Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Central African Republic in Crisis WP African Union Mission Needs United Nations Support

Annette Weber and Markus Kaim S

On 20 January 2014 the foreign ministers of the EU member-states approved EUFOR RCA . The six-month mission with about 800 troops is to be deployed as quickly as possible to the . In recent months CAR has witnessed grow- ing inter-religious violence, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and an ensuing humanitarian disaster. France sent a rapid response force and the African Union expanded its existing mission to 5,400 men. Since the election of the President Catherine Samba-Panza matters appear to be making a tentative turn for the better. But it will be a long time before it becomes apparent whether the decisions of recent weeks have put CAR on the road to solving its elementary structural problems. First of all, tangible successes are required in order to contain the escalating violence. That will require a further increase in AU forces and the deployment of a robust UN mission.

In December 2012 the largely Muslim mili- infrastructure forces the population to tias of the Séléka (“Coalition”) advanced organise in village and family structures. from the north on the Central African The ongoing political and economic crises Republic’s capital Bangui. This alliance led of recent years have led to displacements by Michel Djotodia was resisted by the large- and a growing security threat from armed ly Christian anti-balaka (“anti-machete”) gangs, bandits and militias, and further militias. The ensuing civil war has had eroded the resilience of society. Thus in immense humanitarian consequences, with CAR the problem of weak statehood is com- different religious groups conducting tit- pounded by a weak society. for-tat massacres. The conflict is a conse- quence of the fundamental weakness of the state, which ever since independence has The Current Situation proven largely incapable of providing infra- Improving security in Bangui and securing structure, policing, justice, healthcare or an aid corridor from neighbouring Cam- education for its citizens. Despite possess- eroon are the foremost objectives of the ing valuable resources including diamonds, intervening forces. These currently com- mineral ores and timber, CAR is one of the prise 2,000 French troops and 5,400 soldiers world’s ten poorest countries. Lack of state in the MISCA mission (Mission internatio-

Dr. Annette Weber is a Senior Associate of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 15 PD Dr. Markus Kaim is Head of SWP’s International Security Division March 2014

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nale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous con- outside intervention. Members of FACA duite africaine) authorised in December were also involved in atrocities in February 2013 by the African Union. Inter-religious 2014. So neither President Samba-Panza’s clashes began when the predominantly new government nor the militia leaders Muslim Séléka militias advanced on the actually have control over the violent actors. capital Bangui. Later, fighting between Furthermore, Chadian members of the Séléka and anti-balaka spread beyond AU mission are accused of liberating and Bangui. However, since the fall of Séléka- evacuating detained Séléka leaders without connected President Michel Djotodia in authorisation from mission command. Con- January 2014, outbreaks of violence have currently with the resignation of President primarily involved the Christian anti-balaka Djotodia, Séléka forces began withdrawing militias acting against Muslim civilians, from Bangui, and are currently regrouping rather than the two groups fighting one in the north of the country. There too, ob- another. servers report, they receive support from In the absence of a state monopoly of vio- Chadian MISCA members. lence, criminal gangs, bandits and other violent actors had proliferated to a discon- certing extent long before the arrival of Weak State Structures the Séléka in Bangui. Successive presidents President Djotodia was deposed on 10 Janu- placed little trust in the regular armed ary 2014. Ten days later parliament elected forces (FACA, Forces armées centrafricaine), the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba- which comprised fewer than 5,000 soldiers, Panza, as president. On 25 January Samba- and instead treated the presidential guard Panza appointed Andre Nzapayeke as prime as a private militia. Instead of protecting minister. Nzapayeke, previously Secretary- the population, the poorly trained and General of the African Development Bank, paid armed forces themselves represented was chosen as a “neutral instance”. He heads a security threat. Young men armed them- a government of technocrats that includes selves to protect against attacks, prepared ministers from both Séléka and the previ- to resist the national army if necessary. ous government of François Bozizé, designed In March 2013 rebels led by Michel to continue the transitional process agreed Djotodia toppled President Bozizé and took in January 2013 in Gabon’s capital Libreville over the government. This also expanded between the then President Bozizé and the the power of the armed wing of the Séléka, Séléka rebels under the patronage of the which despite demobilisation and integra- neighbouring states. At the end of this pro- tion programmes was not integrated in the cess, new elections are scheduled for 2015. regular national armed forces. Since CAR became independent of In September 2013, months before he French colonial rule in 1960, changes stepped down in January 2014, Séléka of leadership have generally been accom- leader Michel Djotodia distanced himself plished through military coups, and rarely from most of his militias. His intention was through democratic elections. Especially to legitimise his continuation as president since the beginning of the 2000s the coun- in the eyes of the international community, try has been riven by ongoing internal but in so doing he also relinquished control conflict. Following the logic of clientelism, over the militias. rulers generally concentrated on satisfying The leaders of the Christian anti-balaka their own clientele, including foreign allies militias have also long since lost control and kingmakers, and were rarely motivated over their various groupings. The religious to attend to state penetration or the needs militias are increasingly fragmented into of the country as a whole. The CAR is twice small autonomous units obeying no higher as large as Germany but has only five mil- command, which further hampers any lion inhabitants, who live largely in the

