DOCSLIB.ORG

The Central African Republic Crisis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Central African Republic Crisis The Central African Republic crisis March 2016 Nathalia Dukhan About this report This report provides a synthesis of some of the most recent, high-quality literature on the security and political processes in Central African Republic produced up to the end of January 2016. It was prepared for the European Union’s Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, © European Union 2016. The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of GSDRC, its partner agencies or the European Commission. This is the second review published by GSDRC on the situation in the Central African Republic. The first review of literature was published in June 2013 and provides a country analysis covering the period 2003- 2013. It is available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/car_gsdrc2013.pdf. Expert contributors GSDRC would like to thank the following experts who have contributed to the production of this report: Carolina Reyes Aragon, UN Panel of Experts on the CAR Jocelyn Coulon, Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de la Paix Manar Idriss, Independent Researcher Thibaud Lesueur, International Crisis Group Thierry Vircoulon, International Crisis Group Ruben de Koning, UN Panel of Experts on the CAR Yannick Weyns, Researcher at IPIS Research Source for map of CAR on following page: International Peace Information Service (PIS) www.ipisresearch.be. Suggested citation Dukhan, N. (2016). The Central African Republic crisis. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. About GSDRC GSDRC is a partnership of research institutes, think-tanks and consultancy organisations with expertise in governance, social development, humanitarian and conflict issues. We provide applied knowledge services on demand and online. Our specialist research team supports a range of international development agencies, synthesising the latest evidence and expert thinking to inform policy and practice. GSDRC, International Development Department, College of Social Sciences University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom [email protected] www.gsdrc.org Contents Chronology of events ................................................................................................................... ii 1. Overview ................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Principal internal actors ........................................................................................................... 2 2.1 Rebel movements ........................................................................................................................ 2 2.2 Rebel groups ................................................................................................................................ 5 2.3 The transitional authorities ......................................................................................................... 8 2.4 Principal national security forces................................................................................................. 9 2.5 Political parties ............................................................................................................................ 9 2.6 Religious leaders ........................................................................................................................ 10 2.7 The private sector ...................................................................................................................... 10 3. Principal external actors ......................................................................................................... 11 3.1 Regional organisations............................................................................................................... 11 3.2 Main regional actors .................................................................................................................. 12 3.3 International organisations ....................................................................................................... 13 3.4 International actors ................................................................................................................... 15 4. Principal internal dynamics .................................................................................................... 16 4.1 Sectarian violence ...................................................................................................................... 16 4.2 The agro-pastoral conflict .......................................................................................................... 19 4.3 Culture of impunity .................................................................................................................... 19 4.4 Phantom state, economic predation and the natural resource curse ...................................... 22 5. Principal external dynamics .................................................................................................... 24 5.1 The ambiguous role of Chad ...................................................................................................... 24 5.2 Regional armed combatants ...................................................................................................... 25 6. National dialogues and peace agreements (2014-2015) ........................................................... 26 6.1 The Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, July 2014 ............................................. 26 6.2 The Nairobi deal, January 2015 ................................................................................................. 26 6.3 The Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, May 2015 ........................................................ 27 6.4 The electoral process ................................................................................................................. 27 6.5 DDR and security sector reform ................................................................................................ 28 7. Capacities for peace ............................................................................................................... 30 7.1 Former conflict resolution mechanisms: the case of agro-pastoralism .................................... 30 7.2 Religious leaders in the reconciliation process.......................................................................... 30 7.3 Decentralised governance ......................................................................................................... 