Critical Currents No.5 October 2008

critical currents Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Occasional Paper Series

The United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa Lessons and no.5 Prospects 1 Critical Currents no. 2 October 2008 Beyond Diplomacy – Perspectives on Dag Hammarskjöld 1

critical currents no.5 October 2008

The United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa Lessons and Prospects

With contributions by Kwesi Aning Linnea Bergholm Andreas Mehler

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Uppsala 2008 The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation pays tribute to the memory of the second Secretary-General of the UN by searching for and examining workable alternatives for a socially and economically just, ecologically sustainable, peaceful and secure world.

In the spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Critical Currents is an integrity, his readiness to challenge the Occasional Paper Series dominant powers and his passionate plea published by the for the sovereignty of small nations and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. their right to shape their own destiny, the It is also available online at Foundation seeks to examine mainstream www.dhf.uu.se. understanding of development and bring to the debate alternative perspectives of often Statements of fact or opinion unheard voices. are those of the authors and do not imply endorsement By making possible the meeting of minds, by the Foundation. experiences and perspectives through the Manuscripts for review organising of seminars and dialogues, should be sent to the Foundation plays a catalysing role [email protected]. in the identifi cation of new issues and the formulation of new concepts, policy Series editor: Henning Melber proposals, strategies and work plans towards Language editor: Wendy Davies solutions. The Foundation seeks to be at the Layout: Karim Kerrou cutting edge of the debates on development, Design: Mattias Lasson security and environment, thereby Printed by X-O Graf Tryckeri AB continuously embarking on new themes ISSN 1654-4250 in close collaboration with a wide and Copyright on the text is with the constantly expanding international network. authors and the Foundation. Contents

Preface ...... 5

Kwesi Aning The UN and the African Union’s security architecture: defi ning an emerging partnership? ...... 9

Linnea Bergholm The UN and the AU: a co-dependent relationship on matters of peace and security ...... 25

Andreas Mehler Positive, ambiguous or negative? UN peacekeeping in the local security fabric ...... 41

Preface

Hammarskjöld was the person who made the UN an active peace organization rather than just the diplomatic, bureaucratic outfi t it had started as. He was the person who developed peacekeeping, and he became the world’s chief negotiator of really diffi cult problems.

Sir Brian Urquhart1

The origins1 of the United Nations’ role He was under the direct command of the in peacekeeping operations, as this testi- Secretary-General. UNEF became the fi rst mony of a close staff member in his offi ce force under a command with purely inter- confi rms, are inextricably linked with the national responsibilities. organisation’s second Secretary-General. The initial two involvements of direct UN With the Congo crisis emerging in 1960 (as presence in precarious local settings preced- a direct result of which Hammarskjöld sac- ing them were military observer missions, rifi ced his life in September 1961 during his which monitored a truce in Palestine and in eff orts to fi nd a negotiated solution) the UN Kashmir respectively. With the Suez crisis peacekeeping mission deployed within a in 1956, military observers were no longer matter of weeks a veritable military contin- enough. It was then that the deployment of gent, seeking to stabilise the deteriorating UN peacekeeping forces in larger numbers situation: ‘We fl ew in 3,000 soldiers in three came about. By resolutions 1000 and 1001 days and another 10,000 in two weeks. They of 5 and 7 November 1956 respectively the simply arrived and got between people who United Nations General Assembly estab- were likely to be killing each other.’2 lished the practice of this kind of intervention, thereby actively assuming already in Since then, peacekeeping operations by UN broad terms what more recently has been forces have become a regular feature and termed the ‘responsibility to protect’, al- steadily increased. Since the turn of the cen- beit in a slightly diff erent context. The tury, the number of peacekeepers in opera- United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) tion has almost trebled. African missions have was subsequently created to secure and su- over the years absorbed increasing capacity pervise the cessation of hostilities under a and funds. Currently, some 90,000 peace- commander appointed by the Assembly. keepers are deployed in 17 missions world- wide, of which eight – with staff outnumber-

1 Kreisler, Harry, ‘A Life in Peace and War. ing by far the total of all other missions – are Conversation with Sir Brian Urquhart’, 19 March 1996. http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/ Urquhart/urquhart6.html (accessed 26/08/2008) 2 Ibid.

Th e Quest for Regional Representation – Reforming the United Nations Security Council 5 in African countries. The current costs of Dag Hammarskjöld would have welcomed UN peacekeeping missions are estimated to the willingness by African states to share the exceed US$ 6.5 billion a year with the mis- burden of peacekeeping and security opera- sions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic tions with the UN and to take over increas- of Congo absorbing almost half of the budget. ing responsibility for the operations. There But operations suff er from lack of funds, re- remains however much to be improved, to main overstretched and become increasingly achieve maximum eff ect for the benefi t of unable to accomplish their missions: ‘Critics the people. The three contributions in this argue that the Security Council appears to issue of our Occasional Paper series Critical have little problem sanctioning peacekeeping Currents seek to provide useful insights, with missions but fi nds it diffi cult to stump up the the aim of improving future operations. We resources to carry out their mandate.’ 3 trust that this is a humble mission accom- plished, thereby honouring the legacy of The beginning of this century also resulted Dag Hammarskjöld constructively and with in a shift in continental African policy para- relevance for today and tomorrow. digms from the holy principle of non-intervention into sovereign states under the Or- Henning Melber ganisation of African Unity (OAU) towards more collective responsibility, as refl ected in the Constitution of the African Union (AU). As a result, a new security architecture has been emerging, which involves the active engagement of African states to solve confl icts in AU member countries. African governments are now willing to provide means for peacekeeping operations jointly with the UN. While this is a positive development, its fi rst results have been rather mixed: ‘The AU’s experience in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia suggests that the organisation has much to do to improve its abil- ity to deliver peace and security to African citizens. However, it goes without saying that the AU’s peace and security architecture will be a vital component of Africa’s strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent.’ 4

3 Bloomfi eld, Steve, ‘UN peacekeepers “at breaking point”’, The Independent, 28 July 2008. 4 Murithi, Tim, ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: the African Union mission in Burundi, the African Union mission in Sudan and the African Union mission in Somalia’, African Stud- UN Airplanes on ies Review, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2008, p. 82. monitoring mission. Photo: Dag Hammarskjöld

6 Critical Currents no. 5

Subsidiary Bodies Chairmen 8 Critical Currents no. 5 Brief Security Council. UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras The UN and the African Union’s security architecture: Defi ning an emerging partnership?

Kwesi Aning

There is no doubt that since the transformation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), this new institution is demonstrating an encouraging proactiveness in terms of its prepared- ness to tackle the continent’s peace and security challenges, and generally contributing to issues relating to the attainment of international peace and security. This has resulted in the establishment of new mechanisms and institutional frameworks for resolving confl icts in Africa. This is best exemplifi ed Kwesi Aning is currently head of the Confl ict by the increasing number of resolutions and Prevention Management and Resolution presidential statements adopted by the UN Department (CPMRD) of the Kofi Annan Security Council (UNSC) and the frequency International Peacekeeping Training Centre and regularity of matters considered by the (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. Until January 2008, African Union’s Peace and Security Council he served as a Senior Consultant to the UN (AU PSC) that are subsequently referred to Department of Political Aff airs and wrote a UN the UNSC. The frequent communications Secretary General’s report on ‘Th e relationship between these two bodies, the mentioning between the UN and regional organisations, and discussion of Africa-specifi c security particularly the African Union on peace and matters and the deference of Africa-related security’, which has been submitted to the UN security issues by the UNSC to the AU PSC Security Council. He was recently awarded a signal not only a deepening recognition of Non-Resident Fellow position by the Centre on the role that regional organisations and es- International Cooperation, New York University. pecially the African Union can play, but also its growing infl uence and potential role in contributing to the attainment of international peace and security.1

1 A/47/277-S/24111, para. 64.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 9 But the AU’s most promising achievements In this paper, I argue that collaborative ven- are usually attained when they engage in tures between the African Union (at the collaborative ventures that have interesting regional level), the regional economic com- perspectives and yield fruitful outcomes. munities (RECs) (at the sub-regional level) While these are encouraging, one must, and the UN (at the global level) are the best however, accept that there are still serious options for resolving some of the continent’s challenges in designing an eff ective peace most challenging human security dilemmas. and security architecture that can avoid bot- The world is experiencing a unique moment tlenecks and respond rapidly and eff ectively of opportunity in the relations between the to the multiple security challenges faced by United Nations and (sub)regional organisa- Africa. As a result, partnerships that are sat- tions broadly and the AU specifi cally. It is isfactory to the AU and its collaborative in- imperative, therefore, that (sub)regional or- stitutions are increasingly being established, ganisations, in areas of proximity to confl icts, especially with the European Union (EU) should be empowered and supported to take and in November 2006 with the Organisa- necessary actions to restore peace and securi- tion of American States (OAS). Although ty. However, in defi ning how such coopera- this paper is not about the AU’s partnership tive and collaborative relationships should be arrangements, it is important that in the dis- established, it is also imperative that regional cussion one fully explores the multiple in- organisations broadly, and the African Union terfaces where such collaborative ventures especially, should not be viewed in isolation; best compliment each other. rather, it needs to be recognised that the AU’s supporting mechanisms and infrastructure, This paper seeks to do three things. First, it the RECs, all have roles to play in attaining explores the deepening effi cacy of the AU, overall global security. especially in matters relating to peace and security and its institutional effi cacy in elic- iting member states’ compliance with re- Towards the African Union’s peace spect to their responsibility to protect, and and security architecture therefore focuses especially on its peace and security architecture and its broader rela- In this section, I describe how the African tionship with the international mechanisms Union has established institutional mecha- for attaining peace and stability. Second, nisms to support its role in the prevention, it explores how the UN can contribute to management and resolution of confl icts, improving its partnership with the AU and particularly through the establishment of its off ers a tentative explanatory framework for Peace and Security Council (PSC) in March some of the diffi culties that bedevil this re- 2004. This is the most critical institutional lationship. Third, it examines the opportu- component of the African Union’s peace and nities that have been created for networks security architecture. More important is that of specialised agencies to support the AU in the AU’s new security regime is premised on its endeavour to tackle issues of peace and several norms, which are both old (based on security on the continent. the Charter of the OAU) and new (emanat- ing from the Constitutive Act). These core norms, which I argue form the central planks of the AU’s security regime, are:

10 Critical Currents no. 5 • Sovereign equality of member states warning arrangement to facilitate timely and (Article 4a) effi cient response to confl ict and crisis situa- • Non-intervention by member states tions in Africa’.2 Furthermore, the PSC is the (Article 4g) single most powerful institution within the • African solutions to African problems peace architecture of the AU. In consultation • Uti possidetis (Article 4b) with the Chairperson of the AU, the PSC: • Non-use of force/peaceful settlement of disputes (Articles 4e, 4f, 4i) • Undertakes peacemaking and peace- • Condemnation of unconstitutional building functions to resolve confl icts changes of government (Article 4p) where they have occurred • The AU’s right to intervene in a member • Authorises the mounting and deployment state in grave circumstances (Article 4h) of peace support missions • Recommends to the assembly of Heads A combination of these values and norms of State and Government intervention plus the institutional mechanisms has given within a member state in respect of se- the AU an institutional vibrancy that cre- vere circumstances, namely war crimes, ates opportunities for proactive responses to genocide and crimes against humanity some of the continent’s security challenges. • Institutes sanctions whenever an uncon- A core document that defi nes the principles stitutional change of government takes and objectives of the AU’s security policy is place in a member state the Constitutive Act of July 2002. In its pre- • Implements the common defence policy amble, it states that member states are: of the AU3 • Follows up the progress towards the promo- Conscious of the fact that the scourge tion of democratic practices, good govern- of confl icts in Africa constitutes a ma- ance, the rule of law, protection of human jor impediment to the socio-economic rights and fundamental freedoms, respect of development of the continent, and [rec- the sanctity of human life and international ognise] the need to promote peace, secu- humanitarian law by member states rity and stability as a prerequisite for the • Supports and facilitates humanitarian ac- implementation of our development and tion in situations of armed confl icts or integration agenda. major natural disasters • Coordinates and harmonises continental Prior to the adoption of the Constitutive eff orts in the prevention and combating Act, several processes had begun to establish of terrorism.4 a collective African security regime. This began with the establishment of a Peace and Security Council in July 2002 as a standing 2 See for example Chapter IV (b), Article 16 of the Common African Defence and Security Policy decision-making organ of the Union. Sub- (CADSP). sequently, the Protocol establishing the PSC 3 See also Chapter IV, Article 15 (b) and Article 3 (e) and became eff ective in December 2003 after the Introduction, CADSP, point 3 of the Solemn Declara- tion on a Common African Defence and Security Pol- required ratifi cation by 27 member states. icy. Here, it states clearly that, the PSC shall ‘implement the Common Defence Policy of the Union’. The PSC, which comprises 15 member states 4 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace of the AU, is ‘a collective security and early- and Security Council of the African Union, Article 3.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 11 In addition to the PSC Protocol, the peace - Salim Ahmed Salim, former secretary- and security architecture includes the Afri- general of the Organisation of African can Union Non-Aggression and Common Unity (East Africa) Defence Pact, adopted by the 4th Ordinary - Brigalla Hlope Bam, chairperson of Session of the Assembly of the Union, held the Independent Electoral Commis- in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005; the sion of South Africa (Southern Africa) Common African Defence and Security - Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Policy (CADSP), adopted by the Second Algeria (North Africa) Extraordinary Session of the Union, held - Elisabeth K. Pognon, president of the Con- in Sirte, Libya, in February 2005; as well stitutional Court of Benin (West Africa) as other security instruments of the Union, - Miguel Trovoda, former president of Sao such as the Treaty establishing the African Tomé and Principé (Central Africa). Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone (the Pelindaba Treaty) and the Convention for the Preven- • The continental early warning system tion and Combating of Terrorism. While (CEWS), the aim of which is to ‘facili- previous eff orts concentrated on confl ict tate the anticipation and prevention of resolution, the new peace and security ar- confl icts’ on the continent. It is made chitecture provides for a holistic approach up of a Situation Room at Addis Ababa, to the promotion of peace and security in Ethiopia, and linked into the early warn- Africa. Furthermore, as part of the broader ing mechanisms of the regional econom- framework for establishing this security ar- ic communities; of these, the Intergov- chitecture, the PSC is supported by a host of ernmental Authority on Development institutional arrangements, including: (IGAD) has established its own confl ict early warning and response mechanism – • The Commission of the African Union through CEWARN – which primarily focuses on the Chairperson and the Commissioner for small-scale pastoral confl icts. In this par- Peace and Security and the Directorate for ticular case, the PSC Protocol makes pro- Peace and Security. This department, in vision for and authorises the Commission terms of Africa’s peace and security issues, ‘…[to] collaborate with…research cent- is the most critical. The core divisions are: ers, academic institutions and NGOs, to (a) Confl ict Management, (b) Peace Sup- facilitate the eff ective functioning of the port Operations, (c) Defence and Security, Early Warning System’.5 (d) Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), and (e) the Secretariat to the Peace and Se- curity Council.

• A fi ve-member Panel of the Wise consist- ing of ‘highly respected African person- alities’ selected on the basis of regional representation and appointed for three years to serve as a proactive confl ict pre- 5 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace vention team. This team comprises: and Security Council of the African Union, Article 12 (3).

12 Critical Currents no. 5 • An African Standby Force (ASF), made up In the face of the challenges posed by con- of fi ve regional brigades.6 The ASF has fl icts to the attainment of the integration the technical support and backing of a agenda, the need to establish a common de- Military Staff Committee (MSC) whose fence and security policy for the continent role is to provide technical suggestions was recognised.9 and solutions to issues relating to military issues and to provide expert opinions to Towards this end, at a meeting of Heads of the PSC before military decisions are State and Government in Sirte, Libya, in made. Furthermore, there is recognition February 2004 the Solemn Declaration on that ‘that ‘[i]n undertaking [its] functions, a Common African Defence and Security the African Standby Force shall, where Policy was adopted. The fundamental philo- appropriate, cooperate with …regional sophical idea underlying this document was organizations, as well as with national that of human security. It went on to identify authorities and NGOs’.7 23 diff erent categories of threats to Africa. The CADSP introduces a new concept into • The RECs, which, according to the PSC African defence and security thinking which Protocol, should help the PSC perform is both fascinating and creates options and its functions by ‘…hold[ing] informal new niches for contributions by civil society consultations with parties concerned by organisations (CSOs). This is borne out by or interested in a confl ict or a situation the argument ‘…that each African country’s under its consideration, as well as with defence is inextricably linked to that of other Regional mechanisms, international or- African countries, as well as that of other re- ganations and civil society organizations gions and, by the same token, that of the Af- as may be needed for the discharge of its rican continent as a whole’.10 responsibilities’.8 The identifi ed com mon secur it y threats span • A Special Peace Fund. both inter-state and intra-state confl icts/ tension, unstable post-confl ict situations 6 Among some of the functions that the ASF shall perform and other factors that engender insecurity, are: (a) observation and monitoring missions; (b) other namely refugees and internally displaced types of peace support operations; (c) intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the persons (IDPs), use of landmines and unex- request of a Member State in order to restore peace and ploded ordinance, illicit proliferation, circu- security, in accordance with Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the lation and traffi cking in small arms and light Constitutive Act; (d) preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a confl ict from escalating, (ii) an weapons, pandemic diseases such as HIV/ on-going violent confl ict from spreading to neighbour- AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, environmental ing areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence degradation, violent and other crimes, in- after parties to a confl ict have reached an agreement; (e) peace-building, including post-confl ict disarmament cluding organised and cross border crimes, and demobilisation; (f) humanitarian assistance to allevi- ate the suff ering of civilian population in confl ict areas and support eff orts to address major natural disasters. All 9 See Constitutive Act, Articles 3 (a) to (h) and 4(d). these duties are in Article 3, (a) to (g). 10 The Solemn Declaration on a Common African 7 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Defence and Security Policy, Articles 5 and 12 (i). Security Council of the African Union, Article 13 (4). This actually forms one of the new cardinal principles 8 Ibid, Article 11. inherent in the CADSP.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 13 human traffi cking, drug traffi cking, money From rhetoric to reality: normative laundering.11 The expansive nature of the commitments and political issues identifi ed threats generates opportunities for diff erent expert groups to make contri- While the RECs, which are the building butions both to the policy formulation and blocks upon which the AU is established, the implementation processes of the AU. CSOs and other organisations are working hard to stymie confl icts, the AU as the prin- Added to these identifi ed ‘common threats’ cipal regional organisation has undergone are areas of a Common African Defence a normative shift from its earlier position and Security Policy, in relation to child under the OAU by positing that non-inter- soldiers, peace-building and peacekeeping ference does not mean indiff erence (Kon- as well as post-confl ict rehabilitation and are 2004). On this basis, the AU has moved reconstruction including demobilisation, towards a more preventive, principled and disarmament and reintegration.12 Further- coercive role. The complexity of challenges more, the document stated the objectives faced by the African continent has contrib- and goals of the policy, the principles and uted to a ‘novel idea’: values underlying the CADSP, which I argue represents the adoption of a multi- The notion of non-interference must be dimensional notion of security and thus revised because it must never be associ- provides a more encompassing and holistic ated with indiff erence. And this non-indif- approach to identifying and responding to ference must lead to coercive measures, to security threats. According to Golaszinski well-adapted and active policies.13 (2004) a combination of the CADSP, the PSC Protocol and other documents ‘pro- In whatever sense one examines this state- vides a framework for a regular review and ment, this is a radical departure from the na- close monitoring of the implementation of ture of traditional African international rela- all instruments relevant to Africa’s eff orts tions since 1963. It is important to appreciate to promote peace and security’. the context within which the AU is developing such specifi c ‘principles’ and norms to guide community action. What can be de- duced is that by emphasising issues of secu- 11 CADSP, Article 8 (1-4). The document further de- rity (among a panoply of other issue-areas), fi nes what it perceives as ‘common external threats. the AU is developing into a regime with spe- These ‘refer to external challenges to Africa’s con- cifi c rules, norms and principles as enunciated tinental security, which may engender or have the potential, either directly or indirectly, to constrain in Article 4 of the Protocol relating to the es- individual and collective eff orts to achieve conti- tablishment of the PSC. Its functions are spelt nental security goals’. These include among others, out in Article 6 and powers of execution in mercenarism, international terrorism and terrorist Article 7. The collective impact of these in- activities, weapons of mass destruction, cross border crimes such as drug and human traffi cking et al. See Article 8 (a) to (h) of the CADSP. 12 Article 10 of the CADSP. 13 Konare (2004: 2), emphasis added.

