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D 3.3 IECEU Central African Republic Review D3.3: The CAR Review CSA project: 653371 Start date: 1/5/2015 Duration: 33 months PROJECT TITLE: Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (ICE) in EU Conflict Prevention D3.3 The Central African Republic (CAR) Review Lead beneficiary: FINCENT Delivery date: 14/2/2017 Version: 2.8 Dissemination level PU: Public CO: Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission services) PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission) RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission) D3.3 The CAR Review PU IECEU CSA project: 653371 Start date: 01/05/2015 Duration: 33 months Contents GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRY ............................................................................. vi ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................... viii ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................... xi 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Remarks on the methods ......................................................................................................... 4 1.2 The Central African Republic and the IECEU project .............................................................. 5 1.3 The structure of the deliverable ..................................................................................................... 6 2 CONTEXTUALISING THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ......................... 7 2.1 A history of violence ....................................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Dynamics of the regional conflict ................................................................................................. 11 2.2.1 Crisis in Darfur ....................................................................................................................... 12 2.2.2 International response to the regional crisis .......................................................................... 14 2.2.3 Escalation of violence in the Central African Republic in 2012 ............................................. 17 2.2.4 International response to the conflict in the Central African Republic ................................... 20 2.2.5 Efforts to restore peace ......................................................................................................... 22 2.3 Root causes of the conflict ........................................................................................................... 23 2.3.1 Characteristics of the Bozizé regime ..................................................................................... 24 2.3.2 The rise of Séléka and competition for power ....................................................................... 24 2.3.3 Illicit trade in natural resource curse ..................................................................................... 27 2.3.4 Frustration with Michel Djotodia ............................................................................................ 29 2.3.5 Politicisation of ethnicity and religious conflict ...................................................................... 31 2.3.6 Poor governance and underdeveloped security institutions ................................................. 36 2.3.7 Consequences of the conflict ................................................................................................ 40 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371 The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. iii D3.3 The CAR Review PU IECEU CSA project: 653371 Start date: 01/05/2015 Duration: 33 months 2.4 Internal parties to the conflict ....................................................................................................... 47 2.5 External actors ............................................................................................................................. 53 2.5.1 International organisations .................................................................................................... 53 2.5.2 Regional organisations .......................................................................................................... 54 2.5.3 Neighbouring countries, principally Chad .............................................................................. 56 2.5.4 France ................................................................................................................................... 58 2.5.5 Other countries ...................................................................................................................... 59 2.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 59 3 THE CSDP MISSION/OPERATION AND THE CONFLICT ........................................................... 62 3.1 The EU’s approach to responding to the conflict ......................................................................... 62 3.1.1 The approach of EUFOR Tchad/RCA ................................................................................... 65 3.1.2 The approach of EUFOR RCA .............................................................................................. 66 3.2 The multilateral approach ............................................................................................................ 68 3.2.1 Co-operation and co-ordination – EUFOR Tchad/RCA ........................................................ 68 3.2.2 Co-operation and co-ordination – EUFOR RCA ................................................................... 70 3.3 Perceptions of EUFOR Tchad/RCA ............................................................................................. 74 3.3.1 The general public ................................................................................................................. 74 3.4 Perceptions of EUFOR RCA ........................................................................................................ 78 3.4.1 The general public ................................................................................................................. 78 3.4.2 The main beneficiaries .......................................................................................................... 80 4 DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................................. 83 4.1 The general approach to preventing conflict and the lessons identified ...................................... 83 4.2 The EU’s military approach .................................................................................................... 86 4.2.1 ‘Best practices’ ................................................................................................................... 86 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371 The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. iv D3.3 The CAR Review PU IECEU CSA project: 653371 Start date: 01/05/2015 Duration: 33 months 4.2.2 Drawbacks ......................................................................................................................... 89 4.3 Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................................... 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................... 96 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................... 109 INTERVIEWS ...................................................................................................................................... 111 FIGURES Figure 1. Map of the Central African Republic ................................................................................................. vii Figure 2. Main Séléka groups ........................................................................................................................ 122 Figure 3.Key Séléka leaders ......................................................................................................................... 123 Figure 4. Anti-Balaka and other key groups .................................................................................................. 124 Figure 5. Key people, leaders and coordinators ............................................................................................ 124 ANNEXES Annex 1: Interview guide Annex 2. Key Historical Events Annex 3. Conflict parties and their compositions This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371 The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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