approach to operational planning and execution, although lower-level commanders often complained of a lack of time to make suitable arrangements. The commander of 1st Battalion, Bert Stacy, stated that brigade orders usually contained unnecessary detail and that he often received them too late to take the action required. He wanted more control over the planning. “I submit with deference that the work of battalions would be greatly simplified if the orders issued could be received as soon as possible after the attack is projected containing on the lines of FSR only what is necessary for Battalions to know and that it then be left to Battalions to make all their own arrangements.”136

132 Bean Notebook, AWM38 3DRL 606/208/1 133 Ron Austin, ‘Rough as Bags’: History of 6th Battalion, pp. 261-263. 134 ‘1st Brigade Order 115 (25 August 1918)’, 1st Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/1/37, App. 14. 135 Bean Notebook, AWM38 3DRL 606/208/1. 136 1st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/18/34, App. 14.

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Stacy received news on 19 August of 1st Division’s impending attack in the Chuignes valley but was given no detailed orders from 1st Brigade until 6:00 AM 22 August, the day before it was due to commence. In anticipation, Stacy carried out his own preparations in the interim but,

any extra information contained in them [the orders] could only with great difficulty be disseminated amongst Companies owing to duties of reconnaissance; on the other hand, a close study at that time takes up time which is most valuable, and it is generally found that most of the information has been received or provided for already … a short order issued early is worth more than a full order issued late.137

It was not an isolated occurrence. “But, as constantly – and inevitably – happened in these operations, the higher commanders’ decisions were made too late to be carried out in the time intended,” Bean wrote of operations that took place in late August the Australians approached the Somme bend. “The 15th Brigade, just recalled from the cancelled relief of the 8th, could not relieve the 7th before dawn on August 30th, and as movement down the slope to the river in daylight meant decimation the relief was postponed to the following night.” As a result, 7th Brigade “now shouldered the 15th Brigade’s task.”138

Most of the tactical planning and preparation was carried out at brigade level and below during the pursuit in the final week of August because higher-level commanders were simply too far back to exercise much influence. It was a testing period for the front-line commanders. One described operations during that time as:

probably … as varied in nature and extent as it has been the privilege of any member of the unit [22nd Battalion] to participate in. The range of operations has fluctuated from some trench warfare to some open warfare with all its necessary movements and quick change of plan and objective.139

137 1st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/18/34, App. 14. 138 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 789. 139 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/39/36, App. 13.

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The frustration of lower-level commanders caused by rushed planning and preparation is a constant refrain in war diaries during this time. “Not enough consideration is given to the time it takes to issue orders to subordinate commanders,” lamented the GOC 3rd Brigade, Edward Martin.140 James Robinson (CO 26th Battalion) concurred. “It is extremely desirable to obtain the earliest information about an attack so that such information can be passed to the NCO and men for their digestion,” he reported in the wake of the fighting at Mont St Quentin in early September. “Cases occur where all officers of a Company become casualties and the men are then at a loss to know how to act.”141

The speed of operations and need for rapid planning often made it necessary to issue instructions verbally before they were written down and distributed officially. This led the 12th Brigade’s commander, Leane, to observe:

It is interesting to note the growth of popularity of the conference method of transmission of information and orders. On such occasions when moves are frequent and the number of details to be arranged is not reduced, it is impossible to transmit information quickly enough to allow time for preparation by junior formations for the action to be taken, except by verbal instructions given at a conference which are confirmed later by written orders and instructions. In this way the units obtain the maximum amount of time in which to arrange their requirements and merely await the written order as confirmation of their action.142

This was evident on the eve of 7th Brigade’s attack at Mont St Quentin on 2 September. Monash called Rosenthal to his headquarters at 7:30 PM on 1 September and instructed him to organise an attack for 5:30 AM the next morning. Rosenthal met with the 7th Brigade’s commander, Evan Wisdom, and his artillery commander, Owen Phillips, at about 9:30 PM. Wisdom returned to his headquarters at Buscourt and briefed his battalion commanders at 10:45 PM. The 25th Battalion’s commander, William Davis, held a meeting with his company commanders at 11:00

140 3rd Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/3/34, App. 13. 141 26th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/43/38. 142 14th Brigade War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/14/29.

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PM and issued verbal instructions. Corps HQ did not then issue formal written orders for the attack until 11:06 PM.143

Relying on verbal instructions increased the prospect of miscommunication, misinterpretation or subsequent alteration, however. As one brigade commander recognised, after issuing a verbal instruction it was important to “Write your operation order then! It saves a lot of amendments later on.”144 The rush to issue orders during operations also meant frequent changes and could lead to uncertainty in units concerned. “We are wondering when our next orders will come to move,” wrote one junior officer in the 60th Battalion before the operations at Péronne. “I have never known so many orders to be issued and cancelled as has been the case during the last few days.”145 He expressed a similar frustration a week later:

Once more the order for our Bn. to come out has been cancelled. We wonder sometimes what our staff can be dreaming about. They do not seem to be able to think the same thing twice these days. It is hard to say who is responsible for the conglomeration of orders which are received.146

With little or no time to await instructions from above, battalion commanders and their subordinates often had to determine for themselves solutions to the myriad of problems brought about by more open and freewheeling operations, and then implement them.147 Senior commanders often highlighted the important role played by junior officers in particular, and their leadership during operations did much to foster the morale and combat effectiveness of troops under their command. “I need hardly record that the troops displayed the highest spirit throughout,” reported Stacy following 1st Battalion’s attack in the Chuignes valley in mid-August, “and that the work of Company Commanders, junior Officers and Other Ranks was worthy of

143 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 855. 144 12th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/12/31, App. 19. 145 Brewer Diary, 29 August 1918, SLNSW, MLMSS 1300/6. 146 Brewer Diary, 29 August 1918, SLNSW, MLMSS 1300/6. 147 Hayden Lammiman, ‘The Senior Soldier: An Analysis of the Command Response of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Infantry Battalion Commanders to the Momentum of the Hundred Days Offensive’, BA Honours Thesis, UNSW (Canberra), 2016, p. 11.

191 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command praise each in their own role. Reorganisation proceeded on every suitable occasion and the Units were well under command and control all the time.”148

Fighting by the 56th Battalion in the streets of Péronne on 2 September illustrated the primacy of battalion commanders and junior officers once operations were underway. After three difficult days, the 15th Brigade HQ issued orders to its battalions with the simple instruction: ‘CO 56th running the show.’ The acting- commander of 58th Brigade, Major Harold Ferres, received the instruction at 7:30 AM. With the barrage already finished, he realised:

it was uncertain when communication would be made with 56th Battalion and every mind that the enemy had more time to recover from the effect of our artillery which had probably not been without effect on his machine gun defences.149

Ferres decided to act immediately. He sent a patrol into Péronne and made his way back to the moat, where he established a headquarters, before sending forward the remainder of A, B, and D Companies (keeping C Company in reserve) into the town to mop up. The operation was successful and Ferres was well supported by his junior officers throughout. Ferres later praised,

the sound leadership … and personal gallantry exercised during the day by Lieutenants Morrison, Laing and Slaughter, MC. These officers, not usually in command of companies, found the command devolve on them at the outset owing to casualties, and in the case of Lieutenants Morrison and Slaughter, they were the only Officers with the Company.150

The operational tempo of the advance slowed considerably in mid-September as Fourth Army approached the formidable defences of the Hindenburg system and that allowed time for battle procedure to be implemented more deliberately. Planning reverted to the more familiar ‘top down’ approach, with the Corps once again central to the process. In contrast to preparations for the 8 August, however,

148 1st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/18/34, App. 14. 149 58th Battalion War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 23/75/32, App. 2. 150 58th Battalion War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 23/75/32 (Part 1) App. 2. Lt Thomas Slaughter, a 26-year-old farmer from Wimmera in Victoria, enlisted as a sergeant in the 4th Light Horse in August 1914. He received a bar to his MC for his work during this action.

192 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command the planning for the attack at the St Quentin Canal on 29 September contained significant flaws that ultimately proved costly.

Rawlinson first met with his corps commanders, Monash, Butler and Braithwaite (GOC IX Corps) on 13 September to discuss the proposed operation. During the attack on 8 August, the British had captured detailed plans of the Hindenburg defences opposite Fourth Army and these were both confirmed and supplemented by recent extensive aerial reconnaissance and photography. Rawlinson gave Monash responsibility for formulating the general plan for the operation. He also placed the American II Corps under Monash’s command to supplement the Corps’ dwindling strength. On 18 September, with fighting underway at the Outpost Line, Monash finalised a detailed preliminary outline of the proposed attack against the St Quentin Canal. It was an ambitious scheme that also included the capture of the distant Beaurevoir Line, but was predicated on the Outpost Line opposite Fourth Army being secured in its entirety by the time the main attack commenced on 29 September.151 It was a misguided assumption that would have serious ramifications.

Rawlinson met with his senior commanders again on 19 September and altered Monash’s plan. Fearing heavy fire upon the land-bridge from the flanks, Rawlinson accepted a suggestion by Braithwaite to push one British division over the canal at Bellenglise on the right of the Australian Corps and south of the tunnel, and then pass a second through it. This doubled the frontage of attack to 12,000 yards and Rawlinson charged two divisions of IX Corps with the amphibious crossing.152 Rawlinson also limited the objectives on the first day to the Hindenburg Line and not the Beaurevoir Line beyond, which he considered to be an unnecessarily ambitious undertaking.153

151 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 233-240. 152 These were 46th (North Midland) Division and 30th Division. 153 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 240-241.

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Monash believed these alterations were ill-advised and that the amphibious crossing by the British divisions was not feasible. The canal was a formidable obstacle and much depended on the ability of the two corps on either side of the Australians to establish a suitable jumping off line in the week prior. In the event, Rawlinson’s decision to force a crossing over the canal was a masterstroke. Meanwhile, III Corps’ failure to capture the heavily defended Outpost positions of The Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm left the Australian left flank dangerously exposed in the lead up to the attack.

Rawlinson issued formal orders on 22 September, and Monash held a three-hour Corps conference the following day with his divisional and brigade commanders, as well as the staff and commanders of II American Corps (which was to make a preliminary attack on 27 September to secure the proper jumping-off line for the main operation two days later).154 Unlike the attack on 8 August, the element of surprise was out of the question and orders could be issued in a more timely fashion. To facilitate co-operation with the Americans and to assist with their preparations, Monash formed an Australian ‘mission’ on 24 September. It was placed under the direction of 4th Division’s commander, Maclagan, with nearly 220 Australian soldiers (including 90 officers) attached to American units.155

Monash held a final corps conference on 26 September. Present were the commanders and staff of the 3rd and 5th Australians Divisions (which were to attack the Hindenburg Line), as well as those of 2nd Division (which would make the subsequent attack against the Beaurevoir Line beyond), the American divisional and brigade commanders, and the relevant tank, air force and cavalry commanders. It was the largest gathering of commanders brought together by Monash during the entire campaign.156 Monash outlined the scope and detail of both the preliminary

154 ‘Report on Operations of the Australian Corps’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. 155 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 240-241. See also Blair, The Battle of the Bellicourt Tunnel, pp. 1-7. 156 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 250.

194 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command and main operations, and settled points not previously decided upon.157 The failure of the American divisions on 27 September to make good the jumping-off line in time for the main attack two days later, however, meant that the planning for the attack across the land-bridge by the Australians was formulated on a false premise. The strain of the previous six weeks was clearly showing on Monash, with Blamey describing the Corps commander’s appearance at the time as “thin and worn.”158

Monash attempted to re-direct blame for the problems that eventuated. Early in the evening of 28 September, after it was clear that the American 27th and 30th Divisions would not secure the start line in time for the next morning’s attack, he called together the Australian correspondents. Bean claimed that Monash was ‘very insistent’ in doubting the Americans would reach their objectives because of their inexperience and lack of training. “John gave us, as usual, an absorbingly interesting account of the fight,” Bean noted in his diary.

He made a great point of an American brigade having gone into the starting point without its bombs for mopping up. … As usual, we found this statement of John’s to be inaccurate … John was hedging against a possible defeat.159

As Dale Blair has pointed out, however, Monash “did not integrate the Americans sufficiently in his own mind when it came to fighting the battle – he viewed them as a separate entity and not his own.”160

On the eve of the assault, therefore, Monash knew he was in “a sea of troubles”.161 Subsequent events bore this out. The fighting on the Hindenburg Line was marked by chaos, confusion and heavy losses. The Americans attacked at 6:20 AM on 29 September but their accompanying tanks were all quickly put out of action, either by

157 ‘Report on Operations of the Australian Corps’, Australian Corps General Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/35/10, App. 22. 158 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p. 391. 159 Bean Notebook, AWM38 3DRL 606/117/1. The Australian correspondents present were Bean, Hubert Wilkins, Keith Murdoch, and Gordon Gilmour. According to, Sadler, Gellibrand – a frequent critic of Monash – believed that the Australian Corps commander found it difficult to “face defeat with determined coolness of mind and conduct.” Sadler, The Paladin, p. 181. 160 Blair, Diggers and Doughboys, p. 138. 161 Monash, The Australian Victories, p. 274.

195 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command enemy artillery fire or because they wandered into an old British minefield that had been neglected in the planning.162 According to Bean, Monash’s plans had “gone to the winds” by 10:00 AM, although “he did not yet realise it.”163 Sketchy reports from airman and German prisoners led Monash to believe – wrongly – that troops of the American 27th Division were on their objective line; he appears to have done little to verify them independently, however. Meanwhile, Gellibrand himself went forward under heavy fire towards Guillemont Farm and quickly learned that the Americans were in fact still held up. Remarkably, Blamey refused to accept Gellibrand’s protestations, continued to insist that mopping-up operations had commenced, and ordered a frontal attack by 10th and 11th Brigades at 3:00 PM. This was to be undertaken without artillery support for fear of hitting American troops supposedly already on the Green Line. Unsurprisingly, the attack failed miserably.

Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Jess directed 3rd Division’s operations during the period of Gellibrand’s absence. Anticipating the dire situation that was unfolding, Jess warned the 9th Brigade (then in reserve and guarding 3rd Division’s northern flank) that it might soon be required to take part in the attack. In the event, and following the failed operation in the afternoon by 10th and 11th Brigades, 9th Brigade was indeed ordered forward just before 10:00 PM, with a view to launching an attack the following morning. The heavy conditions were such that it took some seven hours for 9th Brigade’s troops to reach their start line. Meanwhile, Jess informed James Cannan (CO 11th Brigade) that three of his battalions would attack alongside 9th Brigade by moving up Bony Spur.

The brigade redeployment in the dark after heavy rain was particularly difficult, and only seven of the 18 tanks were in place to attack on time at 6:00 AM on 30 September. The troops themselves were not in position by then, however, and the

162 Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 289. 163 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 995.

196 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command tanks went forward without them. The infantry did eventually move forward but were quickly held up, with any real progress impossible during the day despite hard fighting. The result was yet another “acrimonious telephone conversation between Gellibrand and Monash” that evening.164 Monash did not appear to believe that Gellibrand’s battalions were only about 200-strong, that he had only a handful of tanks at his disposal, or even that 3rd Division had sustained such heavy casualties; according to Sadler, Monash claimed to have ‘seen a list’ showing only 40.165 Monash therefore insisted on yet another frontal attack the following morning, something Gellibrand knew was pointless. Fortunately for the Australians, the British 46th North Midlands Division had managed to cross the canal to the south, breaching the main defensive line, and German resistance began to waver. The operation proposed for 1 October proved therefore to be something of an anti-climax, as the enemy decided to pull back from their forward positions.

Despite its eventual success, the attack against the Hindenburg Line at the end of September was not Monash’s finest hour. While widely acknowledged as a proven expert and manager of the carefully arranged set-piece, he was found wanting once his careful planning began to unravel and the fog of war rolled in. No doubt exhaustion played a role, as did limitations imposed by the communications systems during the advance (something that will be explored in detail in the next chapter). The events on the Hindenburg Line also highlighted the chaotic nature of the industrialised battlefield in 1918, and the inability of senior commanders situated well behind the line to exert any real influence over operations once fighting was joined.

Monash must shoulder a fair portion of the blame for the problems that ensued. He had not issued any contingency instructions in case of operational failure, and relied for the most part on unconfirmed reports from unreliable sources – including

164 Sadler, The Paladin, p. 179. 165 Sadler, The Paladin, p. 180.

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German prisoners – rather than the first-hand account of one of his most senior and capable commanders. It would appear that Monash based his decisions on what he wanted to believe, not what he needed to hear or was actually the case. This made him blind to the tactical reality before him and he continued to believe that a frontal assault was required, despite Gellibrand’s strenuous and informed opinion to the contrary. And while Pedersen points to the extraordinary strain and stress of the previous six months as a possible explanation for Monash’s erratic performance on the Hindenburg Line, it does not justify it.166 Monash was not as well situated or informed as Gellibrand to be making crucial decisions in the heat of battle, and should have deferred to his senior commander in the line.

Despite the difficulties experienced in the days following the success at Amiens on 8 August and on the Hindenburg Line at the end of September, it is nevertheless clear that an experienced, proven and professional cohort of commanders, officers and senior staff oversaw Australian Corps operations during August and September 1918. These men were far removed from the inexperienced, untried group that had led the troops ashore at Anzac only three years earlier.167 They also shared a great deal in common with their counterparts in the BEF at the time. All were well-trained and battle-hardened, with thos unable to withstand the pressure of leadership sifted out.168 They were thoroughly familiar with operational methodology on the Western Front in 1918, including the latest developments in British tactics, doctrine and technology.

In the words of John Connor, “The AIF was able to play its role in the defeat of Germany in 1918 because it had been organised and trained to operate seamlessly within the British Empire army.”169 Typical of all British corps formations during the Hundred Days, the Australian Corps generally employed a flexible and devolved

166 Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 291. 167 Westerman, Soldiers and Gentlemen, p. 200. 168 Stanley, Bad Characters, p. 39. 169 Connor, ‘Australian Military Education, 1901-18’ in Delaney, et al., (eds) Military Education, p. 81.

198 Chapter 4 Commanders and Command command structure that enabled it to maintain a good operational tempo throughout, and that does much to explain its battlefield success.170

The exercise of command and battle procedure on the Australian front during the advance was generally well managed, but not without its problems. While the attack on 8 August was an exemplar of effective preparation and organisation, planning for the subsequent exploitation phase was rushed, flawed and costly. The most challenging period for the exercise of battle procedure was the final two weeks of August and the first week of September, as the Australians pressed the German retirement along the Somme. Planning during that time depended heavily upon the ability of lower-level commanders to anticipate the wishes of those above them and commence preparations as early as possible. They were often forced to prepare for attacks in a very short space of time, and with minimal information; it was not unusual during that time for junior officers to be briefed while their unit moved into the line. Delegation of command was essential and significant tactical decisions inevitably fell to the ‘man on the spot’.

As the advance slowed in mid-September prior to operations against the strongly defended Hindenburg Line positions, battle procedure reverted to the more evenly paced and familiar pattern of previous years. It was effectively directed once again from above. The attack against the Hindenburg Line itself at the end of the month highlighted the familiar difficulty of sustaining an attack against well-prepared defences and determined defenders even at that late stage of the war, however, and the cost of 2,500 Australian casualties in just four days at the end of September was particularly heavy.

Having considered the nature of battle procedure, command and control during operations on the Australian front in the final advance, we will now turn our attention to the communication systems that facilitated them.

170 Simpson, Directing Operations, p. 225.

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CHAPTER 5

COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL

As we saw in the previous chapter, the depth and rate of the general advance on the Australian front during August and September 1918 posed significant and peculiar demands for commanders long used to the stasis of trench warfare. It highlighted in particular the need for rapid decision-making in order to exercise effective battlefield control and seize opportunities as quickly as possible.1 This in turn emphasised the need for a flexible, reliable, resilient and rapid system of communications to and from the line.2 The BEF certainly recognised the central importance of communications during periods of active operations. According to SS135, “the rapid establishment of good signal communications immediately after the attack is one of the most important, though one of the most difficult, things to be dealt with. No possible means of keeping up communication must be neglected.”3

This chapter will address questions related to the nature and effectiveness communications systems and the exercise of battlefield control in the Australian Corps during the advance, and the role they played in the success or otherwise of operations. In particular, it will address three questions. Firstly, what were the various means of communication available to the Australian Corps? Secondly, how effectively did they cope with the demands of this particularly strenuous period? Thirdly, how did they influence the operational and combat capability of the Corps on the battlefield?

The range of signalling and communication systems available the Australian Corps was typical of British formations in 1918. It included runners, despatch riders, liaison

1 Jonathan Boff, ‘Command Culture and Complexity: Third Army during the Hundred Days, August-November 1918’, Chapter 1 in Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (eds), Changing War: The British Army, the Hundred Days Campaign and The Birth of the Royal Air Force, 1918, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, London, 2013, p 19. 2 FSR I emphasised the need to maintain “constant … communication between the various parts of an army.” Field Service Regulations Part I: Operations (1909) (Reprinted, with Amendments October 1914), HMSO, London, 1914, pp. 22 & 39. See also Brian Hall, ‘Technological Adaptation in a Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914–1918’, The Journal of Military History 78,January 2014, p. 42 3 SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918 (January 1918), HMSO, p. 44.

Chapter 5 Communications and Control officers, carrier pigeons, contact aeroplanes, message-carrying rockets and power buzzer-amplifier sets, as well as a number of visual methods, such as heliograph, semaphore and electric lamps. The three mainstays of the system, however, were telegraph, telephone and wireless.4 Army and corps signal troops were responsible for the communication assets within the corps area throughout the advance, apart from those integral to divisions, and high priority was given to the establishment and maintenance of secure cable lines before and during attacks.5 Routes were put in place to carry communications forward from Army headquarters to that of the various corps under its command.

The broad scheme of communications employed by the Australian Corps in the final advance was also typical of that employed by the various Corps across the BEF. Divisions usually put down a main route of two or more pairs of twisted cable to connect to their forward brigades. The divisional headquarters then moved forward along this line while also establishing an advanced headquarters further ahead. The line left behind was then employed to connect the Corps headquarters to the division. Meanwhile, the division’s advanced headquarters ran airlines forward to the brigades and those cable-heads were then utilised by the main division headquarters when the line moved on once again.

Whenever the main division exchange moved forward, the routes were used either to extend the Corps line or recovered and re-laid forward to the division’s new advance headquarters.6 It was a logical system but the entire process took considerable time and preparation to carry out, which inevitably limited the ability of divisions and brigades to maintain constant communication during prolonged

4 SS 135, p. 44. For a detailed explanation of the various means of communication employed by the British army during the war, see Chapter 3 in Brian Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 88-117. 5 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 11. 6 ‘Signal Communications During the Period August 8th to November 11th 1918’, Fourth Army Records of General Lord Rawlinson: Miscellaneous Papers, IWM 20537/52. See also Butler Papers, IWM 69/10/1, App. J. Three circuits were also pushed back from the division’s advanced headquarters to its main headquarters in the rear.

201 Chapter 5 Communications and Control operations or rapid forward movement. Operational pauses were often necessary to allow the various headquarters to be re-sited and lines established accordingly.7

As with almost every other aspect of the Australians’ operation at Amiens on 8 August, considerable attention was given to the establishment of an effective communications system and it worked well throughout the day. Preparatory work on the Australian front commenced a week beforehand with a permanent line established between the Corps headquarters at Bertangles and Poulainville, a distance of about three miles. Extra arms then extended this through to the villages of Les Alençons, Bussy and Glisy, the last of which was used when the Corps headquarters relocated on 13 August. An old French route was repaired to push the line through from Bussy to the forward divisions, while another line was pushed through Vecquemont and Aubingy to the newly established headquarters of 3rd Division at Fouilly. Although only four miles away as the crow flies, this second line required 42 miles of wire to complete. Meanwhile, another old French route running along the Amiens-Chaulnes railway carried the line from Glisy to the headquarters of 5th Division’s, which was situated at that time in a railway dugout at Villers- Bretonneux.8

Once the attack commenced, an airline cable was run out from the 5th Division’s headquarters to the ‘Red Chateau’ at Villers-Bretonneux in time for 1st Division to move in and establish its own HQ there that evening. Another cable was strung forward for nearly 9,000 yards (5.1 miles) from that point to the village of Bayonvillers. Cables were also run out from Fouilloy Chateau to the headquarters of the British 17th Division (then under Australian command), before being pushed forward by another 1.5 miles. The distance from the Australian Corps headquarters at Bertangles to the 17th Division’s HQ was 26,000 yards (14.7 miles) at that time, and it was 28,000 yards (15.9 miles) to 1st Division’s headquarters at Villers-

7 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10/1, App. J. 8 ‘Report on Communications of Australian Corps During Operations of 8th August, 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 22/10/6, App. 32.

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Bretonneux. This meant that some 23 miles of airline route had to be constructed prior to the attack (requiring about 232 miles of wire), in addition to three miles of buried cable.9

Communication traffic through the Corps Signals Office increased substantially once any major attack commenced and never was this more evident than on 8 August. The Corps Signals Office had to deal with nearly 5,300 telephone calls through just two switchboards on that one day alone, at a rate of about 220 an hour. It was the greatest number of calls handled by the Corps Signals Office on any one day in the war and almost twice the usual daily average.10 Because two separate 10- line exchanges had also been installed in advance at Corps headquarters – one for the BGGS (Blamey) and the other for the GOCRA (Coxen) – the pressure on the Australian Corps advance signals exchange (AUO) was reduced. Along with the use of inter-office phones, this allowed it to cope with the extra strain.11

Communications between Monash’s headquarters and his forward divisions generally worked well on 8 August, despite some advanced headquarters being up to 16 miles away.12 Extra runners were employed to take priority messages directly to the Corps Report Centre, and two extra aeroplane runners were used. Operating shifts for the men at the Corps Signals Office were lengthened from eight to 12 hours to minimize delay on wireless sounder sets, which meant 15 men were available for each shift instead of the usual ten. British and Australian aeroplanes also dropped messages at frequent intervals and these provided the Corps headquarters with details of the fighting and progress of the troops.13

9 ‘Report on Communications of Australian Corps During Operations of 8th August, 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 22/10/6, App. 32. 10 ‘Report on Communications of Australian Corps During Operations of 8th August, 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 36. 11 ‘Report on Communications of Australian Corps During Operations of 8th August, 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 32. 12 ‘Report by Lt H.W. Watson, MM, for Month of August, 1918,’ Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 37. 13 Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 36.

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The communication methods available to Australian formations at Amiens, including their employment and challenges faced, can be seen in the 15th Brigade’s post-battle report:

Communications: throughout worked well. At no time was Brigade Headquarters out of touch with Division. The long length of line to be maintained between Division and Brigade made a big drain on the personnel of the Brigade Signal section, who worked at high pressure all the time and did splendid service. Wireless: was not used to any extent, most of the work being done by telephone. Pigeons were successfully used. Light Horse: were an excellent means of communication. The two men were of the greatest used to the Battalions, especially right forward. The men supplied were very intelligent and could find their way with care, even to difficult map references. To be of greater service however it is suggested that a complete squadron be allotted to a Brigade for communication and reconnaissance duties. Cyclists: another great success owing to the broken and crop sown ground. Some of the cyclists were lost in the march on the assembly position owing to the fog. Motor DR was the one with the Brigade Section was of immense use especially for very urgent work forward when telephones were temporarily out of order. Message rockets were not used. Runners: as always the case, again worked with untiring energy and were tireless in their efforts to get messages through. Brigade and Battalion headquarters in all cases moved by bounds, headquarters did not move from one location to another until the next place forward had been connected up.14

While communication system from the Corps headquarters to divisions worked relatively smoothly in the first phase of the attack at Amiens, difficulties arose in forward areas once the line began to advance. In the second phase of the operation, field artillery brigades on 4th Division’s front immediately south of the Somme attempted to maintain direct contact with the divisional artillery headquarters by telephone during the attack. This proved impossible, however, because of the number and length of lines required, as well as a shortage of available linesmen.15

14 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30, App 8K. 15 4th Division Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/14/30, App. 18.

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Similar problems would recur time and again across the Australian front throughout the advance.

The experience of 2nd Division illustrates the general efficacy of the communications system in the early days of the advance, however, as well as the labour-intensive and time-consuming nature of the process. The division’s signal company spent the days before 6 August burying cable and linking all battalions, infantry and artillery brigades, artillery groups and divisional headquarters. Brigade forward signal parties moved off from their respective cable heads when the attack commenced at 4:20 AM and followed the rear waves of infantry. Each party laid two pairs of line overland to advanced signal stations established at pre-selected locations just behind the Green Line in each brigade sector. These lay on open ground but the absence of German counter-artillery fire on the day meant they remained uncut, and proved reliable.16

As the ground line was laid out, a poled airline cable was also pushed forward from 2nd Division’s cable head (roughly along the inter-brigade boundary) to reach Bayonvillers (some 2,000 yards ahead of the first objective line) by 11 AM. A telephone exchange was established the next day and it facilitated the general advance by accepting traffic from all units in the area, not just those attached to 2nd Division.17 A divisional signal store and cable dump was also established at the Bayonvillers exchange and that allowed all units to draw communications equipment without undue delay.18 As the advance progressed, three pairs of poled cable were run forward from the exchange at Bayonvillers to the dual brigade headquarters at nearby Harbonnières, giving each a direct line back to the division headquarters.19

16 ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81. 17 Those formations simply ran lines to the exchange and this enabled them to maintain touch with their higher formations. 18 ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81. 19 This airline was increased the following day to five pairs of line, two of which were allotted to the flanking divisions. ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81.

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This process showed the value of concentrating upon the rapid construction of a strong forward route with a series of exchange stations located as far forward as possible within the divisional sector. The grouping of infantry headquarters, artillery brigade headquarters, and battalion headquarters also assisted communications by allowing formations to maintain touch with higher command on a single main channel of both wireless and telegraph. The buried system constructed by the 2nd Division during this time was also helpful to other formations; the 5th Division used it after passing through, as did the 2nd Canadian Division on the right.20 The British counter-battery work, which effectively neutralised retaliatory German fire, and this helped to ensure virtually every line remained intact throughout.

In addition to the ground cable, the three brigades also remained in touch with the 2nd Division’s headquarters by wireless throughout operations from 8 to 11 August. Trench sets in conjunction with an amplifier were employed successfully over distances up to six miles, while motorcycle and horse despatch riders operated between infantry and artillery brigade headquarters, as well as to division.21 Visual signalling was not always possible because of early morning fog on 8 August but lamp signalling was used both by infantry and artillery units when it finally lifted by 8 AM22

Despite the general success of the communications system on the Australian front on 8 August, there were problems in some areas that affected battlefield performance. In a few instances in 4th Division, formation headquarters failed to notify the divisional headquarters in advance of their proposed location, and the single cable wagon was unable to keep all brigades in telephonic communication with their artillery. In addition, buried cable could not be recovered easily once it

20 The Australian Corps HQ, the Corps Heavy Artillery, as well as 4th Division, also subsequently used the buried route. Meanwhile, the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Division, all utilised the poled route in due course. ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81. 21 ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81. 22 ‘Notes on Operations of 2nd Australian Div. on 8th August, and Succeeding Days’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 81.

206 Chapter 5 Communications and Control had been laid down, and this compounded the difficulties once the line moved forward.23 Blame for problems on 4th Division’s front on 8 August have long been attributed to the failure of III Corps to capture the German guns on Chipilly Spur across the river to the north but that ignores systemic difficulties that were present within the division itself.

Following the great success on 8 August, the strain and limitations of the communications network were soon apparent in the exploitation phase that followed, and that contributed significantly to the operational difficulties experienced across the Corps’ front. By 9 August, the 4th Division Signals Company had to maintain about 25 miles of cable and that only increased with the push forward north of the river during the next four days. This slowed the advance and it was soon obvious that communication arrangements had to be streamlined if a higher operational tempo was to be achieved and maintained. From that time onwards, one or two lines were laid forward as quickly as possible to a pre- determined central point that could be accessed by the relevant artillery brigades. This became the forward exchange and report centre, with as many brigades connecting to it as they could. The new system worked well and was generally employed by 4th Division in its future operations.24

On the right of the Australian line on 9 August, 60th Battalion was unable to establish clear communication with other units in the vicinity. No telephone lines were laid out and visual signalling with flags was fruitless. This undermined the combat effectiveness of the battalion because it could not easily contact its supporting artillery. “Had I been able to communicate rapidly with the artillery on the morning of the ninth inst.,” reported the battalion commander, Herbert Layh, after the operation, “much of the delay in advancing would have been obviated.

23 4th Division Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/14/30, App. 18. 24 ‘Lessons Learned from Communications During Operations Commencing 8 August 1918’ 4th Division Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/14/30, App. 18.

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Runners proved the most reliable but are necessarily very slow in getting messages through.”25

The rapid nature of the advance during the final weeks of August meant that often only light airlines were usually established initially to connect Rawlinson’s Fourth Army headquarters to that of the Australian Corps. These temporary lines were laid as rapidly as possible by Fourth Army’s construction companies and replaced subsequently by more permanent ones. The Australian Corps HQ also established one or two light airline routes to their own formations in forward areas. The HQ then moved forward along these routes as the advance progressed. They consolidated them in the process and left them intact for the Fourth Army’s headquarters to use subsequently for its own communication forward.26 To the north of the Australians, III Corps successfully employed a similar system, with three trunks carrying communication traffic between divisional headquarters and its advanced exchange.27

A well-sited divisional headquarters was crucial to the effective and rapid transmission of orders and information to fighting units in forward areas. If too far back, any break in the line would effectively leave staff ‘blind’ until an officer could reconnoitre forward and organise a repair, a procedure that usually took considerable time and posed significant danger to the men involved. On 3rd Division’s front north of the Somme in August, the rapidly advancing fighting line magnified the problem by adding an area that was described by one officer as being “of more or less doubtful communication.”28 Because changing the location of a divisional headquarters in the midst of an action created problems with communication, it was best done either at the operation’s conclusion or during a period of prolonged consolidation. It took time to establish a new telephone system and this made it

25 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30 Part 3 App 8I. 26 ‘Signal Communications During the Period August 8th to November 11th 1918’, Fourth Army Records of General Lord Rawlinson: Miscellaneous Papers, IWM 20537/52. 27 Butler Papers, IWM 69/10/1 Part 2 App. J. 28 3rd Division War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 1/46/22, App. 27.

208 Chapter 5 Communications and Control important to determine the exact location of a forward battle headquarters prior to Zero. The brigade and battalion headquarters were situated as far forward as possible before the attack commenced and did not move once it was underway.

Figure 5.1 Diagram of wireless communications network on the Australian and III Corps fronts in mid-August 1918.29

The 38th Battalion’s experience typifies the challenges facing front-line units in maintaining effective communications during the fast-moving pursuit along the Somme river valley in August. Its companies were situated just east of Hamel in Vaire Wood on 8 August. Telephone communication between battalion and brigade was in place well before Zero and was maintained successfully throughout that first day. The battalion headquarters moved forward to Hamilton Wood in the afternoon

29 Liaison Force War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/65/3, App. C8. Liaison Force was situated north of the Somme adjacent to III Corps, while the Australian 4th Division and British 17th Division were on the southern side.

209 Chapter 5 Communications and Control of 8 August and visual contact was established with its parent 10th Brigade before a line was put through.

During the night of 8-9 August, 38th Battalion attacked along the Warfusée- Abancourt Road. Visual means were out of the question, of course, which meant that communication was only possible by runner until a line could be established to the forward companies. Unsurprisingly, carrying messages by hand between the various formations with any speed in the dark and over unknown ground proved very difficult. Furthermore, the heavy German retaliatory shelling in the area compounded the problem and slowed the process by making it difficult for linesmen to establish the lines.30 As the advance progressed, the battalion’s signallers were able to utilise captured German lines that duplicated newly laid British ones, and this helped to resolve the problems.

Following this difficult period, the battalion spent much of the time during their short rest behind the line in Hamilton Wood practising open warfare communications.31 The men returned to the line north of the Somme on the night of 23 August but found that there was only a single line linking its new headquarters to one forward company, and that was difficult to maintain in the face of heavy German shelling. Work to establish more forward lines was carried out hurriedly, and they managed to survive the German counter-barrage that fell during III Corps’ attack that was already underway north of Bray. The companies were able to stay in touch with the battalion’s HQ and with each other, and there were enough linesmen available at that time to ensure that a constant flow of communication was maintained throughout the operation.32

30 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27. 31 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27. 32 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27.

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Effective communications did much to facilitate 1st Division’s attack in the Chuignes valley in the third week of August, with one officer’s report highlighting the importance of signals section to the success of the operation:

A general line of communication was run through the centre of the Brigade attack. During the night previous to the attack a report centre was established as near the jumping off tape as possible and almost continuous communication was kept up by ‘phone. On moving forward, a report centre was established in Robert Wood and throughout the communication between Brigade Headquarters and Units of the command was very good. Very little signalling was done by visual work as telephone and runner communication met almost every need. Especially quick laying of cable was carried out by the Signal Section of the 1st Battalion who followed closely on the barrage and established a Battalion forward report centre at (map reference) soon after the attack commenced.33

August 1918 was the busiest and most strenuous month for the Australian Signal Service for the entire war, and the pressure on the men operating the communications system was relentless.34 The AUO handled nearly 7,000 messages and packages each day between 22 and 24 August during 3rd Division’s operations at Bray, as well as those undertaken by 1st Division and the British 32nd Division’s across the river in the Chuignes valley.

There were a number of reasons for the extraordinarily heavy traffic passing through the Corps Signal Office during August. These included the scale and fluid nature of operations, the rapidly advancing line and distances covered, the fact that at least five divisions (as many as eight for a brief spell in mid-August) and a HA unit were all under the Corps’ command at various times, and the frequent movement of the various formation and unit headquarters.35 Despite the predictable increase in communication traffic prior to operations, however, the general shortage of

33 1st Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/1/37 App. 11 34 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery Signals Section Diary, August & September 1918, AWM4 22/10/6 & 7 35 ‘Report by Signalmaster on Work During Month of August 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 22/10/6, App. 41.

211 Chapter 5 Communications and Control manpower within the Corps meant that there were no extra personnel available to handle it and just two reliefs of 17 telegraphists and five clerks had to carry out all of the duties.36

Figure 5.2 Total messages and packages received, handed in and transmitted by Australian Corps Signals Office during August 1918.37

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000 No. of messages, etc. 2000

1000

0

The length and speed of the advance during August placed enormous pressure on the supply of wire available on the Australian front. For example, the 38th Battalion used between 13,000 and 14,000 yards of wire during the month and constantly faced a shortage. To address the problem in the short term, German lines were wound up whenever possible and re-laid for the battalion to maintain communication with the 10th Brigade’s headquarters.38

Lessons concerning communications were rapidly absorbed during the hectic period of operations in late August and early September. For 2nd Division’s attack at Mont St Quentin, brigade and battalion HQs were all located close to each other to

36 There were a number of superintendents in the Signals Office but they were not actively involved in the transmission of communications. ‘Report by Signalmaster on Work During Month of August 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 22/10/6, App. 41. 37 Australian Corps Signals Headquarters War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7 38 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27.

212 Chapter 5 Communications and Control facilitate communication. In addition, all lines forward to battalions were doubled to ease congestion of communication traffic once operations commenced.39 These measures did much to contribute to 2nd Division’s success in the confusion of the hard fighting on the slopes of the hill. According to the 23rd Battalion’s commander, William Brazenor:

An outstanding feature of the month’s operations has been the close liaison maintained by COs of the Brigade. In my opinion, this has been of great value in the success gained … the close proximity of the four Battalion Headquarters has enabled the COs to confer and help materially in the tactical control of their Units. Such close liaison has not been possible or made use of in the previous history of the Brigade.40

Fighting in the broken, urban landscape of Péronne in the first days of September presented its own peculiar set of communications challenges for 5th Division. The 59th Battalion’s HQ was subjected to heavy shelling during the night of 2 September. Gas also reeked in the streets. This made gas masks necessary, which restricted visual communication. The line running back to 15th Brigade’s advance HQ was also broken repeatedly and linesmen worked hard to keep it open until the battalion commander, Scanlan, could move forward into the town. A line was then established between 15th Brigade and Scanlan’s new headquarters (sited with that of 58th Battalion), but it was difficult to maintain in the shattered town because of enemy constant shelling.41

Another line was run out to 59th Battalion’s forward-most company in the early evening on 3 September. It broke in the midst of a conversation with the Brigade headquarters, however, and the linesman sent to repair it was wounded in the attempt. Fortunately, communication with the other two companies was maintained and Scanlan managed to re-locate his headquarters at 8:00 PM to a position also used

39 ‘Report on Operations 27th August to 31st August 1918’, 5th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM 23/5/38, App. 3. 40 ‘Commanding Officer’s Report on the Month of August 1918’, 23rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/40/35, App. 24. 41 59th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/76/32 App. 10.

213 Chapter 5 Communications and Control by 54th Battalion in the neighbouring 14th Brigade. Communication was re- established from there back to 15th Brigade’s HQ, while lines were run laterally out to the 57th and 60th Battalions. These were maintained (but again only with great difficulty), while the gas masks and debris from shattered buildings continued to make visual communication virtually impossible. It was a gruelling and challenging period for all concerned but effective co-operation between the various battalion and brigade signal companies, as well as the extraordinary bravery shown by the signallers themselves when heading out to make repairs under heavy fire, enabled just enough lines to be maintained for the operations to continue.42

The Corps signallers faced enormous challenges during this period. The battered village of Méricourt was in a terrible state, for example, and it was difficult to find adequate covered office space for the signals staff. For a time, the Corps Signal Office occupied a room only 7-feet square, which had to provide for the Assistant Director Signals and his staff of four. Rain fell through the broken roof and spoiled maps and equipment. Some signals staff even had to vacate the space at one point to make enough room for officers and NCOs, who had arrived to draw up orders for the next day’s operations at Mont St Quentin and Péronne. This all served to cause considerable delays in the preparation of the attack.43 When the Corps headquarters moved to Tincourt on 11 September, the only accommodation available for signallers were dugouts on the side of roads or small hills. These were large enough to hold three or four men but all “were in a terrible condition”.44

Once across the Somme, the Corps Signal Office had to establish new lines while at the same time maintaining communication with the various divisional headquarters, any of which could move forward at short notice by anything up to 12,000 yards.45 Signallers had to exercise initiative and take advantage of whatever material and

42 59th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/76/32, App. 10. 43 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7. 44 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7. 45 ‘Monthly Report on Australian Corps Signal Company August 1918’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 22/10/6, App. 43.

