Peace Negotiations Cannot Be Held Forever: Breaking the Deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

PEACE NEGOTIATIONSCOMMENTARY CANNOT BE HELD FOREVER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT

FARID SHAFIYEV* and VASIF HUSEYNOV**

* ADA University, Azerbaijan ORCID No: 0000-0002-6352-0180

** Khazar University, Azerbaijan ORCID No: 0000-0003-4653-270X

ABSTRACT The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process had expe- rienced insurmountable deadlock due to the failure of the peace negotiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States since the mid-1990s. The so-called Velvet Revolu- tion of Armenia in 2018 was unable to deliver any progress, although a breakthrough was expected of, and promised by, the new leadership of the country. This, coupled with the constant provocations of the military and political leaders of Armenia, aggravated the conflict and led to the outbreak of an almost full-scale war on September 27, 2020. The war changed the status quo and created an environment for the negotiated resolution of the conflict following the establishment of a humanitarian ceasefire in Moscow. Armenia’s subsequent viola- tions of the ceasefire regime by targeting Azerbaijani civilians have, however, demonstrated that peace is likely to remain an inaccessible dream of the region’s people in the short to medium term.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Caucasus

Insight Turkey 2020 Vol. 22 / No. 4 / pp. 99-109

Received Date: 15/10/2020 • Accepted Date: 08/11/2020 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2020224.07

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Introduction in line with a regional arrangement under Chapter VII of the UN Char- n the threshold of the disso- ter. Since the mid-1990s, the Minsk lution of the Soviet Union at Group of the OSCE, an international Othe end of the 1980s, a vio- mission including eleven states and lent dispute broke out between Soviet co-chaired by the United States, Rus- Armenia and Azerbaijan, caused by sia, and France, has coordinated the a call from Armenian nationalists to conflict resolution process and has carve out the Nagorno-Karabakh au- offered a number of settlement for- tonomous region of Azerbaijan and mulations in that time. unify it with Soviet Armenia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, The so-called “Basic Principles,” also Armenia launched a full-scale mil- known as the “Madrid Principles,” itary operation against Azerbaijan presented by the co-chair states of the in 1992-1994, which resulted in the Minsk Group in November 2017 in occupation of almost twenty percent Madrid, Spain, held the highest po- of Azerbaijan’s internationally recog- tential for an effective and peaceful nized territory. The occupied territo- resolution.1 According to this docu- ries included the Nagorno-Karabakh ment, the territories surrounding the region and seven adjacent districts of Nagorno-Karabakh region are sup- Azerbaijan. posed to return to Azerbaijan’s control. Nagorno-Karabakh will be given In 1993, the UN Security Council an interim status and provided with adopted four resolutions –822, 853, guarantees for security and self-gov- 874, and 884– demanding the with- ernance, while its final legal status drawal of Armenian troops from will be determined later by a legally the occupied Azerbaijani territories. binding expression of will (i.e., a The resolutions reconfirmed the plebiscite). Nagorno-Karabakh region and the other occupied territories as part of The international efforts to reach the Republic of Azerbaijan. The mili- a resolution, however, failed to de- tary hostilities persisted, however, af- liver a breakthrough owing to the ter the adoption of these resolutions consistent deconstructive moves of and a ceasefire was only reached in the Armenian government. Being May 1994, through the mediation of interested in the prolongation of the Russia, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. status quo and consolidation of control over the occupied territories of The peace negotiations between the Azerbaijan, the Armenian leaders two parties to the conflict were en- refused to implement the principles. trusted to the mediation of the Con- This aggravated the situation on the ference for Security and Cooperation frontline, sporadically causing vio- in Europe (CSCE), which was later re- lent escalations (e.g., in April 2016), named the Organization for Security and minimized hopes for a peaceful and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), settlement.