14 Critical Currents no. 5 stitutional mechanisms is to give operational • cases where there have been constitu- expression to the ‘new culture of peace’. tional illegalities or changes of govern- ment15 Rules, in this sense, ‘relate to the written • the demarcation of boundaries rules and guidelines within the specifi c issue • genocide and gross human rights abuses area that the signatory states essentially have • the issue of the fairness of elections (see voluntarily accepted to uphold’. Further- Konare 2004: 3). more, and in the same vein, ‘principles are the results of the development of a common In the Constitutive Act, the AU has ‘the understanding and collective interpretation right to intervene in a Member State pursu- of reality of individual incidents…that aff ect ant to decision of the Assembly in respect member states’.14 of grave circumstances: namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.16 To that end, several questions arise, which These principles were given further accept- will need to be disaggregated and examined: ance with the adoption of the Ezulwini Con- sensus, which is presented by the AU as Af- • First, what explains this radical shift in rica’s endorsement and incorporation of the approach and methodology? responsibility to protect principle.17 • Second, what is the level of bindingness, understood as the level of political will- The above, therefore, is the extent to which ingness of structural commitments that the idea of non-intervention but responsive- member states have made to employ such coercive measures? 15 See Decisions AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV) and AHG/ • What role, if any, have epistemic com- Dec.142 (XXXV) on Unconstitutional Changes of munities played in bringing about this Government adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session critical change in policy? of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, 12-14 July 1999, • Finally, what set of occurrences will elicit and Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the responses that demonstrate the characterisa- Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitu- tion of the African Union as ‘exist[ing] and tional Changes of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State keep[ing] its promises of rebirth’ (see Aning and Government of the OAU, held in Lomé, Togo, 1998: 1), which are the issues of security, de- 10-12 July 2000. fence and economic development? 16 See also Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act. A further addition to Article 4(h) gives the AU the right of intervention in cases of ‘a serious threat to legitimate It is important to understand the normative order to restore peace and stability in the Member framework within which the AU’s peace State of the Union upon the recommendation of the and security regime is situated. Various situ- Peace and Security Council’. 17 Although Articles 4 (h) and (j) exist, there are as ations and issues are identifi ed as potentially yet no specifi c operational mechanisms for guiding warranting coercive measures. These are: decision-making, apart from the ones taken by the PSC. See African Union (2005), ‘The Common Af- rican Position on the Proposed Reform of the Unit- ed Nations – “The Ezulwini Consensus”’, Executive 14 For further exposition, see Aning (1998: 48ff ). Council, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) especially Section B, paras 1 and 11.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 15 ness should be seen. Although the concept, • Darfur presents a unique and particularly as has been enunciated, will be challenging tough challenge as to how such developing in praxis it is not impossible to implement. norms and principles should be applied. However, what is critical in this discussion is Here, it is obvious that both the AU and the extent of the political will to apply coer- the wider international community have cive measures when it becomes imperative. so far failed to change Sudan’s behaviour. Not only that; there might arise a situation where there is the need to disaggregate the • In the case of Somalia, the establishment type of coercive measures that are antici- of the African Union Mission in Somalia pated in terms of state size, power and infl u- (AMISOM) and the reluctance of African ence. Although this issue has not yet arisen, states to contribute troops to the mission it is critical that there is thinking about how demonstrate the chasm between rhetoric best to respond to any challenge that arises and reality. from having to respond coercively to a large and powerful state. • Recognition of Somaliland by AU member states as an independent member of the From theory to praxis: Togo, Mauritania, comity of nations need not pose any chal- Darfur, Somalia and Somaliland lenges contrary to either the OAU and the AU’s positions on state recognition. Soma- However, since 2004 these norms, values liland’s case presents particularly interest- and principles have been unevenly applied ing perspectives in terms of the interpreta- to states that have fallen foul of them: tion of the norm of uti possidetis.

• In the case of Togo, for example, it took This is the framework within which the the combined leadership of ECOWAS AU seeks to deepen its partnership with (Economic Community of West African the UN, particularly in the areas of peace States) and the AU to bring about a re- and security issues. The AU recognises that versal of the palace coup d’état that took its peace and security actions on the conti- place after the death of the president in nent will be eff ective if it cooperates with February 2005. the UN. To that end, the African Union, at its Summit meeting held on 22-30 January • In Mauritania, the blanket application of 2007 entreated the UN to examine, within sanctions after the coup d’état did not the context of Chapter VIII of the United bring the desired change and a reversal Nations Charter, the possibility of funding, of the military take-over, despite the sus- through assessed contributions, peacekeep- pension of its membership by the AU and ing operations undertaken by the African broader international eff orts to encour- Union or under its authority and with the age a return to democratic government. consent of the UN. However, Mauritania has managed to hold free and fair elections, with a democratic regime in place now.

16 Critical Currents no. 5 An emerging partnership? spite of what can be seen as a signifi cant ef- fort to collaborate with other organisations, Can one say that there is an emerging re- such cooperation does not come easily to lationship between the AU and the UN? the UN, which is structured and funded There is no doubt that in the last decade to focus on its own operations rather than there has been a growing recognition by the those led by other groups even when such UNSC of the need to cooperate more closely missions are authorised or supported by the with regional organisations, particularly the Security Council. AU, under Chapter VIII of the Charter. For example, in 1989 there were no references in In seeking to improve the cooperation and Security Council resolutions to regional or- coordination between the UN and regional ganisations, and in 1990 there was only one organisations, especially the African Union, such reference. From 1991, however, refer- there are several issues that should be re- ences to regional organisations’ engagement solved concerning how to interpret Chapter in confl ict became common. The period VIII of the UN Charter. Part of this deals between 1989 and 1992 saw resolutions ex- with the discussion of the role of regional pressly recalling Chapter VIII of the UN organisations broadly, but the AU specifi - Charter; conveying appreciation of regional cally, in international peace and security. But eff orts aimed at the settlement of a confl ict; more importantly, it is also about the type, supporting cooperation between the UN nature and division of responsibilities. There is and regional organisations; or endorsing re- no doubt that any endeavour to resolve and gional eff orts.18 While most of the references understand the nature of the relationship concerned attempts at peaceful settlement of between the United Nations and regional disputes, this period also saw the fi rst au- organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN thorisation by the Security Council of the Charter will need to address some of the use of force by a regional organisation.19 It defi nitional and conceptual issues inherent is clear that since 1989, and especially since in any such a relationship and partnership. 2004, the Council’s practice with respect to This is critical because it is becoming obvi- approving actions undertaken by regional ous that while both the UN and regional organisations has increased. organisations talk about partnership(s), there is a fundamental misconception, misunder- Early initiatives along these lines were wel- standing and misperception of what such comed by the General Assembly.20 As a fol- partnerships entail, and what should be the low-up to GA Res 48/42 in 1994 there was guiding principles of this relationship. a Declaration of the General Assembly that regional organisations in peace and security Over the past years, there has been a deep- should be encouraged and, where appropri- ening of the relationships and interfaces be- ate, supported by the Security Council.21 In tween the UN and regional organisations generally in the areas of securing interna-

18 S/25184 tional peace and security. And nowhere is 19 S/25567; S/PV.3191 this more practically demonstrated than in 20 General Assembly resolution 48/42, para. 63 the UN’s collaboration with the African 21 General Assembly resolution 49/57, annex, para. 5

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 17 Union. Responding to and collaborating ity for promoting peace, security and stabil- with the AU on diff erent forms of crises has ity in Africa’.22 However, further on in the demonstrated beyond doubt that when col- Protocol, it pledges to ‘cooperate and work laboration between the UN and regional or- closely’ with the UNSC.23 For clarity, the ganisations is implemented correctly, it goes PSC Protocol states: a long way towards bringing about success, as exemplifi ed in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Where necessary, recourse will be made Burundi. Understanding and appreciating to the United Nations to provide the how such partnerships should be designed is necessary fi nancial, logistical, and mili- primary to determining the outlines of this tary support for the African Union’s relationship. activities in the promotion and mainte- nance of peace and stability in Africa, in Division of responsibilities keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN charter.24 There is no doubt that the best way to prevent confl icts is when the United Nations While the UN Charter stipulates that it can partners with regional organisations in authorise a regional organisation to under- which the parameters of such partnerships take enforcement action under its authority, are well defi ned and well coordinated. Es- it also asserts that, ‘no enforcement action tablishing support arrangements for such shall be taken under regional arrange- cooperation and coordination will not be ments…without the authorization of the achieved easily. A division of labour will not Security Council’.25 It is clear from the cu- be without political implications. However, mulative proactive interventionist language the AU’s active engagement with peace and in both the Constitutive Act and the PSC security issues on the African continent is Protocol that, whilst the UN’s primacy in fraught with challenges and diffi culties both maintaining international peace and secu- among its member states and in terms of its rity is recognised, the AU has also reserved relations with the UN. There are several for itself an interventionist role that only re- provisions in both the Constitutive Act and verts to the UN where necessary.26 the Protocol establishing the AU PSC that on the surface appear to be contradictory. But herein lie the possible conceptual, legal, A cursory glance at the two documents political and operational pitfalls: if the AU shows a level of uncertainty as to whether has these provisions, to what extent must the PSC has taken upon itself the primary responsibility for peace and security in Af- 22 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace rica. Furthermore, nothing in either the and Security Council of the African Union, Article 16 (1). Constitutive Act or the Protocol establish- 23 Ibid, Article 17. ing the PSC openly requires the AU to seek 24 Ibid, Article 17 (2) prior consent from the UNSC. But there are 25 UN Charter, Article 53 (1) 26 A combination of the Constitutive Act (Articles 4 potential diffi culties and confl icts here be- (h) and (j)) and the PSC Protocol, Articles 4 (j) and tween the two organisations. The PSC has (k), Article 6 (d), 7 (c) - (g), Article 16 (10) and 17 (1) arrogated to itself the ‘primary responsibil- and (2) amply demonstrate this cumulative desire to initiate intervention schemes.

18 Critical Currents no. 5 the UN support the AU when the PSC nature of such relationships. For example, takes unilateral decisions like authorising its how far can the UN go to support decisions member states to contribute troops to form taken by regional organisations outside the the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? remit of the Security Council. What does While such decisions create diffi culties for delegation of authority mean? both organisations, there is no doubt that There is an apparent schism in understand- Africa, for example, has come a long way ing between the UN and regional organi- in defi ning and refi ning its peace and secu- sations when the functions of the UN are rity architecture since the end of the Cold ‘delegated’ to regional organisations. There War. However, Africa’s experiences in the is a need to bridge this apparent gap and de- peace and security fi eld, especially its rela- fi ne the conditions under which there can tionship with the UNSC, have contributed be more scope for partnerships in the UN, to undermining the notion that the Security and how the UN can assume a larger role in Council is the only organisation that does operations managed by regional organisa- peacekeeping. It is fair to conclude that this tions, either through co-deployment, co-fi - assumption is outmoded. nancing or hybrid forces. Such an approach requires the UN to decide whether it can Although these diffi culties exist, there are aff ord to have ad-hoc approaches and del- several reasons why the role of regional egate what it considers as non-core missions organisations in peacekeeping should be to regional organisations. encouraged and supported. These include their proximity to the crisis, their familiar- With the increase in the interfaces and syner- ity with the actors and issues involved in a gies between the UN and regional organisa- particular crisis and, more importantly, the tions, particularly the African Union, there perception and recognition that a regional appears to be recognition that regionalism organisation has an interest in resolving a as a component of multilateralism is desira- crisis that has erupted in its background. ble, feasible and necessary. There is now the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter underlines possibility of a global/regional mechanism the roles that regional organisations can play for maintaining international peace and se- as partners of the UN in maintaining in- curity. This is based on the recognition of ternational peace and security. This is the the need for greater involvement by regional reason why when the African Union un- agencies in confl ict prevention and manage- dertakes peace and security interventions: it ment in all regions, in cooperation with the perceives its actions as a contribution to the United Nations. It is this that underpins the UN and the general international commu- vision of a ‘mutually-reinforcing regional- nity and therefore expects to be supported. global mechanism’ for peace and security.27 However, the Security Council’s responses This mechanism can be eff ective if there is to decisions made by regional organisations a combination of fl exibility and impartial- are, at best, ad hoc. There is certainly the ity pragmatism and consistency. Such an need to discuss what exactly the term ‘part- approach will reduce the endemic uncer- nership’ means. Understanding such part- tainties and occasional tensions between the nership also raises several issues about the UN – responsible for international peace

27 A/61/204 – S/2006/590

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 19 and security – and regional agencies, which and effi cient responses to confl ict and crisis are meant to play a supporting role. situations in Africa.

However, much as there is a recognition of Following the establishment of the AU PSC the potential for and sometimes the reality in March 2004, the Security Council adopt- of greater involvement by regional agencies ed two Presidential Statements,28 which in confl ict prevention and management in recognised the importance of strengthen- all regions, in cooperation with the UN, the ing cooperation with the African Union real challenge is to replace the improvised, in order to help build its capacity to deal politically-selective, resource-skewed ap- with security challenges. This cooperation proach to regionalism with a more planned, has been epitomised in Security Council consistent – yet fl exible and resource-bal- resolution 1625, expressing support for the anced – style of regional and global govern- establishment of a 10-year capacity building ance on the part of the UNSC. programme for the African Union.

The trend in recent years has been a moving As a result, several practical measures have away from the exclusive reliance on UN-man- been undertaken. For example, on 12 No- dated peace enforcement operations in favour vember 2006, the Department for Political of ‘hybrid’ operations in which the UN and Aff airs received a request from the Com- other international organisations cooperate in mission of the African Union to train staff various ways over the same mission. members of the Secretariat of the Peace and Security Council, on the work of the Secu- Coordination and consultation mechanisms rity Council. To help improve the perform- ance of the PSC Secretariat, the Security Improved partnerships between the UN Council Aff airs Bureau organised two train- and regional organisations by extension as- ing programmes focusing on the working sume that there will be coordination and methods of the Security Council and the ac- consultation mechanisms between the UN tivities of the Security Council Aff airs Divi- Security Council and Peace and Security sion (SCAD) in its various aspects. Further to organs of other regional organisations. In these developments, on 16 November 2006, the case of the African Union in particu- my predecessor and the Chairperson of the lar, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), African Union signed a Declaration on En- was established as part of a new structure hancing UN-AU Cooperation.29 that provides a clear paradigm on security to construct a continental security ar- More recently, the UNSC also issued a presi- chitecture. The objectives of the AU PSC dential statement which encouraged increased include the promotion of peace, security exchange of information and sharing of expe- and stability in Africa, the anticipation and riences, best practices and lessons learned be- prevention of confl icts and the promotion tween the Security Council and the AU.30 of peace-building and post-confl ict reconstruction. Furthermore, it is established as a standing decision-making organ intended 28 S/PRST/2004/27 and S/PRST/2004/44 to function as a collective security and early 29 A/61/630 warning arrangement to facilitate timely 30 S/PRST/2007/7