214 Chapter 5 Communications and Control opportunities presented themselves. They were helped in this by being able to utilise pre-existing infrastructure. The No 1 and No 2 Australian Signal Sections and the British 48th Motor Airline (MAL) Section started cleaning the existing German route before wiring it through Chuignolles to Dompierre, a distance of 6000 yards. This was extended by 9000 yards through Herbécourt and Flaucourt over the next two days by utilizing existing English and German routes. By 4 September, it was continued along the old German route to the western outskirts of Péronne. The route over the canal was repaired by 12 September and linked to lateral and forward communications systems east of the town.46 This was established by salving and repairing old British, French and German telegraph routes.47

Because the use of old, established routes saved much-needed time, labour and resources, pre-existing lines were employed whenever possible. This was particularly evident during September in the operations east of Péronne to the Hindenburg Line. The Australians often repaired German routes that had been erected in the wake of the March advance, as well as even older British ones that were already in place before that time. Most were still in serviceable condition and required only simple rewiring, which enabled a good system of lateral and forward communications to be established relatively quickly. That allowed the advance to continue apace, which in turn largely prevented the Germans from destroying cable lines as they fell back. As a result, old wires were sometimes left intact for miles. The Germans did cut down every second pole during the retirement in places to slow the advance. These were usually put back into working order relatively quickly, however, and that in turn helped to establish and good communications network for the eventual attacks against the various defences of the Hindenburg Line.48

46 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7. 47 ‘Summary of Work for September 1918 No. 1 Australian Motor Airline Section’, Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7, App. 30. 48 ‘Summary of Work for September 1918 No. 1 Australian Motor Airline Section’, Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7, App. 30.

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After crossing the Somme at the start of the September, a serviceable German route ran from Le Mesnil to Harcourt through Cartigny, while an old British route was located between Bussu and Biaches and employed to link the Australian Corps HQ to the northern line.49 The former was used as the main forward route in anticipation of the Corps HQ move to Tincourt on 11 September. At that time, the poles and arms of an old British route running south of the railway were still in good condition and a German route in the area needed only little repair to serve both the Corps Heavy Artillery and 4th Division in the line.50

The Australians also employed captured German transmission equipment when possible. The 11th Brigade took possession of an old German wireless set on 8 August, for example, and used it extensively thereafter during the advance. When the brigade’s line communication failed on 7 September, the German set handled all traffic with the various battalion headquarters until the fault could be repaired. A wireless aerial left behind by the Germans during their retirement was also put into immediate use by being fixed to a high tree at one end and a telegraph pole at the other.51

Despite the best efforts of linesmen, establishing and maintaining telephone wires during operations was laborious and difficult. It usually took hours for them to be put into use or repaired. This was evident in the attack by 1st Battalion at the Outpost Line on 18 September. The operation commenced at 5:30 AM and telephonic communication was established between the forward battalion headquarters and 1st Brigade HQ three hours later. With the Red Line captured, a line was then pushed out and the forward and rear battalion headquarters were in communication with each other by 11:30 AM. The battalion signallers also managed to put down a line from the Brigade forward station to the rear battalion headquarters but communication was not established between the two until 7:00

49 Assistant Director Signals Australian Corps Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/1/28. 50 Assistant Director Signals Australian Corps Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/1/28. 51 3rd Division Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/13/24.

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PM, nearly eight hours later. Telephone lines were established between the battalion headquarters and the reserve, front-line and support companies by 1:45 PM, 2:00 PM and 2:30 PM respectively. Constant shelling meant that no line could be established with the forward company on the right, however, until at 8:15 PM, some six hours later.52

Constant and heavy German artillery fire in the opening stages of the attack on the Hindenburg Line on 29 September made it difficult to maintain forward routes. Linesmen worked under enormous pressure to ensure that the Corps HQ was never entirely out of touch with the divisions. Attempts were made on 1 October to push forward the southern route on 5th Division’s front through Templeux-le-Guérard and Hargicourt to Bellicourt, but it was impossible to construct lines beyond that point because of the artillery fire. Work on 3rd Division’s attacking front was also stopped for the same reason.

Not all of the damage caused to the communication system on the Australian front was caused by enemy action. It was not unusual for tanks to smash into poles inadvertently, and that could bring down entire sections of cable for a considerable distance, dislocating communications as a result. Frustrated signallers made frequent representations to the Tank Corps about ‘careless driving’ in areas where there were airline routes but it remained a constant problem.53 During the night of 1-2 October, in the midst of the bitter fighting at the Hindenburg Line, a British tank knocked down the angle pole outside the Australian Corps headquarters at Tincourt and temporarily interrupted communications between the Corps and its forward divisions.54

The wired communications system was at breaking point and the frustration of 18th Battalion’s experienced commander, George Murphy, was obvious following the

52 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, App. 7. 53 ‘Monthly Report by OC Company’, Australian Corps Headquarters, Signals Company, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7, App. 36. 54 Assistant Director Signals, Australian Corps, War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 22/1/29.

217 Chapter 5 Communications and Control operations on the Beaurevoir Line a few days later:

Communications were fair during the operations. The tremendous amount of transport, tanks, et cetera moving in immediate rear of the front line was constantly responsible for cutting the overland lines. There was very little trouble from enemy shellfire.”55

It was not only infantry units that had communication problems at the Hindenburg Line. Following the fighting at Bellicourt on 5th Division’s front, the commander of the 14th Australian MG Company reported:

The greatest trouble was experienced during operations in keeping up communications. Communication with ‘Rear’ particularly Battalion HQ was a matter of great difficulty. It was some considerable time before the location of Battalion HQ was supplied to this Company HQ … While Company HQ was established at (map reference), visual signalling, in conjunction with 8th Company Signal is, was kept up with Forward Battalion HQs.56

The difficulty of establishing and maintaining lines during the advance meant that units often relied heavily upon runners once operations commenced. Because it took time for wires to be pushed forward, runners were frequently used in the initial stages of an attack to communicate messages to and from the fighting line. Runners moved forward with the advancing infantry and tanks during the attack at Amiens on 8 August to collect information about the enemy and position of the line, for example, and reported back to divisional headquarters. This was taxing in itself because of the long distances to be travelled and heavy enemy shelling, but it was made even more so by the constant movement of infantry battalions and other units and their equipment in the area.57

55 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. Murphy had been in command of 18th Battalion since December 1916. 56 5th Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/5/7, App. 52. 57 Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM 412/3/18, App. 2.

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The difficulty of maintaining lines during operations meant that runners were often the only way to get messages to and from the fighting line. Runners were regarded as the “most satisfactory” means of communication during 4th MG Battalion’s operations in the operations at Amiens, for example, as visual communication out of the question because of the fog but also tanks moving about on the battlefield and frequently breaking the telephone lines.58 During the 6th Battalion’s operations at Harbonnières between 9 and 11 August, “practically the only reliable means were runners. Lamps were tried but were not successful.”59 On 42nd Battalion’s front on 12 August, the only means of sending messages to and from forward companies was by runner, “telephonic communication being impossible.” A forward command post was established and which runners were meant to take messages to it for transmission, but this proved almost impossible because of German shelling in the area.60

Runners were obviously susceptible to the many lethal dangers of the industrialised battlefield and their assignments often entailed extraordinary personal courage. “The flat, open ground at Lihons was constantly swept by MG and shell fire throughout the 10th August,” notes Ron Austin in his history of the 6th Battalion. “To maintain communications with the companies, the runners had to actually run to survive. Private Foon was a company runner and when he saw a fellow runner for mortally wounded, he crept up to the other man, removed his despatches and returned with them to BHQ. Private J. Grieson was another daring runner who delivered despatches until he was wounded later in the day.”61

All but two of the 30 runners from the Corps Cyclist Battalion attached to 2nd Brigade’s HQ during its operations in the Chuignes Valley in mid-August were evacuated to hospital because of gas shelling. The two remaining men had to carry

58 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4, App. E. 59 6th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/23/33 App 24. 60 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/22, App 5. 61 Ronald J. Austin, As Rough as Bags: The History of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF, 1914-1919, self-published, McCrae, Australia, 2005, p. 265.

219 Chapter 5 Communications and Control on during this ‘rather trying time’ until new runners could be obtained from the infantry battalion.62 Commanders continued to rely heavily on runners despite their vulnerability, in part because other means of communication were limited but also because giving a message to a man to deliver had a long familiarity about it, and soldiers generally trusted other soldiers ahead of more novel or less familiar means. In his report at the end of August, the Signals Officer of the 38th Battalion noted that, “Runners – used very largely and as usual proved the surest means of communication.”63

Communication by runner usually took considerable time, and carrying messages over broken ground or through crowded trenches was often difficult and exhausting. Even withstanding the problem of enemy shelling, it was not uncommon for runners to become disorientated or lost because of bad weather, smoke or darkness. This was evident prior to an attack by 40th Battalion near Bray on 24 August, where, “owing to the very heavy fog communication by visual was impossible and by runner very difficult.”64

The 38th Battalion’s operations in the first week of September highlighted another problem with runners: even if they were not injured, they did not always return from their errands. This resulted not only in uncertainty but also frustration between units. “I sent two runners away to you (battalion headquarters) at 4 AM,” one company commander reported in September. “At 5:30 AM was told by lamp that message was received. It is 9:10 AM now & they are not back. Are you keeping them?” The battalion headquarters replied at 11:00 AM that both men had left at 5:30 AM to return to the company but nothing was seen of them. Because Light Horse gallopers had already been withdrawn, the company was forced to rely on lamp signals as its only means of communication. This was far from ideal, of course, because sending

62 Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM 412/3/18, App. 2. 63 38th War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27. 64 40th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/57/29 App. 1.

220 Chapter 5 Communications and Control messages by lamp was conspicuous and risked conveying information to the enemy.65

Any delay in communicating important information could have significant ramifications for an operation. The commander of 42nd Battalion established his command post 4:30 AM on 29 September prior to the attack at the Hindenburg Line but did not receive brigade orders informing him of its role in the proposed attack until 8:00 AM – it should have commenced two hours earlier. The delay was caused by the fact that:

the runners bringing [the orders] having been lost in the barbed wire and pitch darkness. At 6 AM the barrage ‘of heavy harassing fire’ fell and a few tanks went forward W of Bony but none of our troops attacked as the orders had not been reached then. … At 8 PM we received warning order from Brigade stating 9th and 10th Brigade would attack and consolidate Canal Tunnel in entirety, 11th being in reserve. But this idea was abandoned at midnight … The new month opened with everyone floundering about in wire & mud in delightfully inky darkness.66

While runners were used to carry messages forward of the brigade headquarters to and from the fighting line, motorcycle despatch riders usually carried them between brigade headquarters and division. Like runners, despatch riders were taxed extremely heavily during the advance, particularly as the distance between various headquarters increased, often by the day. As a result, the Despatch Rider Letter Service (DRLS) was on the point of collapse by the end of September due to an increasing shortage of riders and machines still in working order.

The attack on 8 August saw an unusually high number of messages carried by the DRLS in the hours immediately prior to Zero. Motorcycle runs to divisions were split into three groups. The No. 1 Group carried messages for the heavy artillery and two divisions, the furthermost being nearly 26,000 yards (14.7 miles) from the Corps

65 38th Battalion War Diary, September AWM4 23/55/28, App 1. 66 42nd Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/59/23

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HQ. The remaining two divisions and the AUO at Glisy were split into two groups, with an average distance of 20,000 yards (11.4 miles) for each. At 2:40 AM, less than two hours before Zero, 16 separate messages were handed to the DRLS for urgent delivery to formations.67 All had to be delivered within three hours and four despatch riders were sent out to do so. The riders travelled about 40 miles in all along bad roads in the dark and through areas congested with men and artillery, with no definite knowledge about tanks moving in the area. Regardless of the obvious challenges, all 16 messages were delivered in time for the attack.68

The strain experienced by despatch riders during August was enormous. Motorcyclists attached to 1st Division covered more than 11,500 miles during the month, with an average daily run of nearly 25 miles.69 The distance between the Corps headquarters and forward divisions increased almost daily, and extra units operating in the Corps area only increased the number of deliveries required. Some trips took six hours because of heavy traffic and the few roads available were often shell-torn or scarred by old trench systems.70 The lack of adequate maps was once again a frustration. Riders often had to deliver messages from grid references and that required a ready supply of accurate maps. Coloured maps provided by the Topographical Section were often unsuitable because they showed congested trench systems that obscured many of the roads and tracks in the area, apart from main ones.71

While there were no significant breakdowns in the delivery of messages during the month, the wear and tear on the motorcycles took a particularly heavy toll.72 Frames broke, collisions occurred, and the damage to tyres was particularly severe, with

67 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 36. The messages were for: all seven attacking divisions on the Fourth Army front; GOCRAs in the three corps; 5th Tank Brigade HQ and four tank battalions in forward areas; and Heavy Artillery. 68 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 36. 69 1st Australian Division Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/11/39, App. 8 70 ‘Report on Work Done During August, by DR Sergeant’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 39. 71 ‘Report on Work Done During August, by DR Sergeant’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 39. 72 1st Australian Division Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/11/39, App. 8.

222 Chapter 5 Communications and Control punctures frequent. A shortage of ‘patchquick’ to carry out repairs meant that it was necessary to cut rubber from old tubes and it was kept in place by several coats of what was referred to simply as ‘solution’.73 Repairing machines was also difficult because of time constraints and the lack of available parts. Replacement motorcycles were slow to arrive and often more were sent back to base than received. Machines had to be seconded from officers (including a DR sergeant on one occasion) to ensure riders could carry out their duties.74

The distance back to repair depots had increased substantially and the roads in the Péronne–St Quentin area were particularly bad following the heavy rains and recent fighting in that area. Riders had to travel long distances and broken barrel springs were a constant problem.75 The lack of manpower again proved to be a major problem and there was an increasingly desperate shortage of riders. To address this in the short term, four men were taken from the DRLS and attached to Fourth Army HQ. The five Australian divisions were then instructed to supply four riders each to the Corps Section but only three divisions had done so by the end of the month.

To make matters worse, the replacement machines seconded from the neighbouring IX Corps arrived in bad condition and even the Australian divisional signal companies sent riders of ‘very indifferent’ quality to the Section.76 Finally, the few reinforcements the DRLS did receive during the month were mostly untrained, with only one of the five considered sufficiently competent for duty. All of this exacerbated the strain on the DRLS, threatening its unit cohesion and morale, and undermining its efficiency.77 The DRLS was on the brink of collapse when the last

73 ‘Report on Work Done During August, by DR Sergeant’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 39. 74 ‘Report on Work Done During August, by DR Sergeant’, Australian Corps HQ Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/6, App. 39. 75 1st Divisional Despatch Rider Service sent four machines away during September with broken frames but only three new machines were received. This left the unit five machines short of establishment by the end of the month. Despatch Rider Service, 1st Division Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/11/40, App. 8. 76 Monthly Report for Despatch Riders Section, Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7, App. 29. 77 Monthly Report for Despatch Riders Section, Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 22/10/7, App. 29.

223 Chapter 5 Communications and Control the Australian fighting units were withdrawn from the line by early October. As Figure 5.3 shows, the mileage travelled by the motorcycle riders increased significantly during advance, particularly in the attacks at the Outpost and Hindenburg Lines. By the end of the month, the service was operating only at the very limits of its capacity.

Figure 5.3 Australian Corps motorcycle mileage in August and September 1918.78

700

600

500

400

Mileage 300

200

100

0 2-Sep 4-Sep 6-Sep 8-Sep 1-Aug 3-Aug 5-Aug 7-Aug 9-Aug 10-Sep 12-Sep 14-Sep 16-Sep 18-Sep 20-Sep 22-Sep 24-Sep 26-Sep 28-Sep 30-Sep 11-Aug 13-Aug 15-Aug 17-Aug 19-Aug 21-Aug 23-Aug 25-Aug 27-Aug 29-Aug 31-Aug

Australian units used pigeons to carry messages in the early stages of but this became less frequent as the distance from lofts to the various headquarters increased. Because Army, Flying Corps and other senior formations used the lines to the rear of the Corps headquarters, lofts were also connected to the nearest local exchange and this added to the heavy signals traffic already passing through. By the time the Corps HQ moved to Méricourt on 31 August, it usually took between two and three hours for a message carried by pigeon to travel from the front line to the loft and for it then to be transferred to the Corps headquarters. Transporting birds forward was also made difficult by the shortage of motorcycles and, in any case, lofts usually had to be located in one place for at least three weeks for birds to be sufficiently reliable. The speed of the advance obviously militated against this. With other more

78 Australian Corps Headquarters Signals Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 22/10/7&8

224 Chapter 5 Communications and Control effective means of communication usually available in the final stages of the advance to the Hindenburg Line, the pigeon service attached to the Australian Corps was rendered largely obsolete.79

Communication and control during the advance were not confined to the ground in this new age of three-dimensional warfare, of course, and aeroplanes played an important part in the preparation for and conduct of Australian operations. British and Australian pilots were far better trained and more experienced in 1918 than previously, and flew in significantly more advanced aircraft. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had also firmly established control of the skies by the time of the advance and comparatively few German planes crossed the Fourth Army’s lines during the period.80 The Australian Corps squadron in 1918 was the No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps (AFC), which flew RE8 aircraft.81 These British two-seaters carried a pilot and observer (in the rear), were equipped with a Vickers machine gun and two Lewis guns, and could be fitted with a side-mounted large-plate box camera for photographing enemy positions.

The advent of semi-mobile warfare over such a vast area highlighted the importance of aerial tactical reconnaissance.82 Aeroplanes provided Australian commanders with comparatively rapid and reliable information about the progress of front-line formations, something Monash described as ‘more important than ever’ during the advance.83 Despite the glamour associated with dogfights, the most important tasks carried out by the No. 3 Squadron involved photographing German forward and back areas, and preventing enemy planes from doing likewise over the British front.84 In the week immediately prior to 8 August, for example, the squadron worked with

79 Assistant Director Signals, Australian Corps, War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 22/1/29, App. 4. 80 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 24. The RAF was established on 1 April 1918, following the merging of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). 81 The No. 69 Squadron AFC was redesignated ‘No. 3 Squadron, AFC’, on 20 January. The RE8 was a two-seater plane that carried an observer in the rear. ‘RE’ stood for ‘Reconnaissance Experimental’; the RE8 was the 8th such design. 82 Michael Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air, Oxford University Press, Victoria, 2014, p. 197. 83 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 171. See also Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air, p. 197. 84 Peter Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, p. 311.

225 Chapter 5 Communications and Control the 15th (Corps) Wing photographic section to produce some 90,000 photographs of the German line. Folders with maps and photographs relevant to the area over which a particular unit would advance were distributed down to the level of platoon sergeants.85 Aerial photographs in the last week of August showed a new system of German trenches being constructed on the eastern side of the Somme between Falvy and Voyennes, for example, which signalled the general retirement to Péronne and the line of the river.86

Apart from reconnaissance and the photographing of enemy positions in preparation for operations, planes carried out other important tasks once an attack was underway. These included close co-operation with infantry and artillery, bombing enemy positions, and counter-attack patrols. Planes often conducted detailed reconnaissance of enemy territory to a depth of 10,000 yards during attacks (paying particular attention to roads and transports routes in the shell-torn countryside) and harassed the Germans as they fell back.

As a result, planes serving different functions had to be clearly identified by the soldiers on the ground. Rectangular panels on the underside of the wings marked contact patrol planes operating with Australian infantry.87 Planes working with tanks had a black band on the tail, while ammunition planes had the underside of the lower wings painted black for a distance of 30 inches from the wing tips. Various means were devised for planes and infantry units to communicate with each other during battle. Pilots could signal to troops in the case of an impending counter-attack by sounding a klaxon horn or firing a white Very light flare. In order to communicate with the planes, soldiers could fire a ground flare to indicate success or use the

85 HN Wrigley, The Battle Below: Being the History of No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, Errol G Knox, Sydney, 1935, p. 87. 86 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 101. 87 These panels measured 2x1 feet, and were positioned on each wing 3 feet from the fuselage.

226 Chapter 5 Communications and Control reflective metal disc sown into the inside cover of his box respirator to flash an SOS signal skyward.88

These methods all had limitations, however. Ground flares were easily visible but infantry did not always carry them, while reflective tin discs were ineffective on cloudy days.89 Men also realised that firing flares during an attack inevitably drew enemy fire onto their position. The smoke of the barrages and early morning mist often combined to obscure the foremost infantry positions from the sky, which made pilots reluctant to drop bombs in support.90 Soldiers were instructed to gain a pilot’s attention by lying rifles in groups along the parapet of a trench but there is no evidence that this was employed successfully during the advance, if it was even attempted at all.91

Pilots could use wireless to communicate with artillery if they saw a German counter- attack developing and then fire a white parachute flare in the direction of the massing troops.92 Artillery commanders on the ground did not always grasp the possibilities and potential of this new medium, however. This was partly because they had long relied heavily on visual means, runners or telephone to communicate with their brigade or divisional headquarters, and also because not enough men were trained sufficiently in its use.93 Furthermore, the 18-pounder batteries were not inclined to respond to zone calls and SOS signals from planes without first consulting with their brigade commanders. Given the importance of field artillery support in fast-moving operations, such as those undertaken by 2nd Division on Mont St Quentin, the failure of battery commanders to respond rapidly to calls from pilots was a constant

88 56th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/73/31. Prior to the attack at Etinèhem on 13 August, companies of 50th Battalion were instructed to use mess tins in a similar way. 50th Battalion War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/67/26 App. 20. 89 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20. 90 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20. 91 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20, App. 1. 92 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/22, App. 34. The best means of communication with planes was wireless, however, and a reliable lightweight radio-telephone and CW telegraph suitable for both air and ground was in mass production by 1917. ‘Response to Dr Brian N. Hall’s Articles on British Wireless in the First World War’, War in History, 2016, Vol. 23(2), p. 236 93 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20, App. 1.

227 Chapter 5 Communications and Control source of frustration.94

Planes carrying extra ammunition for ground troops during an attack needed clearly marked drop zones. Vickers gun teams were responsible for doing this by placing a large white calico ‘V’ on the ground, the apex of which pointed towards the German line.95 It appears that only once during the advance did a plane respond to this particular call for more ammunition, however. That occurred during the 1st MG Battalion’s operations on 23 August but it proved fruitless, as “a contrary wind carried the box nearly a thousand yards from the gun position.”96

August was the most strenuous month of the war for the No. 3 Squadron. Its planes flew for nearly 1,000 hours, carried out more than 200 contact patrols and took more 659 photographs over German lines. They dropped 1,419 bombs in support of infantry operations and poured more than 62,500 machine gun rounds onto enemy trenches and positions.97 The statistics for September were similar but highlight the greater priority that was given to photographic reconnaissance as the Australians approached the fortified positions of the Hindenburg Line. The squadron flew for 871 hours during the month, which including 162 contact patrols. This was fewer flying hours than in August but the squadron took more than 680 photographs. The fact that the 45,330 rounds fired into enemy positions was a decrease of 27.5% from the number fired in August also points to the slower tempo of operations once the Somme had been crossed.98

The effective use of planes was obviously dependent upon a ready availability of suitable landing grounds. The long period of static warfare prior to the advance had seen more or less permanent landing fields established in back areas. The advancing line made it important for new forward landing fields to be established, however, if

94 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20, App. 1. 95 The arms of the ‘V’ were about six feet in length and one foot in width. 96 1st Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/1/6, App. 5. 97 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20. 98 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20; No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21.

228 Chapter 5 Communications and Control planes were to operate most efficiently with the fighting units. The No. 3 Squadron’s primary aerodrome during August was at Villers-Bocage, about 7 miles north of Amiens. Because this was 30 miles behind by line by the end of the month, a temporary advanced airfield had to be established at Glisy. Planes took off from Villers-Bocage during the pursuit from Bray to Péronne but landed at Glisy to pass on any information they had gathered.99

Figure 5.4 Aerial oblique photograph (looking east) of Bray and its surrounds, taken on 19 August 1918. This was three days before 3rd Division’s attack.100

IWM Q 46944

Glisy was too small for a permanent aerodrome, however, and unsuitably located between two rivers. As a result, a new landing field east of Proyart was put into effect on 3 September.101 This was only used as an advanced landing ground until 6

99 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20. 100 AWM4 1/65/1, App. 34. Note the bend in the line on British 12th Division’s front in the centre-left. It would pose significant problems during the attack. Happy Valley is on the left edge of the photograph. 101 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21.

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September, by which time the many shell holes were repaired and it was ready for permanent use.102 A new forward aerodrome near Bouvincourt was established prior to the operation at the Outpost Line on 18 September but heavy German shelling delayed a permanent move there until the front line had moved further east. Planes took off from Bouvincourt for the attack but returned to Proyart in the evening. The move to the Bouvincourt landing ground was made on 21 September, in time for the major offensive at the Hindenburg Line a week later.103

The most valuable work undertaken by aeroplanes during this period was artillery reconnaissance. A break in the weather on 1 September enabled planes to photograph the entire German line opposite the Australians before dark.104 Planes reconnoitred the Somme bridges and fired into German positions whenever the opportunity presented. Airman also engaged German planes during attacks and thereby hindered them from firing upon Australian forward positions. The weather finally cleared on 4 September and during the next few days planes took more than 100 photographs that provided important information on the nature of the German withdrawal.105

There were fewer ground attacks conducted by Australian units as they approached the structured defences of the Hindenburg Line in mid-September but the importance of aerial reconnaissance nevertheless increased significantly.106 Aeroplanes photographed behind the German line on 14 September to a depth of 4,000 yards and some areas were re-photographed in the subsequent three days. The fact that fighters were allocated to escort the reconnaissance planes at this time highlights the importance given to the work.107 Oblique photographs showed the enemy line from the reverse (German) side, which provided details of trenches and

102 Similar to the advanced landing field at Glisy, planes operated in the interim from Proyart during the day but returned to Villers-Bocage each evening. Wrigley, The Battle Below, pp. 112-113. 103 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21. 104 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 110. 105 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, p. 35. 106 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 139; Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air, p. 201. 107 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 120.

230 Chapter 5 Communications and Control positions not easily visible from the British side.108 Infantry preferred oblique photographs to ones taken from directly overhead because they were easier for non- specialists to interpret and provided a better impression of contoured terrain.109

The success or otherwise of aerial operations was obviously subject to weather conditions. Thick fog and low clouds on the morning of 8 August prevented contact planes from flying until 10:30 AM, for example, and the heavy mist that rolled into the valley at 6:00 AM in the early stages of 1st Division’s operations at Chuignes on 23 August prevented plans from taking off for the next few hours. Planes provided valuable support thereafter by identifying Australian troops on objectives and conveying that information rapidly to headquarters. They also dropped a dozen phosphorous bombs and nearly a hundred explosive bombs on selected German positions, as well as four boxes of small arms ammunition (SAA) to forward units.110 Bad weather also limited the role of aeroplanes during 2nd Division’s operations at Mont St Quentin in early September and that added to the confusion of the day. Early flights went out when the 5th Brigade commenced the attack on 31 August but the weather deteriorated during the day and rendered further patrols impossible until 4:00 PM. The following day was also wet but a single flight did go out at 8:00 AM and, flying low through the mist, and managed finally to locate the forward- most Australian troops.111

The changeable autumn weather during September included high winds and heavy rainstorms that prevented planes from flying at times in the ten days prior to the attack at the Outpost Line. Fortunately, the weather cleared on 14 September and aerial operations could be resumed.112 A violent thunderstorm and ‘cyclonic gale’ struck the aerodrome at Bouvincourt on 17 September, however, and caused considerable damage. Rapid repairs were needed and the landing ground was made

108 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 87. 109 Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air, p. 197. 110 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 8/6/20. 111 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 110. 112 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21.

231 Chapter 5 Communications and Control serviceable by evening but it was nevertheless a serious imposition on the eve of a major operation.113 Heavy rain on the morning of the attack itself meant that all planes were grounded until 7:30 AM. When the machines did eventually fly, they dropped phosphorous bombs in the early stages of the attack and provided accurate reports about troops establishing themselves on their objectives, and in some cases beyond it.

Bad weather also affected preparations for the major attack at the Hindenburg Line, with fine days interspersed by squally rain and morning ground mists. Heavy downpours and poor visibility on 28 September prevented flights taking off before 3:00 PM, for example.114 The attack commenced on time at 5:00 AM the next morning but heavy mist made it impossible for planes to fly until about 8:00 AM. Even then, the visibility was so poor that little useful information was gathered for another two hours. Contact patrols also had to fly low in the fog and this exposed them to German machine gun and artillery fire.

Even worse from a command perspective was the fact that heavy rains returned at 5:00 PM, obscuring visibility and resulting in misleading reports that American troops in the first phase of the attack were on their objective line.115 This had serious tactical repercussions because it convinced Monash not to employ close artillery support for fear of hitting men in those forward positions. In the words of one officer in No. 3rd Squadron, “It was an unsatisfactory day both from the airman’s point of view as well as the infantry.”116 Monash blamed these operational problems on the Americans, claiming that they either failed to use flares to indicate positions, or were not issued with them.117 As Michael Molkentin has pointed out, however, by attributing blame to the inexperienced Americans, Monash conveniently ignored the fact that contact patrols working with experienced Australian troops had only

113 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21. 114 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21. 115 Wrigley, The Battle Below, p. 132. 116 No. 3rd Squadron, Australian Flying Corps, War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 8/6/21. 117 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 251.

232 Chapter 5 Communications and Control mixed success during the previous months, and they also had poor results working with 2nd Division at the Beaurevoir Line only a week later.118

The advent of the industrialised combined-arms battlefield required a complex and integrated system of communications to facilitate operations.119 By mid-1918, there was a wide range of communications methods available to the Australian Corps, where one or more systems broke down, others were usually available to pick up the slack and allow operations to continue. The communications system employed on the Australian front, while far from perfect, held up relatively well on the whole during the eight-week advance and did much to shape the Corps’ operational success. The communications system was constrained by a range of factors, however, including terrain, weather, the length and speed of the advance, a shortage of material, hostile enemy artillery and machine gun fire, as well as the sheer number of messages the signals offices were expected to expedite.

The nature and tempo of Australian operations was heavily influenced by the ability of the signallers to connect the various headquarters to a moving front line, as well as to each other, and for messages to be conveyed between them in a timely fashion. This was particularly difficult during periods of mobile or fluid operations in late August and early September, with commanders effectively blind to the actions in the line for much of that time. As the advance slowed again prior to the limited set-piece attacks against the lines of the Hindenburg defences in mid-September, more time was allowed for the establishment of a range of communications systems but many failed to cope with the extraordinary pressures of the hostile environment in which they were forced to operate. The inevitable result was to highlight yet again the importance of individual battalion commanders and junior officers in the exercise of battlefield control once fighting was underway.

118 Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air, p. 203. 119 Brian Hall, Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 305.

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Some communications technologies were still in their infancy in mid-1918 and most had obvious technical limitations once shelling commenced, battle was joined, and the fighting line began to move forward. As a result, Australian commanders attempted to employ a variety of different methods during attacks but were not always sufficiently experienced or familiar with them, and therefore often did necessarily employ them as effectively or efficiently as they might have done. Instead, commanders frequently fell back onto more ‘traditional’ familiar means to convey messages to and from the line, including most obviously runners and despatch riders. This placed an enormous strain on these systems and, like so many other aspects of the Australian Corps during the advance, they approached the very limits of their endurance by the beginning of October and verged on collapse. The crucial point to make, however, is that despite this extraordinary stress, the communications system was resilient enough to cope – albeit only just – for as long as absolutely necessary to support operations. While communication issues did influence the preparation and nature of Australian operations, no large-scale attack on the Australian front failed because of a failure of communications.

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CHAPTER 6

MEDICAL, EVACUATION, FOOD AND WATER

As we saw in the previous chapter, the fighting during August and September 1918 took a tremendous physical and emotional toll on the Australian troops. Declining numerical strength, as well as threats to individual and collective morale brought on by the strain of the advance, meant it was vital to pay close attention to the health and welfare of the men, both in and out of the line. This was necessary to maintain the troops in the best possible physical condition for as long as possible, thereby preventing illness and keeping wastage to a minimum. This involved attending to matters of hygiene and sanitation, medical care, rest and accommodation, as well as the adequate provision of food and water, to ensure that troops could recuperate and recover their fighting strength quickly when out of the line. It was also important to individual and collective morale that medical staff and quartermasters alike understood the desperate predicament faced by men in forward areas, and were closely attendant to their needs. This chapter will examine how effectively the Corps met the particular challenges of force preservation during this extraordinarily strenuous period, and consider the implications that had for its operational effectiveness and combat capability.

Apart from battle casualties, sickness was responsible for the greatest loss of manpower in an army in the field. Outbreaks of disease and illness were generally preventable and the amount of sickness in any formation was one measure of its efficiency and administration.1 Because units were frequently on the move during August and might remain in one place for only a day or two at a time, it was not always possible to take all necessary sanitary measures in accommodation areas. There was often no choice but to bivouac on squalid battlefields, some of which

1 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 9.

Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water were fought over only hours previously and remained littered with the detritus of war, including putrefying body parts.2

Captured enemy positions were also often found to be in an unsanitary state. According to one RMO, the Germans had not always constructed or improved latrines and urinals on ground captured during the spring and summer months, preferring instead to use the British ones already in place. They also often left dead horses untended where they fell. This resulted in a terrible stench during the heat of August and a proliferation of flies that increased the prospect of serious health issues.3

High priority was given to sanitation in rest areas and billets when men were out of the line in order to prevent outbreaks of illness or disease. Refuse had to be buried, grease pits cleaned, incinerators established and horse manure buried.4 The corpses of men and carcasses of dead horses had to be disposed of as quickly as possible.5 Fly-proof latrines were erected, although one RMO “gave voice to a heresy” by claiming he had never actually seen a “so-called fly-proof latrine”; he believed deep pits were more effective.6 Baths were also provided for the troops. These might be as sophisticated as a portable steam engine with a small caravan containing 12 showers, or as simple as a wagon cover stretched over a hole.7 If they were not available, however, men could usually bathe and swim in the Somme River.8 Blankets

2 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 3 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 4 Previously, horse manure had usually been burned but one officer reported that, when it was in great quantity, it kept smouldering at night and presented a target for German guns during the advance. Two battery wagon lines had been bombed in this way. Deep burial was therefore the preferred option. Report by RMO of 5th AFA Brigade’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 5 ‘Report by RMO of 5th AFA Brigade’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 6 ‘Monthly Report by RMO, 25th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 7 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23; Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/19/33. 8 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/22/31, App. 122.

236 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water were fumigated, and there was usually a good supply of fresh underclothing for the men to change into at the first opportunity.9

The speed of the advance in August meant sanitation units were soon stretched to the limit. They were often unable to do everything required in one area while also keeping up with the advancing front. As a result, by early September sanitation units were still dealing with areas in the rear up to 20 miles behind the line. This prevented them from assisting with water testing in forward areas and increased the workload for already over-burdened RMOs.10

A sanitation officer’s task was generally difficult and thankless, with battalion RMOs often critical of their work. One reported at the end of August that:

it was very seldom that the battalion has anything to do with the Sanitary Section. Occasionally a man or NCO comes along and inspects the area occupied but he reports to no-one in authority. He at times takes it upon himself to issue instructions …, which are quite often wrong. He sends in a report to the OC Sanitary Section (apparently).11

Obviously frustrated, he suggested that all sanitation reports first be given to the orderly or MO in charge, but there is no evidence that this idea was adopted.12

Because sanitation work was time-consuming and labour-intensive, the infantry was often called on to assist despite units being tired and declining in numbers. On 9th September, for example, the troops of 42nd Battalion moved through the village of Doingt, near Péronne, and found the area in a filthy state. The men remained there for nearly three weeks prior to their operations at the Hindenburg Line at the end of the month, and spent much of that time cleaning up the location. In order to

9 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45. 10 “During an advance Sanitary Sections are absolutely useless for forward areas,” noted the ADMS of 2nd Division, “unless they come under the ADMS.” Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/19/33. 11 ‘Report by RMO of 25th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 12 ‘Report by RMO of 25th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25.

237 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water make it habitable, they repaired shell craters, dug refuse holes for the accumulated debris, filled in old latrines and constructed new ones. They also treated horse carcasses with lime. All of this took a toll on the troops and added to their general fatigue.13 The close attention given to matters of sanitation paid dividends as the advance progressed, however, and there were no serious epidemics or outbreaks of illness or disease within Australian units. Troops did often report sick with minor complaints (such as boils, ulcers or ‘septic troubles’, and dental issues) but the vast majority of those men were able to remain in the line.14

Significantly, the pneumonia-influenza epidemic (or ‘Spanish flu’) then sweeping through sections of the Western Front in mid-1918 was almost entirely absent within Australian ranks during the advance.15 As with other aspects of the Corps’ success, timing played a crucial part. The disease reached Europe in mid-1918 but did not peak in the first wave until the late spring of that year, by which time the five Australian divisions were all out of the line. It then appears to have struck with a vengeance, however, something evident in the mortality figures among troops at AIF depots in the United Kingdom. In the period July-September 1918, fewer than 10 men died in AIF depots due to influenza or respiratory disease but that figure rose to nearly 120 in the period from October to December.16

The issue of venereal disease (VD) – a vexed one for the AIF throughout the war – is also conspicuous by its absence in RMO’s reports during the period of the advance. Only 50 cases were admitted in 2nd Division during September, despite the three brigades being out of the line for most of that month following their operations at Mont St Quentin. Most of those affected contracted the disease while

13 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 7. 14 3rd Division Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 71. 15 Butler, AOHMS Vol. III, p. 562. 16 According to one study, the pneumonia-influenza mortality rate among soldiers who enlisted after July 1918 was 3.72%. Prior to that, the percentage of pneumonia-influenza deaths was never more than 0.84% for any cohort of men who enlisted in any of the four previous 12-month periods (from July to June). See G.D. Shanks, A. MacKenzie, R. Mclaughlin, M. Waller, P. Dennis, S. Lee and J.F. Brundage. ‘Mortality Risk Factors During the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic in the Australian Army’. The Journal of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 201 (June 2010), p. 1883.

238 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water on leave in the United Kingdom, with only a handful of cases traced to villages around the Fourth Army area.17

The numerical strength of 20th Battalion was severely depleted during September due to battle casualties but its sick parades were “very small as a rule and no epidemics occurred.”18 Regular inspections found the men to be clean, with only two cases of scabies and few evacuations because of illness. The fact that men could rest by the Somme and swim in the canal no doubt contributed to their general health and well-being, and, as we saw in Chapter 2, time out of the line was interspersed by ‘recreational training’, including battalion, brigade and divisional sporting events. There were half a dozen cases of PUO within the battalion, which led to the establishment of a battalion ‘rest hut’, and one evacuation for trench fever.19 “Sickness had been at a minimum,” reported the 55th Battalion’s RMO at the end of September, “with occasional cases of pulmonary catarrh and colic of short duration.”20 Some 300 men reported sick in the 46th Battalion during September but only 11 had to be evacuated. This was the lowest number recorded by that particular battalion when in the field during the war.21

It was important that men had adequate rest during the advance but the continual movement into and out of the line often made it difficult for units to find suitable accommodation in back areas. Not only did this add to their fatigue but crowded bivouac areas increased the prospect of illness and large numbers of men had to sleep in the open. Improvised shelters in the side of a bank or culvert offered some protection from shellfire but troops remained exposed to the elements. “It is a different war now,” a long-serving British engineer attached to an Australian unit wrote in early September:

17 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/19/33, App. O. 18 20th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/37/38, App. 12. 19 20th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/37/38, App. 12. ‘Pyrexia of Unknown Origin’ (‘PUO’) refers to an unexplained fever. 20 55th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/72/31, App. 12. 21 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32 App. 6.

239 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water

The old days when we first got out here were like holidays compared to this stunt; we could get away from the line into quite comfortable quarters but now everywhere is like a wilderness; there are no civvies within 35 kilos (21 miles) and only few houses which are not absolutely demolished.22

Sleeping in the open was not problematic in the hot dry conditions that prevailed for most of August but it was a different proposition when the weather turned at the end of the month. The temperature dropped in September and the autumn wind was often bitterly cold and penetrating.23 Troops were issued with trench covers but spent much valuable time and energy digging or constructing places to sleep, which sapped them of energy.24 The men in 24th Battalion bivouacked near of Dompierre- Becquincourt as they moved up to the line on 26 August. This followed a 3,000-yard cross-country march to the billeting area and the troops had to sleep in an old trench system that provided little shelter. They had a difficult time, as a “sharp shower of rain earlier in the night made the ground and trenches rather wet and muddy”, and there were only a few waterproof sheets available.25 It was hard to get respite from the cold weather, something evident in the 10th Battalion’s RMO description of their billets on 26 September as “good although some had rather an excess of ventilation.”26

The congestion caused by numerous units in one location placed enormous strain upon the facilities and resources, something evident in the large build-up of troops for the attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September. The men of 11th Battalion moved from Tincourt to L’Etoile on 26 September and found the billets to be “exceptionally good” but sanitary arrangements “hopelessly inadequate”, even for a battalion considerably understrength. The incineration facilities were deficient and there were only four seated latrines for the entire battalion, as well as one for the 3rd

22 James Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper: The 216th (Nuneaton) Army Troops Company, Royal Engineers, in the Great War, Paddy Griffith Associates, Nuneaton, 1998, p. 206. 23 38th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/55/28, App. 1. 24 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24. 25 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/41/35. 26 ‘Monthly Report by RMO, 10th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13.