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The change of government in mid- 2018 in Armenia initially generated According to recently marked optimism for an eventual breakthrough. This was caused not declassified information, only by signals from the highest level the leaders of the two of the Armenian government, but countries were also in private also by the relatively peaceful environment on the front line. Unfortu- communication through the nately, it was soon clear that Arme- initiative of the Armenian nia’s new government, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, was side abusing this process to consolidate its domestic control, as it soon revi- talized extremist approaches relating agreed on the establishment of a tele- to Armenia’s claim to the occupied phone hotline between the military territories of Azerbaijan. This policy commanders for the first time and, in approach, bolstered by the belliger- January 2019, they agreed to take con- ent rhetoric of Armenia’s military top crete measures to “prepare popula- brass, destroyed any possibility for tions for peace.” According to recently a negotiated resolution and led the declassified information, during this process toward the grievous escala- time the leaders of the two countries tion on September 27, 2020. were also in private communication through the initiative of the Arme- nian side.2 It has been leaked that Ar- The False Promise of Armenia’s menia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashin- 2018 Regime Change yan, had indirectly communicated his desire to resolve the conflict through In the aftermath of the so-called negotiations that took place secretly Velvet Revolution of 2018, which in an unspecified European country. brought Nikol Pashinyan to power This happened against the backdrop in Armenia, a degree of optimism ar- of a substantial decline in the number rived at the negotiating table. In con- of casualty-causing incidents to just a trast to his predecessors, Prime Min- handful in 2019.3 ister Pashinyan is not of Karabakh origin and is not associated with the The new situation in the conflict, on war of the early 1990s. This was part the one hand, indicated the impor- of the reason that he was expected to tance of the political will for de-esca- show more constructivism with re- lation and, on the other hand, gener- gard to the peace negotiations. ated hope and favorable conditions for further agreements and an eventual There were, indeed, a number of pos- breakthrough. Those expectations, itive developments at the beginning unfortunately, did not become reality, of Pashinyan’s rule. In late 2018, the as an abrupt volte-face of Prime Min- leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia ister Pashinyan caused a dramatic de-

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cess only after consultation with and Having caused dramatic consent from all parties. This formula implied that, given some progress in frustration amongst the talks, both communities of the Azerbaijanis, such Nagorno-Karabakh region –Arme- provocations, coupled with nian and Azerbaijani– would become involved, as clarified by the Minsk growing militarization on Group Chairman in a statement is- the Armenian side, left no sued on September 15, 1992. chance for the resolution of Armenia’s military leadership the conflict at the negotiation demonstrated an even more decon- table structive and markedly belligerent position. Addressing a meeting of the Armenian diaspora in New York in March 2019, Armenia’s Defense terioration in the peace process and Minister, Davit Tonoyan, declared paved the way for new escalations. It that Yerevan would use the formula later became clear that Pashinyan may “new war for new territories” instead have aimed for a degree of stability on of the formula “peace in exchange for the front line while he was busy with territories” proposed by the media- domestic power struggles. He soon tors. According to him, this strategy abandoned his peace-building initia- “will rid Armenia of this trench con- tives and demonstrated a more radi- dition, the constant defensive state, calized, nationalistic position towards and will add the units which may the conflict. shift the military actions to the territory of the enemy.”5 Tonoyan made First, in March 2019, Pashinyan and this statement immediately after his government cast doubt on the in- the OSCE-mediated meeting of the ternationally mediated negotiation Prime Minister of Armenia with the process and attempted to change its President of Azerbaijan in Vienna, format by bringing in representatives which resulted in a joint statement of the local regime in the occupied on the need to create a favorable en- Karabakh region.4 This attempt was vironment for peace and the adop- challenged not only by Azerbaijan, tion of results-oriented steps in the but also by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. negotiation process to find a peaceful It is important to recall that the found- settlement to the conflict. ing documents of the Minsk Confer- ence, dated March 24, 1992, defined An extremist position was also taken the two parties to the negotiation: by the Armenian Prime Minister Armenia and Azerbaijan. Elected who, in August 2019, in his address and other representatives from the at the opening ceremony of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azer- Pan-Armenian games that were held baijan will join the negotiation pro- illegally in Khankandi, part of the

