Revolutions and the International: The Negotiated Character of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Armenia 2018 ______Nina Kolarzik

International Relations Department of Global Political Studies Bachelor’s Degree Programme – IR103L, IR 61-90 15 Credits Thesis Summer 2020 Supervisor: Scott McIver Kolarzik, Nina 19970512T086

Abstract In a global system of increasing instability and civil society protest movements, it is important for IR to pay attention to revolutions. In the past, Marxist-structuralist theories have contributed to the research on revolutions and the international but are insufficient to explain recent cases and a contemporary generation of scholars has provided more multivariate and processual theories about revolutions. Within this field, this thesis concerns the theory development about revolutions and their international dimension. The guiding argument guiding is that revolutions are internatio na l events which are being shaped by and shaping the international system. Using the concept of “negotiated revolutions” by George Lawson, the Armenian “Velvet Revolution” 2018 is analysed as a comparative case-study to describe its international aspects. By applying the theory to a new case, it can be explored whether it still holds in another context beyond the cases with that Lawson established it. The analysis uses qualitative data from multiple sources, employing an intersoc iet y approach and incorporating different contemporary explanations into the analysis of the case and its characteristics. It is concluded that the concept negotiated revolution is well suited to explain the dynamics of the Armenian Revolution in relation to the international system.

Key Words: Velvet Revolutio n, Armenia, theories of revolution, negotiated revolutio ns, critical theories

Word Count: 13 995

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Table of Contents 1. Introducing the Armenian Revolution 1 1.1. Structure 2 2. Build ing a Framework 3 2.1. Research on the Armenian Revolution 3 2.2. Theories of Revolution 4 2.2.1. Revolutions in IR 4 2.2.2. Define Revolutions- Past and Present 5 2.2.3. Contemporary Studies 7 2.2.4. Lawson & An Intersocietal Approach 8 2.3. A Contemporary Response: Negotiated Revolutions 9 2.3.1. Anatomy of Revolutions 9 2.3.2. Negotiated Revolutions 12 3. Methodologies 15 3.1. Methodological Influences from the Study of Revolutions 15 3.2. Comparative Case Studies 16 3.3. Research Design 17 3.3.1. Anatomy of the Armenian Revolution 18 3.3.2. The Negotiated Revolution 19 3.4. Data Collection Methods 20 4. Analysing the Armenian Revolution 22 4.1. Anatomy of the Armenian Revolution 22 4.2. The Armenian Negotiated Revolution 29 5. Conclusio ns 35 6. Bibliography 37

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1. Introducing the Armenian Revolution

In the last two years, political protests in Hong Kong, the environmental “Fridays for Future” protest movement or the Armenian “Velvet Revolution”, gave the studies of revolutio nar y change new cases. While it is to be debated, which events are actual revolutions, it becomes evident that the mainstream and the academic understanding of the concept of revolution has come a long way since the for long defining French Revolution. In the past, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has widely neglected the study of revolutions, a field that is informed mainly by research from history and sociology. Revolutions in IR were reduced to be domestic events or disturbances in the regular international order, but not as constitutive events themselves (Halliday 1990:207-211; Lawson 2015:307). Contemporary scholars of interdisciplinary theories of revolution however pay attention to the international dimensions of revolutions and treat revolutions as emergent processes and conjunctural, multi-causal events, that are influenced by a variety of factors (Lawson 2016:109). The theoretical framework of this thesis can be placed within these contemporary, post-modern, critical approaches. Sparked by long-term developments and short-term trigge r s and producing various outcomes, contemporary revolutions are connected to the internatio nal on multiple levels. This thesis adds to the debates about revolutions and the international, supporting the argument that revolutions are connected at all stages with the internatio na l dimension. By changing the societies where they take place, revolutions play a part in changing the international system (Lawson 2005:474). The recent case of the “Velvet Revolution” 2018 in Armenia (AR) has not yet been explored from an IR perspective. Despite taking place inside Armenia, this thesis argues for its relevance to IR, since no revolution is purely domestic but always tied in causes, trajectories and outcomes to the international system (Halliday 1990:213; Lawson 2011:1069). The AR were protest actions that lasted from the start of a protest march on the 31st of March to the election of Nikol Pashinya n as new prime minister (PM) of Armenia on the 8th of May 2018. Existing literature about the AR (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018; Grigoryan 2019; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019; Iskandaryan 2018; Feldman & Alibašić 2019) suggest that there are multiple aspects of an international dimension to the AR, e.g. questions about Armenia’s foreign policy, the transnational diffusion of revolutionary repertoires and stories, the role of the diaspora, the framing of the AR and the influence of global values. Be it as aspiration for other movements or embracing the dominant ideas of the international order, Lawson argues that “[r]evolutio ns have always been international events” (2005:480).

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To explore this argument, the theoretical approach of George Lawson and his concept of “negotiated revolutions” is applied to the new case. The aim is to use this contemporary concept in contrast to previous theories and explore how the AR is connected to factors beyond its national borders. Deriving from previous literature on the AR, it is assumed that it can be a negotiated revolution according to the conceptualisations. Since this concept has been useful in previous works on contemporary revolutions (e.g. Lawson 2003, Kuzio 2006), it is acknowledged as a valuable concept to understand revolutions in today’s international context. This will be explored on the new case for its wider applicability beyond the cases Lawson used in his development of the theory (Halperin & Heath 2017:213), designed as a comparative single-case study. Lawson’s tool about anatomy of revolutions is employed to analyse the AR and use this knowledge for the characteristics of negotiated revolutions. Additionally, the findings of different studies in similar contexts, which go beyond a single grand IR theory, are used. The qualitative research is using news and research reports, official publications and statements, scholarly articles as well as interviews with Armenian experts and participants of the revolution. The question to be researched in this thesis is: Using Lawson’s concept of “negotiated revolutions”, what are the international dimensions of the Armenian “Velvet Revolut io n” 2018? With this case-specific research question and the descriptive purpose of the thesis, this work adds to the ongoing process of developing and improving theories and concepts for contemporary revolutions. By applying the concept “negotiated revolutions” to a new case, it helps to explore the wider generalisability of the model. Therefore, it is a contribution to the area of theories on revolutions and the international, which plays a role for IR regarding the role of revolutions in the international system and for social science in general, since revolutions are an important way for non-state actors to shape politics.

1.1. Structure The thesis at hand is structured as following: it starts with an overview about the development of theories of revolutions and the academic influences that shaped the field. This review also shows the debates about revolutions and the international and the relevance of revolutio n studies for IR. This chapter closes with a presentation of Lawson’s framework to analyse revolutions and the concept of “negotiated revolutions”, which will be applied to examine the case of the AR. From these theorisations, the methodology chapter develops a framework with concrete elements to look in-depth at the empirical case and presents the data that is used for

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this purpose and how it was collected, presenting in particular the interviews that were conducted. In the analysis, the anatomy of the AR is analysed in a first step. In a second step, the five elements of negotiated revolutions are investigated in the case of the AR, to explore if this concept helps to explain the revolutions international dimension. Finally, the thesis concludes by showing how the AR connects to the aspects of the concept of “negotiated revolutions” and therefore multiple international aspects.

2. Building a Framework

The following sections will give an overview of research that has been conducted on revolutions and informed the theoretical framework and research design of this thesis.

2.1. Research on the Armenian Revolution This section presents the research that has been already conducted on the AR (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018; Grigoryan 2019; Iskandaryan 2018; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019; Feldman & Alibašić 2019): The majority of the existing literature is of explanatory nature, discussing its specific characteristics. Analyses of the protests provide a lively picture of their nature and how the various tactics were developed. Examined are the rapid speed of the revolution, the mobility of the protests and their polycentric network structure as well as the actors behind the events, either with a focus on protest leader Pashinyan or the youth participation. Moreover, the combination of old protest methods with new communication technologies and the nonviolent character of the AR are discussed. Frequently, the AR is set in a comparative context to past events, in particular to the Colour Revolutions of the 2000s and previous protests in Armenia. These comparisons show similarities, influences and differences. Scholars agree that the activists behind the AR have learned from and build up on those previous experiences (Grigoryan 2019:167; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:87; Iskandaryan 2018:476). Some attention also concerns the naming of the events as “Velvet Revolution”, its meaning and constructive power (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:512-514; Iskandaryan 2018:465). The name “Velvet Revolution” is of political significance (Iskandaryan 2018:466). Therefore, for political neutrality in this thesis, the event is called “Armenian Revolution”. The findings of these studies are important as material for the analysis of this research. What has been missing in the existing literature is an examination of the AR in a full internatio na l context. Despite its domestic causes and goals, there are many transnational aspects to the AR. Their impact varies, but this thesis supports the claim that contemporary revolutions are

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international events (Lawson 2011:1070). The theoretical basis and the research behind this claim are reviewed in the following section.

2.2. Theories of Revolution The following will address how revolutions have been studied in the past regarding their international dimension.