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AFA Brigade. British RE troops had to be called in to construct more latrines, ablution benches, meat-safes and grease traps.27

It was evident by the end of August that men’s feet suffered from long route marches, including those undertaken as part of training during rest periods.28 It was important that these problems were attended to quickly and alleviated, so that men could continue to take their place in the line. Troops were instructed to wash their feet with soap as often as possible when out of the line, and to change their socks frequently. If they were resting for an hour or more during a march, men were encouraged to remove their boots and puttees change socks from one foot to the other, ensure that any blisters or abrasions were covered with adhesive plasters, and to apply a dusting of boracic antiseptic or chalk powder.29

Few men escaped medical problems of some sort during this strenuous period. Having taken part in the attack at Amiens, the men of 30th Battalion had been on the move for a week by 22 August. A medical inspection at that time revealed that their feet were “not in the best condition” because of the constant marching and movement. About a dozen men needed serious medical treatment and “all battalion boot makers and battalion barbers were busy throughout the day working on the boots and hair of the men.”30

Minor ailments inevitably became more numerous as the advance progressed. An inspection of the troops in 44th Battalion in the second week of September revealed more than a dozen cases of scabies and numerous foot problems, although most were easily dealt with. Nearly every man and officer was infested with lice but this was addressed effectively in the short term simply by a bath and change of clothes. The battalion then received a three-week spell before resuming operations at the

27 ‘Report for September by RMO of 11th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13. 28 ‘Report by RMO of 22nd Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 29 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 18; Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 9. 30 30th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/47/37.

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Hindenburg Line at the end of the month. The RMO described the troops at that time as “perfectly fit, physically, mentally and morally” but noted that “their staying power had lessened considerably. This could be attributed to the active operations of the previous two months.”31

It was expected that evacuations due to illness should not exceed one man per battalion per day.32 While it was not always possible to meet this target during the advance, the number of evacuations from Australian units because of sickness was remarkably small across the board. Nevertheless, given the serious shortage of manpower in Australian ranks, the loss of every man in a front-line infantry unit was keenly felt. Only two officers and 42 other ranks were evacuated from 51st Battalion during September but this constituted about 8% of its average weekly strength of just 30 officers and 606 men.33

The hardest pressed Australian division at the start of the advance was 3rd Division, which had experienced only three spells out of the line since 26 March.34 The cumulative effects of this was evident in the troops’ physical condition. At the end of August, after three weeks of fighting along the northern bank of the Somme, its men were described by the ADMS as “mentally and physically weary and their resistance is being lowered with a result that a rise in the sick rate may be expected. But they are still fit to carry on and in good spirits.”35 The general health of the 43rd Battalion during the month was described as very good, however, something the RMO attributed to the close attention given to good sanitation measures whenever out of the line, as well as excellent rationing arrangements and provision of good

31 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 3. 32 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 9 33 51st Battalion Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/68/31, App. 28. Nine of them suffered from venereal disease, while eight were sent out for illnesses ‘Not Yet Diagnosed’ (NYD). Other conditions that led to evacuation included: furunculosis (5); trench fever (3); synovitis (3); debility (3); orchitis (1); sprains and fractures (2); dermatitis (2); pleurisy (1); bronchitis (2); tonsillitis (1); gastritis (1); otitis (1); epilepsy (1); and gout (1). 34 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 35. 35 These spells were of only 14, 10 and 7 days respectively, but even then, the division remained in close support. Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 35.

242 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water clothing.36 There was also little sickness reported in the neighbouring 42nd Battalion, which the RMO believed was due primarily to good weather during the month.37

Nevertheless, evacuations because of sickness was noticeably more prevalent on the whole in 3rd Division during the advance than it was in the other four, as is evident in Figure 6.1. That holistic figure is broken down in Figure 6.2 (overleaf) into a weekly comparison with the divisions of III Corps. The higher British figures almost certainly results from the fact that III Corps divisions were in the fighting line for longer periods than individual Australian divisions, as we saw in Chapter 1. The strain and squalid conditions of the forward trenches no doubt contributed to the greater incidence of sickness. Similarly, the higher Australian figures in late August and early September reflect the fact that the three divisions in the line experienced some of the most prolonged physical and psychological strain of the entire advance during that time.

Figure 6.1 Average admission to field ambulance and evacuation to base in Australian divisions in August and September 1918 as % of divisional strength.38

3.50 3.25

3.00 2.48 2.50 2.27 2.34

2.00 1.86 1.83 % 1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00 1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division 4th Division 5th Division Aust Corps

36 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24, App 4. 37 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/22, App 1. 38 Administrative Staff, Headquarters, Australian 2nd Division War Diaries, August-October 1918, AWM4 1/45/33- 35. For complete data table with breakdown of admissions to Field Ambulance and evacuations to base, see Appendix 4.

243 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water

Figure 6.2 Total weekly admission to field ambulance and evacuation to base in Australian Corps and III Corps in August and September 1918 as % of divisional strength.39

27-Jul 3-Aug 10-Aug 17-Aug 24-Aug 31-Aug 7-Sep 14-Sep 21-Sep 28-Sep 5-Oct Ave Aust Corps 1st Division - - - 2.76 3.78 2.40 2.59 2.26 2.92 1.58 1.55 2.48 2nd Division 2.16 2.89 4.13 2.24 2.16 2.43 2.13 1.48 1.06 2.13 2.17 2.27 3rd Division 2.06 2.54 4.08 4.09 3.60 4.67 3.68 2.23 3.01 2.95 2.87 3.25 4th Division 1.41 1.75 3.69 2.22 2.27 1.77 1.68 1.79 1.94 1.16 0.75 1.86 5th Division 1.34 1.67 2.86 1.59 1.46 1.81 2.24 1.22 1.77 1.98 2.19 1.83 Average 1.74 2.21 3.69 2.58 2.65 2.62 2.46 1.80 2.14 1.96 1.91 2.34

III Corps 12th Division N/A 1.15 2.61 2.76 4.04 4.50 2.80 1.27 2.03 N/A N/A 2.65 18th Division 1.41 1.97 3.30 2.29 3.18 2.68 2.05 1.42 1.79 N/A N/A 2.23 47th Division 3.31 3.2 4.12 3.22 4.08 4.03 3.50 - - N/A N/A 3.64 58th Division 1.89 2.00 4.42 2.06 2.93 5.56 3.12 2.5 2.52 N/A N/A 3.00 74th Division ------3.32 2.73 2.94 N/A N/A 3.00 Average 2.20 2.08 3.95 2.52 3.40 4.09 3.00 1.98 2.32 N/A N/A 2.84

While sanitation and preventative measures helped to keep men in condition to undertake operations, it was also important to remove wounded men from the battlefield as quickly as possible once fighting was underway and convey them to medical facilities for the earliest possible treatment. This not only increased their prospects of recovery and even possibly a return to the line, it also sent a strong message to all troops that their lives and welfare were valued. Minor casualties, including gas victims, were not usually evacuated from the front but sent instead to recovery stations in the area. The AAMC had also developed surgical resuscitation teams during the mobile fighting of 1918 to ensure men were attended to as rapidly as possible. They proved so effective that Neville Howse, the AIF’s Director of Medical Services in England, recommended to Monash in mid-September that they become a permanent AIF establishment.40

39 Administrative Staff, Headquarters, Australian 2nd Division War Diaries, August-October 1918, AWM4 1/45/33- 35. 40 Alison Starr, Neville Howse, VC: Biography of an Authentic Australian Hero, Les Baddock & Sons, Sydney, 1991.

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The evacuation of wounded men from the forward zone was comparatively straightforward during stationary trench warfare but, as with almost every operational aspect, it took on an entirely different character once the advance commenced in August. The pressure on a unit’s medical resources increased exponentially as the tempo of operations increased, and that in turn strained the RMO’s ability to deal effectively with the stream of wounded brought in by stretcher-bearers from the fighting line.

Evacuation of the wounded was carried out well across the Australian front on 8 August. This was not only because, like almost every aspect that day, preparations for evacuation from the battlefield were thorough and meticulous, but also the fact that the number of casualties was comparatively small. This in turn reflected the success of British counter-battery fire, which resulted in a lack of substantial or effective German retaliatory fire. The arrangements made by 48th Battalion were fairly typical. Stretcher-bearers moved in a wave behind the attacking companies, with the AMC and ambulance bearers following behind in a similar formation. Stretcher-bearers were instructed to dress a man’s wounds but then leave him on the field with a rifle and a small white flag stuck into the ground to indicate his position.41 The RAP was established close to the battalion HQ in a valley near Proyart, about 800 yards from the line. Because German shelling was only light, casualties brought into the RAP could be treated safely in the open.

The system worked well. Men were picked up and conveyed relatively quickly by ambulance bearers to the RAP, allowing stretcher-bearers to remain with their companies until they reached the final objective. No wounded man had to wait in the RAP for more than half an hour, and casualties were taken back to the rear by two GS wagons and two limbers, Australian Field Ambulance (AFA) stretcher- bearers, or by German prisoners. Casualties in the battalion that day numbered only one officer and 10 men killed, with four officers and 71 men wounded (only about

41 48th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/65/31.

245 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water half of whom were classified as serious). The scarcity of shrapnel wounds caused by German artillery shells also reflected of the efficacy of British counter-battery fire; the serious casualties mainly included bullet wounds to the chest or abdomen, and compound fractures of legs and thighs.42

While the medical system supporting the infantry was streamlined and efficient on that first day, like so many other operational aspects it encountered significant problems during the subsequent exploitation phase. This was evident in 6th Battalion’s attack near Lihons on 9 August. The battalion established its RAP east of Harbonnières in time for the infantry to move into action at about 1:30 PM. Its location was conveyed to the brigade HQ immediately by a signaller and runner, and the ambulance was asked to send bearers as quickly as possible. They did not arrive until about 6:00 PM, however, by which time numerous stretcher cases had already accumulated. The infantry had already pushed on to the ridge in front of Lihons by then, which made the carry between the line and RAP stretch to some 3,300 yards.43

The RAP was unable to relocate any further forward because of the large number of wounded already accumulated there and the pressure on medical staff to continue working. The fighting units had marched for more than 12 miles from the time they broke camp early on 9 August until they finally reached their objective that evening. Most had eaten nothing from about 8:00 AM until evening, when at last they received a hot meal in the line. As a result, many casualties arriving at the RAP also suffered from hunger and exhaustion. It was a very difficult time for all concerned. The RAP was not finally cleared of wounded until about 2:30 AM on 10 August.44

The constantly advancing line presented numerous challenges for RMOs, who had to work as close as possible to it and often in extremely difficult circumstances. The distance between the RAP and the line usually ranged from 500 to 1,500 yards,

42 48th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/65/31. 43 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 44 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22.

246 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water depending on the terrain. When a RAP was to change locations, runners had to notify company headquarters as early as possible, and it then notified the company stretcher-bearers. This process was not always managed effectively and sometimes lead to delays and confusion.45 During the fighting near Proyart on 9-10 August, men were evacuated efficiently to the RAP but stretcher cases accumulated there. This was due primarily to the fact that the Main Dressing Station (MDS) was a considerable distance back, with no closer positions available. Cars took between 1½ and 2 hours to do the round trip to and from the MDS, and there were too few available to cope with the initial rush. Fortunately, the weather was fine and warm, which meant the wounded could be placed in the open with no need for shelter.46

Operations along the northern bank of the Somme during August saw existing medical arrangements modified to meet the demands of the rapid advance. In 43rd Battalion, a horse-drawn Maltese cart followed the battalion HQ wherever possible and served as first-line transport. Fortunately, casualties were relatively few in the early days of the advance and the evacuation system coped well. The battalion rested at Hamel between 13 and 17 August, which allowed the men to bathe and put on clean clothes. The speed of operations north of the Somme and increasing number of casualties left little time for RMO’s to determine the best location for their RAPs. Inevitably, the first suitable spot was usually selected and made ready.47

The experience of 44th Battalion highlights challenges faced by RMOs during this period of frequent moves. The battalion’s RAP changed location every two days on average during August, and sometimes up to three times on a single day. It was usually established as far forward as possible and advertised by conspicuous flags so that stretcher-bearers could readily identify it during operations. The steep banks north of the river afforded excellent protection but dugouts were also constructed when necessary. There was plenty of salvaged building material in the area to do this,

45 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 5. 46 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45. 47 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24, App. 9.

247 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water including an abundance of timber and corrugated iron. Australian Pioneer Battalions did much of the construction but German prisoners were also put to work. Fortunately, the good weather during August usually meant no need to construct a RAP, with men treated in the open or under the shelter of a bank.48

When selecting the best location for a RAP, medical officers often had to compete for space with other units in the area and this could result in overcrowding. In preparation for the attack by the 1st Brigade in the Chuignes valley early on 22 August, 4th Battalion’s RMO moved his RAP the evening before to a tunnel under a road. Only 30 minutes before the attack commenced, the RMO discovered that the brigade’s signallers and battalion headquarters had chosen the same location. A steady stream of wounded from different units began to arrive from 4:30 AM. In the event, there was no pressing need to keep any of them at the RAP for long and no serious issues arose, although there was little room for medical staff to do dressings.49

The 4th Battalion’s RAP moved subsequently to a shell-proof position about 60 yards behind the support company. This was an ideal location and the RAP remained there until the battalion was relieved a few days later.50 It was a particularly gruelling time for the medical staff, however, with four RMOs in 1st Division becoming casualties themselves (two wounded and two gassed).51 On 20 September, immediately following the fighting at the Outpost Line, the CO of the 3rd Australian Field Ambulance Brigade was unable to site the ADS in his preferred location in the village of Templeux because the neighbouring British 74th Division’s Field Ambulance already occupied it. The RMO therefore located his RAP in an open field by a road but that in turn meant that a ‘switch stand’ for cars had to be purpose- built, as well as portable dressing station buildings.52

48 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 5. 49 4th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/21/42, App. 10. 50 4th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/21/42, App. 10. 51 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45. 52 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46.

248 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water

As with so many other aspects of the advance, resourcefulness and initiative on the part of individual junior officers was often vital. The 42nd Battalion was in the line for the first nine days of September and made use of previously constructed shelters for RAPs whenever possible, although these were often very rudimentary. Once across the Somme and past Péronne, the speed of the advance, comparatively light shelling, and relatively few casualties meant no real need to construct more permanent RAP positions. Medical officers improvised instead, even using a disused tank as a RAP on one occasion.53

Stretcher-bearers usually took wounded soldiers to the nearest medical post, which meant that battalion RAPs frequently treated men from other units as well their own. The 27th and 28th Battalions brought their wounded to one of 25th Battalion’s stretcher-bearer relay stations during the fighting at Mont St Quentin on 2 September, which resulted in some 30 wounded men accumulating there, including serious cases. Only the use of captured prisoners to carry the wounded to other nearby RAPs relieved the situation. These included one German medical officer who did “excellent service, himself acting as a bearer and making several trips.”54 Australian RAPs also treated German casualties. During the fighting at the Outpost Line on 18 September, the 11th Battalion’s RAP attended to “a great number of Germans” in addition to those from other Australian battalions.55 This increased the burden on the already stretched medical staff, added to the congestion at the RAP, drained it even further of supplies and resources.

The greatest difficulties in the evacuation system generally occurred between the RAP and Motor Loading Post (MLP). The distance between the two was usually between 500 and 2,000 yards but patients often had to be carried the entire way by stretcher-bearers over broken terrain that did not suit wheeled stretchers. It was also

53 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 7. 54 ‘Monthly Report by RMO of 25th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 55 ‘Report for September by RMO of 11th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13.

249 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water difficult to establish contact between the RAP and the nearest MLP during mobile operations and the frequent moves meant ambulance stretcher-bearers often had to be shown a new evacuation route.56 Problems were inevitable. The forward MLP supporting 25th Battalion at Mont St Quentin “did not come within a mile” of the prescribed location, and stretcher-bearers carrying wounded back from the RAP could not find it. Bearers required maps but suitable ones were not always available. Relays were set up if possible when long carries were needed. If not possible, then a ‘moveable relay team’ was established that included six bearers per stretcher. When employed, the relay system usually worked well.57

The condition of roads and bridges was another factor that determined how efficiently evacuations were made from the MLP to the Casualty Clearing Station (CCS). The speed of the advance in August meant forward road and rail repairs were not always carried out in time to keep up with the fighting line. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. The area around Mont St Quentin and Péronne in early September provided the greatest challenges to the Australians in this regard. A Ford car ambulance post near Cléry supported 5th Division’s operations at Péronne but it was a very long route and the roads were in a terrible condition, making it “very trying for the patients and very heavy on the ambulance cars”.58 It could not be moved closer to the line until engineers constructed a bridge at Halle. The Ford car post was moved forward when this was done, thereby shortening the evacuation route by some six miles. Even then, two changes of vehicles were still required.59

Congested roads in back areas posed yet another problem for the evacuation system, particularly as units undertook operations against the various defences of the Hindenburg Line in the final weeks of September. During the Corps’ final operation at Montbrehain in early October, the road from Bellicourt back to Hargicourt was

56 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/20/23, App. 124. 57 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 5. 58 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/22/32, App. 2. 59 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/22/32, App. 2.

250 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water in a terrible condition and crowded with traffic, which resulted in frequent blockages. It was about five miles from the ADS to the MDS (about half the distance of that in the Villers-Bretonneux sector during August) but it took a considerable time to make the journey. This meant that even more ambulance cars were required than usual. Tanks also travelled along that road, compounding the problem, and it was blocked completely for some hours on the night of 3-4 October by the slow movement of three artillery brigades. As a result, the time it took to clear casualties from the ADS to the MDS was considerably slower than initially anticipated.60 This inevitably militated against rapid and efficient medical treatment for the wounded men but is not possible to quantify the extent to which it contributed to the death toll.

The lot of the stretcher-bearer was extremely difficult and dangerous, with many killed or wounded during the advance. They often had to negotiate their way across broken ground and through heavy shelling and machine gun fire to bring in injured men. A shortage of stretcher-bearers was therefore a common problem in many units, particularly during periods of heavy fighting when they were in the greatest demand. About 40% of the 190 casualties to pass through the 8th Battalion’s RAP between 10 and 19 August were stretcher-bearers, and ambulance bearers had to be brought forward to make up for the shortage.61 A ‘big percentage’ of the battalion’s bearers had wounded or killed as they carried men over open ground in full view of the enemy who swept the field with machine gun fire.62 The 8th Battalion’s RMO also claimed that German snipers deliberately targetted bearers, shooting three of the four in one volunteer squad of Pioneers on 10 August at Crépey Wood, and killing one.63 This was not necessarily the norm, however. The 20th Battalion’s RMO

60 ‘Evacuation During Tour of Duty in the Line, 2nd October to 6th October 1918’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, October 1918, AWM4 26/19/34, App. E. 61 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 62 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 63 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22.

251 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water reported on the same day that his stretcher-bearers “worked under the white flag and were emphatic on the point that the enemy did not deliberately snipe them.”64

During the opening stages of the operations in Chuignes valley on 23 August, the 8th Battalion’s stretcher-bearers again suffered heavily. To compensate, German prisoners were put to work bringing in the wounded, which addressed the problem in the short term, but soon there were too few stretchers to cope with the demand. Improvisation was necessary and just about every conceivable item was used, including waterproof sheets, German overcoats, doors, planks of timber and sheets of galvanised iron. In this way, the RAP was cleared of wounded by about 9:00 AM.

Manoeuvring stretchers forward to the during operations line was invariably difficult. On 1 September, the 12 stretcher-bearers attached to 24th Battalion carried extra stretchers and blankets on a wheeled stretcher, crossing the Somme by way of the footbridge at Feuillères. The men had great difficulty getting the cart and stretchers forward thereafter, however, because of the numerous shell holes and trenches, as well as the fact that the Germans had blown up the railway (which the Australians used as a guide) in a number of places. With progress slow, shelling in the area increased, causing six casualties, and the cart soon had to be abandoned because it was too difficult to move forward any further.65

The continually advancing line meant stretcher-bearers often had to make increasingly long carries over broken, war-torn ground. This was evident in the operations that place in the final weeks of September. For the attack at the Outpost Line on 18 September, regimental and reserve stretcher-bearers in 46th Battalion moved forward with their companies in the initial 1,500-yard advance. The ambulance bearers and RMO proceeded 500 yards to the rear, carrying a Red Cross flag. The RAP was established 500 yards short of the Red Line but it was 2,000 yards

64 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. 65 ‘Report by RMO of 24th Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/19/33, App. Q.

252 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water back by the time the battalion reached its final objective. Because no more suitable forward location could be used, the RAP remained there for the next four days.66

The wounded were treated efficiently during that period but the battalion’s stretcher- bearers suffered badly, particularly when they moved forward with the companies to the Red Line in the initial phase of the attack. Most were hit before the battalion had even reached its objective.67 Three of the four stretcher-bearers in the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance Brigade were evacuated during September, something the RMO described in his monthly report as “very inconvenient”.68 It was difficult to evacuate many of the casualties during 44th Battalion’s heavy fighting at the Hindenburg Line because they also included many of the unit’s stretcher-bearers.69

To overcome a shortage of stretcher-bearers during operations, German prisoners were often put to work, usually between the RAP and MLP but sometimes from the fighting line itself.70 German prisoners were most numerous during periods of heavy fighting, which also corresponded to the greatest number of Australian casualties and the heaviest demand for carriers. During 42nd Battalion’s operation at Bouchavesnes on 1 September, a number of “very big German guardsmen” were used under the supervision of an Australian stretcher-bearer. According to one officer, “they worked admirably and were quite docile and thus no difficulty was experienced evacuating wounded from the line.”71

It was a similar story on 5th Division’s front at Péronne, where the decline in German morale was clearly evident in the following report by Lieutenant RG Thompson of 56th Battalion:

That they were glad to be on our side of the line is evidenced by their broad smile of satisfaction which seems nowadays to relieve they're somewhat gloomy countenance,

66 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32, App. 6. 67 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32, App. 6. 68 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13. 69 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/25, App. 41. 70 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 7. 71 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 1.

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with little effort, despite the fact that they had been chosen men to defend Péronne against the Australians. Their physique on the whole was quite good, anyhow good enough to allow of them taking the ends of a stretcher and in many ways, cheerfully rendering every assistance to our stretcher-bearers and wounded.72

In the wake of the fighting at the Outpost Line on 18 September, the 11th Battalion’s RMO reported that, “German prisoners were very useful for the now very lengthy carry back, because I had no men to spare for relays.”73

Even when there were enough bearers available, a shortage of stretchers during periods of heavy fighting was common, particularly following the initial rush of casualties in the early stages of an attack.74 “For a time we had to send out feelers in all directions to obtain stretchers,” reported 44th Battalion’s RMO during the fighting at the Hindenburg Line, and “demands were constantly made on us by bearers of other battalions and the Americans.” The situation was not always helped by the actions of Australian soldiers themselves. The same RMO had complained earlier in the month that many of his stretchers had been used for purposes “other than carrying the sick and wounded” and were thereby rendered unserviceable.75

Importantly, the hard work, courage and determination of the stretcher-bearers was recognised and appreciated by the troops themselves, and war diaries and battalion histories are full of praise for them. Typical is this comment by 55th Battalion’s RMO at the end of September:

As usual, (the stretcher-bearers) did splendid steady work. Stretcher-bearers of the Battalion are all proved men of great calibre for active service, and are regarded with great respect by all the officers and men in their companies. Many of them have decorations and several were awarded military medals in the recent operations.76

72 56th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/73/32, App. 30. 73 ‘Report by RMO 11th Battalion for September’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13. 74 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/25, App. 41. 75 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 3. 76 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 3. Not only was the work of the stretcher-bearers dangerous and exhausting, their shoulders suffered badly under the weight of the stretchers. Various means to

254 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water

The provision of sufficient medical supplies to RAPs was yet another challenge to overcome during the advance. Medical officers were often loaded “like beasts of burden” when carrying supplies and equipment forward from the nearest MLP. A typical load early in the advance might comprise a haversack containing morphia, hypodermic syringes and some instruments, about 150 steel dressings and two pounds of wool, several rolls of gauze and about 50 bandages, tourniquets, two Thomas splints and half a roll of Gooch’s splints.77 Because it was difficult to get large stocks of dressings, blankets and stretchers from field ambulances, men often had to carry them forward.78 When the RAP moved forward during operations at the Hindenburg Line at the end of September, the medical staff of 33rd Battalion had to discard everything except for shell dressings, wool, roller bandages, Thomas splints, a small supply of comforts, a primus stove and some water.79

Shortages were inevitable, particularly when the first flood of wounded arrived at the medical posts.80 During 6th Battalion’s operations near Lihons on 9 August, there was no facility at the RAP to provide hot drinks for the wounded, and no Thomas splints available from the ambulance. Despite numerous requests, the battalion did not receive any Thomas splints throughout that period of operations, which did not effectively end until 14 August. The battalion also had no fresh dressings for shell wounds, and only a limited supply of gauze and bandages.81

protect the shoulders were tried to address this problem, the ‘most serviceable’ being a 5” x 8” kapok-filled canvas pad. Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 10. 77 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. The ‘Thomas splint’ was designed by the British orthopaedic surgeon, Hugh Owen Thomas (1834-1891). It consisted of a canvas-covered iron frame and were used to stabilise femoral fractures. Widely used during the First World war. The Thomas splint greatly reduced the likelihood of death if applied soon after injury occurred. The ‘Gooch’s splint’ was first described by Benjamin Gooch in the early 1770s. A Gooch’s splint consisted of a soft wood with a canvas backing glued on. Used to deal with fractures to the upper and lower extremities of limbs, a Gooch’s splint was reversible, which made it relatively versatile. The canvas side could be turned towards the skin to encircle the limb or the wooden side could be turned towards the skin for a more rigid splint. The Gooch’s splint was still in use by ambulance crews until the 1960s. 78 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24, App. 9. 79 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 16. 80 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/24, App. 41. 81 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 5.

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In order to address this problem of shortages, Australian medical officers often salvaged German equipment and supplies whenever possible. They even commandeered overcoats to use as blankets for the wounded.82 They made use of German dressings, splints, stretchers and blankets taken from captured casualty clearing stations. The medical unit of the 4th Division’s Engineers attended to about 60 German soldiers on 8 August but soon ran short of dressings. Fortunately, captured German Santitats Compagnie personnel were able to direct them to several dugouts that contained supplies of dressings. This addressed the problem in the short term. In another case, a shortage of medical instruments was resolved by the capture of a German RMO who voluntarily handed over his own private cases.83 The medical officers in 8th Battalion carried a minimal number of dressings and splints on 9-10 August but replenished their stocks from a captured German field hospital and this enabled the RAP to cope with the influx of wounded. According to the battalion’s RMO, it proved to be “a Godsend in view of the heavy casualties.” 84

The 58th Battalion’s RAP was located in the trench system on 31 August and “work was carried out under extreme disadvantages.”85 Men had to carry medical supplies forward to the line because the medical cart could not reach the RAP. The wounded had to be carried for 1,100 yards until the RAP’s position was moved forward and established in a dugout close to the company lines. This resulted in a shortage of supplies until they could be obtained from the ambulance “and any prospective difficulties avoided.”86 The RAP remained in that position until the Somme was finally crossed, and Péronne captured on 2 September.

82 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/24, App 5. 83 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 4th Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/21/27, App. 25. The Australians also discovered that the German method of packing compressed gauze in strips made it cleaner to handle than the British packages, which were difficult to open and “keep clean unless opened aseptically. This is impractical at an improvised dressing post.” 84 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 85 58th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/75/31, App 23. 86 58th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/75/31, App 23.

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A shortage of blankets at forward medical posts was another recurring problem. It usually occurred because units down the line failed to return blankets to their place of origin (usually a front-line medical post), having used them to cover wounded soldiers. On 9 August, some of the MAC cars supporting 5th Division were not properly equipped with blankets or stretchers. Some had only one stretcher and others had only two blankets because, according to the orderlies, the CCS simply could not supply them.87 Co-operation between units to address the blanket shortage was not always evident. “The reciprocal exchange of stretchers and blankets at CCS very unsatisfactory,” reported the CO of the 8th Australian Field Ambulance following the fighting at Amiens.88 During the 2nd Division’s operations at Mont St Quentin in early September, one CCS refused to exchange blankets with another because “all theirs were new”, while others in the area simply had no blankets to exchange.89

Although not a common occurrence during the advance, the effects of German gas shelling were difficult for medical staff to address. This was partly because symptoms did not always appear immediately and treatment became more difficult and less effective after they had finally become evident. The 58th Battalion suffered casualties from a gas bombardment behind the line on 4 August, a few days prior to the attack at Amiens. “The majority were burnt by actual splashes of Yellow Cross Gas,” reported Captain PE Voss, the Battalion’s RMO, “but all showed conjunctivitis and some bronchial signs. Yellow Cross burns proved most intractable to treatment, the men rarely reporting before actual blebs have formed.”90

A more proactive approach was required. Stretcher-bearers were provided with a bottle (whiskey bottles were ‘very suitable’) containing a solution of sodium bicarbonate, a smaller bottle with a dropper, as well as a packet of compressed wool, and instructed to wash the eyes of any man who might have been exposed to gas or

87 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/22/31, App. 42. 88 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 5th Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/22/31, App. 42. 89 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/19/33. 90 58th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/75/31, App 23.

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Yellow Cross liquid as quickly as possible.91 This usually provided immediate relief. Troops affected by mustard gas, or who worked through crops recently saturated by Yellow Cross gas, had chloride of lime rubbed into the affected parts to limit or prevent blistering.92 If applied in good time, these measures enabled men to remain in the line when otherwise they would have necessarily been evacuated.

The Germans employed a good deal of gas during 1st Division’s operations in the Chuignes valley in mid-August. Some 700 cases passed through the gas centre of the 2nd Field Ambulance between 23 and 28 August, including nearly 500 on 26 August alone. Most of the men treated by the 8th Battalion’s RAP on 24 August suffered from the effects of gas but the provision of ammonia capsules to patients at the first opportunity eased the symptoms fairly quickly and relieved distress. The supply was limited, however, despite repeated requests by the RMO for more. He believed that evacuations due to gassing could have been reduced significantly if every soldier was issued with a tin of the capsules, but the supply was simply too limited for that possibility.93

Troops in 6th Battalion were subjected to a heavy gas bombardment on St Martin’s Wood on the night of 24-25 August. The next morning was hot and, according to the RMO, “the fumes rose in considerable concentration.”94 In his view, the men had been poorly located in the event of a gas attack and that made casualties unavoidable. The troops were evacuated by bus to Hamel but more developed symptoms in the colder days that followed. In all, about 100 men were treated for the effects of gas during the month, although most cases were only slight.95

An aspect of force preservation often neglected by historians is the vital role played by the provision of food and water to the line. Napoleon’s maxim that ‘an army marches on its stomach’ might be timeworn but it nevertheless points to an essential

91 Assistant Director of Medical Services, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. A1. 92 Assistant Director of Medical Services, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. A1. 93 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 94 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 95 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22.

258 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water truth. A regular provision of food was crucial during this strenuous period of operations if the demand for nutrition and calories was to be met, and which in turn facilitated and prolonged the troops’ ability to remain active in the line. It was also important for morale.96 The British army had long recognised the fundamental importance of feeding soldiers in the field and emphasised in particular the need for protein, fats and carbohydrates. Taste was only a secondary consideration.97 The men themselves had a nuanced relationship with food. While its main purpose was obviously to provide them with nutrition, the act of eating was also an important ‘social and emotional event’. Food was therefore a junction at which the physiological and psychological experiences of the front line were knitted tightly together.98

The system of food supply for an Australian battalion was typical of that employed throughout the BEF. A unit’s daily allocation was handed in bulk to company quartermasters, who in turn apportioned dry rations for distribution directly to the men. Uncooked wet rations were distributed to company cooks for preparation. Each company had its own cooker, usually situated 2,000 to 3,000 yards behind the line. Quartermasters’ stores and transport lines were located another two or three miles further back. Vehicular transports carried food forward to companies in daylight. Dry and uncooked wet rations might leave the quartermaster’s store at 4 PM and arrive at the company cookers an hour later. The transports dropped off uncooked wet rations for the following day before taking forward those already prepared, along with dry rations, to the battalion ration dump. The food was then provided to the men as quickly as possible.99

96 In the words of Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, “I would say without hesitation that lack of food constitutes the single biggest assault upon morale … Apart from its purely chemical effects upon the body, it has woeful effects on the mind.” Cited in Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1995, p. 72. 97 Rachel Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2012, p. 146. The food ration across the BEF – including the Australians – was determined to be 4,193 calories per man in the field in the final year of the war, and 3,472 calories per man on the lines of communication. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914-1920, p. 586. 98 Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting, pp. 146-147. 99 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AMW 4/23/41/35 App. 24

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Hot wet rations were sent forward in converted petrol tins. These were cheap, easily converted for the purpose and could be carried two per man. They were packed onto a limber and insulated with a thick covering of closely pressed straw. A tarpaulin was tied tightly over the load before moving off from the cookers to the ration dump. Food was kept hot for 8 hours in this way, and warm for up to 24 hours.100 The British had also developed ‘panpacks’ that were strapped to the backs of the ration parties, and contained dixies of stew insulated by straw or hay.101 Water and tea were taken forward in unconverted tins, while dry rations (including bread, jam, margarine and cheese) were sent forward in sandbags.102 The men used Tommy cookers to warm the tea, which usually arrived cold.103

It could be difficult to arrange ration dumps sufficiently far forward during the advance, and getting food to the line in daylight hours was often impossible. The same general system was still employed but it took longer because of the greater distance, and fact that movements were usually made at night. Wagons generally moved off at dark and men often did not receive their hot meals before midnight.104 Periods of wet weather also turned the tracks to mud, which slowed the process even more. Despite these challenges, the system generally held up well during the advance and men in the line were well provisioned throughout.105

The provision of hot food immediately after operations did much to nourish the men but also calm them, and the restorative effects were obvious. Battalion reports generally suggest that food was always in good supply, with an adequate amount of

100 To convert the tins, the top was cut off and a piece of wood nailed to the underside of the lid. Two strips of wood are then nailed to the top of the lid, which was hinged to the tin with strong wire. A hook and eye of wire then made it ready for use. 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AMW 4/23/41/35 App. 24; Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 31. 101 Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting, p. 161. As Duffett notes, the ‘panpacks’ were like large rucksacks that were unwieldy and awkward to carry through the confines of the trenches, but at least they left a man’s hands free to maintain balance. 102 Each bag usually contained enough rations for eight men for 24 hours. 103 A wooden label was attached to each bag to ensure each company received its allocation. The label was also scored by a number of nicks in the side for identification in the dark. If a company was spread out along an outpost line, the number of rations in each bag was adjusted accordingly. 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AMW 4/23/41/35 App. 24. 104 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AMW 4/23/41/35 App. 24. 105 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AMW 4/23/41/35 App. 24.

260 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water vegetables, meat and bread usually available.106 This was important, as carbohydrates in the vegetables provided adequate levels of energy, while the meat ration (although fatty) provided necessary protein.107 There was little scope for a varied menu during the advance, and preserved meat was issued so often that men found it monotonous to the point of being unpalatable.108 Because it was hard to vary the way meat was prepared at the front, cooks invariably fell back on preparing stew.109 Of course monotony was always preferable to hunger.

Beyond the obvious matter of nutrition, a regular supply of provisions to the front line was important for morale.110 Meals eaten together did much to enhance a unit’s esprit de corps, while the work of field kitchens and transports to ensure that hot food reached men in forward positions demonstrated to the troops that they were valued. Having consolidated their positions at Harbonnières on 8 August, the men of D Company in 59th Battalion “lay down to rest, feeling a bit weary after out day’s work, and just at this particular time our worthy friend the QM came to light with plenty of steak and potatoes, so we sat back and ate to our hearts’ content.”111 Food also served as a much-needed fillip during times of extreme stress and vulnerability. In the period from 5 to 9 September, 43rd Battalion was engaged in open warfare between the town of Péronne and the village of Roisel. The men were exhausted but received at least two meals a day throughout. “It was this that, to a large extent, enabled the men to keep going over a very strenuous period,” noted the battalion’s RMO.”112

The rapid provision of food to forward units reinforced the feeling of success after

106 51st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/68/31 App. 23; 40th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/57/29, App. 1. According to Edmonds, “Regimental officers were unanimous in reporting that the troops could not have carried through the tasks demanded of them had not supplied rations – and full rations – been maintained under all conditions.” Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 579. 107 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/39/36 App. 14. 108 51st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/68/31 App. 23. 109 ‘Report by RMO of 41st Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 3rd Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/20/25, App. 41. 110 Stevenson, To Win the Battle, p. 82. 111 ‘Narrative of Operations, by Sgt WF Skinner (D Coy), 8 August 1918’, 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31. 112 43rd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/60/25 App. 4.

261 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water an action, and troops often received hot meals within a few hours of positions being captured and consolidated. Troops appreciated the risks taken by quartermasters and transport staff to ensure that hot food or drink reached them as soon as possible after an operation. The men in 43rd Battalion received breakfast in the line at dawn on 22 August, immediately prior to their attack at Bray. Heavy fighting occurred throughout the morning but hot tea was brought forward by transports in the afternoon. “This was very much appreciated as the day was very hot and the men had had hard digging, heavy shellfire, and a certain amount of gas,” reported one soldier after the battle.113 The men were relieved that evening and arrived in their rest area after midnight. They received rations and water immediately, and a hot meal was prepared. During the morning of 23 August, the men were allowed to sleep or relax and bathe in the Somme canal, before re-organising and re-equipping in the afternoon in preparation for the next move forward.114 In 28th Battalion, the men usually received a hot meal soon after securing objectives throughout August, including after the hard fighting at Mont St Quentin on 1 September.115

Following the operations on Bouchavesnes Spur in the first few days of September, the troops in 40th Battalion marched back to Ham,

where the QM had everything in readiness for the men. And what an excellent meal was had at 7 PM. There were good warm blankets already laid out under tent covers and in dugouts, so that every man had a place in which to lie down and sleep, and there were cigarettes and biscuits for all hands. Soon the hum died down and the battalion was asleep, the best sleep it had had for many days. All through these stirring times there was a spirit of cheerfulness and optimism, each man knowing and feeling that he was better than a dozen Bosche so far from his line on August 8th.116

While the 43rd Battalion trained at Frise in mid-September prior to the attack at the Outpost Line, “the facilities … for cooking roast joints and the excellent rations

113 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24. 114 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24. 115 28th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/45/41. 116 40th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/57/29, App. 1.

262 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water available had the effect of getting our men in 1st class condition very rapidly.”117

A regular supply of food to the trenches was not without its problems, however. Battalion quartermasters and supply officers found it particularly difficult to make suitable arrangements when the distance to the line had stretched to ten miles or more.118 Carrying parties often failed to locate units because of unexpected moves, darkness or bad weather. To address this, troops received lectures during training periods on the importance of clear and accurate communication regarding the exact location of their forward positions. It was nevertheless a perennial frustration for quartermasters, particularly as they sometimes had to take men from the line during an action in order to address a problem of supply.119 In the midst of hard fighting at the Hindenburg Line on 30 September, the quartermaster of 42nd Battalion, Lieutenant Ken Murdoch, sent a request that some men in forward positions be sent back to assist, “otherwise it is impossible for me to send hot meals and supplies. Will you please arrange for Coys to send guides … by 6:30 PM and I will send hot meal, water, and bombs to there.”120

A great deal depended on the experience and initiative of individual quartermasters during this time, and close liaison between the various headquarters was essential. For example, the supply officer in 6th Brigade visited his staff captain every day during the operations in mid-August to ensure the smooth provision of food and equipment throughout. Utilising old trench systems, field cookers were pushed as far forward as possible and hot rations were taken up each evening in the front portion of a cooker.121 The 43rd Battalion’s Transport Officer made a reconnaissance – often under heavy fire – on all four days of 3rd Division’s operation at the Hindenburg Line at the end of September, in order to ascertain the exact location of his companies. He then led the transport forward under the cover

117 20th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/37/38 App. 9. 118 15th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/32/41. 119 60th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/77/32. 120 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 4. 121 ‘Report on Operations 8-19 August, 1918’, 6th Brigade Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/6/36 App. 36C.

263 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water of darkness to ensure that the men received a hot meal on each night of the battle, and cold cooked meat every morning.122

Experienced quartermasters could even anticipate troop movements and stay ahead of them. The 22nd Battalion crossed the Somme at Feuillères on 31 August and made a long march through Cléry to a position behind a railway bank, prior to the attack at Mont St Quentin. Battalion cookers were already waiting there with hot meals when the men arrived.123 Quartermasters also made do with whatever equipment was at hand, including captured German cookers. The rapid progress of 1st Division at the Outpost Line on 18 September made it difficult to keep men in forward positions supplied with hot food. The troops of 2nd Battalion had to rely on their iron rations until a company cook salvaged an old German cooker. It was soon operational and provided hot soup to the troops.124

The work of 38th Battalion’s Percy Telfer in August illustrates the enormous value of an experienced and diligent quartermaster during this strenuous period of mobile operations. The battalion’s headquarters made ten moves in just 23 days as they chased the Germans north of the Somme. According to Telfer, this was “quite a record” for the battalion and he had to streamline his supply system to cope. Telfer went forward every morning to locate the headquarters and arrange definite locations at which to dump rations in the evening. He also used that time to secure new forward campsites for his stores and transport. The QM’s staff and transport moved forward in the afternoon to prepare the delivery of meals that evening, or early the next morning.125 The system generally worked well but Telfer required more than a hundred petrol tins each day to keep his men fed, and many were lost or destroyed during the advance. His stock of 800 soon ran out. Telfer managed to

122 43rd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/60/25. 123 22nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/39/36. 124 Taylor and Cusac, Nulli Secundus, p. 329. The company cook was Mick Taylor. All British soldiers carried emergency ‘iron rations’ in case they were cut off from their regular food supply for an extended time, and was supposed to be eaten only on the orders of an officer. By 1918, the BEF’s ‘iron ration’ consisted of 1 lb preserved 5 meat (bully beef), 12 oz biscuits, 8 oz tea, and ½ oz sugar. 125 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/55/27 Part 2 App 5.