20 Critical Currents no. 5 What role for non-state parties: can or should be operationalised. Identify- defi ning a new relationship? ing areas for NGO and CSO participation is therefore critical. In this section I focus on another important aspect of the emerging security architecture Evaluating CSO capacity and identifying as mentioned in the CADSP and the PSC areas of potential collaboration Protocol, namely the role of specialist NGOs and civil society organisations. I identify Clearly it is important to assess the capaci- three possible entry points through which ties that CSOs can bring to the table, paying organisations with the requisite expertise in particular attention to issues of subsidiarity, security-related issues can contribute to the comparative advantage and complimentarity. Commission’s work; I also address the prob- There are several identifi ed areas where CSOs lem of NGOs’ limited capacity in this area. can be of support to the AU in terms of confl ict CSOs and NGOs are referred to interchange- prevention, management and other actions. ably in the CADSP and the PSC Protocol, These are on two levels: conceptual and ana- as they are, too, in the analysis below. Both lytical work; and practical peacebuilding ac- can be seen as epistemic communities in the tivities.32 These are areas where the AU needs sense that these groups have a ‘common un- particular support and help from CSOs.33 derstanding of particular problems in their fi eld of research as well as an awareness of, Among some of the identifi ed weaknesses of and a preference for, a set of technical solu- the AU is the lack of: tions to these problems’ (Hansenclever et al. 1996: 209; see also Haas 1992: 3, 16-20). • in-depth analyses of confl icts to provide a sound basis for taking decisions on in- There are several references to CSOs and terventions NGOs in both AU documents. For exam- • adequate capacity to manage the confl icts ple, the PSC Protocol states, under the sec- on the continent tion referring to relations with civil society • independent analytical briefi ng of the AU organisations: on the situations in confl ict zones • mechanisms for disseminating informa- The Peace and Security Council shall en- tion about the decisions and operations of courage non-governmental organizations, the AU. community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate actively in the eff orts aimed at promoting peace, security 32 See ‘Civil Society–African Union consultative pro- and stability in Africa. When required, cess: towards a new partnership’, prepared by CSS- DCA/CIDO of the AU Commission, (n.d.), pp. 3-4. such organizations may be invited to ad- The concept note identifi es several areas for poten- dress the Peace and Security Council.31 tial CSO contribution and argues that ‘analyses of confl ict issuing from such indigenous sources have tended to have a diff erent thrust from those of for- However, nowhere in either document is eign scholars and think-tanks’. there a discussion of how this relationship 33 Ibid, p. 3. Other areas where CSOs can be of help are (a) mobilising resources, (b) as a conduit for early warning; see Murithi (2005: 121-125). 31 Article 20. See also Article 24 of the CADSP.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 21 Earlier I characterised CSOs and NGOs as want to be under public scrutiny; and the epistemic communities – that is, communi- dearth of civilian expertise on matters of ties with a shared understanding of particu- security. The latter issue helps explain why, lar issues pertaining to their area of expertise. after more than a decade of democratic dis- What, then, are the situations in which such pensation, only a few civil society groups are expert groupings can contribute to the op- actively engaged in the fi eld. Several security erationalisation of the AU’s peace and security areas are still highly specialised; as a result, architecture? Among the several possibilities there is both limited expertise and interest, a that exist, I will mention three: situation sustained by the traditional secrecy in which security-related issues have been (1) when a high degree of uncertainty exists cloaked. among policy-makers, arising out of insuffi cient understanding of complex issues There is therefore a need to broaden the and their causal linkages (see Hansenclever limited circle of experts and expertise, ex- et al. 1996) pand the space for debate on security sec- (2) when there is no coherent policy frame- tor reform (SSR) and democratise popu- work, as a result of lack of consensual lar participation and interrogation of the knowledge among experts concepts, norms and practices of security (3) when members of such communities gain analysis in Africa. Equally, there is a need to political power or have relatively unfet- avoid complacency in assuming that CSOs tered access to those with political power. are, by their mere existence, structurally superior to state structures and inherently Contextualising the role of CSOs is also im- better equipped to contribute positively to portant. While there is enthusiasm on the the security debates. Civil society may not part of the AU for a collaborative process, the always be ‘civil’ and ‘may be similarly un- number of non-state actors involved remains representative and unaccountable to society’ small. It was only in the late 1990s that a few (Damian 2002: 7). civil society organisations started to take an active role in security sector issues.34 Before To this end, more work needs to be done on then, two key factors militated against their how the United Nations can better support involvement: the nature of the regimes in arrangements for further cooperation and power, with their overriding penchant for coordination with the African Union on putting an embargo on issues they did not Chapter VIII arrangements to contribute to addressing common security challenges and 34 There is also increasing concern about the need to deepen and broaden dialogue and coopera- disaggregate the sum of CSOs proff ering expertise tion between the Security Council and the in particular issue areas. Murithi (2004: 113) warns about this proliferation and ‘...the assumption that Peace and Security Council of the African all civil society groups are benevolent in nature and Union. purpose. This of course would be a misconception. Civil society [groups]…can be just as authoritarian, in their internal governance, and as corrupt as the governments they criticize. Some civil society organizations are opportunistic enterprises convened for the purposes of taking advantage of donors...’

22 Critical Currents no. 5 Literature

Aning, K. (1998), Security in the West African Sub-region: An Analysis of ECOWAS’s Policies in Liberia, Copenhagen: Reprocentre. Damian, Lily et al. (2002), ‘A Goal Oriented Approach to Governance and Security Sec- tor Reform’, International Alert, London. Golaszinski, Ulrich (2004), ‘Africa’s evolving security architecture’, mimeo, October. Haas, Peter M. (1992), ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization, no. 46, pp. 1-35. Hansenclever, Andreas; Mayer, Peter and Rittberger, Volker (1996), ‘Interests, power, knowledge: the study of international regimes’, Mershon International Studies Review, no. 40. Konare, Alpha Oumar (2004), ‘Security is the African Union’s priority’, African Geo- politics, no. 13, winter. Murithi, Tim (2005), The African Union – Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Develop- ment, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 23 AU and UN Special Envoys for Darfur Peace Process 24 Critical Currents no. 5 Address Journalists. UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferre The UN and the AU: a co-dependent relationship on matters of peace and security

Linnea Bergholm*

This article looks at the advantages and limitations of a regional organisation, the African Union (AU), in its response to the large-scale civil war challenge of Dar- fur. I show how the quality of the evolving relationship between the UN and the AU had political implications for the type of response to Darfur that was chosen. One thorny question that may well continue to hamper the UN-AU relationship revolves around what it is that makes a confl ict international and/or local. This is important because it is the UN Security Council that determines whether a confl ict is of international signifi cance or not. If they agree that Linnea Bergholm is a PhD candidate it is, an internationally backed intervention at the University of Aberystwyth, would be expected to follow, in line with Department of International Politics. Th is UN peacekeeping principles.1 By contrast, article is based on one of the chapters the civil war in Darfur was framed as a local in her thesis, which provides a critical problem and, consequently, was met with less assessment of the AU’s involvement in Darfur and its civilian protection mandate in particular. She has carried * I wish to thank Ludwig Gelot for helpful and constructive comments on an earlier version of this article out ﬁ eld research in Darfur, Sudan, in November-December 2006 as well 1 Consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. The as in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and New Brahimi Report added that all mission mandates York, USA, in September-October need to be backed up with the appropriate politi- 2007. She will be completing her cal backing and resources from the UN membership. This is diffi cult to enforce, as long as Article 43 studies during the ﬁ rst half of 2009. of the UN Charter gives member states the right to selectively support missions with military and other assistance. See UN (2000).

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 25 urgency and less resolve. The AU lead in humanitarian crises.5 On 22 July 2004, the this confl ict symbolises a suspicion that Af- UN Security Council adopted Resolution rican political problems, involving no great 1556, which, under Chapter VII of the UN political, economic or security interests for Charter, determined that Sudan constituted the P5 states,2 may be framed as ‘chaotic’ or a threat to international peace and security ‘risky’.3 I argue that the international reac- and to stability in the region. Yet, subsequent tion to Darfur implied a co-dependent rela- non-compliance from the Khartoum gov- tionship between the UN and the AU. The ernment to UN demands met with no more implications of such co-dependence are in than empty threats. This was the case be- need of further discussion. cause the UN is politically constrained when enforcing certain decisions, most signifi - cantly Chapter VII missions into countries The UN, Sudanese sovereignty where the sitting regime does not consent to and the AU such intrusion.6 The Sudanese government had made it clear that it would not accept Denied by no one except the Government Western troops on its territory. The US pre- of Sudan (GoS), the crimes committed in ferred to steer clear of military options in Darfur amounted to human rights viola- the wake of the deeply unpopular interventions on a scale that required the invok- tion in another Islamic state: Iraq. Further- ing of the global ‘responsibility to protect’ more, the considerable diplomatic and fi - (R2P).4 On 5 December 2003, Jan Egeland, nancial investments by the US, Norway, the the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, said UK and the East-African Intergovernmen- that Darfur was amongst the world’s worst tal Authority on Development (IGAD) in the mediation of the North-South confl ict in Sudan hindered mediation of the Darfur confl ict (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 38).7 There was an unwillingness to acknowledge 2 The Permanent Five members of the Security Coun- cil: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and that the same politicians who were meant the United States. to implement peace, might be executing 3 Rwanda is the most high-profi le UN scandal along new war crimes elsewhere (Prunier 2005: these lines; see UN (1999). Of course, the lack of political will amongst Western nations to deploy ix). The Security Council avoided the mili- robustly in Africa is not absolute. There have been exceptions in cases that acquired ‘international’ importance, such as MONUC in the Democratic Re- 5 UN (2003), Press Release, December 12, AFR/789 public of Congo in its later years and Operation Pal- IHA/840. liser in Sierra Leone. 6 For two diff erent takes on this point, see Wheeler 4 Darfur was widely described as a fi rst test case for (2000) and Findlay (2002). R2P. The R2P framework, embraced by the UN 7 The UN’s political eff orts in Sudan initially focused member states in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 on the North-South confl ict, as seen in the existence UN World Summit Outcome Document, prescribes a ‘re- of the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) sponsibility to protect’ in grave circumstances: geno- since 2004 and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) cide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. from 2005. The main task for UNMIS was to over- Importantly, the R2P should not be equated with see the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace any carte blanche for military adventurism. The Agreement (CPA), concluded between the GoS and framework includes a broad range of policy choices, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army from prevention to reaction. (SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005.

26 Critical Currents no. 5 tary option for other geopolitical reasons as survival. It insisted that what was occurring well. Sudan exports oil to, and imports arms in Darfur was a tribal confl ict, an internal from, China and Russia.8 It trades terrorist matter in which no international organisa- intelligence with the US.9 In their capacity tion could legitimately intervene. By repeat- as UN Security Council P5 members, these ing and exaggerating the ethnic component states chose to stress the need to uphold Su- of the war, or its ‘African’ character, outside dan’s unity and to focus most attention on advocates played into the hands of the GoS.13 a large-scale humanitarian eff ort. In sum, There was hardly any acknowledgement of no non-African state was willing to commit the civil war in Darfur that had been well their troops to Darfur. In a remark telling of under way since 2002. This war was indica- how the UN is only as strong as its members tive of questions of power and development, allow it to be, then UN Secretary-General and posed a threat to the inner circle of the Kofi Annan admitted: ‘We can’t go and say regime (Prunier 2005: 106).14 The pressure “Send in the cavalry” and then not be able to do something mounted as reports of the to go through with it.’10 Additionally, from violence proliferated and the word ‘geno- the UN Secretariat’s point of view, a mis- cide’ began to be used.15 More and more sion in an area with ‘no peace to keep’ was sources showed that the ‘Janjaweed’, proxy seen as infeasible.11 militias of Arab identity, were operating with the full support of the regular Suda- In a briefi ng with the AU Peace and Secu- nese army (see for example, Human Rights rity Council in July 2004, Sudan foreign Watch 2004). minister, Dr Mustafa Osman, asked the AU to take the lead over the Darfur issue. He Turning to the AU can be seen as an illustra- implied that this would help protect Sudan tion of the ongoing ‘decentralisation’ of in- from negative foreign interference.12 The ternational peace and security management. GoS resorted to a manoeuvre commonly The UN has since the early 1990s started used by a regime preoccupied with its own cooperating more with regional actors and ‘coalitions of the willing’ (see, for example, Bellamy and Williams 2005: 157-195; Fawcett 8 BBC News, 2008. ‘China is ‘fuelling war’ in Darfur’, 2003). There has been an increase in ‘sub- 13 July. These charges were immediately refuted as ‘ungrounded’ by Liu Guijin, the Chinese govern- contracting’ and burden-sharing in UN opment’s special representative on the Darfur issue. erations, often argued to be useful in this 9 After the al-Qaida attack on the US, on 11 September time of global ‘peacekeeping overstretch’ 2001, US-Sudan relations improved because Sudan had, in 1996, off ered to hand over Osama Bin Laden. and capacity as well as legitimacy defi cits. The Bush regime has since collaborated with the Su- Sometimes the argument is also that a re- danese regime on issues of international terrorism. gional actor is best placed to intervene. 10 Agence France Press, New York, 3 July 2004. 11 Confi dential interview with senior EU military offi - cial, Addis Ababa, September 2007. It would have been 13 For one example, see ‘War in Western Sudan Over problematic, but not impossible, for the UN to access Shadows Peace in the South’ , New York Times, 17 Darfur with the considerable logistics and resources January 2004. required, without the consent of the GoS. On the im- 14 Prunier has estimated that the war has killed around portance of ‘a peace to keep’, see UN (2008a: 49). 300,000 people. 12 Panapress, ‘Sudan asks AU for Protection against 15 First used in May 2004, by the US Managing Com- ‘Outsiders’’, 5 July 2004. mittee of the Washington Holocaust Memorial.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 27 For instance, Sudanese diplomat Francis ity, and we can do it’ (cited in Rice 2005). Deng, the UN secretary-general’s special In addition to the AU’s wish to act there representative on internally displaced per- were also more spurious cultural and his- sons (IDPs), advocated an AU lead on these torical reasons. Darfur is wholly Muslim, grounds. For him, UN or Western military comprising both Arab and African identities intervention would be likely to ‘complicate that have changed historically depending on and aggravate the situation’ and meet with factors such as ancestry, language or way of armed resistance (Deng 2004: paras 36 and life (de Waal and Flynt 2005: 5). Darfur, and 37). Thus, the idea of an African solution the ongoing politicisation of ethnic identi- seemed the most attractive. ties, risked upsetting the Arab and African identities contained within the member The AU itself began to claim ownership states of the AU.16 over their eff orts in Darfur. The organisation was already involved, since late 2003, An ‘African solution’ to the confl ict in in the Chad-led mediation process between Darfur was the ideal compromise: it was the GoS and the (then) two main rebel the only one that all parties, including the groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement/ GoS, could agree to. The UN membership Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality could be seen as taking action after having Movement (JEM). The signing of the Hu- passed Resolution 1556. Yet, this choice had manitarian Ceasefi re Agreement (HCFA) in a number of political consequences. Both N’Djamena, on 8 April 2004, marked a suc- the UN and the AU knew, but were will- cess in the sense that the agreement detailed ing to leave to the side, that the AU did not the provisions for the deployment of the Af- have the authority or capability to rapidly rican Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The GoS, stop the violence in Darfur. the SLM/A and the JEM had thereby consented to an AU military presence in Darfur (AU 2004). The key drive behind the AU’s Political consequences involvement in Darfur is to be found in the Co-dependency politics of the evolving African security architecture and the normative shift from Proactive leadership at the pan-African level non-interference to ‘non-indiff erence’. The in 2003-2004 provided momentum for the signifi cance of this context has been aptly AU to engage both politically and mili- captured in the article by Kwesi Aning (see tarily in Darfur, through the mediation of also Williams 2007; Kioko 2003). Capturing ceasefi res, negotiation, and its peacekeep- this mood, Thabo Mbeki, the president of ing operation, AMIS. The AU Commission South Africa, stated in a June 2005 meet- chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, held ing with George Bush on Darfur: ‘It’s criti- several consultations with the GoS, express- cally important that the African continent ing concern over the humanitarian situation [deals] with these confl ict situations on the in Darfur (Human Rights Watch 2006: 12). continent… We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy 16 For example, contemporary Nigeria, which, like troops in Darfur. It’s an African responsibil- Sudan, is a large African state with both Arab and African peoples.

28 Critical Currents no. 5 However, the Union’s structures and insti- AU was under the impression that the UN tutions were in their emergent phases. The would take their mission over much sooner AU lacked the fi nances, human resources, than it eventually did.18 A signifi cant chal- logistical procurement capability and mili- lenge to the UN-AU relationship was the tary capability necessary to sustain a peace prevailing interpretation of Chapter VIII of process or a military presence in a crisis as the UN Charter. According to this inter- complex as that of Darfur. The AU mem- pretation the UN Assessed Contributions bership knew that international support Budget, which fi nances UN-authorised and was required and that the expectations of UN-led peacekeeping, could not be used the AU were high. The AU’s special repre- for actions undertaken by regional organi- sentative in Darfur, Ambassador Baba Gana sations. On an ad-hoc basis, therefore, the Kingibe, said on 8 June 2005: ‘We stand or UN provided the AU with assistance in the fall in Darfur’ (Cohen and O’Neill 2006: 53). form of human resources, skills and certain The dependency of the AU’s actions on out- logistics. The UN sent military advisors, side assistance and expertise was also due to police advisors, and civilians. It established the reluctance of AU member states to con- a planning cell in Addis Ababa to help the tribute. Close to 75 per cent of the entire AU with strategic planning for AMIS. Be- AU budget is paid by only fi ve countries, tween 18 August and 27 August 2005 the namely South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria UN together with the EU, NATO and the and Algeria.17 US undertook a ‘map exercise’ (MAPEX) at AMIS force headquarters in El Fasher. The formal start of the co-dependent rela- In 2005 the UN also arranged training for tionship between the UN and the AU over AMIS personnel, covering human rights, Darfur was when the UN endorsed the AU’s policing, rule of law and gender-based vio- actions in operative paragraph 2 of Resolu- lence, and deployed 49 human rights offi cers tion 1556, passed by the Security Council on to Darfur (UN 2005b: 1-12). 30 July 2004. The UN had thereby clarifi ed that the AU was the lead organisation. It ac- In consequence, the AU relied on various knowledged the legitimacy of the AU’s ef- sources of assistance from individual states forts and signalled international agreement as well as other regional organisations. The and support. However, the UN was not EU contributed 300 million Euros to AMIS prepared to formalise this delegation of au- from its ‘African Peace Facility’ and pro- thority. The resolution avoided the strong- vided military and police support for AMIS er term ‘authorised’ which may be seen as (Piiparinen 2007: 385-6). On 8 June 8 2005, a way for the UN to detach itself from the NATO decided to launch an operation to AU by virtue of language. For instance, the airlift AU troops into Sudan: its fi rst op-

17 Countries with signifi cant fi nancial resources, such as Angola and Botswana for instance, contributed little to the AU budget, and to AMIS. The Arab 18 I have not found any written records of such a prom- League was also criticised for their meagre support, ise, yet it was a verbal agreement according to several in addition to their relative silence over the events in AU offi cials interviewed in Addis Ababa, September Darfur. 2007.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 29 eration on African soil.19 The US focused operative relations with the GoS.21 Sudan on humanitarian aid, providing almost half was a member of the AU Peace and Security of the total international amount of fund- Council around the time of the outbreak of ing for Darfur’s emergency needs in the violence in Darfur and drew sympathy from period 2004 to 2006 (US Government Ac- states such as Libya, Algeria and Egypt (Kag- countability Offi ce 2006: 21). The US State wanja and Mutahi 2007: 6). South Africa and Department covered the cost of the private Nigeria were more prone to condemn cer- contractor Lockheed Martin’s Pacifi c Ar- tain aspects of the Darfur crisis.22 chitects and Engineers (PAE) to construct and maintain camps for AMIS. The UK The existing political settlement, the HCFA, was a signifi cant cash donor. In June 2005 did not provide for an assertive civilian pro- Canada donated 105 armed personnel car- tection role. For instance, its provisions for riers (APCs) and civilian helicopters which the disarmament of the Janjaweed failed to helped increase the mobility of AMIS.20 defi ne who constituted the Janjaweed and who could realistically do the disarming The irony of the outside support behind the (vaguely stressing the responsibility of the AU was that it was neither wholesale nor GoS to neutralise the ‘armed militias’). This long-term. As such, the AU ‘had been sched- agreement lamentably set the course not uled for a “Mission Impossible” type of situ- only for the AU’s subsequent eff orts but also ation. It was supposed to substitute [sic] itself for the demands of the UN Security Coun- to the coalition of the unwilling ... to oper- cil (de Waal 2007a: 1041).23 UN Security ate on a shoestring and to keep the pretence Council Resolution 1556 gave the Sudanese of serious international involvement for its regime 30 days to comply with requirements tight-fi sted sponsors’ (Prunier 2005: 145-6). on facilitating humanitarian access, the disarmament of militias, civilian protection, AMIS and the challenge and the investigation and punishment of of civilian protection human rights violations. Nevertheless, it did The co-dependent and ad hoc relationship 21 The Darfur crisis was one of the fi rst challenges for between the UN and the AU inhibited ef- the AU Peace and Security Council. Its Protocol was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Gov- fi cient security provision for Darfur’s civil- ernments in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, and ian population. Both organisations faced entered into force in December 2003. challenges in striking the right balance be- 22 Both Nigeria and South Africa were important mediators and troop contributors in the overall AU re- tween protection for Darfur’s civilians and sponse to Darfur. They were both instrumental ac- respect for Sudan’s territorial integrity. The tors behind the creation of the AU. For more details AU membership, on their part, favoured co- see Tieku (2004). 23 By April-May 2004, the UN fact-fi nding missions to Darfur had well established the proportions of the human rights violations and war crimes in Darfur 19 NATO (2008), ‘NATO Supporting African Union’s (see UN 2004). ‘Report of the Acting High Com- Missions’, Press Release, 1 February. missioner on the Human Rights Situation in Dar- 20 The GoS did not allow the APCs to enter Sudan fur’, E/CN.4/2005/3, 7 May. Visits to Darfur made until October 2005, when 35 were allowed in. Not clear that far greater responsibility for human rights until December 2005 were all the APCs fi nally in violations rested with the GoS and the proxy militia Darfur; see Human Rights Watch (2006: 34). than with the rebel forces. See also UN (2004c).