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west and in the capital Bangui. Its infra- Paris is not perceived as a neutral broker structure is almost non-existent, further in the region. Instead, decades of political impeding the provision of goods and ser- manipulation have consolidated a form of vices to the civilian population at large. dependency on French interests. France is, In response to the ongoing fighting, many moreover, specifically accused of basing its fled the urban centres to the savannah current engagement on its own economic and the rain forest. interests. Although some suggest that Until Michel Djotodia seized power in France is interested in uranium from CAR a coup in March 2013, CAR was governed as an alternative to existing sources in exclusively by members of the Christian southern Algeria, northern Mali and Niger, majority from the western and central falling uranium prices and the current provinces. Djotodia, like his predecessor conflict situation would imply that ura- Bozizé, was supported by the Chadian gov- nium from CAR is not currently uppermost ernment. As the Séléka retreat to north- among French economic interests. In 2012 western CAR and on into Chad, the CAR armed gangs attacked an uranium mine crisis could acquire a regional dimension. owned by the French AREVA Group in south- eastern CAR, and it later closed. Neighbouring Chad is no less closely Regional and International Actors involved in CAR politics, in particular Regional conflict mediators will be decisive jostling with France to direct influencing for the future of CAR. Both the peace agree- top political appointments. François Bozizé ment of Libreville and the N’Djamena Dec- was supported by N’Djamena, and his laration signed on 18 April 2013 in the troops trained and armed in Chad. Indeed, Chadian capital were initiated by the Eco- Chadian troops were directly involved nomic Community of Central African States in Bozizé’s coup against his predecessor (ECCAS) and negotiated under its auspices. Patassé. One important factor is the close- ECCAS has also maintained a Mission ness of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline to for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Chad’s border with CAR. Since the toppling African Republic (MICOPAX) since 2008. of Michel Djotodia and the accession of ECCAS membership overlaps with that President Samba-Panza, Séléka forces and of CEMAC (Communauté Économique et thousands of Muslim civilians have fled Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), a smaller north into Chad. This represents a chal- regional organisation that has had a multi- lenge for Chad’s President Déby, whose national peace mission in CAR since 2002. Chadian troops operate as a MISCA con- On 19 December 2013 the MICOPAX mis- tingent in CAR. Although Déby is regarded sion merged into the AU-led MISCA as a supporter of the Séléka, he would not mission. However, certain states involved want see their fighters remaining in Chad. in conflict pacification in CAR are also With ongoing fighting in Darfur and the part of the problem. In particular, the roles conflict in South Sudan expanding, there played by France and Chad are ambivalent. is no shortage of new constellations of Of all the Western external actors, France violent actors whose conflicts could have certainly possesses the best knowledge negative consequences for the broader about the country, its political actors and region – and for Chad’s regional leader- its geographical conditions. But its interest ship ambitions. in continuing to operate as the dominant South Africa has also exerted influence external power makes France ill-suited as a on CAR politics in recent years. Only after neutral mediator. Ever since independence fifteen of its soldiers died when Séléka France has remained the kingmaker in forces captured Bangui in March 2013 did CAR; rarely has a president gained or lost South Africa withdraw its military contin- office without direct French influence. So gent from CAR. It is unclear why 200 South