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get more by sending parties out to petrol dumps every evening to procure more but this made particularly heavy demands on his already heavily taxed staff.126

Despite the extraordinary strain on quartermasters during this period, there are few reports of the system breaking down to any extent, although there were occasional shortages. The 8th Battalion’s RMO reported that rations were plentiful throughout the month of August but there was a “marked absence of green vegetables, it being some time now since a decent issue of green vegetables made [sic], and I think the present condition of the men warrants a full issue of same as soon and as often as possible.”127 On the other hand, a company in 40th Battalion found itself over- supplied with food on 24 August after its attack north of Bray. The men had “quite enough food and decided not to bother with breakfast which speaks well for the feeding of the men during a succession of stunts.”128

Salt was in short supply at times during the advance, and the highly anticipated rum ration was only available occasionally. The latter inevitably resulted in grumbling within the ranks but it did not materially affect their capacity to undertake operations.129 A temporary shortage of potatoes in August was a larger concern but the supply could be supplemented by purchases from army stores using regimental funds.130 Purchases were also be made from the YMCA or the AIF’s Comfort Fund, and might include curry powder, flaked oats or custard powder.131 The Somme itself

126 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/55/27 Part 2 App 5. “Just here I would like to add a word of praise to the men in the Store, Company Cooks, and Quartermaster-Sergeants for their hearty co-operation and assistance for the period 23rd to 31st of August,” wrote Telfer. “They had little or no sleep as with the constant moving and the many altered hours of feeding it rendered sleep impossible. The Battalion was relieved on the night of the 31st and are now resting and while in the present area (Curlu) shortages in clothing and equipment will be made good and all repairs effected.” Telfer suggested that a central brigade supply-source of tins should be established. Battalions could draw down daily the number required, “as at present no provision is made for utensils to carry food forward, and quartermasters are sometimes placed in great difficulties in their endeavours to purloin the very necessary and all-important petrol tin.” Bean also cites the example of a shortage of food containers in the 56th Battalion, which was overcome when the Pioneers made 60 containers out of biscuit tins fitted into boxes lined with sawdust. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 31. 127 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 128 40th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/57/29, App. 1. 129 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/23 App. 9; 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24 App. 2. 130 15th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/32/41. 131 43rd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/60/25

265 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water and the surrounding farmland also provided rich pickings. Men foraged for potatoes and other crops, while bandsmen in the 24th Battalion even established a ‘fish market’ in August by catching eels from the river. “Supplies of well-cooked eel sent along with the rations have been appreciated by the troops,” noted the first edition of the battalion’s journal at the end of the month.132

Soldiers at the front had to be fed but an adequate provision of potable water during the advance was equally if not more important. Captured ground had to be made habitable as quickly as possible and this demanded a reliable supply of clean water to forward positions, particularly as the men were fighting at the height of a European summer. The task of opening wells was usually allocated to the tunnellers and the process was the same as that employed throughout the BEF. As soon as a well was located in an area, it was opened and marked ‘Not Tested’. Once the medical team had carried out the necessary tests, the sign was removed and replaced with either ‘Unfit for Use’ or ‘Fit for Use with (number) Scoops’, as appropriate. Troops near the river were also instructed that water drawn from peat lagoons was 55% purer than that taken from the canal.133

The efficient provision of water for 11th Brigade on 8 August demonstrates the value of furnishing troops with relevant and important information in a timely fashion before a set-piece. Prior to the attack, all commanders were given maps that showed initial and forward water supplies, while sterilisers and water-carrying lorries were allotted to the Corps.134 Once the Green Line was captured shortly after 7:30 AM, tunnelling companies attached to 11th Brigade rapidly opened up wells in the area. A water cart went forward at 10:30 AM (in addition to the brigade cart) and

132 The eels were probably caught in what had previously been a German ‘eel-processing factory’, near Frise. The river there had been netted off and traps built. The Battalion diarist stated that, “The eels thus secured were smoked and issued in a ration. We followed suit and had many a dinner of fat eels.” ‘24th Battalion Journal (Preliminary Publication), 1 September, 1918’, 24th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/41/31, App. 18. Such ingenuity was not confined to the Australians. On 23 September, following the heavy fighting at Épehy, a batman in the 1/1st Cambridgeshires (who happened to be a ‘poacher’ in civilian life) used a 12-bore shotgun to shoot coveys of partridges, which made “a welcome addition to our rations.” E. Riddell and M.C. Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914 to 1919, Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge, 1934, p. 245. 133 34th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/51/22, App. 7. 134 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 18.

266 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water arrangements were made for six pack-mules to take forward 24 tins of water to the Green Line.135 Each man carried his own water bottle and also a beer bottle full of water to the assembly positions. This ensured they were well provisioned from the outset. A supply tank also carried an additional 75 petrol tins of water. These were dumped at a pre-arranged point, and 85 more tins were set down further ahead. A 1,300-gallon water tank was also stationed near the brigade HQ to refill the water carts, or in case of any other emergency.136 It was an impressive set of arrangements but almost impossible to replicate under the pressure of more fast-paced mobile operations.

The forward supply of water was managed well throughout August as the divisions moved along the Somme valley. Captured wells were quickly put into use after being tested for bacillary and mineral poisons.137 By the end of the month, however, battalions in 3rd Division north of the river were some four miles ahead of their nearest major water supply at Villers-Fauçon. This point had to supply men across a 15-mile front, and long lines of water carts ran to and from British, Australian and American units. It was a challenging period as men had to haul water by hand from a 100-foot well at one point, but the supply was nevertheless maintained and units never went without.138

There were more challenges in keeping up an adequate supply of water to the front after the Corps crossed the river at Péronne and pushed eastwards in the first two weeks of September. By 11 September, there were ten possible water sources in what was by then a back area around the villages of Roisel and Hervilly (where 1st Division was located), but seven had either been destroyed or were unfit for human consumption. It was a similar situation a week later, when seven of the ten water sources captured by 1st Division at the Outpost Line were classified as drinkable but

135 41st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/58/22. 136 34th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/51/22, App. 7. 137 43rd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/60/24, App 4. 138 ‘Transport Section Diary’, 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 7.

267 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water only after chlorination or boiling.139 Water carts also had difficulty supplying the advancing front during this period because they often had to travel over many miles of poor roads.140 The advance slowed in the approach to the Hindenburg Line defences at the end of the month, however, and that allowed time for water supply to units to be managed relatively easily once again.

Of greatest concern to medical officers was the prospect of water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea breaking out and spreading rapidly within units. This was particularly the case during the hot, dry weather August, when flies were most numerous and men more inclined to drink water without taking the necessary precautions. In 1st Division, there were over 120 cases of diarrhoea on average each week during August; that was an increase on the usual rate but it was still not deemed to be of particular concern.141 The AMC of the 1st Australian Field Ambulance attributed the outbreak to drinking impure water in the area.142 Similarly, the RMO of the 3rd MG Battalion reported an outbreak of diarrhoea at the end of August, which he also attributed to the inefficient supply of clean water. As a result, men simply drank whatever water was at hand.143 Swimming and bathing in the Somme canal saw men ingest unchlorinated and unclean water, which was thought to be responsible for a small spike in cases of diarrhoea in 3rd Battalion in early September.144

The greatest problems with the provision of water on Fourth Army’s front did not occur until its formations moved beyond the Canal du Nord in early October, by which time 2nd Division was the only Australian formation still in the line. On 2 October, its transport units moved forward and camped next to the 6th Brigade’s headquarters. The water in the nearby canal was tested but found to be unfit for

139 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46. 140 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13. 141 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 142 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/18/45, App. 22. 143 ‘Report on Medical Work of 3rd Australian Machine Gun Battalion for August 1918’, 3rd Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/3/6, App. 18. 144 Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 1st Division, September 1918, AWM4 26/18/46, App. 13.

268 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water drinking. “Water was our main difficulty,” wrote one officer. “The nearest water point was Roisel many miles in the rear.”145 Fortunately, the uninhabited villages nearby all had wells still in relatively good condition and that mitigated the problem. Nevertheless, with thousands of troops in the area and only a limited supply of water available, strict rationing was needed for the few days that 2nd Division remained in the line near Montbrehain.146

No matter how mobile or capable a front-line fighting formation was, or how rapidly the enemy fell back, no unit could afford to get too far ahead of the systems that provisioned the troops with food, water and medical support. The medical and evacuation systems employed by the Australians mirrored those used by units throughout the BEF and were heavily dependent upon a large number of men and a considerable quantity of equipment. This threatened to undermine their efficiency at times given the decreasing strength of units and, like almost every other aspect of advance, those systems experienced extraordinary strain as officers and men struggled to meet the myriad of challenges that arose.

Given the enormous challenges posed by the strain of the advance, as described in Chapter 3, the ability of the Australian Corps to ensure force preservation for as long as possible was crucial to its combat capability and operational success. For Australian units to be effective on the battlefield for sufficiently long periods of time, and for morale to be maintained as well as possible in the face of almost unimaginable stress, the health and well-being of the men had to be given the highest priority. That meant attending closely to issues such as the adequate provision of medical and sanitation facilities, food and water. All played a significant role in the Corps’ success and their importance cannot be underestimated or overstated. With unit numbers dwindling and ever more being demanded of already battle-weary

145 24th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/41/37. 146 24th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/41/37. The sappers in III Corps were also adept at ensuring a regular supply of water for troops in forward areas. By the time the 18th Division attacked at Combles at the beginning of September, for example, the provision of sufficient water for the horses was an increasing problem. Keeping pace with the advance, 80th Field Company soon had six windlasses operating in the village before nearby Fregicourt was secured, and twenty-one were in working order within 24 hours.

269 Chapter 6 Medical, Evacuation, Food and Water troops, there was no scope for avoidable wastage. The tireless effort and ingenuity of the men charged with providing this support was one of the great but unheralded factors that underpinned the combat effectiveness of the Australian Corps during its final months in the line. Without it, the Corps’ operational capability would have been ground down even more rapidly than it was.

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CHAPTER 7

SUPPLY, TRANSPORT AND ENGINEERING

Without well-organised and efficient supply, transport, and engineering systems, sustained operational tempo and flexibility is difficult to achieve, if not impossible.1 In July 1918, on the eve of the final advance, the BEF’s Quartermaster-General recognised that, “The problem of effective pursuit will largely be one of supplies and transport. …To convert a German withdrawal into a decisive German defeat, the necessities to follow the enemy up not only with men, but with a vast tonnage per day per mile.”2 With this in mind, the Australian Corps was entirely dependent upon the ability of a massive British logistics organisation moving vast quantities of provisions, equipment, ammunition and troops to and from the front during the advance, or else their operations would simply have ground to a halt. The Australians also piggy-backed on the BEF for much of the engineering expertise and equipment required to construct and maintain roads, railways and bridges in the Corps area, as well the provision of clean water and food to troops in newly-won forward positions and back areas. This chapter will consider how effectively these support systems were managed on the Australian Corps front during the final advance, and assess their influence on its operational capability.

After more than three years of static trench warfare, by mid-1918 the BEF’s system of supply to the front line had developed into a massive, complex and well-managed organisation. All five British armies had their own supply lines by the final year of the war and these were under the general control of the Deputy Director of Supply and Transport (DDS&T). Supplies, equipment and troops all crossed the Channel on Royal Navy ships before being unloaded in France at one of five base ports. The cargo was then apportioned into standard packs about 300 tons and sent by train to

1 Foxton, Powering War, p. 86. 2 R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army (Vol. II), Anthony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne, 1932, p. xxvi.

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an advanced supply depot.3 The general scheme from base ports to advance supply depots in 1918 worked along two main lines. The Northern Line ran from Calais and Boulogne to service the First and Second Armies. The Southern Line ran from Le Havre, Dieppe and Rouen to supply the Third Army and Rawlinson’s Fourth Army.4

Because the AIF fed directly into the established British network of supply and transport on the Western Front, there was no need for it to develop an independent system to any extent.5 This therefore enabled the Australians to channel their limited manpower and resources more efficiently towards front-line combat.6 The British Army Service Corps (ASC) had grown tremendously during the war, from an organisation of only 500 officers and 6,000 men in 1914 to 12,000 officers and nearly 320,000 men just four years later.7 The Australian Army Service Corps (AASC) comprised about 10,000 men by the time Australian divisions arrived in France in mid-916. Unlike its British equivalent and despite falling enlistments, however, its numerical size remained fairly stable until armistice. Its units were spread across I ANZAC and II ANZAC during 1916 and 1917 according to the division to which they were attached, and brought together only with the creation of the Australian

3 ‘The Directorate of Supplies: British Armies in France and Flanders 1914 to 1918’, TNA WO 158/2. Supplies were sent by rail from these ports to 46 different railheads, twelve of which were dedicated to ammunition. Stevenson, To Win the Battle, p. 80. See also Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 80. 4 ‘The Directorate of Supplies: British Armies in France and Flanders, 1914 to 1918’, TNA WO 158/2. On the Southern Line, fresh meat, potatoes, preserved meat, and bulk forage, were drawn from No. 1 Base Depot at Le Havre. Petrol and oils in bulk, as well as bread, were sent forward on trains from No. 2 Depot at Rouen. Section bread packs and bulk fuel trains, as well as a section pack grocery train, were supplied from the base at Dieppe. All of these supplies were then sent down to the Fourth Army’s advanced supply depot in the area of Abancourt. 1st Australian Railhead Supply Detachment War Diary, AWM4 25/35/1, App. 2. 5 Supply and transport units for Australia’s fledgling defence force were formed in the wake of Federation but these were militia-based and organised along state lines rather than federal. Units were re-organised in 1912 to ensure uniformity among the various organisations and bring them into line with the structure of the British ASC. An AASC was established but no provision was made for the creation of Australian Motor Transport (MT) units. The Staff Officer Supplies and Transport, Movement and Quartering appointed at this time was Captain J.T. Marsh, a British officer seconded for four years from the Imperial Army Service Corps. When the first AIF contingent sailed in November 1914, supply and transport support was a small, ad hoc arrangement, ill-prepared to cope with overseas operations of any duration and the Anzacs at Gallipoli relied almost entirely upon the British ASC for all of their logistical requirements. One item that the Australian government insisted on providing for its soldiers, however, was the uniform. Lindsay, Equal to the Task, p. 202; The Advertiser, Adelaide, 29 November, 1912. See also Stevenson, The War With Germany, p. 182. 6 Lindsay, Equal to the Task, p. 202-220. 7 Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps, p. xxvi.

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Corps at the beginning of 1918.

The structure of the AASC mirrored that of the ASC and both were re-organised in early 1918 to release more men for front-line duty. Divisional supply and ammunition Motor Transport (MT) units were withdrawn and consolidated at that time into corps parks and columns. Reserve columns were abolished, which enabled the formation of new divisional trains. Numerous small depot units were also to have been combined into larger centralised corps supply companies but this was not carried out because the AIF preferred to maintain direct links between individual brigades and their designated depots in the rear. This was not necessarily a wise decision. According to Lindsay, the reluctance to create centralised corps supply companies

was an early demonstration of a recurring shibboleth of Australian middle level command – that it is better to have your own puddle than access to a big pool: the logic of breadth and depth of support of a pool, and economies of scale were usually lost in the urge for possession and the false idea that only possession can guarantee response.8

The massive scale of the BEF’s supply network is evident in the fact that it had to provision more than two million men in the field in 1918, including some 60 fighting divisions.9 The Australian Corps sat only at the very tip of this vast network and its general system of supply was essentially identical to that of every British and Dominion corps on the Western Front. Supplies for Fourth Army were unloaded at Abancourt, reorganised into divisional ‘packs’ at the Romescamps regulating station and forwarded to each division’s designated railhead. Each pack contained everything required by that particular division for one day.

In early August, on the eve of the attack at Amiens, the railhead for the five divisions of the Australian Corps was located at Ailly-sur-Somme, 25 miles northeast of

8 Lindsay, Equal to the Task, p. 220. 9 BEF Quarter-Master General War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/39.

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Romescamps and five miles north of Amiens. Australian divisional supply columns picked up their packs from trains at Ailly-sur-Somme and transported them by lorry to brigade refilling points that were situated as close to the line as practical. Supplies were then taken forward to the various battalion dumps, sometimes by motor vehicle but usually by animal transport because of the poor condition of roads in forward areas. Battalion quartermasters took responsibility for the supplies when they arrived at the dumps and re-organised them for distribution to the units, whether at rest or in the line.10

A number of factors affected the system of supply to the line before and during operations. These included the terrain, weather, enemy action and the inevitable congestion caused by the continual movement of vast numbers of men, as well as enormous quantities of supplies and ammunition. The terrain on the Australian front in the initial stages of the advance was particularly well suited to the management of forward supply during operations. South of the Somme east of Amiens, it was characterised in the main by open, rolling farmland crossed by a few main roads, as well as numerous lesser roads and farm tracks. The long, straight road that ran due east from Villers-Bretonneux played a vital role in transporting men and goods to the front as far as Péronne. On the southern part of the Corps front in August, a railway line ran southeast from Villers-Bretonneux through Nesle, before turning northeast towards St Quentin.

Steeply wooded gullies and valleys broke the terrain immediately north of the Somme as the advance progressed in the final two weeks of August, and there was no major transport artery on the Australian front until the divisions reached the Albert-Péronne road north of Curlu. The main road in that area angled southeast across the line of advance before running into the town of Péronne itself. The Australian divisions also benefitted from advancing across country that had been

10 1st Australian Railhead Supply Detachment War Diary, AWM4 25/35/1, App. 2. See also Stevenson, To Win the Battle, pp. 77-80; and Bou and Dennis (eds), The Australian Imperial Force, p. 146.

274 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering previously occupied by the Allies following the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line in the spring of 1917, however, and many old transport routes and lines of communication were still intact.11 The river valley itself was the most significant geographical obstacle facing the Australians, however, with its canalised marshland that turned and crossed the line of advance immediately west of Péronne.

Rail was the most efficient means of transporting large volumes of men and materiel on the Western Front. A motor vehicle carrying supplies or ammunition usually ‘weighted-out’ before it ‘bulked-out’ but the converse was true of a train. A single train crew could move substantial quantities of goods over long distances, which resulted in an economy of manpower. Unlike motor vehicles and animal transports travelling on dirt roads and farm tracks, trains did not generate clouds of dust and the development of petrol engines eliminated the problem of smoke. Rail did have limitations, however. Trains could travel forward only as far as the operational situation allowed, lines were vulnerable to artillery shelling or aerial bombing, while a single breakdown or derailment could choke a line and cause lengthy delays.12

From a rail perspective, Fourth Army was ideally placed to launch a major offensive in early August. The lines that converged at the Amiens railhead enabled the rapid concentration of troops and material, something managed far more efficiently in mid-1918 than prior to the Somme offensive two years earlier.13 The entire British transportation system in France had been overhauled and streamlined since that time, under the oversight of Sir Eric Geddes. It withstood the challenges posed by the German offensives in the spring and was now well placed to cope with the return to mobile operations in August.14 About 230 special trains brought troops and material into the area for the offensive at Amiens and an extra 60 carried food and engineering material, all of which highlighted the effectiveness of the network.15 The

11 A.M. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, HM Stationery Office, London, 1937, p. 436. 12 P.D. Foxton, Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics, Brasseys (UK) Ltd, London, 1994, pp. 51-52. 13 Chris Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation: A Case Study of Fourth Army During the Battles of the ‘Hundred Days’’, unpublished MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2009, p. 15. 14 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 196-197. 15 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 13.

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Australian Corps in mid-1918 could therefore depend upon a British rail system that was well placed to meet their operational requirements.

Railways were useful during the deployment phase of operations but line construction struggled to keep pace once attacks were underway. The distance from a railhead to the fighting line necessarily influenced a unit’s speed of advance and operational flexibility. The policy of the BEF early in the war was to push forward broad (‘standard’) gauge railheads as far as possible and then use horsed wagons to convey supplies along roads to light tramways that ran back from the trenches but this placed considerable pressure on the road network as the scope of military infrastructure increased. From February 1916, therefore, 60-cm wide light rail (‘narrow-gauge’) feeder lines were constructed as far forward as possible from broad gauge railheads.16

The value of this was soon apparent at the height of the first Somme offensive in August 1916 when Haig ordered the extensive employment of light rail along the British front. This minimised the reliance on motor transport and thereby reduced pressure on the road network and petrol consumption. The light rail system was intended primarily to carry artillery ammunition and engineering equipment, as well as general supplies and ordnance stores, and its success resulted in the appointment of a Director of Light Railways and Roads (DLR) in October 1916, with control centralised at GHQ.17 An Assistant Director (ADLR) was also appointed for each of the five Army areas and a Corps Light Railway Officer (CLRO) for each corps in 1917.18

British light rail developed extensively in the Somme region following the German

16 Although imperial measurements have been used throughout, narrow-gauge rail was usually referred to in metric. 17 The DLR had three main responsibilities. These were: to relieve the roads of extra traffic; assist in any rapid advance over shell-torn areas where roads were unusable; and transport road stone for swift repair in a destroyed zone, thereby facilitating the movement of guns and the re-establishment of road traffic as quickly as possible. The DLR assumed responsibility for light rail and roads on 23 December 1916. Director General of Transport - History of Light Railways, TNA WO 158/852 18 The CLRO was essentially an agent for light railways in a corps area, assisting in the development of policy and serving as a liaison between the Corps and ADLR. Director General of Transport - History of Light Railways, TNA WO 158/852.

276 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering retirement to the Hindenburg Line in early 1917. A number of alternative routes were laid, usually with two main lines running forward to each corps area. Three lateral lines connected these main routes and were used primarily to transport medium and heavy artillery, as well as mortar ammunition. Points all along the front could be reached relatively easily, even if a main line forward was disrupted during operations. Each corps could also utilise an efficient circular double-line system in quieter times. Another important organisational change was made to facilitate construction on the eve of the Amiens offensive in 1918. The Director of Construction was given responsibility for all broad-gauge railways in France, while light rail construction on the Somme in particular became Fourth Army’s responsibility.19

The construction and maintenance of lines and railheads on the Australian Corps front was managed well during the first three weeks of the advance in August. Because convenient railheads were crucial to the efficient provision of supplies and equipment to the front, Monash believed the main broad-gauge railhead that supplied the corps area should never be more than 12 miles behind the fighting line.20 The close proximity of Amiens meant there were a number of possible forward routes in place from the outset. The Australian front south of the Somme pushed forward rapidly by some ten miles along the Amiens-Chaulnes railway in the initial stages of the advance on 8 August and cut across that line between Rosières and Chaulnes. One battalion of Canadian Railway Troops had been allocated to Fourth Army as skilled labour and it managed to open a single light-rail track through Rosières (on the right of the Australian front) by 13 August. Advance railheads were also operating at Villers-Bretonneux, Marcelcave, Wiencourt and Guillaucourt three days later.21 The last was only 4½ miles behind the line, and well within Monash’s desired range for operations.

19 Director General of Transport - History of Light Railways, TNA WO 158/852. 20 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 194. 21 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, p. 437.

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Once the Fourth Army’s offensive commenced, tractors were taken forward by road on the Australian front to repair existing lines. Some 15 miles of old German line was also soon in operation, as well as captured rolling stock.22 A railhead near Villers- Bretonneux and another at Corbie supplied the Australian divisions during August, while those near Albert supported III Corps to the north.23 About 12 miles of double track were restored on Fourth Army’s front by 21 August, in time for the Australian attacks in the Chuignes valley and at Bray in the subsequent two days, as well for the operations by III Corps that stretched to Albert in the north.24

The Germans tried to destroy transport routes as they fell back in the final weeks of August, in order to hinder the advance. On 3rd Division’s front north of the Somme, explosive charges had damaged the standard gauge line every few yards in places (particularly at the points), although the permanent route remained broadly intact. The Germans also cut down telephone posts and wrecked bridges.25 This scorched- earth approach continued as they retired across the country east of the Somme. According to one Australian, “from noon to dark the eastern sky was besmirched with dense columns of black smoke from the destruction fires lit by the retreating Bosche (sic)”, as the Germans fell back to the Outpost Line defences in the second week of September.26

The speed of the Fourth Army’s advance denied the enemy time to carry out wholesale destruction of the light rail system, however, and many miles of it (including yards and sidings) were often captured intact. Repairs were carried out swiftly and lines connecting to the rear were soon open for traffic. Aerial photography also helped locate enemy light railways, which allowed Fourth Army

22 W.J.K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War: A History of Tactical Rail Communications on the British Fronts, 1914-1918, David & Charles Ltd, Devon, 1966, p. 99; Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, p. 454. 23 On 11 August, all five Australian divisions drew their supplies from the same railhead, at Corbie, for the first time in the war. 1st Australian Railhead Supply Detachment War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 25/35/1. See also 1st Australian Divisional Mechanical Transport Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/83/6. 24 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, p. 437. 25 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24. 26 44th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/61/24.

278 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering engineers to link them to new or reconstructed British lines.27 Although captured light rail often ran only about 10 miles at most to old German rear areas, some 30 miles of new light rail was constructed in the Army’s area of operations between 9 August and 4 October, and another 150 miles of captured line reconstructed.28

The rail network supported the Australians well throughout the rapid advance in August but difficulties arose as units approached the Somme bend at the end of the month. By the time the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions moved onto the river’s western bank at the end of the month, the main railheads supporting them were some 18 miles back at Villers-Bretonneux and Corbie.29 This placed considerable pressure on an already overburdened lorry service, which will be discussed in due course.30 Fourth Army headquarters therefore requested that the Maricourt-Péronne rail line be opened for traffic until the Chaulnes-Péronne line could be restored to working order. That line was soon reopened as far as Hem on northern bank, but that was still four miles short of Péronne.31

Péronne’s railhead and lines to the east had to be repaired as rapidly as possible for the advance to continue in early September but the Germans had destroyed the large railway bridge in the town. Because it could not be rebuilt quickly, alternatives had to be found. One possibility was to construct a new line connecting the one at Bray to Péronne but it would require at least two weeks to complete the eight miles of track required. Another was to repair the line to Péronne on the western side of the river and establish a new railhead on the eastern side. This was the more attractive option and could be completed reasonably quickly because extensive sidings in reasonably good condition already existed on the western bank. Road bridges across

27 ‘Historical Record of Light Railway Construction from 8th August to November 30th, 1918’, Director General of Transport (History of Light Railways), TNA WO 158/852 28 CH Maginniss, ‘Heads of Steel’: Logistic Support to BEF’s Mobile All Arms Battle (July-November 1918); ‘Statement Shewing Mileage of Light Railway Construction and Reconstruction from 9th August to 29th November, 1918’, Director General of Transport, TNA WO 158/852 29 Edmonds, BOH (Vol. IV), p. 424. A similar situation had arisen on the III Corps front, to the north, where the main railhead supporting the British divisions was 13 miles to the rear, near Albert. 30 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 194. 31 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, p. 437.

279 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering the river first had to be made operational both at Péronne and Brie for the line to function effectively, however, in order for the large volume of traffic to cross and service the new railhead.32

The time taken to repair these bridges meant that no railway reconstruction was undertaken on the Australian front east of Péronne until 10 September, by which time the extension to the town line was approved but its carrying capacity was limited to only four to six trains per day. Furthermore, the majority of these were construction trains that did not carry supplies and provisions forward to the men. To support III Corps north of the Somme, meanwhile, another line was needed to run north from Péronne to Moislains (about four miles away) and it was agreed on 12 September to construct it in case of an operation, although only as a temporary measure. The line from Péronne was extended by 14 miles east to Étricourt as Fourth Army approached the Hindenburg Line in the third week of September. It was used initially to carry material to the Rocquigny-Épehy line and later for salvage.

The importance of the rail network to Australian operations during September is evident in the fact that trains provided 10,360 tons of supplies during the month, with more than 350 tons arriving daily at the front line. The main item carried was ammunition, with more than 6,000 tons hauled from railheads to forward dumps during that one month alone.33 While rail carried these vast quantities of material, equipment and men to the front, it also conveyed shattered divisions out of the line for rest and reconstitution. Once carriages were unloaded they could take wounded men back to field hospitals for treatment. About 20 trucks fitted with seats and covered by tarpaulins were used during the Australian operations at the Hindenburg Line in late September, for example. They conveyed walking wounded from Corps relay posts at Templeux and Villers-Fauçon to the casualty clearing station at Tincourt, about five miles to the rear. In this way, more than 2,500 wounded were

32 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 195. 33 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, pp. 436-437.

280 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering carried on 29 September alone, with another 700 evacuated the following day.34

Despite the importance of light rail in the conduct of mobile warfare, it did have limitations and it was not sensible for the Australian formations to rely too heavily on it during the advance. Depending on factors such as weather, terrain and the availability of labour, the construction and repair of tracks could take considerable time to carry out. Loads were also limited to 30 tons each. This was only ten percent of the capacity of a broad-gauge train, which meant a large quantity of rolling stock and manpower were necessary for the light rail system to work efficiently. Motor transport bridged the gap and the nature and speed of the Australian advance was determined as much by the condition and availability of roads to and from the front as it was by almost any other factor.35

Motor transport was more labour-intensive than rail. As with a locomotive, every motor vehicle required a driver. However, unlike a train engine that could pull multiple carriages, a motor vehicle’s load capacity was very limited. Motor vehicles were not restricted to a single fixed track and that did provide a greater degree of flexibility than rail, but they could not travel across country and were therefore limited to the available roads in an area. Of course, roads in forward areas were heavily used by all manner of units, including artillery and tanks, and constant maintenance was necessary to keep them in a serviceable condition.36

The Australian Corps assumed control of its own Motorised Transport (MT) unit from attached British ASC units in 1918. The provision of supplies by motor transport to the front was relatively straightforward when divisions were stationary for any length of time, with repairs carried out relatively easily and swiftly in back areas. The transition to mobile operations in August made it almost impossible to

34 Australian Corps Administrative Staff War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/37/7, App. 37. 35 Edmonds, BOH Vol V, p. 579; Monash, Australian Victories, p. 173. The BEF was also responsible for maintaining more than 4,000 miles of roads on the Western Front in 1918. BEF Quarter-Master General War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/39. 36 Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, pp. 450-451. The British army had not made particularly close study of road making prior to the war and a shortage of road stone had presented problems in 1917. Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, pp. 11-19.

281 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering meet the ever-increasing demand for vehicles, however, and Australian MT companies were soon stretched to the limit. Motorised vehicles were used in the in the wake of the attack on 8 August and many were badly in need of maintenance and repair within a week. Divisional supply columns and sub-parks used vehicles to carry ammunition and supplies to the front line but they were also needed to transport engineering material, as well as for other general purposes.37

Hard-sprung British vehicles with solid tyres were not suited to the dirt roads and tracks of the Somme farmland.38 Supply vehicles and ambulances were particularly affected in this way. They were fitted with 2½-inch or 2-inch springs that were too rigid for rough roads in forward areas. One unit had nine of its 12 ambulances out of action in mid-September for this reason.39 The advancing line also meant that vehicles had to travel much further than previously and for longer periods, which increased the prospect of breakdowns. The lack of care taken by drivers was another frustration for transport officers, as it often led to unnecessary damage to vehicles. Excessive speed damaged roads and resulted in lorries constantly being put out of action with broken springs. Finally, the urge from higher command to press the advance left precious little time for mechanics to repair and maintain vehicles. Three days before the attack on the Hindenburg Line in late September, more than half the lorries allocated to the Australian Corps were undergoing repair in the Siege Park, which was significant given the importance of motor transport in the exploitation phase of the attack.40

The speed and success of the advance on 8 August meant the Germans could not carry out wholesale destruction of roads as they had done during their planned retirement to the Hindenburg Line 18 months earlier. Where 5th Division advanced on the right of the Australian front, for example, the land was “quite flat and easy to

37 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 25/4/20, App. 7. Each Australian division had a MT company attached, with the 6th Australian MT Company serving as corps troops. 38 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 8 39 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer Australian Corps War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 25/4/21. 40 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer Australian Corps War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 25/4/22, App. 4.

282 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering traverse and the roads … in excellent condition … Many were surprisingly good.”41 The success of British counter-battery fire on 8 August also meant road repairs could be carried out on that day with relative impunity. The road east from Villers- Bretonneux was repaired to a point past Warfusée by 7:50 AM, which was 30 minutes ahead of schedule and well in time for the second phase of the attack. As a result, artillery, motor lorries, motorcars, and other transport vehicles were streaming through Warfusée within the hour.42

Australian field companies worked throughout the day reconnoitring front-line positions and they submitted accurate reports on nearly 20 miles of roads and railways in newly won areas by 4 PM.43 By 10 August, they had constructed a road adjacent to the main transport route between Villers-Bretonneux and Warfusée that was dedicated solely to horse traffic, and all roads in the Australian Corps area were in a serviceable condition only a day later. A steel girder bridge was also placed across the Somme at Cérisy within a week, linking Australian divisions south of the river with Wisdom’s Liaison Force on the northern bank.44

The relentless advance took a heavy toll on transport routes. Most roads in the region were designed to carry farm traffic, such as animal-drawn carts and bicycles, and not the large numbers of troops, heavy machinery and motorised vehicles of modern industrial war. Constant traffic in the dry heat of August also resulted in enormous clouds of dust that slowed movement and attracted German attention and shellfire. Even the main road running east through Villers-Bretonneux had only three inches of surface metal. Potholes were created as it broke up, allowing rainwater later in the month to seep into its chalky foundation.45 The fighting itself also caused substantial damage. Shell-holes and craters scarred roads, while long established drainage systems and culverts were destroyed. Blockages caused by the

41 56th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/73/31. 42 Chief Engineer Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/4/8, App. A 43 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 336. 44 This was done by utilising the abutments of an old bridge alongside it, which had been demolished. Keatinge, War Book of the Third Pioneer Battalion, p. 116. 45 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 15.

283 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering detritus of battle strewn across thoroughfares caused long delays and engineers were kept busy repairing forward routes and bridges.46 Following 3rd Division’s operations at Bray in the last week of August, “all roads forward at this time showed the great effect of heavy shelling of British guns, with dead horses, men, and smashed limbers being mixed up with fallen trees and wrecked huts along the roadside.”47

Monash wanted at least three serviceable main roads leading back to main supply bases during the advance. Only the main route running from Villers-Bretonneux to St Quentin was available during August, however, and it also serviced III Corps to the north. Repairs to that route continued throughout the month and it did remain open for two-way motorised traffic, but an endless stream of vehicles, wagons, tanks, and horses in both directions caused frequent hold-ups. This failure to provide separate ‘up’ and ‘down’ routes points to the difficulty Australian staff officers faced in adjusting to this period of more mobile operations.48

The central role played by artillery during the advance meant battlefield success was heavily dependent upon the efficient provision of shells for the guns. Supply of ammunition prior to a major set-piece operation was relatively straightforward. It was collected initially by MT vehicles from a railhead and taken to an Ammunition Refilling Point (ARP).49 The division or artillery brigade then collected its allotment and transported it to the Battery Wagon Lines. Horse-drawn vehicles carried it for there to the battery position, where it was stockpiled in readiness for the attack. Suitable positions forward of existing field batteries were also selected in the planning phase of an operation as advanced ARPs. Their number and location depended on factors such as the availability of suitable roads, the terrain and the

46 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 15. 47 Keatinge, War Book of the Third Pioneer Battalion, p. 121. 48 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 157. 49 The ARP was located on a suitable main road within convenient reach of the Divisional Ammunition Column (DAC) or Brigade Ammunition Column (BAC) lines. ‘Artillery Operations (August-November 1918)’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52.

284 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering number of artillery brigades in the attack. It was usually sufficient to have one ARP for each division’s artillery, and one for the Corps’ Army brigades.50

During the operation itself, the Division Ammunition Column (DAC) or Brigade Ammunition Column (BAC) moved forward at Zero and dumped ammunition at the designated ARP as soon as the situation permitted. Batteries moved with their particular infantry units and sent a gunner or junior NCO to the ARP to await the arrival of the ammunition column. The man informed the officer in charge of the quantity of ammunition dumped in the gun pits, as well as the location. Wagons were then detailed by the officer to collect the ammunition and carry it forward. The DAC or BAC would return to the original ARP for refilling only after all of the ammunition left in the gun pits was moved forward. If the attack progressed to a point whereby the forward ARPs were too far back, new sites were selected and the entire process was repeated. The old sites could then serve as locations for the new ammunition dumps.51

The provision of heavy artillery ammunition was carried out along similar lines. Batteries were made up to establishment 24 hours before Zero and dumps were situated close to the battery areas, which enabled railheads to be cleared as rapidly as possible. Ammunition was sent directly to these forward positions when the advance commenced and that allowed the vacated sites to serve as new forward dumps. Brigade dumps were formed again once the batteries had replenished their supply.52 A process was also facilitated by a system of liaison officers that saw an MT officer detailed to work with the Staff Captain of each divisional artillery unit. The liaison officers also assisted Staff Captains by selecting new ARPs, ensuring they were suitable for delivery by MT, and advised divisional HQ of the condition of roads in forward areas and the best routes to follow. The entire system worked

50 ‘Artillery Operations (August-November 1918)’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52. 51 ‘Artillery Operations (August-November 1918)’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52. 52 ‘Artillery Operations (August-November 1918)’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52.

285 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering effectively during the demanding period of mobile operations and remained in place throughout August.53

The growing shortage of vehicles as the advance progressed threatened to undermine the capacity of Australian units to undertake or sustain operations. The constant movement of heavy guns by fully-laden lorries damaged roads in the Corps area and placed enormous strain on the vehicles.54 About 500 artillery rounds were required at the new site every time a six-gun battery moved. This in turn meant that at least ten lorries were needed to stockpile shells for one gun, and 60 were needed to supply an entire battery.55 The rapid nature of the pursuit during August and the badly damaged roads in the Corps area meant wear on vehicles was particularly severe. Many were soon out of action and the Australian MT unit was short by some 200 lorries a day during the month. The problem eased to some extent during September as the advance slowed prior to the major set-piece operations at the Outpost Line and the Hindenburg Line itself.56

Even when good roads were available, the shortage of vehicles in September meant that material could not always be moved forward in sufficient quantity. The Corps Cyclist Battalion was instructed to hand over two of its vehicles to another unit in the middle of the month and this ‘rendered the transport question very difficult’ for the cyclists.57 The battalion received 27 additional Lewis guns on 26 September, complete with magazines and parts. This weighed a total of nearly 8,500 lbs (without reserve SAA), for which the Corps or Army had to provide motor transport when the unit moved. In addition, the battalion’s quartermaster received an additional 3,722 lbs of supplies during the month but was given only one more limbered wagon

53 Australian Corps Motor Column HQ War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 25/23/19, App. 1. 54 ‘Artillery Operations (August-November 1918)’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52. Typical of all British corps, the Australian motor transport was organised into two columns. One comprised lorries allocated to artillery brigades and heavy howitzer batteries that were not designated to move forward until later in the operation, helping to ensure the railhead was cleared quickly. The second column comprised lorries allocated to batteries that had moved to forward positions, thereby clearing rear positions rapidly. 55 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer Australian Corps War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 25/4/22, App. 4. 56 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 25/4/20. 57 Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 12/3/19, App. 1.

286 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering capable of carrying just 520 lbs. The quartermaster’s frustration was clear in his monthly report, particularly as the means for moving the reserve SAA for the guns had not been considered.58

Traffic congestion on the Australian front was a continual problem throughout the advance, with lengthy delays frequent. Marching troops always had right of way over all other traffic and the movement of thousands of men strained ill-suited roads already struggling to cope. The Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) was responsible for traffic control in the Corps’ area. His task was straightforward during prolonged periods of static warfare but mobile operations made it both complicated and physically demanding because his men were required to work long hours and over increasingly large distances.59

Vehicles frequently broke down and traffic controllers had to ensure that roads were cleared rapidly and put back into in a serviceable condition. They also had to enforce speed limits and road rules in order to prevent unnecessary problems. Drivers made life difficult at times, however, particularly when the need for operational efficiency was at a premium. At the height of the pursuit along the Somme in mid-August, a lorry belonging to the 3rd AMT Company and a General Services (GS) wagon belonging to the 189th Brigade RGA were found loaded with civilian furniture looted from a nearby village.60

The wear caused by the frequent movement of heavy traffic throughout August meant roads on the Australian front were constantly under repair. Ironically, the transportation of tons of road stone sent forward for that repair contributed to the damage.61 Stone had to be sourced from wherever it could be found and the reduction of villages to rubble meant some was often on hand for temporary repairs. Explosive charges were used to break up heavy stone and masonry but clearing the

58 Australian Corps Cyclist Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM 412/3/18, App. 1. 59 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 197-198. 60 Assistant Provost Marshal War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 3/2/10. 61 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 173.

287 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering narrow streets of Péronne was particularly labour intensive and time consuming.62 These measures ameliorated the shortage in the short term but there was invariably a cost for hurried or patchwork repairs, with many roads quickly deteriorated once again and a lack of men available to maintain them. The main road near Suzanne was repaired to carry lorry traffic in late-August but became virtually impassable only a few weeks later because shell holes were not filled in and fallen trees were not cleared.63

“Transport difficulties present themselves now that we are back in the Somme battle ground,” Hector Brewer wrote in his diary at the end of August, “and these difficulties will increase as & when the bad weather begins.”64 The wet weather did return in September and this combined with the mass movement of artillery, motor transport and tanks in preparation for the attack at the Hindenburg Line to cause frequent delays on the Australian front.65 The deterioration of cross-country tracks meant that packhorses were forced onto main routes at times, adding to the congestion and wear.66 The desire to press the pursuit left little time to reconnoitre alternative routes, however, and transportation of men and supplies was often undertaken on main roads, increasing congestion.67 Crowded routes with slow moving traffic and columns of men also increased the prospect of being subject to German aerial bombing raids, something that concerned 3rd Division’s troops during their long approach to the Hindenburg Line on 26 and 27 September.68

Drivers and infantry did not always co-operate effectively and this caused tension between units on occasion. When the 13th Brigade moved back out of the line on 6 September, for example, men were debussed at Herbécourt but the six lorry loads

62 ‘Work Report’ for Month of September, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 14/17/31, App. 15. 63 Keatinge, War Book of the Third Pioneer Battalion, p. 123. 64 Brewer Diary, 29 August 1918, SLNSW, MLMSS 1300/6 65 14th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/31/47, App. 1. 66 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 8 67 ‘Narrative of Fighting near Bony September 29th to October 2nd’, 10th Brigade War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/10/24, App. 12. 68 ‘Narrative of Fighting Near Bony September 29th to October 2nd’, 10th Brigade War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/10/24, App. 12.