2.2.1. Revolutions in IR Hannah Arendt famously stated that war and revolutions are the two processes that shaped the world in the 20th century. But while war occupies a central spot in IR, revolutions do not receive equal interest in the discipline (Lawson 2011:1068; Halliday 1990:207; Panah 2002:271). There are several reasons for this neglect. While IR concerns relations between states, revolutions were banned into the domestic sphere (Phana 2002:274). The major theories use different concepts for revolutions and treat them in a loose sense, what makes it difficult to distinguish revolutions from other types of social change. Liberalism and Realism regard revolutions not as crucial forces in the international, not as object to study in itself, but merely disruptions from the international order (Lawson 2003:91, Halliday 1990:207-211; Panah 2002:274). After revolutions, revolutionary states are regarded as having the same goals as other states. But on the long-term it becomes visible that the situation is more complex (Halliday 1990:215-217). Behaviourists treats them as part of violence and internal wars that spread across borders, painting a negative picture (Halliday 1990:207-212). “IR theorists have usually treated revolutions as problems to be solved (e.g., Walt 1996) or as noisy interlopers (e.g., Armstrong 1993) rather than as constitutive of international order” (Lawson 2015:307). Instead of a system of states, IR is treated here as a system “of social conflict on a world scale, mediated and fragmented by states” (Halliday 1990:221). Revolutions are not disturbing but are part of what shapes our world order. As Wight points out, “abnormal” factors played historically a bigger part in determining the social and political order than normal ones (in Halliday 1990:212), as is especially visible in the twentieth century. The post-WWII era has been often a response to revolutions, on which the new world order was build and later again by the revolutions of 1989 destroyed (Halliday 1990:213; Lawson 2005:474). This and the current instability of the international system make an engagement with revolutions in IR valuable, and encourages theoretical rethinking for the discipline, from the links between

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domestic and international and their mutual influence to rethinking the concept of the state and the character of the international system (Halliday 1990:216-220). IR has already made some important contributions to revolution studies by showing the international components of revolutions and the mutually constitutive relationship between revolutionary states and the international system (Lawson 2003:94). This shows the importance for IR to study revolutions, especially since other disciplines as history or sociology pay little attention to the international dimension (Halliday 1990:208). Therefore, an approach to study contemporary revolutions from an intersocietal perspective is presented on p.8. This thesis has a critical approach and draws on knowledge that goes beyond IR research. Concepts, explanations and theories of revolution and the international, that are at the cross-road of IR and other disciplines, are to be used. At the centre is Lawson’s concept of “negotiated revolutions” (see p.12). The existing theories of revolutions will be examined in the following.

2.2.2. Define Revolutions- Past and Present There are discussions whether the AR can be regarded as a revolution (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:512). The definition of revolutions is a debate itself throughout four generations of theories and is crucial for how revolutions are treated in the internatio na l context. Pre-1989 theorists were mainly concerned with a handful of cases: France 1789, North America 1765-1783, Russia 1917, England 1640 and China 1949 (Goldstone 2001:140). In the literature they are called great, classical, or major modern revolutions. From those, the modern, mainstrea m understanding of revolutions derived, creating a list of essential characteristics: violence, inevitability, total change, class ideology and an utopian vision. Third generatio n scholars often have been expanding on Marxist, historical approaches and were influential for studying revolutions. They viewed revolutions as progressive and positive, as a necessary step to a new stage for society. The international plays a role for the context where a revolutio n emerges (Lawson 2003:62-63; Lawson 2005:476; Pop 2013:349; Halliday 1990:212). Overlapping with that are structuralist theorists, focussing on structural causes behind revolutions. Skocpol has been influential in showing an international dimension to revolutio ns, but only as a context. Agency in the International does not play a major role (Lawson 2003:74; Goldstone 2001:171; Foran 1993:3).

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However, these theories have major problems: by ascribing essential features, they limit revolutions on economic causes and class antagonism. Seeing them as inevitable and necessarily violent does not allow a processual, formative, dynamic role and reduces revolutions to static objects that are to be analysed. Structural theories fail to explain why revolutions occur in imperfect conditions or do not take place even with perfect conditio ns (Lawson 2003:63-65, 75; Lawson 2005:475-476; Lawson 2016:109; Halliday 1990:212). They are also unable to explain the AR (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:512). This thesis condescends that revolutions are not inevitable, static or follow one ultimate form, but they are multi-causal, change across time and space and are influenced by diverse actors and events and therefore take multiple forms and meanings (Lawson 2003:56-57; Lawson 2016:110-113; Lawson 2011:1071). For instance, the East and Central European revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union 1989 came widely unforeseen (Pop 2013:347) and showed that revolutions could be nonviolent and create change within the existing laws (Iskandaryan 2018:466). Furthermore, recent events as the Arab Spring or Euromaidan led to new engagement with the concept of “revolution” (Pop 2013:349-351; Lawson 2016:106) and provided a new model of transition. World politics is again marked by insecurities and instability (Lawson 2005:474), resulting in more flexibility, complexity and a conjuncture of political, economic, ideological and cultural factors in the models of social science (including IR) and more multi-method and cross-method collaboration. Historical, postmodernist, sociological approaches turned the focus increasingly towards norms, identities and institutions (Foran 1993:16; George & Bennett 2005:17). The cultural turn in social science lead to a new engagement with recent cases of revolutions. The sub-field of revolution studies was extended by new factors and explanations became more diverse and multifaceted (Goldstone 2001:139-142). Adding to the strengths of the structural oriented theorists, a fourth generation of scholarship on revolutions emerged (Foran 1993:6-10). The contemporary analysis of revolutions does not focus on classes alone, but interactio n between a wide constellation of factors. Here, scholars like Foran, Goldstone, Lawson and Ritter, regard “revolutions as conjunctural amalgams of systemic crisis, structural opening, and collective action, which arise from the intersection of international, economic, political, and symbolic factors” (Lawson 2016:109), linking actors to their social environment (Lawson 2003:98). They incorporate factors like networks, culture, ideology, identity, gender and processes like mobilisation, coalition building or leadership (Goldstone 2001:144, 172-175). A combination of structural and agency approaches emerged. This thesis understands

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revolutions according to the definitions by Goldstone (2001:142), Tilly (Pop 2013:351) and Lawson (2005:479, Lawson 2003:98), which are said to have explanatory power for the AR (Iskandaryan 2018:466; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:513). Their definitions include only the core elements that revolutions share, e.g. the transformation of political institutions, mass mobilisation and actions from civil society movements and the wider public to undermine the authorities, seeing revolutions as “rapid, mass, forceful, systemic transformation of a society’s principal institutions and organisations” (Lawson 2005:479). This shows that the AR can be indeed conceptualised as revolution. Moreover, revolutions are emergent processes of mobilisation and struggle between actors. Revolutions are like critical junctures that offer different possible outcomes (Lawson 2003:337; Lawson 2016:110; Goldstone 2001:172-175; Pop 2013:352). They are negotiated by many actors and change in interplay with its historical and social, international and domestic context (Lawson 2003:75; Lawson 2005:475-476). Theoretical explanations are case-specific, and identified attributes not repeatable in history, since they depend on a specific timing (Lawson 2016:110). Today there is not one clear theory, but a generation of approaches that unify different models to criticise, deepen and improve the third generation (Foran 1993:4; Goldstone 2001:175-176). Different contemporary approaches are used in the analysis, working with the tool of “anatomy of revolutions” by Lawson (see p.9).

2.2.3. Contemporary Studies An important set of contemporary studies concerns the so-called “Colour Revolutions” of the 2000s. Due to their similar cultural and geographical context and the frequent comparison, they informed the thesis regarding theory, method and empirical data. The characteristics and causes of the Colour Revolutions are interesting to compare to the Armenian case. Explanatory factors e.g. for the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia 2003 were: the hybrid regime, the corruption, the strengthened civil society and political activism and the media (Machurishvili 2019:98). An important component is the role of civil society and Youth activism as actors in post-communist states and revolutions (Laverty 2008; Angley 2013; Kuzio 2006; Bunce & Wolchik 2006b:55). Of interest for IR is especially the involvement of foreign actors and supporters. This thesis will dig deeper into such international aspects in the case of the AR. Rediscovered from earlier theorists is also the relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation “is defined as a perception of difference by a person, between expectations […]

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and existence when comparing themselves to others” (Gurr in Machurishvili 2019:95). Van Belle sees mass deprivation as underlying cause for a society to revolution (1996:126). It was used by Machurishvili (2019) to explain the social causes of the Rose Revolution, and the thesis contends that it can explain dynamics underlying the AR. Significant in several studies is the diffusion of ideas, models, repertoires. Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) investigated how the “electoral model” has been spreading and developing. Electoral revolutions are “attempts by opposition leaders and citizens to use elections, sometimes in combination with political protests, to defeat illiberal incumbents or their anointed successors; to bring liberal oppositions to power; and to shift their regimes in a decidedly more democratic direction” (Bunce & Wolchik 2006a:284). The internatio na l diffusion of the electoral model in the post-communist region was surprisingly successful. Bunce & Wolchik’s comparative research shows how the model has been travelling and developing and which factors support the diffusion. (Bunce & Wolchik 2006a:285-286). While a world revolution may not be achieved, revolutions can play an aspiring role for protest movements (Lawson 2003:93). Activists do not have to invent everything new but can use ideas and experiences of others (Lawson 2005:477; Abdelraham 2011:423). The diffusion process is important to understand for the intersocietal approach, which will be presented in the following.