30 Critical Currents no. 5 not defi ne ‘disarmament’ or ‘Janjaweed’; nor ation in Darfur, the AU – and the UN26 – did it specify any consequences resulting from refrained from calling the confl ict genocide. non-compliance. The Sudanese regime did On 4 July 2004 the AU Peace and Security not meet the demands of the resolution. On Council stated that, even though the crisis in the one hand, it was unrealistic to expect Darfur was grave, the situation could not be the GoS to rein in the Janjaweed in such a defi ned as genocide.27 Nonetheless, the at- short time (Prunier 2005: 118). On the other tacks on the mission itself and on civilians hand, the GoS also failed to comply with led to calls for AMIS to be upgraded from the changed requirement of 90 days in to- an observer mission to one with a more tal, proposed by the UN secretary-general’s proactive protection role.28 special representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk. The UN Security Council went on to pass On 20 October 2004 the AU authorised the resolutions on oil sanctions, travel bans and transformation of AMIS into a peacekeep- an arms embargo, neither of which was effi - ing mission of 3,320 personnel, which in- ciently monitored or implemented.24 Seem- cluded force protectors and unarmed civilian ingly a little more eff ective was the Security police. The expanded AMIS mandate was Council’s decision, in Resolution 1593 of 31 fourfold: to monitor the ceasefi re; to as- March 2005, to refer the situation in Darfur sist in the process of confi dence-building; to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to contribute to a secure environment for (De Waal and Flint 2005: 129). the delivery of humanitarian relief; and to contribute to the improvement of the se- In June 2004 80 AU military observers and curity situation, ‘it being understood that a small protection force of 300 Nigerian and the responsibility for the protection of the Rwandan troops arrived in Darfur.25 They civilian population lay primarily with the faced a general situation of continued cease- GoS’. Also listed was the task of protecting fi re violations by all parties to the confl ict, as AMIS personnel, equipment and facilities as well as ongoing abuses of international hu- well as civilians under imminent threat, in man rights and humanitarian law such as the the immediate vicinity of AMIS personnel, government’s aerial bombardment of villages. and within the capabilities of AMIS.29 This Despite their concern with the security situ- 26 Neither the Security Council nor the Secretariat has applied that word in connection with Darfur. The UN Commission of Inquiry found that the GoS and the Janjaweed were responsible for ‘...crimes against humanity and war crimes ... [that] may be no less seri- 24 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolutions ous and heinous than genocide’ (UN 2005e: 3-4). 1564 and 1591. Alex de Waal and Julie Flint provide a 27 AU (2004d:.1). The Assembly, in its fi rst thorough good discussion of the ineffi ciency of these demands treatment of the Darfur issue, followed this line (AU, (see De Waal and Flint 2005: 127). 2004c: para. 2). It is possible that this was a political de- 25 The AU Peace and Security Council meeting on 25 cision to facilitate the entry of AU forces into Sudanese May 2004 called for the deployment of military ob- territory. servers to Darfur (see AU 2004e). The Assembly of 28 Such as the concerns raised by Sector Commander Heads of States and Governments of the AU (com- Seth Appiah Mensah (‘Frustration of Darfur “Ob- monly known as the AU Summit) authorised the server”’, BBC News, 14 November 2004). deployment of AMIS in June 2004 to monitor the 29 AU (2004a: paras 65 and 67). The civilian protection ele- N’Djamena ceasefi re agreement. ment was reemphasised one year later (see AU, 2005a).

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 31 was the fi rst time that an Africa-led mission situation on the ground. AMIS provided had explicit legal permission to protect civil- water and fi rewood patrols for scared IDPs, ians. Signifi cantly, the UN affi rmed the AU’s escorted humanitarian convoys, and helped legal authority through its endorsement of victims of attacks get to hospitals.33 the enhanced mandate.30 The UN Security Council, meeting in Nairobi on 19 Novem- Nevertheless, AMIS’s weak political and ber 2004, expressed its strong support for the military clout meant that the security and increased AMIS, as well as for its enhanced protection they could provide in Darfur was mandate. It urged member states to provide dependent upon the cooperation of the war- the required support.31 ring parties. Such cooperation was sorely lacking. One example of this was when, on To fi nd ways of strengthening AMIS fur- 7 April 2005, government-supported militia ther, the UN and the AU launched a joint attacked the village of Khor Abeche despite assessment mission to Darfur in March 2005. assurances from the GoS given to the AU days After this, AMIS was authorised a total earlier.34 AMIS troops also largely lacked the strength of 6,171 troops plus 1,560 person- training and experience to face the political nel in the civilian police component. The and operational implications that were like- deployment of these numbers was delayed ly to follow from decisions to engage with due to problems with the AU command elements of the Sudanese army involved in and control chain, as well as lack of fund- attacks on civilians.35 In a tragic illustration, ing. Challenges with donor-funded aviation on 29 September 2007, an AMIS Military fuel and camp construction were two de- Group Site in Haskanita, South Darfur, was laying factors (Human Rights Watch 2006: attacked by a heavily armed group, leaving 30-31, 51). ten peacekeepers dead (Polgreen 2007).

By December 2005, AMIS force levels fi nally The AU’s dependency on external resources reached almost 7,000, including a stronger ci- prevented any long-term planning on the vilian police component totalling approxi- part of AMIS and impacted on what civilian mately 1,320.32 This increase in numbers protection the force was able to provide. The made a positive diff erence to the security 33 The AU confronted the GoS with evidence of government involvement in attacks. The government had pre- 30 See UN (2004a: para. 54). Also, UN Security Council viously denied all use of airpower in its off ensive mili- Resolut ion 159 0 of 24 M a rch 24 20 05 rea ffi rmed AMIS’s tary operations. Now it ‘agreed’, on 8 February 2005, mandate and described events in Darfur above all as a to withdraw all Antonov bombers from Darfur. The crisis of insecurity and lack of protection. It established GoS did not honour the agreement. (Human Rights UNMIS and aff orded it with a similarly worded civil- Watch 2006: 19.) ian protection mandate under Chapter VII. In 2006 the 34 UN News Centre, ‘UN-African Union condemn UN ‘acknowledged’ the steps taken by the AU in “savage attack” on village by armed militia’. A joint regard to civilian protection in armed confl ict (Se- statement was made on 8 April 2005 by the AU’s Am- curity Council Resolution 1674, S/RES/1674). bassador Baba Gana Kingibe and the UN’s Jan Pronk 31 S/RES/1574 2004, Operative Paragraph 13. on the destruction of Khor Abeche on 7 April 2005. 32 The troops were from Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 35 Confi dential interviews with the Darfur Implementa- Senegal, Gambia and Kenya, the police from Ghana, tion Task Force (DITF) and the UN DPKO Darfur and there were military observers from Egypt and Lib- Planning Team, Addis Ababa, September 2007, and ya, among others. New York, October 2007.

32 Critical Currents no. 5 mobility of AMIS was highly reliant on the by the GoS and the Minni Minawi faction vehicles, helicopters, and fi xed-wing aircraft of the SLM. However, the hopes for peace provided by donors. However, AMIS lacked were immediately shattered as both the JEM attack helicopters, military pilots, adequate and the SLM Abdel Wahid al Nur faction intelligence, proper communications tech- rejected the agreement.39 Post-DPA, grow- nology, and professional medical services. ing segments of Darfur’s society started per- Donors never followed through on the rec- ceiving AMIS as siding with the GoS (Fadul ommendation of the March 2005 UN-AU and Tanner 2007: 284-313). The previously assessment to provide AMIS with attack relatively cohesive rebellion fractured into helicopters (Human Rights Watch 2006: 8; more than 15 groups, without clear politi- UN 2005c; AU 2005d). This was a tangible cal positions and with little popular support obstacle. AMIS sector commanders had to (International Crisis Group (2007). The GoS request helicopter back-up from El Fasher to initiated new off ensives to crush the re- try to deter any suspected attacks within their bellion (de Waal 2006). In this situation of sector. Often none could be sent, since AMIS ongoing confl ict, the UN found itself in a only had civilian aviation capability with diffi cult position. The new mediation ini- civilian pilots. Civilian pilots, as opposed to tiative that was launched by the UN and the military pilots, cannot be ordered to fl y long AU in Sirte, Libya, in 2007, had yet to pro- distances in dangerous circumstances.36 duce anything approaching a durable settlement that would overcome the weaknesses During 2006 the AU Peace and Security of the DPA. Additionally, the UN remained Council stressed the need to strengthen unwilling to contemplate a UN peacekeep- AMIS and called for an increase in the ing operation without the consent of the number of personnel to around 12,300.37 GoS. The Sudanese position, supported by There was no willingness amongst the in- the AU, was that it would accept a UN force ternational partners to fund such an increase. only if a political agreement was reached and Instead, there were increasing pressures for if the force was primarily comprised of Afri- the UN to take over AMIS.38 can troops.40

‘No peace to keep’ In a fascinating move, UN Security Coun- cil Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, in- The pressures for the UN to take over only vited the Sudanese government to consent to grew stronger when the AU-led media- a robust UN peacekeeping operation. When tion process culminated in a Darfur Peace the GoS refused, a compromise proposal, the Agreement (DPA), signed on 5 May 2006 ‘hybrid’ UN-AU force, was suggested by the US and China on 16 November 2006. Su- 36 Confi dential interview with AMIS military offi cial, November 2006; International Crisis Group (2005: 7-8). 39 Overall, the AU’s mediation process lacked consis- 37 The number was recommended in Konaré’s ‘Report tency, planning and reliable funding despite signifi - on the situation in Darfur’ (AU 2005c: 27). cant contributions from the UK and the US. The 38 Especially the US, but also Canada and the EU were DPA was ‘a product of externally imposed deadlines, keen to stop funding AMIS (confi dential interview international pressure, and the AU’s mediators draft- with Canadian embassy offi cial and with senior EU ing eff orts’ (Nathan 2007: p. 253). military offi cial, Addis Ababa, September 2007). 40 AU (2006a: para. 6a).

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 33 dan consented to this during consultations did not benefi t from life-saving patrols. In with the UN and the AU in Addis Ababa, a serious criticism against UNAMID the on 12 June 2007 (de Waal 2007a: 1042).41 Darfur Consortium argued that the mission Consequently, on 31 July 2007, the Secu- could be doing more, even within the limits rity Council authorised the establishment of of their existing troops and resources. For the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) example, they could be doing more foot pa- through Resolution 1769. trolling (Darfur Consortium 2008: 6).

UNAMID became operational on 1 Janu- Sudanese sovereignty remains the primary ary 2008. Its authorised deployment was of impediment for civilian protection.43 UN- 26,000 troops, and the budget estimate for AMID was aff orded a civilian protection the fi rst year was a staggering 2,2 billion mandate, under Chapter VII. Despite this USD.42 The use of the UN Assessed Con- initially bold mandate adoption, the politi- tributions Budget thus enabled the authori- cal and military leadership of UNAMID has sation of numbers and resources that were retracted on the interpretations of the man- denied the AU-led force. What remains to date. Force Commander General Martin be seen is whether the political backing be- Luther Agwai and Joint Special Representa- hind UNAMID will enable the deployment tive Rodolphe Adada regard UNAMID as of these fi gures and towards what purposes a peacekeeping force present in Darfur to they will be used. keep a peace that doesn’t exist. Even if UN- AMID were at full deployment, they argue After six months on the ground, UNAMID that the peacekeepers are ‘not there to stand was still struggling with inadequate force between rival armies and militias engaged levels, equipment and resources and could in full-scale combat’.44 This suggests that only provide a basic level of protection in UNAMID peacekeepers will not be sup- Darfur. In July 2008 the force comprised ported to act proactively to save lives where only approximately 9,400 troops of which they can. Nor can they seize and dispose of approximately 1,600 were civilian police illegal arms. UNAMID may only ‘monitor (Darfur Consortium 2008: 3). Most of these whether any arms or related material are were ex-AMIS forces. UNAMID lacked at- present in Darfur in violation of the Agree- tack and transport helicopters, and means ments and the measures imposed by para- for ground transportation (NGO Report graphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004)’.45 2008: 6). As of 28 July 2008, many areas 43 Sudanese offi cials have warned that UN peacekeep- 41 See S/RES/1769. This ‘Addis Ababa Agreement’ ers may be heading for another Iraq- or Afghani- detailed that the hybrid force would have a pre- stan-style disaster, as long as talks between the Khar- dominantly African character and that the troops toum government and rebel groups remain stalled should, as far as possible, be sourced from African (see ‘Sudan Warns West of ‘Iraq-style Disaster’ in countries. Darfur’, The Guardian, 12 March 2008). 42 At the 62nd General Assembly Fifth Committee 44 Cited by Rodolphe Adada, ‘The U.N. is Making a Meeting (GA/AB/3828, November 19) a 1.48 billion Diff erence in Darfur’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 June USD budget was passed for the fi rst year of UN- 2008. AMID. This amount has not been without criticism. 45 Article 9 of the UN Resolution 1769. The fi nal text of See Konaré in ‘Caught Between Peacekeeping And the resolution dropped a threat of sanctions inserted Development,’ Inter Press Service, 11 March 2008. by Britain and France, due to China’s opposition.

34 Critical Currents no. 5 Despite these ambiguities, UNAMID may cuse for Western powers to avoid commit- have deepened the understanding of the co- ting their own soldiers (Cohen and O’Neill dependent relationship between the UN 2006: 52). Nonetheless, the AU’s partners and the AU. Ad hoc lines of communication also needed the AU: their support allowed and diplomacy vis-à-vis the Sudanese gov- them to portray themselves as ‘doing some- ernment have set an important precedent. thing’ about Darfur. The AU’s actions in For instance, UN Under-Secretary-General Darfur were therefore global contributions for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie and not a ‘substitute’ for the UN’s fulfi lment Guehenno, and AU Peace and Security of its responsibility for international peace Commissioner Saïd Djinnit conducted joint and security. This means that the actions of assessment missions in Darfur. The political the AU, and its reliance on constructive en- process underway in Darfur saw the birth of gagement and cooperative relations with the a joint envoy system between the UN spe- GoS, cannot be understood and evaluated cial envoy to Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the with reference to the AU alone.47 AU special envoy to Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim. The fi rst-ever joint meeting between Full UN engagement in Darfur may not members of the UN Security Council and have been possible or desirable. Naming the AU Peace and Security Council took Darfur an ‘international confl ict’ in Reso- place on 11 June 11 2007 in Addis Ababa. lution 1556 was not enough to forge a con- They committed themselves to the devel- sensus view or exit plan amongst the P5. opment of a stronger and more structured The decision to turn to the AU in these cir- relationship, in a joint resolution by the UN cumstances should have been followed by a secretary-general and the AU Commission higher degree of formalised empowerment chairperson (UN 2007).46 However, the bal- and support (political, human, fi nancial). ance of the working relationship, concern- AMIS, for all its imperfections, was the only ing the control and command structure of signifi cant foreign military presence in Dar- UNAMID and its strategic and military fur. Overall, it prevented even larger-scale planning, remains tilted towards the UN killings in Darfur. Yet, it could have done rather than the AU. more had it not been so severely under-re- sourced.

Conclusion Darfur, in sum, serves as a warning that the international division of labour of peace- I have argued that the UN and the AU were keeping can have negative political impli- co-dependent ‘partners’ in their response to cations. There is a risk that the UN will the violence in Darfur. The UN member- come to rely on burden-sharing opportuni- ship detached itself from the events in Dar- ties aff orded by (sub)regional organisations fur through the use of the slogan ‘African such as the AU, sometimes facing greater solutions to African problems’. The deploy- constraints than the UN itself. It is therefore ment of AMIS provided a convenient ex- 47 In a positive move, the AU Summits of 2006, 2007 and 2008 prevented the president of Sudan, Omar 46 See also S/2007/421, annex II. al-Bashir, from assuming the chair of the AU.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 35 a matter of hope that the issue of how to AU (2005d), ‘The AU Assessment Mission interpret Chapter VIII has become a high- to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March 2005: Report level priority for the UN. For example, on of the Joint Assessment Team’, 22 March. 7 April 2008 a secretary-general report on AU (2004a), ‘Peace and Security Council the UN-AU relationship on issues of inter- 17th Meeting: Report of the Chairperson national peace and security acknowledged of the Commission’, PSC/PR/2(XVII), 20 that the AU resource base needs to be sup- October. ported and improved in a sustained way. He recommended that a panel of distinguished AU (2004b), ‘Peace and Security Council persons from both organisations be set up 13th meeting: Report of the Chairperson of to propose such modalities, in particular as the Commission on the situation in Darfur’, related to start-up funding, equipment and PSC/PR/2 (XVII), 27 July. logistics of AU peacekeeping missions with UN mandates (UN 2008b: para. 76). AU (2004c), Assembly 3rd Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Assembly/AU/Dec.54 (III), 6-8 July. Literature AU (2004d), Peace and Security Council, 12th Abbas, Ademola (2007), ‘The United Nations, meeting, PSC/MIN/Comm.(XII), 4 July. the African Union and the Darfur Crisis: Of Apology and Utopia’, Netherlands International AU (2004e), ‘Report of the Chairperson of Law Review, vol. 54, no. 3. the Commission on the Establishment of a Continental Peace and Security Architecture AU doc. PSC/MIN/2(XLVI), 10 March 2006. and the Status of Peace Processes in Africa’, PSC/AHG/3(IX) 25 May. AU (2006a), ‘Peace and Security Council 46th Meeting’, PSC/MIN/Comm.(XLVI)’, AU (2004f), Peace and Security Council, 10 March. Fifth Session, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis AU (2006b), ‘Peace and Security Council in Darfur), PSC/PR/2(V), 13 April. Meeting’ PSC/PR/2(XLV), 12 January. Badescu, Cristina (2007), ‘Hard Choices in AU (2005a), ‘Peace and Security Council 42nd Saving Strangers: Securing Authorization for Meeting, PSC/PR/2(XLII)’, 20 October. Humanitarian Intervention’, Canadian Journal AU (2005b), ‘Overview of the AU’s Eff orts to of Political Science, vol. 40, no. 1, March. Address the Confl ict in the Darfur Region of Baldo, Suliman (2006), ‘The African Response the Sudan, Pledging Conference for the AU to Darfur’, in Mepham and Ramsbotham Mission in Sudan (AMIS): An Opportunity (eds), pp. 14-21. for Partnership for Peace’, CONF/PLG/2(I) and CONF/PLG/3(1), 26 May, Addis Ababa. Bellamy, Alex and Williams, Paul (2005), ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis AU (2005c), ‘Report on the situation in in Darfur’, Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 1. Darfur’, Peace and Security Council, PSC/ PR/2(XXVIII), 28 April.

