PEACE NEGOTIATIONSCOMMENTARY CANNOT BE HELD FOREVER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT Peace Negotiations Cannot Be Held Forever: Breaking the Deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict FARID SHAFIYEV* and VASIF HUSEYNOV** * ADA University, Azerbaijan ORCID No: 0000-0002-6352-0180 ** Khazar University, Azerbaijan ORCID No: 0000-0003-4653-270X ABSTRACT The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process had expe- rienced insurmountable deadlock due to the failure of the peace nego- tiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States since the mid-1990s. The so-called Velvet Revolu- tion of Armenia in 2018 was unable to deliver any progress, although a breakthrough was expected of, and promised by, the new leadership of the country. This, coupled with the constant provocations of the military and political leaders of Armenia, aggravated the conflict and led to the outbreak of an almost full-scale war on September 27, 2020. The war changed the status quo and created an environment for the negotiated resolution of the conflict following the establishment of a humanitarian ceasefire in Moscow. Armenia’s subsequent viola- tions of the ceasefire regime by targeting Azerbaijani civilians have, however, demonstrated that peace is likely to remain an inaccessible dream of the region’s people in the short to medium term. Keywords: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Caucasus Insight Turkey 2020 Vol. 22 / No. 4 / pp. 99-109 Received Date: 15/10/2020 • Accepted Date: 08/11/2020 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2020224.07 2020 Fall 99 COMMENTARY FARID SHAFIYEV and VASIF HUSEYNOV Introduction in line with a regional arrangement under Chapter VII of the UN Char- n the threshold of the disso- ter. Since the mid-1990s, the Minsk lution of the Soviet Union at Group of the OSCE, an international Othe end of the 1980s, a vio- mission including eleven states and lent dispute broke out between Soviet co-chaired by the United States, Rus- Armenia and Azerbaijan, caused by sia, and France, has coordinated the a call from Armenian nationalists to conflict resolution process and has carve out the Nagorno-Karabakh au- offered a number of settlement for- tonomous region of Azerbaijan and mulations in that time. unify it with Soviet Armenia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, The so-called “Basic Principles,” also Armenia launched a full-scale mil- known as the “Madrid Principles,” itary operation against Azerbaijan presented by the co-chair states of the in 1992-1994, which resulted in the Minsk Group in November 2017 in occupation of almost twenty percent Madrid, Spain, held the highest po- of Azerbaijan’s internationally recog- tential for an effective and peaceful nized territory. The occupied territo- resolution.1 According to this docu- ries included the Nagorno-Karabakh ment, the territories surrounding the region and seven adjacent districts of Nagorno-Karabakh region are sup- Azerbaijan. posed to return to Azerbaijan’s con- trol. Nagorno-Karabakh will be given In 1993, the UN Security Council an interim status and provided with adopted four resolutions –822, 853, guarantees for security and self-gov- 874, and 884– demanding the with- ernance, while its final legal status drawal of Armenian troops from will be determined later by a legally the occupied Azerbaijani territories. binding expression of will (i.e., a The resolutions reconfirmed the plebiscite). Nagorno-Karabakh region and the other occupied territories as part of The international efforts to reach the Republic of Azerbaijan. The mili- a resolution, however, failed to de- tary hostilities persisted, however, af- liver a breakthrough owing to the ter the adoption of these resolutions consistent deconstructive moves of and a ceasefire was only reached in the Armenian government. Being May 1994, through the mediation of interested in the prolongation of the Russia, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. status quo and consolidation of con- trol over the occupied territories of The peace negotiations between the Azerbaijan, the Armenian leaders two parties to the conflict were en- refused to implement the principles. trusted to the mediation of the Con- This aggravated the situation on the ference for Security and Cooperation frontline, sporadically causing vio- in Europe (CSCE), which was later re- lent escalations (e.g., in April 2016), named the Organization for Security and minimized hopes for a peaceful and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), settlement. 