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A site hit by a missile launched by the Armenian Armenian-occupied internationally and participate constructively in the army in Ganja, recognized territories of Azerbaijan, negotiations. Quite the contrary; the Azerbaijan on called for unification between Arme- absence of an international back- October 17, 2020. nia and Karabakh, declaring “Kara- lash emboldened Prime Minister Twelve civilians bakh is Armenia, period.”6 Breaking Pashinyan to completely derail the were killed, including two with the tradition of former Arme- negotiations. In April 2020, his gov- children, and nian governments that had previ- ernment denied the existence of any more than 40 ously denied Yerevan’s control over documents on the negotiating table, others injured. the occupying regime established thereby rejecting all the efforts of the LOKMAN AKKAYA / in the Nagorno-Karabakh region OSCE’s Minsk Group, including the AA of Azerbaijan, he put the essence of Madrid Principles.8 the entire peace effort into question. Even Sergey Lavrov Foreign Minister Armenia declared this in response to of Russia, Armenia’s ally within the the remarks of Russian Foreign Min- Collective Security Treaty Organiza- ister Sergey Lavrov about the peace tion (CSTO), reacted to Pashinyan’s negotiations between Armenia and speech and highlighted that such Azerbaijan. Addressing a videocon- statements “do not help the settle- ference organized by the Gorcha- ment of the conflict.”7 kov Public Diplomacy Fund, Lavrov expressed support for the existing In spite of this, there was no major “firmly established format of negoti- international pressure on the Ar- ations” and described the draft doc- menian government to refrain from uments on the agenda to be a “very provocative and dangerous rhetoric important step in implementing the

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[United Nations] Security Council Tovuz Clashes: Harbinger of a resolutions.”9 This caused particular Bigger War concern in Armenia as the resolutions of the UN Security Council, ad- On July 12-15, 2020, the conflict be- opted in 1993, demand the immedi- tween Armenia and Azerbaijan esca- ate withdrawal of Armenian military lated into a major military confronta- forces from the occupied territories tion along the state border straddling of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s Tovuz and Armenia’s Ta- vush regions. The clashes, involving A month later, in yet another provoc- heavy artillery as well as aerial drones, ative move, the Armenian side held resulted in the deaths of several mil- an inauguration ceremony, with itary personnel and civilians along Prime Minister Pashinyan present, with the destruction of infrastructure for the new so-called president of in the border region. The attack –di- the local regime in the city of Shu- rectly along the state border between sha in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh the two rival South Caucasus neigh- –a place of deep cultural significance bors– was a deliberate move by the to Azerbaijanis. Having caused dra- Armenian side to lay the ground for matic frustration amongst Azerbai- the involvement of the Moscow-led janis, such provocations, coupled CSTO in the conflict. with growing militarization on the Armenian side, left no chance for the Notably, any hostilities in the Kara- resolution of the conflict at the nego- bakh region itself or the surrounding tiation table. Armenian-occupied areas do not fall under the jurisdiction of the alliance Against this background, Azerbai- owing to the status of this area as part jan began to express more loudly its of Azerbaijan’s internationally recog- dissatisfaction with the international nized territories. In an attempt to in- mediation, thereby underscoring the voke Article 4 of the CSTO Charter, potential ramifications of Armenia’s which designates an attack on a mem- provocations for peace and security ber state as an attack against all mem- in the entire region. On July 6, in one bers, Armenia’s Foreign Minister, of his last media appearances before Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, held a phone the Tovuz clashes, Azerbaijani Pres- conversation with CSTO Secretary ident Ilham Aliyev openly criticized General Stanislav Zas. A few hours the international mediators in the after their talks, the secretary general negotiations, declaring that the peace announced an emergency meeting of process had become “meaningless.”10 the organization; however, that meet- These concerns did not receive much ing was soon postponed indefinitely, international attention, which en- for unknown reasons. couraged Armenia to organize sys- temic attacks against Azerbaijan on A plan to sever the connection be- both the state border and in the oc- tween Azerbaijan and Europe was cupied Nagorno-Karabakh region. also assumed by some observers as