36 Critical Currents no. 5 Bellamy, Alex and Williams, Paul (2005), yond, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers and ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization IPA, pp. 11-30. and Contemporary Peace Operations’, Interna- tional Security vol. 29, no. 4, Spring, pp. 157-195. Fadul, Abdul-Jabbar and Tanner, Victor (2007), ‘Darfur After Abuja: A View from the Cohen, Roberta and O’Neill, William G r o u n d ’, i n d e Wa a l ( e d . ) ( 2 0 0 7 b ) , p p . 2 8 4 - 313 . (2006), ‘Last Stand in Sudan?’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April. Findlay, Trevor (2002), The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Stockholm: SIPRI, Darfur Consortium, The (2008), ‘Putting and Oxford University Press. People First: The Protection Challenge Facing UNAMID in Darfur’, Kampala, Human Rights Watch (2006), Sudan: Impera- Uganda, 28 July. tives for Immediate Change – The African Union Mission in Sudan, vol.18, no. 1 (A), January. de Waal, Alex (2007a), ‘Darfur and the Fail- ure of the Responsibility to Protect’, Inter- Human Rights Watch (2004), ‘Darfur Doc- national Aff airs, vol. 83, no. 6. uments Confi rm Government Policy of Militia Support’, Briefi ng Paper, July 20. de Waal, Alex (ed.) (2007b), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, Harvard, Mass: Har- International Crisis Group (2007), ‘Darfur’s vard University Press. New Security Reality’, ICG: Africa Report no. 134, 26 November. de Waal, Alex (2006), ‘I will not sign’, London Review of Books, vol. 28, no. 23, 30 November. International Crisis Group (2005), ‘The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps’, de Waal, Alex and Flint, Julie (2005), Darfur: Africa Briefi ng no. 28, 6 July. A Short History of a Long War, London: Zed Books. International Peace Academy (IPA) (2007), ‘The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Deng, Francis M. (2004), ‘Report of the Standby Force’, March. Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons: Mission to the Kagwanja, Peter and Mutahi, Patrick (2007), Sudan – The Darfur crisis’, UN Economic ‘Protection of Civilians in African Peace and Social Council, E/CN.4/2005/8, 27 Missions: The Case of the African Union September. Mission in Sudan, Darfur’, ISS Paper no. 139, May. Ekiyor, Thelma (2007), ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine in Af- Kioko, Ben (2003), ‘The Right of Interven- rica’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Briefi ng Pa- tion under the African Union’s Constitutive per 01, January. Act’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 85, no. 852, pp. 807-825. Fawcett, Louise (2003), ‘The evolving architecture of regionalization’, in Pugh, Michael; Mepham, David and Ramsbotham, Alex- Singh, Sidhu; Waheguru, Pal (eds), The United ander (eds) (2006), Darfur: The Responsibility Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Be- to Protect, London: IPPR.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 37 Mills, Kurt (2008), ‘Which Responsibility Toga, Dawit (2007), ‘The African Union in Darfur?’ Peace Review, vol. 20, no. 2. Mediation and the Abuja Peace Talks’, in de Waal (ed.), (2007b), pp. 214-244. Murithi, Timothy (2008), ‘The African Un- ion’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations’, UN (2008a), United Nations Peacekeeping Op- African Security Review, vol. 17, no. 1. erations: Principles and Guidelines (‘The Cap- stone Doctrine’), Department of Peacekeep- Nathan, Laurie (2007), ‘The Making and ing Operations. Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement’, in de Waal (ed.) (2007b), pp. 245-266. UN (2008b), ‘Report of the Secretary-Gen- eral on the relationship between the United NGO Report (2008), ‘Grounded: The In- Nations and regional organizations, in par- ternational Community’s Betrayal of UN- ticular the African Union, in the mainte- AMID’, July. nance of international peace and security’, O’Neill, William, G. and Cassis, Violette S/2008/186**. (2005), ‘Protecting Two Million Internally UN (2007), ‘Report of the Secretary Gen- Displaced: The Successes and Shortcom- eral and the Chairperson of the AU Com- ings of the African Union in Darfur’, The mission on the hybrid operation in Darfur’ Brookings Institution, November. S/2007/307 Rev.1, 5 June. Piiparinen, Touko (2007), ‘The Lessons of UN (2006), ‘Report of the Secretary-Gen- Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian In- eral on Darfur’, S/2006/591, 28 July. tervention’, Global Governance, vol. 13, pp. 365-390. UN (2005a), ‘World Summit Outcome Document’, A/Res/60/1, 24 October. Polgreen, Lydia (2007), ‘Peacekeepers as Targets: Darfur Attack Imperils Talks’, New UN (2005b), ‘Report of the Secretary-General York Times, 1 October. on the Sudan’, S/2005/579, 12 September. Prunier, Gerard (2005), Darfur: The Ambigu- UN (2005c), ‘Report of the Secretary- ous Genocide?, Ithaca: Cornell. General on U.N. Assistance to the A.U. Mission in the Sudan’, General/ S/2005/285, Rice, Susan, E. (2005), ‘Why Darfur Can’t 3 May. Be Left to Africa’, Washington Post, 7 August. UN (2005d), Security Council Resolution Slim, Hugo (2004), ‘Dithering over Darfur’, S/RES/1590, 24 March. International Aff airs, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 811- 828. UN (2005e), ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Tieku, Thomas Kwasi (2004), ‘Explaining United Nations Secretary-General’, Gene- the Clash and Accommodation of Interests va: 25 January. of Major Actors in the Creation of the Afri- can Union’, African Aff airs, vol. 103, no. 411, UN (2004a), ‘Report of the Secretary-General pp. 249-267. on the Sudan’, S/2004/881, 2 November.

38 Critical Currents no. 5 UN (2004b). ‘Report of the Acting High Commissioner on the Human Rights Situa- tion in Darfur’, E/CN.4/2005/3, 7 May. UN (2004c), ‘High-Level Mission to Darfur, the Sudan, 27 April-2 May’, Khartoum, May. UN (2000), ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Re- port)’, A/85/305–S/2000/809, August. UN (1999), ‘Independent Inquiry into the actions of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda’, S/1999/1257, 16 December. US Government Accountability Offi ce (2006), ‘Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges’, Report to Con- gressional Requesters GAO-07-9, November, p. 21. Wheeler, Nicholas, J. (2000), Saving Stran- gers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, Paul, D. (2007), ‘From Non-Inter- vention to Non-Indiff erence: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture’, African Aff airs, vol. 106, no. 423, pp. 253-279. Williams, Paul (2006), ‘The African Union and the Crisis in Darfur’, talk at Johns Hop- kins University, 27 November.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 39 40 Critical Currents no. 5 Positive, ambiguous or negative? Peacekeeping in the local security fabric

Andreas Mehler

This contribution aims to shed more light on the balance sheet of outside eff orts to bring security to African countries, in particular by peacekeeping troops. After a discussion of general aspects, three case studies – two short ones on Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, and a more extended one on the Central Afri- can Republic – are presented. It is argued that a realistic assessment must include local perspectives on peacekeepers and their relations to other (state and non-state) actors in the security arena. Peacekeepers do harm, just as they do good; and they would profi t from a more systematic evaluation of the local perception of their action (or passivity).

Of the 18 African countries that have expe- rienced peacekeeping operations 12 have had Andreas Mehler is director of the operations lasting more than a few months, Institute of African Aﬀ airs at the and could be considered places where the German Institute of Global and peacekeepers had a prominent role in se- Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg. curity provision: Angola (1988-99), Burun- His research interests include causes di (2003-2006), Central African Republic of conﬂ ict, statehood and security, (CAR) (1997-2000; 2002- ), CAR/Chad French Africa policy, and politics (2007- ), Democratic Republic of Congo in Francophone Africa south of (DRC) (1999- ), Côte d’Ivoire (2003- ), the Sahara. He is an advisor to Guinea-Bissau (1999), Liberia (1990-97, President Köhler’s ‘Partnership with 2003- ), Mozambique (1992-94), Rwanda Africa’ initiative and co-editor of (1993-96), Sierra Leone (1997-2005), Soma- the Africa Yearbook (with Henning lia (1992-95) and Sudan (2005- ), that is one Melber and Klaas van Walraven), published by Brill, Leiden. Peacekeeping Monument, Ottawa, Canada Photo by Alistair Williamson

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 41 fourth of all sub-Saharan African countries 1999; Baker 2007: 31). When UN and other are concerned. Mandates are variable; they peace missions come to Africa they look for are adapted to some degree to the local situ- cooperation with state agencies. Most of the ation and probably to a higher degree to the time a short appraisal is enough for these to changing dominant paradigms, with the ‘re- be considered in urgent need of reform. So sponsibility to protect’ being the order of the ‘security sector reform’ is high on the agenda, day.1 Although a majority of peacekeeping and usually the security sector can be seen as troops deployed in Africa’s crises are from limited to the state organs: the police, army, Asia or Africa, their mission is conceived secret service, maybe also the customs serv- somewhere else, most of the time in the ices, prison guards and adjacent judicial serv- UN’s headquarters in New York, in Brussels ices. This delimitation might be highly prob- or in Paris. This has impacts on the way se- lematic as some of the most effi cient self-help curity is conceptualised. The remote threat mechanisms are kept out of the picture and to domestic security plays a certain role: a receive only scant attention. In recent years youth rebellion in Africa may be seen as the ‘non-state armed groups’ have been identi- breeding ground of terrorism (particularly in fi ed as important players in post-confl ict sit- mostly Islamic societies) and war could be an uations at least in development cooperation additional push factor for illegal immigrants (Grävingholt et al. 2007), but usually they are coming to Europe. It is of course legitimate seen as ‘spoilers’ of peace processes. ‘Non- to care about threats from outside, but this state armed groups’ can be of a very diff erent thinking might be utterly simplistic and may nature and some may be important positive conceal what is at stake locally. forces. Unwittingly, the outsiders may de- stroy more than they can build up. One major problem is the transposition of the outsiders’ own institutional set-up to the cri- A second neglected aspect is the more im- sis area. The conceptualisation of an outside minent role of international peacekeepers intervention in supposedly failed or weak in the local security fabric (Pouligny 2006). states is usually guided by … a clear state bias! Not all of their actions provide more secu- The state is considered by the overwhelm- rity to everyone or would be regarded as ing majority of Western decision-makers as impartial. As well as the peacekeepers other the only possible saviour when it comes to outside security providers may be at work: security concerns. If it is in shambles, it has security advisers to the president of a given to be re-built as quickly as possible. The real state; private military and security compa- needs of a population may not come to mind nies of foreign origin; troops from neigh- at all. However, in many African states the bouring states or from the former colonial public security services have become prima- power, which might still be linked to its rily ‘insecurity providers’ (Chabal and Daloz ancient possession by defence agreements. This latter scenario is not unusual in the 1 While the idea that sovereign states have a respon- case of former French colonies in Africa. sibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable This contribution questions the value of catastrophe is clearly expressed, the proponents of the paradigm fi nd that when those states are unwill- security provision from outside. It focuses ing or unable to do so, that responsibility must be mainly on peacekeeping troops and touches borne by the broader community of states (see, for only superfi cially on the other actors enu- example, Schorlemer 2007).

42 Critical Currents no. 5 merated above. The reason is that the para- an important part of the population – before, dox of missions assigned and outcome be- and certainly after the event – not least becomes clearer in the case of peacekeepers. It cause (c) they had not managed to do the job is argued that the relation between peace- they were mostly expected to do: providing keeping and security provision is much more security. In the case of the Ivorian demon- complex than A leading to B. The outcome strators this meant particularly the disarma- of peacekeeping missions can be quite am- ment of rebels. Frequently, dishonest moti- biguous. Why is this so? The answer is ob- vations on the part of the demonstrators are vious: contexts are not taken into account then presumed, but not properly examined. and diverging interests may not allow for an An analysis of the legitimacy of peacekeep- outcome that satisfi es all. ers in the eyes of the population is most of the time not – at least not verifi ably – un- The academic and practice-oriented discus- dertaken, because by defi nition they have to sion suff ers from the following aspects: represent the good cause. It is however crys- tal clear that the role of peacekeepers has to • an insuffi ciently complex description of be examined more objectively, particularly the social relationship between actors of when they remain in their local operational violence, including the peacekeepers area for several months. • the overemphasis on dichotomies such as ‘state’/‘non-state’ or ‘good’/‘bad’ The ambiguous balance sheet of peacekeep- • ignorance of local perceptions. ers in the local arena has become evident in reports of rape and child abuse by peace- I have argued elsewhere that local actors are keepers that have been published, mostly likely to be regarded as not entirely impar- on the UN mission in the DRC since early tial and that they can have an ambiguous 2004.2 But in Côte d’Ivoire as well, a Mo- record in security provision: a threat to one roccan contingent of UNOCI3 had to be as- segment of society and a force for protection signed to the barracks when similar com- to another. This can be true and has a cer- plaints were voiced.4 The UN reacts sensi- tain degree of probability for international tively to these kinds of accusation, which are peacekeepers, too. Take, for example, Côte d’Ivoire in November 2004 or January 2006, 2 See, for example, Refugees International, ‘Must when peacekeepers shot demonstrators. In Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and both cases Western media and human rights Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions’, 18 October 2005, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/con- organisations said that the demonstrators or tent/publication/detail/6976/ (accessed 21 January the government manipulating them bore the 2008). A rather early and damaging report was issued brunt of the responsibility (Amnesty Interna- in 2002 by UNICEF and Save the Children: ‘Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refu- tional 2006). The peacekeepers would have gee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone’. acted in legitimate self-defence. This can be Sexual exploitation of children at refugee camps in- an important part of the explanation of why volved also UN troops (as well as aid workers). See also Murphy, 2006. peacekeepers shot live bullets. But the fact 3 United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. remains that (a) the deaths were on the side 4 Jeune Afrique (Paris), 29 July-4 August 2007, 68ff ; of the demonstrators and (b) the legitimacy Süddeutsche Zeitung (München), 29 July 2007 (‘Vom of the peacekeepers was doubted by at least Schutzengel missbraucht’).

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 43 documented inter alia by the Women’s In- Liberia ternational League for Peace and Freedom.5 The entire balance sheets of peace missions In Liberia, a comparatively small country, the are not automatically turning negative as United Nations Mission for Liberia (UN- a result of such events. But they should be MIL) with its 15,000 troops (one of the big- an integral part of a sober analysis of how gest UN missions to Africa to date) had rather much security and insecurity is produced by good preconditions for providing security. In peacekeepers interacting locally. And as we fact, it must be seen as the dominant secu- will see, they have to interact. Peacekeepers rity provider and as engaging in a security cannot remain untouched by the surround- sector reform programme. UNMIL trains ing society. And any interaction makes them the personnel of the Liberia National Police part of the local constellation of actors. In (LNP). In the fi rst three years since the peace fact, this is no new topic in the debate, at agreement of 2003 the LNP was not able to least in West Africa where several, mostly provide security on its own, not even in the Nigeria-led, ECOMOG missions to Liberia capital. Recent information shows that this and Sierra Leone (1990-1997) showed nu- had not completely changed even by the end merous problematic aspects of local inter- of 2007.7 This gap was partly fi lled (and only action, including traffi cking with precious in some areas of Monrovia) by neighbour- resources by peacekeepers.6 hood watches (Community Watch Teams) which take over the responsibility of protecting communities. And wealthier citizens hire Three case studies in the services of private security companies to outside intervention protect their property.

A more detailed account of the security The picture gets more complex with the function and imperfections of outside forces, UN mission contracting private security in particular peacekeepers, can be provided companies who themselves employ (badly through focusing on recent case studies. remunerated) ex-combatants. On the one The cases of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (since hand this gives an income opportunity to 2002/3) are briefl y presented while the rich potential spoilers of the peace process; on history of outside intervention in Central the other hand the UN itself may demon- African Republic (since 1996) receives more strate a lack of confi dence in the Liberian attention.

