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Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Central African Republic in Crisis WP African Union Mission Needs United Nations Support Annette Weber and Markus Kaim S On 20 January 2014 the foreign ministers of the EU member-states approved EUFOR RCA Bangui. The six-month mission with about 800 troops is to be deployed as quickly as possible to the Central African Republic. In recent months CAR has witnessed grow- ing inter-religious violence, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and an ensuing humanitarian disaster. France sent a rapid response force and the African Union expanded its existing mission to 5,400 men. Since the election of the President Catherine Samba-Panza matters appear to be making a tentative turn for the better. But it will be a long time before it becomes apparent whether the decisions of recent weeks have put CAR on the road to solving its elementary structural problems. First of all, tangible successes are required in order to contain the escalating violence. That will require a further increase in AU forces and the deployment of a robust UN mission. In December 2012 the largely Muslim mili- infrastructure forces the population to tias of the Séléka (“Coalition”) advanced organise in village and family structures. from the north on the Central African The ongoing political and economic crises Republic’s capital Bangui. This alliance led of recent years have led to displacements by Michel Djotodia was resisted by the large- and a growing security threat from armed ly Christian anti-balaka (“anti-machete”) gangs, bandits and militias, and further militias. The ensuing civil war has had eroded the resilience of society. Thus in immense humanitarian consequences, with CAR the problem of weak statehood is com- different religious groups conducting tit- pounded by a weak society. for-tat massacres. The conflict is a conse- quence of the fundamental weakness of the state, which ever since independence has The Current Situation proven largely incapable of providing infra- Improving security in Bangui and securing structure, policing, justice, healthcare or an aid corridor from neighbouring Cam- education for its citizens. Despite possess- eroon are the foremost objectives of the ing valuable resources including diamonds, intervening forces. These currently com- mineral ores and timber, CAR is one of the prise 2,000 French troops and 5,400 soldiers world’s ten poorest countries. Lack of state in the MISCA mission (Mission internatio- Dr. Annette Weber is a Senior Associate of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 15 PD Dr. Markus Kaim is Head of SWP’s International Security Division March 2014 1 nale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous con- outside intervention. Members of FACA duite africaine) authorised in December were also involved in atrocities in February 2013 by the African Union. Inter-religious 2014. So neither President Samba-Panza’s clashes began when the predominantly new government nor the militia leaders Muslim Séléka militias advanced on the actually have control over the violent actors. capital Bangui. Later, fighting between Furthermore, Chadian members of the Séléka and anti-balaka spread beyond AU mission are accused of liberating and Bangui. However, since the fall of Séléka- evacuating detained Séléka leaders without connected President Michel Djotodia in authorisation from mission command. Con- January 2014, outbreaks of violence have currently with the resignation of President primarily involved the Christian anti-balaka Djotodia, Séléka forces began withdrawing militias acting against Muslim civilians, from Bangui, and are currently regrouping rather than the two groups fighting one in the north of the country. There too, ob- another. servers report, they receive support from In the absence of a state monopoly of vio- Chadian MISCA members. lence, criminal gangs, bandits and other violent actors had proliferated to a discon- certing extent long before the arrival of Weak State Structures the Séléka in Bangui. Successive presidents President Djotodia was deposed on 10 Janu- placed little trust in the regular armed ary 2014. Ten days later parliament elected forces (FACA, Forces armées centrafricaine), the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba- which comprised fewer than 5,000 soldiers, Panza, as president. On 25 January Samba- and instead treated the presidential guard Panza appointed Andre Nzapayeke as prime as a private militia. Instead of protecting minister. Nzapayeke, previously Secretary- the population, the poorly trained and General of the African Development Bank, paid armed forces themselves represented was chosen as a “neutral instance”. He heads a security threat. Young men armed them- a government of technocrats that includes selves to protect against attacks, prepared ministers from both Séléka and the previ- to resist the national army if necessary. ous government of François Bozizé, designed In March 2013 rebels led by Michel to continue the transitional process agreed Djotodia toppled President Bozizé and