100 Insight Turkey PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE HELD FOREVER: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK IN THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT The change of government in mid- 2018 in Armenia initially generated According to recently marked optimism for an eventual breakthrough. This was caused not declassified information, only by signals from the highest level the leaders of the two of the Armenian government, but countries were also in private also by the relatively peaceful envi- ronment on the front line. Unfortu- communication through the nately, it was soon clear that Arme- initiative of the Armenian nia’s new government, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, was side abusing this process to consolidate its domestic control, as it soon revi- talized extremist approaches relating agreed on the establishment of a tele- to Armenia’s claim to the occupied phone hotline between the military territories of Azerbaijan. This policy commanders for the first time and, in approach, bolstered by the belliger- January 2019, they agreed to take con- ent rhetoric of Armenia’s military top crete measures to “prepare popula- brass, destroyed any possibility for tions for peace.” According to recently a negotiated resolution and led the declassified information, during this process toward the grievous escala- time the leaders of the two countries tion on September 27, 2020. were also in private communication through the initiative of the Arme- nian side.2 It has been leaked that Ar- The False Promise of Armenia’s menia’s Prime Minister, Nikol Pashin- 2018 Regime Change yan, had indirectly communicated his desire to resolve the conflict through In the aftermath of the so-called negotiations that took place secretly Velvet Revolution of 2018, which in an unspecified European country. brought Nikol Pashinyan to power This happened against the backdrop in Armenia, a degree of optimism ar- of a substantial decline in the number rived at the negotiating table. In con- of casualty-causing incidents to just a trast to his predecessors, Prime Min- handful in 2019.3 ister Pashinyan is not of Karabakh origin and is not associated with the The new situation in the conflict, on war of the early 1990s. This was part the one hand, indicated the impor- of the reason that he was expected to tance of the political will for de-esca- show more constructivism with re- lation and, on the other hand, gener- gard to the peace negotiations. ated hope and favorable conditions for further agreements and an eventual There were, indeed, a number of pos- breakthrough. Those expectations, itive developments at the beginning unfortunately, did not become reality, of Pashinyan’s rule. In late 2018, the as an abrupt volte-face of Prime Min- leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia ister Pashinyan caused a dramatic de- 2020 Fall 101 COMMENTARY FARID SHAFIYEV and VASIF HUSEYNOV cess only after consultation with and Having caused dramatic consent from all parties. This formula implied that, given some progress in frustration amongst the talks, both communities of the Azerbaijanis, such Nagorno-Karabakh region –Arme- provocations, coupled with nian and Azerbaijani– would become involved, as clarified by the Minsk growing militarization on Group Chairman in a statement is- the Armenian side, left no sued on September 15, 1992. chance for the resolution of Armenia’s military leadership the conflict at the negotiation demonstrated an even more decon- table structive and markedly belligerent position. Addressing a meeting of the Armenian diaspora in New York in March 2019, Armenia’s Defense terioration in the peace process and Minister, Davit Tonoyan, declared paved the way for new escalations. It that Yerevan would use the formula later became clear that Pashinyan may “new war for new territories” instead have aimed for a degree of stability on of the formula “peace in exchange for the front line while he was busy with territories” proposed by the media- domestic power struggles. He soon tors. According to him, this strategy abandoned his peace-building initia- “will rid Armenia of this trench con- tives and demonstrated a more radi- dition, the constant defensive state, calized, nationalistic position towards and will add the units which may the conflict. shift the military actions to the ter- ritory of the enemy.”5 Tonoyan made First, in March 2019, Pashinyan and this statement immediately after his government cast doubt on the in- the OSCE-mediated meeting of the ternationally mediated negotiation Prime Minister of Armenia with the process and attempted to change its President of Azerbaijan in Vienna, format by bringing in representatives which resulted in a joint statement of the local regime in the occupied on the need to create a favorable en- Karabakh region.4 This attempt was vironment for peace and the adop- challenged not only by Azerbaijan, tion of results-oriented steps in the but also by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. negotiation process to find a peaceful It is important to recall that the found- settlement