31 7.4 Economic opportunities............................................................................................................. 31 7.5 Strengthening the judiciary and support transitional justice .................................................... 31 7.6 Disarmament and demobilisation ............................................................................................. 32 8. Synthesis of recommendations (2014-2015)............................................................................ 33 Appendix 1: CAR armed groups – situation as of January 2016 .................................................... 37 Appendix 2: Deployment of armed groups within CAR and their main sources of revenue ........... 38 Appendix 3: Historical origins of the sectarian violence ............................................................... 41 Appendix 4: Impact of the CAR crisis on pastoralists in the region ............................................... 42 References ................................................................................................................................. 43 i Chronology of events 2012 10 December 2012: The Seleka, a coalition of rebel groups from the north of the Central African Republic (CAR), launched a major armed offensive from the north-east of the country against the Bozizé regime. Heavily armed mercenaries from Chad and Sudan supported the attack. They took control of several towns and villages in the east and advanced up to Sibut (180 km from the capital, Bangui). 2013 11 January 2013: Following the Seleka offensive, President Bozizé and the Seleka coalition signed the Libreville Agreement to establish a Government of National Unity. 24 March 2013: The Seleka rebels carried out a coup, took over the capital, and moved into the western part of the country. Bozizé fled to Cameroon. Michel Djotodia, leader of the Seleka coalition, proclaimed himself president, dissolved the Government of National Unity and the National Assembly, suspended the constitution and announced that he would rule by decree for at least three years. During this period, Seleka fighters committed widespread abuses against the civilian population, including killings, pillage, rape and forced displacement. 13 April 2013: Following pressure from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the National Transitional Council was established and elected Michel Djotodia, the sole candidate, as Head of the Transition. 13 June 2013: A new Government of National Unity was formed. Michel Djotodia remained Minister of Defence and President of the Transition. 18 August 2013: Michel Djotodia was officially sworn in as Head of State of the Transition and committed to holding national elections within 18 months. 13 September 2013: President Djotodia formally dissolved the Seleka coalition, but this political announcement had no real effect in terms of ending the widespread abuses committed by the Seleka rebels and supporters
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Power-Hungry Are Fueling Violence in the Central African Republic
    Note: This is the English translation of an op-ed in French that originally appeared in Le Monde and was written by Enough Project Analyst and Researcher, Nathalia Dukhan. The power-hungry are fueling violence in the Central African Republic By Nathalia Dukhan August 21, 2017 Fourteen armed factions, a multitude of local militia groups, invasions by mercenaries from neighboring countries, and a militia army — in August 2017, less than a year after the official retreat of the French military operation, Sangaris, this is the situation confronting the Central African Republic (CAR). More than 80 percent of the country is controlled by or under the influence of armed militia groups. The security and humanitarian situation has been disastrous for the past 10 months. In recent days, the towns of Bangassou, Gambo and Béma, situated in the east of the country, have been the scene of massacres and sectarian violence. While the leaders of the armed groups shoulder much of the blame, they are not the only ones responsible for this escalation of violence. Political actors and their support networks, operating more discretely in the background but equally hungry for power and personal gain, are supporting and perpetuating these crimes. This political system, based on the manipulation of violence, is fueling trafficking, threatening the stability of the region and leaving the population of an entire country in profound distress. To bring an end to this crisis, there is an urgent need to delegitimize these actors who are perpetrating violence and yet involved in the peace process, to strengthen the implementation of judicial mechanisms and targeted sanctions and to tackle these trafficking networks, in order to pave the way for a peace dialogue.
    [Show full text]
  • Niger Stages Historic Elections Despite Jihadist Bloody Attacks Poll Could Seal a First Peaceful Handover Between Elected Presidents
    Established 1961 7 International Monday, December 28, 2020 Niger stages historic elections despite jihadist bloody attacks Poll could seal a first peaceful handover between elected presidents NIAMEY: Voters went to the polls in Niger yester- mer interior and foreign minister. “It is a great pride day for an election that could seal a first peaceful that this date of December 27 has been respected,” handover between elected presidents, against the Bazoum said after voting. Bazoum’s main rival, former backdrop of a bloody jihadist insurgency. The West prime minister Hama Amadou, was barred from con- African country, unstable since gaining independ- testing the vote on the grounds that in 2017 he was ence from France 60 years ago, is ranked the world’s handed a 12-month jail term for baby trafficking-a poorest country according to the UN’s Human charge he says was bogus. Development Index. Around 7.4 million people are registered to vote for the ballot for presidency, which Overshadowed by insecurity coincides with legislative elections. Polling stations are scheduled to close at 7:00 pm “I expect the Nigerien but are instructed to close president to put security, later in case of delays to health, progress and ensure 11 hours of voting. democracy first,” Campaigning Partial results for the presi- Aboubakar Saleh, a 37- dential election are expect- year-old launderer, told overshadowed ed to be announced today AFP in Niamey without with final counts on revealing who he voted by insecurity Wednesday or Thursday. A for. Issaka Soumana, a 52- second round, if necessary, year-old lorry driver, said will be held on February 20.