104 Insight Turkey PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE HELD FOREVER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT

part of the motivation leading to the July clashes.11 Importantly, Azerbai- The day after the agreement jan’s Tovuz district, where the clashes took place, is a region that hosts ma- on the humanitarian ceasefire, jor energy pipelines (the Baku-Tbili- Azerbaijan was shocked si-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South- by a missile attack by the ern Gas Corridor) and transporta- tion routes (the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars armed forces of Armenia railway and the East-West Transport against a densely-populated Corridor) connecting Azerbaijan with Europe through Georgia and civilian settlement in Ganja, Turkey. Any instability in this part Azerbaijan’s second largest of Azerbaijan would deal a serious city, at 2 AM blow to its connection with its West- ern partners, with overarching consequences for both sides. Therefore, the potential role of some third par- This was accompanied by the re- ties who oppose the rise of Western sumption of the illegal settlement of influence in the South Caucasus in Armenians based in foreign countries the recent escalation on the border is in the occupied territories of Azer- also an assumption deserving serious baijan. A day after the catastrophic attention. explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, on August 4, 2020 Arayik Harutyunyan, Although the clashes in Tovuz the leader of the occupying forces in calmed down quickly, an increased Karabakh, declared that they were militarization of Armenia was ob- ready to receive 100-150 Armenian served in its aftermath. This was re- families.14 Later, speaking at an Au- flected in both the inflow12of arms to gust 25, 2020 meeting devoted to Armenia from third countries and assistance programs to Lebanese-Ar- the country’s formation of a mili- menians, Harutyunyan declared that tia of 100,000 female and male vol- his administration would “welcome unteers aged up to 70.13 There were and provide housing to all […] com- reports about the shipment of tons patriots who wish to move” to Kara- of weapons from Russia to Armenia bakh.15 Armenia’s illegal settlements in the wake of the Tovuz escalation. in the occupied territories, which vi- The Azerbaijani government was not olate the Geneva Convention of 1949, convinced by Russia’s explanation aim at the consolidation of control that it was merely “construction ma- over the region and the creation of a terials” inside the aircraft that passed fait accompli for future negotiations. through the complex transporta- tion routes, as the shortest route via These were the major signals of an Georgia was unavailable thanks to upcoming war between the two the principled position of the Geor- countries. On September 19, 2020 gian government. President Aliyev of Azerbaijan

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A protest against Armenia’s cross- border attacks and in support of warned that Armenia was “preparing most intensive military confrontation Azerbaijan was for a new war[…] concentrating their since the establishment of the Rus- staged in front of forces near the line of contact[…] We sia-brokered ceasefire in May 1994. the United Nations Office in Geneva, follow their actions. Of course, we Switzerland on will defend ourselves.”16 Armenia’s On September 27, Armenia’s armed October 29, 2020. sudden attack in the early morning of forces started a large-scale provoca- BAYRAM ALTUĞ / AA September 27, 2020 along the line of tion and fired at Azerbaijani army contact demonstrated that President positions and civilian settlements in Aliyev was right in his precautions. the front-line zone with large-caliber Azerbaijan was again under shelling weapons, mortars and artillery of var- from the armed forces of Armenia. ious calibers at about 6 AM. Azerbai- jan’s Ministry of Defense, in response, launched a counter-offensive opera- Second Karabakh War and Its tion involving troops along the entire Implications front to suppress the combat activity of the armed forces of Armenia and en- Towards the end of September, less sure the safety of the civilian popula- than three months after the border tion. Both sides immediately invoked clashes of July 12-15, 2020 the con- a general or partial mobilization and flict between Armenia and Azer- took the necessary measures for a lon- baijan escalated into the largest and ger period of intense confrontation.