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African soldiers were in the country in the above all funding through the United first place. Nations and corresponding aid from inter- Although Uganda and the United States national donors. In view of the poor secu- are not directly involved in CAR’s national rity situation and the disintegration of politics, their forces have been operating public order, however, humanitarian aid jointly there since 2010. The fighters of will remain ineffective unless external ’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), security forces ensure a secure environ- who are held responsible for human rights ment. Because German governments have violations in northern Uganda, South promised to act to prevent ethnic cleansing Sudan and north-eastern DR Congo, have and genocide, this dimension of the situa- been present in south-eastern CAR for years. tion in CAR suggests German participation Since 2010 the Ugandan army has been in the EU mission there. According to the operating in the region, together with a latest discussions, Germany will probably small contingent of US marines, to mili- contribute a MedEvac Airbus (flying hospital) tarily defeat the LRA. However, the mission, and staff officers for the headquarters in which involves 3,000 soldiers from the Larissa and Bangui. region and 100 US troops and has been operating under an AU mandate (Operation Monsoon) since August 2013, has remained The Alliance Dimension unsuccessful to date. Two instruments of German security policy have not been used to the extent that would have been desirable in recent years, The Humanitarian Dimension and both have suffered as a result: bilateral All political considerations aside, the cur- Franco-German cooperation on security and rent situation in CAR represents a humani- defence, and the European Union’s Com- tarian emergency of “epic dimensions”. mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That is the formulation UN Secretary-Gen- Both could be reinvigorated and strength- eral Ban Ki-Moon chose in his address to the ened through active German engagement UN Human Rights Council on 20 January in crisis management in Africa, specifically 2014. The country, he said, is in “free fall”. in CAR. Public order has collapsed, the state secu- On 20 January 2014 the foreign minis- rity services have disintegrated, and count- ters of the EU member-states decided to less human rights violations were commit- launch military mission EUFOR RCA Ban- ted during the fighting between Christian gui. About 800 soldiers will participate in and Muslim militias. As a consequence the operation, which is to be deployed as about one million people have been dis- rapidly as possible and remain in CAR for placed, and more than 2.5 million are six months. The objective is to restore pub- reliant on humanitarian aid. As bleak as lic order in the capital Bangui and create the situation already is, strong tensions conditions that allow international organi- between Christians and Muslims create a sations to supply humanitarian aid. The EU danger of the conflict consolidating along foreign ministers rejected proposals for a religious fracture lines and continuing to more ambitious mission that would have be conducted with violence, unless external included areas outside the capital, but did actors intervene. According to John Ging, agree that the EU contingent would relieve Director of the Coordination and Response the 2,000 French troops in the country to Division at the UN Office for the Coordi- an extent that allows them to be deployed nation of Humanitarian Affairs, all the outside Bangui. This is a “bridging mission” elements of violence observed in Rwanda whose tasks are to be taken over after and Bosnia are also present in CAR today. six months by either a UN mission or the This humanitarian emergency demands African Union.