2.2.4. Lawson & An Intersocietal Approach Fred Halliday saw international relations as being shaped by coercion and resistance and with some control of its actors (Lawson 2011:1067). The importance of revolutions for IR lies in its interaction with the international system. Underlying this thesis is the understanding that revolutions form the societies where they take place and the international relations they interact with (Lawson 2005:474). They are processes which are in parts formed in an internatio na l context, and in turn influence the international order and its structures (Lawson 2003:94; Halliday 1990:213), although the effects are uneven (Lawson 2011:1070). This thesis supports the argument that no completely domestic revolutions exist (Lawson 2011:1069) and works with the puzzle of the international dimension of domestic revolutions. Many scholars have claimed to have included international factors into their analysis of revolutions, but the engagement is uneven, reduced to a few factors and often only adding cases and variables onto structural explanations, which reinforces the dichotomy between structure and agency, domestic and international (Lawson 2015:305; 2016:119). Because revolutions are

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“complex amalgams of transnational and local fields of action” (Lawson 2015:316), theories are to be improved by focussing on the social interactions and relations between different entities (Lawson 2016:110-115). Therefore, Lawson suggests an “intersocietal” approach to study revolutions and their international components in a satisfying way. The basis is that the meaning and nature of revolutions depends on “historical context, social conditions and collective action” (Lawson 2003:56). Intersocietal means that revolutionary events have a dimension that goes beyond the nation state (Lawson 2015:307). This approach “takes seriously the relationship between revolutions and the international” (Lawson 2015:308). In the Armenian case, it goes beyond the diaspora ctivities, building on the premise that events in one location affect and are affected by events elsewhere (Lawson 2011:1073; Lawson 2016:120). Intersocietal relations between and across borders have a generative role and drive revolutionary dynamics (Lawson 2016:121). Arguing that the AR has relevance beyond its national borders, this thesis applies Lawson’s theorisations. The following section will have a closer look at his tool of the “anatomy of revolutions” and the concept “negotiated revolutions”, that are to be used for the analysis.

2.3. A Contemporary Response: Negotiated Revolutions The approach to studying revolutions by Lawson, that is to be applied in this thesis to the recent case of the AR, he first developed in his PhD thesis “Negotiated Revolution: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile” (2003) and published in a book and an article (2005). In his conjunctural approach Lawson admits that all the different perspectives in theories of revolutions bring something of interest to the table, but they also have their problems (2003:95- 96). From there he develops how to address the study of revolutions. Lawson builds on and improves Halliday’s approach to revolutions, who moved from abstract analyses directly to empirical cases. To address this gap, Lawson provides an “anatomy of revolutions” for analysing revolutions (2011:1071-1075). This will be used later as analytical tool.

2.3.1. Anatomy of Revolutions The “anatomy” Lawson used for his analysis of negotiated revolutions. This tool is an abstraction that contains core elements of revolutions that are to be explored but gives enough flexibility that specific cases in their variety can be analysed (Lawson 2011:1075-1076).

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The ideal anatomy of revolutions is structured into revolutionary situations, revolutio nar y trajectories, and revolutionary outcomes (Lawson 2011:1068). With that distinction, it is a useful model to examine how different agents operate within social structures (as demanded in George & Bennett 2005:106). The intersocietal approach broadcasts IR at all stages.

Revolutionary Situations Revolutionary situations appear in extraordinary times of internal and external pressure. A typical understanding of contemporary approaches is that long-term crises in a society are building the causes and the groundwork, while short-term trigger moments are leading to the outbreak of a revolution (Lawson 2003:82-83; Lawson 2005:478-479). The international system is a cause and influence. This shows e.g. through the spread of ideologies or the strategies of revolutionary movements across borders. Trade networks, transnational agencies and alliances also impact the economic situation of states and can contribute to the risk of revolutionary outbreaks. States which are dependent on others are challenged to modernise by the international system. If the ruling regime visibly cannot deal with the changes in the international system, do not meet the goals and expectations and an opposition can offer an alternative, the conditions for a revolution are laid (Lawson 2011:1076- 1078; Lawson 2015:310-311; Goldstone 2001:145-149). The regime and an emerging counter- elite both bring forward competing, political claims, through which a situation of “multip le sovereignties” arises (Tilly in Pop 2013:351; Iskandaryan 2018:467; Lawson 2015:310). Revolutionary situations emerge from a systemic crisis (Foran 1993:14). In such a situation, a trigger can further destabilise the order and lead to an outbreak (Lawson 2003:100). A question that arises regarding mobilisa tio n is why individuals decide to join the protests. Here, using a cost-benefit analysis and a synthesis of different theories of revolution, Van Belle shows how leadership and the benefits outweighing the initial high costs of mobilisation, could be the solution for the collective action problem at the beginning of a group formation process (1996).

Revolutionary Trajectories The unfolding of revolutions is neither the result of only structural or agency factors (Lawson 2011:1081). While structural factors help explaining the causes of revolutions, constructivist approaches are a useful contribution when it comes to analyse mobilisation, protest identities and sovereignty shifts.

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Three main determinants influence the events (Lawson 2011:1078-1081): the regime type and corresponding state effectiveness, an elite in power of the coercive apparatus, and an opposition that organises a revolutionary movement. The first two concern the legitimate power in a state and the willingness to use the coercive apparatus to contain uprisings. When the authority of the old regime loses its legitimacy and alternative sovereignties emerge, the state monopoly on the use of violence can be broken (Iskandaryan 2018:467). The formation of a strong united protest identity within the revolutionary movement relates to mobilisation that drives the sovereignty shift. They help to bring people together for collective action, that fulfil the tasks of the state and claim to be superior, so that people transfer their confidence to the revolutionary group (Goldstone 2001:153-154; Iskandaryan 2018:467). This transfer of sovereignty is to be observed. For the formation of protest identities, ideologies and cultural frameworks are used by revolutionary leaders to shape the perceptions about the abilities and character of the state and the protest movement. Stories, symbols, myths or past protests are used for this purpose (Goldstone 2001:154-156). Movements draw on local and international cultural resources and revolutionary repertoires to legitimise and strengthen the protests (Lawson 2015:311-312). Revolutionary leaders here use favourable political and economic circumstances. There are two types: people-oriented leaders inspire and bring people together by providing a vision and a group identity, while task-oriented leaders create strategies and tactics and manage resources (Goldstone 2001:156-158).

Revolutionary Outcomes The outcomes of revolutions often take unexpected turns (Goldstone 2001:167). There are consequences both for the domestic and the international relations of the revolutionary state. Concerning the international relations, the new state needs to become part of the existing state system and find its position in the international (Goldstone 2001:170). Thus, the international order is challenged, since alliances and trade agreements are to be renegotiated and norms and values of the new state are uncertain. Insecurities, perceptions of threat, mistakes or miscalculations by the new state, the possibility for other states to improve their own position and a will to export the revolution increase the possibility of war. Other actors must decide whether or not to support the revolution (Lawson 2015:314-315; Goldstone 2001:170). Also, as example of how successful transition, the revolutionary states can offer material aid or serve as model for others and inspire protest movements abroad (Lawson 2015:314-315; Goldstone 2001:170).

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There is no consensus when revolutions are considered as ended (Goldstone 2001:167). At the minimum and short-term, a revolution is considered successful when revolutionaries take over the state power. A long-term success “is the institutionalization of a new politica l, economic and symbolic order” (Lawson 2011:1082). For that, it is necessary to wait at least for the first generation after a revolution to make a point (Lawson 2003:102, Lawson 2011:1082).

2.3.2. Negotiated Revolutions Revolutions do not belong to the past but are part of the contemporary world and take the form of “negotiated revolutions”. The thesis agrees with Lawson claims that the norms and structure of international relations in every epoch can be analysed through the lens of a “great revolution”. In the contemporary world, these are negotiated revolutions (Lawson 2003:327- 329). To define negotiated revolutions, Lawson compares the cases of South Africa and the end of Apartheid, Czechoslovakia 1989 and the transition in post-Pinochet Chile, to the classical revolutions (p.5). With those, negotiated revolutions share some general features (Lawson 2003:478-482): they occur “when two broad conditions are met— that the dominated revolt, and the rulers cannot go on ruling” (Halliday 1990:213). They rapidly transform fundamental political, economic and social structures of a society (and therefore its international relations). and have a constitutive effect on the international system (Lawson 2005:479-480). Negotiated revolutions also differ in five main ways from the classical revolutions. These characteristics are treated as benchmarks for a revolution with a negotiated character in the research design (see p.19). All aspects relate to the different times in the anatomy of a revolution.

1) Instead of suspicion, the international welcomes the new state Revolutions used to be seen as a disruption to the international order and the status quo. After the end of the Cold War, this opened up and revolutionary change was seen less negative. “As long as revolutionaries framed their story as one of a return to normalcy (Chile), emancipation from the Soviet yoke (the Czech Republic) or as liberation from a system whose time had long passed (South Africa), as long as they agreed to abide by a series of neo-liberal reforms and signed up to a welter of international institutions and normative frameworks” (Lawso n 2003:331; Lawson 2005:483-484) they were welcomed by the international community. If the

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cause was good (from the perspective of the dominating order), it gets a chance for realisatio n and even international assistance (material or normative). The will of the new state to be included in the international community shows in its foreign policy: instead of hostility towards enemies or isolated protectionism, it seeks to strengthen international ties (Lawson 2003:330- 331; Lawson 2005:483-485).