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The war in the military field stretched over into the information space as There was a belief that any well. From the outset of hostilities, the Armenian side disseminated a military move by Azerbaijan to stream of disinformation for various liberate its occupied territories purposes. Most importantly, attempt- would entail a Russian ing to invoke the collective defense article of the CSTO, Armenia accused backlash that Baku would not Azerbaijan of targeting an Armenian dare face fighter jet inside Armenian territory. Outraged by the political support of Turkey for Azerbaijan, they claimed that Azerbaijan had used a Turkish hour talks, the sides agreed on the es- F-16 aircraft to target Armenia’s SU- tablishment of a humanitarian cease- 25. However, these attempts proved fire and the restart of negotiations on futile, as the CSTO did not react to the basis of “Basic Principles.” The them, and the hostilities remained agreement also included a clause on local and fell short of evolving into the format of the negotiations that a regional war between Russia and reaffirmed the existing format and Turkey. thus rejected the demands of the Ar- menian government about the repre- According to the official statistics pro- sentation of the occupying regime in vided by the respective sides as of Oc- Karabakh in the negotiations. tober 14, the Armenian side has lost more than 500 military servicemen The day after the agreement on the while Azerbaijan has lost at least 43 humanitarian ceasefire, Azerbaijan civilians (no information about mili- was shocked by a missile attack by tary casualties was reported by Azer- the armed forces of Armenia against baijan’s defense ministry). In its coun- a densely-populated civilian settle- teroffensive, Azerbaijan has been able ment in Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second to liberate some strategic positions in largest city, at 2 AM. The attack was its occupied territories including the perpetrated from the territory of Ar- Jabrail region, the Hadrut, and Suq- menia, that is, not from the occupied ovushan (Madagiz) settlements, and territories of Azerbaijan, and killed at several small villages. least ten civilians while leaving many others, including women and chil- The international calls for an imme- dren, wounded. diate ceasefire and a return to negotiations did not affect the conflict until October 9, when the foreign Conclusion ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in Moscow at the initiative and The protraction of the peace negoti- through the mediation of the Russian ations between Armenia and Azer- government. As a result of the ten- baijan against the backdrop of the

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Azerbaijani town, planning to move The active phase of the the “capital” of the occupational regime to Shusha, adopting a military war was supposed to end doctrine announcing “new war for on October 10, 2020 in new territories,” and so on, the Arme- accordance with the Moscow nian government derailed the negotiations and caused new escalations. agreement between the foreign ministers of Armenia The second Karabakh war came hard on the heels of these developments. and Azerbaijan mediated by Emboldened by its defense pact with the foreign minister of Russia the CSTO and the military deliveries from Russia in the wake of the Tovuz clashes, Armenia attacked the posi- absence of international pressure on tions of the Armed Forces of Azer- Yerevan to abide by international baijan with the apparent objective of law and the resolutions of the United implementing Defense Minister Da- Nations Security Council had appar- vit Tonoyan’s “new war for new ter- ently assured the Armenian leaders ritories” strategy. Quite contrary to that their control over the occupied Armenia’s expectations, thus far Rus- territories would remain unchal- sia has refused to become militarily lenged in the years to come. Relying involved in the conflict, referring to on the security assurances within the the fact that the clashes did not occur CSTO, not only did the country start in the territories of Armenia and, as to mock the negotiations, but it also such, are not covered by the collective sought to consolidate the status quo defense commitments of the CSTO. and build new settlements in the occupied territories. There was a belief The active phase of the war was sup- that any military move by Azerbai- posed to end on October 10, 2020 in jan to liberate its occupied territories accordance with the Moscow agree- would entail a Russian backlash that ment between the foreign ministers Baku would not dare face. of Armenia and Azerbaijan mediated by the foreign minister of Rus- This was the reason why the Arme- sia. However, the attack by the armed nian government challenged Azer- forces of Armenia against the civilian baijani people’s limits of the patience settlement of Ganja city in Azerbai- through constant provocations. By jan and the subsequent violation of shouting “Karabakh is Armenia, pe- the humanitarian ceasefire by the riod,” denying the existence of any Armenian side demonstrate that the document on the negotiating table ceasefire is fragile and it will not be and thus rejecting the Madrid princi- possible to achieve peace unless Ar- ples, holding a so-called inauguration menia abandons its territorial claims ceremony for the leader of the occu- and accepts the supremacy of inter- pying regime in Shusha, a historic national law.

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