    [Show full text]
  • 11 September 2013 ENTITLEMENTS in RESPE
    Cour Penale Intern ationa Ie Le Greffe International The Registry Criminal - Court - - Information Circular - Circulaire d'information Ref. ICC/INF/2013/007 Date: 11 September 2013 ENTITLEMENTS IN RESPECT OF SERVICE IN FIELD DUTY STATIONS 1. The Registrar, pursuant to section 4.2 of Presidential Directive ICC/PRESD/G/2003/001, hereby promulgates this Information Circular for the purpose of informing staff assigned to field duty stations and implementing Administrative Instruction rCC/Al/2010/001 on Conditions of Service for Internationally-Recruited Staff in Field Duty Stations; Administrative Instruction ICC/ AI/2011/006 on Mobility and Hardship Scheme; and Administrative Instruction rCC/AI/2011/007 on Special Entitlements for Staff Members Serving at Designated Duty Stations. 2. A number of decisions have been made by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) and the UN common system Human Resources Network Standing Committee on Field Duty Stations (Field Group). Pursuant to Staff Regulation 3.1, salaries and allowances of the Court shall be fixed in conformity with the United Nations common system standards. Accordingly, the decisions will be implemented as indicated below: a) Effective 3 May 2013, Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire, has been declared a family duty station; b) Effective 1 July 2013, Bangui, Central African Republic, has been declared a non- family duty station; c) Effective 1 January 2013, the hardship category of Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire, and Kampala, Uganda, changed from C to B; d) Effective 1 July 2013, Rest and Recuperation (R&R) cycles in respect of: i. Bangui, Central African Republic, has been shortened to 6 weeks; ii.
    [Show full text]
  • 089 La Politique Idigene in the History of Bangui.Pdf
    La polit...iq,u:e indigene in t...he history o£ Bangui William J. Samarin impatltntly awaiting tht day when 1 Centrlllfricu one wHI bt written. But it must bt 1 history, 1 rtlltned argument biSed 01 Peaceful beginnings carefully sifted fact. Fiction, not without its own role, ciMot be No other outpost of' European allowtd to rtplace nor be confused with history. I mm ne colonization in central Africa seems to have atttmpt at 1 gentral history of the post, ner do I inttgratt, had such a troubled history as that of' except in 1 small way, the history of Zongo, 1 post of the Conge Bangui, founded by the French in June 1889. Frte State just across tht river ud foundtd around the nme Its first ten or fifteen years, as reported by timt. Chronolo;cal dttlils regarding tht foundation of B~ngui ll't the whites who lived them, were dangerous to be found in Cantoumt (1986),] and uncertain, if' not desperate) ones. For a 1 time there was even talk of' abandoning the The selection of' the site for the post. that. Albert Dolisie named Bangui was undoubtedly post or founding a more important one a little further up the Ubangi River. The main a rational one. This place was not, to beiin problem was that of' relations with the local with, at far remove from the last. post at. Modzaka; it. was crucial in those years to be people •. The purpose of' the present study is able to communicate from one post to to describe this turbulent period in Bangui's another reasonably well by canoe as well as history and attempt to explain it.
    [Show full text]
  • Central African Republic RISK & COMPLIANCE REPORT DATE: March 2018
    Central African Republic RISK & COMPLIANCE REPORT DATE: March 2018 KNOWYOURCOUNTRY.COM Executive Summary - Central African Republic Sanctions: Yes - UN and EU have imposed arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze restrictions FAFT list of AML No Deficient Countries Compliance with FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations Higher Risk Areas: Not on EU White list equivalent jurisdictions Corruption Index (Transparency International & W.G.I.)) World Governance Indicators (Average Score) Failed States Index (Political Issues)(Average Score) Major Investment Areas: Agriculture - products: cotton, coffee, tobacco, manioc (tapioca), yams, millet, corn, bananas; timber Industries: gold and diamond mining, logging, brewing, sugar refining Exports - commodities: diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee Exports - partners: Belgium 31.5%, China 27.7%, Democratic Republic of the Congo 8.6%, Indonesia 5.2%, France 4.5% (2012) Imports - commodities: food, textiles, petroleum products, machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals Imports - partners: Netherlands 19.5%, Cameroon 9.7%, France 9.3%, South Korea 8.7% (2012) Investment Restrictions: Information unavailable 1 2 Contents Section 1 - Background ....................................................................................................................... 4 Section 2 - Anti – Money Laundering / Terrorist Financing ............................................................ 5 FATF status ...............................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Cameroon's Infrastructure: a Continental Perspective
    Public Disclosure Authorized COUNTRY REPORT Cameroon’s Infrastructure: Public Disclosure Authorized A Continental Perspective Carolina Dominguez-Torres and Vivien Foster Public Disclosure Authorized JUNE 2011 Public Disclosure Authorized © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved A publication of the World Bank. The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com.