2) Instead of utopia, desire to return to normalcy Revolutions used to be thought as in need of a grand vision for changes. However, in 1989 e.g., the revolutionaries in Central and Eastern Europe did not have a utopian vision, but instead aimed “to return to Europe, to catch up with the West, to become what they perceived as normal again” (Lawson 2005:486). The pattern of terror, counter revolution and war are broken by avoiding the use of an ideology to legitimise means of the changes. Instead, states of negotiated revolutions build their order according to the example of leading market democracies: the economy experiences liberalisation and privatisation and gets included into globalised economic structures, the norms and structures of advanced market democracies and international institutions are embraced and free media and a strong civil society fostered. Instead of punishing or retributive justice, the revolutionaries build on restorative justice to deal with past injustices through reconciliation (Lawson 2003:332-334; Lawson 2005:485- 487)

3) Instead of violence, mutual dependence with rival forces Negotiated revolutions offer a different conceptualisation of violence than modern revolutio ns which have been associated with violence and where one side replaced the other. They “are not violent fights to the finish but relatively peaceful processes in which deals are struck between revolutionaries and adversaries” (Lawson 2005:488). The lines of conflicts are not class-based, instead multiclass coalitions have the best chance to succeed (Foran 1993:14). Coercive power and overt violence are avoided and appear in rather structural than direct and extreme forms, which caused in the past troubles for many post-revolutionary regimes. For a success of the revolution, both sides must agree on distancing from violence as a legitimate tool (Lawson 2003:334-337; Lawson 2005:487-489).

4) Instead of fighting to the end, negotiations with the old regime The great moments of negotiated revolutions are not heroic, violent rebellions but they are marked by the power of peaceful masses and negotiations between the old and the new regime

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(Lawson 2003:337-338; Lawson 2005:489-490). The outcomes in revolutions were always unclear, not inevitable or miraculous outcome but about to be made in the process. “As such, these processes serve as powerful examples of the dynamic interplay between structure and agency” (Lawson 2003:338; Lawson 2005:490).

5) Instead having a strong bureaucratic state, the new state is hemmed and weak In the traditional sense, if revolutionaries succeeded in getting the control over the state, they were concerned with securing this control against internal and external challengers. Armies and bureaucracies were expanded and a stronger state was built, often turning into tyranny. While negotiated revolutions also stem from a systemic crisis in which the old regime loses legitimacy, there is no regime collapse of the old regime. The conflicting parties “approach the negotiating table from positions of mutual dependence” (Lawson 2003:340; Lawson 2005:491). Without an enemy, there is no need to build coercive forces and no desire to export the revolution. The aims are offered by the world political order itself, to which they want to catch up (Lawson 2003:338-341; Lawson 2005:490-491).

It is visible how the different aspects of negotiated revolutions intersect with each other, which is the basis of the conceptualisation for this thesis: a negotiated revolution is a process of regime change when, in a situation of a systemic crisis, two opposing groups of actors fight with nonviolent means and through negotiations for the representation of a society and control over the coercive apparatus. The new state does not aim for drastic upheaval in the internatio nal orientation but seeks stability though a legitimate transition at home and an active inclusio n into the international system. Following the preceding theorisations, this thesis will not employ one grand theory, but draw on several concepts and findings outlined above to critically explore the different aspects of the AR. This will take place around Lawson’s intersocietal approach to revolutions and IR, applying the concept “negotiated revolutions” as an analytical framework to the recent case of the AR, to test its explanatory value as contemporary form of revolutions. With this aim, the subsequent research is a case-specific study about the place a particular revolution in the international system. The following section will present the methodological influences and considerations as well as the outline of design of the analysis.

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3. Methodologies

The subsequent section develops a research design to use the conceptualisation of “negotiated revolutions” (see p.14) for the analysis of a new case. A contribution can be made both towards the state of research on the AR and further development of theories on revolutions towards an inclusion of the international dimension.

3.1. Methodological Influences from the Study of Revolutions Most reviewed studies about revolutions rely on case studies in a national context, often designed as a comparative research with a small number of cases and focusing on macro-level factors (Goldstone 2001:162). Comparative research is one of the most used methods in politica l research (Halperin & Heath 2017:211), in particular in the study of revolutions. Since Skocpol’s research of the causes of social revolutions using a Most Different System's Design (Halperin & Heath 2017:222; George & Bennett 2005:112), small-n studies to compare cases directly are being used. Laverty compares between the Colour Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (2008), Kuzio (2006) does a comparative case study of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, using a five-fold framework that discusses different aspects in-depth. Foran (1993) did a comparative analysis of three Third World social revolutions, testing two successful revolutions against one that failed. Bunce & Wolchik (2006b) also use a comparative design, which is particularly helpful to find evidence for international diffusion. Lawson developed his theory about negotiated revolutions through a comparative research (2003), with Czech and South Africa being revolutions and Chile being different. Not always is the comparison direct, but it can also be indirect, using a theoretical framework and a new single-case, e.g. Angley (2013) who uses a framework by Larry Diamond to check if the Georgian civil society in the Rose Revolution fulfils its democratic functions. The qualitative study of revolutions involves a concern with history, either through the examination of historic cases, the context setting or the analysis of developments before a revolution. Through comparisons the use of a single historical narrative is to be avoided (George & Bennett 2005). Also, there is a mutual interplay between theory and history, theory development and empirical cases of revolutions (Foran 1993:17). With case studies a specific aspect of history is to be examined to see whether the explanation of the event can be generalised (George & Bennett 2005:18). While other methods have been used in revolution studies, e.g. rational choice models like Van Belle’s cost benefit analysis (Van Belle 1996) or statistical analysis (Goldstone 2001:163),

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the case study approach is dominating. The design of other contemporary studies inspired this thesis to work in a similar manner, designing this thesis as a comparative case study, applying Lawson’s theoretical framework to the AR as a new case. Comparative work on a variety of cases is the best way to develop and improve theory of revolutions (Foran 1993:16).

3.2. Comparative Case Studies The analysis of this thesis is designed as a comparative research, using a single case with the purpose to apply a theory (negotiated revolutions) to a new context (the AR). As single-case study this thesis works with indirect comparison. In the discussion of negotiated revolutio ns, the presence of its characteristics is compared to the absence of factors that were seen as essential to revolutions by Marxist-structuralist scholars (Halperin & Heath 2017:212). This thesis belongs to the type of comparative research that applies an existing theory to a new case to see whether they work the same way in different contexts. The original theory about negotiated revolutions, that was developed by Lawson is applied to the new context of the AR to assess whether it still holds and whether it is a more general theory beyond the cases with that Lawson established it. Through the comparison, it is more than an individualist ic explanation of a phenomenon (Halperin & Heath 2017:212-215). Rokkan calls this method “‘micro replication, which is designed 'to test out in another national and cultural settings a proposition already validated in one setting” (in Halperin & Heath 2017:213). The horizon is broadened, since it analyses whether findings or truths in one context also work in another context. With that it guards against the danger of "false uniqueness" and "false universal is m ” of theory (Halperin & Heath 2017:212). With each case study, a theory can be refined and developed further (George & Bennett 2005:88). By exploring to which extend the concept applies or can be replicated in varying contexts, this research fulfils a descriptive purpose of comparison, describing the characteristics of a case (AR) of one model (negotiated revolutions) (Halperin & Heath 2017:96). With their strengths in addressing complex issues and exploring the hypothetical role of causal mechanisms in specific cases are case studies valuable for theory development (George & Bennett 2005:25). While this single-case study not enough to explain the differences and develop a new aspect of the theory or test it (Halperin & Heath 2017:213-215), it contributes to the exploration of the wider applicability of the concept of negotiated revolutions. It explains a historical case, as example for an existing theory (George & Bennett 2005:62).

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The researchers’ values, knowledge and point of view have influence on the research choices and conclusions (Halperin & Heath 2017:57, 175). Different selections would bring different answers and possibly results, therefore selection bias are potential problems. Being deeply involved with the topic, the significance of the events might be overstated. The most crucial and difficult point is therefore the case selection, for which a good rationale needs to be provided (Halperin & Heath 2017:215; George & Bennett 2005:164). A limitation of single case studies is the question how far it can be generalised from one case. Case-based explanations are in a way provisional (George & Bennett 2005:73) and inferences made from single case studies should be treated carefully (Halperin & Heath 2017:215). The answers could be a product of the selected case (Halperin & Heath 2017:235). There is the danger to select only theory-confirming cases and generalise too much from those (George & Bennett 2005:31). This case-specific thesis trades a high internal validity and detailed observations of one case against generalisations that could be widely applied (George & Bennett 2005:30; Halperin & Heath 2017:217). The event was the starting point of interest for the research. Asking “‘what is this event a case of’” (George & Bennett 2005:24), the AR is used as a case of a contemporary revolution. It was chosen since it happened recently and, despite being a domestic revolution, it has in my argument considerable relevance beyond the Armenian borders, which makes it a relevant case to analyse (Terzyan 2019:24). To do good research, it needs to be made clear where statements come from and the researcher’s bias need to be identified and minimised (Halperin & Heath 2017:58). Through data triangulation and constant reminder of the existing bias it was tried to minimise them and provide as good research as possible. As single-case study, this thesis deals intensively with the AR, that is situated in a comparative context in the sense that it addresses an issue of wider academic relevance (the international dimension of revolutions) and uses a concept that is applicable to other contexts (negotiated revolutions). How this is executed will be outlined in the following section.

3.3. Research Design To answer the research question “Using Lawson’s concept of ‘negotiated revolutions’, what are the international dimensions of the Armenian ‘Velvet Revolution’ 2018?”, a framework was developed to investigate the characteristics of the AR and its implications in the international system, based on the theorisations by Lawson (2003; 2005). The books by

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Halperin & Heath (2017) and George & Bennett (2005) have been helpful for methodological considerations and designing the research. The following qualitative analysis splits into two parts: First, the anatomy of the AR is examined to get an understanding of the characteristics of the revolution. In the second part, this knowledge is used to examine the five aspects of the concept “negotiated revolutions”, to see whether this form of contemporary revolution explains the AR’s international dimens io n. Lawson’s work serves as analytical tool. From his research, concrete questions developed to guide the analysis of the empirical data. Within this framework, it is drawn on several of the concepts and explanations from contemporary studies of revolutions (e.g. diffusion of revolutionary repertoire, leadership, electoral revolution model, mobilisation, role of civil society). The guide can be used for future similar research on other cases or to check this study.