7 The BBC reported on 31 December 2007 that the government handed out mobile phones for security reasons. The text of the report is telling: ‘Each of 400 5 http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/pk- communities around the capital, Monrovia, will be watch.html (accessed 15 November 2007). given 10 phones, pre-programmed with a free police 6 van Walraven (1999: 53) draws this conclusion: ‘Un- hotline to report crimes. There will be a prize for fortunately, throughout their stay in Liberia the per- the community which reports the most crimes … formance of ECOMOG’s contingents was limited [Police] Offi cers only go into dangerous areas with in eff ectiveness and, in the long run, was even self- the backing of UN peacekeepers’ (www.bbc.co.uk, defeating and counter-productive.’ accessed 31 December 2007)

44 Critical Currents no. 5 police (or state services in general) by hiring 1,400) took over some positions in early private security services. It also means that 2003. Only in 2004, when a sizeable UN working relations between UNMIL and mission (United Nations Operation in Côte other actors providing the security architec- d’Ivoire – UNOCI) was established (about ture are consistently maintained. 6,000-, later even 8,000-strong), was the international presence substantial. The French Although UNMIL, compared to other UN mission stayed on and was only partially missions, has an overwhelmingly positive integrated into the overall mission. France balance sheet, there have been controversial was seen by government and rebel parties acts such as the media-reported but offi cially as a party in the confl ict – for diff erent rea- denied use of arms against ex-combatants sons. France had stopped the rebel advance illegally holding the Firestone rubber plan- in September 2003, but it had not helped tation in Guthrie.8 At least once a shoot-out the government to push back the rebels al- between peacekeepers was reported.9 And though they were obviously supported by furthermore at the end of 2006 a number of the regime in neighbouring Burkina Faso events were recorded, when one Nigerian (which would have allowed Paris to see peacekeeper and fi ve Russians contracted by the attacks as aggression from outside and UNMIL were accused of sexual harassment therefore react in the name of the existing or rape. It should be noted, on the other defence agreement). It was probably not by hand, that between October 2003 and May chance that most of the serious incidents be- 2005 alone 47 UNMIL peacekeepers lost tween 2002 and 2007 involved Opération their life in service in Liberia.10 Again, com- Licorne. Amongst them: the appropriation pared to other places, the Liberian record of of a sum of money by a group of French sol- UN peacekeepers is fairly good. diers deployed to protect a public bank; the murder of a suspected highwayman and as- Côte d’Ivoire sassin in French military custody, which led to the suspension of a French general; the International peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire lack of intervention when security forces (2002-2007) received a particularly nega- violently ended a demonstration by the op- tive local assessment. This has to be seen position; and the shooting of demonstrators in light of the strong French component of after anti-French riots in Abidjan.11 the peacekeeping troops, although profes- sionally they were certainly no less suitable than others for the job. Until April 2004 the French ‘Opération Licorne’ (about 4,000 troops), operating under a UN mandate, formed the backbone of the international mission while ECOWAS troops (about 11 In January 2006 UNOCI peacekeepers shot dead fi ve demonstrators and wounded at least 20 in Gui- glo (Western Côte d’Ivoire) after they were harassed 8 Daily Observer (Monrovia), 7 September 2006. by violent demonstrators, see Amnesty International 9 Daily Observer (Monrovia), 21 September 2006. (2006). The UN troops had to leave this and three 10 The News (Monrovia), 30 May 2005. other cities; all UN buildings were ransacked.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 45 These events will be described in some detail: were killed (and 274 wounded).14 The French peacekeepers, based in Abidjan, • The robbery of the local branch of the did not intervene. The spokesperson of West African Central Bank, BCEAO, in the Licorne mission declared that the the course of a confl ict between com- troops were not on the spot, information peting rebel groups in their stronghold was insuffi cient, their mandate would of Bouaké (October 2003) left more than not have been suffi cient and the authori- 30 million euros unaccounted for. A de- sation of the Ivorian security forces to tachment of Licorne peacekeepers called intervene was lacking. to the scene found a bundle of bank notes containing about 58,000 euros and took • Finally, one of the most debated events it. Only when attempting to exchange of the Ivorian crisis, involving an escala- the money for diamonds were the six tion of violence, came in the aftermath perpetrators caught; they were brought of an attack on a French military camp to trial a year later in France.12 by the Ivorian air force in November 2004, which left nine dead.15 France’s • The suspected robber, murderer and rap- then president, Jacques Chirac, ordered ist Firmin Mahé was shot and seriously the destruction of the Ivorian fi ghter wounded on 13 May 2005 close to Ban- jets. Angry protests and anti-French riots golo by French peacekeepers. On the way started in the metropolis of Abidjan. Ac- to hospital he was suff ocated with a plastic cording to offi cial fi gures 64 people died bag by his custodians. A shadow was cast as a result of French bullets (and 1,300 over the entire mission when it was estab- were wounded).16 Paris essentially held lished that their superiors had given orders the Ivorian army responsible, for not that could be interpreted as a wish to have managing to contain the demonstrators. the criminal brought in dead rather than While the French media predominantly alive. General Henri Poncet, well known reported on the horrors endured by fl ee- for his tough stance, was fi nally suspend- ing French nationals the media close to ed from offi ce, since he had covered up the government in Abidjan showed ter- for his men and may also have given the rifying photographs of dead Ivorians.17 nod to Mahé’s assassination.13 These four events show how easily peace- • A banned demonstration by the oppo- keepers can get into a situation where they sition took place on 25 March 2004 in become part of the local constellation of Abidjan and served as a pretext for an violent actors. It is maybe even more strik- escalation of repression by supporters of the president. According to a report by an expert mission at least 120 people 14 UN Security Council, ‘First report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, UN Doc. S/2004/443 (2 June 2004). 15 Amnesty International, 19.9.2006; Mehler 2004. 12 Le Monde (Paris), 16 November 2005, ‘Le piètre larcin de 16 According to President Gbagbo reported by Agence six soldats français pilleurs de banque en Côte d’Ivoire’. France Press, 24 November 2004. The health ministry 13 Le Monde (Paris), 2 November 2005. Later, doubts later gave the following fi gures: 57 dead, 2,226 wounded. arose as to whether the right man was captured and 17 Amateur videos of the most macabre scenes were sold killed (Le Monde, 22 December 2005). in the steets of Abidjan almost immediately afterwards.

46 Critical Currents no. 5 ing that they can do harm to the local popu- proverbial effi ciency of French troops can- lation.18 This could also be done quite in- not be doubted. It is after all unclear how directly, as a diff erent example shows. The the Ivorian crisis would have developed inhabitants of a village in the ‘confi dence without active French participation. The zone’ reported that they were harassed by diffi cult situation Opération Licorne found government troops because of their alleged itself in proves is that stereotypes and expec- support for the Licorne mission.19 tations, already formed prior to the mission itself, can have a negative impact. This is The balance of Licorne and UNOCI is at particularly true for former colonial powers best ambiguous. Both in the government- acting in their ex-colonies. controlled south of the country as well as in the north held by the rebels (and particularly Central African Republic in the ‘Wild West’ where any control was lacking) massive human rights violations This can be seen again in our third case. In and violent encounters between communi- the Central African Republic French troops ties, above all in 2003 and 2004, took place became part of the confl ict while they (reluc- – despite the presence of the peacekeepers. tantly) supported President Patassé during the It should be noted as being of particular sig- second and third of three mutinies in 1996.22 nifi cance that in the ‘zone of confi dence’, During the second mutiny, in May, 43 people controlled neither by government nor rebels were killed in combat. Violence returned once and patrolled by the peacekeepers, a high again in mid-November. The confrontation number of violent acts were recorded.20 clearly had become more dangerous after Pa- This should not at all make us overlook the tassé had created his own party militias. France fact that without French troops there would was now dragged deeper into the confronta- have been no ceasefi re in 2002.21 And the tion, despite the already big distance between the governments in Paris and Bangui. In the 18 For some conceptualisation of interventions in local, fi nal stage, French troops were themselves trans-border and global frameworks see Callaghy et ultimately considered a party in the confl ict al. (2001). On spatial dimensions see Engel and Me- when they engaged overtly in acts of retalia- hler (2005: 87-102). 19 UN Security Council, ‘Eighth report of the Secre- tion after two French soldiers were killed by tary-General on the United Nations Operation in mutineers. No exact fi gures are available, but Côte d’Ivoire’, UN Doc. S/2006/222 (11 April 2006). several dozen innocent civilians probably died 20 A reading of numerous reports by the UN Secretary General on the UNOCI mission supports this, for ex- during these incidents. French Prime Minister ample those dated 3 January 2006 (S/2006/2), 17 July Jospin made a remarkable and decent declara- 2006 (S/2006/532), 17 October 2006 (S/2006/821) and tion to the press later on when he deplored 8 March 2007 (S/2007/133). One of the fi rst actions after rebel leader Soro and President Gbagbo signed the peace accord of Ouagadougou in March 2007 was 22 It might be recalled that CAR citizens had seen de- in fact to dissolve the confi dence zone. Both sides ployments of French troops before. When France were negative about it. By mid-April UNOCI had al- launched Operation Barracuda to topple Bokassa in ready started to disband control posts and in Septem- 1979 and re-install President Dacko this came with ber 2007 the confi dence zone was suspended. There an important deployment of troops. The mission was reportedly a new rise of criminality after this date counted 1,400 men and created what was called, by in the area, as should be noted. the later prime minister, Ngoupande, the ‘Barracuda 21 Even so, a positive interim balance sheet of the syndrome’ – that is, a heavy outside military compo- French mission is drawn up by Leymarie (2004) and nent in the upholding of any regime in the country, Scheen (2004). internalised as a given by all Central Africans.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 47 the African deaths: ‘The problem is to know The French presence was originally not part what missions the government is giving to our of a peacekeeping mission. But Paris acted soldiers. The defence accord with the CAR on the diplomatic scene to get one on the which is invoked is not a police accord. The ground. The Bangui Peace Accord of 25 French army should not be transformed into a January 1997 provided for the deployment of force of internal security nor into a presiden- an inter-African military mission as a buff er tial guard for President Patassé’.23 These words between mutineers and loyalists (Mission were not chosen by chance. In December 1996 Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords a former interior minister under Kolingba, de Bangui – MISAB). MISAB had fi nan- and his son were killed by Patassé’s Presiden- cial and logistical support from France, but tial Guard. French military ‘coopérants’ were at acted under an African command. All in all, that time training the same Presidential Guard. MISAB played a constructive role by, inter The series of events showed how diffi cult it alia, rather eff ectively collecting arms (Faltas was and is to stay out of the local security are- 2001). One major incident showed, however, na when physically present with soldiers. The that the peacekeepers had muscles. In May consequence was the (temporary) closure of and June 1997 new confrontations with the French military bases in the CAR. These had mutineers took place. After the death of a become, over decades, part of the life of the Senegalese peacekeeper MISAB started car- capital, Bangui, and Bouar in the west of the rying out blind acts of retaliation, including country: economically, politically and socially. the bombing of several neighbourhoods of As in other countries, Côte d’Ivoire being a Bangui (ICG 2007: 11). The capital was for good example, the mere presence of French a short while back in a situation of highly troops had a dissuasive function. The behaviour escalated confl ict, with bombing and heavy of the troops was not always exempt from lo- mortar fi re. The fi ghting between MISAB cal criticism: it was seen to be patronising and and the rebels resulted in the heaviest loss disrespectful of national sovereignty. But major of life of the entire mutiny phase. Accord- logistical operations such as the organisation of ing to the International Committee of the country-wide elections would not have been Red Cross, 500 people died in the confl ict possible without French military help.24 and 60,000-70,000 were driven from their homes. In this context, media and human rights groups reported that MISAB soldiers 23 Le Monde, 7 January 1997; the entire declaration is disregarded citizens’ human rights. The cited in ICG 2007, footnote 50. MISAB commander denied these allega- 24 The author had the opportunity to assist in the prepa- ration for those elections and once accompanied a tions, suggesting that criminal elements had military fl ight to distribute voting material in the east masqueraded as MISAB members – not a of the country. All was well organised and effi cient. very credible excuse.25 In this way, the fi rst Before sitting down for a picnic on the tarmac of an airstrip the military police patrolled with German peacekeeping mission to the CAR quickly shepherd dogs and scared away the kids of the nearby found itself in a situation similar to that ex- town, an unpleasant instance of master-and-servant be- perienced by the French troops. haviour. Before the take-off the remaining baguettes were thrown onto the tarmac and the kids stormed the location, to the amusement of the soldiers. This kind of 25 US Department of State (1998), ‘Central African ‘post-colonial situation’ is probably far from rare with Republic Country Report on Human Rights Prac- French military missions in Africa. tices for 1997’.

48 Critical Currents no. 5 MISAB was replaced in April 1998 by a UN Patassé. What the undisciplined MLC rebels mission (Mission des Nations Unies en RCA caused in terms of human suff ering is not yet – MINURCA). No major incident was re- fully documented.28 Six months later, in late corded during the MINURCA era (which October 2001, a new rebellion was started continued until February 2000), while, for by the sacked chief of staff , Bozizé. Libyan example, the establishment of a neutral ra- troops and aircraft were back again. They dio station (Radio MINURCA, later trans- were quickly replaced by a small peacekeep- formed into Radio Ndeke Luka) was widely ing mission, under the fl ag of Cen-Sad (or appreciated. What the 1,350 peacekeepers COMESSA), the Libyan-sponsored Com- could not prevent was a tentative ‘ethnic munity of Sahelo-Saharian states, with con- cleansing’ which took place in parts of the tingents coming from Djibouti (50), Sudan capital, Bangui; some neighbourhoods be- (50) and Libya (200). The Libyan troop pres- came completely ethnically homogene- ence was obviously not popular in Bangui, ous in the last years of the old millennium. while an embassy offi cial simply stated on No major scandals were recorded, though. the mission: ‘We want to improve the se- The main problem with MINURCA was curity in the country … If we leave, there its early termination after elections in 1999 would be a coup tonight.’29 At the end of were deemed suffi ciently acceptable (and 2002 the Cen-Sad troops were – under dip- won by the incumbent Patassé). This was lomatic pressure – replaced by yet another to underestimate the underlying sources of peacekeeping mission under the authority confl ict. The UN hoped to retain the mo- of the Central African Economic and Mon- mentum by entertaining a small UN peace- etary Community, CEMAC. The so-called building offi ce (BONUCA) on the ground, ‘Forces Multinationales de la CEMAC’ which engaged inter alia in police training (FOMUC) was just 380-men strong and had and human rights seminars.26 Only two contingents coming from Chad, Congo and years later violence was back. A failed, but Gabon. It was barely in a position to con- bloody coup attempt in May 2001 proved trol the capital Bangui. On Bozizé’s second, that an early end to a peacekeeping mission, successful attempt to conquer Bangui (and no doubt linked to fi nancial considerations, to oust Patassé) he met with little resistance could be another, not-so-innocent signal to by FOMUC; only at the airport a shoot-out local armed groups. with the Congolese contingent caused the death of some peacekeepers. According to This time outside forces (about 100) came the International Crisis Group the CEMAC from Libya to support the regime.27 About countries preferred Bozizé to the diffi cult 300 combatants of the Mouvement pour la character of Patassé and had given orders Libération du Congo (MLC), a rebel group to their peacekeepers not to move; a com- in neighbouring DRC, came to the rescue of 28 Only in 2007, after a long delay, did the Internation- al Criminal Court, offi cially launch investigations 26 BONUCA is linked to the UN Department of Po- into crimes against humanity, particularly sexual litical Aff airs (DPA), not the UN Department of violence and rape, committed by Patassé, the MLC Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). and others. 27 On Libya’s involvement in CAR see, for example, 29 BBC, 12 February 2002, ‘Libya’s presence in Bangui Melly (2002: 10ff ). questioned’ (www.bbc.co.uk; accessed 15 February 2002).

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 49 munication problem seems to have resulted In 2004 the spread of zones of insecurity in in this message not being delivered to the the countryside were attributed not only Congolese contingent (ICG 2007: 16, foot- to the so-called ‘Zaraguina’ highway rob- note 81). In this context, 300 French soldiers bers (or ‘road-blockers’), but also to former were sent to Bangui to protect French na- ‘libérateurs’ who became a major source of tionals. This was the beginning of ‘Opéra- concern. Those frequently undisciplined tion Boali’. troops, most of Chadian origin, also began racketeering with Bangui residents. In July This was not the end of the FOMUC mis- some success in combating banditry at the sion, which was prolonged time and again. northern border was reported after the gov- One hundred and fi fty out of 500 Chadian ernment deployed about 200 French-trained soldiers who were called by Bozizé to the soldiers. In fact, one year after Bozizé’s coup, still insecure capital of Bangui shortly af- France had again reinforced her presence. ter his victory were integrated in the mis- Vice-admiral Giraud, in charge of military sion. This was heavily resented by parts of and defence cooperation in the French For- the local population as Chadian nationals eign Offi ce, visited the army barracks and controlled part of the small commercial was received by Bozizé. He handed over 46 sector and were frequently involved in vio- vehicles plus equipment worth US$ 3.2 mil- lent confrontations. FOMUC risked being lion. Military trainers and support for the associated with (unsympathetic) Chadian CEMAC troops would remain – meaning interests.30 However, FOMUC is also cred- that about 200-300 French troops would ited with disarming and conducting to the stay in the country. As when the author in- Chadian frontier, in 2003, about 200 so- terviewed French offi cers in 1993,31 an Inter- called ‘libérateurs’ (that is, armed supporters national Crisis Group (ICG) report in 2007 of Bozizé at the time of the coup) who had recorded a remarkable absence of vision as begun to be a serious security threat in Ban- to why they were there (ICG 2007: 21): ‘c’est gui (Berman 2006: 27). de la présence pour la présence’ (‘it is being present to be present’).

30 Human Rights Watch (2007: 73-74) lists human The year 2005 saw a growing number of at- rights abuses by Chadian actors in the CAR and notes that Chad’s role in the CAR is complex: tacks in the northern part of the country. ‘Chadian elements can be found on all sides of the Small groups of armed men had launched various confl icts: Bozizé’s personal security detail a series of raids. In August, skirmishes oc- is Chadian, and so are many of his GP troops that helped bring him to power (the ex-libérateurs). Many curred between government forces (sup- Chadian ex-libérateurs are found in the ranks of the ported by the Chadian army and remotely UFDR fi ghting in the northeast; Chadian bandits by French troops) and rebels believed to be are involved in the zaraguinas criminal groups attacking civilians in the north; Chadian troops form part of the FOMUC regional peacekeeping mission; Chadian anti-Déby rebel groups have based them- 31 At that time, French pilots, asked why they were selves in CAR; and Chadian army troops have car- there, argued that the two air bases off ered an ideal ried out independent raids against CAR rebel groups opportunity to quickly deploy troops to Rwanda. on CAR territory, and have also engaged in abusive They were not able to detail the interests in doing looting raids inside CAR, some involving the rape exactly this. Source: interviews conducted by the of civilians.’ author in Bangui in 1993.