took in January 2013 in Gabon’s capital Libreville over the government. This also expanded between the then President Bozizé and the the power of the armed wing of the Séléka, Séléka rebels under the patronage of the which despite demobilisation and integra- neighbouring states. At the end of this pro- tion programmes was not integrated in the cess, new elections are scheduled for 2015. regular national armed forces. Since CAR became independent of In September 2013, months before he French colonial rule in 1960, changes stepped down in January 2014, Séléka of leadership have generally been accom- leader Michel Djotodia distanced himself plished through military coups, and rarely from most of his militias. His intention was through democratic elections. Especially to legitimise his continuation as president since the beginning of the 2000s the coun- in the eyes of the international community, try has been riven by ongoing internal but in so doing he also relinquished control conflict. Following the logic of clientelism, over the militias. rulers generally concentrated on satisfying The leaders of the Christian anti-balaka their own clientele, including foreign allies militias have also long since lost control and kingmakers, and were rarely motivated over their various groupings. The religious to attend to state penetration or the needs militias are increasingly fragmented into of the country as a whole. The CAR is twice small autonomous units obeying no higher as large as Germany but has only five mil- command, which further hampers any lion inhabitants, who live largely in the SWP Comments 15 March 2014 2 west and in the capital Bangui. Its infra- Paris is not perceived as a neutral broker structure is almost non-existent, further in the region. Instead, decades of political impeding the provision of goods and ser- manipulation have consolidated a form of vices to the civilian population at large. dependency on French interests. France is, In response to the ongoing fighting, many moreover, specifically accused of basing its fled the urban centres to the savannah current engagement on its own economic and the rain forest. interests. Although some suggest that Until Michel Djotodia seized power in France is interested in uranium from CAR a coup in March 2013, CAR was governed as an alternative to existing sources in exclusively by members of the Christian southern Algeria, northern Mali and Niger, majority from the western and central falling uranium prices and the current provinces. Djotodia, like his predecessor conflict situation would imply that ura- Bozizé, was supported by the Chadian gov- nium from CAR is not currently uppermost ernment. As the Séléka retreat to north- among French economic interests. In 2012 western CAR and on into Chad, the CAR armed gangs attacked an uranium mine crisis could acquire a regional dimension. owned by the French AREVA Group in south- eastern CAR, and it later closed. Neighbouring Chad is no less closely Regional and International Actors involved in CAR politics, in particular Regional conflict mediators will be decisive jostling with France to direct influencing for the future of CAR. Both the peace agree- top political appointments. François Bozizé ment of Libreville and the N’Djamena Dec- was supported by N’Djamena, and his laration signed on 18 April 2013 in the troops trained and armed in Chad. Indeed, Chadian capital were initiated by the Eco- Chadian troops were directly involved nomic Community of Central African States in Bozizé’s coup against his predecessor (ECCAS) and negotiated under its auspices. Patassé. One important factor is the close- ECCAS has also maintained a Mission ness of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline to for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Chad’s border with CAR. Since the toppling African Republic (MICOPAX) since 2008. of Michel Djotodia and the accession of ECCAS membership overlaps with that President Samba-Panza, Séléka forces and of CEMAC (Communauté Économique et thousands of Muslim civilians have fled Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), a smaller north into Chad. This represents a chal- regional organisation that has had a multi- lenge for Chad’s President Déby, whose national peace mission in CAR since 2002. Chadian troops operate as a MISCA con- On 19 December 2013 the MICOPAX mis- tingent in CAR. Although Déby is regarded sion merged into the AU-led MISCA as a supporter of the Séléka, he would not mission. However, certain states involved want see their fighters remaining in Chad. in conflict pacification in CAR are also With ongoing fighting in Darfur and the part of the problem. In particular, the roles conflict in South Sudan expanding, there played by France and Chad are ambivalent. is no shortage of new constellations of Of all the Western external actors, France violent actors whose conflicts could have certainly possesses the best knowledge negative consequences for the broader about the country, its political actors and region – and for Chad’s regional leader- its geographical conditions.

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