3.3.1. Anatomy of the Revolution In the following it is presented which particular aspects are to be described in the Armenian case.

Revolutionary Situations Here the importance of timing and a processual ontology for studying revolutions is important (Lawson 2016:111). At first, the analysis searches for a proof of a systemic crisis through: a) changes in the international system, b) changing geo-political and economic contexts, a domestic crisis of the old regime, and the existence of an opposition and leadership, that is challenging the legitimacy of the regime, c) and trigger events.

Revolutionary Trajectories To understand how the events unfolded and what determinants influenced them, the analysis investigates in the second step: a) the social order and the political system, the regime type and effectiveness of the state, b) the form of actors, who is holding the power over the coercive apparatus, the existence of multip le sovereignties, c) the form of collective action that takes place (organisation, leadership, resources, values etc.),

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d) and identity formation: on which repertoires, known figures, symbols etc. does the movement draw on. This is to observe when and how a shift of sovereignty took place.

Revolutionary Outcomes Here, scholarship often divides into the short-term and long-term consequences (see Hobsbawm in Lawson 2003:102). a) Short-term: Is the revolution over? Is the “minimum condition” fulfilled, the takeover of state power by the revolutionaries (Lawson 2003:102)? b) Long-term: Is the “maximum condition” fulfilled, the “establishment of a new social and legal framework, and the institutionalisation of a new political and economic order” (Lawson 2003:102)? The international consequences need to be equally examined. How is the relation of the revolutionary state to other actors, how does it find its place in the international system? Are other movements inspired to learn from the events? The long-term consequences can the earliest be assessed in the following generation that grows up with the changes (Lawson 2003:102; Lawson 2011:1082). This anatomy Lawson used to investigate core elements of revolutions, to compare how they are similar or distinct. The insights gained here will be used to whether the AR can be understood through the concept of negotiated revolutions in the second part of the analysis.

3.3.2. The Negotiated Revolution The five characteristics in which “negotiated revolutions” are different from the mainstream understanding of the great, modern revolutions (Lawson 2003:105, 330-341, Lawson 2005:483) are being analysed, to understand the AR in an intersocietal context. The following questions were developed:

• instead of suspicion, the international welcomes the new state: How is the AR framed in the international context (by the new elite in Armenia)? How was the reaction from the international? What international aid was given (normative/material)? What foreign policy perspectives does Armenia express? • instead of utopia, desire to return to normalcy: What kind of ideology and aim is expressed? What kind of justice is expressed? Is there a collective foundation narrative?

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• instead of violence, mutual dependence with rival forces is accepted: What kind of violence do both sides use? Do they see violence as a legitimate policy tool? • instead of a fight to the end, negotiations: How are the symbolic moments of the revolution portrayed? Do both sides want negotiations? • instead of having a strong, bureaucratic state, the new state is weak and hemmed: How do the parties approach each other? How do revolutionaries deal with the old regime afterwards? What were the negotiations about? Are military forces build up by the new regime? Is there a desire to export the revolutio n? The elements of the negotiated revolutions are the benchmarks for whether the AR fits into this type of contemporary revolutions, against the previous structuralist-Marxist explanations.

3.4. Data Collection Methods For comparative case studies, a wide range of data collection methods is used (Halperin & Heath 2017:215). The most frequently used data collection methods in the reviewed literature are interviews, ethnographic studies, publications (political, cultural, media etc.) and other research documents. Most scholars used a combination of different sources. The scholars who examined the AR used to a big extent qualitative primary data, which they gained in field work and directly from the people of Armenia, often based on observations and interviewing. Another frequent data source are textual and cultural data and a wide range of publicatio ns, from activist campaigns, newspapers, statements by organisations and civil society actors as well as academic literature. This informed this thesis’ data collection methods, which also draws on multiple data sources, which is important for triangulation and avoiding a one-sided picture of the events. Research reports and publications by Armenian and foreign institutions, media, states and individuals are used. Previous articles on the AR provided valuable secondary data, e.g. about the post-revolution foreign policy or from field studies during the revolution. Complemented is the secondary data by a range of interviews that was conducted by the author with mainly Armenian participants, which will be explained in more detail here, since they were conducted as primary data for this work. For the first take of the thesis, six interviews about the AR with Armenian citizens (Interviews 1-6), activists, protest participants and Armenian policy experts, were conducted and can be reused. Additionally, four more expert interviews (Interviews A- D) were conducted specifically to validate the own findings regarding the five elements of negotiated revolutions. These experts are academics, mostly Armenians, who have special

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knowledge about the AR and Armenia in general. The access to the participants came through personal contacts, their publications and forwarding recommendations. Their expertise makes them a valid source to validate my findings. For the research purpose, an in-depth study of a small number of interviews was prioritised to a high quantity. Due to the small sample, the interviews are not representative of the opinion of the whole Armenian population, however experts could make some more general statements and improve the data set. The interviews were conducted semi-structured, aiming for a high validity through in-depth knowledge of the participants (Halperin & Heath 2017:286). The course of the interviews took different directions depending on the answers and fields of knowledge of the interviewees. The direction was given by the interviewer and the questions served as orientation, but the interviewees were active subjects of the process (Halperin & Heath 2017:290-291). Due to their diverse identities, the interviews are hard to compare but provide a combination of varying perspectives. Two interviewees preferred to respond via e- mail for accessibility reasons. With permission the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. To ensure meeting all ethical research principles when gathering and processing of the data, an application for the first set of interviews to the KS Ethics Council at Malmö University was prepared and approved in March 2020. For the second interview set it was proceeded in the same way (but without another application for the Council). The data collection can be handed in upon request. Regarding bias and defectiveness, not every aspect will be answered to the fullest detail, since they could each be the concern of a separate text. With the scope of research that is possible here, there is the risk to jump to conclusions which require a deeper investigation. Also, the author is limited to some extend on the respondents’ answers, which requires a critical reading of conflicting statements. The identity of the participants influences their answers and people tend to give answers that fulfil the perceived expectations of the researcher (or society in general) (Halperin & Heath 2017:59, 290). The anonymity of the interviewees was therefore a step not only for ethical reasons but also to encourage honest answers. To minimise the bias, people from different backgrounds were important. With bigger data sets the results will provide a more general picture and can be applied in a wider context (Halperin & Heath 2017:149). Therefore, the interviews are only a part of the full data set. The preceding text has presented different ways of how revolutions and the internatio nal have been studied and developed how the thesis will address this research area. The argument, that revolutions are international events because they are being shaped by and are shaping the international system, is to be explored. Using a comparative case study of the Armenian

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Revolution 2018, Lawson’s intersocietal approach to revolutions provides the basis for applying the concept of “negotiated revolutions” to a new case. With that the thesis responds to the research question: Using Lawson’s concept of ‘negotiated revolutions’, what are the international dimensions of the Armenian “Velvet Revolution” 2018? Treating negotiated revolutio ns as the contemporary form revolutions take (Lawson 2003:327-329), the subsequent analysis will research what the case of the AR is telling us about the contemporary world.

4. Analysing the Armenian Revolution

The findings of the analysis are presented as re-narration of the infor ma tio n gained from the data. The interview data can be handed in upon request for transparency.

4.1. Anatomy of the Armenian Revolution The findings regarding the three temporal stages here are overlapping.

Revolutionary Situations Following several unsuccessful protests, it seemed like the Armenian population had accepted their situation (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:89-90; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:511; Zolyan 2018). But this stability was an illusion, as the interplay of domestic and international factors shows. In the absence of achievements and increasing signs of incompetence, the regime lost support. The discontent with the bad economic situation and the lack of progress and change grew. On top came frustration with unpunished criminals, systemic corruption, dishonesty, inequality, declining stability in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, incompetence and no real judiciary. Space for democracy and civil society activism was shrinking, regionally and globally. In Armenia’s neighbourhood, a tendency towards authoritarianism was to be observed, which Armenia seemed to follow (Kuzio 2006:384; Socioscope 2019:15, 21, 71; Ignatius 2018; Ball 2019; Zolyan 2018). The dissatisfaction becomes even more significant in the context of the international system. Following the Cold War, the international order has seen the spread of democracy, liberalism, and human rights ideas, which are a threat to authoritarian regimes (Lawson 2015:310). The globally dominant liberalism and modernity are attractive for Armenia. From the sources the impression arose that the Armenian society not only appreciates Western values, but that they strive for similar political and economic standards success (see p.31). The old government

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claimed to be against corruption and share European Union (EU). In consequence, a situatio n arose where people considered those values as goals. When they saw that the government did not act as they claimed, it provided ground for tension and a systemic crisis (Interview C). Armenia wants “to keep pace with the world” (Grigoryan 2018:17). By comparing the own situation to Western states and responding expectations, the dissatisfaction with the existing system was fuelled (Goldstone 2001:147-149). Relative deprivation (as defined in Machurishvili 2019:95) of a society and especially young people serves an explanation for the underlying causes of the AR. That is how the international environment has an indirect impact on the domestic. This made the popularity of Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) decline (Iskandaryan 2018:469). Armenians did not feel represented by their government (Grigoryan 2018:39). Simultaneously, the world has seen a rapid increase in protest movements and civic activism (Socioscope 2019:15, 71). Within the arising systemic crisis, pro-democracy activists in Armenia took a step forward: without opportunities to change politics in the parliament, the opposition took the politics to the people in the streets (Grigoryan 2018:37). The trigger for the revolution was when Sargsyan broke his promise to not become a candidate for the PM (Iskandaryan 2018:473; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:511). This lie was used by Pashinyan and the protest movement in a momentum of frustration and anger (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:517-518; Interview A). The revolutionary situation shows how the unexpected AR was an outcome of a long-term process (Grigoryan 2019:158). Long-term developments lead to a systemic crisis, in which the rulers were unable to rule (Foran 1993:14; Lawson 2003:82-83; Lawson 2005:478-479; Halliday 1990:213). The trigger of Sargsyan’s lie at the right time then brought about the revolution.