288 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering of kit were unloaded two miles away, and the OC Bus Column could not be persuaded to take it to its destination. This left brigade and battalion staff to flag down passing lorry drivers, which, according to one officer,

was rather undignified but successful. … Moreover, it does not seem to be generally recognised by Bus Company Commanders that it is a very serious thing to keep 1,500 men waiting on the side of a road for an hour, which is quite a common occurrence.69

Repair to transport routes required considerable engineering expertise, labour and road stone. Motor wagons brought up stone to reconstruct roads but engineers also utilised material from captured German dumps.70 On the morning of 8 August, 20th Battalion captured a considerable quantity of engineering supplies, which it gathered it into company dumps.71 The Australians also found 200 tons of stone in a captured dump near Marcelcave railway station, while another 400 tons was discovered at Guillaumont station.72 By mid-morning, troops in 5th Division were on the second objective, where “the quantity of material captured in the area was very great and engineering supplies were everywhere available for the purposes of consolidation.”73

Motor transport units did not receive the same priority as combat troops during the advance despite demands by engineers for unprecedented quantities of equipment. Clearly frustrated, the Australian Senior Mechanical Transport Officer (SMTO), Walter Tunbridge, complained in late August that engineers required between 100 and 200 lorries to transport material but none would be available as they were required to move ammunition and other supplies to the line.74 Tunbridge constantly

69 13th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/13/32. 70 20th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/37/37. 71 ‘Report on Operation of 8th, 9th and 10th August 1918’, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/17/30, App. 5. The captured material included machine guns, light trench mortars, telephone equipment, pigeons, and ‘other things too numerous to mention. 72 ‘Report on Operation of 8th, 9th and 10th August 1918’, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/17/30, App. 5. 73 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 334. 74 Australian Army Service Corps, Mechanical Transport Branch – History, AWM 24 MSS 250. Colonel Walter Tunbridge (1856-1943) arrived in Queensland from England as an assisted immigrant in 1884. He was an architect by profession but also a citizen-soldier and Boer War veteran, Tunbridge enlisted in the AIF 1914 and was immediately placed in command of 1st Australian Division Ammunition Park (Mechanical Transport) and commissioned to raise its six officers and 468 men. According to the ADB, “With limited understanding of the use of mechanical transport in the supply services of the Armed Forces, Tunbridge was guided by an article in the New

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‘begged’ the Corps for more vehicles. “The MTA will, of course, always do its best,” he reported, “but there is a limit to the endurance of both vehicles and men.”75

When it was impossible to use motor transport near the front line, horses and mules carried supplies between the nearest railhead and refilling point. The animals suffered from the constant, heavy workload and could not be used for prolonged periods, however, and this could limit the scope of operations. On 15 August, with the advance from Amiens only a week old, 15th Brigade’s movements were restricted by the need to carry forward “all mobile stores, echelons, and extra material which is necessary for warfare nowadays.” Baggage wagons and transport moved to within 4,000 yards of the line but experienced great difficulty carrying all of the hot boxes to feed the men, as well as a load of 36 Lewis guns.76

As the distance from an established refilling point to a unit’s stores increased, horse feed and rations for the men had to be put onto carts and this in turn placed the animals under enormous strain.77 Furthermore, the ravaged landscape over which the Australians passed during August meant that feed for the horses was often in short supply and straw was not as abundant as in previously occupied areas.78 As 2nd Division’s brigades prepared to attack at Mont St Quentin on 31 August, the divisional train was informed that no lorries were available “owing to the pressing need of these vehicles for other work”, and that horses had to be used to transport

Zealand Military Journal: he inspected and purchased about 200 vehicles, and provided the required workshops and accessories.” Tunbridge arrived to France in July 1915 in command of the newly renumbered 300th and 301st MT Coys, ASC, AASC. He assumed command of the Ammunition Sub-Park for Allenby’s V Corps in August. Tunbridge remained with V Corps until the arrival of the Australian divisions in April 1916, at which time he was given command of I ANZAC Ammunition Park. He was appointed SMTO of I ANZAC in January 1917 but his responsibility was extended across the entire AIF in France in the midst of 3rd Ypres, later in the year. Promoted to Colonel on 1 June 1918, Tunbridge was the Corps SMTO for the remainder of the war. Charles Glyn-Daniel, 'Tunbridge, Walter Howard (1856–1943)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/tunbridge-walter-howard-8876/text15587, published first in hardcopy 1990, accessed online 3 September 2017. 75 Senior Mechanical Transport Officer, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 25/4/20, App. 7. 76 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30. 77 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30. 78 ‘Transport Officer’s Report for Month of August’, 55th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/72/30, App. 22.

290 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering supplies and equipment in a round trip of between 15 and 18 miles.79 Fortunately, the fine weather enabled animals to use cross-country tracks but any significant rain would have prevented this and added considerably to the distances involved.

As a result of these pressures, the condition of many transport animals had declined noticeably by the end of August.80 It was also impossible to get enough mules for 58th Battalion during operations at Péronne on 1 September and less than half the number necessary was available to carry rations and equipment forward from the supply dump.81 Despite all these challenges, however, the general system of supply on the Australian front held up comparatively well during August. According to the 2nd Division’s Transport Officer, this was because “the period (of operations) was not long enough, nor the daily advance great enough to do more than strain our Transport resources.”82

In the main, the question of transport to and from the line did not cause significant problems once the line moved east of the Somme and the advance slowed in preparation for the major attacks in September. Prior to the attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September, four roads in the Australian Corps area were made serviceable as rapidly as possible. These were labelled ‘Black’, ‘Red’, ‘Yellow’, and ‘Blue’, with each identified by signboards painted in the appropriate colour. The Blue road was northern-most and in the worst state of repair. To minimise congestion in that area, infantry units were instructed to avoid roads whenever possible and move by cross- country tracks instead.83 This eased pressure to an extent but added to the men’s fatigue, particularly when they were separated from their transport. The other three roads further south were in better condition but nevertheless pock-marked by shell

79 ‘Report on Operations from 25th August to 4th September 1918’, 2nd Divisional Train War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 25/15/38, App. 1. 80 ‘Monthly Report of the Transport Section’, 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27. 81 58th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/75/32, App. 4. 82 ‘Report on Operations from 25th August to 4th September 1918’, 2nd Divisional Train War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 25/15/38, App. 1. 83 ‘11th Infantry Brigade Order No. 141’, 42nd Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/59/23, App. 4.

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craters.84

While transport and supply problems did threaten to undermine some front-line operations, the Australians were assisted by the fact that the Germans were no longer the formidable adversary of previous years. On 30 September, with heavy fighting already underway on the Hindenburg Line, badly scarred and congested roads held up 18th Battalion’s transport carrying the battalion’s Lewis guns, extra SAA, and bombs, and it had to move independently of the infantry. The Lewis guns were not available for distribution to the companies until midnight and it was impossible to get kitchens forward in time to provide hot food for the troops.85 Despite these difficulties, an absence of tanks, and the fact that only 249 men and 13 officers (organised into three companies of three platoons each) lined up on the tape, German artillery fire was ‘feeble’ and the attack eventually succeeded after heavy close-quarter fighting.86

Although often overlooked by historians, the work of engineers (or ‘sappers’) was integral to success of the Australian advance. The British Royal Engineers comprised about 11,500 regulars and 13,500 territorial troops in 1914 but this increased to nearly 300,000 within just three years.87 Engineering services in the Australian Corps were pooled under the overall command of its CE, Cecil Foott, and allotted as required for operations.88

84 56th Battalion War Diary, AWM4 23/73/32, App. 6. 85 ‘Report on Operations 27 September to 4 October 1918’, 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39, App. 10. In the event, the men of 18th Battalion did not receive a hot meal until nightfall on 2 September. 86 ‘Report on Operations 27 September to 4 October 1918’, 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39, App. 10. 87 ‘Australian Engineers in the First World War’, Australian War Memorial website, https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/australian-engineers-in-the-first-world-war, viewed 23 September 2017. See also Chris Baker, ‘The Corps of Royal Engineers in the First World War’, The Long, Long Trail: the British Army in the Great War website, http://www.1914-1918.net/cre.htm, viewed 23 September 2017. 88 A Queenslander, Foott was appointed by Birdwood in March 1918 and retained the position after Monash assumed command of the Corps at the end of May. He was CE throughout the advance. After the Armistice, Foott served as Deputy Director General of the AIF’s newly established Department of Repatriation and Demobilization (Monash himself was the Department’s Director General). See Warren Perry, 'Foott, Cecil Henry (1876–1942)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/foott-cecil-henry-6204/text10663, published first in hardcopy 1981, accessed online 31 August 2017.

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Field companies and pioneer battalions undertook most of the engineering work on the Australian front.89 Field companies specialised in engineering tasks that included work on roads, tracks, railways, bridges, accommodation, the provision of water supply to the line, as well as the consolidation and wiring in of captured front-line positions. They transported RE supplies, reconnoitred captured areas and constructed headquarters for brigades and battalions.90 The Pioneer units were a hybrid between engineers and infantry. The Pioneers supplemented the engineering capacity of a division but, given the presence of a division’s three field companies, their role was often somewhat ambiguous and had no clear guidelines.91 Pioneer battalions usually fitted in as required therefore and earned a reputation as the ‘handymen of the division’.92

Pioneer battalions were tasked with repairing roads across a battlefield as rapidly as possible and then maintaining them, in order to enable motorised vehicles, artillery, cavalry and supply transports to advance with the infantry, and for engineering equipment to be moved forward. Pioneers also undertook road and water reconnaissance and assisted in consolidation by wiring in new positions and reconstructing strong points.93 Their versatility was on display when 5th Pioneers were placed under the command of the 1st Canadian Railway Company following the attack on 8 August. Despite having no previous experience in that area, the men

89 Each division had three field companies attached. Field companies were numbers in accordance with the brigades of the particular division. For example, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Companies were with 1st Division, 5th, 6th, and 7th Field Companies were with 2nd Division, and so on. Tunnelling companies were also part of the Royal Engineers. As the name suggests, they mined and tunnelled (both defensively and offensively) in the front line. This work was suited to the conditions of static warfare but the return to movement in 1918 saw their specialist role diminish, and often they were used during the advance in conjunction with field companies for general engineering work. 90 1st Divisional Engineers HQ War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/7/32, App. 2. 91 Pioneers were to “to obtain the maximum output of skill and, if necessary, technical work over the maximum area with the minimum expenditure of manpower”. The CRE oversaw the work of a pioneer battalion but divisional COs deployed pioneers when required in combat and were responsible for discipline within the unit. “Jet”, ‘A Pioneer Battalion in the Great War’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 75, 1930, p. 122, cited in William Westerman, ‘The Handyman of the Division: Assessing the effectiveness of pioneer battalion concept in the First Australian Imperial Force’, British Journal of Military History, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2017, p. 49. 92 Ellis used the term ‘handyman of the division’ to describe the versatility of the Pioneers. Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 6. Pioneers were divisional troops with an establishment of about 1,000 men divided into four companies and a HQ, mirroring an infantry brigade. 93 See Westerman, ‘The Handyman of the Division’, pp. 43-61.

293 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering worked for three days on the broad-gauge railway near Marcelcave.94

This overlap between engineering services was not ideal and sometimes resulted in the inefficient use of resources.95 Technical work undertaken both by field companies and pioneers could be so similar that it was often impossible to distinguish their individual duties, and that in turn might lead to friction between units as well as the over-supply of material and working parties.96 Furthermore, field companies acting in liaison with infantry brigades might be unaware of other engineering work already underway in their area, which resulted in unnecessary traffic congestion and duplication of effort. The detachment of field companies and pioneer battalions for light railway work also meant they could lose touch with their infantry units as the advance progressed. This led to calls for field company commanders to be given absolute control over all engineering work in a brigade sector but these requests do not appear to have been acted upon at higher levels.97

Because engineers and Pioneers were highly skilled and difficult to replace, they had not generally been exposed to the same degree of danger as other troops during the war. One divisional CRE claimed that the value of a Pioneer battalion to a division was “300% greater than that of an infantry battalion”, and believed that there was rarely sufficient cause to risk a serious deterioration of its strength.98 This meant engineers had more time and opportunity to develop their skills and specialise in particular roles, such as bridge building.99 As a result, they suffered relatively few casualties throughout the war when compared to front-line fighting units and, when they did occur, they tended to come in ‘penny numbers’ due to artillery fire.100

94 ‘CO’s Report’, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/17/30, App. 1. 95 3rd Australian Divisional Engineers Headquarters War Diary December 1918, AWM4 14/9/18, App. 1. 96 3rd Australian Divisional Engineers Headquarters War Diary December 1918, AWM4 14/9/18, App. 1. This also occurred between tunnelling companies and divisional engineering units. Headquarters of 4th Divisional Engineers War Diary December 1918, AWM4 14/10/35. 97 Headquarters of 4th Divisional Engineers War Diary December 1918, AWM4 14/10/35. 98 Headquarters of 4th Divisional Engineers War Diary December 1918, AWM4 14/10/35. Engineers were also more highly paid than the infantry and enjoyed better living conditions. 99 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 15. 100 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, p. 219.

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This entire situation altered during the final advance. Engineer units tended to remain in one place for a month or more during long periods of static trench warfare. They could carry out a regular program of work and rely upon a predictable and established system of supply. This changed with the advent of more mobile operations, however, and the strain on engineering units increased accordingly. Field companies and pioneers followed the infantry closely in an attack, for example, and their work was invariably tiring, difficult and dangerous.101 Whereas previously engineers had primarily constructed and maintained trenches, they now had to ensure that a suitable operational ‘infrastructure’ was in place to maintain attacking momentum and this meant liaising closely with heavy artillery and transport units, in addition to the infantry.102

The work of the 5th Pioneers provides a good example of the difficult work undertaken by engineering units during the advance. Their preparation for 8 August was thorough and complete. Using aerial photographs, large-scale mosaics of each unit’s proposed area of work on 5th Division’s front were constructed prior to the attack. Unit officers and NCOs were then given enough time to study them and consider ‘various knotty points’, including likely problem areas on roads. Companies of the 5th Pioneers moved forward in small groups close behind the infantry when they advanced in the second phase of the attack at 8:20 AM, and quickly set about their work.103 When it was completed, the companies camped at the most convenient spot, thereby avoiding the need for a long march to and from the rear and minimising the inevitable prospect of fatigue.104

Subsequent operations during August saw the 5th Pioneers constantly on the move, along with their equipment and supplies. Its headquarters moved seven times in the last three weeks of the month, with a longest stay in any one area of just eight days.

101 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 579. 102 Author unknown, History of the 11th Field Company Australian Engineers, War Narratives Publishing Coy, London, 1919, p. 38. 103 A small reserve of Pioneers was left behind in case of unanticipated problems 104 ‘CO’s Report’, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/17/30, App. 1.

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Its companies moved even more frequently.105 The strain on front-line engineering units near Péronne in early September was obvious, with all field companies, pioneers, tunnelling companies and attached Army Troop companies employed in work at Brie, Eterpigny or Péronne itself.106 The terrain also presented its own challenges. Once past Péronne, the 5th Pioneers had to construct a corduroy road of beech slabs for about 1,000 yards from the bridge at Eterpigny to the Péronne-St Quentin road but the steep river valley made it difficult to ensure the road did not exceed the maximum allowable grade of 1 in 20.107

After nearly a month in the line, the 5th Pioneers spent a fortnight in back areas before returning for the operation at Bellicourt on 29 September, where they were placed under the command of CRE Corps Troops. The battalion expected this operation to be similar to those of 8 August and therefore they pushed forward with their road-making duties almost immediately after the attack by the 27th and 30th American Divisions had commenced. The men made good progress at first and almost reached Bellicourt before encountering heavy enemy fire and strong fighting parties that had not been mopped up by the Americans as they passed. According to one battle report, at this point “the pioneers threw away their shovels and set lustily to work with rifle and bayonet – an employment not less congenial and equally well understood.” The 5th Pioneers captured 160 German soldiers and helped to clear Bellicourt, but suffered more than 60 casualties in the process. The failure of the infantry to reach their objectives on the first day meant that the Pioneer companies were often drawn into combat and could not then carry out their allotted labour tasks for the operation. Nevertheless, various engineering units in the area ensured that roads forward to the line were maintained in a sufficiently serviceable

105 ‘CO’s Report for August 1918’, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/17/30, App. 1. The headquarters of 11th Field Company, working with 3rd Division north of the Somme, changed twenty times during August and September. Author unknown, History of the 11th Field Company Australian Engineers, War Narratives Publishing Coy, London, 1919, p. 38. 106 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 196. 107 ‘Work Report’ for Month of September, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 14/17/31, App. 15. The 8th Field Company, also operating with 5th Division, reconnoitred nearly 80 miles of roads and tracks east of the Somme in the first week of September.

296 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering condition throughout. 108

The 1st and 2nd Australian Tunnelling Companies played a dangerous and vital but mostly unheralded role in the Australian advance. Because the speed and nature of operations meant less need to construct fewer dugouts and defences than in previous times in the war, the tunnellers were put to other work. They were tasked instead with helping to repair roads and bridges, inspect enemy dugouts, reconstruct railways and wells, and construct new divisional headquarters. The Germans also left mines and tank traps in thoroughfares as they fell back during August, and tunnelling companies were tasked with searching for and clearing such devices.109

Operating with 5th Division on the right of the Australian line on 8 August, the 2nd Australian Tunnelling (AT) Company helped to clear 14 mines that had been left on roads in the area. It also investigated numerous German dugouts, which were described as ‘a very inferior type with practically no head cover.’110 All men in the Company who could be spared on 9 August were attached to the 4th Canadian Railway Battalion and for the next ten days assisted with the reconstruction of the railway between Villers-Bretonneux and Marcelcave. On 19 August, the company took over work from the 1st AT Company by constructing dugouts for the heavy artillery in preparation for the attacks four days later. This work was soon discontinued, however, because the depth and speed of the advance meant that the guns had to be moved forward constantly to keep up. An ambulance at the head of a convoy transporting the 22nd Battalion’s RAP forward towards Cléry On 28 August passed within a few inches of one of 10 large mines planted along the Villers- Bretonneux–Péronne road for a distance of some 400 yards.111 Demolition charges were removed from mines along all bridges and transport routes in the Corps area

108 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 14/17/31, App. 15. 109 The 1st AT Company operated in the northern sector of the Corps front, while the 2nd AT Company operated in the southern sector. 1st Australian Tunnelling Company War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/16/22. 110 2nd Australian Tunnelling Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 16/3/21. 111 ‘Monthly Report by RMO of 22nd Battalion’, Assistant Director of Medical Services War Diary, 2nd Division, August 1918, AWM4 26/19/32, App. 25. The mine was noticed only because recent rain had washed away the soft dirt used to cover it.

297 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering in the last week of August, including some 41 charges on the Chaulnes–Péronne railway on the eve of 5th Division’s attack at Péronne.112

There were fewer mines and tank traps on the Australian front east of the Somme, as roads leading out of Péronne were often metalled and the haste of the German retirement left little time to place them down. The problem then largely dissipated for the first weeks of September as the Australians moved rapidly into the open country beyond, although this changed once again as they neared the strongly prepared positions of the Outpost Line. A German prisoner stated that a road in front of 13th Brigade had been heavily mined, for example, and had several gaps in the wire, something confirmed subsequently by aerial photographs. Any suggestion of German traffic being diverted from a transport route suggested it was also to be avoided.113 On 28 September, on the eve of the attack on the Hindenburg Line, the 1st and 2nd AT Companies were put in charge of all advanced roads in the Corps area. The companies immediately established their own Road Report Centres in the same location as the Corps Advanced Road Report Centre at Templeux-le-Guerard, which had been opened by the Fourth Army’s CE on that same day.114

One of the most important tasks undertaken by engineers during the advance concerned the bridging of rivers and waterways. The speed of Australian operations during August was determined largely by the capacity of engineers to construct crossings for loaded vehicles and heavy artillery to push forward in support of the infantry.115 The Royal Engineers erected more than 330 stock-span or rolled-steel joint bridges during the Hundred Days, which was nearly twice as many as during the previous four years of fighting. These were capable of bearing heavily laden motorised transport and tanks, but did not even exist before 1916.116

112 2nd Australian Tunnelling Company War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 16/3/21. 113 49th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/66/29. 114 1st Australian Tunnelling Company War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/16/22. 115 See Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 10. 116 Anonymous, The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War 1914-1919 – Bridging, W & J Mackay & Co. Ltd, Chatham, 1921, p. 33. See also Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days: The End of the Great War, Viking, London, 2013, p. 108.

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Engineers supporting the Australians in 1918 were better trained and more experienced than previously, and bridging teams profited from advancing over terrain familiar to the British from the fighting of previous years. Indeed, the pursuit of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line in early 1917 served effectively as an unintentional ‘dry run’ for these operations.117 In 1915, the BEF’s Geographical Section commenced a detailed topographic study of northern France. Potential sources of road stone and water supply had been identified, as well as rivers requiring bridging in the case of an advance. The BEF’s CE had made estimates of future bridging material and it was accumulated in anticipation. The Royal Engineers (RE) produced a pamphlet in 1917 entitled, The Organisation of Bridging Work. Drawing upon the experience of bridge construction over the Somme during the previous year, this was issued to all RE units and was revised repeatedly in the final year of the war.118

The BEF’s supply system from ports to the army area meant that heavy steel spans held at the RE Base Park at Le Havre could be delivered to railheads at 72 hours’ notice. Other bridging stores were held in army RE parks. The army and corps Bridging Officers were responsible for arranging delivery to the most convenient railhead for the bridging site.119 This allowed the Australian Corps’ Chief Engineer, Foott, to anticipate engineering requirements and speed up the process by ordering bridging material accordingly during the advance.120 Bridging units of Fourth Army usually had ample material at their disposal, most of which had been accumulated during the previous three years.121

The Australians operated on both sides of the Somme during August but were forced to cross it at various points and this required the rapid construction of

117 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 11. 118 Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 11. 119 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, p. 206. 120 ‘III Corps Engineering Work During Operations August-September 1918’, TNA WO 95/451. 121 J.W.S. Sewell, ‘The Supply of Bulk Stores in War’, The RE Journal, 35, 1922, p. 24, cited in Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 20.

299 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering bridges.122 A good example of work undertaken during this period was that of 3rd Pioneer Battalion on 10 August, following the capture of Chipilly Spur.123 Two high, level steel lattice bridges were already in place in the area before 8 August. One was the original civilian bridge and the French army built the other early in the war. The Germans had blown up both during the fighting but there was a sufficient length of the military bridge still in place to span the abutments of the civilian bridge. That was re-constructed in just four days and all necessary loads could then cross the river, except tanks. The ingenuity of the British engineers on the Australian front was also apparent a few weeks later when the Chipilly bridge was replaced by a more permanent structure and the parts re-erected on 30 August at Bray.124

The Australian Corps benefitted enormously from improvements in British bridging techniques during the war. These included the development of Hopkins and Inglis bridges, both of which could be adapted on site to meet the requirements of a particular situation.125 The Inglis was erected more rapidly than the Hopkins but the latter was capable of carrying heavier loads, including tanks. Both bridges had flexible designs and used standardised materials that simplified construction and enabled re-use elsewhere as necessary. This versatility was important, as parts for the Inglis bridge in particular were expensive and slow to manufacture. It was also easy to transport, light enough to be carried by just two men and required little specialist training to erect. The 84-foot Inglis bridge at Vaire was re-used by 3rd Pioneers at Bray in mid-August (see Figure 7.1 overleaf) before being dismantled and replaced by a more permanent structure with rolled-steel joist spans on piles. The parts of the original bridge were then re-used once again by 216th Army Troops (AT) Company to cross the Selle River in October.126

122 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 197. 123 Chief Engineer Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/4/8. 124 (Author unknown), The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919: Bridging (published by the Secretary, RE Institute), W & J McKay & Co, Ltd, Chatham, 1921, p. 35. 125 Chief Engineer Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/4/8. Invented by Sir Charles Inglis in 1909, an Inglis bridge consisted of pyramidal bays and was designed to carry troops in single file over a distance up to 120 feet. 126 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, pp. 230-237.

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Because Fourth Army’s advance in August prioritised speed above all else, it was more important for infantry to cross a river quickly than for that crossing to be made substantial. As we have seen, temporary bridges were constructed rapidly and sometimes employed remnants of an original structure, in order for troops and light supply loads to cross as soon as possible. The crossings were then strengthened to carry supplies and even field guns, often within 48 hours. When the line was sufficiently advanced, the crossings were improved for larger guns and heavy loads to cross. The speed of work on the Australian front was certainly impressive. For example, the 3rd Pioneers began to build bridges across the Somme canal near Suzanne on 27 August and these were carrying wheeled traffic the next day.127

Figure 7.1 The Inglis Bridge that carried the Bray-Chuignolles road over the Somme at Bray, September 1918.

IWM Q 46944

127 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, pp. 204-205.

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Troops, vehicles, and light artillery also utilised cork floating bridges and pontoons for rapid passage across waterways. These were another British wartime innovation and available early in 1918, with supplies of material estimated for the rest of the year and distributed to armies accordingly. Floating bridges were constructed easily and enabled troops to make a crossing relatively quickly. The floats could then be carried forward and re-used, although they were heavy to transport when wet. An example of the versatility and value of these bridges to the Australians was the construction of one by the 14th Field Company (AIF) behind the line in the final week of August. It was moved a few hundred yards along the river after completion and put in place near Biaches on 27 August, allowing infantry units to cross safely to the eastern bank.128 For the attack at Péronne four days later, the 15th Brigade utilised a bridge that had been repaired by the 15th Field Company using cork piers and duckboards to join two footways on either side of the river, about two hundred yards apart.129 The frequent use of floating bridges by Fourth Army during the advance resulted in a shortage of cork bridging material towards in late September but this had little impact on Australian operations, which ended shortly thereafter.130

Field guns moved forward on horse-drawn limbers, while heavy artillery employed motorised transport, but crowded, shell-damaged, dilapidated roads and a shortage of vehicles often made the going slow and difficult. And while the rapid repair of bridges by engineers enabled infantry to cross, considerable reinforcement was required before all of the guns could do likewise. Building new bridges took time and the difficulty of pushing guns forward rapidly during this stage of the advance meant targets of opportunity were often missed. By the time guns were in place to fire onto known hostile positions, German artillery in those locations was likely to

128 5th Australian Divisional Engineers Headquarters War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 14/11/28. The construction of temporary floating bridges was another innovation by the British during the war, and by no means unique to the Australians. See Phillips, ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation’, p. 22. 129 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, p. 121. 130 Chief Engineer Australian Corps Operations Files, 11 to 24 Sep 1918, AWM4 26/473/6

302 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering have already withdrawn.131

Nowhere on the Australian front was bridging more important than in the vicinity of Péronne and Mont St Quentin, where the Somme flowed directly across the Australian line of advance. Because the town was situated for the most part on the eastern side of the Somme and the river wound through it, bridging work carried out by field companies and pioneers did much to facilitate 5th Division’s operations in that area be allowing troops to enter the main body of the town.132 This haste of the Australians to move troops across the river did result in some poorly constructed temporary crossings, and operations were affected as a result. On 2 September, 60th Battalion crossed the river near Péronne over a hastily constructed bridge under machine gun and artillery fire from Germans on the heights. The first company across made its way into the town and established contact with 59th Battalion before the crude bridge gave way and left the two supporting companies stranded back on the other side. The crossing was re-established only by the ‘energetic efforts’ of Lt Cooper’s C Company, allowing the advance to continue.133 All soldiers had to pass over this narrow footbridge, however, which resulted in a bottleneck. This resulted in soldiers being exposed to enemy fire and resulted in heavy casualties.134

Successful bridging work by 2nd Division’s field companies did relieve the infantry of a long, tiring march prior to the attack at Mont St Quentin, however. The GOC of 6th Brigade, James Robertson, instructed the 6th Field Company on 30 August to construct a crossing at Buscourt, between Ommiécourt and Feuillères, which involved traversing 500 yards of marshland. The engineers utilised a floating bridge and a pre-existing, repaired trestle footbridge. The work was completed by midnight on 30 August and significantly shortened 6th Brigade’s approach on the morning of

131 ‘Counter-Battery Report 29-30 August 1918’, Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29, App. 6. 132 5th Australian Divisional Engineers Headquarters War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 14/11/28. 133 ‘Personal Narrative by Major T Kerr, 60th Battalion Operations 27 August to 6 September 1918’, 60th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/77/32, App. 9. 134 ‘Narrative of Operations Carried out by 58th Battalion in the Vicinity of Péronne on September 2, 1918, by Lt EA O’Malley, MC’, 58th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/75/32.

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31 August. Meanwhile, the 5th Field Company repaired the bridge at Feuillères, two miles west of Cléry, by evening on 29 August. This complex bridgehead involved two crossings over the canal and four more across the river itself. The Germans left charges in the remnants, however, and Cléry remained under direct observation until Mont St Quentin was finally captured five days later. Nevertheless, there was a sufficient quantity of material in the area to enable the 5th, 6th and 9th Field Companies to strengthen this crossing in the subsequent days. Vehicles and field guns could now cross and adequate supply and artillery support for the infantry, while the road through Feuillères became a major artery in the Australian advance.135

Congested roads in back areas and the lack of a bridge capable of bearing heavy guns near Mont St Quentin were instrumental in shaping 2nd Division’s attack, however. Because the Somme marshes were at least 1,000 yards wide on either side of the river, the heavies were drawn up to the west bank but could not move across to the other side without strong and stable crossings. Determined to hold the bridgeheads, the Germans had well-sited machine guns and artillery on high ground to the east that targetted crossing points. The bridges at Ommiécourt were also destroyed and unexploded mines were still attached to the remnants.136 The only alternative was for the heavy artillery to detour all the way back to Corbie to cross but Monash’s unnecessarily urgent desire to press the advance at this point made that impractical. Rather than waiting for the guns to be brought across, therefore, the fighting on Mont St Quentin took place without close heavy artillery support.

Only three Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) heavy batteries had crossed the river in time for the attack, and plans had to be hurriedly re-arranged. Instead of providing a covering barrage for the attacking troops, the shortage of forward guns and uncertainty about 5th Brigade’s positions saw a concentrated bombardment placed upon selected targets in German back areas. The details were not settled until

135 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, p. 62. 136 Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, p. 62.

304 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering midnight, only hours before the guns were to commence firing at 5:30 AM on 31 August. The start time for the infantry was pushed back to 6:00 AM to ensure units received orders in time but the vital element of surprise was lost.137 The 5th Brigade subsequently had to endure some of the hardest close-quarter fighting of the entire advance.

On the afternoon of 31 August, 20th Battalion called for a light barrage along the line so that the infantry could adjust and re-establish contact with sections on the left. The guns were still being moved forward, however, “and very little effective fire was obtained.”138 As a result, the 5th Brigade’s line and forward positions remained ragged and exposed to enfilade fire from the Germans. Artillery supporting the 6th Brigade’s attack on 1 September should have crossed the river by noon on 31 August but still had not done so by 3:30 PM. The infantry was at the very limit of the guns’ range and 6th Brigade’s commander, James Robertson, informed Rosenthal that his men could not advance. Rosenthal ordered Robertson to move forward nevertheless in the mistaken belief that the artillery would catch up.139

While Australian units were responsible for many of the engineering tasks on the during the advance, they were well supported by British army troops and RE companies operating in the Corps area. The 648th Field Company RE, and the 146th, 238th and 567th Army Troop Companies RE, were placed temporarily under the command of the Corps at various times during the advance. In addition, the 216th AT Company, 574th AT Company, 648th Field Company, and 254th Tunnelling Company did excellent work after coming under Australian command at Amiens.140

137 Robertson (CO of 6th Brigade) would have preferred a 5:30 AM attack. 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38, App. 8. 138 20th Battalion War Diary, August 2018, AWM4 23/37/37. 139 Michele Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne 1918, Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, Newport, NSW, 2012, p. 42. 140 The value of these companies to the Australians was recognised by Foott, for example, who noted that in “the bridging of the Somme Canal above Corbie some excellent results were obtained in very good time by the 216th and 574th Companies.” Chief Engineer Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 14/4/8.

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The experience of British bridging companies and their value to the Australians during the advance is obvious in the work of the 216th AT Company.141 Commencing on 12 August, this company operated on the Australian front for twelve days straight. During that time, it worked to clear the Somme canal of the vast accumulation of floating and sunken debris, repaired lock gates and replaced wrecked bridges with new ones (including some capable of carrying tanks). It also repaired masonry abutments of the wrecked wooden bridges at Gailly, constructed five Hopkins bridges from 16’ to 60’ and capable of carrying all loads (including tanks), cleared bridge sites and removed canal debris at Bouzencourt and Gailly.

After the Australians passed Suzanne north of the Somme in the final week of August, the 216th AT Company RE constructed more heavy bridges so that tanks and heavy artillery could be employed on both side of the river.142 Another British unit, 574th AT Company RE, constructed a tank bridge on the Péronne-Flamicourt road in early September, and salvaged a 60-foot crossing over the Somme by 26 September. This latter crossing materially assisted preparation for operations against the Hindenburg Line a few days later.143

This work was particularly strenuous, something evident in the description by one British soldier working on the Australian front:

We have been so busy that I have been glad to get to sleep every spare minute we have had. … We are getting glorious weather and it is a good thing too for we are having to rough it pretty badly. … My word, you should see the battlefields; they are absolutely beyond description: nothing but ruin desolation and death for miles and miles.… The heat has been most trying at times but we have been at the riverside all the time so we have been able to bath twice most days, and of course we get plenty of drinking water, which is a great trouble in many parts.…

141 Drawn mainly from the area of Nuneaton in Warwickshire, the 216th AT Company was used primarily as a specialist heavy steel bridging company during the advance. However, they also built at least one pontoon bridge and, occasionally, wooden bridges. Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, pp. 236-237. 142 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, p. 204. 143 (Author unknown), The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-1919: Bridging (published by the Secretary, RE Institute), W. & J. McKay & Co, Ltd, Chatham, 1921, p. 36

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I often thought no conditions could be worse than the seas of water and mud we saw last year but I think they are little worse than the blinding dust we get now: the slightest breeze or movement stirs up clouds of it. We breathe it, eat it with our food, and drink it in our tea, we walk about on it all day and sleep on it at night; not a particle of our body escapes. One thing I am pleased to say I never felt healthier or stronger in my life, so no doubt the open air does not hurt one.144

An engineering unit charged with bridging work transported the material by lorry from the railhead to the site. This worked while railheads were close to the line but the distance increased with the advance. For example, the 216th AT Company used the railhead at Longeau, three miles east of Amiens, on 12 August. Its railhead had moved only four miles east to Vecquemont by 5 September, however, despite the fighting line advancing some 20 miles during that time. Because lorries and other vehicles were in increasingly short supply, it was necessary to salve material and use captured German dumps for work to progress.

Despite the many challenges faced, there were remarkably few significant operational hold-ups on the Fourth Army’s front because of a lack of transport or engineering supplies until the final weeks of October.145 It was also during that month that the construction and repair of supply and transport routes slowed considerably. As Fourth Army pushed east of Beaurevoir Line, the chalky, rolling farmland gave way to more low-lying terrain broken by streams, rivers and canals.146 A great deal of bridging work was required, which was time-consuming and demanded large quantities of stone and other building materials to be transported by rail, which placed even more pressure on an already overtaxed system and overworked labour force. The Germans placed delay-action mines in embankments and bridges to destroy lines east of the Hindenburg Line, compounding the difficulties faced by the British.147 The speed of the advance in the final month of

144 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, p. 205. 145 Sambrook, With the Rank and Pay of a Sapper, p. 208. 146 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 83. 147 British tunnelling companies made systematic searches to uncover these mines but many remained undetected. The timing of the delay could be considerable: one mine that exploded on 9 November between Chaulnes and

307 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering the war also meant rail lines were often constructed hurriedly and this increased the number of accidents.148 The systems began to break down on the Fourth Army front thereafter, primarily because of difficulty pushing railheads forward as advance progressed beyond the Hindenburg Line. They were on the brink of collapse when the armistice was finally signed in November. The Australian Corps was spared these problems, of course, as its five divisons were by that time all resting at Abbeville.

The BEF’s supply and transportation systems were initially ill-prepared for the scale and nature of operations on the Western Front. Following its rationalisation during 1916 and 1917, and subsequent fine-tuning in 1918, however, it was in fact ideally placed to support Haig’s limited but powerful attacks during the late summer and autumn of 1918, and that enabled him to switch the points of general offensive at short notice.149 This happened to coincide with the final successful advance by the Australian Corps – which fed directly into the Fourth Army’s logistics organisation – and does much to explain its operational success. Historians have long ignored the vital and effective role played by supply and transport units, as well as engineers, tunnellers and bridging teams when examining the performance of the Australian Corps during August and September 1918. Without their crucial support, Australian operations would simply have ground to a halt regardless of the quality and experience of the front-line fighting men.

As Monash noted, “The rate of our advance was controlled almost as much by the speed with wich main and secondary roads could be made practicable for traffic as by the degree of resistance offered by the enemy.”150 With that in mind, the achievements of the Australian Corps during August and September 1918 owed a great deal to the complex, reslient and pragmatic supply, transport and engineering systems that supported it, and which were essentially British in nature. These ‘sinews

Marcelpot could not have been laid any later than 27 August. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front, 1914-1918, pp. 439-440. 148 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 83. 149 Brown, British Logistics, pp. 204 & 237. 150 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 173

308 Chapter 7 Supply, Transport and Engineering of war’ were crucial to the operational effectiveness of the Australian Corps at all levels, and do much to explain its success on the battlefield.

The return to mobile operations in August severely tested its logistics organisation but excellent work by individual staff officers and engineers, a long spell of dry weather, and the forced German retirement all across the Fourth Army’s front, ensured that the front line was never short of supplies and material to any significant extent, and that operational tempo was maintained. The supply and transportation systems on the Australian front began to groan under the weight of the advance as the month drew on, however. Continual congestion on roads was the greatest problem. Transport units struggled at times to keep up with the demand for vehicles, which were often in need of repair, and much of the heavy artillery was soon well- behind the line and effectively out of action, unable to find clear routes forward.

The greatest challenge facing the transport and engineering units during the advance involved crossing the Somme River in the vicinity of Péronne and Mont St Quentin at the end of August, and attacks in that area had to go ahead without the support of heavy artillery. The rains also returned in September and many roads became almost impassable. This would have hindered mobile operations but the advance necessarily slowed at that point in preparation for the careful, deliberate attacks at the strongly defended Outpost and Hindenburg Lines. This in turn allowed sufficient time for the Corps to organise its supply and transport systems, and the final operations by the Australians were not unduly affected as a result.

Although not without problems, the ability to move troops and equipment continually to and from the front line enabled the Australian Corps to maintain pressure on the Germans throughout the advance. As with so many aspects, the Australian Corps operated during its final two months in the line in 1918 at the absolute edge of its operational capability during the war.

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CHAPTER 8

FIREPOWER

In Australian Victories, Monash described the features of the set-piece battle in 1918:

Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, but in nothing so much as in the employment of what I have more than once referred to as ‘set-piece’ operations. The term is one which should convey its own meaning. It is the direct result of the great extension, which this war has introduced, of mechanical warfare. It is a ‘set-piece’ because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of interesting developments. … In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully silenced by our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, nothing can happen, except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly and methodically across the ground until it reaches the line laid down as the final objective. Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for 80 to 100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery programme is ended the battle is either completely won, or to all intents and purposes completely lost. If the barrage for any reason gets away from our Infantry, and they are relegated to hand to hand fighting in order to complete their advance, the battle immediately assumes a totally different character, and is no longer a set-piece affair.1

In light of this, the Australian Corps operation at Hamel on 4 July 1914 has long been synonymous with the advent of a modern integrated weapons system, in which infantry, tanks, artillery and planes worked closely in concert to overwhelm the enemy’s defences. In fact, many authors had claimed that Monash himself had finally unlocked the secret to breaking the stalemate on the Western Front and produced a

1 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 226-227.

Chapter 8 Firepower blueprint for the Allies to win the war.2 Having considered the nature of small-unit weapons and tactics within Australian battalions in Chapter 2, this chapter will address examine the employment of large-scale firepower on the Australian front during the final advance. What was available to the Australians in this regard, in what quantity, and how effectively was it employed? And had Monash and his Corps really developed have a modern ‘winning formula’?