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When it discussed its role in Mali* in into a UN peacekeeping mission with up * See the SWP-Aktuell 2013, the European Union made an in- to 10,000 troops and 1,800 police at the on Mali by Markus Kaim (8/2013, German, coherent impression. This time, its decision request of the African Union. The resolu- http://bit.ly/SWP13A08) of January 2014 shows the Union deter- tion also authorised the French armed and the Comments by mined to tackle crisis management in Africa forces in CAR to take all necessary measures Wolfram Lacher and using military and possibly civilian means to support MISCA in fulfilling its tasks. The Denis Tull (7/2013, http://bit.ly/SWP13C07). in the scope of the CSDP. A German con- mandate for EUFOR RCA Bangui is similarly tribution would not only underline Berlin’s doubly subsidiary, referring to support willingness to do more to satisfy its inter- both of MISCA and of the French “Sangaris” national responsibilities in this field. It contingent. The European Union’s support would also send European allies the im- has already found a financial expression, portant message that the German govern- with it providing €75 million for MISCA via ment now attributes greater importance the African Peace Facility. to the CSDP than it has in the past, and is The subsidiary character of the mission actively seeking to shape it. dovetails with the latest German and In recent years Franco-German security European security concepts, under which relations have reached an unprecedented national governments and other regional nadir. Diverging priorities and widely dif- organisations should be empowered to ferent foreign policy ambitions, for example undertake crisis management themselves. in international crisis management or If that succeeds there is no need for the joint procurement projects, have muddied European Union or NATO to take on a bilateral relations in this policy area. A direct role. clear declaration that the German govern- MISCA currently has about 5,400 soldiers ment is again seeking to deepen security in CAR (as of early March 2014), but only policy cooperation with Paris could also the Rwandan contingent is actively going give a new boost to the CSDP. The decision after the rival militias. It is becoming appar- of 19 February 2014 to deploy up to 250 ent that the African Union lacks the politi- German soldiers in Mali, including mem- cal cohesion necessary for MISCA to be suc- bers of the Franco-German Brigade, demon- cessful, and that the partiality of individual strates a reorientation of bilateral relations troop providers is endangering the effec- of the kind that could also occur in CAR. tiveness of the mission. This problem is likely to persist even if the intervention is transformed into a UN peacekeeping Support from AU and United mission, because the troop-contributing Nations: The Limits of Enabling nations would in all likelihood remain and Enhancing identical. Other problems arise out of the The UN Security Council authorised RCA subsidiary approach: three parallel but Bangui on 28 January 2014, in resolution intertwined military missions demand a S/RES/2134 (2014). The resolution fits into higher level of coordination, and respon- the existing legal framework regulating sibilities become blurred. Against this back- international crisis management in CAR: ground UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon resolution S/RES/2127 (2013) of 5 December has called for MISCA, Sangaris and EUFOR 2013 already noted that the situation in RCA forces to be placed under a joint com- CAR represented a threat to international mand. The so-called “Enable & Enhance peace and security. On that basis, under Initiative” encounters clear limits in the chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security case of CAR, when it comes to estimating Council authorised the African Union’s the expected success of the EU mission. MISCA stabilisation mission in CAR for twelve months and raised the prospect that MISCA could eventually be transformed

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The Functional Dimension: Congo in 2006 and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in The UN Security Council Mandate 2008/09. The more coordination is required Anyone who proposes an EU military inter- between participants and the more con- vention in CAR (with German participation) tributions of others are required in order must also state what objective the proposed to achieve a political goal through military mission is to pursue, what criteria are to engagement, the more questionable it be used for assessing success or failure, and becomes whether the tasks demanded by what timeframe is foreseen. In the case at the UN mandate or the respective German hand this is particularly difficult because policy can actually be fulfilled. All these the UN mandate not only defines ensuring concerns apply equally to the planned oper- public order as a purpose of the mission, ation in CAR: what fall-back option would but also lists a complex multidimensional Germany or the EU have in the event of package of tasks for the UN’s political repre- MISCA making no progress in the next six sentation in CAR since 2010, the Bureau months, if the planned UN mission was intégré des Nations Unies pour la Consoli- dropped and/or the timetable for the politi- dation de la Paix en République centrafri- cal transition process had to be shelved? caine (BINUCA). Alongside the aforemen- First criticisms from the French military tioned security elements, the package also suggest that Paris has plainly underesti- contains a disarmament component (demo- mated the dimensions of the challenge in bilising rebel militias and integrating them CAR. into the regular armed forces), a humani- Comparably broad UN mandates have tarian dimension (protecting human rights in the past led Western capitals to overload and caring for refugees), a rule of law their military operations with complex dimension (strengthening police and judi- objectives (sometimes extraneous to the cial authorities) and a political component mandate), or conversely to equip them with (planning for a transitional government such small capabilities that the mandate and restoring constitutional order in CAR). could never be fulfilled. The same must be Most of these tasks must be fulfilled by the feared in the case of CAR. The focus on the African Union and United Nations rather humanitarian dimension illustrates the than the European Union. But whether the problem. In this respect the mandate is very EU mission in CAR can achieve more than clearly defined and comparatively modest: symbolic success will depend on whether EUFOR RCA Bangui will concentrate on the that preparatory work is actually done, capital. But according to current reports and done well. The UN mandate clearly in- thousands of internal refugees have gath- dicates that although comprehensive and ered not only in Bangui, but also in two lasting regulation of the conflicts in CAR areas around Bossangoa (300 km from the requires a military component, it will capital) and (more than 700 km). be impossible without a parallel civilian To protect and supply them would demand dimension. considerable transport and security capac- The circumstances of the EU mission ities on the part of MISCA and the French are thus a good deal more complex and contingent. Currently it is unclear how this demanding than initially expected. In the situation should be dealt with. past comparable missions whose long-term A slim German contribution to a small success (measured not against the mandate EU mission supporting MISCA is without but against overarching political objectives) doubt politically important from the per- depended completely or largely on the co- spective of Germany’s international respon- operation of other international, regional sibility and strengthening regional security or national actors have been problematic organisations and the United Nations. But or condemned to failure. Examples in the it will have little impact in CAR. The worst African context would include EUFOR RD case would be an appearance of success for