Revolutionary Trajectories This section examines the different determinants that affected the course the protests took.

1) Armenia’s Political System As other post-communist countries in the region, the pre-revolution political system in Armenia could be described as competitive authoritarian regime or hybrid regime. In some areas, pluralism and democratic contest is permitted, e.g. in media, civil society and through elections. This is seen as a facade for an international audience, but it meant that some favourable preconditions for an effective democratisation existed (Angley 2013:51; Bunce & Wolchik

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2006a:297; Iskandaryan 2018:471; Feldman & Alibašić 2019:427-428; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:3; Interview 3; Interview C). In the decade before the revolution, a trend in Armenia of increasing political oppression and authoritarianism could be observed. International observers noted that Armenia was on the line between a hybrid and full authoritarian regime (Socioscope 2019:9; Grigoryan 2018:33; Aberg & Terzyan 2018:161-162; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:3-4, see p.22). The constitutio na l changes are widely considered as strategic move to allow Sargsyan and the RPA to continue ruling (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:511; Socioscope 2019:18; CSCE 2018:5). The existing liberties however were used and defended by developing civic groups (Angely 2013:51).

2) The Actors and the Distribution of Power in the Revolution On one side of the revolution was the previous government of Armenia, consisting mainly of the RPA lead by Serzh Sargsyan as president, later PM. This regime was opposed politically by the Yelk Alliance of opposition parties and two civil initiatives that formed together the protest movement (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:528; Feldman & Alibašić 2019:425). The main actors were the citizens (Grigoryan 2018:49; Interview 6). The protest movement was mainly a youth movement. Young Armenians grew up without the psychological burdens of the previous generation from the Soviet Union and the many failed attempts of protest (Grigoryan 2019:168; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:516; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:5; Zolyan 2018; Interview 3). Over the past decade, civil society in Armenia was developing and they formed a new protest milieu, representing a (for Armenia new) leftist argumentation with a focus on social issues (Iskandaryan 2018:474, 478). While these people were building the core, all different population groups, ages, professions, political orientations and social milieus joined in and it became truly a nationwide movement (Grigoryan 2019:168; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:528; Socioscope 2019:36; Ayres 2018; Zolyan 2018; Interview 5; Interview 6). People transferred their support to the revolutionary group (Goldstone 2001:153-154; Iskandaryan 2018:467). The protests were spreading all over the country. Unity, inclusiveness and the possibility for everyone to be part of the movement was central and a multi-class coalition was formed (Foran 1993:14). Already the evening meetings in Yerevan came an estimated 150,000-200,000 people came (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:521), which is more than the critical mass in a country of three millio n inhabitants. Beyond the state borders, diaspora communities organised protest actions, helped

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financially and extended the support for the AR in their host countries (Grigoryan 2018:13, 43; Interview A; Interview B; Interview D). With this united population, the protest movement could challenge the government for its legitimate rule over the people of Armenia. A situation of multiple sovereignties (see Tilly in Pop 2013:351; Iskandaryan 2018:467; Lawson 2015:310) existed: the parliamentary majority versus the majority of the population in the streets. The protesters provided an alternative to elect a government (Grigoryan 2018:22, 37). By paralysing the country through their sheer number, the protest movement could pressure politics and Sargsyan was forced to resign and the RPA eventually voted Pashinyan into office (Feldman & Alibašić 2019:421), showing that the will of the people was beating the formal parliamentary majority (Grigoryan 2019:171). Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the revolution, played an important role. He became a main figure of the protest, the charismatic leader or the symbol of the revolution (Iskandaryan 2018:479; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:93; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:522). As such, he is the typical people-oriented leader, who is good at inspiring and mobilizing people. But he is also a practical leader in developing the tactics of the AR, particularly the nonviolence and mobility elements (Goldstone 2001:156-158). As in the Rose Revolution, people did not gather around a particular ideology, but supported one leader and overarching aim (Angley 2013:52). However, while analyses often focus on Pashinyan, behind him were many activists (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:519, 528; Interview D).

3) The Form of Collective Action The activists learned from the mistakes and achievements of previous protests in Armenia (Grigoryan 2019:167; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:87, 90; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:516; Sociosciope 2019:19, 28; Ohanyan 2018; Zolyan 2018; Interview B). They also learned from activists and revolutions abroad, e.g. the Rose Revolution or the Velvet Revolution 1989 (Interview 3; Interview A) and similarities in tactics (nonviolence, network structure) and actors (Youth, civil society) are visible (see Kuzio 2006; Angley 2013; Machurishvili 2019; Laverty 2008). The protests started with a march of activists from Gyumri to Yerevan and ended with strikes, protests and various civil-disobedience actions in the capital. One of the most important principles of the movement was nonviolence, which will be discussed on p.32. The protests were designed as civil disobedience and took place decentralised, spontaneous and mobile. People were blocking the streets to paralyse the system from functioning. As soon as police forces approached, they moved away and gathered new in a different place, like a network all

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over Yerevan. The state machinery could not keep up with the movement and no leadership structures were needed (Iskandaryan 2018:479; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:522-526; Sociosciope 2019:29; Zolyan 2018; Interview 6; Interview A; Interview B). The atmosphere was joyful, many tools were creative and fun. It was cool to be part of the protests, social media portrayed the protests in a good-looking light (Sociosciope 2019:29-31; Grigoryan 2018, Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:527; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:93; Zolyan 2018; Ayres 2018; Interview 5). The use of new information and communication technologies was a decisive factor. The old protest tactics were combined with new technologies. Decentralised protests could be coordinated and groups formed and re-formed. The regime could control the traditional but not social media. Even people who had to stay at home felt involved. The international audience was kept informed by translated interviews, video footage and twitter posts (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:93-94; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:525-527; Grigoryan 2019:168; Socioscope 2019:28; Zolyan 2018).

4) Protest Identity Formation Regarding identities, repertoires and symbols, comparison with previous movements and revolutions are unavoidable. Important for the identity is the naming of the protests. Similarities between the AR and the original “Velvet Revolution” from 1989 in Czechoslovakia can be seen (Iskandaryan 2018:466; Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:513; Grigoryan 2019:169). A reason to borrow the name could be that for Pashinyan nonviolence was a priority. Another factor is to distance themselves from the Colour Revolutions (Grigoryan 2019:169; Iskandaryan 2018:466). Both aspects play a role for the understanding as a negotiated revolution and are discussed there (4.2.). Throughout the protest, the participants developed a new identity of the proud, empowered Armenians that were changing their government (see p.28). It was building centrally on elements of solidarity and unity among the people as well as their agency. Moving united against the regime strengthened their group identity. The narrative was highlighted by many data sources and also by Pashinyan himself, since it gave him a strong legitimacy (Intervie w 4). The examination of the political system, the revolutionary actors, the protest forms and identitie s make it possible to observe the shift of sovereignty. The general strike that unfolded was significant and 39 days after the beginning of the protests, Pashinyan was the new PM.

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Revolutionary Outcomes On the short-term, it can be said that the first aim of the revolution was achieved when Sargsyan resigned, the second when Pashinyan was voted by the parliament as new PM. This marked the end of the revolution itself. The revolutionary period was over with the snap elections for the parliament in December 2018, which confirmed the success of the AR. While the RPA did not enter the parliament, the Yelk Alliance won 70 percent of the votes (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:86; Feldman & Alibašić 2019:421; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:2). Therefore, it can be claimed that the minimum condition, the takeover of state power (Lawson 2003:102), was fulfilled. These elections were widely praised as the most free and fair elections in Armenia’s history and acknowledged by the international community (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:86; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019; OSCE 2018b). But they used the old electoral system, the electoral code and the constitution remain unchanged until today (Interview B). The sources show clearly that high hopes are connected to the new government. However, the long-term outcomes are more complex. The interviews differ in their judgement about from a complete change to the better to strong scepticism. The long-term can the earliest be assessed in the following generation that grows up with the changes (Lawson 2003:102; Lawson 2011:1082). Only two years have passed since the revolution, literature can only outline the challenges and possibilities ahead. There is wide interest in how things will develop. Domestically, first steps are taken. Pashinyan has been dealing with the attacks in the protests 2008, where in consequence former officials were arrested (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:94; Socioscope 2019:74; Interview 3; Interview A). But while some investigations and prosecutions regarding the state of corruption have been made, structural reforms to address the underlying problems still have to follow (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:94-96). The electoral success depended largely on Pashinyan’s personal popularity (Interview 1), but his program is “long on democratic idealism and thin on specifics” (Ignatius 2018). First frustration shows because of unfulfilled expectations. Pashinyan is committed to an “economic revolution”, but so far, no real reforms have followed (Terzyan 2019:34). A reform of the constitution and the electoral system and a strengthening of the rule of law and the legal system need to follow (Grigoryan 2020; Grigoryan 2019:172; Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:2). But a challenge is the new government: the activists that fill many positions in the new system lack experience in politics and public service (Grigoryan 2019:172; Iskandaryan 2018:480; Interview B; Interview D). There is criticism that Pashinyan’s government is becoming increasingly authoritarian and