Artillery was the dominant feature of offensive operations on the Western Front in 1918.3 Commanders on both sides recognised its essential role and understood that infantry, cavalry and tanks became easy prey for enemy machine guns and field guns if they advanced without sufficient artillery support.4 The central role of artillery can be seen in the increasing scale of its use during the war. The BEF possessed fewer than 500 guns and howitzers in 1914 and few heavy pieces.5 It had nearly 6,500 guns and howitzers in France by the end of 1918, however, including more than 2,200 heavy guns.6

Artillery was employed in a variety of ways in 1918. It provided protection for formations as they advanced, prevented German counter-attacks, ‘searched’ likely German assembly areas and poured fire onto areas across which the enemy had to move.7 Artillery ‘counter preparation’ also involved a number of tasks. It provided ‘counter-battery fire’, something carried out primarily by the heavy guns. It also put down ‘harassing fire’, in which artillery fired shells to a depth of 1,500 yards east of the ‘SOS’ line, with heavy guns targetting the area thereafter. Finally, ‘annihilating

2 See, for example, Peter FitzSimons, Monash’s Masterpiece: The Battle of Le Hamel and the 93 Minutes that Changed the World, Hatchette Australia, Sydney, 2018. 3 Chris McCarthy ‘Queen of the Battlefield: The Development of Command, Organisation and Tactics in the British Infantry Battalion during the Great War’, Ch VIII in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds), Command and Control on the Western Front, p. 173. See also J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, Military Press Ltd, Oxford, 1989; or Sanders Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War, Farnham Ashgate, 2013. 4 Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. 5 The first six divisions of the BEF were all equipped with a battery of 60-pounders, which were classed as a heavy gun. 6 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 5, p. 595. According to Edmonds, the British went into the field in 1914 with 486 guns and howitzers; on 11 November 1918, the BEF possessed 6,437 guns and howitzers (exclusive of anti-aircraft artillery and trench mortars, including 2,211 medium and heavy guns. 7 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52; Royal Artillery, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/4/16.

311 Chapter 8 Firepower fire’ saw the greatest possible fire concentrated on particular sections of front at relatively short notice.8

German defensive policy in mid-1918 was to hold ground in depth by arranging artillery and machine guns systematically to provide the main resistance. Few British attacks were therefore made without close artillery support.9 According to Boff, 186 of the 202 (92%) Third Army attacks between 8 August and the Armistice employed close artillery support.10 The figures are similar in Fourth Army. Of the 114 attacks launched by brigades of III Corps during August and September 1918, 110 (96.5%) had artillery support. The brigades of the Australian Corps engaged in 69 individual actions between 8 August and 5 October, with 66 (95.7%) enjoying close artillery support.

While this heavy reliance on artillery helped to facilitate the Corps’ success on the battlefield, it also placed inevitable limits around the scope and tempo of its operations. Certainly, and despite its obvious effectiveness, the need to employ artillery on a large scale was not conducive to a swift mobile campaign based on deep and prolonged advances into enemy territory. “All attempted time-tables were controlled by our Artillery requirements,” Monash wrote, “both the assembling of the necessary guns – often drawn from distant fronts – and the accumulating of the requisite ‘head’ of ammunition to see a battle through, were processes whose duration could only be very roughly forecasted.”11 Guns had to be moved forward rapidly once operations were underway to ensure sufficient protection during the subsequent phases, and some 500 to 600 rounds of ammunition had to be collected and stored in gun-pits prior to any major attack. All of that required time and labour, and it also placed enormous demands upon the rail and transport systems.12

8 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52; Royal Artillery, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/4/16. 9 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 515-516. 10 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 145. 11 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 153. 12 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 153.

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Because hostile artillery was expected to be the ‘chief menace’ to Fourth Army’s advance on 8 August, two-thirds of the heavy guns on its front were employed in counter-battery work.13 They targetted German gun positions, detachments and ammunition dumps, something made possible by a host of scientific developments that occurred within the British Army during the war.14 Enemy targets could be located precisely and accurately by a variety of means in 1918, including sound ranging, flash spotting, aerial photography, improved mapping techniques and trigonometrical surveying.15 Gunners made adjustments for differences in temperature, air pressure, wind, barrel-wear and even variation between batches of shells.16 Artillery had made the transition during the course of the war from an art to a science.

This meant that British commanders in 1918 (including Monash) had the means to protect their troops with accurate supporting fire and the capacity to reduce or even eliminate the danger posed by enemy guns by employing effective counter-battery fire.17 The ability to deliver shells accurately from the outset also precluded the need for a preliminary bombardment. The effects were two-fold. First, it meant economy of ammunition expenditure. Second, the force-multiplying element of surprise denied the Germans crucial time to organise defences or arrange retaliatory fire.18

The massive employment of effective artillery fire was integral to the Corps’ success at Amiens on 8 August. The Australians had the support of 18 brigades of field artillery, as well as nine brigades of heavy artillery, four six-inch batteries, one 12-

13 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52. 14 Brigadier General, I ANZAC Heavy Artillery and Headquarters, Australian Corps Heavy Artillery, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29. 15 Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Western Front 1914-18, The Royal Artillery Institution, London, 1986, p. 260. For a detailed examination of the development of intelligence gathering on the Western Front, see Jim Beach, Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916-1918, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. 16 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 102-103; Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days: The End of the Great War, Viking, London, 2013, pp. 33-34. Prior to an operation in 1918, batteries ranged their guns behind the line by firing at a series of wired screens, establishing respective muzzle velocities and correcting directional errors. 17 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 293-294. 18 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52.

313 Chapter 8 Firepower inch howitzer battery and four anti-aircraft batteries.19 In combination with the 4.5- inch howitzers and 13-pounders, these guns fired more shells on average than those supporting the British or Canadian Corps on either side.20 The impact of this massive weight of shell was magnified by the unexpected suddenness of the onslaught and that fact that it was directed onto a German defensive line comprising only roughly dug trenches in many places, with few communication trenches and no significant dug-outs.21

The British almost certainly overestimated the number of guns opposite Fourth Army on 8 August.22 A battery identified previously but inactive in the week prior to the attack was still considered to be in position unless aerial photographs clearly demonstrated otherwise. German guns were often well concealed, however, which made such ‘negative evidence’ difficult to obtain.23 The British estimated that there were 680 German guns opposite Fourth Army, including some 530 in the ‘zone of operations’. The locations of about 500 were identified and 450 were captured intact on the first day alone. Not many escaped the onslaught.24

The effective silencing of German guns is also evident in the fact that some 70% of all Australian casualties treated on 8 August had rifle and machine gun wounds, while only 27% suffered from shell wounds. Conversely, a high percentage of German prisoners captured on that day had received shrapnel wounds, which points to the efficacy of British gunners.25 Because so few German shells fell in the Australian

19 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52. The total of 672 18-pounders equated to one for every 22 yards of front. 20 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52. 21 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 15. 22 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29, App. 6. 23 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29, App. 6. 24 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52. 25 ‘Official Report of the DMS Fourth Army 8 August 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. The GOCRA of Fourth Army, Charles Budworth, explained the success of artillery on 8 August. He believed that the element of surprise was crucial. So, too, was a permanent corps system with a well-defined artillery policy and a clear plan. Excellent preliminary arrangements by British Q staff, which included locating accurately German gun positions, enabled British artillery to neutralise hostile fire. Budworth also acknowledged the ‘energy and zeal’ of the gunners, particularly in the early stages of the battle. Finally, he recognised the ‘excellent spirit of co-operation’ between the artillery, RAF, observation groups, sound-ranging sections and workshops in assisting the infantry both before and during the operation. Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52.

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Corps area after 5:40 AM, the infantry and tanks advanced relatively unmolested.26 Figure 8.1 shows the barrage map for the 7th AFA Brigade on 8 August. It included 40 lifts at intervals ranging from 2 minutes to 4 minutes, which was fairly typical of barrages put down during the advance.

Figure 8.1 7th AFA Brigade Field Artillery barrage map for 8 August 1918.27

Effective artillery support once operations were underway demanded a flexible, decentralised approach. For 4th Division’s part in the operation on 8 August, artillery groups were decentralised to independent but co-ordinated brigade control under the tactical command of their respective commanders. This was, according to one Australian officer, “essential in open warfare.”28 Groups were then reformed on

26 Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, p. 290. 27 7th Australian Field Artillery Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/35/22. 28 4th Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/48/29, App. 65.

315 Chapter 8 Firepower the final objective, and the artillery assumed a defensive role during the consolidation phase.

Despite its central contribution to the success of 8 August, artillery support for the Australians in the following days was often hurriedly arranged and poorly co- ordinated. The initial speed and depth of the advance meant that guns were soon miles behind the line. Field guns could be moved forward reasonably quickly but heavies often took days to follow. It required time and resources to stockpile a sufficient supply of ammunition at gun-pits, while communication lines had to be established between newly located headquarters and the exact position of the foremost troops determined before plans could be finalised.29

Regardless of an infantry unit’s training and combat experience, attacking without close artillery support usually led to poor results. The downhill advance by 46th Battalion on the left of the Australian line on 8 August was initially relatively straightforward but heavy German machine gun fire made it difficult to progress up the far side of the valley. The guns behind the Australians had practically ceased by that time and, in the words of one soldier, “it was very difficult work to get on without their support.”30 In the event, only a lack of resolve on the part of the German defenders in that area (many of whom remained in their dugouts) saw the positions overrun.31

The two brigades of 5th Division advanced on 9 August in a hurriedly improvised operation with minimal artillery support. Compelled to go forward in the place of 1st Division troops still making their way to the line, and in light of the previous day’s overwhelming success, one company commander in 15th Brigade believed “the Boche had no stomach for close-quarters fighting” and that many who surrendered were “panic stricken and incapable of fighting”.32 He convinced his men

29 Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, pp. 344-345. 30 46th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/63/32, App. 18. 31 ‘Operational Report by CO of C Coy’, 16th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/33/34, App. 5. 32 Lance Corporal M Liddy (C Coy), 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM 23/76/31, App. 10.

316 Chapter 8 Firepower therefore that both artillery and tank support were unnecessary. His company made some headway initially but German machine guns in Vauvillers soon held up 8th Brigade’s advance on the left. Progress was possible only by outflanking and rushing German positions, with the Australians suffering heavily as a result.

It was not enough simply to provide a barrage. For the infantry to have the greatest chance of success, it had to be sufficiently powerful, well-timed and well-placed, given the terrain and German positions opposite. Monash described the general principles underpinning an effective barrage:

The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular leaps, at regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, and incapable of alteration once the battle has begun. Should the rate prove too slow and the Infantry could have advanced more quickly, it cannot be helped, and no great harm is done. On the other hand, if there be any risk of the barrage rate being too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen minutes are often introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry line, or any part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch up.33

While these principles certainly appear sound, the execution of barrages on the Australian front was not always so precise. For example, the barrage supporting 1st Division’s operation at Lihons on the afternoon of 9 August was described as “wretched – scimpy (sic) and without sting”. It landed more than 800 yards away from the jumping-off trenches and was “completely useless.”34 This left the infantry exposed to heavy German machine gun fire and suffered badly as a result. The field guns provided an ‘excellent’ barrage for the 1st Division’s attack on 10 August but the 100-yard lifts every three minutes were “rather too fast … for the condition of the ground which was a maze of trenches.”35 Many strong points remained untouched and hard trench fighting ensued. The barrage supporting 6th Brigade’s

33 Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 226-227. 34 ‘Narrative of Operations 9th-11th August 1918: Deductions and Recommendations’, 6th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/23/33, App. 24. According to Bean, the advance by 2nd Brigade up a long, bare slope during this phase of the operation “strongly reminded the older soldiers of the brigade's famous attack near Krithia in Gallipoli on the 8th of May, 1915.” Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 634. 35 'Report on Operations Carried Out by 1st Australian Division on the 9, 10 and 11 August, 1918, Culminating in the Capture of Lihons' 1st Divisional War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/42/43, App. 10.

317 Chapter 8 Firepower failed operation at Herleville on 18 August came down on time and landed 200 yards ahead of the infantry, as planned. It was spread too thinly to deal effectively with German machine gun posts disposed ‘chequer-wise’ in the forward defensive zone, however, and the attacking troops were exposed to heavy enfilade fire. The depleted companies made some initial progress but in the end the attack failed miserably.36

Despite the experience of Australian gunners and the attention given to the problem of inconsistent firing caused by excessive wear on barrels, ‘shorts’ were still relatively common during the advance. This was due to a combination of factors, including the rushed nature of many operations, the need to keep guns in action for as long as possible, problems of visibility for FOOs caused by smoke, mist or bad weather, and also the difficulty of communicating with batteries once an attack was underway. The advance by 15th Brigade on 8 August went smoothly until 8:50 AM but troops became “rather indignant at the erratic shooting of our artillery, many shells falling short at this stage.”37 The problem was reported but two guns nevertheless continued to fire short, hampering the advance.38 The barrage arranged for 40th Battalion’s afternoon attack at Bray on 23 August “was not one of the best that has been given us and very many shorts were fired.”39

The problem persisted throughout the advance. In the final Australian attack of the war, at Montbrehain on 5 October, 6th Brigade followed a barrage described later as “very ragged, scattered and thin”.40 Its volume was increased by 30% after two minutes but many shells still fell short. “The ragged firing of the barrage made it very difficult for our troops to move up close to it,” noted the Brigade’s commander, James Robertson, “and in consequence we suffered many casualties from the enemy barrage which was mainly an enfilade one from the south-east and kept pace with

36 ‘Operation Report No. 4: Operations of the 6th Australian Infantry Brigade on 18/8/1918’, 2nd Division War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 1/44/37, App. 61. Prior to the attack, the three companies of 22nd Battalion, in the centre of 6th Brigade front, held a 1,000-yard line. They comprised only 30, 24, and 36 men respectively. The fourth, in reserve, had 40 men. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 720-723. 37 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30, App. 8K. 38 15th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/15/30, App. 8I. 39 40th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/57/29. 40 6th Brigade War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/6/38, App. 22.

318 Chapter 8 Firepower our troops as they moved forward.”41 In this instance, the reason for the short firing was not necessarily due to wear and tear on the gun barrels. Instead, it was because a number of batteries had only been brought into action the previous night and had no opportunity to register their guns.42 The barrage was also notable for the slow rate of its advance. It remained on the start line for 6 minutes, before moving forward at 4-minute intervals. This in itself might explain why ‘shorts’ apparently hit some men. Used to more a rapid rate of advance, it is quite possible that they moved ahead too quickly and walked into it.43

Attacking in daylight against well-sited, determined defenders was difficult at the best of times but even more so if the enemy was given time to organise effective artillery counter-fire. On 9 August, 2nd Brigade advanced up the long glacis slope towards Lihons. A battery of mobile 18-pounders was pushed forward to deal with German guns on the ridge but all were quickly put out of action, along with the 14 tanks assigned to the operation. This left the Australian infantry to advance without close artillery support against concealed machine gun posts and well-sited German guns firing over open sights. Every movement was observed and officers suffered particularly heavily at the hands of snipers. The 2nd Brigade made only limited progress, with the 8th Battalion alone losing 223 of its 706 men.44

While problems did occur during the advance, the provision of effective artillery support for attacks was often the decisive factor in an attack. Once 15th Brigade’s attack on 9 August stalled, it arranged for heavy artillery to be put down at 12:45 PM. The initial barrage lacked sting but a subsequent request from the line saw it intensify and creep forward after five minutes. The effects were immediate and telling. “The artillery fire completely rattled the enemy for the greatest number of

41 6th Brigade War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/6/38, App. 22. 42 ‘Report on Operations October 3rd to 5th, 1918’, 2nd Division War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/44/39, App. 14. 43 ‘Report on Operations October 3rd to 5th, 1918’, 2nd Division War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 1/44/39, App. 14. 44 8th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/25/44, App. 5. Official casualties in the 8th Battalion on 9 August were 12 Officers, 202 Other Ranks, and 9 men missing, believed killed or gone to the rear unobserved by the RAP.

319 Chapter 8 Firepower them were soon in full retreat with our men chasing them,” reported one soldier in 60th Battalion. “A large number came running forward with hands in the air. In this short space over 100 prisoners were taken in the battalion’s sector and a number of light and heavy MGs abandoned by the enemy.”45

The proper placement and rate of a barrage during an attack was crucial. Too close or slow, troops might walk into it; too distant or fast, enemy machine gunners might retain a free hand on the battlefield. As one Australian commander reported in August:

The line for the re-opening of a barrage is best arranged between Infantry Brigade and Artillery Brigade Commanders, and should allow a liberal safety margin on account of uncertainty as to exact location of infantry. This barrage should dwell for at least 5-10 minutes before lifting, so that infantry all along the line may get under it.46

Well-organised barrages on the Australian front usually followed a fairly predictable pattern perfected by the British during the previous two years. It can be seen in 1st Division’s attack on 23 August. The artillery commenced firing at 4:45 AM in the pre-dawn light. The opening barrage landed 200 yards in front of the start line and rested there for three minutes to enable troops to move in behind it. It then made three 100-yard lifts at two-minute intervals before slowing to three-minute intervals as far as the halt line in Froissy Valley. It sat there for 15 minutes, protecting the infantry as troops reorganised for the second stage of the advance. It then began to move once again up the eastern slope of the valley in preparation for the infantry’s assault on Froissy Beacon itself.

Not all barrages fired on the Australian front conformed to this pattern, however, which points to the Corps’ tactical flexibility. The most complex arrangement took place on 11th Brigade’s front south of the Somme on 11 August. Two standing

45 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31. 46 1st Brigade War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/1/37, App. 11.

320 Chapter 8 Firepower barrages put down a curtain of fire that ran parallel to the advance on either side of the infantry attack. The three infantry companies were positioned one behind another and moved like ‘pistons down a cylinder’ behind their own creeping barrage along the channel created by the two flanking barrages.47 The arrangements worked well and the attack was successful. On 27 August, 11th Brigade moved forward behind a barrage that ran diagonally to the line of advance. Again, the attack was successful.48

For 14th Brigade’s attack in the streets of Péronne on 2 September, field artillery placed down a hurricane bombardment on selected locations expected to offer significant resistance to the advance, while guns supporting 7th Brigade’s attack at Mont St Quentin later that same day fired along three designated ‘lanes’.49 In this latter operation, the individual barrages advanced at rates corresponding to those supporting the divisions on either side. With 14th Brigade attacking on the right and the British 58th Division on the left, 7th Brigade arranged for three-minute lifts in the right lane, four-minute lifts in the centre lane and five-minute lifts in the left.50 This complex arrangement proved instrumental in the infantry’s success.

By 1918, artillery shells were designed for a range of purposes. A typical barrage on the Australian front during the advance employed 50% shrapnel shells, 25% 106- fuse high explosive (HE) shells and 25% 101-fuse (delay or non-delay) HE shells.51 Barrages also often included 10% smoke shells, as recommended by SS 135.52 Not only did the smoke obscure attackers from defenders, it helped advancing troops determine the barrage line so that they did not walk into it, or find themselves in the

47 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 701. 48 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 776. 49 ‘Report on Operations 31 August- 2 September, 1918’, 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/14/30, App. 1; 7th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/7/37. 50 7th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/7/37. 51 Shrapnel shells were effective on all terrain, including heavy and shell-pitted ground, and particularly against enemy troops with little cover. They did not have the power or demoralising effect of HE shells, however, and it was difficult to ensure the height of the shell-burst. The 101-fuse employed in HE shells was suited to hard ground that did not slope severely, and against well-entrenched troops. It was less effective in soft or broken ground but infantry could move close behind a barrage employing non-delay fuse shells without undue difficulty. ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens, August 8th, 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM, 20537/52 52 SS 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, p. 22.

321 Chapter 8 Firepower midst of the searching barrage beyond. Smoke was used to close out the German guns on Froissy Beacon during the first phase of 1st Division’s attack in the Chuignes valley on 23 August, while 3rd Division’s artillery north of the river placed smoke screens on Bray spur and across the mouth of Chuignolles valley for the second phase. Meanwhile, aircraft overhead also dropped smoke bombs and heavy artillery fired on selected targets behind the German lines.53 This sophisticated and substantial use of artillery helped to ensure the attack was successful despite strong, well-placed opposition in difficult terrain and only limited tank support.

The shift from static to more mobile warfare in August provided a stern and novel test for the artillerymen. It was both physically and mentally taxing but the prospect of victory was a powerful motivator. This was evident in the observation by the commander of the 7th AFA Brigade, which operated for the month north of the Somme:

August gave the brigade it’s [sic] first opportunity of putting into practice it’s [sic] early training at Larkhill in offensive open warfare. After a long spell of trench warfare minor mistakes were made at first but these were soon rectified, and towards the end of the month batteries had become quite proficient at this new mode of warfare. The operations called for great endurance on the part of both men and horses, the former displaying splendid qualities of courage and cheerfulness on all occasions. August, 1918, will long be remembered as the greatest month in the history of the Australian Corps, when it’s [sic] five divisions combined together to reap the full results of the hard and wearisome fighting astride the Somme since April.54

The challenges facing artillery officers in fast moving operations were certainly significant. The exact location of forward infantry positions was also often uncertain, there was often insufficient time to make the necessary arrangements, or there simply might not be enough forward guns. The initiative of quick-thinking local commanders was therefore essential. German field guns and machine guns

53 1st Division War Diary, September 1918 AWM4 1/42/44, App. 4. 54 7th Brigade AFA War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/35/22.

322 Chapter 8 Firepower positioned on Froissy Beacon and in Marly Woods held up 1st Brigade’s attack on 23 August. A battery of the Royal Horse Artillery designated to assist in the exploitation phase pushed forward to a hill north-west of Chuignolles but communication with the infantry was only possible by mounted orderly and it proved slow. A forward observer with the 49th Battery recognised the problem and quickly directed three batteries to fire onto German positions. The 298th RFA Brigade arrived at 8:30 AM and, after establishing contact with 10th Battalion’s commander, Wilder-Neligan, began to shell the heights. Enemy retaliation lessened considerably and the Australian infantry was able to progress.55

During the pursuit in August, gunners supporting the Australians had the ability to locate their guns on captured high ground, which often gave them excellent observation over German defences. As the Australians approached the Somme canal at the end of the month, a battery of the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) pushed through the village of Barleux near Péronne and situated itself at the head of the valley, from where it could shell German troops and wagons at the railway station. The commander of the 5th Brigade RHA later described it as “the best shooting I have ever had against targets of every description”, both north and east of the river.56

As we saw in the previous chapter, congested roads and transport problems created enormous challenges for artillery units attempting to keep pace with forward units and an advancing line. This was evident in the speed with which guns could be moved forward and across the Somme River, which placed constraints upon Australian operations at the end of the month. The 2nd Division’s attack at Mont St Quentin in particular highlighted the difficulty of having “to procure unity of action at short notice”.57 Artillery brigades were grouped under single command but there was only limited staff available to manage the extra units, and the signal sub-station could not maintain effective communication with them. Some batteries had to fire

55 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 755. 56 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 788. 57 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38, App. 8.

323 Chapter 8 Firepower up to 3,500 yards ahead of the infantry’s foremost locations, while others fired up to 2,000 yards in front of the infantry line east of the Péronne-Bouchavesnes Road.58 The 23rd and 24th Battalions crossed more than 1,000 yards of open ground without close support and were exposed to direct machine gun and artillery fire. Men had to rush from shell hole to shell hole, which resulted in heavy casualties.59

The volume of artillery support provided on the Australian front during the advance was formidable and central to the Corps’ success. Nearly 1,100 guns supported the attacks by 1st and 3rd Divisions on either side of the Somme on 22 and 23 August, including some 700 field guns and howitzers, which fired 79,034 rounds in 24 hours.60 This was a rate of 3,300 rounds an hour and more than 1,100 tons of shell fell onto the German line. An additional 426 heavy guns fired nearly 29,000 rounds during the same period at a rate of 1,200 an hour, comprising more than 1,700 tons of shell.61 Indeed, the artillery expenditure on Fourth Army’s front throughout August was extraordinary. It included more than 1.5 million 18-pounder shells, 300,000 60-pounder shells, and 20,500 6-inch shells. Meanwhile, 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers fired an additional 800,000 rounds, and 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers fired 100,000, while 12-guns fired 2,000.62

The volume of artillery fire on the Australian front in September was even more imposing. The field guns supporting 1st and 4th Divisions at the Outpost Line on 18 September fired 127,767 rounds between them in just 24 hours. This was 1,876 tons of shell at the remarkable rate of more than 5,300 rounds an hour. Heavy artillery fired 25,630 rounds (1,453 tons of shell) during the same period or nearly

58 2nd Division War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 1/44/38, App. 8. 59 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 375. 60 A total of 1,086 guns of all calibre supported the operations by 3rd Division, 1st Division and British 32nd Division (then under Australian Corps command). The field artillery included more than 500 18-pounders and 13- pounders, as well as 200 4.5-inch howitzers and 60-pounders. Royal Artillery, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/4/16, App. 16. 61 The heavy artillery comprised 194 6-inch howitzers, 60 8-inch howitzers, 28 9.2-inch howitzers, six 12-inch guns, one 12-inch gun, and one 14-inch gun. The exact number of rounds fired by heavy artillery on the Australian front in that 24-hour period was 28,797. Royal Artillery, Australian Corps War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/4/16, App. 16. 62 ‘Ammunition Expenditure’, Fourth Army Records, Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52.

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1,100 shells an hour.63 Figure 8.2 is a diagram of the barrage plan across the Australian front for the attack on 18 September. It provided for more than 50 ‘lifts’, which was ten more than used in the first phase on 8 August (see Figure 8.1), at intervals ranging from 2 minutes initially to 4 minutes in just over four hours.

Figure 8.2 Barrage map for attack at the Outpost Line on 18 September 1918.64

63 Royal Artillery, Australian Corps War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 13/4/17, App. 14. 64 1st Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM 4/23/1/38, App. 48.

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For the operations at the Hindenburg Line ten days later, 1,044 field guns and 593 heavy guns covered the Fourth Army front and fired 1,299,467 rounds from 26 September to 4 October.65 That was a daily rate of nearly 117,000 rounds of field artillery (4,900 an hour) and 45,600 rounds of heavy artillery (1,900 rounds an hour) for eight days.66 For the entire month of September, Fourth Army fired more than 1.5 million 18-pounder shells, 207,000 60-pounder shells, 20,500 6-inch shells, 375,000 4.2-inch howitzers shells, 440,000 6-inch howitzer shells, and 61,000 8-inch howitzer shells, in addition to its other guns, light and heavy.67 Those imposing figures in themselves do much to explain the Australians’ achievements during that time.

While effective artillery support did much to pave the way for Australian success, it is important to recognise that British units provided much of it. Ten of the 18 field artillery brigades on the Australian front on 8 August were British, for example, as were all nine RGA brigades, the four 6-inch guns batteries and the single 12-inch gun battery. Artillery supporting 2nd Division’s celebrated operations at Mont St Quentin in early September included two British brigades of heavy artillery and seven brigades of field guns, four of which were British.68 Two of the four field artillery brigades supporting 3rd Division’s attack at Bouchavesnes on 31 August were British, as were two of the four supporting 5th Division’s attack at Péronne on 1-2 September. Because the Australian Corps integrated so seamlessly into the BEF’s tactical methodology by that stage, that there was no obvious way to determine whether the artillery support in any particular operation was provided by Australian or British units.

65 This total comprised 934,487 rounds of field artillery and 364,980 rounds of heavy artillery. ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Attack on the Hindenburg Line, September 29th, 1918’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52. 66 The field artillery on the Australian Corps front on 27 September comprised: 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisional AFA; 25th and 58th Divisional FA; 12th Army Brigade, AFA; and 65th, 84th, 96th, 104th, 108th and 150th Army Brigades, RFA. In addition to these field artillery units were 11 brigades of heavy artillery. 67 ‘Ammunition Expenditure’, Fourth Army Records, Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52. 68 The four British formations supporting 2nd Division at Mont St Quentin were: The two brigades of heavy artillery were 9th and 51st Brigades, RGA. Field artillery was provided by: 5th Army Bde, RHA; 16th Army Bde, RHA; 298th Army Bde, RFA; 14th Army Bde, RFA. The three Australian formations were: 4th and 5th Brigades, AFA; and 3rd Army Brigade, AFA.

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Furthermore, the Royal Garrison Artillery provided all heavy artillery support on the Australian front during the advance. This was because the Corps’ own heavy artillery remained in Flanders throughout 1918 and took no part in the Australian operations on the Somme.69 Each British corps was responsible for advancing the heavies under its command and keeping enemy transport arteries and bridges under constant fire.70 British heavies carried out a range of important tasks, including wire cutting, longer- range harassing fire, targetting lines-of-communication (including roads, tracks, bridges, villages, woods, valleys, trenches and billets) and troop movements, counter-battery fire, counter-preparation fire (including assembly points, command posts, machine gun posts and working parties) and the targeting of enemy supply dumps. In the 48-hours from 12 to 14 August, three British heavy brigades fired nearly 20,000 rounds into German back areas before being disengaged and “used upon such targets of opportunity as the tactical situation disclosed.”71 On 24 August, the 160th Siege Battery RGA registered successfully upon German wire with the help of the No. 29 Balloon Section, RAF. The battery then cut two lanes through the wire to assist the Australians in their subsequent advance.72

According to one captured German document, British counter-battery fire destroyed 13% of guns opposite Fourth Army during August.73 Montgomery informed Monash in late August that, “the loss or destruction of any such [heavy] guns is a matter of minor importance in comparison with the destruction which may be caused to the enemy.”74 The impact of artillery fired on the Australian front during August in particular was clearly evident in the large number of German lorries, cars, wagons, horses and men that had been struck by heavy shells and were

69 This was the Australian 36th Heavy Artillery Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Siege Batteries. For a discussion of 36th Heavy Artillery Brigade operations during the war, see Peter Burness, ‘The Big Guns’, Wartime, Issue 26, 2004. 70 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/437/6. If a particular target lay on the counter- battery boundary, both corps were instructed to engage it. 71 Brigadier General, I ANZAC Heavy Artillery and Headquarters, Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29. 72 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/2. 73 ‘Australian Corps News Sheet (Extracts from Allied and Enemy Press compiled from Press cuttings supplied by the Australian Wall Records Section and Other Sources)’, 59th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/76/32 App. 19. 74 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/437/6.

327 Chapter 8 Firepower strewn across the battlefield, while its effects were magnified by the fact that German defensive positions during the retirement were often little more than shell holes or derelict trenches that afforded little shelter against shellfire.75

There were only few roads the Germans could use to retire their guns as they retreated along the Somme during, however, and those were kept under constant fire by the British with shrapnel and HE shells.76 The British also knew the location of every bridge capable of taking heavy traffic across the river and targetted them with 6-inch guns and 60-pounders “boldly pushed forward for the purpose”.77 The Australians also pushed forward small groups of guns that leapfrogged each other to hasten the pursuit and ensure German lines of communication were continually shelled. The villages of Villers Carbonnel, Barleux, Herbécourt, Péronne, Cléry, Le Forest and Combles were kept under constant fire during this time, and 12-inch and 14-inch guns were directed specifically against Péronne.78

British artillery units also did much to prepare the ground for Australian success at Bouchavesnes, Mont St Quentin and Péronne in early September. The heavy artillery commenced firing on selected targets behind German lines at 5:00 AM on 30 August. The 68th and 5th Brigades RGA engaged active enemy machine gun posts, while the 114th Siege Battery targetted troop concentrations and working parties on roads behind the line, including one group of 100 Germans and another of about 60. The 211th and 168th Siege Batteries fired upon 50 Germans sheltering in a ravine, while heavies “fired upon numerous targets at the request of, and in consultation with the infantry.”79

75 ‘Fourth Army Intelligence Summary 3 September 1918’, TNA WO 157/198; ‘Daily Tactical Report from 3:00 PM on 29 August to 3:00 PM on 30 August 1918’, Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29. 76 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 264. The 106-fuse was employed in order to prevent extensive damage to the road surface that would impede subsequent British requirements. 77 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/437/6. 78 Fourth Army General Staff War Diary, August 1918, TNA WO 95/437/6. On 26-27 August, the 543rd Siege Battery fired 20 12-inch rounds on bridges in the Péronne area. Brigadier General, I ANZAC Heavy Artillery and Headquarters, Australian Corps Heavy Artillery, War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29. 79 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/29.

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While British and Australian artillery fire caused obvious physical damage to German-held territory, it also did much to hasten the disintegration of the enemy’s morale. German regimental histories emphasise the “disorganisation and moral isolation” of defenders during this time, which was probably even greater than British GHQ realised.80 The Germans were forced into a fighting withdrawal during the day but at night the men often had to forego sleep as they fell back into new positions.

The demoralising effect of artillery on the Germans was clearly evident in statements made by prisoners taken during this period. Many of those captured north of the Somme in early September highlighted the heaviness and accuracy of the barrages on the Australian front, as well as the speed with which attacking infantry moved in behind them. With German regiments effectively fought-out and divisions “hopelessly intermixed” during the retirement, no counter-attack stalled the Australians for any length of time. German leaders therefore had little choice but to continue to fall back.81

The Australians also employed captured German artillery during the advance. On 19 August, the 5th AFA Brigade turned three guns against the German lines and successfully targetted an 8.2-inch howitzer position.82 A week later, men in 44th Battalion fired a recently captured German 77-mm gun towards Curlu.83 During fighting by the 14th Brigade on the northern edge of Péronne on 1 September, three privates of the 53rd Battalion brought a German 77-mm gun into action and used it with “considerable effect” against positions on Mont St Quentin to the left.84

80 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 265. 81 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 265. 82 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 13/7/2. These were 8.2-inch, 5.9-inch, and 4- inch German guns. 83 An artillery officer had given ‘an eager crowd’ of men a ‘lightning course’ on how to fire the gun and 1,000 rounds of captured ammunition were put into the German lines, ‘much to their enjoyment’. 44th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/61/23. 84 ‘Report on Operations 31 August- 2 September, 1918’, 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/14/30 App. 1.

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Australians rarely used preliminary bombardments during the advance, primarily because they eliminated the force-magnifying element of surprise. On the few occasions they were used, the effects were usually poor. For the 14th Brigade’s attack at Péronne on 2 September, a preliminary barrage commenced at 5:30 AM (30 minutes before Zero) but the firing was ragged and served primarily to warn the Germans of the impending action. A strong retaliatory counter-barrage landed on Australian assembly positions 15 minutes later and caused heavy casualties, and the attack itself at 6:00 AM was met by withering machine gun fire. Men from the54th Battalion managed to reach the town centre by 8:20 AM but only after violent, isolated hand-to-hand fighting, and problems caused by machine guns sited in houses overlooking the narrow streets.85 It was later reported that the heavy losses significantly outweighed any benefit gained from the preliminary bombardment.86

The respective artillery programs on the Australian front at Amiens and the Hindenburg Line provide a telling study in contrast. Because German positions at Amiens were so poorly constructed and a large number of tanks were available, there was little need for artillery to cut wire or destroy enemy machine gun posts and strong points. The Germans also had divisions in reserve in early August and surprise was therefore necessary to prevent them from moving forward prior to the attack. As a result, there was to be no preliminary bombardment before the attack at Amiens. There was no possibility of strategic surprise before the large-scale British and Australian attacks at the Outpost Line on 18 September, however, or for the operations at the Hindenburg Line ten days later.

Unlike the German defences at Amiens, substantial belts of wire, numerous machine gun posts, concrete emplacements and well-fortified villages opposite the Australians made it necessary to employ maximum destructive force prior to the operation itself. This meant that Fourth Army’s advance had to slow as it

85 54th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/71/32. 86 ‘Report on Operations 31 August-2 September, 1918’, 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/14/30, App. 1.

330 Chapter 8 Firepower approached this formidable system so that there was time for a sufficient quantity of artillery to move forward to support the infantry attack.87

On 26 September, three days before the attack at the Hindenburg Line, a 48-hour preliminary bombardment commenced on the Australian front at 10:00 PM. It included a destructive bombardment by HE shells and an additional 32,337 ‘BB’ gas shells, used by the British for the first time in the war.88 This was the only time during the advance that the Australians included gas in an attack. By this stage, the Germans lacked material to make masks and Monash believed they would not be prepared for this new type of gas. Drawing on lessons learned from the Germans themselves, the gas shells were not dispersed widely; they were concentrated instead on unit headquarters, centres of activity and gun batteries. 89

No attempt was made to destroy the deep tunnels and dugouts in and around the St Quentin Canal during the preliminary bombardment but entrances and exits were targeted, particularly on the day of the attack. Heavy shelling concentrated instead on the strongholds of Bellenglise, Nauroy, Bellicourt and Bony, effectively reducing the villages to rubble. Such was the strength of German defences in the area, however, that the most striking effect of the preliminary bombardment was probably not material but psychological. Defenders were driven into deep shelters and many remained there until well after the infantry attack had commenced.90

Unlike the offensive on 8 August, there was insufficient time to locate every German battery at the Hindenburg Line prior to the attack and the bombardment was therefore intended primarily to destroy the forward defences. Thick wire entanglements were concealed in ground depressions and artificially constructed

87 Archibald Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, p. 150. 88 ‘Fourth Army Artillery in the Attack on the Hindenburg Line, September 29th 1918’, Fourth Army Records, IWM 20537/52. 89 Some 6,336 howitzer and 26,101 18-pounder ‘BB’ gas shells were fired during this 8-hour period. 50,000 of these new gas shells were available. Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 153-154; John Monash, Australian Victories, pp. 255-256. See also Elizabeth Greenhalgh: ‘Australians Broke the Hindenburg Line’ in Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, 2010, pp. 81-82. 90 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 153-154.

331 Chapter 8 Firepower sunken moats, however, which made them difficult to pinpoint.91 The task of wire- cutting was given mainly to 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers, as well as 6-inch Newton trench mortars, but they proved only partially effective. Some lanes were created for the infantry to advance down but much of the wire remained intact.92

The problem of attacking against uncut wire had a long and terrible history during the war but it was nevertheless still evident in the final Australian operations in 1918. While the wire was cut effectively on the right of 18th Battalion’s front on 29 September and A Company reached its objective near Joncourt by 7:15 AM, it remained uncut on the left and fighting in that area was reminiscent of the awful experience on the Somme in 1916. With no tanks to assist, C Company encountered heavy machine gun fire and men had to climb over the wire behind the barrage. About a dozen managed to do so but they lacked Lewis guns and rifle grenades. Close-quarter fighting followed until midday before the German defenders were finally overcome, but only after a neighbouring company commander seeing trouble on his flank moved men across to assist. Although this particular action echoed the fighting of previous years, there was at least one very important difference: the surrender of 200 Germans to the understrength 18th Battalion demonstrates that the enemy at that time clearly lacked the stubborn resolve of their predecessors.93

If artillery was the backbone for Australian attacks during the final advance, machine guns provided the ‘claws’.94 By the time operations commenced in August 1918, every British division (including the Australians) employed machine gun companies as central tactical units and their large-scale use in attacks was commonplace.95 Similar to divisions across the BEF, the four machine gun companies attached to each Australian division had been formed into single battalions in early March 1918,

91 Monash, Australian Victories, p. 256. 92 Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army, pp. 153-154. 93 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918 AWM4 23/35/39. 94 GS Hutchinson, Machine Guns: Their History and Tactical Employment, Macmillan & Co, London, 1938, p. 322. 95 “Notes on Machine Gun Organisation and Tactics”, Montgomery, The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battle of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th, 1918, Appendix J, p. 334-335.

332 Chapter 8 Firepower each comprising 64 guns.96 Machine guns were removed from their parent infantry brigade and placed under divisional control. They were then allocated back to brigades as necessary.

A machine gun battalion commander in mid-1918 was therefore “in a position ‘analogous’ to that of the CRA of a division concerning the artillery.”97 A new company establishment provided for gun crews of eight, which was intended to obviate the need for infantry to be attached as carrying parties. A British General Staff circular issued in April 1918 outlined principles for the employment of machine gun battalions in mobile warfare. It included the principle that “such units (companies and half-companies) as are considered necessary will be placed under the command of Infantry Brigadiers, who will be entirely responsible for their tactical employment.”98

As Figure 8.3 (overleaf) illustrates, forward machine guns usually worked in pairs firing over open sights. In this way, they could cover an advance, protect the troops during the consolidation phase, or break up German counter-attacks. Meanwhile, rear guns were positioned on higher ground and provided barrage fire over the heads of attacking troops, supplementing the artillery.99 They used intensive fire to rake locations such as ravines and woods, as well as enemy approaches, and could engage strong points up to 1,000 yards distant and field guns up to 2,200 yards.100 Four-gun ‘batteries of opportunity’ were also used independently in case an attack stalled or they were needed to harass enemy communication lines and reserves.101

96 ‘General Staff Circular No. 12’, AWM25 721/23. 97 ‘Memorandum, Dawnay to the Armies, 2 November 1918’ E434, JSCSCL cited in Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale, p. 138. 98 WA Carne, In Good Company: An Account of the 6th Machine Gun Company AIF in Search of Peace 1915-19, 6th Machine Gun Company (AIF) Association (incorporating the 2nd Australian Machine Gun Battalion), Melbourne, 1937, pp. 277-278. 99 Machine gun barrages were based on artillery timetables. Hutchinson, Machine Guns, p. 322. 100 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4, App. A2. 101 Hutchinson, Machine Guns, p. 322.

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Figure 8.3 Vickers machine guns arranged in pairs on 13th Brigade’s front on 8 August 1918.102

The importance of machine gun support for the Australians is evident in the scale of its use throughout the advance. The Fourth Army employed 1,422 machine guns on 8 August.103 All three corps used them on that day according to standard practice and orders were usually given as ‘tasks’, which worked well.104 On the Australian front, two companies of forward guns supported 2nd Division’s infantry in the first phase of the attack, while two companies of rear guns supplemented the artillery barrage.105 The rear guns alone fired some 75,000 rounds. To the left, 3rd Division

102 4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/4/4. 103 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 104 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 105 Each machine gun company comprised 16 guns.