    [Show full text]
  • Les Publications À L'occasion Du Centenaire De L'ã©Vangã©Lisation En RéPublique Centrafricaine
    Mémoire Spiritaine Volume 1 De l'importance des Ancêtres pour inventer Article 13 l'avenir... April 1995 Les publications à l'occasion du centenaire de l'évangélisation en République Centrafricaine Ghislain de Banville Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/memoire-spiritaine Part of the Catholic Studies Commons Recommended Citation de Banville, G. (2019). Les publications à l'occasion du centenaire de l'évangélisation en République Centrafricaine. Mémoire Spiritaine, 1 (1). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/memoire-spiritaine/vol1/iss1/13 This Chroniques et commentaires is brought to you for free and open access by the Spiritan Collection at Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mémoire Spiritaine by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. Fondation de Saint-Paul des Rapides, à Bangui, par Mgr Prosper Augouard ( 1894 ). Reproduction d'une carte postale éditée à l'occasion du centenaire. CHRONIQUES ET COMMENTAIRES Mémoire Spiritaine, avril 1995, p. 147 à 150 Les publications à Foccasion du centenaire de révangélisation en R.C.A. Ghislain de Banville* 13 février 1894 Fondation de la mission Saint-Paul des Rapides, à Bangui. 2 novembre 1894 Fondation de la mission Sainte-Famille des Banziris, à Ouadda 1^' ( transférée le février 1895 à Bessou ). Ces deux créations de stations missionnaires par Mgr Prosper Augouard, vicaire apostolique à Brazzaville, marquent le début de l'évangélisation en Centrafrique. De l'Epiphanie 1994 à l'Epiphanie 1995, l'Éghse cathoHque a célébré l'événement. Sur ces festivités, préparées depuis janvier 1993, il cette chronique est seulement de y aurait beaucoup à dire ; mais l'objet de faire le point sur les pubhcations mises à la disposition des chrétiens à l'occa- sion de ce centenaire.
    [Show full text]
  • Diversity Visa Program, DV 2019-2021: Number of Entries During Each Online Registration Period by Region and Country of Chargeability
    Diversity Visa Program, DV 2019-2021: Number of Entries During Each Online Registration Period by Region and Country of Chargeability The totals below DO NOT represent the number of diversity visas issued nor the number of selected entrants Countries marked with a "0" indicate that there were no entrants from that country or area. Countries marked with "N/A" were typically not eligible for that program year. FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 Region Foreign State of Chargeabiliy Entrants Derivatives Total Entrants Derivatives Total Entrants Derivatives Total Africa Algeria 227,019 123,716 350,735 252,684 140,422 393,106 221,212 129,004 350,216 Africa Angola 17,707 25,543 43,250 14,866 20,037 34,903 14,676 18,086 32,762 Africa Benin 128,911 27,579 156,490 150,386 26,627 177,013 92,847 13,149 105,996 Africa Botswana 518 462 980 552 406 958 237 177 414 Africa Burkina Faso 37,065 7,374 44,439 30,102 5,877 35,979 6,318 2,591 8,909 Africa Burundi 20,680 16,295 36,975 22,049 19,168 41,217 12,287 11,023 23,310 Africa Cabo Verde 1,377 1,272 2,649 894 778 1,672 420 312 732 Africa Cameroon 310,373 147,979 458,352 310,802 165,676 476,478 150,970 93,151 244,121 Africa Central African Republic 1,359 893 2,252 1,242 636 1,878 906 424 1,330 Africa Chad 5,003 1,978 6,981 8,940 3,159 12,099 7,177 2,220 9,397 Africa Comoros 296 224 520 293 128 421 264 111 375 Africa Congo-Brazzaville 21,793 15,175 36,968 25,592 19,430 45,022 21,958 16,659 38,617 Africa Congo-Kinshasa 617,573 385,505 1,003,078 924,918 415,166 1,340,084 593,917 153,856 747,773 Africa Cote d'Ivoire 160,790
    [Show full text]
  • Bangui, Central African Republic
    CITIES IN CRISIS CONSULTATIONS - Bangui, Central African Republic MARCH 2016 INTRODUCTION Overview of Urban Consultations Bangui has been affected by violence and displacement over the past 4 years and currently hosts over 50,000 internally displaced people. By 2050 over 70% of the global population will live in urban areas. This accelerating urbanization trend is accompanied by an increasing vulnerability of cities to The crisis has put significant strain on municipal services, which have lacked the required resources and capacity to meet the evolving needs both natural and man-made disasters. More and more, humanitarian actors are of Bangui’s increasingly vulnerable population. As a consequence, the provision of basic services has become heavily reliant on international responding to urban crisis. They are however often badly equipped to understand humanitarian stakeholders. Due to a multiplicity of factors, linkages between humanitarian stakeholders and municipal actors have remained and effectively engage with cities’ complex socio-economic dynamics and weak, contributing to sub-optimal coordination and affecting the efficiency of humanitarian planning and targeting. With the recent elections governance structures. Recognizing these challenges, the World Humanitarian and a renewed hope for stability in the CAR, strengthening this linkage must become a priority in order to support the recovery effort and the Summit has mandated an Urban Expert Group to identify key recommendations for promoting better humanitarian response to urban crisis. re-establishment of municipal services. With a view of contributing to this discussion, IMPACT Initiatives and UCLG’s KEY FINDINGS Task Force On Local and Regional Government Disaster Response facilitated a series of consultations in six cities affected by natural or man-made disasters.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC and Small Arms Survey by Eric G