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works the same way as the previous government did (Interview A; Interview B). Personal changes took place, but no structural and institutional ones. The Armenian people have changed through the success of the protests. They regained self- worth and the knowledge that they can contribute to change. Armenians rediscovered that they have agency and they proudly tell that they brought about the regime change. The new government is theirs, Pashinyan is their chosen PM. People felt that their voice matters (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:98; Grigoryan 2018:172-173; Ayres 2018; Ball 2019; Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 6; Interview A). The Armenian civil society grew stronger and they stress, that they can make the same move again (Interview 6). The international consequences play a significant role for the long-term developments, and are marked by continuity, not change: With Pashinyan, there were hopes of normalising the hostile relationships to Turkey and Azerbaijan (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:98). However, there are no breakthroughs so far, what continues to hinder reforms (Aberg & Terzyan 2018:168; Terzyan 2019:34-38; Interview D). Russia is the main security provider for Armenia. Additionally, Russia hosts the biggest Armenian diaspora and is Armenia’s leading economic partner, investor and has the control over Armenia’s energy. Altogether, Russia is a key player that determines Armenia’s politics (Markarov & Davtyan 2018:539; Terzyan 2019:27-30; Rettman 2018; Interview A; Interview B; Interview C). With this dependency in mind, it is no surprise that the activist and the new government highlight that the AR had no geopolit ic a l component but only domestic aims (see p.29). The post-revolution leadership and activists stress that the movement is neither pro-Russian or pro-Western. They expressed commitment to not revise but deepen the ties with Russia (Markarov & Davtyan 2018:532; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:86; Terzyan 2019:25, 32; Feldman & Alibašić 2019:427; Ohanyan 2018; Grigoryan 2018:144-145; Ignatius 2018; Interview 6; Interview B). In the past, Pashinyan was very critical about Russia. However, after becoming PM, Pashinyan fundamentally changed his position and highlighted the close relationship of the two countries, the strategic importance of their alliance (Feldman & Alibašić 2019:426; Terzyan 2019:26-27). This examination has revealed some important aspects that will be used in the following part to analyse how the AR can be understood as a negotiated revolution and what this tells us about the wider relevance of the AR as a contemporary form of revolution and political change.

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4.2. The Armenian Negotiated Revolution The following presents the findings from the comparison of the characteristics of negotiated revolutions with the AR.

1) The international welcomes the new state To understand the international component, it is to be observed how the revolution leaders frame the AR in the context of Armenia’s geopolitica l situatio n. Most international interest concerns potential foreign policy implications (Terzyan 2019:24; Zolyan 2018; Interview A). The main principle of Armenia’s foreign policy is complementarity. Caught between big regional powers, Armenia aims to balance the interests of all the major players (Markarov & Davtyan 2018:531-533; Interview D). Especially to Russia it is connected by multip le dependencies (see p.28). Following the AR, continuity of foreign policy priorities and obligations under the new government stand out (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:86). The commitment to deepen the alliance with Russia stands in contrast to the Colour Revolutio ns, which had been turning West. Colour Revolutions are inspired or supported by external actors (Iskandaryan 2018:466) and are depicted as infiltration by the West and a setback for Russia (Bouchet 2016:2; Terzyan 2019:25). In 2015, Russia adopted a National Security Strategy that identifie s foreign-sponsored regime change as a security threat. As consequence, such revolutions are about to prevented, at home as well as abroad, if necessary by military intervention (Bouchet 2016:1). Therefore, the revolution leaders wanted to avoid the impression of a coloured revolution and claimed their revolution was unique. Foreign involvement is strongly denied and frequently stressed that the protests were a reaction to the domestic situation with domestic goals (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:519; Grigoryan 2019:167; Ohanyan 2018; CSCE 2018:12). Still, external actors made the revolution possible through the normative support in the previous decades. Western donor assistance helped Armenian civil society with the promotion of democracy, human rights and liberal ideologies (Socioscope 2019:20-21). The EU provided normative input and values that were considered as desirable (Markarov & Davtyan 2018:541; Interview C). After the AR, support increased and Armenia was presenting itself willing for political reforms to foster cooperation with the EU (Terzyan 2019:34; Interview 1; Interview A; Interview D). However, no European but Armenian flags were visible in the protests (Rettman 2018). That shows that the people’s concern was with their country. Therefore,

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Russia did not perceive it as a threat and did not react against the protests (Terzyan 2019:25, 32; Ignatius 2018; CSCE 2018:13-14; Interview D). Beyond the diplomatic curtain, not all Armenians are too fond of Russia (Feldman & Alibašić 2019:427; Interview 3; Interview C). The old system, with its corruption and authoritarianism, reminded many of the Russian system and Armenia’s dependency (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:88; Grigoryan 2020; Interview C). Some associate the former government with traditions, conservatism, Soviet times and the new one with an open, pro-European/Western agenda and modernity (Interview 3, Interview A). Instead of the East vs. West discourse however, a narrative of conservatism vs. modernity explains the anti-Russian mindset better. In front of international institutions, Armenian representatives highlight their will to embrace human rights and principles of good governance and democracy (e.g. OSCE 2018a). They tell the outside world what they want to hear: that democracy, civil liberties and the economy are improving and corruption decreases (Interview 1). It shows the Armenian desire to be accepted by and included into the international system (Grigoryan 2018:21). The firs t reactions to the AR internationally were indeed widely positive (e.g. CSCE 2018 and EEAS 2019:2). It is celebrated as a positive example of peaceful transition and democratic progress, as a victory of democratic values “in a world marked by growing international illiberalism” (Ball 2019). Overall however, there was less international attention than e.g. in the Arab Spring. Most actors only reacted after Sargsyan’s resignation, when the most crucial point was over and the consequences became too big to ignore. This was also an advantage, since Armenia was less prone to fight proxy battles (Zolyan 2018, Ball 2019). That Western powers were relatively silent allowed Pashinyan to secure the relationship with Russia (Interview C). Visibly, the international situation played a key role for the AR, especially for its framing, to send the right message to the key stakeholders in the region and the international communit y. As it is typical for negotiated revolutions, the new state seeks to strengthen internatio na l ties , frame its story as return to the dominant system and submit to its institutions and norms, for that the new state is rewarded by being welcomed by the international community (Lawson 2003:331; Lawson 2005:483-484). It is truly remarkable that the democratic AR could “win in a country considered one of Russia’s close allies and be accepted as legitimate both by Russia and the West” (Zolyan 2018).

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2) Desire to return to normalcy The main aim of the AR was simple: “Reject Serzh”, meaning a rejection of Sargsyan, his government and the rule of the RPA. The simplicity of the demands is arguably what kept the movement together and made it a success (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:517-518; Interview B). Everyone is against corruption and liars, therefore negative slogans united the society. The simple worldview consisted of good and bad leaders, Pashinyan is portrayed as hero, Sargsyan as the personification of the evil (Iskandaryan 2018:479). The solution was: replacing the bad with the good (Iskandaryan 2018:478). A chain of aims went from Sargsyan’s resignation via a new government and a change of the electoral code to a constitutional change (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:518; Interview B). These aims centred around norms and values of Western democracies. Interestingly, the AR is marked by an avoidance of ideology in Pashinyan’s discourse (Socioscope 2019:43), as is typical in negotiated revolutions (Lawson 2003:332-334; Lawson 2005:485-487). The AR had a practical, problem-solving approach, connected to modernity (Interview B; Interview D). People from different ideological backgrounds and political orientations were “united by one common goal: to get rid of the regime” (Zolyan 2018). This relates to what was learned about unity and identity (see p.24, 26). The all-inclusiveness without an ideological basis can also become a problem: there are few officials now who raise critical positions about the neoliberal agenda of the government, which is needed to counter economic-driven interests (Socioscope 2019:43; Interview B). Already, there seems little tolerance for those who are critical about the new government and alternative narratives (Interview 4), which bears the danger to end like Georgia where no effective opposition remained following the Rose Revolution (Laverty 2008:153). In some way, three “competing but also complementary discourses and practices – national- local, liberal, and leftist” (Socioscope 2019:32) came together in the AR. While including some leftist perspectives about justice and equality, the national-liberal political discourse is prevailing (Socioscope 2019:30). Despite the claim that the AR follows no ideology, a focus on neoliberal values like modernity, progress and a discourse of an “economic revolutio n” (Interview 4) can be observed. There is a clear shift from conservatism to liberalism to be observed under the new administration (Interview D). Even though the AR was not directly inspired or supported by Western actors (Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:85), the dominance of the neo-libera l system has an appealing effect for Armenians and liberal states serve as orientation. They resemble freedom from the old system with its restrictions and the desire to catch up with the leading market democracies (Lawson

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2003:332-334; Lawson 2005:486, Lawson 2015:310; Interview A; p.30). Considering the explanations of mass deprivation (see p.23), it shows how the domestic revolution is connected to the international.