50 Critical Currents no. 5 members of the FDPC (‘Forces pour la Dé- the rebel conquest of these northern towns. mocratie du Peuple Centrafricain’) of Ab- In a dramatic radio message, the govern- doulaye Miskine. The FDPC was consid- ment appealed to the international com- ered to be close to former President Patassé, munity and ‘friendly nations, in particular which added a political dimension to the those linked by specifi c treaties, particularly fi ghting. During the rainy season, Miskine France, to work for the restoration of the could attack villages and army posts. The territorial integrity’.34 The response was victims were mainly civilians, who suff ered immediate. France used six Mirage fi ghter at the hands of both sides and were accused jets to combat rebels in accordance with the of complicity with the enemy. A second military pact linking both countries. About group, ‘l’Armée Populaire pour la Restau- 300 French soldiers took part in the opera- ration de la Démocratie’ (APRD) claimed tion. Nine years after the closure of her two to be behind further attacks on Marcounda military bases in the CAR, France was vis- (September) and Kabo (December). The ibly back. APRD, ridiculed by a government speak- er as a small and ethnically based group The UFDR launched a second attack on Bi- (‘groupuscule complètement folklorique’),32 rao on 3-4 March 2007 and quickly gained declared its intention to overthrow Bozizé. control of the airport. A small French mili- CEMAC decided to deploy peacekeepers tary detachment left in Birao in November to the north of the country and about 100 2006 appeared to be threatened. This was were sent to the northeastern mining town the obvious reason why Paris acted quickly, of Bria in October. launching a high-risk operation involving a paratrooper commando securing the airstrip In January 2006, Paris deployed two heli- prior to the landing of a Transall with 130 copters to help the Central African army in additional elite troops stationed in Gabon. transporting troops.33 Worse was to come. French media complained about the news On 30-31 October 2006, rebels of the best- blackout on the major Birao operation, organised group, the ‘Union des forces where Mirage fi ghter jets and helicopters démocratiques pour le rassemblement’ were used. UN coordinator Toby Lanzer (UFDR) attacked Birao, killing 10 soldiers visited Birao two weeks after the raid, im- and taking the town. Subsequently, other posing – in his words – ‘a pax Gallica,’ and towns (Sam Ouandja, Ouanda Djallé in reported that only 600 of the 14,000 inhab- Vakaga prefecture, Ouadda in Haute-Kotto itants who had fl ed the city had returned to and provincial capital Ndele in neighbour- their homes.35 He compared Birao with the ing Bamingui-Bangoran) fell to the rebels. Chechen capital Grozny: 70 per cent of the Cooperation with France intensifi ed after houses were destroyed by the armed forces

32 According to Agence France Press (AFP), 15 De- 34 Agence Centrafricaine de Presse (ACAP), 31 Octo- cember 2005. ber 2006, ‘La communauté internationale appelée à 33 On 26 June 2006 at least two members of the Chad- défendre l’intégrité territoriale de la RCA’. ian contingent of the FOMUC were killed during a 35 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), rebel attack (AFP, 3 July 2006; Agence Centrafric- 23 March 2007, ‘République centrafricaine : Une aine de Presse (ACAP), 5 July 2006). ville désertée par ses habitants fuyant l’insécurité’.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 51 and French bombs (ICG 2007: 28). A report supportive statement.36 In June, a second by Human Rights Watch accused the French UN assessment mission toured both coun- soldiers of being bystanders when the state tries and on 10 August the secretary-general security organs committed severe human came up with a revised concept, including rights violations (HRW 2007). Christophe the deployment of an EU military mission.37 Gazam Betty, a former CAR ambassador On 25 September, the UN Security Council to Paris, now self-declared coordinator of a decided on the establishment for one year of number of rebel groups, went a step further the United Nations Mission in the Central in a media interview on 20 April, accusing African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), France of committing crimes against hu- with an express mandate to protect civil- manity by indiscriminately bombing villag- ians with the support of the EU operation.38 es in the north of the CAR and saying they France fi nally secured a ‘Joint Action’ of the should be dealt with by the International Council of the European Union on 15 Oc- Criminal Court. Paris constantly invoked tober 2007,39 wherein it nominated an Irish the defence agreement linking both coun- commander, but it had diffi culty mobilising tries when justifying its engagement. With- its European partners in terms of commit- out massive French help it would not have ments to troop deployment. NGOs such as been possible to hold Birao in March 2007. the International Rescue Committee and France’s ‘Opération Boali’ established itself the Red Cross openly questioned whether more fi rmly, with a full colonel as a com- a troop dominated by France could be re- mander (replacing a lieutenant-colonel) at garded as neutral in its former colonies,40 the head of a 200-men-strong detachment. and it was only with great diffi culty that ap-

The story of peacekeeping in the CAR does 36 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclu- not end here. After a report by a techni- sions on Sudan/Darfur, 2817th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 23 and 24 July 2007’: cal assessment mission in Bangui and Bi- ‘The EU … reiterates its support for the deploy- rao, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon ment of a multidimensional UN presence in Eastern recommended the deployment of a UN Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic … The Council asks its competent bodies to con- peacekeeping mission to the border trian- tinue planning in view of a possible decision on a gle between Chad, the CAR and Sudan on bridging operation, in the framework of the Eu- 23 February 2007. This met with hesitation ropean Security and Defense Policy, in support of on the Chadian side, while Bangui was in the multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic with a favour. During the summer, France pushed view to improving security in those areas.’ for the organisation of an EU-led opera- 37 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and tion with a UN mandate; an EU Council the Central African Republic’, 10 August 2007, S/2007/488. meeting on 23 July came up with a vague 38 UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), 25 September 2007, S/RES/1778 (2007). 39 Council of the European Union: Council Conclu- sions on Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan, 2824th External Relations Council meeting, Luxemburg, 15-16 October 2007. 40 IRIN, 26 December 2007.

52 Critical Currents no. 5 proximately 3,500 troops were raised in the criminality: ‘…bandits have become lords European Union by mid-January 2008 for of the night, attacking residents and mur- the mission, including 2,100 from France it- dering and/or robbing them of their meager self (the rest from Poland and Ireland). This possessions, sometimes under the noses of caused a considerable delay of the mission offi cers of UNMIL or elements of the se- that should have started in November. curity forces of the government of Liberia’ – and this despite a very large mission with History seems to repeat itself, with troops of a robust mandate. ‘And the best UNMIL … a former colonial power dominating a mul- has been able to do is to play the ambulance tilateral peacekeeping mission, and all the unit, clearing bodies from the streets, taking attendant risks of encountering problematic them to the mortuary and promising inves- stereotypes and expectations on the ground. tigation into the crime.’42 It can only be hoped that the police-oriented mission of MINURCAT makes a The line of defence of those criticised should diff erence. However, the close association not surprise: the mandate is insuffi cient – or of FOMUC with the government’s recon- at least the number of troops deployed is in- quest of rebel-held territory in 2006/2007 suffi cient to do more than is currently being and the disputed neutrality of BONUCA41 done.43 Most remarkable is the frequently raise doubts whether any peacekeeping and voiced opinion that military personnel are peacebuilding eff ort funded from outside not suited to policing tasks. In a post-con- can become anything other than an exten- fl ict phase these policing challenges are more sion of the power of the president.

42 The Analyst (Monrovia), 5 September 2006. See also Aboagye and Bah (2004: 16) who criticise ‘...the The underexposed local inaction of troops arising from the narrow inter- appraisal of peacekeepers pretation of UNMIL’s mandate regarding the use of force for the protection of civilians’. In Sierra Leone UNAMSIL was similarly criticised in an early phase Intervention troops and peacekeepers are of its deployment, see Standard Times (Freetown), 26 rated locally. Local sources report people’s January 2001 (‘Editorial: UNAMSIL and the Image disappointment with international peace- Factor’): ‘And as if to increase the pain and trauma of the local populace UNAMSIL men are seen engaged keepers when expectations are unmet. This in frivolous and jolly activities as if they are here for is no diff erent in the case of recent UN mis- a picnic of course.’ UNAMSIL had a particularly sions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which diffi cult start in Sierra Leone, when more than 200 UN peacekeepers were captured by rebels. British have been criticised by local media. In Libe- paratroopers provided for a second and better start. ria, there is a good number of voices com- Interestingly, they receive a much more positive ap- plaining about insuffi cient eff orts to curb praisal than their French counterparts in close-by Côte d’Ivoire. 43 Interview with Licorne spokesman Lt. Col. Mis- 41 See Refugees International, ‘Central African Re- set in Le Nouveau Réveil (Abidjan), 4 April 2004, public: Take steps now to head off intractable crisis’ ‘Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General (www.refi ntl.org/article/detail/9962; accessed 25 on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, March 2008). This alleges that ‘BONUCA and its S/2005/186, 18 March 2005’. It is written verbally: leader, General Cissé, have grown too close to the ‘The capacity of both UNOCI and the Licorne government, preventing it from acting as a neutral forces was exceeded during the November [2004] mediator and facilitator’. crisis.’

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 53 frequently than not the most salient issues.44 process was a failure.47 But rebel sympathis- The attempt to explain the weaknesses of ers were no less vocal in accusing the peace- a mission as the result of a hostile environ- keepers of remaining inactive when faced ment and, in particular, manipulation by with acts of repression by the government. politicians is more problematic.45 The rheto- Rumours of an imminent (and robust) dis- ric and tactical skill of African politicians is armament of rebels led to a big demonstra- not in doubt, but it could be a bit too easy if tion in their stronghold of Bouaké; the pro- the accusations were not even to be exam- test march reached the local headquarters ined and if the role of the intervention force of the Licorne mission and the UN head- in the local security architecture were not to quarters.48 The explanation of the protesters be viewed with some objectivity.46 was straightforward: you want to take away our most important means of protection. In the case of the Côte d’Ivoire the charges UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had to were not voiced by just one confl ict par- acknowledge in March 2005 – more than ty. The president’s party, Front Populaire two years after the peace accord of Linas- Ivoirien (FPI) constantly aired its accusa- Marcoussis – that the disarmament of ex- tions that the UN-sponsored disarmament combatants (rebels and militias close to the president) had not yet even begun.49 This failure must have had repercussions for the perception of the effi ciency of the mission, 44 The eighth report of the Secretary-General on the as for the perception of the current security United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN situation on all sides. Doc. S/2006/222 (11 April 2006), notes ‘As part of the lessons learned form the January disturbances, personnel of formed police units are being deployed alongside the United Nations troops returning to the west, to ensure a crowd control capacity’. The police 47 This was the reason given by National Assembly component of UNOCI was steadily increased and chairman Mamadou Koulibaly for demanding the stood at 1000 troops in December 2006. Pouligny disbanding of the Licorne mission, see Le Jour (Abi- (2006: 252) notes on police work in UN missions djan), 14 March 2005. President Gbagbo made an ‘Much is played out in day-to-day life, in a work of equally sharp declaration in an interview with Jeune proximity and small gestures, seemingly insignifi - Afrique, 3-9 July 2005, when he found the Licorne cant, which will none the less make it possible or not mission ‘psychologically disturbing’. He stated: ‘Li- to build relations of confi dence.’ corne est assimilée par une majorité d’Ivoiriens à une 45 International NGOs are quick to support this, see force injuste, loin d’être neutre.’ Amnesty International (2006). Only rudimentary 48 Le Nouveau Réveil (Abidjan), 7 October 2004 : ‘…la evidence is given to support the judgment. Human société civile entend protester contre la communau- Rights Watch (2006) is more critical in its report, té internationale et les responsables de l’opération ‘“Because they have the guns ... I’m left with noth- qui auraient manifesté leur volonté de désarmer de ing.”: The Price of Continuing Impunity in Côte force les FAFN [Forces Armées des Forces Nouvel- d’Ivoire’. The proportionality of the reaction is les, A.M.]. Selon un membre de la société civile que questioned here (p. 10). nous avons approché, leur action serait la résultante 46 Failures of UN operations are rather briefl y analysed des rumeurs qui proviendraient de l’ambassade de (in comparison to the fully documented successes) France. Pour les manifestants qui se sont recrutés par in Doyle and Sambanis (2007). The factors of fail- centaines dans tous les quartiers de Bouaké, la Fran- ure identifi ed in Cyprus and Rwanda are given as ce aurait choisi de rouler pour Laurent Gbagbo. ’ the wrong design of the mission and management 49 UN Security Council (2005), ‘Fourth progress re- errors. The authors do not consider analysing local port of the Secretary-General on the United Nations perceptions of the missions. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, S/2005/186 (18.3.2005).

54 Critical Currents no. 5 The offi cial reactions to the ‘aff aire Mahé’ we asked them to do.’54 This shows that the (cited above) were rather modest. FPI chair- local population makes judgements, be they man Pascal Affi N’guessan delivered the positive or negative. It is obvious that these clearly political message that the suspen- judgements infl uence the chances of peace- sion of General Poncet must be seen in light keeping missions being successful. of his overall output (not of the link to the assassination).50 However, the local me- Peacekeepers in Central African Republic dia were less restrained. One paper writes could not have such a prominent role in the that the announcement of Mahé’s death by mindset of the local population as they were French soldiers to their superiors was deliv- always smaller in numbers. However, some ered ‘in the way that bushmeat is delivered major problems occurred in the MISAB for dinner’.51 The UN secretary-general re- mission and the Libyan – and by extension ported in early 2007 that civil society groups the Cen-Sad peacekeepers – were publicly had accused UNOCI troops of behaving in rejected by the entire opposition. When an unacceptable way; for example, no assist- in June 1997 rebels attacked MISAB troops ance seems to have been given to civilians based in some areas of Bangui, their response threatened by sexual violence.52 According was clearly disproportionate, leading to up to to the next report of the secretary-gener- 500 deaths. In this context, media and human al, the complainants retracted their allega- rights groups reported that MISAB soldiers tions during the course of an investigation; disregarded citizens’ human rights. In partic- however, new allegations of misconduct by ular, members of the Chadian contingent of UNOCI military personnel were also re- MISAB were pointed at, as having commit- ceived.53 ted human rights abuses including the killing of civilians and the looting of residences However, local people can also have the in Bangui’s suburbs of Fatima and Petevo. A opposite experience and as a consequence Catholic priest reported the killing of old peo- come to a much more positive assessment ple, children and women by soldiers wearing of peacekeepers. When French troops took MISAB uniforms.55 The rather problematic stronger action in response to multiplying image of Chadians in Bangui contributed to acts of violence in the confi dence zone they a negative local view of the mission. were explicitly thanked by the local population: ‘We feel secure now and can circulate There are a few hints as to reservations vis- freely‘ was one of the opinions expressed by à-vis MISAB and MINURCA on the part a mini-van driver to Le Jour: ‘This is what of Central Africans. In a lengthy article to l’écho de Centrafrique. republished by the pro- Patassé internet source Centrafrique-Presse, an 50 Abidjan Lumières (Abidjan), 25.10.2007. author complained about unspecifi ed costs of 51 Le Matin d’Abidjan (Abidjan), 25.11.2007. the mission: ‘Qui va payer pour la MISAB … 52 ‘Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, S/2007/275 (14.5.2005), para. 30. 54 Le Jour (Abidjan), 30.12.2005. 53 ‘Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General 55 US Department of State, ‘Central African Repub- on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’, lic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for S/2007/593 (1.10.2007); para. 57 1997’.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 55 la MINURCA … puis aujourd’hui le BO- On 6 February 2002 the same parties wrote NUCA…? Ce sont nos enfants. N’aurait-il to the members of the UN Security Coun- pas mieux valu que cet argent soit dépensé cil and the UN secretary-general, express- autrement?’ 56 In another lengthy contribu- ing their fi rm opposition to the deployment tion in the Patassé-critical internet journal of Cen-Sad troops as peacekeepers and ask- Sangonet allusions to the arrogant conduct of ing the Security Council to turn down any the UN missions and its eff ect on the offi cial demand for the funding of this force. In security forces were made: ‘... une armée March they noted that the Security Council qui n’a pas encore digérée [sic] la trahison had not expressed its view on the matter and des politiques et la soumission à l’arrogance complained that, nevertheless, a Sudanese des militaires aussi bien de la Misab que de contingent had been deployed to comple- la Minurca’.57 But open accusations of par- ment the Libyan troops ‘déjà présentes de tiality and failures in protection were not manière illégale sur le territoire national’ voiced. This is probably due to the limited (already illegally present on the national scope of both missions. territory). The Sudanese deployment was in fact suspected to be motivated by the unde- The Libyan troops and Cen-Sad peacekeep- clared design to use the CAR territory as a ers received more local criticism. On 14 No- base from which to fi ght the rebels in the vember 2001 the opposition political parties south of Sudan. Interestingly, the political issued a statement in which they requested, parties went one step further in declaring inter alia, the withdrawal of Libyan troops their complete rejection of the principle of from the Central African Republic.58 In a any peacekeeping force in the CAR, even later declaration, on 1 January 2002, the op- under the aegis of the UN, in a context position saw the hand of Libya behind the where there was neither civil war nor ag- decision of the attorney-general, Bindoumi, gression from the outside. In this context, to stop judicial prosecution of Bozizé and this force would have no mission other than others after it had obtained a supposedly to consolidate the power of the president in- hard-fought-for Cen-Sad mandate for a stead of alleviating the suff ering of the Cen- peacekeeping mission. The parties had four tral African people. Instead of a peacekeep- main demands – in this order: the return ing mission they asked for a prolongation of of refugees in conditions of guaranteed se- the BONUCA mandate and extended the curity, a general amnesty, the retreat of the capacities of this small peace-building unit Libyan troops, and a national dialogue.59 to help disarm the president’s militias, reform the armed forces, fi ght insecurity and poverty, facilitate the return of refugees and 56 Centrafrique-Presse, 4 February 2002. further national reconciliation.60 Paul Bel- 57 Sangonet, 22 November 1999, ‘Dologuéle II: Méri- tocratie’, by Jean-Claude Lenga. let, a leading opposition political fi gure is 58 UN Security Council. ‘Report of the Secretary- quoted as saying ‘We resent the infl uence General on the situation in the Central African Re- public, 2 January 2002’, S/2002/12. 59 Sangonet, 5 January 2002. The declaration was 60 Sangonet, 16 March 2002 (www.bbc.co.uk, accessed signed by the political parties ADP, ASD, FC, FND, 18 March 2002), signed by ADP, ASD, FC, FND, FODEM, FPP, MDI-PS, MESAN-BOGANDA, FODEM, FPP, MDI-PS, MESAN-BOGANDA, MNR, PUN and UNDD. MNR, PUN and UNDD.

