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Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic

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Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic March 2016 Cover Photo: Internally Displaced People at the M’Poko airport in Bangui. Cover Photo credit: UNHCR/D. Mbaiorem The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) was conducted by Andrew Lawday (Team Leader), Karimou Adjibade, Nicola Dahrendorf, Floribert Kubwayezu and Lezlie Caro Morinière [from The KonTerra Group]. Evaluation Management Management Group members for this project include: Marta Bruno (FAO), Machiel Salomons (UNHCR), Koorosh Raffii (UNICEF), Miranda Sende and Elise Benoit (WFP). The evaluation was managed by Maria Agnese Giordano and Wiebke Uhde, Evaluation Officers for OCHA, New York, under the guidance and supervision of Victoria Saiz-Omeñaca, Chief a.i. Evaluation and Oversight Unit, OCHA. Disclaimer The contents and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the IAHE Steering Group for Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations, the Management Group, or the United Nations. Responsibility for the opinion expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Suggested quotation Lawday, A., Adjibade, K., Dahrendorf, N., Kubwayezu, F., Morinière, L.C. (2016) Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to the Crisis in the Central African Republic. Report Commissioned by the Steering Group for Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations, New York, March 2016. Copyright © 2016 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs CONTENTS Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................4 Acronyms .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................7 Résumé analytique ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................18 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30 1.1 Background and Purpose ........................................................................................................................................................................ 30 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations (IAHEs) ...................................................................................................31 Assumptions ............................................................................................................................................................................................................31 1.2 Country context ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 32 Protracted crisis ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32 Complex emergency (2012–2013) ..........................................................................................................................................33 Acute phase (December 2013) .....................................................................................................................................................34 Persistent needs (2015 and beyond) .................................................................................................................................... 37 1.3 Response and plan.............................................................................................................................................................................................38 L3 declaration ......................................................................................................................................................................................................39 Strategic Response Plan 2014 .......................................................................................................................................................39 Humanitarian Response Plan 2015 ......................................................................................................................................... 40 1.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 44 User engagement .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 44 Framework development .................................................................................................................................................................... 44 Stakeholder consultation ....................................................................................................................................................................45 Data collection ..................................................................................................................................................................................................48 Listening to people affected ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������48 Analytical strategy ........................................................................................................................................................................................49 Reporting ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 50 Limitations and potential bias of the selected methods .......................................................................... 50 2. Response plan strategic objectives ...........................................................................................................................................................51 2.1 Appropriateness ......................................................................................................................................................................................................51 2.2 Relevance........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 52 2.3 Monitoring and evaluation ..................................................................................................................................................................... 53 2.4 Results ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 55 Basic services ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 Protection ................................................................................................................................................................................................................56 Assistance .................................................................................................................................................................................................................56 Livelihoods, resilience and recovery .................................................................................................................................... 57 Inter-cluster performance ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������58 Primacy of process .......................................................................................................................................................................................59 Popular perceptions ..................................................................................................................................................................................59 2.5 Protection .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 60 Protection of civilians
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