3) Nonviolence & mutual dependence of rival forces The AR became known as “Velvet Revolution”, which is supposed to be peaceful, nonviolent and legitimate (Iskandaryan 2018:466). A look behind the story of the name reveals interesting aspects about the perceived nonviolence of the event. Even though many believe the story of the peaceful protests, there were some incidence of violence at the beginning and damage of properties. Compared to the “Velvet Revolutio n” 1989, Pashinyan chose the name beforehand. It was actively used to send the appeal to both protesters and the government to stay away from using violence. The protesters controlled the discourse and it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was so often repeated, that everything else became morally unacceptable, for the protesters as well as for the regime and the police. In social media, peaceful scenes replaced the violent clashes of the first days. Movement activists were teaching the participants nonviolent methods. However, while Pashinyan’s discourse means that physical violence was largely absent, symbolic and structural violence is visib le since then, e.g. in Pashinyan’s rhetoric (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:513-514; Zolyan 2018; Interview 3; Interview 6; Interview A; Interview B; Interview D). The attention of the international community helped the protesters indirect by preventing the old regime from using violence (Grigoryan 2018:52). Success of the AR was possible because both sides, and also Sargsyan stayed away from using violent means (Abrahamia n & Shagoyan 2018:514, Interview B; Lawson 2005:489). The protests as well as the power transition later were at large peaceful. Even more, Pashinyan wanted to do the transition in line with the legislation. The regime change occurred in accordance with the constitution and the legal framework (Iskandaryan 2018:480; Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:87; Ball 2019; Zolyan 2018; Interview A; Ohanyan 2018). Therefore, sources suggest that a use of the adjective “velvet” is justified (Abrahamian & Shagoyan 2018:514; Interview B). The AR shows therefore that revolutions, in which direct violence is neglected as a tool by both sides, is possible (Lawson 2003:334-337; Lawson 2005:487-489).

4) Negotiations The meeting between Sargsyan and Pashinyan on the 22nd of April was a negotiation attempt and became a key moment symbolising the AR, which ended however with Sargsyan storming

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of the stage. The meeting however showed that they were ready to talk. The outcome of the protests was still unclear and dependent on the ongoing process (Lawson 2005:490; Lawson 2003:338). There was a dispute about who had the power in Armenia, the state or the people (Lawson 2003:337-338; Lawson 2005:489-490; see p.25). The demonstrators were blocking the city so that the government felt powerless (Interview A) and had to negotiate. Pashinyan was trying to build the bridge between the protesters and the politicians. With his party “Civil Contract”, he was negotiating in the parliament about the elections, while showing with the mass protests the people’s power and gaining their support for the election (Grigoryan 2019:171; Ohanyan 2018). The cooperation between the political and civil forces made the revolution work (Shirinyan & Zolyan 2019:9). This fusion of protests and elections to bring about a political revolution shows the application of the electoral model (Bunce & Wolchik 2006a:284; Bunce & Wolchik 2006b:56) that was already successful in other post-communist revolutions. Another key moment of the revolution was when Sargsyan announced his resignation on the 23rd of April. The words “‘Nikol Pashinian was right, I was wrong’” (in Lanskoy & Suthers 2019:93) were quite remarkable in this situation and showed that no endless fighting was necessary. The RPA eventually realised that they could not win and started negotiating and cooperating with Pashinyan (Interview C; see next). Such symbolic moments are a central characteristic of negotiated revolutions (Lawson 2003:337-338; Lawson 2005:489-490).

5) The weak and hemmed new state During the phase between the revolution in May and the parliamentary elections in December, the old officials were gradually replaced by activists or talented, knowledgeable people from the previous administration who agreed to work for the new government. Instead of having a regime collapse, Armenia was ruled by a mixed group who needed each other (Iskandaryan 2018:480; Lawson 2003:340; Lawson 2005:491; Interview C). While in the CR the new governments got completely rid of the old ones, Pashinyan was voted into the office of the PM also by the RPA and ensured a that the transition took place legitimate, to avoid the usual post- revolutionary disasters. At that point, there was coexistence and cooperation of the RPA and the new minority government (Iskandaryan 2018:466; Ohanyan 2018; Ball 2019; Interview D). It was also said that there would be no “vendetta” (blood feud). And while several old oligarchs are now being persecuted, Sargsyan and members of the old government were not touched. On the long-term however, Pashinyan replaced the old government completely (Iskandaryan

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2018:480; Interview B; Interview D). The new government is considered to be unexperienced and it is to be seen how it deals with he challenges ahead (see p.27). There is no visible desire to export the revolution or build up military forces. Instead the new, legitimate regime aims to fit into the political world order (see p.30). However, an exchange of experiences, strategies and repertoires with other activists can be observed, as it is tradition in the region (Bunce & Wolchik 2006a:297). Examples from 2018 suggest that activists and civil societies in other countries get inspired by the AR. Protests actions in Moscow in May 2018, when protesters chanted “‘We want it like it is in Armenia!’” (Grigoryan 2018:173)/ “‘We want a Velvet Revolution as well’” (Interview A) were well-known among the interviewees. Armenian activists shared their experience with other (Interview 6), and activists abroad said that they needed to study the Armenian tactics (Interview 4). Several scholars therefore suggest, that the lessons and impact of the AR will go beyond Armenia’s borders (Feldman & Alibašić 2019:429; Grigoryan 2018:19; Interview 4; Interview B). However, this is hard to proof and so far, cases that imply an impact only appeared shortly after the event and regionally. Also, the conditions for the AR were special, so that the same kind of revolution could not work so easily elsewhere (Feldman & Alibašić 2019:429; Interview C). Some say that only the future will tell if the examined event is a revolution or a regime change (Interview A, Interview D). As the analysis however showed, the AR fits all aspects of the understanding of revolutions of this thesis (p.6-7). The final part will conclude with the results and reflect on what the AR as a negotiated revolution teaches us.

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5. Conclusions

Within the theories on how to research the international dimension of revolutions (Hallida y 1990; Lawson 2016:117-119), this thesis has explored a recent case. It has applied the concept of “negotiated revolutions” by George Lawson (2003) to a new context, the Armenian “Velvet Revolution” from 2018, to assess whether it still holds and has value beyond the cases with that Lawson established it. It was asked at the beginning for the international dimensions of the Armenian Revolution, using the respective concept. With the conceptualisation of negotiated revolutions and the anatomy of revolutions as analytical frameworks, a comparative case study has been designed to apply Lawson’s theorisations to the new case. With that, the thesis adds to the puzzle of the international dimension of domestic revolutions. On the theoretical level, it shows the interplay of structure and agency, international and domestic factors, long-term developments and sudden triggers to bring about radical change in world politics. Such changes were and will be a central feature of the international system and need to be taken seriously as constitutive power (Lawson 2003:345-346). It demonstrated that for this type of contemporary revolutions, conjunctural, multi-causal, multivariate, processual theories, like the intersocietal approach used here, have more value than earlier Marxist- structuralist approaches on revolutions. Analysing the characteristics of the AR within the concept of negotiated revolutions, it becomes visible that it fits all aspects: the international community welcomes the new Armenia, which aims at “returning” to the liberal world order. The two rival sides abandoned violence as a legitimate tool and negotiated with each other to bring about an end to the protests. With these elements, the AR might not match the mainstream picture of revolutions, but “[i]ts very orderliness, unrevolutionary nature seems to have won the Velvet Revolution a solid chance of sustaining its success and building a fortress of democracy in a region dominated by antidemocratic regimes” (Ball 2019). The findings are case-specific for the AR. However, if, as Lawson wrote, negotiated revolutions are the lens through which our contemporary world can be analysed (2003:327- 329), what is the AR telling us? It shows that the interplay of the geopolitical situation as well as the atmosphere in the international system can have an influence on the framing of protest movements. Local groups refer to global values for legitimacy and influence does not only work through direct, material but also indirect, normative channels. The continued importance of nonviolent strategies in protests and civil disobedience is highlighted and that about the legitimate rule is not to be fought with swords, but with words. Concerning actors, it contributes

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to findings about the importance of social movements for contentious politics. Old and new forces work together in a peaceful transition and the new state integrates into the internatio nal state system. To summarise, “negotiated revolutions are tangible signs of an imminent modularity in world politics in which radical change is based around negotiation rather than violence; citizenship rather than subjection; and liberation rather than utopia” (Lawson 2003:330). That is not to say that this is a model for every contemporary revolution worldwide, but that these aspects need to be taken into consideration when analysing socio-political change in connection to IR. What can be criticised is that Lawson’s conceptualisation shows the dominance of a liberal world order, to that revolutionary states have to submit to be accepted. Lawson writes that negotiated revolutions “serve to strengthen the liberal international order” (2005:491). They are a new way for societies to catch up with Western market democracies. “By strengthening the legitimacy of market democracy both as an aspirational project and as a tangible goal, negotiated revolutions have had a constitutive impact on global politics” (Lawson 2003:345). This reads like a justification of the dominant world order without questioning it and should be reflected on in the future. With these findings, the argument that revolutions are international events in terms of being shaped by and shaping the international system (Lawson 2016:120), still holds. Therefore, revolutions should be studied in IR, as they are a force within world politics and especially for non-state actors like civil society a way to influence their societies and with that internatio nal politics (Lawson 2005:474). Protests as recently in Belarus and Lebanon should therefore not be underestimated. It will be an essential question whether this form of revolutions can offer a real alternative in settling conflicts through negotiations instead of violent rebellions (Lawson 2005:493). Few people foresaw the success of negotiated revolutions in the past, therefore they can be continued to be seen as promoters of peaceful change (Lawson 2005:493). Despite all models to predict the probability revolutions and assess instability and state crises, revolutio ns may still surprise us (Goldstone 2001:175), as the AR surprised the international community.

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