334 Chapter 8 Firepower attacked with one company of guns in forward positions and three in the rear. The forward guns assisted in the capture of two German machine guns near Accroche Wood, as well as four field guns and their crews, and an anti-tank gun.106 When 5th Division advanced in the second phase at 8:20 AM, each brigade was supported by one company of the 5th MG Battalion. Packhorses and limbers kept the guns supplied with ammunition belts, which contained 4,000-rounds each.107

Operations on 8 August clearly demonstrated the value of machine guns in providing anti-artillery fire. The companies of the 4th MG Battalion on the left by the river advanced in depth and formed a 3,000-yard defensive flank against German artillery on Chipilly Spur. This helped to neutralise the enemy guns until sufficient Australian field artillery support could be brought forward. “Pre-war teaching on this point was undoubtedly wrong,” noted one British machine gun officer, “as it used to be laid down that machine guns should not take on hostile artillery. On the contrary no opportunity of doing so should be lost.”108

The sheer volume of machine gun fire in set-piece operations during the advance was tremendous and did much to overwhelm the German defences. The 60 Vickers guns of the 3rd MG Battalion fired 420,000 rounds in just three hours during 3rd Division’s operation at Bray on 22 August. Machine guns allotted to battalions for the attack the next day provided close infantry support but the advance stalled in low ground east of Ceylon Wood. Only after the guns were moved back to higher ground was further progress possible, which led one commander to suggest they should have been kept back from the outset.109

The terrain of the Chuignes valley immediately south of the Somme was ideally suited for the employment of machine guns supporting the 1st Division’s attack on

106 The forward guns assisted in the capture of two machine gun nests north-east of Accroche Wood, as well as four light guns and most of their crews, and an anti-tank gun. ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August- November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 107 One and a half companies travelled forward in Mark V* tanks but a number of men were overcome by the noise, heat and fumes. ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 108 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 109 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65.

335 Chapter 8 Firepower the same day. They fired 75,000 rounds of indirect fire and subdued German strongpoints in Herleville Wood.110 The machine gun’s value was not lost on the Australians. “Sections attached to the attacking Battalions proved that the Vickers Machine gun is an excellent weapon in the overcoming of an enemy post,” reported one officer, “especially in regard to the supporting fire given to the infantry in the act of enveloping enemy positions.”111

Close co-operation between machine guns and field artillery was an important feature of Australian operations. Artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOO) called in neutralising or direct-overhead fire from forward machine guns, while field guns placed down shells on hostile batteries.112 The success of this was evident in 40th Battalion’s operation at Bray on 24 August. The artillery commenced firing upon the western side of the village at Zero (1:00 AM). The bombardment crept through the village after five minutes, followed by a machine gun barrage. Machine guns also fired a flank barrage on the northern side of the village, while artillery fired on selected positions to the east.113

Two companies of infantry moved to the north and south respectively, surrounding the village and linking up on the objective line 500 yards to the east. A third company moved through Bray itself and cleared the village before helping to consolidate the objective line. The fourth company carried forward supplies. German machine guns remained active in the north-west corner of the village, however, and hard fighting took place there before the objective line was finally secured by 2:50 AM. Captures included 186 prisoners, three loaded trains on railway sidings, and ammunition and timber dumps.114

110 1st Australian MG Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 24/1/6, App. 5. 111 ‘Report on Operations before Proyart from 21st to 26th of August, 1918’, 1st Brigade War Diary, August 1918 AWM4 23/1/37, App. 1. 112 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 113 These included a ridge to the west of Ceylon Wood and a gully running towards Bray from the north-east. 114 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, pp. 762-763.

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Machine guns were particularly valuable during rapid mobile operations in which artillery could not be moved forward sufficiently quickly. However, the provision of close machine gun support was dependent upon the terrain and nature of the fighting. The close-quarter fighting that took place during 2nd Division’s attack at Mont St Quentin in early September meant that heavy covering fire was out of the question and forward machine guns could not provide their usual close support. A few individual machine gun units did good work, however, reflecting the initiative of their commanders. Lieutenant Edgar Towner employed his four machine guns of the 7th Machine Gun Company on 24th Battalion’s southern flank, for example, as they attempted to bomb their way along a sap. With his guns well-positioned and using field glasses for observation, Towner engaged enemy machine guns whenever they appeared on the parapet and then moved them forward when the Germans eventually retired.115

The Australian infantry had long experience working with machine guns by the time the final advance commenced in August 1918 and could employ a flexible approach in attacks. Mobile attachments of machine guns accompanied the infantry throughout the 5th Division’s operation at Péronne on 1-2 September. “Their powerful fire effect was always a great assistance,” wrote Ellis. “The 5th MG Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Marsden) did excellent work, and its machine guns were used mainly in close support of the infantry instead of being arranged in barrage groups.” It reminded Ellis of the 5th Division’s successful employment of machine guns during the attack at Polygon Wood a year earlier.116

The use of machine guns at the Outpost Line on 18 September illustrates their remarkable versatility and value during fast-moving operations. Two machine gun battalions put down harassing fire on 1st Division’s front between 9 PM and midnight on the night of 17-18 September, helping to mask the noise of tanks as

115 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. Towner and five of his men were wounded in this fighting. Towner was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross. Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 841n. 116 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 356.

337 Chapter 8 Firepower they assembled. The barrage provided by rear machine guns fell 1,200 yards in front of the infantry’s jumping-off line at Zero (5:20 AM), and 800 yards beyond that in the second phase.117 Four rear companies in 4th Division supplemented the artillery barrage by providing supporting fire to the first objective, and then placed down a protective barrage during the 130-minute halt to consolidate. The machine gun two companies in support set off 10 minutes after the infantry and moved to that line to supplement the barrage onto the second objective. Meanwhile, companies of forward machine guns each worked with an infantry battalion and provided close support .118

These arrangements worked well and objective lines were captured quickly. German defences stiffened thereafter, however, and the British 1st Division’s failure to advance left the Australian left flank in the air. This, combined with a lack of close artillery support, resulted in heavy casualties. Progress was only possible if Lewis guns provided covering fire but the men were exhausted and only part of the final objective was secured by 3:00 PM.119 The machine gun companies then received orders two hours later for a subsequent attack at 11:00 PM. Support guns were instructed to move forward prior to the attack and place a barrage down on the final objective line at Zero. Positions were selected from the map and battery charts drawn up. All guns were in place by 9:00 PM following a 4,000-yard advance from their original line, and the infantry attack two hours later was successful.120

While artillery support underpinned the Australians’ success at the Outpost Line on 18 September, the work of machine gunners was equally important. The 128 guns supporting 4th Division on the left the infantry fired 12,750 rounds of direct fire and 342,000 rounds of indirect fire, while those supporting 1st Division fired some 446,000 rounds.121 This was a total of nearly 800,000 rounds fired by just four

117 1st Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/1/7, App. 4. 118 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 119 12th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/12/30, App. 6. 120 ‘Fourth Army Records – Machine Gun Narratives August-November 1918’, Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/65. 121 These were the machine guns of the 4th and 5th MG Battalions. The fire an average of more than 2,750 rounds per gun. 1st Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/1/7, App. 4.

338 Chapter 8 Firepower machine gun battalions. One German prisoner claimed that machine guns caused nearly all of the casualties around him, and that his men were ‘amazed’ by the ferocity of the barrage.122 Between 18 and 21 September, 12th MG Company fired 62,500 rounds from their own machine guns and another 14,000 rounds from German guns captured during the fighting.123 Machine gun support was also integral to the Australian attack against the Hindenburg Line a week later, particularly as artillery support could always not be called on because of the close nature of the fighting. According to Ellis, a constant supply of ammunition was brought forward “by the daring use of pack-horses” and “without machine guns, successes gained might never have been won and could scarcely have been held.”124

The British army had no trench mortars at the start of the war but by 1918 every infantry brigade had a battery of 24 light (Stokes three-inch) trench mortars attached.125 These moved forward with attacking troops to assist in the consolidation phase of operations. They were particularly effective in situations where machine guns or Lewis guns did not have direct line of sight, or if no tanks were available to deal with enemy strongpoints. Australian units therefore did not utilise mortars to any great extent on 8 August because the speed of the advance, open terrain, presence of tanks and lack of determined opposition meant they were not generally required.126

Even when mortars were required and available, infantry officers did not always make use of them and that fact frustrated senior commanders. Companies in 60th

122 ‘Report on Operations September 1918’, 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/4/5, App. A1. 123 ‘Report on Operations September 1918’, 12th Australian MG Company, 4th Australian MG Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 24/4/5, App. A1. 124 Ellis, A. D. The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, pp. 382-383. 125 Medium (6-inch Newton) and heavy (9.45-inch) trench mortars had been re-designated from divisional to Corps troops in January 1918. Medium trench mortars operated in batteries of six, while heavy trench mortars operated in batteries of four. Sheffield, Command and Morale, p. 138. See also Steve Larkins, ‘Virtual War Memorial Australia website’, https://vwma.org.au/explore/units/472, created 2014, viewed 10 October 2018. 126 In Fourth Army, only the Canadians made extensive use of mortars on 8 August (III Corps did not use any). Twelve mobile mortar units advanced with the Canadian infantry. One was knocked out early in the operation but the remaining eleven stayed close to their infantry units. “They engaged numerous machine gun nests, etc., which were holding up the advance and in this way were of the greatest assistance… In every case in which a strong point was engaged by a mortar, the enemy cleared off after a few rounds had been fired.” Rawlinson Papers, IWM 20537/52.

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Battalion failed to use mortars on 8 August, despite a number of opportunities to do so.127 “The use of the Stokes mortar was quite overlooked,” reported one officer in 42nd Battalion following the fighting on 12 August. “The necessity of having some with the advanced platoons was very clearly emphasised with a number of available targets.”128 Mortar teams did see more action in the following days as the advance slowed, the terrain by the river became difficult, and tanks were increasingly scarce. During 3rd Brigade’s operations near Lihons on 10-12 August, one section of the 3rd Australian Light Trench Mortar (ALTM) Battery was attached to each battalion and it dealt with Germans preparing to counter-attack from Crépey Wood.129

Mortars were employed most effectively during the advance in the broken, wooded terrain of the Somme valley in the final weeks of August, as well as in the shattered ruins of Péronne. For the attack by 14th Brigade in Péronne on 1 September, two mortars moved forward with the second wave of troops. They assisted in mopping up a German machine gun nest and the capture of two prisoners, before being withdrawn to defensive positions. On the whole, however, “the country and nature of enemy defences did not allow of a great use being made of LTMs during the advance. This coupled with the difficulties of getting ammunition up rather limited the sphere of usefulness of the Battery.”130

The limitations of mortars in open country were evident during the 1st Battalion’s attack at the Outpost Line on 18 September. Two were attached to the battalion and detailed to the support company, “but owing to the excellent observation and fields of fire available for infantry and lack of good targets for such weapons, they were not brought into action.”131 The battalion commander, Stacy, reported that:

127 Lieutenant C Cookson, OC A Coy, 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31, App. 1. 128 ‘Narrative of Events Concerning Offensive 12 August 1918’, 42nd Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/59/22, App. 5. 129 ‘Report on Operations Near Lihons on 10th, 11th, 12th August 1918’, 10th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/27/34. 130 14th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/14/30, App. 18. 131 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, App. 7.

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the attempt in present fighting to use LTM Batteries is an expense of material and men not justified by results or possibilities of use. If they were needed the small amount of ammunition that can be carried prevents their being of substantial value.132

The manpower shortage often meant a lack of carrying parties, which restricted operations by both trench mortars and machine guns at times during the advance. To address the situation, the commander of 6th Brigade, James Robertson, suggested that one machine gun with a double crew per battalion was sufficient, and those men not involved in firing the gun could carry ammunition. A permanent party of at least six men per battalion would be established for the purpose, although it is not clear that this was ever implemented.133

Even when enough men were available, carrying ammunition forward in the midst of operations was particularly dangerous. According to Aubrey Wiltshire, on the eve of the attack on 8 August, “Corpl. Wigger of our Transport was up forward carting S.A.A. up for Bde and somehow got out into No Mans Land being lost. The 21st post put a bullet through him.”134 The difficulty of getting enough ammunition forward also restricted the use of mortars by 2nd Division at Mont St Quentin at the beginning of September.135 Supply tanks were an obvious means to transport mortars but few were available as the advance progressed. Pack mules were used to carry a mobile reserve of ammunition but many fell victim to artillery and machine gun fire.136

Probably more than any other element of the BEF’s weapons system in 1918, the significance of tanks has been the subject of intense debate. Tanks did not win battles by themselves but they did make winning them easier when used in sufficient numbers. There are numerous references in battle reports to the effectiveness of the

132 1st Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/18/35, App. 7. 133 ‘Operations of 6th Infantry Brigade, August 31st – September 4th 1918’, 6th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/6/36, App. 43. 134 Wiltshire Diary, SLNSW MLMSS 3058/2/21. 135 ‘Operations of 6th Infantry Brigade, August 31st – September 4th 1918’, 6th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/6/36, App. 43. 136 12th Brigade War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/12/31, App. 19.

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Mark V tanks when working closely with the infantry. Unlike the sudden randomness of a bombardment fired from unseen distant guns, the highly visible presence of tanks and, moreover, their ability to specifically target and grind over German positions was particularly ominous and demoralising for the enemy; the prospect of being deliberately crushed to death by one the giant steel monsters unnerved even the most experienced soldiers. The Mark V fighting tank, which first saw action only in mid-1918, was longer, better armoured, and had more firepower and greater manoeuvrability and speed than its predecessor, the Mark IV. It was ideally suited to mobile operations and most effective when working closely with the infantry. While tanks might contribute to an operation’s success, however, it was up to the infantry to ensure it.137

Tanks were at their most effective on the Australian front early in the advance when they were available in large numbers. The speed and mobility of the Mark V tanks gave attacking troops greater latitude and flexibility on the battlefield, and infantry tactics were adapted accordingly.138 Tanks were most effective against machine gun nests or strongpoints when they advanced in light mist or pre-dawn half-light and over open, undulating terrain. These conditions were evident on the Australian front on 8 August and the value of the machines was obvious. The number of available tanks decreased as German anti-tank tactics improved during the advance, however, and there was a corresponding decline therefore in their contribution to Australian operations. Only a handful were on hand to assist in the attacks at the Outpost and Hindenburg Lines in the final weeks of September, for example, and their influence in those battles was limited at best.

Tanks played a central role on the Australian front on 8 August. The 430 machines supporting Fourth Army on that day constituted the most armour ever assembled

137 LHCMA Fuller Papers 1/1. 138 LHCMA Fuller Papers 1/1.

342 Chapter 8 Firepower for a single action during the war.139 Their contribution to the Australians’ success was obvious. During 2nd Division’s advance through Guillaucourt, for example, troops came under fire from Germans in houses and a church tower. Tanks rumbled through the village and fired directly into buildings on both sides of the road, causing Germans to “pour out … and surrender in droves.”140

Whenever a German machine gun position offered resistance on 5th Division’s front, “invariably a tank made straight for the spot and extinguished it.”141 The experience of 59th Battalion reflects this. One company attacking Bayonvillers encountered enemy machine guns on the edge of the village. A tank made for the post and silenced it. On reaching the Blue Line beyond the village, German machine guns halted the advance. Lieutenant Randolph Dunkley ‘gave chase’ to a nearby tank returning from the line and informed its commander of the difficulties. The officer ‘kindly consented’ to ‘about turn’ and made for the machine gun posts, silencing them. Following closely behind, Dunkley’s company reached the Blue Line and consolidated in the old trench system.142

Sergeant James Balding reported after the battle:

Without the aid of tanks it would have been almost an impossibility to advance across the open to Harbonnières, on account of the machine gun and artillery fire we would have otherwise encountered. As it was, practically no resistance was met on with on the first day, and on the second advance the main trouble experienced was from heavy guns beyond the range of the tanks, and machine guns stationed on the flanks outside our sector.143

139 Hugh Elles, Fighting Tanks: An Account of The Royal Tank Corps in Action 1916-1919, Seely, Service & Co. Ltd, London, 1929, p. 170. This figure includes Mark V fighting tanks, Mark V* supply tanks, Whippets, and the 17th Armoured Car Battalion. 140 Downing, To the Last Ridge, pp. 145-146. 141 Ellis, Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 330. 142 ‘59th Battalion AIF Operations of 8th and 9th August, 1918, Narrative by Lieutenant R Dunkley, OC A Coy’, 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App. 10. 143 ‘59th Battalion AIF Operations of 8th and 9th August, 1918, Narrative by Sergeant JM Balding, C Coy’,59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App. 10.

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Dunkley was more effusive:

The Hun does not like the Tank and from what I could see he always came out of his hole and put his hands up before the tank was nearer than 300 yards from him. I consider the work of the tanks in this advance absolutely beyond praise. In my opinion, if we had enough tanks we would go on to Berlin.144

Not only did tanks present a terrifying prospect for the Germans, their presence on the battlefield gave confidence to the Australian soldiers. “The magnificent gallantry of the tanks crews appealed … to the Australian soldiers and no other arm of the Services gained quite the place in the affections of our men that the tank personnel enjoy,” wrote Ellis.145 Harold Binder shared Ellis’s enthusiasm. “In my opinion the operation splendidly demonstrated the capabilities of the tank in open warfare,” he wrote, “and also that despite our period of comparative inaction in trench warfare, our men are still able to fight in the open.”146 The obverse was true for the enemy.147 Machine guns cut down retreating Germans as 2nd Battalion advanced towards Vauvillers on 9 August, while “the tanks, also spitting fire, provided an inspiring sight as they lumbered on, uphill and down dale, completely destroying the morale of the enemy who scuttled away like frightened rabbits.”148

Despite their success on 8 August, the hurriedly planned operations during the exploitation phase meant they were not always available in sufficient numbers or necessarily employed effectively. Only 150 of the 430 machines used on the Fourth Army front on 8 August saw action the next day. That number fell to 85 on 10 August, and just 38 two days later.149 Their absence was keenly felt. Resuming the advance on 9 August, 60th Battalion attacked without tanks or artillery support.

144 ‘59th Battalion AIF Operations of 8th and 9th August, 1918, Narrative by Lieutenant R Dunkley, OC A Coy’, 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31, App. 10. 145 Ellis, The Story of the Fifth Australian Division, p. 332. 146 ‘59th Battalion AIF Operations on 8th and 9th August, 1918. Narrative by Lieutenant HAL Binder, C Coy,’ 59th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/76/31 (App. 10) 147 ‘Summary of Tank Actions from August 8th to October 20th’, TNA WO 95/94. See also Lloyd, Hundred Days, p. 50. 148 Taylor and Cusack, Nulli Secondus, p. 317. 149 There is disagreement over the exact number. Edmonds claims 145 tanks were available on 9 August but Elles cites a figure of 155. Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, p. 87n; Elles, Fighting Tanks, p. 172;

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There was little in the way of German artillery fire but enemy machine guns made progress difficult. “If we had been supplied with a tank, or had artillery support, we would not have been held up five minutes,” one company commander reported.150

Even when tanks were available during the exploitation, the rushed nature of operational planning meant they were not necessarily put to good use. Tanks supporting 10th Battalion’s attack near Lihons on 10 August arrived an hour late and their commanders were uncertain about their specific role in the attack. The first two to arrive were sent into Lihons to mop up and told simply to move up and down the streets continually until the mist lifted, or it was certain there were only a few Germans were left. Meanwhile, two more helped the infantry near Auger and Crépey Woods. One tank was asked to assist 11th Battalion but its commander believed it was too light by that time, making it particularly vulnerable. The order was subsequently cancelled and the tank released.151

The limitations of tanks were increasingly evident during the advance. According to Lieutenant H Smith in 16th Battalion:

The tanks generally are a success, although they are too unwieldy to manoeuvre under direct artillery fire, and too slow. I consider the 14,000 yards advance was too much to be expected from the low-powered engine installed, and the final patrol of too long nature for the personnel inside the tank to stand and still remain efficient. It was particularly noticeable that all ranks on coming out of the machines were incapable of any movement for varying periods up to three and four hours. The tank crews appeared to be more affected by this inertia than our own troops. If the tanks were reasonably cool at the start of the final patrol men could stick two or three hours, but the people who were to do the job would have to be specially trained and in the best of nick. The tank officers and crews, particularly the drivers of these tanks, appeared to me to do all in their power to assist the infantry … In my opinion, bad luck and a few good

150 ‘Personal Narrative of Operations, Captain CH Roberts, OC D Coy’, 60th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/77/31. 151 ‘Report on Operations Near Lihons on 10th, 11th, 12th August 1918’, 10th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/27/34.

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brave 77-mm artillerymen were the causes of the tanks not coming up to my expectations.152

Tanks sometimes ran out of petrol during attacks and it was in increasingly short supply as the line moved ahead of established depots. Tanks also attracted considerable enemy fire, particularly when advancing in broad daylight over flat ground, and this placed any nearby infantry in danger. During 26th Battalion’s operations on 9 August, tanks passed through the attacking troops at 4:15 PM and German artillery poured shells down in the area for about 20 minutes, wounding six of the troops accompanying them. German guns essentially had a free hand as the tanks advanced without artillery support. A 77-mm gun knocked out five of them on the western outskirts of Vauvillers.153

The terrain was another limiting factor for tanks. Disused trench systems obscured by overgrown vegetation made progress difficult and many tanks ditched as they wandered blindly into them.154 They were also restricted by steep ground. Tanks operating with 4th Brigade near the riverside hamlet of Méricourt on 8 August had to alter their course away from the infantry units to which they were attached, in order to avoid the steep, broken ground near the river. They moved instead onto the road near the village but this left them exposed to German guns firing over open sights, and only one made it to the Red Line.155 A number of tanks supporting 1st Brigade on 23 August were knocked out on the open ground in Chuignes valley, while those attempting to climb out of the valley on its north-eastern side found the going too steep and could not therefore assist the infantry assault on Froissy Beacon.156 Even the few that did manage to crest the plateau were instructed to

152 16th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 33/33, App. 6. 153 26th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/43/37. 154 Tank Corps Narratives (August-November 1918), Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65. 155 4th Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/4/35. 156 1st Brigade War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/1/37, App. 1.

346 Chapter 8 Firepower return ‘automatically’ 30 minutes after the main advance finished, in order to preserve them.157

German anti-tank tactics were also increasingly effective as the advance progressed. Tanks operated most effectively in dawn light, mist, or under the cover of a smoke screen. They were particularly vulnerable when sent out in daylight against an alert enemy.158 The tank’s greatest enemy was the German 77-mm field gun, which accounted for 90% of tank casualties on 8 August.159 German artillerymen became adept at firing at tanks over open sights, particularly if the machines slowed down or paused for any reason.160 The gunners were instructed to prioritise the destruction of tanks, with anti-tank ‘forts’ established in forward battle zones.161 The most elaborate consisted of field guns, machine guns, anti-tank rifles, minenwerfer and even portable searchlights, all arranged in a mutually supporting manner. One captured map showed nine such forts on the Fourth Army’s front in September, in an area only 1,500 yards wide and 3,500 yards deep. Anti-tank rifles operated independently, however, with groups of four to six distributed in depth.162

The employment of tanks in daylight exposed them to hostile fire but operating in thick fog or at night they were, in Peter Hart’s words, little more than “blind, blundering monsters”.163 A tank’s route had to be clearly identified in advance for night operations but they still needed a guide to walk in front. Three tanks supported 10th Brigade’s ill-fated night attack on 10 August, in which Monash was involved deeply in planning. Whereas planes usually flew overhead to disguise the noise of tanks assembling, for that operation the tanks deliberately advertised their approach

157 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 734. 158 ‘Report on Operations of 18th September 1918 by 2nd Tank Battalion with III, Australian and IXth Corps’, IWM 20537/65. 159 Elles, Fighting Tanks, p. 173. 160 Tank Corps Narratives (August-November 1918), Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65 161 One captured set of Germans instructions stated, “The first duty of the field artillery is to keep off the enemy’s tanks. To this all other duties give way.” ‘Annexe to Fourth Army Summary 15th September 1918’, Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries September 1918, TNA WO 157/198. 162 ‘Annexe to Fourth Army Summary 26th September 1918’, Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries September 1918, TNA WO 157/198. 163 Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, p. 335.

347 Chapter 8 Firepower in the hope of demoralising the Germans. Armoured cars of 17th Armoured Car Battalion created a diversion, meanwhile, by racing along the Roman road with their headlights on.164 The plan was remarkably ambitious and men in 37th Battalion received their orders “quietly but with some amazement. After some sardonic smiles, and a few grim jests, preparations were made to move.”165 Bean stated that the tank officers themselves “thought the job was mad.”166

They were right to think so. Heavy enemy machine gun and artillery fire rained down upon the advancing column but the tanks were unable to identify – let alone deal with – the strongpoints in the dark.167 The attack was soon abandoned and Edmonds was scathing in his appraisal:

The operations of the 10th Australian Brigade were a complete failure. The brigadier did not understand the purpose of tanks, and they were put in front of the column and alarmed the enemy. The movement was discovered whilst the long drawn-out columns were still on the Roman Road, and shelling, bombing and machine gun fire forced it to halt. Every time a tank moved there was a renewal of the fire, and eventually the attack was abandoned.168

The Australians never again attacked with tanks at night. Advancing north of the Somme, meanwhile, the troops of 4th Brigade attacked Etinèhem at 11:30 PM on 10 August without tanks and the operation succeeded.169

Tank crews suffered badly from heat and noxious engine fumes generated inside the machines, and were thrown about violently against its hard iron surfaces. “For a tank to be of much use you want a Superman inside it, and supermen are hard to find,” one British officer observed. “It is difficult for any man to co-operate efficiently with infantry when he is locked up inside a safe. Nevertheless, tanks are good things to

164 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 687. 165 McNicol, The Thirty-Seventh, p. 219. 166 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 687. 167 38th Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/55/27. 168 Edmonds, BOH Vol. 4, pp. 131-132. 169 41st Battalion War Diary, August 1918, AWM4 23/58/22.

348 Chapter 8 Firepower have with you, so long as you do not count too much on them.”170 Crews were therefore unable to operate for extended periods. One tank commander stated that his men required at least 48-hour of recuperation after operations at the Outpost Line on 18 September.171

Tanks were an increasingly scarce commodity on the Australian front by September. For the attack against the Outpost Line, the 1st and 4th Divisions had only nine between them, including one Mark V* supply tank.172 Whereas the 16th Battalion attacked with eight tanks on 8 August, the entire 4th Brigade was allocated just three for the operation at the Outpost Line six weeks later, and against considerably more formidable defences. In the event, five of the eight working with 4th Division did reach the objective. They were also materially assisted by heavy rain that fell a few hours prior to Zero (5:20 AM), which dampened the atmosphere and caused smoke in the barrage to hug the ground. Keeping direction by compass, the tanks therefore remained obscured from the German defenders until the very last moment and the element of surprise magnified their effectiveness.173

The psychological effect of massed tanks was also a telling factor against strong defences. In order to deceive the Germans into believing there were more tanks present than was actually the case on 18 September, therefore, ten ‘dummy tanks’ were constructed to ‘operate’ on 4th Division’s front, five with each attacking infantry brigade. Whether or not the ruse would have worked is unknown, as the heavy mist meant they were visible only at a few yards, and therefore proved to be little value.174

For the attack against the Hindenburg Line on 29 September, the 5th Tank Brigade supported the Australian and American divisions in the centre of Fourth Army. The

170 Feilding, War Letters to a Wife, p. 293. 171 ‘Tank Corps Operations Vol. IV’, LHCMA Fuller Papers 1/7. 172 ‘Report on Operations of 18th September 1918 by 2nd Tank Battalion with III, Australian and IXth Corps’, IWM 20537/65. 173 ‘Report on Operations of 18th September 1918 by 2nd Tank Battalion with III, Australian and IXth Corps’, IWM 20537/65. 174 16th Battalion War Diary, September 1918, AWM4 23/33/34, App. 5.

349 Chapter 8 Firepower brigade comprised the 8th Tank Battalion (27 Mark V), 13th Tank Battalion (12 Mark V) and the 16th Tank Battalion (36 Mark V and Mark V*), as well as the 3rd (Light) Tanks Battalion (31 Whippets), the 17th Armoured Car Battalion (10 armoured cars), and one company of 17 supply tenders.175 This total of 133 armoured vehicles was a far cry from the 450 that supported Fourth Army on 8 August against much weaker defences.

Figure 8.4 Mark V tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade moving forward near Bellicourt ahead of the attack at the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918.

IWM Q 9364

175 This was a total of 75 Mark V and Mark V*, 31 Whippets, 10 armoured cars, and 17 supply tenders. Two companies of 8th Tank Battalion were allotted to 5th Division, two companies of 16th Tank Battalion were allotted to 3rd Division, while one company for each division was held in reserve. ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, IWM 20537/65.

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The only crossing point for tanks on the Australian front was the 6,000-yard land- bridge over the St Quentin Canal tunnel, and the Germans naturally concentrated their anti-tank defences in that area. These included anti-tank guns and numerous mines, many of which were planted by the Germans but some were remnants of an old British minefield in the area. In order to counter these, special parties of mine sweepers were detailed to work in front of the tanks as they approached the Green Line. Because of the difficulties encountered by the two American divisions prior to Zero, the tanks had to fight their way to the start line in the first place and the minesweepers were never employed.176

At the same time, the approach of tanks in 5th Division’s sector on the right was hindered by thick mist and heavy German gunfire. In order to preserve the tanks for as long as possible on 29 September, they did not advance ahead of the infantry as they had done on 8 August. Instead, they followed the leading waves of troops and were called on only when necessary. As a result, they proved of little value. Eight tanks supporting 3rd Division were quickly put out of action by German artillery, ditched for mechanical reasons or ran into the mines.177 Three operating with 8th Brigade fell out with mechanical trouble during the approach and two more were soon ditched. When the mist cleared, the remaining machines were exposed to German artillery fire from high ground near Nauroy, and spent most of the day sheltering for protection. Two did help to clear Bellicourt village but German guns then knocked one out and the last succumbed to mechanical trouble.

No further progress was possible until the attack resumed at 3:00 PM. Four of the Mark Vs and eight Whippets supporting 15th Brigade were put out of action within 15 minutes by anti-tank guns near Cabaret Wood Farm.178 Four tanks advanced with the 8th Brigade but shells struck three of them. The fourth made it into the Ricqueval

176 ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65. 177 Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 978. 178 ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, IWM 20537/65.

351 Chapter 8 Firepower ravine before it too was hit proceeding to the rallying point.179 All but one of the tanks working with 11th Brigade on 3rd Division’s front was put out of action. As a result, only 35 of the 75 tanks and armoured cars that commenced the operation rallied at day’s end.180

The events of 30 September were more promising but still problematic. Late on the evening of 29 September, 3rd Division headquarters received orders to mop up the Hindenburg–Nauroy–Le Catelet line to the northern end of the tunnel, including the strongly held village of Bony. Each attacking brigade was supported by nine Mark V and Mark V* tanks. The late arrangements resulted in confusion. Moving forward in the dark to their assembly points and with no time to reconnoitre off- road routes, the tanks were forced onto crowded main roads and the infantry guides assigned to them never arrived. The wet ground had been heavily shelled, which also made the going difficult. Only six of the nine assigned to the 11th Brigade reached the starting point, and just one of those assigned to 9th Brigade.181 Despite being unable to find the infantry units to which they were attached, these seven nevertheless went into action when the attack commenced at Zero (6:00 AM). Despite strong resistance at Bony, all reached their objectives, with six rallying at the quarry east of Hargicourt.182

The limitation of tanks was also evident during 2nd Division’s final operation at the Beaurevoir Line. On 3 October, 11 of the 12 Mark V’s allocated to the attack reached the starting line north of Ramicourt but only after significant difficulty due to German shelling in the areas. According to the battle report, the machines did “tremendous execution with case shot in the streets of the village” but one received

179 ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65. 180 In all, 36 tanks on Fourth Army front were knocked out by direct hits during the day, ten succumbed to mechanical problems, five were ditched, and one struck a mine. ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65. 181 Two of the three tanks assigned to 11th Brigade experienced mechanical trouble and one was ditched. ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 182 The single tank from the 16th Tank Battalion was struck by a direct hit after reaching its objective and did not rally. ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, Fourth Army Records IWM 20537/65. See also Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 1001.

352 Chapter 8 Firepower a direct hit, one was ‘bellied’ on a tree-stump, and three broke tracks.183 The two supporting 18th Battalion were disabled early in the attack, although one did return later in the day.184 It was later reported that tanks were:

not of any assistance in the capture of the first objective. Had they been in close attendance behind the barrage, the wire would have been made passable and the problem greatly simplified on the left flank. It is understood that they had very great difficulties of the ground to contend with.185

Jonathon Boff has shown that artillery-infantry co-operation lay at the heart of British Third Army combined arms method during the Hundred Days.186 The same can be said for the Australian Corps’ operations, with machine guns also playing a crucial role by supplementing barrages and providing close suppressive fire on the flanks during attacks. In particular, the machine gun was instrumental in allowing the infantry to hold and consolidate ground during operations, thereby preventing the inevitable counter-attacks of previous years. Despite their success at Hamel on 4 July and at Amiens a month later, the influence of tanks on Australian attacks throughout the advance is too easily overstated. Although valuable when employed in the right conditions and in sufficient number (and never better than on 8 August), they were too often limited by mechanical and logistical difficulties, exhausted crews and increasingly effective German anti-tank tactics. The tank was still in its infancy in 1918 and would not reach adulthood until the next great European war broke out 20 years later.

It is clear that the Australian Corps did not employ a single ‘winning formula’ during the advance. While the Australians could win set-piece battle after battle during the advance, the question of sustained, open, mobile warfare in 1918 – the long sought

183 ‘5th Tank Brigade Report on Operations with Australian Corps from 29th September to 5th October, 1918’, IWM 20537/65. 184 ‘Report on Operations of 27th September to 4th October 1918’, 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. 185 ‘Report on Operations of 27th September to 4th October 1918’, 18th Battalion War Diary, October 1918, AWM4 23/35/39. 186 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 153.

353 Chapter 8 Firepower after ‘break-out’ – was much more difficult to achieve, partly for reasons related to firepower but also other factors that have been discussed, including manpower, morale, discipline, logistics, and communication challenges. No two attacks were the same, and a variety of firepower and tactical methods were employed. Most were successful, but not all. Typical of formations across the BEF during the Hundred Days, infantry–artillery–machine gun co-operation lay at the heart of the Corps’ operations.

The Australians were very well provided for in this regard and – crucially – had the battlefield experience, tactical expertise and effective support systems available to ensure it was usually employed effectively. This in turn allowed the Australian infantry to overcome the lack of small-unit firepower brought about by the escalating manpower shortage and understrength infantry formations. Despite the Australians’ exalted reputation, there was nothing particularly glamorous about their approach. The tired and weakened Germans were on the ropes by the time the advance commenced and the Australians had the means at their disposal to help to bludgeon the enemy into submission.

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CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to re-evaluate reasons for the success of the Australian Corps during the Allied advance in August and September 1918, its final two months in the line. Instead of playing into the myth of military exceptionalism, which places Monash and the iconic Australian Digger at the centre of the narrative, the study focused instead upon more prosaic but crucial doctrinal, organisational, command and tactical systems that facilitated the Corps’ exploits and shaped its performance on the battlefield. It has redressed a long-standing historiographical imbalance in the process by presenting a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the Australian Corps and its experience during the Hundred Days than has hitherto been the case.

The final advance from Amiens to Montbrehain was one of the most gruelling periods of fighting experienced by the Australian divisions during the war. For two months, the Corps fought a succession of operations across terrain that ranged from open, rolling farmland to the ridges and gullies of the Somme’s heavily wooded and broken river valley, and through the narrow streets and rubble of shattered villages and towns. The Australian divisions undertook operations in daylight, at night, and in all weathers. They launched well-prepared large-scale combined-arms attacks against established defensive positions, as well as numerous smaller improvised operations arranged at comparatively short notice.

Despite its achievements on the battlefield, it soon became apparent during the course of the research that the overall performance of the Corps was in fact strained and uneven. The final advance was no straightforward or triumphal march to victory. It was a succession of bloody, bruising encounters that battered a tired, enervated enemy already on his knees into submission. Instead of launching neat surgical strikes with clinical precision and minimum loss, the Corps had to brawl its way forward using whatever implements were at hand. It used up its final reserves of energy in doing so, however, and bled itself white in the process.

Conclusion

This study has emphasised the fact that fighting is, at its core, a very human experience. While most Great War histories tend to fall into one of two camps – the socio-cultural or the military-operational – this has bridged the gap. It has focused on the character and experience of the Australian soldier in the line, including background aspects such as demography and training, but also the extraordinary strain those pre-war civilian volunteers experienced as they were driven to the very limits of their physical and psychological capabilities. Chapter 1 provided a narrative overview of the Corps’ operations and in the process addressed a number of deeply entrenched myths that have long underpinned the popular reputation of Monash and the Corps during the final months of the war. Rather than being pressed harder than the British and repeatedly asked to do ‘other people’s work’, the study showed that no more was expected of the Australians than was asked of comparable BEF formations, including in particular III Corps to the north.

Chapter 2 examined the myth of the Australian ‘super-soldier’, and demonstrated that Diggers and Tommies in mid-1918 shared a great deal more in common than otherwise. They possessed similar physical traits and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as behavioural norms that were shaped in the main by Anglo-Celtic protestant values and a shared racial and cultural heritage. Australian and British soldiers were imbued with a common imperial worldview, although it was flavoured by a peculiar sense of both national and provincial identity. Australian units did possess a strong degree of fighting spirit in 1918 but so too did BEF formations, and it was derived essentially from the same source: the terrible shared experience of combat. As one long-serving Australian soldier wrote after the war:

What, then, was the inspiration of the Australian Imperial Force? Even the most caustic critics cannot deny the fact that the Australians were first-class fighting men. On what foundations was this battle spirit established? Religion can be discarded. Patriotism? – we were too British for that (emphasis added). Tradition? – what tradition had we? Probably the very lack of tradition made the Australian soldier jealous of the honour of his particular unit. When his battalion or battery had been through the

356 Conclusion

testing furnace of battle, and emerged with general honour and personal pride to the individual, the foundation of his esprit de corps was laid.”1

At its heart, therefore, the Corps was both ‘Australian’ and ‘British’ at one and the same time, neither entirely one nor the other. Therefore, to explain the success of the Corps through a singularly nationalistic lens – no matter how appealing that seems – is naïve and entirely unsatisfactory.

The battlefield experience of the men comprising the Corps in mid-1918 was undoubtedly an asset during the fast-paced operations of the advance. The lack of fresh volunteers by the final years of the war meant that Australian ranks were filled with a comparatively large proportion of long-serving veterans, which in turn meant the average Digger by that time was older, better trained and more battle-hardened than his British counterpart, who was quite likely to be a young conscript. This was important. While British battalions could take more men into battle and suffer casualties without necessarily incurring a significant loss of small-unit firepower, the declining numerical strength of Australian units meant they had to make do with fewer men in the line, which in turn demanded a comparatively high level of combat efficiency. Their long years of training and accumulated combat experience certainly went a long way to achieving it.

While the extensive combat experience of the men comprising to the Corps in mid- 1918 was certainly an asset on the battlefield, it also proved to be also its Achilles heel in a wider sense. This thesis has shown how the strain and privations of army life was cumulative, and that the strenuous nature of the final advance rapidly ground down men’s individual and collective endurance. The heavy losses – particularly in relative terms given the paucity of reinforcements and fresh men – and the relentless nature of operations meant units went into battles increasingly tired and well below strength. This made them prone to chronic levels of absenteeism and ill-discipline, as men reached – and passed – their breaking point. There were instances of whole-

1 Williams, An Anzac on the Western Front, p. 189.

357 Conclusion unit combat refusal and mutiny. The end of the war was in sight but the internal structures of the Corps were fracturing.

Chapter 4 turned the focus away from the front-line fighting men and on to the character and quality of the Corps’ commanders and staff, and their effectiveness in carrying out battle procedure during this strenuous period of mobile operations. It demonstrated that Australian senior commanders and staff officers in mid-1918 shared a great deal more in common with their British counterparts than otherwise. There is no question that Monash’s headquarters was filled by capable professional soldiers who were well prepared to administer the Corps throughout the advance. All had extensive pre-war training with the British army and were thoroughly familiar with its doctrine and procedures. Australian divisional and brigade commanders in 1918 were cut from similar cloth to their equivalents in the BEF and could not claim to be superior leaders in any obvious or telling respect. Indeed, by that time the BEF itself was a far cry from the small professional force that crossed the channel only four years earlier, and the men who administered and led of the fighting formations in the final months of the war were – like the Australians – all proven, decorated, capable battlefield commanders. Australian and British commanders followed essentially the same battle procedure and employed the similar tactical methodology and decentralised control. They had to. Australian success depended after all upon the Corps’ capacity to integrate into the BEF’s systems and apply its procedures and processes willingly and effectively, not otherwise.

In order to explain the success of the Australian Corps in the final advance, we must avoid simplistic explanations that play into cherished national tropes, and look past the iconic image of the Digger in the line. We should instead turn our gaze back to focus on the organisational processes and systems that supported him. This thesis has done that. It has highlighted the vital role played by a range of medical, support and logistics services that underpinned the Corps’ operations but which have been almost entirely neglected by historians. Chapters 5 to 8 all demonstrated that those vital systems – though stretched to breaking as the advance wore on – were able to

358 Conclusion compensate to a large degree for the Corps’ decline in numerical strength, and that in turn enabled the fighting units to operate as effectively as possible on the battlefield despite serious internal problems. There was, however, a limit to this resilience and the Corps had reached it by the first week in October.

By mid-1918, the Diggers and their commanders knew they could depend upon flexible and efficient systems of supply, transport, food, water, communications, engineering and medical support, as well as the provision of substantial firepower, to ensure they had the resources necessary and at hand to sustain them in the field for as long as possible, and to allow them to push on for victory. Like the front-line units, the support units to the rear were stretched to breaking point but proved resilient enough to meet the exacting demands of the semi-mobile battlefield and advancing line for just as long as necessary. The men who comprised these units are the Corps’ unsung heroes.