56 Critical Currents no. 5 Gaddafi is having on our president and However, local expectations, experiences on our country … Our people were bur- and perceptions are among the most im- ied alive in their homes during the Libyan portant factors of success or failure in in- bombing’. ternational missions. It is most surprising that they are so rarely taken into account by Apart from the statements of politicians policy-makers in the North and the South. BBC reporters collected further evidence of a widespread popular rejection of Libyan troops in February 2002. The newspaper Le A tentative conclusion Citoyen wrote: ‘Central Africans are asking themselves: what have the Libyans done for A tentative balance-sheet of outside inter- us? … Libya has a dream of an Islamic repub- vention troops in the three case studies can lic in Africa but we do not share that dream’. be given in a synoptic way. The table on the Local journalists are said to have complained following page summarises size, mandate that Libyan offi cials tried to bribe them with and a brief characterisation of security pro- trips to Tripoli, promising them meetings vision as perceived by the local population. with Colonel Gaddafi . They claimed they had been asked to write laudatory articles about the Libyan troops in an attempt to change public opinion. A journalist on Le Confi dent reportedly wrote ‘Most people see the Libyan troops as only here to protect the president … The harassment of civilians by soldiers continues – there are still bandits in the country – so what do the Libyans off er the average citizen?’61 The president’s camp, while acknowledging widespread criticism of the Libyans62 justifi ed the presence of the Cen-Sad peacekeepers by the fact that Pa- tassé’s decision to call them in conformed with both the CAR Constitution and the Cen-Sad treaty which the CAR ratifi ed in 1999 – the defence of the republican institutions being the main aim; nothing was said about the security of the population.63

61 BBC, 12 February 2002, ‘Libya’s presence in Bangui questioned’ (emphasis added), www.bbc.co.uk, accessed 15 February 2002). 62 Some critics termed them ‘occupation troops’, or compared their action with an ‘invasion’, or even accused them of turning the CAR into a ‘protectorate’. 63 Centrafrique-Presse, 15 January 2002, ‘A propos de la Cen-Sad’.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 57 cient cient Balance sheet/ security security sheet/ Balance provision Ambiguous, not seen as impartial Negative, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties Positive, but maybe not sustainable Positive/ ambiguous, disproportionate use of violence Positive, short-lived Libyan Ambiguous/short-lived, contingent seen as not impartial Ambiguous, Chadian contingent seen as not impartial Ambiguous, not seen as impartial, disproportionate use of violence Ambiguous, not seen as impartial, disproportionate use of violence Ambiguous, not effi Ambiguous, not effi 67 72 65 . , facilities , 64 66 71 70 69 68 Monitoring of the arms embargo. Support for humanitarian assistance. 73 demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement. Disarmament and dismantling of militias. Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians, and civilians, support for humanitarian and human rights assistance, support for security sector reform, support for implementation of peace process . Mandate - of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city; to assist the national security forces in maintaining and law order and in protecting key installations in Bangui;nal disposition to supervise, of control storage, and monitor the fi all weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise... . security) (presidential forces. Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security be may threatened. In consultation with UNOCI, intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside UNOCI’s areas of deployment. Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units. Contribute to monitoring the arms embargo established by resolution. facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff Contribution to the structural reform of the army. theAccompany stabilisation process by supporting the economic relaunch. and normalisation institutions of Disarmament of ex-mutineers, militias and all other persons illegally armed. provincial tours in 100 to 200 km perimeter outside Bangui, training of army. Support for the redeployment of State administration. Assistance in eld of human rights, public information, and law order. the fi 8,000 Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups. Disarmament, 15,000 agreement,re protection staff UN of ceasefi Support of implementation for Personnel (max.) 1,500- 2,500 1,350 Assistance in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom 300 ned defi not - 380 Contribution to the security of CAR. 4,000 Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international 1,400 Facilitate the application of the Marcoussis agreements: monitor the cessation of hostilities; 500-1,100 Return to peace and security by controlling the application of the Bangui accord. 220-300 Support of FOMUC, protection of a French military camp, patrols in the city of Bangui, MINUCI/UNOCI (2004- ) UNMIL (2003- ) Mission/ intervention (years) troop MLC 2002-2003) (2001, CEN-SAD (2002) 300 Make the capital secure and ensure the security of the President of the Republic MINURCA (1998-2000) troops Libyan (2001-2002) FOMUC (2002/3- ) Opération Licorne (2002- ) ECOMICI (2003-2004) MISAB (1997-1998) Opération Boali (2003- ) utside intervention troops in CAR, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, 1997-2007 O Liberia Country CAR Côte d’Ivoire Table:

58 Critical Currents no. 5 pted by the Security Council at its meet- 5213th o ing, on 24 June 2005 (S/RES/1609), para. 12. The mandate was slightly altered by UN Security Coun- cil, Resolution (2007), 1739 adopted by the Security Council at its 5617th meeting, January on 10 2007 (S/RES/1739), para. 2. (accessedNo105/3ECOWAS.htm July 23 2008) interest: protect ‘To United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government ad- National of Reconciliation, protect to (2005), 1609 civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, Resolution within its capabilities Council, and its areas of deployment. Security UN opted by the Security Council at its meeting, 5213th on 24 June 2005 (S/RES/1609), para. 2k. 71 UN Security Council, Resolution 1609 (2005), ad- http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/ 72 73 The formulation of the respective paragraph is of ed Central African the army in making other zones secure was foreseen, as was a progressive transfer of responsibility unspecifi to and ma- FOMUC from terial defence and security forces. Assistance by the French army was explicitly mentioned. Source: ibid. populations by regular patrols’ in the regions of Bria, Bozoum and Kaga Bandoro was mentioned just as a vague contribution to the return to sovereignty and to the control of the economy in these regions by the (ac- Central African state (source: ibid). Other mandates www.operationspaix.net/FOMUC in listed are cessed 4 March 2008). Thisuous text when it comes is to the much concrete tasks, more ambig- as it claims that the security of President Patassé, the surveillance of the border between CAR and Chad as well as the arrest and disarmament of warlords would fall within its ght domain. against The fi pillaging and other acts of violence in and around north the capital are the a further cover to 2005 mandate mentioned. The August mandate in of FOMUC was extended indeed and the east of the country as well (besides Bangui). 69 In the framework of this main task the assistance to 70 In the framework of this main task ‘reassuring the (accessed July 23 2008) caM.htm. (accessed July 23 2008) The mandate was later extended to a more broad-based support of na- elections. tional Communiqu%C3%A9s/Report%20-%20RCA%20 En%2014-01-03.pdf (accessed July 23 2008) airport and camp Mpoko, the defence of the city of Bangui and the re-establishment of free movement fouron axes (Bangui-Bossembele-Bouar, Bangui- Damara-Sibut-Bambari-Bouar, Bangui-Sibut-Kaga Bandoro and Bangui-Mbaiki-Carnot) plus a contribution to control of the regions Bozoum, Bria and Kaga Bandoro were foreseen. Cooperation with army, gendarmerie and police was explicitly mentioned. Additionnel ‘Acte 07/06-CEMAC-168- n° CCE-SE portent aménagement mandate du la de Force Mulitnational de la CEMAC (FOMUC)’, accessed via www.izf.net (4 March 2008). 64 http://unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=mandate64 65 22 July Appendix, 1997. S/1997/561; http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/minur-66 http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/ 67 68 In the framework of this main task the control of the

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 59 Column three shows that some missions, Ranked second (at 18.4 per cent) was the particularly in the CAR, were so small that Liberia National Police; other actors were a substantial protective eff ect could not be rarely mentioned. In the ensuing part of the expected. Column four shows that some- questionnaire individual security providers times mandates did not particularly include had to be rated according to predetermined security provision for the population. This options (ranging from ‘very important for was probably so only in the past and should my personal security’ to ‘a big threat for my now be constantly part of the mandate with personal security’). Again, the responses the new dominant paradigm of ‘responsibil- are in line with this positive assessment of ity to protect’. the UN mission, with 96.5 per cent of the respondents opting for ‘very important’ or The balance in column fi ve is based mostly ‘somewhat important’ (UNMIL again be- on the interpretation of local and interna- ing followed – at a distance – by the Libe- tional news coverage by the author. It is ob- ria National Police). However, community viously diffi cult to establish without proper watch teams – a non-state actor – were also investigation techniques and is therefore very positively rated. debatable (with one exception). It would be most helpful to have some concrete data, but Peacekeepers and other peace-building mis- they are frequently lacking. Those data can sions have to explicitly decide with whom be generated. In a recent research project they want to cooperate in the security fi eld. about security perceptions in Liberia (and As we have seen, in both Liberia and the Sierra Leone)74 we used a quantitative opin- Central African Republic they have opted ion poll and qualitative research techniques for state agencies with little regard for other such as focus group discussions to get more groups, be they (former) rebel groups, self- tangible results. help organisations or traditional authorities. Implicitly, though, the UNMIL mission The opinion poll revealed a very positive interacted intensely with other actors. This assessment of the UNMIL mission’s protec- seems not to be the case for any of the out- tive capacity by inhabitants of Monrovia and side intervention troops in the CAR: MIS- two other cities (Buchanan and Tubman- AB, MINURCA, FOMUC, the French burg) two and a half years after the end of ‘Opération Boali’ or even the UN peace- the war in a survey conducted in November building unit BONUCA. And at the same 2005 (Mehler and Smith-Höhn 2007: 49- time, CAR presidents Patassé and Bozizé 65; Basedau et al. 2007): 77.8 per cent of the have privatised the state to a large extent, respondents replied ‘UNMIL’ to the open including parts of the security sector. It was question of who they thought was the most therefore far from obvious that the state important actor for their personal security. should be the sole partner of outsiders in security aff airs. In contrast, as Côte d’Ivoire was eff ectively split into North and South 74 ‘Legitimate oligopolies of violence in post-confl ict societies’, funded by the German Foundation for the three Ivorian rebel groups united under Peace Research. The opinion polls were fi nanced by the label of ‘Forces Nouvelles’ were more or the Institute of African Aff airs/German Institute of less natural partners for outside intervention Global and Area Studies, Hamburg.

60 Critical Currents no. 5 forces. However, little care was given to the appropriate local cooperation partners in effi ciency and legitimacy of other non-state the fi eld of security in African post-confl ict providers of security at the local level. What societies. This should be self-evident if the ordinary people thought of them was never statement of Doyle and Sambanis (2000: analysed. 779) on peacekeeping strategies holds true: ‘Strategies should address the local roots This contribution has argued that for peace- of hostility, the local capacities for change, keepers it is essential to know: and the (net) specifi c degree of international commitment available to assist sustainable • how their own actions are rated locally peace’. It is going a step further to suggest • which actors are truly effi cient and legiti- that the forced introduction and mainte- mate (with which groups within the soci- nance of a monopoly on the use of force ety) in providing security, as these are the might have less chance of succeeding in natural cooperation partners. bringing about security than the ‘optimi- sation of oligopolies of violence’ (Mehler Another important assessment concerns the 2006). A second motive may support this extent of the challenge for those security ac- view: whoever wants to avoid costly long- tors remaining on the ground when peace- term protectorates as a by-product of ever keepers leave. As UNMIL proved to be by more complex UN missions should not far the most important provider of security in ignore non-state actors and might have to Liberia, it is obvious that it would be diffi cult think about cooperation, if only for this to replace it. Our focus group interviews (or material reason. The question remains: with one of their results – a graphical mapping of whom? Two main criteria for such coopera- actor constellations) saw UNMIL as having tion stand out: effi ciency and local legitima- contacts and links of cooperation with most cy. This legitimacy may again partly be the other actors; it was in a key position, which outcome of effi cient security provision or be state actors would have diffi culties in fi lling. based on charisma, ideology, symbols and It should be borne in mind, nevertheless, myths, or conformity of important norms that UNMIL was not in a position to patrol and convictions between protectors and the anything except the main streets, strategic protected.75 It is obvious that most western sites and public buildings and that crime was governments will fi nd it impossible to co- a daily experience in Monrovia. One con- operate with actors who openly violate hu- clusion from this seems obvious: with the man rights or even call for genocide. But current limitations of state security forces it even actors who do not qualify as partners would be very unwise to dismantle self-help should not be left out of any analysis about mechanisms on a local level; instead it would the security situation. Diff erent wings of the be better to promote them. ‘Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance’ (MFDC) (Evans 2004, Foucher What all this means is that there is simply 2007) in Senegal or the ‘jeunes patriotes’ in a real necessity to think beyond state structures to (a) get the picture of the security 75 Meagher’s analysis of the Bakassi Boys (2007: 98-99, output of peacekeepers right and (b) fi nd 112-113) invites the drawing of similar conclusions on relevant criteria.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 61 Côte d’Ivoire may be portrayed as ‘impossi- Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999), ble partners’. But a sober assessment of how Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, they are viewed locally is needed. Potential Bloomington: Indiana University Press. strategies to integrate diffi cult non-state Doyle, Michael and Sambanis, Nicholas actors in a holistic security-sector strategy (2007), Making War and Building Peace, Prin- may include a strategy of ‘certifi cation’ and ceton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. an obligation to respect core human rights in exchange for recognition and sustained, Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicho- trustful cooperation. But trustful coop- las (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: eration also presupposes that peacekeepers A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, can be trusted and are appreciated locally. American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. Again, this is far from self-evident when the 4, pp. 779-801. reality-check proposed in this contribution Engel, Ulf and Mehler, Andreas (2005), is taken into account. ‘“Under construction”: Governance in Af- rica’s new violent social spaces’, in Engel, Literature Ulf and Olsen, Gorm Rye (eds), The African Exception, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 87-102. Aboagye, Festus B. and Bah, Alhaji M. S. Evans, Martin (2004), ‘Senegal: Mouvement (2004), ‘Liberia at a Crossroads. A preliminary des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance’, look at the United Nations Mission in Libe- Chatham House AFP BP 04/02. ria (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians’, ISS Paper 95, November. Faltas, Sami (2000), ‘Mutiny and Disarma- ment in the Central African Republic’, in Baker, Bruce (2007), Multi-Choice Policing in Faltas, Sami and Di Chiaro, Joseph, III (eds), Africa, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarma- Basedau, Matthias, Mehler, Andreas and ment as an Element of Peace-building, Baden- Smith-Höhn, Judy (2007), ‘Caught between Baden: Nomos, pp. 77-96. International, State and Non-state Actors: Foucher, Vincent (2007), ‘The resilience of Public Perceptions of Security in Post-con- weakness. Interpreting the separatist insur- fl ict Urban Liberia’, Journal of Peacebuilding and gency in Casamance’, in Dunn, Kevin and Development, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 84-89. Bøas, Morten (eds), African guerrillas. Raging Berman, Eric G. (2005), ‘Central African Against the Machine, Boulder/CO: Lynne Republic: A Case Study of Small Arms and Rienner, pp. 171-197. Confl ict’ Rapport Spécial/ Small Arms Grävinginholt, Jörn, Hofmann, Claudia Survey, Geneva: Institut universitaire de and Klingebiel, Stephan (2007), Development Hautes Études Internationales. cooperation and non-state armed groups, Bonn: Callaghy, Thomas, Kassimir, Ronald and German Development Institute Latham, Robert (eds) (2001), Intervention and Hofmann, Claudia (2006), ‘Engaging Non- Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local Net- State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Ac- works of Power, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- tion’, International Peacekeepingi, vol. 13, no. versity Press. 3, pp. 396-409.

62 Critical Currents no. 5 Meagher, Kate (2007), ‘Hijacking civil so- Documents ciety: the inside story of the Bakassi Boys vigilante group of south-eastern Nigeria’, Amnesty International, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, Clashes between peacekeeping forces and no. 1, pp. 89-115. civilians: lessons for the future’, AI Index 31/005/2006 (19.9.2006). Mehler, Andreas (2006), ‘Les oligopoles de la violence en Afrique de l’Ouest’ Politique Human Rights Watch (2006), ‘Because they étrangère, no. 3, pp. 557-568. have the guns ... I’m left with nothing’. The Price of Continuing Impunity in Côte Mehler, Andreas (2004), ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Chirac d’Ivoire’, (Human Rights Watch report, 18 (4)). allein zu Haus?’ Afrika im Blickpunkt, no. 4, 2004, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. Human Rights Watch (2007), ‘Central Af- rican Republic: State of Anarchy. Rebel- Mehler, Andreas (2003), ‘Legitime Gewalto- lion and Abuses against Civilians, (Human ligopole - eine Antwort auf strukturelle In- Rights Watch report, 19 (14)). stabilität in Westafrika?’, Focus Afrika, IAK- Diskussionsbeiträge, no. 22, Hamburg. ICG (International Crisis Group) (2007), ‘République Centrafricaine. Anatomie d’un Mehler, Andreas and Smith-Höhn, Judy Etat fantôme’ (Rapport Afrique no. 136) (2007), ‘Security Actors in Liberia and Sierra Leone Roles Interactions and Perceptions’, in Peacewomen (2007), ‘Peacekeeping Watch: Debiel, Tobias and Lambach, Daniel (Hg.), Monitoring Sexual Exploitation and Abuse ‘Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of by UN Peacekeepers and the eff orts of the Governance’ (INEF Report 89), S. 49-65. international community to respond’. http:// www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/pk- Melly, Paul (2002), ‘Central African Republic watch.html (accessed 15 November 2007) – uncertain prospects’ (UNHCR Emergen- cy and Security Service, WRITENET Paper S/2004/443 (2.6.2004): ‘U N, Secur it y Coun- No. 14 / 2001, revised May 2002. http://www. cil: First report of the Secretary-General unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3d8f11894.pdf on the United Nations Operation in Côte (accessed 16 February 2008) d’Ivoire’. Pouligny, Béatrice (2006), Peace Operations S/2005/186 (18.3.2005): ‘UN, Security Seen from Below. UN Missions and Local Peo- Council: Fourth progress report of the Sec- ple, Bloomfi eld CT: Kumarian Press. retary-General on the United Nations Op- eration in Côte d’Ivoire’. Schorlemer, Sabine von (2007), ‘The Respon- sibility to Protect as an Element of Peace’ (= S/2006/222 (11.4.2006): ‘UN, Security SEF Policy Paper; 28), Bonn: SEF. Council: Eighth report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Operation van Walraven, Klaas (1999), ‘The Pretence in Côte d’Ivoire’. of Peacekeeping. ECOMOG, Liberia and West Africa 1990-1998’, The Hague: Cling- S/2007/275 (14.5.2007): ‘UN, Security endael Institute. Council: Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’.

Th e United Nations, Security and Peacekeeping in Africa – Lessons and Prospects 63 S/2007/593 (1.10.2007): ‘UN, Security Coun- cil: Fourteenth progress report of the Secre- tary-General on the United Nations Opera- tion in Côte d’Ivoire’. US Department of State (1998), ‘Central Af- rican Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997’.

Ugandan civil police prepare to board a Botswana C-130 at the airport in Kigali, Rwanda. They were returning home after a one-year deployment to the Darfur region where they were part of the African Union peacekeeping mission. 646 CriticalCriticac l CuCurrentsrrrennts nno.o.o 5 (U.S. Air Force photo/Capt. Erin Dorrance)

United Nations peacekeeping operations go back to Dag Hammarskjöld’s initiatives as the second Secretary-General. More recently, they have taken on hitherto unprecedented dimensions. By far the largest proportional engagement is currently to be found on the African continent. Of late, the African Union has initiated its own security architecture to complement the UN’s efforts and assume collective responsibility for African security affairs.

The contributions explore the experiences and scope of UN peacekeeping initiatives in Africa and the emerging collaboration with the continental body.

Critical Currents is an Occasional Paper Series published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It is also available online at www.dhf.uu.se.

Printed copies may be obtained from Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Övre Slottsgatan 2 SE- 753 10 Uppsala, Sweden email: [email protected] phone: +46 (0)18-410 10 00

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