    SMALL ARMS: A REGIONAL TINDERBOX A REGIONAL ARMS: SMALL AND REPUBLIC AFRICAN THE CENTRAL Small Arms Survey By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland p +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738 e [email protected] w www.smallarmssurvey.org THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND SMALL ARMS A REGIONAL TINDERBOX ‘ The Central African Republic and Small Arms is the most thorough and carefully researched G. Eric By Berman with Louisa N. Lombard report on the volume, origins, and distribution of small arms in any African state. But it goes beyond the focus on small arms. It also provides a much-needed backdrop to the complicated political convulsions that have transformed CAR into a regional tinderbox. There is no better source for anyone interested in putting the ongoing crisis in its proper context.’ —Dr René Lemarchand Emeritus Professor, University of Florida and author of The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa ’The Central African Republic, surrounded by warring parties in Sudan, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lies on the fault line between the international community’s commitment to disarmament and the tendency for African conflicts to draw in their neighbours. The Central African Republic and Small Arms unlocks the secrets of the breakdown of state capacity in a little-known but pivotal state in the heart of Africa. It also offers important new insight to options for policy-makers and concerned organizations to promote peace in complex situations.’ —Professor William Reno Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University Photo: A mutineer during the military unrest of May 1996.
    [Show full text]
  • Africa's Role in Nation-Building: an Examination of African-Led Peace
    AFRICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING An Examination of African-Led Peace Operations James Dobbins, James Pumzile Machakaire, Andrew Radin, Stephanie Pezard, Jonathan S. Blake, Laura Bosco, Nathan Chandler, Wandile Langa, Charles Nyuykonge, Kitenge Fabrice Tunda C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2978 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0264-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: U.S. Air Force photo/ Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane; Feisal Omar/REUTERS. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Since the turn of the century, the African Union (AU) and subregional organizations in Africa have taken on increasing responsibilities for peace operations throughout that continent.
    [Show full text]
  • Central African Republic: Sectarian and Inter-Communal Violence Continues
    THE WAR REPORT 2018 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: SECTARIAN AND INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE CONTINUES © ICRC JANUARY 2019 I GIULIA MARCUCCI THE GENEVA ACADEMY A JOINT CENTER OF Furthermore, it provided that Bozizé would remain in HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT power until 2016 but could not run for a third term. The current violence in the Central African Republic However, the Libreville Agreement was mainly (CAR), often referred to as the ‘forgotten’ conflict, has its negotiated by regional heads of state while the leaders of most recent roots in 2013, when the warring parties in CAR and Muslim rebels from the Seleka The current violence in the Central the African Union (AU) itself umbrella group organized a African Republic (CAR), often played a marginal role.4 Thus, coup d’état seizing power in a referred to as the ‘forgotten’ conflict, its actual implementation Christian-majority country.1 has its most recent roots in 2013, immediately proved to be a From the end of 2012 to the when Muslim rebels from the Seleka failure and the reforms required beginning of 2013, the Seleka umbrella group organized a coup under the transition were coalition, mainly composed d’état seizing power in a Christian- never undertaken by Bozizé’s of armed groups from north- majority country. government.5 This generated eastern CAR, including the frustration within the Seleka Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), Democratic coalition, which decided to take action and, by 24 March Front of the Central African People (FDPC), the Patriotic 2013, gained control over Bangui and 15 of the country’s Convention for the Country’s Salvation (CPSK) and 16 provinces.
    [Show full text]