At a macro-level, the study has drawn the lens back and shown that Australian Corps was successful during August and September 1918 because it operated at a unique and unprecedented juncture in the war. While it is enticing to isolate the achievements of the Australian Corps during this time to bolster a national mythology, it is important to remember that it did not advance in a vacuum. Timing and context were crucial. The Corps’ actions were part of the Fourth Army’s general advance, which was itself only part of a broad Allied thrust across the Western Front in the war’s final months. Following the failure of Ludendorff’s great gamble in the spring, and with vast numbers of American troops arriving daily, the Allies were never better placed to implement a concerted strategy that directed all of their considerable resources effectively in the pursuit of victory. The scaffold for victory was in place.

With that in mind, the study has emphasised the fundamental importance of British units and expertise to the Corps’ operational success. The Australians operated deeply within the BEF’s established military doctrine and structures – not outside or independent of them – and that was fundamental to their operational and combat

359 Conclusion effectiveness. This is unsurprising, given that the AIF’s development during the war was covered in British fingerprints. British DNA defined the Corps’ genetic code, and the blood of the British army still coursed through its veins On a command level, from the staff at Monash’s headquarters down to the divisional, brigade and battalion commanders, the influence of the British army was clear. The BEF’s conspicuous presence was also an important feature on the battlefield, although generally ignored in the national narrative. While Australian field artillery units were responsible for barrages that supported the Diggers, they were often supplemented by field guns and howitzers fired by British units. The British also fired every piece of heavy artillery on the Australian front and every anti-aircraft gun. British crews operated every tank and armoured vehicle that accompanied an Australian attack, as well as every observation balloon and many of the reconnaissance planes and fighters that flew overhead.

The BEF’s organisational structures and support systems were also fundamental to the Australians’ ability to plan and conduct operations but most are, iceberg-like, hidden from view. British railways and rolling stock, as well as British engineers, bridging teams, vehicles, and shipping, facilitated Australian attacks throughout the advance. The Diggers ate food that arrived at the front by way of a complex and well-regulated British distribution system of bases and depots. They employed British weapons, ammunition and technology on the battlefield, as well as British communications systems and hardware. British intelligence-gathering systems ensured the Australians were kept informed of the latest developments across the wire. The Corps’ medical system worked well but was predicated upon the British model and fed into its network of hospitals and convalescent homes. The Corps was an integral component of the British army in 1918, not distinct from it.

While this is certainly a national story in many respects, operationally, organisationally and tactically it is in fact a close study in microcosm of the BEF and its war-winning capability in 1918. The Corps operated only at the very tip of a vast, complex organisation, which possessed the resources and expertise necessary for

360 Conclusion victory. It plugged directly into the BEF’s enormous military machinery and that provided the powerful current necessary to drive its advance.

Not only was the Australian Corps ideally placed to capitalise upon the evolution of the BEF’s war-winning systems and processes in mid-1918, it did so just as the Germans approached the nadir of theirs. The Allies turned to the offensive in August 1918 against an enemy in obvious moral and physical decline, running short of men and supplies, and with illness breaking out within the ranks.2 For the most part, the German soldiers opposite the Australians were not the well-trained, battle- hardened resilient troops that resisted the British offensives of 1916 and 1917. With many of their better-trained and experienced soldiers killed or wounded earlier in the year, the resolve and spirit of the Kaiser’s army was collapsing, as was his home front. The Germans were looking through a window of vulnerability. As tired and short of strength as Australian formations were in 1918, Monash was nevertheless playing with a stacked deck.

In short, Monash received the reins of the Australian Corps in mid-1918 at the absolute pinnacle of the BEF’s wartime learning process. He assumed control of a well-trained, well-organised, battle-hardened formation, and could avail himself of a massive arsenal of firepower, battlefield technologies, doctrines and systems that were simply not available to his counterparts in the BEF even twelve months earlier. At that particular point in the war – and never previously – a range of crucial operational factors coalesced to create the architectural framework and conditions essential for victory. Monash and the Australian Corps caught the king tide of victory as it surged towards the shoreline, and rode it for as long as he possibly could.

Rather than viewing the Australians’ success as the product of a ‘winning formula’, it is more appropriate to think in terms of a winning environment. The Australian Corps under Monash advanced for those two months in 1918 within something of an operational ‘Goldilocks zone’ for the British Army and its allies on the Western

2 Watson, Enduring the War, p. 183 and pp. 230-231.

361 Conclusion

Front. George Barber, the DDMS of the Australian Corps, summed up the situation well after the war when he wrote:

[Monash was] lucky in that the corps was turned over to him as a perfect fighting machine. There was a wonderful spirit of cheerfulness and optimism in the corps when all the troops around us were in the depths of gloom, and we never looked back from this time onward.”3

That does not mean Australian success was simply a matter of blind chance or happenstance. After all, it takes considerable skill, courage and commitment to ride a king tide. By the time Fourth Army’s advance commenced at Amiens on 8 August, the Diggers’ extensive training and tactical expertise meant they were ideally placed to employ the vast arsenal of arms and resources at their disposal, and to seize opportunities that presented themselves on the battlefield. They had been forced to learn rapidly on the job – often by trial and error – and served a long, difficult, often brutal apprenticeship. By August 1918, however, they were seasoned tradesmen and possessed the range of skills necessary to exploit the opportunities that presented themselves.

Monash had every right to proclaim the success of the Australian Corps under his command in August and September 1918, and to lament the lack of public recognition for its battlefield achievements. They certainly deserve to be known and celebrated more widely. It is also important they are explained appropriately, however, and not used simply to buttress a cherished national mythology. While the Australian Corps was undoubtedly a capable, adaptable and experienced formation by that stage of the war, the reasons for its combat effectiveness were more nuanced than is generally thought to be the case. Its success was in fact contingent upon a range of fundamental organisational and operational systems – many external to it – that converged at that precise moment in the war to create the conditions necessary to break the stalemate on the Western Front once and for all, and open the way for the final victory. While Monash rightly extolled the achievements of the Australian

3 Cited in Bean, AOH Vol. VI, p. 211. See also Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander, p. 295.

362 Conclusion

Corps in the advance from Amiens to Montbrehain as ‘Australian victories in France in 1918’, they are more appropriately described as ‘British victories’, but with an Australian accent.

363

APPENDIX 1

Advances by the Australian Corps between 8 August and 5 October 1918

AWM 2018/6/78

APPENDIX 2a

Heights recorded of men with surname Brown, Jones, Smith or Williams killed in 1918 (heights that include a ½-inch have been rounded up).

Height (in) Officers NCOs Men Total % 5’1’’ 0 0 2 2 0.5% 5’2’’ 0 0 12 12 3.0% 5’3’’ 1 2 18 21 5.25% 5’4’’ 0 4 39 43 10.75% 5’5’’ 1 4 39 44 11.0% 5’6’’ 0 8 52 60 15.0% 5’7’’ 3 7 44 54 13.5% 5’8’’ 2 5 35 42 10.5% 5’9’’ 3 9 41 53 13.25% 5’10’’ 2 5 28 35 8.75% 5’11’ 1 4 14 28 4.75% 6’0’’ 0 0 9 9 2.25% 6’1’’ 0 0 2 2 0.5% 6’2’’ 1 0 1 2 0.5% 6’3’’ 0 1 1 2 0.5% Total 14 49 337 400 100%

APPENDIX 2b

Ages of Australian soldiers killed in 1915 and 1918, and comparison with British soldiers in III Corps.

Age Australian soldiers killed Australian soldiers killed III Corps soldiers killed in 1915 and buried in and buried in France and buried in France Turkey between between 1 August – 6 October 1918 1 August – 1 October 1918 ≤ 22 1,348 36.41% 936 25.46% 1,311 58.66% 23-25 848 22.9% 936 25.46% 299 13.38% 26-28 597 16.13% 667 18.14% 215 9.62% 29-31 318 8.59% 444 12.08% 123 5.5% 32 ≤ 591 15.97% 693 18.86% 287 12.84% Total 3,702 100% 3,676 100% 2,235 100%

Commonwealth War Graves Commission Website, https://www.cwgc.org/

365

APPENDIX 2c Religious Affiliation Religion Men with surname Brown, Jones, Smith or Williams killed in 1918 AIF Total Church of England 56.64% 49.22%

Protestant (Other) 27.32% 25.20% (Protestant TOTAL) (83.96%) (74.42%) Roman Catholic 15.79% 19.36% Other 0.25% 6.22% Total 100% 100%

APPENDIX 3 Australian Victoria Cross Winners 8 August – 5 October 1918

Last First Height Weight Place of Rank Age Date Unit Place Enlisted Name Name (in) (lbs) Birth Gaby Alfred Lt 26 8 Aug 28th Bn 5’11¾’’ 170 Amiens Tasmania 1915

Beatham Robert Pte 24 9 Aug 8th Bn 5’9’’ 149 Rosières England 1915

Statton Percy Sgt 27 12 Aug 40th Bn 5’8’’ 171 Proyart Tasmania 1914

Joynt William Lt 29 23 Aug 8th Bn 5’5’’ 152 Chuignes Victoria 1915

McCarthy Lawrence Lt 26 23 Aug 16th Bn 5’7’’ 182 Vermandovillers WA 1915 26-27 Gordon Sidney L/Cpl 27 41st Bn 5’7’’ 126 Bray Tasmania 1916 Aug Cartwright George Pte 23 31 Aug 33rd Bn N/A N/A Bouchavesnes England 1916

Lowerson Albert Sgt 22 1 Sep 21st Bn 5’10 157 Mont St Quentin Victoria 1915

Mactier Robert Pte 28 1 Sep 23rd Bn 5’6’’ 137 Mont St Quentin Victoria 1917 2nd MG Towner Edgar Lt 28 1 Sep 5’11¾’’ 150 Mont St Quentin Qld 1914 Bn Currey William Pte 22 1 Sep 53rd Bn 5’5’’ 132 Péronne NSW 1915

Buckley Alexander Cpl 27 1-2 Sep 54th Bn 5’11½’’ 151 Péronne NSW 1915

Hall Arthur Cpl 22 1-2 Sep 54th Bn 5’10½’’ 140 Péronne NSW 1915 New Weathers Lawrence L/Cpl 28 2 Sep 43rd Bn 5’7¾’’ 144 Péronne 1914 Zealand Buckley1 Maurice Sgt 27 18 Sep 13th Bn 5’7½’’ 140 Le Verguier Victoria 1916 South Woods James Pte 27 18 Sep 48th Bn 5’3 127 Le Verguier 1915 Australia 29 Sep– Wark2 Blair Maj 24 32nd Bn N/A N/A Bellicourt NSW 1915 1 Oct Hindenburg Ryan John Pte 28 30 Sep 55th Bn 5’7’’ 154 NSW 1916 Line Maxwell Joseph Lt 22 3 Oct 18th Bn 5’4½’’ 126 Estrées NSW 1915

Ingram George Lt 29 5 Oct 24th Bn 5’11½’’’ 173 Montbrehain Victoria 1916

Average 25.8 5’8’’ 148.9

1 Maurice Buckley served during the war as ‘Gerald Sexton’ 2 Blair Wark’s physical details are not recorded on his recruitment papers

366

APPENDIX 4

Evacuations due to Sickness August – September 1918 (as percentage of strength)

27 July 3 August 11 August 17 August 24 August 31 August Aust Corps Field Field Field Field Field Field Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Amb Amb Amb Amb Amb Amb 1st Division ------1.40 1.36 2.76 1.91 1.87 3.78 1.32 1.08 2.40 2nd Division 1.50 0.66 2.16 1.79 1.10 2.89 1.51 2.62 4.13 1.09 1.15 2.24 1.11 1.05 2.16 1.19 1.24 2.43 3rd Division 1.37 0.69 2.06 1.61 0.93 2.54 2.05 2.03 4.08 2.10 1.99 4.09 1.48 2.12 3.60 2.37 2.30 4.67 4th Division 0.82 0.59 1.41 1.07 0.68 1.75 1.39 2.3 3.69 1.07 1.15 2.22 1.14 1.13 2.27 1.02 0.75 1.77 5th Division 0.85 0.49 1.34 0.85 0.82 1.67 1.26 1.6 2.86 0.64 0.95 1.59 0.62 0.84 1.46 1.00 0.81 1.81 Average 1.14 0.61 1.74 1.33 0.88 2.21 1.55 2.14 3.69 1.26 1.32 2.58 1.25 1.40 2.65 1.38 1.24 2.62

Field Field Field Field Field Field III Corps Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Amb Amb Amb Amb Amb Amb 12th Division - - - 1.03 0.12 1.15 1.5 1.11 2.61 1.86 0.90 2.76 2.24 1.80 4.04 2.35 2.15 4.50 18th Division 0.99 0.42 1.41 1.36 0.61 1.97 1.72 1.58 3.30 1.54 0.75 2.29 1.61 1.57 3.18 1.44 1.24 2.68 47th Division 2.52 0.79 3.31 2.44 0.76 3.2 2.09 2.03 4.12 2.09 1.13 3.22 2.73 1.35 4.08 2.48 1.55 4.03 58th Division 1.48 0.41 1.89 1.43 0.57 2.00 1.84 2.58 4.42 1.39 0.67 2.06 1.68 1.25 2.93 3.68 1.88 5.56 74th Division ------Average 1.66 0.54 2.20 1.57 0.52 2.08 1.79 1.83 3.95 1.67 0.85 2.52 2.01 1.39 3.40 2.53 1.56 4.09

7 September 14 September 21 September 28 September 5 October Field Field Field Field Field Aust Corps Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Base Total Amb Amb Amb Amb Amb 1st Division 1.57 1.02 2.59 1.26 1.00 2.26 1.34 1.58 2.92 0.69 0.89 1.58 1.20 0.35 1.55 2nd Division 1.17 0.96 2.13 0.98 0.50 1.48 0.69 0.37 1.06 0.95 1.18 2.13 0.94 1.23 2.17 3rd Division 1.87 1.81 3.68 1.36 0.87 2.23 1.37 1.64 3.01 1.47 1.48 2.95 1.11 1.76 2.87 4th Division 0.99 0.69 1.68 0.96 0.83 1.79 0.83 1.11 1.94 0.45 0.71 1.16 0.51 0.24 0.75 5th Division 1.18 1.06 2.24 0.67 0.55 1.22 0.93 0.84 1.77 0.93 1.05 1.98 1.04 1.15 2.19 Average 1.36 1.11 2.46 1.05 0.75 1.80 1.03 1.11 2.14 0.90 1.06 1.96 0.96 0.95 1.91

Field Field Field Base Total Base Total Base Total III Corps Amb Amb Amb 12th Division 1.68 1.12 2.80 0.78 0.49 1.27 1.07 0.96 2.03 18th Division 0.89 1.16 2.05 0.89 0.53 1.42 0.89 0.9 1.79 47th Division 2.32 1.18 3.5 ------58th Division 1.88 1.24 3.12 1.47 1.03 2.5 1.38 1.14 2.52 74th Division 2.17 1.15 3.32 1.63 1.10 2.73 1.54 1.40 2.94 Average 1.82 1.18 3.00 1.19 0.79 1.98 1.22 1.10 2.32

367

APPENDIX 5

Summary of Sickness (week ending)

3 August 10 August 17 August 24 August 31 August Aust Corps Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded 1st Division N/A N/A 84 602 240 891 315 950 170 809 2nd Division 182 212 427 1327 181 464 162 85 192 413 3rd Division 150 85 327 472 297 524 315 571 317 786 4th Division 110 50 372 666 180 316 173 199 116 265 5th Division 144 286 281 694 158 99 140 124 134 234 British 32nd Division 167 473 158 1249 Total 586 633 1491 3761 1056 2294 1272 2402 1087 3756

III Corps Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded 12th Division 19 2 145 1232 119 323 208 810 258 711 18th Division 92 19 234 1229 119 98 190 1011 167 600 47th Division 118 20 317 99 175 98 207 1331 215 681 58th Division 90 47 313 1541 104 183 180 290 234 1739 74th Division 92 4 Total 319 88 3991 11623 517 702 785 3442 966 3735

7 September 14 September 21 September 28 September 5 October TOTALS Aust Corps Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Total 1st Division 145 111 141 35 220 724 114 186 44 70 1473 4378 5851 2nd Division 149 970 71 8 54 41 171 24 178 1202 1767 4746 6513 3rd Division 232 437 113 61 216 51 206 15 229 865 2402 3867 6269 4th Division 105 59 127 40 170 733 103 55 35 53 1491 2436 3927 5th Division 177 1039 84 43 129 38 161 32 177 1179 1585 3768 5353 British 135 341 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 32nd Division 460 2063 2523 Total 943 2957 536 187 789 1587 755 312 663 3369 9178 21258 30436

III Corps Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Sick Wounded Total 12th Division 158 367 69 167 138 1063 123 463 N/A N/A 1237 5138 6375 18th Division 157 512 74 32 111 1232 120 393 N/A N/A 1264 5126 6390 47th Division 175 1382 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1207 3611 4818 58th Division 165 333 151 543 157 430 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1394 5106 6500 74th Division 162 760 136 308 161 1105 N/A N/A N/A N/A 551 2177 2728 Total 817 3354 430 1050 567 3830 243 856 N/A N/A 8635 28680 37315

APPENDIX 6

Courts-Martial 27 July – 5 October 1918 (week ending)

27 July 3 Aug 10 Aug 17 Aug 24 Aug 31 Aug 7 Sep 14 Sep 21 Sep 28 Sep 5 Oct

Aust 56 68 52 74 59 53 63 50 98 59 30 Corps III Corps 20 19 16 6 11 N/A 1 13 5 2 N/A

368

APPENDIX 7

Australian Corps Commanders and Senior Staff August-September 1918

The Australian Corps Headquarters Staff at Bertangles, 20 July 1918 AWM EO2766K

Identified by number: (1) Col. G.W. Barber; (2) Brig-Gen. L.D. Fraser; (3) Brig-Gen. C.H. Foott; (4) Brig-Gen. T.A. Blamey; (5) Lt-Gen. Sir J. Monash; (6) Brig-Gen. R.A. Carruthers; (7) Brig-Gen W.A. Coxen; (8) Col. A.O. Jenny; (9) Lt-Col. E.T. Leane; (10) Lt-Col. G.C. Somerville; (11) Lt-Col. A.M. Martyn; (12) Lt-Col H.D. K. Macartney; (13) Capt. A.M. Moss; (14) Capt. P.W. Simonson; (15) Lt-Col. F.J. Alderson; (16) Lt-Col. T. Matson; (17) Maj. J.T. McColl; (18) E.O. Milne; (19) Maj. F.K. Officer; (20) Maj. R.G. Casey; (21) Maj. S.A. Hunn; (22) Maj. F.W. Lawson DSO, WSO (22); (23) Maj. T.G. Millner; (24) Maj. W.W. Berry; (25) Maj. E.G. Radford; (26) Maj. S. Mitchell; (27) Maj. C.L. Chapman; (28) Maj. G. Davey; (29) Capt. J.N. Kennedy; (30) Capt. J. Roydhouse; (31) Capt. E.J. Chenery; (32) Capt. H.B. Sewell; (33) Capt. R.C.A. Anderson; (34) Lt. H.J. Lane; (35) Capt. E.M. Johnson; (36) Capt. F. Harrison; (37) Capt. W.H.T. Long; (38) Capt. C.J. Fletcher; (39) Capt. H.J. Cobb; (40) Capt. H.W. Acland-Troyte; (41) Capt. F. Orange; (42) Lt. W.J. Mulholland; (43) Capt. R.C. Wertheim; (44) Capt. A.G. Shearman; (45) Capt. W.H. Kaighin; (46) Lt. H.S. Buchanan; (47) Lt. J.J. Raisbeck; (48) Lt. A.J.R. Wimble; (49) Lt. A.M. Simpson; (50) Lt. A.N. Kemsley; (51) Lt. H.O. Townsend; (52) Lt. F.F. Christian; (53) Lt. P.L. Harris; (54) Lt. H.R.G.S. Espley; (55) Lt. H. de Floris; (56) Capt. A. Edge; (57) Lt. M. Mauss: (58) Lt. T. Parnell; (59) Lt. L.L. Wrathall; (60) Lt. R.P. Penna; (61) Lt. F.G. Thorpe; (62) Mr C.E.W. Bean; (63) Lt. J.L. Williams; (64) Capt. R.J.W. Wilson; (65); Capt. W.E. Barclay.

Date of Appointment GOC Lt-Gen. Sir J Monash, KCB. 1 June 1918 BGGS Brig-Gen. T.A. Blamey, CMG, DSO. 1 June 1918 DA&QMG Brig-Gen. R.A. Carruthers, CB, CMG. 1 January 1918 GOC, RA Brig-Gen. W.A. Coxen, CMG, DSO. 18 October 1917 CE Brig-Gen. C.H. Foott, CMG. 17 March 1918 Corps Heavy Artillery Brig-Gen. L.D. Fraser, CB, CMG. 1 January 1918

369

APPENDIX 8

Australian Divisional Formations and Commanders During the Advance

1ST DIVISION

GOC Maj-Gen. T.W. Glasgow, CB, CMG, DSO. 30 June 1918 GSO1 Lt-Col. A.M. Ross, DSO.

AA&QMG Lt-Col. H.G. Viney, CMG, DSO.

1st Australian Brigade Brig-Gen. I.G. Mackay, CMG, DSO & Bar. 6 June 1918 1st Battalion Lt-Col. B.V. Stacy, CMG, DSO & Bar, C de G. 17 March 1917

2nd Battalion Lt-Col. A.B. Stevens, CMG, DSO & Bar. 19 December 1917

3rd Battalion Lt-Col. D.T. Moore, CMG, DSO & Bar, MC. 1 December 1916

4th Battalion Lt-Col. C.D. Sasse, DSO & Bar. 1 April 1918 1st Australian Trench Mortar Battery

2nd Australian Brigade Brig-Gen. J. Heane, CB, CMG, DSO. 1 December 1916 5th Battalion Lt-Col. D.A. Luxton, CMG, DSO. 8 March 1917

6th Battalion Lt-Col. T.F. Ulrich, DSO & Bar. 14 April 1918

7th Battalion Lt-Col. E.E. Herrod, CMG, DSO. 10 May 1917

8th Battalion Lt-Col. J.W. Mitchell, DSO & Bar. 14 April 1917 2nd Australian Trench Mortar Battery

3rd Australian Brigade Brig-Gen. HG Bennett, CB, CMG. 3 December 1916 9th Battalion Lt-Col. L.M. Mullen, CMG, DSO. 1 December 1916

10th Battalion Lt-Col. M. Wilder-Neligan, CMG, DSO & Bar, DCM, C de G. 15 July 1917

11th Battalion Lt-Col. J. Newman, DSO. 28 May 1918

12th Battalion Lt-Col. C.H. Elliott, CMG, DSO & Bar. 1 March 1916 3rd Australian Trench Mortar Battery

Divisional Artillery Brig-Gen. S.M. Anderson, DSO. 12 October 1917

Divisional Engineers Lt-Col. W.A. Henderson, DSO.

1st Machine Gun Battalion Lt-Col. W.R.R. French, DSO, MC. 3 June–2 September 1918

Maj. H. Eustace, DSO. 3 September 1918

370

2ND DIVISION

GOC Maj-Gen. C. Rosenthal, CB, CMG, DSO. 21 May 1918

GSO1 Lt-Col. C.G.N. Miles, CMG, DSO. 13 March 1917

AA&QMG Lt-Col. J.M.A. Durant, CMG, DSO.

5th Brigade Brig-Gen. E.F. Martin, CMG, DSO. 3 May 1918 17th Battalion Lt-Col. R.M. Sadler, DSO, MC. 1 April 1918

18th Battalion Lt-Col. G.F. Murphy, CMG, DSO & Bar. 1 December 1916 19th Battalion Lt-Col. W.J. Bateman 3 August 1918

20th Battalion Lt-Col. F.W.D. Forbes, CMG, DSO, VD. 30 May 1918 5th Trench Mortar Battery

6th Brigade Brig-Gen. J.C. Robertson CMG, DSO. 18 July 1918 21st Battalion Lt-Col. B.O.C. Duggan, DSO & Bar. 15 June 1917

22nd Battalion Lt-Col. A.R.L. Wiltshire, CMG, DSO & Bar, MC, C de G. 10 Jun 1917

23rd Battalion Lt-Col. W. Brazenor, DSO & Bar, VD. 2 June 1917

24th Battalion Lt-Col. W.E. James, DSO & Bar. 17 July 1917 6th Trench Mortar Battery

7th Brigade Brig-Gen. E.A. Wisdom CB, DSO. 7 December 1916 25th Battalion Lt-Col. W.M. Davis, MC. 21 June 1918

26th Battalion Lt-Col. J.A. Robinson, DSO. 8 July 1918

27th Battalion Lt-Col. F.R. Chalmers, CMG, DSO. 16 December 1917

28th Battalion Lt-Col. P. Currie, CMG, DSO, C de G. 23 March 1918 7th Trench Mortar Battery

Divisional Artillery Brig-Gen. O.F. Phillips, DSO. 12 October 1917 Divisional Engineers Lt-Col. J.M. Corlette, DSO. 2nd Machine Gun Battalion Lt-Col. A.W. Ralston, CMG, DSO, VD. 27 April 1918

371

3RD DIVISION

GOC Maj-Gen. J. Gellibrand, CB, DSO. 1 June 1918 GSO1 Lt-Col. C.H. Jess, DSO. 20 January 1918

AA&QMG Lt-Col. R.E. Jackson, DSO.

9th Brigade Brig-Gen. H.A. Goddard, CMG, DSO, C de G Belg. 21 May 1918 33rd Battalion Lt-Col. L.J. Morshead, CMG, DSO. 16 April 1916

34th Battalion Lt-Col. W. Le R Fry, OBE, VD. August 1918

35th Battalion Lt-Col. HF. White, CMG, DSO, C de G. 16 June 1918

10th Brigade Brig-Gen. W.R. McNicoll, CMG, DSO. 10 February 1916

37th Battalion Lt-Col. E.E. Knox-Knight 1 July 1917-10 August 1918 (DOW) Lt-Col. C.C.B. Story 10 August-18 September 1918

Major W.F.H. Robertson 18 September 1918 (Temp CO)

38th Battalion Lt-Col. G. Hurry, DSO, VD. 12 May 1918

39th Battalion Lt-Col. R.O. Henderson, DSO. 15 February 1917

40th Battalion Lt-Col. J.E.C. Lord, CMG, DSO, VD, C de G. 10 February 1916

11th Brigade Brig-Gen. J.H. Cannan, CB, CMG. 30 August 1916 41st Battalion Lt-Col. A.R. Heron, CMG, DSO. 6 July 1917

42nd Battalion Lt-Col. A.R. Woolcock, DSO, MM. 10 February 1916

43rd Battalion Lt-Col. J. Farrell, DSO. 16 February 1918

44th Battalion Lt-Col. J.P. Clark, DSO, VD. 5 August 1917 11th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

3rd Machine Gun Battalion Lt-Col. A.C. Blacklow, OBE, DSO. 3 March 1918 Divisional Artillery Brig-Gen. H.W. Grimwade, CB, CMG. 10 July 1916 Divisional Engineers Lt-Col. H. Bachtold, DSO, MC.

372

4TH DIVISION

GOC Maj-Gen. E.G. Sinclair-Maclagan, CB, DSO. 2 July 1917

GSO1 Lt-Col. J.D. Lavarack, DSO. December 1917

AA&QMG Lt-Col. R. Dowse, DSO.

4th Brigade Brig-Gen. C.H. Brand, CB, CMG, CVO, DSO. 10 July 1916 13th Battalion Lt-Col. D.G. Marks, DSO, MC. 6 December 1917

14th Battalion Lt-Col. H.A. Crowther, DSO, MC. 14 March 1918

15th Battalion Lt-Col. T.P. McSharry, CMG, DSO & Bar, MC.

30 Aug.1916-6 Aug.1918 (DOW)

Lt-Col. C.M. Johnston, DSO. 2 September 1918

16th Battalion Lt-Col. E.A. Drake-Brockman, CB, CMG, DSO, VD. 17 Feb 1918 4th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

12th Brigade Brig-Gen. R.L. Leane, DSO, MC. 1 June 1918

45th Battalion Lt-Col. C.M. Johnston, DSO. 30 June-2 Sept. 1918 (Temp CO)

Lt-Col. N.M. Loutit, DSO & Bar. 2 September 1918

46th Battalion Lt-Col. J.J. Corrigan, DSO & Bar, MC. 10 July 1918

48th Battalion Lt-Col. S.L. Perry, DSO, MC. 1 June 1918 12th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

13th Brigade Brig-Gen. S.C.E. Herring, DSO. 26 June 1918 49th Battalion Major W.L. Arrell, DSO. 1 July-18 September 1918 (Temp CO)

Lt-Col. J.L. Whitham, CMG, DSO. 18 September 1918

50th Battalion Lt-Col. A.G. Salisbury, CMG, DSO & Bar, L d’H. 18 August 1916 51st Battalion Lt-Col. R. Christie 23 October 1917 13th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

4th Machine Gun Battalion Lt-Col. H.W. Murray, VC, CMG, DSO and Bar, MC, DCM, C de G. 15 March 1918

Divisional Artillery Brig-Gen. W.L.H. Burgess, CMG, DSO. 25 August 1917

Divisional Engineers Lt-Col. R.J. Dyer, DSO.

373

5TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

GOC Maj-Gen. J.J.T. Hobbs, KCB, KCMG, VD. 18 January 1917

GSO1 Lt-Col. J. Peck, DSO. September 1917

AA&QMG Lt-Col. J.H. Bruche, CMG.

8th Brigade Brig-Gen. E. Tivey, CB, DSO, VD. 3 February 1916 29th Battalion Lt-Col. J. McArthur, DSO & Bar. 1 March 1918

30th Battalion Lt-Col. F. Street, DSO. 2 August 1918

31st Battalion Lt-Col. N.M. Freeman, DSO. 1 February 1918

32nd Battalion Lt-Col. C.S. Davies, CMG, DSO. 9 May 1917 8th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

14th Brigade Brig-Gen. J.C. Stewart, DSO. 3 April 1918 53rd Battalion Lt-Col. W.J.R. Cheeseman, DSO, MC. 29 September 1917

54th Battalion Lt-Col. N. Marshall, DSO & 2 Bars, MC. 1 May 1918

55th Battalion Lt-Col. P.W. Woods, DSO & Bar, MC. 19 June 1917

56th Battalion Lt-Col. A.C.S. Holland, L d’H. 4 August 1918 14th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

15th Brigade Brig-Gen. H.E. Elliott, CB, CMG, DSO, DCM. 1 March 1916 57th Battalion Lt-Col. C.A. Denehy, DSO & Bar. 1 May 1918

58th Battalion Lt-Col. C.V. Watson, DSO & Bar, VD. 1 May 1918

59th Battalion Lt-Col. J.J. Scanlan, DSO & Bar. 6 February 1918

60th Battalion Lt-Col. H.T.C. Layh, CMG, DSO & Bar, VD. 1 May 1918 15th Australian Trench Mortar Battery

5th Machine Gun Battalion Maj. A.H. Wright 5 March-16 August 1918

Lt-Col. T.R. Marsden, DSO. 17 August 1918

Divisional Artillery Brig-Gen. A.J. Bessel-Browne, CB, CMG, DSO. 18 January 1917

Divisional Engineers Lt-Col. L.F.S. Mather, DSO.

374

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ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS Barrett, J. ‘No Straw Man: C.E.W. Bean and Some Critics’. Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 23, No. 90 (1988), pp. 102-114. Blair, D.J. ‘‘Those Miserable Tommies’: Anti-British Sentiment in the Australian Imperial Force, 1915-1918.’ War and Society, Vol. 19, No. 1 (May 2001). Brennan, P., and T. Leppard. ‘How the Lessons Were Learned: Senior Commanders and the Moulding of the Canadian Corps After the Somme’. Canadian Military History since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000. Ottawa: Directorate of History and Heritage, Dept. of National Defence (Direction-Histoire Et Patrimoine, Ministère de la Défense Nationale), (2001). Boff, J. ‘Logistics During the Hundred Days Campaign, 1918: British Third Army’. Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, Vol. 89 (2011), pp. 306-321.  ‘The Moral Maze: the German Maze in Late 1918’. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, Issue 6-7 (2014), pp. 855-878. Buckland, R.U.H. ‘Experiences at Fourth Army Headquarters: Organisation and Work of the RE’. The RE Journal, Vol. 41 (September 1927), pp. 385-413. Cook, T. ‘Combat Effectiveness and the Canadian Corps in 1917’. The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947-1997: Proceedings of the Chief of Army's History Conference Held at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 23 September 1997. School of History, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1997.  “The Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great War”. Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 637- 66. Crookshank, S. D’A. ‘Transportation With the BEF’. The RE Journal, Vol. 32 (1920), pp. 194-195. Durrant, J.M.A. ‘Some Aspects of the Operations of the 2nd Australian Division from the 27th August to the 2nd of September, 1918’. Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXI (October 1935 and January 1936), pp. 86-95.

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Feltman, B.K. ‘Tolerance as a Crime? The British Treatment of German Prisoners of War on the Western Front, 1914-1980.’ War in History, Vol. 17, No. 4 (November 2010), pp. 435-58. Ferguson, N. ‘Prisoner Taking and Prisoner killing in the Age of Total War: towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat.’ War in History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 148-192. Garton, S. ‘War and Masculinity in Twentieth Century Australia’. Journal of Australian Studies, Vol. 56 (1998), pp. 86-94. Gill, D. and D. Gloden. ‘Mutiny at Etaples Base in 1917’. Past & Present No. 69 (1975), pp. 88-112. Grey, J. ‘Cuckoo in the Nest? Australian Military Historiography: The State of the Field’. History Compass, Vol. 6, No. 2 (March 2008), pp. 455-468. Jager, G. ‘Sinews of Steel: Canadian Railway Troops on the Western Front, 1914- 1918’. Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Autumn 2007), pp. 65-79. Júnior, D.P., and E.E. Duarte. ‘The Concept of Logistics Derived from Clausewitz: All That Is Required so that the Fighting Force can be Taken as a Given.’ The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 28, No. 4 (August 2005), pp. 645-77. Kiszley, J. ‘Achieving High Tempo – New Challenges’. RUSI Journal, December 1999, Vol. 144, No. 6, pp. 47-53. Lake, M. ‘Mission Impossible: How Men Gave Birth to the Australian Nation: Nationalism, Gender and Other Seminal Acts’. Gender and History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1992), pp. 66-78. Lindsell, W.G. ‘Administrative Lessons of the Great War’. RUSI Journal, Vol. 71 (1926), pp. 712-720. Londey, P. ‘A Possession for Ever: Charles Bean, the Ancient Greeks, and Military Commemoration in Australia’ in Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2007), pp. 344-359. Maginniss, C.H. ‘Heads of Steel (Logistic Support to BEF’s Mobile All Arms Battle: July-November 1918)’. The British Army Review, No. 122 (Autumn 1999), pp. 74-79. McConnell, D., R.A. Hardemon, and L.C. Ransburgh. ‘The Logistics Constant Through the Ages’. Air Force Journal of Logistics Vol. XXXIV, Nos 3 & 4 (October 1999), pp. 82-87. McNaughton, A.G.L. ‘The Development of Artillery in the Great War’. Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (January 1929), p. 160.

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Millett, A.R., Murray, W and Watman, K.H. ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organisations’. International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 37-71. Millett, J.D. ‘Logistics and Modern War.’ Military Affairs. Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 1945), pp. 193-207. Pugsley, C. ‘We Have Been Here Before: The Evolution of the Doctrine of Decentralised Command in the British Army 1905-1989.’ Sandhurst Occasional Paper No. 9, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011. Robson, L.L. ‘The Origin and Character of the 1st A.I.F., 1914-1918: Some Statistical Evidence’. Australian Historical Studies. Vol. 15, No. 61 (October 1973), pp. 737-749. Sewell, J.W.S. ‘The Supply of Bulk Stores in War’. The RE Journal, Vol. 54 (1940), pp. 47-79 (re-printed from RE Journal of July 1922). Shanks, G.D., A. MacKenzie, R. Mclaughlin, M. Waller, P. Dennis, S. Lee and J.F. Brundage. ‘Mortality Risk Factors During the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic in the Australian Army’. The Journal of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 201 (June, 2010), pp. 1880-1889. Sheffield, G. ‘How Even Was the Learning Curve? Reflections on the British and Dominion Armies on the Western Front 1916-1918’ in Tremblay, Y. Canadian Military History since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000. Directorate of History and Heritage, Dept. of National Defence (Direction-Histoire Et Patrimoine, Ministère de la Défense Nationale), Ottawa, 2001. Simpson, A. ‘The Outsider as Insider’. Wartime, Issue 73 (Summer 2016), pp. 38- 43. Strachan, H. Training, Morale and Modern War. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2006), pp. 211-227. Swank, R.L. and W.E. Marchand. ‘Combat Neuroses: Development of Combat Exhaustion’. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1947, Vol. 105(5), p. 549. Taylor, M.G. ‘Land Transportation in the Late War’. RUSI Journal, Vol. 66, Issue 464 (1921), pp. 699-722. Thomson, A. ‘Steadfast Until Death? CEW Bean and the Representation of Australian Military Manhood’. Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 23 (1989), pp. 462-478. Tyquin, M. ‘Unjustly accused? Medical authorities and army recruitment in Australia 1914-1918’. Journal of Military and Veterans Health, Vol. 22 No 2 (June 2014), pp. 20-28.

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Westerman, W. ‘The Handyman of the Division: Assessing the effectiveness of pioneer battalion concept in the First Australian Imperial Force’. British Journal of Military History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2017), pp. 43-61. White, R. ‘Motives for Joining Up: Self-sacrifice, Self-Interest and Social Class, 1914-18’. Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Issue 9 (1986), pp. 3-16.  ‘The Soldier as Tourist: The Australian Experience of the Great War’. War & Society …? Vol. 5 (1987), pp. 63-77. Wilson, G. ‘The Relevance of Miscellany Administrative, Support and Logistic Units of the A.I.F.’. Sabretache, Vol. 44, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 21-24. Wise, N. ‘The Lost Labour Force’. Labour History, No. 93 (November 2007), pp. 161-176.

ARTICLES, CHAPTERS AND LECTURES PUBLISHED ONLINE Abbot, A. ‘A Message from the Prime Minister The Hon Tony Abott MP, on the Launch of Maestro John Monash’. http://www.publishing.monash.edu/books/mjm-9781922235596-Message- from-the-Prime-Minister-2014.pdf. Francis, A. ‘All Commemoration is Political’: Historians Lead Charge Against Gallipoli ‘Myth’. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-11/war-and- memory-australians-experiencing-commemoration-fatigue/5081544, 14 April 2014. Gerster, R., ‘On Re-reading Bean’s Official History’. Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 76, Issue 3 (Spring 2017). https://meanjin.com.au/essays/on-re-reading-beans- official-history/. Jones, S. ‘The crucible of war: the adaption and development of the British Army on the Western Front 1915’. Chief of Army Conference 2017, ‘The Skill of Adaptability: The Learning Curve in Combat.’ https://cove.army.gov.au/article/chief-army-history-conference- 2017-dr-spencer-jones. Moore, Ryan J., ‘Maps of The First World War: An Illustrated Essay and List of Select Maps in The Library of Congress’, The Occasional Papers No. 7, A Philip Lee Phillips Map Society Publication, Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Summer 2014. https://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/pdf/plp/occasional/OccPaper7.pdf.

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Proceedings of Chief of Army Conference 1998. ‘1918: Defining Victory’, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20history/AAHU/Conferen ce%20Papers%20and%20Images/1998/1998%201918%20Defining%20Vict ory.pdf.

UNPUBLISHED THESES

Clarke, G. ‘Supplying the Battlefront. British Frontline Transport in Mobile Warfare 1918’. MA Thesis. University of Birmingham, 2006. Garstang, E. ‘Crime and Punishment on the Western Front: The Australian Imperial Force and British Army Discipline’. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2009. Faraday, B.D. ‘Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the A.I.F. 1914-1918’. PhD Thesis. University of New South Wales (Canberra), 1997. Fredrickson, L. ‘The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front by 1916-1918: An Imperial model of training, tactics and technology’. PhD Thesis. University of New South Wales (Canberra), 2015. Lammiman, H. ‘The Senior Soldier: An Analysis of the Command Response of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Infantry Battalion Commanders to the Momentum of the Hundred Days Offensive’. BA Honours Thesis, University of New South Wales (Canberra), 2016. Millar, J.D. ‘A Study in the Limitations of Command: General Sir William Birdwood and the A.I.F., 1914-1918’. PhD Thesis. University of New South Wales (Canberra), 1993. Millichope, D. ‘A Re-assessment of the Performance of Lieutenant-General Sir Richard H. K. Butler as Corps Commander’. MA Thesis. University of Birmingham, 2010. Phillips, C. ‘A Modern Industrial Organisation: A Case Study of Fourth Army during the battles of the ‘Hundred Days’’. MA Thesis. University of Birmingham, 2009. Wedge, M. ‘From the Hindenburg Line (1917) to the Hindenburg Line (1918): An evaluation of the developments in BEF logistical and engineering methodology based on the experience of open warfare game during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line (February-April 1917)’. BA Thesis. University of Birmingham, 2009.

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NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES ‘Sir John Monash’. The Argus, Melbourne, 15 March 1927. ‘Australians at Dardanelles: Thrilling Deeds of Heroism’. The Argus, Melbourne, 8 May 1915. ‘Anzac Day includes all Australians, Julia Gillard tells crowd at Gallipoli’. Dennis Shanahan, The Australian, 25 April, 2012. ‘There's an inconvenient truth about Anzac Day: our soldiers are exceptional’. Peter FitzSimons, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April, 2017. Reveille. Returned Services League of Australia. New South Wales Branch and Returned Sailors' and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia. New South Wales Branch W.J. Stagg for the proprietors, R.S. & S.I.L.A. (N.S.W. Branch), Sydney, 1927-1939.

WEBSITES Australian Dictionary of Biography, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ Australian War Memorial. http://www.awm.gov.au/ ‘Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics.’ https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/2112.01911?O penDocument. Commonwealth War Graves Commission Website. https://www.cwgc.org/

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