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the European Union, with the mandate The Robust Option fulfilled in the sense of securing Bangui, In this case Germany would contribute a restoring public order there and feeding larger contingent of soldiers to a mission the population – but the failure of all in CAR, either directly in the French Opera- political and humanitarian efforts in the tion Sangaris or a few months later in the rest of the country, leaving nothing gained planned UN mission. Both variants imply a with respect to the overaching political presence across the entire territory of CAR, objectives. EUFOR RD Congo was confronted which is clearly associated with greater with this problem in 2006: Although it suc- challenges and risks and would therefore cessfully supported the UN mission in hold- be correspondingly controversial in Ger- ing elections, as per its mandate, it was able many. On the other hand there would also to exert very little positive influence on be a greater chance of fulfilling the essence overall political developments in DR Congo. of the UN mandate, namely restoring pub- lic order throughout the country and

enabling displaced persons to be cared for © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Possible Steps for Germany wherever they are located. In view of public Politik, 2014 In view of the crumbling state structure, promises by Chancellor Angela Merkel and All rights reserved the multitude of violent actors fighting one Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, These Comments reflect another and the devastating humanitarian who have ruled out a “combat operation” solely the authors’ views. emergency, it would be mistaken to expect in CAR, the choice of this option is, how- SWP a rapid, imminently deployable and effec- ever, unlikely. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik tive military mission. Germany and the EU German Institute for have three options for action in this situa- International and Security Affairs tion: The Civilian Option There are two fundamental requirements Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 for comprehensive conflict management in 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 The Symbolic Option CAR: rapid military intervention to contain Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Germany could participate symbolically the humanitarian emergency, and beyond www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] in the EU mission, for example with an air- that a lasting civilian engagement. The craft and a number of staff officers in the European Union, with the military and ISSN 1861-1761 operation’s headquarters. This would at civilian components of its crisis manage- Translation by Meredith Dale least demonstrate good will and Germany’s ment, is especially well-equipped for both (English version of intention to accept greater responsibility tasks. Germany, especially, has repeatedly SWP-Aktuell 10/2014) and strengthen the CSDP. But the success of called for the use of civilian instruments. the European Union and a possible German To that extent it would be only logical if contingent would remain geographically the German government were to supply and functionally restricted, and thus illu- substantial capacities for fulfilment of the sory. The restricted mandate could even non-military dimension of the UN mandate. turn the operation into a burden for Ger- These could include financial, material and man politics, if the impression arose that personnel contributions, for example for European military contingents were watch- feeding and housing refugees, establishing ing helplessly as massive human rights functioning security forces, improving gov- violations occurred. Decision-makers in ernance, reintegrating militias, supporting Brussels and Berlin should clearly commu- elections, prosecuting human rights viola- nicate such limits in the interests of expec- tions, and much more. This civilian dimen- tation management. sion has to date been little discussed in Germany and Europe. But it will play a key role in any medium- and long-term conflict regulation.

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